

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART I PD-ABI-178 87325

1. BEFORE FILING OUT THIS FORM, READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS.
2. USE LETTER QUALITY TYPE, NOT "DOT MATRIX" TYPE

IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Reporting A.I.D. Unit: Mission or AID/W Office <u>RHUDO/NEHA</u> (ESS# _____)		B. Was Evaluation Scheduled in Current FY Annual Evaluation Plan? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Skipped <input type="checkbox"/> Ad Hoc <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Evaluation Plan Submission Date: FY _____ Q _____		C. Evaluation Timing Interim <input type="checkbox"/> Final <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ex Post <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>	
D. Activity or Activities Evaluated (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated; if not applicable, list title and date of the evaluation report.)					
Project No.	Project / Program Title	First PROAG or Equivalent (FY)	Most Recent PACD (Mo/Yr)	Planned LOP Cost (000)	Amount Obligated to Date (000)
664-HG-004	HG-004C, Tunisia Low Cost Income Housing Project	Sept 17, 1988		US\$15 million of HG loans and US\$30 million equivalent Host Country	

ACTIONS

E. Action Decisions Approved By Mission or AID/W Office Director	Name of Officer Responsible for Action	Date Action to be Completed
Action(s) Required		
(Attach extra sheets if necessary)		

APPROVALS

F. Date Of Mission Or AID/W Office Review Of Evaluation:				(Month)	(Day)	(Year)
G. Approvals of Evaluation Summary And Action Decisions:						
	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission or AID/W Office Director		
Name (Typed)	Lane Lee Smith		Monia Ben Khalifa	David L. Painter		
Signature						
Date	3/9/94		3/8/94	3/15/94		

ABSTRACT

H. Evaluation Abstract (Do not exceed the space provided)

The 15 million HG004C program was authorized in 1986 and signed September 1988. It is the first housing program in Tunisia that addresses policy and institutional changes. The 15 million dollars are lent to the GOT and passed on to the Housing Bank BH as initial equity capital. The program objectives are:

- To promote private production of low income shelter:
- To improve the efficiency and performance of the housing finance system.
- Lower norms and standards for shelter.
- To introduce institutional and financial mechanisms for increased production of developable land.

To date the program proved to very efficient in promoting a private real estate sector active in low income shelter and improving both housing and housing finance delivery, particularly to low income households.

Impacts on increasing the supply of developable land have been very limited.

Minor implementation problems have been met and could be corrected through technical assistance and training.

All available evidence indicates that policy program can be successfully developed and implemented in Tunisia and have in the case of HG004C greater impacts than projects concerned with specific physical output.

For even better results, policy programs require adequate technical assistance and training at early implementation stages.

COSTS

1. Evaluation Costs

1. Evaluation Team		Contract No. OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (U.S. \$)	Source of Funds
Name	Affiliation			
Samir Kanoun	Urbanisme et Aménagement	-IQC No.940.100	\$22,620.97	RHUDO Program Budget
Rachid Taleb		I-00-2002-00 D.O. No.2 Amend- ment modification 1 to D.O. No.2 -P.O. No.940- 1008-0-00-2097 (Amend)	\$ 3,519.00 \$26,140.47	RHUDO Program Budget

2. Mission/Office Professional Staff Person-Days (Estimate) <u>5</u>	3. Borrower/Grantee Professional Staff Person-Days (Estimate) <u>10</u>
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2

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART II

SUMMARY

J. Summary of Evaluation Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (Try not to exceed the three (3) pages provided)

Address the following items:

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| • Purpose of evaluation and methodology used | • Principal recommendations |
| • Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated | • Lessons learned |
| • Findings and conclusions (relate to questions) | |

Mission or Office:

RHUDO/NENA

Date This Summary Prepared:

February 1993

Title And Date Of Full Evaluation Report: Evaluation
of HG-004C Tunisia Low Income Housing Project
February 1993

1. This evaluation is carried out by outside consultants on behalf of RHUDO/NENA USAID TUNIS.

2. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The 15 million HG004C program was authorized in 1986 and signed September 1988. It is the first housing program in Tunisia that addresses policy and institutional changes while aiming at concrete private production of affordable low income housing. The 15 million dollar are lent to the GOT and passed on to the Housing Bank BH as initial equity capital. The GOT, BH and the Land Development Agency AFH were to make available construction, mortgage and land financing and to introduce adequate procedures and norms for a sustainable private production of affordable low income land and core housing and developable land.

2.1 PURPOSE OF THE PROGRAM,

The programme addresses the constraints prevailing at the time of the design namely the recurrent shortages of land and/or housing affordable to low income beneficiaries and the resulting proliferation of substandard housing. In line with USAID policies HG004C focused on policies and procedures leading to greater private sector participation in low income shelter production and strengthened housing finance system.

2.2 PROGRAM COMPONENTS.

The program calls for restructuring the " Caisse Nationale d'Epargne Logement (CNEL) " into an autonomous private law housing bank BH with an initial equity capital of 15 million Dollars.

Under the program the three main implementation agencies; BH, AFH, and GOT had to satisfy the following requirements :

BH has to:

i- Make affordable mortgage loans to HG eligible beneficiaries for the purchase of serviced housing sites and/or completed expandable core houses.

ii- Encourage private sector developers to produce affordable housing sites and core housing units for sale to

program beneficiaries through land acquisition and development financing.

iii- To offer loans on a pilot basis to a limited number of municipalities, for land acquisition and development of access roads and infrastructure to increase the availability of serviceable land for Program Beneficiaries.

The Public land development agency, AFH has to:

Revise its policies to emphasize off site infrastructure projects which will allow for wholesale transfer of land to developers for further subdivision and servicing and/or housing construction.

GOT has to:

i- Encourage municipalities to use the financing made available from BM.

ii- Improve coordination between public utility companies and land developers.

iii- Revise standards and specifications for land development and housing construction towards increasing affordability.

iv- Take the necessary actions to allow municipalities to fully recover their infrastructure investment costs.

3. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY USED.

The present evaluation is the single evaluation to be made for this program. Its purpose is therefore twofold:

i) To assess the progress achieved in the implementation of the program and make recommendations for future action.

ii) To analyze and distill the experience gained so far with a view of providing pertinent input for the design of intended future HG programs.

The methodology used for this evaluations combines the study of program files; intensive interviews with the different parties involved (BH, AFH, GOT, Beneficiaries and private developers), analysis of data provided by participating institutions and site visits.

4. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:

The program proved to be pertinent and well focused on the constraints prevailing at the time of its design; some six years ago. The program has progressed satisfactorily with regard to both policy, Institutional initiatives and physical output objectives,

except as concerns AFH, which did not fully shift its emphasis to land assembly and off-site projects and the municipal component which has not been activated. Because of the latter two important exceptions the program did not achieve enough progress towards increasing the supply of developable land.

While most of the policy and institutional changes pursued by the program were well received and have been officially adopted, their implementation in the field suffers several imperfections due to inadequate training, weak control and lack of experience. These imperfections concern architectural designs, work relationships between public administrations and the private sector, coordination between developers and public utility companies, AFH land pricing and uneven construction quality. Implementation technical assistance is required to alleviate such imperfections during the remaining part of the program.

4.1 program achievements;

The detailed program achievements are given below for each of the implementing agencies:

BH:

i/ BH was created in April 1989 and chartered as a private law bank. At that time its capital was 15 million Dinars and was wholly owned by the state. Currently the capital of BH is 35 million Dinars of which 15 million owned by private share holders. By 1996 BH capital is planned to reach TD 50 million with a private majority holding.

ii/ BH has a land financing facility extending land acquisition loans to both beneficiaries and developers. land financing was banned prior to the program.

iii/ 70% of BH low income housing construction finance is extended to private developers as opposed to 10% by CNEL before the program.

AFH;

- Current AFH policy declaration states that at least 50% of the land produced by the agency should be affordable to low income beneficiaries. Previously low income sites and services were carried out on behalf of the government as special projects.

- The wholesaling of land to developers for further subdivision and/or housing construction is institutionalized and built into AFH's commercial strategy. However AFH did not shift its policies as stated in the program agreement.

The GOT.

The GOT acting through the Ministry of Public Works and Housing has accomplished the following:

SUMMARY (Continued)

- GOT issued regulations lowering the norms for low income land development allowing parcels of 80 sqm, densities of up to 60 units per hectare and core units of 40 sqm.
- GOT conducted USAID financed studies on physical planning and land development with a view of further lowering development standards and improving coordination. The results of these studies will be incorporated into a new urban code.
- GOT took action concerning the coordination between public utility enterprises and developers. As a result SONEDE, the public utility company in charge of water supply, has abandoned its monopoly over the construction of on-site water networks.
- The municipal finance component has not been activated for lack of follow up. However the issues related to municipal development and finance have been dealt with in HGO04D and in a major World Bank Project.

4.2 Impacts of the program;

The transformation of CNEL into an autonomous bank accountable for its financial results led to a better accountability and motivation of the staff. This phenomena has been accentuated by the recent public sale of BH share capital which made management and staff feel accountable to the public at large. Technical assistance, although limited, in computerization, management information systems, project evaluation and accounting and control procedures helped BH sensibly improve the efficiency of its operations. BH has proven very instrumental in promoting a private sector in housing and currently constitutes the back bone of this sector. Construction finance through BH at market rate led to better project selection, better compliance with laws and regulations and speedier construction. It is putting pressure on public agencies such as AFH or SNIT to gear up to speed and produce bankable projects as opposed to previous politically motivated projects.

From a situation nearly ex-nihilo, the private sector is currently predominant in low income housing and/or land production and in organized shelter production in general. 70% of BH disbursements for low income housing construction are made to private enterprises.

Shifts from public to private production, from heavily subsidized housing to credit financed housing and from unrealistic norms and standards to norms commensurate with beneficiaries ability to pay have clearly resulted in improved delivery of low income shelter with a reduced financial burden on the government. Availability of shelter affordable to the poor contributed to a substantial reduction of clandestine housing proliferation. Clandestine dwellings dropped from 40% to 20% of new construction and consist

mainly of middle income housing built without a permit not substandard housing.

The program did not have a tangible impact on the supply of developable land. This issue could be the focus of future RHUDO activities in Tunisia as the shortage of developable land continues to be a major constraint to shelter development.

4.3 Main implementation problems;

- The main implementation problems stem from the administration's lack of experience in interacting with the private sector. Most public officials are process oriented and are not accustomed to working with interest bearing funds. Gridlock, redundant approvals, cumbersome procedures and lack of coordination continue to cause excessive and costly delays eroding the profits of private developers and therefore their motivation.

- AFH has not been able to produce enough land. Most of the parcels sold to private developers come from old sites and have been down-zoned to low income housing. Their shape and dimensions did not allow efficient design.

- Land is wholesaled to developers at prices per gross area roughly equal to prices per net area of fully serviced land sold to beneficiaries for owner built houses in the same site. It is estimated that program beneficiaries pay 2 to 2.5 times the price paid by other beneficiaries for each sqm of fully serviced land. AFH discriminate against lower income households.

- Site layouts and core houses architectural designs can be substantially improved. This will result in lower cost and greater acceptance by beneficiaries.

- Controls and surveillance are weak or absent depending on the location of the site. As a result the quality of the infrastructures and construction is uneven and some defects have been observed.

4.4 Unforeseen problems and opportunities;

Current low income housing production, which is still below demand, is well beyond GOT and BH capacities to mobilize the necessary long term financial resources. Low income housing needs are estimated at approximately 4000 Units per year and current production capacity is around 3700 Units per year. The resources available for low income housing finance are replenished at the rate of 25 million TD per year through a 1% levy on salaries and approximately 15 million TD reflows from previous loans. These resources allow at best the financing of 2000 units per year or 50% of the estimated demand. Furthermore low income mortgages are extended at a 5% interest rate making it impossible to mobilize alternative resources and to insure adequate replenishment. Failure to find an adequate solution

to this resource problem will jeopardize the sustainability of the program.

Over a total of approximately 180 hectares developed and built by both private and public developers AFH supplied only 60 hectares or less than a third. The remaining 120 hectares have been purchased from private owners and developed by private developers. Where sewer trunk infrastructure was lacking private developers negotiated alternative sewer solutions with municipalities. This shows a current readiness to depart from previous rigid insistence on piped sewer. It also indicates a need to insure that developers and local governments adopt environmentally safe alternative sewer techniques.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THIS ACTIVITY AND ITS OFFSPRINGS:

The implementation problems identified above could be addressed effectively through technical assistance and training focusing on such topics as:

- improving the working relationships between state and local employees and officials and the private sector. Among the topics to be treated the additional costs to beneficiaries and the economy at large resulting from administrative delays and superfluous procedures.

- Improving the design of low income sites and the architectural design of core housing and providing beneficiaries with pre-approved extension drawings.

- Reinforcing construction control and surveillance mechanisms

Technical assistance is urgently needed in the area of resource mobilization and management for low income housing. Two directions should be followed; increasing the level of resources and improving loan conditions and maturities of mortgage loans while preserving affordability.

Actions should be taken in order to increase the supply of developable land. This issue should be the focus of RHUDO future activities.

6. LESSONS LEARNED:

6.1 Project design implications.

Programs focusing on policy and procedural changes, if well targeted, designed and accepted by counterparts, result in greater development impacts. This has been the case for HG004C. In designing such programs attention should be given to building strong and capable institutions and to providing the attitudinal and skill training required to implement the changes. Close follow up and monitoring are required in order to timely identify unforeseen problems and opportunities and to react accordingly.

Policy focused programs involves frequent contacts with policy and decision makers. Their implementation requires senior officers skilled in high level contacts and knowledgeable about the changes they are advocating and their implications.

6.2 Broad action implications.

The focus of future RHUDO/ NENA USAID Tunis should be policy and institutional initiatives aimed at increasing the supply of developable land particularly in the vicinity of large urban centers where infrastructure is critically missing. Private sector participation, sound financial mechanisms, affordability cost recovery and efficient institutional settings should continue to be priorities.

Sewer, the most prominent infrastructure constraint should receive a special focus. Alternative sewer solutions, lower service levels and phased infrastructure and servicing are now solutions accepted by the government but for which little or no experience exist and RHUDO contribution will be welcomed.

ATTACHMENTS

K. Attachments (List attachments submitted with this Evaluation Summary; always attach copy of full evaluation report, even if one was submitted earlier; attach studies, surveys, etc., from "on-going" evaluation, if relevant to the evaluation report.)

Copy of Evaluation of HG-004C Tunisia Low Income Housing Project, Reforms Support
HG-004C Program Assessment.

COMMENTS

L. Comments By Mission, AID/W Office and Borrower/Grantee On Full Report

10

XD-PBI-188-A
87329

**Evaluation of HG004C
Tunisia Low Income Housing Project**

February 1993

Prepared By:
Samir Kanoun

For:

**Regional Housing and Urban Development Office (RHUDO)
US Agency for International Development
Tunis, Tunisia**

**The views herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Office of Housing and Urban
Development or the US Agency for International Development.**

11

OUTLINE OF BASIC PROGRAM IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. Country: Tunisia
2. Project title: H3004C
3. Project Number: 664-HG-004C.
4. Project Dates:
 - a. First Project Agreement: September 17 th. 1988
 - b. Final Obligation Date :
 - c. Most recent PACD :
5. Project Funding
 - a. HG Funds: US\$ 15 Millions
 - b. Other Major Donors: none
 - c. Host Country: US\$ 30 Million Equivalent

US\$ 45 Million Equivalent
6. Mode of implementation: Direct implementation by GOT, the Housing Bank and The Land Development Agency.
7. Project Designers: RHUDO/NENA USAID Tunis, GOT.
8. Responsible Mission Officials:
 - Mission Directors: Charles Weden
George Carner
James A. Graham
 - RHUDO Directors: David Ollinger
David Liebson
David I. PAINTER
9. Previous Evaluations: None

12

**HG004C EVALUATION.
TABLE OF CONTENTS;**

1. **MISSION NAME:**
2. **PROGRAM DESCRIPTION.**
 - 2.1 **Purpose of the Program.**
 - 2.2 **Program components:**
 - 2.2.1 The housing finance institution:
 - 2.2.2 The Land Development Agency AFH;
 - 2.2.3 The Government of Tunisia GOT;
 - 2.3 **Loan mechanism:**
 - 2.4 **Brief historical background:**
3. **PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY USED:**
4. **FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**
 - 4.1 **Summary:**
 - 4.2 **Program Achievements:**
 - 4.2.1 **BH program achievements;**
 - 4.2.1.1 Restructuring of CNEL and equity capital:
 - 4.2.1.2 Land Financing and mortgage loans for expandable low income housing:
 - 4.2.1.3 Encouraging private developers:
 - 4.2.1.4 BH lending to Municipalities:
 - 4.2.1.5 Technical assistance to BH,
 - 4.2.2 **AFH Achievements under the program;**
 - 4.2.2.1 Introduction
 - 4.2.2.2 AFH policy achievements Under HG004C:
 - 4.2.2.3 Need to increase the supply of developable land;
 - 4.2.2.4 AFH land deliveries to developers;
 - 4.2.2.5 BH financing;
 - 4.2.2.6 Characteristics of AFH's land deliveries;

13

**HG004C EVALUATION.
MAIN REPORT.**

1. This evaluation is conducted on behalf of RHUJO/NENA USAID Tunis.

2. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION.

HG004C 15 million program has been authorized in 1986 and signed on September 17th 1988. It was the first HG program in Tunisia that addresses policy and procedural changes while resulting in concrete production.

2.1 Purpose of the Program.

The program aims at increasing the supply of serviced land and housing that is affordable to households earning below the median income and improving access of these households to shelter through the introduction of new policy and institutional initiatives in the shelter sector. It addresses the constraints prevailing at the time of the design namely, the recurrent shortage of serviced land and/or housing affordable to low income beneficiaries and the resulting proliferation of substandard housing. This shortage was the result of several structural deficiencies including; a) the weakness of the housing finance institution and the absence of land financing b) the lack of private sector participation in low income shelter production c) cumbersome procedures for land delivery at the national and local levels, d) Norms and standards that are high and beyond the purchasing power of low income beneficiaries and d) depleted reserves of devolapble land.

2.2 Program components:

The program components consist of policy procedural and institutional initiative tailored towards alleviating the perceived constraints and centered around the housing finance institution, the land development agency (AFH) and the GOT which are the three implementing agencies of the program.

2.2.1 The housing finance institution:

The program calls for the transformation of the housing finance institution CNEL into an autonomous, private law bank (BH), with an authorized equity capital of 30 Million TD and a

14

fully paid in initial GOT subscription of at least the Dinar equivalent of \$ US 15 Million.

Under the program BH has to:

a) Make affordable mortgage loans available to program beneficiaries for the purchase of serviced housing sites.

b) Encourage private sector developers to produce affordable serviced housing sites (as well as core housing units) for sale to program beneficiaries and provide pre-sale financing for land development costs; and

c) Provide loans on a pilot basis, to a limited number of municipalities, for land acquisition and development of access roads and infrastructure to increase the availability of serviceable land for program beneficiaries. The acquisition of land shall be limited to pathways necessary for the above roads and infrastructure.

2.2.2 The Land Development Agency (AFH);

The land development agency AFH has to revise its policies to emphasize land assembly and off-site infrastructure projects which will allow for wholesale transfer of developable land to developers with priority to private developers.

2.2.3 The Government of Tunisia GOT;

GOT, through the Ministry of Public Works and Housing and the Ministry of Interior has to:

a) Encourage municipalities to avail themselves of the financing available from BH for activities set forth in paragraph 1.c. above.

b) Provide for improved coordination mechanisms between public utility companies and land developers;

c) Revise the standards and specifications for land servicing and housing construction to increase the affordability of shelter for program beneficiaries, and

d) Take the necessary steps to allow municipalities to fully recover their land development costs.

2.3 Loan mechanism:

HG 15 million Dollar funds are lent to the GOT which in turn provides the equivalent amount in local currency to BH as equity contribution. BH will provide during six years beginning from the date of the first disbursement the Dinar equivalent of \$ US 45 million as mortgage loans for program beneficiary purchase of serviced land and core housing produced by developers, predominantly private developers.

2.4 Brief historical background:

Until the mid eighties, organized and legal housing production focused mainly on high and middle income households and led to an important shortage of low income housing and the resulting proliferation of clandestine substandard housing. Organized housing production was dominated by a public system consisting of the Societe Nationale Immobiliere for housing construction, the Agence Fonciere d'Habitation AFH for serviced land production, the Caisse Nationale d'Epargne Logement for housing finance and the Fond de Promotion de Logements pour Salaries, FOPROLOS, for low income housing finance to salaried persons. A nascent private sector, attracted by the financing made available by CNEL, existed and produced mainly luxury housing on land purchased from AFH. The remaining production was carried out by owner builders for the high to median income categories; building quality housing on land purchased from AFH and to a very large extent by the informal system building substandard housing on clandestine settlements.

CNEL was created in 1974 and structured as an administrative public entity. It operated a contractual savings scheme designed initially to finance some 8000 Units per year. Proceeds from beneficiary savings were used to prefinance SNIT programs and to a much lesser extent state approved private housing programs earmarked for these same beneficiaries. The contractual savings scheme was opened to all categories of income. In practice, however most of the housing produced was not affordable to low income beneficiaries and CNEL issued more so called "immediate loans" to solvent non savers than it did to the savers whose funds financed the housing programs. Despite the immediate loans CNEL had excess liquidity as there were no housing products affordable to the majority of its savers particularly the low income categories.

FOPROLOS funds were housed at CNEL and replenished at the rate of approximately 25 million TD per year collected through a 2 and then 1% tax on all salaries paid. These funds were only partially used for lack of production of affordable serviced land and/ or housing.

AFH produced serviced land mainly for upper income households. Low income serviced sites were produced as special projects carried out on behalf of the government and financed through foreign aid such as HG004B. Most of the land used by AFH was purchased from the state at symbolic prices or preempted from private owners. Land production cycles were very long reaching up to 10 years. In fill land reserves were nearing depletions and pressing needs for additional infrastructure emerged particularly concerning sewer.

In face of this situation the GOT undertook a major substandard housing eradication program designed to eliminate or rehabilitate the existing. The GOT also changed its policies towards lowering the standards, encouraging the production of low income housing and the participation of the private sector in such production, encouraging private land development and encouraging municipal investments in trunk infrastructure.

3. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY USED:

The present evaluation is the single evaluation to be undertaken for this program. It is carried out while preparations are being made for authorizing the second disbursement under the program and work is underway for the identification and appraisal of a new HG 005 program. Its purpose is therefore twofold:

- To assess progress made in the implementation of the program and make appropriate recommendations for the remaining part of the program.

- To analyze and distill the experience gained so far with a view of providing pertinent input for the design of HG005 program.

The methodology used for this evaluation, carried out by two outside consultants, combines the study of program files, intensive interviews with the different parties involved (BH, AFH, GOT, Beneficiaries and private developers), analysis of the data provided by the various institutions and site visits. While carrying out the evaluation a special emphasis was put on the identification of impacts of the various policy, procedural and institutional changes introduced by the program.

Follow up meetings were organized with the heads of AFH and BH as well as the directorate of housing of the ministry of public works and housing to discuss the findings of the evaluation as well as the recommendations for improvement.

4. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will describe the findings as they relate to each of the implementing agencies. a section will be included to describe the findings relating to private sector developers. First a brief conclusion:

4.1 Summary:

The policy and institutional initiatives introduced by the program were well received by GOT and the implementing agencies and officially adopted with the exception of the policies related to municipal borrowing and cost recovery. Progress on both the policy agenda and the physical output is satisfactory. The changes introduced by the program are now standard practices and policies, well imbedded in the shelter sector and gave tangible results such as the creation of affordable private low income shelter production, a performing housing finance institution and a sharp reduction in the proliferation of substandard housing. In the case of AFH the policies introduced by the program are currently an integral part of the official policy declaration of the Agency. However, although some land is being sold wholesale to private and public developers for further subdivision and/or construction and the Agency is still far from shifting its emphasis to land assembly and offsite infrastructure.

While the policies have been adopted their implementation in the field is amenable to improvement. Architectural designs for core housing suffer imperfections, relationships between the administration and private developers are sometimes strained and construction control and surveillance are absent or inefficient. These imperfections could be alleviated through targeted training and technical assistance during the remaining part of the program.

Current low income housing production is well beyond GOT and BH capacities to mobilize long term resources for mortgage financing. Failure to find a timely solution to this problem will jeopardize the sustainability of the program and its gains.

Five years after the HG004c signature the institutional setting, the procedure and shelter and housing delivery systems have tangibly improved. Two structural problems facing the shelter sector remain intact. The resource problem mentioned above and the persistent shortage of developed and developable land. These two problems should continue to be the focus of RHUDO/NENA USAID Tunis activities in Tunisia and particularly land delivery. AFH should be pressed to shift its emphasis to land assembly and off-site infrastructure as agreed in HG004C. But relying on AFH is now an obsolete solution. Municipalities

endowed with a good lending system and a corollary cost recovery should be caused to invest in urban infrastructure and to gear up with the pressing demands for urban land. Since sewer is the prominent infrastructure constraint, efforts should be made to address this issue with high priority. The study undertaken with USAID financial assistance on sewer strategies for Tunisia should be reactivated, as alternative sewer techniques that are environmentally safe could effectively help solve the land constraint and improve the affordability of shelter to low income beneficiaries.

4.2 Program Achievements:

4.2.1 BH program achievements;

4.2.1.1 Restructuring of CNEL and equity capital:

One of the major institutional initiatives of HG004C is the transformation of CNEL into an autonomous private law Housing Bank with an initial subscribed and paid in capital of TD equivalent of US 15 million .

The decision to restructure CNEL was taken by a ministerial council held on June 30 th. 1988. The actual restructuring took place almost one year later on may 30 th. 1989 when CNEL officially became BH.

At the time of creation the equity capital of BH was 15.1 million TD in conformity with HG004C agreement. This capital was wholly owned by the state and totally paid in; in the form of a transfer of assets from the state to BH. The Capital of the bank has since been raised to 35 million TD. A first increase bringing the capital to 20 million TD was made in April 1992 through the consolidation of a State loan into equity capital. A second capital increase of 15 million TD took place shortly thereafter under the form of an equity shares issue to the public at large. An additional capital increase of TD 15 million is programmed for 1996.

Currently the structure of the capital of the bank is as follows:

State	57 %
Private	43 %

BH shares are quoted on the Tunisian stock exchange "Bourse" they were issued at 5 TDs per share in June 1992 and are currently trading for 7.2 TDs.

4.2.1.2 Land Financing and mortgage loans for expandable low income housing:

BH is currently a so called universal Bank engaged in all forms of commercial banking including foreign operations. As related to housing BH has diversified its products to include:

- Land financing,
- Home Improvement loans,
- Loans for the purchase of existing homes,
- Loans for luxury housing at full market rate and in amounts strictly based on borrowers capacity to pay and the value of the home.

a) Land financing;

Land financing loans are medium term loans not to exceed seven to ten years. Their maximum amount is set at 7000 TDs. In order to qualify for a land loan beneficiaries should deposit 3000 TDs at BH for a period of at least Three months. Loans for land acquisition are estimated at about TD 4 million for 1992 and are increasing at 10% per year. The land financing facility was very instrumental in accelerating sale of AFH serviced land stock. However it is not very clear that low income households are benefiting from this facility.

b) Loans for expandable core housing;

The number and amounts of mortgage loans for expandable low income core housing issued by CNEL and subsequently BH between 1988 and 1991 is summarized in the table below:

LOW INCOME MORTGAGES EXTENDED BY BH 1988-1991

YEAR	NUMBER	AMOUNT TD Mio	CUMU- LATIVE
1988	1895	12.5	12.5
1989	1986	14	26.5
1990	3005	25.1	51.6
1991	2553	27.8	79.4

In the four years between 1988 and 1991 BH has granted 79.4 TD million worth of affordable mortgages for expandable core housing. A recent verification of a meaning sample of these mortgages revealed that 88% of them or about 70 million

20

TDS were extended to eligible beneficiaries. According to HG004C program agreement BH should provide the dinar equivalent of US\$ 45 million in affordable mortgages to eligible program beneficiaries within six years of the first disbursement i.e by December 26th 1997. According to the table above BH satisfied this condition before even the first disbursement took place on December 1991. It should be noted that the first disbursement took place 30 months after the signature of the Agreement despite GOT timely satisfaction of relevant conditions precedent. The second disbursement has yet to take place.

c) Resources for low income housing finance;

Resources for low income finance are made available through the " Fonds de Promotion de Logements pour les Salaries " FOPROLOS. FOPROLOS is a special fund replenished through a 1% annual levy on all salaries paid and through loan repayments form FOPROLOS financed mortgages. Currently the fund is being replenished at a rate of approximately 39 million TDS; TD 25 million in new funds and TD 15 million in loan repayment.

Beneficiaries of FOPROLOS loans are salaried persons whose salaries do not exceed three times the minimum guaranteed salary "SMIG" .

The fund provides mortgage loans and construction finance as follows:

i/ Beneficiaries earning less than Twice the SMIG:

- Mortgage loan for a home not to exceed 50 square meters i.e. approximately 1490 sqf.
- Beneficiary cash payment equal to 10% of the cost.
- Monthly installment less than 40% of income.
- Interest rates of 5% with maturities of up to 25 Years.

ii/ Beneficiaries Earning between 2 and three times the SMIG

- Complementary loans of TD 528 at an interest rate of 8.25%

iii/ Housing construction loans

These loans are issued to developers for low income housing projects at the following conditions:

- Loan amount: 90% of estimated project cost, including land.
- Interest rate: Money market rate + 1.5 %,
- Maturity 3 years.

d) *Affordability of the Mortgage loans;*

Currently the median income is TD 270 per month in Tunis and TD 240 elsewhere in the country. The average cost per expandable core housing unit is about 14000 TD and affordability in Tunisia is officially defined as spending no more than 40% of income on Housing.

Typical financing for a core house is as follows:

- Beneficiary advance 1500 TD
- Mortgage loan at 5% over 25 years 12500 TD

The monthly installment on such a loan is 73 dinars or 27% of the median income in Tunis and 30% elsewhere. It should be noted that housing is slightly cheaper outside of Tunis.

Beneficiaries other than FOPROLOS can obtain BH regular contractual saving loans at 8.25% with maturities of up to 20 Years. Such beneficiaries pay monthly installments of 98.5 Dinars or 36% of their monthly income.

Most of the beneficiaries interviewed are paying monthly installments ranging between 60 and 90 dinars per month. Prior to moving to their purchased homes they used to pay monthly rents ranging between 45 and 75 TDs per month as tenants of units of comparable size and quality or slightly better. Household incomes ranged between 200 and 360 Dinars.

e) *Characteristics of the housing built;*

The table below is based on verifications made on the sites visited. It summarizes the characteristics of the core houses built by private and public developers:

CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSING BUILT

SITE	SIZE Sqm	PLOT SIZE Sqm	DEVELOPER	PRICE
ZARZOUNA	42Sqm	97	SNIT	15500
FOUCHANA	47 to 55		ESSOUKNA	14900
KALAA KBIRA	41	135	SNIT	15000
ESSADA	43	84 to 100	PRIM	13500
SIDI SAHBI	35.7	102 to 11	SNIT	13000
SIDI SAHBI	33.5	85 TO 120	DHAMEN	NA

f) Expendability of the housing built;

Site visits revealed that private developers adopted architectural designs that are more responsive to beneficiary demand and provide in some instances several designs on the same site. Public developers on the other hand have a better quality construction.

Tunisian architects and developers have no experience with core housing design. SNIT for instance continues to leave a 4 meter frontage. Accordingly extensions on SNIT core houses are done on the street side.

Where beneficiaries built extensions they did so at high cost and with an undue waste of space for lack of professional architectural advice and/or pre-established extension drawings.

Technical assistance in architectural design for low income core housing, offered through BH to developers and their architects would help improve the layouts and designs for core low income housing. Pre-existing extension drawings should automatically be handed to beneficiaries and a solution should be found to control and technically assist construction of home extensions. In Morocco for instance ANHI, the public land developer, commissions private architects to follow up the construction on its sites for a period of three to five years and advise and assist beneficiaries. The honoraria of these architects are included in site development cost and recovered from beneficiaries at the time of plot purchases. These costs amount to a very small percentage of land cost but result in big savings to beneficiaries and better quality housing and neighborhoods.

4.2.1.3 Encouraging private developers:

a) Factors that influenced the emergence of a private sector:

i/ Land Acquisition and development loans;

Opening the land acquisition and development pre-sale financing facility at BH, prompted a rush towards private low income housing development. Previously land acquisition financing was deemed inflationary and banned. SNIT had by far the lion's share in shelter development and private developers were precluded as the requirement to come up with up-front equity financing to pay for land and land development costs made it impossible for them to participate. Only very few private developers were active in housing development. They

were well established developers with a good financial standing.

Currently, low income housing projects, can benefit from construction finance loans of up to 90% of the project cost including land acquisition and development costs. These loans are extended at positive real interest rates equal to the prevailing money market rate plus a 1.5% margin (now 13.25%) and have a three year maturity.

ii/ Fiscal incentives

The rush towards low income housing development has also been motivated by new fiscal incentives granted to developers and summarized below:

- Low registration tax for chartering the enterprise.
- Income tax exemption on 35% of capital subscribed in real estate development companies.
- Low fixed rate registration tax for cancelling sales promises.
- Low registration tax and land purchases.
- Low registration tax rate on borrowing contracts, property registration and all other project financing costs.
- Income tax exemptions of up to 50% of the profits realized on low income housing development operations.
- low fixed rate registration tax for land purchased from a land developer, and for new housing purchased from a developer.

These fiscal incentives are detailed in Law # 90-17 dated February 26 1990 relative to real estate development and its amendments as stated in Law # 91-76 dated August 2nd 1991 and the Finance Law of 1992.

iii/ Simplification of administrative procedures and improvement of financing conditions;

Finally private low income housing development has been helped by the acceleration and simplification administrative procedures such as the delivery of building permits and tangible improvements in financing such as raising the ceiling for housing finance made available through social security funds from 5000 to 10000 TD, extending FOPROLOS loan maturity from 20 to 25 years and lowering developer's up-front

participation in project financing from 20% to current 10% of project estimated costs.

b) *Private sector growth;*

The number of registered and approved real estate developers has doubled between 1986 and 1991 to reach 253, as shown in the table below:

REAL ESTATE COMPANY FORMATION

YEAR	COMPANY FORMATION	CUMULATIVE
1986	12	125
1987	6	131
1988	11	142
1989	32	174
1990	49	223
1991	30	253

A clear acceleration in company formation has been noticed between 89 and 1991, fueled by the availability of financing and the fiscal incentives described above. It should be noticed however that not all the companies registered had real activity and that currently there is a slow down in company formation and in low income housing development. This slow down is the result of a current shortage in long term financial resources for low income housing and depleted land reserves.

Relevant characteristics of real estate development companies are given in annex 1

b) *BH activities related to low income housing developers:*

The following tables summarize BH construction finance activities since its official creation in 1992:

LOAN COMMITMENTS TO HOUSING DEVELOPERS
TD Mio.

	1989		1990		1991		1992	
	TD	%	TD	%	TD	%	TD	%
PUBLIC DEVELOPERS	15.5	49	36.8	48	25.9	27	41.1	53
PRIVATE DEVELOPERS	16.3	51	39.5	52	70.9	73	36.8	47
TOTAL	31.8		76.3		96.8		77.9	

BH LOAN DISBURSEMENTS TO DEVELOPERS FOR LOW INCOME HOUSING
TD (000)

YEAR	PUBLIC DEVELOPERS		PRIVATE DEVELOPERS		TOTAL
	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	
1987	4328	100	0	0	4328
1988	9419	100	0	0	9419
1989	7176	53	5280	47	13436
1990	7774	54	6460	46	14334
1991	11658	37	19991	63	31649
1992 (LAST MONTHS ONLY)	7134	30	16305	70	23439

SOURCE : BASED ON DATA PROVIDED BY BH

26

BH LOAN DISBURSEMENTS TO DEVELOPERS: HIGH INCOME HOUSING
TD (000)

YEAR	PUBLIC DEVELOPERS		PRIVATE DEVELOPERS		TOTAL
	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	
1987	13743	92	1118	8	14861
1988	3198	61	2008	39	5206
1989	10918	60	7054	40	17972
1990	9325	46	10998	54	20323
1991	6473	32	13845	68	20318
1992 (1992 6 YEST MONTHS ONLY)	3601	30	8424	70	12025

SOURCE : BASED ON DATA PROVIDED BY BH

TOTAL BH DISBURSEMENTS FOR DEVELOPERS

TD (000)

YEAR	PUBLIC DEVELOPERS		PRIVATE DEVELOPERS		TOTAL
	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	
1987	18071	94	1118	6	19198
1988	12617	86	2008	14	146
1989	18094	59	12334	41	30428
1990	17099	49	17458	51	34557
1991	18131	35	33836	65	51967
1992 (1992 6 YEST MONTHS ONLY)	10735	30	24729	70	35464

SOURCE : BASED ON DATA PROVIDED BY BH

27

The tables above clearly indicate the emergence of a private sector active in low income core housing development. Organised private production of legal low income housing did not exist prior to the program.

- BH activities clearly favored the private sector for all types of housing. BH disbursements for housing projects were 70% to private developers and 30% to public developers for both low income housing and other types of housing. Prior to the program 92% of CNEI disbursements went to the public sector and 8% only went to private developers for housing projects catering to higher income groups. CNEI role was limited to that of project administration. It was limited to providing the necessary financing for projects evaluated and approved at the ministry of Public works and housing and had no private sector promotion role whatsoever.

- In 1991 BH disbursement for housing construction were almost three times higher than they were in 1988 when the program was signed.

d) Current situation;

As mentioned above there is currently a slowdown in low income housing construction due to a resource shortage and to increased depletion of the stock of developable land particularly in the main urban centers. In the second half of 1992 BH sharply decreased its new commitments for low income housing projects and will continue to do so until a solution to the resources problem is found. According to both BH and the government the following solutions are being explored:

- Using part of the FOPiOLOs proceeds to subsidise interest rates on resources raised on the financial market for purposes of financing low income housing.

- Further targeting FOPiOLOs loans towards lower income categories.

- Increasing beneficiary cash payment requirement from current 10% of unit cost to 15 or 20%.

- Introducing negative amortization.

- Raising additional resources through foreign borrowing.

The resource gap for low income housing during the period of the eighth plan (1992- 1996) is estimated at 150 million TDs.

Failure to come up with a timely solution to the resource problem will jeopardize program gains.

4.2.1.4 BH lending to Municipalities:

Lending to Municipalities for trunk infrastructure extension did not take place. Alternative institutional solutions to municipal borrowing have been developed and are currently being implemented. A major World Bank municipal development program has been signed recently and is being implemented. This projects addresses the issue of municipal borrowing but is not specifically focused on trunk infrastructure extension. A 10 million Dollar HG004D project has been authorized on September 27 th. 1990. The program agreement is awaiting signature.

4.2.1.5 Technical assistance to BH,

BH benefited from USAID technical assistance in the following areas:

- The identification of Savings Pockets: This was a study and survey aimed at identifying savings pockets and ways in which low income beneficiaries finance their housing. The study was instrumental in defining BH new products and BH savings collection strategies. The study was conducted by a consortium of local consulting firms. It was financed by USAID Tunis and carried out jointly with the World Bank.

- The Study on Small Developers: This study aimed at surveying the universe of formal and informal small developers and their methods of intervention with a view of identifying and targeting BH activities towards this group. The study took a very long time to complete due to changes in RHUDO/WENA USAID Tunis staff. It was not exploited to any useful end and no follow up was made on either part. The study was carried out by a Tunisian consulting firm; Perspectives Sociales.

- Study on the automation of BH activities. This study carried out by a US free lance consultant; Mr. William A. Ryan was very instrumental in defining BH automation strategy. It was well received by BH and served as a basis for defining USAID financed computer hardware and software procurement. More importantly it laid the basis for a more important undertaking currently Financed by the Canadian Agency For International Development and aiming at installing a fully integrated computerized information system covering both headquarters and branch network. According to BH management the bank has currently the most performing computer information system in Tunisia. However much remain to be done in comparison with the possibilities offered today elsewhere in developed countries in terms of integration, security and automation of additional activities and management procedures. It should be noted that

automation made a difference between former CNEL practices and current ones particularly as concerns accounting.

- BH received financial assistance for procurement of audiovisual and educational equipment for its training center. The training center helped BH carry out the important training activities that accompanied its creation. These ongoing training activities have been defined in a training plan developed with technical assistance from the French " Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique ". They concerned all categories of personnel across the board. IN 1991 for instance BH carried out 91 training activities totaling 2604 person days, at a cost of 125 000 TD and benefiting 673 persons.

- A seminar on housing projects evaluation was organized in 1990 for a group of more than 20 professionals from BH and some representatives from AFH and the ministry. The seminar was intended to introduce relevant staff members to the techniques of technical and financial analysis of housing projects from the point of view of a banker. The organizers a Higher Finance education institution the IFID was supposed to identify the most gifted participant for further intensive training and for staffing the project evaluation unit of BH. No follow up actions were taken and the impact of the seminar was limited.

- Other isolated training activities were undertaken such as the participation of the deputy chairman of BH in the FELS course, an information trip to the Jordan Housing Bank, and participation of BH staff in a seminar on small developers organized by the JHB>

- Study on BH procedure: This USAID financed study is in two parts. The first phase has been completed in September 1992. The purpose of the study was to adapt BH procedures to its new activities, to increased automation and towards increased accountability of the staff and security. The first part dealt with the diagnostic, and recommendations. The second phase which has yet to start is supposed to cover the detailed design and writing of the procedures, the accounting and the control systems as well as the organization and training of the accounting services. This study is very important for further streamlining BH operations and improving its efficiency.

4.2.2 AFH Achievements under the program;

4.2.2.1 Introduction

During the three years following signature of HG004C program AFH was plunged into a deep crisis and was subject to major audits and Administrative inquiries. Its management has been changed three times and its activities came nearly to a halt. With the current new Director General AFH seems to be returning to life and new projects are starting. All this has taken place

against a background of a deep financial crisis and new constraints such as the depletion of government owned land stock and the difficulties in raising the financing necessary. Very few households are willing to make advance payment for the acquisition of an AFH serviced plot as they did in the past. They are discouraged by the lengthy production cycles and they no longer have savings.

AFH crisis can briefly be characterized as follows:

- Accumulated losses as of December 31st 1991 reached 3.5 million TDs or 35% of AFH's equity capital as indicated in AFH condensed balance sheet for 1991 given in annex 2 .

- Short term debt reached 131 million TDs as of December 31st 1991 of which 89 million TDs in beneficiary advance payments and 28 million for consumables.

- Short term assets reached 131 million TDs also as of December 31st 1991. These assets consist in AFH land stock, both land under development and land simply kept as a reserve. These assets that are supposed to back up beneficiary advance payments warrant the following remarks:

- Because of the law of 1983 concerning the protection of agricultural land approximately 600 hectares or 56% of AFH's land reserves have been declared agricultural land and are therefore unfit for development. Solutions are being sought for selling or exchanging these land parcels but because of their classification as agricultural land it is expected that replacement costs will be much higher than what these parcels might sell for.

- 120 hectares of serviced land remained unsold as of December 31st 1989. They concern sites scattered all over the country namely those of Jalta, Gaafour, Dahmani, Tajerouine, Bou Arada, Zriba, Hajeb El Ayoun, Bir Ali Ben Khelifa, Djebnana, El hancha, Tataouine, Tozeur, Kebili, Mednine, Bouficha, Jelma and Matmata. The reason for bad sales are varied but are mainly:

- The absence of a sewer system: Several of the sites above have been equipped with piped sewer on-site. However there is no off-site sewer network to connect these sites to nor are there any alternative sewer solutions planned.

- The absence of demand: This concerns some politically motivated projects that have been

overdimensioned and that are not adapted to the local environment such as Kebili.

- In addition to the 120 hectares mentioned above AFH sites which have been sold or which are in progress contain an important number of plots reserved for public facilities. These plots totaling an area of approximately 76 hectares and estimated at 9 million TDs have not been paid by the administration.

- AFH continues to be overstaffed. Its staffing approaches four hundred persons of which only 30 are professionals including 15 engineers and architects.

4.2.2.2 AFH policy achievements Under HG004C:

In 1990 AFH elaborated a performance contract " Contrat programme " covering the period 1991 to 1993. This contract is directly inspired from the recommendations of the ad-hoc commission on housing that have been approved by the restricted ministerial council of June 1989. This contract that governs AFH's activities for the period contains two policy initiatives directly related to HG004C. The first concerns off site development of land parcels for subsequent wholesale to developers. The second concerns adapting the production to the needs and purchasing power of low income beneficiaries through an increase in densities.

While HG004C calls for revising AFH policies to "... emphasize land assembly and off-site infrastructure projects which will allow for wholesale transfer to developers with priority to private developers" the contract program states that:

- "... In addition to ordinary plots, AFH will produce tracts equipped with off-site infrastructure for sale to private and public developers.

- "... However the production of such plots will be done to order; on the basis of firm orders and a clearly expressed demand."

- " The production of land tracts equipped with off-site infrastructure is allowed only on sites having a total area of at least 10 hectares ".

Although the policy statement constitutes an innovation and a step towards implementing the changes agreed to in HG004C, it falls short of what is expected. AFH is simply introducing wholesale of land to developers but it has yet to shift its emphasis to land assembly and off-site infrastructure projects.

The fact that land tracts are produced to order implies that developers have to come up with advance payments. This requirement is unrealistic and unproductive for two reasons. First AFH land development cycles average seven years and no developer can make plans for such a long period. Second most developers lack the financial resources necessary for the purchase of land and rely on banks (BH) for the pre-sale financing of land.

In an attempt to shorten its land production cycle and to make its land tracts offer more attractive AFH authorized construction of housing projects before completion of off-site infrastructure. Some developers bought into the offer but are not likely to do so in the future. In some instances off-site networks, when completed, were not in conformity with the plans and accordingly developers were not able to connect their sites to the sewer network because of incompatible elevations. In other instances developers completed their projects but were not able to sell or long periods because of delays in the construction of promised off-site infrastructure. In both cases developers made big losses.

4.2.2.3 Need to increase the supply of developable land;

During the remaining implementation period of HG004C AFH should be encouraged to actually depart from its traditional land development activities and not only emphasize land assembly off site infrastructure and wholesale to developers but also to move towards partnerships with municipalities for trunk infrastructure projects where the emphasis will be the production of developable land and cost recovery of infrastructure rather than sale to beneficiaries or wholesale.

The need for such a move is imposed by the depletion of the stock of developable land and the cost of immobilizing huge financial amounts in land reserves during lengthy land development cycles. Cheap financing in the form of beneficiary advances has retracted so did quasi free government land transfers that fueled most of AFH past activities.

The suggested policy is now feasible due to the organization and actual emergence of a dynamic private land development sector that needs an adequate and constantly renewed supply of developable land for its survival.

4.2.2.4 AFH land deliveries to developers;

According to AFH records, actual land deliveries to developers reached about 71 hectares as of December 1992.

Land sold to private developers:	41.2 hectares
Land sold to public developers:	30.2

Total	71.2

The detailed listings of the sites and tracts sizes is given in annex 3 . These records are apparently incomplete as BH records show an additional 5.17 hectares (See paragraph below)

4.2.2.5 BH financing;

BH records indicate that only 22.24 hectares have been prefinanced by BH. Among the tracts prefinanced by BH and produced by AFH 6 sites totaling 5.17 hectares show on BH records but not on AFH's as follows:

SITE	DEVELOPER	=UNITS	AREA. Sqm
MOURUJ III	SPIT	25	2500
KAIROUAN	CID	122	20860
MOUROUJ V	ESSAAD	75	11270
MENZ. HAYET	HADRUMETE	44	9390
BEN AROUS	IMMO	30	4128
MUROUJ III	SPM	32	3596
TOTAL		328	51744

It is not clear how the remaining 18 or 24 hectares have been prefinanced. Available data suggests the following possibilities:

- Developers selected another source of financing.
- The land has been purchase but not yet developed.
- The land has not yet been delivered and only an advance cash payment was made.

4.2.2.6 Charcteristics of AFH's land deliveries;

Most land delivered by AFH to date consists of tracts of land from old AFH sites that started before HG004C. These tracts of land have been down-zoned for low income housing. They usually have a very small dimension (Less than a hectare) and very often require little in-site servicing. More importantly their shapes and dimension did not allow for an efficient land use and wastages were observed. In the future AFH should

34

incorporate tracts of land for sale to developers in its original design and attempt to dimension these tracts accordingly.

Where AFH attempted to sell tracts of land on new sites that have not started and recover advance cash payments developers were very reluctant. Advance cash payments received have been minimal and range between 3% and 30% of the cost depending on work progress on the site.

Some tracts of land have been sold and built before completion of the sites and their connection to the sewer network. Such a practice could work and result in tangible time and financial savings provided good planning, scheduling and coordination. Unfortunately these conditions were not met. Housing was built and remained unsold until such time as connection to utility networks were made. These delays eroded developers profits and caused some to leave the profession.

4.2.2.7 AFH Projected deliveries;

AFH is required to identify 80 additional hectares of land for sale to private developers as a condition for the second and final disbursement of the program. A list was provided in April 92 and included 81 hectares. This list, given in annex 4 is not in conformity with the requirements of HG004C specifying that the sites should be acceptable to BH. As of this date and based on data made available BH did not verify the acceptability of the list. This verification aims at assessing whether the tracts of land proposed are suitable for bankable private sector low income projects i.e among other things whether the tracts:

- Are in areas where there is a demand for low income housing among BH beneficiaries.
- Could be connected to public utility networks.
- Have clear property documents.
- Are ready for construction in a reasonably short period of time.

A quick examination of the list shows that several of the tracts are located on sites that have not even been purchased by AFH or for which the drawings and specification manuals are not ready. A sample of these tracts is given below:

SITE	AREA HECTARES
SELTENE	20
KASSERINE	4
MOBNASTIR	2
SAHLOUL 3	3
GROMBALIA	3
MEDINA III	6
DJERBA	4
SKHIRA	3
LE KEF	3
SILIANA III	2
TOTAL	50

The list proposed by AFH concerns mostly planned activities. Contrary to the requirements it does not provide enough land tracts that are clearly identified and ready in reasonably short time for private construction.

It is recommended that RHUDO/NENA USAID Tunis makes a close examination of this issue with a view of assessing whether AFH can deliver tracts of land in conformity with the letter and intent of HG004C and if necessary identify corrective actions.

4.2.3 GOT policy achievements under HG004C;

In June 1988 GOT adopted a new housing policy making ample room for private sector participation in low income housing production. This new housing policy is in line with the purpose, policy and institutional initiatives pursued by HG004C. It is based on the recommendations of an ad-hoc housing commission of which relevant excerpts are given in annex 5.

4.2.3.1 Actions taken concerning the revision of norms and standards;

a) *Norms and standards;*

GOT new housing strategy calls for:

- Increased densities of the urban tissue bringing the average density to 40 to 50 units per hectares. These densities were 20 units per hectare. They resulted in wasteful land consumption and exclusion of low income beneficiaries from access to legally produced shelter.

- Revising land use characteristics in current urban plans and those in progress to allow new forms of housing that consume less land (Dense single family units, attached housing, and multiple family housing)

- Adapting current land use regulations as well as set backs ,and heights of buildings to the requirement of smaller lot sizes and higher densities.

The new policy also calls for:

- Adapting the service levels,

- Considering staggered or gradual provision of infrastructure or services;

- Considering low cost alternatives that are environmentally safe particularly for sewer.

The latter three policy initiatives constitute good opportunities for the design of new programs in Tunisia. If adequately translated into realities they can contribute to solving the main issues concerning low income housing and particularly the supply of affordable urban land.

b) *Fiscal policy;*

In order to encourage the production of affordable low income housing GOT provided an attractive fiscal incentives package for housing or land development projects respecting affordable norms . These norms are defined in a ministerial order of November 27 1991 concerning the definition of social and priority housing given in annex 6. The order defines social housing as follows:

- Average plot size superior or equal to 120 Sqm with a minimum plot size of 80 Sqm.

- The cost per Sqm of serviced land not exceeding 20% of the minimum guaranteed wage.

- Core Unit size equal to or greater than 40 Sqm expandable to a minimum of 80 Sqm for single family housing. Multiple family housing should have a size of at least 60 Sqm per unit.

- Sales prices not exceeding 1.7 times the minimum guaranteed salary " SMIG ".

4.2.3.2 Improving the coordination between public utility companies;

Coordination among the various parties concerned with land development particularly developers and public utility companies continues to be a major problem. It is one of the priorities included in the housing strategy of 1988. MEH is receiving technical assistance, under the World Bank fifth urban development project, aimed at developing coordination procedures between the various players active in urban and housing development. Two USAID financed studies, concerning the procedures for elaborating and approving physical plans and land development project and the second, constituted the first step in this direction.

As a concrete step to improving coordination SONEDE, the national public utility company in charge of water production and distribution, relinquished its monopoly over the construction of in-site water distribution networks. According to MEH, STEG the public utility company in charge of electricity is expected to do the same in the near future. Relinquishing past monopolies over in-site network construction allows developers to better coordinate work on site and to shorten site development duration.

4.3 Impacts of the program;

4.3.1 The emergence of a private sector active in low income shelter production;

A private sector active in low income housing production emerged from a situation nearly ex-nihilo. Its emergence could be traced to the introduction of land financing, the attractive fiscal incentives package put in place by the GOT, the active role of BH in promoting the activity and the measures undertaken towards lowering the norms and standards. During the period starting in 1988 the private sector has been the recipient of more than two thirds of BH construction and land development financing. The private sector has been active in both land development and housing construction. It developed approximately 120 hectares of land for low income housing or

about twice the land which has been made available to the program by AFH and launched and delivered more low income housing than SNIT.

4.3.2 Improved low income housing delivery:

As a result of the program and the accompanying GOT policy initiatives housing production has been appreciably adapted to the needs. Low income households that had no choice but a hard to get government subsidized house or alternatively and more often a substandard clandestine house can now access the property of a legally produced and titled housing.

4.3.3 Improved housing finance system:

Restructuring CNEL into an autonomous housing bank BH resulted in greater efficiency of the housing finance system. The improvements could be measured through:

- The volume of mortgage and construction loans which is much higher than that reached by CNEL.
- Improved procedures and better beneficiary satisfaction.
- Diversified products that are adapted to consumer needs.
- Improved coverage country wide.
- Improved loan recovery.
- Better housing project selection.

BH enjoys more management and decision autonomy than did CNEL and more accountability for the funds it manages. This autonomy and accountability will further increase as a result of the public sale of BH's equity.

Because of its autonomy and accountability BH is resisting pressures to finance public projects that are not bankable pushing AFH and SNIT to better appraise and select their projects. BH is also being active in prompting the administration to remove constraints that impede its operation such as the weakness of the institutions in charge of property registration.

As an autonomous banker BH is more interested in the development of the private sector which is a better client than the public sector.

4.3.4 Reduced proliferation of clandestine housing;

The supply of low income housing made available through the program has effectively contributed to reducing the proliferation of clandestine substandard housing. According to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing clandestine housing fell from about 40% of new housing construction to about 20%. Furthermore most of the clandestine housing built consists of good quality middle to high income housing built without a permit as opposed to a predominance of substandard housing previously.

4.4 Unforeseen problems:

Resources for financing low income mortgages have been provided through FOPROLOS. This fund is replenished through a 1% tax levy on all salaries paid yielding TD 25 million a year and reflows from previous loans of approximately TD 15 million per year.

Current low income housing production levels are estimated at 3500 units and the demand during the next 4 years is estimated at about 4000 units per year. Taking into account land and construction financing needs and expected cost escalations the resource requirements for sustaining a production of 4000 units are estimated at TD 80 million or twice the resources currently available through FOPROLOS.

Lack of resources already prompted BH to reduce its new commitments forcing several developers to leave the profession. Efforts are underway to find alternative resource solutions. GOT is heading towards better targeting of FOPROLOS beneficiaries, improving loan conditions, earmarking portions of FOPROLOS funds for interest rate subsidies and repayments of resources raised on the financial market and mobilizing resources from abroad.

Failure to find a timely solution to the above mentioned resource problems could jeopardize program gains.

5. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS AND RELEVANT RECOMMENDATIONS:

5.1 Problems met at BH

5.1.1 PROJECT EVALUATION AND MONITORING:

The departments in charge of project evaluation are understaffed and the staff is not well trained in project evaluation and control. Annex A of HG004C agreement which is an integral part of the agreement states that BH should improve its project appraisal evaluation and control capability. A seminar was organized in this sense but the necessary follow up actions aiming at selecting and further training the most promising participants were not taken. Observed weaknesses concern both project evaluation and monitoring construction.

RECOMMENDATION:

BH should reinforce its project evaluation department through additional staffing and training.

BH should use the services of private monitoring and surveillance companies to insure that disbursements are made against actual works agreed upon and that the construction is sound and conform to plans.

5.1.2 QUALITY OF SERVICE

Private developers accounts are handled by regular BH staff and developers like beneficiaries have to stay in line and expose their problems in front the public. Very often the regular staff is not well qualified to give prompt answers to the problem and has to refer to other units.

RECOMMENDATION:

BH should create a special unit for the management of developers accounts. The staff should have enough decision autonomy to take the appropriate decisions diminishing the need to revert very often to the highest level of the organizational hierarchy.

5.2 Problems met at AFH

During the three years following signature of HG004C AFH plunged into a very deep crisis and was subject to frequent management changes. With the new management things seem to be picking up but the difficulties to be overcome are numerous and range from overstaffing and lack of qualifications to a huge financing crisis.

5.2.1 AFH EMPHASIS:

Rather than shifting its emphasis to land assembly, offsite infrastructure and wholesale of tracts of land to developers and particularly private developers as stated in the program agreement AFH simply introduced wholesale of land to low income housing developers and appears to be far from abandoning its past activities.

AFH requires prospective developers to make cash advances for the purchase of tracts of land before starting design and development. This practice is contrary to HG004C intent of encouraging pre-sale land financing to developers as no bank will lend money to a developers to take a purchase option on a tract of land.

RECOMMENDATION;

Discussions should take place with AFH and GOT to seek insurance that AFH will actually shift the emphasis of its operation to off-site development and will refrain from the practice of requiring cash advance payments from developers.

5.2.2 MANAGEMENT OF SPECIAL PROJECTS:

The staff in charge of HG004C is clearly unqualified. As a result project tracking data is hardly available and more importantly coordination with BH is very weak if not totally absent. A change took place lately but the new person in charge does not seem to have the punch necessary to push the agenda of HG004C.

RECOMMENDATION;

AFH should be asked to appoint a qualified project manager for special projects such as HG004B and HG004C. These projects concern implementation of new policies. They should be well tracked and their impacts constantly monitored and evaluated. This is not currently the case.

5.2.3 PRICING:

AFH does not have an adequate pricing policy. The main problems concerning pricing are as follows:

- Because of the lack of project cost data AFH pricing is based on the needs for overall financial equilibrium rather than actual project costs. Historical accounting is practiced and no provisions are made for land replacement costs. Accordingly AFH serviced land is being sold at prices lower than unserviced land sold by private owners in the vicinity and than those practiced by similar institutions in comparable countries. As a result and despite all the land that has been transferred to AFH by the GOT, AFH failed to build up the financial reserve necessary to finance its operations. Rather it eroded 30% of its capital through losses accumulated in the recent past. (See condensed balance Sheet as of December 1991 given in annex 6)

- Prices charged to developers are higher than those charged to beneficiaries of serviced plots in serviced

sites. These prices end up being two to three times higher when additional in-site development cost and the cost of land consumed by infrastructure are accounted for.

RECOMMENDATIONS;

- AFH should be asked to align the price of tracts of land sold to low income housing developers on those charged to regular beneficiaries on the same sites. In calculating these prices provisions should be made for development costs and for the cost of land to be consumed by infrastructure.

- AFH should reinforce its accounting services and introduce project accounts and cost accounting. Detailed accounting and good separation of accounts are prerequisites for the implementation of a good pricing policy allowing AFH to recover its costs, pay its debt, renew its assets and finance its growth.

5.2.4 LOW PRODUCTION LEVELS;

There has been a confusion in interpreting the program agreement regarding land delivery requirements. This confusion concerns whether the tracts of land sold to developers for purpose of low income housing that should be taken into account for the satisfaction of the conditions precedent should be tracts exclusively sold to private developers or sold to all developers and predominantly private developers. Both RHUDO and the implementing agencies are now leaning towards tracts of land sold exclusively to private developers. However the confusion is still causing some delays in processing the request for the second disbursement.

Notwithstanding the remark above AFH production of land has been very slow. Most of the tracts sold were Tracts from old sites down-zoned for sale to private development of low income housing.

AFH is meeting difficulties in identifying an additional 80 hectares earmarked for sale to private developers. The sites proposed are sites in the very early stages of identification and or development and are unlikely to be available for construction in a reasonably short time frame.

RECOMMENDATION;

- Organize a meeting with all operational directors and possibly project managers with a view:

a) Of informing them about HG004C. It should be noted that the program has not been well advertised and some confusion exists concerning its objectives.

b) Examining the possibility of identifying sites for sale to private developers where there is a demand. These sites should be well advanced and potentially deliverable in a reasonably short term.

- Focus future programs on increasing the supply of developable land through extension of trunk infrastructure and particularly sewer. Reinforcing the institutions, introducing alternative low cost, environmentally safe solution, creating good financial intermediation and introducing full cost recovery will help achieve the achieve the purpose.

5.2.5 LAND TRANSFER PROCEDURES:

AFH deviated from the land transfer procedures developed with USAID technical assistance for the pilot project. These procedures eliminated redundant approvals and introduced competition for quality. Currently land is sold to developers on the basis of regular bids that do not allow to know developers intentions and to check a priori their conformity with the specifications.

RECOMMENDATION;

AFH should reinstate the land transfer procedures developed for the pilot project and possibly improve upon them. Particularly, discrimination among prospective buyers should be based on the quality of the projects they envisage and not only on the prices they offer.

5.2.6 CONSTRUCTION SURVEILLANCE:

Technical monitoring and surveillance of works continue to be very weak and the quality of the sites largely depends on contractors good will rather than on an efficient monitoring system insuring compliance with specifications. Further more once Tracts of land are sold to developers AFH does not exercise any control over the layouts and designs adopted by the developers in order to insure the urbanistic coherence of the site.

RECOMMENDATION;

- AFH should rely on private monitoring and surveillance companies to reinforce its own insufficient control capacity. The costs incurred by such controls should be considered as part of project costs and recovered from beneficiaries. These controls will insure good quality and could result in lower costs and shorter construction delays.

AFH should regularly follow up the sites sold to developers and insure that layouts and designs are coherent with the specifications and with the urbanistic Characteristics of the sites.

5.3 Problems met at GOT level:

5.3.1 WORK RELATIONSHIPS;

Work relationships between private developers and the administration are strained due to unclear procedure, different interpretation of legislation and norms and standards, slow decision making and lack of aptitude. Of particular interest is the fact that administration officials are usually process oriented and have no experience in working with cost bearing money as do developers for which time is literally money.

RECOMMENDATION;

- GOT should accelerate current work on the adaptation of norms and standard and insure their understanding through detailed manual and adequate training.

_ GOT should organize seminars with a view of improving staff attitudes towards private developers and improving their responsiveness to the requirements of an efficient private sector.

5.4 Problems met at the level of developers:

Tunisian developers have no experience with the design of core housing. Several imperfections have been met during site visits including inefficient layouts, wasted space, superfluous decorative walls that have to be torn down at great expense during home extension and wasteful and non judicious set backs. Similar problems have been met concerning site layouts.

RECOMMENDATION;

GOT, AFH, and BH should provide training seminars to private architects and developers on architectural design for expandable low income housing and site design for low income housing. They should also disseminate successful experiences by organizing visits to efficiently designed sites and core housing.

5.5 Problems met at the level of beneficiaries:

A few beneficiaries have already started extension of there core homes and some have already finished. The extension were done without professional help accordingly they were done at high cost and did not efficiently make use of the space

available. Very often extension were also done without respecting regulations.

RECOMMENDATIONS;

Developers should provide beneficiaries with pre-approved extension drawings. Alternative designs should be provided and action should be taken to insure adequate monitoring of extensions and enforcement of urban regulations. Private monitoring of extensions could be envisaged and offers a superior alternative to current municipal and administrative controls. Beneficiary education could also help as several beneficiaries ignored the existence of architects or thought that they were very costly.

6. LESSONS LEARNED;

6.1 Design implications:

The program proved that policy programs can be developed and successfully implemented in Tunisia. As shown by the results achieved so far these programs when well defined, well accepted and well tailored to the removal of prevailing constraints can yield much higher impacts than programs focusing on physical outputs.

Policy programs such as HG004C require greater and more advanced or sophisticated technical assistance as they introduce new concepts and new attitudes for which there is no previous experience and no adequate institutional culture. These programs also require more training assistance as they introduce procedures and techniques applicable country wide and by a larger number of institutions.

Finally these programs require skilled project officers for their design and implementation as they involve frequent contacts with a wide range of policy and decision makers who are usually more educated and more sophisticated than usual project implementation staff.

6.2 Future activities:

Five years after the signature of HG004C two major problems are highlighted and are sources of concern; The shortage of long term resources for low income housing and the shortage of developable land particularly in the vicinity of large urban centers.

The Resource problem could be addressed through technical assistance aimed at increasing resource mobilization and improving the yield of existing low mortgage loans without excessively reducing affordability.

The land supply problem should be the focus of RHUDO/NENA activities in Tunisia. Solutions to the land problem lay in an increased supply of trunk infrastructure. The issues to be addressed are numerous and include:

- The institutional setting,
- Resource mobilization for infrastructure investments,
- Cost recovery of infrastructure investment and affordability,
- Private sector participation in design, financing, and construction

Sewer infrastructure is the most prominent constraint and should receive a special attention. Alternative low cost sewer systems that are environmentally safe, phased infrastructure servicing and lower service levels are policy initiatives that should be pursued.

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RHUDO

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REFORMS SUPPORT HG004 C PROGRAMME

ASSESSMENT

november 1992

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10055

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48

REPORT

REFORMS SUPPORT H3004 C PROGRAMME

ASSESSMENT

November 1992

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49

HO 00 4 C PROGRAMME ASSESSMENT

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

1- PROGRAMME PROGRESS

2- PROJECTS ANALYSIS

- 2.1- Zarzouna Project - Bizerte (SNIT)
- 2.2- Fouchana Project - Tunis (ESSOUKNA)
- 2.3- Kalaa Kebira Project (SNIT)
- 2.4- Essaada Project - Sousse (SOKIPRIM & SOPROLOGE)
- 2.5- Sidi Sahbi Project - Kairouan (SNIT)
- 2.6- Sidi Sahbi Project - Kairouan (DHAMEN)

3- ACTORS' PERCEPTIONS

- 3.1- The Developers
- 3.2- The 'Banque de l'Habitat'
- 3.3- The 'Agence Fonciere d'Habitation
- 3.4- The Ministry of Public Works and Housing
- 3.5- The Professional Bodies

4- CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDICES: (1 to 11)

9

HO 004 C PROGRAMME ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION

The urban housing policy in Tunisia was based on three main systems of housing production:

- The popular public system organised around SNIT, CNEL and FOPROLOS.
- The system of individual constructions on plots produced by AFH or by the private sector.
- The informal system (so-called anarchic), which is a response to certain discrepancies between housing offer and demand.

This system was conducive to remarkable results with a 4.94% growth in urban housing between 1975 and 1984. Nevertheless and paradoxically it also resulted in the exclusion of significant target groups in the population and to the physical degradation of urban peripheral areas.

Further, farming lands were wasted, urbanisation was exaggeratedly over-priced, the functioning of large towns was distorted, historic centres were turned into slums, and huge capital was unduly mobilised for luxury housing, left very often vacant (around 15% in 1984) while the development of social housing was hindered by financing difficulties.

The production of social housing has always been faced with two major issues:

- The land issue: availability, cost, services, location (in relationship with employment areas).
- Financing of buildings.

As far as the first issue is concerned, a number of analyses led to the conclusion that building land was eventually diminishing and pointed to the excessive waiting period for land because of legal procedures (AFH).

On the other hand, AFH could, until recently, draw from cheap public land reserves. Once serviced this very land was coveted especially by the better-off social groups (plots size, compulsion to pay cash, etc).

Thus, low income groups had to resort to SNIT and to self-construction on allotments from miscellaneous origin.

As far as financing is concerned, it appeared very quickly that the building society savings system which was the raison d'être of the former CNEL, led to the channelling of the largest pre-financing capacities to the benefit of the same better-off social groups who, benefitting from very advantageous mortgage loans and credit conditions awarded by social security funds and other bodies (banks, employers, companies funds), built

relatively few dwellings with important financial resources.

In the light of the problems above mentioned and others such as the insufficiency and inadequacy of public housing, the glaring insufficiency of social housing (long waiting lists for a SNIT dwelling), the lack of building land for low income households, the inadequacy of the CNEL system, the opacity of the land market (non-registered or DMVVM land...) and finally the lack of control over urbanisation (areas around big towns which are not), the approach of the 664 HG 004 programme seems to be clearly defined.

The housing programme agreement of 17 September 1988 and supplemented by Agreement Letters clearly define the aims of the project:

- 1- Completion of the conversion of CNEL into an autonomous Banque de l'Habitat (Housing Bank) which can finance or pre-finance any negotiable housing operation.
- 2- Orientation of the Agence Fonciere d'Habitation to a withdrawal from the sector of individual allotments to a function of developer of large estates to be sold to private or public developers, priority being given to the production of social housing.

Evolution of AFH plots sales to public or private developers

Year	Total Surface Sold (m2)
1987	159 403
1989	409 029
1990	467 807
1991	419 656

1- 1988 does not enter into the accounts since exceptional events took place.

2- In 1990, this total represented 36% of AFH total sales while it fell down to 30% in 1991.

Our purpose is to assess the results of the project with respect to the defined objectives, and to check that the conditions pending to the last credit payment have been lifted by the main contractors.

The terms of the pending conditions are as follows:

- AFH should supplement the sale of land to private developers up to 40 hectares.
- The Banque de l'Habitat should prefinance private developers' operations/projects.
- AFH should identify a further 80 hectares for sale to private developers and designed for the same target population.
- Progress report within the revision of service and construction standards.
- BH and AFH should issue of a completion plan (plan d'execution) of the completed programme.

This report, which is a part of the complete assessment of the HG 004 C project hinges around four main axes:

- 1- Project progress
- 2- Appraisal of some operations
- 3- Presentation and analysis of main participants' perception of project.
- 4- Recommendations and suggestions for the pursuance of the project within effective conditions.

1- Programme Progress

AFH sold.....extra-muros allotments (with services) within the HG 004 C programme.

HG004 PROGRAMME (USAID)

Table showing allotments designed for the construction of suburban dwellings (Extra-muros) and transferred/sold to private developers.

53

Allotment Identification			Developer Customer
Location	Allotment Number	Surface (ha)	
FOUCHANA		2,3800	ESSOURNA
HAMMAN-LIF		1,0440	ERRIDHA
CITE ESSALEM		0,8178	DIARTOUNES
		0,8810	SOPROLOGE
RADES II		0,8800	SI6 KHAYEM
MOUROUJ IV		0,2808	SPIT
MOUROUJ V		5,5000	LE LOGEMENT
		0,3400	LA NOUVELLE PROMOTION
			IMMOBILIERE
MOUROUJ IV		0,3679	MENZEL MABROUK
		0,4418	MENZEL MABROUK
		0,7780	SOTARI
		0,1578	SOBIT
		0,3885	BEIT JADID
		0,1728	IFEL
		0,1880	IFEL
		0,1638	SPIT
		0,1927	SPIT
MOUROUJ V		1,5560	IMMOBILIERE DE L'ARIANA.
		1,6308	EDIM
		0,7440	MAISON FAMILIALE
		1,1270	MAISON FAMILIALE
EL ONS LE KEF	H.S.C	0,2885	STAR IMMOBILIERE
SAHBI III		0,7800	SI6 DHAMEN
EL FATH JAMMEL		0,8900	SI6 BEIT - SI6 G.M.F
KALAA KEBIRA		1,4320	S.P.I.T
MONASTIR		0,9390	HADRAMAOUT
ESSAADA SOUSSE		1,100	BOKIPRIM - SOPROLOGE
SAKIET EZZIT	G 1	0,8920	RESIDENCE
SFAX			
EL ONS SFAX	G 2	0,7088	IMMOBILIERE MAGRIBINE
	G 4	0,7142	ALI MOALLA
	G 5	0,7862	EL AMEL
	G 7	0,8887	EL AMEL
	G	0,8807	IMMOBILIERE DE L'ARIANA
CITE ENNOUR			
DJEDAIDA			
EL MENZAH			
MOJEZ EL BAB		0,7360	BEIT JADID
NOUVELLE MECINA		0,8100	IMMOBILIERE SAIDA
KALAA KEBIRA 2		2,8770	G.M.F
JAMMEL		0,5000	
TESTOUR		0,4410	
TOTAL		35,1390	

AFH Return 11/11/1992

56

2- Project Analysis

2.1 - Zarzouna Project (Bizerte) (SNIT)

This project was initiated by SNIT in 1990.

It was broken down in three stages:

- 1) 52 houses, completed, sold and the keys were remitted to the recipients.
- 2) 46 + 48 dwellings, construction: 90% completion, services being laid out and commercialisation initiated.
- 3) 24 dwellings, "Kesseb" type: construction has just started (5%).

Thus, in total this project included 170 dwellings. Surface of land bought from AFH is 2.763 hectares. The cost per square metre is 14 Dinars and total price which was entirely paid to AFH is 387,100.000. This land was sold to AFH in 1985 for 4-5 Dinars/m². BH awarded an amount of 729 980.000 Dinars as a pre-financing measure (25/12/1990) for the acquisition of the land and the construction of the dwellings. Interest rates which were initially 10.5% increased to 13.3125% since 1/1/1992.

Sale price of house was 15,500.000 Dinars.

Average plot size is 97 m² while built surface is 42 m²/dwelling.

The house is - in its initial version - composed of a 12m² bedroom, a 13m² living room, a 6.3 m² kitchen and W.C. shower-washbasin. The base of the stairs is located in the back of the house, which does not allow for a separate first floor.

Street width is 9.00 m and access to most plots is ensured by 6.00 m wide passages with paving, without pavement. A 450 m² plot was reserved for commercial use. Although the land was bought by AFH in 1985 Agreement in principle from the Municipality and the 'Direction Regionale de l'Equipement' was not granted until 1989. Four applications for a land division permit were made by SNIT since 1989 (problem of protection area required by STIR).

AFH assignment note is dated 6 March 1990. The survey necessitated 6 months and it appears that - at Bizerte - the application was examined twice (land division permit and building permit).

Service notes were delivered on the following dates:

- 51 houses: 9-07-1990
- 48 houses: 5-12-1990
- 46 houses: 24-09-1991
- 24 houses: 24-07-1992

Works on the site of the first 52 dwellings necessitated about 24 months, which represents a period of seven years since the acquisition of a bare land by AFH to the final delivery of the houses.

The problems faced within this project are quite numerous and reflect an insufficient mastery of the general process by the different contractors. These problems can be summed up as follows:

58

1 - AFH sold and assigned the land to SNIT before completing off-site works; off-site services were laid out and the constructions were carried out simultaneously, which entailed serious constraints for access to the sites (rain, clayish soil, trenches, etc...).

2 - AFH interfered with SNIT in the laying out of tertiary services.

3 - Lack of competence of selected contractor.

4 - AFH gave priority to a site and services project (101 allotments) adjoining SNIT operation, which entailed further delays.

5 - A further delay was recorded by STEG with respect to the supply of electric power to the site (the survey carried out by STEG remained unpaid by AFH; the latter, in turn is claiming a revision of the survey) notwithstanding the fact that SNIT paid for a serviced land and for the survey by STEG. Furthermore, STEG are no longer willing to supply public lighting to these estates.

6 - The problems particular to SONEDE are the lack of specialised companies in the area, which causes over-price and delays). In addition, any transaction over 50,000.000 Dinars requires the Director General's signature, via the District Manager, which is a further cause of delay.

7 - The revision of the Urban Plan carried out simultaneously with the operation modified the width of certain roads (the width of a 12.000 metre road was changed to 20 metres) thus affecting the surfaces available for the operation.

8 - Wrought iron fixed on the windows caused the first deterioration of the facade.

9 - As far as the price of the land is concerned, it is revealed that the price of land with services (laid out by SNIT) amounts to 40 Dinars per m2.

10 - The committees examining the technical aspects of the applications require that some lands should be reserved for playing grounds or green areas, which increases the price of land while reducing transferable land.

2.2 - Fouchana Project (TUNIS) - ESSOUKNA

This project consists of 160 houses at Fouchana. It was initiated by the developer ESSOUKNA, a joint stock company established in 1983 and which capital is 2,150.000 Dinars divided into 215,000 shares, of which SIMPAR holds the majority (214,242 shares).

Land was bought from AFH in February 1991. Its surface is 23,472 m2. Total cost was 363,816.000 Dinars that is 15.5 Dinars / m2. BH pre-financed this transaction up to 343,000 Dinars on 22-04-1991.

60

The application for a building permit was made on 6 April 1991, agreement was awarded in August 1991. In September of the same year, works were launched. The project is now reaching its final stages.

Instead of sewerage a common septic tank was to be installed in the estate; this option was accepted under the condition that AFH should buy a septic tank pump lorry (vide-fosse) on behalf of the municipality. AFH delay in this matter caused the first application for a building permit to be turned down; in addition, the developer lost a few months' interest on loans.

AFH site was initially designed for council housing and was converted into suburban housing.

As far as commercialisation is concerned, 80 applications have already been presented to BH. Sale price ranges between 14,000 and 20,000 Dinars according to the allotment surface.

Several pattern -plans were proposed, which makes a site plan more adapted to the terrain specificity (dimensions, shape). Housing unit surface ranges between 47.5 and 55 m². In their majority they display the following

- functions:
- Bedroom 1: 9 m²
 - Bedroom 2: 9 m²
 - Living room: 10.2 m²
 - Hall
 - Kitchen: 4.8 m²
 - WC: 2m²

61

Some of the houses are composed of one 10.2m² bedroom only and of a 16.0m² living room out of a total surface of 47.5 m².

In general, the houses are set back from the facade fence and the stairs are always designed at the other end of the allotment and starting in the hall, which entails problems with respect to the extension of the house:

- since the facades are not complete, a high degree of heterogeneity will result with further extensions.

- The stairs location does not allow but an extension for the household's own needs, since the two floors cannot be separated.

Tertiary streets are in general 6 meters wide (including a 1.5 meter pavement) with double-layer asphaltting.

In this particular case, ONAS had specific requirements with respect to the diameter of the tertiary sewers which appeared to be bigger than the secondary sewers where they flow.

A delay in the delivery was caused by STEG refusal to carry out works before completion of road surface while the developer wished to complete the road surface after STEG and SONEDE interventions.

On the whole, this operation was quite well-conducted with reasonable delays and costs. The developer is willing to duplicate this type of project under the same pre-financing conditions.

62

2.3 Kalaa Kebira Project (SNIT)

SNIT scheme includes 29 'AZZIZ 1' housing units. Works on site have just started (30% progress) and tertiary services have not started yet. AFH surface allotment is 4,725 m². Unit price is 15.000 dinars /m², which brings total cost up to 70,875 Dinars. Site plan does not include losses nor residual plots.

A 100 m x 8m tertiary street runs along a single row of allotments while the other rows should be located along the off-site streets built by AFH.

Transferable surface is thus 3,925 m², that is an average of 135 m² per allotment. At a tertiary servicing price of 15 Dinars/m², serviced transferable land price will amount to 33 Dinars/m².

This project does not include allotments for commercial use. A sale by auction or at a higher price could have put down average price per square meter.

Project agenda is as follows:

- | | |
|--|-------------|
| - AFH purchase of site | :10-08-1984 |
| - Compulsory Purchase Decree | : 6-08-1988 |
| - Building Permit;
Agreement in Principle | :25-04-1989 |
| - Sales Agreement (to SNIT) | :18-09-1991 |
| - Off-site servicing works launching | :20-10-1987 |
| - Off-site servicing provisional
delivery | :24-03-1989 |
| - SNIT Building Permit | :17-07-1991 |

63

- SNIT service note : 19-01-1992

- Period of completion : 200 calendar days

The surface of the housing unit built by SNIT is 41 m² distributed as follows:

- bedroom : 9.8 m²
- living-room : 15.6 m²
- hall : 3.6 m²
- kitchen : 8.4 m²
- WC, shower : 3.6 m²

Front facade width is 9.20 meters with two yards in the front and a cemented backyard. Flat extensions are designed in the back.

This allows a separation between the two floors; however, this would result in total heterogeneity of the facades after completion of extensions.

No specific pre-financing was required by SNIT for this project and estimated completed housing unit price is 15,000 dinars.

The only problem faced by the developer was a three month delay caused by the contractor whose works were stopped by order of the Ministry of Finance because of unpaid tax. Penalties inflicted by the developer have not compensated for the loss of three month's bank interest.

2.4 Essaada Project (SOUSSE) (SOKIPRIM & SOPROLOGE)

SOPROLOGE Project comprises 41 extendable social housing units, built on G1, G2 and G3 sites bought from AFH on

64

15-12-1990, with effective possession on 18-01-1991. The site was sold to the developer at 14 Dinars/m²; total surface was 4,955 m².

For this project, AFH launched off-site servicing works in June 1987. Provisional delivery occurred on 27 September 1989.

The housing units are now all completed and occupied.

Their surface is 43 m² out of a total allotment surface ranging between 84 and 100 m². Construction works lasted less than one year (November 1990 to June 1991).

The project consists of a double row of back-to-back houses; one row is served by AFH off-site street and the other looks on a street adjoining the allotment and the half of which was the developer's onus.

Each house has a common wall with the houses on its sides and with the house in the back. The housing units are composed of the following:

- Bedroom 1 : 11.2 m²
- Bedroom 2 : 8.5 m²
- Living-room : 15.9 m²
- Kitchen : 5.3 m²
- WC/shower : 2 m²

Only flat extensions are possible with external stairs in the front.

The developers obtained a 65,500 Dinars pre-financing on 28-11-1990 for the acquisition of the site. Construction pre-financing was 426,470 Dinars.

65

There are 7 female owners. In addition, 7 houses are let because their owners had to move elsewhere for professional reasons.

The houses were delivered to their Beneficiaries without water and electricity meters. The beneficiaries had to pay for their individual connections.

The road which was the developer's responsibility is not completed yet. The Municipality and the developer came to an agreement and completion should not be long.

There is no public lighting either.

Building standards are generally poor and several defects were noticed:

- fences without concrete
- detachment of plaster (sand of poor quality)
- poor tile jointing
- poor roof water-proofing
- low standard woodworks
- insufficient thickness of partitions between 2

houses.

BH technical services noticed and informed of defects during the works. It is noteworthy that it is the developer's first site and that he is the builder.

Several owners were interviewed: a taxi-driver, a railway man who started his first floor extension, a policeman and a civil servant in the Ministry of Higher Education.

The first disbursements varied between 12,000 and 15,000 Dinars and the rest was divided up over a period of 25

6/6

years with 80 to 100 dinars monthly instalments according to Beneficiaries' age and income. As far as the interviewees are concerned the instalments represent about one third of household's income. The beneficiaries were previously tenants with a monthly rent of about 60 dinars. On the whole, the beneficiaries are satisfied with the project. Above all they appreciate the fact that it gives the possibility to occupy the houses without trouble while they try and find the supplementary resources required for defect repairs and for extensions, which are commonly considered to be necessary.

The neighbouring project of SOKIPRIM comprises 50 housing units on a 5,097 m² site bought from AFH at 14 Dinars/m², i.e. 71,388 Dinars in total.

A 67,433 Dinars pre-financing was granted by BH on 28-11-1990.

Construction works started in January 1990 without prior AFH site possession which did not take place until 29-01-1991. The amount of 500,450.000 Dinars was granted by BH in order to pre-finance the housing units. The houses have just been marketed, several are not yet occupied.

Average allotment surface is 80 m² (71-95 m²) and usable surface of houses is 38.3 m² to 51.55 m². They are composed of two bedrooms, one living-room, a kitchen and a WC/shower, which dimensions vary from one pattern plan to another.

67

All the plans are not extendable, however, they are not designed as such.

Thus, pattern-plan II (Allotments 1,2,3,14,15,16,17,18 & 19) is not extendable in spite of the small size of the allotment (71 m²).

On the whole, construction standards are acceptable. As far as services are concerned, half a road was completed with double-layer asphaltting, but there is not public lighting.

A TOFCO employee (Sousse) was interviewed. His income is 180 Dinars/month with 60 Dinars for travel/transfer expenses.

He is now reimbursing 78 Dinars to BH for a period of 25 years. He was a tenant of a flat in Hammam Sousse which rent was 70 Dinars/month. His present situation represents an improvement.

His small house is going to induce him to limit the number of childbirths.

2.5 - Sidi Sahbi Project (Kairouan) (SNIT)

The Sidi Sahbi III SNIT project comprises 110 Boufete/11 pattern-plan extendable housing units on two sites bought from AFH at the price of 14.500 Dinars/m². Total surface varies between 8,040 and 8,550 m². Both sites are rectangular allowing but an odd number of rows of construction transversally, which results in a low use ratio of the services since one of the rows is served by

69

two parallel streets. The tertiary street completed by the developer is 8 meter wide. There is no public lighting.

Two types of allotments are available on the site-plan: 102 m² and 114 allotments. Corner allotments were also designed with more surface.

All the houses are sold and occupied.

The houses are set back from the fence; there is a front garden and a back yard. Each housing unit is composed of the following:

- bedroom : 10.1 m²
- living-room : 12.2 m²
- kitchen : 9 m²
- WC/shower : 2,9 m²
- Hall : 1.5 m²

Which represents a total surface of 35.7 m².

Extensions can be carried out on the facade or as a first floor. Total front width is 7,85 meters.

Housing unit sale price is 13,000,000 Dinars cash.

Two households were interviewed. The head of the first household is a chief monitor in a high school whose salary is 356.000 Dinars/month. He is the father of three children and opted for this alternative when he was transferred to Kairouan. Before this transfer, he was letting a 2 room house in Zaghouan for 60 Dinars /month. He is currently reimbursing monthly instalments of 75.000 Dinars over a period of 20 years. He is on the whole

69

satisfied with his new situation and envisages to build an extra living-room.

The head of the second household interviewed is a conductor in the 'Societe Regionale des Transports'.

His monthly salary is 220 Dinars/month and he is the father of three children (two sons and one daughter).

He has already started the construction of an extra bedroom for his children who are now occupying the living room.

He is repaying 82 Dinars/month over a period of 19 years, which represents more than a third of his salary. He thinks that he can just manage. He was previously a tenant paying a monthly rent of 50 Dinars. He had 2 years savings at CNEL. Then one year was necessitated before a special favour was granted to SRT employees by SNIT.

Were a 'site and services' allotment available, this household would have preferred it.

Project agenda was as follows:

- AFH Acquisition of site: Since 1975
- Service note to contractor: 10-03-1987
- Off-site works completion : 10-03-1988
- SNIT Sales : October and Nov.1990.

2.6 - Sidi Sahbi Project (Kairouan) (DHAMEN)

Sidi Sahbi III project initiated by the private developer comprises 60 extendable housing units on a 7,662 m2 site

bought from AFH in September 1989 at the price of 14 Dinars/m².

A 8 m on-site road is available. It was built by the developer. Initially, the houses were composed of two rooms (Bedroom: 9.7 m², living-room: 16.5 m²) a 3.5 m² kitchen, a 2.5 m² WC/shower and a 1.3 m² hall, i.e. a total usable surface of 33.5m².

The houses are built on 95 and 120 m² allotments. Extensions are designed in the back of the allotment or in the first floor thanks to internal stairs, thus excluding the alternative of two separate floors.

On the whole the construction is of good standards. Technical standards are satisfactory even though plumbing problems appeared recently.

Two households were interviewed on this site:

The first household is composed of a young couple who bought the house in 1990. Both husband and wife work and earn a monthly income of more than 350 Dinars. Monthly repayment instalments are 61 Dinars over a period of 25 years. An extra room was built in the back of the allotment but a loss of usable surface is to be noted because of a lack of expert counsel. The wife is officially the owner and she is satisfied on the whole with the project.

The head of the second household is a regular army officer based in Kairouan. His monthly income is 295 Dinars and he must repay 60 Dinars/month over a period

of 25 years. With 4 young children the house is far too small. An extra room has already been built in the ground floor and the household envisages a first floor extension. Because of their small allotment (85 m²) they question the usefulness of a wide pavement.

72-

3- Actors' perception

3.1- The Developers

There is little difference among the developers with respect to the projects targeted by the HQ004C programme. On the whole, the programme was welcomed despite some reservations especially from SNIT.

This project does not bring much to SNIT, since social housing has always been SNIT main field of action. As a general rule, SNIT has always been favoured by AFH in the choice of sites, even though some regional directions deny it. However, SNIT is usually the first to operate on a new site, which involves additional constraints in comparison with other developers who operate only when a first project has already been realised on the site. Very often, SNIT operates on tertiary networks while AFH is carrying out primary and secondary networks.

Furthermore, SNIT usually pays 5% of the total amount of sewerage works to ONAS for works follow up. This usually facilitates works delivery/reception by ONAS.

As far as financing is concerned, SNIT does not always apply for BH pre-financing. Works are usually carried out from SNIT's own funds or bank overdraft, which, considering SNIT high operating expenditure (10 - 15% of SNIT Center turnover) seriously reduces profit margins.

SNIT wishes to reserve on its sites some allotments for commercial use and sell them at a higher price in order to achieve a partial balance. SNIT also wishes the price

13

per square meter to be fixed according to the size of the allotments for it turned out that in large allotments the percentage of non-transferable land such as green areas, playing grounds, roads, is greater than in small allotments.

Private developers are on the whole favourable to this type of project, even if, now and then, some constraints hindered works progress.

Thus, it appears that the procedure is still fragile and that the various actors /participants have not completely got into the way of things:

- BH still lacks flexibility to respond to particular situations.
- AFH sometimes neglects servicing works or does not inform the developer on the hazards of the sites sold to them.
- The administration has a different approach with respect to sites allocated for social housing according to regions or developers.

For instance, SORITS case is quite a good illustration of all these impediments which can be overcome quite easily when they happen in turn but can result in a total dead end when they are combined together.

SORITS whose manager is a public works engineer took an option on AFH allotments HC1 and HC5 at Mahares.

An application for pre-financing was made to BH, meanwhile a first application for a building permit had

been turned down; it was alleged that the designed sewerage had no outlet. In fact, the whole of Mahares has no sewerage and the problem of waste was not previously solved on its site by AFH.

Furthermore, a sewage treatment plant is being installed but not the primary network. BH has not replied to the pre-financing application and the whole of the project is blocked.

Although the developer has a building permit, he feels that he will not get an occupation permit because of the problem of sewerage, therefore he prefers to stop the project altogether until a global solution is brought about. In the meantime AFH is urging him to pay the price of the site in total as soon as possible, or to give up his option. The litigation is thus in the open to the detriment of the production of social housing in Mahres.

Other problems are often mentioned by private developers:

- BH requirement to domiciliate the developer's, the contractor's business accounts and even those of the other companies belonging to the developer is considered to be excessive.
- AFH land division plans and specifications are thought to be technically insufficient (especially with respect to the issue of prescribed densities).
- The requirement of the technical services of the Public Works to provide a large number of house pattern plans is also thought to be excessive.

15

In spite of these problems, the programme undoubtedly displays significant advantages which may forecast a relative permanence:

- 15-20% profit margin (according to declarations)
- Developer's low investment
- High demand.

However, certain indices point to the fact that private developers do not a priori intend to be always involved in social housing. This, in fact, is no more than a springboard for a quick capital accumulation in order to invest in other areas.

3.2 - 'La Banque de l'Habitat' (BH)

Notwithstanding the lack of an official declaration summing up BH official stance this issue was examined through a number of interviews with several officials and by cross-checking other developers' stances.

First of all, it seems that the evolution of the institution from CNEL (dependent and limited in scope and resources) to an independent and responsible bank is irreversible and without major impediments.

The enclosed tables show BH evolution towards private and public developers involved in social housing on an annual basis. It also turns out that site pre-financing is evolving. Examination of developers' applications requires approximately one month. Four dimensions are examined. i.e.: legal, technical, commercial, financial.

16

EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPER'S PRE-FINANCING LOANS

PER DEVELOPER	1992							
	1989		1990		1991		AU 30.8.92	
	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%
PUBLIC DEVELOPER	15 543	49 %	36 800	48 %	25 919	27 %	41 085	53 %
PRIVATE DEVELOPER	16 316	51 %	39 539	52 %	70 896	73 %	36 838	47 %
TOTAL	31 859	100 %	76 339	100 %	96 815	100 %	77 923	100 %

Source : Banque de l'Habitat

EVOLUTION OF PRE-FINANCING DISBURSEMENT

THOUSAND DINARS

DEVELOPER	YEAR 1987 YEAR 1988 YEAR 1990 YEAR 1991 A 1992 Au 31.8.92											
	AMOUNT %		AMOUNT %		AMOUNT %		AMOUNT %		AMOUNT %		AMOUNT %	
	PUBLIC DEVELOPERS	18 071	94%	12 617	86%	18 094	59%	17 099	49%	18 131	35%	10 735
SOCIAL HOUSING	4 328		9 419		7 176		7 774		11 658		7 134	
ECONOMICAL HOUSING	13 743		3 198		10 918		9 325		6 473		3 601	
PRIVATE DEVELOPERS	1 118	6%	2 008	14%	12 334	41%	17 458	51%	33 836	65%	24 729	70%
SOCIAL HOUSING	0		0		5 280		6 460		19 991		16 305	
ECONOMICAL HOUSING	1 118		2 008		7 054		10 998		13 845		8 424	
TOTAL	19 189	100%	14 625	100%	30 428	100%	34 557	100%	51 967	100%	35 464	100%
SOCIAL HOUSING	4 328		9 419		12 456		14 234		31 649		23 439	
ECONOMICAL HOUSING	14 861		5 206		17 972		20 323		20 318		12 025	

78

EVOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING PRE-FINANCING CREDITS

THOUSAND DINARS

DEVELOPER	YEAR 1987		YEAR 1988		YEAR 1989		YEAR 1990		YEAR 1991		A 1992 Au 31.8.92	
	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%
PUBLIC DEVELOPERS		0 %		0 %	29 461	74%	26 232	57%	23 997	39%	23 831	33%
SOCIAL HOUSING					9 561		10 417		14 283		14 806	
ECONOMICAL HOUSING					19 900		15 814		9 714		9 025	
PRIVATE DEVELOPERS		0 %		0 %	10 335	26%	20 177	43%	36 856	61%	49 229	67%
SOCIAL HOUSING					4 527		8 022		19 956		28 062	
ECONOMICAL HOUSING					5 808		12 155		16 909		21 167	
TOTAL	61 021	0 %	43 826	0 %	39 796	100%	46 409	100%	60 862	100%	73 060	100%
SOCIAL HOUSING	2 248		13 749		14 088		18 439		34 239		42 868	
ECONOMICAL HOUSING	58 773		30 077		25 708		27 969		26 623		30 192	

79

- Examination of applications is centralised in one service proposing at the end of the procedure a pre-financing to the credit committee where a final decision is taken.

The projects involved in the HG004C programme face a number of problems. Hence, BH technical service is not sufficiently staffed in order to achieve the following tasks:

- ensure that the site targeted by the developer is reliable.
- Ensure an efficient control of the sites works.
- Ensure an effective delivery of the completed housing units (especially with respect to the beneficiary's mortgage).

The seminar held in 1990 with USAID support on the analysis and appraisal of the projects presented by the developers had a limited impact. This was due to two main reasons:

- The seminar examined methods of appraisal of long-term projects whereas the projects involved in the programme are rather short-term. The methods proposed by the seminar are thus inadequate.
- The second part of the seminar which should have been devoted to projects follow-up did not take place.

From a financial point of view, the main problem remains loans recovery especially from low-income groups.

80

EVOLUTION OF PARTICULAR CREDITS RECOVERY

TYPE OF CREDIT	RECOVERY/YEAR			CUMULAR UNPAID		
	at 31/12/89	at 31/12/90	at 31/12/91	at 31/12/89	at 31/12/90	at 31/12/91
I- CREDITS CNEL	32 680 424	32 305 070	32 000 922	12 813 569	13 769 574	13 881 632
C. normal & Immediate	27 713 373	30 683 834	30 728 848	11 668 140	12 934 867	13 142 661
C. anticipé	2 967 051	1 621 216	1 272 074	1 145 429	834 707	738 971
II- CREDITS BH	1 143 586	3 940 806	10 262 104	475 360	1 779 382	3 983 446
C. Mortgage	1 123 033	2 521 692	6 745 814	431 306	1 265 846	2 791 773
attornment acquisition	7 411	520 199	1 202 908	17 680	142 805	340 981
old Houses	13 142	667 716	1 440 936	25 381	211 194	464 826
C. refurbishment		104 376	350 333	993	71 988	163 238
C. extension		126 823	516 002		87 549	200 413
C. standing			6 111			22 215
III- PROJETS SPECIAUX	7 924 096	8 849 790	11 747 460	8 334 266	12 533 202	19 400 709
C. isoprolos	7 611 073	8 278 742	10 731 946	6 784 204	8 803 470	10 345 979
Other USAID, BIRD dégauchification	313 023	571 048	1 015 514	1 550 062	3 784 932	9 054 730
TOTAL GENERAL	41 748 106	45 095 646	54 010 486	21 623 195	28 137 358	37 265 787

Source : Banque de l'Habitat.

Our filed work has largely confirmed this finding. House holdes declaring that they paid on a regular basis are scarce.

81

3.3- 'L'Agence Fonciere d'Habitation' (AFH)

First and foremost, AFH has always produced sites for social housing (suburban, site and services, etc...).

In addition, several sites included in the current programme, were unsold sites. The allotments were divided in order to comply with the suburban typology. This is the reason why the width of several sites did not allow but an odd number of allotment rows (three in general).

This technical solution displays the disadvantage of allotments served by two parrallel roads.

Further, AFH specifications allow the developers to determine the tertiary roads, alignment, location of green areas and densities.

Some specifications are clearly supplied but they do not suffice to guarantee the production of a coherent urban fabric.

Time required for the production off-site sites is not shorter than for other projects. Indeed, tertiary services works do not increase AFH costs relative to time, since laying out of services did not represent more than 10-15% of time generally required by AFH to produce building sites. The best evidence is that AFH proposes on the same site off-site and individual allotments. Conversely, delays are caused by land conflicts which must be solved by AFH.

One solution consists in making AFH benefit from an immediate possession (one year) of the expropriated land

82

in exchange of the deposit of the transaction approximate amount at the Treasury, until a final price is fixed.

AFH has recently introduced a method consisting in a market analysis prior to site acquisition. It seems that the department in charge has not yet produced a first demand analysis and that it is premature to judge the impact of USAID assistance.

Improvements are requested by AFH regional agencies especially with respect to site selection, services, sale price and allotments distribution among the developers.

These different tasks which are centralised in Tunis, are often rightly criticised in the regions. In addition, local contingencies (officials' pressure) sometimes hinder the progress of a project; for instance, site and services or individual sites may be favoured to the detriment of off-site allotments.

Further, the necessity of tertiary services follow up, although organised by the developers, is largely AFH responsibility. Once the sites are sold AFH cannot disengage from this responsibility for deontological reasons. What is at stake is the creation of tomorrow's towns and the urban soil must be treated differently from other commercial goods. Coherence must be preserved through regular supervision, which can be compared to an after-sales service of land development.

83

As far as sale price of serviced sites is concerned the mechanism whereby costs are fixed needs refining. Indeed it is not normal that the action of the agency increases the value of neighbouring sites while no benefit is made on behalf of the buyers.

At Sidi Sahbi III (Kairouan), AFH sold completely serviced sites for 20 Dinars/m² whereas an adjoining land, a private property, was sold 25 Dinars/m² (without services). It is also inadequate to make the buyers from the agency bear the cost of the primary networks. Similarly, reservations of sites for equipments should not be exclusively required to the agency.

Some suggestions were made requiring AFH to carry out superstructure equipments in order to pass the cost on all the buyers. Since the equipments concerned are primary schools, health centers, playschools, green areas, police station, post office, this alternative would need fine-tuning, for considerable qualitative advantages would result for the buyers and for the developers.

84

3.4 - The Ministry of Public Works and Housing

The Housing Department (Ministry of Public Works and Housing) is responsible for the implementation of the housing policy. A number of interviews were carried out in this Department.

Social housing in Tunisia as it was recently defined by the new legislation is subjected to three conditions allowing the developers to benefit from particular fiscal advantages. These conditions are:

- Projects should comprise a minimum of 20 housing units
- Average surface should not exceed 40 m² per extendable housing unit and 80 m² per individual housing unit (60 m² minimum for council housing). There is no maximum limit.
- Sale price of built square meter should not exceed 1.7 times SMIG in force at the date of application (229.000 Dinars/ m² in October 1992).

Important measures and procedures were designed to allow a smooth completion of the projects and to prevent major conflicts and abuses. Thus, regional services are required to ensure projects technical follow-up. This follow-up should, in principle, check whether the final product is in accordance with the specifications of the building permit, whether building agrees with the state of the art. Follow-up should also check that designed green spaces are effectively planted and that road and miscellaneous networks works are of good standards.

85



If final checking is satisfactory, three certificates are delivered to the developers (an occupation certificate, a conformity certificate and). Thus, they can register sales contracts on fixed duties (fiscal advantage).

In addition, insurance companies 1986 legislation relative to building is going to be reviewed shortly in order to involve contractors, developers and others in a joint and common action in the future. Insurance companies will be required to act immediately in order to finance repairs, while the issue of damage responsibility is sorted out.

Construction standards are currently defined within M.E.H.. Results are expected for January 1993. It already seems that standards are defined which should allow a significant reduction of building costs such as sewerage, street width, ...

Further, the preference seems to be given to developers-contractors instead of discriminating the two functions. This is particularly important at a time when all expectations are focused towards assisted self-construction.

The urban planning code review which is well advanced involves the following:

- The possibility for owners included in a 'PIF', to become developers if they own more than 2 hectares.
- Generalisation of servicing in two stages: one provisional stage and a definitive stage after completion

86

of construction works. A guarantee is envisaged as a bank guarantee or a mortgage on some sites to the benefit of the local authority.

- New concepts and new mechanisms are introduced such as land appreciation, intra and inter-allotments alignment, etc...

On a technical level there are several objectives:

- a simplification of the building permit procedures
- a greater project density
- Developers should be allowed to undertake their own surveys for the supply of drinking water and electricity, without the compulsion to go through SONEDE or STEG.
- Installation of telephone networks (since June 1992).

3.5- The Professional Bodies

In this category are included architects and consultant engineers. Briefly, these professional bodies share the view that actors should be diversified, which would result in the multiplication of collaboration possibilities. When SNIT was carrying out the major part of social programmes pattern-plans were the rule and both architects and engineers were called forth only scarcely. Since social housing was opened to private developers each project requires a new action from architects and engineers. Thus, from this point of view the appraisal is satisfactory.

87

However, if we consider that both private and public developers' action represents about 25% of the housing market and that their projects involve a large number of housing units, the above-mentioned professional bodies would have a vested interest in the increase of the number of housing units per site. This would increase both benefit and honorarium.

Another issue of concern for architects is a gradual monotony of buildings because the constraints are such that it is very difficult to diversify the architecture of the housing units.

88

4- Conclusion and Recommendations

The initial aim of this appraisal of HQ004C programme was to compare the respective performance of both the public and private sectors in the field of social housing development. This comparison was difficult to do mainly because the protagonists were not under the same constraints, nor were their objectives similar.

However, it turns out that private developers can carry out smaller programmes with a more diversified architecture faster than the public sector. In addition, private developers achieve better profit margins and show an interest for this type of projects in the future.

On the other hand, the public sector builds more solid but less adapted houses.

But this comparison may appear as an overgeneralisation. In fact, more time and a larger number of completed projects are needed before an appropriate appraisal can be arrived at.

Some recommendations can be made with respect to the implementation of this policy. Developers should be informed of these recommendations in order to increase their motivation and thus induce them to launch more projects based on more reliable bases.

Recommendations:

- 1- Examine the possibility of the creation of a single office including BH, AFH and MEH.

89

- 2- Immediate land possession with deposit of transaction amount should be generalised.
- 3- Special attention should be given to site surveys and follow-up should be carried out by AFH.
- 4- Laying out of services should be carried out in two stages.
- 5- Developers should be allowed to create a predetermined number of allotments for commercial use.
- 6- Coordination between off-site allotments, size of allotments and roads should be ensured.
- 7- Control of services and buildings should be ensured at all levels; the alternative of counselling /consultants - architects and engineers- paid on each individual project seems to be the best. Ways and means for mediation should be examined in case of conflict.
- 8- Developers should be allowed to attend or to be represented in building permit committees.
- 10- Price of allotments should be fixed according to their respective size and developers should be encouraged to start a project on a new site.
- 11- The use of local materials should be encouraged, especially plaster (limestone) which increases comfort and salubrity without a significant increase of cost.
- 12- Production of light prefabricated products should be encouraged (partitions, walls, sanitary blocks, stairs, lintels, etc.) in order to reduce costs and delays.

13- The construction of an initial core on the street front, the location of the stairs on the facade (in order to allow the sale or the letting of the first floor), the protection of external woodworks by canopies, installation of high and low ventilation in the kitchen and bathroom, and the construction of heavy partitions between two adjoining houses should be compulsory.

14- Pre-financing should not be authorised prior to completion of off-site services.

15- Projects preliminary plans should accompany applications for pre-financing.

ANNEXES

- 1) Profils de quelques nouveaux promoteurs privés opérant en relation avec la Banque de l'Habitat.
- 2) Ventes de parcelles APH aux promoteurs -1987.
- 3) Ventes de parcelles APH aux promoteurs-1989
- 4) Vente de parcelles APH aux promoteurs-1990
- 5) Vente de parcelles APH aux promoteurs-1991.
- 6) Organigramme général de l'APH.
- 7) Avis de presse : vente de lots de terrain suburbain
- 8) Cahier des charges - type applicable à des parcelles extr-muros
- 9) Situation des hypothèques prévisionnelles sur des programmes préfinancés par la BH.
- 10) Liste des pièces constitutives d'un dossier de préfinancement .
- 11) Textes juridiques et réglementaires, regissant l'activité de promotion immobilière.

**1- PROFILS DE QUELQUES NOUVEAUX PROMOTEURS
OPERANT EN RELATION AVEC LA B. H.**

Date agrément	Société de promotion	Ancienne activité du gérant ou du principal actionnaire.
1990	RIAHI	Electricien en bâtiment (FRANCE)
1985	EL IKAMA.	D. A. F. d'une grande entreprise de bâtiment
1990	EL KHAYEM.	Architecte (SNIT)
1990	Immobilière Maghrébine	Directeur (SNIT)
1984	SOPRI	Directeur technique d'une entreprise de bâtiement
1992	CITE	Assurance CARTE
1976	EDIM.	Société EL ISKAN
1983	Ridha SRAIRI	conducteur de travaux (FRANCE)
1991	Immobilière du Cente	Architecte
1991	Hadrumète	Gérant de sociétés
1990	SAP-SAP	Gérant de sociétés (économiste)
1989	EL-AMEN.	Ingénieur Génie - Civil.
1988	EL MEDINA	Directeur dans une banque
1990	DIAR TOUNES	Ingénieur Centralien
1990	ERRIDHA	Ingénieur centralien
1989	IFEL	Technicien.
1975	LE LOGEMENT	Gérant de sociétés
1990	ESSAAD	Ingénieur (SNIT)
1989	SPIT	Commerçant, Gérant de sociétés
1990	IBTIKAR	Architecte.
1991	Grand Maghreb	PDG entreprise de T. P.

Date agrément	Société de promotion	Ancienne activité du gérant ou du principal associé
1991	NPI	Gérant de société
1991	IMMO	Gérant de sociétés (économiste)
1990	Immobilier des Parcs	Economiste
1985	EL BINA	Expert - comptable
1990	L'ARCHE	Architecte.
1989	EDDAR	Financier, gérant de sociétés
1990	Triangle II	Industriel
1989	ERRIBAT	Entrepreneur

2- Ventes de parcelles AFH aux promoteurs - 1987.

Lotissement	Promoteur	Superficie (m2)	Prix (Dinars)
Ezzahra	SOMAPI	1351	26749,800
Mourouj 5	SNIT	100.000	
Manar II	Zarrouk	1881	56 430,000
Menzah 9 A	PRIM	2935	88050,000
Manar I	Le Logement	3228	96840,000
Ennasr	DIM	5012	131849,000
Megrine	STAR	4580	50380,000
Mourouj 3	Les Chalets	14 238	213 570,000
Mateur	Zarrouk	10 863	85 594,400
Zaghuan	Ste de Promotion	2342	30 446,000
Ibn Rochd	Med Ghali	1 300	52 000,000
Jammel	SNIT	3173	34 903,000
Kalaa Kebira	SNIT	8 500	102 000,000
Total	-	159 403	-

Source : AFH

94

3- Ventes de parcelles APH à des promoteurs - 1989.

Lotissement	Promoteur	Superficies (m ²)	Prix (Dinars)
Mourouj 3	PRIM	3 000	57 000
Mourouj 3	Immobilière de l'ARIANA	3742	61 743
Manar C2	Immobilière de l'ARIANA	3483	59 211
Manar 2	EL IKLAA	3041	51 697
Mourouj 3	EL BINA	6053	115 007
Manar C2	L'ESSOR	2208	37 536
Enasr 2	EDDAR	3072	129 024
"	SIMPAR	12 450	538 274
"	MENZEL ENIK	4633	199 219
"	Habitation Moderne	2976	124 992
"	EL AZIZ	2510	107 930
"	EL GHALI	3648	160 512
"	ESSOUKNA	4032	177 408
"	BOUSTEN	2809	120 787
Enasr 1	L'ESSOR	3207	112 245
"	RIBAT	2606	91 210
"	EDDAR	3114	108 990
"	EDIM	4368	144 144
"	PRIM	1869	65 415
Ibn Rochd	Les Chalets	3310	148 950
ERRIADH (sousse)	SNIT	14287	
Sidi Abdelhamid (Sousse)	SIMEL	1174	
Mourouj 1	Le Passage	2991	61 315
Mourouj 3	Immobilière de l'Ariana	1849	44 376
Mourouj 2	Essoukna	1534	35 299
Erriadh 2 (Sousse)	OLM intérieur	3651	60 373
Sidi Abdelhamid (Sousse)	GMP	1143	27 432

Lotissement	Promoteur	Superficies (m ²)	Prix (Dinars)
Briadh 4 (Soussse)	SNIT	6294	-
Jammel	SNIT	39910	-
"	GMP	10427	-
Sbeitla	SNIT	8300	70 550
Briadh 3 (Soussse)	SNIT	7800	117 000
Mourouj 3	LOGECO	2954	62 034
"	RIBAT	2750	57 034
"	GHALI	3630	76 230
"	LE LOGEMENT	3944	82 824
"	SPM	2596	75 516
Ezzahra	DOMA	4812	134 736
Baraket Sahel	IMAS	1643	50 790
"	SPIT	1463	43 890
"	GHALI	2595	77 850
Zaghouan	LOGECO	2521	35 296
Nabeul	SIM-PAR	3231	92 083
Fouchana	ESSOU KRNA	11925	184 837
Mourouj 3	BOUSTEN	2830	59 430
"	GHALI	3230	41 235
"	SOROSAT	2754	57 834
Sidi Sahbi 3 (Kairouan)	DHAMEN	6800	102 285
Kasserine Jedida	SNIT	4260	63 944
Monastir	SNIT	14650	-
Mourouj 4 (projet pilote)	Le Logement	36000	
Menzah 9 A	SOPRIMO	2258	80 159
Manouba	SO PRIMO	1695	38 137
Ezzahra	M BAREK.	1279	45 004
"	HABITATION MODERNE	2150	75 650
"	LA SANTE	2035	71 235

Lotissement	Promoteur	Superficies (m2)	Prix (Dinars)
Borj Cedria	IMBN	3240	58 320
Bnnaer 2	SIVIA	4428	185 976
"	BSSOUKNA	11510	475 395
"	LA MEDINA	4446	177 840
Jammel	SIMBL	3977	
Manar 1	Charfi	3423	154 035
"	Trabelsi	1010	147 460
"	Zitouna	2335	420 075
"	LE BSSOUKNA	2420	108 100
"	LOGEMENT	4527	203 715
Bnnaer 1	SPIC	2942	126 506
Briadh 3	SNIT	54900	-
Kajaa Kebira	SNIT	3375	45 562
Total	-	409029	-

Source : AFH.

4- Ventes de parcelles AFH aux promoteurs 1990

Lotissement	Surfaces (m2)	Nbre de logements
Rades 2	8600	43
Zarzouna	27250	138
Bougatfa Bizerte	13711	69
Fouchana	23472	117
Mateur Omrane	13296	67
Medina Jedida	18067	93
Tataouine	13750	69
Sousse Saada	10052	51
Sidi Sahbi Kairouan	39607	198
Enfidha	3687	18
Sbiba	8850	44
Sousse Sahloul	38386	192
Kasjerine Feth 2	11900	60

97

Kasserine Saadedine	17750	89
Sidi Bouzid.	3496	18
Jeima	2480	12
Gabes Boulbaba	45301	227
Zaghouan	2521	13
Mejez El Bab	7361	57
Total.	310 138	1 575

Source : AFH

Note : à ce total, il convient de rajouter 157 669 m² vendus des promoteurs pour réaliser de l'habitat collectif. Ce qui porte le total général de 1990 à 467 807 m².

5) Ventes parcelles AFH aux promoteurs - 1991

Les ventes aux promoteurs en 1991 ont totalisé 298 184 mètres carrés. Le seul gouvernorat de Ben Arous a abrité 70,11 % de cette surface. Les reste a été réparti entre Jendouba, Kallaa Kebira, Grombalia, Zaghouan, Bizerte et Jammel.

A ces ventes, il convient d'ajouter 121 472 mètres carrés qui ont été destinés à l'habitat collectif, emprises assimilables aux précédentes, car cédées à des promoteurs publics ou privées.

Le total de l'année 1991 se monte donc à 419656 mètres carrés. (Source : Rapport d'activités AFH).

98



Avis n° 45/92

Vente de lots de terrain suburbain pour les promoteurs immobiliers

L'Agence Foncière d'Habitation porte à la connaissance des promoteurs immobiliers agréés par le ministère de l'Équipement et de l'Habitat, qu'elle met en vente des lots de terrains destinés à la construction de logements suburbains dans les lotissements suivants :

Lotissement	N° du lot	Superficie	Prix unitaire	Affectation	Mise en possession
Bouficha	G6	3.050 m ²	14,500 P.P.	Logements groupés	Fin décembre 92
Bouficha	G7	3.000 m ²	14,500 P.P.	Logements groupés	Fin décembre 92
Hajeb El Ayoun	G1	3.200 m ²	13,000 P.P.	Logements groupés	Immédiatement
Hajeb El Ayoun	G2	3.922 m ²	13,000 P.P.	Logements groupés	Immédiatement
Hajeb El Ayoun	G3	3.122 m ²	13,000 P.P.	Logements groupés	Immédiatement
Sidi Amor Bouhajla	G1	3.692 m ²	13,000 P.P.	Logements groupés	Immédiatement
Sidi Amor Bouhajla	G2	6.545 m ²	13,000 P.P.	Logements groupés	Immédiatement
Sahloul 2 Sousse	G1	10.760 m ²	24,000 P.P.	Logements groupés	2ème trimestre 93
Sahloul 2 Sousse	G2	9.200 m ²	24,000 P.P.	Logements groupés	2ème trimestre 93
El Madina Jadida — Kassrine	G2	8.743 m ²	14,500 P.P.	Logements groupés	Immédiatement

Tout promoteur désireux d'acquiescer un ou plusieurs lots est prié de déposer un dossier à la Direction opérationnelle du Centre comportant :


- Une demande rédigée sur papier libre en indiquant les lots choisis.
- 1 cautionnement de 1% du ou des lots retenus.
- Photocopie de l'agrément et du statut de la Société.

Le dernier délai fixé pour le dépôt des dossiers est le 31-10-1992.

Toute demande déposée après le délai ne sera pas examinée par la commission.

Observation : Les prix définitifs qui ne sont pas arrêtés actuellement seront fixés avant l'établissement des contrats.

**ORGANIGRAMME GENERAL
DE L'AGENCE FONCIERE
D'HABITATION**



180

ILOTS EXTRA - MUROS (S-U)

CLAUSES APPLICABLES AUX PARCELLES DESTINES A LA
REALISATION DE LOTS EN VUE DE LA CONSTRUCTION
DE LOGEMENTS INDIVIDUELS DE TYPE GROUPE.
(SUB-URBAIN).

ARTICLE .1.- DEFINITIONS

Le plan de lotissement, annexé au présent cahier des charges, prévoit la réalisation de parcelles en vue de la construction de logements individuels de type groupé.

L'Agence Foncière d'Habitation et la Banque de l'Habitat ont élaboré en commun une nouvelle stratégie invitant l'ensemble des promoteurs immobiliers (publics et privés) à se mobiliser pour augmenter l'offre des logements accessibles aux populations à faibles revenus.

Les lots individuels de type groupe sont des lots ou les constructions sont groupées en rangées continues et comportent des espaces libres avec courette et jardin dont la densité varie entre 50 et 70 logts/Ha ; et une surface de parcelle de 100 m² environ et un front minimum de 8 m (huit).

ARTICLE .2.- LOTISSEMENT - PLANS

Le plan de lotissement prévoit les parcelles Sub-Urbain (S.U.) destinées à recevoir ce type de logement.

Chaque promoteur doit procéder au lotissement et aux travaux de viabilisation de sa parcelle en fonction de la taille et de l'architecture qu'il adoptera et en conformité avec les articles du présent titre.

ARTICLE .3.- AUTORISATIONS

Le projet d'exécution élaboré par le promoteur pour l'obtention de l'autorisation de bâtir doit comporter un dossier d'étude comprenant : un plan de masse et un plan de voiries et réseaux divers. Ce dossier doit être visé préalablement par l'Agence.

Les dossiers de lotissement et de permis de bâtir peuvent être présentés en même temps par le promoteur, en vue d'obtenir les autorisations administratives nécessaires.

101

**ARTICLE 4.- GESTION, MAINTENANCE ET CESSIION DES LOTS
AFFECTES AUX ESPACES PUBLICS**

Jusqu'à leur cession à la Municipalité, l'acquéreur gardera l'entière jouissance des terrains lui appartenant qui sont affectés aux espaces publics, tels que définis dans l'article 4.1 ci-dessus.

Les destinations prévues pour les terrains affectés aux espaces publics seront strictement respectées et, en aucune façon, l'acquéreur ne pourra les aménager en vue d'un autre usage.

A la date de réception des travaux, un acte de cession sera établi entre l'acquéreur et la Municipalité.

**ARTICLE 5.- VOIRIES, RESEAUX DIVERS ET PARKINGS A LA
CHARGE DES ACQUEREURS**

A l'intérieur de sa parcelle, le promoteur aura la charge des travaux de voirie et réseaux divers, suivant les caractéristiques définies en accord avec les services concernés, ainsi que la réalisation des parkings nécessaires aux besoins de la population résidente. Les voies publiques seront réservées de préférence aux piétons et seront traitées de façon à permettre le passage des véhicules de secours. La largeur minimale est de six (6) mètres.

Les normes de stationnement sur chaque lot (S.U) de logements groupes sont d'une place minimum pour trois logements.

Le promoteur devra se raccorder aux réseaux périphériques réalisés par l'Agence Foncière d'Habitation.

Le promoteur s'engage à réaliser le réseau d'eau potable et à le raccorder au réseau de distribution.

Toutes les constructions doivent être raccordées au réseau d'eau usées conformément aux prescriptions techniques de l'ONAS.

Le promoteur s'engage à réaliser le réseau de distribution électrique.

ARTICLE 6.- EMPRISE AU SOL

6.1- Coefficient d'occupation au sol (COS) :

L'emprise au sol de l'ensemble des constructions ne doit pas excéder soixante dix pour cent (70 %) de la superficie de la parcelle.

102

.6.2- Patio :

Les patios desservant les pièces d'habitation doivent présenter une superficie de seize mètres carré (16 m²) au minimum et un côté égal ou supérieur à trois (3) mètres.

.6.3- Implantation :

Toutes les constructions doivent respecter l'alignement des voies.

ARTICLE .7.- COEFFICIENT D'UTILISATION DU SOL (CUS)

Le coefficient d'utilisation du sol ne peut en aucun cas dépasser 140 % soit 1.40.

ARTICLE .8.- HAUTEUR DE LA CONSTRUCTION

La construction comportera au maximum deux (2) niveaux (un rez-de-chaussée et un étage).

La hauteur totale ne doit pas dépasser sept mètres (7 m).

ARTICLE .9.- CLOTURES

Dans le cas où il y a un retrait sur rue, une clôture doit être édictée et implantée sur la voie publique. Cette clôture doit être constituée d'un mur bahut de quatre vingt centimètres (80 cm) de hauteur, surmonté de treillages ou de grilles.

La hauteur totale n'excédera, en aucun point de la clôture, un mètre quatre vingt dix (1.90 m).

Un mur de hauteur maximale de deux mètres vingt (2,20 m) doit séparer deux lots où il y a des patios contigus.

ARTICLE .10.- SERVITUDES D'ARCHITECTURE ET DE CONSTRUCTION

L'aspect extérieur de chaque unité d'habitation doit être en étroite harmonie avec celui des unités voisines.

Dans chaque logement, il sera prévu notamment :

- des niches individuelles pour l'emplacement des compteurs d'eau et d'électricité ;

- une installation électrique, devant comprendre obligatoirement des prises de courant avec prise de terre ;

- une installation pour l'alimentation en eau potable en tubes galvanisés.

103

ARTICLE .11. ESPACES LIBRES ET PLANTATIONS

Le terrain laissé, éventuellement, libre entre la construction et les limites du lot sera aménagé en jardin.

Le promoteur est tenu d'aménager les espaces de jeux pour enfants à concurrence de cinq pour cent (5 %) au moins.

ARTICLE .12.- GARAGES ET DEPENDANCES

Les garages et dépendances sont interdits dans les lots.

ARTICLE .13.- FUSION DES LOTS

Les lots sub-urbains peuvent être fusionnés en un seul lot unique S.U.1.

N.B : (dérogation) les lots SU - destinés à la construction des lots sociaux seront aménagés et édifiés suivant plan masse SPROLS approuvé par le Ministère de l'Équipement compte tenu de la densité initiale des lots collectif (ancien EHC1 - EHC2).

104

SITUATION DES HYPOTHEQUES PREVISIONNELLES SUR DES PROGRAMMES PREFINANCES PAR B.H

01/10/92

PROMOTEURS	LOCALITE	NOMBRE DE LOGEMENTS	SURFACE TOTALE DES LOTS	PREFINANCEMENT BH		DATE PROBABLE	COUT MOYEN	HYPOTHEQUES PREVISIONNELLES
				ACCORDE	DEBLOQUE			
A-PROMOTEURS PUBLICS								
1 SMIT NORD	MATEUR	171	2,720	1 916 632	839 200	DEC 91	14 500	2 232 000
2 SMIT NORD	MATEUR	54		612 150	0	OCT 92	14 200	690 120
3 SMIT NORD	ZARZOUNA	100	2,770	1 039 520	761 000	DEC 91	14 000	1 260 000
4 SMIT NORD	ZARZOUNA	76	1,360	822 339	0	JUIN 92	16 520	1 129 968
5 SMIT CENTRE	SAHBI III	86	1,900	911 700	776 500	JUILL 91	13 900	1 076 000
6 SMIT CENTRE	SBIBA	30	0,890	307 600	157 500	AOUT 91	13 500	365 000
7 SMIT CENTRE	KASSERINE	36	0,870	321 171	284 500	FEV 91	13 000	421 000
8 SMIT CENTRE	KASS.M.JED	59	0,870	685 220	0	JUIN 92	14 500	769 950
9 SMIT TUNIS	HOUROUJ V	476	8,451	1 047 683	0	DEC 93	18 500	7 925 400
10 SMIT CENTRE	SAHLOUL A	230	3,840	3 054 400	0	FEV 93	16 600	3 436 000
TOTAL A		1318	23,671	10 718 415	2 818 700			19 305 438
B-PROMOTEURS PRIVES								
1 EL KHAYEM	RADES	25	0,855	823 010	0	JUIN 92	14 412	324 270
2 ESSOUKHA	FOUCHANA	160	2,350	2 403 594	343 800	JANV 93	16 569	2 385 936
3 DIAR TOUNES	HAYM. LIF	78	0,951	1 006 700	728 463	SEPT 92	16 117	1 131 413
4 SOPROLOGE	HAYM. LIF	60	0,817	784 085	151 135	JUIN 92	16 500	891 000
5 SOKIPRIM	SOUSSE	50	0,510	567 883	525 200	SEPT 91	14 500	652 000
6 SOPROLOGE	SOUSSE	41	0,500	491 970	440 900	MAI 91	14 500	535 000
7 BEIT EL JEDID	HOUROUJ IV	28	0,356	342 400	150 100	NOV 92	16 000	403 200
8 EDIM	HOUROUJ V	110	1,630	238 000	0	AOUT 92	13 000	1 287 000
9 SPIT	HOUROUJ IV	34	0,356	70 700	70 700	JUIN 93	14 500	443 700
10 SPIT	KALAA KEBIRA	102	1,432	210 000	210 000	AVRIL 93	14 500	1 331 100
11 ESSAAD	HOUROUJ V	75	1,127	159 800	156 842	DEC 92	15 200	1 026 000
12 KENZEL NABROUK	HOUROUJ IV	54	0,809	158 100	158 100	JANV 93	15 500	753 300
13 I F E L	HOUROUJ IV	24	0,359	71 400	0	NOV 92	16 000	345 600
14 ERIDHA	FOUCHANA	72	1,046	901 500	650 075	OCT 92	15 572	1 009 066
15 SPIT	HOUROUJ III	25	0,250	66 400	66 400	JUIN 93	15 000	337 500
16 LE LOSEMENT	HOUROUJ IV	275	5,500	2 766 200	2 211 900	JANV 93	15 500	3 836 250
17 M. P. I	HOUROUJ III	30	0,349	92 400	92 400	FEV 93	16 900	456 300
18 MADRINETE	MONASTIR	76	0,939	443 600		FEV 93	14 000	957 600
TOTAL B		1 319	20,136	11 597 742	5 956 015			18 106 235
TOTAL GENERAL		2 637	43,807	22 316 157	8 774 715			37 411 673

105

**BANQUE DE L'HABITAT
DIRECTION CENTRALE DES CREDITS
SERVICE CREDIT A MOYEN TERME**

PIECES CONSTITUTIVES D'UN DOSSIER DE PREFINANCEMENT

==**==*==0==**==*

A - LE DOSSIER JURIDIQUE

1. Copie des statuts dûment signés, légalisés, timbrés et enregistrés.
2. Copie du Procès Verbal de l'assemblée générale constitutive, ou photocopie certifiée conforme à l'original.
3. Copie du Procès Verbal du 1er Conseil d'Administration (ou photocopie certifiée conforme à l'original).
4. JOURN portant publication de l'acte constitutif de la Société.
5. Copie du certificat de dépôt au greffes (timbrée).
6. Copie de la déclaration de souscription et de versement.
7. Liste des souscriptions (approuvée par le Président Directeur Général de la Société).
8. Copie des pouvoirs du Président Directeur Général de la Société (timbrée) ou photocopie certifiée conforme à l'original.
9. Décision d'approbation du promoteur.

B - DOSSIER DE PREFINANCEMENT

1. Justificatifs de la propriété du terrain et autorisation d'hypothèque en cas d'acquisition d'un terrain auprès de l'AFH, contrat du terrain + titre foncier.

106

2. Description du projet :

- Coût vertical (construction, terrain, VRD, études et autres)
- Prix de revient, prix de vente et superficie par logement.
- Composantes du logement.

3. Bilans, compte d'exploitations, compte de pertes et profits des 3 dernières années et rapports du commissaire au compte correspondants.
4. Marchés conclus avec les entrepreneurs (en double exemplaires).
5. Devis estimatifs en double exemplaires.
6. Cahier des charges en double exemplaires.
7. Contrats d'honoraires pour les études.
8. Plan d'architecture et de situation (en double exemplaires).
9. Autorisation de bâtir.
10. Plan Prévisionnel de trésorerie, et schéma de financement du projet.
11. Curriculum Vitae du Gérant.
12. Copie de la Carte d'Identité Nationale.

N.B : Le dossier Juridique du promoteur présenté au moment du préfinancement du premier projet sera complété par toutes modifications ultérieures.

11- TEXTES JURIDIQUES REGISSANT L'ACTIVITE DE PROMOTION IMMOBILIERE

Loi n° 90-17 du 26 Février 1990 portant refonte de la législation relative à la promotion immobilière telle que modifiée par la loi N° 91-76 du 2 Août 1991 et par la loi des Finances pour l'année 1992.

Décret n° 90-2165 du 19 Décembre 1990, fixant les attributions, la composition et les conditions de fonctionnement de la commission consultative de la promotion immobilière.

Décret n° 91-1330 du 26 Août 1991, portant approbation du cahier des charges générales de la promotion immobilière.

Arrêté du ministre de l'Équipement et de l'Habitat du 27 Novembre 1991, portant définition de l'habitat à caractère social ou prioritaire.

Décret n° 90-1280 du 7 Août 1990 modifiant le décret n° 77-965 du 24 Novembre 1977 pris en application de la loi n° 77-54 du 3 Août 1977 portant institution d'un fonds de promotion du logement pour les salariés.

Arrêté du ministre de l'Équipement et de l'Habitat du 27 Novembre 1991, précisant les critères d'agrément des promoteurs immobiliers.

Note circulaire du 12 Janvier 1991 relative au suivi des projets de promotion immobilière.

Note circulaire du 25 Janvier 1991 relative aux cellules régionales de promotion immobilière.

Note circulaire du 28 Janvier 1991 relative aux projets d'habitat intégrés.

Note circulaire du 4 Janvier 1991 relative à l'aménagement et à la plantation des espaces verts prévus dans les nouveaux lotissements.