

**EVALUATION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO 1991/92 SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT**

Country Report: LESOTHO

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Prepared for:

AID/Bureau for Humanitarian Response

Prepared by:

**Ira Amstader
John Eriksen (Team Leader)**



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ACRONYMS

AID	Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C.
CCL	Christian Council of Lesotho
DESA	Drought Emergency in Southern Africa
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations
DMU	Disaster Management Unit
DRIG	Drought Relief Implementation Group
EAP	Environmental Action Plan
EC	European Community
ESAP	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Program
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFW	Food for Work
FSG	Food Studies Group of Oxford University, Oxford, England
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOL	Government of Lesotho
GNP	Gross National Product
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRC	International Red Cross
ITSH	Internal Transport, Shipping, and Handling
LCN	The Lesotho Council of NGOs
LHWP	Lesotho Highlands Water Project
LRC	Lesotho Red Cross
NEWU	National Early Warning Unit
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Overseas Development Administration of the United Kingdom
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Washington, D.C.
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SCF/UK	Save the Children, United Kingdom
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SARP	Southern Africa Regional Program, AID
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development Mission in Maseru, Lesotho
VHF	Vulnerable Household Feeding
WFP	World Food Programme of the United Nations
WHO	World Health Organization of the United Nations

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND¹

A. Country Overview

The Kingdom of Lesotho, formerly the British protectorate of Basutoland, gained independence in 1966. Completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa (RSA), the mountainous country covers 30,555 square kilometers. Only 9 percent of this area is arable but 66 percent is suited for livestock grazing. Most of the arable land -- and hence the population -- are located in the lowland and foothill areas of the western part of the country. Lesotho's major natural resource is water which -- with the completion of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) -- will be sold to South Africa to supply the municipal water systems in Pretoria and Johannesburg.

Following recent elections which returned the country to civilian leadership after being under the latest military government since 1986, the new government faces major political challenges. These include the transformation to a democratic civilian system, assembling an experienced cadre of officials to administer the new government, and decentralizing top-heavy government administration.

The Basotho population has more than doubled in the past 25 years to 1.8 million and the annual population growth rate is 2.6 percent. Domestic unemployment is estimated at between 40 and 50 percent and over half the Basotho live below the poverty line. While highly dependent on South Africa, the economy of Lesotho saw an average annual growth in real per capita gross national product of 5.2 percent between 1965 and 1988. Much of this growth has been financed through borrowing and deficit spending, with international donor agencies playing a key role in the financing. In 1991/1992, for example, 82.8 percent of Lesotho's capital development budget was donor financed.

The Government of Lesotho (GOL) began implementing an IMF supported three-year Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1988/89. This was followed by a three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) beginning in 1991/92. Both programs aim to reduce government budget deficit and external debt, achieve price and monetary stability, diversify the productive and export base, and enhance the private sector's role in the economy.

Lesotho's participation in the Southern Africa Customs Union, which provides for free exchange of goods within the Union and pooling of customs and excise duties, is of enormous economic importance to the country. South African Customs Union receipts constituted 53.5 percent of total GOL revenues, excluding external grants, over the period 1986 to 1991.

Access to the regional labor market is also of vital importance to Lesotho's economy. Basotho miners working in South Africa represent 23 percent of Lesotho's total active work

¹ This evaluation was performed under contract to A.I.D.'s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (AEP-0085-I-00-3001-00, D.O. 9). A Statement of Work is attached as Annex G.

force and 60 percent of the active male work force. According to the UNDP, 1991 remittances from these miners amounted to Maloti 1.2 billion -- or nearly 50 percent of Lesotho's GNP for that year. These remittances were estimated to have provided income for one-half of rural households.

Subsistence agriculture and livestock raising employs 86 percent of the domestic labor force and provides 21 percent of GNP. While land resources in Lesotho were already degrading at independence, accelerating environmental degradation since then has prompted the United Nations Environmental Program to classify Lesotho as a country "undergoing desertification." Decreasing yields and difficult land tenure laws have reduced the amount of land in cultivation from an estimated 450,000 to 300,000 hectares. One in four rural households are now landless. Livestock numbers far exceed carrying capacities of the steep hillsides even in "normal" rainfall years -- and, in drought years, their presence creates some of the worst environmental degradation in all of Africa.

Major development problems face the new government including the abject poverty of over half the population, the limited and degrading natural resource base, the low domestic productivity, rising inflation, reductions in the Basotho mine worker force active in South Africa, increasingly uncertain external investment inflows, and growing social demands for change. Political changes in South Africa also portend major changes for Lesotho, with both new opportunities and increased challenges. In this regard, Lesotho is no longer considered to be an economic and political "hostage" of South Africa and the international donor community is already demanding that the government take a more active and responsible role in its own development than it has in the past.

B. Emergency History

Droughts leading to crop failures, water shortages, and degradation of land resources are realities in Lesotho. In mountainous Lesotho, deep snowfalls, hailstorms and unseasonable frosts are common events.

Records from the monitoring station in Maseru indicate that serious droughts in Lesotho seem to follow a ten year cycle, with the last major countrywide drought in 1982/1984. Regional problems with rainfall within the country due to rain falling at the "wrong time" or severe drying heat at critical points in the crop cycle are also features of Lesotho's mountain climate.

A severe snowfall in 1986/1987 devastated the country and made distribution of food through commercial channels virtually impossible. At this time, the military government created the Disaster Management Unit, charged with the training of district disaster committees. The Food Management Unit, established in 1978, was responsible for coordinating transport of all relief food donations.

C. The 1992/1993 Emergency in Lesotho

The 1992 drought was devastating for many rural households in that it largely destroyed the standing cereal crops and severely reduced forage resources on Lesotho's rangelands. Yields of maize, sorghum and wheat were reduced by 65 percent and initial United Nations estimates indicated that 170,000 people were in need of targeted food relief in June 1992 and this estimate was revised upward to over 300,000 in February 1993.

This domestic situation was complicated by reductions in the numbers of mine workers sending remittances from South Africa. This further reduced rural household purchasing power and impacted on households' purchases of both food and agricultural inputs. Urban and rural water supplies were threatened as water sources dried up forcing water rationing and emergency drilling and/or rehabilitation of boreholes in the lowland areas. According to UNICEF, severe malnutrition among children increased by 30 percent in rural areas and hygiene-related diseases increased dramatically countrywide because of reduced availabilities of clean water.

Even with all of these domestic consequences, however, the exceptional factor in southern Africa in 1992 was the pan-regional nature of the drought conditions. Had deficient rainfall conditions occurred only in Lesotho, it is unlikely that donor relief efforts would have extended much beyond some emergency work on water supply systems and continuation of existing programmed food aid programs for Lesotho because most vulnerable Basotho could have had their basic food needs met through existing commercial delivery networks with their linkages with the South African food supply system.

D. Lesotho's Ability to Withstand and Manage the Disaster

1. General GOL Management

Disaster management is not a new challenge for Lesotho, yet the handling of this emergency by the new government could be called an improvised response at best. One might have expected that Lesotho, based upon past experience and lessons learned from its regional neighbors, would have developed a functional disaster management system long before the current drought arrived. This was not the case. There was little evidence of much preparedness in terms of existing institutional structures actually capable of managing an emergency response, procedural manuals detailing responsibilities for emergency relief actions or any sort of standing orders for line ministries at the onset of the drought emergency. This was so even though there was ample early warning of the impending drought from the GOL's own National Early Warning Unit.

During the drought emergency, the GOL was always in a reactive position vis-a-vis donor offers of assistance and never did control the relief response process. There were no GOL organized donor meetings to deal with relief problems across sectors, though there were many ad hoc meetings organized by the principal donors.

When the GOL did get organized enough to make an appeal through SADC, the donors had already "divided the pie" and decided what they were to be involved in. In most cases, this involved expansion of their ongoing programs.

A partial explanation for the lack of the GOL involvement in drought activities can be found within the context of a major change in governments. Preparation for and execution of national and district elections were the major priority of the GOL, not the drought emergency.

Government indecisiveness and the inability or unwillingness to commit resources to drought relief was an overwhelming problem at all levels of government. This situation was complicated further by the fact that neither the outgoing or incoming governments had any long-term development plans in place to guide resource allocations. The GOL's seeming inability or unwillingness for focus on those short-term activities needed to deal with the drought in 1992 created a situation of extreme frustration among the major donors which continues to the present.

2. Emergency-Related Government Structures

a. Food Management Unit

The Food Management Unit, created in 1978, is under the Office of the Prime Minister. It was created in response to the snow emergency of 1986/1987 and is responsible for the management of GOL food warehouses, coordination of distribution of all food donations, the GOL Early Warning System, and accounting for funds generated from food monetization.

Food commodities are donated to Lesotho for a variety of programs. These include food for work (FFW) activities, free food distribution, school feeding programs, and projects using the monetized receipts from sales of imported cereals. These programs are currently supported by the European Community (EC), the Japanese and Italian governments, and the World Food Program (WFP).

Under the Food Management Unit, the National Early Warning Unit (NEWU) analyzes data on crop production, meteorological information and miller stores and produces a quarterly bulletin with forecasts of crop harvests and the food security situation. It was this unit that was warning the GOL of a significant crop failure in early 1991.

A consistent problem with the NEWU is inaccurate information regarding early estimates of crop production shortfalls and in-country grain stocks. USAID asked FAO, which is supplying technical assistance to the NEWU, to check these crop estimates and recommend how to improve forecasting techniques.

Some of the problems investigated included:

- Crop failure rates that were too high and misrepresented regional yields;
- Country-wide statistics using the same yield coefficients in all areas were deemed unreliable. It became clear that assessments needed to be done on a district by district basis to be reliable.
- The reference year in use by Bureau of Statistics was different from that used by the NEWU and the local millers. This accounting year was changed from April to March to coincide with miller records and allow for verification of beginning and ending dates for carry-over stocks.
- Per capita cereal requirements were deemed much too high at 270 kilogram per person per year in maize equivalent. Therefore, requirements were revised downward to 175 kilogram per person per year, reducing estimated import needs by 68,000 metric tons.

These problems and others undermined the creditability of the NEWU and their calculation of the cereal deficit was considered suspect by the donors. The National Early Warning Unit did report that the drought's affect would be severe, however, donors disagreed with the methodology it used in formulating its conclusions.

Moreover, the GOL-- and the donor community -- analysts never really arrived at a common and sharply delineated definition of Lesotho's structural food deficit -- i.e., that deficit that Lesotho should be expected to cope with as within the "normal" range of temporal and spatial distributions of annual rainfall and the subsequent performance of the domestic agricultural economy -- versus the deficit in available food stocks caused by truly exceptional drought situations. No common set of criteria were established to determine what constituted the structural deficit and what constituted an exceptional demand on the food system. In the absence of such criteria, there was no techno-economic basis for determining how much additional food should be imported into Lesotho as drought relief -- over and above stocks which could have -- and should have -- been handled through normal commercial channels.

b. **Disaster Management Unit**

The Disaster Management Union existed prior to the drought to train district disaster management teams; but it did not have the appropriate structure or capability to plan or coordinate activities for the 1992/93 relief emergency. Rather than putting more resources into this existent structure, the GOL chose to create a completely new organization -- the Drought Relief Implementation Group (DRIG). It is unclear to the evaluation team how this decision was made.

c. **The Drought Relief Implementation Group (DRIG)**

The DRIG was established in July 1992. This was well after the drought emergency was officially declared in March and the UN/SADC appeal was launched in June. Though initially set up as a temporary structure, DRIG officials contend that it will become a permanent disaster management structure attached to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.

DRIG, as an independent unit, reported directly to an Inter-Ministerial Task Force. DRIG was not completely operational until September 1992 and, though a national drought relief budget was to be allocated to support its operations, the funds were never transferred to the unit. The DRIG is staffed at the senior level by a Chief Executive Officer, Deputy Chief Executive, and a UNDP-sponsored Drought Relief Coordinator/Advisor.

After visits and briefings in all ten districts, DRIG began to take central level responsibility for drought relief coordination, monitoring, and multi-sector planning. While the operation had a good start-up, there was resistance on the part of involved ministries to the institutional coordination imposed by DRIG. Decisions on major policy issues were often slow and indecisive. DRIG, while having responsibility for coordination of drought activities, lacked the necessary authority to enforce its decisions on the line ministries and agencies of the GOL. For this reason, several donor representatives felt that the DRIG was an unnecessary additional layer of bureaucracy to be side-stepped at best.

According to the SADC Drought Management Assessment: "DRIG, composed of governmental, non-governmental and UN agencies working together across inter-departmental lines, reports directly to a Task Force of Ministers directly involved in drought crisis and relief operations through a Steering Group of Principal Secretaries closely involved with the emergency. These include: the Military Council; Finance and Planning; Agriculture; Health; Interior; Information and Broadcasting; and, Water, Energy and Mining Ministries."

The SADC Assessment further states that: "another major impediment to institutional coordination at central level has been the fragmentation, diffusion, and duplication of drought-related responsibilities between government ministries and agencies. For example, many are concerned with planning, too few with implementation, delegation and monitoring; urban and rural water supply are divided between two ministries; water conservation and soil conservation are similarly divided; three different authorities deal with nutrition; another three or four deal with health education. Under these conditions, institutional coordination becomes exceedingly difficult; lack of liaison and communication between players makes it virtually impracticable."

DRIG attempted to address these concerns and in September 1992 set up several working groups -- Logistics and Food Distribution, Health/Nutrition, Water, and Agriculture -- that met bi-weekly for decision-making and monitoring of projects. This was particularly the case for the Logistics and Food Group.

According to the SADC assessment: "At district level, institutional coordination never worked in terms of drought relief for three main reasons: preoccupation with elections; the lack of authority of District Secretaries to coordinate within their areas, even if they had the capability to do so; and the characteristic reluctance to become involved in high pressure, potentially problematic, drought relief operations requiring local problems to be solved locally. DRIG and NGOs drove drought relief top down. It was not until early 1993 that DRIG and the NGOs started to install the bottom up structure that is now in place and functioning. The institutional lessons of the 1982/1984 drought experience seemingly were not considered though clearly recorded."

DRIG is now attempting to deal with the constraints on its operations through Development Councils in each district and Disaster Committees at the village level. Largely in response to these new structures and the NGO community, DRIG is phasing in community-based FFW projects that respond to locally articulated needs.

3. Food Security and Vulnerability

a. Country-wide

Even in the best of years, Lesotho imports the majority of its maize from South Africa. Only in one of the last five years has domestic production been over 20 percent of consumption needs. Food security -- or lack thereof -- is based upon Lesotho's ability to purchase grain from outside of its borders. Due to its location, landlocked and surrounded by South Africa, its food security is also based upon maintaining congenial relations with its giant neighbor.

In 1986, Lesotho's food security was seriously threatened by political problems with South Africa. During the conflict, South Africa closed its border with Lesotho and unilaterally imposed what amounted to an economic embargo. At that time, a UN mission advised the GOL to establish a strategic grain reserve to be used for emergencies. During the 1991/1992 drought, the presence of huge amounts of programmed food aid already in Lesotho and its access to commercial maize imports from South Africa made use of a strategic grain reserve unnecessary.

The pan-regional nature of the 1992 drought concerned the GOL. While the GOL had been assured by South Africa that adequate stocks of maize would be available, the government wanted to assure consumers that the prices for maize meal would not increase significantly. To mitigate against this happening, the GOL provided 21 million Maloti to the three local milling companies to ensure that maize meal price increases would not be a major negative factor in the commercial supply system. This was the only major GOL budget item to deal with the drought.

For the foreseeable future, Lesotho's food security is based largely upon continuing good relations with South Africa. However, political changes in South Africa may affect many of its economic relationships with Lesotho. Significant reductions in South African production of

white maize or in the number of Basotho miners permitted to work in the country would have immediate and severe implications for Lesotho's food security situation and overall economy.

b. **Household Food Security**

While droughts have long been a climatic feature in Lesotho, their impacts have become increasingly severe on rural households. The cumulative effects of decades of inappropriate and destructive land use practices have been to decrease the amount of arable land in the country in absolute terms and to greatly reduce yields on the remaining crop land. Household food security is much less assured. Many more Basotho are landless. A larger percentage of the national herd is owned by a smaller number of people. And, increasing numbers of rural households have become dependent upon externally provided public feeding programs. According to WFP, nearly 30 percent of Lesotho's population is now benefitting from food assistance on a regular basis.

Ironically, crop years 1990/1991 and 1991/1992 had above average rainfall amounts in the aggregate; but the "rains simply fell at the wrong times" causing harvest failures in both years that compounded difficulties for the vulnerable population. Weather was much more severe during the drought of 1982/1984 but the impacts were much less so because rural households were in a better position to withstand the drought.

Much of household security now is tied to the income received from miners' remittances. This dependence upon cash generated outside the country, coupled with the physical absence of the majority of the able-bodied male labor force, tends to diminish incentives and capacities to maintain Lesotho's more productive agricultural enterprises. The absence of men in rural areas means that large numbers of rural households are necessarily headed by women which creates special constraints on and tensions between allocations of time and resources to household, agricultural and commercial activities.

According to the UNDP's 1986/1987 Household Budget Survey:

- The 25 percent of the Basotho population falling in the lowest income group -- monthly income of Maloti 40 or less -- survived on a mere 1.5 percent of the country's total cash income; and
- The top 25 percent of the households received 61.1 percent of the total cash income.

4. **Emergency Preparedness Capability**

As discussed above, there were no disaster plans or effective management structures in place at the time of the last drought emergency. There were no manuals or summaries of lessons learned from the previous emergencies that were drawn upon for disaster mitigation planning. As a result, the drought response in Lesotho was largely improvised.

II. DESIGN and IMPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSE

A. Recognition of the Problem and Response Planning

Early warning information indicating rainfall irregularities were supplied by the NEWU of the Food Management Unit starting in early 1991. This led the Ministry of Planning, Economic and Manpower Development to request donor consideration of a drought appeal for assistance as early as mid- 1991. At this point, the donor community was reluctant to respond because of questions about the credibility and reliability of information supplied from NEWU -- i.e., the NEWU was seen by some donors more as a political tool than a reliable technical source of information -- and because the pan-regional nature of the drought was not yet realized.

It appears that the 1991 experience discouraged the GOL from approaching the donor community again in 1992 when rainfall patterns continued to be erratic and the second consecutive poor harvest was foreseen. And, in early 1992, the roles in dealing with the drought were effectively reversed with the drought appeal being largely prepared as a result of pressures from the donor community and the decision to formulate a comprehensive UN/SADC appeal on a regional basis.

Treating the drought as largely a food security issue, the military government in Lesotho made a number of budget adjustments in March 1992 for the 1992/1993 financial year. On the supply side, higher producer prices were announced for winter wheat. On the demand side, a subsidy on maize meal was announced which amounted to about \$ 4 million.

The GOL felt that with two consecutive poor harvests the purchasing power of the population had decreased and feared that the price of imported maize from South Africa would increase. Seeking additional revenues to support drought relief activities, the GOL approached both the World Bank in May 1992 and the African Development Bank in September 1992 for funding to cover additional imports. Both organizations reacted positively but disbursement of funds took longer than expected -- over a year in the case of the ADB.

The WFP/FAO regional assessment mission took place in March/April 1992 and was followed up with design of emergency projects for inclusion in the DESA appeal. In the early stages of the emergency, the Food Management Unit and the MOA were the main GOL collaborators with United Nation agencies. Understandably, initial requests for assistance were focused on food and agriculture needs.

Also in March/April 1992, though separately from the WFP/FAO assessment mission, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of AID mounted its own independent needs assessment mission in Lesotho. After reviewing the food security situation in country, the OFDA mission concluded that: "The second year of drought will intensify Lesotho's economic problems and could severely impact the budgets of the GOL and households as costlier imported cereals are brought into the country."

OFDA made the following recommendations to the United States government:

- USAID should continue to utilize the abilities of the Peace Corps Volunteers in Lesotho to help monitor the status of conditions in their communities which will help in the targeting and distribution of drought relief commodities.
- The United States should encourage the use of local currency generated by the European Community's cereal monetization program to pay for additional logistical costs of any expansion of the WFP food-for-work activities as well as complementary inputs and support of NGO activities which are targeted towards drought relief activities. Some funds could also be used to purchase food locally or provide seeds.
- The United States should increase its provision of Title II food by responding to the forthcoming WFP drought appeal for approximately 75,000 metric tons of food aid, with 15,000 metric tons of emergency Title II maize and maize meal (Note: the mission currently provides cornmeal and vegetable oil for the regular WFP program). Early approval and shipping is critical to the success of the relief program.
- The Food Management Unit will coordinate and help manage all donor food aid. The United States should provide technical assistance in the form of food logistics experts in the Food Management Unit to help with the transport, storage and distribution of commodities.
- The United States should provide technical assistance -- or funds for such assistance -- through the United Nations in conducting a regional nutritional survey to obtain better baseline information on the nutritional status of infants and children.
- The United States should support the use of food-for-work activities in the areas of soil and water conservation.

Coincidental with the June 1992 DESA Appeal in Geneva, the military Government announced a State of Emergency.

By the time of the DESA mid-term review in November 1992, there was a change in perception of the most urgent drought needs. DRIG had completed its district assessments and now the requirements of the non-food sector became predominant -- i.e., water supply and sanitation. Estimates of the number of persons affected by the drought were also revised upwards based upon the registration of beneficiaries.

Registration of vulnerable groups, and assessments of drought impact to determine allocation of needed resources, were fraught with political maneuvering to the point that at one time almost half the population was registered for supplemental feeding. Government assessments were viewed as highly suspect by the major donors and United Nations agencies.

B. Organization and Implementation of the Response

1. The GOL and the NGOs

By September 1992, DRIG had established an Operations Center and became the executive arm of the GOL for national coordination of relief efforts. The Food Management Unit transported food to their district warehouses from which it was either picked up by involved ministries and transported to FFW sites or transported by Save the Children to distribution points. At these distribution points, local NGOs took over the actual food distributions to recipients.

The Lesotho Council of NGOs assumed a lead role in representing the local Lesotho NGO community in May 1992. Thereafter, it assumed primary responsibility for relief operations management at the district level. This included registration of beneficiaries, in collaboration with District Secretaries and distribution to vulnerable households. It was the LCN that approached the GOL after the emergency announcement and told them for which districts individual NGOs would be responsible. The GOL provided Lesotho Council of NGOs with about 260,000 Rand per month (\$80,000) to finance its coordination activities and provide assistance to other NGOs.

Technical assistance, financed by USAID and other donors, was provided by DRIG. The technical specialist assigned to the DRIG for logistics and coordination was financed by USAID and subsequently seconded by DRIG to the Lesotho Council of NGOs on a half time basis. The Lesotho Council of NGOs leased vehicles, hired distribution supervisors and two teams of monitors to work collaboratively with WFP monitors, and provided grants to member NGOs.

Lacking prior experience, the Lesotho Council of NGOs became operational very quickly benefiting greatly from the expertise of the Lesotho Red Cross, working in collaboration with the International Red Cross (IRC). Only the Lesotho Red Cross was in a position to rapidly become operational in identifying drought induced vulnerability. Taking responsibility for food distributions in the three remote mountain districts with the least developed rural infrastructure, the Lesotho Red Cross used existing demographic and socio-economic data. They also prepared training packages and presented a one day training workshop on targeting of food to vulnerable households, evaluation of results and the larger issue of the "process" of moving from short-term relief to long-term sustainable development projects.

Other NGOs involved in local distribution included:

- Christian Council of Lesotho, which took responsibility for two lowland districts and distributed over 15,000 metric tons of relief food. Concerned with the time and energy needed for the long walk to the distribution points, they used internal funds supplied by overseas donors to finance additional transport of food from the distribution points to sub-points closer to the people. They were the only NGO that found this necessary.

- Caritas was responsible for the northern-most districts from September 1992 to January 1993.
- World Vision was responsible for one southern district.
- Save the Children from the United Kingdom, which already had a long-term involvement in the school feeding program throughout Lesotho, built upon this role and, for the drought emergency, provided secondary transport from Food Management Unit warehouses to distribution points, where the above mentioned NGOs took responsibility for final distribution. This activity was funded by the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) at a cost of approximately \$ 250,000.

Another large international NGO -- CARE -- chose not to be involved in the relief efforts but did continue with its regular programming.

Registration for the Vulnerable Household Feeding program began in August 1992 and was completed in December. Difficulties with the initial registration prompted DRIG to call for a re-registration which took place in early 1993 and took two months to complete. This reduced the number of registered persons from a high of 600,000 to 310,000.

2. **Multilaterals**

There is a relatively small group of international donors operating in Lesotho. Informally the EC, UNDP and USAID began to meet to discuss the drought situation before the GOL requested any assistance. The donors pushed the GOL to declare the 1992 drought emergency and, by the time the government did declare the emergency, the major donors had already decided how they were going to respond. Since WFP already had a large programmed FFW program in place, all additional food was channeled through them.

a. **World Food Program (WFP)**

Since 1965, the WFP in Lesotho has had average annual expenditures of \$ 8 to 9 million. This is one of its highest per capita programs worldwide and, at present, WFP feeds over 30 percent of the Basotho population through either ongoing development activities or drought emergency operations. WFP was clearly the major player in food transfers. Key elements of the overall program include: school and institutional feeding and labor intensive FFW projects using program food aid; and drought relief operations.

Since 1965, WFP has supported an education and school self-reliance program. This program is funded at a level of \$ 30.3 million for the period 1989/1994 and currently benefits 364,000 school children. Providing a school lunch to improve the effectiveness of education while providing an incentive to parents to send their children to school, it is an important safety net in poorer areas where the lunch may be the only meal during droughts.

At present, the WFP is gradually phasing this program out in 368 schools in areas of relative wealth. These schools are instead receiving technical assistance and materials to undertake self-reliance activities. The Peace Corps is actively involved in these activities under a Ministry of Education policy of "education with production" which aims to install a new curriculum emphasizing agricultural production and self-reliance. USAID has been supplying Title II commodities to this program.

The wisdom of continuing with this phase out during a drought emergency was seriously questioned by the NGO community and other UN agencies. It was thought that withdrawing a safety net that had been in effect for 27 years during "the worst drought in memory" simply because it was "planned" was evidence of non-pragmatic inflexibility.

The five year (1989-1994) WFP project for development of rural infrastructure is funded at \$ 15.4 million and benefits 30,000 poor rural and urban people. Up to 10,000 workers are engaged daily under the supervision of the Ministries of Interior and Agriculture with the objective of "improving rural infrastructure and the sustainable use of natural resources while generating development-oriented employment for the large unskilled labor force."

Food is provided in exchange for work on rural roads, forestry development and soil conservation. In response to the drought emergency, an additional 7,000 metric tons of wheat were monetized through the commercial sector with generated funds used to purchase materials and equipment for expansion of project activities.

Averaging 6,000 workers daily, each worker receives a ration for five people. In principle, the work force is rotated monthly giving more people the opportunity to participate. Workers also receive a daily cash incentive from the GOL of 2 Maloti (around \$ 0.60).

There is tremendous controversy surrounding FFW projects in Lesotho. Concerns about the FFW projects' role in engendering dependency among the recipients; impacting negatively on women-headed households; and the economic efficiency of paying participants with food, rather than cash, in a cash driven economy are paramount.

AID provided 1,220 metric tons of Title II maize meal and 894 metric tons of Title II vegetable oil to WFP for this program.

Between July 1992 to September 1993, WFP provided of \$ 6.3 million of food to 310,000 vulnerable households in Lesotho.

b. The European Community

The EC commits an additional 2,000 metric tons of wheat to their ongoing wheat monetization program and provided 5,000 metric tons of maize and 450 metric tons of vegetable oil and pulses through WFP for the drought emergency in Lesotho. Since just after the border emergency with in 1977, the EC has been providing Lesotho with 7 to 10,000 metric tons of wheat annually which is sold at commercial rates -- i.e., 500 Rand per metric ton, which is more or less world price delivered to Maseru -- to Lesotho Mills. This parastatal also purchases local wheat at 650 to 700 Rand per ton, but domestic production is so low in comparison with local demand -- 7,000 metric tons spring wheat and 11,000 metric tons winter wheat -- that the EC wheat does not compete with commercialized local production.

Funds generated from the EC monetization program average 4 to 5 million Maloti (\$ 1.5 to 2 million) annually and are used for financing of small rural projects and to pay for the internal transport shipping and handling of cereals used in WFP programs.

c. The World Bank

Based upon a request from the Ministry of Finance in May 1992, the World Bank approved a \$ 2 million loan for developing a land management/conservation project. Administrative delays made it necessary for the GOL to pay for the program initially.

Another World Bank-financed rural water supply project was begun. The objective was to drill 150 boreholes, using five drilling rigs. This project has been stopped due to administrative problems.

d. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

UNICEF spent \$ 2,202,262 for drought-related activities between June 1992 and May 1993. Of this amount \$ 150,000 was provided by OFDA for an immunization program. Specific UNICEF efforts during the drought included funding of:

- Red Cross to coordinate supplemental feeding for malnourished children under five years if age at the district level;
- An information officer position at the DRIG;
- Assistance to Ministry of Health for gathering statistics and field monitoring;
- Intensification of childhood immunization program;
- Provision of milk and sugar to hospitals for treatment of malnourished children;

- Acceleration of the training program for village health care workers focusing on growth monitoring and use of scales for weighing of malnourished children under 5 years of age; and
- Expansion of the on-going "wet-feeding program" supplying food to be cooked in the communities and made available to children.

e. **World Health Organization (WHO)**

WHO provided assistance valued at \$ 130,000 in support of the Ministry of Health for nutritional surveillance.

f. **Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)**

FAO funded inputs for crop production. FAO, in the winter season 1993, provided \$ 500,000 for emergency supplies of wheat seed and fertilizers to Basotho farmers. According to the FAO, "Lesotho's midterm request through the DESA appeal for seed stocks was amply justified by the low acreage sown to summer crops -- a direct consequence of the limited earlier assistance to the country in form of seeds -- and the possibility of compensating for this by planting more winter wheat." This activity was judged to have been a success by FAO.

FAO also provided \$ 400,000 in assistance to the MOA's Mechanization Services in the form of credit and technical expertise.

g. **United Nations Development Program (UNDP)**

The UNDP played an important role in encouraging the GOL to make their 1992 UN/SADC appeal. UNDP also committed \$ 400,000 for DRIG operations.

Ongoing UNDP activities related to drought mitigation include:

- Small scale enterprise development geared specifically to creating jobs for returning unemployed miners;
- Activities to promote sustainable agriculture;
- Strengthening of the Environmental Secretariat within the Office of the Prime Minister with the objective of rejuvenating the Environmental Action Plan; and
- Promoting a dialogue with the GOL on land tenure.

3. Bilateral Donors

a. British High Commission

The British Government through the ODA provided \$ 250,000 for secondary transport of food relief commodities from 14 Food Management Unit district storehouses to 90 village distribution points throughout the country. The transport operation was carried out by Save the Children/United Kingdom.

b. United States Government

1.) Peace Corps

The Peace Corps has a total of 89 volunteers working in development activities aimed at mitigating the effects of drought. Thirty-five Volunteers are engaged in drought relief projects funded by USAID for \$ 580,000. The objective is to create 75 water catchments and eight horizontal wells. Twenty-four Volunteers are working with the WFP-funded School Self-Reliance Project. They are working with the 386 lowland schools that were phased out of the WFP feeding program. Finally, 26 Volunteers are involved in promotion of village garden water system development using \$ 1 million supplied from USAID's SSIAP project.

2.) AID/FHA

In addition to funding provided for the Peace Corps programs, the United States provided Lesotho with \$ 5,734,000 for the drought relief activities in FY 1992. Of this, \$ 280,000 was from OFDA and the balance was for Title II and Section 416 food assistance channeled through WFP.

3.) USAID/Lesotho

The USAID Mission in Maseru played an active role with UN agencies and EC in coordinating drought activities. USAID also initiated a poverty mapping exercise utilizing Peace Corps Volunteers to help in establishing a distribution plan for vulnerable groups under the WFP targeted emergency assistance program. It contracted with a local consulting firm to conduct a systematic survey of 213 villages to complement the poverty mapping exercise.

The information generated by the studies was useful to the GOL and donors in establishing selection criteria for identifying the most vulnerable groups for food distribution. Finally, USAID provided technical assistance to the DRIG for logistics and food monitoring.

C. Identification of Vulnerable Groups

It is extremely difficult in Lesotho to clearly differentiate between that portion of the population which was made vulnerable specifically by the drought and the much larger percentage of the population which is simply poor and lacks household purchasing power even in the best of years.

The DRIG, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and with assistance from WHO, UNICEF and the NGOs, established criteria for vulnerable households. Village Relief Committees were responsible for registration under supervision of NGOs. Registration of vulnerable households was the responsibility of NGOs with the assistance of village committees. Upon approval, a requisition for food supplies was sent through the Lesotho Council of NGOs to the DRIG. Registration was based at about 15 distribution points per district.

Vulnerable groups were identified as pregnant and lactating women, children under five years of age, female-headed households, landless persons who were not receiving remittances, and the unemployed. According to a Household Welfare Study funded by the EC and UNDP, household food security is primarily determined by access to scarce and inequitably distributed resources. At least half of Lesotho's population of 1.8 million live in absolute poverty. Where household incomes are still highly dependent upon agriculture production, harvest failure has profound impacts on households.

For the majority of Lesotho households, livestock and mine worker remittances are more important to household security than crop agriculture. However, mine worker remittances are decreasing with reductions in the Basotho labor force in South Africa and ownership of livestock is extremely inequitable, with less than 10 percent of the population owning 80 percent of the cattle herd.

The Lesotho Council of NGOs provided seven District Coordinators and 150 distribution point supervisors and monitors who worked side by side with WFP monitors. The Lesotho Red Cross provided all necessary personnel in three mountain districts. The principal challenges encountered with registration and monitoring were:

- Over-registration of "non-vulnerable" households;
- The resentment of local people being arbitrarily defined as "drought affected" or merely chronically poor;
- The lack of cooperation from district secretaries, who were preoccupied with the election campaign;
- Theft of food commodities;

- The limited support from village authorities who feared public reprisals for the "unjust" targeting; and
- The limited capacities of some NGOs in managing registrations and food distributions.

III. SPECIAL ISSUES

A. Effects of the Drought on Lesotho's Development

The drought, while less severe than past droughts, dramatically underlined the economic vulnerability of the majority of the Basotho. In this regard, there is a need for effective multi-sectoral planning by government which acknowledges intermittent droughts as one of the conditions likely to effect development in Lesotho.

In general terms and with some exceptions, the NGOs performed admirably during the drought emergency and the experiences gained should allow them to play a larger role in rural development in the future.

At the household level, this drought clearly impoverished more people and consumed more rural capital. Simply put, the poor got poorer. Rural resources are now concentrated in fewer hands. Inequity increased. Land resources were further depleted. And, more people are now more vulnerable to the next disaster.

B. Relationship Between the Drought and the USAID Program

USAID activities, according to the Mission planning documents, are to focus in several areas related to mitigating the impacts of future droughts. Building upon a 20 year history working with agriculture and natural resources programs in Lesotho, USAID will continue to work collaboratively with EC, World Bank and FAO in assisting the GOL to better manage its natural resource base. Perhaps the greatest impact that USAID has had and will continue to have is that of providing trained human resources at all levels of the government.

USAID had a significant Title II food aid program during the previous Country Development Strategy Statement period focused on maternal and child care, school feeding and promotion of FFW project. This program was phased out in 1989. For the 1992 drought emergency, a limited program was reinstated but it will be discontinued when the current food allocation has been distributed.

C. Relationship to IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Program

The GOL began implementing a three-year Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1988 and this was followed by a three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) which began in 1991. Both programs aimed to reduce budget and external deficits, achieve price and monetary stability, diversify the productive and export base, and enhance the private sector's role in the economy.

According to the UNDP, while there has been growth with significant improvements in the country's fiscal and balance of payments positions, there has also been a steady decline in living standards as measured by per capita consumption. Per capita consumption declined by 10 percent between 1985 and 1991 and by 16 percent between 1988 and 1991.

It is clear that vulnerability to drought is rooted in poverty in Lesotho. An increasing proportion of the population is poorer in 1991 than three years earlier. What this drought made clear is that there needs to be substantially more GOL emphasis for long-term development that addresses poverty. It remains to be seen if the ESAP has the flexibility to respond pragmatically to these development challenges.

D. Donor Relations

The fact that Lesotho's status as the "hostage" of South Africa is rapidly changing became apparent to some government officials and NGO representatives during the drought crisis. The impacts of that change are beginning to be felt. Several bilateral donors and international NGOs are pulling out or scaling down their activities in Lesotho and it is obvious that many donor agencies are "tired" of pouring resources into the country with little to show in terms of "real" development.

Several factors during the drought emergency made the GOL appear less than "serious" to the donor community. Among these were:

- The preoccupation of government officials with elections, which clearly took precedent over drought mitigation activities;
- The government insistence of creating the DRIG when other emergency structures already existed and then failing to fund its operations adequately;
- The declaration that almost one-half of the Basotho population would need supplemental feeding based upon the first registration; and
- The government's ineffective emergency management capability.

E. South Africa

Lesotho is heavily dependent upon South Africa for its economic survival. Political changes in the Republic could conceivably lead to significant disruptions in past economic relationships between the countries. There is the potential for massive repatriations of Basotho mine workers as South Africa moves to generate more domestic employment opportunities. There is also a possibility that, with land reallocations, South Africa's current status as a food surplus country will change and it will be increasingly unable or unwilling to guarantee cereal shipments to meet Lesotho's growing food needs. And, finally, there is the probability that changes will be necessary in South Africa Customs Union arrangements, which currently are of great benefit to Lesotho.

If any or all of these changes come about in the medium-term, they could place enormous pressures on the new civilian government and seriously threaten the emerging but still very fragile democracy in Lesotho. Recent years have seen Lesotho become increasingly dependent on the largess of international donors but this trend is ripe for reversal, with many donors having adopted a "sink or swim" attitude toward the new government.

F. Post-Drought Recovery

According to the DRIG, rainfall patterns in Lesotho continue to be irregular, key aquifers are only slowly recharging, and the districts in the mountains and the south of the country are expecting very low cereal harvests in 1993/1994. Based upon these factors, the DRIG feels continuation of a relief operation, with both food and non-food aid components, is justified.

For the reason, the GOL declared a continuation of the drought emergency through June 1994. The DRIG formulated a draft appeal and presented it to the donor community in July 1993. While there is to be a scaling back of targeted food and the phased withdrawal of all free food distribution to vulnerable households under the appeal, there is a request for expansion of community-based FFW projects.

As discussed in other sections, there is great resistance to FFW projects in Lesotho on the part of the international NGOs and many of the donors. Considering the high number of female-headed households, many view the phasing out of free feeding for vulnerable households and the increased emphasis on FFW projects will on balance have a negative effect on the households in need. Moreover and unfortunately, the appeal for more FFW projects is still not tied in any meaningful way to the implementation of a long-term development plan for Lesotho.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

- The exceptional factor in southern Africa in 1992/93 was the pan-regional nature of drought conditions, not the specific conditions in Lesotho. Had deficient rainfall conditions occurred only in Lesotho, it is unlikely, in our opinion, that any massive donor response would have been warranted because vulnerable populations could have been accommodated by the existing commercial food delivery network.
- The GOL-- and the donor community -- analysts never really arrived at a common and sharply delineated definition of Lesotho's structural food deficit -- i.e., that deficit that Lesotho should be expected to cope with as within the "normal" range of temporal and spatial distributions of annual rainfall and the subsequent performance of the domestic agricultural economy -- versus the deficit in available food stocks caused by truly exceptional drought situations. Since no common set of criteria were established to determine what constituted the structural deficit and what constituted an exceptional demand on the food system, there was no techno-economic basis for determining how much additional food should be imported into Lesotho as drought relief -- i.e., over and above stocks which could have -- and should have -- been handled through normal commercial channels.
- In light of the well-established commercial channels for cereal importation and distribution in Lesotho, donors might have better served the needs of vulnerable consumer groups by monetizing relief cereals, distributing maize meal and other cereal products through the commercial network, and then using the receipts generated to provide the most vulnerable households with vouchers or other means of financial access to normal commercial channels.
- The United States government decision to turn over the distribution of relief food to WFP facilitated movement of enormous quantities of food throughout the region. However, the strategy used by the WFP in designing mitigation programs was essentially the same for countries that are traditionally food-surplus as it was for chronically-deficit countries. We believe that the USAID Mission in Maseru, had it been given the latitude, could have better tailored the United States drought response to the specific conditions of Lesotho. In this regard, there is a considerable difference between assigning the logistical arrangements for a drought emergency to WFP and turning over the responsibilities for both designing the response strategy and implementing it.
- To the extent that food distributions were not free, we believe it would have been more appropriate with Lesotho's monetized economy to design effective cash for work projects, rather than food for work projects.
- Available baseline data on household income flows and economic activities in Lesotho proved inadequate to the task of differentiating between those Basotho households

placed at significantly greater risk because of the drought and those that were chronically poor for other reasons.

- WFP is already feeding 30 percent of the Basotho population through programmed feeding programs. This indicates to us that food insecurity at the household level in Lesotho has its roots in circumstances other than the periodic occurrence of droughts. Under such conditions, ad hoc emergency relief programs, no matter how well run, will not contribute much to resolution of fundamental food insecurity issues. These must be tackled in the context of a sound long-term development plan that addresses basic poverty reduction and promotes fundamental changes in land management and agricultural practices in Lesotho.
- Lesotho's food security at present is more directly linked to South Africa, as a food surplus neighbor, than in any other SADC state. Given the political changes occurring in South Africa, continuation of past supply relationships should not be seen as guaranteed and it would be prudent for Lesotho to develop contingency plans for meeting its food import needs from other sources in the event that South Africa is unwilling or unable to be the effective guarantor of Lesotho's food security in the future.
- There is a great need for some standardization and sharing of procedures to find effective approaches to common problems in disaster relief operations. In this regard, effective sharing of the tremendous experience of international NGOs, such as the International Red Cross/Red Crescent, CARE and Save the Children, in disaster relief as reflected in their operations manuals and training materials is vital to the development of efficient fledgling relief operations like the DRIG in Lesotho.
- It is crucial to incorporate drought preparedness, response and recovery strategies into a country's long-term development planning. All long-term development interventions and GOL expenditures must be carefully analyzed to reduce the vulnerability of the population to climate induced shocks. While drought tolerant plant varieties and soil and water conservation strategies are important to foster, rural labor intensive projects that increase income and employment opportunities are crucial to household food security. In a cash economy, people must have the income to purchase essential needs.
- SADC has declared 1993 to be "the year of going to the people." The GOL and the NGO community need to take this objective to heart. Creation of additional layers of top-down bureaucracy will not bring the highly centralized government in closer touch with rural people. Emphasis on devolution of responsibility to the district and village levels in Lesotho might be a more effective strategy for the new government.

- According to UNICEF, in emergency situations their feeding programs do not attempt to differentiate between persons who are malnourished because of a specific drought and those chronically malnourished. Operationally, this is because such distinctions are unacceptable in local communities being served and "more trouble than they are worth."
- While the targeted food aid program went reasonably well in Lesotho, considering the mountainous terrain, there remains the question of the cost effectiveness of this method of serving vulnerable households. Both Save the Children and CARE, organizations with considerable experience in disaster assistance, had serious doubts about the efficacy of this approach and raised these with WFP at initial meetings in early 1992. They felt that a targeted feeding program, considering the inaccessibility of many Lesotho mountain villages, would require such massive logistical backup that it would not be cost effective. These issues were seemingly not addressed by WFP and neither CARE nor Save the Children representatives were invited to follow-on planning meetings.
- If drought relief efforts are properly planned and implemented to address specific and short-term vulnerabilities caused by exceptional conditions, they are highly likely to be self-terminating and should not engender long-term dependencies among local constituencies. The greatest danger for creating dependency exists when the government confuses short-term drought relief activities with longer-term development objectives and then seeks to capitalize upon the temporary emergency situation to further its development objectives.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

- In future emergencies requiring relief food distribution in Lesotho, donor attention should be focused first and foremost on using existing commercial networks to handle importation of cereals and distribution of cereal products.
- Given that Lesotho operates as a cash economy, donors should consider increasing monetization of all cereal imports and use of the proceeds generated to support well-targeted programs to increase the purchasing power of vulnerable households. In this regard, USAID should offer technical assistance to the GOL in designing, testing and evaluating alternative systems for converting proceeds from monetized sales into increased purchasing power for vulnerable households through issuance of ration cards, food chits, identification cards, etc.
- The United States supplied approximately 38 percent of the emergency food allocated to Lesotho yet seemed to have no effective voice in determining how that food was used. In the future, USAID should play a more active role in formulating an effective, country-specific drought emergency response. While it may be desirable in the future to delegate specific responsibilities for food logistics and management to WFP in Lesotho, turning over the entire responsibility for both planning and implementing the donor community's drought response does not appear warranted or desirable.
- USAID in the future should strongly encourage both the GOL and WFP to clearly distinguish between short-term activities appropriate to mitigating specific emergency conditions and longer-term development activities.
- The donor community should strongly encourage the GOL to refine its criteria for assessing vulnerability in drought situations **before** the next emergency.
- Given the problems with FFW projects in Lesotho and elsewhere in southern Africa, USAID should minimize its involvement in such projects and instead promote effective cash for work modeled on the Botswana experience.

**ANNEX A
LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED**

USAID

F. Gary Towery	Director
Gary E. Lewis	ADO
Maletete Khalikane	Agricultural Officer

Drought Relief Implementation Group

M.P. Sejanamane	Chief Executive
L.L. Molapo	Deputy Chief Executive

Peace Corps

Nancy Yuill	Training/Small Enterprise Officer
Patricia Matete	Agricultural Program Officer
Richard Dobson	PCV
Buzz Iacovelli	PCV

WFP

(Tel: (266) 323989 FAX: (266) 310239)

Tesema Negash	Director
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WFP Evaluation Team

Bhim Mahajan	Team Leader/Consultant
Annemarie Waeschle	Evaluation Officer/WFP
Franz Gotz	Transport Economist/Consultant
Peter Murphy	Agricultural Economist/FAO
Bernadetter M. Duma	Public Health/Nutrition/WHO

FAO

(Tel: (266) 315585 FAX: (266) 310196)

Dario Gilmozzi	Resident Representative (acting)
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UNICEF

(Tel: (266) 315801 FAX: (266) 310248)

Ralph Diaz	Representative
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UNDP

(Tel: (266) 313790 FAX: (266) 310 042)

John O. Kakonge	Resident Representative
John H. Skinner	Drought Relief Coordinator and Advisor to DRIG
Dolar Vasani	U.N. Volunteer Program Officer

European Community	(Tel: (266) 313726 FAX: (266) 310193)
J.Jochem Zuidberg	Head of Delegation
Lesotho Council of NGOs	(Tel: (266) 317205 FAX: (266) 310412)
Caleb Nchafatso Sello	Executive Director
Christian Council of Lesotho	(Tel: (266) 313369 FAX: (266) 310412)
Malefelisa Setloboko Tseliso Tuhroane	
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	(Tel: (266) 313911)
Richard P. Briant	Relief Delegate
Lesotho Red Cross	(Tel: (266) 313911)
Roland C. Mokoma	Director
Food and Management Unit	
Sello Letsie	Director
M. Makhalanyane	Deputy Director
M. Seboka	Early Warning System Specialist
F. S. Kolobe	Financial Controller
E. Mokatja	Controller of Stores
M. Chere	Operations Supervisor
J. Matsumunyane	Senior Project Officer
R. Lerotholi	Senior Project Officer
Phillip Lucas	Advisor
British High Commission	(Tel: (266) 313961 FAX: (266) 310120)
P.V. O'Connor	Second Secretary (AID/Commercial)
CARE	(Tel: (266) 323223 FAX: (266) 310195)
E. Krishnan	Country Director
Julie Redfern	Project Manager
Others	
Abby Maxman	GTZ/WFP Consultant
Charles Danzol	USAID consultant assigned to DRIG and LCN
Geoffrey Rockliffe-King	Food Studies Group, Oxford University

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ANNEX C
LISTING OF EACH RECIPIENT OF UNITED STATES FUNDING

Of estimated non-food needs of \$ 5,042,278, the United States Government provided \$ 280,000. This funding included:

Grant to UNICEF for immunization and health program	\$ 150,000
Ambassador's Self-help Fund grant for food transport and distribution	25,000
American Red Cross grant for an emergency project in Lesotho	105,000

Total direct United States non-food assistance	\$ 280,000
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OFDA provided \$ 150,000 to UNICEF in general support of their health and immunization programs, both of which were accelerated during the drought emergency. This was in line with the OFDA assessment recommendations. The total UNICEF budget during the period of June 1992 to May 1993 was \$ 2,202,262.

OFDA provided \$ 105,000 to the American Red Cross which was passed through to the collaborative effort of the Lesotho Red Cross and International Red Cross in general support of their relief efforts during the drought emergency.

An additional \$ 25,000 was provided through the Ambassador's Self-help Fund for food transport and distribution directly to the Lesotho Red Cross for food transport to 45 distribution points in the three mountain districts.

ANNEX D
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

- Early 1991 National Early Warning Unit issues first bulletins warning of rainfall irregularities in Lesotho.
- Mid 1991 GOL issues an appeal to donors for assistance in drought relief. The appeal elicits no donor responses.
- Early 1992 Donor representatives in Lesotho become concerned about the drought situation and pressure the GOL to issue an appeal.
- March/April 1992 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment missions are undertaken in ten SADC countries in cooperation with SADC Early Warning Units. The GOL prepares emergency projects for inclusion in a DESA appeal.
- OFDA Assessment mission is undertaken in Lesotho.
- The military government in Lesotho recognizes the drought as food security issue and makes a number of budgetary adjustments for coming fiscal year.
- 15 April 1992 A joint FAO/WFP drought emergency alert issued.
- May 1992 The Ministry of Finance approaches the African Development Bank for support in dealing with drought emergency. Bank reacts positively but disbursement of funds takes over a year.
- The Lesotho Council of NGOs is given a mandate by its membership to coordinate NGO response to drought.
- June 1992 An official UN/SADC appeal is presented at donors conference in Geneva.
- The military government in Lesotho announces a State of Emergency.
- United States Ambassador Spearman declares a disaster and gives \$ 25,000 to the Lesotho Red Cross.
- July 1992 The Drought Relief Implementation Group (DRIG) is created replacing the the existing GOL Disaster Management Unit.
- GOL promises to establish a National Drought Relief Budget for DRIG but does not act.

- August 1992 Registration of beneficiaries under the Vulnerable Household Feeding Program begins. Registration is completed in December.
- September 1992 Ministry of Finance approaches the World Bank for support in dealing with drought emergency. Bank reacts positively.
- DRIG becomes operational.
- November 1992 NGOs receive GOL funding to implement the Vulnerable Household Feeding Program.
- December 1992 A decision taken by DRIG, endorsed by the GOL, to re-register vulnerable households in Lesotho because of irregularities with the first registration effort. Re-registration takes two months.
- Interest in DRIG monthly coordination meetings declines as politicians gear up for elections.
- February 1993 A revised UN/SADC appeal is issued.
- June 1993 The GOL through DRIG declares that drought continue in selected areas.

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ANNEX E

**COMPARISON OF FOOD SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES
AND TOTAL AMOUNTS SUPPLIED**

The FAO/WFP needs assessment placed food requirements for Lesotho at 60,702 metric tons for 170,000 affected people. Of this total, the United States Government provided 23,325 metric tons of maize representing 38 percent of the emergency food supplied and at a value of \$ 9,229,100.

United States Food Assistance

	FY 1992		FY 1993	
Title II	8,114 metric tons	\$ 3,864,000	10,121 metric tons	\$ 3,775,100
Section 416	5,000 metric tons	1,590,000	0	0
	<hr/>			
Total	13,114 metric tons	\$ 5,454,000	10,121 metric tons	\$ 3,775,100

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ANNEX F
REVISED UN/SADC APPEAL FEBRUARY 1993

	<u>Revised UN/SADC Appeal</u>		<u>United States Contribution</u>	
	<u>Metric Tons</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Metric Tons</u>	<u>Value</u>
I. <u>FOOD AID</u>				
National Import Requirement	299,702			
Less Commercial Imports	222,000			
Total Food Aid Requirement: of which:	77,702			
Program Food Aid	45,000			
Targeted Food Aid	15,702	\$ 6,033,820	23,235	\$ 9,22-
	9,100			
	-----	-----		
Sub-Total Food	60,702	\$ 6,033,820		
II. <u>NON-FOOD AID</u>				
Agriculture		\$ 900,000		
Logistics		358,430		
Health/Nutrition		130,000		
Vulnerable Groups		2,202,262		
Water		1,453,586		
Other		0	\$ 280,000	
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Sub-Total Non-Food		\$ 5,042,278	\$ 280,000	
Grand Total		\$ 11,076,098	\$ 9,509,100	

STATEMENT OF WORK

SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION

I. Background

Southern Africa faced one of the worst droughts in decades in 1992. The drought devastated crops, particularly maize, reduced scarce water availability in many areas and placed the lives of some 18 million people at risk from starvation and disease. In countries also affected by conflict or insecurity, the drought added to already catastrophic conditions, placing additional heavy burdens on people who could no longer cope with further adversity.

FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment missions, in cooperation with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), estimated that the aggregated cereal production of the ten drought-affected SADC countries had fallen to six million metric tons (MT); about half of the normal production in 1992/93. The cereal import requirement of these countries was estimated in March 1992 to be at a level of 6.1 million MT, compared with less than 2 million MT in a normal year.

In response to the drought, emergency food aid shipments to southern Africa have reached unprecedented levels. As of December 31, 1992, U.S. emergency food aid was 2.3 million MT valued at \$650 million for the region, an increase of over 1.4 million MT from previous years. Non-food emergency assistance also reached an all time high for the southern Africa region with FHA/OFDA providing over \$37 million and AFR/SA providing \$59.9 million through December 31, 1992.

The objective of relief assistance is to save lives. Evaluations of relief efforts thus must assess the achievements of the international relief community toward this overall goal. The U.S. contribution also needs to be placed into the context of the total international relief effort.

It is in this context that an assessment of the USG emergency program is conceived. This assessment will provide the opportunity to take stock of USG successes, lessons learned and deficiencies in delivering emergency assistance. It is hoped that this review will contribute to improving the effectiveness of USG emergency aid responses and will develop new models or document existing ones that can be used by other donors and host governments.

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II. Objectives

1. To provide data on the overall international relief effort including the validity of the initial assessments, the appropriateness of the response measures employed, the U.S. role in the international effort and, to the extent possible, a comparative analysis of this effort with past relief efforts of similar magnitude.
2. To assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact of emergency food and non-food assistance to the Southern Africa Drought Emergency (SADE) and suggest means of improvement.
3. To assist USAID Missions, AID/Washington, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), host governments and other donors in programming future emergency, rehabilitation and disaster prevention activities and in improving Washington/field donor coordination by providing A.I.D. (and the donor community) with lessons learned regarding the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.
4. To Identify conditions under which import mobilization and internal food distribution were both efficient and cost-effective in meeting drought response objectives.

III. Scope of Work

The following questions are illustrative of the kinds of issues that should be examined in depth by the team in carrying out the objectives of this evaluation. Emphasis, of course, will vary from country to country and will depend on the particular type of intervention being examined and the degree of severity of the emergency situation. Priority should be given to information gathering and analysis leading to improved programming, design and exploration of new options for the formulation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.

A. Causes of the Emergency

- o Food deficit due to the drought emergency in southern Africa.
- o To what extent was the country's food problem related to agricultural and macroeconomic policies that may discourage local agricultural production and marketing rather than the drought? Has the drought caused any tangible change in agricultural policies?

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B. Host Country Preparedness and Contingency Planning

- o Do national procedures exist in the affected countries for responding to emergencies? Are they followed when an actual emergency occurs?
- o How did the internal and external coordination of the drought response affect the overall efficiency, impact and cost-effectiveness of each country's drought emergency response?
- o Identify what combination of public and private sector roles led to appropriate, timely, efficient and cost-effective responses by both host country governments and donors.
- o Describe the types and levels of public and private sector security stocks, distribution mechanisms and how they were used, if they were used, in the disaster situation.
- o What planning activities could be undertaken to strengthen the capacity of the affected country's government to respond more effectively to structural and emergency food deficit situations?
- o Review drought prevention/mitigation actions: farming practices, crop diversification, soil/water conservation measures, food security stocks, storage/transport losses, seed production, etc.
- o How does the local population normally deal with food shortages and how can this traditional coping behavior be reinforced?
- o How effective were the early warning systems/weather forecasting services (FEWS project, etc.)? Will these systems remain in place for the future? Will SADC install an early warning system as part of its activities?
- o What was/is the impact of pests (army worms/locusts) and plant disease?

C. Donor Coordination

- o How effective were the USG early warning systems and coordination?
- o Were adequate mechanisms (including telecommunications systems) in existence or were they established to coordinate assessments of donor requirements and implementation efforts?

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- How successful was the U.N. World Food Programme and the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Assistance in coordinating assistance, delivering assistance, etc. and how did they interact with each other and other groups responding to the drought?
- What was the role and responsibilities of international, U.S. and/or local non-governmental organizations/private voluntary organizations?
- How do donors' methodologies for calculating food and non-food needs and their system for reporting on food deliveries, donor pledges, etc. relate to those of the UN? Are they adequate?
- What were the successes and failures of donor coordination and the role of donor meetings and appeals.
- What was the role of SADC and was it effective in responding to the drought needs of the member countries?
- What was the role of South Africa? How well did cooperation among regional transport authorities work, and what factor influenced the success of those efforts? Did early estimates of South African port and rail capacity overestimate the difficulties of handling projected food imports? If so, why?
- What role did WFP play in transport coordination?

D. Needs Assessment

- What were the types of information collection system (e.g., rainfall analysis, nutrition surveillance), analysis procedures and use of data for early warning, assessment of requirements, declaration of disaster, design of programs, estimation of food input, etc. used by A.I.D., the UN, host governments?
- Was the logistical capacity of the government, USAID and the private sector adequately taken into account in determining food aid levels?
- Evaluate the accuracy, rapidity, integrity and appropriateness of A.I.D.'s needs assessment process?
- Was there any effort to monitor prices in the local market as a measure of determining food shortages?

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E. Project Design

- How were the target areas and groups of beneficiaries selected?
- Describe the demographics of the beneficiary population. Did the majority of food and/or non-food assistance go to a specific group (e.g., farmers, urban poor, displaced persons, refugees)?
- Were local food preferences and food consumption patterns of the target population as well as local market prices adequately considered in the choice of commodities and the selection of distribution systems?
- Which mechanism was the most effective in providing food aid to the beneficiary (WFP, host government, PVO, etc.) Did this vary based on the type of beneficiary; e.g., getting food to markets versus targeted feeding?
- By the type of recipient (malnourished children, adults, etc.) which type of food aid implementation was the most effective (FFW, general distribution, targeted feeding, etc.)
- Were necessary complementary inputs (i.e., seeds, vaccines, materials, technical assistance, environmental impacts assessments) incorporated into the food emergency program?
- To what extent had participation of beneficiaries and utilization of already existing organizational structures/resources, particularly local non-governmental organizations, been built into responses?
- How can the basic food problem best be addressed with emergency food aid? With commercial?
- How were costs a factor in the design of the emergency response program? What budget limits, if any, were established by the respective host government(s)?
- Were provisions for termination of emergency food aid and/or transition to rehabilitation and longer term development foreseen during the planning stages?
- Were linkages with regular food and non-food aid programs and other complementary resources explored?
- Were disincentives introduced by the provision of massive quantities of PL 480 food?

F. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

- o Did the host governments, UN, USAID Missions, AID/W, PVOs and local community groups effectively organize themselves to manage the emergency? How vigilant were these groups in protecting themselves from becoming overextended? What emphasis was placed on institution-building and the enhancement of local resourcefulness? Did they utilize guidelines for assessing environmental impacts? Were these guidelines effective? What was the role of the Peace Corps and other USG agencies? How did the different Bureaus within A.I.D. interact? What was the role and utility of the Southern Africa Drought Task Force? Discuss in terms of relief planning, organization, resource allocation (the Africa Disaster Assistance Account), postcrisis rehabilitation and longer term sustainability.
- o What are the policies/practices of local governments and donors in the management, monitoring and evaluation of emergency programs and what was their varying impacts on large commercial farmers and small, subsistence farmers?
- o How can management, monitoring, oversight and evaluation be improved?

G. Timeliness of Emergency Response

- o Discuss the effectiveness and quantify the exact time frames for the following:
 - Needs assessment
 - Approval process for food and non-food projects considered
 - Procurement of commodities
 - Delivery of commodities to the country
 - Internal distribution of food and non-food aid to the target population
 - Arrival of technical assistance
- o Describe constraints, i.e. logistical/organizational /political bottlenecks, and how and if they were overcome. Was the WFP regional logistical unit in Harare and its subset in Johannesburg effective? Suggest ways of expediting these procedures in the future. Was private sector transport, handling and storage used effectively in

the response to the drought and, if not, how can it be improved?

- o If food commodities arrived late, were appropriate actions taken to avoid disincentive effects on local production and marketing?

H. Program Results

To the extent possible and, taking into account the constraints inherent in disaster situations, the evaluation team will present evidence of the effectiveness/impact of emergency interventions in terms of the following:

- o Targeting: extent to which areas and/or victims with greatest need are being reached. Was better targeting achieved as the drought progressed?
- o Appropriateness and adequacy of USG food and non-food intervention. Were resources allocated appropriately for maximum effectiveness?
- o Coverage: percentage of the affected population being assisted (by the United States, by other donors)
- o Increased availability of food in target areas and consumption by vulnerable groups
- o Incentive/disincentive effects on agricultural production/prices/incomes
- o Improved nutritional and health status of target groups
- o Decreased infant and child mortality
- o Demographic effects: population movements to centers and urban areas, age/sex distribution, etc.
- o Dependency/self-reliance: Have the relief programs weakened the self-help capacity of individuals and community groups? How can programs be organized better to reempower individuals and strengthen local decision-making and resource generation/productivity?
- o Policy and institutional reform: How has the emergency affected ongoing food strategy plans and price restructuring efforts? How has the emergency intervention strengthened the capacity of the national and local governments as well as local NGOs to respond more effectively to future emergencies?

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I. Policy Issues

The following issues are complex and deserve separate studies in themselves. They are extremely important in thinking about programming options and will provide a useful backdrop for discussions and future interventions. As appropriate, the team should address these concerns in the context of recommendations for program improvement/redesign and lessons learned:

- o Relative effectiveness (impact and costs) of various distribution modes (e.g., general free distribution, maternal and child health, supplementary feeding programs, food for work, monetization, triangular transactions, rehabilitation activities), consideration of alternative distribution mechanisms and the extent of the relief effort's decentralization/regionalization.
- o Comparative advantage and cost-effectiveness of different food distribution channels (WFP, PVOs, host governments) and criteria for selecting among them.
- o Linkages with regular food aid program and other development assistance activities, how to use them to prepare better for future emergencies as well as to assess the effect a disaster has on them in the short term. This includes the following:
 - a. What effect do emergency activities have on the Mission's regular program and their strategic objectives? Should we consider these "on hold" while an emergency takes place? Should funding for them be decreased and moved toward the emergency?
 - b. How should disasters affect the composition of the Mission program? Should the Strategic Objectives in their regular development program take this into account and, if not, why?
 - c. Can ongoing activities be redirected to assist the drought? To what extent should they?
- o The capacity and ability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to act independently of political constraints.
- o How food emergency programs can be planned to support sector and macroeconomic policy reforms and strengthen food self-reliance, disaster prevention and longer term development initiatives.
- o Criteria for determining when and how emergency programs should be phased in and out.

- o The role that donor coordination (food and non-food needs assessments, standardized methodologies, centralized assistance/pledge information) does/should play in maximizing the effectiveness of emergency responses.

IV. Evaluation Approach and Duration

During the first week of the assessment, the Contractor will draft scopes of work for team participants. All team members then will meet in Washington, D.C., to review and clarify the scopes of work, develop field protocols for site visits and for interviews with local officials and program participants, as well as to hold discussions with key A.I.D., USDA, State Department and PVO officials in Washington.

After this prefield analysis is completed, the teams will proceed to the southern Africa region, as coordinated by the Contract's Chief of Party, to carry out field investigations: review additional documentation, interview key U.S. Mission personnel, host government, PVO and other donor officials and inspect appropriate field sites. Specific attention should be devoted to capturing the perceptions of program participants, either through structured interviews or informal conversations in their own language. The field work will be carried out in approximately 36 working days per team member. For Mozambique the field work will be carried out in approximately 20 working days per team member.

While in the field all logistical support costs will be provided by the contractor and not by the Missions. This includes travel and transportation (surface and air), lodging, office space, office equipment and supplies, etc.

The teams will inform the Mission of the countries visited of areas that will be considered.

Upon return from the field, each team will review its findings and will prepare a draft country report. When all the country studies have been completed, Mission comments received and the final reports prepared, the Contractor's core technical staff will prepare a synthesis of findings and recommendations, drawing out lessons learned about what works, what does not work and why, from both the operational and policy perspectives.

AID/Washington and USAID Missions would be expected to collect all existing data and reports and other relevant records for the team before their arrival to the countries being identified. To the extent possible, USAID Missions should provide logistical support for the team while in-country.

Total duration of the evaluation will be approximately three months with a target completion date of September 21, 1993.

V. Country Selection

All drought-affected countries in the southern Africa region, including South Africa and excluding Angola, which received USG food and/or non-food assistance will be assessed. The region will be broken into four areas, each of which will be visited by one team, as follows: 1) Zimbabwe and South Africa, 2) Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, 3) Zambia and Malawi, and 4) Mozambique.

VI. Team Composition and Level of Effort

In conducting these country assessments, the contractor will provide at least four teams of specialists; one team for each of the areas specified above. Given the range of skills required to carry out this scope of work and the short time frame, the background of these specialists will vary, but all of the following areas of expertise must be represented:

- Language skills and country-specific experience
- Agricultural economics
- Public health/nutrition
- Rural Water
- Social Anthropology
- Food Logistics
- PL 480 Program Regulations and WFP Procedures
- Policy analysis/program design/evaluation
- UN System
- Disaster Management

The team leaders will be on the contractor's core technical staff. While continuity in the evaluation team is assumed, it is not essential for the same consultants to go to all the countries.

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VII. Reports

The team will submit a report on each country as well as a synthesis containing an analysis of those factors that appear to determine program effectiveness, recommendations on how A.I.D. can improve its programming of emergency food aid and non-food aid and lessons learned. Before departure from each country, the team will have engaged the USAID in a dialogue concerning their findings and recommendations. The draft country reports are due to AID/Washington no later than two weeks after each team has returned to the United States. Fifty copies will be delivered. The Missions will be asked to complete their reviews and respond with comments by cable within two weeks of receiving the draft. The Contractor will conduct a debriefing in Washington for AID and all interested parties within one month of the return of all teams. The final report (including an executive summary and synthesis of findings, recommendations and lessons learned) will be completed by the Contractor within two weeks of receiving all Mission comments. Fifty copies of this report will be delivered to FHA/OFDA, who will distribute them to all interested parties including FHA/FFP, AFR/SA, SADTF, LEG, CDIE and InterAction.

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