

FINAL REPORT

**AN EVALUATION OF THE COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PPC/WID AND CID
AND MUCIA**

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April 1990
Prepared for:
Office of Women in Development
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Agency for International Development
Contract No. 1DC-0100-Z-00-9044-00

GENESYS

Acronyms

A.I.D.	United States Agency for International Development
USAID	Office of A.I.D. in the recipient country
PPC/WID	Office of Women in Development Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination Agency for International Development
CID	Consortium for International Development
CID/WID	CID's Women in Development Management Office
MUCIA	Midwest University Consortium for International Activities
MUCIA/WID	MUCIA's Women in Development Management Office
PAC	Project Advisory Committee, MUCIA/WID
CA	Cooperative Agreement
TS	Technical Specialist
TA	Technical Assistant
SOW	Scope of Work

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
Chapter I - Introduction	I-1
A. Background	I-1
B. The Evaluation	I-2
C. The Organization of This Evaluation Report	I-3
D. Goals and Objectives	I-3
Chapter II - History of CID/WID Activities	II-1
A. CID/WID's Responsibilities Under the Cooperative Agreement	II-1
B. Overview of CID	II-1
C. Description of Country Activities	II-2
1. Countries That Received Technical Assistance	II-2
2. Countries That Responded to the Worldwide Cable But Did Not Receive Technical Assistance	II-3
D. Conclusion	II-5
Chapter III - Management Evaluation of CID/WID	III-1
Introduction	III-1
B. CID/WID's Program, Organizational Structure and Decision Making Process and Authority	III-2
1. The CID/WID Technical Assistance Program: Integrating Gender Issues into Development Programs	III-2
2. Project Organizational Structure and Decision Authorities	III-2
3. PPC/WID's Management Role	III-3
C. Procedures/Processes Followed in Responding to Requests for Technical Assistance	III-4
1. Selection of Country to Receive Assistance	III-4
2. Selection of the Technical Specialist	III-6
3. Fielding of the Technical Specialist and the Development of the Scope of Work for Technical Assistants	III-7
4. Advertising for and the Selection of the Technical Assistant	III-9
5. Technical Assistants in the Field	III-10
6. Return of TA and Submission of Report	III-11
D. Timing and Responsiveness to Mission Requests	III-12
E. Backstopping of the TA Field Activity	III-13
F. Conclusions	III-15

Chapter IV - Effectiveness of CID/WID's Field Performance	IV-1
A. Appropriateness and Effectiveness of TS Activity	IV-1
1. Qualifications of the TS	IV-1
2. The Role of the TS: Understandings and Misunderstandings	IV-1
3. Appropriateness of Scopes of Work (SOWs)	IV-2
4. Impact of TS Activity on Mission	IV-3
5. Laying the Groundwork for TAs	IV-3
B. The Appropriateness and Effectiveness of the TA Activity	IV-4
1. Qualifications of the TAs	IV-4
2. Mission Perceptions of the TAs: Professional or Intern	IV-4
3. Quality and Appropriateness of TA Research	IV-4
4. Impact of the TA Activity	IV-6
C. Overall Effectiveness of CID/WID Field Activity	IV-6
 Chapter V - History of MUCIA/WID Activities	 V-1
A. MUCIA/WID's Responsibilities Under the Cooperative Agreement	V-1
B. Overview of MUCIA/WID	V-1
C. Description of Activities by Country	V-1
1. Countries that Received and will be Receiving Technical Assistance	V-1
2. Countries that Responded to the Worldwide Call but did not Receive Technical Assistance	V-3
D. Conclusion	V-4
 Chapter VI - Management Evaluation of MUCIA/WID	 VI-1
A. Introduction	VI-1
B. MUCIA/WID's Technical Assistance Program, Organizational Structure and Decision Making Process and Authority	VI-2
1. MUCIA/WID's Technical Assistance Program: Women in Development Program in Technical Assistance	VI-2
2. Project Organizational Structure and Decision Authorities	VI-2
3. PPC/WID's Management Role	VI-4
C. Procedures/Processes Followed in Responding to Request for Technical Assistance	VI-4
1. Selection of Country to Receive Assistance	VI-5
2. Selection of the Technical Specialist	VI-5
3. Fielding of the Technical Specialist and the Development of the Scope of Work for the Technical Assistants	VI-8
4. Advertising for and the Selection of the Technical Assistant	VI-10
5. Technical Assistants in the Field	VI-12

6.	Return of TA and Submission of Report	VI-13
D.	Timing and Responsiveness to Mission Requests	VI-15
E.	Backstopping of TA Field Activity	VI-17
F.	Conclusions	VI-17

Chapter VII - Effectiveness of MUCIA/WID's Field Experience VII-1

A.	Appropriateness and Effectiveness of TS Activity	VII-1
1.	Qualifications of the TS	VII-1
2.	The Role of the TS: Understandings and Misunderstandings	VII-1
3.	Appropriateness of the Scopes of Work (SOWs)	VII-2
4.	Impact of TS Activity on Mission	VII-3
5.	Laying the Groundwork for TAs	VII-3
B.	The Appropriateness and Effectiveness of the TA Activity	VII-3
1.	Qualifications of the TAs	VII-3
2.	Mission Perceptions of TAs: Professional or Intern	VII-4
3.	Quality and Appropriateness of TA Research	VII-4
4.	Impact of the TA Activity	VII-5
C.	Overall Effectiveness of MUCIA/WID Field Activity	VII-5

Chapter VIII - CID/WID and MUCIA/WID: Lessons to be Learned from a Comparison VIII-1

A.	The Cooperative Agreement	VIII-1
B.	Management Structure	VIII-1
C.	Selection Procedures	VIII-3
D.	Supervision and Coordination of the Field Activity	VIII-4
E.	TA Qualifications	VIII-4
F.	Mission Commitment	VIII-5
G.	Use of Consortium University Networks to Identify Opportunities	VIII-5
H.	Knowledge of AID and PPC/WID	VIII-5
I.	The Role of PPC/WID	VIII-6
J.	Campus Support of Consortia WID Activities	VIII-6

Chapter IX - Title XII University Consortia as Appropriate Vehicles for Institutionalizing Gender Issues: CID/WID and MUCIA/WID IX-1

A.	Introduction	IX-1
B.	The Capacity of CID/WID and MUCIA/WID to Institutionalize Gender Issues	IX-2
1.	Expanding the WID Knowledge Base	IX-2
2.	Convincing Missions and Host-Country Institutions of the Importance of Gender Issues	IX-3
3.	Institutionalizing Gender Issues on Consortia Campuses	IX-3

4.	Incorporating Gender Issues into AID-funded Projects and Activities	IX-4
5.	Strengthening the Capacity of Missions to Undertake WID Interventions	IX-5
C.	Strengths of the Consortia to Meet PPC/WID's Needs	IX-5
Chapter X - Conclusions and Recommendations		X-1
A.	Building Capacity for WID Institutionalization	X-1
1.	Conclusions	X-1
2.	Recommendations	X-2
B.	Improving the Design of the Cooperative Agreement	X-3
1.	Conclusions	X-3
2.	Recommendations	X-4
C.	Improving the Appropriateness of TS Activities	X-5
1.	Conclusions	X-5
2.	Recommendations	X-6
D.	Improving the Appropriateness of TA Activities	X-7
1.	Conclusions	X-7
2.	Recommendations	X-7
E.	Improving the Recruitment of TS and TA Candidates	X-8
1.	Conclusions	X-8
2.	Recommendations	X-8
F.	Improving Consortia Responsiveness to PPC/WID and Mission Requests	X-9
1.	Conclusions	X-9
2.	Recommendations	X-9
G.	Recommendations for Future Cooperative Agreements with Title XII University Consortia	X-10
1.	PPC/WID Objectives and Expectations	X-10
2.	The Structure of the Cooperative Agreement	X-11

Appendix A - Time Line

Appendix B - Consortia Reactions to the Evaluation and GENESYS's Final Thoughts

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1974, the Office of Women in Development (PPC/WID) of the United States Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) has administered and supported the A.I.D.'s efforts to integrate women more effectively into the economic development processes. In 1989, with the passage of the "Foreign Assistance Act," Congress called for the A.I.D. to increase its efforts in integrating women as both participants and beneficiaries into Bureau and USAID programs and projects. Responsibility for implementation of the "WID mandate" was given to PPC/WID and it has taken the lead in assisting A.I.D.'s Bureaus and overseas missions in meeting mandate requirements.

In July 1987, PPC/WID signed two-year cooperative agreements with the Consortium for International Development (CID) and the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Development (MUCIA) in order to strengthen its capacity for responding to USAID requests for WID technical assistance. CID/WID received two no-cost extensions for a total of nine months, whereas MUCIA/WID received two no-cost extensions for a total of twelve months. CID/WID and MUCIA/WID cooperative agreements were designed to further WID institutionalization by providing missions with low-cost -- actually no-cost -- long-term technical assistance. PPC/WID had had a previous contract with CID/WID, and had now adopted the cooperative agreement contracting mechanism in order to gain greater control over Consortia field activities and act as the central contact for missions. MUCIA/WID, on the other hand, had no experience in providing technical assistance on the scale that was required by the CA.

In February 1990 as the cooperative agreements were drawing to an end, PPC/WID contracted for an evaluation, the purpose of which was to assess CID/WID's and MUCIA/WID's respective abilities to locate appropriate "technical specialists" (TSs) and "technical assistants" (TAs), respond to mission requests in a timely and appropriate manner, and perform effectively in the field. In addition, evaluators were asked to consider the capacity of the Consortia for institutionalizing gender considerations. Recommendations were called for to assist the Consortia in improving their management and field performance. PPC/WID also asked for guidance in identifying the most appropriate role for the Consortia in the furtherance of the Office's goal of WID institutionalization within the Agency.

In brief, CID/WID has successfully complied with the terms of the cooperative agreement by fielding five Technical Specialists (TS) to Chad, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, and Nepal. These efforts have resulted in the fielding of two Technical Assistants (TA) each to Kenya, Mali and Nepal, and four to Lesotho. No TAs were fielded in Chad. A breakdown of the specific research reports produced is provided in Table II-1 in Chapter II.

MUCIA/WID, on the other hand, had not fulfilled all of the requirements of the cooperative agreement at the time of this evaluation. The Consortium had fielded four TSs to Cameroon, Guatemala, Indonesia and Uruguay, but had only fielded three TAs, one each to Guatemala, Indonesia and Uruguay. A breakdown of the specific research reports produced is provided in Table V-1 in Chapter V.

The findings and conclusions of the evaluation are grouped according to the various evaluation factors:

Improving the Design of the Cooperative Agreement

- The cooperative agreement with Title XII Universities is an appropriate contracting mechanism for PPC/WID to use to accomplish a research objective that supports institutionalization by expanding the knowledge base on gender issues.
- Seven major flaws in the current design of the cooperative agreement were identified:
 - lack of mission "ownership" of the technical assistance because it was provided at no cost;
 - failure to capitalize on the strengths of the Consortia--long term research and institutional development;
 - limited and not clearly defined role of the TS;
 - lack of incentive and support for TAs;
 - primary responsibility for recruitment and fielding of TSs and TAs inappropriately taken by PPC/WID rather than the consortia project management offices;
 - lack of systematic orientation and information gathering activity prior to fielding the TSs and TAs; and
 - utilization of the cooperative agreements to respond to short-term technical assistance needs of missions.

Recruiting and Fielding Appropriate TSs and TAs

- The value of maintaining a centralized WID roster in the management office, featuring the strengths and backgrounds of the applicant pool, was clearly demonstrated by CID/WID.
- The lack of a formal information and promotion program about the Cooperative Agreements on the Consortia campuses limited the Consortia management offices' effectiveness in reaching potential candidates for TS and TA programs.
- TA activities are more effective when candidates are pre-recruited, and interventions timed to coincide with university schedules.
- The use of a rigorous application form screens out less sincere and non-gender sensitive candidates.

Timeliness and Responsiveness

- The cooperative agreement mechanism is not the appropriate mechanism for quick response technical assistance.

- TA pre-recruitment facilitates fielding quality TA candidates in a timely and responsive manner.
- Centralizing decision-making responsibilities in the project management office allows the office to make quick decisions and take prompt action.
- The project director position should be as a minimum, a three-quarter time position, in order to effectively manage the administrative and operational functions of project implementation within the allotted time.

Quality and Impact of Consortia Technical Assistance

- The high quality of CID/WID research had significant impacts on missions -- providing valuable information for the design of as many as three new projects -- and on a host-country agricultural training institute where WID institutionalization efforts were successfully initiated.
- Delays, miscommunications, and inappropriate SOWs and TAs impeded, if not precluded, MUCIA/WID's effectiveness in the field.
- SOWs were, in general, too broad and unspecific for relatively inexperienced TAs; SOWs did not provide a sufficiently detailed research design to guide researchers.
- TAs are not sufficiently supported or supervised in the field.
- Confusion over responsibility for logistical support and backstopping was pervasive, affecting both Consortia and creating resentment on the part of missions.
- Lack of dissemination of final reports and research findings, in a form in which a wide audience could use, dampened the potential impact of Consortia activities on Missions, Bureaus, as well as PPC/WID.

Institutionalization of WID within A.I.D.

- University Consortia TSs, because of their unfamiliarity with the A.I.D. operating environment and short time in country, are not the best means for addressing mission program needs (short-term technical assistance).
- CID/WID had some success in convincing missions of the importance of gender issues to development because of the strength and effectiveness of TS and TA field demonstrations. This impact was due to the fact that CID/WID had used more senior TAs.
- MUCIA/WID's contributions to WID institutionalization were disappointing, at least partly because they worked with missions that had little interest in WID and that were using the Cooperative Agreement as an inexpensive mechanism to fulfill their Congressional WID mandate.
- Free technical assistance with inexperienced and unprofessional TAs is not conducive to WID institutionalization. In fact, it may do more harm than good.

Insufficient dissemination of research in environments receptive to integrating gender into development activities led to lost opportunities .

These conclusions lead to several key recommendations:

1. PPC/WID needs to determine the best role for Consortia within their current program. The evaluation recommends that Consortia be used for what they do best -- long-term applied research and institutional development -- and not for short-term program-oriented technical assistance, for which other mechanisms are better suited.
2. PPC/WID should require missions to "buy-in" to Consortia activities and field more senior-level, salaried TAs to improve mission perception of the technical assistance, create more ownership of the activity, and increase the potential for WID institutionalization.
3. PPC/WID and Consortia should expand the TS role to include TA selection and supervision in-country to ensure research quality, timely progress, and completion. Visits by TSs during the course of the research are only part of the expanded supervision requested by missions. TSs need to take more of a supervisory role in designing, implementing, and presenting the research in a professional form.
4. Consortia should pair TAs with host-country WID experts to facilitate TA orientation to the host-country and build in-country WID capacity.
5. Consortia need to orient TSs to A.I.D./W, USAID, and PPC/WID policies, programs, projects, and funding mechanisms and the requirements of adequate SOWs, with potential for having powerful WID demonstration effects.
6. Consortia should develop a formalized process of publicizing the TA research results. The evaluators consider that one option for this may be a widely distributed monograph series. Reports would be edited into monograph format upon the return of the TAs, and published and distributed to A.I.D. bureaus and missions, other donor agencies and all WID coordinators on the Consortia campuses. Another alternative could be the presentation of papers at a PPC/WID sponsored conference (to be held annually).
7. PPC/WID's role in the cooperative agreement should be clarified and made consistent in both agreements. First, PPC/WID should play a major role in the selection of the country, primarily to ensure that the mission is committed to and interested in the WID technical assistance. Then, PPC/WID should be involved in defining the area of research prior to fielding a TS. These two activities should constitute PPC/WID's primary involvement in the management of the project; instead its role should encompass facilitating project implementation, and securing clearance for major activities. PPC/WID should assume neither a direct managerial function nor serve as the focal point of contact/communication with the mission after the area of research has been defined. As demonstrated in the case of MUCIA/WID, when such a role was assumed by PPC/WID it was ineffective, and delayed implementation. It also adversely affected the mission's perception of the Consortium's management capability.

8. An intensive orientation/publicity campaign should be carried out at the beginning of the cooperative agreement. The purpose would be to explain the objectives and goals of the cooperative agreement program, opportunities available, and activities which will and will not be carried out. Further, it would provide the opportunity to inform Consortium campuses of the goals and objectives of PPC/WID's program, how they view the Consortium program, etc. It would also instruct Consortium campuses on A.I.D. and its operational environment.
9. The project management office of each consortium must be given and exercise control of critical decision-making as it pertains to the operation and management of the program. The Project Office should be the focal point for communications with the missions once an activity has been approved by PPC/WID. At that point PPC/WID should be kept abreast of matters while maintaining a facilitative rather than managerial or authoritative role. Responsibility for project implementation must be vested in the management office. The Project Director position should be at least three-quarter time, if not full-time.

In the final analysis, it is the belief of the evaluation team that the cooperative agreement is an appropriate mechanism for working with Title XII Consortia. It provides PPC/WID sufficient leeway to control the anticipated outcome of the activity, while at the same time allowing the Consortia flexibility in responding to and managing the mission's requests for assistance. However, PPC/WID must first clarify its own objectives and expectations in regard to the cooperative agreement.

PPC/WID has one overall goal -- to institutionalize the capability to address gender differences within A.I.D. programs and projects in order to enhance the effectiveness of development assistance. PPC/WID has a variety of mechanisms at its disposal that can contribute to the achievement of this goal. Each one of these mechanisms contributes to institutionalization in a different way. Therefore, PPC/WID must first define a concrete objective for each mechanism and determine how it supports the achievement of the overall goal.

In the opinion of the evaluation team, the Consortium's comparative advantage rests in the provision of long-term, applied research and institutional strengthening. The Consortia, at low cost, can contribute to the body of knowledge about gender issues in development, including what works and what does not in addressing gender differences in participation in, and impact of project interventions on, specific sectors, regions or countries. This will provide critical raw data needed to convince missions and bureaus of the need to address these differences in their programming and projects. Therefore, the Cooperative Agreement with the Consortia is the proper vehicle for expanding the body of knowledge on gender issues.

The Cooperative Agreement with the Consortia, at least as it is currently structured, is not the appropriate vehicle for integrating gender considerations in A.I.D. development activities, but a restructured agreement could play an essential, indirect role in institutionalizing the gender focus. TSs could directly contribute to institutionalization, but they are not in the field long enough, nor do they have sufficient information initially to convince missions of the role and importance of considering gender in development activities. Only when the research activity is completed can the TS serve in this role, and only then if they had been involved throughout the research exercise.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This report presents an evaluation of the current Title XII university consortia programs to provide technical assistance to PPC/WID in the integration of gender issues into A.I.D.'s development programs. The current programs have been managed through cooperative agreements with two university consortia; the Consortium for International Development (CID) and the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities (MUCIA).

This chapter presents general background information relevant to the cooperative agreements, a description of the evaluation objectives and process and an overview of the organization of the evaluation report. The chapter also presents some discussion of PPC/WID's perceived objectives for the cooperative agreements and their impact on the overall program.

A. BACKGROUND

In June/July 1987 the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) signed two year cooperative agreements with two university consortia, CID and MUCIA, to provide assistance to the Office of Women in Development of the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC/WID). Although each cooperative agreement had slightly different objectives, the overall purpose of these programs was to promote the integration of gender issues into A.I.D.'s development programs. Under these cooperative agreements the two consortia were to provide, at no cost to the missions, short-term technical specialists to USAID missions for the purpose of defining specific gender related research activities that would result in an increased integration and institutionalization of gender considerations in the overall portfolio of each Mission's programs. These short-term activities were to be followed by long-term technical assistance oriented to the actual conduct of the research. A complementary objective of these cooperative agreements was to increase university capabilities and resources vis-a-vis gender and international development.

The structure of each cooperative agreement was intended to be sufficiently flexible to provide gender knowledgeable professionals (faculty or senior graduate student) to the USAID Missions in a variety of functional and sectorial disciplines. Basically, the Missions were to identify their basic needs and work with the consortia (through PPC/WID) to accomplish these needs. Under this structure each consortia would provide assistance to Missions in four countries over the two year life of the cooperative agreements. Actually, both consortia have obtained no cost extensions to the original agreements. CID's agreement will terminate on March 31, 1990 and MUCIA's agreement will be completed on June 30, 1990.

The current program follows a previous program under which PPC/WID contracted for technical assistance from two university consortia; CID and the South-East Consortium for International Development (SECID). Under the previous contractual arrangements PPC/WID had little control over the consortia activities and their interactions with the USAID missions. As a result of this lack of control, PPC/WID elected to use a cooperative agreement approach for the current program. In this way PPC/WID would have the ultimate control and authority over consortia

activities. An additional change from the previous arrangements is the establishment of the technical specialist position for the design of the research programs (SOWs) to be implemented by the technical assistants.

B. THE EVALUATION

Recently, A.I.D. through the PPC/WID office has contracted with a consortium of consulting firms, led by the Futures Group, to provide support services under the GENESYS (Gender in Economic and Social Systems) project. PPC/WID has requested the GENESYS project to perform an evaluation of the CID and MUCIA Cooperative Agreements.

In order to accomplish the evaluation the GENESYS project established an evaluation team consisting of:

- Dr. Charles H. Smith III of Ernst & Young
- Ms. Susanna Mudge of Ernst & Young
- Dr. Jeanne Downing, an independent consultant
- Ms. Sandra Altamero of Ernst & Young

The evaluations are to focus on three principal objectives:

1. **Assess the performance of CID and MUCIA under their two-year cooperative agreements with PPC/WID:**
 - **Performance evaluation**
 - quality and responsiveness of the SOWs to Mission needs
 - appropriateness of the TSs and TAs qualifications
 - timeliness of the consortia's response to Mission requirements
 - quality of the field activity in terms of Mission needs
 - quality of the field activity in terms of its contributions to PPC/WID's agenda.
 - **Management evaluation**
 - selection process of field activities
 - effectiveness of the recruitment process
 - communications and coordination among the consortium, PPC/WID, USAID, host-country counterpart organization, project team, technical specialists and technical assistant.
 - consortium's central office support for TA activity throughout field activity.

2. Determine the capacity of Title XII University Consortia to meet the PPC/WID's needs
3. Make recommendations
 - Mitigating the constraints of the Title XII consortia approach
 - Building on the strengths of the Title XII consortia approach
 - Improving management effectiveness
 - Improving the effectiveness and appropriateness of the contracting mechanism between A.I.D. and the consortia.

In conducting the evaluation, the team visited both the CID and MUCIA project offices, interviewed the CID Project Director, the MUCIA acting Project Director, officials of the executive offices of both consortia as well as several TSs and TAs. The team also interviewed current and former PPC/WID project officers for the Title XII agreements. Extensive telephone interviews were conducted with the actual MUCIA Project Director, officials from many of the USAID missions as well as additional TSs and TAs. The team reviewed the cooperative agreement documents, regular progress reports submitted by both consortia, relevant project correspondence files and all approved SOWs and TA reports. Moreover, the team reviewed the evaluations of previous PPC/WID programs with Title XII consortia. The balance of this report is the product of our analyses of the information gleaned from these interviews and documents.

C. THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS EVALUATION REPORT

This evaluation has focused on the activities of two separate, but similar cooperative agreements. As such it is necessary to present separate descriptions and evaluations of each consortium agreement. However, much of what can be learned from the experience of these two consortia programs is learned through a comparative analysis and synthesis of the programs. Consequently, the evaluation contains separate sections on the history, management and technical performance of each consortium. These sections are followed by chapters on the lessons to be learned through a comparison of the performance of the two consortia and on the appropriateness of the Title XII consortia as a mechanism to promote the integration and institutionalization of gender considerations in USAID mission programs. This key issue relates to PPC/WID's overall goals for the cooperative agreements and whether the university consortia is the most appropriate vehicle to achieve these goals. The issue of goals and objectives will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter and will be further addressed in Chapter IX.

D. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

In conducting this evaluation, it is important to consider the overall objectives of the various entities involved with the Cooperative Agreements. If these objectives do not coincide PPC/WID will not be able to achieve the goals that it has established for the Cooperative Agreements. Consideration should be given to the stated objectives of the agreements as well as the objectives of PPC/WID, the USAID missions and the university consortia.

The stated objectives of the two Cooperative Agreements are basically to provide assistance to selected USAID missions to improve the participation of women in their projects. Additional objectives included the development of gender disaggregated data (CID), the development of experimental projects to demonstrate the impact of gender issues (CID), the incorporation of gender issues in mission projects (MUCIA) and the generation of increased development awareness on the university campuses (MUCIA).

These objectives should be supportive of PPC/WID's overall goals which are to promote the integration of gender issues into A.I.D.'s development programs. In general, it may be said that PPC/WID's over-riding goal is to integrate serious gender considerations into as many A.I.D. programs as is possible within their funding capabilities. Integration is the key word because PPC/WID does not believe that special women's programs will ultimately lead to increased opportunities for and decreased discrimination against women. To achieve this integration they have a variety of program mechanisms including the Title XII consortia agreements, the new GENESYS project, buy-ins to the Private Sector Bureau's PEDS contract and others.

It is not possible to specify the gender related goals and objectives of the USAID missions because these will vary depending upon the needs of the specific country and the experience and commitment of mission staff. Basically, all USAID Missions have a Congressional mandate specifying that they must incorporate gender considerations into their overall programs. Observing the USAID Missions that considered and/or made use of the Cooperative Agreements, it is possible to categorize their goals and objectives in one of two ways. Some Missions have seen the relevance of gender issues in their overall program and are looking to the Cooperative Agreements to provide added gender emphasis and refinement to specific projects. Other Missions have not been convinced of the importance of gender issues and consequently are looking to the Cooperative Agreements as an inexpensive (actually almost no cost to the Mission) means of fulfilling their Congressional mandate.

The university consortia, on the other hand, are interested in the PPC/WID program because they believe that they must have an international involvement in order to remain world class universities and to continue to develop their constantly evolving base of knowledge. They consider that overseas development projects provide differing perspectives for their faculty and as such offer opportunities to improve their skills. These projects also provide graduate students a broader learning experience. Most universities are committed to increasing the integration of gender issues in their programs and see their participation in the Cooperative Agreements as a research base for refining their approach to gender issues.

Given this diverse set of goals and objectives, one can summarize the situation in the following manner. PPC/WID would like to increase the serious integration of gender issues into A.I.D.'s overall development programs. To do this, they must work with Missions, some of which are not convinced of the relevance of gender, to increase the gender integration into Mission projects. One mechanism that PPC/WID uses to achieve this integration is the Title XII Cooperative Agreements. However, the structure of the program, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, focuses on university research activities in the field. Senior faculty (ISs) are provided for short periods to develop research plans and junior faculty or graduate students (TA's) are provided for longer periods to conduct the research.

It appears that there is something of a mismatch between PPC/WID's objectives and the overall program design and the Title XII consortia capabilities. Well qualified, experienced senior

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following conclusions and recommendations address the major findings of this evaluation of PPC/WID's cooperative agreements with CID and MUCIA. They are grouped into six topics, the first of which addresses the ability of the cooperative agreement to achieve PPC/WID's goal of institutionalizing the capability to address gender differences within A.I.D. programs and projects. The remaining five address critical issues related to the management structure of the cooperative agreement. A final section presents the views of the evaluation team as to the future goal and structure of PPC/WID's cooperative agreement with Title XII University Consortia.

A. BUILDING CAPACITY FOR WID INSTITUTIONALIZATION

1. Conclusions

One of PPC/WID's major objectives for the Title XII Cooperative Agreements is to use the consortia activities to inject gender considerations and issues into USAID mission programs. In essence, the consortia were to contribute to the institutionalization of gender issues within the overall A.I.D. programs. The evaluation team considers that this objective is actually one of the principal goals of PPC/WID but that the cooperative agreements with the university consortia may not be the most appropriate mechanism for the direct achievement of this goal. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to provide experienced, highly qualified professionals with gender-specific knowledge to influence overseas missions that may, as yet, be unconvinced of the importance of gender considerations. However, research activities do make an essential, indirect contribution towards the achievement of the institutionalization goal. The effectiveness of this contribution could be enhanced by improving the structure of the cooperative agreement.

While the senior faculty may be the professionals who could influence the mission programs, under the cooperative agreement they are in the country at the wrong time to effect such influence. The best opportunity for institutionalizing gender issues is after completion of the research being carried out by the TAs, who often do not have the experience level to be able to influence the missions. The evaluation team believes that PPC/WID's use of the Title XII university consortia should focus on research programs that provide the data necessary to enable the institutionalization of gender issues. Inexpensive long-term research activities are what universities do best. The actual activities required to achieve institutionalization may draw upon the research output but should be channelled through other PPC/WID mechanisms that are more appropriate for short-term interventions in USAID missions.

The experiences of both Consortia demonstrated basic design weaknesses in the cooperative agreement. One of the most profound weaknesses was that the technical assistance was provided at no cost to the Missions. Consequently, USAID missions felt little ownership of the activity, and, in a number of cases, used it as a convenient and low cost mechanism for meeting the requirements of the Congressional WID mandate. Moreover, because the consortia approach was designed to

provide low cost research, the TAs were not intended to receive remuneration under the Cooperative Agreements. As a result, TAs often had lower levels of experience and were unsalaried. Because the missions did not have to invest their own funds in the effort and because they perceived the TAs to be inexperienced the credibility of the project was further diminished as well as its capacity for WID institutionalization.

Nonetheless, Consortia capacity for WID institutionalization was demonstrated in some cases such as Mali where CID/WID research findings were used to justify and design significant WID interventions. Despite the relative inexperience of TAs in Mali, the TS's ability to identify activities with potential for impact, the quality of TA research, the contributions of a Consortia professor to the final report, and the openness of the Mission to gender-specific research were important ingredients to a successful effort. The experiences of MUCIA/WID, on the other hand, made clear the futility of working in environments that had no commitment or even interest in WID.

Insufficient dissemination of research in environments that were receptive also led to opportunities lost. How can Consortia enhance their effectiveness as agents of change; and how can PPC/WID better capitalize on the Consortium's strengths and thereby enhance its program? The following recommendations are meant to address these issues.

2. Recommendations

- To enhance PPC/WID's program and the Consortia's probability of success, Consortia activities should be focused on what they do best: long-term applied research and professional/institutional development.
- To improve the potential for WID institutionalization, missions should be required to buy-in to the activity, on a cost-sharing basis, and to designate a high level officer to oversee and be responsible for activity.
- Identifying a host-country counterpart to work with TAs will build commitment to WID and potential for WID institutionalization.
- To improve the quality of work and prospects for its application to Mission activities, the role of the TS should be expanded to include supervision of TAs and follow-up at the end of the research activity.
- To maximize their impact, Consortia need to expand their efforts at disseminating final reports and findings in a form that a wide audience can use. Consortia budgets need to include monies for dissemination.
- In order to improve WID institutionalization on Consortia campuses and in the field, recruitment efforts need to be expanded toward candidates with specializations in "non-traditional" fields.

CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5. Strengthening the Capacity of Missions to Undertake WID Interventions

CID/WID's success at linking their work to host-country institutions and A.I.D.-funded projects and their ability to produce quality research within a reasonable period of time resulted in the use of CID/WID research by missions and host-country institutions in undertaking WID interventions. A pre-condition for mission capacity building, however, is at least some show of interest and commitment on the part of the mission. The Mission Director at USAID/Mali was already an advocate of WID; CID/WID research here resulted in significant WID interventions. In Lesotho and Nepal, support for WID was less ardent, and yet the willingness of the missions to fund senior level TAs was an expression of commitment that gave the activity credibility. Free technical assistance requiring no contribution on the part of the mission is not conducive to mission capacity building. Both Uruguay and Cameroon viewed the MUCIA/WID cooperative agreement as a convenient mechanism for addressing problems of marginal concern to the mission.

C. STRENGTHS OF THE CONSORTIA TO MEET PPC/WID'S NEEDS

The strengths of Title XII University Consortia, as demonstrated by their field activities, are long-term applied research and institutional development. To the extent possible, PPC/WID should capitalize on these strengths and rely on other mechanisms for addressing mission program needs. This could be done by further rationalizing PPC/WID technical assistance, such that mechanisms that have clear strengths in quick response, short term technical assistance, address mission program needs. Consortia, on the other hand, could be used for longer-term assistance.

Establishing stronger links between short- and long-term activities could also improve PPC/WID's ability to respond to mission needs. Short-term technical assistants could provide Consortia with valuable information on mission needs, and thereby expand the opportunities which Consortia are able to identify on their own. On the other hand, as experience has shown, Consortia activities also result in requests for program assistance. Exchanges of information could be mutually beneficial to Consortia and short-term technical assistants. Coordinating Consortia cooperative agreements with other PPC/WID contracts could strengthen the WID program and provide a powerful tool for institutionalizing gender issues within the A.I.D. environment.

But while low-cost, long term applied research is clearly the strength of Consortia that PPC/WID should capitalize on, there are also weaknesses in the cooperative agreement that warrant attention. The most important weakness may be PPC/WID's lack of clarity concerning their expectations of the Consortia. Institutionalizing the ability of A.I.D. to address gender issues can be achieved in a number of ways. Moreover, PPC/WID has a variety of mechanisms at its disposal that can contribute to the achievement of this goal. Each mechanism, including the Cooperative Agreements with Title XII University Consortia, has different contributions to make to WID institutionalization. PPC/WID needs to define those contributions which Consortia are in the best position to make.

In addition, there is some question whether the use of inexperienced TAs, without greater supervision, is conducive to WID institutionalization. The question asked by some is whether fielding TAs who, in some cases, had very little, if any, experience can possibly further WID institutionalization. Does it do more harm than good when WID issues are associated with "technical assistants" who are viewed as graduate students or interns? PPC/WID needs to consider whether the

cooperative agreement would be more successful using salaried TAs who can clearly act as professionals in the field. If inexperienced TAs are to be used, experience strongly suggests that supervision of their activities is critical. PPC/WID also needs to consider whether free technical assistance is conducive to WID institutionalization. The use of MA candidates, in most instances, did not further the credibility of WID. Requiring missions to buy-in to the activity would provide funds for salaried TAs while also ensuring that the activity is taken seriously and that there is a real opportunity for even experienced TAs to further WID institutionalization.

WID knowledge base but rather focused on activities that missions, admittedly unknowledgeable about WID, requested. TSs need to take a strong lead in identifying potential activities that address development issues of import both to missions and the Agency as a whole.

2. Convincing Missions and Host-Country Institutions of the Importance of Gender Issues

The greatest successes of Consortia in raising gender awareness came from well conceived and executed research relevant to immediate mission concerns. Mission staff in Lesotho, Mali, and Nepal noted that CID/WID field demonstrations were instrumental in influencing key staff and others in the development community that gender issues do matter in project design. However, where TA activities targeted areas of marginal interest to the mission, as in Uruguay, and where missions had little interest in the activity, Consortia research was quickly forgotten.

USAID/Nepal suggested that Consortia capacity to influence the development community required that TSs and TAs have expertise in technical or "non-traditional" areas. Mission experts with the least understanding of gender issues tended to be those in these "non-traditional" fields. They also held high level positions and thus had considerable influence on program and project design. USAID/Nepal argued that unless WID specialists can interface with specialists in agriculture, agronomy, animal sciences, forestry, and the like, their sphere of influence will be limited to areas where they are least needed. The TA in Nepal, according to interviews, was able to influence a cadre of high level professionals at the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Sciences because of her technical background. USAID/Mali and USAID/Lesotho requested WID specialists with technical expertise in agricultural economics and irrigation. The analytical skills of these technical assistants were critical in providing hard evidence for incorporating gender into projects.

CID/WID activities in Nepal's IAAS, and Kenya's Egerton University demonstrated Consortia capacity for WID institutionalization within an academic context. The obvious familiarity of Title XII Universities with institutes of higher learning and the possibility of fielding a number of TAs, such that assistance efforts can build on and reinforce one another make Consortia well suited for these kinds of WID institutionalization efforts.

3. Institutionalizing Gender Issues on Consortia Campuses

Both CID/WID and MUCIA/WID are connected to a network of WID programs on Consortia campuses. These programs support seminars, workshops, newsletters, and, in the case of MUCIA/WID, an impressive publication series which disseminates WID research findings from a broad range of disciplines. The Consortia have also worked to incorporate gender issues into university curriculum.

Despite these considerable efforts, WID is largely isolated to a narrow sphere of influence, in departments of Women's Studies, Anthropology, and Sociology. There has been little success institutionalizing WID in more "non-traditional" departments. Yet, these departments have substantial involvement in donor-funded projects, many of which are AID-funded and thus represent opportunities for WID institutionalization. Interviews revealed that members of "non-traditional" departments view Consortia WID specialists as having limited expertise to deal with technical issues. As one economist noted, they do not know how to "speak the same language" as the economist, agronomist, or animal scientist. This perception on the part of directors of non-traditional departments serves to limit the amount of interest generated in WID-related activities. Junior faculty

or graduate students perceive their professional opportunities may be limited if they become ear-marked as a "WID person". A concentrated effort from the senior management of the universities will be needed to change this perception and attitude.

Identifying female graduate students in non-traditional fields could provide a vehicle for reaching a broader range of departments. Graduate students steeped in both a technical field and WID would be better able to introduce gender issues into "non-traditional" fields in a language technically-oriented development specialists can appreciate. Incorporating technically oriented graduate students into Consortia programs could be mutually beneficial. Attracting these kind of graduate students would require expanded efforts on the part of the Consortia, but the potential benefits of attracting a pool of eligible TAs could expand capacities for WID institutionalization both on member campuses and in the field.

The lack of dissemination of TA research findings and reports on member campuses also contributes to the isolation of Consortia WID activities. Neither Consortia has made substantial effort to raise their visibility on member campuses by making research reports available to those who might have some interest and use of the findings. Although MSU has a WID Working Paper series, they have made no attempt to publish TA reports. Dissemination of research in an appropriate form for distribution on member campuses could help to contribute to the credibility of the WID activity and perhaps serve to entice more to participate in the program.

4. Incorporating Gender Issues Into A.I.D.-Funded Projects and Activities

The previous contractual agreements with Title XII University Consortia were designed more specifically to target A.I.D.-funded projects. The new agreements define more broadly the organizational contexts within which the Consortia can work. Consequently, CID/WID, in particular, worked outside of project contexts. In Lesotho, however, CID/WID worked with two A.I.D.-funded projects, LAPIS and BANFES. LAPIS staff reported that they did not see the applicability of CID/WID research to the project, despite prior agreement on the SOWs. The apparent limited impact on LAPIS may be the consequence of joining a project in mid-stream, which has already-established agendas and perhaps little use or desire for information that has redesign implications. In Mali, on the other hand, TA research was timely as the mission was contemplating a new credit project in the OHV Zone. CID/WID research provided valuable information for both justifying and designing this project.

Of the MUCTA/WID's research activities that were completed at the time of this evaluation, only one, in Indonesia, was actually linked to a larger A.I.D.-funded project. Although the TA activity in Indonesia was not particularly effective in promoting gender considerations, the opportunity for an important impact was clearly there.

Consortia experience working with A.I.D.-funded projects shows the potential impact that can be made. It also suggests that the potential for incorporating gender issues into projects is greatly strengthened when research can feed into project design activities. Experiences with the LAPIS project and during the earlier cooperative agreement indicate the difficulty of having an impact on a project once the objectives and plan of implementation are established.

CHAPTER IX

TITLE XII UNIVERSITY CONSORTIA AS APPROPRIATE VEHICLES FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING GENDER ISSUES: CID/WID AND MUCIA/WID

A. INTRODUCTION

A central agenda of PPC/WID is to institutionalize the ability to address gender differences in A.I.D. programs and projects in order to enhance the effectiveness of development assistance. Although PPC/WID envisioned that CID/WID and MUCIA/WID would contribute to this institutionalization effort, it does not appear that the Consortia were fully aware of the importance of this institutionalization to PPC/WID nor were they given any guidance as to how they might best further this goal. In addition, the Consortia did not fully appreciate the differences in institutional values between A.I.D. and universities in general. A.I.D., while interested in research, tends to be more concerned about the impact of research and technical assistance activities. Universities, on the other hand, tend to stress "quality of the research" above such things as protocol or management of the research activity.

There are several types of activities necessary to achieve the institutionalization that PPC/WID desires. Among these are short-term technical assistance to USAID missions, long-term program implementations and long-term research to expand the body of knowledge on the effect of gender differences in development activities. There are appropriate mechanisms at the disposal of PPC/WID for each type of activity.

This leads to the more complex issue of whether or not the Title XII university consortia are appropriate mechanisms for directly achieving the institutionalization and integration of gender considerations into A.I.D. and USAID mission programs. In reality the Cooperative Agreements, as currently structured, focus on two types of activities:

Short-term development by senior faculty (TSs) of statements of work (SOWs) for research activities

Long-term conduct of research by junior faculty or graduate students (TAs) including a final report highlighting the research results.

Given this structure, the evaluation team believes that there is a mismatch between the PPC/WID goal of institutionalizing gender considerations and the Cooperative Agreement structure. In the USAID mission environment there are missions with considerable WID knowledge and skills and others which have as yet not been convinced of the importance of gender considerations. In both cases experienced, highly qualified professionals will be necessary to influence USAID missions to institutionalize and integrate gender considerations into their programs. However, the TSs who could achieve that goal are only at the USAID mission for a short time prior to the research activity that would generate the data necessary to affect the institutionalization. The research is performed and presented by the TAs who, by the design of the Cooperative Agreements, are too inexperienced to influence the missions. Thus, the Cooperative Agreements may be best suited to the conduct of

research that ultimately results in an expansion of knowledge regarding gender differences and gender issues. The research results may certainly be used by appropriate professionals to achieve PPC/WID's overall goal to promote the institutionalization and integration of gender considerations into A.I.D. and USAID mission programs.

In reality, the evaluation of the Consortia should be based on what they do best: long-term and applied research and institutional development. However, this evaluation must also focus on the Consortia's accomplishments in relation to the objectives defined in the Cooperative Agreements. Therefore, in evaluating the WID institutionalization efforts of the Consortia, the following categories were used to define and assess the Consortia contributions to WID institutionalization: (1) expanding the WID knowledge base; (2) convincing missions and host-country institutions of the importance of gender issues; (3) institutionalizing gender issues into A.I.D.-funded projects; and (4) strengthening the capacity of missions to undertake WID interventions. These categories represent both explicit objectives stated in the Cooperative Agreements as well as implicit expectations on the part of PPC/WID.

B. THE CAPACITY OF CID/WID AND MUCIA/WID TO INSTITUTIONALIZE GENDER ISSUES

1. Expanding the WID Knowledge Base

Title XII University Consortia, given their orientation toward research and their ability to field long-term technical assistants at a low cost that few development organizations can match, have a comparative advantage in expanding the WID knowledge base through their cooperative agreements. The cumulative evidence of CID/WID research in -- (1) gender-integrated professional development; (2) women as entrepreneurs; and (3) gender issues in irrigation/water resources -- demonstrated this capacity. For the purpose of this evaluation, CID/WID developed a summary compilation of findings in these three areas. The result was an impressive body of knowledge that both substantiated past research and made original contributions to understanding the constraints and opportunities that women face in their economic and professional endeavors.

Unfortunately, CID/WID research has been disseminated to only a limited audience. Even mission staff noted that CID/WID reports were difficult to obtain, and as a result requests for reports could not be filled, and impacts were less than they might have been. PPC/WID, itself, has only received full final reports from which significant findings are difficult to cull. And yet the summary compilation of CID/WID findings represents a powerful tool for PPC/WID to influence A.I.D. policy and programs. The effect of CID/WID's insufficient dissemination efforts -- and perhaps insufficient budget for dissemination -- has been limited impact on A.I.D. and limited appreciation of the contributions that Consortia can make to expanding the WID knowledge base.

MUCIA/WID's paucity of research activities completed did not provide the basis for drawing meaningful conclusions. Nevertheless, MUCIA/WID's acknowledged capabilities in such areas as agriculture, institutional development, and private enterprise development indicate potential for generating significant WID information. This potential can only be realized, however, if MUCIA/WID can better manage TS activity, develop SOWs that have greater potential for having powerful WID demonstration effects, and identify TAs capable of conducting quality technical assistance. In some instances, MUCIA/WID SOWs did not provide the ground for expanding the

CHAPTER IX

**TITLE XII UNIVERSITY CONSORTIA AS APPROPRIATE VEHICLES
FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING GENDER ISSUES
CID/WID AND MUCIA/WID**

Among CID/WID member universities, professors commonly supported one another to allow for greater participation in Consortium activities. Moreover, CID/WID's TSs valued the cooperative agreement as an opportunity to gain further overseas experience. Even department heads and deans on CID/WID campuses viewed the international experience afforded by the project as enrichment for professors and their courses. International experience was seen as adding to the credibility of the university.

There appeared to be less support and less incentive for MUCIA/WID TSs to participate in the project. Perhaps, because of limited access to overseas opportunities, CID/WID TSs went to great lengths to get released from their teaching activities to participate in Consortium activities. This kind of enthusiasm was not apparent among MUCIA/WID TSs. MUCIA/WID universities and professors apparently did not view the opportunities offered by the cooperative agreement as favorably as those of CID/WID.

According to MUCIA/WID, there is also little incentive for junior-level faculty, who are vying for tenure, to participate in the program since it takes them away from their teaching and publishing activities. Although on the surface it might appear that long-term research overseas would further a faculty member's career, MUCIA/WID noted that junior-level faculty are under pressure to publish, and are often burdened with a heavy teaching load. Most begin by publishing material from their dissertations; this is the fastest and easiest way to generate requisite publications for tenure. Taking six months off for an assignment that probably does not coincide with their research area is thus not viewed as particularly attractive by non-tenured faculty. Clearly, junior-level faculty on CID/WID campuses must deal with the same pressures; nevertheless, their universities tend to view the experience as more valuable, contributing to the credibility of the professor and the university, than do MUCIA/WID member universities.

Moreover, a review of MUCIA/WID TS candidates revealed a much larger pool than that for TAs. In other words, had MUCIA/WID seen the possibility of using these TS candidates as TAs, their success at finding qualified TAs and fielding them in a timely manner might have been improved.

MUCIA/WID problems in fielding TA candidates in a timely manner also demonstrates the difficulty of working within the timing constraints of an academic schedule. TAs cannot be recruited and fielded in a semester. CID/WID did not suffer from such constraints, primarily because it was generally timing interventions to occur when TAs were available. Because CID/WID had greater lead time, they were able to work within the timing constraints of an academic environment.

F. Mission Commitment

Mission willingness to commit funds to Consortium activity in Lesotho and Nepal produced a vested interest in the research which was lacking in places where MUCIA/WID worked. In Kenya, CID/WID worked with a host-country counterpart who was very much committed to the activity; and in Mali, fortunately the Mission Director was a strong WID advocate. Thus, in all countries where CID/WID conducted research there was clear demonstration of commitment to the WID technical assistance.

On the other hand, MUCIA/WID's lack of an established relationship with USAID missions, resulting from their ability to link activities with on-going A.I.D. projects, lead to the acceptance of opportunities where mission commitment to WID was tenuous, if not nonexistent. Lack of commitment on the part of missions combined with problems identifying and fielding TAs left MUCIA/WID with limited chances for success.

G. Use of Consortium University Networks to Identify Opportunities

CID/WID's greater success at identifying opportunities has been stated several times. Although MUCIA/WID had access to very large universities with substantial international project involvement, they were unable to capitalize on this. MUCIA was a larger Consortium than CID, and the majority of MUCIA's projects are not A.I.D.-funded. Nevertheless, the support to which MUCIA/WID might lay claim was, in actuality, not there. Neither MUCIA, MSU, nor other large participating universities provided opportunities for the WID Consortium. In only one instance was there mention of such support; a University of Minnesota professor offered to collaborate with MUCIA/WID in identifying field opportunities but the Consortium appeared not to follow up on this one offer. Perhaps MUCIA/WID's greater access to international consultancies resulted in fewer incentives for participating in the program as compared to CID/WID, where international opportunities were much more scarce. Or perhaps, MUCIA/WID has just not yet identified what "niche" they should target in order to attract opportunities and people.

H. Knowledge of A.I.D. and PPC/WID

CID/WID, as compared to MUCIA/WID, had significantly more experience in working with USAID missions and PPC/WID. Consequently, CID/WID was able to access A.I.D.-related information more effectively, negotiate adeptly with USAID missions, and meet the expectations and needs of PPC/WID. Moreover, CID/WID's familiarity with the A.I.D. environment as well as its previous contacts with USAID mission personnel improved their ability to identify opportunities that

could be addressed under the Cooperative Agreement. At its own initiative, CID/WID made a presentation of project findings to PPC/WID. This presentation demonstrates CID/WID's understanding of the A.I.D. operating environment and did much to increase PPC/WID's appreciation of Consortium activities. MUCIA/WID never gave a such a presentation to PPC/WID.

I. The Role of PPC/WID

While the relative success of the Consortia activities under the Cooperative Agreements primarily result from their respective management processes and the quality of the TSs and TAs that were fielded, the role of PPC/WID in each was also an important factor. As has been previously discussed, the overall objectives of the two Cooperative Agreements were basically the same. However, PPC/WID's role in each was strikingly different.

Having had recent project experience with CID/WID, PPC/WID was sufficiently confident of the consortium's capabilities to permit them to manage the project, to maintain communications with the USAID missions and to select and supervise the TSs and TAs conducting the field activities. PPC/WID basically required that the consortium keep it informed of project related decisions and activities. The CID/WID management office and PPC/WID were able to address project needs in a cooperative fashion and truly work together, resulting in a more effectively managed project. Certainly this partnership approach was enhanced by CID/WID's knowledge of the A.I.D. and PPC/WID operating environment.

In contrast to the collegial approach taken with CID/WID, the PPC/WID role in the MUCIA/WID agreement was more managerial. Lacking a familiarity with how MUCIA/WID would manage the project, PPC/WID was quite specific in the Cooperative Agreement about the management process. MUCIA/WID deferred some of its decision authority which PPC/WID accepted and used. PPC/WID became the linking pin between the consortium and the USAID missions as a result of its intercession in the communications flow. Perhaps this was the result of MUCIA/WID's and/or the missions' slow responsiveness to the information and decision requirements of the other. As a result of this approach, PPC/WID was more deeply involved in the project management than may have been appropriate for an effectively responsive project.

If one were to conclude something from the comparison of these two approaches, it is clear that the PPC/WID partnership role in the management of CID/WID's cooperative agreement was more effective than the managerial approach that was taken with the MUCIA/WID agreement. However, this was only possible because PPC/WID had previous, successful project experience with CID/WID and because CID/WID was quite familiar with the operating environment of A.I.D. and PPC/WID. The situation with MUCIA/WID could perhaps have been different if it had a more aggressive Project Director who was also more experienced with the A.I.D. and PPC/WID environment. The situation could also have been improved if PPC/WID had devoted additional effort to assuring that both consortia were fully aware of the A.I.D. environment as well as the additional mechanisms available through PPC/WID for facilitating their support to the missions.

J. Campus Support of Consortia WID Activities

Interviews with project coordinators on member campuses and visits to the University of Arizona and Michigan State University suggested that CID/WID had more active support for their WID activities from participating universities and university departments than did MUCIA/WID.

The CID/WID Project Director was originally budgeted as a full-time position although it was reduced to three-quarter time in order to use the remaining funds to provide a minimal remuneration to the WID campus coordinators. MUCIA/WID's Project Director, on the other hand, was only one-quarter time; clearly, this was insufficient. Moreover, no financial remuneration was provided to the WID campus coordinators. Managing a project that is responsive as well as flexible, and able to deliver services in four countries in two years, requires at a minimum a half-time position for the Project Director. It also requires a strong support staff in view of the amount of correspondence, report writing and general administrative work required to manage a project. MUCIA/WID did not have the management support necessary to operate effectively.

Regarding the overall responsiveness of the WID campus coordinators to the project management office requirements, it would appear that the CID/WID campus coordinator network provided more timely and effective responses than did the MUCIA/WID campus coordinator network. In addition, the CID/WID campus coordinators appeared to have more actively assisted TS and TA applicants in the preparation of appropriate responses to project needs. The greater involvement of the CID/WID campus coordinators may in part be due to the minimal financial incentive that they received through the CID/WID project management office.

C. Selection Procedures

CID/WID was very aggressive in the promotion of the cooperative agreement program, particularly in seeking linkages with other CID member university projects. Three of the five countries which were eventually selected resulted from such contacts. MUCIA/WID's efforts to promote similar linkages failed. As a result, they were limited to the opportunities provided by PPC/WID, several of which involved working with missions that had questionable WID interests.

CID/WID and MUCIA/WID followed different TS and TA recruitment and selection procedures. The differences in TS and TA selection procedures have already been discussed. In examining differences in recruitment, it was clear that CID/WID began its efforts far in advance of MUCIA/WID. For example, CID/WID began identifying TA candidates at the time the country was selected. In fact, SOWs were developed with particular TA candidates in mind. MUCIA/WID did this only once, in the case of Uruguay.

CID/WID's pre-recruitment efforts were critical in its success in fielding quality TAs in a timely fashion. On average, CID/WID took 3 months to field the TS and 8 months to field the TA. MUCIA/WID, on the other hand, took 6.5 months and 11 months respectively. CID/WID's successful pre-recruitment efforts included the following:

- The TS was in contact with the Project Office while in the field, and informed the Director of proposals for TAs SOWs.
- TSs submitted draft SOWs to and received preliminary approval of the mission before departing the country.
- The TS was given specific instructions as to what should be included in the SOW, and the management office ensured that the issues were adequately addressed. If they were not, the Project Director was in communication with the mission to resolve any pending matters prior to the departure of the TS.

The CID/WID management office had a centralized roster of qualified WID individuals. This list was reviewed as each opportunity was identified. Candidates that met the specified qualifications were contacted either by the campus coordinator or the Project Director and encouraged to apply.

D. Supervision and Coordination of the Field Activity

A major reason for CID/WID's advantage over MUCIA/WID's appears to rest in the abilities and commitments of the Project Director. CID/WID's Director took a pro-active stance, communicating directly with missions and CID Project Directors and ensuring that each TS and TA was properly informed and oriented to what they could and could not do in the field. As a result, CID/WID did not suffer to the extent that MUCIA/WID did from delays in communications, misunderstandings, and TSs and TAs in the field with little knowledge of their functions or tasks. Part of this can be explained by the fact that CID/WID's Project Director position was three-quarter time whereas MUCIA/WID's Project Director position was one-quarter time. Clearly, CID/WID's Project Director had more time to communicate with missions and generally follow-up on matter.

Moreover, the CID/WID Project Director was able to convince missions of the efficacy of the assistance offered and thereby market the project. MUCIA/WID Project Director, on the other hand, was unable to represent her project as effectively. Mission response and cooperation clearly reflected this.

Finally, Guatemala insisted that a supervisor be obtained to monitor the TA field activity. CID/WID was not requested to do so. This reflects the flexibility of the cooperative agreement, since the hiring of the supervisor was allowed. However, it also demonstrates the importance of incorporating a systematic field supervision structure in the cooperative agreement.

E. TA Qualifications

Almost half of CID/WID TAs were senior level people, who were paid professional consulting fees with mission and PPC/WID matching funds. The Devres evaluation had recommended greater use of salaried WID experts, which is essentially what these senior level CID/WID TAs were. MUCIA/WID, on the other hand, struggled to find even junior level TAs and in no case did they make use of PPC/WID matching funds to field professional-level TAs. According to the Acting Project Director, MUCIA/WID was unaware that CID/WID was utilizing the full range of PPC/WID resources, despite open and frequent communications between CID/WID and MUCIA/WID Project Directors.

MUCIA/WID's relative ineffectiveness in recruiting high caliber TAs can be, at least partly, attributed to its unfamiliarity with PPC/WID and the creative uses to which the cooperative agreement could be put. For example, MUCIA/WID had a request from Malawi for two TSs. PPC/WID responded that this was not in accordance with the one-TS/two-TA design of the cooperative agreement. On the other hand, when Nepal requested three senior-level technical assistants, CID/WID responded accordingly, and merely called two of the senior-level professionals TAs. Funding for these professionals was provided by the Mission and PPC/WID matching funds. MUCIA/WID reported lack of awareness that such arrangements were possible.

CHAPTER VIII

CID/WID AND MUCIA/WID: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM A COMPARISON

This chapter compares the experiences of CID/WID and MUCIA/WID in order to highlight difficulties shared by both Consortia that suggest a modification to the cooperative agreement; demonstrate the lessons learned from the successes of each Consortium; and underscore the causal factors for poor management and field performance. This comparison of the Consortia focuses on differences in the use of the cooperative agreement, management styles, selection procedures, supervision and coordination of the field activity, qualifications of TAs, commitment of participating missions, identification of opportunities, knowledge of the A.I.D. operating environment, the role of PPC/WID and member university support.

A. The Cooperative Agreement

CID/WID's and MUCIA/WID's cooperative agreements were similar in funding amounts, duration, and in general types of activity to be carried out. They were not similar in the level of specificity provided for program management. MUCIA/WID's cooperative agreement explicitly outlines how the program should be managed, including procedures and timetables. CID/WID's cooperative agreement, instead, focuses on the type of technical assistance to be provided and mechanisms for collaboration with PPC/WID in its implementation.

Probably the most striking difference between CID/WID and MUCIA/WID, however, was their use of the cooperative agreement. It seemed as if they were playing by different rules. CID/WID was able to capitalize on PPC/WID's other funding mechanisms and thereby field salaried and high- and senior-level TAs. In Nepal, one of CID/WID's TAs was a university dean, with years of development experience. Her consulting fees were paid for by the Mission and PPC/WID matching funds. MUCIA/WID, on the other hand, had difficulty securing more than master candidates for TAs, and in no case was a TA paid a salary. MUCIA/WID claimed that it was unaware that the cooperative agreement could be used as such.

Clearly CID/WID's innovative understanding of PPC/WID's program and funding mechanisms gave the Consortium a tremendous advantage over MUCIA/WID. In essence, they were playing the same game with the same rules. However, CID/WID was able to use these rules to their fullest extent, while MUCIA/WID, by their lack of awareness of all the rules and funding opportunities, could not perform in an effective and responsive manner. MUCIA/WID was therefore less successful in meeting PPC/WID's agenda.

B. Management Structure

The general management structure and process followed by the consortia in implementing the cooperative agreement programs were similar. The structure, as outlined in the initial business proposals, was developed in collaboration among MUCIA/WID, CID/WID and SECID/WID, the other consortia which submitted proposals for this program. MUCIA/WID's utilization of the structure, however, was different than that followed by CID/WID, as discussed in Chapter VI. This

difference, coupled with the fact that MUCIA/WID worked with several difficult missions, resulted in problems in complying with the objectives of the cooperative agreement and delivering effective technical assistance.

The differences between CID/WID's and MUCIA/WID's approach to decision-making are critical to explaining the timeliness and responsiveness of the former and the delays and limited responsiveness of the latter. In the case of CID/WID, decision-making was centralized in the management office. MUCIA/WID, on the other hand, was debilitated by its decentralized decision-making structure. The impact of these differences is illustrated by their decision-making process for selecting TSs and TAs. CID/WID's management office made the initial selection, ranked them, and forwarded the results to PPC/WID, who forwarded them to the mission. In other words, the Project Director made the determination as to who the best candidate would be. This decision, in all cases, was coincident with that of both PPC/WID and the mission. In the case of MUCIA/WID, the decision concerning selection of TSs and TAs was, for the most part, deferred to PPC/WID, who both ranked and selected an appropriate candidate and then discussed their decision with the MUCIA/WID management office. In other words, PPC/WID assumed responsibility for a function that could have been more expeditiously done by MUCIA/WID.

The degree of involvement of the PAC in decision-making may have been a further impediment to swift decision-making; moreover, it gave the impression that the MUCIA/WID management office was not really in control of the project, but merely an information transmission center between PPC/WID and the PAC.

MUCIA/WID's PAC was equivalent to CID/WID's Advisory Board. However, in the case of MUCIA/WID, the PAC appeared to be given authority to make a number of decisions that were made by CID/WID's Project Director after discussions with members of the Advisory Board. Further, the PAC sought agreement on issues by consensus, giving the impression of slow turn around in decision-making. Another difference between the PAC and the Advisory Board was that members of the latter were given a small stipend. It appeared that this facilitated the role and strengthened the commitment of the Advisory Board members. In addition, the evaluation suggested a much greater amount of collaboration and cooperation among CID/WID's Advisory Board members than was apparent among MUCIA/WID's PAC members. In fact, there were rumors of competition and in-fighting among the PAC members.

The support of the CID Executive Office was also important to the success of CID/WID. The Office's commitment to CID/WID is evidenced by its decision to assign the Deputy Executive Director to the project and by the Offices' efforts to market the project among deans, faculty and program heads of CID campuses. The MUCIA Executive Board, on the other hand and in its own assessment, maintained a hands-off approach to the project. This contributed to the lack of information about the project on most MUCIA campuses.

A comparison of the support provided to CID/WID by its Executive Office as compared to that provided by MUCIA/WID's must take into consideration the following caveat: the MUCIA Executive Board's headquarters was located in Ohio while the MUCIA/WID office was in Michigan. This distance may have limited MUCIA/WID's access to the Board, and perhaps created a barrier which precluded the same kind of support that CID/WID enjoyed from its Executive Board, which was located in the same city.

CHAPTER VIII

CID/WID AND MUCIA/WID LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM A COMPARISON

particularly given the apparent lack of commitment to WID. Nevertheless, the Mission indicated that the TA research would be used to develop a WID strategy.

C. OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF MUCIA/WID FIELD ACTIVITY

The evaluation of MUCIA/WID activities reveals the Consortium's limited effectiveness in the field. Efforts were repeatedly hampered by insufficient understanding of TSs of the import of well developed SOWs, the A.I.D. environment, and the limits and requirements of their field assignments. While MUCIA/WID's inexperience with the cooperative agreement needs to be taken into account, the performance of MUCIA/WID's well-qualified TSs underscores the need for greater oversight of TS activities. The stature and experience of some MUCIA/WID TSs may have masked the need for more extensive orientation to the goals and purposes of the cooperative agreement. More appreciation of the requirements of SOWs -- in order to further the goals of PPC/WID and provide sufficient ground for successful TA research -- is needed. The inexperience of MUCIA/WID TAs meant that the groundwork for their research, the responsibility of TSs, required substantially more care and detail than was provided.

Despite MUCIA/WID's access to a large pool of TA candidates on campuses that have strong programs in international development, the Consortium was unable to recruit more than a few applicants for each position. In the case of Uruguay, there was only one candidate. The TA for Guatemala was actually identified through a mission contact. The TA applicants that were identified were, for the most part, junior level graduate students with limited experience and analytical skills. Clearly, MUCIA/WID needs to improve its recruitment process to operate effectively in the field. However, in those cases where TAs are graduate students, MUCIA/WID must take responsibility for compensating for their lack of experience by providing necessary guidance and supervision and input into final reports.

MUCIA/WID's problems were confounded by limited success in marketing their program and, thereby, generating opportunities for their TS/TA activities. Neither the larger umbrella organization of MUCIA, nor MSU, nor other member universities were willing to collaborate with MUCIA/WID in identifying field opportunities. Scarcity of opportunities forced the Consortium to accept assignments that had limited potential for success, where the Mission had limited interest in or commitment to WID. While the Consortium needs to take responsibility for better capitalizing on the opportunities that do arise, PPC/WID should consider whether free technical assistance is conducive to WID institutionalization efforts. As MUCIA/WID experience demonstrates, free technical assistance is too easily abused. Missions should be required to show some commitment to the activity and responsibility for its oversight. If missions were required to buy-in to the activity and a high ranking officer delegated responsibility for it, the potential for having an impact would be greatly enhanced.

4. Impact of TS Activity on Mission

The TS activity in Indonesia was detrimental to the relationship between PPC/WID and USAID/Indonesia. It was the worst case scenario, "a good idea that went awry." And as is common in such unfortunate situations, there were numerous explanations as to why. Interviews surrounding this incident suggest that the MUCIA/WID Project Director needs to take a stronger lead in clarifying the breadth and limits of the TS SOW, lines of communication, expected outputs, and the priority goal of furthering PPC/WID's agenda.

USAID/Guatemala praised the activity of the TS, who made substantial contributions to the Mission WID Workplan and was able to negotiate adeptly a somewhat difficult environment. This same TS also worked in Uruguay. Here, the Mission Director admitted to having no interest in gender issues and to using MUCIA/WID technical assistance, requested by his predecessor, because it was convenient for addressing the needs of a local PVO. Given this environment, there was little chance for the TS to have an impact. According to USAID/Cameroon, the TS, although "hard working and competent," also had little impact on the Mission -- which admitted to giving WID a low priority.

Overall, the MUCIA/WID TS activity can be summed up as opportunities lost. Some of the difficulties could have been avoided with better management on the part of MUCIA/WID. Others might have been circumvented if MUCIA/WID had more field opportunities to choose from and thus more latitude in refusing to work in situations where the potential for success was so low. It became apparent that missions, which were not interested in and/or lacked knowledge of gender issues, tended to use the Consortium TS/TA activities as a low-cost means for fulfilling the requirements of the Agency's WID mandate.

5. Laying the Groundwork for TAs

Interviews, cables, and other communications indicated that TAs were insufficiently prepared for their research activity. USAID/Indonesia reported that the TA required substantially more guidance than was provided -- in the form of a more developed SOW that included key gender-specific research questions to guide data analysis toward issues of import to the Mission and PPC/WID. As already recounted, lack of specificity of the SOW in Guatemala also hampered TA research. However, interviews with the TA and the Mission Director revealed that the greatest constraint to a more timely completion of the research was related to poor timing of the TA research. After delays in identifying an acceptable TA, research was initiated during a time which spanned the Christmas holiday, when many offices were closed. For a full month, the TA was unable to conduct interviews required for the research.

B. THE APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TA ACTIVITY

I. Qualifications of the TAs

Of the three TAs MUCIA/WID fielded, two possessed MAs and one was a PhD candidate; only one had gender expertise. Although one TA had no overseas experience, another, assigned to Uruguay, had lived and worked for years in Latin America. His previous work there with a PVO was valuable in implementing his SOW. The TA to Guatemala, while less familiar with the country

context, was able to contribute needed technical and gender expertise to the research effort. USAID/Indonesia requested a TA with considerable computer and statistical expertise. The TA identified by MUCIA/WID had this technical background but, according to the Mission, had insufficient understanding of development issues.

2. Mission Perceptions of TAs: Professional or Intern

In all instances, missions perceived TAs as interns rather than professionals. In Guatemala, the Mission required that the TA have supervision in-country; a local consultant was hired ostensibly to fulfill this role. In Uruguay, the Mission Director reported that he would have preferred a higher level of expertise. USAID/Indonesia perceived the TA to be hard working and sincere, but lacking substantially in the skills needed to act as a professional in the field.

3. Quality and Appropriateness of TA Research

At the time of the evaluation, MUCIA/WID had only submitted two completed final reports to PPC/WID: one for Indonesia and one for Uruguay. TA activity in Indonesia potentially has important WID demonstration effects. The research examined a much debated topic in the development community concerning the effect of increasing mechanization of agriculture on gender-specific farm and non-farm employment. The research was also part of a much larger Mission-supported research effort undertaken to help guide national policy making. If done well, the research could have provided PPC/WID with valuable evidence for influencing A.I.D. policy and programs and for furthering the economic concerns of Indonesian women. However, because of limited expertise, the TA was unable to draw from the plethora of data powerful arguments that fully capitalized on these opportunities. More methodological guidance from the SOW and more assistance from MUCIA/WID in writing the report could have strengthened the TA research. In the final analysis, however, the TA likely had too little experience to do what was asked of her.

The report submitted to USAID/Uruguay was weak in a number of respects. To begin, it failed to address gender issues. But while the TA can be faulted for a lack of understanding of gender issues related to institutional development, the SOW provided no guidance for addressing gender issues. However, the report also failed to analyze the institutional constraints and strengths of PRODISA in any depth. Despite the TA's experience in working with PVOs in Latin America, the TA activity in Uruguay had limited success due to the lack of guidance and supervision on the part of MUCIA/WID.

Although the report for USAID/Guatemala had not been completed at the time of the evaluation, the Mission reported that TA research was of high quality and appropriate to the needs of the Mission.

4. Impact of TA Activity

The impact of the TA activity in Indonesia was limited for reasons explained above. A second TA activity was not pursued by USAID/Indonesia. There was little potential for impact in Uruguay, given the lack of interest in WID within USAID/Uruguay. Although, the Uruguayan PVO with which the TA worked reported the utility of the technical assistance, the TA expressed uncertainty about the impact of his activities. In Guatemala, the TA activity was part of an information gathering effort on the part of the Mission. Again the TA was not clear about how her research would be used

CHAPTER VII

EFFECTIVENESS OF MUCIA/WID'S FIELD PERFORMANCE

MUCIA/WID's field performance evaluation was based on the same kinds of information as CID/WID's: a review of TS and TA curriculum vitae, a survey of participating missions and host-country institutions, interviews with TSs and TAs, and assessments of SOWs and final reports. The evaluation focuses on the effectiveness of the TS activity and then turns to a similar assessment of TA participants and their research. The division of the evaluation as such and the scarcity of people fielded by MUCIA/WID (three TSs and three TAs) means that assessments of TSs are based on three people; the same is true for TAs. This also means that several unfortunate situations color the overall picture of MUCIA/WID's program.

A. APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF TS ACTIVITY

1. Qualifications of the TS

The three TSs fielded by MUCIA/WID were experienced and high caliber professionals. All had substantial expertise in gender analysis and were well qualified technically in the other areas called for by their assignment. TSs, however, were less well versed in A.I.D. procedures, protocol, and programs as well as the details of PPC/WID's program. To strengthen TSs capabilities in the field, MUCIA/WID needs to provide a more extensive orientation to the concerns, strategies, and project portfolio of a given mission, the procedures, documentation, and project cycle of A.I.D. and goals, objectives and resources of PPC/WID.

2. The Role of the TS: Understandings and Misunderstandings

The central role of the TS, established in the cooperative agreement, was to develop -- in conjunction with Mission staff and host-country counterparts -- SOWs with potential for having powerful WID demonstration effects. Differences in understandings and expectations on the part of missions, PPC/WID, and the TS impeded the successful execution of this central role.

In Indonesia, rather than concentrating on a sector of particular import to the Mission and women, the TS wrote eleven SOWs that addressed the full project portfolio of this very large mission. This strategy resulted in SOWs that were insufficiently developed to be acceptable to PPC/WID. TS involvement in additional technical assistance unrelated to MUCIA/WID only reduced the time available for generating SOWs. TS confusion about the scope and requirements of her assignment caused delays in the approval of TA SOWs and the initiation of the overall MUCIA/WID program. These difficulties might have been avoided or, at least, mitigated by additional TS orientation and/or guidance establishing data requirements for SOWs, the number of SOWs to be developed, and the need for preliminary Mission approval of SOWs prior to leaving the country.

Misunderstandings also arose from differences in expectations on the part of the Mission and PPC/WID concerning use of the TS's time. USAID/Guatemala requested assistance from the MUCIA/WID TS on a range of WID-related activities. PPC/WID expressed concern to the Mission

that the demands being made on the TS's time would interfere with the MUCIA/WID activity. However, in an attempt to be responsive to the Mission, the TS agreed to a larger SOW. These additional activities were done at the expense of the MUCIA/WID program. The TS was left with insufficient time to adequately research and develop SOWs that provided a basis for effective TA research. These experiences as well as those of CID/WID underscore the importance of delimiting more clearly the role of the TS.

3. Appropriateness of Scopes of Work (SOW)

Interviews with missions and MUCIA/WID TAs revealed that well conceived SOWs were key to the effectiveness of the technical assistance activity. In cases where SOWs lacked focus and detail, TAs spent their initial time in the field attempting to clarify what was expected of them. Mission staff too often had to assume the burden of providing TA direction that was the responsibility of the Consortium. In cases where SOWs did not target priority concerns of the mission, the research, despite great efforts on the part of the TA, had little impact. Pressed for time, MUCIA/WID TSs in Indonesia, Guatemala, and Uruguay were unable to fulfill these requirements for "appropriate" SOWs and thus provide sufficient ground for strong WID demonstration effects.

In Guatemala, the TA reported that the SOW was "too vague and unrealistic in terms of what could be and needed to be accomplished." Inadequate definition of the research gave the Mission latitude in adjusting the SOW during the course of the research, causing confusion for the TA and disrupting the focus and progress of the research. This confusion was confounded by the discovery that local organizations had already produced an inventory similar to that called for in the SOW. This forced the TA to spend scarce time redefining the SOW to improve its utility in light of the information already available.

In Uruguay, the SOW did not clarify the gender issues inherent in policy and organizational analysis. As a result, the TA -- who was relatively inexperienced in gender analysis -- was unable to bring a gender perspective to his research. This gap in the SOW and the final product was ignored by the Mission, which admittedly had little understanding or appreciation of WID. Thus the opportunity for implementing WID interventions and demonstrating the utility of gender analysis to the Mission was foregone.

SOWs in Cameroon -- while held up by "misunderstandings" to no fault of the TS -- were well conceived both in terms of their appropriateness to Mission needs and PPC/WID's agenda of demonstrating the utility of gender analysis. In Indonesia, there were substantial delays in getting SOWs approved. However, the one SOW that was accepted, although lacking in specificity, identified an activity that had great potential for WID demonstration effects.

Given the relative inexperience of MUCIA/WID TAs and the tenuous commitment of participating missions to WID, SOWs did not provide the ground required for strong WID demonstration effects. In Guatemala and Uruguay, SOWs defined rather vague information gathering efforts with no clear link to a priority mission activity. The TA in Guatemala stated that "it was not clear what her research would be used for." There is little hope of having an impact in environments where missions are unconvinced of the utility of gender analysis unless SOWs target concerns that have clear relevance to mission development strategies.

CHAPTER VII

EFFECTIVENESS OF MUCIA/WID's FIELD EXPERIENCE

E. BACKSTOPPING OF TA FIELD ACTIVITY

All three missions which MUCIA/WID worked with complained that there was little backstopping of the TAs field activity. As a result, they felt they were forced to assume responsibility for guiding the TA and providing office and administrative support and local transportation. This is not to say that missions should not have assumed some of this day-to-day responsibility, rather that it was not clarified beforehand. As a result, missions were resentful of being shouldered with this burden, one which they felt rightfully belonged to the management office.

It also colored their overall perception of the project. One mission stated they would never ask for this type of assistance again -- it was "too much hassle." In general, missions have little time available to manage teams in the field. It is therefore the responsibility of the service provider to handle the necessary logistical arrangements and to recruit self-sufficient individuals to conduct the specified activities. The cooperative agreement did provide sufficient funds to cover backstopping expenditures. It was also flexible enough to allow a supervisor to be hired when requested by the USAID Guatemala. The Mission's perception of the need for TA supervision, combined with the complaints of other Missions which received services under the cooperative agreement, demonstrates the importance of providing some mechanism for TA field supervision and backstopping in any future Consortia cooperative agreement.

F. CONCLUSIONS

In summary, MUCIA/WID had major problems in managing the technical assistance program of its cooperative agreement. Some blame can be placed on MUCIA/WID's naivete and inexperience in working within the operational environment of AID. However, the umbrella Consortium, MUCIA, has extensive international development experience, and yet no attempt was made to tap into this expertise, particularly when problems in implementation developed. Just as the Executive Board of MUCIA adopted a hands off approach to the management of the project, so too did the MUCIA/WID management office.

The management problems experienced by MUCIA/WID include the following:

- unwillingness of the management office to accept responsibility for making critical decisions,
- insufficiently staffed management office to carry out the tasks required to comply with the objectives of the cooperative agreement,
- insufficient control of critical processes including TS and TA recruitment and selection, communications with USAID missions, etc.
- delegating insufficient responsibility to campus WID coordinators to give them a vested interest in promoting the project,
- inability to cement linkages with other MUCIA University AID projects,

- insufficient publicity of the cooperative agreement on the member campuses to tap the large number of resources available and gain support for the project;
- inability to pre-recruit and otherwise field TAs in a timely manner;
- lack of a systematic and A.I.D.-specific orientation, and instructions, for TSs and TAs;
- insufficient supervision of TAs in the field;
- insufficient monitoring of final reports to ensure their compliance with established guidelines.

There are many lessons to be learned in evaluating MUCIA/WID's management of the cooperative agreement of which a number are similar to those discussed in Chapter III on CID/WID. The following lessons are particular to MUCIA/WID:

- The management office needs to be sufficiently staffed and to exercise control over the administrative and operational functions of project implementation to ensure effective and responsive management.
- The role of PPC/WID in the management of the project should clearly defined, specifically to work initially with missions to clarify research agendas to be addressed by Consortium, and assisting in the dissemination of the research results at the end of the intervention.
- The Consortium needs to establish linkages with and otherwise market the cooperative agreement on member university campuses to expand potential opportunities and ensure qualified candidates are interested in project.
- TSs and TAs need a more systematic orientation to A.I.D. and the requirements of the Consortium program, and monitoring of their activities to ensure compliance established procedures.
- The Consortium needs a centralized WID roster and a wider pre-recruitment process for TAs.
- The role of the TS needs to be expanded to include overall management of the research activity from beginning to submission of final report, and including in-country supervision.

D. TIMING AND RESPONSIVENESS TO MISSION REQUESTS

There are two issues which need to be discussed when assessing the timing of MUCIA/WID's activities under the cooperative agreement. One is concerned with scheduling the travel of TSs and TAs to the field. The TS in Indonesia discovered that during the third week of her mission, most of her contacts were out of office because of a national holiday. No mention had been made of this prior to her departure. This clearly had an impact on the preparation of the SOW. The TS in Guatemala confronted a similar problem, discovering only after arrival that the second week of her mission fell during Easter, when the mission was closed. Again, the SOWs suffered from specificity and clear understanding as to the responsibilities of the each party. Also in the case of Guatemala, because of delays in approval of SOW and identifying an appropriate TA, the TA did not arrive until late October. In view of the fact that many of the agencies being examined were closed or working with a skeleton staff during the Christmas holidays, the TA was unable to conduct the interviews needed for her project for over a month. As a result, the TA was estended trhough February 1990 in order to complete her assignment.

The second timing issue relates to the inherent problems of working within an academic environment. MUCIA/WID felt that the timing of the assistance affected their ability to recruit viable candidates. Not only was the short lead time a factor, but when missions wanted TAs to start work immediately, often during a semester, it was difficult to find qualified candidates. In the case of Uruguay, the SOW was timed to coincide with the US summer vacation period. Although the selected time was acceptable to the host institution, PRODISA, it conflicted with the vacation of the USAID contact for the project. Thus, a potential source of guidance for the TA was not available. A review of cable traffic and correspondence indicates that the MUCIA/WID management office did not inform missions of potential timing constraints.

A detailed time line was prepared for two projects within each consortium and is included in Appendix A. The two projects selected were those for which services had been completed at the time of the evaluation. The purpose of the time line was to evaluate the responsiveness of the management office to requests, as well as to understand better the process the Consortium followed in delivering the requested services. It indicates that from the time the country was confirmed, MUCIA/WID took an average of 6.5 months to field the TS and 11 months to field the TA. The total process took an average of 20 months, from the time the country was confirmed until the TA report was submitted.

	<u>Indonesia</u>	<u>Uruguay</u>	<u>Average</u>
Time to field a TS after country selection	5 mo.	8 mo.	5.3 mo.
Duration of TS Mission	1 mo.	1 wk.	3 wks.
Time to secure approval SOW after TS returned	5 mo.	1 mo.	3 mo.
Time to field TA once SOW approved	1.5 mo.	1 mo.	1.25 mo.
Duration of TA	8 mo.	2.5 mo.	5.25 mo.
Time to submit report upon return of TA	6 mo.	1 wk.	3.1 mo.
<u>TOTAL TIME OF PROCESS (ONE TA)</u>	<u>26.5 mo.</u>	<u>14 mo.</u>	<u>20.25 mo.</u>

The intervention in Cameroon is not included, since a TA was not fielded during the period of this evaluation. The Mission in Cameroon assumed full responsibility for this result, indicating MUCIA/WID had been responsive and persistent in its attempt to move the activity forward. Recent information indicates that MUCIA/WID is attempting to field a three-person team of TAs to Cameroon to undertake one of the SOWs before the end of the cooperative agreement.

The chart confirms the previous conclusion that MUCIA/WID was slow both in fielding the TS and in securing approval of SOWs. The Guatemalan Mission complained about the delay in fielding the TA after the SOW was finally approved. This delay was caused by MUCIA/WID's difficulty in locating TA candidates. The TA selected was found only after a MUCIA/WID contact working on unrelated MUCIA business in the mission intervened.

Overall, MUCIA/WID averaged 10.3 months between the time the request for services was confirmed for MUCIA/WID and the time the first TA was fielded, and 20 months for the whole process. This clearly indicates that any time-sensitive technical assistance required by USAID missions would not be adequately serviced under this cooperative agreement.

In summary, timing and responsiveness was a critical factor for MUCIA/WID's effective delivery of services under the cooperative agreement. Because of delays in getting approval of the SOW and finding and fielding the TAs, missions were often strict in their demand that certain time factors be considered. Insufficient attention was given to potential time conflicts in the country, resulting in incomplete SOWs. One could argue that the missions were responsible for ensuring that in-country time conflicts were avoided. However, it is also the responsibility of the management office to ask such questions and be prepared to respond accordingly.

Indonesia did receive considerable guidance from the Project Director while in the field, primarily through an exchange of letters. The TA in Uruguay had no contact with the Office during his tenure in the field. Therefore, there was no consistent structure or formal mechanism for communication.

In the case of Guatemala, the Mission insisted that a supervisor be obtained to monitor the TA's activity in country. Securing a supervisor delayed the date of implementation by three months. Nevertheless, past experiences indicated the benefits of strong in-country supervision. Sending TAs into the field with no set format for supervision and support only leads to problems, particularly in the case of MUCIA/WID where the majority of the TAs were young and inexperienced, with no previous knowledge of A.I.D.

The TA was required to debrief the mission on their activities and to submit a draft copy of their final report before leaving the country. In Indonesia, this was not done and it took over six months before the report was deemed satisfactory for submission to PPC/WID. Part of the delay was due to the TAs' delay in receiving the necessary data from the team. However, a debriefing should have been conducted. In the case of Uruguay, a debriefing with the mission was conducted at the same time the draft report was submitted. No further comments were received on the report, and it became final. In the case of Guatemala, no debriefing with the mission was held, and there is some question as to whether a draft version of the report was left before the TA departed.

This clearly indicates that although the procedures (orientation, debriefings, selection criteria, application forms, guidelines, etc.) were in place, they were not enforced. The Project Office should have ensured that TAs were properly instructed. Furthermore, if MUCIA/WID had been in better communication with TAs in the field, they could have made the necessary arrangements to correct any problems which were preventing TAs from complying with their tasks, or with any other issue for that matter. On-going communication would have also allowed the Project Director to demonstrate concern and support to the TA who was, by all accounts, on their own.

6. Return of TA and Submission of Report

The cooperative agreement states that within one week of returning to the United States, each TA was responsible for submitting two copies of their draft report to PPC/WID and MUCIA/WID for its review, assessment, and approval. All comments on the TA's final report were due within one month of the report's submission. One month later, eight copies of the report was due at PPC/WID, which would forward the report to the host Mission. These terms were not complied with.

In principle, the report was to contain a copy of the original scope of work, an executive summary, a description of the nature of the technical assistance provided, principle agencies and/or organizations involved, and recommendations to ensure the sustainability of specific gender issues in development planning.

In the case of Indonesia, the TA did not leave behind a draft report nor conduct a briefing with the Mission prior to her departure. The report was prepared and revised upon her return, it took over six months before it was deemed acceptable for submission to PPC/WID. The management office played a major role in finalizing the report.

In the case of Uruguay, a technically sound report was prepared. However, the report contained no mention of gender nor was any gender-related analysis conducted. The report was approved by the mission, which had stated it had no interest in WID other than as a financing mechanism for the assistance provided. However, it was also approved by the management office, which calls into question their understanding of the original goals of the cooperative agreement. The TA should have been requested to add a chapter on gender considerations.

In the case of Guatemala, according to the mission, the TA left before her project was finished, forcing the project supervisor to assume the responsibility for final report preparation. However, in discussions with the TA, she indicated that a draft report was left with the Mission, although a debriefing was not conducted. According to the Mission, the management office did not make any alternative arrangements and in general was not responsive to the concerns raised by the mission when informed the project was behind schedule. At this point, a draft report has been submitted to the management office for its review.

Overall, insufficient time was allocated to final report preparation during the course of the TA intervention. The management office did not sufficiently enforce the requirement that at least a draft report be left with the mission prior to the departure of the TA. This lengthened the time it took to submit the report since the TA was not necessarily free to finish the report upon their return. Incorporating mission comments and revisions, as well as those of the management office and PPC/WID, only added to the delay in final report submission.

In brief, MUCIA/WID was not effective in managing the process outlined in its cooperative agreement, even though the project description provided clear procedures and timetables. Instead, its primary function appears to have been one of channelling information between the PAC and PPC/WID. MUCIA/WID, it would also appear, did not fully grasp the opportunities afforded it by the cooperative agreement, nor attempt to aggressively promote the activity among its campuses, other MUCIA A.I.D. development projects, and with select missions of interest to the consortium.

Furthermore, it appeared that MUCIA/WID did not understand A.I.D. protocol and culture and the requirements of delivering technical assistance rather than pure research. The latter is often done in relative isolation, where the end product is what is important, not the process followed. In the former case, the process is equally if not more important than the end result. However, MUCIA/WID was not even successful in producing viable products under this agreement.

The impression was also given that the cooperative agreement had little influence on MUCIA campuses and within the MUCIA Executive Office. The activity certainly did not get publicized and was not accepted into mainstream development activities on MUCIA campuses. The campus WID coordinators were interested in the TS position, but otherwise exhibited little initiative or interest in implementing the remainder of the program.

This is not to say that MUCIA/WID is not capable of managing viable WID interventions. In Barbados, MUCIA/WID is credited with promoting the incorporation of gender issues into the Caribbean Agriculture Extension (CAEP) project design, producing informative baseline studies, and providing the University of the West Indies with appropriate extension research methodology, communications, and farm management techniques. However, they were not effective in the management of the MUCIA/WID cooperative agreement program.

Furthermore, because the SOWs generally took a long time to be approved, when they were finally cleared by the mission and PPC/WID, the mission wanted someone in-country immediately. This further exacerbated the problem of recruiting and fielding high caliber TAs.

Each applicant was required to fill out an application form, and submit their CV, three professional references, and an eight to ten page paper providing the following:

- A review of country-specific WID literature relevant to the SOW;
- a methodology as to how they would address the specific duties outlined in the SOW;
- personal knowledge, skills and abilities relevant to the qualifications described in the SOW; and
- personal and professional reasons for applying.

On average, TA candidates were given a month to fulfill the application requirements. However, in the case of Indonesia and Uruguay, because of time constraints, applicants were required only to answer the second and third items, and provide their resume and three letters of reference. Although not directly related, both candidates that were fielded in these two countries were latter criticized by the mission for being inexperienced in gender analysis. Part of the blame rests with the SOW which did not clarify the gender issue to be analyzed during the TA intervention. However, part of the blame can also be placed on the application procedure, which, although set up well, was not effective in the end, since the candidate was not asked to demonstrate any type of gender sensitivity or analysis capability.

MUCIA/WID averaged 1.6 candidates for the each of the five TA positions it had fielded at the time of this evaluation. In the case of Uruguay, there was only one applicant, although he had been approached by the TS prior to her departure to the field, and the SOW was designed with him in mind. However, MUCIA/WID was more successful in recruiting TS than TA candidates. Part of the blame rests in the fact that the SOW took so long to be approved. By the time a go-ahead for the recruitment came through, interested candidates had accepted other assignments. However, it is also clear that MUCIA/WID was not conducting any pre-recruiting activities, nor were they familiar with the resources available on each campus, since they did not have a centralized WID roster. In addition, the recruitment of applicants was the responsibility of the campus coordinators who, as previously mentioned, appeared less motivated, particularly in the case of TA candidates. As a result, the management office had few candidates to choose from in making the TA selection.

For each TA selection, the applications were reviewed and ranked by a pre-determined selection committee, consisting of the Project Director, and one to two members of the PAC. PAC members were not allowed to vote on candidates from their own campuses. The main selection criteria for the TAs were:

- educational background;
- work experience;
- superior references;
- extent to which applicants expertise and proposed methodology met the specific needs of the field;

- Recommendation of the respective WID campus coordinator; and
- their facility in the specified language.

Initially, the candidates were interviewed by the Project Director prior to their selection. In the case of Guatemala, however, both candidates were interviewed prior to selection. Once the selection committee had made their decision, and ranked the applicants, this information was forwarded to PPC/WID for its decision. Again, through a telephone call between the PPC/WID and the Project Director, the final decision as to the top candidate was made. PPC/WID was then responsible for forwarding the information officially to the Mission, and requesting clearance. In most cases, the Project Director wrote the mission, providing greater detail on the selected candidate.

The performance review indicated that many of the person applying for TS position were, in fact, better qualified to serve as TAs. However, no effort was made to convert them, or to encourage them to apply when appropriate opportunities were identified. It appeared that once the call went out for TA candidates, MUCIA/WID did nothing until the applications were received.

In summary, it is clear that MUCIA/WID had difficulty in finding appropriate TA candidates. Why? In discussions with the management office and the MUCIA Executive Board, the primary reasons given were timing and the lack of incentive to apply. For one thing, the application was considered somewhat lengthy, requiring time commitment. The fact that the TA was not provided a salary, other than living expenses, differentiated this project from other MUCIA projects, and potentially discredited both the MUCIA/WID Cooperative Agreement and general WID development activities. The lack of a salary also resulted in more graduate students being interested in the project rather than junior faculty. There were no restrictions preventing a salary from being paid by other means, i.e., if they could coordinate the activity with an on-going project, or if the applicant took a leave of absence from their current position. However, it would appear that such an action was not viewed highly by either MUCIA university project directors nor faculty/dean in the various disciplines, since it was not even discussed or encouraged.

5. Technical Assistants In the Field

Prior to the TAs departure, they were brought to the management office for an orientation. In this briefing, attended by the Project Director and i. the case of Indonesia by the TS as well, the TA was provided with a copy of the SOW, guidelines regarding final report preparation, and the names and addresses of key contact persons in the field. Logistical arrangements were discussed, for example the renting of computers. General information on the particular situation within each country was provided. The TA to Indonesia had a one day meeting with staff of PPC/WID, who provided her with information on the WID activities in the mission and further details on the project that the TA was assigned to work with. No other TA, in either Consortium, was briefed by PPC/WID.

A personal service contract was prepared with each TA before their departure. A subordinate agreement with the home university of the TA was also prepared, thereby allowing the transfer of the necessary funds to cover the logistical and related costs of fielding the TA. This procedure appears to have worked well, since most TAs were in the field within one month of their selection.

Once in country, however, the TAs were on their own. Although it was stated in the original proposal that each TA would submit monthly progress reports, it was not enforced. The TA in

indicate any other special requirements.

However, it is clear that not all TS followed this format, nor did the management office verify their compliance. As a result, the SOWs suffered from lack of clarity of purpose, specifics regarding research methodology for the TA and responsibilities for TA support in the field, even conceptualization of the gender issue to be addressed. These omissions resulted in delays in securing PPC/WID and Mission approval of the SOWs, and in the fielding of the TAs.

No instructions were provided as to the number of SOW which were to be developed. Even though the cooperative agreement specified that two TAs would be fielded in each country, the number of SOW's developed ranged from 1 in the case of Uruguay to 11 in the case of Indonesia, although only one was eventually carried out at the request of the mission. A minimum and maximum number of SOW's should be set in order to ensure detailed and workable SOW's are developed.

None of the TSs performed well in determining responsibility for local logistical arrangements for TAs (office space, translation, related support). As a result, the missions were lead to expect that this would be provided, or otherwise taken care of. When this did not occur, the missions felt imposed upon, and resisted assuming responsibility for it. This also created problems for the TAs while they were in country, affecting their performance.

Finally, the management office did not enforce, nor even suggest, that the TSs secure the approval of the draft SOWs before they left the country. It is also interesting that PPC/WID did not insist that the draft SOW be approved prior to the TSs departure. The cooperative agreement had stated that the SOWs would be approved within two weeks of their submission to USAID, MUCIA/WID and PPC/WID. Even this was not complied with. As a result, none of the SOWs were approved before the TS departed from the country and, with the exception of Uruguay, there was a minimum of three months before final clearance of the SOW was secured. The impact of this delay in the approval of the SOW clearly affected MUCIA/WID's ability to field the TAs in a timely fashion.

Overall, the MUCIA/WID's TSs were not properly prepared for their assignments. They were not instructed about the importance of the SOW or sufficiently informed about the cooperative agreement itself. Dr. Barbara Knudson, the TS to Uruguay and Guatemala, commented on this fact in her trip report. She was unable to answer questions regarding the level of financial and personnel assistance that a mission could expect from MUCIA/WID, nor the time frame within which the activity should take place. Given that part of her responsibilities were to determine just that, needless delays in project implementation occurred while these issues were later resolved. There is a clear need for a systematic and in depth orientation for TSs prior to their departure to the field. This orientation should include specific guidelines as the number of SOWs, securing mission concurrence prior to departure, and delineating responsibilities for TA support in country.

According to the original proposal, the TS, upon returning to the US, were required to:

- write a final reports about their trip,
- travel to the Project Office for an intensive debriefing session,

- follow-up, through *correspondence and copies of their final reports, all contacts made,
- send copies of their reports to appropriate units within their own universities, to ensure that personnel in own institution were aware of the resources available to help integrate a WID focus into technical assistance efforts;
- send copies of information disseminated to project director, who distributes to appropriate A.I.D. bureaus, missions, projects, host country organizations, MUCIA, and other US-based consortia.

MUCIA/WID had no established procedure to assure that these requirements were adhered to on a systematic basis; nevertheless, every TS wrote a trip report. The TS to Indonesia did participate in a debriefing session with both PPC/WID and the Project Office, in addition to attending the briefing session for the TA. The TS to Guatemala and Uruguay, on the other hand, only participated in the briefing of the TA to Uruguay, which was conducted at the University of Minnesota because of time constraints. Although a briefing was held with the TA for Guatemala, the TS was unable to attend because of other time commitments. None of the TSs carried out any additional promotional efforts regarding their experience upon their return. This is unfortunate since it would have provided an excellent opportunity to motivate individuals to apply for TA positions.

As discussed in the management evaluation of CID/WID, there is a general problem in the cooperative agreement regarding the role of the TS. It is a one time intervention, with no follow-on activity other than to brief the TA. This is unfortunate, particularly in addressing the problems caused by sending TAs into the field with general SOWs and little backstopping. This will be elaborated on in Chapter X: Conclusions and Recommendations.

4. Advertising for and Selection of the Technical Assistant

The TA recruitment process was initiated as soon as the SOW was officially approved. MUCIA/WID followed the same procedure in recruiting TAs as for TSs. A more extensive publicity activity was outlined in the proposal, including the wide distribution of flyers to development-related and WID units on the MUCIA universities and to MUCIA campus media. Unfortunately, none of this was ever undertaken, although a general brochure on the program was prepared at the beginning of the agreement and disseminated to the PAC. In addition, MSU organized a series of meetings during the TA recruitment process for Indonesia, but to little avail since none of the eventual applicants attended.

In the case of Indonesia, the recruitment process was initiated prior to the approval of the SOWs. This unfortunately created problems later when one of the SOWs was not approved, and the second was changed, altering the level of qualifications for the TA candidate. As a result, the recruitment process had to be re-initiated when the second SOW was reformulated, since none of the original applicants were interested in the new SOW. Probably because of this initial experience, MUCIA/WID was hesitant to advertise the TA position until the SOW was officially approved. As a result, TA candidates had little lead time to prepare their schedules to be available for such assignments, nor were they informed prior to this time about even the possibility of such an opportunity.

process did occur. In the case of Indonesia, the Mission actually made the selection of the TS. In the case of Cameroon, only one candidate was forwarded to the Mission, which subsequently rejected the candidate because of lack of language capability. (It had not been specified as a requirement initially.) In the case of Uruguay, PPC/WID made the selection, and then suggested the same TS carry out the assignment in Guatemala.

The above demonstrates the major role that PPC/WID played in the selection of the TS candidate. This managerial role added to PPC/WID's duties in administering the cooperative agreement. It also calls into question what management functions were being performed by the MUCIA/WID management office.

While the TS selection was underway, the management office was preparing a bibliography on and information packets for the country(s) in question. This information was general versus project specific. In the original proposal, MUCIA/WID outlined an intensive information gathering exercise, whereby the project director would:

- Review all current and proposed A.I.D. projects;
- Develop list of key individuals working in A.I.D. missions and projects, and in host-country organizations such as National Ministries, research centers, universities, and women's bureaus and associations, and
- Correspond with these individuals to introduce them to the program, elicit their support, etc.

This information was to be used to advise the PAC as they initiated their search for TSs and TAs, and to provide background information for candidates submitting application forms. Unfortunately, only a limited information gathering process was carried out, and it appeared that, except for Indonesia, little A.I.D. specific information was gathered.

The original proposal also outlined a "frequent, on going communication" process with key personnel in the country and with US based project staff, primarily to "negotiate and establish terms of responsibility for local transportation, housing, translators, and field assistants". However, as pointed out above, little of this intensive information gathering and communication process took place, at least not on a systematic basis. In general, the information that was gathered was useful, and helped orient the TS and TA, although not towards working with and in an A.I.D. environment.

MUCIA/WID's original proposal also included a promotion program whereby the project director would visit each campus to describe the goals of the program and to answer related questions. The purpose of these sessions was to recruit a corp of applicants for the subsequent TA positions. This would have been an excellent opportunity for informing campus authorities and potential TA candidates about the project, and might have motivated additional individuals to apply for the TA position. Furthermore, it might have increased the level of viability of the MUCIA/WID program on the various campuses, given the little publicity that was, in reality, generated. For no apparent reason, this activity was not carried out, even though funds were included in the budget.

3. Fielding of the Technical Specialist and the Development of the Scope of Work for Technical Assistants

Upon selection, the TSs were instructed by the management office to communicate directly with the Mission to gather necessary information and to arrange their travel schedule. In the meantime, the management office asked the MSU Grant and Contract Office to draw up a personal service contract with the candidate, and, in most cases, a subordinate agreement with the home university of the candidate. The home university would then assume the responsibility for making the necessary logistical arrangements (travel, provide per diem funds, health insurance, etc.), as stipulated in the agreement. The home university would receive indirect costs (overhead) for providing this service, between 21% to 26% of the total. Furthermore, the candidate was to abide by the rules and regulations of the home university, versus that of MSU or MUCIA. This decentralization of the overall responsibility seems to have worked well, and appears to have contributed to ensuring the TS traveled in a timely manner.

In the case of Uruguay and Guatemala, a personal service contract was signed directly with the TS. The management office was therefore responsible for making the logistical arrangements for fielding the TS.

In the original proposal it was suggested that the selected TS travel to the project office for an intensive orientation session prior to their departure. The purpose of this session was to discuss and clarify the logistical and substantive matters relating to the TS work in the field, and the nature of their funding. Information on key individuals in the USAID Mission, host country institutions, etc., was to be provided, and the TSs were to contact these individuals prior to their departure. Again, this was an excellent idea that was never implemented. It would appear that only the TS to Cameroon was provided a briefing, partially explained because she was from MSU. It is not clear why the remaining TSs were not briefed, particularly since funds were included in the budget for this purpose. Timing was not a factor since there was an average of three months between the time the TS was selected and undertook the field assignment. It is apparent that there was a perceived lack of need for such an orientation, although the results indicate the opposite.

Some guidance was provided to the TS before their departure. They were given guidelines for preparing the SOW's, specifying the following:

- Identify the objective of the assignment and the specific duties of the TAs;
- establish linkages with experts/institutions with whom the TAs will be expected to collaborate, (providing names, affiliations, contact addresses, etc.);
- determine the appropriate timing and location (where TA will be based);
- outline the necessary qualifications of the TA (language capability, for example);
- determine the necessary support to be provided by the Mission or other groups (i.e., transportation, housing, office space, office equipment, translators, etc.). If not provided by the Mission or other, than TS should ensure management office is informed accordingly), and

1. Selection of Country to Receive Assistance

The MUCIA/WID's program description outlined a different procedure for country selection than that followed by CID/WID. Specifically, MUCIA/WID and PPC/WID were to select jointly a number of potential target countries, based on such criteria as size of the USAID portfolio, kinds of programs and projects being implemented, ability to replicate the outcome in other countries, and availability of appropriate skills at MUCIA. The cooperative agreement also stated that PPC/WID would cable those countries which they (PPC/WID and MUCIA/WID) had initially agreed upon, soliciting the A.I.D. missions' support for the overall effort. Based on their response, PPC/WID and MUCIA/WID would decide on the final countries to be served.

Analyses of the quarterly reports and discussions with both Consortia and PPC/WID, made clear that a version of the above process was followed. PPC/WID transmitted copies of the initial mission request cables to MUCIA/WID, who forwarded them to the PAC members. A conference call was arranged in which the PAC decided they wanted to work in Cameroon and Kenya (2 of the 5 missions requesting participation). This information was transmitted to PPC/WID. The next series of countries which responded to PPC/WID (first, Indonesia and Mali, later Uruguay) were also handled this way. MUCIA/WID did not suggest TS candidates as the determining factor for country selection, as done by CID/WID. Instead, PPC/WID, based on the PAC decision, determined which countries MUCIA/WID would work in. MUCIA/WID was assigned Indonesia and Cameroon initially (Kenya chose not to participate), and later Uruguay. During the second year of the cooperative agreement, PPC/WID also assigned Guatemala to MUCIA/WID since, by this time, CID/WID already had secured its four countries.

2. Selection of the Technical Specialist

The recruitment process for the TS was not initiated until a second cable was received from the mission, usually in response to a PPC/WID cable requesting clarification on the particular issues and sectors to be addressed by the intervention. In the case of CID/WID, this clarification step had been carried out by the Project Director as part of her information gathering and TS SOW formulation process. MUCIA/WID, on the other hand, deferred this responsibility to PPC/WID, even though they had included this process in their original proposal. This lack of direct contact with the Mission clearly placed the MUCIA/WID management office at a disadvantage in regard to clearly understanding the main issues to be addressed, and establishing early and significant contact with the Mission. It also added to the impression that the management office was not in control.

As will become apparent throughout this management evaluation, MUCIA/WID tended to take a reactive versus pro active stand in the execution of activities under the agreement. The Consortium made PPC/WID the initial point of contact for missions, only communicating directly with USAID mission's after the TS was selected. Even then, the contacts were made by the TS, not the Project Director. When problems in implementation occurred, such as in the case of Cameroon, the MUCIA/WID Project Director waited two months after the country was selected before initiating direct communication, and then only in writing. This lack of direct contact with the Mission impacted negatively the Project Director's ability to supervise the TS and IA activities.

The specific information on the TS activity was forwarded to the PAC by the management office, with the request to start the TS recruitment process. The management office did not maintain a centralized roster of WID qualified people on MUCIA campuses, but instead relied on the campus

coordinators to identify the most appropriate candidates. TS candidates were defined as mature individuals with a strong knowledge of and commitment to gender issues.

The normal procedure followed in TS and TA recruitment included dissemination of flyers announcing the position and indicating that interested persons should contact the campus WID coordinator (usually the PAC member) for the necessary forms and any additional information. Some campus coordinators would send individual letters announcing the opportunity to members on their WID mailing lists; others made announcements in their classes or talked to faculty members and program directors. However, there was no systematic procedure followed by all campus coordinators.

Interested TS candidates were required to submit an up-dated curriculum vitae, 3 professional references, and an 8-10 page work plan, outlining how they would respond to the needs identified by the USAID Mission. This information was forwarded directly to the management office; it did not go through the campus WID coordinator. This process had several faults. Even though the recruitment responsibility was vested in the campus coordinator, the coordinator had no further involvement with the candidate once they provided him/her with the necessary instructions, information and forms. Coordinators were not required to screen the applications to ensure that all the information was provided, nor did they conduct a personal interview to ensure the person had the appropriate sensitivity to gender issues.

The recruitment of strong TS candidates was critical to the success of the TA activity. Yet, the MUCIA WID Project Office had no control over, nor a direct role in the recruitment process. Further, although it had vested the responsibility in the campus WID coordinators, they also were not sufficiently in control of the process, nor did they have a ready pool of applicants identified in advance. This process does not ensure that gender sensitive, sincere professionals are recruited as TS or TA candidates.

Despite these faults, the process appeared effective. On average, nine persons applied for each TS position, indicating a high level of interest in this assignment. Applications were received by the management office usually within one month from the time the initial request was made. The applications were subsequently forwarded to PPC WID for their review and ranking. Independently, the Project Director ranked the candidates, using the following criteria:

- language capability,
- educational background,
- work experience in WID area,
- professional record,
- analytical and writing capabilities,
- superior references, and
- applicability of work plan to identified needs.

Previous AID experience was not a requirement for the TS. **As explained in the Chapter III, this was unfortunate since it would have facilitated the work of the TS, and ensured a greater level of success in producing appropriate SOWs with mission support.**

According to the MUCIA WID Project Director, the TS selection was made jointly with PPC WID, through a pre-arranged telephone call. PPC WID would then forward the information on the top three candidates to the USAID mission for its concurrence. However, variations to this

b. Program Management

The lead university for the cooperative agreement was Michigan State University (MSU), which was responsible for the administrative functions and day-to-day operations of the program. The MUCIAWID management office was established within the Office of Women in International Development, under the direction of the Office of International Studies and Programs (ISP). The MUCIAWID management office was staffed by a one-quarter time Project Director, Dr. Rita S. Gallin, a half-time graduate assistant, and a one-third time secretary. The Project Director was responsible for planning and directing the implementation of all project activities, including communications with A.I.D. staff and host country organizations, overseeing the technical assistance activities, committing project finances, and directing activities of personnel directly involved in the project.

MUCIAWID also felt hampered by the lack of funds to defray travel costs of the Project Director to visit Missions to discuss opportunities with Mission staff. The MUCIAWID initial proposal had included this provision, however, it was not included in the final budget that MUCIAWID submitted which was subsequently approved by the Mission.

The MUCIAWID project management office had the authority to make any decisions necessary for the proper management of the program, in particular the day-to-day operations. However, it appeared that the Office was not comfortable with this authority, and instead choose to consult with either PPC/WID and or the PAC before making decisions. In essence, the management office choose to serve as a conduit of information between the PAC and PPC/WID and, particularly with the PAC, would move forward on a matter only after a consensus had been reached. This avoidance of decision making and deferring of responsibility placed much of the project's actual management responsibility with PPC/WID. This was not the intention of the cooperative agreement.

The Project Advisory Committee (PAC)

A Project Advisory Committee (PAC), as is customary for most MUCIA consortium projects, was established at the beginning of the project. It was composed of ten members representing the eight MUCIA universities (two universities, Iowa and Ohio, had two members). The representatives were appointed by the MUCIAWID unit on each campus. The MUCIAWID Project Director was the chair of the PAC. Because MUCIA took a decentralized approach to the management of the project, the PAC was mandated to serve as a resource for the management and technical personnel directly involved in the project. Under this project, the PAC was given additional responsibilities, as follows:

- consulted on most decisions, whether it was selecting countries, drafting application forms, requesting an extension, modifying the program, etc.
- recruiting candidates for both IS and IA positions, in particular advertising the positions and serving as the point of contact for questions, application forms, additional information, etc.
- when requested, serving on the selection committee for the IAs, and
- providing general on campus back-up support to the program.

Decisions taken by the PAC were based on reaching a consensus. In view that the PAC was consulted on most decisions, it fostered the impression that the Project Director did not have authority. It also gave the impression that the management office was slow in responding to requests.

3. PPC/WID's Management Role

As was the case with CID/WID, PPC/WID retained the authority to select countries which would receive services under the cooperative agreement, and approve all activities undertaken under the project. However, in the case of MUCIA/WID, PPC/WID was given additional managerial functions, from communicating officially with the missions to ranking and participating in the selection of the TS and TA candidates. This was not originally contemplated under the cooperative agreement.

Further, because MUCIA did not have recent project experience with PPC/WID, it would appear that PPC/WID had decided to monitor more closely the activities being carried out under the agreement. As such, they assumed, with little objection on their part, many of the managerial functions that should have been performed by the MUCIA/WID management office, but which that office was equally willing to give up. PPC/WID, therefore, took the lead on communications with the missions, selecting TS and TA candidates, approving SOWs, and even working with missions on field activity support.

One partial explanation for PPC/WID's assumption of this role can be found when reviewing the Cameroon activity. The management office, albeit late, attempted to work with the Mission in defining the TS activity and securing approval of the proposed TS candidates. In spite of repeated inquiries, the Mission was very slow in responding. PPC/WID then became involved. Because this occurred at the initiation of the cooperative agreement, the precedent was set for PPC/WID to actively intervene in the communications flow between MUCIA/WID and the missions.

It can also be said that in view of MUCIA/WID's lack of recent experience with PPC/WID and its lack of familiarity with AID operational procedures, PPC/WID could have played a more supportive role in ensuring that MUCIA/WID would be aware of and able to take full advantage of every project facilitation mechanism available through PPC/WID. For example, no one made an effort to inform MUCIA/WID that matching funds could be used to cover TA salaries or that it could be possible to field three TS-level professionals by assigning two as senior-level TAs, etc. PPC/WID did, however, attempt to support MUCIA/WID's involvement in a project in the Dominican Republic, but to no avail.

It also should be noted that, as in the case of CID/WID, the USAID missions receiving support under the Cooperative Agreement had to concur with the proposed SOWs as well as with the selection of the TS and TAs. The missions also had the responsibility to approve the timing of TS and TA activities in their respective countries. However, responsibility for the primary coordination of the MUCIA/WID project, at least initially, rested with PPC/WID.

C. PROCEDURES/PROCESSES FOLLOWED IN RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

MUCIA/WID followed the process described below in delivering its technical assistance program.

CHAPTER VI

MANAGEMENT EVALUATION OF MUCIA/WID

A. INTRODUCTION

In performing the evaluation of the cooperative agreement with MUCIA/WID, the team conducted a review of MUCIA/WID's project management practices. The project management evaluation focused on MUCIA/WID's:

- Project Organization Structure, Decision-making Process and Authority;
- Country Selection Process;
- TS and TA Recruitment Process;
- Communications and Field Support Activities; and
- Timing and Responsiveness to Mission Requests.

This chapter presents a description of MUCIA/WID's process for performing these functions. Evaluation points associated with this management process are presented both in this chapter and in Chapter VIII which compares the performances of both Consortia.

The management evaluation is also a key part of the overall evaluation of MUCIA/WID's cooperative agreement because their approach to project management had a critical impact on the Consortium's ability to respond in an effective manner to mission and PPC/WID's requests. In the case of MUCIA/WID, the management approach resulted in the slow delivery of services, deferment of decision responsibilities to PPC/WID, impression of a lack of MUCIA/WID project office control, and submission of final reports of limited quality and value to missions and PPC/WID.

Before beginning the analysis, however, it is important to point out that the program descriptions contained in MUCIA/WID's and CID/WID's cooperative agreements were very different. MUCIA/WID's agreement was management and process oriented. It spelled out the tasks that were to be carried out under each phase of the program, specific timetables that all parties to the agreement were to abide by, and even the format of the TA draft report. CID/WID's cooperative agreement did not contain this level of detail, probably in recognition of their previous program with PPC/WID. It is possible that this specificity of process and management structure operationally hampered MUCIA/WID's ability to be flexible and deliver services outside of the stated format. Discussions with the MUCIA/WID management office suggested, in comparison to CID/WID, they were implementing different cooperative agreements, playing by completely different rules.

B. MUCIA/WID'S PROGRAM, ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND AUTHORITY

1. MUCIA/WID's Technical Assistance Program: Women in Development Program in Technical Assistance

The cooperative agreement specified that MUCIA/WID would work in four selected countries, providing project-specific technical assistance to A.I.D.-funded projects and activities. The assistance was to be provided in two phases during the two year term of the agreement. In phase one, entitled Technical Specialist Program, the project director and four other technical specialists (faculty with experience in WID and established professional reputations) would work with key Agency and host-country personnel in identifying needs and providing expertise in functional areas where gender considerations were important. The TSs were to spend approximately one month in the field to do this.

In phase two, entitled Technical Assistance Program, eight technical assistants (faculty and/or advanced graduate students in development related disciplines) would work in collaboration with mission, professional project consultants, and/or host country government officials to ensure the incorporation of gender issues into specific project or program activities. The overall objective was to increase the ability of development specialists to respond to the A.I.D.'s WID mandate in development planning activities. The technical assistants (TAs) were to spend approximately six months in the field in order to do this.

2. Project Organizational Structure and Decision Authorities

The cooperative agreement did not require that MUCIA/WID establish a specific organizational structure for providing the requested services. Instead, MUCIA/WID replicated the structure described in their business proposal, which consisted of the following:

a. The Role of the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities (MUCIA)

MUCIA, through its executive office, retained the primary responsibility for the programmatic, financial and personnel decisions of the program. However, MUCIA delegated most of this responsibility to MSU. The MSU Office of Grants and Contracts was responsible for contracting and approving budgets with other MUCIA-member universities, while the ISP provided programmatic and personnel guidance to MUCIA/WID. Official communications with A.I.D. were transmitted through the MUCIA Executive Office. Otherwise, according to the Executive Director and President of MUCIA, Mr. William L. Flinn, MUCIA maintained a "hands-off" approach to the management of the MUCIA/WID program.

MSU, for the most part, did not interfere in the operation of the management office other than when called for, i.e., in designating a new Project Director when Dr. Gallin took a leave-of-absence. The MUCIA Executive Office did finance a one day meeting of the PAC in Chicago for the purpose of determining ways in which the project could be more responsive and attract more requests for services. However, it did not attend this meeting.

CHAPTER VI
MANAGEMENT EVALUATION OF MUCIA/WID

TABLE V-2

MIDWEST UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANTS

Country	Number of Applicants: TS/TA	Technical Specialist/ Technical Assistant(s), Dates of Participation	MUCIA Member University Affiliation	Degree	Discipline
Cameroon	TS-9	Cheryl Danley (8/88-9/88)	Michigan State Univ.	PhD Candidate	Agricultural Economics
Guatemala	TS-1 TA-2	Barbara Knudson (3/89) Judy Rein (10/89-12/89)	Univ. of Minnesota Univ. of Wisconsin	PhD PhD Candidate	International Dvlpmt Politics and Pol. Econ.
Indonesia	TS-12 TA-2	Kate Cloud (3/88) Denice Gray (9/88-6/89)	Univ. of Illinois Univ. of Wisconsin	Ed.D. MS Candidate	Admin/Public Policy Economics
Uruguay	TS-8 TS-1	Barbara Knudson (5/89) Bruce Moffat (7/89-9/89)	Univ. of Minnesota Univ. of Minnesota	PhD MA Candidate	International Dvlpmt Public Policy Admin.

TABLE V-1

MUCIA's Scopes of Work and Reports

Country/Project	Approved SOWs	Corresponding Reports and Authors	Comments
Cameroon			
Agriculture Policy and Planning	"Improving Statistics and Indicators on the Situation of Women in Agriculture"		team scheduled to leave in April 1990
National Cereal Research and Extension Project	"Gender Roles in Processing and Marketing of Foodcrops"		not implemented
Credit Union Development Proj.	"Assessing Gender Differences in Savings Behavior"		not implemented
Agricultural Education Project	"Curriculum Design in Applied Economic and Post-Harvest Technology"		not implemented
Guatemala			
Strengthening Contacts with Women's Organizations of the Nation-Improving Coordination of Programs for Women in Developmt.	"Survey of Women's Organizations and WID Projects/Activities"	"Survey of Women's Organizations and WID Projects/Activities" - Judy Rein	
Creating a Gender Based Information System Within the Emerging Mission Data Systems	"Improving Statistics and Indicators on Women in Guatemala"		scheduled for March 1990
Gender Review of Projects in Mission Portfolio	"Gender Analysis of Projects in Portfolio of AID/Guatemala"		not implemented
Office of Private Enterprise Development	"Survey of Women Employed in the Micro-Enterprise Sector"		Mission decided not to have this implemented
Office of Rural Development HIGHLANDS Agricultural Dvl/pmt. II	"Investigation of the Consequences of Agricultural Diversification upon Women of Small Farm Household"		Mission decided not to have this implemented

TABLE V-1

MUCIA's Scopes of Work and Reports

Country/Project	Approved SOWs	Corresponding Reports and Authors	Comments
Indonesia			
Indonesia Rapid Rural Appraisal (IRRA)	"Small Scale Irrigation Management Project"		not implemented
Rural Dynamics Capital Mobilization and Agro Industries Study	"Agricultural Planning Study"	"Rural Dynamics, Capital Mobilization and Agro-Industries in South Sulawesi, Java" - Denise Gray	
Uruguay			
PRODISA	"PRODISA"	"Proyecto de Desarrollo Integral Social Articulado (PRODISA) - Bruce Moffat	

hindered MUCIA/WID's ability to field a TA for the second SOW before the termination of the first six-month extension, MUCIA/WID contacted the Mission about implementing the second SOW, "Improving Statistics and Indicators on Women in Guatemala" and the Mission consented. The TA is scheduled to leave in April 1990. One SOW approved by the Mission, "Gender Analysis of Project in Portfolio of AID/Guatemala will not be implemented by the end of the cooperative agreement.

The two SOWs for Indonesia were drafted in March 1988. In November 1988, the Mission decided that its needs were different from those addressed in the first SOW, "Small Scale Irrigation Management Project" and would therefore not be implemented. The second SOW, "Agricultural Planning Study" was, however, successfully implemented.

Table V-2 provides information on the TSs and TAs who have completed work under the cooperative agreement. Under the terms of the cooperative agreement, there were to be four TSs to design SOWs for four countries and two TAs to provide the subsequent technical assistance as presented in the SOWs, to each country (for a total of eight TAs). While TSs were fielded to four countries, three of the four (Guatemala, Indonesia and Uruguay) received only one TA and Cameroon received no TAs.

All of the TSs had their Doctorate in "non-traditional" female areas of discipline, Agricultural Economics, International Development and Administrative/Public Policy. Of the three TAs, two were Master's level candidates and one a PhD Candidate. The two female TAs were in "non-traditional" female areas of discipline, Politics and Political Economics and Economics, and the one male TA in a traditional male area of discipline, Economics.

2. Countries that Responded to the World-wide Cable but Did Not Receive Technical Assistance

The Dominican Republic, Malawi and Paraguay were countries in which activities might have led to the provision of technical assistance, but due to various circumstances, they did not ultimately receive services. Their inclusion here serves to provide a complete picture of MUCIA/WID's activities under the cooperative agreement.

Dominican Republic

The Mission was accepting bids for an agricultural project in July, 1988 and notified PPC/WID that they wanted ICRW to perform the WID component. MUCIA/WID was one of the bidders on the agricultural project. In the interest of the Title XIIs, PPC/WID suggested that the Mission wait until the bid was won to decide who should perform the WID component. PPC/WID then notified MUCIA/WID of the opportunity to provide the technical assistance for the WID component.

MUCIA won the agricultural project. However, the Mission still requested ICRW to perform the WID component. In the words of the Mission's Director of Rural Development, "The Mission wanted to know what it was getting." Apparently, even after the PPC/WID Title XII Project Director alerted MUCIA/WID to the opportunity the consortium was unable to capitalize on it. Consequently, the Mission requested the services of ICRW.

Malawi

On behalf of MUCIA/WID, the Michigan State University Project Coordinator visited the Mission in March 1989. During her visit, the Mission WID Officer requested the assistance of two TSs and that the assistance be provided in mid-April. PPC/WID stated that fielding two TSs without follow-up trips by TAs was not the manner in which the cooperative agreement operated. After the MUCIA/WID Project Director sent the Mission the CVs of two candidates for the TS position, the Mission responded that the cooperative agreement mechanism was not well suited to the Mission's immediate needs.

Paraguay

In July 1988 the LAC Desk Officer contacted PPC/WID expressing Paraguay's interest in receiving technical assistance. Paraguay later decided not to participate in the program, due to reasons unrelated to MUCIA/WID.

D. CONCLUSION

At the time of this evaluation, MUCIA/WID had not fulfilled all of the requirements of the cooperative agreement. The Consortium was able to identify four countries and field four TSs, as specified under the cooperative agreement. However, no country received technical assistance from two TAs. Instead, three countries, Guatemala, Indonesia and Uruguay received only one TA each and Cameroon received none.

MUCIA/WID also demonstrated a lack of assertiveness in the case of the Dominican Republic. The Consortium could have used MUCIA's leverage through winning the agricultural project to promote itself to perform the WID component of the project. However, in failing to do so, MUCIA/WID lost this opportunity, which had been initially created by PPC/WID.

CHAPTER V

HISTORY OF MUCIA/WID ACTIVITIES

A. MUCIA/WID'S RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

The two-year cooperative agreement between MUCIA/WID and PPC/WID was signed on July 7, 1987, in support of the project entitled "Women in Development Program in Technical Assistance." The amount budgeted was \$411,678.00. The cooperative agreement was effective from July 7, 1987 to June 30, 1989. Towards the contract's termination date, MUCIA/WID requested and was granted a six-month no-cost extension until December 1989. MUCIA/WID again requested and was granted a six-month no-cost extension, until June 1990. MUCIA/WID was to submit quarterly performance reports and a final report.

The project's sole activity was to provide technical assistance in accordance with specified instructions outlined in three stages. The terms of the agreement between MUCIA/WID and PPC/WID reflected the desire for a very close relationship between the Consortium and PPC/WID. In addition, the roles of the TSs and TAs were well-detailed, including the requirement that TAs were to be faculty or graduate students of MUCIA member institutions; that MUCIA/WID was to select TAs for the SOWs within four weeks of the SOWs approval; and that fieldwork was to commence within one month of mission approval. (Program Description of Cooperative Agreement, page 3)

B. OVERVIEW OF MUCIA/WID

MUCIA was established as a non-profit educational corporation in 1964 and presently consists of eight member Universities: Michigan State University, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Indiana University, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Ohio State University, Purdue University and the University of Wisconsin. This consortium is the oldest and most experienced of the several university consortia involved in international development and education.

MUCIA's interest and commitment to women in development issues and activities dates back to the late 1970's with the formation of the first Women in Development Network among American universities (MUCIA/WID). MUCIA/WID's activities have included research supported by MUCIA; development of a conference on women's economic roles; production of a newsletter; and the networking and strengthening of campus WID activities. Each MUCIA campus has an identified WID contact and on-going WID-related activities. A notable example is MSU's development of a specialty in WID Project Advisement and a series of WID Working Papers. The working paper series now has up to 200 research papers addressing various gender issues. MUCIA/WID's network structure was such that each member University could be active in the selection of its students and faculty for participation in the cooperative agreement with PPC/WID.

Michigan State University (MSU) served as the lead institution for this cooperative agreement with A.I.D. MSU's qualifications for this position stem from its well-developed international focus which has included assisting and cooperating with education, development and research institutions

in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. In addition, MSU's faculty has designed, implemented and evaluated diverse development projects throughout the world.

A project director for the PPC/WID cooperative agreement was appointed from MSU. The project director was permitted to dedicate up to 25% of her time to the PPC/WID project. This position was initially occupied by Dr. Rita Gallin. Dr. Gallin had been the Director of MSU's office of Women in International Development since 1983 with a PhD in Sociology from MSU. In August 1989, Dr. Gallin took a leave of absence from the University to perform a gender related project in China. The current project director is Dr. Ann Millard, a medical anthropologist with research and international consultancy experience, including issues of women and the development process.

MUCIA's highest officials, its Board of Directors and member University Presidents are also committed to the Consortium's activities. "The Board reviews MUCIA projects and formulates programs at its monthly meetings and twice annually with the Council of Presidents to establish MUCIA future directions and goals. At critical junctures in the life of MUCIA projects, Board members, presidents and regents engage in site visits and aid in project evaluation." However, in the words of its Chairman, the Board kept a "hands off approach vis-a-vis the MUCIA/WID cooperative agreement."

C. DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES BY COUNTRY

1. Countries that Received and Will Be Receiving Technical Assistance

Table V-1 illustrates MUCIA/WID's activities under the cooperative agreement, highlighting the scopes of work and their corresponding technical assistance reports. Table V-2 provides information on each country's TS and TAs with regard to their University affiliations, degrees and areas of discipline.

As of this evaluation, only three of the twelve SOWs had been implemented. (See Table V-1) Of these, the reports for Guatemala and Indonesia addressed women's roles directly, whereas the report for Uruguay did not. Uruguay's report addressed gender issues only insofar as women were the direct beneficiaries of PRODISA, the Uruguayan project to which the report was related.

There are varying reasons that some of the SOWs were not implemented and these deserve mention here.

In Cameroon, the Mission responded in an untimely fashion throughout the cooperative agreement even though it had indicated interest in receiving technical assistance as early as August 1987. The TS was able to draft four SOWs in August and September of 1988, but the Mission's chronic unresponsiveness ultimately eliminated the possibility of having any SOWs implemented even with a six-month extension through December 1989. However, in March 1990, the Mission accepted MUCIA/WID's proposal to carry out the first SOW and the team, to consist of three TAs, is scheduled to leave in April 1990.

In Guatemala, the TS prepared five SOWs in March 1989. In April, the Mission requested that only the first three be implemented in sequential order. The Mission withheld approval of the first SOW until August 1990 due to their need to resolve several logistical and technical issues, including TA supervision. The local TA supervisor and TA were selected in October. These delays

CHAPTER V
HISTORY OF MUCIA/WID ACTIVITIES

to without mention of gender or intra-household differentiations. Production constraints are analyzed without mention of gender-related constraints; and where gender-disaggregated data is provided, de facto female headed households are classified as male headed. Thus, this report was a rather poor demonstration of the utility of gender analysis, despite having an important impact on the design of a new project that benefitted women.

Another research activity in Lesotho examined the effect of increased vegetable production, as a result of the LAPIS project, on nutrition. Although this analysis, like the previous lacked background information on the extent to which women were involved in production, the categorization of household composition and the correlation made between household composition and nutrition contributed to the WID knowledge base. Research revealed the diversity of intra-household relationships and the importance of distinguishing among different types of households to understanding nutritional effects of increased production.

The report on the "effects of newly introduced technology on women agriculturalists in Lesotho," written by a senior level TA, was an excellent demonstration of gender analysis. It revealed the constraints and opportunities experienced by women using newly introduced technologies and the contributions that gender analysis can make to improving project designs and achievement of objectives. It was the best case example of what the Consortia cooperative agreement can achieve: it contributed to the WID knowledge base, had some impact on a Mission project, and was important to convincing mission staff of the utility of gender analysis.

CID/WID conducted two studies in Mali; the first consisted of a cost-benefit analysis of a range of women's enterprises and the viability of extending credit to women entrepreneurs. The second report focused on the potential for extending credit through women's social organizations, and provided valuable information on women's borrowing, lending, and savings activities. Although the second report was better written and organized, the economic analysis provided by the first study provided the hard evidence needed to justify a new project to extend credit to women in the OHV Zone of Mali. Given that the TAs who conducted this research were Master's Candidates, the quality and impact of the TA activity was indeed impressive.

TA activities in Kenya and Nepal consisted of institutional development efforts, nevertheless, both involved research. Studies in Kenya aimed at understanding women's low participation rates in agricultural diploma and degree programs and identifying tools for promoting women's agricultural education. This activity produced a range of training materials and a professionally written report, revealing why so few women specialized in agricultural majors and making recommendations for mitigating constraints faced by women. The TA in Nepal developed materials for training faculty, students, and professionals in gender analysis. In addition, she designed and implemented a farming systems study that incorporated key gender issues. The quality of the research, conducted by this senior-level TA, was excellent; it demonstrated the utility of gender analysis and expanded the country-specific WID knowledge.

Missions, Egerton University, and the IAAS all noted the quality of CID/WID TA activities. Nevertheless, as evidenced above, several reports were weak in gender analysis. At least one, while competent in other technical areas, was so weak in addressing gender issues that it should not have been submitted to the Mission without revisions. CID/WID needs to monitor final reports more carefully to ensure that gender issues are properly addressed.

4. Impact of the TA Activity

The CID/WID TA activity had substantial impact on missions, A.I.D.-funded projects, and host-country institutions. In Lesotho, TA research on women's non-traditional income generating activities has been used to develop a "Women in Business Trainers' Manual" and other materials for business training for women. The report on sorghum production and "food consumption and its relation to production" provided valuable input to a sorghum marketing dehuller feasibility study undertaken by the Agricultural Research Division (ARD). The Mission Director reported that, together, TA activities contributed to the formulation of the Mission WID strategy.

TA activity in Kenya and Nepal was successful in initiating gender awareness at agricultural institutes. Institutionalizing gender issues at this level is critical to future WID interventions in the agricultural sector where women play such a major role. TA research in Kenya, in light of the important role Kenyan women play in agriculture, was meant to address the need for and lack of female extension agents to assist female farmers. CID/WID activity in Kenya represented a successful beginning of an effort that is by nature long-term. In Nepal, a second visit by the TA revealed the impact of previous TA activity and indicated a successful start of the WID institutionalization effort. USAID/Mali staff reported that both TA activities have been a basis for a newly designed credit project; CID/WID research was "instrumental in justifying to the banks and the Government that women had viable economic opportunities."

However, the impact of CID/WID research would have been greater, according to a number of missions, with expanded dissemination of final reports. Dissemination of findings in a form that a wide audience in the missions and A.I.D./Washington can easily use is critical to expanding CID/WID impact.

C. OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF CID/WID FIELD ACTIVITY

Given the difficulty of conducting technical assistance through a university structure and with relatively inexperienced TAs, CID/WID deserves praise for a difficult job well done. They completed four field activities, all of which had very positive impacts. Every mission reported that they would be interested in working with CID/WID again, and all hoped that this kind of service would continue to be offered.

CID/WID research proved to be a useful and powerful mechanism for demonstrating the importance of gender as a development issue. A USAID WID Officer asserted that "not until people see for themselves and are convinced by facts" will WID be institutionalized within A.I.D. The success of CID/WID's demonstrations are evidenced by the use of the research in follow-on activities in Lesotho and Mali. While these results are impressive, CID/WID's presentation to the evaluation team of a compilation of their findings revealed the wealth of knowledge produced by CID/WID. Much of this, however, has not been shared with PPC/WID or the development community at-large. Greater dissemination of findings in a form that a larger audience can appreciate is needed to demonstrate the effectiveness of CID/WID's technical assistance.

allotted. In Nepal, the IAAS WID task force organized by the CID/WID TS added considerable detail to original SOWs. Again this greatly facilitated TA research.

While SOWs need to provide both guidance and flexibility, given the changes that often occur between the time when SOWs are drafted and the time when TAs arrive to begin research, interviews with TAs overwhelmingly underscored the benefit of specificity in SOWs of research purpose, methodology, and implementation plan.

4. Impact of TS Activity on Mission

Overall CID/WID's TS activity was well received by missions. Although the initial TS in Mali was viewed by the Mission as too inexperienced to be effective, CID/WID's decision to send in a second, more experienced TS preserved the integrity of the program. In Nepal, the TS was instrumental in designing and facilitating a "Women In Farming" seminar. According to USAID/Nepal, this seminar demonstrated to some key Mission staff the importance of women's roles in development. USAID/Lesotho cabled PPC/WID, praising the effectiveness and professionalism of the CID/WID TS. The Mission Director reported that the focus of the TS's work on sorghum highlighted an area of importance that the Mission would never have considered. The agricultural institutes with which TSs worked in Kenya and Nepal recounted the catalytic role TSs played in raising gender awareness. In Kenya, the TS's previous work at Egerton University provided an entry for CID/WID activity and initiated efforts to promote the greater participation of women in agricultural training and degree programs.

5. Laying the Groundwork for TAs

An important role of the TS was laying the groundwork for relatively inexperienced TAs. Mission interviews indicated that TA activities were hampered most often by lack of supervision, insufficiently detailed SOWs, and inadequate logistical support. Supervision of TAs is not an explicit part of the design of the cooperative agreement, but was nevertheless envisioned as the responsibility of the TS. Repeated complaints of TA reliance on mission guidance makes clear that current TA support is insufficient. More detailed SOWs would provide some of the additional guidance needed. However, missions requested that TSs play more of a role in supervising TAs through additional field visits during the course of the research. An additional alternative was suggested by the Devres evaluation of previous Consortia cooperative agreements. Devres recommended that a host-country counterpart be identified to work with the TA, to provide needed orientation to the host-country and valuable knowledge of local conditions. The host-country counterpart could, in turn, benefit from TA technical expertise. The involvement of host-country personnel in CID/WID research in Nepal and Kenya illustrated the mutual benefits of such an arrangement. Moreover, local WID capacity building leaves a vested interest in issues generated by CID/WID research after the departure of the TA.

Confusion over responsibility for logistical support arose repeatedly. Interviews with missions, TSs, TAs, and PPC/WID revealed a multitude of perceptions of this issue. According to PPC/WID, the Consortium was responsible for all logistics. This was not always clear to TAs, who in several instances turned to the mission for support. The CID/WID Project Director made extensive efforts to conserve resources; this too may have contributed to the confusion. Nevertheless, what is clear is that all parties need to be informed of logistical responsibilities; and CID/WID needs to ensure that logistical support for TAs is adequate. A CID/WID TS suggested that the identification of a high

level mission contact responsible for providing continuous oversight of the activity might reduce confusion. In these cases, TAs have little recourse or support when problems arise. Giving responsibility for the project to a person such as the Deputy Mission Director would ensure support for the activity and enhance mission ownership.

B. THE APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TA ACTIVITY

1. Qualifications of TAs

Over the two year period of the cooperative agreement, CID/WID secured field activities for ten TAs. Although TAs are meant to be either graduate students or junior level faculty, half of CID/WID's TAs were more experienced professionals. CID/WID TAs included a university dean, two professors (one with tenure), three Ph.d candidates, one ABD, two Master degrees, and two Master degree candidates, who were former Peace Corps volunteers in the countries to which they were assigned. Only one TA had no overseas experience. The TAs in Nepal spoke Nepalese; the TAs in Mali were fluent in both French and Bambara; and one of the TAs in Kenya spoke Bantu. Both TA's to Nepal and one in Lesotho were paid professional consulting fees with a combination of USAID and PPC/WID funds; in other instances, universities paid TAs salaries. One TA in Lesotho was given a stipend to cover the cost of housing. About half of the TAs received no payment for their technical assistance beyond per diem and travel.

CID/WID was able to identify quality candidates by means of a rigorous application process. This application required a lengthy analysis of gender issues relevant to the country for which candidates were applying and provided a demonstration of analytical and writing skills. In addition, candidates had to provide evidence of language abilities, overseas experience, and technical expertise. The rigor of the application process weeded out those not seriously interested in the assignment and without sufficient technical and gender expertise. The quality of research produced by even the least qualified TAs demonstrates the efficacy of these applications.

2. Mission Perceptions of TAs: Professional or Intern

Mission interviews indicated that out of ten TAs only two were viewed as interns rather than professionals. The two exceptions appeared to be related to TAs' requests for Mission assistance. In one case, the Mission felt that the view of the TA as an "intern" could have been mitigated if the SOW had provided the relatively inexperienced researcher with more methodological guidance. In the other case, the Mission reported that the TA needed more supervision or backstopping from CID/WID.

3. Quality and Appropriateness of TA Research

At the time of the evaluation, four TA reports had been completed for USAID/Lesotho, two for USAID/Mali, one for Egerton University in Kenya, and one for the Institute for Agriculture and Animal Sciences (IAAS) in Nepal. One of the studies in Lesotho examined the reasons for the decline in the production and use of sorghum in the rural areas and the probability that an improved processing method (a sorghum dehuller) would lead to increased consumption. While this report provided the necessary technical information for a follow-on activity to introduce a sorghum dehuller, it was weak in highlighting critical gender issues. Repeatedly, households and farmers are referred

CHAPTER IV

EFFECTIVENESS OF CID/WID'S FIELD PERFORMANCE

The major question addressed by CID/WID's field performance evaluation involved the competence and effectiveness of TSs and TAs as demonstrated by their work, that is SOWs and final reports, and their impact on USAID missions. But while quality research was certainly an important aspect of the CID/WID program, even more important for PPC/WID was the effect of the activity on USAID strategies, programs, and/or projects. PPC/WID expected, either implicitly or explicitly, that CID/WID would act as an agent of change, furthering the agenda of PPC/WID overseas. Consequently, TSs and TAs are not evaluated solely on the basis of their outputs, but also on the extent to which their activities furthered WID institutionalization. The evidence presented in this chapter is based on a review of TS and TA curriculum vitae, a telephone survey of participating missions and institutions, interviews with TSs and TAs, as well as a review of final reports.

A. APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF TS ACTIVITY

1. Qualifications of the TS

CID/WID fielded four TSs in five countries; one TS went to two countries and the Project Director, at little or no cost to the cooperative agreement, completed the unfinished TS activity in Mali. All TSs had substantial expertise in gender issues, and all but one had sufficient and appropriate technical expertise for their assignments. With some exception, however, TSs did not have an abundance of experience working as professionals in the field or within the A.I.D. environment. For those TSs (half) who worked with host-country educational institutions, this inexperience did not pose a problem. Of the TSs that worked closely with the missions, one, while very knowledgeable about the host-country, was unable to overcome the handicaps posed by her lack of professional experience, her lack of understanding of A.I.D., and her youth. To ensure the credibility of CID/WID, TSs -- who are expected to play the role of "specialists" -- should be able to convey to missions professional expertise.

As one mission officer noted, unless TSs understand how A.I.D. operates, who the different players are, and how to get things done, it is difficult to write SOWs that effectively address Mission needs within a few weeks time. While some inexperienced TSs may be perfectly capable of negotiating a USAID environment, A.I.D. experience -- for those TSs working directly with missions -- clearly strengthens their chances of a successful assignment. CID/WID can play a stronger role in preparing TSs, who lack A.I.D. experience but are otherwise well qualified for an assignment. CID/WID orientations for TSs should include a review of A.I.D. systems, procedures, project cycle, and budgeting mechanisms -- as well as familiarity with mission CDSSs and project portfolios.

2. The Role of the TS: Understandings and Misunderstandings

The role of the TS, according to the original design of the cooperative agreement, was to write SOWs for long-term technical assistance, based on a review of the mission's project portfolio or a specific request from a mission or host-country institution. In a number of instances, however,

missions made additional demands on TSs for technical assistance unrelated to CID/WID. Too often these demands were met at the expense of quality SOWs. In Mali, for example, TS efforts devoted to the Mission CDSS left insufficient time to develop SOWs acceptable to the mission; a second TS was needed to refine these SOWs to Mission satisfaction.

CID/WID's experience in Mali (repeated by MUCIA/WID in other countries) raises the question of the proper role of TSs. Should TSs respond to mission demands for program assistance? Is this the best role for TSs who have had little or no previous A.I.D. experience? Are mission needs for program-related WID assistance better met by other entities experienced in providing this type of assistance? (This issue will be discussed further in Chapter IX.)

The experiences of CID/WID TSs suggest the need for greater definition of the TS role in order to preserve the quality of Consortia technical assistance. If in order to be most responsive to mission needs and to capitalize on the presence of a TS in a given country, PPC/WID decides that TSs can provide a broader range of assistance, then measures need to be taken to ensure that the CID/WID activity is not sacrificed. To ensure that TSs have sufficient time to develop and refine TA SOWs, PPC/WID might follow the model used in Nepal. PPC/WID suggested that if USAID/Nepal had additional funds, the TS was available for the larger scope of activities requested. This arrangement preserved the integrity of the CID/WID activity by separating the TS activity from other forms of technical assistance, and adjusting time and funding requirements accordingly.

The missions suggested other modifications to the TS role. They requested that TSs be allocated additional time to play a significantly more expanded role supervising TA research, essentially managing the research from beginning to end. Beyond writing SOWs, TSs would oversee the development and articulation of the research design, visit the field twice after the arrival of the TA -- in order to ensure the research is on track and to participate in the debriefing to the mission -- and have greater input into the final report, making it a professional product. This expanded role would require that TSs have more time in-country to lay sufficient groundwork for the TA work as well as more time in the USA overseeing the production of the report.

3. Appropriateness of Scopes of Work (SOWs)

CID/WID SOWs represented well conceived activities with potential for having an impact on mission views of gender as a serious development issue. Despite the acknowledged impact of CID/WID technical assistance, some missions reported that SOWs were overly broad and complex, given the "minimal budgets and tenuous arrangements for supervision and support." Although these comments grew out of misunderstandings concerning responsibility for logistical support, they do point to a weakness in all Consortia SOWs. In Lesotho, for example, SOWs identified activities with powerful WID demonstration effects that could have been effectively implemented by professional consultants. However, they lacked sufficient guidance for relatively inexperienced TAs. Discussions with a CID/WID TS suggested a more expanded role for TSs, that included, after the approval of SOWs, the development of a "work plan" in which a clear set of hypotheses and research questions, methodological guidance, and a plan for implementing the research activity were detailed.

The benefits of detailed SOWs were demonstrated in CID/WID's activity in Kenya, where in order to obtain a research permit, the SOWs had to include a statement of purpose, plan of implementation and a finalized questionnaire. This detail provided TAs with a clear direction for their research and allowed timely completion of the TA activity with the short amount of time

CHAPTER IV

EFFECTIVENESS OF CID/WID's FIELD PERFORMANCE

Since the TA position was advertised as a research position, not as a technical/consultant position, TA selection was based on their capability to conduct research, not ability to respond to the politics and intricacies of working within an A.I.D. environment. This put the TA in a disadvantaged position, which could have been mitigated if a supervisor had been built into the project and a more systematic orientation procedure had been in place before the TA left for the field.

F. CONCLUSIONS

In summary, CID/WID effectively managed their technical assistance program under the cooperative agreement, providing sound research studies that demonstrated the importance of gender considerations in development activities. CID/WID did suffer some management problems, however, several of which were related to the structure of the cooperative agreement. The problems included:

- Lack of sufficient supervision of TAs in the field,
- lack of a systematic and A.I.D. specific orientation for TSs and TAs;
- the perception of TAs as "interns" rather than professionals; and
- insufficient publicity for the cooperative agreement and dissemination of the research results.

The key lessons learned can be briefly summarized as follows:

- The need to expand the role of the TS to include overall management of the research activity from beginning to submission of final report, and including in-country supervision
- The need for a more systematic orientation to TSs and TAs on A.I.D. and the requirements of the Consortium program.
- The need for wider publicity of the cooperative agreement and wider dissemination of its results
- The effectiveness of a WID roster and pre-recruitment process for TAs
- The value of higher level support, as demonstrated by the CID Executive Board, for generating expanded field opportunities, and gaining support of member university faculty and deans
- The critical value of centralizing decision-making within the management office in order to provide timely and responsive technical assistance
- The value of rigorous applications which demand gender expertise.

	<u>Mali</u>	<u>Nepal</u>	<u>Average</u>
Time to field a TS after country selection	3 mo.	2 mo.	2 mo.
Duration of TS Mission	1 mo.	1 mo.	1 mo.
Time to secure approval SOW after TS returned	2 mo.	2 wks.	1.25 mo.
Time to field TA once SOW approved	3 mo.	3 mo.	3 mo.
Duration of TA	6 mo.	5 mo.	5.5 mo.
Time to submit report upon return of TA	6 mo.	3 mo.	4.5 mo.
TOTAL TIME OF PROCESS (One TA)	21 mo.	14.5 mo.	18 mo.

The missions did complain that CID/WID was slow in submitting the final reports of TAs and disseminating the results to a wider audience. Otherwise, CID/WID did not receive any complaints from missions regarding timing and responsiveness. Rather, they were praised for their ability to be flexible and responsive to most problems when they arose, in a timely manner.

In summary, even though timing was not a direct problem for CID/WID, it is also true that few, if any, of the activities undertaken were time sensitive. Working with Title XII University Consortia inherently dictates working with constraints imposed by academic scheduling. Problems do arise if quick turn around is required. Consortia are set up to more effectively provide longer-term research than short-term technical assistance. However, this comparative advantage is not addressed in the cooperative agreement. It is recommended that future cooperative agreements with Title XII University Consortia bear this in mind.

E. BACKSTOPPING OF THE TA FIELD ACTIVITY

Backstopping was the only other area where CID/WID was criticized by the missions, though not always justifiably. In the case of Lesotho, although the TS had signed a memorandum of understanding specifying who was to provide what, confusion arose when mission and project staff turnover. The problem centered on responsibility for local transportation. The CID/WID Project Director, by working closely with the country Project Director, was able to resolve this matter in an expeditious manner. The activity in Kenya went very smoothly because Egerton University took the lead in clarifying who would be responsible for what, and communicated this to the TAs as they arrived. Clearly, the management office needs to pay greater attention to local logistical

arrangements, and determining who is responsible. If the support is not provided by the mission, host-country project or institution, than the project must assume the responsibility.

Several Missions also objected to sending TAs into the field with nothing but a SOW to guide them. In CID/WID's case, it was less of a problem since many TAs were older, experienced, and capable of working on their own. Several TAs were attached to on-going projects (Lesotho) or host-country institution (Kenya and Nepal), providing at least a framework for backstopping and related support. However, when the TAs were less experienced and/or not attached to a project or host-country institution (Mali), they required greater supervision and support. They tended to turn to the mission for this support, which was not prepared to provide it, and resented the added responsibility.

Some of the TAs felt that the CID/WID management office was not responsive to their needs while in the field. Particularly in view of the distances and problems of communications, this is not surprising. However, it does present an issue which the current structure of the cooperative agreement does not address, that is the need for TA supervision.

The structure of the cooperative agreement does not provide for any on-the-ground monitoring of the TA activity. The most logical person to do this is the TS. However, their role was limited to that of preparing SOWs and determining responsibilities for logistical and administrative support. Research, which by default if not by design was the responsibility of the TA, is by definition a constantly changing and fluid activity. Yet, no mechanism was in place to handle this problem, forcing the TA to fend for themselves once they were in the field. Furthermore, there was no mechanism whereby the TS could ensure that the SOW was being implemented as originally designed.

The rationale given for this restricted TS role was financial. The CID/WID Project Director or Mission staff was forced to assume this role of supervisor. For the Project Director, this was difficult since she were not privy to the deliberations and rationale behind the formulation of the SOW. It placed undue pressure on the management office to resolve problems from a distance, compounded by distance and communication constraints. The primary function of the management office was administration of and overall supervision of the TA activity, not on-the-ground monitoring and overseeing. If this was to be the function of the management office, funds should have been built into the budget to allow the Project Director to travel to the country during the time the TA activity was underway. In addition, mission staff are very busy with their own day-to-day activities, and rarely get directly involved in on-the-ground management of technical assistance activities. It was therefore unreasonable to assume that either the Project Director or mission staff could assume the role of TA supervisor.

Supervision became critical when Mission personnel changed during the course of the TA activity, as happened in Lesotho. The new Mission personnel had different interpretations concerning how the TA should implement her SOW. This put the TA in a difficult position, with little recourse or back-up support. The issue was complicated by the mission's perception of the TA -- as either a professional or a university student conducting research. If the TA was non-salaried, the latter perception tended to rule, placing the TA in a situation where she or he really had no other option than to comply with the Mission request. By having in place a supervisor or at least a research director, the TA would have had some recourse when problems or disagreements arose.

Arizona. The project office was responsible for making travel and logistical arrangements, although each individual was given the option of doing it themselves. In those instances when the TA was paid a salary, this was handled directly by the individual and the entity providing the salary. The management office did prepare the terms of reference and budget calculations.

While in the field, the TAs were required to submit monthly progress reports to the CID/WID management office. They were required to leave a draft version of their report, and conduct a seminar on their findings for the mission and host country interested persons before departing from the country. Other than reviewing the progress reports, little continuous support was provided to the TAs while they were in the field. This lack of support will be discussed in detail in Section F of this chapter.

In several instances, more than one TA was in the field at the same time in the same country. Where possible, an attempt to overlap TAs in the field was made. However, when TAs working in the same country did not overlap in the field, there was reportedly little attempt to arrange meetings with the returned TA prior to the second TAs departure. In the case of Nepal, the second TA only received a copy of the first TAs report after some insistence on the first TAs part. This was unfortunate, particularly since returning TAs would have valuable insights to help orient out-going ones. In general, greater attention to TA orientation and coordination need to be incorporated in program management.

6. Return of TA and Submission of Report

Upon the return of the TA, a formal debriefing took place, often at the management office. At this point, issues regarding final report preparation, translation, and time table for completion were discussed. In some cases, the campus coordinators were asked to assist in putting the TA report in final form and, if necessary, funds were provided for this purpose. In the meantime, the CID/WID Project Director was responsible for gathering any comments the Mission might have on the final report. She was also responsible for requesting an evaluation of the TA activity from the Mission.

It would appear, in discussions with the missions, that CID/WID was very successful in fielding the TSs and TAs in a timely manner; however they were slow in getting the final reports back to the mission, and for providing sufficient copies of the report once it was approved. One explanation given for this slow turn around was that the TAs, upon their return, were often required to resume other duties. This made it difficult for some TAs to make major revisions and corrections in a timely manner. Furthermore, since several of the TAs were not paid, their motivation for revising their reports was not necessarily great, particularly since it took them away from other income-earning activities. Even professional consultants will attest to the difficulty of writing reports once they return to their home office. Some consideration of including time in the TA activity for final report revision and preparation in country, prior to the TAs departure from the country, should be made.

TAs were supposed to make a presentation on their experience and research findings to their own campuses upon their return. This was part of the publicity program outlined in the original proposal. Although some TAs did comply with this, it was not enforced. This activity could have facilitated greater dissemination of the project's results, as well as promote the CID/WID cooperative agreement. It would also help institutionalize gender within the university campuses. It is recommended that this activity be included in any subsequent cooperative agreement program.

D. TIMING AND RESPONSIVENESS TO MISSION REQUESTS

It would not appear that the timing of the WID intervention was a factor in the delivery of the TS and TA activity. One would presume that university schedules would preclude senior and junior faculty members as well as graduate students from traveling or arranging their schedules to be overseas for three to nine months at short notice. However, this did not happen. In general, TS candidates required approximately one month to arrange their schedules to undertake the assignment; some indicated it took less time. The fact that other faculty members at the TS's university were willing to cover the TS's teaching requirements during their overseas activities also served to reduce timing problems. In the case of TAs, because CID/WID was recruiting ahead of time, most only needed approximately six weeks from notification of acceptance before they were ready to leave the country. This timing schedule appears to have been acceptable to missions and PPC/WID.

Timing did become an issue when one mission changed or cancelled a schedule to which it had already committed. In the case of Nepal, both TAs were delayed, the first because of slow country clearance, the second because of political unrest. Although both TAs were able to work with their universities to accommodate the delay, it did place CID/WID and/or the campus coordinators in a difficult position. Once a TS or TA is committed to an activity, they make the necessary arrangements to be released from their responsibilities. When a delay occurs, they are left without a job and possibly pay. When a salary is concerned, CID/WID was placed in a position where they might have been forced to cover the pertinent costs. Fortunately, the University system was flexible enough to accommodate the delay. However, the potential problem still exists and is not adequately addressed by the cooperative agreement.

In the case of the TA activity in Kenya, the TA was only available for a set period of time because of her academic responsibilities (fall teaching schedule). When country clearance was slow in coming, the A.I.D. mission assumed the responsibility of bringing the TA in without clearance, cognizant of the timing problem. However, as reflected in the cable traffic, CID/WID clearly made this timing issue known to the mission even before the TAs were selected. This advance notification clearly prevented any misunderstandings on the part of the Mission as to timing constraints.

In regard to TA fielding, the short lead-time was a problem for CID/WID. They did work around it by initiating the recruitment process while the TS was still in the field. Furthermore, it would appear that the TS, in determining the appropriate time for the TA activity to take place, took into consideration the academic schedule and other time constraints of working within an university system. CID/WID also informed each mission that it would take four weeks to recruit the TA, two weeks to review the applicants and make a selection, and five weeks to field the TA after approval of the selection had been confirmed by PPC/WID and the Mission. The missions again were kept informed of timing constraints, and therefore misunderstandings were avoided.

A detailed time line was prepared for two projects within each Consortium. (See Appendix A) The purpose of the time line was to evaluate the responsiveness of the management office to requests, as well as to understand better the process the Consortium followed in delivering the requested services. It indicates that from the time the country was confirmed, CID/WID took an average of 3 months to field the TS and 8 months to field the TA. The total process took an average of 18 months from the time the country was confirmed until the TA report was submitted. The following chart indicates CID/WID's responsiveness at critical time points in the process.

Lesotho received a salary. In the case of the two TAs to Kenya, their respective universities picked up their salary. The TAs to Mali and two of the four in Lesotho did not receive a salary.

This clearly had an impact on the caliber of the candidate applying for the TA position. It also has an impact on the Mission's perception of the individual and the research carried out. When the Mission bought into the activity, or believed they were receiving a senior-level individual, they treated the CID/WID activity more seriously, and viewed the TA as a professional rather than an unpaid intern. It also influenced their subsequent reaction to the intervention, and level of commitment to the WID activity--it was less apt to be a marginal activity.

It also raises the question as to what the Mission was really expecting from the cooperative agreement. Did the Mission's really need senior level professionals, such as that provided by other mechanisms at the disposal of PPC/WID, and not the type of assistance that the Consortia could reasonably be expected to provide? This question will be addressed in Chapter IX.

4. Advertising for and Selection of the Technical Assistant

During the period the TS was in the field, the CID/WID Project Director was in contact with the campus WID coordinators, informing them about the type of activity being developed and requesting them to start identifying potential TAs. This information was formalized once the SOW was approved, at least in a general sense, by the USAID Mission. An advertisement for the TA position, consisting of a flyer identifying the country and research topic, was produced by the CID/WID management office and forwarded to each campus coordinator. Each coordinator was responsible for disseminating it through their respective channels -- newsletters, on-campus discussions, etc.

However, as mentioned above, during the initial start-up phase of the cooperative agreement, potential TS and TA candidates had been identified. When an activity was defined which fit with the capabilities of these interested individuals (and several were) they were approached directly, either by the campus coordinator or the Project Director, and encouraged to apply. For this reason, many TAs were already informed of the activity by the time the official advertisement process started. This clearly had an impact on CID/WID's ability to recruit strong candidates for the TA position.

CID/WID averaged 2.1 applicants for each TA position. TAs were recruited from a pool of junior faculty and advanced level graduate students at CID member universities. Previous international experience was not a pre-requisite, although fluency in the national language of the country was. Each applicant was required to submit a proposal of approximately 8-10 pages, containing specific information on the following:

- experience, skills and knowledge applicable to the tasks outlined in the SOW;
- personal and professional reasons for applying;
- knowledge of and appreciation for why WID technical assistance was necessary; and
- how they would cope in a harsh environment or as a stranger in another culture.

Three letters of recommendations were also required.

The application form required serious reflection and a time commitment on the part of the applicant. Requiring that each applicant demonstrate an ability to integrate a gender-related approach into their field of technical expertise tended to screen out those with little WID-related concerns. It also screened out less than serious candidates generally. This application was meant to address a criticism that TAs lacked gender expertise or ability to integrate technical skills with gender analysis, levied against CID/WID and SECID in the Devres evaluation. The Devres evaluation also had concluded that candidates learned more about WID issues by preparing proposals than they did by simply scanning materials that had been previously sent to them.

On average, TA candidates were given one month to prepare and submit their applications. These applications were then forwarded to the selection committee, composed of the current members of the CID/WID Advisory Board and the Project Director. The committee reviewed the applications and, through a pre-arranged conference call, made the selection of the top candidate(s). Usually this took place within two weeks of the closing date of the application process.

The criteria used for reviewing the proposals were the following:

- Relevance of the proposal to gender issues, in particular the candidates ability to assess the potential positive impact of the SOW on the needs of host country women;
- technical background and competence of the candidate;
- assessment of the long-term impact of the proposed work on the candidate; and
- soundness of the proposal methodology, in particular the candidate's grasp of technical issues relevant to the SOW.

An additional criteria in the TA selection was the campus coordinator's assessment of those candidates from their campuses. However, the campus coordinators could not vote on those candidates from their own campuses.

5. Technical Assistants in the Field

Each TA was brought to the CID/WID management office for a briefing session prior to their departure for the field. The briefing was attended by the Project Director, the CID Executive Office and, when possible, the respective TS. Specific guidelines regarding how the TA should act in the country, to whom they should report, how their final report should be written, were provided. TAs were instructed not to call the mission or PPC/WID, rather they were to channel all communications prior to their departure through the management office. It was also reiterated to the TA that their position was not created for the purpose of gathering data for their dissertations and, even if the data was relevant, it would have secondary consideration. The CID/WID project did permit graduate students to pursue the publication of their data and/or incorporate it in a Ph.d dissertation, but this was not the objective of the TA role.

A personal service contract was not signed with TAs nor with their home universities. Instead, TAs were viewed, from an administrative stand point, as volunteers with the University of

PPC/WID and the USAID Missions concurred with the top candidate selected by the Project Director.

It is important to point out that in two instances, the TS was not selected following this procedure. In the case of Lesotho, Mr. Tim Frankenburger was specifically requested by the USAID mission to serve as the TS. In the case of Kenya, Dr. Alicia Cook, who had been working there on another activity, was directly responsible for marketing the CID/WID cooperative agreement and eventually getting Kenya to request inclusion in the program. In order to secure Kenya's initial approval, Dr. Cook had drafted SOWs, working closely with the staff at both the Mission and the counterpart institution (Egerton University). She was invited back as the TS to refine these SOWs after PPC/WID approved Kenya's request for CID/WID working there.

3. Fielding of the Technical Specialist and the Development of the Scope of Work for Technical Assistants

After the TS was selected and approved by all concerned, the CID/WID Project Director prepared a budget for the TS activity and submitted it to the CID Executive Office, who was responsible for contracting the TS. The normal contracting procedure was a sub-agreement with the candidate's host university. The host university would then be responsible for disbursing the necessary funds to cover the honorarium, travel, and related costs of the TS. This procedure allowed the TS's home university to take overhead on the activity; CID also charged a minimal overhead to the project.

There was no systematic orientation of the TSs prior to their departure to the field. TSs were not required to travel to the CID/WID management office nor to PPC/WID for any type of orientation, even though funds were included in the budget for this purpose. The Project Director did send relevant information on the country, although it tended to be more general country- and gender related than A.I.D. specific. The TSs were allowed to communicate directly with the USAID mission and PPC/WID to collect any additional information they might need and to determine the best time for travel. However, the level and depth of information gathered by the TS was not consistent, depending more on the TSs personal initiative rather than on a set procedure for ensuring the TS was adequately prepared for undertaking the assignment. Given the peculiarities of working in the A.I.D. environment, and the demand of effectively representing PPC/WID, a more systematic procedure of orientation for both TSs and TAs should be established.

As soon as the travel schedule was confirmed, it was transmitted to the management office, for onward transmission to PPC/WID. Once PPC/WID had approved the schedule, country clearance was requested.

While in the field, the TS was charged with the following tasks:

- Follow-up on the work of the Project Director in identifying key areas for TA interventions
- Prepare SOWs centering on Women in Development concerns. The SOW should specify the qualification requirements for the TA, and delineate who was responsible for local transportation, housing arrangements, providing office space and administrative support, etc.

- Build and strengthen linkages among relevant parties and institutions in the host country
- Serve as articulate, well-informed project representatives in their own academic specialty and on gender issues

The TS was clearly instructed by the Project Director that they could not carry out their own program of research. It was reinforced that their sole purpose was to assist Missions or projects in preparing SOWs that were research-oriented, and to outline the qualifications of the TA and responsibilities for local arrangements. Although the TS could extend his or her stay to carry out other assignments, their first priority was the preparation of detailed SOWs. It was encouraged that any additional activities undertaken were to be financed by means other than the cooperative agreement. It would appear that these instructions were well heeded. Several TSs did provide additional services, some within the scope of the TS activity (Nepal), others outside of it (Mali). In general, the SOWs that were developed were sufficiently detailed and appropriate to PPC/WID's agenda, allowing their rapid approval.

Prior to their departure from the field, the TSs were required to cable back their SOWs for review by the CID/WID Project Director. This provided the management office an opportunity to incorporate any necessary changes prior to the TS's departure from country. On average, three SOWs were developed for each country, although in the case of Lesotho, four were written and subsequently implemented at the request of the Mission. It was a clear unwritten rule that the SOW had to be accepted by the Mission prior to the TSs departure. Although the SOWs were not final until PPC/WID had approved them, and an official cable was sent by the Mission to PPC/WID indicating recruitment could proceed, this clearly facilitated the approval process.

Furthermore, if approval was not forthcoming within two to three weeks after the TS had returned from the field, the Project Director and PPC/WID were telephoning, telexing and otherwise badgering the mission for at least a general approval of the "sense of the SOW." The general approval was sufficient to allow the TA recruitment process to get underway.

Each TS was required to prepare a final report on their activity, which was submitted to the CID/WID Project Director. Once approved by CID/WID, it was sent to PPC/WID, the CID Executive Board, and the respective campus and project staff, mission personnel, and country representatives in the host country. The TS was not required to travel to the CID/WID management office for a debriefing; instead it was conducted by telephone. The TS was also not involved in the selection of the TA for the SOWs they wrote, although they were involved in the briefing of the TA prior to their departure to the field. This limited role of the TS will be discussed in Section F of this chapter.

It is important to note that the TSs, in conjunction with the USAID mission, often determined that the best qualified person to undertake the proposed SOW was more senior than that which would normally be recruited through the TA application process. In these cases, the Mission was given four choices: 1) Buy into the activity and have PPC/WID match (25%/75%); 2) if the TA SOW is attached to a project, have the project pay the salary; 3) have the CID/WID management office lobby the home university of the selected candidate pay the salary; or 4) take the chance of receiving a lower level candidate (i.e., a graduate student). As a result, the two TAs in Nepal and two in

candidates for both the TS and TA positions. They were to forward this information to the CID/WID management office within a week.

Based on the information provided by the Advisory Board, the Project Director transmitted to PPC/WID a brief biographical sketch of the recommended TS candidates for the indicated countries. No ranking of the candidates was provided at this time, since the information was merely to demonstrate to PPC/WID what resources were available on CID campuses to carry out the proposed tasks. PPC/WID used this information to determine which consortium would work in which country. This process was followed in the case of Mali, Indonesia and Uruguay. CID/WID was assigned Mali, and MUCIA/WID Indonesia and Uruguay. PPC/WID independently decided that CID/WID would work in Chad, and MUCIA/WID in Cameroon and Guatemala. These last three countries were not competed for by the other Consortium.

CID/WID, however, also undertook an aggressive promotion campaign to interest selected USAID missions in the cooperative agreement. After the worldwide cable and the fact sheet had been sent, the CID/WID management office contacted CID university project directors, some of whom had expressed interest in CID/WID's services following the 1984-86 program but before the cooperative agreement was signed. The countries associated with these projects included Malawi, Mauritania, Lesotho, Nepal, Jordan, and Egypt. The project directors subsequently sent cables to the respective USAID missions, informing them of the CID/WID project and possible ways the services could be used. The CID/WID Project Director also was able to get CID experts traveling on other A.I.D or personal business to market the project in those countries they were visiting. Both of these tactics were ultimately responsible for Nepal, Lesotho and Kenya asking PPC/WID for CID/WID's assistance under the cooperative agreement.

Once PPC/WID determined in which country CID/WID would work, the Project Director began communicating with the respective USAID Mission, and other involved parties which included CID or CID member university project directors, and host-country institutions. The goal of this information gathering process was to further refine the objectives of the proposed project activity. In particular, key issues requiring gender analysis were identified, the services that could and could not be provided under the cooperative agreement were clarified, and key contact persons in the host country were indicated. If necessary, the Project Director was budgeted to travel to the selected countries for up to two weeks to further this process, although this was never done. Based on the information compiled, the SOW for the TS was finalized.

Also during this time period, the Project Director was compiling previously prepared country reports, key WID documents, and related country specific data. This packet of information was sent to the campus coordinators for their information and use in directing potential TA candidates. All TA candidates were required to demonstrate a thorough knowledge of the background information and WID issues in the host country in their application proposals.

CID/WID's information gathering process was also important for establishing within the Management Office a growing body of knowledge on gender and related development issues. The correspondence files reveal that the Office was repeatedly asked for gender documentation from CID campuses, USAID missions, even other international donor institutions. This depository strengthened CID/WID's capability to institutionalize gender within its Consortium.

CID/WID was effective in generating Mission interest in the cooperative agreement and in preparing the TSs for their project activities because of their aggressive use of the CID and CID/WID networks. Furthermore, the project office undertook an intensive pre-program preparation effort, which provided a solid foundation from which to proceed with the program's management.

2. Selection of the Technical Specialist

During the start-up phase of the cooperative agreement, the CID/WID Project Director had requested each campus WID coordinator to submit a list of potential candidates for both TS and TA positions. The list specified language capability, discipline, degree, and country/region emphasis and/or experience. Each campus WID coordinator was responsible for updating this list. With each country request, the Project Director would renew the request, asking the coordinators which candidates they would recommend for the outlined tasks.

The Project Director then contacted the recommended individuals, to determine their availability, interest and level of gender expertise. She also asked them how they would approach the outlined tasks. Each person contacted was asked to send an up-dated curriculum vitae and three letters of recommendations. On average, four persons were considered for each TS assignment.

Based on this information, the Project Director selected the TS and one or two alternative candidates. The following criteria were used in the TS selection:

- Experienced faculty or staff member in development-related fields;
- acknowledged expertise in area of gender issues and ability to integrate gender issues into his/her field of expertise;
- previous international experience;
- current faculty or staff member at one of the participating CID-member University;
- relevant national language fluency; and
- proven record of prompt report submission.

It is important to note that TSs were not specifically required to have experience working in or knowledge of the A.I.D. environment. This was an important omission since, as described below, the TSs were not systematically briefed or oriented before they left for the field. Working with A.I.D. requires knowledge of the characteristics and nuances of the environment; persons who are strong technicians but who are not familiar with the practices and procedures of A.I.D. have a much greater chance of failure. This lack of knowledge of A.I.D. was not as critical in the case of the TA selection, although preparation of the TA for work in such an environment, particularly when they were on their own in the field, should have been provided.

The Project Director forwarded the curriculum vitae and related information on the top TS candidates, with their ranking, to PPC/WID for its concurrence. PPC/WID, assuming it was in agreement with the selection, would transmit the information to the USAID Mission. In all cases,

the day-to-day management authority to the project office. The Deputy Executive Director was a permanent member of the CID/WID Advisory Board.

b. Program Management

The lead university for the cooperative agreement was the University of Arizona. The management office, located in the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology, was staffed by a three-quarter time Project Director, Dr. Helen Henderson, a part-time Secretary, and a part-time graduate student. The Project Director was originally budgeted for a full-time position. However, it was decided to use one-fourth of the Director's budget to pay a small stipend to the CID/WID campus coordinators (see below). Office space, with the necessary furniture and other facilities, was provided at no direct cost to the project.

The Project Director had primary responsibility for implementing the program, liaising with CID campuses, managing the project's information flow, and marketing the project to USAID personnel in the United States and in the cooperating host countries. The CID/WID management office had the authority to make any decisions necessary to the implementation of project activities and day-to-day operations in the field. This authority was vested by CID in the Project Director, who exercised it.

The Project Director was responsible for reporting on the project's activities to the Director of the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology at the University of Arizona, where the management office was physically located. This Bureau was responsible for monitoring the project's progress and overseeing its operational requirements.

c. The CID/WID Advisory Board

The CID/WID Advisory Board was composed of one campus WID coordinator from each of the member universities. Each coordinator was responsible for providing on-campus back-up to the program; this included recruiting candidates, orienting candidates to gender issues, helping the TA candidates prepare their applications, and, when necessary, assisting TAs in finalizing their field reports. The Advisory Board also participated in the TA selection committee. During the first year of the agreement, five of the campus coordinators served on this committee; during the second year, the remaining coordinators performed this function. To encourage the coordinators to carry out their duties, they were paid a small stipend each year (approximately US\$1,000).

3. **PPC/WID's Management Role**

Both cooperative agreements stipulated that PPC/WID would:

- Approve all activities carried out under the cooperative agreement, including country selection, scope of work (SOWs), TS and TA selection, and the final product.
- Collaborate in the development of specific activities to be carried out under the agreement.
- Approve all international travel prior to the departure of any TAs.

The Cooperative Agreement also specified that PPC/WID would cooperate with CID/WID in the identification and design of technical interventions, financing of specific interventions and providing organizational assistance to the missions.

Probably because CID had recent project experience with PPC/WID, they were able to develop a relatively fluid working relationship. PPC/WID participated in the initial country selections and then adopted an oversight role, allowing the CID/WID Project Office to take the lead on the TS and TA recruitment as well as on the support of field activities. PPC/WID generally concurred with CID/WID's actions and recommendations and basically required that it be kept informed of progress in each of the countries. Because of CID/WID's knowledge of PPC/WID's programs, they were able to obtain additional PPC/WID funding to support some TA activities where the missions had requested more senior TAs.

It should be noted that while the primary coordination of the CID/WID project rested with PPC/WID, the USAID Missions receiving support under the Cooperative Agreement also had to concur with the proposed SOWs as well as with the selection of the TS and TAs. The missions also had the responsibility to approve the timing of TS and TA activities in their respective countries.

C. PROCEDURES/PROCESSES FOLLOWED IN RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

CID/WID followed the process described below in delivering its technical assistance program.

1. Selection of Country to Receive Assistance

PPC/WID assumed the responsibility for promoting the cooperative agreement with the USAID missions and key bureaus within A.I.D. A worldwide cable announcing the signature of the Agreements and their objectives was sent to the missions in mid-July, 1987. A fact sheet on the program was also prepared and disseminated among key offices and departments around the same time.

The countries which responded to the announcement were initially screened by PPC/WID, taking into consideration such factors as:

- Category of country on the A.I.D. rating system (1, 2 or 3);
- existence of important A.I.D.-funded project or institute;
- commitment by the Mission, host -country project or institute to gender-related planning; and
- anticipated overall impact.

Once PPC/WID determined which countries would receive services, it "faxed" a copy of the request to the CID/WID and MUCIA/WID project directors, requesting an assessment of their capabilities to deliver the specified services. The CID/WID Project Director forwarded this request to the CID/WID Advisory Board, instructing them to send names and resumes of appropriate

CHAPTER III

MANAGEMENT EVALUATION OF CID/WID

A. INTRODUCTION

In performing the evaluation of the cooperative agreement with CID/WID, the team conducted a review of CID/WID's project management practices. The project management evaluation focused on CID/WID's:

- Project Organization Structure, Decision-making Process and Authority;
- Country Selection Process;
- TS and TA Recruitment Process;
- Communications and Field Support Activities; and
- Timing and Responsiveness to Mission Requests.

This chapter presents a description of CID/WID's process for performing these functions. Evaluation points associated with this management process are presented both in this chapter and in Chapter VIII which compares the performances of both Consortia.

The management evaluation is a key part of the overall evaluation of CID/WID's cooperative agreement because their approach to project management had a significant impact on the Consortium's ability to respond in an effective manner to mission and PPC/WID's requests. In the case of CID/WID, the management approach resulted in the provision of technically sound reports, focusing on the effects of gender differences in specific functional areas.

Before beginning the analysis, however, an important point needs to be made that colors the interpretation of CID/WID's management approach. CID/WID, as a result of its previous grant program with PPC/WID, had already developed the institutional and managerial capacity to work with A.I.D., and to plan and implement gender sensitive technical assistance activities overseas. The network of participating CID universities was in place, key WID specialists had been identified, and relationships with the project directors of both CID and CID member university development projects had been formed. CID/WID's past experiences as well as the previous evaluation, provided the Consortium with lessons learned that were invaluable in its management of the new cooperative agreement.

B. CID/WID'S PROGRAM, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND AUTHORITY

1. The CID/WID Technical Assistance Program: Integrating Gender Issues into Development Programs

The cooperative agreement specified that CID/WID would work in collaboration with USAID missions in providing "project-specific technical assistance and research. This assistance was to be provided to a limited number of missions in order to ensure that consistent and long-term relationships could be developed.

The cooperative agreement did not specify any structure for the delivery of the technical assistance and research program. Instead, CID/WID followed the structure outlined in its initial business proposal, which stated that a total of four countries, two each year, would receive services during the two year period of the cooperative agreement. PPC/WID would select the participant countries. One Technical Specialist (TS) and two Technical Assistants (TAs) would be fielded to work in each of the designated countries. The TS, who would receive a salary, was responsible for traveling to and working with the USAID mission in designing scopes of work for longer-term, gender-related research, to be carried out by two TAs. TSs were also responsible for making the necessary logistical arrangements for fielding the TAs. The TAs were responsible for undertaking the research outlined in the scope of work.

2. Project Organizational Structure and Decision Authorities

The cooperative agreement did not require that CID/WID establish a given organizational structure for providing the requested services. Again, CID/WID replicated the structure described in their business proposal, which consisted of the following:

a. The Role of the Consortium for International Development (CID)

CID was the organization-of-record for the project. Its Executive Office, located in Tucson, Arizona, was responsible for CID/WID's legal and financial management and for formalizing agreements among the participating entities. The CID Executive Board also played a very important supportive role for the program. The CID Executive Board marketed the CID/WID Cooperative Agreement when they were on CID business overseas, and to the Board of Trustees and faculty on CID campuses. The Executive Board encouraged CID faculty to participate in the program, or at least to support those in their departments that were selected. This was critical in generating interest in and motivating strong candidates to apply to the program.

The Office sought to enlist the commitment of USAID and campus personnel in integrating WID concerns into CID's A.I.D.-funded projects. This latter activity proved particularly important since several of CID/WID's interventions were incorporated into on-going CID member university projects.

CID assigned its Deputy Executive Director, Dr. James Collom, to the project. He was responsible for providing back-up support and advice to the Project Director, and obtaining access to university administrations responsible for international program activities. CID, however, delegated

CHAPTER III
MANAGEMENT EVALUATION OF CID/WID

TABLE III-2

CONSORTIUM FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (CID)
TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANTS

Country	Number of Applicants: TS/TA	Technical Specialist/ Technical Assistant(s), Dates of participation	CID Member University Affiliation	Degree	Discipline
Chad	TS-none*	Laura Ann Fernea (2/88)	California Polytech.	MA	International Dvlpmnt. Studies
Kenya	TS-none* TA-4	Alicia Cook (11/88-12/88) Margaret Lewis (4/89-7/89) Margaret Denney (4/89-8/89)	Colorado State Univ. Oregon State Univ. Colorado State Univ.	PhD MS MED	Educational Psychology Nutrition Education/Management
Lesotho	TS-1 TA-9	Tim Franckenberger (11/87-12/87) Joyce Kanyangwa (5/88-8/88) Pamela Riley (9/88-3/89) Sandra Saenz de Tejada (5/88-1/89) Marina Gorton (11/88-5/89)	Univ. of Arizona Texas Tech. Washington State U. Univ. of Arizona Texas Tech.	MA PhD Candidate PhD (Prof.) PhD Candidate PhD Candidate	Farming Systems Food and Nutrition, Agric. Econ. Sociology Anthropology International Development
Mali	TS-7 TA-3	Laura Ann Fernea (1/88) Andrea Luey (7/88-12/88) Bill Grigsby (12/88-6/89)	California Polytech. Univ. of Arizona Univ. of Idaho	MA MA Candidate MA Candidate	International Dvlpmnt. Studies Agricultural Economics Social Forestry
Nepal	TS-2 TA-5	Ravathi Balakrishnan (9/88) Sara Tisch (1/89-6/89) Anne Holman (12/89-3/90)	Oregon State Univ. Washington State U. Cal. State Polytech.	PhD (Prof.) PhD (Prof.) PhD (Dean)	Family Resource Management International Development Ecology/Zoology

* - Ms. Fernea was chosen to design the SOW in Chad since she was completing an assignment in Mali just before the Chadian Mission required TS assistance. Dr. Cook responded to a direct Kenyan Mission request to her for SOWs.

TABLE III-1

CID's Scopes of Work and Reports

Country/Project	Approved SOWs	Corresponding Reports and Authors	Comments
Chad			
VITA	"The Economic Activities of Women in NDjamena"	NA	
Kenya			
Egerton University	"Factors Affecting Career Choices of Female Students Attending Egerton Univ. During the 1988-1989 Academic Year"	"Factors Affecting Career Choices of Female Students Attending Egerton University During the 1988-1989 Academic Year" - Margaret Lewis	
Egerton University	"Career Module to Develop Female Students for Careers in Agriculture"	"Career Module to Develop Female Students for Careers in Agriculture"- Martha Denney	
Lesotho			
LAPIS	"Sorghum Production and Its Use"	"Sorghum Production and Its Use"- Joyce Kanyangwa	
LAPIS	"Effect of Newly Introduced Technologies on Women"	"The Effect of Newly Introduced Technology on Women" - Pamela Riley	
LAPIS	"Food Consumption and Its Relation to Production"	"Food Consumption and Its Relation to Production: A Survey in Lesotho" - Sandra Saenz de Tejada	
LAPIS	"Directory of Alternative Income Possibilities for Women"	"Alternative Income Generation for Women" - Marina Gorton	

TABLE B-1

CID's Scopes of Work and Reports

Country/Project	Approved SOWs	Corresponding Reports and Authors	Comments
Mali	"Women's Organizations in Rural Mali"	"Women's Economic Activities and Credit Opportunities in the Operation Haute Vallee Zone"- Andrea Luery	
	"Women's Economic Resources and Potential Access to Credit"	"Lending, Borrowing and Women's Organizations in Rural Mali" - Bill Grigsby	
Nepal			
IAAS	Review of Extension and Research Models Currently in Use at IAAS	Review of Extension and Research Models Currently in Use at IAAS-Sara Tisch	
IAAS	Integration of Gender Issues in Selective Courses or Departments Identified in SOWs	Integration of Gender Issues in Selective Courses of Department Identified in SOW 1- Anne Holman	

D. CONCLUSION

CID/WID successfully fulfilled the requirements of the cooperative agreement to provide technical assistance to four countries. In addition, CID/WID's country activities reflect the cooperative agreement's flexibility. Specifically in the cases of Chad and Lesotho, CID/WID's activities went beyond a strict interpretation of the cooperative agreement in the provision of additional services.

to be implemented by two TAs. The Egerton University reports for Kenya addressed the issue of attracting women to a "non-traditional" female area of academic discipline, agriculture. The Mali reports researched the issue of rural women's access to credit. Nepal's technical assistance activity addressed gender roles in Nepal's agricultural sector.

As reflected in Table II-2, Lesotho was the one country that received technical assistance outside of the terms specified in the cooperative agreement. The TS wrote four SOWs and four TAs were subsequently fielded. This type of exception reflects the flexibility that existed in the cooperative agreement between CID/WID and PPC/WID.

Table II-2 also illustrates that the areas of discipline for the majority of the female TSs and TAs were those undertaken traditionally by females: Nutrition, Education/Management, Sociology, Anthropology, etc. Only one of the nine female TAs could be strictly defined as within a "non-traditional" discipline, Agricultural Economics. The two men, one TS and one TA, were both in generally regarded traditional male disciplines, Farming Systems and Social Forestry.

With regard to degrees, of the four TSs, two of the four TSs were MAs and two were PhDs. Of the eleven TAs, they ranged in degree from two MA candidates to three PhD Professors and one Dean.

By the cooperative agreement's expiration date, CID/WID had provided technical specialists to five countries: Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Nepal and Pakistan, and fielded a total of 10 TAs. The TAs prepared a total of ten reports: two each in Kenya, Mali and Nepal, and four in Lesotho.

2. Countries That Responded to the Worldwide Cable But Did Not Receive Technical Assistance

In Chad, Egypt and Pakistan activities were begun that could have led to the provision of technical assistance, but due to various circumstances, ultimately did not participate. Their inclusion here serves to provide a complete picture of CID/WID's activities under the cooperative agreement.

Chad

In September 1987, the Mission sent a proposal outlining a study of Chadian women's entrepreneurial activities. The Mission specifically requested the formulation of a scope of work (SOW) for information gathering on the social, economic and political status of Chadian women; the activity would be carried out by the Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA). The PPC/WID Title XII Coordinator asked CID/WID to take on this project. From the beginning, PPC/WID and the Mission understood that CID/WID would provide only the services of a TS. This type of understanding is indicative of the cooperative agreement's flexibility, understood by both PPC/WID and CID/WID.

Everyone at the Mission agreed that this SOW would increase their understanding of the dynamics of the N'Djamena economy. The Mission also suggested that it would perhaps consider implementing the SOW later after determining whether or not to continue support of VITA's supervised credit program.

Egypt

The National Agricultural Research Project (NARP) Project Officer and Director General in Egypt requested technical assistance from CID/WID in March 1988. The Mission Director proposed a specific professor of Washington State University as the TS.

During the summer, the coordinator for NARP at New Mexico State, completed the Technology Transfer Component Amendment to the NARP and a USU representative went to Cairo to develop the workplan. At that time, however, they decided that it would be best that WID issues not be incorporated into the Amendment.

CID/WID was, simultaneously, working on securing Kenya or Egypt as the cooperative agreement's fourth country. The CID/WID Project Director decided that which ever of the two would come through with Mission and country approval first, would be chosen. Kenya came through before Egypt.

Pakistan

The University of Idaho's WID Coordinator had been in contact with the Idaho Project Coordinator for the Pakistan Irrigation Systems Management Research Project and proposed a highly qualified woman as TS. The proposed TS spoke with the ISM/R Project Officer, the Chief of Party (C.O.P.) and the social researcher in Nepal. The C.O.P. was very supportive of the project and was willing to provide \$21,000 in matching funds to CID/WID for a team effort.

When the TS returned to the U.S. in September, she met with individuals from the University of Idaho, CID and CID/WID to develop the proposal for work in Pakistan and to create a budget for a three-person team. The proposed project was to study the role of women in water management, including domestic on-farm and off-farm production activities and in water user's associations. The study was to also address exploratory questions to women in landed families and to female laborers. The proposal requested matching funds of approximately \$24,000 from the Pakistan Project.

At the end of November 1988, PPC/WID received a cable of support for the proposed SOWs from USAID/Pakistan. The proposed study was to take place from December 1988 to late April 1989. The ISM/R project proposed to contribute \$30,000 with CID/WID financing the remainder.

When CID/WID received the mission cable, it began making arrangements for the TS to travel to Pakistan. However, the Government of Pakistan had not given its approval of the cable at that time. Based on a telephone conversation between the CID Executive Office and the Pakistan liaison for the ISM project, who stated that host-country approval was most likely forthcoming, the TS was sent to England. This, however, proved to be premature because even though CID/WID funding was used, her arrival in Pakistan was seen as a possible cause for difficulties for the ISM/R project, and consequently she had to return to the United States.

On June 9, 1989 the Program Director for the Irrigation Systems Management Research Project reported that the Pakistani Government did not approve the ISM/CID WID Cooperative proposal.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF CID/WID ACTIVITIES

A. CID/WID'S RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

The Agency of International Development's Office of Women in Development (PPC/WID) acts to ensure that women are integrated as both participants in and beneficiaries of all A.I.D. programs, projects and activities. The growth of CID's Women in Development (WID) units were encouraged by PPC/WID through numerous collaborative projects between the two organizations prior to this cooperative agreement.

The two-year cooperative agreement between CID/WID and PPC/WID was signed on July 10, 1987, in support of the project entitled "Integrating Gender Issues into Development Programs." The total amount of the agreement was \$399,373.00. The agreement was effective from July 10, 1987 to June 30, 1989. Towards the contract's termination date, CID/WID requested and was granted a six-month no-cost extension until December 1989. CID/WID again requested and was granted a four-month no-cost extension until April 1990. CID/WID was to submit annual progress reports; tri- or sub-project reports; end of project report; and a financial report.

The project's major purpose was to provide project-specific technical assistance to USAID missions in the areas of agriculture, credit and small enterprise development. The project's activities were technical assistance and research.

The primary goal of the technical assistance was for CID/WID to use its knowledge of women in developing countries to assist missions and project teams in designing new strategies for reaching women, or integrating gender-specific components into their on-going projects. CID/WID was to provide Missions with approximately forty person weeks of in-field technical assistance for designing, implementing and/or evaluating projects.

CID/WID was to use its university linkages to develop a research program that would investigate the significant aspects of women's economic participation in developing countries and the effects of economic and social changes on women's roles. Based on identified capabilities, CID/WID was to prepare briefing documents on the actual and potential roles of women at the request of PPC/WID and the missions.

B. OVERVIEW OF CID

CID was established in its present form in 1975 as a nonprofit corporation consisting of 11 Universities: the University of Arizona (ASU); California State Polytechnic University, Pomona; Colorado State University (CSU); University of Hawaii; the University of Idaho; New Mexico State University (NMSU); Oregon State University (OSU); Texas Tech University; Utah State University (USU); Washington State University (WSU) and the University of Wyoming.

CID's objectives are to encourage and promote the involvement of member universities and their faculties in international activities; to provide support for international project planning.

implementation and evaluation; and to assist the member universities' efforts to share their expertise with developing countries. The CID system provides a network through which interested faculty and departments of the universities can interact with donor agencies and host countries. An Executive Committee implements policies of the Consortium and acts on behalf of the board where appropriate and necessary to fulfill the goals and objectives of the Consortium. The Chair and Vice Chair of CID's Board of Trustees serve on the Executive Committee along with three other members who are elected by the Board from among its membership.

The goals of the CID's general Women in Development Program are to 1) increase the knowledge, understanding and sensitivity of project planners to the distinctive problems faced by rural, poor women in developing countries and 2) encourage the involvement of women in program planning activities for social and economic development.

CID/WID's Project Director and Central Management Office are located at the University of Arizona which is the lead university for CID's participation in the cooperative agreement. The Project Director was Helen Henderson, the Head of the Women in Development Section, at the University of Arizona's Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology. The WID section conducts research on women in rural development areas focusing primarily upon production and reproduction issues. Dr. Henderson received her PhD in Anthropology from the University of California, Berkeley.

From 1984-1986, CID/WID provided technical assistance activities under a contract with PPC/WID entitled "Integrating Women into the Development Process." Under this program, CID/WID fielded 27 Technical Assistants (TA) of various disciplinary backgrounds and training for projects in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Near East. Devres, Inc.'s April 1986 evaluation of CID/WID's performance concluded that although the WID TA programs were generally successful, both on the consortium's campuses and the host countries, there was some confusion about the program's overall objectives among staff, participants and intended beneficiaries.⁷ Participation in this program allowed CID/WID to develop a strong institutional capacity for work with A.I.D., particularly in planning for and implementing gender-related projects in developing countries. CID/WID's experience under the contract arrangement and its subsequent evaluation were critical in contributing to CID/WID's performance under this cooperative agreement.

CID is also a very active participant in other A.I.D. contracts, which have provided the consortium with knowledge of the A.I.D. consulting environment, as well as contacts with many of A.I.D.'s overseas missions.

C. DESCRIPTION OF COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

1. Countries That Received Technical Assistance

Table II-1 illustrates CID/WID's activities under the cooperative agreement, highlighting the scopes of work and their corresponding final reports. Table II-2 provides information on each country's TS and TAs with regard to their University affiliations, degrees and areas of discipline.

Kenya, Mali and Nepal were the three countries that received technical assistance under the terms specified in the cooperative agreement. Namely, that a TS design two SOWs which were then

CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF CID/WID ACTIVITIES

faculty could probably influence a reluctant mission regarding the importance of gender issues, but they are in country at the wrong time and for too short a time. In order to effect an integration of gender issues, especially in reluctant Mission, the senior faculty needs the benefit of the research results. The TAs who do the research are perceived by the Missions to be too junior or inexperienced. Consequently the TAs have little prospect of influencing the Missions and Mission programs.

However, there is a great need to expand the base of knowledge regarding gender issues and this can be done very well under the Cooperative Agreement approach. Research activities are what universities do best and the concept fits well with their stated objectives of expanding their knowledge base and improving their skills. A Cooperative Agreement approach focusing on applied research for the expansion of A.I.D.'s body of knowledge regarding gender issues would be an effective use of the Title XII university capabilities. As will be discussed during the balance of this report, there are some weaknesses in the Cooperative Agreements that would limit their effectiveness as applied research vehicles. These weaknesses are principally in the areas of research supervision and information dissemination. Future Title XII Cooperative Agreements should probably focus on conducting and broadly disseminating gender related research. The direct integration of a gender focus into Mission programs should be left to other PPC/WID mechanisms that can use the research output to design effective programs and projects taking gender issues into consideration.

B. IMPROVING THE DESIGN OF THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

1. Conclusions

The cooperative agreement with Title XII Universities is an appropriate contracting mechanism for PPC/WID to use to accomplish a research objective. However, there are several problems inherent in the agreement's design. Two were identified previously -- no cost technical assistance and inappropriate use of the strengths of the Consortia. Five more are detailed below.

The most critical flaw pertains to the limited role of the TS. The TS position was incorporated in the current cooperative agreement structure in response to problems identified in the previous Title XII contractual arrangement. In particular, it addressed the need to specify the TA activity with missions prior to their fielding. Unfortunately, it did not go far enough. TSs, when properly prepared, did assist missions in efficiently and effectively defining the gender-specific needs which could be addressed by the Consortium. SOWs, when sufficiently detailed, did provide a research framework for TAs, and clarification of local responsibilities. However, this was more the exception than the rule. Research agendas are flexible, and need to be adjusted as activities get underway. Because TSs were limited to identifying issues -- a shot-gun approach -- there was no mechanism to ensure the research was carried out as originally designed. This, coupled with the need for on-the-ground monitoring and, when the TA was inexperienced, supervision of the TA activity, clearly demonstrate the value of expanding the role of the TS. The TS position should be reformulated to incorporate TA supervision, research monitoring, and general involvement in the process from formulation through TA selection to overseeing final report preparation and presentation.

A second flaw pertains to TAs being non-salaried. CID/WID's experiences clearly demonstrated the importance of mission receptiveness and seriousness when missions perceive they are receiving and senior-level professionals from the Consortium. In addition to diminishing the activity in the field, non-salaried TAs also limited the seriousness which the Consortia university administration and faculty viewed the cooperative agreement program. It relegated the activity to a second level of priority, if that, and promulgated the opinion of WID as a special interest. By being non-salaried, potential TAs tended to pursue their own agendas, whether it was to gain international experience or dissertation material, regardless of how the program goals had been explicitly stated previously.

MUCIA/WID's experience clearly demonstrated a third flaw, that of vesting too much authority to PPC/WID, particularly in regard to communications with missions. PPC/WID served as the focal point of contact with missions, becoming an intermediary between the Consortium and the Mission. One can argue that MUCIA/WID's program description specified this role. CID/WID's program description, on the other hand, did not contain this approach, instead fostering the impression of a more collaborative role in program execution. This is the more appropriate role for PPC/WID. By becoming an intermediary between the Mission and MUCIA/WID, PPC/WID fostered the impression that the Consortium was non-responsive. Further, that it was not competent to arrange directly the activities being requested of it. It diminished MUCIA/WID's management office's control of negotiations with the mission, which is necessary to deliver services in a timely manner. The role of PPC/WID should be one of facilitation -- it should not get involved in the actual delivery of the services. Being consulted in the process, and maintaining final approval of activities, is also an appropriate role. PPC/WID must allow the Consortia to assume the

administrative and logistical responsibility for implementing the program, as well as the programmatic content of the intervention.

A fourth flaw is the lack of a systematic orientation and information gathering activity within the cooperative agreement program. Further, the Cooperative Agreement did not include a promotion/publicity effort at the beginning of the project. This process was outlined in MUCIA/WID's proposal, but not carried out. Unfamiliarity with A.I.D. procedures and operating environment, and that of PPC/WID, impacted MUCIA/WID's ability to effectively develop and manage their activities. It also impacted their ability to effectively recruit candidates. The Consortium was unable to establish linkages with and market the cooperative agreement on member university campuses to expand potential opportunities and ensure qualified candidates were interested in the project. An extensive orientation and promotion campaign, outlining both the objectives of the program, A.I.D. and PPC/WID roles and objectives, would go a long way to correcting the problems experienced by MUCIA/WID in recruiting for, and managing its project.

A final flaw in the design is that it did not build upon the Consortium's comparative advantages -- long-term research and institutional development. Instead, the Consortium's were used, and particularly the TSs, to respond to short-term technical assistance needs of the missions. The TS/TA structure and its implementation by the Consortium, is not appropriate for time sensitive activities. The TS can be fielded in a timely manner to address short-term needs, but it is in direct conflict with their specific objectives -- to prepare research agendas for TA activity. The Consortia should be one of several mechanisms tapped for the provision of short-term assistance, but it must be viewed separately from the cooperative agreement program. The TS role vis-a-vis the cooperative agreement must be clearly defined and maintained as that of developing and monitoring the research agenda, not as a provider of short-term technical assistance.

2. Recommendations

The TS role should be redefined and expanded to include the overall management of the research activity from the beginning to the submission of the final report. The TS should be responsible for:

- establishing the research agenda in conjunction with the Mission;
- defining the research methodology and instruments;
- determining and securing responsibility for administrative and logistical support in country;
- participating in the selection of the TA(s) to carry out the tasks and in their orientation;
- periodically visiting the country to monitor performance, and addressing issues impacting the research outcome;
- overseeing the preparation of the final report;

conducting follow-on activities related to the product, ensuring its ample disseminations and usage.

- The TA position should be a salaried to ensure the WID activity is viewed commensurate with its importance and demonstrate that it is not a special interest intervention. It would also go a long way to ensuring the PPC/WID's goal are congruent with that of the TA.
- PPC/WID's role in the cooperative agreement should be clarified and made consistent in all agreements. First, PPC/WID should play a major role in the selection of the country, primarily to ensure that the mission is committed to and interested in the WID technical assistance. Then, PPC/WID should be involved in defining the area of research prior to fielding a TS. These two activities should constitute PPC/WID's primary involvement in the management of the project; instead its role should encompass facilitating project implementation, and securing clearance for major activities. PPC/WID should assume neither a managerial function nor serve as the focal point of contact/communication with the Mission. As demonstrated in the case of MUCIA/WID, this was ineffective, and delayed implementation. It also adversely affected the mission's perception of the Consortium's management capability.
- An intensive orientation/publicity campaign should be carried out at the beginning of the cooperative agreement. The purpose would be to explain the objectives and goals of the cooperative agreement program, opportunities available, and activities which will and will not be carried out. Further, it would provide the opportunity to inform Consortium campuses of the goals and objectives of PPC/WID's program, how they view the Consortium program, etc. It would also instruct Consortium campuses on A.I.D. and its operational environment.
- To enhance PPC/WID's program and mission responsiveness, it is suggested that PPC/WID consider using its current mechanisms for short-term technical assistance to identify opportunities for longer-term assistance and research, to support the respective programs or missions. Note that this identification should not be the direct goal of specific short-term activities but rather should be a complementary benefit from short-term field activities. Once the mission or program has concurred with the identified need, the Consortia should be utilized to perform the longer-term research support or assistance.

C. IMPROVING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF TS ACTIVITIES

1. Conclusions

The major problems associated with TS activity related to the lack of definition of the TS role and inadequately developed SOWs that did not provide sufficient guidance for relatively inexperienced TAs or the foundation for strong WID demonstration effects. Where TSs were requested to meet mission needs for technical assistance unrelated to Consortia activities, there was, too often, insufficient time for writing appropriate SOWs. This demonstrates that neither the TSs nor the missions fully appreciated the import and requirements of SOWs. Moreover, the admitted lack of preparedness on the part of TSs indicates they could have benefitted from more extensive orientation to the A.I.D. operating environment, mission activities, and PPC/WID objectives.

CID/WID's concentration on activities in three subject areas appeared not only to strengthen the program but to improve its utility to PPC/WID. Specialization allowed the Consortium, on the basis of findings from a number of demonstrations, to make significant contributions to the WID knowledge base. The repeated experience of research in a given area may also have strengthened management capabilities.

2. Recommendations

- Consortia project directors need to take responsibility for selecting TSs with sufficient facilitation skills to further the WID institutionalization goals of PPC/WID.
- Consortia need to provide more extensive orientations to TSs in the following areas:
 - A.I.D. protocol, policy, procedures, project cycles, and budget mechanisms;
 - PPC/WID program goals, resources, and funding mechanisms;
 - background information on missions in the form of CDSSs, PIRs, and history of USAID WID activities; and
 - the importance of SOWs in providing guidance for TAs and ground for powerful WID demonstration effects with potential for furthering WID institutionalization.
- Consortia need to develop clear guidelines for SOWs, for example:
 - potential WID demonstration effects of the activity identified in SOW need to be established, including the potential contributions that identified research will make to the WID knowledge base in subject areas in which Consortia have a demonstrated strength;
 - the immediate relevancy and utility of SOW to mission activities and PPC/WID concerns need to be clearly identified; in cases where SOW relates to an on-going project, SOWs must identify immediate utility of research to project objectives and strategy.
 - a clear set of research questions, specification of gender issues to be addressed by research, methodology, and plan of implementation for research needs to be provided; and
 - SOWs should, to the extent possible, represent areas of specialization of Consortia.
- The role of TSs should be expanded to include orientation of TAs and supervision and follow-up of their field activities.
- PPC/WID should ensure that mission demands on TSs for technical assistance unrelated to CID/WID -- are met with appropriate adjustments in time and funding.

- PPC/WID should decide if TSs are the best mechanisms for meeting mission requests for program-related WID technical assistance.

D. IMPROVING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF TA ACTIVITIES

1. Conclusions

The greater experience of CID/WID TAs as compared to MUCIA/WID's lead to fewer difficulties of the former Consortia. In every case where TAs lacked overseas experience, there were problems. Where TAs lacked academic experience, they tended to rely on project and or mission staff for supervision. Missions repeatedly complained of insufficient supervision for relatively inexperienced TAs. Even where research results were positively received, confusion or conflict over responsibility for both supervision and logistical support were areas where missions had the most difficulty or reservation about Consortia activities. The Devres evaluation raised this same problem, demonstrating the persistence of confusion in this area and the need to address it.

The idea of pairing a host-country person with a TA was recommended by earlier Consortia evaluations. This suggestion should be seriously considered not only to improve the support/supervision for TAs but also because it would be a mutually beneficial relationship that could have significant effects on host-country WID capacity building.

2. Recommendations

- TAs should all have previous overseas experience and appropriate language skills. In cases where TAs are junior level graduate students, TS or central office supervision must compensate for analytical, gender, or other expertise.
- Consortia need to provide in-country supervision for relatively inexperienced TAs. Beyond more guidance from SOWs, relatively inexperienced TAs need supervision during the course of the research that might be best provided by periodic visits by TSs, familiar with the research and the context.
- Agreement on and responsibility for providing logistical support needs to be established. Stating such responsibilities in writing has proven to be insufficient. The identification of a high level mission officer to oversee and be responsible for Consortia activity would mitigate confusions and improve Consortia mission relations.
- TAs should be paired with a host country counterpart in order to maximize efforts of inexperienced TAs and to build host country interest in the research.
- Consortia need to ensure that final reports are of a professional quality, this may require the editorial services of experienced Consortia personnel.

E. IMPROVING THE RECRUITMENT OF TS AND TA CANDIDATES

1. Conclusions

CID/WID was clearly effective in TS and TA recruitment. One important factor for this success was the centralized WID roster maintained by the management office, featuring the strengths and backgrounds of the applicant pool. The WID campus coordinators were critical in up-dating this information and supporting interested candidates in the application process.

The lack of any formal promotion of the cooperative agreement program clearly limited the management office in reaching potential recruits for the TA program. CID/WID, because of its previous program with PPC/WID, and the initiative of its campus coordinators, was more effective than MUCIA/WID. A systematic orientation and publicity program, as outlined in B above would go a long way toward publicizing the program on Consortium campuses. Even in CID/WID's case, the program was not successful in tapping candidates from "non-traditional" disciplines. This might have been enhanced if a serious orientation program, with representatives of PPC/WID, Consortium Executive Officers, and the Program Director participating, had been designed and executed.

MUCIA/WID's experience in TA recruitment and fielding demonstrate the problems inherent with working with academic schedules. Unless pre-recruitment activities can be undertaken, most TA candidates will not be available when applications are requested, especially if it is in the middle of an academic semester. On-going communication with the TS while in the field, approval by mission of the draft SOW prior to the departure of the TS, specified responsibilities for TAs supervision and backstopping, and agreed timing of the intervention would greatly facilitate pre-recruitment activities. Interested candidates could then adjust their academic programs to accommodate their participation. It would also allow the TA time to work with the university administration and program departments to secure their support for the TA's activities.

The application form used by CID/WID and MUCIA/WID, although not enforced by the latter, clearly was an improvement over that used in the previous PPC/WID Title XII Grant Agreement. It forced the applicant to reflect seriously on gender issues applicable to the SOW, and screened out less sincere candidates.

2. Recommendations

- Campus WID coordinators should be informed of potential activities prior to TS's departure to the field, at which time they should commence pre-recruitment activities.
- A centralized WID roster should be established in the management office.
- A rigorous application process, requiring gender analysis, should be instituted and enforced.

F. IMPROVING CONSORTIA RESPONSIVENESS TO PPC/WID AND MISSION REQUESTS

1. Conclusions

Quick turn around responses are problematic for university faculty, due to their teaching and administrative responsibilities, especially when assignments require more than 1-2 weeks. Quicker responses are possible in fielding candidates for TS than TA assignments, since TSs require less time in the field. However, this project cannot be expected to be primarily a quick response mechanism. Instead it is one which requires adequate planning and lead time to be effective.

MUCIA/WID experienced the greatest problems in being responsive to PPC/WID and mission requests. Part of the Consortium's problem originated in their lack of a pre-recruitment process for identifying TS and TA candidates early in the project. MUCIA/WID's slowness in recruiting TAs could have been avoided if the management office had had a centralized WID roster. Moreover, if the Project Director had solicited assistance from each campus coordinator at the beginning of the project in identifying interested TSs and TAs, the recruitment process could have been further streamlined.

MUCIA/WID's lack of responsiveness was also related to its decision-making structure. Because decision-making was decentralized, the management office spent precious time consulting with other players in the Consortium, rather than making decisions and taking action.

MUCIA/WID's decision to make the Project Director position quarter time clearly limited its ability to service the project effectively and in a timely manner. If nothing else, they could not control the administrative and operational functions of project implementation sufficiently within the allotted time.

Delays in the approval of MUCIA/WID's SOWs were caused by the departure of the TS before preliminary approval had been obtained. Logistical field support responsibility for TA also had not been determined prior to the departure of the TS, again causing needless delays before TA recruitment could begin. Because of these delays, missions tended to press for the immediate fielding of the TA when clearance was secured. Missions tend, in general, to want immediate implementation upon their approval of an activity, resulting in difficulties for the Consortia. If this happened during the semester period, finding appropriate, if any, candidates was difficult, especially if little advance notification on the activity had been provided. Quick turn around on TA recruitment and fielding also prevented tapping alternative financing mechanisms for TA salaries, where applicable.

Working within the constraints of an academic environment was less of a factor for CID/WID, although problems did occur when activities did not take place as originally programmed. In addition to TS or TA time availability constraints, if they have replaced themselves in income earning activities, the Consortium was put in a position where it could have been liable for lost salaries.

2. Recommendations

The Project Director position, as a minimum should be three quarter time, if not full time, to ensure timely and effective administrative and logistical management of the project.

- The project management office of each consortium must be given and exercise control of critical decision-making as it pertains to the operation and management of the program. The Project Office should be the focal point for communications with the missions; PPC/WID should be kept abreast of matters, but maintain a facilitative rather than managerial or authoritative role. Responsibility for project implementation must be vested in the management office.
- The Consortium should maintain a centralized WID roster of TSs and TAs and undertake a wider pre-recruitment process for TAs.
- A systematic orientation process for TSs and TAs prior to their departure, in which responsibilities, project scope, and A.I.D. procedures are clarified, should be provided and compliance monitored. In particular, the draft SOW and determination of responsibilities for logistical and administrative support of TAs, must be approved by the mission prior to the TSs departure from the country.
- TSs should provide supervision or oversight of TA work on the SOWs they designed, in order to ensure that the final product is in keeping with the Mission's request.

G. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH TITLE XII UNIVERSITY CONSORTIA

In the final analysis, it is the belief of the evaluation team that the cooperative agreement is an appropriate mechanism for working with Title XII Consortia. It provides PPC/WID sufficient leeway to control the anticipated outcome of the activity, while at the same time allowing the Consortia flexibility in responding to and managing the mission's requests for assistance. However, there are two major issue which must be addressed first before any new cooperative agreements are signed with the Consortia.

1. PPC/WID Objectives and Expectations

PPC/WID has one overall goal to institutionalize the capability to address gender differences within A.I.D. programs and projects in order to enhance the effectiveness of development assistance. PPC/WID has a variety of mechanisms as its disposal that can contribute to the achievement of this goal: the new GENESYS project, buy-ins to other A.I.D. projects, short-term consultancies with private firms, and the cooperative agreement with the Title XII Consortia. Each one of these mechanisms contributes to institutionalization in a different way. Therefore, PPC/WID must first define a concrete objective for each mechanism and determine how it supports the achievement of the overall goal.

In the opinion of the evaluation team, the Consortium's comparative advantage rests in the provision of long-term research and institutional strengthening. The Consortia, at low cost, can contribute to the body of knowledge about gender issues in development, including what works and what does not in addressing gender differences in participation in, and impact of project interventions on, specific sectors, regions or countries. This will provide critical raw data needed to convince missions and bureaus of the need to address these differences in their programming and projects.

Therefore, the Cooperative Agreement with the Consortia is the proper vehicle for expanding the body of knowledge on gender issues.

The Cooperative Agreement with the Consortia, at least as it is currently structured, is not the appropriate vehicle to use for directly integrating gender considerations in A.I.D. development activities. TSs could, but they are not in the field long enough, nor have sufficient information initially to convince missions of the role and importance of considering gender in development activities. Only when the research activity is completed can the TS serve in this role, and only then if they had been involved through out the research exercise.

The Cooperative Agreement with the Consortia, in general, is not the appropriate mechanism for providing short-term, time-sensitive technical assistance. TSs can, but TS within the structure of the CA should not unless additional time is built in. Further, TSs or senior faculty members cannot work for more than two to three weeks, except in the summer or when, with sufficient lead time, they can arrange for a leave of absence in order to undertake an assignment. In other words, their availability does not fit within the A.I.D. structure. In addition, the Consortia are not set up to back stop and manage a consulting activity as efficiently as are other mechanisms available to PPC/WID.

2. The Structure of the Cooperative Agreement

The evaluation team believes that the Title XII Consortia can and do provide a valuable service vis-a-vis the overall PPC/WID agenda. However, for the future, the structure and form of the cooperative agreement should be modified to build on the strengths of the Title XII Consortia. We also believe that the cooperative agreement as a contracting mechanism is appropriate as long as the responsibilities of each party are clearly defined.

The following modification/incorporations to the current cooperative agreement structure are recommended:

Initial Publicity Program/Orientation

Immediately following the signing of the cooperative agreement, an intensive orientation briefing needs to be organized on each campus. The purpose of these sessions would be to discuss: a) PPC/WID's goals and objectives, and how the Cooperative Agreement can help achieve these goals and objectives; b) the operational environment of A.I.D., USAID missions, and PPC/WID; c) the goals and objectives of the Cooperative Agreement; d) the structure of the cooperative agreement, and available opportunities; and e) who to contact for more information. The session should be conducted by a representative from PPC/WID, the Project Director, and the Consortium Executive Board. The target audience is Campus WID Coordinators, University Administration, Dean and Faculty in Development Related, Traditional and Non-traditional fields, etc.

Role of PPC/WID

PPC/WID should work closely with requesting missions to first determine their specific needs, and then determine which mechanism is best suited to meet those needs. The criteria for Consortia selection should not be because it is cheap, rather that the mission or PPC/WID itself needs data to substantiate a policy reform, design a project, or expand its body of knowledge on a particular area. Only after the country has been selected, and the Mission's needs and expectations clarified, should

the Consortia become involved. After this, the Consortia should play the leading role, working directly with the Mission in establishing timing, priorities, signing off on responsibilities, formalizing work plan for TS, selecting TAs, etc. PPC/WID should take a secondary role, allowing the Consortia management office assume primary responsibility. If necessary, PPC/WID should sign-off on activities, but, particularly in the case of TAs, it really is not necessary for it to be involved.

PPC/WID should clearly define its coordinating role at the beginning of the agreement, and be consistent with how ever many number of cooperative agreements it has with Title XII universities. In addition, the Consortium management role is critical, and should be enhanced by PPC/WID, not hindered or assumed, as occurred in the case of MUCIA/WID.

Expand the Role of the TS

The TS role should be expanded, from initially working with the missions to design the research program (SOWs), selecting the TA candidates, traveling with them to start-up the activity, monitoring it through one or more (as appropriate) return visits, working with TAs during the final wrap-up sessions, where the results are presented to the Mission and interested counterpart, and finalizing the report. The TS is the person who can influence a mission regarding the importance of integrating gender into development activities, but only with research data will the TS have the information to influence the Mission. Before TA activities are conducted, the TS can only speculate.

Local Counterpart Institution

As much as possible, the research activity should be attached to a local organization/institution, or a project, preferably during the design phase of the latter. This placement will improve the research quality and backstopping of the TA, but also develop the local capability as well as facilitate institutionalization in the local country context.

Salaried TA

If the goal of the Consortia cooperative agreement is to expand the body of knowledge, then it is important that the TA be a higher level person, either junior faculty or a doctoral candidate. People at this level usually require some remuneration if they are to take time from their normal university activities to do an overseas activities. The higher level TA demonstrates the importance of quality research and professional approach in assessing WID issues, just as you would any other development/research activity. It will show that PPC/WID considers the effort to be important and serious, with potential for generating good data for use in program and policy formulation. It also motivates quality candidates to apply, and helps them justify the seriousness which the activity should be viewed even on their own campuses. In the end, you pay for what you get.

Greater Dissemination of the Results

Previously, it was recommended that the Project Director be at least three quarter time, if not full-time. Preferably, the position should be a full time one, with the Project Director/Management Office assuming the added responsibility of synthesizing and disseminating the results of the research studies undertaken. PPC/WID should participate in the process as well. Only then, will institutionalization take place on the campuses and within A.I.D. It is not possible for the current cooperative agreement, through the fielding of 8 TAs and 4 TSs, be effective in

institutionalization among the Consortia campuses. It is too small a group to even be noticed, unless their results can be amply disseminated. Only then will the cooperative agreement's objective of generating increased development awareness on the university campuses, and the development of experimental projects to demonstrate the impact of gender issues, be achieved.

APPENDIX A
TIME LINE

TIME LINE

MALI (CID)	NEPAL (CID)	URUGUAY (MUCIA)	INDONESIA (MUCIA)
<p>JULY 87 Worldwide cable out</p> <p>MID SEPT 87 (Mission to PPC/WID) Initial request for possible participation from USAID Mission AID-PPC/WID</p> <p>OCT 87 Mission confirms participation, requests TS with Mak French farming system capability</p> <p>OCT 87 Henderson initiates search for TS</p> <p>MID OCT 87 Top TS candidate selected (Willis); travel tentatively scheduled for December, possible TA (Kevry) also identified</p> <p>NOV 87 (TS on CDSS) TS speaks with Carlson/PPC-WID re assignment PPC/WID finalizing country selection with USAID/Mali</p> <p>DEC 87 Aid Mission postpones travel until after X-mas (mid January)</p> <p>MID DEC 87 Willis child sick - resigns TS position, suggests L. Fernea</p>	<p>JULY 87 Worldwide cable out</p> <p>JUNE 10, 1988 USAID/Nepal writes letter to Dr. Thomas, Utah State, requesting assistance in planning and design "Women in Farming Workshop"</p> <p>JUNE 17, 1988 SOW for TS to PPC/WID</p> <p>JUNE 22, 1988 Letter passed to Dr. Riley, Utah State WID/Coordinator who sends to Henderson</p> <p>JULY 88 Search for TS, discussion with USAID/Nepal re CID/WID CoOp Agreement, etc R. Balakrishnan/Lettler tentatively identified. Henderson presents program to Oregon staff AID/Nepal gets briefing re: project</p> <p>JULY 14, 1988 Telex officially requesting program to PPC/WID. July 15 - confirms interest</p> <p>JULY 19, 1988 CV letter and Balakrishna sent to Carlson -PPC/WID</p>	<p>JULY 87 Worldwide cable out</p> <p>JULY 88 Mission requests WID TA</p> <p>JULY 20, 1988 P. Carlson sends copy Uruguay telex to MUCIA</p> <p>JULY 26, 1988 R. Gallin forwards comments re: her concern of SOW requested.</p> <p>SEPT 88 Carlson queries AID/Uruguay re: SOW to which Mission responds with justification. Uruguay given a "go" for MUCIA.</p> <p>SEPT/OCT 88 Applications for TS solicited from members of PAC.</p> <p>NOV 8, 1988 TS applications (3) sent to Carlson for selection</p> <p>DEC 6, 1988 Barbara Knudson selected as TS.</p> <p>MARCH 6, 1989 Telecom Carlson/USAID Mission.</p>	<p>JULY 87 Worldwide cable out.</p> <p>SEPT 87 Mission expresses interest in working with Consortia.</p> <p>OCT 87 Mission confirms interest and PPC/WID assigns Indonesia to MUCIA after PAC agrees.</p> <p>NOV 87 Mission requests material on potential TS's. 12 applications sent to MUCIA/WID onto PPC/WID.</p> <p>NOV/DEC 87 Information packet and bibliography prepared and distributed to PAC.</p> <p>JAN 88 Mission selects Kate Cloud as TS.</p> <p>JAN 21/1988 R. Gallin communicates with USAID Jakarta.</p> <p>FEB 5, 1988 Subcontract initiated for K. Cloud with U. of Illinois.</p> <p>FEB 10, 1988 Subcontract sent to U. of Illinois.</p>

TIME LINE (continued)

MALI (CID)	NEPAL (CID)	URUGUAY (MUCIA)	INDONESIA (MUCIA)
<p>LATE DEC 87 Femea interviewed, accepts, receives clearance from Carlson PPC/WID</p> <p>JAN 88 Country clearance received</p> <p>Jan 14, 1988 Femea leaves for Mali, arrives Jan 15 Conducts 3 week mission, then moves onto Chad as TS</p> <p>JAN 19, 1988 Femea's SOW sent to PPC/WID for approval</p> <p>JAN 88 Mission approves visit KRW/CID team, also indicates concurrence of visit PD Henderson at end of February</p> <p>MID FEB 88 Femea unable to complete TS assignment in view - SECID Project not willing to use CID/WID TA in farming system. Femea had to leave for Chad TS</p> <p>MARCH 7, 1988 Henderson travels to Mali from Mauritania develops third SOW-Women and Credit</p>	<p>JULY 20, 1988 Tentative SOW from Mission received</p> <p>AUG 8, 1988 Balakrishna accepted by Mission as TS</p> <p>AUG 11, 1988 PPC/WID informs Mission re travel plan</p> <p>AUG 23, 1988 Workshop confirmed for Oct 5-7 Balakrishna rearranges schedule</p> <p>AUG 31, 1988 Advertisement for TA goes out - start search - possibility of salary</p> <p>SEPT 88 Workshop schedule delayed due to earthquake</p> <p>SEPT 25-EARLY OCT 1988 TS leaves for Nepal</p> <p>NOV 1, 1988 TS cables SOW to Henderson with OK of Mission</p> <p>NOV 1, 1988 First packet info re Nepal sent to WID coordinators - TA search starts</p>	<p>MAR 89 Telex initiating travel arrangements for TS - proposing coordination with UNDP evaluation team, May 89</p> <p>APR 20, 1989 MUCIA receives copy of cable with travel arrangements</p> <p>APR 20, 1989 Gallin writes USAID/Uruguay with details re program, B. Knudson background, etc</p> <p>APR 24, 1989 Request for country clearance.</p> <p>MAY 1, 1989 MUCIA signs Personnel Service contract with TS - TS signs May 3, 1989.</p> <p>MAY 89 Country clearance received</p> <p>MAY 8-12, 1989 TS in field</p> <p>MAY 17, 1989 TS sends trip report to Carlson and Gallin, and faxes "approved" SOW to Uruguay.</p>	<p>MARCH 10, 1988 K. Cloud departs for Indonesia (3/10-4/4/88)</p> <p>APR 4, 1988 Cloud returns</p> <p>APR 7, 1988 Conference call with PAC to discuss project; initiate search for TA; deadline 4/22 set for selection committee.</p> <p>APR 11, 1988 Washington meeting between Gallin, Carlson, Long and Cloud to discuss SOW's</p> <p>APR 13, 1988 PPC-WID requests detail/clarification of SOW.</p> <p>APR 22, 1988 Deadline application - TA's.</p> <p>MAY 3, 1988 (Cougill/Carlson) Cable from USAID/Jakarta approved. First SOW with change; delay 2nd SOW until 89. Current TA candidates not interested in revised SOW.</p> <p>MAY 12, 1989 Search for TA for revised SOW initiated.</p>

TIME LINE (continued)

MALI (CID)	NEPAL (CID)	URUGUAY (MUCIA)	INDONESIA (MUCIA)
<p>MARCH 25, 1988 Henderson telexes A/D Mali requesting approval SOW for TA's. Proposing mid-June TA arrival.</p> <p>MARCH 25, 1988 Mission approves "general sense of SOW" and allows CID to start TA recruitment (appears info not passed to PPC/WID who sent telex April 7, 1988 requesting approval).</p> <p>MARCH 29, 1988 TA advertising initiated. Info sent to Coordinator. Info packet on Mali previously sent.</p> <p>APRIL 88 <u>Telex to PPC/WID indicating Mission "general approval". Initiate process.</u></p> <p>APRIL 88 TS report received and forwarded.</p> <p>APRIL 20, 1988 SOW for 2 TA's (Credit and Women Organisation) sent to coordinators. May 15 deadline set. 2nd packet info sent.</p> <p>MAY 88 Selection Committee, through conference call, selects Luevy & Grigsby (2 candidates). PPC/WID consulted.</p>	<p>NOV 7, 1988 Office advises re TA position out. SOW approved.</p> <p>DEC 19, 1988 TS report mailed to USAID/Nepal.</p> <p>DEC 28, 1988 Conference call to select candidate. Tisch and Holman selected.</p> <p>JAN 89 Henderson telexes mission with info re candidates. "Only go with salary."</p> <p>JAN 89 Briefing by telephone to Tisch.</p> <p>JAN 31 1989 Telephone call CID Exec. Committee to USAID/Nepal re salary issue.</p> <p>FEB 89 Salary issue resolved through matching funds. Country clearance for Tisch received.</p> <p>FEB 17, 1989 Tisch leaves for Nepal.</p> <p>MARCH 23, 1989 Henderson contacts USAID/Nepal re: 2nd TA Holman.</p>	<p>MAY 26, 1989 Telecom P. Carlson/P. Orr referring to SOW and appropriateness of SOW to PPC/WID objectives.</p> <p>MAY 89 Telex from Mission to PPC/WID endorsing SOW and justifying activity.</p> <p>JUNE 2, 1989 Cable received from PPC/WID. Proceed with TA selection for Uruguay.</p> <p>JUNE 2, 1989 Fax to PAC indicates recruit TA's for Uruguay. Due date: 6/15.</p> <p>JUNE 6, 1989 Letter to P. Orr from R. Gallin indicating search for TA underway.</p> <p>JUNE 13, 1989 Application from B. Moffatt received.</p> <p>JUNE 16, 1989 B. Moffatt selected. USAID/Uruguay informed. (They had called PPC/WID requesting urgency of fielding person ASAP). Telecom Orr/Carlson - informed of selection.</p>	<p>MAY 88 Letter from Gallin to Mission clarifying issues raised in 1st cable.</p> <p>JUNE 88 PAC wishes Indonesia to be considered as 2 countries. No go. (6/29).</p> <p>JULY 88 2 TA applications received for SOW.</p> <p>JULY 29, 1988 K. Cloud sends revised SOW with greater detail to PPC/WID.</p> <p>AUG 16, 1988 PPC/WID agrees to proceed with SOW 1. TA/Denise Grey selected through conference call.</p> <p>AUG 18, 1988 Gallin sends letter to Coughil requesting clarification re Grey's responsibilities/logistics.</p> <p>SEPT 11, 1988 Response received from Coughil.</p> <p>SEPT 15/16, 1988 Briefing meeting with Grey at PPC/WID and with MUCIA/WID (Cloud attends).</p> <p>SEPT 16, 1988 Grey signs contract.</p>

TIME LINE (continued)

MALI (CID)	NEPAL (CID)	URUGUAY (MUCIA)	INDONESIA (MUCIA)
<p>JUNE 2, 1988 PD Henderson telexes mission with selection info</p>	<p>MARCH 24-25, 1989 TA briefing (Holman) U of Arizona</p>	<p>JUNE 89 Telex from Mission to PPC/WID approving Moffatt, giving country clearance reiterating no administrative support to be provided</p>	<p>SEPT 24/29, 1988 Grey leaves for Indonesia/arrives.</p>
<p>JUNE 88 PD Henderson sends supporting documentation re TA selection</p>	<p>APRIL 89 Holman postponed due to political unrest</p>	<p>JULY 6, 1989 Gallin/Moffatt talk via phone re: assignment send Personnel Service contract</p>	<p>NOV 17, 1988 Letter from AID/Jakarta requesting different SOW than that prepared for SOW 2.</p>
<p>JUNE 88 Mission telexes concurrence with selection and submits approved SOW Country clearance for Luery and Grigsby given</p>	<p>MID JUNE 89 Tisch leaves draft report with USAID/Nepal</p>	<p>JULY 6, 1989 R Gallin writes USAID/Uruguay with info re Moffatt Sub contract with U of Minn signed re Moffatt</p>	<p>DEC 21, 1988 Mission decides not to proceed with 2nd SOW.</p>
<p>JUNE 27, 1988 TA orientation for Luery and Grigsby given at U of A. Fernea attends. Roles procedures outlined</p>	<p>JUNE 6, 1989 2nd workshop programmed, request Tisch return</p>	<p>JULY 8-SEPT 18, 1989 Bruce Moffatt in field.</p>	<p>JUNE 1, 1989 TA Grey returns from Indonesia.</p>
<p>JULY 7, 1988 Telex to mission informing delay in arrival of Luery due to loss of passport by passport office July 13 expected arrival date</p>	<p>LATE JULY 89 Tisch return confirmed in writing</p>	<p>SEPT 14, 1989 Moffatt leaves copy of report with Mission - debriefs.</p>	<p>OCT 3, 1989 1st draft report received.</p>
<p>JULY 13, 1988 TA Luery arrives and begins assignment</p>	<p>AUG 89 Additional funding for Tisch found</p>	<p>SEPT 15, 1989 Moffatt report received by MUCIA/WID</p>	<p>NOV 7, 1989 2nd draft report received.</p>
<p>NOV 8, 1988 Henderson telexes mission for approval of Grigsby's assignment</p>	<p>SEPT 9, 1989 Tisch leaves for workshop</p>	<p>SEPT 19, 1989 Moffatt returns from Uruguay.</p>	<p>DEC 89 3rd version of report received, approved by MUCIA/WID and submitted to PPC/WID.</p>
<p>NOV 23, 1988 Henderson resends telex</p>	<p>NOV 89 Go ahead for Holman received, same SOW Travel schedule for 12/28/89-3/26/90</p>	<p>Report approved?</p>	

TIME LINE (continued)

MALI (CID)	NEPAL (CID)	URUGUAY (MUCIA)	INDONESIA (MUCIA)
<p>DEC 88 USAID Mail cables PPC/WID giving clearance for Gingsby (original clearance sent Nov 19)</p> <p>MID DEC 88 Luery finishes assignments, leaves preliminary report at Mission</p> <p>DEC 18, 1988 Gingsby commences assignment</p> <p>MARCH 15, 1989 Luery draft report acknowledged by AID/Mali, desirous of several modifications</p> <p>MAY 89 Gingsby returns to US, leaving preliminary report in Mali</p> <p>MID MAY 88 Luery report revised at U. of A. Final in English. Translation to French begins</p> <p>JUNE 88 Translation in process</p> <p>JULY 31, 1989 Luery final report in English and French sent (delayed due to translation difficulties. Mission had requested copies several times)</p>	<p>DEC 28, 1989 Holman departs</p> <p>JAN 11, 1990 Holman in delicate political situation, possibly change of SOW</p> <p>JAN-FEB 90 Unrest continues, affecting SOW, transportation problem</p> <p>FEB 90 Transportation issue resolved</p>		

TIME LINE (continued)

MAU (CID)	NEPAL (CID)	URUGUAY (MUCIA)	INDONESIA (MUCIA)
<p>SEPT-NOV 88 Comments re Gipsy report pending small revisions and French translation requested</p> <p>NOV 89 Final report Gipsy sent in English French pending due to high translation cost - Still not resolved</p>			

APPENDIX B

**CONSORTIA REACTIONS TO EVALUATION AND
GENESYS'S FINAL THOUGHTS**

APPENDIX B

Consortia Reactions to Evaluation and GENESYS's Final Thoughts

This appendix has three sections.

- 1. CID/WID's comments (both CID Executive Office and CID/WID Project Director) on the Evaluation.**
- 2. Executive Summary and Introduction of MUCIA/WID's response to the Evaluation.**
- 3. GENESYS's final thoughts and observations**

Section 1:

**CID/WID's comments (both CID Executive
Office and CID/WID Project Director)
on the Evaluation**



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June 11, 1990

Dr. Martin Hewitt and
Dr. Rosalie Norem
PPC/Women in Development
3725 A New State
Agency for International Development
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20523

Dear Drs. Hewitt and Norem:

This is in response to your request for CID/WID comments on the evaluation of the cooperative agreements between PPC/WID and CID. Enclosed is a detailed response from Dr. Helen Henderson, who was the CID/WID Project Director.

As you will remember, the evaluation team was delayed in arriving in Tucson due to a winter storm in the mid-west. Because of the changed schedule and a heavy tourist season in Tucson, we had difficulties in finding appropriate places for them to stay that were close to the campus. However, once everyone arrived and we were able to rearrange schedules for faculty, including those who had come from other universities, the evaluation session went well, even through the weekend. We found the team to be gracious, flexible, and willing to learn and listen. In general, we felt the evaluation was useful and focused on the right issues.

Dr. Henderson has provided a number of comments that will be useful in analyzing the report.

There are a few comments which are listed subsequently that I would like to have considered.

- (1) One of the main conclusions of the evaluation is that the cooperative agreement is not an appropriate vehicle for short-term activities oriented to integrating gender considerations into A.I.D. development activities. The implication is that university consortia are not able to do this type of short-term work well.

I disagree with this conclusion. CID/WID placed over 16 people on short-term assignments with limited financial resources in this project. Annually, CID places between 50-60 short-term people through our various projects. We recently had an agriculture indefinite quantity contract through which we placed many short-term teams in many A.I.D. missions throughout the world.

Dr. Martin Hewitt and
Dr. Rosalie Norem
June 11, 1990
Page 2.

The point is, we do long-term research and institutionalization and short-term work. The long- and short-term activities are mutually supportive and enable us to provide A.I.D. with people who have in-depth knowledge and understanding of the real world situations into which AID/WID concerns must fit. We want to do both long and short-term work and believe it is in the best interests of the Agency for universities to be involved this way.


- (2) The recommendation that U.S. short-term personnel work with host country personnel in WID activities is an excellent one. Training national personnel and giving them credibility and access to mission and government leaders is one of the key ways to gain sustainability for WID concerns. CID/WID emphasized this "pairing" and was successful in doing this in many cases.
- (3) The point about briefing personnel regarding A.I.D. and Agency procedures is a good one. We need to improve in this regard. It is difficult to do a thorough job in all regards in a project where funding is so limited. One of the advantages we at CID enjoy, is that through substantial involvement with A.I.D. for over 20 years, we have CID contacts and personnel in many countries who can help with mission-specific briefing, but we will improve our predeparture briefing during the next project.
- (4) I believe mission buy-ins are useful. They provide a sense of ownership and additional resources. We are knowledgeable about how to administer them. PPC/WID and our consortia project management will need to work together to insure the mission buy-ins are central to the purpose of the agreement.
- (5) I believe PPC/WID and the consortia should cooperate in choosing country sites. Your office can be helpful as we make these decisions. We also have important information and perspectives about where we might make the best contribution. We would like to see this selection process be a cooperative one--not one decided by PPC/WID alone.
- (6) There is a dilemma regarding the funding level for these projects. To stretch the money as far as possible, we paid no salaries in some cases, reduced the budgets for the work to a minimum--in some cases, perhaps, to a sub-minimum. By doing this, we had a significant impact in several different places. (The following is my personal belief, and not necessarily CID's.) Unfortunately, I believe, we perpetuated the belief in the missions, in the host countries, and in our campuses, that this work isn't worth full funding. Following this funding philosophy, WID analysis may be seen as not important enough to fully fund. Some of my colleagues working with WID disagree. Regardless, we need to be aware of the messages we send throughout A.I.D. about WID analysis by how we fund the project. I would be happy to discuss this with you further.

Dr. Martin Hewitt and
Dr. Rosalie Norem
June 11, 1990
Page 3.

We, at CID, are anxious to use the evaluation to improve our efforts and make even more significant contributions in the future. We believe the future holds great promise for improving U.S. development assistance through incorporation of a better understanding of gender issues into A.I.D. programs.

Thank you for requesting our response. We look forward to working with you in the future.

Sincerely,



Earl D. Kellogg
Executive Director

EDK:lam

cc: H. Henderson, UA

June 7, 1990

Martin J. Hewitt
Rosalie Norem
PPC/WID
Agency for International Development
Washington D.C. 20523

Dear Martin and Rosalie:

In response to your request for the CID/WID reaction to the Earnst and Young Draft Evaluation, I have prepared the following notes which are specially focused on the sections of the report dealing with CID/WID and those providing overall recommendations.

The response is divided into two sections, the first dealing with the general recommendations discussed in the Executive Summary and in the Conclusions and Recommendations. In the second section, I give clarifications of particular details.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

* I concur that the Technical Specialist should be able to assist the TAs, possibly through an additional site visit, and to participate in the final report writing. The TS should be a co-author of the final report. These steps will improve the Consortia's ability to provide meaningful and well-analyzed data to the Missions. It is also a good idea to have the TS as a voting member of the advisory committee.

Although the TS was not a member of the selection committee during the 1987-89 Cooperative Agreement, candidates were encouraged to call the TS for clarification of the SOW to which they were responding. Prior to the telephone conference, I have usually talked to the TS about the qualifications of the candidates.

I strongly disagree that the TS should "select" the TA. One of the strengths of the Cooperative Agreement is that we have a committee of Campus Coordinators who impartially review all proposals (responses to the SOWs, and discuss and rate the proposals during a conference call with the Project Director. A vote is taken with the Project Director participating in the voting. Through this means during two CID/WID projects we have maintained strong cohesion, based on the Consortia-wide sense that favoritism is not a part of the selection process. I have always been impressed with the committee's good judgement in picking the best candidate. To give selection rights for the TA to the TS would weaken the strength of the central management composed of the Project Director and the Campus Coordinator Advisory committee, and possibly lead to divisiveness within the system.

The TS should assist the Consortia WID Project Director in "overseeing

preparation of the final report" and in "conducting follow-on activities". The Project Director is going to be held responsible for the results and therefore cannot abdicate responsibilities concerning work plan and final results.

A new Cooperative Agreement needs to provide flexibility to the Project Director to send the TS out to the field for a second time, if necessary, or to provide for other supervision if the TS is not available.

- * TSs can provide short-term assistance as long as PPC/WID, U.S.A.I.D. Missions, the Consortia WID Project Directors, and the TSs clearly understand that drawing up the SOWs needs to have first priority.

- * Although I support a program of Mission Buy-Ins to provide salary for the Technical Specialists and (under certain circumstances) Technical Assistants, the cases of Mali and Kenya indicate that you can have strong impact without Buy-Ins. In Mali, both TAs were graduate students, yet their work is being incorporated into new government credit programs for women. In Kenya, though the TAs were salaried through their own universities, the Mission and Egerton University were very receptive to their work. In Lesotho, highly effective work was done by several TAs. I concur that an excellent report on the impact of technology on women agriculturalists was written by a senior faculty member (with LAPIS BUY-IN), but it should be noted that a TA (an MA candidate with extensive African experience-) produced data on sorghum production which is also affecting Mission planning.

- * The Consortia are in a double bind: asked to produce cost-effective/"inexpensive long-term research" but then criticized for sending out "inexperienced persons" because they are "inexpensive." Most of the TAs had previous international experience, though it is true that some lacked experience in dealing with Missions. Most TAs (salaried or unsalaried) provide a valuable research service to A.I.D. and, in return, gain experience which enhances their career choices.

- * In terms of cost-effectiveness, it should be noted that CID/WID would not have been able to fund its Ts as an if it had not been judicious with Cooperative Agreement monies and if had not had the strong support of the lead university (University of Arizona), which did not require Indirect Costs on the travel, per diem, or operations of TAs. If a stipend or salary had been provided for TAs it might have been more difficult to justify not taking Indirect Costs.

Costs for information dissemination usually exceed those awarded in the Cooperative Agreement. This means that operational funds have to be re-allocated. In the case of CID/WID, the Project Director chose to use the phone more and travel less. This enabled us to provide funds to publish manuals for Egerton College addressing female students' needs, to pay for French translation of reports (cost for each report ranging from \$1,000-\$1,500), and to offer support for a Women in Business Handbook in Lesotho.

- * As CID/WID Project Director, I used limited international travel funds only once, when I was in Mauritania (funded by a Univ. of Arizona Project) and made a side-trip to Mali to develop an additional SOW and conduct negotiations with the Mission. In all other cases, I communicated with the Mission through phone, telex, or through CID/member university faculty

travelling to countries in which the Cooperative Agreement was operating or anticipated operating.

* We think that our orientations were effective. They can, of course, be improved upon especially by providing information on AID operations. 1987-89 TA orientations usually had participation of the TS, and various faculty members in fields related to the TA's research. Prior to proposal writing, country and topic specific materials had been provided to each campus; additional materials were provided at the orientation.

Orientations for the TS were held over the phone. A considerable amount of materials was sent to all TSs prior to their departure. Campus Coordinators also provided orientations for TSs on their own campus.

* A problem mentioned in the evaluation was that of confusion over logistical support and backstopping. This was especially true in Lesotho where cost for vehicle rental exceeded the costs anticipated in the Cooperative Agreement. In addition, we had 4 TAs in Lesotho due to Mission requests. Since this was the first country in which we worked, we were concerned about negatively affecting the budget for other countries. For later countries, especially Kenya, we were much more generous.

* Consortia are capable of undertaking focused, relatively short-term effective work. For example, see the manuals produced by one of the Kenya TAs and a host-country co-researcher. Several Technical Specialists combined SOW development with focused consultancies for USAID Missions, e.g. in developing a Women in Farming Systems Workshop in Nepal, in providing Nutrition and Agriculture advice to the Lesotho Mission (funded by an another AID project collaborating with CID/WID), and in providing credit advice in Chad.

* Short summaries of final reports could be and should have been provided to PPC/WID. Extensive dissemination efforts were not part of the Cooperative Agreement. We were under the mistaken impression that Missions would be able to duplicate reports, themselves.

* CID/WID TSs and TAs in "traditional (female) fields" usually had training appropriate to the SOW. It is more difficult to find women in science, engineering, etc., but several of our 1984-86 TAs had such backgrounds.

* Host-country counterparts can be part of the TS/TA research and joint author team, but the ultimate responsibility for the final product must lie with the central project administration. We have had difficulty in reaching counterparts for feed back on reports.

CHAPTER II: HISTORY OF CID/WID ACTIVITIES

* II-2. CID/WID projects have indirectly affected University of Arizona programs and publications but they are not responsible for the Women in Development Workbook, the UA WID program, and the Women's Studies Committee. The latter are UA based programs and publications with funding from a variety of sources.

* II-2. The 1984-86 program fielded 27, not 20 TA. (It is possible that the last evaluation cited 20 because it was conducted prior to the completion of

the project.)

* II-3. I am not sure I would call Farming systems and Social Forestry traditional male disciplines. The social forester Mali TA was a student of a female faculty member at Idaho who had been a CID/WID TA to India in the 1984-86 project.

* II-4. TSs to Nepal , Kenya and Pakistan had doctorates, TSs to Mali/Chad and Lesotho had MAs.

* II-5. The phone conversation was between Jim Collom (Deputy Executive Director of CID) and the Pakistan Mission liaison. Both Henderson and Collom had been attempting to reach Pakistan; before the decision to send the TS was made, Henderson consulted with P. Carlson, PPC/WID Project Officer. Except for this point, this complicated history has been presented very clearly in the evaluation .

CHAPTER III: MANAGEMENT EVALUATION OF CID/WID

* III-3. Primary management of information flow was with the CID/WID Project Office at the University. Major files are kept there, though copies of some key documents are made for the CID office.

* III-7. TSs were briefed by phone. It would be much better to bring them in for a formal briefing that stressed AID procedures. Again, we were concerned about overspending. For most of the TSs, however, lack of formal briefing was not a problem.

* III-11. Although the CID Deputy Executive Director received copies of candidates' applications, I do not believe he was ever present when the telephone conference took place. He did give me his impressions of the applications.

* III-12. Support in the field was difficult to provide. In some cases, as in Nepal during the recent uprising, communications were kept up with Holman with the help of IAAS staff. When Denney needed more funding for her Kenyan counterpart, she requested and received the money from the Project Director. The greatest logistical difficulties occurred in Lesotho (see above) due to cost of vehicle rental and, in the case of Gorton, lack of clear identification with a project. There were numerous phone calls about financial problems, and some extra money was provided for vehicles by the collaborating Nutrition and Agriculture project.

* III-13. I strongly agree that write-up time is important. Due to unanticipated delays, it is often difficult to complete write-up in the field. If data has to be coded and analyzed, a final analysis is usually done after return to the U.S. It is difficult to get a TA to do extensive re-write. In one case I suggested extensive changes, but settled for minor ones in order to have a more timely report for the Mission. The Mali TAs, however, were very responsive to suggestions for revision. (Perhaps because they still think of themselves as students!) More detailed discussion of the need for report revision (with specific examples) should be a part of the briefing process. If the TS has joint authorship, TAs may be more willing to rework their material.

CHAPTER IV: EFFECTIVENESS OF CID/WID'S FIELD PERFORMANCE

* IV-1. The Mali TS had prepared three SOWs, but one was based on the SECID Farming System Project staff's willingness to work with a CID/WID TA. A day or two before the TSs departure SECID personnel decided that they only wanted a TA from SECID; this clearly was impossible under our Cooperative Agreement.

IV-3. Indeed, SOW's should be more detailed, and work plans (derived from the SOW) greatly increased effectiveness of TAs in Kenya and Nepal.

IV-4. Mission supervision may be possible. In most cases, Missions probably would not seek such a formal tie. It's clear there needs to be a mechanism to ensure continuity of the TA's assignment inspite of personnel changes at Missions. Our major problem here, again, was with Lesotho.

CHAPTER VIII: CID/WID AND MOCIA/WID

I believe the idea of using PPC/WID matching funds came out of a December 1988 phone conversation with John Breslar, USAID /Nepal, as he was pointing out IAAS's need for senior TAs and we were telling him that CID/WID was not set up to provide salaries to TAs. Jim Collom's familiarity with the process of Buy -In was also helpful. Breslar was also in phone contact with Tulin Pulley of the PPC/WID Office.

CHAPTER IX: TITLE XII UNIVERSITY CONSORTIA AS APPROPRIATE VEHICLES FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING GENDER ISSUES

I think that the TS/ TA team, with some field supervision and joint report responsibility, would enhance Consortia's ability to "institutionalize gender considerations " at USAID missions. I do not see a major split between Consortia and other organizations in providing short term assistance, although sufficient lead time is critical.

Thank you for giving me a chance to respond to the Draft Evaluation.



Helen K. Henderson
Head, Women in Development Section
Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology

Section 2:

**Executive Summary and Introduction of MUCIA/WID's
Response to the Evaluation**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Response by MUCIA/WID to "An Evaluation of the Cooperative Agreements between PPC/WID and CID and MUCIA," by Ernst and Young, draft of April 1990

A detailed review of the above document shows that it lacks factual accuracy and distorts the management system for the MUCIA/WID cooperative agreement with PPC/WID. The accompanying materials deal with several aspects of these problems. As an illustration of the inaccuracies in the evaluation, Table 1 summarizes twenty-one major errors in the depiction of the first Scope of Work implemented in Guatemala. Section VI, "Scope of Work I, Guatemala...", provides a narrative description of the same errors as further illustration for this one case.

Three overviews provide more general information dealing with the cooperative agreement as a whole. The first, Section III, "Major Flaws..." summarizes the major strengths of the work of MUCIA/WID and the major errors in Ernst and Young's document. The report shows on the part of Ernst and Young:

- lack of knowledge about the PPC/WID agenda for MUCIA, which actually focused on less responsive missions;
- misportrayal of basic management characteristics of MUCIA, which did not include a decision-making apparatus that slowed response time. It is also apparent that MUCIA-WID had support from the MUCIA Executive Office and Board;
- misunderstanding of AID missions and their autonomy from PPC/WID is not recognized. They tend to be portrayed as under the management of PPC/WID rather than as separate units only loosely tied to many AID/Washington offices.

The second overview, Section IV, "MUCIA/WID Recommendations," discusses six major recommendations that would enhance the efficiency of a cooperative agreement. They stress drawing on the comparative advantage of the consortia, ensuring flexibility, and adjusting the management process to encourage more creative responses to a variety of issues.

The third overview, Section V, "Re-examination of Ernst and Young Recommendations," discusses suggestions in the evaluation that need further discussion in view of the factual errors on which they are based. Further detailed information is presented in "A Running Account of Factual Errors in the Evaluation, Pages V-1 through X-3." Information on further errors is presented in the margins of the document itself.

The response is based on material in our files, information from nine other MUCIA people and the recollections of four former staff of AID/Indonesia (two now at AID in Washington). It is apparent

that much of the data reported by Ernst and Young are erroneous, and that the errors have significantly shaped the analysis. Incontrovertible errors are present in time lines and virtually all characterizations of the supposed mismanagement of the project. Furthermore, the evaluation document is self-contradictory on some basic facts.

Rather than locating weakness in management styles, once these corrections are made, the evaluation would draw attention to structural issues. The evaluation should seriously take up these issues, and if future cooperative agreements are to be more efficient, new recommendations should be proposed. Instead, the evaluation tends to make recommendations that have already been instituted, as shown by changes in the relationship between MUCIA and PPC/WID over the last seven months.

Discrepancies in facts and misportrayal of management and structural features lead us to question the soundness of the evaluation. The evaluation contains numerous factual inaccuracies leading to false conclusions; thus we are forced to question the evaluation's validity.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Pages</u>
Executive Summary	1 - 11
I. Introduction	1 - 2
II. Table 1. Scope of Work I, Guatemala: an Illustration of Ernst and Young's Errors	3 - 4
III. Major flaws in the Ernst and Young analysis	5 - 6
IV. MUCIA/WID recommendations	7
V. Re-examination of the Ernst and Young recommendations	8 - 9
VI. Scope of Work I, Guatemala: an Illustration and Discussion of Ernst and Young's Errors	10 - 16
VII. List of Background Materials Provided to TAS: Examples for two Scopes of Work: Guatemala, Scope of Work II and Cameroon, Scope of Work I	17 - 18
VIII. A running account of errors in the Ernst and Young evaluation, Chapters V - VI and comments on Chapter VII	19 - 29
IX. The Ernst and Young evaluation with marginal corrections, Chapters V - X, p. 3	30
Table V-1	31 - 32
Table V-2	33
Chapters V - X, p. 3	34 et seq.
Appendix A. Memorandum from Anne Ferguson, "Comments on 'An Evaluation of the Cooperative Agreements Between PPC/WID and CID and MUCIA prepared by Ernst and Young'"	

INTRODUCTION

This response deals with several types of information in the Ernst and Young evaluation: fundamental facts, the resultant findings, and the recommendations based on them. Additionally, the response notes MUCIA/WID's successes and provides recommendations from MUCIA/WID on general characteristics of cooperative agreements with consortia.

MUCIA/WID's response is that numerous, severe inaccuracies in data collection led the evaluation team to flawed findings and, in turn, to recommendations that in some cases are inappropriate. The first major point in our response deals with the inadequacy of data collection by Ernst and Young. The case of the first Scope of Work in Guatemala is dealt with in depth to illustrate the errors in the evaluation. Table 1 summarizes major errors in the portrayal of supposed mismanagement by MUCIA in Scope of Work I for Guatemala. Section VI returns to this material and discusses it in some detail to explain what actually happened as documented by MUCIA/WID.

Having established the basic distortions by Ernst and Young of this Scope of Work, this response also considers errors throughout the depiction of MUCIA's work. Section VIII gives a running account of the errors in the evaluation; Section IX shows photocopies of chapters from the evaluation dealing with MUCIA, with marginal notes pointing out errors. As this section shows, severe misreporting by Ernst and Young occurred not only in the case of the first Scope of Work in Guatemala, but in all phases of our project. These sections document the copious errors by Ernst and Young, virtually all of them damaging to MUCIA's case for strong project management.

The MUCIA response also weighs these errors in relation to the outcome of the evaluation, and finds that they fundamentally shaped Ernst and Young's views of MUCIA's work. The relationships of Ernst and Young's findings and recommendations to their errors in writing the history of the project are examined in Sections III, V, VI, and VIII. In many cases, the errors led to misportrayals of MUCIA management and these findings then formed a faulty basis for Ernst and Young's recommendations. For example, Ernst and Young grossly mischaracterize MUCIA/WID's management in two ways. First, the evaluation describes MUCIA/WID as passing responsibility for decision making to PPC/WID, as noted frequently in Section VIII; however, PPC actually imposed their micromanagement on the project at the start. This arrangement may have seemed appropriate at the time; over the last seven months, however, micromanagement by PPC has not been pursued. MUCIA/WID has had much more responsibility for project management than in the beginning of the cooperative agreement. This was discussed with the evaluation team and the changes are apparent in the files on the project; however, the evaluation does not take note of the changes.

MUCIA/WID entered into the evaluation process in a good faith effort

to learn from our mistakes. We openly discussed our mistakes and difficulties with the evaluation team during their three-day visit at our Project Management Office, we gave them free access to our files, and we provided them with further information once they had left. Thus, we are baffled as to the origin of the copious errors in the document. It is our position that with so many errors in the evaluation, it is impossible to separate the wheat from the chaff in the present document. On the other hand, we would welcome a straightforward and insightful evaluation, and we believe that it would be as fruitful for us as for PPC/WID.

The recommendations in the evaluation generally seem to be more thoughtfully assembled than the rest of the document. In general, we agree with a number of the recommendations, except that they are often expressed as rigid rules rather than including flexibility. In some cases, we caution that the recommendations are based on an inaccurate history of the project, and in these cases, we find that they are poorly supported. Sections IV and V below point out some of the areas where flexibility is called for and why.

Section 3:
GENESYS's Final Thoughts and Observations

The objective of an evaluation is to review a project's goals, purpose and methodology as well as project implementation. The evaluation seeks to determine whether the project's design and implementation were effective and to identify lessons learned that can effect an improvement in the design and implementation of future projects. Evaluations are generally performed in an objective manner, seeking to identify positive elements of the project as well as to provide constructive criticism where appropriate.

By their nature evaluations generate divergent opinions. It is not uncommon that each entity observes and interprets facts from its own perspective. AID, host country institutions, consortia, Technical Specialists (TSs) and Technical Assistants (TAs) all have differing opinions regarding project activities. Such divergence of opinion strengthens an evaluation and should be carefully considered by those who wish to use the evaluation.

This evaluation of the CID/WID and MUCIA/WID cooperative agreements followed these precepts. It sought to recognize positive accomplishments and present constructive criticism that, if recognized, can improve the effectiveness of university consortia activities with AID. To accomplish this, the evaluation team, over a very short time, reviewed all available project documentation (progress reports, SOWs, technical assistance reports, correspondence, etc.) and interviewed personnel from PPC/WID, the USAID Missions, and the Consortia. Many of the TSs and TAs were also interviewed. The findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are based upon information presented by these various sources.

As may be expected, both consortia expressed their own opinions on the evaluation. Presented herein are the CID responses to the evaluation as well as the Executive Summary and Introduction of MUCIA's response.

After taking these comments into consideration, the evaluation team continues to believe that the overall conclusions and recommendations of this evaluation remain valid. The team would, however, like to add the following comments which address some of the concerns raised by the Consortia.

1. MUCIA/WID and, to a lesser extent CID/WID, both identified factual errors in some data presented in this evaluation. As was indicated above, the evaluation team collected data from a wide variety of sources over a very short period of time. This data was received from documentation provided by both consortia and by PPC/WID. The data was confirmed and supplemented through interviews conducted with the consortia WID management and executive boards as well as with many TSs and TAs. Extensive interviews were also conducted with officials of PPC/WID and the relevant USAID missions. Clearly, information received from such a variety of sources often results in differing interpretations of activities. The evaluation team sought to use various information sources to confirm the data on which this analysis was based. Nevertheless, some factual errors did occur, and they have been corrected in this final version. However, the team sincerely believes that they did not have a major impact on the analysis and their corrections have not resulted in a significant modification of the conclusions and recommendations of this evaluation.
2. The evaluation was conducted in February and March, 1990. At this time, CID/WID was in the process of finalizing its activities undertaken during the two year cooperative agreement

program. MUCIA/WID, on the other hand, was nearing completion of one Scope of Work for Guatemala, about to initiate a second Scope of Work for Guatemala, and at the end of this evaluation, proposed to and received permission from PPC/WID to implement one of the Scopes of Work for Cameroon. In other words, MUCIA/WID was in the midst of completing its cooperative agreement program. Furthermore, although every attempt was made to obtain up-to-date information for purposes of this evaluation, the majority of the information reviewed reflects activities undertaken during the June 1987 to December 1989 time period.

Therefore, in the case of MUCIA/WID, the evaluation, as presented, does not take into consideration the results of these last three activities. If information on these three activities had been available during the evaluation period, the conclusions and recommendations would have reflected the results of these activities. Having received subsequent information regarding the implementation of one of these scopes of work, the evaluation team still believes that the evaluation is accurate as presented.

3. Finally, the evaluation team would like to extend its appreciation to the Consortia and PPC/WID for their interest in and commitment to the evaluation which was undertaken. The frankness of the responses, often containing self-criticisms and self-evaluations, and the graciousness in which they were presented, made the evaluation that much easier. The evaluation team regrets any factual errors that may have been included in the report, as well as any confusion which resulted.