

**EVALUATION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO 1991/92 SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT**

Country Report: BOTSWANA

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Acronyms

AID	Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C.
BMC	Botswana Meat Corporation
CFW	Cash for Work
DES/	Drought Emergency in Southern Africa
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations
EC	European Community
ECU	European Currency Unit
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	Food for Work
FRD	Food Resources Department
FSG	Food Studies Group of Oxford University, Oxford, England
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOB	Government of Botswana
GTZ	German Technical Assistance Agency
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
IMDC	Inter-Ministerial Drought Committee
IRC	International Red Cross
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MLGL	Ministry of Local Governments and Lands
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Overseas Development Administration of the United Kingdom
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, A.I.D./Washington, D.C.
SACU	South African Customs Union
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SARP	Southern Africa Regional Program, AID
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development Mission in Gaborone, Botswana
WFP	World Food Programme of the United Nations
WHO	World Health Organization of the United Nations

BOTSWANA COUNTRY REPORT

Highlights

- Botswana has a population of 1.3 million, foreign exchange reserves exceeding that needed for a year's imports (Botswana imports over 80 percent of its grain requirements in a "normal" year), reliable commercial trading links with South Africa, tremendous experience with drought, and a disciplined financially responsible government. These factors combine to make Botswana much more prepared to deal with drought-induced crop shortfalls than its landlocked neighbors. Botswana's decentralized political and administrative system provides an effective base for both drought recognition and response.
- Botswana's financially responsible government has tremendous experience with drought and has installed effective mechanisms for institutionalized response to such emergencies.
- Statutory institutions meant to deal with emergencies meet periodically. This approach maintains the country's capacity to respond to natural disasters without delay. The statutory institutions, down to district level, work efficiently across ministries and sectors. A strong tracking and monitoring system provides regular ongoing assessments of local food security.
- The Government of Botswana (GOB) has effectively decentralized drought relief implementation to the district level, with corresponding transfers of authority and financial means.
- The GOB's approach avoids creation of parallel bureaucracies by implementing programs using existing field officers. This avoids duplication of effort in relief activities and conflict with implementation of ongoing development programs. In this way, relief activities are carried out and monitored by the same officers who plan and manage the country's overall economic development program.
- The philosophy underlying Botswana's drought relief program is that rural households are responsible for their own food security and people are "expected to plan for bad years in the good rainfall years." The need for government assistance in the form of food aid is seen as a programmatic failure to be avoided.

I. BACKGROUND

Having had drought conditions in at least twenty of the last thirty years, Botswana has had tremendous experience dealing with such emergencies. In this context, the government concluded that, while 1992/1993 conditions were severe, the drought certainly was not the worst one seen in recent times. While some of the other SADC countries were experiencing their "worst drought conditions in living memory," Botswana was reliving conditions on a scale more or less similar to any of the drought years in the 1980s.

Botswana is faced with two major challenges. First, it is being required to increasingly depend upon its own resources for drought management. And, second, the availability of these domestic resources is being increasingly challenged by a downturn in the country's economic performance and increasing pressures on resources caused by population growth and growing political uncertainty in the region.

Regionally Botswana plays a pivotal role as a transit link for grain coming from the ports of South Africa and transiting to Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. The limiting constraint in this system is the 650 kilometer section that had been designed for extraction of cattle from Botswana, rather than movement of commodities into and through Botswana.

A. Country Overview

The Republic of Botswana occupies 231,803 square miles and is bordered by Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. After independence from the United Kingdom in 1966, the former Bechuanaland was one of the poorest countries in Africa with per capita income estimated at only \$ 50 per year. Over 50 percent of the male population aged 20 to 40 years were working as migrant laborers in South African mines and farms at independence.

Led by the diamond mining sector, the economy over time has grown dramatically. Between 1965 and 1987 per capita gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 10 percent per year in real terms. This growth was accompanied by a sharp rise in foreign exchange reserves. At present, the mining sector accounts for one-third of GDP, two-thirds of export earnings, and 50 percent of government revenues. Outside this sector, GDP growth is approximately four percent per year.

Over 80 percent of Botswana's 1.3 million people are engaged in rural activities which account for 5 percent of GDP. About 80 percent of this GDP is produced by the livestock sub-sector. Facilities for processing of meat and other livestock products are also a major component in the country's manufacturing sector. Livestock processing is dominated by the Botswana Meat Corporation (BMC). It accounts for 50 percent of the value added in the manufacturing sector, but this contribution has been declining at an average of 4 percent per year in recent years.

¹ This evaluation was performed under contract to A.I.D.'s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (AEP-0085-I-00-3001-00, D.O. 9). A Statement of Work is attached as Annex E.



With arable land at only seven percent of total area and subject to chronically low levels of annual rainfall, drought-prone Botswana is a food deficit country in the best of years. Since the early 1980s, Botswana has regularly imported 80 to 90 percent of its total cereal requirement.

The GOB has long since recognized that the country does not have a comparative advantage in crop production and has instead focused on diversifying industry and jobs creation. In recent years, formal sector employment has increased at an annual growth rate of 9.45 percent and the industrial sector has grown enormously. Rare for the region, annual increases in employment have exceeded annual additions to the work force though overall unemployment -- particularly in rural areas -- remains a critical challenge.

Drought is a regular feature in Botswana. The Government has proven itself increasingly adept at managing drought relief operations and is pragmatic and self-critical in analyzing past efforts. They have applied these lessons to the difficult balance between short-term relief and long-term development and come up with exemplary approaches, including self-targeting cash for work and effective permanent and structured institutional relationships that are quickly responsive to dealing with drought. One of the greatest challenges facing Botswana is bringing about "more rural development with less rain."

Characterized by a disciplined, financially responsible government with a strong political commitment to drought relief, Botswana places major development emphasis on the alleviation of the underlying cause of vulnerability to drought -- i.e., rural poverty.

Botswana is faced with major challenges regarding drought management. First, it is being required to increasingly depend upon its own resources for drought management. Second, the availability of these domestic resources is being increasingly challenged by a downturn in foreign exchange earnings and increasing pressures on resources caused by population growth and growing political uncertainty in the region. Third, trends since the 1970s indicate that rural poverty and inequity in cattle ownership is increasing, making an increasingly large proportion of the population vulnerable to the adverse impacts of drought.

Botswana railways play a major role in regional transport and this became of vital importance during the pan-Southern Africa drought relief effort. The six hundred plus kilometer railway section that passes through Botswana was considered an important limiting factor for the movement of food commodities coming from the ports of South Africa to recipient countries of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. Designed for extraction of cattle and, for political reasons, neglected in the ongoing modernization of the rest of the railway system, the system was to be expected to perform well beyond its capabilities. A fortuitous needs assessment, financed by the Southern Africa Regional Program (SARP) of the Agency for International Development (AID) in 1990, provided recommendations for improving communication linkages in this system. The USAID mission organized the implementation of these recommendations and the Botswana railways performed admirably. This had virtually no

effect on 1992 drought relief activities in Botswana but was critical for the region and further developed Botswana's railway infrastructure.

B. History of Drought Emergencies

Botswana has tremendous experience in dealing with drought. The decade long drought and recovery period of the 1980s was a serious challenge, with loss of one-third of the national herd and agriculture sector growth at less than population growth of 3.6 percent, but there were no deaths due to starvation or lack of water during the decade.

In response to this last drought, the GOB mounted a major relief and recovery action. The program, with a total cost of 440 million Pula (\$234 million), extended over six years of drought relief years, followed by two years of recovery. Drought response activities included food relief activities, labor-based public works relief projects, water supply measures, agriculture loan relief, and agricultural rehabilitation projects.

Two major overlying economic concerns became evident to the GOB in analyzing this drought experience.

- While the portfolio of drought relief activities was effective in keeping people alive -- i.e., malnutrition prevalence decreased from 25 to 15 percent and infant mortality almost halved -- rehabilitation programs had not been successful in reducing vulnerability to drought. The majority of households had not been able to raise themselves above basic levels of consumption and inequity had increased -- e.g., 60 percent of the cattle are owned by 10 percent of the population and those without cattle rose from 28 percent of farmers in 1980 to 39 percent in 1987.
- External funding had been an important component of drought relief but this funding could not be depended upon to continue at the same level in the future.

The implementation of the drought relief and recovery projects of the 1980s cost the GOB 16 percent above the projected amount for National Development Plan VI (NDP6) representing 16 to 18 percent of the total GOB development expenditure. The 1991/1997 development plan (NDP7) forecasts about \$ 1.5 billion required from external funding sources which is greater than twice that achieved during NDP6. NDP7 domestic funding is expected to cover only 60 percent with the remainder having to be covered with external assistance. Expecting donor assistance to increase is considered unrealistic. Continuing the drought response mechanism of the 1980s is now considered by the government to be "unaffordable."

Based on its past experiences and a pragmatic, self-critical review of its actions, the GOB adopted a policy of strict concentration on relief interventions in line with development objectives. While this disciplined approach, combined with strong management and fiscal responsibility, well prepared the GOB to deal with the 1992 drought in some ways, it also

caught the GOB "midstream" in internalizing the lessons learned from the last drought experience.

Although many of the lessons learned and recommendations made from that evaluation (Food Studies Group/Oxford University, 1990) had been internalized, such as the emphasis on labor intensive public works, other decisions were not yet finalized and put into effect, such as expansion of the Destitute program.

C. The 1992 Drought Emergency

While the drought starting in January 1992 was severe, Botswana was largely ready for it since it followed so closely on the experience of the 1980s. President Sir Ketumile Masire declared a drought emergency at the end of March 1992 after it was obvious that the hot and dry weather of January/February had essentially destroyed the maize and sorghum crops and limited vegetative growth on rangelands. Rainfall was 50 to 70 percent below normal in most areas of the country. The western and extreme southwest of the country were most affected.

Total crop area planted during the 1991/1992 season was 64,000 hectares, as compared with 305,400 hectares in 1989/1990 and 164,100 hectares in 1990/1991. (Note: 1989/1990 crop year was the last year of the drought recovery program with significant incentives in place to plant and plow). Total area planted in sorghum had fallen by 55 percent and maize by 75 percent. The 1992 harvest of 20,000 metric tons of cereals was 27 percent of normal -- "normal" based upon the average annual production for the past four non-drought years (1987/1988 to 1990/1991) of about 74,000 metric tons. But, while these comparative production figures are dramatic, it must be realized that, even in the best of years, Botswana imports 80 to 90 percent of its cereal needs.

More important, rural household economy is largely based upon livestock raising and the drought impacted heavily on rangeland productivity and ground water availability severely reducing livestock carrying capacities. Combining the effects of reduced subsistence crop production and decreased livestock revenues made for a situation of real household food insecurity for many remote area dwellers.

D. Botswana's Ability to Withstand and Manage the Disaster

1. Structure and Approach

Botswana's institutional arrangements for drought response have now been in place for over a decade. As a result, most of the government's response to the 1992 drought conditions followed the general pattern of operations in previous years with many specific improvements. In most aspects of its country program, Botswana was acting upon the evaluated experiences of and lessons learned from prior drought situations.

The government had a pre-existing institutional structure to address the drought. The Inter-Ministerial Drought Committee (IMDC) already was meeting four times a year to make

recommendations to the Rural Development Council and through it to the Cabinet on all issues related to drought preparedness and/or management of drought operations.

Botswana's decentralized political and administrative systems were seen as an advantage in the drought relief effort, particularly with respect to drought monitoring and the rapid mobilization of institutional and other resources. Under the country's democratic system, elected politicians generally responded expeditiously to the pressures exerted by their constituencies to reinforce and support the drought management system in place.

The IMDC was served by a permanent -- **not temporary ad hoc** -- secretariat located in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) -- arguably the most powerful ministry in the government. It was chaired by the Coordinator of Rural Development, who is also the Head of the Rural Development Coordinating Division in the ministry. The secretary of the secretariat is the Principal Food Strategy Coordinator in the same ministry.

The IMDC is supported by an Early Warning Technical Committee and the staff of the National Early Warning Project under the auspices of the SADC regional Early Warning System. These support groups gather, collate and evaluate information from all participating departments and surveillance systems and present it to the IMDC on a regular basis.

a. **Central Administration**

A key arrangement is that the MFDP, as the lead ministry for drought management, combines the functions of overall financial management with economic development planning. The Chair of the Inter-Ministerial Drought Committee (IMDC) is the Coordinator of the Rural Development Coordination Division. The same ministry provides the Secretariat of the IMDC.

The MFDP, therefore, effectively integrates a drought early-warning system with actual implementation of drought relief activities. Moreover, the MFDP has the internal capacity to put financial resources where they are needed in direct support of development activities and to monitor the results. Finally, by placing MFDP representatives in each of the technical line ministries to monitor and evaluate performance, the MFDP can quickly assess where program deficiencies exist and what adjustments are needed.

The following Ministries and Departments are represented in the IMDC:

- The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning;
- The Ministry of Agriculture;
- The Ministry of Local Government and Lands;
- The Department of Food Resources;

- The Department of Water Affairs;
- Meteorological Services Department;
- The Central Transport Organization; and
- The Family Health Division of the Ministry of Health.

They are charged with the following tasks:

- To collect and analyze drought related information and make appropriate recommendations to the GOB;
- To develop a Drought Relief Program for GOB approval;
- To coordinate the implementation of the approved Drought Relief Program and report progress to Cabinet;
- To make recommendations for resource allocation;
- To organize research and use research findings to improve drought relief programs.

The IMDC is supported by an Early Warning Technical Committee and the staff of the National Early Warning Project under the auspices of the SADC regional Early Warning System. The Early Warning Technical Committee gathers empirical data from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Growth Monitoring and Nutrition Surveillance System in the Ministry of Health and the Meteorological Services Department on production and consumption components of food security. This information is collated and analyzed for presentation to the IMDC on a regular basis through Food Security bulletins. This collection of data, including consumption side information on the nutritional status of children, is unique in the region.

The Food Resources Department (FRD) of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands is responsible for receipt of food imports, deliveries and logistics to the village level. Since 1982, this Ministry has been responsible for on-going primary school feeding programs and supplementary feeding programs for medically selected vulnerable groups. It is, therefore, always ready to expand operations when a drought is declared.

b. **District Administration**

A parallel system works at the district-level through the District Drought Relief Committees, chaired by the District Commissioners. As with the central committee, the presence of senior officers in this permanent structure ensures that actions can be taken quickly. It also ensures that the drought programs are taken very seriously at all levels and that their place in the district development programs is widely understood. Apart from serving as a district link with

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the central drought management structure in Gaborone, the District Drought Committees also serve as the principal links between the center and the grassroots through its coordinating role with Village Development Committees and village extension teams. District Drought Committees meet at least twice a year to discuss the production and nutrition situation and increase these meetings to biweekly if there is a drought situation.

While their effectiveness varies depending on region due to technical human resource shortages, this district level structure is considered crucial to the success of drought strategies. The District Commissioners are senior officers to be listened to at the central government level and they can influence decision-making. The District Councils have the power to take decisions to alleviate food insecurity as needed and are in charge of implementation of drought relief measures.

2. Food Security

Botswana has a very large structural food deficit even in "normal" rainfall years. Domestic cereals production accounts for less than 40 percent of consumer demand even in the best of years. While drought accentuates the domestic food deficit, it clearly does not cause it. According to an agricultural sector survey done in 1990, Botswana has very little regional comparative advantage in the production of most basic cereals. Its advantage lies in beef production if cattle are raised under sustainable grazing schemes. Botswana has access to profitable beef export markets to support this comparative advantage.

Receipts from diamond exports, a strong commercial sector, and financial discipline have assured Botswana's food security in the past. The labor intensive rural works program, as part of the country's development program, helps to assure food security at the household level by providing cash for work to participants which is used in part for food purchases from the commercial sector. Lack of resources suitable for crop agriculture and susceptibility to drought mean that Botswana presents a very different food supply scenario from most of the other SADC countries -- Namibia and, possibly, Lesotho excepted.

3. Emergency Preparedness Capability

Botswana has learned through past experience and post-drought evaluations that the best way to deal with drought is through development of proactive programs that include drought as a condition of their execution. This is seen as preferable to always being in a position of reacting to specific drought "emergencies." Having experienced drought conditions at regular intervals since independence in 1966, Botswana now has more collective experience in coping with these situations than any other government in southern Africa. The GOB has proven itself progressively more able to manage drought-related operations largely because it has a very strong record of evaluating its successive attempts at drought relief and learning from those experiences.

In this regard, the FSG evaluation of the 1982/1990 drought relief program had a major influence over the design and implementation of the drought relief program in 1992/93. The main thrust of this approach is the incorporation of drought preparedness into regular long-term development programs, thereby reducing the need to mount a separate relief program in the event of drought. Since the impacts of drought depend on the state of preparedness of the economy, institutions, areas and individual households, the GOB decided to incorporate drought preparedness in rural development strategies and ongoing programs thereby abandoning the policy of "blanket coverage" of vulnerable groups for relief feeding.

Significantly, remote area dwellers are no longer be treated as a separate vulnerable group but have been enrolled in the permanent Destitute Relief Program through which destitutes receive an allowance. Even in drought years, there will be no relief food rations but the able-bodied remote area dwellers will be eligible to participate in the Labor Intensive Rural Public Works Program.

II. DESIGN OF RESPONSE

A. Needs Assessment

1. Host Government

Botswana's exposure to persistent drought has resulted in the evolution of an institutionalized drought management structure. The structure serves the dual role of Early Warning and implementation and management of drought interventions. As described above, the GOB maintains statutory institutions under the Inter-Ministerial Drought Committee (IMDC) which meet four times per year, even in non-drought years, to assess food security. The national early warning unit issues regular bulletins to all levels of GOB administration. Drought assessment tours provide additional information to the Cabinet in preparation for the annual Presidential declaration on food security. The Growth Monitoring and Nutrition Surveillance Unit of the Ministry of Health collects and continually revises data on the nutritional status of children. District drought committees meet to discuss local production and nutrition status two or more times per year increasing to bi-weekly if a drought situation exists. There are thus ample indicators from the consumption side of food security.

2. Multilaterals

The WFP/FAO regional assessment was conducted in March/April 1992 and encouraged the GOB through the UNDP Resident Representative to take part in the regional UN/SADC appeal.

3. USAID

In March 1992, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of AID mounted its own independent needs assessment mission in Botswana. After reviewing the food security situation, the OFDA mission made the following recommendations:

1. The United States Government should provide assistance to upgrade the communications capacity and technical capability of the Botswana Railroad due to the crucial role it could play in removing a regional bottleneck in food transport.
2. The United States Government should respond positively to GOB requests for Peace Corps technical assistance in various projects and in monitoring the expanded public works programs to cope with the current drought.
3. As part of its immediate drought response, the GOB will be initiating a massive supplementary feeding program for all children under 5. Past experience has shown that this was a very effective drought response. The GOB has not yet issued an appeal for food for the nutrition programs but an appeal is expected. The United States Government should respond positively to forthcoming requests from the GOB for supplementary foods.
4. Given Botswana's efforts to preserve the fragile ecology of the Okavanga Delta and indeed the entire country, any water intervention must be carefully evaluated. The United States Government should not encourage or support any "high-tech" solutions for Botswana's water problem without involving the government at every step.

B. Planned Response

1. Host Government

According to GOB officials, there were two major changes in management of the 1992 drought program. First, the government as a matter of policy deliberately reduced the level of food hand-outs during this drought and concentrated instead on creating income-earning opportunities through a program of labor-intensive rural public works projects. Only those persons who were considered incapacitated after screening by professional social workers were eligible for inclusion in a pre-established national destitute program. And, even here, eligible persons were provided with food coupons, not direct food handouts.

Second, there was a deliberate attempt to link temporary drought relief activities with regular development programs through projects which were amenable to labor-intensive approaches. During the drought, the funding for such projects -- many of which were designed and approved prior to the onset of the drought and included in the overall development plan -- was moved up to accelerate implementation of activities capable of creating income-earning

opportunities in the rural areas. Payments were made in cash to engender increased rural purchasing power for the individual participants in line with their own preferences; introduce multiplier effects in the communities through the increased financial flows; and place greater reliance on the existing commercial food distribution network to move stocks to rural areas.

Botswana's decentralized political and administrative systems were seen as an advantage in the drought relief effort, particularly with respect to drought monitoring and the rapid mobilization of institutional and other resources. Under the country's democratic system, elected politicians generally responded expeditiously to the pressures exerted by their constituencies to reinforce and support the drought management system in place.

The government declared a country-wide drought emergency on 29 March 1992 and simultaneously announced a number of measures aimed at mitigating the adverse impacts of the drought on the population. These measures fell broadly within the already defined drought policies of the government. The main objectives of these policies were to:

- Incorporate drought preparedness into regular long-term development programs, thereby reducing the need to mount a separate relief program in the event of drought;
- Adopt stricter targeting criteria for all beneficiaries of drought relief programs, as well as to avoid all input subsidies as an element of relief. This was in line with the government's overall Seventh National Development Plan policy of targeting subsidies; and
- Adopt a labor-intensive public works program with cash payments to participants as a major vehicle for creating employment opportunities and for providing relief during droughts.

a. **Human Relief**

Specific elements in the human relief program were:

- Implementation of the country-wide cash for work program as a means of compensating households for lost incomes;
- Supplementary feeding for all children under five years of age so as to forestall any deterioration in their nutritional status; and
- Provision of additional financial and material support to local authorities so as to ensure availability of potable water for the human population in all villages.

b. The Labor-based Rural Public Works Program

Upgraded from the program in the 1980s to be one of the principal components of drought relief in 1992/93, this effort was implemented on a much larger scale than ever before. During its first year of operation (June 1992/June 1993), elements in the labor intensive cash-for-work program were:

- Implementation of more than 3,000 discrete activities within an agenda of development projects;
- Creation of an estimated 90,000 to 100,000 jobs, a substantial increase over the 61,000 jobs created during the peak of the previous drought operation in 1987/1988; and
- Provision of Pula 267 million for the jobs program, compared to an average of Pula 13.1 million per year spent on public works job creation activities between 1986/1987 and 1988/1989.

c. National Policy on Destitutes

Another important element in the Botswana safety net strategy was a well established national policy on destitute persons. Under this program, vulnerable individuals were identified and screened by professional social workers. Individuals were classified as either "permanent" -- Group A -- or "temporary" -- Group B -- destitutes.

During the previous droughts, Group B destitutes were provided with food rations as part of a special drought relief program. Since regular Group A and B destitutes normally received food coupons to use in commercial shops to secure food, this meant that for the drought destitutes, a different and parallel welfare delivery mechanism was in use, with actual rations rather than coupons given. During the 1992/1993 drought, this practice of treating drought destitutes as unique from other temporary destitutes was discontinued, with the result that all destitutes were treated under a common national policy and coupons became the main vehicle for welfare assistance delivery. Evidence to date indicates that this approach significantly improved the targeting of assistance, as well as reducing the pressures of having to physically move large quantities of food around the country.

d. Agriculture

This aspect was aimed at 90,000 smallholder crop producers. Specific elements in the agricultural relief program were:

- Acceleration of the implementation of the already existing agricultural development programs -- e.g., expansion and acceleration of implementation of the livestock water development project under which farmers owning less than 500 cattle receive grants on a diminishing scale for borehole drilling and use of livestock feeds;

- Ploughing assistance subsidies for free seeds, ploughing and row planting to crop farmers; and
- Provision of about Pula 70 million for the ploughing subsidy and free seed in 1992/1993, which was much higher than the total spent on the Accelerated Arable Agriculture Program during all the drought years of the 1980s. (The 1980s, the AARP was dissolved based upon the assessment that the overall program was inequitable and ineffective).

2. Multilaterals

UNICEF was instrumental in preparing the regional assessment of the drought conditions. DESA appeals in June and December 1992 were instrumental in rationalizing the fund raising for the region. It appears that more effort on the part of UN/SADC was needed to garner more non-food pledges from donors.

UNICEF funded a non-governmental organization food security network, chaired by the Botswana Red Cross, but this organization has yet to articulate its aims and objectives for 1993.

WHO was strongly critical of the second DESA appeal, which took a great deal of effort to pre-prepare and elicited no response from donors. WHO put great effort into preparing an inoculation program for Botswana endemic Hepatitis B but received no response from donors and in the end the health sector had to divert funds from inoculations to emergency health needs.

UNDP ran several multi-donor coordination meetings with reluctant participation from the GOB. While some donors and NGOs found the meetings useful for general information sharing, many felt that this initiative should have been held by the GOB and they should rightfully be in charge of the drought relief coordination process.

WFP pledged 3,300 metric tons of cereals and 1,700 metric tons of pulses, milk, and oil for targeted food relief in drought affected areas.

3. USAID

USAID realized early in the drought emergency that the Botswana railroad link would be a limiting factor in the movement of food commodities from South African ports to Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Concern was based on the failure to upgrade the Botswana system on a par with regional improvements made under the auspices of SADC. An analysis done before the ramifications of a regional drought became apparent by USAID/SARP examining causes of delays on the system contained excellent recommendations for improvements.

These recommendations were largely implemented by the Botswana Railways with excellent results. The intervention seems to have been well-conceived and greatly appreciated by local officials. Such a selective intervention seems to have greatly facilitated timely movements of food from southern ports to northern recipients.

The intervention consisted of the rental of two locomotives at a cost of \$ 1,985,000, the initial feasibility study at a cost of \$ 53,000, and the purchase of the communication and signaling equipment for the Botswana Railways. Total expenditure for the railroad was \$ 2,288,000 from the SARP. In addition, there were 4,368 metric tons of Title II commodities at a value of \$ 1,354,300 that were distributed through the targeted feeding program.

4. **NGOs and Churches**

a. **Botswana Christian Council**

The Botswana Christian Council Drought Network was established as a coordinating body for information sharing about funding for specific programs. This was an attempt to avoid duplication among the churches. During the program, the Roman Catholic church was responsible for programs on malnutrition, the Botswana Christian Council was responsible for seed distribution, and the Lutheran World Federation handled water activities. The Botswana Christian Council received donations from a number of sources including \$ 337,040 from the United Kingdom and \$ 75,000 from UNICEF.

b. **Lutheran World Federation/World Service (LWF/WS)**

The LWF/WS had an ongoing water supply program. The program had a special focus on livestock watering points during the drought. In addition, the LWF/WS was involved in construction of food stores in cooperation with the Food Resources Department (FRD) and providing technical assistance and transport facilitation. Drought-related expenditures included seeds given to Botswana Christian Council for distribution -- i.e., 100 metric tons of cowpea seed valued at \$ 60,000 and 50 metric tons of sorghum seed valued at \$ 39,000; and \$ 66,000 for the multi-purpose stores and technical assistance valued at \$ 145,000.

c. **Botswana Red Cross**

The Botswana Red Cross has recently established a Department of Disaster Preparedness. The Coordinating Secretary for the NGO Food Security Network funded since May 1992 by donors through the SADC initiative is based at the Botswana Red Cross. The objective is to "enhance NGO coordination in the field of food security, production, distribution and processing." To date the network's main achievement has been the provision of a discussion forum which brings together NGOs and government. It is too early to discuss the effectiveness of this structure as they are yet to articulate their implementation plans.

C. Identification of Vulnerable Groups

Botswana continually refines its policy regarding the identification and location of vulnerable persons country-wide. Development policies identify those in chronic need of assistance for the longer-term goal of poverty reduction and those additionally at risk during drought episodes. Those considered chronically vulnerable and thus part of regular development programming include: severely malnourished children; children of primary school age; medically-selected pregnant and lactating women; remote area dwellers; and destitutes.

Those additional persons considered vulnerable during a drought are: all children under five; children from 6 to 10 years of age who are not attending school; and self-selected cash-for-work participants. (Note: Self selection is done by setting of the program wage rate slightly below the regional paid labor rate. This effectively limits competition with the private sector for workers and assures that people are only on the GOB dole as long as necessary).

The nutritional surveillance program is based in each health clinic and provides monthly growth monitoring data. About 85 percent of the population lives within 15 kilometers of a well-stocked clinic. Though attendance varies, during drought years, the supplementary feeding program for children under five is an incentive for mothers to attend and the increased attendance increases the effectiveness of the monitoring program.

The Village Development Committees assist in identifying the chronically destitute and those in priority need of access to the public works programs. Committee members are elected by their local communities and are well in tune with the households in their communities that may need assistance.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The GOB 1992 Drought Response had three broad objectives:

- To replace rural incomes, particularly those of smallholder crop producers, lost due to the drought;
- To forestall a major erosion in productive rural assets; and
- To facilitate rehabilitation of the rural economy.

Labor-intensive rural public works program was intended to be the main vehicle for income transfers through creation of employment opportunities to the most needy in the rural areas. The choice of this tool was, in part, due to its financial efficiency. During the drought of the 1980s, this program proved that it had low recurrent costs -- estimated at only 20 percent of the total -- and that it transferred an average of 63 percent of total costs to participants as wages for work on development projects.

The GOB has accepted the recommendation of the 1990 FSG evaluation that this program should be a permanent, long-term program to promote employment in rural areas even in non-drought years. The major problem encountered during the 1992 drought was that government had not had sufficient time to fully articulate and evaluate a complete inventory of activities to be included under the program. This meant that, rather than scaling up work activities under the program from a well-established agenda of pre-approved projects, the government had to start activities from scratch in many areas. This being the case, some of the same problems with rapid implementation of program activities which had been encountered in the 1980s recurred. However, in 1992/1993 the speed of scaling up was much more rapid and dramatic than in the 1980s. During that period, employment under the program gradually increased from 38,000 jobs to 61,000 jobs over a period of five years.

As in the previous program, every effort was made to ensure that at least 60 percent of the cost of projects implemented under the 1992/1993 program were passed on to needy beneficiaries as wages. It is estimated that about 100,000 job opportunities were created during the period from July 1992 to May 1993. This made the program the largest ever mounted in Botswana in terms of employment targets.

Since the government has not yet completed a comprehensive evaluation of this program, the extent to which the poorest individuals in Botswana were actually engaged in work for cash activities, particularly in the smaller and more remote settlements where opportunities for productive employment are extremely limited, is not yet known. However, available evidence seems to indicate that to a large extent it was the needy who participated in the program.

The low daily wage rate of Pula 4.50 seems to have served well as a self-targeting wage. An indication of this is that, throughout the course of implementing the program, several districts complained about their inability to attract the most productive persons in the local labor force due to the low wage being offered. The self-targeting effect of the wage is perhaps corroborated by the predominance of female labor in program activities, with female labor accounting for about 75 percent of the program's labor force. In addition, the sheer size of the program may have allowed accommodation of virtually everyone who sought employment in the rural areas.

Although the program is perceived by government to have been a success, its full impacts remain to be carefully evaluated. One issue of concern is the impact of the program on the women's workloads. Although the high participation rates of women in the program may be considered as positive given the under-privileged position of most rural women, it raises the question of the extent to which women's participation in the program added an extra burden to the participants' already heavy workloads. This consequence, in turn, may have forced women to forego some of their other essential activities like child care. Another issue that needs further investigation is the impact of the program's wage rate on rural labor markets. For example, what is the impact of paying a relatively low wage -- which is higher than the estimated shadow wage rate in many areas but is still regarded as below a minimum subsistence wage rate?

With regard to the agricultural relief program, some of the most interesting aspects were the components the government chose not to implement in 1992/1993 based upon its evaluation of the drought program in the 1980s. For example, the government chose not to allow bank loan write-offs because these had been shown to be highly regressive during the 1980s, benefitting only the larger farmers. In addition, it did not implement a livestock feed subsidy this time around because it was also shown to be highly regressive and to discourage higher livestock offtake rates, where the latter was judged to be a more reasonable economic and environmental response by livestock owners to drought.

These components were eliminated from the 1992/1993 drought management program for agriculture despite pressures exerted by the powerful agricultural lobby in Botswana. Instead, taxes at local abattoirs were reduced by government and the benefits were passed on to livestock owners in the form of higher prices for the animals they sold during the drought. Judged by the higher slaughter rates at local abattoirs, this action is thought to have encouraged earlier and higher offtakes of animals and reduced grazing pressures on the country's rangelands. The question which remains is whether communal and commercial farmers reacted differentially to this policy decision?

With respect to the ploughing subsidies, the reinstatement of this program was, to some extent, in contradiction with the government's 1991 White Paper on drought management since it had been shown that such subsidies were financially inefficient and benefitted mainly tractor owners. Although the White Paper indicated a government decision to eliminate this type of subsidy, when push came to shove, government was unable to come up with a better assistance alternative for crop farmers.

With respect to the livestock water development effort, the major lesson emerging is the need for better targeting of such programs in the future to improve management schemes, control expenditures and monitor the environmental and economic effects of borehole installations.

The major problem with maintenance of a strategic grain reserve was that inadequate information on the expected deliveries of imported grains by retailers and millers made it somewhat difficult for the government to determine the necessary size of strategic stocks needed to stabilize cereal prices during the drought. Overall, however, government injections of cereals from strategic stocks -- not exceeding 20,000 metric tons -- seem to have achieved that pricing objective, given that the private sector was importing much larger stocks of cereals through separate commercial channels.

The main lessons learned were, first, that the government needs to be cautious in building up strategic stocks to excessive levels, given Botswana's free market economy and the strong presence of private sector agents in the country's food delivery system; and, second, that more structured information sharing is necessary between the public and private sectors to avoid problems in the future.

With respect to water, health and sanitation interventions, the following observations can be made:

- The principal new intervention in water supply was government purchase of 28 water trucks. However, these trucks were not delivered under the end of June 1993 and hence played only a limited role in the 1992/1993 drought management program. Major difficulties were avoided through reconditioning and use of older trucks acquired for previous drought operations. The principal lesson learned was that more advanced planning was necessary with respect to acquisition of new trucks.
- The World Health Organization, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, was able to identify individuals with exceptional health problems related to drought because of the excellent health surveillance programs already in existence for neonatals, young children and pregnant and lactating women.

The decision to expand supplemental feeding to all children five years and younger had good effect. A comparison of the first quarter of 1993 with corresponding periods of 1991 and 1992 shows no significant departures from the general trends with mild to moderate malnutrition prevalence at the national prevalence rate of 15.9 percent.

With respect to information gathering and decision-making, the major lesson is that more disaggregated household level socio-economic data are needed to facilitate more targeted approaches to drought relief programs. The experience from the 1992/1993 drought operation is that adequate disaggregated data on agrometeorology, cropping patterns, and under five child nutrition are available. However, reliable information on other aspects of the socio-economic situations of households is not always readily available.

More selective targeting of drought relief was another of the major recommendations of the 1990 FSG evaluation which was accepted by the government. To a limited extent, more selective targeting was achieved in the feeding program mainly by screening out certain groups which had been eligible for relief under the 1980s program. For example, instead of categorizing all pregnant and lactating mothers as drought-vulnerable, only medically selected pregnant and lactating mothers were eligible for direct food relief in 1992/1993. While this type of screening improved targeting in a limited way across one group, the big challenge remains how to implement effective targeting on a geographic basis, especially as drought recovery occurs at different rates in different parts of the country.

In this regard, the issue of targeting according to socio-economic criteria remains an elusive goal in Botswana, as elsewhere. Government officials judge that improved targeting is perhaps most feasible for the agricultural components of the drought relief program. For example, the ploughing subsidy could be refined to include only farms under a certain size or within a certain income classification. Similar steps could be taken with respect to inclusions under the livestock water development scheme.

Whatever the final determinations in better targeting, there is no doubt that these issues will become more pressing as pressures on government expenditures increase.

The government reported that no significant difficulties were incurred with respect to monitoring the various components of the 1992/1993 drought program.

Because of the experience gained from a long history of drought, the existence of a permanent drought management system, and the guidance provided by the government's White Paper for drought management strategy, Botswana was comparatively much better prepared for the 1992/1993 than most of its SADC neighbors. However, since the new drought followed so closely on the heels of the 1980s drought years, government was still in the process of working out the practicalities of implementation for the strategy adopted in the White Paper.

This meant that, in the transition, several aspects of the 1992/1993 response were done in a rush. More clearly worked out guidelines for the labor-based rural public works program were, for example, not yet in place. And, this deficiency, among others, tended to compromise program productivity, cost containment, and the government's initial position on much stricter targeting of relief efforts. In addition, some ministries were still in the process of working out more viable future relief interventions and this resulted in the unfortunate reintroduction of some of the schemes considered to be less than efficient during the 1980s drought operations, such as the ploughing/planting subsidies. Finally, in many instances, a lack of trained manpower within the drought management system and the implementing ministries reduced the operational effectiveness of what was on balance a well-planned drought response.

The decision to rely solely upon the commercial transport system for movement of commodities rather than creating parallel and often competing structures as in other countries was beneficial in developing the private sector.

V. SPECIAL ISSUES

A. Effect of Drought on Country's Development

Clearly the drought relief and mitigation system in Botswana is working and working better with each successive drought in this drought prone country. Botswana prepares for drought as part of its regular five year development plans. According to government sources, one of the biggest challenges in the process is bringing about "more rural development with less rain." In other words, what can be done over the long term to "drought proof" the rural economy and to reduce poverty in rural areas, apart from drought relief operations per se. Poverty is an issue of utmost concern to the government because poverty is seen to render a significant proportion of the country's population vulnerable to the adverse impacts of droughts, while, on the other hand, recurrent droughts further entrench poverty.

Botswana takes its five year development plans very seriously and it is safe to assume that the lessons learned from this drought experience will be incorporated into the ongoing development plans of the country.

B. SADC

Botswana's institutionalized system for dealing with drought is exemplary in the region and all efforts should be encouraged to spread the lessons learned. While it is true that Botswana, due to foreign exchange earnings from the diamond sector, is in an enviable financial position, it is the decentralized government's strict and disciplined development planning that sets the country apart. While faced with very difficult challenges of chronic rural poverty, the seriousness of their approaches are to be applauded. Perhaps the most salient feature is their willingness to continually assess programs and quickly modify or eliminate any short-term measures that do measurably impact on the long-term goal of rural poverty reduction. It seems that SADC could do more to expand this lesson to other countries of the region faced with similar development constraints beyond those specific to drought.

C. Relationship with USAID Program

USAID did an agriculture assessment in 1989/1990 and many of the recommendations were accepted into the national plan. Most salient to the drought is that the GOB had wanted to be self-sufficient in crop production but the report convinced them that, considering the amount of arable land, erratic and inadequate rainfall and the current use of marginal lands, that food security was a more realistic goal. This change in thinking had a definite impact on the GOB approach to food security and agricultural policy.

The USAID Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) does not specifically address drought issues. According to the mission, directives from AID/Washington over the past several years have been to decrease emphasis and involvement in the agricultural sector. USAID/Botswana focus has been in human resource development with AID being the principal GOB partner for training in the health and population sector and in private sector development. According to the mission, USAID has an impressive record of training in Botswana with over 1,200 Botswana nationals being sent out of the country for long-term training. All but two of these participants have returned to assume responsible positions in the government or private sector.

All drought-related USAID funds put into Botswana came through the SARP, with no increase in bilateral funding.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

- The government should continue efforts to further refine the management and operations of its cash-for-work schemes in the rural areas. This program should be maintained on a permanent basis, with the operational scale determined by the agenda of feasible development projects.
- The government should expand -- and USAID should support -- development of a national information system to better monitor food and economic security issues at the rural household level. This would greatly facilitate identification of vulnerable households during drought emergencies. More importantly, it would lay a firm empirical basis for targeting households in the longer-term poverty alleviation effort which the government sees as its highest priority.
- While Botswana should continue to encourage increased offtakes of livestock as part of any drought management program, other components of the agricultural relief program should be comprehensively evaluated as to their economic efficiency and their equity consequences for rural populations.



ANNEX B
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ANNEX C
COMPARISON OF FOOD SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES
AND TOTAL AMOUNTS SUPPLIED

Of the 1,292,281 persons in the total population, it was decided by the GOB that there were 100,000 that were truly affected by the drought emergency, as opposed to those in need because of general poverty conditions.

The Revised (February 1993) UN/SADC Appeal

	<u>Metric Tons</u>	<u>Value</u>
I. Total Food Import Requirement	241,700	
Less Commercial Imports	225,000	
Total Food Aid Requirement	16,700	
of which:		
Programmed Food Aid	11,700	
Targeted Food Aid	5,000	\$ 3,106,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Sub-Total Food	16,700	\$ 3,106,100
II. Non-Food Aid		
Agriculture		\$ 413,000
Logistics		1,900,000
Health/Sanitation		602,994
Public Works		331,000
		<hr/>
		\$ 3,246,994
Grand Total		\$ 6,352,994

Of this, the United States government contribution amounted to 4,368 metric tons of grain valued at \$ 1,354,300.

ANNEX D
DONOR SUPPLIED COMMODITIES OUTSIDE THE DESA APPEAL

Lutheran World Federation	Cowpea seed	100 metric tons	\$ 60,000
	Sorghum seed	50 metric tons	39,000
	Multi-purpose stores		66,000
	Technical assistance		145,000
China	Agriculture equipment		89,366
United States	Communications equipment		250,000
	Feasibility study		53,000
	Leasing of two locomotives		1,985,000
India	Cash for drought relief		4,000
PEP Stores	Cash for drought relief		1,000
WHO	Cash for the Ministry of Health		20,000
Botswana Christian Council	Technical and financial assistance		250,000
Pakistan Association of Botswana	Cash for drought relief		1,200
European Community	Skimmed milk powder (250 metric tons)		Unknown
United Kingdom	Cash for NGO activities		337,040
UNICEF	Toyota truck for the Ministry of Health		58,000
	Cash for NGO activities		75,000

ANNEX E
STATEMENT OF WORK

SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION

I. Background

Southern Africa faced one of the worst droughts in decades in 1992. The drought devastated crops, particularly maize, reduced scarce water availability in many areas and placed the lives of some 18 million people at risk from starvation and disease. In countries also affected by conflict or insecurity, the drought added to already catastrophic conditions, placing additional heavy burdens on people who could no longer cope with further adversity.

FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment missions, in cooperation with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), estimated that the aggregated cereal production of the ten drought-affected SADC countries had fallen to six million metric tons (MT); about half of the normal production in 1992/93. The cereal import requirement of these countries was estimated in March 1992 to be at a level of 6.1 million MT, compared with less than 2 million MT in a normal year.

In response to the drought, emergency food aid shipments to southern Africa have reached unprecedented levels. As of December 31, 1992, U.S. emergency food aid was 2.3 million MT valued at \$650 million for the region, an increase of over 1.4 million MT from previous years. Non-food emergency assistance also reached an all time high for the southern Africa region with FHA/OFDA providing over \$37 million and AFR/SA providing \$59.9 million through December 31, 1992.

The objective of relief assistance is to save lives. Evaluations of relief efforts thus must assess the achievements of the international relief community toward this overall goal. The U.S. contribution also needs to be placed into the context of the total international relief effort.

It is in this context that an assessment of the USG emergency program is conceived. This assessment will provide the opportunity to take stock of USG successes, lessons learned and deficiencies in delivering emergency assistance. It is hoped that this review will contribute to improving the effectiveness of USG emergency aid responses and will develop new models or document existing ones that can be used by other donors and host governments.

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II. Objectives

1. To provide data on the overall international relief effort including the validity of the initial assessments, the appropriateness of the response measures employed, the U.S. role in the international effort and, to the extent possible, a comparative analysis of this effort with past relief efforts of similar magnitude.
2. To assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact of emergency food and non-food assistance to the Southern Africa Drought Emergency (SADE) and suggest means of improvement.
3. To assist USAID Missions, AID/Washington, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), host governments and other donors in programming future emergency, rehabilitation and disaster prevention activities and in improving Washington/field donor coordination by providing A.I.D. (and the donor community) with lessons learned regarding the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.
4. To Identify conditions under which import mobilization and internal food distribution were both efficient and cost-effective in meeting drought response objectives.

III. Scope of Work

The following questions are illustrative of the kinds of issues that should be examined in depth by the team in carrying out the objectives of this evaluation. Emphasis, of course, will vary from country to country and will depend on the particular type of intervention being examined and the degree of severity of the emergency situation. Priority should be given to information gathering and analysis leading to improved programming, design and exploration of new options for the formulation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.

A. Causes of the Emergency

- o Food deficit due to the drought emergency in southern Africa.
- o To what extent was the country's food problem related to agricultural and macroeconomic policies that may discourage local agricultural production and marketing rather than the drought? Has the drought caused any tangible change in agricultural policies?

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B. Host Country Preparedness and Contingency Planning

- o Do national procedures exist in the affected countries for responding to emergencies? Are they followed when an actual emergency occurs?
- o How did the internal and external coordination of the drought response affect the overall efficiency, impact and cost-effectiveness of each country's drought emergency response?
- o Identify what combination of public and private sector roles led to appropriate, timely, efficient and cost-effective responses by both host country governments and donors.
- o Describe the types and levels of public and private sector security stocks, distribution mechanisms and how they were used, if they were used, in the disaster situation.
- o What planning activities could be undertaken to strengthen the capacity of the affected country's government to respond more effectively to structural and emergency food deficit situations?
- o Review drought prevention/mitigation actions: farming practices, crop diversification, soil/water conservation measures, food security stocks, storage/transport losses, seed production, etc.
- o How does the local population normally deal with food shortages and how can this traditional coping behavior be reinforced?
- o How effective were the early warning systems/weather forecasting services (FEWS project, etc.)? Will these systems remain in place for the future? Will SADC install an early warning system as part of its activities?
- o What was/is the impact of pests (army worms/locusts) and plant disease?

C. Donor Coordination

- o How effective were the USG early warning systems and coordination?
- o Were adequate mechanisms (including telecommunications systems) in existence or were they established to coordinate assessments of donor requirements and implementation efforts?

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- o How successful was the U.N. World Food Programme and the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Assistance in coordinating assistance, delivering assistance, etc. and how did they interact with each other and other groups responding to the drought?
- o What was the role and responsibilities of international, U.S. and/or local non-governmental organizations/private voluntary organizations?
- o How do donors' methodologies for calculating food and non-food needs and their system for reporting on food deliveries, donor pledges, etc. relate to those of the UN? Are they adequate?
- o What were the successes and failures of donor coordination and the role of donor meetings and appeals.
- o What was the role of SADC and was it effective in responding to the drought needs of the member countries?
- o What was the role of South Africa? How well did cooperation among regional transport authorities work, and what factor influenced the success of those efforts? Did early estimates of South African port and rail capacity overestimate the difficulties of handling projected food imports? If so, why?
- o What role did WFP play in transport coordination?

D. Needs Assessment

- o What were the types of information collection system (e.g., rainfall analysis, nutrition surveillance), analysis procedures and use of data for early warning, assessment of requirements, declaration of disaster, design of programs, estimation of food input, etc. used by A.I.D., the UN, host governments?
- o Was the logistical capacity of the government, USAID and the private sector adequately taken into account in determining food aid levels?
- o Evaluate the accuracy, rapidity, integrity and appropriateness of A.I.D.'s needs assessment process?
- o Was there any effort to monitor prices in the local market as a measure of determining food shortages?

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E. Project Design

- o How were the target areas and groups of beneficiaries selected?
- o Describe the demographics of the beneficiary population. Did the majority of food and/or non-food assistance go to a specific group (e.g., farmers, urban poor, displaced persons, refugees)?
- o Were local food preferences and food consumption patterns of the target population as well as local market prices adequately considered in the choice of commodities and the selection of distribution systems?
- o Which mechanism was the most effective in providing food aid to the beneficiary (WFP, host government, PVO, etc.) Did this vary based on the type of beneficiary; e.g., getting food to markets versus targeted feeding?
- o By the type of recipient (malnourished children, adults, etc.) which type of food aid implementation was the most effective (FFW, general distribution, targeted feeding, etc.)
- o Were necessary complementary inputs (i.e., seeds, vaccines, materials, technical assistance, environmental impacts assessments) incorporated into the food emergency program?
- o To what extent had participation of beneficiaries and utilization of already existing organizational structures/resources, particularly local non-governmental organizations, been built into responses?
- o How can the basic food problem best be addressed with emergency food aid? With commercial?
- o How were costs a factor in the design of the emergency response program? What budget limits, if any, were established by the respective host government(s)?
- o Were provisions for termination of emergency food aid and/or transition to rehabilitation and longer term development foreseen during the planning stages?
- o Were linkages with regular food and non-food aid programs and other complementary resources explored?
- o Were disincentives introduced by the provision of massive quantities of PL 480 food?

F. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

- o Did the host governments, UN, USAID Missions, AID/W, PVOs and local community groups effectively organize themselves to manage the emergency? How vigilant were these groups in protecting themselves from becoming overextended? What emphasis was placed on institution-building and the enhancement of local resourcefulness? Did they utilize guidelines for assessing environmental impacts? Were these guidelines effective? What was the role of the Peace Corps and other USG agencies? How did the different Bureaus within A.I.D. interact? What was the role and utility of the Southern Africa Drought Task Force? Discuss in terms of relief planning, organization, resource allocation (the Africa Disaster Assistance Account), postcrisis rehabilitation and longer term sustainability.
- o What are the policies/practices of local governments and donors in the management, monitoring and evaluation of emergency programs and what was their varying impacts on large commercial farmers and small, subsistence farmers?
- o How can management, monitoring, oversight and evaluation be improved?

G. Timeliness of Emergency Response

- o Discuss the effectiveness and quantify the exact time frames for the following:
 - Needs assessment
 - Approval process for food and non-food projects considered
 - Procurement of commodities
 - Delivery of commodities to the country
 - Internal distribution of food and non-food aid to the target population
 - Arrival of technical assistance
- o Describe constraints, i.e. logistical/organizational /political bottlenecks, and how and if they were overcome. Was the WFP regional logistical unit in Harare and its subset in Johannesburg effective? Suggest ways of expediting these procedures in the future. Was private sector transport, handling and storage used effectively in

the response to the drought and, if not, how can it be improved?

- o If food commodities arrived late, were appropriate actions taken to avoid disincentive effects on local production and marketing?

H. Program Results

To the extent possible and, taking into account the constraints inherent in disaster situations, the evaluation team will present evidence of the effectiveness/impact of emergency interventions in terms of the following:

- o Targeting: extent to which areas and/or victims with greatest need are being reached. Was better targeting achieved as the drought progressed?
- o Appropriateness and adequacy of USG food and non-food intervention. Were resources allocated appropriately for maximum effectiveness?
- o Coverage: percentage of the affected population being assisted (by the United States, by other donors)
- o Increased availability of food in target areas and consumption by vulnerable groups
- o Incentive/disincentive effects on agricultural production/prices/incomes
- o Improved nutritional and health status of target groups
- o Decreased infant and child mortality
- o Demographic effects: population movements to centers and urban areas, age/sex distribution, etc.
- o Dependency/self-reliance: Have the relief programs weakened the self-help capacity of individuals and community groups? How can programs be organized better to reempower individuals and strengthen local decision-making and resource generation/productivity?
- o Policy and institutional reform: How has the emergency affected ongoing food strategy plans and price restructuring efforts? How has the emergency intervention strengthened the capacity of the national and local governments as well as local NGOs to respond more effectively to future emergencies?

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I. Policy Issues

The following issues are complex and deserve separate studies in themselves. They are extremely important in thinking about programming options and will provide a useful backdrop for discussions and future interventions. As appropriate, the team should address these concerns in the context of recommendations for program improvement/redesign and lessons learned:

- o Relative effectiveness (impact and costs) of various distribution modes (e.g., general free distribution, maternal and child health, supplementary feeding programs, food for work, monetization, triangular transactions, rehabilitation activities), consideration of alternative distribution mechanisms and the extent of the relief effort's decentralization/regionalization.
- o Comparative advantage and cost-effectiveness of different food distribution channels (WFP, PVOs, host governments) and criteria for selecting among them.
- o Linkages with regular food aid program and other development assistance activities, how to use them to prepare better for future emergencies as well as to assess the effect a disaster has on them in the short term. This includes the following:
 - a. What effect do emergency activities have on the Mission's regular program and their strategic objectives? Should we consider these "on hold" while an emergency takes place? Should funding for them be decreased and moved toward the emergency?
 - b. How should disasters affect the composition of the Mission program? Should the Strategic Objectives in their regular development program take this into account and, if not, why?
 - c. Can ongoing activities be redirected to assist the drought? To what extent should they?
- o The capacity and ability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to act independently of political constraints.
- o How food emergency programs can be planned to support sector and macroeconomic policy reforms and strengthen food self-reliance, disaster prevention and longer term development initiatives.
- o Criteria for determining when and how emergency programs should be phased in and out.

- o The role that donor coordination (food and non-food needs assessments, standardized methodologies, centralized assistance/pledge information) does/should play in maximizing the effectiveness of emergency responses.

IV. Evaluation Approach and Duration

During the first week of the assessment, the Contractor will draft scopes of work for team participants. All team members then will meet in Washington, D.C., to review and clarify the scopes of work, develop field protocols for site visits and for interviews with local officials and program participants, as well as to hold discussions with key A.I.D., USDA, State Department and PVO officials in Washington.

After this prefield analysis is completed, the teams will proceed to the southern Africa region, as coordinated by the Contract's Chief of Party, to carry out field investigations: review additional documentation, interview key U.S. Mission personnel, host government, PVO and other donor officials and inspect appropriate field sites. Specific attention should be devoted to capturing the perceptions of program participants, either through structured interviews or informal conversations in their own language. The field work will be carried out in approximately 36 working days per team member. For Mozambique the field work will be carried out in approximately 20 working days per team member.

While in the field all logistical support costs will be provided by the contractor and not by the Missions. This includes travel and transportation (surface and air), lodging, office space, office equipment and supplies, etc.

The teams will inform the Mission of the countries visited of areas that will be considered.

Upon return from the field, each team will review its findings and will prepare a draft country report. When all the country studies have been completed, Mission comments received and the final reports prepared, the Contractor's core technical staff will prepare a synthesis of findings and recommendations, drawing out lessons learned about what works, what does not work and why, from both the operational and policy perspectives.

AID/Washington and USAID Missions would be expected to collect all existing data and reports and other relevant records for the team before their arrival to the countries being identified. To the extent possible, USAID Missions should provide logistical support for the team while in-country.

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Total duration of the evaluation will be approximately three months with a target completion date of September 21, 1993.

V. Country Selection

All drought-affected countries in the southern Africa region, including South Africa and excluding Angola, which received USG food and/or non-food assistance will be assessed. The region will be broken into four areas, each of which will be visited by one team, as follows: 1) Zimbabwe and South Africa, 2) Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, 3) Zambia and Malawi, and 4) Mozambique.

VI. Team Composition and Level of Effort

In conducting these country assessments, the contractor will provide at least four teams of specialists; one team for each of the areas specified above. Given the range of skills required to carry out this scope of work and the short time frame, the background of these specialists will vary, but all of the following areas of expertise must be represented:

- Language skills and country-specific experience
- Agricultural economics
- Public health/nutrition
- Rural Water
- Social Anthropology
- Food Logistics
- PL 480 Program Regulations and WFP Procedures
- Policy analysis/program design/evaluation
- UN System
- Disaster Management

The team leaders will be on the contractor's core technical staff. While continuity in the evaluation team is assumed, it is not essential for the same consultants to go to all the countries.

VII. Reports

The team will submit a report on each country as well as a synthesis containing an analysis of those factors that appear to determine program effectiveness, recommendations on how A.I.D. can improve its programming of emergency food aid and non-food aid and lessons learned. Before departure from each country, the team will have engaged the USAID in a dialogue concerning their findings and recommendations. The draft country reports are due to AID/Washington no later than two weeks after each team has returned to the United States. Fifty copies will be delivered. The Missions will be asked to complete their reviews and respond with comments by cable within two weeks of receiving the draft. The Contractor will conduct a debriefing in Washington for AID and all interested parties within one month of the return of all teams. The final report (including an executive summary and synthesis of findings, recommendations and lessons learned) will be completed by the Contractor within two weeks of receiving all Mission comments. Fifty copies of this report will be delivered to FHA/OFDA, who will distribute them to all interested parties including FHA/FFP, AFR/SA, SADTF, LEG, CDIE and InterAction.

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