



MISSION FOR PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN

INTERIM PROJECT ASSISTANCE COMPLETION REPORT (PACR)

FOR

TECHNICAL SERVICES & SUPPORT PROJECT (TSSP) NUMBER 306-0200

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TECHNICAL SERVICES AND SUPPORT PROJECT (TSSP)
(306-0200)

INTERIM
PROJECT ACTIVITY COMPLETION REPORT (PACR)
2-14-1994

I. BASIC PROJECT DATA:

<u>Action</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>PACDs</u>	<u>Auth. Amounts</u>
Authorization:	Feb. 25, 1986	Feb. 24, 1991	\$ 3.5 million
Amendment 1:	Jun. 18, 1989	Dec. 31, 1992	\$ 7.0 million
Amendment 2:	Jun. 08, 1992	Sep. 30, 1994	\$11.5 million
Amendment 3:	Sep. 15, 1993	Feb. 24, 1996	\$16.0 million

Cumulative obligations (12/31/93), \$11,523,360; cumulative expenditures (12/31/93), \$7,243,557.

II. PROJECT GOAL AND PURPOSE:

A. Goal:

To assist the AID/Representative (AID/Rep.) for Afghanistan Affairs to develop and design high-priority Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance (CBHA) activities, to develop strategies, studies and projects which will encourage Afghans to remain in Afghanistan and to encourage their repatriation to resistance-controlled areas of their homeland.

B. Purpose:

To provide a funding mechanism to support the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance program for war-affected Afghans and provide grant assistance to outside organizations for activities which are supportive of the broad overall objectives of the program.

III. PROJECT COMPONENTS:

The TSSP is comprised of five components: Logistical Support, Technical Assistance, Data Collection and Analysis (DCA) Unit, Design/Evaluations/Studies, and Grants. The Grants component, formerly subsumed under the Studies element, was split off as a separate component in 1993 when it was anticipated that the amount of project resources devoted to this element would increase substantially. Each of these project components is discussed below in detail.

A. Logistical Support:

Because of extremely tight space constraints at the U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission buildings in Islamabad and Peshawar, it was necessary for O/AID/Rep to lease additional office space in Peshawar and Islamabad to house PSCs, TDY and support personnel. Since these logistical arrangements did not pertain to a specific project but provided support for all program activities, the operation and maintenance costs for these supplemental offices, along with a small office in Quetta, were funded out of the TSSP. In FY 93, the USAID/Pakistan office building in Peshawar was vacated and its operations were consolidated into the O/AID/Rep premises in Peshawar. The merger of these two operations resulted in overall savings to the Afghanistan and Pakistan programs.

With the downsizing of the USAID/Pakistan operations in Islamabad, space to house the O/AID/Rep operations in the USAID/Pakistan Mission building became available. As a result, the annex office space leased by O/AID/Rep in Islamabad was vacated in June of 1993. O/AID/Rep personnel completed their move from the Embassy to the USAID/Pakistan Mission building by September of 1993 and thus the consolidation of all Islamabad-based personnel into the USAID Mission building was completed by the end of FY 1993. This move resulted in greater operational efficiencies and reduced cost. On July 20, 1993, the two missions merged and became the USAID Mission for Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Quetta O/AID/Rep office space was vacated in May of 1993 with the transfer of the office of the Regional Affairs Officer to the USAID/Pakistan Liaison Office building. The O/AID/Rep Regional Affairs Office in Quetta closed in early August 1993. After FY 93, only the AFO/PRO office space in Peshawar was financed under the TSSP through FY 1994.

B. Technical Assistance:

Historically, a substantial portion of the TSSP resources were utilized to fund technical and support staff under personal service contracts (PSCs). This staff provided necessary assistance in project design and implementation services. A greater number of PSCs were employed at the Mission than is typical of a traditional bilateral program because it was a unilateral program without host country counterparts.

Reductions in personnel for the O/AID/Rep program in 1992 resulted in a substantial increase in the workload of those remaining. In this environment, the cost-effective PSC staff assumed an even greater importance to the Mission in providing design and implementation activities.

As of December 31, 1993, 83 PSCs had been funded under the TSSP; this included 59 US, 23 FSNs and one TCN. Historically, this component accounted for 51% of TSSP expenditures.

In accordance with a Mission Action Memorandum approved on July 28, 1993, FSN PSC personnel associated with the O/AID/Rep program were transferred to the USAID/Pakistan personnel rolls upon completion of their O/AID/Rep personal services contracts. Thereafter, the salaries and benefits of these personnel were paid initially from the USAID/Pakistan Trust Fund Budget. A cost allocation was established under which the cost of these PSC employees will be recovered from the Trust Fund and charged to the TSSP budget allocation and/or the Afghan Program's Operating Expense (OE) budget through a book transfer of funds. Some are charged directly to TSSP and others to OE, based on their work responsibilities.

C. Data Collection and Analysis Unit:

The Data Collection and Analysis (DC&A) Unit was formed in 1989 in response to the unique situation in Afghanistan, where expatriate employees of the U.S. Government and its contractors generally were unable to travel because of adverse security conditions. The DC&A Unit was designed to provide a tier of monitoring independent from that of the technical assistance contractors and grantees, thus ensuring greater accountability of USG resources. Because their activities spanned the scope of the Mission's entire portfolio, it was formed as an independent unit funded under the TSSP, managed by the Program Office.

The DC&A Unit consisted of an American (PSC) manager, a monitoring unit head, six monitors, a computer specialist, a cartographer and a driver. With the exception of the manager and the computer specialist, all personnel of the DC&A Unit were Afghans. The monitoring missions were carried out by sending teams of monitors into selected geographical areas inside Afghanistan to gather information about all O/AID/Rep-supported facilities and operations there. The Afghan monitors proved to be very effective because of their low profile and familiarity with the language and culture.

Over the years 1991-1994 comprehensive monitoring missions were undertaken to Logar, Wardak, Kabul City, Nangarhar, Badakhshan, Kunar, Paktia and Paktika provinces. More focussed monitoring missions were carried out in all provinces, except Nimroz, Badghis and Faryab, in order to verify delivery of specific program inputs and the existence of facilities. All trips resulted in comprehensive, printed reports, which attest to the diligence and thoroughness of the Unit's field work. In the process, many inaccuracies in previous contractor/grantee reporting were identified and were subsequently corrected.

Needless to say, the Unit's findings and recommendations were not always and universally welcomed by those implementing the cross-border program.

D. Design/Evaluations/Studies/Grants:

1) Design:

Since its inception, TSSP has been the vehicle for funding short-term consultancies to assist in project design. Conceived as an "enabling project," it funded consultancies, feasibility studies and project design/redesign activities of the entire Afghan program portfolio, which included ten distinct and separate projects in addition to TSSP (not including the bilateral PL-480 Title II program, 1986-1990).

2) Evaluation:

Evaluation of the program portfolio elements also was a significant element of the TSSP. Ten evaluations conducted through this project assisted project managers to improve project interventions and shape the program to meet the rapidly and constantly changing realities of the operating environment in Afghanistan.

3) Studies:

The TSSP was historically also a source of funding for studies and surveys conducted for the Afghan program. These studies were very useful in developing overall program strategy and designing and implementing specific project activities. Ten such studies and surveys were completed under the TSSP. The studies component was reduced in prominence with the activation of the Nathan-Berger Afghanistan Studies component under the Commodity Export Program (306-0205) in 1989.

4) Grants:

The TSSP also provided a source of funding for grants to certain organizations engaged in important Afghan assistance efforts which did not fit within the parameters of the Mission's sectoral projects. For example, such grants have been made to the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) to fund a survey of wages and benefits in Afghanistan (FY 92), to coordinate and increase the effectiveness of NGO humanitarian assistance activities in Afghanistan and in refugee camps (FY 91), and for NGO training and ACBAR's administrative costs relating to that activity (FY 92).

Historically, this facet of the project accounted for only a small portion of overall funding; however, with the grant under TSSP for operating costs of the Mine-Detection Dog Center (MDC) 1994-1996, the proportion of funding devoted to this element increased substantially (to 80% in FY 93). The MDC is an Afghan organization, started under the Mission's Commodity Export Program, which trains and deploys dogs and their Afghan handlers to detect land mines inside Afghanistan. The Mission's planned phase-out of the CEP in 1994 is proceeding on track but, because of the high level of USG interest in the MDC's activities, the Mission wanted to assure bridge-financing for the MDC until it could secure alternate sources of funding under UN auspices.

IV. INPUTS:

Because of the nature of the Afghan Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance program, and the lack of a counterpart government, all funds under TSSP were obligated into contracts, cooperative agreements, personal services contracts, grants, and procurements. This was a unilateral project, hence no contributions in this project were included from the Government of Afghanistan (nor from other donors).

As of Dec. 31, 1993, \$11,523,360 had been obligated and \$7,243,557 expended.

V. PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

A. Logistical Support:

TSSP funds supported two annex buildings and operations through FY 1993 (Islamabad and Quetta) and one annex operation in Peshawar through FY 1994. The Peshawar and Quetta operations were critically important in the successful implementation of the program portfolio because virtually all contractors and cooperative agreement grantees and sub-grantees operated out of these two locations for their USAID-funded cross-border operations. Liaison functions were critical, as were the physical locations of Assistant Project Officers, liaison personnel and the DC&A Unit. It was anticipated that even after an eventual move of program and project operations to Kabul, it was likely that for some period of time some type of administrative presence would remain either in Islamabad or Peshawar or both, necessitating the operation of down-sized facilities there. This of course never happened. Historically, expenditures for the logistical support function accounted for 14 percent of total project outlays.

B. Technical Assistance:

The TSSP served as a critical resource to enable the Mission to conduct the Afghanistan program successfully in an unusual operating environment. Unlike most USAID programs, the Mission operated in the absence of a cooperating host country government. This lack of traditional counterparts placed a greater burden on Mission personnel in designing, implementing and monitoring program interventions. The TSSP provided a source of funding for long-term personal services contractors (PSCs) and short-term technical assistance contractors to assist in these functions. In addition, the TSSP provided a mechanism for obtaining specialized expertise necessary for monitoring and data collection, studies and analyses, project evaluations and design assistance necessary to enable the Mission to respond to the rapidly changing political, military and economic circumstances in Afghanistan.

A large number of the personal service contracts were with US nationals rather than FSNs, because of the nature of the program many positions required high security clearances. In addition, for some of the administrative, logistic support and secretarial functions there was a shortage of qualified Afghans, or Dari/Pashto-speaking Pakistanis to fill these positions.

Annex A lists the names and positions of technical assistance personnel funded from TSSP since its inception. The project has funded the following numbers and categories of technical assistance personnel since its inception.

44 long-term US PSCs (most with top secret clearances)
15 short-term US PSCs
7 US consultants
5 Afghan consultants
1 long-term TCN PSC
23 long-term FSN PSCs (of which 12 were Afghans)
1 short-term (purchase order) expert.

In addition, TSSP paid \$27,051 for short-term US national assistance as part of USAID/Pakistan's Dependent Employment Roster.

Long-term TA personnel have performed the tasks typically carried out by counterpart (Ministry/Department/Agency) personnel under bilateral USAID programs with cooperating governments, such as:

- Implementing project activities;
- Providing secretarial and logistical support for joint project implementation;

- Helping design work plans;
- Scheduling critical activities in project implementation; ensuring follow-up;
- Obtaining government clearances (of all types);
- Ensuring that project funds are expended correctly, fulfilling the accountability requirements;
- Ensuring that the project beneficiaries are reached by project outputs; ensuring that project inputs result in the proper, planned, outputs;
- Involvement in project monitoring and evaluation activities and in drafting scopes of work for evaluations and reviews; acting as the key resource person when outside evaluators are brought in; and
- Alerting project officers to potential sensitivities, bottlenecks and other constraints on the part of the host government, because of their expertise.

Without these contributions from long-term TA personnel, the Mission would not have been able to implement its project portfolio.

C. Data Collection and Analysis Unit

In the early years of the CBHA program, the O/AID/Rep supported a great variety of assistance efforts through large numbers of PVOs (PVO Co-financing), grants and sub-grants (Rural Assistance Program), through cooperative agreements with major US PVOs/NGOs (VITA, CARE, MSH), and through more traditional contract mechanisms (UNO, AMEG/RONCO). The magnitude of the program, the diverse nature of its assistance activities, and its cross-border nature, involving a country to which "official Americans" had no access, called for special reporting and monitoring systems in order to address accountability concerns. Contractor and grantee reporting was found to be generally inadequate, no standardized monitoring and reporting systems were in place, and as a result the O/AID/Rep lacked data and information on how and where targeted groups were benefitting from the assistance provided.

In the spring of 1988 the O/AID/Rep contracted for the services of Dr. Carol Carpenter, an American anthropologist whose husband worked in Pakistan for a World Bank project, to design and to assist contractors/grantees implement monitoring and reporting systems; to try to determine the effectiveness and impact of the CBHA program; to participate in the Mission's design/redesign/evaluation activities; and to collect USAID and other donor experience and lessons learned in responding to needs of populations which had experienced man-made disasters. Dr. Carpenter spent 1-1/2 years with the O/AID/Rep program designing and implementing monitoring and reporting systems.

When she departed in December 1989, she was succeeded by Ms. Diana Stiles, a social science systems analyst, who continued and refined Carpenter's work, along the lines of an identical scope-of-work. However, Stiles soon began to report on problems (non-cooperation, obstruction, unwillingness to share project monitoring and project output data) she encountered with certain contractors and grantees. She hired professional staff to assist her and the Data Collection and Analysis (DC&A) Unit was born in early 1990. Over the years it evolved into a highly professional unit of Afghans under the leadership of a US PSC. When she resigned in mid-1991 to return to graduate studies for her doctoral degree, she was replaced by Roger Helms, who had an auditing and management information systems (MIS) background and had subsequently specialized in mapping. The DC&A Unit has done an impressive amount of work since its inception, but, as "auditors", they attracted considerable opposition and generated controversy among our program implementers.

As USAID staff and contractors continued to have very limited access to Afghanistan, the DC&A Unit's work fostered accountability and supported Mission decision-making on project implementation inside Afghanistan through field monitoring, data management and periodic impact assessments with sets of performance indicators. Its mapping functions were ancillary to these functions. On a routine basis, the DC&A Unit has worked with contractors, cooperative agreement grantees and Afghan counterparts to improve their record keeping, reporting and data-base management functions, including basic mapping/geographical location assistance and tools (geopositioners).

The DC&A Unit has provided a vital independent monitoring and verification function, carried out through periodic monitoring missions to A.I.D.-supported facilities and activities inside Afghanistan, to verify the existence, inputs, outputs, quality and, impact of project activities, and the collection of socio-economic indicators with respect to project beneficiaries. As part of these monitoring missions, DC&A Unit staff also reported on political, social, economic and security developments in the provinces and districts they visited. These reports provided a useful backdrop of the situation on the ground against which the Mission's project activities were implemented over time.

By December 31, 1993 the DC&A Unit consisted of 12 persons; a US PSC Chief, a Data Collection Specialist, four Assistant Data Collectors, one Monitoring Specialist, three monitors, a Cartographer and a driver. All but the Unit's Chief were Afghan nationals. Annual operating costs of the Unit totaled approximately \$200,000 each for 1992 and 1993.

- Helping design work plans;
- Scheduling critical activities in project implementation; ensuring follow-up;
- Obtaining government clearances (of all types);
- Ensuring that project funds are expended correctly, fulfilling the accountability requirements;
- Ensuring that the project beneficiaries are reached by project outputs; ensuring that project inputs result in the proper, planned, outputs;
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D. Design/Evaluations/Studies/Grants

As of December 31, 1993 this element of the project accounted for \$5.7 million in obligations (including the yet unspent \$3.6 million grant to UNOCHA in support of the Mine Detection Dog Center (MDC) and \$2.1 million in expenditures. Historically this element accounted for 28 percent of project expenditures.

In the early years of the project, this element was really "the meat" of the activity, as studies, appraisals, design and evaluation work put into place the core project portfolio of O/AID/Rep, 1986-1989:

306-0201	PVO Co-financing Project
306-0202	Education Sector Support Project
306-0203	Health Sector Support Project
306-0204	Agriculture Sector Support Project
306-0205	Commodity Export Program
306-0206	Afghanistan Humanitarian Relief
305-0211	PVO Support Project
306-0212	Human Resources Development

Design and redesign work for projects was essentially coordinated in-house by USDH and US PSC personnel. Evaluation components were built into the projects so that dependence on TSSP for these activities lessened considerably as time progressed.

Annex B contains a brief description of these early activities.

The grants component was initially not considered to be an integral element of the project, but over time there evolved a need to assist certain organizations whose work was directly supportive of O/AID/Rep's broad program objectives. For this reason a number of grants were made to the PVO/NGO umbrella organization Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR):

IOM grant for Afghan Registry	\$	90,000
ACBAR grant for NGO training		50,000
ACBAR grant for an Afghan wage survey		24,000
ACBAR grant for Afghan NGO upgrading		50,000

Similarly, the Mission decided to make a grant of \$3.6 million to UNOCHA in support of the MDC's operations, 1994-1996, until such time as the MDC is able to charge appropriate fees for its work in demining inside Afghanistan.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED:

- A. The Afghan program would not have gotten off the ground without an "enabling" project of this nature.**

Given the project development and design work called for by this newly created and politically important program (bi-partisan political support in Congress for the Administration's decision to support war-affected Afghans), and the then, limited O/AID/Rep staff available, outside technical assistance was urgently needed for immediate preparation of feasibility, design and development activities for the very projects assisting the Afghans (Annex B describes the important early studies, appraisal, design and evaluation activities funded out of TSSP.) Within record time of TSSP approval and authorization (February 25, 1986) a basic portfolio of humanitarian assistance was designed, authorized and activated:

PVO Co-financing Project, March, 1986
Health Sector Support Project, March, 1986
Commodity Export Program, July, 1986
Education Sector Support Project, August, 1986
Agriculture Sector Support Project, June, 1987
Afghan Humanitarian Relief, October, 1987

- B. The Afghan program, operating as it did, without the benefit of host-country counterpart institutions and personnel, could not have successfully fulfilled its mandate without the Technical Assistance component of TSSP.**

Forty-four long-term US PSCs supported by 23 long-term FSN PSCs performed the manifold tasks, duties and responsibilities analogous to those usually carried out by host-country counterpart personnel in more typical bilateral USAID programs. Without their contributions the Mission would not have been able to implement its project portfolio. Because of the nature of the program, high security clearances were required. Therefore, the bulk of the long-term PSCs funded under this program were US PSCs with top secret clearances.

- C. As USAID staff and American citizen staff of contractors/grantees were not allowed to travel inside Afghanistan (for security reasons), the work of the project-financed Data Collection and Analysis (DC&A) Unit was critical for the program's accountability requirements.**

The Peshawar-based DC&A Unit was tasked with independently monitoring and verifying each class of USAID-funded activities in Afghanistan (education, health, agriculture, relief supplies, emergency food aid); assisting contractors, cooperative agreement grantees, co-financed grantees and Afghan counterparts in

designing and setting up their own activity/commodity monitoring data collection and reporting systems insofar as they related to field activities; and documenting, testing and certifying these systems. This was done because the Mission sometimes questioned the quality and quantity of contractor/grantee reporting and in some cases suspected that they were selectively reporting on the successes and achievements of their project-funded activities, and were keeping back certain facts in order to make their programs look good.

As a direct result of DC&A Unit experience with inadequate monitoring and selective reporting on the part of contractors and grantees, 1988-1991, the new DC&A Unit's Chief's (Helms's) scope-of-work contained the following requirements:

"Provide independent monitoring reports based on quantitative and qualitative information obtained through data collection missions. This involves both the verification of the existence of facilities inside Afghanistan and the collection of socio-economic indicators of project progress and quality, based on interviews with the target population carried out by trained Afghan researchers."

These requirements forced a much closer relationship between the -- then rapidly expanding -- DC&A Unit staff and those of contractors and grantees. However, this cooperation continued to be troublesome and was often confrontational, as Helms, like his predecessors, complained of obstructionism, lack of cooperation, selective reporting, and obstreperous attitudes on the part of some contractors and grantees.

Yet, the Mission began to receive less biased and distorted information on its cross-border operations when it deployed a team of neutral observers, not paid by or under the control of (and therefore beholden to) contractors and grantees.

D. Mission management and oversight of the DC and A Unit was unnecessarily complicated and poorly structured.

Originally the Monitoring and Data Collection Specialist was part of the Program Office and located in Islamabad. With the recruitment of Diana Stiles, the function was physically relocated to Peshawar but remained part of the Program Office, although the day-to-day work was supervised by the Regional Affairs Officer (RAO), Peshawar. With the recruitment of Roger Helms to lead the DC&A Unit in June 1991 the prime responsibility for the Unit (in terms of technical guidance) was shifted to the Project Development and Implementation Services (PDIS) Office in Islamabad, although the daily work continued to be supervised by the RAO/Peshawar. The chain-of-command thus became so

confused during this period that the DC&A Unit was technically guided by the PDIS Office, administratively controlled by the Program Office and supervised by RAO/Peshawar. Upon the arrival of AID Representative Machmer and the departure of Project Development Officer Swain in early 1992, responsibility for managing the DC&A Unit reverted back to the Program Office, but until the spring of 1993 the Unit's work continued to be supervised by RAO/Peshawar. To-date, the Unit remains in the Program Office, but its work was until recently supervised by the Food-for-Peace Officer, who, when he was part of the Program Office, was given this responsibility by the Program Office chief, due to lack of staff resources in that office during the period 1992-1993.

This diffuse and often changing responsibility in "ownership" of the Unit, the split between technical guidance from Islamabad and supervision from Peshawar, and a dose of "office politics" resulted in confusion and uncertainty on the part of the Unit's leadership, only exacerbated by being given often conflicting directives. This was an untenable situation.

The DC&A Unit's mandate was not clearly spelled out to the contractors/grantees. In essence its work should have fostered accountability and supported Mission decision-making through data management, field monitoring and periodic impact assessments through sets of performance indicators. Its mapping functions were ancillary to these functions and should not have been pursued as an independent activity. Too much of its past work was in response to specific but uncoordinated requests from O/AID/Rep support and technical officers. These requests tended to be topical and difficult to predict in advance. However, they were often given priority over scheduled monitoring and data collection and analysis functions. These requests interfered with workplans and overloaded the system. Planning of monitoring trips proved to be another difficulty in that they had to be undertaken without the knowledge of contractors/grantees (in order to prevent "Potemkin Villages"), but well known to the project officers.

VII. SUSTAINABILITY

The Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance (CBHA) program for war-affected Afghans focussed its activities primarily on provision of basic social and agricultural services to Afghans who chose to remain in their country in resistance-controlled areas, on emergency relief and on selected rural reconstruction activities. Sustainability was not an issue early in the program, but gained an importance over time in health, education and reconstruction activities, as the Mission positioned itself to shift its program to a more developmental mode during the period 1992/93.

Because of the nature of the Technical Services and Support Project, as an

"enabling project" to design and help implement a program portfolio of humanitarian assistance activities, sustainability of the various project elements was never anticipated nor expected.


The only project-funded activity which was undertaken because of sustainability concerns is the 1993 grant to UNOCHA in support of the Mine-Detection Dog Center's (MDC) operating costs for the period 1994-1996. The MDC evolved out of the old Animal Holding Facility, funded through the Commodity Export Program (CEP - 306-0205), which originally supplied and trained pack-mules for carrying relief supplies into difficult-to-access areas of Afghanistan. When that activity phased out with the withdrawal of Soviet occupational forces from Afghanistan in 1989 and large refugee returns were expected, demining activities gained prominence. USAID supported mine-detection dog training programs for animals and handlers from mid-1989 onwards and the dog populations of the two MDC branches (Peshawar and Quetta) grew to almost 100 animals plus training, handling and support personnel. With the anticipated activities completion of the CEP project by mid-1994, the future of the MDC became an important sustainability issue. The MDC learned to stand on its own feet and evolved into an independent, properly organized and registered NGO, able to operate with funding generated by its critical assistance to demining work inside Afghanistan (with an estimated 10 million unexploded mines and other ordnance). Actions and activities aimed at making the MDC independent and self-sustainable began in late 1992, in close coordination with UNOCHA, which is the lead umbrella organization for demining activities. With the anticipated termination of USAID's humanitarian assistance program, UNOCHA was determined to be the most logical "home" for the MDC in terms to coordinating its activities with overall demining work across Afghanistan. The \$3.6 million grant to UNOCHA to fund operating costs of the MDC over the next two years, as it transforms itself from an aid-dependent activity to a financially self-sustainable organization, is meant to support this transition to sustainability.

A proposed grant to UNICEF (out of FY 1994 ESF) in support of EPI activities (vaccines, cold chain equipment and syringes) will enable UNICEF to carry out the EPI program in Afghanistan for two years beyond the program termination date. Since the TSSP will continue into CY 1996, this was determined to be the most logical mechanism for this grant. Immunization programs are inherently non-sustainable in terms of being able to cover costs from fees-for-services, as these are public sector/donor-funded activities if ultimate goals are to be achieved. The sustainability issue therefore does not arise from the proposed grant to UNICEF. It merely allows the continuation of the program, which used to be funded from and supported by the Health Sector Support Project (HSSP - 306-0203).


TECHNICAL SERVICES & SUPPORT PROJECT (306-0200)

OBLIGATION OF FUNDS BY COMPONENTS

AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1993



TECHNICAL SERVICES & SUPPORT PROJECT (306-0200)
FINANCIAL PROFILE AS OF 12/31/93



OBLIGATED
 EXPENDED
 PIPELINE

TSSP

Technical Assistance Personnel

A. Long-term US PSCs

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Clearance</u>
1. Jean Gianfranceschi	Asst. Proj. Design Officer, PDIS	Top Secret
2. Susan Grosenick	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
3. Mary Aalto Leiter	Asst. Project Officer	LOU
4. Janice Martin	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
5. Donald Meier	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
6. Tom Rogers	Asst. Program Officer	Top Secret
7. Pamela Wegge	Asst. Project Officer	LOU
8. Demetria Arvanitis	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
9. Ronald Bjorkland	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
10. Rita Brooks	Secretary	Top Secret
11. Marcia Burris	Secretary	Top Secret
12. Christina Crowe	Secretary	Top Secret
13. Aida Dickherber	Secretary	Top Secret
14. Beverly Donahue	Secretary	Top Secret
15. Beverly Eighthmy	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
16. Beverly Eighthmy	Project Manager	Top Secret
17. Beverly Engberg	Secretary	Top Secret
18. Sarah Fassett	Asst. Program Officer	Top Secret
19. John Garney	Executive Officer	Top Secret
20. Mala Georgian	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
21. Harold Gill	Financial Analyst	Top Secret
22. Luz De Jesus	Office Manager (Peshawar)	Top Secret
23. Susan Lenderking	Asst. Project Dev. Officer	Top Secret
24. Laura Lindskog	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
25. Michael McGovern	Civil Engineer	Top Secret
26. Mahjuba Morid	Secretary	Top Secret
27. Mahjuba Morid	Asst. Office Manager	Top Secret
28. Barbara Naughton	Secretary	Top Secret
29. Albert Nehoda	Area Specialist	Top Secret
30. Roger Helms	Chief, DC&A Unit	Top Secret
31. Marcella Oneida	Office Manager (Peshawar)	Top Secret
32. Andrew Rude	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
33. Colleen Rychak	Secretary	Top Secret
34. Nagwa Savich	Secretary	Top Secret
35. Frederick Smith	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
36. Jim Stone	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
37. Nancy Waldhaus	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
38. Claudia Wolf	Secretary	Top Secret
39. Nellie Rishoi	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
40. Carol Carpenter	DC&M Specialist	Top Secret
41. Diana Stiles	DC&M Specialist	Top Secret
42. Lois Kerr	Secretary	Top Secret
43. Lois Kerr	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret
44. Qazi Saleem	Asst. Project Officer	Top Secret

B. Short-term US PSCs

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Clearance</u>
1.	Leslie Eveland	Secretary	LOU
2.	Samantha Hays	Secretary (summer-hire)	Nil
3.	Eric Huxtable	Admin. Asst. (")	Nil
4.	Brent Nicholas	Admin. Asst. (")	Nil
5.	Karen Martin	Secretary (")	Nil
6.	Jason Newman	Admin. Asst. (")	Nil
7.	Nagat El-Sanabary	Consultant	LOU
8.	Saida Malik	Secretary	LOU
9.	Elizabeth Monagle	Asst. Project Officer	LOU
10.	Marie Quance	Asst. Project Officer	LOU
11.	Nellie Rishoi	Asst. Project Officer	LOU
12.	Jean Gianfranceschi	RFP Drafter	Top Secret
13.	Violet Nissly	Secretary	Top Secret
14.	Ron Barney	ADP Consultant	Nil
15.	Timothy Lenderking	Special Report Writer	Nil

C. US Consultants

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>
1.	Richard Gibson	Consultant in Logistics Design
2.	Homer Hepworth	Consultant in Wheat and Fertilizer
3.	John Klaasmeier	Consultant in Equipment O & M
4.	Russell Olson	Consultant in Agricultural Economics
5.	George Scott	Consultant in Heavy Equipment
6.	Ralph Singleton	Consultant in Special Projects
7.	Robert Canfield	Consultant in DPI

D. Afghan Consultants

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>
1.	Dr. Abdul Rahman	Consultant on Freeze-dry technology
2.	Hedayat Amin Arsala	Consultant on Policy Planning & Project Design
3.	Abdul T. Assifi	Consultant on Hydrology and Irrigation
4.	G.A. Nisar	Road Damage Assessment
5.	Dr. Abdul Qahar Samin	Agriculture Advisor

E. Long-term TCN

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Clearance</u>
1.	Christopher Jones	Field Support Officer (Peshawar)	LOU

F. Long-term FSN PSCs (Pakistani and Afghan)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Clearance</u>
1. Mushtaq Ahmad (P)	Project Driver	Nil
2. Nauroze Khan (P)	Project Driver	Nil
3. Fida Mohammad (P)	Project Driver	Nil
4. Mohammad Raza (P)	Project Driver	Nil
5. G.M. Sadre (A)	Admin.Aide	Nil
6. Naveed Saeed (P)	Secretary	Nil
7. Ijaz Yaqub (P)	Secretary	Nil
8. G.M. Akhunzada (A)	Asst. Data Collector	Nil
9. Ruhul Amin (A)	Asst. Data Collector	Nil
10. M. Asef Ikram (A)	Data Coll. Spec.	Nil
11. Takbir Khan (A)	DC&A Unit Driver	Nil
12. Ramin Nabilzada (A)	Monitoring Spec.	Nil
13. Lodin G. Sakhi (A)	Asst. Data Collector	Nil
14. Amanullah Shahidi (A)	Cartographer, DC&A Unit	Nil
15. Syed Afzal Sherzad (A)	Monitor	Nil
16. Moh'd Azam Walee (A)	Asst. Data Collector	Nil
17. Sher Moh'd Walizada (A)	Monitor	Nil
18. Verbina Inayat (P)	Secretary	LOU
19. Zulfiqar Hameed (P)	C&R Clerk	LOU
20. Moh'd Yaqub Khan (P)	Contracting Spec.	LOU
21. Zia Mojadeddi (A)	Regional Affairs Officer (Quetta)	LOU
22. Mohammad Yaqub (P)	Secretary/Admin Asst.	LOU
23. Zainullah Mumtaz (A)	Monitor	Nil

G. Short-term FSN Purchase Orders

1. Maj. Gen. (Ret'd) Agha Zulfiqar Ali
Liaison with GOP entities

Early Appraisals, Studies, Design and Evaluations under TSSP

I. Project Appraisals and Design/Redesign: During the calendar years 1987 and 1988, five of the Office's seven operational projects were evaluated, redesigned or both, including the health component of the PVO Co-Financing Project (0201), the Education Sector Support Project (0202), the Health Sector Support Project (0203), the Agriculture Sector Support Project (0204) and the Commodity Export Program (0205). The political environment in which the CBHA has operated and the rapid expansion of its efforts necessitated the appraisals and redesign in order to maximize efficiency of the CBHA. Additionally, FY 1986 funds were used for the evaluation of long term educational activities and the initial design of the ESSP. A total of \$580,626 was committed for the project appraisals/evaluation, design and redesign through the second quarter, FY 1989.

1. Health PVO Evaluation (0201): Contractor: DEVRES, INC. and DR. PAMELA HUNT. The 3-person team, 2-month effort began in mid-June 1987. The evaluation examined the overall operation of the health projects managed by the seven PVOs which are supported by the 0201 project. The evaluation focused on: (1) an examination of each of the PVOs' health activities and an assessment to determine if they met the stated objectives; (2) recommendations for strengthening activities in the areas of administration and program; (3) assessment of and recommendations for PVO compliance with monitoring and evaluation elements; (4) determination of ways to facilitate/foster cooperation, collaboration and coordination among the health PVOs to achieve the overall objectives of health services development, delivery and training.

TOTAL COST: \$26,197

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2. Education Sector Support Project (0203): Contractor: ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. A 3-month effort (beginning in November, 1985) by a 6-person team. The contractor conducted a feasibility study which was the basis for the design of a project addressing some of the educational needs inside Afghanistan. The contractor's efforts included: (1) a survey of efforts made to determine if there were appropriate methods of organizing and systematizing the different approaches of education offered by the many involved groups, and to make recommendations for funding. The goal was to

strengthen on-going lower, middle and secondary educational activities inside Afghanistan or initiate and design new educational activities; (2) a feasibility assessment of proposals for i) a Pakistan-Afghan Institute, ii) a post-secondary scholarships program to place and support selected Afghans to study in existing Pakistani Universities, institutions or other places for academic or vocational training, iii) the creation of an Afghan Studies Center; iv) a scholarship program in the U.S.A.

TOTAL COST: \$138,153

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3. Education Sector Support Project (0202): Contractor: EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT CENTER, mid-September to mid-November, 1988. The 3-person team provided a rapid assessment of the current project and a detailed project redesign. The assessment summarized the successful and unsuccessful aspects of the project and included a discussion of the attainability of the project's institutional goals during the time remaining until PACO. Specifically, the assessment examined (a) accounting procedures of the principal contractor (UNO); (b) monitoring/evaluation systems; (c) contractor organization and management structure; (d) institutional development by the Education Council for Afghanistan (ECA); (e) timeliness and effectiveness of technical assistance, (f) the management information system developed by the contractor; and (g) division of responsibilities and activities among various entities participating in the education sector. The redesign phase prepared a revised AAM which addressed issues examined in the assessment and incorporated the agreed-to changes including but not limited to: (a) project sectoral or sub-sectoral activities to be carried out as independent entities within the project; (b) alternate contract and technical assistance mechanisms; (c) expansion/contraction of areas and levels of effort; (d) institutional improvements within ECA; (e) new life-of-project funding and project assistance completion date; (f) recurrent costs; (g) female education demand; (h) non-formal vocational and technical training; (i) participant training management plan.

TOTAL COST: \$81,051

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4. Health Sector Support Project (0203): Contractor: INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE; INC. (through an Indefinite Quantity Contract). The two-phase assessment/evaluation and redesign effort involved a 4-member team of health and other related professionals for a six-week period commencing in early June, 1988. The purposes of the overall effort were to: (i) examine needs in the health sector and their related fiscal impact; (ii) evaluate the on-going implementation of the project in light of the original AIM, AAM and annual work plans, and (iii) revise the AAM to better reflect present and future requirements in the health sector. Specifically, the assessment/evaluation component included: (a) a review of mechanisms used to finance the Afghan Health Committee (AHC) and PVOs; (b) a review of the monitoring, evaluation and accounting efforts by the project; (c) a review of and recommendations for the Medical Evacuation Program; (d) a review/assessment of various types of the technical assistance teams; (e) a review of the epidemiology of disease and populations, and demographics, (f) a review of the provision of medical/health services (training output, location, number and quality of facilities, commodities); (g) a review/assessment of various types of health programs; (h) a determination of the appropriateness/adequacy of the outputs; (i) an assessment of the present and future role of PVOs; (j) a review of all aspects of commodity management. The redesign component included: (a) a new LOP and PACD; (b) various funding scenarios; (c) a review of existing waivers; (d) a broad policy discussion outlining authority entrusted in response to needs dictated by the fluid political and economic environment of the CBHA.

TOTAL COST: \$88,796

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5. Agriculture Sector Support Project (0204) - Contractor: joint venture of RONCO CONSULTING CORP. and DEVRES, INC., consisting of a five person team for a two month period from mid-October to mid-December, 1988. The effort was a two-phased activity, including project assessment and redesign with the emphasis placed on the redesign. The assessment considered the appropriateness of the A.I.D. agriculture sector assistance including the mode of implementation and provided recommendations for specific, practical improvements which could be implemented in light of the evolving security and donor environment. The assessment addressed, but was not limited to, the following questions and areas of the current project: (a) technical assistance and field team effectiveness; (b) adequacy of the contractor's (VITA) system in addressing the problems and meeting objectives; (c) operating functions; (d) the role of PVOs and their appropriateness

for the tasks; (e) institutional development of indigenous organizations; (f) input and the acceptability or appropriateness of established priorities. The redesign effort produced a revised AAM which included but was not limited to: (a) an analysis of and recommendations for the questions and areas identified in the assessment and which reflected the broad policies and directions of A.I.D.'s agriculture sector in Afghanistan; (b) relationships of VITA vis a vis other agriculture sector organizations; (c) relationship of the project to the Mission transition strategy; (d) discussion of possible separate or new activities in the agriculture sector.

TOTAL COST: \$162,852

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6. Commodity Export Project (0205): Contractor: DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC. (through an Indefinite Quantity Contract). The two-phased review/assessment and redesign effort involved a four member team for a two-month period commencing in April, 1988. The purpose was to review/assess the on-going implementation of the project in the context of its original design and, based on that assessment, to prepare a revision to the AAM which reflected recommendations made in the review/assessment and provided direction for future project operations. Specifically, the review/assessment included the project elements of: (a) total commodity management procedures used by the contract team; (b) timeliness and effectiveness of technical assistance; (c) the organizational and management structure of the contract team; (d) the monitoring and accountability elements of the project; (e) criteria used to select commodities supplied under the program; (f) the utility/impact of these commodities; (g) the appropriateness of the utilization and concentration on transport and related support. The redesign was the preparation of a revised AAM which incorporated the following elements: (a) the appropriateness of an extension/expansion of the CEP; (b) revised funding levels and PACD; (c) broad policy parameters which would permit Mission to alter operations when deemed prudent for the project; (d) scenarios for alternative logistic mechanisms/arrangements which could be used in a dramatically changed political environment.

TOTAL COST: \$83,577

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strengthen on-going lower, middle and secondary educational activities inside Afghanistan or initiate and design new educational activities; (2) a feasibility assessment of proposals for i) a Pakistan-Afghan Institute, ii) a post-secondary scholarships program to place and support selected Afghans to study in existing Pakistani Universities, institutions or other places for academic or vocational training, iii) the creation of an Afghan Studies Center; iv) a scholarship program in the U.S.A.

TOTAL COST: \$138,153

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3. Education Sector Support Project (0202): Contractor: EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT CENTER, mid-September to mid-November, 1988. The 3-person team provided a rapid assessment of the current project and a detailed project redesign. The assessment summarized the successful and unsuccessful aspects of the project and included a discussion of the attainability of the project's institutional goals during the time remaining until PACO. Specifically, the assessment examined (a) accounting procedures of the principal contractor (UNO); (b) monitoring/evaluation systems; (c) contractor organization and management structure; (d) institutional development by the Education Council for Afghanistan (ECA); (e) timeliness and effectiveness of technical assistance, (f) the management information system developed by the contractor; and (g) division of responsibilities and activities among various entities participating in the education sector. The redesign phase prepared a revised AAM which addressed issues examined in the assessment and incorporated the agreed-to changes including but not limited to: (a) project sectoral or sub-sectoral activities to be carried out as independent entities within the project; (b) alternate contract and technical assistance mechanisms; (c) expansion/contraction of areas and levels of effort; (d) institutional improvements within ECA; (e) new life-of-project funding and project assistance completion date; (f) recurrent costs; (g) female education demand; (h) non-formal vocational and technical training; (i) participant training management plan.

TOTAL COST: \$81,051

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4. Health Sector Support Project (0203): Contractor: INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE; INC. (through an Indefinite Quantity Contract). The two-phase assessment/evaluation and redesign effort involved a 4-member team of health and other related professionals for a six-week period commencing in early June, 1988. The purposes of the overall effort were to: (i) examine needs in the health sector and their related fiscal impact; (ii) evaluate the on-going implementation of the project in light of the original AIM, AAM and annual work plans, and (iii) revise the AAM to better reflect present and future requirements in the health sector. Specifically, the assessment/evaluation component included: (a) a review of mechanisms used to finance the Afghan Health Committee (AHC) and PVOs; (b) a review of the monitoring, evaluation and accounting efforts by the project; (c) a review of and recommendations for the Medical Evacuation Program; (d) a review/assessment of various types of the technical assistance teams; (e) a review of the epidemiology of disease and populations, and demographics, (f) a review of the provision of medical/health services (training output, location, number and quality of facilities, commodities); (g) a review/assessment of various types of health programs; (h) a determination of the appropriateness/adequacy of the outputs; (i) an assessment of the present and future role of PVOs; (j) a review of all aspects of commodity management. The redesign component included: (a) a new LOP and PACD; (b) various funding scenarios; (c) a review of existing waivers; (d) a broad policy discussion outlining authority entrusted in response to needs dictated by the fluid political and economic environment of the CBHA.

TOTAL COST: \$88,796

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for the tasks; (e) institutional development of indigenous organizations; (f) input and the acceptability or appropriateness of established priorities. The redesign effort produced a revised AAM which included but was not limited to: (a) an analysis of and recommendations for the questions and areas identified in the assessment and which reflected the broad policies and directions of A.I.D.'s agriculture sector in Afghanistan; (b) relationships of VITA vis a vis other agriculture sector organizations; (c) relationship of the project to the Mission transition strategy; (d) discussion of possible separate or new activities in the agriculture sector.

TOTAL COST: \$162,852

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TOTAL COST: \$83,577

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II. Project Studies and Surveys: During the period September, 1986 - February, 1989, nine major study/survey projects were conducted in support of on-going activities or in preparation for planned activities. The objective of the studies and surveys was the acquisition and analysis of appropriate data and information to enable the Mission to identify programmatic areas in which CBHA could best operate effectively and to define those elements needed to ensure the implementation of identified and planned activities. A total of \$944,464 was committed on this category of activities under the TSSP budget through the second quarter FY 1989.

1. Agriculture Production Survey: Contractor: ENERGY DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL, INC. A three-person team of agriculture economists and computer specialists provided 31-months of technical assistance over a 27-month period, beginning in mid-September, 1986. The objective of the technical assistance was to aid in the execution of a survey of agricultural production in Afghanistan. The contractor team provided the technical assistance to the Swedish Committee for performing the agricultural production survey and was responsible for: (1) overseeing and backstopping the field technicians in order to assure that smooth coordination existed between the team's efforts and those of the Swedish Committee's research unit; (2) the development of computer specifications and procurement, shipment and installation of the appropriate computer hardware and related software essential for data management relative to the survey; (3) ensuring that the Swedish Committee Afghan staff were adequately trained in the application of the survey instruments and the computer system including data management of the survey; (4) providing translation into the English language the various reports and documents as required in the fulfillment of the contract's objective.

TOTAL COST : \$558,018

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2. Afghan Registry: Grant given to the INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR MIGRATION (ICM). The five month effort of ICM, beginning in late September, 1988, was the initial and fact-finding component for a larger, multi-donor funded effort by ICM. This larger effort was directed toward the recruitment and provision of assistance in the repatriation to Afghanistan of a cadre of trained and qualified Afghans living throughout the world and considered critical for the rehabilitation and development of Afghanistan. The grant provided support for the sub-project Return and Reintegration of Qualified Afghan Nationals which included: (1) the development and execution of a survey to identify expatriate Afghans now living in North America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia who have any of a variety of academic and training credentials in a wide range of disciplines

including but not limited to medicine, law, science, engineering, management, education, etc.; (2) the preparation of a registry of such persons. The registry includes a complete array of information providing a profile of the education, employment and personal history and an indication of willingness of these people to return to Afghanistan; (3) the development, maintenance and use of a computerized system for this information. The registry will be periodically reviewed. Surveys were conducted in the following countries: Australia, Canada, France, India, Italy, Pakistan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany.

TOTAL COST: \$90,000

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3. Retrospective Study on Afghanistan: Contractor: DEVRES, INC. The six-week effort by a team of five began in mid-August, 1988 and produced a 147 page report titled Retrospective Review of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan: 1950-1979. The report distilled into a single document the main features of the U.S. economic assistance program to Afghanistan from 1950 to its termination in 1979, with the main emphasis on the last 10-15 years. It documented and analyzed the strengths, weaknesses and lessons learned during the design and implementation phase of the U.S. assistance program. It provided a historic reference for a better understanding of the goals, purposes and impacts of AID projects in Afghanistan.

The report considered the origins and evolution of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, the rationale for the nature and composition of the programs as it developed and the U.S. assistance program in context of the total foreign assistance to Afghanistan. The report analyzed, on a sectoral basis, the design, implementation and impact of A.I.D.-funded activities. It analyzed and described operations of PL480, Titles I and II; described individual mission initiatives; examined other program components including management and staffing requirements; and reviewed the main features of the assistance program.

TOTAL COST: \$79,726

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F. Long-term FSN PSCs (Pakistani and Afghan)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Clearance</u>
1. Mushtaq Ahmad (P)	Project Driver	Nil
2. Nauroze Khan (P)	Project Driver	Nil
3. Fida Mohammad (P)	Project Driver	Nil
4. Mohammad Raza (P)	Project Driver	Nil
5. G.M. Sadre (A)	Admin.Aide	Nil
6. Naveed Saeed (P)	Secretary	Nil
7. Ijaz Yaqub (P)	Secretary	Nil
8. G.M. Akhunzada (A)	Asst. Data Collector	Nil
9. Ruhul Amin (A)	Asst. Data Collector	Nil
10. M. Asef Ikram (A)	Data Coll. Spec.	Nil
11. Takbir Khan (A)	DC&A Unit Driver	Nil
12. Ramin Nabilzada (A)	Monitoring Spec.	Nil
13. Lodin G. Sakhi (A)	Asst. Data Collector	Nil
14. Amanullah Shahidi (A)	Cartographer, DC&A Unit	Nil
15. Syed Afzal Sherzad (A)	Monitor	Nil
16. Moh'd Azam Walee (A)	Asst. Data Collector	Nil
17. Sher Moh'd Walizada (A)	Monitor	Nil
18. Verbina Inayat (P)	Secretary	LOU
19. Zulfiqar Hameed (P)	C&R Clerk	LOU
20. Moh'd Yaqub Khan (P)	Contracting Spec.	LOU
21. Zia Mojadeddi (A)	Regional Affairs Officer (Quetta)	LOU
22. Mohammad Yaqub (P)	Secretary/Admin Asst.	LOU
23. Zainullah Mumtaz (A)	Monitor	Nil

G. Short-term FSN Purchase Orders

1. Maj. Gen. (Ret'd) Agha Zulfiqar Ali
Liaison with GOP entities

Early Appraisals, Studies, Design and Evaluations under TSSP

I. Project Appraisals and Design/Redesign: During the calendar years 1987 and 1988, five of the Office's seven operational projects were evaluated, redesigned or both, including the health component of the PVO Co-Financing Project (0201), the Education Sector Support Project (0202), the Health Sector Support Project (0203), the Agriculture Sector Support Project (0204) and the Commodity Export Program (0205). The political environment in which the CBHA has operated and the rapid expansion of its efforts necessitated the appraisals and redesign in order to maximize efficiency of the CBHA. Additionally, FY 1986 funds were used for the evaluation of long term educational activities and the initial design of the ESSP. A total of \$580,626 was committed for the project appraisals/evaluation, design and redesign through the second quarter, FY 1989.

1. Health PVO Evaluation (0201): Contractor: DEVRES, INC. and DR. PAMELA HUNT. The 3-person team, 2-month effort began in mid-June 1987. The evaluation examined the overall operation of the health projects managed by the seven PVOs which are supported by the 0201 project. The evaluation focused on: (1) an examination of each of the PVOs' health activities and an assessment to determine if they met the stated objectives; (2) recommendations for strengthening activities in the areas of administration and program; (3) assessment of and recommendations for PVO compliance with monitoring and evaluation elements; (4) determination of ways to facilitate/foster cooperation, collaboration and coordination among the health PVOs to achieve the overall objectives of health services development, delivery and training.

TOTAL COST: \$26,197

2. Education Sector Support Project (0203): Contractor: ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. A 3-month effort (beginning in November, 1985) by a 6-person team. The contractor conducted a feasibility study which was the basis for the design of a project addressing some of the educational needs inside Afghanistan. The contractor's efforts included: (1) a survey of efforts made to determine if there were appropriate methods of organizing and systematizing the different approaches of education offered by the many involved groups, and to make recommendations for funding. The goal was to

strengthen on-going lower, middle and secondary educational activities inside Afghanistan or initiate and design new educational activities; (2) a feasibility assessment of proposals for i) a Pakistan-Afghan Institute, ii) a post-secondary scholarships program to place and support selected Afghans to study in existing Pakistani Universities, institutions or other places for academic or vocational training, iii) the creation of an Afghan Studies Center; iv) a scholarship program in the U.S.A.

TOTAL COST: \$138,153

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3. Education Sector Support Project (0202): Contractor: EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT CENTER, mid-September to mid-November, 1988. The 3-person team provided a rapid assessment of the current project and a detailed project redesign. The assessment summarized the successful and unsuccessful aspects of the project and included a discussion of the attainability of the project's institutional goals during the time remaining until PACO. Specifically, the assessment examined (a) accounting procedures of the principal contractor (UNO); (b) monitoring/evaluation systems; (c) contractor organization and management structure; (d) institutional development by the Education Council for Afghanistan (ECA); (e) timeliness and effectiveness of technical assistance, (f) the management information system developed by the contractor; and (g) division of responsibilities and activities among various entities participating in the education sector. The redesign phase prepared a revised AAM which addressed issues examined in the assessment and incorporated the agreed-to changes including but not limited to: (a) project sectoral or sub-sectoral activities to be carried out as independent entities within the project; (b) alternate contract and technical assistance mechanisms; (c) expansion/contraction of areas and levels of effort; (d) institutional improvements within ECA; (e) new life-of-project funding and project assistance completion date; (f) recurrent costs; (g) female education demand; (h) non-formal vocational and technical training; (i) participant training management plan.

TOTAL COST: \$81,051

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4. Health Sector Support Project (0203): Contractor: INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE; INC. (through an Indefinite Quantity Contract). The two-phase assessment/evaluation and redesign effort involved a 4-member team of health and other related professionals for a six-week period commencing in early June, 1988. The purposes of the overall effort were to: (i) examine needs in the health sector and their related fiscal impact; (ii) evaluate the on-going implementation of the project in light of the original AIM, AAM and annual work plans, and (iii) revise the AAM to better reflect present and future requirements in the health sector. Specifically, the assessment/evaluation component included: (a) a review of mechanisms used to finance the Afghan Health Committee (AHC) and PVOs; (b) a review of the monitoring, evaluation and accounting efforts by the project; (c) a review of and recommendations for the Medical Evacuation Program; (d) a review/assessment of various types of the technical assistance teams; (e) a review of the epidemiology of disease and populations, and demographics, (f) a review of the provision of medical/health services (training output, location, number and quality of facilities, commodities); (g) a review/assessment of various types of health programs; (h) a determination of the appropriateness/adequacy of the outputs; (i) an assessment of the present and future role of PVOs; (j) a review of all aspects of commodity management. The redesign component included: (a) a new LOP and PACD; (b) various funding scenarios; (c) a review of existing waivers; (d) a broad policy discussion outlining authority entrusted in response to needs dictated by the fluid political and economic environment of the CBHA.

TOTAL COST: \$88,796

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5. Agriculture Sector Support Project (0204) - Contractor: joint venture of RONCO CONSULTING CORP. and DEVRES, INC., consisting of a five person team for a two month period from mid-October to mid-December, 1988. The effort was a two-phased activity, including project assessment and redesign with the emphasis placed on the redesign. The assessment considered the appropriateness of the A.I.D. agriculture sector assistance including the mode of implementation and provided recommendations for specific, practical improvements which could be implemented in light of the evolving security and donor environment. The assessment addressed, but was not limited to, the following questions and areas of the current project: (a) technical assistance and field team effectiveness; (b) adequacy of the contractor's (VITA) system in addressing the problems and meeting objectives; (c) operating functions; (d) the role of PVOs and their appropriateness

for the tasks; (e) institutional development of indigenous organizations; (f) input and the acceptability or appropriateness of established priorities. The redesign effort produced a revised AAM which included but was not limited to: (a) an analysis of and recommendations for the questions and areas identified in the assessment and which reflected the broad policies and directions of A.I.D.'s agriculture sector in Afghanistan; (b) relationships of VITA vis a vis other agriculture sector organizations; (c) relationship of the project to the Mission transition strategy; (d) discussion of possible separate or new activities in the agriculture sector.

TOTAL COST: \$162,852

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6. Commodity Export Project (0205): Contractor: DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC. (through an Indefinite Quantity Contract). The two-phased review/assessment and redesign effort involved a four member team for a two-month period commencing in April, 1988. The purpose was to review/assess the on-going implementation of the project in the context of its original design and, based on that assessment, to prepare a revision to the AAM which reflected recommendations made in the review/assessment and provided direction for future project operations. Specifically, the review/assessment included the project elements of: (a) total commodity management procedures used by the contract team; (b) timeliness and effectiveness of technical assistance; (c) the organizational and management structure of the contract team; (d) the monitoring and accountability elements of the project; (e) criteria used to select commodities supplied under the program; (f) the utility/impact of these commodities; (g) the appropriateness of the utilization and concentration on transport and related support. The redesign was the preparation of a revised AAM which incorporated the following elements: (a) the appropriateness of an extension/expansion of the CEP; (b) revised funding levels and PACD; (c) broad policy parameters which would permit Mission to alter operations when deemed prudent for the project; (d) scenarios for alternative logistic mechanisms/arrangements which could be used in a dramatically changed political environment.

TOTAL COST: \$83,577

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II. Project Studies and Surveys: During the period September, 1986 - February, 1989, nine major study/survey projects were conducted in support of on-going activities or in preparation for planned activities. The objective of the studies and surveys was the acquisition and analysis of appropriate data and information to enable the Mission to identify programmatic areas in which CBHA could best operate effectively and to define those elements needed to ensure the implementation of identified and planned activities. A total of \$944,464 was committed on this category of activities under the TSSP budget through the second quarter FY 1989.

1. Agriculture Production Survey: Contractor: ENERGY DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL, INC. A three-person team of agriculture economists and computer specialists provided 31-months of technical assistance over a 27-month period, beginning in mid-September, 1986. The objective of the technical assistance was to aid in the execution of a survey of agricultural production in Afghanistan. The contractor team provided the technical assistance to the Swedish Committee for performing the agricultural production survey and was responsible for: (1) overseeing and backstopping the field technicians in order to assure that smooth coordination existed between the team's efforts and those of the Swedish Committee's research unit; (2) the development of computer specifications and procurement, shipment and installation of the appropriate computer hardware and related software essential for data management relative to the survey; (3) ensuring that the Swedish Committee Afghan staff were adequately trained in the application of the survey instruments and the computer system including data management of the survey; (4) providing translation into the English language the various reports and documents as required in the fulfillment of the contract's objective.

TOTAL COST : \$558,018

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2. Afghan Registry: Grant given to the INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR MIGRATION (ICM). The five month effort of ICM, beginning in late September, 1988, was the initial and fact-finding component for a larger, multi-donor funded effort by ICM. This larger effort was directed toward the recruitment and provision of assistance in the repatriation to Afghanistan of a cadre of trained and qualified Afghans living throughout the world and considered critical for the rehabilitation and development of Afghanistan. The grant provided support for the sub-project Return and Reintegration of Qualified Afghan Nationals which included: (1) the development and execution of a survey to identify expatriate Afghans now living in North America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia who have any of a variety of academic and training credentials in a wide range of disciplines

including but not limited to medicine, law, science, engineering, management, education, etc.; (2) the preparation of a registry of such persons. The registry includes a complete array of information providing a profile of the education, employment and personal history and an indication of willingness of these people to return to Afghanistan; (3) the development, maintenance and use of a computerized system for this information. The registry will be periodically reviewed. Surveys were conducted in the following countries: Australia, Canada, France, India, Italy, Pakistan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany.

TOTAL COST: \$90,000

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3. Retrospective Study on Afghanistan: Contractor: DEVRES, INC. The six-week effort by a team of five began in mid-August, 1988 and produced a 147 page report titled Retrospective Review of U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan: 1950-1979. The report distilled into a single document the main features of the U.S. economic assistance program to Afghanistan from 1950 to its termination in 1979, with the main emphasis on the last 10-15 years. It documented and analyzed the strengths, weaknesses and lessons learned during the design and implementation phase of the U.S. assistance program. It provided a historic reference for a better understanding of the goals, purposes and impacts of AID projects in Afghanistan.

The report considered the origins and evolution of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, the rationale for the nature and composition of the programs as it developed and the U.S. assistance program in context of the total foreign assistance to Afghanistan. The report analyzed, on a sectoral basis, the design, implementation and impact of A.I.D.-funded activities. It analyzed and described operations of PL480, Titles I and II; described individual mission initiatives; examined other program components including management and staffing requirements; and reviewed the main features of the assistance program.

TOTAL COST: \$79,726

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4. Policy Planning and Project Design: Contractor: MR. HEDAYAT AMIN-ARSALA. Working under a purchase order, the 3-month effort (beginning in March 1988) produced a study and report which focused on the organization of a planning unit for Afghanistan and its role vis a vis administrative entities. Specifically, the report and study focused on: (1) the general description of what social institutions and economic infrastructure losses have been sustained in Afghanistan; (2) the design of an organization/unit which could serve as a planning unit to assist the political leadership in restoring losses and focusing on recovery; (3) the identification of the skills required for personnel staffing such a planning cell; (4) the development of a method for identifying, recruiting and compensating staff of such a cell; (5) providing guidance on the mechanisms of interfacing that cell with an emerging political/governing body and international entities involved with reconstruction. This study and design originally was going to be complemented by two other reports which were to explore (a) schemes for economic recovery and (b) social and cultural constraints in response to government activities and mechanisms to overcome them. These two additional activities were cancelled.

TOTAL COST: \$24,500

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5. Agricultural Project and Economics Study: Contractor: RUSSEL OLSON. Beginning in late-May, 1988, the 51-day effort resulted in a study and report on various aspects of the agricultural production and economics. Specifically, the effort included: (1) review of the Agricultural Production Survey; (2) review of an IRC proposal; (3) review of current agricultural activities; (4) the provision of recommendations for agriculture program strengthening; (5) the preparation of a SOW for the assessment and redesign of the Agricultural Sector Support Project.

TOTAL COST: \$19,800

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6. Freeze-Dry Technology: Contractor: DR. ABDUL R. RAHMAN. Beginning in mid-August, 1987, the short (3-week) effort produced a pre-feasibility study of freeze-dried and other food processing

technologies. The objective of this study was to evaluate whether and how the O/AID/REP should proceed with a feasibility study geared toward the introduction of appropriate food processing technologies for the "Free Afghanistan" community. The emphasis was placed on a summary of findings (rather than details), including: (1) level of local expertise of food processing technologies; (2) types of possible and feasible food processing technologies with a concentration on the freeze-dried and air-dried technologies; (3) approximate cost estimates of the major components of these technologies; (4) technology and management issues to be considered in employing such food processing activities.

TOTAL COST: \$10,000

7. Heavy Equipment Study: Contractor: GEORGE SCOTT. Beginning in June, 1988, the contractor made three trips to Pakistan to: 1) design and oversee the development of the Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit (ACLU), including equipment, vehicle and spare parts procurement, utilization and control systems, preventative maintenance, administrative structure, and training programs; 2) assist the ACLU and Mission in the evaluation of excess DOD heavy equipment for possible use by ACLU.

TOTAL COST \$85,275

8. Pre-Survey Study of Agricultural Production: Contractor: COMMUNITY SYSTEMS FOUNDATION. The 17-day effort in July, 1986 by a 1-person team resulted in a report which: (1) reviewed available planning and budget documents from the Swedish Committee and E/DI Inc. relating to a proposed agricultural survey of Afghanistan; (2) reviewed the planned methodology, staging and implementation schedule and organization of the study in light of the information requirements of the Swedish Committee and the Mission; (3) provided comments on the cost effectiveness and timeliness of the survey and alternative approaches; (4) provided comments on the appropriateness of budget levels of the proposed survey.

TOTAL COST: \$11,327

9. Health Sector Feasibility Study: Contractor: MANAGEMENT SCIENCES FOR HEALTH (MSH). Beginning in March, 1986, the three week, five person team effort: (1) reviewed and determined the extent of health services provided to refugee populations within Pakistan and programs in Pakistan targeted at Afghans living in Afghanistan; (2) reviewed described programs and outlined activities, coverage and organization of existing health delivery systems; (3) identified areas of

possible coordination of health programming with existing programs in Pakistan; (4) proposed a package of feasible health interventions; (5) developed a comprehensive plan for delivery of health services; (6) recommended a dollar amount necessary to proceed with a health project and advised on needed deviations from standard procedures during implementation of such a project.

TOTAL COST: \$65,818

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





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HOST COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS

According to Mission Order PAK-3-11, dated January 24, 1994, based on Handbook 3, Chapter 2, Appendix 2G, Project Officers must include a final report of host country contributions as part of the Project Assistance Completion Report (PACR) at project close-out.

No such report will be necessary. The Afghan program has operated without a bilateral agreement with the Afghan Government in Kabul. Hence, no host country contributions were part of this, or any other project in the Afghanistan portfolio.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)



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