PD-ABI-811

EVALUATION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO 1991/92 SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT

Country Report: SOUTH AFRICA

February 1994

Prepared for:

USAID/Bureau for Humanitarian Response

Prepared by:

Richard Greene
Allison Herrick (Team Leader)

MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS
INTERNATIONAL

600 Water Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024
USA

202/484-7170
Fax: 202/488-0754

/

SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION
Country Report: South Africa

HIGHLIGHTS

I. Background 1

A. Country Overview 1

B. History of Drought Emergencies 2

C. The 1991/92 Emergency 2

D. Ability to Withstand and Manage the Emergency 3

II. Design and Implementation of the Response 3

A. Response to the Needs within South Africa 3

B. Regional Transport and Logistics Management 7

III. Outcomes 9

A. Effectiveness of the Response 9

B. Organization for Future Preparedness 11

IV. Special Issues 13

A. Relationship between a Disaster Response and Basic Structural Problems of a Country 13

B. Regional Transport 13

V. Lessons Learned 14

Annexes:

A. Chronology
B. Summary of U.S. Assistance
C. Bibliography
D. Statement of Work

SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION
Country Report: South Africa

HIGHLIGHTS

✓ The impact of the failure of rain in 1991/92 was as severe in South Africa as in the other countries of the region; the drought reversed the balance in grain holdings from a surplus of 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 metric tons to a deficit of 5,500,000 tons; however, the country did not require donor funding for grain imports.

✓ The competent and experienced port and rail systems of South Africa, as part of their all-out effort to move grain from four South African ports for domestic use and for six other countries, invited representatives of the grain boards and railways of their neighbors to work with them through a Grain Operations Control Center.

✓ The South African ports handled an unprecedented 8.6 million metric tons of drought-related commodities in thirteen months, 1 April 1992 to 31 May 1993. Spoornet (the rail agency of the South African transportation system, Transnet) and Portnet (the port authority for the ports of Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town) coordinated and managed the distribution of grain for South Africa itself and its landlocked neighbors through the South African ports and southern rail routes. Spoornet mobilized some 15,000 rail wagons to transport grain from South African ports to inland destinations.

✓ A Consultative Forum on Drought, established by the Independent Development Trust, the Kagiso Trust and the Rural Advice Center, provided the venue for coordination of drought relief programs among governmental and non-governmental organizations.

✓ The Water Supply Task Force of the Consultative Forum became active in July 1992 following a survey by the Rural Advice Center and the Department of Water Affairs revealing that a large number of people were about to abandon their communities because of lack of water. The Task Force had available 10,000,000 South African Rand to help meet the immediate water needs of communities that had not been served by government programs. The objective was to assure a community supply sufficient for the WHO-established minimum of 15 liters of water per person per day. Programs coordinated by the Task Force serviced, repaired or installed over 300 water points serving over 700,000 people.

✓ The operations of the Water Supply Task Force of the Consultative Forum, in particular, demonstrated the viability of partnership between government and non-governmental organizations and enabled access by black communities to the human and financial resources of government.

- ✓ The drought occasioned a totally new initiative, on the part of the Independent Development Trust, in relief through employment on community works projects in the poorest and worst-affected South African communities.

- ✓ The NGO sector played a major role in the distribution of food relief. This effort was dominated by Operation Hunger and Save the Children Federation UK, which provided food to over 2,000,000 and 72,000 persons respectively.

- ✓ The NGOs of South Africa had hoped to attract more donations for their drought-related activities. Yet they faced an apparent donor perception that a country as rich as South Africa can and will make resources available to the most vulnerable members of its population. Unfortunately, such has not been the case.

- ✓ USAID/South Africa played a leadership role in alerting external donors and NGOs to the plight of rural black communities suffering from shortages of water supply. Close to US$ 700,00 were committed by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance to NGOs to support their work to save lives by establishing and rehabilitating community water supply systems.

- ✓ As the drought crisis diminished, the Independent Development Trust and Consultative Forum, still in cooperation with government, added rural development to their objectives and moved to organize decentralized structures that will be capable of continuing the promotion of development, in order to mitigate potential future disastrous effects of drought.

- ✓ One of the most notable successes of the entire regional response to the drought crisis was the mobilization of the port, rail and road transport systems of Southern Africa. The importation of over five million metric tons of grain for South Africa itself was unprecedented; added to that, the so-called southern corridor of South African ports and rail carried an additional three million metric tons of grain in transit trade for the region's landlocked countries. The grand total of drought-related imports coming in through South African ports was about 8,575,000 metric tons.

  Such a performance was beyond all previous expectations, a demonstration of professional capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, willingness to cooperate for the benefit of other countries of the region, and strong commitment to the job at hand. The underlying bases for the performance of South Africa were:

  a) a political determination to demonstrate a new attitude toward regional cooperation in the face of negative regional and world opinion;

  b) the commercial interests of Spoornet and Portnet, which must earn their revenue without subsidy from the government;

c) sheer capacity and professionalism; and

d) humanitarian concern to avert a major disaster in terms of human life.

✓ On a macroeconomic level, in terms of finance, importation and transport, South Africa managed to respond to the drought. In statistical terms, the worst potential effects of the crisis were averted. The country, usually a food exporter, brought in a total of 5.5 million MT of grain. By and large, the food needs of the black majority of the people were met, though allocations of government funds and food packs to the homelands were inadequate, and had to be supplemented by massive feeding efforts by large and small NGOs. Government budgetary allocations followed the usual pattern, however, with 81 percent of drought allocations going to the white population (which constitutes 13 percent of the total of 40 million people), and actual per capita benefits at a ratio of 13 Rand per black person to 703 Rand per white person. Although famine was averted, there was, nevertheless, deep suffering in rural areas and among pockets of black population in towns and cities.

Note: U.S. policy limits the A.I.D. program in South Africa to interaction with organizations that are neither financed nor controlled by the government.

I. Background[1]

A. Country Overview

South Africa is the economic powerhouse of southern Africa, dominant in manufacturing, modern infrastructure and trade, with well developed financial, communications, legal and transport sectors. The country currently is facing economic problems of slow growth, severe poverty (24 percent in metropolitan areas, over 60 percent in rural areas and the so-designated homelands), and extreme inequalities in social indicators, incomes and opportunity. In the recent period, 1989-1992, growth trends were negative, as manufacturing and mining volume, commerce and construction declined, the government deficit as percent of GDP more than doubled and real GDP per capita continued to fall. Stagnation in the economy results from long-standing structural problems, including shortages of skilled labor, inefficient trade policies, concentration of economic power in the hands of large enterprises, and formal unemployment persisting at an estimated 40 percent of potentially economically active persons.

Discriminatory legislation has severely reduced the range of economic opportunities open to black members of the population. Inequities in opportunity and government investment over the years have contributed to the illiteracy, lack of skills, unemployment and general poverty found among the black majority. According to a central bank estimate, over four million of the 11 million black persons in the formal labor force are either unemployed or work outside the formal economy in marginal jobs. Other elements of the legacy are the generally substandard housing, water and sanitation, health care, and educational systems available to black people.

In the rural areas and homelands, where the majority of black people live, the physical endowment is poor, the income levels of both households and government are depressed, the capacity for governance is low, and community organization is generally lacking. When disaster hits, it falls heavily on inadequate systems of social and economic welfare. The widespread shortages of water during the drought, for example, were attributable largely to structural inadequacies or failures in the basic water supply systems. According to the Development Bank of Southern Africa, 10 million rural South Africans are without formal water supplies. Studies in the 1980s indicated that approximately 60 percent of the boreholes that were installed in homelands were not functional. Water systems suffer from faulty design or execution, equipment failures, absence of fuel and spare parts, and lack of local capacity for maintenance and management.

In the trade patterns of the region, South Africa dominates. The country's exports to countries of the region exceed its imports from those countries by a factor of more than five to one. South Africa accounts for merely 10 to 15 percent of Zambian and Mozambican imports, but provides 80 percent of the goods entering for South African Customs Union

---

[1] This evaluation was performed under contract to A.I.D.'s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (AEP-0085-I-00-3001-00, D.O. 9). A Statement of Work is attached as Annex D.

members, such as Botswana and Swaziland. Zimbabwe and Malawi depend on South Africa for over 20 percent of their imports. Thus, in spite of the sanctions imposed on South Africa by the independent states of the region (except Malawi), practical and effective working relationships have existed among the railways, transfer agents, shipping agents, agricultural marketing boards and private sector exporters of the neighboring countries of the region. These relationships formed the basis of the cooperative management of food imports during the intense period of drought-induced shortage, from March 1992 through May 1993.

B. History of Drought Emergencies

Drought is not new in South Africa, which shares with other countries of the region a historic cycle of wet and dry years. Recurring drought highlights the fragility of much of South Africa's agricultural sector. Mean annual rainfall averages around 500 mm and only 12 percent of the total land area is suitable for crop production. The effects of a drought are bleak for the 40 percent of the population living in rural areas, and especially for those located in the homelands, where population-to-land densities are highest and communities only survive through a combination of old-age pensions and remittances from the family members employed in urban areas. Even rural households follow the national pattern of buying food, rather than growing it.

Except in years of extreme drought, as in 1982-1986 and again in 1991/92, South Africa is a net exporter of food grains. The bulk of agriculture is rain-fed, but a number of major irrigation schemes enable white commercial farmers to produce crops where rainfall is naturally low. When drought reduces the level of water in major dams to the point where irrigation must be curtailed, it has been government practice to subsidize probects of the commercial farm sector to develop additional and emergency water supply points.

In recent years government investments have ensured that the major metropolitan and industrial areas have secure water supplies that could survive a lack of rainfall of up to 18 months. Because the current political system assigns responsibility for relief and development for the homelands residents to the relatively poor and weak homeland governments, those rural residents are not likely to find relief from drought-related distress.

C. The 1991/92 Emergency

The effects of the 1991/92 drought in South Africa were profound.

- Dam levels were reduced on average to 30 percent of normal.
- Major irrigation projects were curtailed by as much as 50 percent.
- The country (formerly an annual exporter of some 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 MT of maize) had an unprecedented shortfall of 5,500,000 MT of grain, as maize production was 70 percent less than normal, and wheat was down by 48 percent.

- Production of other food crops suffered as well: sugar cane was down 83 percent, grain sorghum 60 percent, sunflower seed 71 percent, soybeans 46 percent, and dry beans 73 percent.
- Livestock losses were heavy (80,000 head of cattle in Transvaal alone; up to 75 percent in some areas).
- Unemployment, exacerbated by cuts of some 65,000 jobs in 1991, rose to an estimated 45 percent or higher, overall, and up to 90 percent in some areas, where informal sector employment was most heavily hit by civil and economic uncertainties, or rural farm workers were laid off (these layoffs usually also entail loss of housing).

Shortage of water was the major crisis for rural people, who were accustomed to scraping up resources, seeking charitable assistance and helping each other gain access to food, but who would have to leave their homes to join overcrowded squatter settlements if they did not have sufficient water for survival. Fundamentally, their crisis during the drought was related less to a simple shortage of water than to their endemic poverty, the government's disproportionately low investment in their areas, and the lack of community engagement in planning and maintaining service systems.

D. Ability to Withstand and Manage the Emergency

The economic costs of the drought, estimated by USAID/South Africa, to have been some US$ 800 million, were born in the main by the government and commercial sector. However, the direct costs in human welfare, most acute among the people of squatter settlements and homelands, were addressed, if at all, by large and small NGOs, by drawdown from the special endowment of government funds to the Independent Development Trust and by direct and indirect donor contributions.

As in other parts of the region, the drought crisis abated within about 12-15 months. Late rains over much of the north in January and February 1993 rescued the country from another disastrous year. The 1993 crop, projected to reach about 7.4 million MT, or almost twice that of the previous year, will be sufficient for, or in excess of local needs.

II. Design and Implementation of the Response

A. Response to the Needs within South Africa

Government. The Government of South Africa provided one billion South African rand for drought relief, from which allocations to commercial agriculture dominated. Minimal resources were available for relief water and employment creation. Unaccustomed as it was to organization of public sector relief programs (except for the Ministry of Agriculture, which regularly helped commercial farmers through recurrent periods of shortfall in rain), the

government identified needs for food relief, relief from floods, and assistance to refugees as falling within its realm of responsibility. Budgetary allocations followed the usual pattern, however, with 81 percent of drought allocations going to the white population (which constitutes 13 percent of the total of 40 million people), and actual per capita benefits at a ratio of 13 Rand per black person to 703 Rand per white person.

NGO representatives report that, despite lack of organizational structure and institutional experience, individuals in government service worked hard to carry out the government program and cooperated with the non-governmental programs. A major constraint was posed by the apartheid-driven structures of government which have separated the functions of the central South African Government and its internal provincial administrations from those of the homeland governments. Staff of the Department of Water Affairs for example, who had no jurisdiction to intervene in a homeland, were inexperienced in rural water supply. Those who joined the relief effort were ultimately more helpful, however, than the ineffectual homeland governments.

Non-Governmental Organizations. The NGO sector played a major role. In distribution of food relief the effort was dominated by Operation Hunger and Save the Children Federation UK, which provided food to over 2,000,000 and 72,000 persons respectively.

The NGOs of South Africa had hoped to attract more donations for their drought-related activities. Yet they faced an apparent donor perception that a country as rich as South Africa can and will make resources available to the most vulnerable members of its population. Unfortunately, such has not been the case.

A signal event in South Africa, triggered by the drought, was the formation, in June 1992, of the Consultative Forum on Drought. At the joint initiative of the Independent Development Trust (IDT) and the Kagiso Trust and with strong leadership and energetic participation by the head of the Rural Advice Center (since disbanded), the Forum brought together 68 donors and organizations, including churches, labor unions, charitable and developmental bodies, central government and homeland government agencies, and liberation movements. The Forum organized and implemented drought relief efforts through a steering committee and five task forces, one each for water supply, nutrition, employment, agriculture, and development. The intent was not to duplicate or complicate on-going activities, but to achieve maximum cooperation in the cause of relief without regard to political differences. The water supply task force was exceptionally active in coordination and effective in execution of agreed tasks.

The IDT underwrote the expenses of the Forum to the extent of 100,000,000 South African Rand allocated by the trustees for drought-related development needs. The IDT itself had been established by President de Klerk in March 1990, with an endowment of two billion Rand, to support programs to help break the cycle of poverty and inequity adversely affecting the black majority population. Its initial mandate to work toward improvements in education, housing and health was expanded later to include job creation. The Kagiso Trust is supported

9

by funds from the European Community. Donor support came mainly from USAID and the British and Canadian aid agencies, ODA and CIDA.

The IDT concentrated its relief effort on a Community Employment Program to get funds into communities where incomes were depressed by crop failure, loss of livestock and loss of jobs. After identifying severely affected communities, the Program activated teams of consulting engineers to work with facilitators and community members to identify a project of high community priority that could be financed with Program funds. Through a community meeting, and a democratic process, the project was agreed upon, a project facilitator was nominated, and the qualifying criteria and working conditions for community labor were established. For each project a community appointed an implementing agent, often a representative of a church, consulting firm or local government, to account for the project.

Funds were disbursed in three tranches, the first of which was disbursed more or less on faith in the community's commitment to its project. Before the second disbursement, the community had to sign a contract with the Program and demonstrate progress on its project. If a community required materials or expertise, it was responsible for locating and financing those inputs. Because no more than 30 percent of Program funds could be used for materials, additional sources sometimes had to be sought, or imaginative solutions created to fulfill project needs. Thus, 70 percent of the funds were assuredly available to pay the needy community members selected to carry out the work.

The experience of the Community Employment Program was exceptionally positive. In one year, a total of 85 million Rand financed eight million work days on 800 projects affecting 8,000 communities. Total management costs were limited to ten percent (8.3 percent for management and facilitation, including the cost of consulting engineers, and 1.7 percent for office overhead). Total losses from misappropriation were only 15,000 Rand, or less than two-hundredths of one percent.

The Water Supply Task Force of the Consultative Forum became active in July 1992 following a survey by the Rural Advice Center and the Department of Water Affairs revealing that a large number of people were about to abandon their communities because of lack of water. The Task Force had available 10,000,000 South African Rand to help meet the immediate water needs of communities that had not been served by government programs. The objective was to assure a community supply sufficient for the WHO-established minimum of 15 liters of water per person per day. Programs coordinated by the Task Force serviced, repaired or installed over 300 water points serving over 700,000 people. Representatives of members of the Task Force met every Monday morning to share information and coordinate activities.

The Task Force itself concentrated on the homelands of Venda, Lebowa, KwaZulu, Ciskei and Transkei. Water specialists, brought from the United States (from the WASH project or International Executive Service Corps) or U.K. (often from Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief, or Red R), worked with designated community liaison officers to analyze the water

needs of communities and identify a means of emergency supply. In some instances sites were prepared for installation of polyethylene or ferro-cement tanks to eliminate the necessity for water tankers to stop at multiple discharge points. In others, a water supply point was re-equipped or rehabilitated and local residents were trained in simple maintenance procedures. A key element of the program was the establishment of community responsibility to ensure that the community could maintain the supply or knew where to turn for help in case of problems. Community involvement was particularly important, as the homeland governments had been reluctant to allow outside agencies to come in and yet were not themselves meeting their communities' requirements.

Through their separately financed programs, certain NGOs and donors, including the United States, covered other homelands and areas of distress.

The United States. The USAID program in South Africa is dedicated to hastening the demise of apartheid and preparing disadvantaged South Africans for leadership roles in a post-apartheid South Africa. The program, which does not at present support organizations that are financed or controlled by the South African Government, is concentrated on: 1) helping the majority population participate more fully in the political development and governance of a democratic, human rights-based South Africa; 2) helping establish a more equitable and effective education system; and 3) increasing black ownership, employment and participation in all levels of the economy. It does not encompass specific agricultural or rural development activities.

USAID did not commit regular program funds to drought relief, but recommended that funds from the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) be directed to the very serious shortages of water in Homelands, where the piped water systems and local river sources were dry, and community wells were lacking or inoperative. A total of close to US$ 700,000 in OFDA grants were made for:

- Medecins sans Frontieres ($237,000),
- The Rural Advice Center ($104,000),
- International Executive Service Corps volunteer executives ($150,000),
- water experts from the WASH project ($100,000), and
- short term services of a drought relief coordinator in Pretoria ($85,000).

In the early days of the drought USAID/South Africa took the initiation to bring together the official and NGO donors to South Africa to discuss the need for coordinated assistance to avert disaster for the rural residents of the country. Although the government was capable of financing needed food imports and financing relief efforts, it was clear that large segments of the population, particularly those residing in so-called Homelands, were vulnerable to serious consequences from lack of income to purchase food and lack of water supply. Major South African NGOs were responding to the need for food, but no one was helping in the water situation.

Since 1987, Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) had been providing food and other assistance to Mozambican refugees in northern and eastern Transvaal Province. In 1992, MSF expanded its work to the homelands of Gazankulu and Kangwane, where it was clear that the drought would cause serious problems of water shortage and nutritional deficiency. With funding from U.K. and the European Community, and later from the United States, and technical and community liaison support through the Water Supply Task Force, MSF mounted an emergency water program. In Gazankulu, drawing on funds provided by OFDA, ESF provided engineering services, excavation equipment, and fuel to areas that had relied on river water without other water supply systems. In Kangwane, MSF used U.S. funds to support a program to increase storage facilities (bladder type polyethylene tanks and cement tanks) for water that had to be brought in by tanker.

The OFDA grant to the Rural Advice Center supported a project in the Nkomazi area of Kangwane homeland, in the northeast of the country, where the NGO had posted a water engineer since 1990. The objective of the project was to supply water to some 250,000 people in 38 villages by siting and testing boreholes and supplying and installing pumps. When necessary to meet a critical need for water for human consumption, the project supplied water tankers on an emergency basis.

To help in the technical oversight of the NGO projects supported by OFDA funds, and to maintain contact with the Consultative Forum on Drought, OFDA supplied the services of an individual experienced in water supply projects for a period of about six months, to March 1993.

B. Regional Transport and Logistics Management

In March 1992, Spoornet (the rail agency of the South African transportation system, Transnet) and Portnet (the port authority for the ports of Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town) were given the responsibility to coordinate and manage the distribution of grain for South Africa itself and its landlocked neighbors through the South African ports and southern rail routes. In April the operating "Strategic Group" of Spoornet and Portnet was expanded to include senior representatives of the Maize and Wheat Boards of South Africa, the Grain Marketing Board of Zimbabwe, and of the railways of Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia. The group established the Grain Operations Control Center in Johannesburg, headed by a senior manager of Spoornet and staffed by personnel from Spoornet and Portnet and representatives of the other Strategic Group members.

USAID/Zimbabwe had committed funds for the operation of the World Food Program/SADC-sponsored Regional Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) in Harare and for the LAC's steps to improve transport logistics in the region. These funds financed the personnel exchanges among regional rail personnel and other aspects of the combined operation. USAID/South Africa played an important liaison role with Spoornet and the Grain Operations Control Center. Recognizing the role that the southern corridor would play in the total relief effort,

World Food Program opened a Johannesburg branch of the WFP/SADC Logistics Advisory Center (LAC) of Harare in close proximity to the Operations Control Center. Spoornet reports that the LAC office provided crucial information on the dates, locations, cargos and destination ports of donor shipments.

The role of the Operations Control Center was to manage the transit of grains arriving at its four ports for transit within South Africa and beyond to a total of six landlocked countries. It combined an up-to-the-minute information gathering capacity with management decision-making capability to coordinate the movement of massive amounts of cargo. The role of the LAC and its Johannesburg office was to gather, coordinate and distribute data on shipments of grain. Regular bulletins, distributed to all transporters, agents and importers of the region as well as governments and donors, covered location and status of vessels, ports of destination, due dates, names of shippers and type of cargo.

Based on daily reports from shipping agents and LAC, all allocations of ports and berths were made by the Control Center. Recognizing that there was likely to be insufficient port capacity to accommodate all projected commercial and relief arrivals, Portnet took steps to alleviate the problem by: putting ports on 24-hour operations, hiring extra labor and purchasing additional equipment, including vacuvators and bagging machines. Very few vessels had to wait outside the ports.

The loading systems at the ports, which had been designed to unload trucks and rail wagons onto ships for grain exports, had to be modified to handle imports and the loading of wagons in accordance with the requirements of destination countries. Zambia and Malawi, for example, wanted their grain only in bags, while Zimbabwe desired 70 percent in bulk and 30 percent bagged, and South African cargo was totally in bulk form. With the combined Portnet and private sector purchase of evacuating and bagging equipment, free storage of Zimbabwean bags to ensure their ready availability, and other measures, the job was done.

The job was massive. Each million tons of bagged grain required 30 vessels, 250 to 300 days in port, 675 trains (comprising over 26,500 rail wagons), and 20 million bags (at 55,000 bags per day). Spoornet mobilized some 15,000 rail wagons, including about 3,000 open wagons brought out of storage and 1,000 under-utilized fruit wagons that had to be modified to serve as bulk grain carriers. The Operations Control Center devised a computer system for tracking the location of wagons and improving turn-around times for their return to the ports.

To alleviate the bunching of trains at receiving warehouses, which slowed the discharge of wagons and, therefore, their return to service, Spoornet arranged for the use of silos in northern Transvaal for temporary storage. To relieve congestion at the border crossing of Beitbridge, Spoornet agreed that its trains could cross the border into Zimbabwe for unloading at Grain Marketing Board discharge depots, thus avoiding the delays involved in transferring to a Zimbabwe train at the border.

All parties were determined that coordination would be effective. Senior officials of transport from Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe formed a Working Group on Drought Relief Coordination which met periodically to deal with logistical issues and take measures to speed the movement of cargo. The railway managers met with LAC representatives on a monthly basis. Public and private sector operators mutually dependent on smooth operations of the southern corridor routes to the interior also met on a regular basis. And, at the Operations Control Center, the representatives of the participating railways worked together on a daily basis.

Portnet established a single consolidated tariff for grain that remained constant throughout the entire period of emergency imports, even though there had been increases in other tariffs during that period.

III. Outcomes

A. Effectiveness of the Response

South Africa. The evaluation team learned that, from the point of view of the white manufacturing and farming sectors, food imports by the government were adequate during the height of the drought, programs to relieve the distress of commercial farmers were effective, and recovery from the aspects of the economic downturn that were attributable to the drought has begun. One element of the government's boost to recovery was a special credit program for commercial farmers for machinery and capital improvements.

On a macroeconomic level, in terms of finance, importation and transport, South Africa managed to respond to the drought. In statistical terms, the worst potential effects of the crisis were averted. The country, usually a food exporter, brought in a total of 5.5 million MT of grain. By and large, the food needs of the black majority of the people were met, though allocations of government funds and food packs to the homelands were inadequate, and had to be supplemented by massive feeding efforts by large and small NGOs. There was, nevertheless, deep suffering in rural areas and among pockets of black population in towns and cities. Moreover, the basic non-drought-related problems of poverty, the disproportionate allocation of central government social services, and the inadequacies of homeland governments that made those populations particularly vulnerable to the drought, still require attention.

The general drought was over by mid-1993, though it was not yet broken by rainfall in all regions of the country. The impacts of the drought were predicted by concerned NGOs to continue for some time, as a consequence of the cumulative effects of the immediate drought on top of deficits of rain from the previous season. Ground water levels are expected to require several years to recover. Households will need time to recover their economic base, as they sold cattle and other assets in order to survive. And farm employment will reach its former levels only slowly, as farmers resume production.

In institutional terms, cooperation between government and NGOs, and between the central government and the communities of homelands, was advanced to an unprecedented degree by the creation of the Consultative Forum on Drought and the daily working relationships it engendered. In addition, pressure by the donor community and the media moved the government to manage the drought resource allocation process more equitably. Department of Water Affairs staff are still participating in the decentralized Forum committees and cooperating with homeland governments and communities as never before. The role of Community Liaison Officers, which proved invaluable in empowering rural communities, helping them identify their needs, and smoothing the way for external assistance, is likely to continue through the regional drought and rural development fora that are in process of formation.

Regional Transport and Logistics Management.

One of the most notable successes of the entire regional response to the drought crisis was the mobilization of the port, rail and road transport systems of Southern Africa to carry a total load of almost 12 million metric tons of grain imports. The importation of over five million metric tons of grain for South Africa itself was unprecedented; added to that, the so-called southern corridor of South African ports and rail carried an additional three million metric tons of grain in transit trade for the region's landlocked countries. The grand total of drought-related imports coming in through South African ports was about 8,575,000 metric tons.

Such a performance was beyond all previous expectations, a demonstration of professional capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, willingness to cooperate for the benefit of other countries of the region, and strong commitment to the job at hand. The underlying bases for the performance of South Africa were:

a) a political determination to demonstrate a new attitude toward regional cooperation in the face of negative regional and world opinion;

b) the commercial interests of Spoornet and Portnet, which must earn their revenue without subsidy from the government;

c) sheer capacity and professionalism; and

d) humanitarian concern to avert a major disaster in terms of human life.

B. Organization for Future Preparedness

Government. The government has no national drought coordination plan. When a crisis comes, a multiplicity of national, regional and Homeland institutions has some kind of responsibility. Provincial administrations all have ministerial or departmental bodies. Other agencies include numerous regional service councils, development corporations and coordinating committees.

The government's Nutritional Development Plan, which was budgeted at 440,000,000 South African Rand for 1992/93, was not intended as a drought response program. It has the potential, however, to establish a national nutrition monitoring program that could serve as the basis for identifying victims with greatest need for nutritional supplement. The Plan has apparently suffered a series of institutional growing pains, some of them political in origin, but possibilities for constructive action still exist.

Non-Governmental Organizations. The NGOs of South Africa, through their participation in the Consultative Forum on Drought, now renamed the Consultative Forum on Drought and Rural Development, and under the leadership of the Independent Development Trust, had concluded that the potential consequences of future droughts must be dealt with in advance by addressing the longer term issue of poverty and promoting the basic rural development that will enable people to withstand a crisis when it comes.

For at least another year, through 1994, the Trust will remain active through its, now renamed, department devoted to Health and Rural Development and the continuing Community Employment Program. Its involvement beyond that will depend on the availability of additional funds; it had received a final 30,000 Rand from the original two billion South African Rand of the Trust's one-time endowment. That endowment is now totally committed. The Consultative Forum similarly will have to look for funds in the future. In the meantime, the organizations are working together to organize decentralized development fora in each of the country's ten administrative regions.

Seven fora are already active, and two are in the process of organization. The general multi-organizational model of the national Forum is being followed, but grassroots representation is to be added as an essential component of the structure. The objective is to have 65 percent of the membership from local community organizations, 25 percent from NGOs and 10 percent from government and funding organizations. The regional fora will concentrate on gathering and sharing information, helping communities organize, making input into regional development policy, and facilitating community access to development resources, but will not actually implement programs. The information function will include promotion of geographic and household information surveys to serve as the basis for food security strategies and(early warning alerts.

The drought inspired the foundation of a new preparedness organization, one that is intended eventually to undertake a regional role. The founder of the Southern Africa Disaster Relief

Agency, or SADRA, had observed that the NGO response to the crisis in South Africa could have been more prompt and more effective if there had been some advance preparation in identifying the resources, skills and experience that would be needed. The organization, which was launched in March 1993, sees itself as a disaster organization, rather than a development agency, but one that must keep in touch with development agencies to ensure continuity of activities, to help them mobilize when a disaster hits, and to provide disaster prevention input into strategic development planning. SADRA has two immediate objectives: 1) to set up a register of volunteer personnel potentially available for disaster work (personnel with skills in medicine, rescue, construction, water, public health, food and nutrition, logistics management, public awareness, financing, etc.); and 2) to help implement a response by activating volunteers, helping monitor the progress of a disaster, providing a communications center and operations room, and raising funds. The organization appears to require an improved foundation of funding before it can become very active, however.

Transport. The proven usefulness of the Grain Operations Control Center was so momentous, the gains from the experience of direct interface among railway representatives so valuable, and the opportunity to serve intra-regional trade on an expanded basis so significant, that Spoornet decided to keep the Control Center open, under the direction of a senior official to manage all regional trade using South Africa's ports and railways.

The, now, Operations Management Center—Africa is designed to unite the operations of the railways of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland and South Africa in order to develop and maintain a client-oriented service that is competitive with road service in the region. It has already established the first regularly scheduled train service between South Africa and Botswana and Zimbabwe in order to assure potential users of predictable service. The transit procedures and interchanges of trains at the border with Zimbabwe, which used to take place at two locations, 12 kilometers apart, have now been unified at Beitbridge, on the Zimbabwe side of the border. The computerized tracking system and telephone conference mechanism set up during the drought have been continued and will be expanded to include the Swazi and Mozambican railways. National Railways of Zimbabwe have expanded their control functions in a Management Operations Center at their headquarters in Bulawayo, and Tanzania has begun investigating the possibility of a similar move.

It is likely that the experience of coordination of the massive drought relief effort will have helped establish a positive working attitude toward South African capabilities and willingness to act as an economic partner in the region. Such a change will help foster increased trade relations as the process of political change within South Africa continues and the climate of regional politics outside the country changes as well.

IV. Special Issues

A. Relationship between a Disaster Response and Basic Structural Problems of a Country

A dilemma is presented when the political, social and economic structures of a country discriminate against a significant segment of the population to such a degree that the government's response to a disaster is inequitable. In South Africa, the structures of apartheid, particularly as they relate to the segregation of homeland residents under separate governments that are usually weak in resources and capacity to govern, discriminate against the majority of rural people. During the recent drought, the government could afford to import the needed food, but distribution of the food and other relief measures in the homelands was left mainly to NGOs. The United States, having determined not to assist in food imports, for either government or NGOs, had to consider whether or not it would help deal with other needs, such as that of emergency water supply.

B. Regional Transport

When speed is essential, even a matter of life and death, it is not possible always to follow the path of least cost. South African ports carried just under half of the total drought-related goods traffic for SADC countries, even though it was more costly for certain of them—Zambia and Malawi in particular, but also Zimbabwe—than the more northerly ports. At the height of the crisis of food availability, however, donors and the governments of landlocked countries ordering commercial imports concluded that it was more important to use the reliable and efficient ports of South Africa, even at higher cost, than to use the more direct and less costly, but less reliable, routes through Tanzania or Mozambique. Shippers and importers wanted to avoid the delays experienced by ships waiting for berths at the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo. Later in the drought period, after the security of Mozambican routes had been demonstrated, shippers were more willing to wait outside Beira, paying the required demurrage, having calculated how long they could delay before their costs would equal those of the route through Durban.

V. Lessons Learned

Even in the absence of a government-to-government program, a USAID can provide effective leadership in helping organizing NGO and other donor responses to emergencies.

National and external NGOs with established geographic and functional niches in a country can make substantial contributions to emergency relief and can be instrumental in bringing together the members of communities and government representatives.

Mutual cooperation among countries under crisis conditions, as in the management of grain imports through South African ports, will yield benefits in terms of mutual understanding and respect and future beneficial political and commercial relationships.

Annex A: Chronology

South Africa

Dec 1991	First reports that a drought might affect grain production
Jan 1992	Early warnings alerted South Africa to the regional extent of the drought
24 Feb 92	Declaration of drought disaster by U.S. Ambassador
Mar 1992	Recognition by TRANSNET, the system of South African transport networks, that an enormous logistical effort would be necessary to import and distribute drought relief grains
	First meeting of donors called by USAID to discuss a coordinated response to the drought
Apr 1992	On the occasion of a meeting of SADCC ministers of transport and of agriculture, Spoornet official included in joint consultations of transport officials which led to establishment of six transport corridors for management of grain imports
	Inclusion of representatives of the grain boards and the railways of neighboring countries in the strategic group to coordinate drought imports
	Establishment of the Grain Operations Control Center in Johannesburg to manage movement of grain through the southern corridor
May 1992	Offer of assistance to Operation Hunger to establish a system of nutritional surveillance to enable monitoring of impact of feeding programs
Jun 1992	Assignment of WFP representative to a branch unit of the SADC/WFP Logistics Advisory Center in Johannesburg in close proximity to the Grain Operations Control Center
	Formation of the Consultative Forum on Drought
	USAID request to OFDA for funding and recruitment of a drought disaster relief coordinator
July 1992	Beginning of activity by the Water Supply Task Force of the Consultative Forum on Drought; first arrival of volunteer water engineers from abroad.
Jul-Aug 92	OFDA grants to Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF), Rural Advice Center, IESC, and WASH project to support water supply activities through the Consultative Forum on Drought

Oct 1992	Arrival at USAID/South Africa of OFDA-funded drought disaster relief coordinator
Oct-Nov 92	Multilateral ministerial meetings on road and rail transport difficulties experienced and issues raised by report of UNCTAD experts
Jan 1993	Meeting of working group of senior transport officials of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe to identify problems in provision of drought relief requiring attention at policy level.
Feb 1993	Final agreement with Operation Hunger on terms of consultancy to design a nutritional surveillance system
Mar 1993	Formation of Southern African Disaster Relief Agency (SADRA) to organize preparation for disaster

Annex B: U.S. Assistance in South Africa

A total of almost US$ 700,000 in OFDA grants were made for:

- Medecins sans Frontieres ($237,000),
- The Rural Advice Center ($104,000),
- International Executive Service Corps volunteer executives ($150,000),
- water experts from the WASH project ($100,000),
- short term services of a drought relief coordinator in Pretoria ($85,000), and
- design of a nutrition surveillance system for the South African NGO, Operation Hunger ($16,900).

Annex C: Sources Consulted on South Africa

Abrams, Len, Rob Short and John Evans. "Root Cause and Relief Restraint Report." Consultative Forum on Drought, Secretariat and Ops Room, 8 October 1992.

anon. "Country Presentation: South Africa." Paper prepared for the Non-Government Organisation Regional Disaster Management Training Workshop at Arlac Training Centre (Harare): 4-8 April 1993.

Consultative Forum on Drought & Rural Development. *Drought Monitor*. Johannesburg, South Africa, no. 4, Sept-Oct 1993.

National Consultative Forum on Drought. "Root Cause and Relief Restraint Report." Prepared by Len Abrams, Rob Short and John Evans for a meeting of the Steering Committee, October 8, 1992.

United States Agency for International Development. *Southern Africa Drought Assessment, March 24-April 29, 1992*. Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance.

United States Embassy, Pretoria, South Africa. "APR 0004—Foreign Economic Trends Report." June 22, 1992.

White, A.R. *Facilitating the Transport of Emergency Grain Supplies--Lessons to be Learned.* United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Project RAF86/046: Transit Traffic and Support to Transport Sector in Southern Africa.

Annex D: Statement of Work

SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION

I. Background

Southern Africa faced one of the worst droughts in decades in 1992. The drought devastated crops, particularly maize, reduced scarce water availability in many areas and placed the lives of some 18 million people at risk from starvation and disease. In countries also affected by conflict or insecurity, the drought added to already catastrophic conditions, placing additional heavy burdens on people who could no longer cope with further adversity.

FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment missions, in cooperation with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), estimated that the aggregated cereal production of the ten drought-affected SADC countries had fallen to six million metric tons (MT); about half of the normal production in 1992/93. The cereal import requirement of these countries was estimated in March 1992 to be at a level of 6.1 million MT, compared with less than 2 million MT in a normal year.

In response to the drought, emergency food aid shipments to southern Africa have reached unprecedented levels. As of December 31, 1992, U.S. emergency food aid was 2.3 million MT valued at $650 million for the region, an increase of over 1.4 million MT from previous years. Non-food emergency assistance also reached an all time high for the southern Africa region with FHA/OFDA providing over $37 million and AFR/SA providing $59.9 million through December 31, 1992.

The objective of relief assistance is to save lives. Evaluations of relief efforts thus must assess the achievements of the international relief community toward this overall goal. The U.S. contribution also needs to be placed into the context of the total international relief effort.

It is in this context that an assessment of the USG emergency program is conceived. This assessment will provide the opportunity to take stock of USG successes, lessons learned and deficiencies in delivering emergency assistance. It is hoped that this review will contribute to improving the effectiveness of USG emergency aid responses and will develop new models or document existing ones that can be used by other donors and host governments.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

II. Objectives

1. To provide data on the overall international relief effort including the validity of the initial assessments, the appropriateness of the response measures employed, the U.S. role in the international effort and, to the extent possible, a comparative analysis of this effort with past relief efforts of similar magnitude.

2. To assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact of emergency food and non-food assistance to the Southern Africa Drought Emergency (SADE) and suggest means of improvement.

3. To assist USAID Missions, AID/Washington, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), host governments and other donors in programming future emergency, rehabilitation and disaster prevention activities and in improving Washington/field donor coordination by providing A.I.D. (and the donor community) with lessons learned regarding the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.

4. To Identify conditions under which import mobilization and internal food distribution were both efficient and cost-effective in meeting drought response objectives.

III. Scope of Work

The following questions are illustrative of the kinds of issues that should be examined in depth by the team in carrying out the objectives of this evaluation. Emphasis, of course, will vary from country to country and will depend on the particular type of intervention being examined and the degree of severity of the emergency situation. Priority should be given to information gathering and analysis leading to improved programming, design and exploration of new options for the formulation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.

A. Causes of the Emergency

- Food deficit due to the drought emergency in southern Africa.

- To what extent was the country's food problem related to agricultural and macroeconomic policies that may discourage local agricultural production and marketing rather than the drought? Has the drought caused any tangible change in agricultural policies?

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

B. Host Country Preparedness and Contingency Planning

- Do national procedures exist in the affected countries for responding to emergencies? Are they followed when an actual emergency occurs?

- How did the internal and external coordination of the drought response affect the overall efficiency, impact and cost-effectiveness of each country's drought emergency response?

- Identify what combination of public and private sector roles led to appropriate, timely, efficient and cost-effective responses by both host country governments and donors.

- Describe the types and levels of public and private sector security stocks, distribution mechanisms and how they were used, if they were used, in the disaster situation.

- What planning activities could be undertaken to strengthen the capacity of the affected country's government to respond more effectively to structural and emergency food deficit situations?

- Review drought prevention/mitigation actions: farming practices, crop diversification, soil/water conservation measures, food security stocks, storage/transport losses, seed production, etc.

- How does the local population normally deal with food shortages and how can this traditional coping behavior be reinforced?

- How effective were the early warning systems/weather forecasting services (FEWS project, etc.)? Will these systems remain in place for the future? Will SADC install an early warning system as part of its activities?

- What was/is the impact of pests (army worms/locusts) and plant disease?

C. Donor Coordination

- How effective were the USG early warning systems and coordination?

- Were adequate mechanisms (including telecommunications systems) in existence or were they established to coordinate assessments of donor requirements and implementation efforts?

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- How successful was the U.N. World Food Programme and the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Assistance in coordinating assistance, delivering assistance, etc. and how did they interact with each other and other groups responding to the drought?

- What was the role and responsibilities of international, U.S. and/or local non-governmental organizations/private voluntary organizations?

- How do donors' methodologies for calculating food and non-food needs and their system for reporting on food deliveries, donor pledges, etc. relate to those of the UN? Are they adequate?

- What were the successes and failures of donor coordination and the role of donor meetings and appeals.

- What was the role of SADC and was it effective in responding to the drought needs of the member countries?

- What was the role of South Africa? How well did cooperation among regional transport authorities work, and what factor influenced the success of those efforts? Did early estimates of South African port and rail capacity overestimate the difficulties of handling projected food imports? If so, why?

- What role did WFP play in transport coordination?

D. Needs Assessment

- What were the types of information collection system (e.g., rainfall analysis, nutrition surveillance), analysis procedures and use of data for early warning, assessment of requirements, declaration of disaster, design of programs, estimation of food input, etc. used by A.I.D., the UN, host governments?

- Was the logistical capacity of the government, USAID and the private sector adequately taken into account in determining food aid levels?

- Evaluate the accuracy, rapidity, integrity and appropriateness of A.I.D.'s needs assessment process?

- Was there any effort to monitor prices in the local market as a measure of determining food shortages?

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

E. Project Design

- How were the target areas and groups of beneficiaries selected?

- Describe the demographics of the beneficiary population. Did the majority of food and/or non-food assistance go to a specific group (e.g., farmers, urban poor, displaced persons, refugees)?

- Were local food preferences and food consumption patterns of the target population as well as local market prices adequately considered in the choice of commodities and the selection of distribution systems?

- Which mechanism was the most effective in providing food aid to the beneficiary (WFP, host government, PVO, etc.) Did this vary based on the type of beneficiary; e.g., getting food to markets versus targeted feeding?

- By the type of recipient (malnourished children, adults, etc.) which type of food aid implementation was the most effective (FFW, general distribution, targeted feeding, etc.)

- Were necessary complementary inputs (i.e., seeds, vaccines, materials, technical assistance, environmental impacts assessments) incorporated into the food emergency program?

- To what extent had participation of beneficiaries and utilization of already existing organizational structures/resources, particularly local non-governmental organizations, been built into responses?

- How can the basic food problem best be addressed with emergency food aid? With commercial?

- How were costs a factor in the design of the emergency response program? What budget limits, if any, were established by the respective host government(s)?

- Were provisions for termination of emergency food aid and/or transition to rehabilitation and longer term development foreseen during the planning stages?

- Were linkages with regular food and non-food aid programs and other complementary resources explored?

- Were disincentives introduced by the provision of massive quantities of PL 480 food?

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

F. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

- Did the host governments, UN, USAID Missions, AID/W, PVOs and local community groups effectively organize themselves to manage the emergency? How vigilant were these groups inprotecting themselves from becoming overextended? What emphasis was placed on institution-building and the enhancement of local resourcefulness? Did they utilize guidelines for assessing environmental impacts? Were these guidelines effective? What was the role of the Peace Corps and other USG agencies? How did the different Bureaus within A.I.D. interact? What was the role and utility of the Southern Africa Drought Task Force? Discuss in terms of relief planning, organization, resource allocation (the Africa Disaster Assistance Account), postcrisis rehabilitation and longer term sustainability.

- What are the policies/practices of local governments and donors in the management, monitoring and evaluation of emergency programs and what was their varying impacts on large commercial farmers and small, subsistence farmers?

- How can management, monitoring, oversight and evaluation be improved?

G. Timeliness of Emergency Response

- Discuss the effectiveness and quantify the exact time frames for the following:

  -- Needs assessment

  -- Approval process for food and non-food projects considered

  -- Procurement of commodities

  -- Delivery of commodities to the country

  -- Internal distribution of food and non-food aid to the target population

  -- Arrival of technical assistance

- Describe constraints, i.e. logistical/organizational /political bottlenecks, and how and if they were overcome. Was the WFP regional logistical unit in Harare and its subset in Johannesburg effective? Suggest ways of expediting these procedures in the future. Was private sector transport, handling and storage used effectively in

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

the response to the drought and, if not, how can it be improved?

- If food commodities arrived late, were appropriate actions taken to avoid disincentive effects on local production and marketing?

H. Program Results

To the extent possible and, taking into account the constraints inherent in disaster situations, the evaluation team will present evidence of the effectiveness/impact of emergency interventions in terms of the following:

- Targeting: extent to which areas and/or victims with greatest need are being reached. Was better targeting achieved as the drought progressed?

- Appropriateness and adequacy of USG food and non-food intervention. Were resources allocated appropriately for maximum effectiveness?

- Coverage: percentage of the affected population being assisted (by the United States, by other donors)

- Increased availability of food in target areas and consumption by vulnerable groups

- Incentive/disincentive effects on agricultural production/prices/incomes

- Improved nutritional and health status of target groups

- Decreased infant and child mortality

- Demographic effects: population movements to centers and urban areas, age/sex distribution, etc.

- Dependency/self-reliance: Have the relief programs weakened the self-help capacity of individuals and community groups? How can programs be organized better to reempower individuals and strengthen local decision-making and resource generation/productivity?

- Policy and institutional reform: How has the emergency affected ongoing food strategy plans and price restructuring efforts? How has the emergency intervention strengthened the capacity of the national and local governments as well as local NGOs to respond more effectively to future emergencies?

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

I. Policy Issues

The following issues are complex and deserve separate studies in themselves. They are extremely important in thinking about programming options and will provide a useful backdrop for discussions and future interventions. As appropriate, the team should address these concerns in the context of recommendations for program improvement/redesign and lessons learned:

- Relative effectiveness (impact and costs) of various distribution modes (e.g., general free distribution, maternal and child health, supplementary feeding programs, food for work, monetization, triangular transactions, rehabilitation activities), consideration of alternative distribution mechanisms and the extent of the relief effort's decentralization/regionalization.

- Comparative advantage and cost-effectiveness of different food distribution channels (WFP, PVOs, host governments) and criteria for selecting among them.

- Linkages with regular food aid program and other development assistance activities, how to use them to prepare better for future emergencies as well as to assess the effect a disaster has on them in the short term. This includes the following:

    a. What effect do emergency activities have on the Mission's regular program and their strategic objectives? Should we consider these "on hold" while an emergency takes place? Should funding for them be decreased and moved toward the emergency?

    b. How should disasters affect the composition of the Mission program? Should the Strategic Objectives in their regular development program take this into account and, if not, why?

    c. Can ongoing activities be redirected to assist the drought? To what extent should they?

- The capacity and ability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to act independently of political constraints.

- How food emergency programs can be planned to support sector and macroeconomic policy reforms and strengthen food self-reliance, disaster prevention and longer term development initiatives.

- Criteria for determining when and how emergency programs should be phased in and out.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- The role that donor coordination (food and non-food needs assessments, standardized methodologies, centralized assistance/pledge information) does/should play in maximizing the effectiveness of emergency responses.

IV. Evaluation Approach and Duration

During the first week of the assessment, the Contractor will draft scopes of work for team participants. All team members then will meet in Washington, D.C., to review and clarify the scopes of work, develop field protocols for site visits and for interviews with local officials and program participants, as well as to hold discussions with key A.I.D., USDA, State Department and PVO officials in Washington.

After this prefield analysis is completed, the teams will proceed to the southern Africa region, as coordinated by the Contract's Chief of Party, to carry out field investigations: review additional documentation, interview key U.S. Mission personnel, host government, PVO and other donor officials and inspect appropriate field sites. Specific attention should be devoted to capturing the perceptions of program participants, either through structured interviews or informal conversations in their own language. The field work will be carried out in approximately 36 working days per team member. For Mozambique the field work will be carried out in approximately 20 working days per team member.

While in the field all logisitical support costs will provided by the contractor and not by the Missions. This includes travel and transportation (surface and air), lodging, office space, office equipment and supplies, etc.

The teams will inform the Mission of the countries visited of areas that will be considered.

Upon return from the field, each team will review its findings and will prepare a draft country report. When all the country studies have been completed, Mission comments received and the final reports prepared, the Contractor's core technical staff will prepare a synthesis of findings and recommendations, drawing out lessons learned about what works, what does not work and why, from both the operational and policy perspectives.

AID/Washington and USAID Missions would be expected to collect all existing data and reports and other relevant records for the team before their arrival to the countries being identified. To the extent possible, USAID Missions should provide logistical support for the team while in-country.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Total duration of the evaluation will be approximately three months with a target completion date of September 21, 1993.

V. Country Selection

All drought-affected countries in the southern Africa region, including South Africa and excluding Angola, which received USG food and/or non-food assistance will be assessed. The region will be broken into four areas, each of which will be visited by one team, as follows: 1) Zimbabwe and South Africa, 2) Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, 3) Zambia and Malawi, and 4) Mozambique.

VI. Team Composition and Level of Effort

In conducting these country assessments, the contractor will provide at least four teams of specialists; one team for each of the areas specified above. Given the range of skills required to carry out this scope of work and the short time frame, the background of these specialists will vary, but all of the following areas of expertise must be represented:

- Language skills and country-specific experience
- Agricultural economics
- Public health/nutrition
- Rural Water
- Social Anthropology
- Food Logistics
- PL 480 Program Regulations and WFP Procedures
- Policy analysis/program design/evaluation
- UN System
- Disaster Management

BEST AVAILABLE COP

The team leaders will be on the contractor's core technical staff. While continuity in the evaluation team is assumed, it is not essential for the same consultants to go to all the countries.

VII. Reports

The team will submit a report on each country as well as a synthesis containing an analysis of those factors that appear to determine program effectiveness, recommendations on how A.I.D. can improve its programming of emergency food aid and non-food aid and lessons learned. Before departure from each country, the team will have engaged the USAID in a dialogue concerning their findings and recommendations. The draft country reports are due to AID/Washington no later than two weeks after each team has returned to the United States. Fifty copies will be delivered. The Missions will be asked to complete their reviews and respond with comments by cable within two weeks of receiving the draft. The Contractor will conduct a debriefing in Washington for AID and all interested parties within one month of the return of all teams. The final report (including an executive summary and synthesis of findings, recommendations and lessons learned) will be completed by the Contractor within two weeks of receiving all Mission comments. Fifty copies of this report will be delivered to FHA/OFDA, who will distribute them to all interested parties including FHA/FFP, AFR/SA, SADTF, LEG, CDIE and InterAction.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY