

**EVALUATION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO 1991/92 SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT**

Country Report: MALAWI

June 1994

Prepared for:

USAID/Bureau for Humanitarian Response

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADMARC	Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation
CDPRR	Commission for Drought Preparedness, Relief and Rehabilitation
CONGOMA	Council of Non-governmental Organizations in Malawi
DC	District Commissioner
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EC	European Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FARRU	Food Aid Relief and Rehabilitation Unit
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System Project of USAID
GIEWS	Global Information Early Warning System
GOM	Government of Malawi
MK	Malawi Kwacha
MOH	Ministry of Health
MRCS	Malawi Red Cross Society
NEWS	National Early Warning System of Malawi
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
ODA	Overseas Development Agency
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPC	Office of the President and Cabinet
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SGR	Strategic Grain Reserve
TLU	Transport Logistics Unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	World Food Program

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

A. Evaluation Objectives

This evaluation was undertaken to profit from the considerable experience gained by USAID, the United Nations agencies, international donors, non-governmental organizations, and the host government, in responding to the Southern Africa drought crisis of 1991-92. The evaluation seeks to extract important lessons regarding disaster identification, needs assessment, response planning, inter-organizational cooperation and coordination, implementation of strategies, and emergency response results which can be applied to future local crises, and generalized for improving responses to potential disasters elsewhere. Analysis will identify efficient and cost-effective strategies which resulted in successful disaster response and which can be built upon. It will also identify problems which should be addressed and avoided. In addition, the impact of the drought emergency experience on governmental and institutional/organizational capacities and policies will be examined.

This evaluation was performed under contract to A.I.D.'s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (AEP-0085-I-00-3001-00, D.O. 9). A Statement of Work is attached as Annex E.

B. Country Overview and Political System

The Republic of Malawi is one of the most densely populated and poorest countries in Africa, with 87 persons per square km, and an estimated per capita income of about \$130 per year. The population is about 9 million, with an additional one million Mozambican refugees, and population growth is 3.3 percent. About 90 percent of the population resides in rural areas. Such population pressure has led to considerable strain on agriculture, which already uses virtually all arable land in the country. The country is landlocked, bordered by Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, and dependant on regional transportation systems for imports and exports.

Malawi has the seventh highest under-five mortality rate in the world, 258 per thousand, and an infant mortality rate of 144 per thousand. Over 60 percent of children between age 2 and 5 years are malnourished, and about half the population does not have access to safe drinking water.

USAID/Malawi focuses on poverty reduction and economic growth through projects to increase food crop production, increase off farm employment, reduce fertility, reduce infant and child mortality and morbidity, and control AIDS. Other goals are to enhance human resource development, expand basic education, and expand the role of NGOs. The Mission is also involved in regional transport sector projects and has been strongly supporting democratization activities.

Political System: After being a British colony and British protectorate, Malawi gained independence in 1964 and Hastings Kamuzu Banda was elected president, and has remained in that position. The country has become increasingly less open and democratic and invoked

criticism from the world community for human rights abuses, failing to permit freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and outlawing the formation of opposition political parties. As a result of concern over human rights abuses in Malawi, the international donor community at the Consultative Group meeting in Paris in May 1992 suspended \$70 million of non-humanitarian aid.

In recent years several events have combined to motivate the government to move toward democratization. Significant reduction of foreign assistance, on which the country is virtually entirely dependant, has had an impact. In early 1992, a Pastoral Letter issued by the Bishop of Malawi addressing human rights furthered movement toward resolution of this issue.

Most significantly, a referendum to restore human rights and legalize opposition political parties was passed by almost 2:1 in June 1992, expressing resounding support for restoration of rights and a multi-party system. Changes immediately followed the referendum. Political prisoners were released, some of whom are now being allowed to sue the government for unlawful arrest. Twenty daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers appeared, whereas before the referendum there was only one state controlled newspaper.

There are now seven political parties registered. A national referendum to elect a president and members of Parliament is scheduled to be held May 1994. There is some concern, however, as to whether it will actually happen, as well as apprehension about whether the transfer of power will be peaceful. Many local and expatriate observers believe that the impetus for these positive changes, such as the referendums, has been the additional pressure exerted by the presence of numerous donor and UN organizations as a result of the drought.

The government structure is a bi-cameral Parliament. Decision-making is extremely centralized with many issues requiring Cabinet or presidential approval. This invariably results in long delays on all decisions, including delaying timely actions and response to emergencies. Government policies are implemented at the district level by District Commissioners (DC). DCs are supervised by Regional Administrators, who in turn report to the Office of the President and Cabinet.

A brief political and economic history of Malawi must make note of its reciprocal relationship with the Republic of South Africa, cultivated since President Banda assumed office in 1964. Trade between Malawi and South Africa has been active. Since the political and trading barriers have begun to open legitimately between South Africa and its neighboring countries, Malawi's special relationship with South Africa may be coming to an end.

C. Emergency History

Malawi has experienced a series of disasters of varying degrees. There have been periodic floods and droughts, cholera and dysentery epidemics, the mealy bug infestation of 1989-91, the flash floods and landslides of 1990-91, as well as Mozambican refugees. Nevertheless, the drought of 1991-92 was a disaster of entirely unprecedented proportions.

Importantly, Malawi has had ongoing experience since 1982 with Mozambican refugees fleeing across the border from civil strife. Exact levels are disputed, but the numbers have been in the hundreds of thousands and have approached one million. The refugees reside in camps and in spontaneous settlements, many participating in marginal economic activities. Full food support is provided to them by United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Commodities are brought in and delivered by the WFP, and programs are administered by Malawi Red Cross. Therefore, considerable in-country experience existed regarding food importation, transportation, and distribution.

In March 1991, flash floods hit the Southern Region of Malawi, mainly in the Phalombe area, and left 500 people dead and about 40,000 people homeless. About 84,000 families lost their crops, including their entire food source. USAID and other donors provided emergency assistance in the form of food and shelter.

D. Causes of 1991-1992 Emergency

The rainy season in Malawi, which lasts from early November to late March, is caused by the establishment of an Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone. A high pressure system is built with counterclock-wise airflow over the Mozambican channel. At the same time, a parallel low pressure system of clockwise air current is established over Botswana. As the zone travels south, convergence normally occurs and brings rain to the entire Southern Africa region. In 1991-92, the pressure systems reversed. The zone was pushed apart, no convergence occurred, and rainfall was far below normal.

Climatically, the drought of 1991-92 is considered the most severe drought since 1949 and arrived with little warning or seasonal indication. Early rains were good and early assessments indicated the likelihood of an excellent harvest. However, the rains stopped in late January, during the critical "tasselling" period for maize. By early February, it was visually apparent that the maize crop was severely affected. Although the rains resumed in mid-March, it was only after irreversible damage had already occurred, resulting in an overall national reduction of 52 percent in normal yield.

The drought did not devastate the entire country. The most severely affected area was the Southern Region which traditionally receives less rain than the rest of the country, and where maize is the predominant crop. Crop failure reached 100 percent in many southern areas. The Central and Northern Regions were less extensively affected, receiving slightly more rain,

and because crops there are slightly more diversified. The degree of maize crop loss varied, with some districts harvesting more than half normal production.

E. Country's Ability to Withstand and Manage the Disaster

1. Resources and Vulnerability

Overall, Malawi was poorly prepared economically, agriculturally, and nutritionally for any kind of disaster. A delicate balance maintains survival during the best of times.

Economy: Malawi's primary source of foreign exchange is the export of tobacco, tea, sugar, coffee, and cotton. Malawi produces 17 percent of the world supply of "burly" variety tobacco, which accounts for 70 percent of Malawi's agricultural export income, primarily from sales to South Africa, the U.S., and Japan. However, tobacco sales have been falling as a result of anti-smoking campaigns in purchaser countries. Reductions in commercial agricultural production or demand can seriously affect national financial resources.

Malawi has small mineral deposits of coal and gold, and possibly platinum and strontium. However, mining activities are limited because of the need for large investment capital to open and expand the industry.

There is only a very limited light industrial capacity, producing simple products for local use. The majority of processed and manufactured goods, as well as agricultural inputs, are imported, primarily from South Africa, representing a considerable drain on foreign exchange.

Infrastructure development has been primarily financed by tobacco sales, and foreign assistance loans, grants, and projects. There are normally no funds available to respond to unexpected emergencies.

Infrastructure: The transportation infrastructure has been a GOM priority. Emphasis has been on developing the road and railroad system for transportation of agricultural products. For internal commodities transport trucks and fuel are readily and sufficiently available in Malawi. Since Malawi is landlocked it is dependent upon transportation linkages with its neighbors. Despite road and rail improvements by the GOM civil strife in neighboring Mozambique and Angola resulting in armed attacks on transport vehicles and destruction of rails has impeded transport of Malawian goods to market. Increased fuel prices and the enforced re-routing of shipments through South Africa because of the closure of rail links through Mozambique have doubled transport costs and made Malawian products less economically competitive abroad.

Communications are relatively good, with many parts of the country connected by telephone service. The quality of the system has been sufficient to make the addition of fax communications possible as an enhancement to coordination.

The water provision system has been very weak. Out of 9,000 water points in the country, at the start of the drought 6,000 were not operating. Although some had suffered from drought-induced reductions in the water table, many were either totally mechanically inoperable, or in need of varying degrees of repair and maintenance. Government water authorities had neither human nor material resources sufficient to even approach maintaining the system. Indicative of the condition and vulnerability of the water system are the results of an International Rescue Committee survey carried out in its designated service district to assist in its targeting and prioritizing. In their district (Ntcheu) there were 1,526 water points. The survey found that 21 percent of them were totally inadequate or inoperable, and 33.4 percent were adequate, while the rest were marginal. Over 60 percent of boreholes were not functioning because of mechanical failure, 80 percent of shallow wells were not functioning, primarily because of aquifer failure, also 80 percent of protected springs were not functioning, primarily because of aquifer failure.

Subsistence Agriculture and Food Security: The majority of Malawians have access to just barely enough food in normal times. Interference with food supply, in the form of reduced production or reduced supplemental resources cannot easily be absorbed by most households, whose reserve assets are minimal. Traditionally, December and January are considered by Malawians as the "hungry" months, between the time the food stores from the previous year are exhausted and new crop is harvested.

Agriculture, including fishing, employs 85 percent of the labor force. About 80 percent of farmers consume all they produce. Seventy-three percent of farmers have access to only 1.5 hectares or less. Areas in which 68 percent of the rural population live chronically produce under 200 kg/yr per capita. About 40 percent of the population cannot achieve sufficient caloric intake from their own crop production in normal years. A large proportion of families supplement their resources by seasonal agricultural labor on estate and commercial farms, and by a share-cropping type of arrangement.

A system of household food security has developed in rural Malawi which sustains existence, although just barely as indicated by chronically poor nutritional levels. Although most farmers have little or no surplus production, many sell a portion of their crop shortly after harvest to the nearest of the 1,200 local depots of the parastatal Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC). Later in the year they buy back the maize, at fixed prices, as needed. This strategy provides necessary cash for household needs and provides safe and convenient grain storage. The majority of farmers report that they buy more maize than they sell. Large-scale purchases by ADMARC automatically absorbs and redistributes surplus production from larger farms to allow for such later purchases. As well as the system works in normal times, it is vulnerable to production shortages which reduce available stocks for sale.

Since independence the GOM has focused on expansion of the agricultural sector towards a goal of food self-sufficiency. With national grain consumption of 1.6 million MTs, self-

sufficiency can be nearly reached with exceptional harvests. However, regional food self-sufficiency, particularly in southern areas of the country, is seldom reached.

In 1986 and again in 1989, as part of the GOM Development Policy document, the need for crop diversification was identified along with the need for agricultural research, extension training, marketing, and increasing animal husbandry. Nonetheless, agricultural policies have remained focused on supporting maize production, with relatively little attention directed toward other food crops. This is in spite of the fact that in some areas, such as the Shire Valley, sorghum and millet are preferred. However, improved seed stock for these crops is generally unavailable.

With most arable land already under cultivation, increased production requires increased yield. The GOM is vigorously promoting the use of hybrid maize and has made input credit available and ensured that sufficient supplies are available for purchase throughout the country. Increasingly, farmers are turning to hybrid maize seed and chemical fertilizers. An estimated 20 percent of farmers use the hybrid seed. For these farmers yield is significantly increased over local maize varieties, as are yearly input costs for seed and fertilizer purchases. But, the hybrid maize does not store as well as the local variety and is more subject to infestation, thus requiring fumigants. Access to credit to purchase inputs is a continually increasing problem. Typically, the poorest smallholders have the least access to such credit.

Health: There is a system of district hospitals and rural health centers and clinics. However, these are chronically understaffed and undersupplied. Nutrition and health are generally very poor and very vulnerable to further deterioration. The census of 1977 found that among children under five years of age 35 percent were underweight during the pre-harvest period, and 28 percent were underweight during post-harvest when food should have been most abundant. Fifty-five percent of the sample exhibited stunting, indicating very long-term undernutrition. A survey in 1992 found only very slight improvement in the intervening 15 years. Diseases such as cholera and malaria remain serious problems.

Government responses to these problems have, thus far, been ineffective. At a Policy Symposium in 1986 sponsored by USAID, UNICEF, and WHO the alarming nutritional state of the country's children was presented to the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC). Subsequently, a nutrition policy was included in the GOM Development Plan which sought to build household food security, improve human resource development, and support micronutrient supplementation. Nutrition Units were placed in three ministries. In the Ministry of Economic Planning the unit had the responsibility of overall planning for integrating a nutrition component into all relevant projects submitted to it by other ministries for funding. The unit in the Ministry of Health (MOH) was responsible for integrating nutrition into health education materials. In the Ministry of Agriculture the role of the NU was undefined. As an indication of the degree of government commitment, the nutrition unit director at the Ministry of Economic Planning has been out of the country on a 3-year state-sponsored PhD program, and the position has been left vacant in his absence.

There are ongoing supplemental feeding programs conducted by UNICEF and supplied by WFP and run through existing clinics. When the drought began, WFP was already providing supplementary feeding for about 80,000 children and 74,000 women.

2. Emergency Preparedness Capability

Prior to the drought Malawi had several structures and mechanisms in place which should have been able to facilitate identification and response to the drought. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that these mechanisms were effectively used to facilitate or increase the timeliness or effectiveness of the GOM response.

In 1986 the GOM approached the UN Disaster Relief Agency to request assistance in dealing with the flood of refugees coming from Mozambique. The GOM also cited a series of moderate droughts, floods, and cyclones. Malawi was given funding to sponsor the National Disaster Preparedness Relief and Rehabilitation Committee to draft a master plan for disaster response. This committee still exists, and is composed of subcommittees for food assessment and monitoring, health, water and nutrition, procurement, and transport logistics.

There was Food Security and Nutrition Unit, established in response to the nutritional findings of 1986, and housed within the OPC to provide analysis and develop policy. Prior to the drought there was an existing national Food Security Policy which included a strategy and approach, although the exact mechanisms for implementation had not been determined. However, this system had been developed to address long-term nutritional problems rather than emergencies. There was also a Food and Nutrition Department within the Ministry of Agriculture, which performed food security monitoring.

When the Phalombe flood occurred in 1991 a master response plan did not yet exist. But as a result of the flood, the Malawi Disaster Act of 1991 passed the legislature and created the Commission for Disaster Preparedness, Relief, and Rehabilitation located in the Office of the President and Cabinet. Its responsibility was to coordinate with each ministry in the drafting of sectoral disaster plans and to consolidate them into an overall master plan for the country. The plan would include estimates of the potential damage to property so that the GOM would be able to project the resources, money and man-power required to respond. In the event of a disaster, the GOM would know how much to request from donors. The intended plan appears to have been more of a needs assessment and assistance appeal guideline rather than a strategy for providing emergency services in a crisis. This plan had not been developed by the start of the 1991 drought.

A task force called the Emergency Management Unit (EMU) was also formed to bring together the Permanent Secretaries, ministry officials, and representatives of donors and NGOs at regular meetings. The EMU was supposed to explore delivery of services for disaster relief, refugees, and food for work programs. District Committees would report their planning ideas and priorities to Regional Committees, through Permanent Secretaries, and on to the National Committee.

Importantly, there was a Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR), managed by the GOM and housed in warehouses of ADMARC. The SGR had an impressive capacity of about 180,000 MTs. Grain for the reserve was purchased from farmers through the same channels as commercial stocks. The SGR had access to a very well developed potential distribution network through 1,200 local ADMARC depots throughout the country. However, the mechanism and criteria for release and use of the reserve was unclear.

In addition, the FAO supported National Early Warning System (NEWS) was operating at the time of the drought. NEWS is within the Ministry of Agriculture Planning Division and conducts ongoing monitoring and analysis of agricultural progress and production, agrometeorology, food prices, and other food security indicators. NEWS has become responsible for implementing national crop surveys and producing and disseminating food balance analysis. A primary consumer of NEWS bulletins is the Office of the President. Although not sensitive enough to identify localized disasters, large-scale emergencies can be readily detected.

II. DESIGN OF RESPONSE

A. Needs Assessment

1. Host Government

Malawi normally monitors food security with crop production and cereal balance information. Through the growing season, rainfall data is monitored and analyzed by NEWS. Commodity price and nutritional data are collected, but not well integrated into analysis.

GOM crop estimates released January 26, 1992 indicated record harvests of 1.6 million MTs. On February 27 a special GOM agrometeorological report was circulated to donors in response to an interruption of rains. The report indicated potentially significant production decreases, with new estimates at 916,000 MTs. Growing government and donor concern led to an emergency crop re-assessment in early March which further revised estimates to a record low of 794,000 MTs. By late June the final 1992 crop estimate had fallen to 641,000 MTs.

The GOM based its grain import needs calculations directly on filling the gap from lost production to meet an estimated grain consumption of 1.6 million MTs. No adjustments were made to account for alternate food crop sources and emergency cultivation (which took place), or logistical capacities for import and distribution. (Note: GOM consumption calculations are considerably higher than those of the UN. While the UN uses 160 kg/per capita, the GOM reasoned that "implicit" per capita consumption of 170 kg/yr should be raised to 180 kg because of the poor production of other food crops).

On March 17 President Banda announced Malawi maize import needs of 800,000 MTs. The GOM appealed to donors for assistance in importing 735,000 MTs, of which 597,000 MTs

would be for free distribution and 138,000 MTs for sale through commercial channels. It is unclear how the division of needs between free distribution and commercial sales were derived, or the basis for calculating non-food costs.

The appeal put the cost of food requirements at US\$ 328 million, and transport/storage at MK 108.4 million. In addition, water and health relief costs were identified as MK 44.6 million and MK 110.4 million respectively.

To identify targeted needs for free food distribution, the GOM conducted a registration exercise of drought-affected people in all 24 Malawi districts during ten days in April. The registration resulted in 6.17 million people requiring emergency free food distribution (out of a total population of about nine million). The targeting process became a fundamental and contentious problem during the relief operations and will be discussed fully in subsequent sections.

2. Multilaterals

Elsewhere in the region, the FAO/GIEWS recognized the extent of the drought by late January. In March the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) requested that the Malawi-based UN agencies, coordinated by UNDP, prepare an appeal for inclusion in the donor pledging meeting. UNDP established a UN agency task force to produce the appeal.

During March field assessment teams were sent to confirm and examine local needs and investigate regional issues. In April, the UNDHA issued an appeal for Malawi to donors. This was followed by a UN/SADC sponsored donor pledging conference for the region, held on June 1-2 in Geneva.

The UN/SADC assessment generally accepted the GOM agricultural production estimates. Its purpose was to confirm the level of needs identified by the GOM to examine the type of needs, and to identify non-food requirements and logistical and implementation strategies.

The results of the assessment, as presented in the appeal, indicated a 690,000 MTs import requirement, of which, it stated, the GOM had promised to import 100,000 MTs. The balance of 590,000 MTs would need to be covered by food aid, plus an additional 150,000 MTs of food aid for Mozambican refugees.

As part of the needs assessment, the World Food Program conducted a district by district analysis from available field data. Using specific criteria for high vulnerability, including differentiating small farmers with total crop loss versus partial crop loss, marginalized farmers who are chronically food insecure, agricultural laborers, and high dependency households (female headed), it was estimated that there were 4.7 million people requiring free food relief.

Based on this analysis, the UN/SADC recommended that 250,000 MTs would be needed from donors for free distribution, with another 100,000 MTs for free distribution supplied by the GOM. The balance of 340,000 MTs, should be provided by donors for monetization through commercial channels.

The appeal also addressed supplementary feeding and non-food needs. It stated that existing supplementary feeding programs, through existing channels, would need to be expanded to include 855,000 beneficiaries, including 575,000 under-fives. Also, two million people would need water assistance. It recommended rehabilitation of all 6,000 inoperable existing water sources and creating 3,100 additional water points.

Table 1.
UN/SADC Joint Appeal for Malawi

	(US \$)	
Target Food Aid (Malawian)	121,675,000	250,000 MTs
Target Food Aid (Refugee)	31,387,950	150,000 MTs
Program Food Aid	115,600,000	340,000 MTs
Supplement feeding	23,943,540	
Water supply	13,226,000	
Health services	2,900,000	
Health/nutrit. info sys	600,000	
<u>Agriculture</u>	<u>8,898,666</u>	
Total	318,231,156	740,000 MTs

In addition to the UN/SADC appeal, the International Federation of Red Cross Societies distributed their own appeal on May 13 for CHF 4,934,500 for targeted food distribution, nutrition and health monitoring. The appeal resulted in contributions of 70 percent of cash and 100 percent of in-kind needs.

During the drought SADC, in cooperation with the UN, issued periodic status reports and updates as a function of its Drought Emergency in Southern Africa Task Forces. In December 1992, UN/SADC issued a mid-term review, status report, and updated appeal for the entire southern Africa region. It stressed that more interventions in health and water sectors were required, and that nutritional and water-related diseases related to the drought were increasing. In addition, it stated that SADC's priority was now a concentration of assistance on disaster-preparedness measures in agriculture, including crop diversification with drought resistant varieties.

For Malawi the mid-term review revised its beneficiary figures upward to include a provisional level of 6.1 million, in keeping with GOM figures. The new figure was pending verification while the original figure of 4.7 million was maintained as the actual target. Emphasis was placed on accurate verification of the beneficiary population. Also, in recognizing the lack of government action in purchasing a promised 100,000 MTs for free

distribution, the UN increased to 350,000 MTs the amount needed from donor contributions for free distribution.

3. USAID

In January 1992 field information led the Mission to suspect that poor rains would result in production shortfalls requiring foreign assistance. During January and February reporting cables and early warning information were circulating from other countries in the region and the Malawi Mission recognized the impending crisis and began lobbying the GOM to respond. By mid-March OFDA situation reports were stating that Malawi was among the southern African countries which would require food assistance.

By the time the USAID/OFDA regional drought assessment mission arrived in Malawi in April, the dimensions of the disaster were quite well known from preceding GOM and UN/SADC assessments and drought response planning was underway. The U.S. assessment served to verify and confirm the earlier findings, and generally accepted their quantitative calculations. The assessment went on to describe the status of donor/UN and GOM response planning and to offer comments and recommendations for U.S. participation.

Malawi was identified as a priority country requiring immediate attention and allocation of resources. It recommended, as did the UN assessments, that donors should ensure food assistance through both commercial and free distribution programs. It recommended that the U.S. assist and support WFP relief activities, and indicated the critical importance of supporting NGOs in the relief and famine mitigation activities, as well as the provision of water, health and sanitation, and drought recovery interventions such as seeds. It also noted the existence of a good regional transport structure which needed to be exploited for imports to Malawi. In addition, the assessment indicated a concern that although almost half of food needs would need to be channeled commercially, there had been little action taken by the GOM to make such purchases.

In late April USAID/Lilongwe reported to OFDA that 685,000 rural families had experienced almost total crop failure, leaving more that 3.2 million people with little or no food supplies.

B. Description of Planned Response

1. Host Government

The GOM was slow to acknowledge and respond to increasing indications in January and February that a serious drought crisis was evolving. Throughout February USAID and other donors and NGOs tried to alert the GOM of the dimension of the drought, and to urge that the GOM to officially declare an emergency so that it and other agencies could activate emergency mechanisms in time to allow for the necessary months of lead time in receiving shipments.

These delays have been attributed to the difficulties inherent in a highly centralized system and the government's unwillingness, for political and financial reasons, to confront potential crisis. The GOM explanation was that decision-makers were waiting for more conclusive data and hoping that the rains would resume in time.

On March 9, the GOM called a meeting of donors and UN agencies to discuss the drought. A second meeting on March 16 formally established a GOM/donor/NGO Drought Technical Committee, with subcommittees on food assessment, health, water, and transport. On March 17 President Banda officially declared a drought emergency and presented his appeal for assistance from donors.

In presenting its position to donors the GOM stated that all smallholder production had suffered so extensively in all regions that rural households would have neither food, nor cash with which to buy food if available. Consequently, referring to UN assessment/appeal for 250,000 MTs for free distribution the GOM stated that it would have to provide an additional 210,000 MTs itself, bringing the total for free distribution to 460,000 MTs. The government pledged to contribute MK 100 million (about US\$ 25 million) towards maize procurement and internal distribution.

Shortly afterwards, the GOM released a document from the Department of Economic Planning and Development titled "A Drought Relief Plan 1992/93," outlining its approach and intended structure of management for relief.

From the outset, the government was insistent that it would have full responsibility and management of the drought response, it would develop the strategies employed, and it would manage and supervise the implementing participants. The GOM also recognized it did not have the financial, managerial, or technical resources to implement the emergency response itself. Therefore it proceeded with the approach that while it remained at the center of activities, the donors would contribute the commodities and resources, and the WFP and other UN agencies would act as suppliers and transporters. NGOs would implement and conduct the distribution of emergency food, under the supervision of District Commissioners.

The GOM would make all decisions regarding the targeting of beneficiaries. In April, to assess total needs and guide local food allocations and distributions the GOM conducted a registration of all drought-affected people throughout the country's 24 districts. The registration identified 6.1 million beneficiaries. The GOM decided on a ration level of 9kg/per capita, which is about half of total adult consumption needs. The original plan was for all registered beneficiaries, regardless of geographic location, age, or circumstances, to receive the same ration. The process, consequences, and problems regarding the registration and targeting became a fundamental issue throughout the course of the drought.

The GOM intended to use existing structures for the response, enhanced by additional support from outside organizations. The Commissioner for Disaster Preparedness, Relief and Rehabilitation, in the Office of the President and Cabinet, would coordinate government, donor, and NGO efforts at the national level. Within this office the Food Aid Relief and Rehabilitation Unit (FARRU) was created to implement relief operations. At the local level, District Commissioners (DC) were made responsible for management of local relief, using their existing structure of district departments of line ministries. District Relief Officers, as well as clerical staff and food distribution teams were assigned to assist DCs in all 24 districts.

The GOM recognized urgent and significant emergency needs in health, nutrition and water. There were subcommittees assigned to coordinate and plan, but there was no clear overall government strategy. The GOM did, however, take the lead in asking donors and NGOs for technical assistance and support. One example is the establishment of the Water Task Force, chaired by the Ministry of Works, which brought NGOs together to identify needs, develop a strategy, and assign responsibilities.

With respect to water, there were some differences in preferred approach between NGOs and the GOM. The GOM argued for a focus on creating new water points. The NGOs preferred to concentrate on rehabilitation of existing facilities and the most time and cost effective emergency response, and because new water points would be addressing a chronic structural problem rather than drought-induced problems.

During early and later stages of planning and implementation, the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) became a point of contention. In March of 1992 existing in-country stocks totaled 250,000 MTs, with the SGR at 136,000 and ADMARC stocks at 114,000 MTs. The UN recommended that 100,000 MTs from the SGR should be immediately released and transported. In sharp contrast, the GOM initially argued that at least 100,000 MTs should be left in the SGR, thus leaving national stocks available for consumption at 150,000 MTs. The GOM stated it would be "unreasonable" to deplete the strategic reserve below 100,000 MTs, leaving just 35,000 MTs available for distribution. No reason was given for the reluctance of utilizing the emergency stocks during an emergency.

The SGR was eventually drawn down to 10,000 MTs for use in commercial channels after ADMARC stocks were depleted, but none of the SGR was provided for free distribution.

The GOM did recognize the potential strain on the commercial grain stocks and purchased 53,000 MTs of white maize by itself soon after the drought was fully acknowledged.

2. Multilaterals

Donors, including USAID, the UN agencies, and NGOs had three primary goals with which to design their approach. These were 1) to prevent famine, 2) to prevent migration due to food or water scarcity, 3) and to ensure the necessary energy levels to plant the next year's crops. The goals were to be met primarily with the provision of maize, and secondarily with supplemental food, health services to prevent epidemics, water, and drought recovery inputs such as seeds.

When the potential crisis was identified, before UN headquarters had requested action from Malawi, the UNDP brought together other UN agencies and the donors to strategize and begin planning a coordinated effort.

The donors agreed to channel their resources and support through UN agencies, with WFP handling food relief and UNICEF working with water and health. Donors felt that the WFP and UNICEF had appropriate experience and expertise, existing networks and mechanisms and the ability to initiate new ones as needed, good relations with the GOM, and the ability to pool donor resources. In turn the UN agencies, would attempt to work through existing GOM structures and under the supervision of the GOM.

The donors all chose to concentrate on addressing target food needs for free distribution. The emergency rations would be given for free, with no food for work or subsidized sales programs as were being planned in other countries in the region. Purchasing power was believed to be too low for subsidized sales, and food for work was rejected for several reasons. Mozambican refugees were receiving free rations of greater quantity, so that serious social problems were anticipated if Malawians were asked to work for their food. Also, the management capabilities for implementation of food for work at the local level were inadequate, as well as there being no local cultural experience with such programs.

No bilateral donor contributed to the appeal for program food assistance for commercial channels. The feeling was that the GOM should draw down its own stocks as part of its contribution, and should supply the market itself. Donors wanted to avoid the potential political (and financial) capital the GOM would gain from their support of the market sector.

Donated food would be whole grain maize, the predominant staple in Malawi. Although white maize is preferred and is the variety grown in Malawi, yellow maize was procured for relief because of its availability to donors.

Community level implementation would be conducted by NGOs and local government authorities. It was hoped that NGOs would assist local operations and supplement local capacities in each district for food distribution, as well as health and water delivery.

In mid-February WFP began planning to establish a drought response unit. WFP held the importation and distribution of maize as the overriding priority in drought response and tried not to get sidetracked by health and supplemental feeding, with which it admittedly had little capacity. WFP began planning for regional transport logistics of maize into Malawi and ensuring transport corridor capability and cooperation. Plans were also made to enhance and ensure adequate communications between regional participants, particularly along transport corridors and between ports and Malawi. By early April WFP submitted a draft master plan to the GOM for organizing food relief. Maize would enter Malawi through four corridors and be delivered to four Extended Delivery Points (EDP), which were ADMARC main warehouses. From the EDPs maize would be transported to local distribution points throughout the country for immediate distribution to beneficiaries. The identification of beneficiaries would be left the GOM, although this later became a sensitive issue as WFP, donors, and NGOs became dissatisfied with this arrangement and unsuccessfully attempted to influence targeting.

The only exception to this plan was the EC which provided 69,000 MTs directly to NGOs, including the Malawi Red Cross and SCF/UK. Only 15,000 MTs was given to WFP. The EC stated that this was done because NGOs already had existing mechanisms and networks in certain areas. The approach avoided the additional layer of WFP involvement and the weakness of government capacities. Free distribution was chosen because of an assumed lack of rural purchasing power. However, this approach was counter to the EC traditional preference to sell first, then give free only when proven needed.

Other donors, in addition to contributing food to WFP, established and executed their own drought response interests. For example, ODA concentrated on support to enhancing logistics capabilities through grants to SCF/UK, while USAID/OFDA also supported logistics and communications, as well as providing direct support for NGO food and water provision activities.

UNICEF worked closely with NGOs in developing a coordinated approach to health and water activities. Wherever possible, local government structures, such as clinics and health centers were to be used in service delivery. However, UNICEF's approach was to participate with and assist NGOs interested in providing health and water, rather than attempting to recruit additional NGOs to address large needs and severe shortages in local capacities .

NGOs organized and coordinated their initial planning and drought response through the Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGOMA). Many of the NGOs involved in water and health/supplementary feeding began their involvement by conducting surveys or assessments to examine the scope of the problems in the sector and district in which they would be working. A considerable problem in this process was the unreliability and paucity of government data regarding existing water, nutrition, agricultural production, and other necessary planning information. Also, many of the NGOs had not before been involved in emergency activities of this nature or magnitude. Therefore, appropriate assessment,

planning, and targeting became critical issues. Some NGOs set conservative targets, while others were considerably overly optimistic in light of their experience and resources.

The original needs assessments had noted the existence of long-term structural problems in Malawi, such as health and water, which had been exacerbated by the drought. However, the need to respond directly to the emergency generally precluded planning for recovery or long-range mitigation during the drought. Follow-through and post-drought planning were addressed seriously only after relief operations were under control.

3. USAID

USAID/Malawi began talking to government officials about the failed rains by the end of January, but the government was reluctant to acknowledge the potential of food insecurity until much later. Immediately after the GOM met with donors to discuss the drought the Mission director, ADO and others met to strategize and mobilize USAID/Malawi drought response. Mission staff believed that although needs and beneficiary levels indicated by the GOM and UN/SADC had not yet been verified, time was critical and the preliminary figures were sufficient cause to initiate an immediate response. The Mission decided to play a major role in the international relief effort and asked the U.S. to contribute about half of the total projected food needs. This amounted to 190,000 MTs, which remained the U.S. contribution target throughout the drought. Ultimately the U.S. contribution ended up being about two thirds of the total. In addition, during FY92-93, the United States provided 208,500 MTs of food to support Mozambican refugees resident in Malawi.

While USAID's regional approach was to minimize disruption of national food distribution systems by using commercial market channels, the strategy for Malawi was deliberately different. At the time of the drought, GOM maize pricing policy resulted in substantial losses on the sale of grain imported at world market prices. While price increases were announced during the drought, domestic sales prices for maize were only a fraction of the landed cost of imported maize. Thus, there was little incentive to purchase maize through commercial channels, either with the government's own funds or resources obtained through international assistance. Under intense pressure from commercial sector shortfalls, the GOM eventually decided to use \$50 million from an IBRD drought relief loan for maize purchases. Shortfalls in the market, of course, increased pressures to expand free food distribution.

Also, USAID was adamant that the drought not become a political tool. For these reasons, the idea of assistance channeled through commercial mechanisms for monetization was rejected.

Next, it was decided that, because of limited Mission relief experience and the potentially huge accounting and management burden, WFP, as well as NGOs, would be the conduit of U.S. assistance. WFP already had a structure in place for assisting refugees and was already familiar with transport, logistical, accounting, and management issues.

The primary objective for USAID/Malawi became the procurement commodities as soon as possible in light of anticipated transport bottlenecks for regional needs. As a result of rapid and flexible planning from the Mission and AID/Washington, the U.S. was able to provide significant quantities of maize to Malawi considerably sooner than any other donor.

AID/Washington response to the regional situation led to reprogramming which allowed AID/FHA to procure and pre-position 45,000 MTs of Title II yellow maize for later consignment to a southern Africa drought-affected country, shipped in April. Following a drought disaster declaration by the American Ambassador to Malawi in April, the full 45,000 MTs was consigned to Malawi, the first truckloads of which arrived in Malawi on June 5, representing the first donor supported relief commodities to arrive. An additional 20,000 MTs of title II maize was available immediately from carryover stocks of an earlier disaster response in Malawi.

USAID played an active role in facilitating the efforts of WFP and the GOM and coordinated logistics with USAID/Zimbabwe's regional efforts. Locally, the Mission used its influence with the GOM in acting as intermediary and advocate for facilitating the operations of the UN and NGOs. The Mission also chose to be actively involved in ensuring that sufficient resources and capacities were applied to the relief efforts, and that sufficient monitoring was conducted to identify and rectify problems. To this end the Mission requested funding from OFDA for a full-time drought relief specialist.

The Mission was instrumental in ensuring NGOs were used for commodity delivery. The Mission Drought Relief Specialist actively solicited proposals from NGOs to participate in food distribution. About 25 NGOs declined to participate in the drought response because of lack of experience and capabilities. A few drought response proposals were rejected by the Mission. Ultimately, six NGOs received proposal approval and were given grants through OFDA for distribution operations and given food through WFP. The Mission had supplied the NGOs with general operational guidelines to address identified needs. In some cases the Mission helped NGOs to reformulate and improve their goals and targets. As well, the Mission supported NGOs in provision of water and seeds.

C. Magnitude and Type of Resources

1. Host Government

The GOM did not contribute any food to the targeted food relief program but did provide food to the commercial sector. It drew down the Strategic Reserve almost completely, and financed the purchase of 53,000 MTs of maize for the commercial market. Much later, the GOM agreed to use a World Bank loan of \$50 million to procure 100,000 MTs of maize for commercial sales. It is, however, recognized that these actions do not represent donations to the relief effort, as the GOM received revenue from the sale of the maize it provided.

The severe lack of resources of the GOM precluded significant allocation of resources but nonetheless the GOM managed to contribute human and material resources to the drought

relief effort. Human resources were allocated in the form creation and maintenance of the Commission for Disaster Preparedness, Relief and Rehabilitation, the formation of the Emergency Management Unit, and the assignment of government personnel to numerous task forces. In addition, the use of District Commissioners and their staffs and resources to supervise and implement food distribution represents a significant contribution. At the early stages of food distribution the GOM also arranged and financed food delivery to distribution centers.

2. Multilaterals

UN agencies and NGOs allocated considerable additional human resources to addressing the drought. WFP assigned logistics and food management specialists to Malawi and regional offices. All of the participating NGOs had to greatly expand their staffs to cope with relief activities. NGOs distributing food had to hire distribution teams. Likewise, Africare hired local water engineers and water point rehabilitation teams. The International Rescue Committee, which provided food, water services, and nutritional surveillance, increased its local staff by 20 and utilized 600 volunteer growth monitors.

Total donor contributions to Malawi in response to the UN/SADC appeal amounted to \$184.2 million by March of 1993, of which \$181.6 million was for maize procurement and transport logistics. This amount is against eventual UN/SADC appeal targets of \$224.5 million. These figures represent only funds channeled through the UN system and do not include the considerable additional funds granted directly to NGOs by various donors, such as ODA, the EC, and USAID. For example, the International Federation of Red Cross launched its own appeal to member countries and directly received funds and in-kind contributions, in addition to receiving food and funds from WFP and donors in Malawi.

Maize contributions to Malawi for free distribution were made by seven donors and totaled 293,700 MTs, representing 93 percent of the amount finally committed to drought assistance. The breakdown of contributions is listed below.

TABLE 2.
DONOR MAIZE CONTRIBUTIONS TO MALAWI

<u>Donor</u>	<u>Maize (MTs)</u>
USA	190,000
EC	69,000
UK	15,500
Canada	11,500
Germany	7,600
France	4,300
<u>Belgium</u>	<u>2,800</u>
TOTAL	297,700

TABLE 3.
VALUE OF DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS (INCL. MAIZE)

<u>Donor</u>	<u>(US\$ X 000,000)</u>
USA	85.3
EC	37.0
UK	14.5
AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, CANADA	8.0
TAIWAN	3.2
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FRANCE, GERMANY	4.5
ITALY, ISRAEL, JAPAN	2.4
KOREA, NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN	2.7
UNDP	1.7
UNICEF	.7
UNHCR	1.0
<u>WHO, WORLD BANK</u>	<u>21.4</u>
TOTAL	182.4

In addition, the World Bank made a \$50 million loan available to the GOM for purchase of maize. This was eventually used by the GOM to purchase 100,000 MTs for the commercial sector.

3. USAID

The U.S. was by far the largest drought relief donor in Malawi, contributing more than double the amount of maize as the next largest donor. USAID initially pledged 163,000 MTs of food aid for Malawi, of this, 45,000 MTs was from prepositioned title II stock and the balance was USDA Section 416. The pledge was eventually increased to 223,000 MTs to address additional needs, but then reduced by 32,700 due to inability of the full amount to reach Malawi during the drought response period. The total amount of food supplied by the US was 190,000 MTs, valued at \$74 million, plus an additional 208,500 MTs provided to support Mozambican refugees resident in Malawi.

In addition to maize allocated specifically for the drought response, 20,000 MTs of U.S. title II maize remaining from an earlier donation was distributed, as well as 44,700 MTs of maize borrowed from the Mozambican refugee program and later repaid. In addition to procurement of the donated maize, the U.S. also funded transport logistics for bringing the commodities into Malawi. To support internal transport and coordination of food distribution USAID supplied the equivalent of US\$ 2 million in local counterpart funds as the initial working capital of the SCF/UK supported Transport and Logistics Unit which coordinated all food transport to rural areas. An additional US\$ 4.8 million in local currency of reallocated USAID/Malawi funds was provided to the GOM to support staff and vehicles for food distribution.

USAID also funded NGO activities addressing food, water, and health activities through OFDA grants. In addition, OFDA funded a PSC Drought Relief Specialist, and the U.S. funded WFP United Nations Volunteer food monitors, and support for GOM drought coordination activities. Many of the U.S. organizational support expenditures are listed below.

Adventist Development and Relief Association:	\$315,409
Food distribution	
Save the Children Federation - US:	389,423
Food distribution	
Christian Reformed World Relief Committee:	327,450
Food distribution	
CCAP Blantyre Synod:	120,868
Food distribution	
International Federation of the Red Cross:	169,000
Food distribution	
International Rescue Committee:	357,706
Food distribution	
Water development	
Nutritional surveillance	
Africare:	347,571
Water rehabilitation and development	
UNICEF:	400,000
Water rehabilitation	
Health and nutrition	
Save the Children Federation - UK:	1,100,000
Water rehabilitation and development	
Child survival	
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture:	200,000
Planting material multiplication	
Government of Malawi:	50,000
Drought relief coordination	
World Food Programme:	25,000
Food monitors	

In all, the value of U.S. contributions for Malawi drought relief (excluding refugee programs) totalled 85.3 million. Of this, \$4.2 million was for non-food needs and \$2.2 million was from OFDA grants. Regional USAID Southern Africa Relief Program funds of \$19.1 million for transport logistics, communications, and transportation system enhancement also benefited the Malawi drought efforts.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

A. Maize Management

1. Acquisition

The lateness of GOM declarations to mobilize donor response, the lead time between ordering and receiving commodities, the severity of the needs in Malawi, and the reluctance of the GOM to use any of its Strategic Grain Reserve for free distribution, all combined to create the possibility of widespread food shortages. USAID was able to prevent this from happening in three ways.

- There was 20,000 MTs of U.S. title II food in-country as carryover from a previous relief effort, which, at USAID's urging, the GOM began distributing in April in the worst affected areas.
- USAID/Washington had pre-positioned 45,000 MTs of maize in the southern Africa region in response to the first indications of a crisis. At the US Ambassadors request, the entire quantity was allocated to Malawi, and began arriving on June 5, a full five months before any Malawi-specific relief maize could arrive.
- In addition, 44,700 MTs of U.S. maize was borrowed from the Mozambican refugee program which had sufficient stocks. This was distributed in July and August.

These three sources of maize enabled relief distributions to start almost immediately after the declaration of disaster, and continue almost until donor maize started to arrive in November. In October supplies ran out and 10,500 MTs of EC maize was diverted from Zambia to Malawi, and later repaid.

The commercial maize supply was a serious problem which eventually became a problem for the free food distribution. The GOM had ordered 50,000 MTs of commercial maize in May which arrived in July to replenish commercial and SGR stocks. But, in spite of strong urging from donors, GOM commercial maize procurement seriously lagged and stocks were expected to finish in January. As the drought deepened ADMARC sales increased dramatically, while stocks quickly diminished. ADMARC began rationing sales, but by the end of 1992, in many areas for extended periods there was no maize for sale at all. Although the World Bank had made available a loan for commercial maize purchase, the GOM continued to request donor assistance, in spite of early and clear indications from donors that they would not finance commercial maize.

At the time of the drought, GOM maize pricing policy resulted in substantial losses on the sale of grain imported at world market prices. While price increases were announced during

the drought, domestic sales prices for maize were only a fraction of the landed cost of imported maize. Thus, there was little incentive to purchase maize through commercial channels, either with the government's own funds or resources obtained through international assistance.

As commercial food disappeared more prospective buyers demanded free food, adding severe pressure to the distribution program. In many rural areas sales of wheat, Irish potatoes, cassava, beans, sweet potatoes and vegetables continued during the drought period, indicating that there was still some purchasing power available.

In light an increasing danger of food riots, the GOM finally used the World Bank loan to order 100,000 MTs of yellow maize in December. In February, 1993, 10,000 MTs of yellow maize was loaned for commercial sale. An offer to convert 25,000 MTs from the drought program was made unnecessary with the arrival of World Bank financed commercial maize beginning in February. But the arrival of the bulk of the World Bank financed food as late as April corresponded with the excellent 1993 harvest, and so a large portion of it was unneeded. It became increasingly difficult to sell with large quantities of local white maize available for purchase, and the GOM was left with large unsold surpluses.

2. Transport, Logistics, and Storage

External: Problems in transport to Malawi were anticipated to be among the greatest in the southern Africa drought response because of Malawi's landlocked position at the end of transport routes, and its reduced access to South Africa's ports because of competition with other relief import programs. In fact, the regional transport system for importing maize into Malawi worked generally very well, in spite of periodic port delays such as port congestion in Durban, port clearing delays in Harare, poor security along the Tete Corridor, and delays in utilizing the northern corridor.

Malawi received 21 shiploads of maize totalling 293,740 MTs, from seven donors, via five ports. More than half of the relief maize came in at Durban, while over 80 percent of commercial maize arrived through Beira.

TABLE 4.
RELIEF MAIZE PORT ARRIVALS

Durban	145,215
Nacala	57,280
Dar	45,090
Beira	34,105
Maputo	12,050

Close coordination between Malawi and regional logistics operations was able to ensure a steady and adequate flow of food into the country. Problems occurred in using the northern

route from Dar-es-Salaam, due to concerns over grain borer infestation, but once these were worked out the route proved very effective. Nacala, the closest port to Malawi, encountered severe delays which made it ineffective. The combined arrivals from all routes of relief and refugee program maize reached as much as 75,000 MTs in January of 1993.

Transport from port to Malawi was managed entirely by WFP, with coordination assistance from USAID/Harare and SADC. Virtually all imported maize was trucked in, with trucking contracts arranged by WFP in Rome. Maize was delivered to four Extended Delivery Points (EDP) in different parts of the country. The EDPs were central ADMARC warehouses. Storage space was sufficient so that there was never competition between relief food and commercial stocks stored in the same facilities, although occasionally maize was stored in temporary structures beside the warehouses.

Internal: From June to November 1992, the Food Aid Relief and Rehabilitation Unit of the Commission for Disaster Preparedness, Relief and Rehabilitation managed maize transport from the EDPs to rural distribution centers. Because of limited organizational capacity, experience, and resources the system was poorly managed resulting in inadequate and inconsistent maize distribution. Nonetheless, 111,062 MTs of maize was delivered.

All internal transport was eventually conducted through the commercial sector, using the same system. The WFP had neither the will or capacity to perform local logistics and turned the responsibility over to the GOM.

As delivery problems continued, SCF/UK, at FARRU's request (Ministry of the Presidency), initiated the ODA-funded Transport Logistics Unit (TLU) in May 1992, to manage all distribution transport. The TLU was under the auspice of the CDPRR, but functioned independently. Its creation was greatly facilitated by an earlier logistics study conducted by an expatriate with previous Malawi transport logistics planning experience, who became the manager of the TLU. The transfer of transport management from FARRU to the more efficient private sector was fully justified.

In the absence of sufficient government trucks, the TLU developed a strategy in which it hired a single private trucking broker for the entire country. The same broker had been handling all refugee relief commodity transport through UNHCR, and so was familiar with such operations. A US\$ two million start-up budget to pay trucking contracts was supplied through a local currency grant from USAID. The TLU took five months to become fully operational, and started delivery in November.

The TLU acted as the conduit, intermediary, and monitor for maize movements between EDPs and 825 local distribution centers. Most, but not all, NGOs participated in the TLU delivery system. Contracts with NGO-owned trucks to transport relief food were also managed by the same broker conducting other contracting for the TLU. DCs and NGOs requested maize directly from the TLU, often using relief program-supplied fax machines, and coordinated site location and delivery times.

The brokerage system organized and made direct deliveries from EDPs to distribution centers, thereby avoiding indirect routing except in exceptional circumstances, substantially reduced the transport costs. Key features were strong financial control over the broker and the progressive development of an agreed TLU/Manica matrix of the distances between the nearest EDP and each distribution center. The matrix formed the basis on which the broker was paid for each truck journey. It was also a useful tool for monitoring average monthly costs and journey distances nation-wide as well as by district and region.

Had the NGOs not cooperated with the TLU, and elected to hire their own contractors to transport donor-supplied the relief maize, optimum use of Malawi's internal trucking fleet would not have been possible. Major problems would have been faced by those NGOs active in districts close to extended delivery points, including Lilongwe, Machinga, Zomba, Chiradzulu, where the short average journey distances were commercially unattractive to truckers.

The contractual obligation for the broker to arrange for truckers to be given an equitable mix of short, medium and long journeys ensured that each district, in broad terms, had access to adequate transport. Even so, additional effort and extra assistance had to be given to Lilongwe and Machinga districts to ensure that an acceptable level of service was maintained. Transport rates were kept the same as those for the refugee operation to prevent competition of trucking resources between programs, and payments made promptly to maintain incentive. By paying the same transport rates and broker's commission for the drought relief movement as those paid under the Mozambican refugee program, competition for the same fleet of trucks, which could have had a negative impact on both programs, was avoided. The brokerage system and the transport rate per ton were apparently acceptable to the domestic private transport sector. No serious complaints or representations from truckers or by the Road Transport Operators Association (RTOA), on their behalf, have been made known to TLU. In all, the TLU transport system moved 212,000 MT.

3. Distribution

Allocation of Relief Food: The CDPRR each month developed district allocation plans. These were a persistent frustration to donors, NGOs, and DCs because they often had little relation to local expectations. The allocations were made according to in-country relief stocks. Frequently certain districts would receive insufficient amounts and would have to reduce rations or reduce distribution frequency, while other districts would receive more than needed. An additional frustration was the governments unwillingness to develop distribution allocations according to the pipeline of expected maize receipts, which would have greatly facilitated advance transport and distribution logistics.

At the district level all relief maize was distributed using the same general system. In every district, distribution was the responsibility of the District Commissioner (DC), often working with an NGO, but sometimes alone. DCs identified 825 distribution centers throughout the country, chosen for their accessibility to both trucks and beneficiaries. District needs,

according to registration of beneficiaries was determined by the DC and commodities ordered from the Transport Logistics Unit. A District Relief Officer, working under the DC, was assigned to coordinate and supervise distributions.

While FARRU was managing maize deliveries arrivals in particular districts were often insufficient to initiate a full distribution at a site and the maize had to be stored, and guarded until sufficient quantities arrived. Sometimes additional stock did not arrive for three weeks. Particularly in these early stages of distribution, logistical problems often reduced and delayed expected food deliveries and in some cases almost 50 percent less food than needed arrived. Consequently, full rations could not be given and families received one ration every two to three months. When the TLU took over, flow improved significantly.

Without NGO assistance DCs had human resources and transportation sufficient to conduct food distributions at one site at a time. With NGO assistance, it was sometimes possible to conduct distributions at five sites in one day. NGO performance and coordination with DCs varied, in part depending on the number of personnel available to maintain coordination, and the perception of mutual benefit and partnership which evolved.

Overall, the level of cooperation, commitment, competency, and energy of officials at the district level was impressive. They performed well under difficult conditions of poor resources and often severe political pressure from local and central government powers. Their willingness to work together with NGOs, or alone in some cases, contributed significantly to the success of food delivery to those most in need.

As an example of the distribution process, the Malawi Red Cross (MRCS) was asked by the GOM to work in three of the most severely drought affected districts. The MRCS was able to successfully apply its experience and skills from its refugee relief operations to these new activities. The MRCS used 60 staff, 600 volunteers, and three International Federation of Red Cross staff. Distribution started in mid-August using GOM registrations for targeting. During October re-verification in one district to more effectively target scarce resources reduced beneficiary numbers by 30 percent. However, distribution was terminated in another district when district officials disallowed re-verification. Drought operations were completed on May 31, 1993, after having distributed 20,167 MTs maize to one million beneficiaries, and 860 MTs pulses to under-fives.

Distribution of relief maize came to a natural termination in May 1993, as the harvest of the new crop became available for local consumption. There was therefore no interruption in food security. The appropriateness of program termination was indicated by increasingly fewer people coming to distribution centers. USAID/WFP relief stocks had been planned and allocated so that there was virtually no remaining carryover, which was cost effective and appropriate in light of the excellent local harvest. In addition, USAID had deliberately terminated relief as soon as feasible to prevent any political utility which could be gained with further free distribution. In contrast, the EC had 12,000 MTs maize remaining, which was converted to the refugee program.

Supplemental Feeding: Supplemental feeding was conducted using the network of existing health centers. Feeding programs were established on an ongoing basis as needs were identified from surveys. Existing health care staff were used to administer the programs. A level of 5 percent or greater severe malnutrition in under-fives was often used as the point at which programs were implemented. Children who received two and three consecutive feedings showed more than 50 percent improvement in nutritional status. However, supplies for feeding programs were very often insufficient because of continuing logistical problems, and human and financial resource deficits.

To Mozambican Refugees: During the drought delivery of food and non-food items to the one million refugees in Malawi was managed by the Malawi Red Cross, in association with the International Federation of Red Cross Societies, as it had been before the drought. Commodities and resources were provided by the WFP, UNHCR, NGOs and IFRCs, and donor national societies. Food distributions were made every two weeks at 152 distribution centers, subdivided into 1032 distribution points. Transport logistics used the same trucking broker as did the relief operations, but working through a separate WFP transport unit, rather than the TLU.

B. Monitoring

During relief operations many participating organizations monitored their own implementation and delivery activities. The TLU and WFP monitored overall operations. In addition, seeking accountability for allocated resources, USAID carefully monitored the progress of relief operations. The OFDA-funded PSC drought officer made frequent trips into almost all districts. His observation and reporting of problems in food distributions allowed USAID to take positive and forceful steps at high organizational levels to pursue solutions.

The National Early Warning System provided general monitoring of food security, including relief commodity arrivals, distributions, and stocks. NEWS is a joint GOM/FAO activity within the Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture, provided with technical assistance from an FAO advisor. Quarterly and special bulletins provide ongoing meteorological, agricultural production, progress, and inputs, food balance, import/export, ADMARC stocks, and commodity price and producer price data, as well as information regarding refugees. Coverage may be limited since bulletins are regarded as "Confidential - not for Re-distribution."

Valuable monitoring of key indicators used to measure relief impact was provided by NGOs. The Red Cross, at the request of the MOH participated in nutrition surveys done by different NGOs in August 1992. The International Rescue Committee implemented rapid growth monitoring using 633 volunteer monitors in 300 villages who used MUAC measurements on 1-5 year olds and reported results monthly. As a result of monitoring, complimentary feeding programs were planned and implemented which prevented increases in malnutrition in some districts. Surveys indicated steady increases of malnutrition from December through February (1 percent/mo), followed by decreases in March and April.

In one district a team composed of NGO staff, and government agriculture, health, water, and education staff was established to investigate claims of critical food and water needs. As a result new distribution centers were opened.

IV. RESULTS

A. Timeliness

The primary goals of the relief effort were met and the response was success. The relief effort was successful in preventing starvation, preventing migration, and enabling a successful harvest the next year. Current vulnerability is not significantly changed from its slight to moderate status in normal times. Advance planning and flexibility of USAID and other international participants was critical in timely response to counter the delays.

Although the GOM had early meteorological indications in December and agricultural proof in January it delayed officially acknowledging the inevitable crisis until March 17, thereby delaying UN and donor mobilization. Government decisions regarding resource allocations, planning, and mobilization were significantly delayed despite the existence of the Commission for Disaster Preparedness, Relief, and Rehabilitation, and government planning structures already in place. This was partly due to a very high degree of centralization in decision-making. But also because of the total unexpectedness of a crisis of such magnitude which overwhelmed existing capacity to mobilize a response.

The government delayed decisions about its own participation, in part to wait for donors and international agencies to take on these responsibilities themselves. This was particularly true in its insistence that donors should supply the commercial sector. The GOM delayed addressing serious commercial shortages until ordering 50,000 MTs maize in April, by which time the deliveries were too late to be of use in covering production shortfalls caused by the drought.

The GOM was slow to use resources made available to it. Although a World Bank loan was made available in July, the GOM did not use it to order additional commercial stocks until December, thus allowing markets to run dry, and ensuring receipt of the purchased maize too late to be significantly useful. Likewise, about US\$ 4 million in local currency counterpart funds was made available by USAID for transport, logistics, and coordination. USAID approval was given in September 1992, but the GOM did not open a bank account for the funds until January 1993, and did not start using the funds until March.

In some respects, the GOM, once activated, got underway quickly. Its registration of beneficiaries, although of strongly contested accuracy, was accomplished in April, quickly after the Presidential declaration. Likewise, the GOM quickly organized and initiated relief operations in the worst affected Shire Valley area in April.

The very timely advanced preparations by USAID Washington and USAID Malawi enabled pre-positioned food to reach Malawi at a critical time, avoiding almost certain disaster. However, with concern developing as early as January the USAID assessment team did not arrive until April, after the dimensions of the drought were well known and response planning was in process. The assessment resulted in recommendations supporting actions and strategies already underway. Likewise, the declaration of disaster by the American Embassy did not occur until April 30.

WFP was able to mobilize very quickly and effectively, largely because of its experience in Malawi with refugees, and internationally with food relief operations. Its fast development of a relief plan and mobilization of logistics personnel greatly facilitated operational success.

Administrative, procedural, and decision-making delays resulted in the EC, the second largest donor, delivering maize so late that 12,000 MTs remained at the end of the relief operations.

Many of the implementing organizations required significant time to expand, organize, mobilize, and get underway. This was particularly true for NGOs involved in the water sector. One U.S. funded NGO did not have a signed grant contract until June, did not start work until October, and did not have pumps in operation until January, almost one year after the identification of the drought. Likewise, the TLU required five months to become operational, even though it was organized around a pre-existing logistics study and organizational plan.

B. Impact

1. Beneficiary Recovery and Current Vulnerability

Food Security: Emergency relief programs delivered 293,000 MTs of maize, which was provided to millions of drought victims. A FEWS survey indicates that 80 percent of respondents received food donations, although 57 percent of the households received less than 45 kgs over the year. Although free food surely went to many whose needs were not critical, it reached all of those, to some degree, whose needs were severe. For some, in less affected areas, or whose assets were greater, the free food was important in preventing greater loss of assets and in maintaining food security. For many, the food prevented possible starvation. For all recipients, the food aid greatly facilitated recovery. However, lost assets and lost agricultural credit will take considerable time to recover.

Agriculture: Large-scale loss of crops resulted in lost household food resources, lost labor opportunities from agriculture, lost assets as a result of distress sales, lost seed stocks, and lost farm input investments. The drought forced many households to resort to exceptional emergency strategies such as farming in swampy areas which are usually too wet to plant, hunting for roots and tubers, and selling assets such as cattle and livestock.

Emergency relief was able to replace lost seed stocks through the activities of a single NGO, working through other NGOs, which distributed about 12,000 MTs of improved (not hybrid)

seed to 1.1 million households. Consequently, relief enabled drought victims to maintain personal food security and to replant their crop to recover self-sustainable food security.

Many farmers borrow on credit to pay for the purchase of seed and fertilizer. In 1991, farmers borrowed money for the planting of the 1991-92 season at 18 percent interest. As a result of the drought farmers were unable to pay back the loans, and the GOM responded by declaring a one year moratorium or grace period on these loans which enabled the farmers to borrow money for the planting of 1992-93 which produced a bumper crop. Before further credit will be issued for the 1993-94 planting, farmers must pay back 100 percent of their 1992-93 interest-free loan, and their total 1991-92 loan including 30 percent interest before they will be able to borrow again. By early November 1993 farmers were not buying seed and fertilizer for the 1993-94 planting. Some farmers think the moratorium was a gift of the government and need not be paid back, and that the government might forgive the current credit, so that a wait-and-see approach is in effect. Farmers will certainly not let themselves starve, but which strategy they will adopt is uncertain.

Overall, continued drought vulnerability rests on the degree of dependance on rain sensitive maize. As the staple crop, it certainly will not be eliminated. But in some areas considerable amounts of cassava and other more drought resistant alternative crops are grown, and farmer interest in such crops in primarily maize producing areas is increasing. Therefore vulnerability will depend in part on access to, and encouragement of such crops. While the GOM is doing little in this direction, USAID, FAO, UNICEF, and NGOs are working towards developing and distributing cassava and sweet potato to farmers. OFDA has invested \$200,000 in research and multiplication of drought resistant crops with a grant to the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture.

Water Resources: The drought seriously injured an already inadequate system of water provision, in which almost 70 percent of the total national water points were not working. Relief efforts repaired and rehabilitated thousands of water points, and created hundreds more. Since many were inoperative even before the drought, and the number of water points was insufficient, the water provision situation for beneficiaries as a result of the drought relief would seem to be much better than it was before. However, an evaluation of the water activities of one NGO concluded that the emphasis on speed and quantity of water points rehabilitated and built resulted in reduced attention to water quality, so that potability and water contamination are real concerns.

Another concern is that new water points were overly emphasized by the GOM and therefore installed in marginal areas which cannot support them. Also, that within a government water services structure which could not even begin to adequately maintain existing water points, the construction of new points adds additional stress to the system, and promises greater numbers of inoperable equipment in the future. NGOs tried to initiate community based training in simple water point maintenance during relief activities, but the success of this initiative is not yet known. NGOs plan to promote community training and maintenance as part of post-drought and drought mitigation programs.

Health and Nutrition: During the drought food insecurity, combined with poor water, led to increased health problems. There was increased infant mortality and morbidity due to diseases such as malaria, respiratory infections, and diarrhea. Bacillary dysentery also became widespread. A survey conducted in April 1992, at the early part of the drought revealed that 30 percent of the children under 5 were underweight and 45 percent were stunted.

In addition, it was suggested that family health suffered because during the drought mothers and traditional caretakers were occupied with queuing for food, traveling further to haul water and firewood, digging for roots and tubers as food alternatives, in addition to their usual chores so that there was less time to care for family members and to take children to the clinic as needed.

WFP had planned to provide supplementary food, a maize-soya weaning product, to the MOH which was responsible for distribution to these target groups through the health centers. The original intent of the program was to provide 300 grams/recipient/day through bi-weekly distribution. This plan was later revised to 100 gram/day of maize meal for all but the most severely needy. Expanded immunization and essential drugs were also to be provided.

Delivery of health and nutritional services during the drought, which is inadequate in normal times, never really got off the ground. Figures regarding the impact of the supplementary feeding program are unavailable, but recurrent anecdotal information suggests that because of the focus of resources on general distribution, the health/nutrition system was never sufficiently in place to assure timely or efficient distribution. The effectiveness would have been difficult to measure in any case because 51 percent of recipients surveyed reported that rations were shared among all family members. However, there is some indication that children in the most severely drought-affected areas fared better in weight maintenance, possibly because these areas received more food, more frequently than other areas.

Current overall health and nutrition status is unknown. However, there is no reason to believe it has improved beyond the poor levels prior to the drought. Therefore vulnerability to severe malnutrition and epidemics from disaster remains high.

2. Capacities, Policies, and Planning

a. National Disaster Response

During the drought, the urgency of immediate response activities overshadowed attention on enhancing long-term technical or material disaster relief capacities. However, the capacity to identify potential emergencies (as opposed to declaring them), is quite good, using the early warning system and agricultural and meteorological information.

The drought provided the potential for a considerable amount of technology transfer, skill development, and on-the-job training. The presence of a wide range of expatriate experts

working within government agencies, NGOs, and the UN provided the opportunity for significant counterpart training. The GOM generally did not capitalize on these opportunities. The government failed to provide appropriate counterparts to the TLU, the NEWS and other offices. In other instances, according to GOM officials, local staff were placed in counterpart positions for which they did not have the necessary skills and experience to take advantage of the training, but proper selection by the GOM could have avoided this. As a result, very little knowledge or skill was gained in the management of relief activities.

During the drought, the ongoing capacities of government emergency services such as health, supplemental feeding, and water were not strengthened. Assistance to these services was short-term, in the form of additional supplies. The systems were so weak, that emergency-related enhancement could have no lasting effect. Training, planning, management, implementation, and continuing resources could not be supplied by the emergency efforts. The utility of the drought to these systems was more to emphasize and highlight their ineffectiveness. Although this was already known, the degree to which they were ineffective has caused UN agencies and NGOs to focus more attention on long-range programmatic assistance.

The GOM itself, however, has shown little initiative in focusing attention on increased capacities for these sectors, rather, letting the international community take the lead. But, in spite of any emergency response plan developed later, without strengthening these basic services, vulnerability to disaster will be left high, and emergency activities attempting to work through these structures will be unsuccessful, as they have been in the past.

Data availability, reliability, and access was a major problem during the drought, particularly for NGO planning, targeting, and monitoring. Government data collection in some areas is weak. Information supplied to NGOs by the Water Task Force was inaccurate and resulting in delays to conduct new assessments and retargeting. In many cases, when data existed, gaining access to it was difficult. For example, the NEWS bulletin is considered confidential. Government policy to improve data and access to it would greatly facilitate disaster planning.

In the post-drought period there has been considerable GOM discussion about disaster planning, but little concrete results can be shown. Momentum is quickly dissipating as most of those involved have left the country or been reassigned. To a large degree, attention has been refocused on more pressing issues, such as the upcoming presidential election and impending change in government.

The Commission for Disaster Preparedness, Relief, and Rehabilitation has scheduled a series of workshops starting in November intended to bring together staff from relevant ministries and drought response veterans to discuss the components of a disaster plan. The National Disaster Preparedness Relief and Rehabilitation Committee is reported to be currently spearheading development of such a plan, based on plans to be submitted by each political

level of district and regional government, and with input from experienced NGOs. WFP and USAID funds are being sought to support this activity.

There exists, as noted earlier in this report, a long-range national Food Security Policy under the auspice of the OPC, but its policies and mechanisms have not been specified, and it is not supposed to be an emergency response system. As indicative of the uncertain progress towards potentially available emergency response, the Strategic Grain Reserve has been refilled to capacity in the recent bumper harvest, but policy and mechanisms for triggering its use, and specifics of how it should be used are still not clear.

In spite of the status of official progress towards formalized disaster response, and the degree of counterpart training, a great deal of valuable experience was gained by a large number of government participants, from District Commissioners to Permanent Secretaries. Since the drought relief represented a set of unprecedented circumstances and interactions, much was learned about cooperative activities, coordination, and about government and donor and NGO capacities. People, and institutional participants, learned what to expect from each other, and that is vitally important in the planning process and for implementation of future activities. These capacities of interaction, although unquantifiable, were undoubtedly increased.

b. Economy and Agriculture

In the primarily agriculture-based economy of Malawi, the drought had a negative affect on foreign exchange earnings. Gross domestic product was reduced by about 15 percent. Commercial crop production of tea, tobacco, and cotton, was reduced, although not as seriously as food crop production because many commercial crops are planted near lakes and rivers and rains can be supplemented by irrigation. Sugar cane production was largely protected by irrigation. In addition, GOM expenditures on the purchase of 50,000 MTs maize, and use of the World Bank loan to purchase an additional 100,000 MTs maize represent unanticipated expenditures, although these were cushioned by revenue from commercial sale of these stocks.

Overall, following the drought, economic policies proposed in the Statement of Development Policies 1987-1996 appear unchanged. The drought highlighted the need for moving ahead with implementation. These include the need to strengthen the economy by import substitution and expansion of the export market, making Malawi more food self-sufficient, and increasing foreign exchange earnings.

The drought had little apparent affect on agricultural policy or planning. It served to highlight the need for crop diversification, more effective land use, and research on improving soil quality. But these issues have been on the agenda for a long time, and there is no evidence they are now being given a higher priority. The unprecedented scope and degree of the drought-induced crop failure has left the impression that this is unlikely to occur again, with the reassurance that even if it does, the donors will once again respond.

This is particularly true in light of the complete rebound of the food crop sector in a record harvest the year following the drought. The issue of crop vulnerability was superseded with problems of disposing of a significant surplus above national consumption and SGR capacities. The GOM has recently been contending with the challenge of finding buyers for considerable stocks.

It should be noted that the food crop recovery, although impressive, was only partially the result of government policy and support. The estimated 20 percent of maize farmers who use purchased inputs lost the value of the inputs and their ability to pay back their credit when their crops failed. Consequently, the government initiated a credit moratorium which allowed farmers to receive credit for inputs in the growing year following the drought, resulting in excellent harvests. However, during the drought the majority of farmers who do not purchase inputs and do not have access to credit ate their seed stock. The GOM had no plan to address this problem. Without the assistance of an NGO which provided seed to over one million farm families, the 1992/93 production would have been significantly, and possibly dangerously, less.

Currently, as a result of the one failed harvest the following successful one, the GOM is facing a challenge in agricultural support policy which could affect 1993/94 maize production. Many farmers now have two years credit to repay to qualify for inputs for the 93/94 season. At the time of this evaluation fieldwork plots were tilled and rains were imminent but very few farmers had repaid credit, purchased inputs on credit, or purchased inputs at all. Farmers may be waiting for GOM response in the form of another moratorium or forgiveness of one year's credit, or another alternative. It is possible that farmers could be planning to buy inputs for cash and avoid credit repayment. It is also possible, but not necessarily probable that these farmers could use local seed, for a greatly reduced yield, to avoid purchases altogether, and compensate with carryover stocks from their excellent previous yield. The GOM will have to monitor the situation carefully and develop a policy accordingly to ensure national food self-sufficiency in the coming year, and to finalize the situation of the two-year credit.

c. Transport

There were no discernable changes to the overall transportation infrastructure in Malawi as a result of the drought. Rather, the capacities of the system were tested as a result of the relief operations and they proved adequate. Trucking capacity may have been somewhat improved as a result of a number of truckers investing in newer or brand new trucks during the drought from delivery contract revenues. Rail lines, which remain minimal, were improved somewhat.

Transport logistics capacities, internal and external, were greatly enhanced, including improved communications, cooperative relations, management, and monitoring systems. While these enhancements may improve ongoing commodities transport, the policy and

planning consequences for transportation, and particularly disaster response transportation, are uncertain.

d. Non-Governmental Organizations

Many of the NGOs involved in the relief activities had little previous emergency experience in Malawi. They were required to quickly increase their capacities and change their orientation and procedures. Under the circumstances, many met the challenge impressively, and overall the NGOs were a critical factor in facilitating relief activities and augmenting weak government capabilities.

Experience in relief, and use of human resources made a tremendous difference. Most of the NGOs depended on hired distribution teams and other staff. A notable example was the International Federation of Red Cross, in partnership with the Malawi Red Cross. The Red Cross had experience with relief activities for refugees in Malawi, as well as a highly developed local network. Using this experience, it was able to recruit and mobilize a large number of volunteers to supplement staff. As a result the Red Cross was able to operate 80 distribution centers in three districts, and provide food for \$8.75/MTs, equivalent with their coverage to twenty-one cents per recipient.

For some NGOs with little experience in relief, their capacity was hindered by unrealistic targeting resulting in completion of less than half of the stated goals; uncertainty in implementation, which resulted in start-up delays of up to five months; lack of proper technical expertise to efficiently implement activities; and insufficient mechanisms to elicit USAID Mission input to correct problems. In contrast, other NGOs set reasonable targets and even subcontracted some of the work to other NGOs to ensure completion.

Certainly, the relief experience enhanced the capabilities of every participant NGO. Many NGOs have already returned to their original focus on development activities. Their relief experience will serve to encourage the planning of developmental activities which recognize the importance of disaster mitigation. Some NGOs, particularly those involved in water have specifically planned post-drought recovery and drought mitigation activities.

There is recognition and agreement among NGOs regarding the importance of emergency contingency planning. However, as the expatriate staff involved continue to leave, there is a loss of momentum in formalizing disaster plans. The capacities of the NGOs to participate in another relief activity will depend on the documentation and institutionalization of lessons learned and procedures developed during the drought.

V. SPECIAL ISSUES

A. Beneficiary Targeting, Distribution, and Politics

A fundamental concern of donors and NGOs throughout the drought response was the management and implementation of the government controlled targeting and relief food allocation system. Donors and NGOs were universally displeased and frustrated by this aspect of the relief program and the GOM's reluctance to cooperate or compromise. Total food distributed was believed to be too high, allocations to different districts were inappropriately made, field data reflecting actual needs was not used, and allocations were politically motivated and influenced.

Original GOM plans had been for rations equal to full consumption needs. Before the delivery started the rations were revised at 9kg/person/month, which is about half of the FAO recommended intake, with the expectation that beneficiaries would be able to supplement the ration themselves. WFP and other participants agreed with this approach.

Community and household targeting within districts was based on a national registration in every district to identify drought affected households. The registration was conducted during ten days in April, for which District Commissioners were given no warning, no additional resources, few guidelines, and poorly defined selection criteria. A combination of political leaders, village chiefs, and household heads was used by DCs to assist in the process.

A general selection criteria was established by the GOM which included marginal farmers, farmers whose crops had been drought affected, dependant households such as women headed households, and dependant individuals such as the elderly and handicapped. However, initially the criteria failed to clarify the exact thresholds in given categories which would qualify, and left these determinations to qualitative judgements. It also failed to distinguish between ongoing structural food insecurity and drought-induced insecurity. Later in the relief operations, when additional information was available, the targeting failed to respond to needs for revision and adjustment to address specifically vulnerable areas.

Most importantly, the targeting failed to account for differential drought affects, and failed to account for any operating coping strategies. For example, while four agricultural divisions experienced declines from the previous year of greater than 55 percent, four others were able to produce almost half or more of the previous year production. Also, cassava, a secondary staple experienced only a 26 percent decline, and pulses a 35 percent decline. In addition, in one of the most severely affected areas, in spite of a disastrous maize production, the drought enabled cultivation of land which was normally swamp which produced a good harvest of alternative crops. But a family which lost all of its crop, and one which lost half of its crop, and one which had grown alternate crops were all targeted for the same level of assistance. Likewise, a household with stored or marketable assets could be eligible for the same rations as a nearly destitute household.

Additionally, the original criteria included as ineligible for relief those involved in cash cropping or fishing, which were not as seriously affected by the drought. There are about 225,000 households, representing about 1.5 million people classified by FEWS as fishers. There are another several million involved in estate and commercial agriculture, although many of them also grow some of their own food. The final total of registered beneficiaries did not reflect this number of ineligible people.

In at least some districts the registration produced beneficiary totals which exceeded the district population. In such cases, the OPC revised the figures using an unknown formula and handed down the new figures to DCs. The final results of the initial registration resulted in 6.17 million people, about 70 percent of the total national population, claiming crop failure and the need for food aid assistance. The majority of beneficiaries (3.97 million) were in southern Malawi, which was most severely affected by the drought. Half of the districts in Malawi had 80 percent or more of their population registered for relief. In fact, the Commissioner for Disaster Preparedness, Relief, and Rehabilitation recognized this as highly exaggerated, as indicated in a letter he sent to DCs in June, but the figure was left unchanged, presumably for political reasons.

There were also instances reported where crop failure was total, assets were unavailable, and needs were at least as great as the registration indicated. There was also a degree of under-registration which occurred due to omissions of villages because of confusion over jurisdiction boundaries, and absence of potential registrants because of misunderstandings about the purpose of the registration.

Food allocations to particular districts were as problematic and frustrating as the beneficiary registration. The GOM had planned that distribution in districts would be phased in according to priority of need. In April distribution started with the two most affected districts, and in June coverage was expanded to all districts. WFP and donors believed that the blanket coverage was initiated far too early, before it was really needed, and could have been delayed until October. As a result, considerable resources were over-allocated to some districts. The GOM allocation, according to the registration, established a monthly target of 55,000 MTs, in spite of WFP identification of 40,000 MT/mo as the realistic logistical distribution capacity. Consequently, in some districts, allocations exceeded capacity to distribute and stocks were usually left over.

Future attempts to improve targeting must take fully into account the practical requirements of the transport and logistics functions which must dictate that the food is positioned in all districts in sufficient quantities and to ensure that the maximum of seriously affected persons are given food in time. Also, that the internal capacity of the trucking sector is properly exploited and mobilized.

Although NGOs played a critical role in distribution they had no control of district allocation and targeting decisions. DCs, who had a clear idea of real local needs, likewise had not control over allocations. In fact, the DCs were often willing to prioritize and to attempt real

targeting but their proposed allocation plans were ignored or overturned at the central level, for political reasons. In June, July, and August, WFP as part of the Food Aid Assessment Sub-Committee helped create monthly district allocation plans according to an assessment based on field data, but these plans were not used by the GOM.

From September through December, when stocks were low, the GOM insisted that rather than more precise targeting, every district would receive maize. As a result, the beneficiary average was 5.1 kg/mo., with beneficiaries in some districts receiving less than 4 kg/mo, a dangerously inadequate ration for severely vulnerable areas. In January NGOs and donors urged the GOM to recognize and utilize nutritional surveys and market price data which indicated the most severely vulnerable areas were in southern and central districts. However, allocations remained unchanged.

The USAID Mission maintained pressure on GOM officials to utilize field data for improving food allocation targeting. It also encouraged WFP to take a stronger position on monthly district allocations prepared by the GOM. USAID felt WFP could have been more pro-active and forceful in insisting on appropriate targeting and frequently urged them to do so.

Donor pressure to reverify the original registration led to the response that such an exercise would be the decision of each DC. Many DCs agreed, and some did not. By November about half the southern and central districts were re-verified. Reductions in beneficiaries of up to 30 percent were recorded in some districts. However, problems with the re-verification process led to increases in some districts. Nonetheless, monthly allocations remained unchanged.

There were cases in which demands were made of NGOs which were resisted. In one case an NGO declined to open ten additional distribution centers, citing growth monitoring data indicating them to be a lower priority than other areas, a shortage of staff, and the need for re-registration to ensure appropriate distribution. In another case, an NGO was denied permission to conduct a reregistration and therefore terminated distribution in that district. Likewise, the EC terminated food deliveries in some areas, claiming that distribution was too politically influenced.

The principal of social equity was often cited to explain the GOM insistence on universal distribution. But more clearly, the allocations were the result of political influence and motivation. At the district level members of Parliament and traditional leaders exerted pressure on DCs to influence distributions. DCs ability to deflect and stand up to such pressure varied. Most DCs attempted to protect the distributions from such pressure, and were assisted by NGOs which could more easily defend decisions with fewer political consequences at stake. At the national level the incumbent Malawi Congress Party, in the process of preparing for its first political party competition, sought to take credit for relief distributions to increase their political capital. A FEWS survey indicated that 80 percent of beneficiaries did, in fact, credit the government with the food donations.

B. Affect of Drought on Country's Development

The drought and the relief activities did not significantly change Malawi's stated development plans and progress, but rather delayed them temporarily. The drought confirmed the GOM need to move forward with agricultural, water, and health programs.

There is some suggestion that the combination of lost donor support resulting from human rights issues, and donor pressure exerted during relief operations facilitated the process of democratization and pushed forward the referendum to establish political parties.

The close coordination required during the drought certainly enhanced the cooperation and partnership between donors and the GOM and between NGOs and the GOM. The relationship instructed the participants about each other's capacities, objectives, and motivations. This new level of relationship should facilitate more effective cooperation and therefore enhance national development.

C. Relationship Between Drought and USAID Program

The drought relief program had little direct effect on ongoing USAID program activities, strategies, and policies. Not as a result of the drought, but rather because of human rights and governance issues, assistance levels had been reduced in recent years. As a result of recent political progress, assistance is likely to be adjusted accordingly.

The drought response was added to Mission responsibilities in the form of a separate program and implemented as a team effort. There were no formal decisions regarding the development of a structure to coordinate drought response. Rather, actions were taken as necessary. In the early stages the ADO was removed from other duties and assigned to supervise drought activities full-time. After the arrival of the OFDA-funded PSC drought specialist in August, the ADO returned to normal duties, and maintained nominal supervision over the PSC. Starting in September, the Deputy Director took on some of the coordination responsibilities. The mission director represented drought issues at the CG meeting and in relations with the GOM. She did not direct activities, but provided needed concurrence on actions proposed by those directly involved. Other officers performed functions in keeping with their normal sectors, such as health and transport.

The first phase of Mission involvement, from March to August 1992 consisted of developing a drought response, eliciting NGO participation and arranging grants, and ensuring that drought response management systems were developed. The second phase, from August through May 1993 involved placement of the response structures, ensuring implementation, and monitoring.

Because the UN was playing the leading role in managing and supervising activities, responsibilities at the mission were greatly reduced. These primarily consisted of acting as a conduit for FFP and OFDA actions regarding pledges, orders, and financing; monitoring

implementation activities of WFP, NGOs and the GOM; maintaining information coordination between USAID, other donors, the UN, GOM, and NGOs; and pursuing issues with the GOM.

As a result of the drought, the Mission has added some recovery and mitigation activities to its responsibilities under the Regional Drought Relief and Recovery Project. There is funding of US\$ 1.6 million to SCF/UK for continued water rehabilitation and construction, along with community-based training and management program to help ensure sustainability. Also, US\$ 240,000 has been added to the existing US\$ 200,000 to support the International Institute in Tropical Agriculture in production and distribution of alternate, drought resistant crops. The Mission is in the process of developing a Disaster Relief Plan, which will be completed within the next six months. The plan will designate a Disaster Relief Officer at the Mission to be available and qualified to coordinate future emergency responses.

The drought also served to help normal program implementation and addressed program objectives. Drought-related coordination and frequent interaction served to loosen protocol and broaden the forums of contact between USAID and the GOM and other development participants in Malawi. The drought response provided an opportunity to test transportation planning. NGOs greatly increased their role, experience, visibility, capabilities, and coordination, and their status with the GOM was improved, particularly at the district level. Recurrent attention throughout the drought on malnutrition and health may have resulted in greater post drought resources, planning, and capacities devoted to child health.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The Malawi drought response accomplished its primary objectives of preventing starvation, preventing migration, and enabling a successful agricultural recovery. The success was possible because of the responsiveness and flexibility of the international aid community and a high degree of regional and local coordination. The drought response was successful in spite of problems with timeliness, beneficiary targeting, and less than optimal government participation and contribution.

The lateness of the government's disaster declaration, the lead time between ordering and receiving commodities, the severity of needs in Malawi, and the reluctance of the government to use any of its Strategic Grain Reserve for free distribution, all conspired to create the possibility of widespread famine. These delays have been attributed to the difficulties inherent in a highly centralized system and the government's unwillingness, for political and financial reasons, to confront potential crisis. Despite these difficulties, the U.S. was instrumental in preventing famine in Malawi, principally by undertaking the following actions.

- There were 20,000 MTs of U.S. title II food in-country as carryover from a previous relief effort, which, at USAID's urging, the GOM began distributing in the worst affected areas in April 1992.
- USAID/Washington had pre-positioned 45,000 Mts of maize in Durban, South Africa in response to the first indications of a serious regional crisis. At the US Ambassador's request, the entire quantity was allocated to Malawi. It began arriving on June 5, a full five months before any Malawi-specific relief maize could arrive.
- 44,700 MTs of U.S. maize was borrowed from the Mozambican refugee program and distributed in July and August 1992.

These three sources of maize provided nearly 110,000 of the 190,000 MTs of total U.S. maize contributions; the total U.S. contribution of maize was about two-thirds all relief food provided to Malawi. The early availability of U.S. grain enabled relief distributions to start almost immediately after the disaster was declared and continue almost until other donor maize arrived. Moreover, after the emergency, the flexibility to deprogram food pledged to Malawi when it was determined the food would no longer be needed allowed considerable savings in effort and funding.

Although the relief effort was successful in preventing starvation and in enabling a rapid agricultural recovery, critical aspects of the relief program were inefficiently run because of the Malawi Government's desire to politically benefit from widely distributed free food.

A. Design of Response

Lack of agreement on the quantity of emergency food needed probably contributed to later problems with government controlled food allocations and distribution. USAID, and to a lesser extent the UN/SADC assessment, focused on defining the magnitude of country-level food needs without explicit criteria and without accounting for differences of drought severity between various parts of the country, capacity of the government to implement a response, or coping strategies of affected populations. Consequently, the Malawi Government estimated 6.1 million people in need of emergency food while the FAO/WFP estimate was 4.7 million. Likewise, the UN and GOM used different base figures for calculating per capita consumption needs.

Insufficient field information was available for response planning and for assessing government capabilities. This was partially because data collection systems in Malawi are poor, but this was compounded by the government not making its socio-economic data available to donors. National-level food distribution allocations, which were controlled by the government, were based on equity principles (if some get free food then everyone should get free food) in an attempt to politically capitalize on donor generosity.

The UN appeal proposed unrealistic and exaggerated targets which later resulted in confusion, contradiction, and unfulfilled expectations. The target of 340,000 MTs of donor-assisted commercial food was never met, but the GOM continued to request it on a grant basis and delayed their own purchase in hopes of donor compliance. Likewise, the UN had appealed for rehabilitation of all water points in Malawi, and supplemental feeding of almost one million people, although implementation capacities were significantly insufficient to accomplish such targets.

B. Implementation

Role of Malawi Government. At the national and central level the government's response and participation was disappointing and inappropriate. It was slow to acknowledge the crisis, and did so only after strong and persistent donor pressure. The government adopted the approach that it would control food allocation and general distribution decisions and was unwilling to compromise on these points. The government was reluctant to commit its own resources in the form of the Strategic Grain Reserve, commercial purchases, use of loans, assignment of counterparts, and for full use of local facilities. Malawi's Government believed that all material and financial resources should come from donors.

The Malawi Government unilaterally controlled the process of food allocations from the national to district level and used relief operations as an opportunity to gain political capital. Food allocation decisions were political, rather than technical, and were calculated to ensure that all Malawians were kept satisfied and the incumbent government could take credit. Given the government's uncooperative attitude, and its reluctance and long delay in releasing

maize from its strategic grain reserve, in retrospect, it seems unwise to have permitted the government to assume unchallenged control of food distribution allocations.

Food Logistics: WFP. The decision of USAID and other donors to channel commodities through WFP, and to give WFP responsibility for importation of maize, was a sound decision. WFP was effective in managing the transport of large quantities of maize into Malawi. WFP's experience and capabilities ensured that donor resources were effectively coordinated, professionally managed and flexibly programmed. In the particular case in which one donor did not use WFP, effectiveness and timeliness suffered.

In-Country Food Transport. The establishment of a Transport Logistics Unit to manage and commercially contract all in-country transport was cost effective and well coordinated. The flexibility of the Transport Logistics Unit to deploy resources according to changing needs saved significant time and money and greatly improved the efficiency of the overall relief operation. The transport management contract, executed through a single brokerage, provided a simple management mechanism which was able to assure flexibility and accountability.

The use of the brokerage system and the award of the brokerage contract to one broker, was the only practical option available to get the drought relief maize distributed in time. No other option was available that would have optimized the use of the internal trucking fleet to provide an acceptable level of service to 825 distribution centers throughout all 24 districts as well as serve the Mozambican relief program. The contractual obligation for the broker to arrange for truckers to be given an equitable mix of short, medium and long journeys ensured that each district was, in broad terms, adequately served in terms of availability of transport.

There was sufficient capacity available within Malawi's domestic transport sector to handle the drought relief program, refugee program and other business. No extraordinary shortages of transport for non-drought use, were reported. Over 500 trucking firms were used by the brokers and the TLU.

Food Distribution. District governments were responsible for overseeing the distribution of food to beneficiaries and did their best to prioritize distributions based on needs. At the district level, the commitment, motivation and quality of local government was critical in identifying and delivering food to those most in need. Local needs, however, were not considered in deciding the overall quantities of food that would be allocated to each district--the districts did the best they could with the allocations apportioned to them by the national government. Actual distribution was most often undertaken by NGOs, with targeting and planning assistance provided by district government. The district governments nominally supervised food distribution operations, however, the NGOs played the critical role in and were crucial, although not completely successful, in helping to limit the negative affects of politically induced decisions.

Decision to Exclusively Support Free Food Distribution. Free food distribution was effective in ensuring that beneficiaries with little or no alternative resources were able to eat. Without this mode of assistance famine would surely have occurred in some areas. However, some purchasing power existed and could have been utilized more effectively. In fact, the unavailability of food for purchase from government stores resulted in food riots in several areas--many were willing and able to purchase food had it been possible.

Government food targeting and district allocations were not cost effective. While highly vulnerable individuals received food, so did a great many who were less vulnerable. Lack of clarity in initial targeting, lack of differential rations according to circumstances, and unwillingness by the government to adjust food allocations according to revised estimates of need resulted in free food having been provided to significant numbers of people willing and able to pay, including many of those not dangerously impacted by the drought.

At the time of the drought, however, GOM maize pricing policy resulted in substantial losses on the sale of grain imported at world market prices. While price increases were announced during the drought, domestic sales prices for maize were only a fraction of the landed cost of imported maize. Thus, there was little incentive to purchase maize through commercial channels, either with the government's own funds or resources obtained through international assistance. Under intense pressure from commercial sector shortfalls, the GOM eventually decided to use \$50 million from an IBRD drought relief loan for maize purchases. Shortfalls in the market, of course, increased pressures to expand free food distribution.

A further justification for not channeling food through Malawi's parastatal marketing system was to prevent the government from garnering political benefit from the relief operation. However, in the end, permitting the government to control free food allocations had the same effect that donors were trying to avoid by bypassing established commercial distribution channels--a FEWS survey indicated that 80 percent of beneficiaries credited the government with the food donations.

The massive contribution of donor food for free distribution almost certainly was a disincentive for government utilization of its strategic reserve, inhibited timely government purchase of food for commercial distribution and increased the relief effort's costs.

C. Impact of the Relief Effort

The U.S. responded to needs in every sector but response to food needs was greatest, in keeping with the emphasis initiated in early assessments and perceptions about the proper response to crop failure. In recognition of limited U.S. resources, the U.S. as the lead donor was responsible for setting the tone by focusing on food. As stated, millions of Malawians were in need of food; the U.S. provided two-thirds of the total volume of relief food supplied to Malawi; and all of those in need were provided food. The relief operation was an immense undertaking that succeeded in preventing famine, facilitated agricultural recovery, and prevented off-farm migration. Other aspects of the relief effort are discussed below.

Nutrition and health. Health and nutrition interventions were limited and ineffective. Although recognized as serious problems, nutrition and health were given lower priority than food relief because they were seen as structural development problems rather than consequences of the drought. Since nutritional conditions were extremely poor prior to the emergency (40 percent incidence of chronic malnutrition among children), donors did not believe a quickly designed and short lived emergency program would be able to rectify this situation. UNICEF was an advocate for nutrition and health needs but donors were not responsive--perhaps because there was no capacity in Malawi for the effectively operating such a program and necessary commodities were not as readily available as was food. Donors contributed less than five percent of health target funding requested by the U.N.'s appeal.

Water services. Water was recognized as a serious drought related problem, as well as structural problem. Thousands of water points were rehabilitated and hundreds more created. Rehabilitation of existing water systems was far more productive than new installations, and was much preferred as an appropriate emergency measure. Rehabilitation is faster, cheaper, and less equipment intensive than installation, and more directly addressed drought-induced water shortages. Rehabilitation of water systems was a particular priority because it was deemed necessary in order to prevent migration.

Construction of new water points was over emphasized by the government and therefore many new systems were installed in marginal areas which will not likely be able to support them. In a government water services structure that could not even begin to adequately maintain existing water points, the construction of new ones adds additional stress to the system, and promises greater numbers of inoperable equipment in the future.

Capacity building. The drought presented an opportunity to greatly enhance the government's emergency response and management capabilities. However, little capacity building or technology transfer occurred, largely because counterparts were not provided to benefit from expatriate expertise.

NGO technical capacity was certainly enhanced as a consequence of the relief experience, but its lasting effects will depend on the documentation of the experience, the development of disaster response plans, and the continued presence of the local staff who were involved. Because most NGOs had to start from scratch in their relief operations there were delays in startup and some problems in developing appropriate specialized technical capabilities. However, NGOs were able to develop productive cooperative relationships with local government officials which enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of activities. Much of this was the result of the introduction of formalized systems for coordination, communication, accounting, monitoring, and resource management. Such systems and development approaches are likely to have some contribution to improved management of rural development activities and more collaborative local government-NGO partnerships.

Agricultural Production. Distribution of free food did not pose any disincentive to agricultural production, as proven in the record harvest following the drought. Contributing to this recovery was an NGO program that replaced lost seed stocks through the distribution of about 12,000 MTs of improved (not hybrid) seed to 1.1 million households.

National development priorities. The severity of the drought was increased by the dependence on maize, and the weakness of the health and water sectors. The drought has again focused attention on the need to address these problems but the government has been an ineffective promoter of development and the drought is unlikely to change this situation.

Government disaster policies and plans. Prior to the drought Malawi had several structures and mechanisms in place which should have been able to facilitate identification and response to the drought. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that these mechanisms were effectively used.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Given the government's limited administrative capacity and waning political legitimacy, any significant donor investment solely for the purpose of planning a disaster response capability is not likely to be a sound investment. A government having a marginal social and economic development record is not likely to be able to organize to effectively manage infrequently occurring large-scale disasters.

However, USAID should selectively support discrete efforts to help better prepared Malawi for future periods of food shortage. One such effort would be to gain clarification on the government's policy for use of the strategic grain reserve. This could lead to a quicker and more appropriate future response by the government itself and would help to better define donor and government roles in future emergencies.

2. The GOM should be encouraged and supported in improving the collection of socio-economic data useful for day to day development planning. This information should be available to donors as part of the economic planning process and would be invaluable in planning a response to future emergencies. The availability of objective data is a useful tool for counter balancing politically motivated relief decisions.
3. USAID should continue to encourage the government and NGOs to undertake development in a manner that will reduce the country's vulnerability to future droughts. Increased crop diversification in areas most prone to recurring drought would be a useful step in this direction.
4. Donor and NGO disaster planning and implementation activities should encourage the participation of local government counterparts so that technology transfer and capacity building are increased. Likewise, future relief efforts in Malawi should be structured upon the proven collaborative abilities of local government-NGO partnerships.

VIII. LESSONS LEARNED

1. The degree of control maintained by donors in allocating resources and managing relief efforts should be based on a government's capabilities, legitimacy and accountability to its citizens. The less capable or legitimate a government, the less a government should be permitted authority over the programming of donated emergency commodities.
2. As a first and preferred choice, a disaster response should carefully consider the feasibility of use of existing food distribution systems. Such an approach is likely to be more cost effective and logistically efficient than setting up a parallel distribution system.

If donors decide not to support monetization of granted emergency commodities in order to avoid the host government coopting the process for political gain, then donors must maintain a high degree of control over decisions regarding resource input levels and in-country distribution.

3. International disaster responses should use a lead agency approach in order to channel and pool resources and to facilitate a unified and complementary response. However, regardless of which donor/multilateral coordinates overall efforts, bilateral donors contributing significant resources to a relief effort have an obligation to actively participate in decisions as to how those resources are used.
4. Development programming should seek to reduce a country's vulnerability to frequently recurring disasters. Likewise, relief programs should include planning for the recovery phase at the initial planning stage, for example distributing agricultural seed packs to help farmers return to production following abatement of drought.
5. The levels of responsibility and accountability between host government, WFP and NGOs need to be defined at an advanced stage of an emergency. Clear policy guidelines should then be agreed to by the participating partners as soon as possible.
6. Where extraordinary imports of relief aid are contemplated, an internal logistics appraisal to identify resources and operational constraints should be undertaken as a component of the overall needs assessment. This appraisal should make recommendations on required resources, financial and personnel; suggest strategies; and provide estimated budgetary costs, including ITSH charges.

Annex A: Coordination of Relief Effort

A. Roles and Responsibilities

The GOM took on the role of overall management, supervision, policy development, coordination, and implementation of drought relief operations, with the assistance of numerous implementing organizations. The GOM regarded WFP to have full responsibility for getting food into the country, and the GOM to have total responsibility for the food once it arrived.

As noted earlier, the GOM convened meetings and established task forces and committees of participating organizations. The government took full responsibility for identifying and targeting beneficiaries and deciding on allocations of maize resources. The GOM also took some responsibility working with regional port and transport authorities in securing sufficient transport route capacity for imports. At the local level, government district authorities did their best to supervise, manage, and provide assistance to local food distribution activities.

Among UN agencies WFP was the most active and most central participant. It was given by donors the role as primary conduit for almost all targeted relief food coming into Malawi. WFP managed the process of logistics and transport for importing donor maize from four ports in the region to Extended Delivery Points (EDP) within Malawi.

The UNDP took responsibility for coordinating the activities of the UN agencies and for bringing together donors and the government. UNICEF worked with the GOM and NGOs to plan, coordinate, and implement health and water relief activities.

There was no direct SADC involvement in Malawi. SADC had some responsibility for facilitating regional transport by working with neighboring governments and transporters. However, since WFP and USAID had their own regional operations in place and there were direct contacts between the GOM and republic of South Africa, the role and responsibilities of SADC were unclear to those working in Malawi.

Donors supplied food commodities and financed food transport and logistics, as well as non-food interventions. Among donors USAID was most active. In addition to being the largest contributor of commodities and funding, it became actively involved in planning and coordinating relief efforts with the GOM, UN agencies, and NGOs. USAID was the only donor with sufficient staff resources and programmatic flexibility to be able to devote significant time to relief operational issues, particularly with the assistance of a full-time drought relief specialist.

Consequently, USAID actively recruited NGO participation, acted as advocate with the GOM for WFP and NGOs in solving problems and facilitating decisions, and continually monitored relief activity progress and provided technical support to participating organizations. The

USAID Mission played a key role in facilitating the timely importation of maize through coordination with regional and AID/Washington efforts.

NGOs were given the task of managing the transport and local distribution of relief food at the district and subdistrict levels, under the general supervision of district officials. In this regard, NGOs coordinated transportation with the Transport Logistics Unit, supplied food distribution teams, and conducted monitoring of relief activities. NGOs also were responsible for implementing supplementary feeding programs and nutritional surveillance, and non-food interventions such as provision of water resources and seeds. More than 30 NGOs worked with local and national authorities to assist in food distribution, water supply, nutrition, and seed distribution. Of these, 15 NGOs were involved in food distribution in 18 districts.

Lines of responsibility at the district level were sometimes contested. Because of differentials in human and material resources, capabilities, experience, and interpretations of task, DCs and NGOs sometimes felt the other was co-opting inappropriate supervisory and decision-making responsibilities

In some particularly well recognized sectors, the range of participating organizations was broad. For water, the donors included USAID, World Bank, EC, ODA, UNICEF, UNHCR, DANIDA, CIDA, the Germans, and the Japanese. Implementing agencies included SCF/UK, the GOM, International Rescue Committee, ADRA, Africare, Concern Universal, and the American Refugee Committee. However, in the provision of seeds and planting stock, participants included only ODA, USAID, the British NGO Actionaid, and the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, with no GOM involvement.

B. Coordination of Relief Effort

The complexity of the drought relief efforts made multiple levels of coordination vital to success. Throughout the relief operations there were numerous formal and informal coordination structures operating among and between all participants. Overall coordination was perceived by virtually all participants to have been effective and to have been a primary factor in the success of the drought response. A great deal of coordination occurred outside meetings on an informal, individual basis.

In fact, there was much closer coordination and cooperation between international organizations and the GOM during the drought than ever before. There is wide agreement among participants that the enforced coordination needs of the emergency broke down barriers and forged beneficial new relationships which will be useful in the future.

USAID and other donors, WFP and other UN agencies, and the GOM, represented primarily by the Commission for Disaster Preparedness, Relief and Rehabilitation and FARRU, met often to discuss programmatic and strategic matters, targeting, logistics, and management responsibilities. Donors and UN agencies met among themselves often as well. In January

and February of 1992, meetings were often weekly. USAID used public meetings and private interaction to push WFP on issues of distribution and transport.

USAID had direct interaction with GOM over issues of targeting and distribution, and took as active a role as possible in intervening with the GOM on behalf of WFP. As the primary donor, USAID had some degree of influence.

Coordination was particularly critical for external and internal maize transport logistics to time deliveries appropriately. WFP coordinated closely and effectively with regional transport offices, ports, transportation corridors, and with Rome. An E-Mail system, installed by USAID, greatly facilitated the speed and efficiency of communications. WFP worked closely with SADC for regional transport issues. Coordination was assisted considerably by having WFP staff in Johannesburg at SPOORNET. WFP coordination with SADC also helped to clear transport paths.

In addition, USAID Malawi worked closely with the regional USAID office in Zimbabwe to facilitate procurement and transport. Starting in January there were frequent status reporting cables traded around the region. USAID Zimbabwe played a critical role in coordinating transport logistics to ensure continued flow of food. Frequent communication with other USAID Missions in the region was considered useful in providing mutual learning and problem solving and an opportunity to anticipate problems with sufficient time to avoid them.

For internal logistics and the delivery of relief food and services unprecedented levels of organization and coordination were required and successfully achieved by the NGO community. Coordination between NGOs was done through Drought Relief Coordination Unit created by NGOs under the Council for NGOs in Malawi (CONGOMA). To enhance and improve coordination at the district level, CONGOMA held workshops for DCs and other government staff to assist District Drought Committees in making decisions on allocation of food, water, and medical services, to improve surveillance techniques, and to improve monitoring of the relief process. There was some feeling that although coordination was effective, it was the result of individual organizational initiative and direct interorganizational relationships rather than the structure and efforts of CONGOMA.

Perhaps the greatest level of coordination was required between NGOs and DCs and between these and the Transport Logistics Unit (TLU) to ensure timely and efficient delivery of maize to distribution centers. Food had to be ordered and delivered to the correct distribution points at the expected time and met by distribution teams. NGO activities had to be coordinated with DC activities to make effective use of pooled resources. During the early stages of the drought response coordination of deliveries was poor and inefficient. With the creation of the Transport Logistics Unit coordination improved significantly.

For NGOs which were involved in health and water services, coordination was less difficult because there were fewer participants. NGOs conducting water provision activities were able to effectively coordinate with national and local water authorities. The GOM took the lead

organizing meetings and working with NGOs to identify needs and strategies. As a result UNICEF was able to support government field teams in repairing 1100 wells.

UNICEF and NGOs working with health found government capacities, coordination, and interest in participation weak. Government programs were overwhelmed, as was their capacity to coordinate additional services.

Overall, coordination worked most effectively when one channel was used by all participants for similar activities. For example, when donors channeled food imports through the WFP logistics and transport system, and when NGOs channeled district maize transport needs through the TLU. This enabled resources to be allocated efficiently to prevent delays, bottlenecks, and duplication of effort. There was one donor and one NGO which chose against using the collective systems employed by other participants. In both cases there were delays in providing services because of procurement and transport problems which other participants did not experience.

Annex B: Malawi Drought Response Chronology

1992

- January First indications of failing rains and drying crops
- January 26 GOM releases first crop estimates predicting record harvest of 1.6 million MT.
- February 26 Zambian president declares national drought disaster emergency
- February 27 GOM special agrometeorological report decreases production estimate to 916,000 MT.
- March 9 GOM convenes meeting with donors concerning drought. Production estimates reduced to 790,000 MT.
- March 16 GOM convenes second donor meeting to formally create GOM/NGO/Donor Drought Technical Sub-Committee
- March 17 GOM President Banda declares drought emergency and puts grain import needs at 800,000 MT.
- March 20 GOM revised production estimate of 714,000 MT.
- March 22-29 WFP/SADC drought/food assessment mission to Malawi confirms magnitude of emergency
- April 1 WFP submits GOM/Donor master plan for food aid operations.
- early April GOM national drought victim registration
- early April USAID/OFDA assessment team arrives
- April 15 WFP/FAO regional assessment released as Special alert
- late April GOM begins first food distribution in Lower Shire with USAID 1991 title II 18,000 MTs carryover
- April 30 US Ambassador to Malawi declares drought emergency
- May 21 USAID pre-positioned 45,000 MTs Title II maize arrives in Durban and consigned to Malawi

June 1-2 UN/SADC southern Africa drought pledging conference in Geneva

June 5 US Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen declares regional drought emergency, authorizing U.S. funds for regional effort

June 5 USAID pre-positioned maize begins arrival in Malawi

June GOM final crop estimate of 641,000 MT.

July GOM/ADMARC import 50,000 MTs commercial maize

July Red Cross is first NGO to assist in food distributions. Other NGOs soon follow.

August USAID/OFDA PSC drought specialist arrives

August GOM begins issuing monthly district distribution plans according to registration

September GOM/NGO re-registration begins in some districts

October EC 10,500 MTs maize diverted from Zambia to Malawi to cover diminishing emergency stocks

October U.S. pledges additional 60,000 title II maize, increasing total pledge to 223,000 MT.

November U.S. maize begins arriving in country and EC first shipment arrives

November GOM/WFP/SCF Transport Logistics Unit begins operations

December GOM uses World Bank loan to order 100,000 MTs maize

December Seasonal rains begin, disrupt food distributions

1993

January ADMARC commercial maize shortages cause riots at distribution centers

February GOM early crop estimates indicate bumper harvest

March U.S. reduces pledge by 33,000 MTs in light of delivery timing and anticipated harvest

March GOM/ADMARC commercial stocks become available in rural depots

April WFP last food allocation
May U.S. last maize distribution to districts
May TLU and NGOs cease operations

Annex C: Persons Contacted

United States

Carol Peasley	USAID, former USAID/Malawi Mission Director
Tim Lavelle	USAID, Food for Peace Office
Andrew Natsios	World Vision, Vice President, (USAID/OFDA, former Director)
Leeland Brenneman	World Vision, Senior Program Officer
Brian D'Silva	USDA, OFDA Assessment Team Leader
Linda Howey	USAID, Southern Africa Drought Emergency Task Force

Malawi

Kurt Rockman	USAID/Lilongwe ADO
Monty Crisp	USAID/Lilongwe Drought Relief Officer
Bill Brands	USAID/Lilongwe PPD
Sam Scott	USAID/Lilongwe Deputy Director
Tony Mita	GOM, Commissioner for Disaster Preparedness, Relief, and Rehabilitation
Luke Banda	GOM, Emergency Management Unit, Principal Administrative Officer
Charles Mann	GOM, advisor to Economic Planning and Development
Peter Murphy	GOM/FAO, advisor to National Early Warning System
Jergen Lovatz	EC, Delegate
Michael Heyn	UNDP, Resident Representative
Phillip Ostenso	WFP, Chief of Operations
Charlie Clark	WFP, Logistics
Jean Marc Magnin	WFP, Logistics
E.T. Tageo	WFP, Sub Office Director, Blantyre
Bhim Mahajan	WFP, Evaluation Team Leader
Natalie Hahn	UNICEF, Res Rep.
Stuart Tyson	UNICEF, Health Programs Director
Keith McKenzie	UNICEF, Water Program Director
Peter Pohland	World Bank, Deputy Resident Representative
Al Panico	International Fed of Red Cross, Chief Delegate
Ron Robinson	IRC, Country Director
Kate Wedgewood	SCF/UK, Water Program Manager
J.C.W. Lawrence	GOM/Office of the President/Office of Commissioner for Drought/TLU, Director
Chris Walker	" "
Mark Mullen	Canadian Physicians in Aid and Relief,
Max Church	ADRA, Country Director
Edson Musapole	ActionAid, Program Director

Lezlie Moriniere
Sam Chimwaza
Kelly Stevenson
Chimumu Ngwira

USAID/FEWS, Field Representative
USAID/FEWS, Technical Assistant
American Refugee Committee
District Commissioner, Machinga District

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Annex E: Statement of Work

SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION

I. Background

Southern Africa faced one of the worst droughts in decades in 1992. The drought devastated crops, particularly maize, reduced scarce water availability in many areas and placed the lives of some 18 million people at risk from starvation and disease. In countries also affected by conflict or insecurity, the drought added to already catastrophic conditions, placing additional heavy burdens on people who could no longer cope with further adversity.

FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment missions, in cooperation with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), estimated that the aggregated cereal production of the ten drought-affected SADC countries had fallen to six million metric tons (MT); about half of the normal production in 1992/93. The cereal import requirement of these countries was estimated in March 1992 to be at a level of 6.1 million MT, compared with less than 2 million MT in a normal year.

In response to the drought, emergency food aid shipments to southern Africa have reached unprecedented levels. As of December 31, 1992, U.S. emergency food aid was 2.3 million MT valued at \$650 million for the region, an increase of over 1.4 million MT from previous years. Non-food emergency assistance also reached an all time high for the southern Africa region with FHA/OFDA providing over \$37 million and AFR/SA providing \$59.9 million through December 31, 1992.

The objective of relief assistance is to save lives. Evaluations of relief efforts thus must assess the achievements of the international relief community toward this overall goal. The U.S. contribution also needs to be placed into the context of the total international relief effort.

It is in this context that an assessment of the USG emergency program is conceived. This assessment will provide the opportunity to take stock of USG successes, lessons learned and deficiencies in delivering emergency assistance. It is hoped that this review will contribute to improving the effectiveness of USG emergency aid responses and will develop new models or document existing ones that can be used by other donors and host governments.

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

II. Objectives

1. To provide data on the overall international relief effort including the validity of the initial assessments, the appropriateness of the response measures employed, the U.S. role in the international effort and, to the extent possible, a comparative analysis of this effort with past relief efforts of similar magnitude.
2. To assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact of emergency food and non-food assistance to the Southern Africa Drought Emergency (SADE) and suggest means of improvement.
3. To assist USAID Missions, AID/Washington, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), host governments and other donors in programming future emergency, rehabilitation and disaster prevention activities and in improving Washington/field donor coordination by providing A.I.D. (and the donor community) with lessons learned regarding the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.
4. To Identify conditions under which import mobilization and internal food distribution were both efficient and cost-effective in meeting drought response objectives.

III. Scope of Work

The following questions are illustrative of the kinds of issues that should be examined in depth by the team in carrying out the objectives of this evaluation. Emphasis, of course, will vary from country to country and will depend on the particular type of intervention being examined and the degree of severity of the emergency situation. Priority should be given to information gathering and analysis leading to improved programming, design and exploration of new options for the formulation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.

A. Causes of the Emergency

- o Food deficit due to the drought emergency in southern Africa.
- o To what extent was the country's food problem related to agricultural and macroeconomic policies that may discourage local agricultural production and marketing rather than the drought? Has the drought caused any tangible change in agricultural policies?

B. Host Country Preparedness and Contingency Planning

- Do national procedures exist in the affected countries for responding to emergencies? Are they followed when an actual emergency occurs?
- How did the internal and external coordination of the drought response affect the overall efficiency, impact and cost-effectiveness of each country's drought emergency response?
- Identify what combination of public and private sector roles led to appropriate, timely, efficient and cost-effective responses by both host country governments and donors.
- Describe the types and levels of public and private sector security stocks, distribution mechanisms and how they were used, if they were used, in the disaster situation.
- What planning activities could be undertaken to strengthen the capacity of the affected country's government to respond more effectively to structural and emergency food deficit situations?
- Review drought prevention/mitigation actions: farming practices, crop diversification, soil/water conservation measures, food security stocks, storage/transport losses, seed production, etc.
- How does the local population normally deal with food shortages and how can this traditional coping behavior be reinforced?
- How effective were the early warning systems/weather forecasting services (FEWS project, etc.)? Will these systems remain in place for the future? Will SADC install an early warning system as part of its activities?
- What was/is the impact of pests (army worms/locusts) and plant disease?

C. Donor Coordination

- How effective were the USG early warning systems and coordination?
- Were adequate mechanisms (including telecommunications systems) in existence or were they established to coordinate assessments of donor requirements and implementation efforts?

- How successful was the U.N. World Food Programme and the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Assistance in coordinating assistance, delivering assistance, etc. and how did they interact with each other and other groups responding to the drought?
- What was the role and responsibilities of international, U.S. and/or local non-governmental organizations/private voluntary organizations?
- How do donors' methodologies for calculating food and non-food needs and their system for reporting on food deliveries, donor pledges, etc. relate to those of the UN? Are they adequate?
- What were the successes and failures of donor coordination and the role of donor meetings and appeals.
- What was the role of SADC and was it effective in responding to the drought needs of the member countries?
- What was the role of South Africa? How well did cooperation among regional transport authorities work, and what factor influenced the success of those efforts? Did early estimates of South African port and rail capacity overestimate the difficulties of handling projected food imports? If so, why?
- What role did WFP play in transport coordination?

D. Needs Assessment

- What were the types of information collection system (e.g., rainfall analysis, nutrition surveillance), analysis procedures and use of data for early warning, assessment of requirements, declaration of disaster, design of programs, estimation of food input, etc. used by A.I.D., the UN, host governments?
- Was the logistical capacity of the government, USAID and the private sector adequately taken into account in determining food aid levels?
- Evaluate the accuracy, rapidity, integrity and appropriateness of A.I.D.'s needs assessment process?
- Was there any effort to monitor prices in the local market as a measure of determining food shortages?

E. Project Design

- o How were the target areas and groups of beneficiaries selected?
- o Describe the demographics of the beneficiary population. Did the majority of food and/or non-food assistance go to a specific group (e.g., farmers, urban poor, displaced persons, refugees)?
- o Were local food preferences and food consumption patterns of the target population as well as local market prices adequately considered in the choice of commodities and the selection of distribution systems?
- o Which mechanism was the most effective in providing food aid to the beneficiary (WFP, host government, PVO, etc.) Did this vary based on the type of beneficiary; e.g., getting food to markets versus targeted feeding?
- o By the type of recipient (malnourished children, adults, etc.) which type of food aid implementation was the most effective (FFW, general distribution, targeted feeding, etc.)
- o Were necessary complementary inputs (i.e., seeds, vaccines, materials, technical assistance, environmental impacts assessments) incorporated into the food emergency program?
- o To what extent had participation of beneficiaries and utilization of already existing organizational structures/resources, particularly local non-governmental organizations, been built into responses?
- o How can the basic food problem best be addressed with emergency food aid? With commercial?
- o How were costs a factor in the design of the emergency response program? What budget limits, if any, were established by the respective host government(s)?
- o Were provisions for termination of emergency food aid and/or transition to rehabilitation and longer term development foreseen during the planning stages?
- o Were linkages with regular food and non-food aid programs and other complementary resources explored?
- o Were disincentives introduced by the provision of massive quantities of PL 480 food?

F. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

- o Did the host governments, UN, USAID Missions, AID/W, PVOs and local community groups effectively organize themselves to manage the emergency? How vigilant were these groups in protecting themselves from becoming overextended? What emphasis was placed on institution-building and the enhancement of local resourcefulness? Did they utilize guidelines for assessing environmental impacts? Were these guidelines effective? What was the role of the Peace Corps and other USG agencies? How did the different Bureaus within A.I.D. interact? What was the role and utility of the Southern Africa Drought Task Force? Discuss in terms of relief planning, organization, resource allocation (the Africa Disaster Assistance Account), postcrisis rehabilitation and longer term sustainability.
- o What are the policies/practices of local governments and donors in the management, monitoring and evaluation of emergency programs and what was their varying impacts on large commercial farmers and small, subsistence farmers?
- o How can management, monitoring, oversight and evaluation be improved?

G. Timeliness of Emergency Response

- o Discuss the effectiveness and quantify the exact time frames for the following:
 - Needs assessment
 - Approval process for food and non-food projects considered
 - Procurement of commodities
 - Delivery of commodities to the country
 - Internal distribution of food and non-food aid to the target population
 - Arrival of technical assistance
- o Describe constraints, i.e. logistical/organizational /political bottlenecks, and how and if they were overcome. Was the WFP regional logistical unit in Harare and its subset in Johannesburg effective? Suggest ways of expediting these procedures in the future. Was private sector transport, handling and storage used effectively in

the response to the drought and, if not, how can it be improved?

- o If food commodities arrived late, were appropriate actions taken to avoid disincentive effects on local production and marketing?

H. Program Results

To the extent possible and, taking into account the constraints inherent in disaster situations, the evaluation team will present evidence of the effectiveness/impact of emergency interventions in terms of the following:

- o Targeting: extent to which areas and/or victims with greatest need are being reached. Was better targeting achieved as the drought progressed?
- o Appropriateness and adequacy of USG food and non-food intervention. Were resources allocated appropriately for maximum effectiveness?
- o Coverage: percentage of the affected population being assisted (by the United States, by other donors)
- o Increased availability of food in target areas and consumption by vulnerable groups
- o Incentive/disincentive effects on agricultural production/prices/incomes
- o Improved nutritional and health status of target groups
- o Decreased infant and child mortality
- o Demographic effects: population movements to centers and urban areas, age/sex distribution, etc.
- o Dependency/self-reliance: Have the relief programs weakened the self-help capacity of individuals and community groups? How can programs be organized better to reempower individuals and strengthen local decision-making and resource generation/productivity?
- o Policy and institutional reform: How has the emergency affected ongoing food strategy plans and price restructuring efforts? How has the emergency intervention strengthened the capacity of the national and local governments as well as local NGOs to respond more effectively to future emergencies?

I. Policy Issues

The following issues are complex and deserve separate studies in themselves. They are extremely important in thinking about programming options and will provide a useful backdrop for discussions and future interventions. As appropriate, the team should address these concerns in the context of recommendations for program improvement/redesign and lessons learned:

- o Relative effectiveness (impact and costs) of various distribution modes (e.g., general free distribution, maternal and child health, supplementary feeding programs, food for work, monetization, triangular transactions, rehabilitation activities), consideration of alternative distribution mechanisms and the extent of the relief effort's decentralization/regionalization.
- o Comparative advantage and cost-effectiveness of different food distribution channels (WFP, PVOs, host governments) and criteria for selecting among them.
- o Linkages with regular food aid program and other development assistance activities, how to use them to prepare better for future emergencies as well as to assess the effect a disaster has on them in the short term. This includes the following:
 - a. What effect do emergency activities have on the Mission's regular program and their strategic objectives? Should we consider these "on hold" while an emergency takes place? Should funding for them be decreased and moved toward the emergency?
 - b. How should disasters affect the composition of the Mission program? Should the Strategic Objectives in their regular development program take this into account and, if not, why?
 - c. Can ongoing activities be redirected to assist the drought? To what extent should they?
- o The capacity and ability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to act independently of political constraints.
- o How food emergency programs can be planned to support sector and macroeconomic policy reforms and strengthen food self-reliance, disaster prevention and longer term development initiatives.
- o Criteria for determining when and how emergency programs should be phased in and out.

- o The role that donor coordination (food and non-food needs assessments, standardized methodologies, centralized assistance/pledge information) does/should play in maximizing the effectiveness of emergency responses.

IV. Evaluation Approach and Duration

During the first week of the assessment, the Contractor will draft scopes of work for team participants. All team members then will meet in Washington, D.C., to review and clarify the scopes of work, develop field protocols for site visits and for interviews with local officials and program participants, as well as to hold discussions with key A.I.D., USDA, State Department and PVO officials in Washington.

After this prefield analysis is completed, the teams will proceed to the southern Africa region, as coordinated by the Contract's Chief of Party, to carry out field investigations: review additional documentation, interview key U.S. Mission personnel, host government, PVO and other donor officials and inspect appropriate field sites. Specific attention should be devoted to capturing the perceptions of program participants, either through structured interviews or informal conversations in their own language. The field work will be carried out in approximately 36 working days per team member. For Mozambique the field work will be carried out in approximately 20 working days per team member.

While in the field all logistical support costs will be provided by the contractor and not by the Missions. This includes travel and transportation (surface and air), lodging, office space, office equipment and supplies, etc.

The teams will inform the Mission of the countries visited of areas that will be considered.

Upon return from the field, each team will review its findings and will prepare a draft country report. When all the country studies have been completed, Mission comments received and the final reports prepared, the Contractor's core technical staff will prepare a synthesis of findings and recommendations, drawing out lessons learned about what works, what does not work and why, from both the operational and policy perspectives.

AID/Washington and USAID Missions would be expected to collect all existing data and reports and other relevant records for the team before their arrival to the countries being identified. To the extent possible, USAID Missions should provide logistical support for the team while in-country.

Total duration of the evaluation will be approximately three months with a target completion date of September 21, 1993.

V. Country Selection

All drought-affected countries in the southern Africa region, including South Africa and excluding Angola, which received USG food and/or non-food assistance will be assessed. The region will be broken into four areas, each of which will be visited by one team, as follows: 1) Zimbabwe and South Africa, 2) Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, 3) Zambia and Malawi, and 4) Mozambique.

VI. Team Composition and Level of Effort

In conducting these country assessments, the contractor will provide at least four teams of specialists; one team for each of the areas specified above. Given the range of skills required to carry out this scope of work and the short time frame, the background of these specialists will vary, but all of the following areas of expertise must be represented:

- Language skills and country-specific experience
- Agricultural economics
- Public health/nutrition
- Rural Water
- Social Anthropology
- Food Logistics
- PL 480 Program Regulations and WFP Procedures
- Policy analysis/program design/evaluation
- UN System
- Disaster Management

The team leaders will be on the contractor's core technical staff. While continuity in the evaluation team is assumed, it is not essential for the same consultants to go to all the countries.

VII. Reports

The team will submit a report on each country as well as a synthesis containing an analysis of those factors that appear to determine program effectiveness, recommendations on how A.I.D. can improve its programming of emergency food aid and non-food aid and lessons learned. Before departure from each country, the team will have engaged the USAID in a dialogue concerning their findings and recommendations. The draft country reports are due to AID/Washington no later than two weeks after each team has returned to the United States. Fifty copies will be delivered. The Missions will be asked to complete their reviews and respond with comments by cable within two weeks of receiving the draft. The Contractor will conduct a debriefing in Washington for AID and all interested parties within one month of the return of all teams. The final report (including an executive summary and synthesis of findings, recommendations and lessons learned) will be completed by the Contractor within two weeks of receiving all Mission comments. Fifty copies of this report will be delivered to FHA/OFDA, who will distribute them to all interested parties including FHA/FFP, AFR/SA, SADTF, LEG, CDIE and InterAction.

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

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