

PD-ABI 170
8/288

MIDTERM EVALUATION

BASIC EDUCATION EXPANSION PROJECT IN MALI

Submitted to:

**The United States Agency for International Development
Bamako, Mali**

**USAID Project Number:
688-0258**

Prepared by:

**Education Development Center, Inc.
International Programs
55 Chapel Street
Newton, MA 02158-1060**

Evaluation Team:

**Kabine Hari DIANE, Education Planner, Mali;
Georges GUISLAIN, Specialist in School and Training Programs, Belgium;
Joshua MUSKIN, Evaluation Specialist/Team Leader, USA;
Bintou SANANKOUA, Educational Policy Analyst, Mali;
Cheickne Hamala SOUMARE, Education Economist, Mali;**

Member Appointed by the Government of Mali:

Issa N'DIAYE, Evaluation Specialist/Assistant Team Leader, Mali;

Resource Persons:

Medjomo Coulibaly, REDSO/WCA, Abidjan

30 December, 1993

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAP OF MALI.....	i
LIST OF ACRONYMS.....	ii
PREFACE.....	iii
SUMMARY.....	v
CHAPTER I.....	1
A. Introduction to the Evaluation Work.....	1
The Evaluation Team.....	1
Evaluation Design and Implementation.....	2
Evaluation Objectives.....	2
Methodology.....	4
B. The Historical and Political Context in Mali.....	5
C. Description of USAID Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP) in Mali.....	7
Project Background.....	7
Project Goals and Objectives.....	12
Organization of the Project.....	13
CHAPTER II.....	17
A. Agencies and Individuals Consulted.....	17
B. Objectives.....	17
C. Description and Basis of Non-Project Assistance.....	19
D. Key Questions.....	23
E. Implementation of Non-Project Assistance.....	23
Brief chronological description.....	23
Success: encouraging factors.....	25
Limitations: problems and failures.....	26
F. Recommendations and Future Directions.....	29
CHAPTER III.....	31
A. Community Support.....	31
Component Objectives.....	31
Strategies.....	31
Key Questions.....	31
Next Stages.....	33
B. Education Management Information Systems.....	34
Component Objectives.....	34
Strategies.....	35
Key Questions.....	36
Next Steps.....	39
C. Management Technical Assistance.....	40
Agencies and Individuals Consulted.....	40
Objectives.....	40
Malian Agencies Involved.....	41
Strategy Developed.....	41


Key Questions.....	41
Recommendations, Strategies, and Future Trends.....	45
D. Girls' Schooling.....	45
Objectives.....	46
Strategies.....	46
Key Questions.....	47
Next Steps.....	53
E. In-Service Training and Distribution of School Books	54
1. Identification of the agencies and individuals consulted.....	54
2. Objectives of the In-Service Training and the Distribution of School Books Components	57
3. Strategy Developed for the In-Service Training	58
4. Key Questions.....	61
5. Identification and attribution of appreciations regarding the implementation of the In-Service Training and the Distribution of School Books.....	61
6. Synthesis of the Collected Information.....	64
7. Next Stages.....	68
8. Conclusion.....	70
F. Monitoring and Evaluation	71
1. Evaluation of the Component.....	71
2. Specific Objectives.....	71
3. The Organization of the Component	72
4. Technical Assistance Strategies.....	72
5. Component Implementation and Impact.....	74
Next Steps.....	82
Conclusion	84
CHAPTER IV.....	85
A. Project Design and Various Interventions	85
B. Context of the Project	92
C. Project Execution	93
D. Equity	94
E. Quality	97
F. Efficiency.....	98
CHAPTER V	101
1. Financing Alternatives.....	101
2. USAID Support in the Definition of a New Education Strategy	102
3. Structural Adjustment	102
4. Construction.....	102
5. Decentralization and Regionalization	103
6. Establishment of a Steering Committee for the Basic Education Expansion Project.....	103
7. Continue the Program of Technical Assistance to the Components.....	103
8. Extension of the Project.....	104
CHAPTER VI.....	105
BIBLIOGRAPHY	

ANNEXES

- A. List of Agencies and Individuals Consulted**
- B. "Republic of Mali, Consolidation Project of the Education Sector (CR.2054-MLI), Monitoring Mission, 10-20 October: Memorandum"
"Table 1 -- Project Cost per Component"
"Financial Plan: Basic Education Expansion Project, Project #688-0258"
"BEEP Financial Plan"
"PIOTs for ABEL"
"Basic Education Expansion Project, Financial Report Status"**
- C. Administrative Chart of National Institute of Pedagogy (*Institut Pédagogique National*)**
- D. Terms of Reference of the Evaluation Mission**
- E. Summary of the Concepts and Content of BEEP's In-Service Training Program Modules**
- F. "Program Performance Indicators" for BEEP**
- G. General Comments on First Draft of Evaluation Report**

Note: The original version of this evaluation report was prepared entirely in French. This English version is a translation from the French and, therefore, does not read as well in English as it would if English had been the first language. The bibliography and annexes are the same as those contained in the French version, except for the scope of work for the evaluation team, (Annex D), which is the English original.

**USAID MALI
EDUCATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
BASIC EDUCATION EXPANSION PROJECT**



LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABEL	Advancing Basic Education and Literacy
APE	Parent Teacher's Association, PTA (<i>Association de Parents d'Elèves</i>)
BPE	Bureau of Education Projects (<i>Bureau des Projets Education</i>)
BEEP	Basic Education Expansion Project
DRE	Regional Directorate of Education (<i>Direction Régionale de l'Enseignement</i>)
FAEF	Support Fund for Fundamental Education (<i>Fonds d'Appui à l'Enseignement Fondamental</i>)
IEF	Inspectorate of Fundamental Education (<i>Inspection de l'Enseignement Fondamental</i>)
IPN	National Institute of Pedagogy (<i>Institut Pédagogique National</i>)
MEB	Ministry of Basic Education (<i>Ministère de l'Éducation de Base</i>)
MEN	Ministry of National Education (<i>Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale</i>)
OPO	Operational Pedagogical Objectives (<i>Objectifs Pédagogiques Opérationnels</i>)
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

PREFACE

The present evaluation was contracted by USAID/Mali to inform the members of the Mission and their colleagues in the Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP) of the progress achieved by the Project, the difficulties encountered, and of future directions to be considered. In order to carry out this work, USAID asked the Education Development Center (EDC) of Newton, Massachusetts to hire a team of five consultants -- with the addition of a sixth one, nominated by the Ministry of Basic Education, -- specialists in the various fields covered by the Project.

- Kabine Hari DIANE, Education Planner, Mali;
- Georges GUISLAIN, Specialist in School and Training Programs, Belgium;
- Joshua MUSKIN, Evaluation Specialist/Team Leader, USA;
- Issa N'DIAYE, Evaluation Specialist Co-Team Leader, Mali;
- Bintou SANANKOUA, Education Policy Analyst, Mali;
- Cheickne Hamala SOUMARE, Education Economist, Mali.

The actual work took four weeks (August, 1993) divided into three major stages.

(1) An orientation week, led by Dr. Medjomo Coulibaly from the REDSO/USAID office in Abidjan, permitted the team to read the extensive basic documentation (comprising a stack of about three feet high and including more than 50 documents) on the Project. Dr. Coulibaly's role served to focus the evaluators' attention on the key questions presented by the Mission. By the end of the first week, with Dr. Coulibaly's help, the team had drawn up (i) a list of the offices and contacts that the team needed to consult, (ii) a work schedule and a distribution of the tasks, and (iii) an outline, or abstract, for the final report.

(2) The second stage consisted of the interviews, during which the team -- either as a whole, in small groups, or as individuals -- consulted the largest number of people possible. These on-site interviews included visits to Koulikoro, Segou, and Sikasso. Considering this crucial aspect of the evaluation, the two weeks reserved for this stage proved not to be sufficient, given the various other constraints such as transportation and communication problems, and the unavailability of the people. Furthermore, USAID had requested the use of a fourth-generation evaluation methodology, which required group meetings. The team is aware that it did not consult all the key figures essential to a more comprehensive evaluation.

(3) The last week of the endeavor was devoted to the drafting of a preliminary document and its presentation to USAID and Ministry officials directly involved in the areas covered by the evaluation. The presentation included a few suggestions for the future direction of the Project, proposed by the evaluation team, for consideration by the various partners of the Project. The Mission requested a draft of the document from the team before their departure so that the Mission, the Ministry, the advisors, staff of the BEEP Project, and others interested could confirm or amend the team's findings and initial conclusions. Over 100 copies were distributed by USAID for comment.

This strategy called attention to numerous gaps in the report, with extensive comments received by over fifteen individuals directly involved with the Project. Their comments enabled the evaluation team to amend the final report. It is hoped that the readers of the amended version will find it more accurate and useful. In some cases, the amended information was directly inserted into the text; in others, the observations are incorporated as footnotes at the bottom of the page concerned. The more general comments will be found in Appendix G. These observations reflect more often the reviewer's opinions than factual corrections to the text.

It is worthwhile to note here that the original unedited draft of the evaluation elicited several negative reactions. Several comments, amendments and especially ill feelings stirred up by the first draft could have been avoided by distributing an edited version. It is the evaluation team's hope that the present version will be considered the official one.

The evaluators hope that this work will contribute something valuable and significant to the dialogue which has lasted for the last four years between the Ministry, USAID, and the various participants involved in the national education reform. Certainly, elements and efforts of the Project may have been overlooked or underestimated by the team, even after taking into account the remarks about the first version. Should any ideas and recommendations suggested by the evaluation bring on discussion or reactions, even negative, concerning the last two years of the Project and beyond, the evaluation team still believes that it has contributed to the search for collaborative solutions between the partners. This collaboration will be critical for the design and implementation of the plan of action for the next stage of the Project.

Finally, the team would like to express its thanks to all the people who were available to participate in their team's work. The consideration of this group contributed greatly to the efforts of the evaluators in understanding this vast and complex Project. We would like to thank in particular the following individuals:

- the Minister of Basic Education, her Cabinet Head and all her assistants;
- the Director for Education and Human Resources Development at USAID, as well as her assistants;
- the local and regional administrators;
- the National Directors and Heads of Central Services, and all their technicians;
- BEEP's technical consultants and their Malian colleagues;
- the Director and staff of ABEL;
- the Regional Directors, the Inspectors of Basic Education, the Pedagogical Advisors, the Principals and other colleagues consulted; and
- the students' teachers and parents.

SUMMARY

USAID initiated BEEP (*Basic Education Expansion Project*) in Mali in 1989 with two major objectives: (i) to broaden the base of primary education, particularly with better internal efficiency; and (ii) to improve the quality of fundamental education, particularly in the first cycle. A third objective was added in a first amendment in August 1991: to regionalize the educational and administrative management of the fundamental schools. The Project is part of a larger educational reform program, the Fourth Education Project, which was designed by the World Bank, and which was partly financed and executed by other sponsors, including France (an anticipated initial amount of US \$3.7 million), Norway (US \$3.0M), Canada (US \$0.8M), the United Nations Development Program (US \$0.5M), the Government of Mali (US \$10.2M), and local communities (US \$4.5M). The initial total of the Fourth Education Project was US \$56.2 million.

Like the Fourth Education Project, BEEP is a "hybrid" project, with two separate components: non-project and investment. The non-project assistance totals US \$3 million, which is to be transferred to the account of the Government of Mali in three equal amounts after the realization of a series of conditionality requirements by the Government. The investment component is based on a program of technical assistance aiming at six sectors of the educational system: (i) in-service training; (ii) girls' schooling; (iii) management information systems; (iv) community support; (v) monitoring and evaluation; and, as a later addition, (vi) management assistance. This component is worth US \$17 million. The activities of the Project are concentrated in four regions: Bamako, Ségou, Sikasso, and after the first amendment, Koulikoro.

BEEP was initiated by USAID/W, in response to an official mandate of the U.S. Congress to develop basic education in Africa. Aware of the World Bank's initiative in Mali, among other considerations, the Washington headquarters insisted, according to USAID/Mali officials, that the latter develop a project, which would initially be financed with US \$10 million, of which US \$3 million were to be reserved for non-project assistance. This rapid evolution of the Project (there was neither an adequate staff nor a coherent strategy at the time the agreement was signed) generated a program which was simultaneously being defined, staffed, and implemented. This development, considered by many participants as "improvised," was criticized at times, while appreciated at others for its timely flexibility in the midst of a very unstable political climate. The most striking political change was the fall of the Moussa Traoré administration in 1991, who had signed the original agreements of the Fourth Education Project and BEEP. Since then, the Project has had to adapt not only to each new government, but to a number of successive officials, who were nominated, together with a new Minister, almost every six months. This situation has ostensibly exacerbated the natural turmoil accompanying a new project.

The USAID/Mali Mission organized the first BEEP evaluation in August 1993. The following terms of reference guided the evaluation team towards a two-tiered assessment of the Project: (i) the technical contribution of the six components; (ii) the repercussions of the overall Project activities on the realization of the major BEEP objectives. The evaluation team attempted to gather the perspectives of the various partners of the Project -- both participants and beneficiaries -- by relying on the "fourth-generation" evaluation methodology (cf. Guba & Lincoln, 1989). In particular, information was gathered from the following groups: (i) USAID officials; (ii) BEEP's technical advisors; (iii) representatives of the national technical bureaus involved in the Project design and execution; (iv) officers of the Ministry of Basic Education (MEB), and of other ministries regarding the non-project assistance program; (v) the Regional Directors of Education, the inspectors, pedagogical advisors, school principals, and teachers of the four regions covered by the Project; (vi) the Parent Teacher's Associations (APE) of the four regions, with other local government officials; (vii) representatives of the Fundamental Education Support Fund (FAEF)

program¹ of Koulikoro, Ségou, and Sikasso; and (viii) other interested partners, such as the consultants or the representatives of non-governmental organizations.

These investigations lasted four weeks and produced a set of different, sometimes divergent perspectives, on the organization, execution, and both beneficial and adverse effects of the Project. Based on a methodology encouraging a diversity of opinions and interpretations, several minor details pertaining to the Project had to be omitted when considering the people interviewed. The intent is not to present "the truth," and certainly not to offer specific recommendations. Rather the aim is to present a clarification of the different perspectives with the hope of promoting a more meaningful dialogue between the various major partners on specific issues which will guide the Project towards a set of new orientations within the framework of joint USAID and Malian priorities and objectives.

The assessment of the six technical components by the evaluation team uncovered various strategies and different levels of success. Without exception, one can say that the administrative and technical level of those six areas developed thanks at least partly to the Project's technical consultants. But the effects of the individual components vary according to (i) the concrete contribution of the Project to teaching and learning in Mali and (ii) the transfer of material and technical expertise to the Malian representatives. To illustrate these general remarks, here is a precis about each component:

1. Community Support.

The Community Support component was created to implement the FAEF program in the four regions of the Project. The two major objectives of this activity are (i) the renovation of school facilities, including the furnishing of classrooms, and (ii) the taking of responsibility by the communities for all aspects of community school management. USAID officials explained that Agency regulations could not permit new classroom construction; there is no way then to satisfy the great wish on the part of the regions and municipalities to add new construction to the renovations financed with Project aid. The FAEF method, directly taken from the Fourth Project, is a shared financing of all renovation work. At the beginning of the Project, the communities' financial (or in-kind) involvement was 35 percent of the global amount, which could be provided in cash, personnel, and labor. Very early in the Project, USAID accepted to finance 75 percent of the total amount.

The financial intervention of this component was complemented by a vast sensitization effort to motivate the rural and urban communities to identify their needs in school infrastructure and to mobilize their necessary resources, labor, or equipment to meet the 25 percent required by the FAEF. The various FAEF officials said that the component interventions led the communities to submit many renovation requests to the FAEF and apparently to create a participatory consensus on school management. From July 1992 to February 1993, 73 requests were granted by the FAEF/USAID steering committee. These requests involved the communities of the ten Inspectorates of Fundamental Education (IEF) in the Bamako district and the Koulikoro region. The APes, school principals, and inspectorates all expressed the need for new classroom construction that could not be funded by FAEF/USAID. In total, the component was able to complete 468 classrooms, latrines excluded. This represents a total investment of 161,355,653 CFA francs (or US \$575,000) by the FAEF.

However high this amount may be, it only represents a portion of the total need for classrooms in Mali. The criticism expressed about this initiative was diverse. Several regional directors, inspectors, APes, and other teachers in the regions complained about the USAID policy not to

¹ -- There are actually two FAEF programs: one financed by the World Bank, and the other by USAID.

finance new construction while others defended the strategies arguing that the renovations were practically new construction as they made room for schools that no longer existed. The issue may be more one of equity than an apparent contradiction with the objective to widen the base of the Malian education system: the least privileged areas often do not have even rundown schools to renovate. The regional administrators also evoked the equity issue when they noted that the least privileged areas often do not have the required 25 percent at their disposal in order to participate in the program. However, the FAEF found that the demand greatly exceeded the supply, and this placed the local authorities, who participated in the sensitization campaign, sometimes in a very delicate predicament: they are the ones to inform the communities that the additional funding to complete the 25 percent is no longer available. In some cases, there is a divergent opinion between the regional and local officials on the use of community funds for schools. At times, it seems that some funds raised for the specific reason to renovate the schools, were actually used for the general development of the region, without the participation or approval of those communities who provided the funds, and often without being among the beneficiaries. This attitude was observed in many communities by several representatives directly involved in the Community Support component. When this is the case, the sense of responsibility for the community's property is seen to rest almost entirely with the government administrators, especially in cases where the schools are concerned. They know only public, private, or parochial schools, no community-run schools. Therefore, the objective to entrust responsibility in the local population for all school aspects is far from being promoted with a simple financial participation, since the latter are generally perceived more as a tax than an investment.

Discussions with the officials and beneficiaries of the Community Support component shed light on certain future actions which could promote the realization of two chief objectives. The team proposes them to USAID and the Ministry of Basic Education as future topics for discussion. (1) The Koulikoro FAEF unit should be able to benefit from continued support, both in quantity and in quality. (2) The education authorities (regional and national) must find a meeting ground with the administrative authorities in the regions on a fair allocation of community resources for the development of the local schools. (3) The Project should double its efforts for community training, and especially of the APEs, in management, in order to realize the second objective. (4) USAID should consider other options, i.e. new construction, which would maximize the Project's influence on the broadening of the education base without forgetting the equity issue. (5) In a more ambitious perspective, one could consider complementary development interventions at the level of the communities, by offering community members the opportunity to develop skills in management in other domains before using them to manage schools; e.g the Kolondieba model of Save the Children.

2. Education Management Information Systems.

The chief purpose of the Education Management Education Systems component is to improve the regular use of clear and appropriate information by the authorities of the education system -- at all levels -- in establishing policies and making decisions. The specific objectives of the Project in this area are the following: (i) the identification of data and other pieces of information to be gathered on a regular basis, and the initiation of procedures and of a system to ensure this collection; (ii) the creation of a computerized capability at the central and regional levels for data gathering and analysis; and (iii) the set-up of communication networks and relay of the data to the various users. With a quasi-permanent consultant and a technical advisor, the component devoted its attention to the computerization of school statistics that were already in place, but gathered and treated by hand. The major steps the component had in mind were the purchase and setup of computers at the Ministry of Basic Education and (still in process) at the four Regional Directorates of Education involved, the creation of new forms, thereby adding information requested by the administrators consulted, the preparation of the annual statistics report by the Ministry, and the training of Malian staff in computer programming and processing. At the beginning, the technical advisor found his

counterpart and other direct colleagues at the National Directorate of Fundamental Education (Planning and Statistics Cell), which was terminated not much after the arrival of the technical advisor. Then the component came under the auspices of the Directorate of Administrative and Finance which was not really appropriate or ready to take on these functions. Only very recently the Ministry established a Planning and Statistics Cell, which is supposed to house the component.

The Ministry managed to computerize part of the data concerning the educational sector, thanks to updated forms developed by the Project. The data were gathered and processed, the results published and the statistical documents distributed, like the report on national teaching personnel.

However, interviews conducted with the officials and beneficiaries of the component raised two major shortcomings in its functioning. The first shortcoming is the perceived lack of transfer of competence to the Malian staff; the component is described as an autonomous operation operating in a vacuum. At the center, the absence of a real collaboration between the component's technical advisor and the DAF staff is particularly evident in the component being housed in a separate building from that of the host Administrative and Financial Directorate, and in the appointment of one single employee to work jointly with the technical advisor. In the Regional Directorates of Education, the regionalization of a management information system seems to have been slowed down due to several factors, like the slowness in setting up the computer rooms, the delays in the training of regional staff in computers, and the apparent lack of strong determination vis-a-vis regionalization. Another criticism is the component's tendency not to involve the Inspectorates of Fundamental Education (IEF) and the staff of the Regional Directorates of Education (DRE) in the collection and processing of the data. The criticism exists also at the other end of the data management process: its distribution is judged insufficient. The other shortcoming or deficiency concerning the component seems to be the lack of specific initiatives to introduce the data into the decision making process and articulation of policies. The component seems to rely mostly on its technical expertise.

The various partners are unanimous in their opinions about the need to transfer the necessary capacities to "malianize" the component and promote the use of data by decision-makers. (1) In order for the regionalization of the Education Management Information Systems component to continue, a more concrete step will need to be taken, including the possibility of taking into account certain recurrent duties of the Regional Directorates of Education (DRE). (2) In order to better guarantee the Malianization of the sector, it may be necessary to stimulate the management of the component's activities by the Planning and Statistics Cell, by housing the personnel and equipment there. (3) In order to organize the use of various data, the interested partners should first define planning and management responsibilities for the three management levels -- central, regional, and local. (4) The rooms destined to receive the computer equipment in the Regional Directorates of Education (DRE) should be in operation as soon as possible. (5) Employees involved in the Planning and Statistics Cell and in the Regional Directorates of Education should set up complementary training in the collection, processing, analysis and presentation of school statistics. (6) It would also be useful to speed up the design of the school map. (7) Regarding specific issues dealt with in the component, an updated census of the personnel from January to February 1992 is suggested, and strategies to meet the goal of personnel management should be chosen. Other collected data and measures ought to be reviewed so as to improve their relevance and utility at each level of management; which might be a good topic of a conference. They could be accompanied by a definitions and data analysis manual.

3. Management Assistance.

The Management Technical Assistance component was established to improve the performance of the education sector in Mali by applying a management and financial approach largely based on the strategic use of precise data. This component therefore hinges closely upon Education Management Information Systems. The chief goal of the technical assistance program is to assist

the central, regional, and local authorities (schools and communities) in managing the human, material, infrastructural, and financial resources of the sector. The original plan (as articulated in the first amendment of the Project Grant Agreement), which included the appointment of a technical advisor at the central level, i.e. the National Directorate of School Planning and Statistics (DNPS) to oversee that area, was modified due to two sets of circumstances: (i) the Government's decision to discontinue the National Directorate of School Planning and Statistics; and (ii) the absence of an appropriate technical advisor to be in charge of this responsibility. An alternative strategy was therefore applied in order to ensure a management assistance which would include the following elements:

- * the transfer of certain responsibilities of Management Assistance to Management Information Systems;
- * the appointment of a part-time advisor (from Clark University, Atlanta) to carry out studies and organize training seminars concerning various management issues;
- * the appointment of a technical advisor in regional school administration to work jointly with the Regional Directorate of Education of Koulikoro; and
- * provisional interventions, particularly in administration training, by other components -- e.g. In-Service Training, and Community Support.

In spite of a difficult beginning and a vacuum in the technical program concerned, some important activities were conducted by short-term technical advisors or by other BEEP components. Among which are: (i) a census of the Ministry personnel; (ii) a study on the training and in-service training needs of the Ministry's personnel; (iii) the planning conference of Sélingué, whose major themes included training, infrastructure, monitoring and evaluation, and management; (iv) an in-service training of school administrators; (v) a study of the Ministry's personnel; and (vi) a study on the reform of the information system in the fundamental education system. The steps taken in Koulikoro may constitute a more sustainable and coherent contribution for the development of the local capability of managing the education system, especially given the presence of a full-time technical advisor on the one hand, and the importance associated with the regionalization of the sector, on the other. The component contributed to the material and technical development of the Regional Directorate of Education of Koulikoro with the following actions: (i) an exhaustive census of the conditions and needs in furniture and school plants of all 383 fundamental schools in the region; (ii) the collection of data on schooling, on relations with the surrounding communities, and relations to the school map for the whole region; (iii) a sensitization of the communities and the school personnel about the FAEF program; (iv) a seminar to train community members in participating directly in the management and the decision-making process concerning the school and the education of their children; (v) a formal evaluation, through a written investigation, of the inspectorates of Koulikoro about the school conditions (furniture and plants), the archival and management systems, transportation, personnel, training, equipment, and the hierarchical coordination of each Inspectorate of Fundamental Education (IEF) of the Regional Directorate of Education of Koulikoro; (vi) the application of accounting and inventory methods for the receiving and control of the equipment provided by the Project; (vii) computer training for the personnel of the Regional Directorate of Education; and (viii) the introduction of a new filing system at the Regional Directorate of Education of Koulikoro, accompanied by an applied training.

The most evident criticism of the component is the absence of a full-time advisor at the central ministry level. Efforts to compensate in this area of intervention with short-term provisional actions led to some interesting results, of which the organization of seminars and studies are good examples. However, the lack of concerted monitoring possible by a continuous presence seems to have diminished considerably the application of these contributions, which remained rather theoretical or mere suggestions; good ideas which at times could not, or would not, be put into

action. To contrast this situation with that of Koulikoro (which is still not quite an ideal example), the technical vacuum created by the absence of a full-time advisor is all the clearer. As far as the assistance provided to the Regional Directorate of Education of Koulikoro is concerned, the issues or problems can be summarized as a lack of sufficient consistency between the internal aspects of BEEP, and more specifically, between the other components and the top officials of USAID/Mali. For example, the training seminar of the communities in school management had to be postponed because it conflicted with other seminars. (Other components complained of similar conflicts -- with other components or with Government-sponsored activities.) Another example is the massive response provoked by community sensitization about the FAEF, greatly exceeding the current available funds for the intervention. The negative impact engendered by this disappointment is difficult to assess.

The next stages for the development of the education sector ought to incorporate measures to provide a more regular technical assistance in order to assist the Ministry and all the regions in improving its administrative and financial management, at all levels. In particular, the evaluation team has defined four related proposals to be accomplished by this advisor: (1) the formal articulation of the tasks of the various positions at the national directorates of the education sector and of the regional directorates of education; (2) the establishment of routine, formal channels for the regular dissemination and processing of the data as well as the discussion and regular use of these data concerning the state of the fundamental education in Mali; (3) a definition of the needs for initial and in-service training of the employees, with the following objectives: (i) the establishment of a management capability, and (ii) the use of data in decision-making and the articulation of policies; and (4) the formulation and implementation of a new amendment to the Grant Agreement, which would include non-project assistance, with disbursements contingent to meeting certain task requirements mentioned above in (1) and (3). Regarding assistance in the other regional school administrations, we suggest the judicious model of the Koulikoro approach. The problem of administrative and financial management of the education system in Mali is overwhelming, and experience in the control of scarce resources is limited. If communities are to be endowed with the management responsibility of their own schools, management assistance proves critical.

4. Girls' Schooling. The goal of the Girls' Schooling component is to increase female participation rates and opportunities for success in schooling. The Project, together with the Government, has articulated four objectives to meet this goal: (i) increase enrollment, participation and retention rates; (ii) increase promotion rates and to encourage schoolgirls in their studies; (iii) improve the quality of teaching for girls; and (iv) increase the participation of female teachers in the schools. The component is headed by a technical advisor who works directly with the employees of the National Cell of Girls' Schooling, housed in the building of the National Directorate of Fundamental Education (DNEF). As with the other project components, this national directorate depends almost entirely on the funds provided by the Project for carrying out its activities; the Government covers salaries. Regional cells of girls' schooling are set up and work independently from the national organization, but often organize, at least theoretically, joint activities with the national cell. Initially, component staff presented seven experimental pilot programs in order to realize these goals and objectives, apparently mostly drawn from studies and reports of actions attempted in other developing countries: (i) improved work conditions for women teachers; (ii) increased participation of women in teachers' training; (iii) strategies to encourage and facilitate female participation in school; (iv) a scholarship and awards program for girls; (v) education programs which favor teaching girls; (vi) the implementation of a media campaign; and (vii) sensitization campaigns directed towards mothers and the whole community. The current program has kept to this plan for the most part. Nevertheless, two principal activities seem to have dominated the efforts: the multi-media sensitization campaign; and the prize distribution to the best female (and male) graduates and to the schools which best promoted female enrollment.

The increase of female participation in schools in the areas covered by the Project seem to show a positive impact of these efforts. For example, USAID reports an increase of the number of girls in the first six grades of about 20 percent between 1989 and 1992, a gain of about two percent in the number of girls of schooling age (from 16.66 to 18.74 percent). The media campaign and the schools competition also seem to demonstrate a remarkable level of participation and professionalism. Radio broadcasts reached many people, with messages judged appropriate for the targeted population (although neither Monitoring and Evaluation nor the present evaluation team studied this question in depth). The prize distribution ceremonies were organized with the apparent close collaboration of the local authorities -- inspectorates, pedagogical advisors, teachers, and APEs. According to several participants, the level of interest and energy surrounding these events was very high, and the expected results, both direct and indirect, in the communities involved seem to have largely been achieved.

This apparent success certainly does not preclude the existence of less positive aspects. As far as the ceremonies are concerned, various participants -- of the Regional Directorates, the APEs, the regional cells -- have especially described the lack of coordination and harmonization between the national cell and the local partners. The Project and USAID were ascribed the same criticism when they decided not to accept the choice in prizes proposed by the local committees. The impression of being dominated by, or subjected to, the central organization, was commonly expressed. Several regional staff, and others, had the feeling that the staff of the national cell limited the role of the regional cells in order to maximize the various transportation stipends for themselves. One problem identified by the evaluation team is the difficulty in attributing gained results in the areas of intervention to the component actions, since the Government implements other strategies in the regions with the same goal. In Sikasso, for example, a girls' schooling campaign was set up before the establishment of the Project in the region; therefore efforts to identify the real cause for this positive effect would be fruitless. There are certainly several influential factors, including those whose objectives did not consider girls' schooling directly. Nonetheless, this concern could be interpreted as being of secondary importance, given that the only true indicators used to assess the influence of the Project in this domain are the enrollment ratios and the girls' persisting in school. In that sense, no indications were found of preliminary research carried in the field with the aim of identifying the true causes of the weakness of girls' schooling for each group or region. On the contrary, it would appear that research was confined to a literature review in order to circumscribe the most appropriate strategies. Without a thorough understanding of the situation in the field, one wonders if the sensitization or award-giving interventions will have long-term consequences upon female enrollment. Moreover, one ought to search for the real factors slowing down participation and limiting the girls' presence in school in order to solve them. This kind of question ought to direct the proposed strategy, in the initial plan, to steer interventions outside the scope of the schools and to others supposed to improve the living conditions, e.g. domestic tasks, of a typical girl in Mali.

The future steps proposed for joint consideration by USAID, the Ministry (MEB), and the local authorities suggest a fundamental review of the overall strategy of the component; not only precise interventions but particularly the question of setting the girls' schooling issue in a separate component. Indeed, there would be a risk of isolating the girls' schooling in a kind of policy ghetto, whereas the objectives ought to be the chief concern of all the areas concerned. The question is merely asked, without real proposals; except that the issue ought to be discussed at length, openly and thoroughly. More precise steps are suggested as follows. (1) A research program ought to be articulated and implemented to shed light on the current situation of female enrollment in Mali and to assess the various causes of its weakness. (2) After the assessment of the results of the research activities, one could initiate pilot interventions, or, if it is deemed recommended, continue to widen the current interventions. (3) One ought to seek to put the component activities in closer contact with those of the colleagues working in the regional bureaus and in the local cells. (4) If there was to be a distinct component, one could suggest the establishment of a committee formed of representatives of the various directorates and divisions of

the Ministry which would conceive and direct a program of coordinated activities affecting the whole education system. (5) A more thorough assessment of the results of the media and sensitization campaign, and of the prizes and awards program ought to be undertaken.

5. In-Service Training.

The interventions of the In-Service Training component focus on the training of the teaching corps of Mali, particularly in Operational Pedagogical Objectives (OPO). Basing the choice and the content of the modules prepared and presented on the school program written out by the National Institute of Pedagogy (IPN), the various staff of the component, supervised by a technical advisor and his Malian colleague, organized the interventions along two complementary approaches. The first is the cascade approach, where all the regional directors and the inspectors of fundamental education are trained and then sent back to the regions to train in turn the pedagogical advisors, who train in turn the school principals, who then train the teachers. The second intervention is direct training, which consists of trainers trained by the component going to the four regions of the Project to lead seminars, for example on the OPOs, with the teachers. At the beginning of the Project, the upper primary teachers were involved. After an impact assessment of the intervention jointly directed with Monitoring and Evaluation, the leaders decided to guide the program towards the teachers of the first two grades of the first cycle of the primary education system. There, indeed, is the foundation of learning for the whole school career of the student.

The contribution of technical assistance to the development of this initiative may be defined in three sectors. First, there is the technical advisor with his team, who have designed teachers' training instruction manuals for 16 different modules. Secondly, the team of trainers is composed of a group of competent professional educators. Thirdly, the organization of many seminars, in Bamako and inland, seem to work relatively well. The Malians unequivocally ask for the continuation of technical assistance so as to ensure the on-going development of technical and organizational expertise, and a good command of those they have begun to apply.

The evaluation team found, however, several fundamental sources of criticism concerning certain component activities. First, it was observed that many teachers had followed several trainings while others had received only one or none at all. Another important criticism is about a program which is operated and staffed by trainers who are separate from the Inspectorate of National Education officially in charge of these responsibilities. Several observations were formulated about the cascade training strategy, which apparently does not always trickle down the school hierarchy. Furthermore, the evaluation team heard several remarks criticizing component employees for having programmed a superfluous participation of trainers to some seminars so that they could receive a stipend and the per diem allocation. As far as the strategy in general is concerned, the double role of inspector/trainer provided by IEF officials should also be questioned.

After assessing this component, the following steps are suggested for the joint consideration of USAID, the Ministry of Basic Education, and the officers and advisors in charge of the education sector. (1) A dialogue ought to be initiated in order to determine, by consensus, when the choice and development of teaching techniques will be left to teachers' own initiatives. (2) For the in-service training to reach the whole teaching body, in-service training centers ought to be established, which would function as IPN units and would be endowed with all the necessary expertise. (3) Funding and technical assistance ought to be guaranteed in order to allow the independent, though complementary, operation of the regional training centers and of the center of pedagogical training in Bamako. (4) Priority should be given to the in-service training of all teachers from first to third grade to familiarize them to the various practical uses of the language/reading textbooks (which have already been distributed) and of the arithmetic textbooks (whose distribution is imminent). (5) The trainers should continue to be "professionalized," and master the material for which they are responsible. (6) Considering the difficulty of conducting such a program over such a large territory, it would be advisable to study in detail the impact of the

in-service training in a few selected schools which would be assessed regularly and over a long period of time. (7) The component activities ought to be closer to the official in-service training department of the Ministry.

The evaluation of the In-Service Training has also included the study of the distribution of textbooks activity conducted by USAID. Finding that a vast quantity of new school books had not been distributed, USAID offered to oversee their distribution, in cooperation with the Ministry so as to agree on a method. Should one judge the intervention on the sole criteria of the presence of textbooks in the classrooms and of a better ratio of students per book -- almost 1:1 after the activity -- one would conclude this was an overwhelming success. Nevertheless, remarks of administrators and educators in Bamako and in the regions were mixed. Regarding the capability of the Malian Government to continue the massive distribution of the textbooks, some officials considered imprudent the decision on the part of USAID not to charge even a minimal price for the books, which apparently was contrary to the policy that had been agreed upon originally.² Moreover, the arrival of the reading books in the classrooms occurred after the time in the school curriculum when these texts were needed. Finally, some criticism was formulated about the adequacy of the book content; according to some, the choice of textbooks was not adjusted to the Malian environment, the lessons were not in conformity with the training provided by the In-Service Training component, and the reading books had been delivered without the teacher's guide.

The next stages proposed for this operation are as follows: (i) to sensitize parents to the value of the books and to their preservation; (ii) to question the cost exemption (free distribution) of the textbooks; (iii) to consider the use of a printing and reproduction capacity at the IPN; (iv) to endow the Regional Directorates and the Inspectorates with the responsibility of textbook distribution; and (v) to ensure the opportunity, quality and relevance of the books, and that they be delivered with the necessary accompanying teaching material at the appropriate time required by the school calendar.

6. Monitoring and Evaluation.

According to BEEP's grant agreements, the chief goal of the Monitoring and Evaluation component is to "monitor and evaluate the work in the classrooms so as to determine and demonstrate the impact of the various changes made in the system (§ III.C.3)." The central focus of this effort includes the various components of the Project (except for Education Management Information Systems, which is not covered). Although the original document directed the component more towards the whole fundamental education system, in reality the component is essentially concerned directly by the Project's efficacy and the impact of the Project in the regions concerned by the Project. The executing wing of the component is the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research, located at the National Institute of Pedagogy (IPN). The component is overseen by a technical advisor, hired under the ABEL contract (the USAID Project of Advancing Basic Education and Literacy). Together with her Malian colleague and a team of researchers from the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research, she carries out two principal functions motivated by the need of meeting research requirements and assessing other Project components. (The Division is supposed to fill the same mandate for the whole Ministry, which it does when it has operational funds at its disposal. With USAID funding, the staff involved have the opportunity of remaining active.) The first function is to write the Monitoring and Evaluation Report of the Fourth Project of Basic Education Expansion. This activity usually begins around February with on-site research and ends in the summer with the distribution of the results. This implies the participation of staff from other components for specific steps -- the design of research

² -- The history of the distribution predating the revolution is full of delicate situations. Given the flagrant need for textbooks in the classrooms, and its lack of experience in that area, USAID/Mali estimated that the most expeditious and the least complicated strategy should be used to carry out this distribution.

protocols, the analysis of preliminary data, and the review of the preliminary report -- to ensure adequate attention to the needs and objectives of the overall Project. The second function has the same objectives, but is concerned with more specific issues or timely research, such as the document "SOS Training" and the testing of a sample of first and fifth grade students in mathematics and French.

The contributions of the Monitoring and Evaluation component to fundamental education in Mali are evident in the component's products as well as in the capability of the staff involved in this work. Regarding the component's products, regular and other documents have already been cited as giving a useful insight on the interventions in the sector. Assessments performed by component staff have led to several modifications in the strategies used for other components. The creation of a testing program in mathematics and in French warrants particular attention as it constitutes an ambitious initiative for the Ministry, especially as its result is of high quality. For the education sector itself, the Project engendered a marked improvement in the skills of the research staff involved. This technical progress has been equally observed in the planning, the implementation, and the management of the component's work.

In spite of the positive appreciation of the component, some gaps have been observed, most of which are not related to the original conceptualization of the Project but may serve to define future actions both for the component and for the Project. The only problem which really could be considered as a conceptual failing could pertain to the component activities exclusively limited to the study of the Project's interventions. Other criticism concerns the statistical analyses in particular. First, the level of analysis -- population stratification -- is too vast -- presenting numbers by region, not really allowing for more subtle comparisons. Secondly, the assessments seem limited to simple questions -- yes or no -- without the introduction of hypotheses or the requirement of experimentation. Furthermore, it would seem desirable to have an overview of all the elements which could help to significantly deepen the understanding of the questions studied; e.g. qualitative aspects, questions of external performance, and socio-economic factors. The criticism evoked by the staff of other sectors of the hierarchy of the education system was two-fold: (i) the inactivity of the component staff regarding issues outside the scope of the Project; and (ii) the failed initial efforts and promises in establishing research agencies and an evaluation capacity at the level of the regions. Finally, the component staff complained about their dependence on the Education Management Information Systems component for the gathering, processing, and analysis of the data, since the Monitoring and Evaluation component does not have the necessary computer equipment at its disposal.

Taking these inadequacies into account, it is suggested to consider the following developments in order to maintain the development of the sector. (1) It is deemed necessary to begin direct actions -- equipment, training, specific funds -- to ensure the regionalization of a monitoring and evaluation capability in the very near future. (2) We propose the initiation of a monitored experimentation program, based on detailed criteria -- e.g. OPO vs. non-OPO schools; used vs. not used textbooks; double session same teacher vs. two teachers -- which would permit the testing of specific hypotheses. (3) Stratification criteria ought to be expanded in the gathering, processing and analysis of the data so as to enable all the actors throughout the education system to understand what is happening at the level which concerns them. (4) Socio-economic factors ought to be incorporated into research protocols. (5) There should also be regulated formal links between the various project components in the design and implementation of the activities of Monitoring and Evaluation, by targeting mixed teams, for example, for the various sectors. (6) In order to go from the descriptive to the prescriptive and understanding, more qualitative research and other research which would allow case studies ought to be considered. (7) The understanding of the educational situation in Mali could also develop if studies of external performance were begun, presently absent in the research program. (8) Regarding the issue of institutionalization and sustainability of monitoring and evaluation at the Ministry, paths ought to be sought to involve other offices of the Ministry, especially for the interventions regarding the actions that are outside

the scope of the BEEP program. (9) Finally, given the progress and the many contributions of the component to the education sector, it is suggested that technical assistance should continue.

Regarding the overall assessment of the Project, six questions were asked directly by USAID with reference to the terms of reference of the evaluation: (i) the stages and the participants of both the initial and the on-going design; (ii) the environment in which it evolved; (iii) the major factors of its implementation; (iv) the influence of the Project on the equity of the educational system; (v) the Project's contribution to the improvement of the quality of the fundamental education; and (vi) the Project's impact on the efficiency of the educational system in Mali.

The evaluation team considered four major questions when assessing the Project's design: 1. How involved have the partners and beneficiaries been in defining the Project's objectives and strategies? 2. Do the Project's objectives reflect the Government's concerns and the current needs in the regions? 3. Does the Project offer a consistent strategy to respond to the major concerns of the education sector? 4. Does the Project's structural design allow the implementation of the education sector objectives? The many interviews with the various participants and beneficiaries of the Project led to the observation that the program has largely been defined as it is being implemented; there has been no obvious global plan of action leading concrete actions. The term most referred to was "improvised." Other partners, working for USAID or the Ministry, who appreciate the capability of USAID in responding adequately to sudden or new requests and priorities prefer the term "flexible." Another common observation concerning the on-going development of the Project is the lack of participation of other partners of the Fourth Project in the major decisions involving both Project components and management. Although the Project targeted areas considered a priority by the Malian Government and by the sponsors, it is not really a consistent program; pieces of the puzzle -- which should be supplied by other donors -- are missing, thus limiting the components' influence, and leaving the Project to function without adequate complementary parts (e.g. in-service training without textbook distribution, a situation fortunately salvaged, at least somewhat, by USAID).

The context in which the Project has been evolving from this point on is characterized by changes occurring primarily due to political events in Mali. After operating for less than two years, the Project witnessed the collapse of the Malian Government by a revolution. Since then, the Project has known three Governments and four different ministries, with the frequent new appointment of key personnel for the Project. The last two school years also experienced upheaval with schools closed for long periods of time. Another element is the slow and heavy bureaucracy of both USAID and the Government of Mali. This aspect has been exacerbated in both cases by changes in officials in charge of the USAID Mission, often accompanied by policy changes, such as the USAID decision to eliminate the stipends and to "rationalize" (lower) the rates of the per diems paid to Malians for project-related in-country travel. On the other hand, several participants remarked that the Project has had beneficial influences on the environment of the Ministry of Basic Education, with the adoption, in particular, of improved management habits by the direct partners.

The evaluation team asked three fundamental questions concerning the Project's overall execution, :

- (1) What were the degree and quality of involvement of the various partners, executives, and beneficiaries in the implementation, coordination, and management of the Project's activities?
- (2) Are the current activities within the framework of the Project?
- (3) What have been the major questions raised when implementing the Project?

Just as for the Project design, decision-making concerning the implementation of many activities remained, for the most part, the privilege of USAID, which, for example, has the final word on annual budgets and plans, introduces management tools, and keeps its veto power for virtually all decisions. This does not mean that this privilege has necessarily been abused; on the contrary, it has usually been exercised quite judiciously. But the decision-making is felt as unilateral and has been the object of near unanimous criticism. Open communication among partners about what USAID can or cannot accept to do, in budgetary or strategic terms, is very rare. One question was formulated on several occasions:

what is the right position between the USAID responsibility to ensure the smooth functioning and implementation of the Project and the adoption of an attitude of direct intervention in the daily Project execution? The recent nomination of a Project chief-of-party, and the desire expressed for several months of transferring the major responsibility of Project management to the BPE (Directorate of Education Projects), indicates a significant step towards this kind of openness. Concerning unity between Project execution and objectives, the views shared by the various participants were rather positive. However, the latter remarked some shortcomings such as the apparent opposition to component monitoring of regionalization by the technical advisors and employees, a concentration of activities in the urban centers, and a lack of consistency or complementarity between the actions of the various components.

The Project's influence on the equity of the education system is more evident in the area of girls' schooling. The Project's influence is less apparent in socio-economic disparities, both between regions and between rural and urban areas. Problems of low enrollment, of lack of teaching and learning material, of insufficient training of teachers, of inadequate support and pedagogical monitoring, and of overloaded programs are acute over the whole country. Nevertheless, the Project's activities are concentrated in the four most (relatively, of course) privileged regions not far from the capital. Within each region, the interventions prove to occur more often in urban than in rural areas, and in the relatively privileged communities. Some of the strategies even seem entirely inappropriate for the rural areas in order to palliate various inadequacies; for example, the FAEF program, which requires a local capability of gathering some capital, in cash, material, or in labor, i.e. all that is less available in the most impoverished rural areas. Another example is the effort to strengthen the private education sector thereby penalizing the populations who really cannot afford to pay for enrollment fees and the communities which are the least attractive to enterprising educators. The same is true with all renovation activities being contingent upon the additional fund program, and by not beginning new construction thereby excluding the most needy populations. The conditionality limiting the recruitment of new teaching personnel would have the same effect. Other sponsors, often endorsed or encouraged by USAID, occasionally address these situations -- e.g. the Canadians' taking responsibility for the provisional teachers' salaries for a year -- but these actions do not compensate for the absence of a direct participation of USAID, the chief sponsor. It is important to stress that social equity is promoted by the few requirements which favor fundamental education over secondary and higher education, widening the access to basic education at the expense of an education for the elite. However, given the vast need and all the other difficulties concerning programmed complementary strategies, it is not at all sure that these conditions will have the desired consequences.

Two major questions concerned the evaluation team regarding BEEP's quality of the program and project execution: (1) What is the effect of the Project on the quality of education; and (2) How adequate are the criteria of quality of education? Although several indicators established by USAID to determine the level of success reached by the Project -- e.g. teachers trained in OPO, the book/student ratio, and internal efficiency -- suggest positive achievement, a more thorough analysis reveals that the effect on the quality of education is much less evident; for example, the effect of more than 7,000 teachers trained in OPO is considerably compromised by a lack of teaching material, by very variable levels of technical mastery, by school principals opposing the use of OPOs, by training periods of varying quality, especially with the cascade training strategy, among other reasons. As far as the adequacy of the criteria is concerned, the evaluation team found that the issue of external quality -- the effect education has on the life of a former student at work, in the society, and in the family -- has largely been ignored, both in the conceptualization of the Project and in the assessment criteria. With the Government's renewed interest in the full significance of the education system for the development of the country and for all Malians, this issue warrants particular attention.

Finally, the issue of efficiency may be appreciated at several levels: (i) the effect of the Project's procedures on its management; (ii) the Project's impact on the achievement of the indicators; (iii)

the validity and pertinence of the indicators; and (iv) the Project's impact on the Government's initiative of decentralization, and the sustainability of the results gained. The team was especially interested in the latter. Regarding the effect of the Project on management, we found both positive and negative aspects. As far as the positive aspects are concerned, Ministry officials and employees expressed more serious attention than many of their colleagues -- especially those directly involved in the Project -- to the process of planning, budgeting, book-keeping, management, and training. As far as the negative aspects are concerned, we noticed the heavy bureaucracy of USAID which was added to the slow bureaucracy of the Ministry, and the lack of open communication, as much concerning USAID as the Ministry and the BPE (Directorate of Education Projects). As is shown in other sections, the direct impact of the Project, which is only one (albeit large) component of the Fourth Project, and which functions parallel with local and governmental initiatives, is too difficult to determine. As for the validity of the indicators, apart from the need to deepen the analysis of these superficial criteria, the evaluation team identified several pertinent factors which are presently ignored but which are very valued in the learning process. In short, one is limited to pedagogical factors in order to address education issues, both in the measures and in the strategies of the Project, which exclude interventions outside the schools that could considerably influence student learning. (The only exception is Girls' Schooling.) Finally, regarding the issue of sustainability of the Project's activities, through a transfer of technical and management expertise from technical advisors to their Malian counterparts, results are mixed. Some components have succeeded very well in that area whereas others appear to have failed. For the overall Project, one can say that the Malian Government is progressing well in its adjustment to the idiosyncratic systems of management of USAID, quite a feat given the need to respond to the various administrative exigencies of the other sponsors. How must the issue of efficacy be applied in this situation?

The evaluation team proposes eight future directions to USAID and the Ministry of Basic Education as recommendations subject to discussion and modification with the priorities to be negotiated by the two partners. The team took into account the major ideas and wishes expressed by the partners involved in BEEP in the formulation of the proposals. The real programming work of the following steps belongs jointly to USAID and the Government. As a *caveat*, we recommend that the reader consult the more comprehensive presentation of these proposals in Chapter 5; the following explanations are but a brief summary.

1. **New financing alternatives** ought to be considered, both at the level of the Project and in specific component areas, such as the FAEF. Three recommendations are suggested for the Project: (i) the financing of interventions directed outside the schools, including the non-formal education sector; (ii) a more careful coordination between USAID -- and the other sponsors -- and the Government; and (iii) the change of the Non-Project Assistance program requirements to make these more contingent upon the internal actions of the Ministry (MEB) rather than on more macro-economic policy. Regarding specific areas, we would suggest: (i) clarifying the concept of the basic school, or community school; (ii) encouraging specific efforts to benefit community schools, which would entail freeing the APE from its financial obligation to the Tax of Regional and Local Development; (iii) involving schools in other community development actions likely to generate resources and sustain actions connected with the management of local educational institutions; and (iv) providing direct assistance aimed at reinforcing community responsibility concerning strategic management and school financing.
2. **The current efforts on the part of the Malian authorities to clarify the goals of the overall education system** should focus USAID attention on providing assistance to the necessary logistic, financial, and intellectual supports for the accomplishment of this task.

3. **The evaluation mission strongly proposes that the Government of Mali and USAID begin serious discussions aimed at four recommendations concerning structural adjustment: (1) abandon unrealistic, and therefore unworkable standards; (ii) appropriately revise requirements which penalize basic education; (iii) authorize the recruitment of teachers of basic education; (iv) design new requirements which merit collaborative efforts between the sponsors and the Government.**
4. **We strongly suggest, given the equity objectives and their major impact on the broadening of the educational base, that USAID should finance new classroom and school construction.**
5. **To support the Government's decentralization efforts more concretely, the evaluation team recommends that USAID actively encourage the components in implementing plans of regionalization for the Project's activities and release sufficient funds to ensure this implementation.**
6. **A Project Steering Committee should be established and have the authority to direct, prioritize and monitor BEEP's activities and ensure its coordination with the Ministry's program;**
7. **We suggest that USAID continue its technical assistance program for the various components, implemented by advisors, with two fundamental underlying principles: (i) to redirect the advisors' and components' terms of reference so as to grant primary importance to regionalization; and (ii) for each individual component to seriously examine the recommendations of the present evaluation. The evaluators suggest that Project officials also impose four conditions, among which: (i) that all partners emphasize the transfer of expertise; (ii) that the advisor's role be circumscribed to his or her role as a technician; (iii) that the Project's budget contain distinct statements to show the cost of technical assistance separate from other Project expenses; and (iv) that USAID and the BPE jointly carry out an annual assessment of each advisor.**
8. **Regarding the issue of equity, in particular, the evaluation team strongly recommends the extension of the Project to all the regions of Mali.**

The evaluation has undoubtedly raised several shortcomings about BEEP, both in its project design and execution. Nevertheless, the contributions realized in all the targeted sectors through its development program are genuine and perceptible. The personal and institutional development in the technical and management capabilities is evident everywhere we look. However, a communication gap remains between partners, which seems to affect all the areas of the program. This problem refers to the communication links between USAID and the Ministry of Basic Education (which seems to be improving with the current BPE), between USAID and the technical advisors (now more promising with the recent nomination of a chief-of-party), and between the various divisions of the Ministry. This situation can be explained to a certain extent by the turmoil the Government of Mali has experienced in the recent past, with the Project being juggled between the hands of one ministerial official to another. The major impact of this problem seems to be a Project which launches great initiatives but whose effects are considerably diminished by a lack of unity with other actions and a breakdown or a lessening of monitoring by the alleged partners. This deficiency must find a solution, and the evaluation team hopes that further discussion of this report and subsequent planning activities will present excellent opportunities for doing so.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

A. Introduction to the Evaluation Work

An evaluator's work is, perhaps, first and foremost, an exercise in humility. His or her main task is to make a project more accessible to those who know it most intimately: the people who conceived it, implemented it, and experienced its positive and negative consequences. The evaluator may bring out a new perspective, gleaned from his or her work with similar projects, or apply technical ideas associated with a particular expertise. S/he starts the task of evaluation the least well informed of all. And in a very limited amount of time, s/he is expected to conduct an objective assessment of a very complex activity containing several nuances. Yet, one can only truly expect an evaluator to have gained, at the end of his or her mission, rather global impressions of the situation at a given moment in the life of the activity being assessed. Furthermore, while s/he may attempt to point out a beneficial course to take for the activity to continue, the real responsibility for the fine tuning of a new course to be taken will have to be conceived jointly with those most directly involved for the long haul, who have to implement and ensure a good outcome.

In the final analysis, all that the evaluator can really hope to do is to gather as much information as possible from the people who have been involved in the project, directly and indirectly, and to present this information to the decision-makers in a coherent fashion. It is the evaluator's hope that s/he will have put together a few original ideas or expressed familiar ones in a new way, thereby helping the decision-makers and the other partners to consider a situation what they have been living on a daily basis from a new angle. A good evaluator must above all be a good apprentice and a faithful reporter.

The Evaluation Team. For the present evaluation, USAID/Mali contacted the Education Development Center (EDC), to put together a team of three Malians and two expatriates. The Government of Mali asked that a fourth Malian be added to the team. The team was as follows:

- Kabine Hari DIANE, Education Planner, Mali;
- Georges GUISLAIN, Specialist in School and Training Programs, Belgium;
- Joshua MUSKIN, Evaluation Specialist/Team Leader, USA;
- Issa N'DIAYE, Evaluation Specialist/Co-Team Leader, Mali;
- Bintou SANANKOUA, Education Policy Analyst, Mali;
- Cheickne Hamala SOUMARE, Education Economist, Mali.

The designation of a mixed team of nationals and expatriates offered the expatriates a number of advantages, which helped them to speed up the work and, at the same time, conduct a thorough and practical investigation of the major related issues. Specifically, the fact that the team was essentially composed of nationals influenced the evaluation along the following lines:

- access to the national offices was easier, and the discussions often proved to be more informal and open.
- the evaluation's basic focus was directed more to the concerns of the Government of Mali than to the donor's, a consequence which may seem subtle but which should be evident throughout the text.
- the team's evaluation of BEEP's activities and procedures was more influenced by the knowledge of the system and priorities of the Government of Mali

than of USAID; consequently, the conclusions and recommendations may have a more practical value for the beneficiaries of the Project.

One possible drawback which can be linked to the nomination of former officials of the Ministry of National Education to the team is a conscious or unconscious bias in their views or conclusions in the analysis. Although this outcome cannot be proven, the possibility should not be entirely overlooked.

It is the team's hope that the questions, arguments and method used in the evaluation will show the sincere expectations that this work should help to guide USAID and the Government of Mali in a common direction to reach the objective of a national basic education system that contributes to the overall development of the country.

Evaluation Design and Implementation. The evaluation began August 2 and lasted four weeks, based mainly in Bamako, with field work visits to Koulikoro, Segou, and Sikasso. The evaluation was originally scheduled for the month of May or June, which would have enabled visits to schools while classes were in session. It actually occurred later which, in the end, proved to be only a mild annoyance, since all the evaluators -- especially the nationals among them -- were already quite familiar with how the primary school system functions in Mali. The general program of the evaluation was as follows:

- Week I. Consultation of basic materials; orientation by USAID; development of an evaluation outline (the team was helped in the preparation of the outline by Dr. M. Coulibaly from the USAID/REDSO office in Abidjan); and initial contacts.
- Week II. Meetings in Bamako and Koulikoro. Partial synthesis of findings
- Week III. Meetings in Segou, Sikasso, and Bamako, and continued synthesis.
- Week IV. Drafting of the evaluation report and its presentation to BEEP (Basic Education Expansion Project), USAID and Ministry of Basic Education representatives.

An exact list of all the agencies and individuals contacted for the present evaluation appears in Appendix A. The majority of the meetings were led by the evaluators alone, although several meetings were attended by more than one evaluator. The team met regularly to synthesize the remarks, focusing its interest on identifying the major themes which emerged from the various discussions and on selecting which questions and hypotheses to follow up on at subsequent meetings. Although each one of the members was keen on fulfilling his or her specific terms of reference, all were very attentive to the need to consider the overall Project, and the degree to which each component complemented each other, so as to ensure the internal quality of each and the collective contribution to the more global objectives of the Project.

Evaluation Objectives. In the terms of reference for the evaluation, as well as in its initial orientation, USAID strongly emphasized the wish for an overall assessment of the Project. It was made clear that USAID does not perceive the Project as a series of technical components, but rather as a consistent strategy, composed of several elements run together, which will result eventually in the improvement of the overall basic education system in Mali. The basic objectives of the Project -- (i) a better internal performance of the system and, (ii) better quality for the fundamental school in Mali -- prompted the evaluators to show the extent to which USAID has been able to achieve these goals with BEEP.

In order to focus the team's attention better on the overall design of the Project, USAID suggested a matrix composed of seven vertical operational themes and nine horizontal areas of intervention:

Operational Themes

1. Planning
2. Environment
3. Implementation
4. Equity
5. Quality
6. Efficiency
7. Future Directions

Areas of Intervention

- a. Community
- b. School
- c. Inspectorate
- d. Regional Bureau
- e. Administrative Bureau
- f. Bureau of Primary Education
- g. Bureau of Pedagogy
- h. Project Implementation Cell
- i. Departmental Staff

In this way, the major issues became the Project's design, implementation context and institutional sustainability. By targeting all the hierarchical areas of intervention involved in the educational system, both as implementors and beneficiaries, the evaluation team was led to appreciate everyone's input as an actual (and potential) USAID partner in the Project.

The team considered this matrix more as a guide than a directive and devoted its time to two separate tasks in the evaluation of the Project. First, the evaluators realized that they could not overlook the various components which constituted the major activities of the Project:

- In-Service Training
- Monitoring and Evaluation
- Girls' Schooling
- Community Support
- Management Information Systems
- Management Assistance

For one, these components define the duties and activities of the Project's technical advisors. Also, the Project's budget, management and implementation are entirely articulated around these functional categories. Additionally, in the regions and the central administrative offices, the Project is referred to by the components. Lastly, the Project's sustainability will be defined, at least to a certain degree, by these technical areas of intervention. The analysis of these components constitutes Chapters II and III.

The first six operational themes were used to map out the global analysis of the Project (Chapter IV), the second task of the evaluation team. (The seventh theme, Future Directions, makes up Chapter V.) The following questions concern the general objectives of the Project:

- Have the interventions conducted by the Project helped to improve school performance and the performance of the teachers and the students?
- Does the Project reinforce the capability of the Ministry of Basic Education to manage the sector and to ensure its effective implementation?
- Are the positive impacts on the system, where they exist, relevant and sustainable?

At this stage, the main focus of the evaluation is on the design and implementation of the Project as a whole rather than on the various components.

A third item of the Project, treated separately, is the Non-Project assistance. Out of the total Project funding amount of US \$20 million, US \$3 million were set aside for quick disbursements, to be made after the Government satisfied a series of conditionalities. Two major questions

concerned both the specialist in the financing and economics of education and the rest of the team. First, what has been the contribution of Non-Project Assistance component to the primary objectives of the Project? Secondly, what has been the ratio between the technical activities of the Project (the investment program) and the quick disbursement aspect the (the sectoral adjustment program)?

Methodology: "fourth generation" evaluation. In organizing the evaluation, USAID asked the team to apply a "fourth-generation" methodology. Dubbed "fourth generation" because three previous generations of evaluation methodologies are identified -- technical, descriptive, judgmental -- the methodology emphasizes the need to allow all the partners involved to express their opinions -- decision-makers, implementors and beneficiaries -- about the activity under examination. The evaluator serves much more the role of facilitator and reporter than that of analyst. His or her particular function is to identify the partners involved and to ask them pertinent questions. At the basis of the methodology is dialogue: the aim is to have the various partners discuss together to help them develop a consensual perspective. Therefore the evaluator is less inclined to synthesize opposite opinions which could consequently disappear in a final report. The goal of the "fourth generation" evaluation is to help the many partners reach a consensus, which would lead to common strategies for following stages of action. Where a consensus has not been reached the task of the evaluator is to articulate the points of disagreement and to suggest strategies of negotiation to ensure continued communication and eventual conception.

As in other situations, however, this is easier said than done. The dialogue between the partners may be compromised due to several factors -- as in the case of this evaluation -- such as: (i) logistical difficulties in getting the partners together (lack of availability of partners or transportation); (ii) a reluctance by some to speak freely in front of their superiors; (3) an innate politeness which prohibits the criticism of someone or something in front of someone else. In short, an open dialogue is a custom which is better exercised when it already exists or needs to be practiced; it does not take place on command. Whenever possible, the evaluators arranged groups to discuss together the various points of the project. The results were generally satisfying. When dialogue was not possible, the evaluators simulated this by presenting to different project parties the remarks by others individually on the various issues. The difficulties and shortcomings created through this approach should be obvious. With such a strategy, a consensus is less obvious, but one still tries to represent the different perceptions, where pertinent, instead of synthesizing them in a conclusion which would impose a consensus that had not truly emerged. Moreover, many perspectives and important sources of information are probably lacking. Without pretending to have remained faithful to the methodology, there was at least an attempt to honor the spirit of the fourth generation evaluation.

The main difficulty for the evaluation team in reaching all those who had been involved in the Project came from having to track down former government officials who had been reappointed with the many changes of government. The three divisions which are most intimately connected to the Project -- the Bureau of Education Projects (BPE), the National Institute of Pedagogy (IPN) and the National Directorate of Fundamental Education (DNEF) were run by administrators who had only occupied their positions for a few months. (The same is true of many of the officers of the Ministry and other national departments.) In some instances, the evaluation team was able to take advantage of opportunities to meet former administrators and officials. (In fact, one team member, Dr. N'diaye, was Minister of National Education for the interim government, and other members -- Mr. Diané, Mrs. Sanankoua, and Mr. Soumaré -- were all members of former governments.) Furthermore, especially for logistic reasons, the team was obliged to neglect certain key figures who could have supplied important information and perspectives, especially as far as the historical background of the Project is concerned. To illustrate this point, perhaps the most striking example was the absence of the former head of the National Institute of Pedagogy, Dr. Abdoulaye Ky, -- who had had a key role in the articulation of the regionalization strategy introduced in the first Project amendment. He also participated in the overall design and

implementation of BEEP over the first three years and as the Head of the Cabinet of the interim government, playing an important role in the organization and implementation of the Planning Conference at Sélingué. (Dr. Ky was interviewed later and his perceptions were included in the final draft of the evaluation.)

The evaluators did try to compensate for these absent voices, as well as others, who could have brought interesting contributions to the evaluation, by soliciting perspectives from other Project participants, and increasing "coverage" by distributing the information gathering tasks among the team members. It is nevertheless very important to remember that this assessment represents only a small part of all those concerned as participants or beneficiaries to the BEEP activities. It is therefore paramount, for those who will engage in the future Project stages to seek to include these people in subsequent discussions.

B. The Historical and Political Context in Mali

After close to a century of French colonization, the independent country of Mali had to draw up an educational system tailored to the ambitions of a young sovereign State where everything remained to be done.³

In order to satisfy the administrative and management needs of the region, the colonial school had established a very basic educational system for the training of common civil servants (interpreters, office workers, skilled workers) and for promoting the cultural assimilation of Africans. With these basic global objectives, the colonial education system was far from able to meet the fundamental needs of a newly independent Mali whose economic, political, social and cultural development requirements necessitated a high number of competent executives.⁴ Hence the necessity of a reform of the structure of the colonial school.

Essentially, the Reform of 1962 had as its purpose the training of a "new individual" capable of building a new nation. The general objectives of the Reform were quantitative, as well as qualitative, articulated around the following lines:

- quality education for all;
- an education that could supply the country with a cadre of professionals necessary for national development in the shortest time and with the greatest economy of funds possible;
- an education that would guarantee an adequate cultural level on par with that of the industrialized countries;
- an education based on the cultural values of Mali, yet open to universality; and
- an education capable of decolonizing the Malian mind.

³ -- "The enthusiasm for the establishment of schools led to an uncontrolled construction of classrooms, causing a mushrooming of the temporary shelters which are currently the target of renovation efforts. This phenomenon of remarkable consequences is not mentioned in the report." (remarks of Boubacar Gaye, Head of the Training Division of the National Institute of Pedagogy, [IPN])

⁴ -- "The accompanying measures resulting from the policy of exclusion in the schools have not been pointed out. This was a project involving the creation of the Center's for Practical Orientation (COP) which was concerned with the elements of school drop-out rates in the first cycle. This system would be even more advantageous in our time to limit the flow toward the second cycles." (remarks of Boubacar Gaye, Head of the Training Division of the National Institute of Pedagogy [IPN])

Quantitatively, the modern state of Mali had to broaden the base of its educational system with an eye toward democratizing the education system. Everywhere classrooms were built, sometimes thanks to an enthusiasm in "human investment" (i.e. the voluntary contribution by local populations of resources and physical labor) to educate the young and teach the adults to be literate. The ambition of the Reform of 1962 was to draw up a development plan for schools that would be able within ten years (1962-1972) to achieve full enrollment (100%) for Mali's children. Therefore the "fundamental school" was instituted, named thus because it constituted the basis of the system and included an initial cycle of five years and a second cycle of four years, a total of nine years which were meant to lead to a secondary level education of one to four years and to a higher education level of two to five years, depending on the case.

Qualitatively, it was necessary to write new programs with training components adapted specifically to meet national and local realities. In 1960, the enrollment rate was less than seven per cent and hardly one out of ten Malians could read or write. Secondary education (the training of office workers and skilled workers) was shaky, and higher education was nonexistent.

In 1964, the first conference on education in Mali took place, aiming to reassess the Reform and correct its shortcomings. From 1960 to 1964, the enrollment rate had more than doubled, but already important problems had started to arise. The rate of classroom construction had begun to lose its momentum, no longer meeting the increasing demand for education of the population. At the beginning of the Reform, the expulsion of students was prohibited in the first of the fundamental cycles, but was allowed from 1964 on. At the same time, an examination was instituted by the Government introducing selection criteria in the fundamental school at the end of the first cycle, which was six years long instead of five (the second cycle consequently reduced from four years to three). On the other hand, as regards teacher training, the need for teachers for the educational system that was set up was such that even massive recruitments, conducted under questionable conditions (with programs of inadequate quality), were not able to satisfy the high demand at that level. Thus were born little by little the distortions which would eventually jeopardize the initial objectives of the Reform.

In 1968, a new tack was introduced after the military coup; the Reform of 1962 was simply placed in dry storage. Everywhere strict selection criteria were introduced in the system. At the fundamental school level, this meant massive dismissals and numerous failed examinations, thereby increasing the misfits of society, depriving them of any other chance, and consequently worsening the serious distortions which existed throughout society.

The 1978 Conference painted a distressing picture. Next to the on-going and worsened state of disrepair at the foundation of the education system, unemployment became more acute due to the trained professionals whose qualifications no longer met the demands of the national economy or the labor market. In 1984, the state introduced an entrance examination for the civil service. The crisis reached its peak then and the authorities closed the schools for two consecutive years. In spite of the Conference on the State of Education in 1989, from which the most interested partners (students and teachers) were notably absent, the system continued to deteriorate at an alarming rate (drop in enrollment, classroom deterioration, decrease in construction, precarious life and work conditions, massive dismissals, numerous failures, severe repression of teachers and students, mass emigration abroad, etc.). The 1991 outburst would reveal the weaknesses of the system and pave the way to a national debate on education.

In 1990, after 30 years of independence, the situation was grim. The national enrollment rate barely reached above 20 per cent and the illiteracy rate exceeded 90 per cent. From 1987 to 1990, the part of the national budget devoted to education gradually decreased (to less than 20 per cent). The internal imbalance of the education budget was worsened by a lower allocation of resources to

basic education than to secondary and higher education. A crucial political choice appeared: whether to commit firmly to basic education as the sector's primary priority.

In this context the World Bank intervened with its the Fourth Education Project, introducing a series of measures aimed at redistributing the national education budget, giving priority to the basic education sector which they perceived as the foundation of all economic development and social well-being.

Since then, with a new political regime in power, the education sector continues to try to emancipate itself from the shackles of 30 years of abuse and neglect. Although a new education policy has been defined, with an emphasis on the main objectives of the Reform of 1962, its implementation has not been evident. This effort was particularly thwarted by the rapid succession of government administrations and Ministry officials -- three since 1991 -- and by the social events that either provoked or were affected by these government changes or upheavals. After the events of March 1991, and following the agreement between the Government of Mali and the Malian Students Association (AEM), the implementation of the Fourth Education Project (and consequently of BEEP) was compromised; the measures concerning budget restructuring and admission to secondary and higher education had undergone enormous modifications. During the governmental transition period (after the 1991 coup), the Government made the decision to increase scholarships by 75 per cent (executed in two stages, of 50 and 25 per cent) and to accept all the independent candidates to secondary and higher education institutions. This decision has strongly disrupted the development of the educational system. To reverse these tendencies, an Emergency Plan for the Education Sector (PUSE) was put in place, involving a reconsideration of the administrative, financial and pedagogical aspects of education in the new democratic context.

The first Government of the Third Republic undertook the new challenge seriously, defining education as a national priority, as is evident in its desire to design and implement a new Reform to reestablish the educational system in Mali. The perspective of a generalized basic education system, whose main objective is education for all, was considered quantitatively as well as qualitatively. However, the application of the Emergency Plan measures and the execution of the will of the first Government of the Third Republic put the Malian school system into further crisis, leading in fact to the Government being replaced. Consequently, the key decision-makers currently responsible for the further conceptualization and the implementation of the educational reforms have not had the chance to become sufficiently familiarized with their portfolios to master them and reestablish some form of management. With the lack of institutional continuity within the Ministry of National Education (only recently the Ministry was divided into three separate ministries), the possibility to articulate a firm policy for the education sector, with solid consistent strategies, has been highly compromised. Relatedly, the capability to incorporate parallel donor activities into national programs has also continued to be seriously compromised.

BEEP, funded and implemented by USAID, was conceived and initiated within the framework of the World Bank's Fourth Education Consolidation Project, sharing its emphasis on equity, quality, and relevance within the system. BEEP subsequently added elements of its own organizational dynamic which further compromised its ability to enhance the improvement of the sector.

C. Description of USAID Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP) in Mali.

Project Background. On August 30, 1989, the Project Agreement was signed between the Government of the Republic of Mali and the United States of America. This six-year project is the first education project that USAID has undertaken in Mali. The Project was originally proposed to the Mission by USAID/W, who wanted to comply with the request from the U.S. Congress to allocate a sizable amount of financial support (several million dollars) to the education sector in Africa. The director of USAID/Mali and his associates were initially reluctant to undertake such a

project: the education sector was not one with which they were familiar, and the USAID Mission was not ready to undertake a new project of such a large scope. There was no strategy or close contacts for education, nor a satisfactory understanding of the sector. USAID/W did not relent and suggested that the USAID Mission use the Fourth Education Project model which the World Bank had just finalized, which the Mission did. Using the World Bank's approach of a "hybrid" project, BEEP started out with a non-project assistance component of US \$3 million -- accepting the disbursement conditions of the World Bank -- and an investment assistance program of US \$7 million, thereby adopting the basic program of the World Bank for fundamental education.

The Fourth Education Project covers the 1989-95 period, with the financial participation of several donors. The initial anticipated contributions from the various project partners are presented in the table below. The USAID allocation has, since then, gone from 13.52 per cent to 35.58 per cent of the initial cost of the Project, a total of US \$20 million, becoming the second partner of the Fourth Education Consolidation Project after the IDA (the World Bank) in terms of fiscal contributions.

Donors' Part PARTNERS	Component	Value in US\$ million		Total	Investment (%)
		Quick Disbursement Component	Investment		
IDA	3.0	22.9		25.9	46.08
USAID	4.3	3.3		7.6	13.52
FAC	1.0	2.7		3.7	6.58
NORWAY	3.0	--		3.0	5.33
ACDI	0.8	--		0.8	1.42
PNUD	--	0.5		0.5	0.88
STATE OF MALI	8.7	1.5		10.2	18.14
COMMUNITIES	--	4.5		4.5	8.00
TOTAL	20.8	35.4		56.2	100.00

In the first financial agreement between USAID and the Government of the Republic of Mali, USAID involvement was renegotiated in order to emphasize the following points: (i) improvement of the efficiency and the relevance of the basic education; (ii) reinforcement of the planning and management capacity of the education system; and (iii) improvement of the quality of the teaching. In the Non-Project Assistance component, USAID is ranked among the few partners who have not yet canceled their expected donations.

Unlike the World Bank, which has canceled its Non-Project Assistance component, USAID is then represented as a *partner* for the expansion of the education in Mali, and not as a *sponsor* of the education system. USAID continues to seek ways and means to continue its efforts in the education sector. This gesture is greatly appreciated by the Malian authorities, who ask them to persuade their peers to stay involved in the Fourth Education Project. Being present in the field with a full management and technical presence, (unlike the World Bank), USAID is attempting to appreciate actively the efforts and especially the desires of the Government of Mali to implement the conditionalities of the Non-Project Assistance, in spite of the unpredictable and violent reactions from high school and college students, in particular. USAID has approached the World Bank inviting it to take into consideration the current context in Mali when planning its further involvement in the sector.

As far as the investment component is concerned, BEEP has achieved some remarkable efforts, compensating in certain areas for the World Bank's abandonment of some of its original commitments and responsibilities; e.g.: (i) the acquisition and distribution of school manuals originally slated to be funded and managed by other donors, and (ii) an increased intervention in the area of classroom renovations. Overall BEEP has achieved an absolute total financial execution of 78.96 per cent of its expected activities. In other words, 78.96 per cent of the US\$ 20 million of the Project funds have been spent or formally engaged in the first four years of the six-year Project.

At the macro level, according to the midterm assistance plan drawn up by the Government of Mali, the basic requirements for total outside assistance were projected to be: (i) US \$546 million in 1989; (ii) US \$443 million for 1990; and (iii) US \$421 million for 1992. Some disbursements were expected as existing loans which would cover about 17 per cent (US \$239 million) of the outside assistance required. (The credit adjustment component, proposed for the adjustment of the education sector and the joint assistance was US \$12 million.)

It should also be pointed out that as regards the overall plan that since 1990 the Government has entered a new phase involving the re-equilibration of the fundamental orientations of the country's education system. Indeed, the education system in Mali has undergone several phases: (i) 1960-1968: the nationalistic policy phase in education, centered around the Reform of 1962; (ii) 1968-1989: the political revisioning phase of the Reform of 1962 and the lack of effective policy; and (iii) 1990-present, with donor participation starting in 1989, a so-called phase of rebalancing of the fundamental orientations of the education system. This objective constitutes the backbone of the Fourth Education Project, and consequently, of BEEP as well.

Having adopted the underlying principles and several of the functional elements of the Fourth Education Project, it became necessary for USAID to articulate an operational strategy, to set up a management and implementation framework, and to establish formal relations with the Ministry of National Education. Not able to adhere to the usual project design process, due to the unusual manner in which the initiative was embraced (basically imposed upon the Mission by USAID/W), the USAID Mission started gathering the necessary elements of a surprising pace. The PAAD was completed just two months prior to the agreement, but the Project Paper (PP), usually authorized prior to a final agreement, was completed later in November 1989. Two months also elapsed before the project administrator for the USAID Mission, Mrs. Chahine Rassekh, was selected. Dr. Freda White Henry, the Education and Human Resource Development Officer, was hired over a year later in January 1991. Project implementation did begin almost immediately with the technical consultant for teacher training hired directly by USAID, and a "buy-in"⁵ contract was negotiated at the same time with the ABEL Project, a central project of USAID/W. This kind of arrangement was seen to be preferable to a bilateral agreement, which is typically time-consuming in its design and initiation. The ABEL Project eventually nominated and placed three permanent advisors between August and October 1990. The remaining advisors were engaged between the end of 1989 and the start of 1991, contracted directly by USAID/Mali.

There was supposed to have been a chief-of-party for BEEP, but the position was canceled by a mutual agreement between USAID and ABEL. This function was consequently taken over by the Project Officer of the USAID Mission. The chief-of-party was meant to serve as coordinator of all the technical consultants associated with the Project, whether contracted by ABEL or USAID. In this capacity, s/he would supervise the daily management of activities, take care of logistics, and be responsible for other administrative details. Furthermore, s/he would serve as a go-between and representative for the technical advisors, as well as for the components that they are assisting,

⁵ -- The "buy-in" is a contract which enables a USAID/W mission to participate in a project sponsored and funded by USAID/W -- here, ABEL (Advancing Basic Education and Literacy) Project -- by using its own project funds.

before decision-makers at USAID and the Ministry of Basic Education. This way, a chief-of-party would have freed USAID Project staff from the smaller details of the Project so that they could have concentrated more on the larger questions and the overall program. Without a chief-of-party, the small details pertaining to management and monitoring fell on the desk of the Project Officer at USAID and her advisors. According to the Project's technical advisors, this situation has also contributed to removing them further from participation in the decision-making process and conceptualization of the Project. Without a chief-of-party to help ease the misunderstandings between the technical advisors and USAID on the one hand and between the advisors and other departments of the Ministry (i.e. outside of any particular Project component) on the other, the technical advisors described this aspect of their work as typically strained.

The unusual start of the basic education assistance program seems to have had two major consequences on the eventual articulation and design of the Project. First, it was not possible to articulate a coherent strategy for USAID's intervention in the sector. There were no "log-frame,"⁶ no indicators, and no comprehensive project design. Consequently, the USAID Mission never established a strategic agreement with the Government of Mali by which to establish direct complementarity between the USAID Project and the Malian Government's education sector initiatives and programs. (As was explained in the previous section concerning the Malian context in which the Project developed, there are other reasons which may explain why there was such a lack of coordination.) As a rule, the Fourth Education Project reflected faithfully the sectoral priorities of the Ministry. Given that (i) USAID took responsibility for only part of the strategy and (ii) the World Bank and the other donors, along with the Government of Mali, abandoned at least part of their various original obligations, the Fourth Project ended up being fragmentary; contributing further to the limited complementarity of the strategic components undertaken by the various donors.⁷ USAID has tried to pick up some of the missing elements of the Fourth Project such as the distribution of school books, either left out in the original design of the larger project (by the donors collaborating under the auspices of the World Bank), or the abandoned by the other donors (and by the Government with the 1991 events and after). USAID also attempted to enlist the participation of other donors (such as Germany, Switzerland and Canada) to support various elements missing from the larger reform program. However, these efforts did not always constitute an education reform program that was fully consistent with the original Fourth Education Project's model.

The second consequence of this somewhat haphazard beginning is considered by many of those involved to be the seeming thrown together nature of the Project's organization. As in the development of the strategic program, certain elements of the Project were implemented at the same time that they were being designed and organized. This seems equally true for the technical assistance, the formal relations with the government, the logistical design of the Project, and the management and monitoring of the Project's activities by USAID. After four years of project implementation, USAID/Mali representatives, the technical advisors and the people involved in the Ministry have all stated that the Project is still seeking a balance between its management and its operations. There has nonetheless been considerable progress associated with the Project, which all the participants -- USAID, the Bureau of Education Projects (BPE)⁸, and the technical advisors -- attribute to the efforts and great determination of those who are responsible for implementing the

⁶ -- The log-frame, or logistical framework, is a planning mechanism used by USAID, which presents the objectives, strategies and evaluation indicators of a project.

⁷ -- "...despite the lack of analysis, the evaluators assert that the World Bank 'abandoned' a part of its obligations, without stating what was abandoned. (Note: if by this it is meant that the World Bank abandoned its supervision obligations, I... [might] agree. But in terms of Project preparation, I think the World Bank was extremely thorough.) (remarks of Sam Carlson, Human Resources Economist, World Bank/Mali)

⁸ -- The Bureau of Education Projects is the ministerial agency responsible for the management of all the projects financed by the foreign donors for the benefit of the education sector in Mali.

Project; an assessment also shared by the evaluation team. Nevertheless, negative effects have surely been felt, as will be shown in the following sub-sections.

The adjective most commonly used by the many various participants when referring to the Project is "improvised." This term applies equally to the development of the Project's strategic program and its management. Even though it may not always be a valid characterization, the impression that the Project has taken shape in fits and starts, as it was being implemented, remains strong both on the eyes of its implementors and on its intended beneficiaries. The first important "improvisation" was the initial first Project amendment, signed in August 1991, whereby USAID added US \$5 million (a 70 per cent increase) to the investment program, a fourth region and an important strategic initiative, that of regionalization.⁹ A second amendment signed at the end of 1991 added US \$5 million more to this amount for the Project's activities, representing an increase from the original amount of 140 per cent even before the Project reached its mid-way point.

Initially, as was indicated earlier, the total cost of the Fourth Education Project was estimated at US \$56.2 million for the six year span, of which US \$20.8 million was set aside for non-project assistance. The Project was to be financed with 46 per cent funding from the World Bank (IDA) and 16 per cent of the total by a group of bilateral donors (USAID, Norway, FAC and ACDI). Furthermore, USAID, FAC and PNUD (United Nations Development Program) would contribute up to 12 per cent to the investment program to be matched by contributions from local communities. The USAID initial input, US \$7.6 million, or 18 per cent of the total, was part of the global assistance from the United States, of about US \$10.0 million, of which the remaining balance would be used for complementary activities not defined at the time the Fourth Project agreement was signed. This supplemental contribution expected from the United States is related to the signing of the amendments subsequent to the BEEP agreement.

The term "improvised," used to characterize the conceptualization of the Project, is not meant to question the value or the contribution of the various strategies added with the Project amendments. To the contrary, the incorporation of several subsequent actions turned out to be very important for the Project, as well as for the efforts of the Government. For example, the articulation of the regionalization objective of the BEEP interventions constituted a relevant complement to the decentralization initiative already undertaken by the Ministry. Another example is the addition of the Koulikoro region among the areas of covered by the Project, thereby adding 366 schools of the first cycle to a region which had not benefited formerly from any particular assistance. Furthermore, the need to introduce amendments had been anticipated and planned since the Project's inception, with the initial level of financing set in the original agreement meant to cover only two years out of the six years. Besides, these two amendments defined priorities and strategies which had not been established originally.

The management, planning, and implementation of the various components of the Project were gradually put in order, through the collaboration of the Bureau of Education Projects and the technical advisors, in order to establish systems and procedures of operation. In March 1992, the ABEL Project, after a USAID request, hired a Project administrator to ensure the coordination and the logistical management of the technical assistance program. In September 1993, USAID plans to select a chief-of-party for BEEP. Among all the important developments raised concerning the Project, only one rivals that of the first amendment and it is the only one that has been discussed by all the partners: the USAID change of policy concerning the *per diem*. Finally, USAID is in the

⁹ -- USAID supports the regionalization of the national education system with the aim of increasing the technical and material capacities of local administrators to manage, monitor and support the educational activities of their zones. The goal is to orient BEEP's programs and actions toward the regional agencies and activities. This strategy acts as a complement to and in support of the decentralization policy instituted by the Government designed to divest a greater operational and managerial responsibility to the level of the regions.

process of suggesting a third amendment to the Government of US \$1 million, which the Ministry has not accepted as of yet. This is more or less an account of the Project's situation after four years of implementation as found by the mid-term evaluation mission in August 1993.

Project Goals and Objectives. The official goal of the Project, as given in the assistance agreement, is the following:

The Project's goal is designed to increase rural household production, productivity and incomes. Education is considered a crucial element in the national development program since it endows its citizens with the tools they need to become better producers. (para. III.A)

In the same document, five reasons are given for choosing to focus on the efforts of the fundamental education, especially on the first cycle: (i) the importance of the sector for the national development; (ii) the possibility to reach the majority of the Malian population, especially in the most impoverished zones;¹⁰ (iii) this is the poorest cycle, financially; (iv) statistical tendencies show a decrease in productivity and quality; and (v) a decision of the Government of Mali to promote practical instruction in this cycle.

In the first amendment, a complementary goal has been added which spells out the more practical or operational aims of the Project:

At the end of the Project, the Ministry of Education will be able to provide better efficiency, equity and quality in primary education. The Ministry of Education environment will be improved with a new knowledge of management, an appreciation of the importance of goal definition, and a programming of their implementation through a more rational use of resources. (p.5)

The objectives and strategies seem to be close to this formula:

1. to improve the internal functioning of the fundamental school; and
2. to improve the quality of the teaching;

A third one was added with the third amendment:

3. to decentralize the technical and administrative control of the schools towards the regions and the communities.

In order to monitor and test the realization of these objectives, USAID initially established three indicators, to which eight were subsequently added:

1. The number of students graduating from the sixth grade must increase (from a base of 19,379 in 1989 to 50,600 in 1990);
2. The total number of students in the first cycle must rise (from a base of 311,873 -- a rate of 22.16 per cent -- in 1989 up to between 485,289 and 528,000 -- 31 per cent -- by 1995);

¹⁰ -- "[This] is not exactly correct. The zones of the Fourth Project are not the most impoverished of the country, quite the contrary. As a matter of fact, this is a current bone of contention." (remarks of the Ministry of Basic Education)

3. Girls' participation rates in the first cycle must increase (from a base of 115,300 -- 16.66 per cent -- to between 183,779 and 200,000 -- 22 per cent -- by 1995);
4. The number of teachers and other educators who have taken a training course in teaching methodology and of school/classroom management must increase (from a base of zero in 1989 to 5,500 by 1995 -- already achieved in 1992, with 6,170 teachers having benefited from in-service training);
5. The ratio of students per teacher in a classroom must be lowered (from a base of 51 in 1989 to 35 by 1995);
6. The repetition rate in the first cycle must be lowered (from a base of 30 per cent to 10 per cent by 1995);
7. The number of school books per student must increase (from a base of three students per book in 1989 to two manuals per student by 1995);
8. The use of school books, both by the teachers and the students in the classroom, must increase (from a base of 10 per cent of all classrooms in 1989 to 50 per cent by 1995);
- 9a. The percentage of the budget allocated to the education sector must increase (from a base of 25 per cent in 1989 to 27 per cent in 1995);¹¹
- 9b. The percentage of the budget allocated to the first cycle of education must increase (from a base of 38 per cent in 1989 to 45 per cent in 1995);
- 10a. The Parent's Associations' contributions to improving the school infrastructure must increase (from a base of 20 per cent in 1989 to 40 per cent in 1995);
- 10b. The number of classrooms in the zone covered by the Project must increase (from a base of 7300 in 1989 to 9450 in 1995); and
11. Student performance in reading, writing, and arithmetic in the second and fifth grade must be improved (from a base of 44.4 per cent in 1992 to 75 per cent in 1995).

Organization of the Project. The indicators give a clear picture of the major strategies which make up the Project. These are organized operationally in seven components, the first six constituting the investment program:

- In-Service Training
- Girls' Schooling
- Community Support
- Management Assistance
- Education Management Information Systems
- Monitoring and Evaluation
- Quick Disbursement -- Non-Project Assistance

There is one technical advisor for each component of the investment program of the Project. The first three components -- In-Service Training, Girls' Enrollment and Community Support -- are

¹¹ -- "The integration of all the annexed budgets and special accounts into the national budget; The base of 25 percent agreed to in 1989 is lowered to 18 percent. It would involve, then, a target of 20 percent in 1995 instead of 27 percent. It's important to remember that the new proportions involve the same level of effort as the old proportions as concerns the Education Sector Adjustment Program" (remarks of the Ministry of Basic Education)

directly hired by USAID/Mali; the others are part of the contract with the ABEL Project. In April 1992, the ABEL Project hired a Project administrator to serve as a logistic coordinator for all the consultants; however, he can only finance the operations of the three permanent consultants (and the temporary short-term consultants contracted by the ABEL Project. (An attempt was made this year to put all the consultants under the umbrella of the ABEL Project, but it did not work out.) All purchases of equipment or material for the Project's activities remain under USAID management. Therefore, the administration of the Project is constituted by three distinct elements: (i) the permanent and temporary technical assistance provided by the contract with the ABEL Project; (ii) the permanent and temporary assistance contracted directly by USAID/Mali; and (iii) the purchases in material and equipment by USAID/Mali, for the Project as well as for the expatriate consultants. As the Project's administrator pointed out to USAID, this system necessitates numerous Project Implementation Letters.¹²

Each consultant is meant to work closely with a Malian counterpart at the Ministry, which is the case for all the components except for the Management Information Systems. The component activities are scattered throughout the Ministry's subdivisions according to the area of intervention: In-Service Training is under the auspices of the National Pedagogical Institute (IPN); Girls' Schooling is under the National Directorate of Fundamental Education (DNEF); Community Support under the Bureau of Education Projects (BPE); the Management Assistance under the Regional Education Bureau of Koulikoro; Management Information Systems is under the Directorate for Administration and Finance (DAF) as well as the Planning and Statistics Cell (when it is in operation); and Monitoring and Evaluation under the National Pedagogy Institute (IPN). USAID officials and the technical advisors have all pointed out the importance of this distribution -- physically and institutionally -- of specialists throughout the Ministry so that they can facilitate the technical supervision and execution of the Project's activities. This supervision, however, seems to remain in the hands of the Malian staff directly involved in the Project; according to all the partners, the hierarchical administrators always stay a certain distance away from the monitoring and the supervision of the technical programs of the Project.

The administration of the Project is intended to be assured by the Bureau of Education Projects (BPE). This bureau was established in July 1986 to manage donor activities and finances attached to the education sector in Mali. In the plan of the Fourth Education Project, it was anticipated that one expatriate consultant (from the French Fund for Aid and Cooperation, FAC) would be appointed to the board of the BPE.¹³ After a lengthy discussion, according to USAID, the Government finally agreed to hire this person, who worked there for only one year; there was no replacement. The absence of a technical advisor at the BPE explains, in great part, according to USAID, the difficulties in establishing sound structures and efficient systems of management and finance for BEEP within the Ministry. Besides this lack of technical support and the absence of someone's direct and regular participation, whose main priority is the transfer of the Project's management responsibility to the Bureau, other preoccupations have preoccupied USAID and the Government. Hopefully, the progress made to date will be validated and speeded up by the new Team Leader.

The improvement and the reinforcement of the financial and administrative management of BEEP's activities, for the BPE as well as for the ABEL Project, are prerequisites for the alleviation and the decentralization of the implementation of the programmed activities. They can diminish the

¹² -- A Project Implementation Letter is a USAID official document authorizing the implementation of some specific elements in an official agreement.

¹³ -- "Concerning the management of the Project, the evaluation did not find out why the USAID component did not respect the system anticipated in the agreement protocol. Indeed, it is expected that the Bureau of Education Projects will authorize the plan of action and the budget for each component and will manage the financial implementation of the activities. The practice is quite different. How is that?" (remarks of the Ministry of Basic Education)

excessive centralization of the Project management at the level of USAID. The most promising actions to accomplish this coordination and management in a more efficacious and efficient manner are to be carried out by the BPE: (i) more formalized communication and integration with the operational departments of the Ministry; (ii) a more defined role in the articulation of the program of the National Education Reform, and of the various donor and partner interventions, and (iii) a more formal status as regards the implementation of the Reform, with the direct, and practical, authorization by USAID and the Ministry Cabinet's; and as regards the ABEL Project, (i) the coordination of all its technical advisors together under a single supervisor; (ii) only one person overseeing all technical assistance, with the appointment of a Malian counterpart, probably the Director of the BPE; and (iii) the final articulation of procedures and a schedule for the management and budgeting for the Project by USAID, prepared jointly with the BPE.

The ideal for BEEP would be to give entire responsibility to these two institutions -- BPE and ABEL -- for the Project's management and implementation; this would then delimit the roles of the Ministry (represented by a Steering Committee) and of USAID to the articulation of policies and major strategies, and monitoring of the Project's implementation. The Ministry's failure in providing such guidance to BEEP and the Fourth Project can be explained in part by: (i) the Ministry's preoccupation with the practical management of the school crisis, such as the resumption of classes, prerequisites to the operation of pedagogical activities (and of BEEP's activities); (ii) the succession ministerial officials; and (iii) the routine unavailability of some officials in the Ministry's key staff. However, the irregularity of mixed meetings greatly hampered the pursuit of BEEP's activities, especially in the articulation of policies and priorities, as well as any complementarity with the program of the National Education Reform, decision-making, implementation of programmed activities, and of monitoring and suitable readjustments of current activities.

As regards BEEP, BPE had a two-fold responsibility: (i) authorize the plan of action and the budget for each component for submission to USAID; and (ii) to manage the financial execution of the Project's activities so as to help ensure proper execution of the programmed budgets. Nevertheless, according to several participants, this system has only recently begun to be realized. During the first three years, the Bureau served basically, to use the term coined by the assistant director of the BPE as, a "mailbox" for the Project. It had no real management function since USAID was in control of everything. The activity expenses were paid by one of the consultants for the ABEL Project, and the BPE was informed only later of the decisions and activities that had already been implemented. In the final year, it is worth pointing out that great efforts were made by both USAID and the BPE to rectify this situation; the Bureau's work is much more in keeping with the initial design.

USAID staff describe the following *modus operandi* for the articulation and the approval of the plans for the various components: (1) the consultants and advisors suggest an action plan; (2) the consultants discuss the individual component plans with USAID, i.e., the Education Development Officer and the Project Officer; (3) the plan is then presented to the director of the appropriate technical division at the Ministry for formal approval; (4) the plan is presented to the BPE for final ministerial authorization; (5) BPE presents the plan to USAID for the final authorization of the program. The presentation of a global plan for the overall Project is new. Before the 1993 plan, each component presented their plans and budgets individually and directly to the BPE, which transferred them to USAID. All the consultants meet monthly with their Malian colleagues, USAID, and, more recently, with a representative of the Ministry's Cabinet to discuss the Projects recent and future activities.

However, this is not the only way the Government of Mali can contribute to BEEP. For example, financially, the Government's input is covered by Malian counterpart funds assigned to Project actions. As far as the special budget for the investment is concerned, this counterpart contribution was always taken into account by the Malian authorities. On the other hand, the Malian

Government assures assistance to the different technical components of the Project via the participation of the Ministry's national directorates (staff and logistics). The Malian staff are directly involved in the Project's activities. The BPE provides help regarding BEEP's administrative and financial supervision. Office space and staff are made available to BEEP and constitute the operational body of its initiatives. The integral contribution of the Malian government is also evident in the complementary roles played by the Ministry and its departments concerning BEEP's actions. For example, the modules presented by the In-Service Training component are conceived by the National Institute for Pedagogy (IPN). Furthermore, the FAEF component actions and the Girls' Schooling go hand in hand with the initiatives designed and implemented by the divisions of the same name at the Ministry.

It is also important to remember that the Commissariat for Administrative Reform, together with USAID, undertook actions favoring the reinforcement of decentralized structures of education. Studies relative to these activities, financed by USAID, are currently being prepared.

Two years remain before the Project comes to an end. The nomination of a chief-of-party for technical assistance has just been made after two years with none. To date, the contract with the ABEL Project is ending in December without a decision from USAID to extend the Project. USAID has recently proposed a third allotment of US \$1 million to the Ministry to support the activities of two American NGOs in the field of alternative education. The Ministry has not yet accepted this activity. The remaining two tranches -- US \$2 million -- on the rapid disbursement account which USAID has still refused to authorize. For the investment component -- US \$17 million -- only US \$650,000 have not been used.

This mid-term evaluation is being made after four years of implementing a project which has undergone unusual circumstances. The evaluators were asked to sum up the first few years at a time when USAID is thinking of a new phase for BEEP, and especially to articulate a constructive criticism of USAID efforts in the educational sector in Mali. Which initiatives should be continued or canceled? What modifications should be made? What innovations should be considered? The present document hopes to have sufficiently grappled with these questions to help illuminate a common path for USAID and the Government of Mali so that they can make improvements in the area of education for the Malian people.

CHAPTER II NON-PROJECT ASSISTANCE

A. Agencies and Individuals Consulted: Identification and Description of the Process

The evaluation of the BEEP's Non-Project Assistance Component is based on the "fourth generation" evaluation methodology. Its aim is to gather and synthesize the opinions of the principal figures -- policy-makers decision-makers, implementors --, partners -- technicians, sponsors and other donors -- and the beneficiaries -- communities, APEs, students, educators -- of the Mali school system with regard to the implementation of the Non-Project Assistance, its future concerns and the overall BEEP effort. In order to do so, the evaluation proceeded in the following manner:

- the gathering and analysis of texts and documents that were relative to Non-Project Assistance management, and the overall BEEP; and
- meetings with the policy and decision-makers, the donors, the beneficiaries, the APEs, the school and project managers, set up (i) in the form of seminars to gather the general information; and (ii) as meetings with individual specialists to gather complementary information.

The range of the evaluation included both the central Ministry structures and the decentralized ones of the zones covered by the Project (District of Bamako, Koulikoro, Ségou and Sikasso).

The table on the following page provides a presentation of the various individuals and agencies related to Non-Project Assistance, BEEP and the sectorial adjustment consulted on the basis of the methodology just described.

B. Objectives

Two major objectives stand out of BEEP's economic evaluation:

1. To analyze the role played by Non-Project Assistance in carrying out BEEP's objectives and to identify the concerns, in relation to Non-Project Assistance and BEEP's strategic operations; and
2. To find strategies and policies which should improve BEEP's financial operations, and in particular, a cost rationalization.

Evaluation Target of the Non-Project Assistance Component	
Nature of the Agencies and Individuals Consulted	Agencies and Individuals Consulted
1. Political Decision-Makers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of Basic Education - Ministry of Secondary Education - Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research - Ministry of Finance, Economy and Planning - Ministry Delegate to the Budget - USAID Mission in Mali - Economic Reform Program/USAID in Mali
2. Non-Project Assistance and BEEP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Administration and Finance Directorate/MEB - National Institute of Pedagogy/MEB - BEEP's Technical Advisors - BEEP/USAID Managers - DNB
3. Other Partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Bank - Canadian Embassy (Bamako Office) - French Mission "Coopération"
4. Beneficiaries at school and community levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Parent Teacher's Association (APE) - High School and College Students - Teachers - Private Donors
5. School Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Directorate of Primary Education - National Institute of Pedagogy - Administration and Finance Directorate - Bureau of Education Projects - National Directorate of Literacy and Applied Linguistics - Regional Directorate of Education - Inspectorate of Primary Education - School Board

USAID oriented the present assessment of the Non-Project Assistance component along the following lines:

- i. the government's capacity and achievement in meeting Non-Project Assistance conditions; questions regarding quick disbursements (both in institutional and budgetary terms);
- ii. the sustainability of the hybrid program initiatives and their impact (in terms of cost/benefit);
- iii. the alternatives to financing primary education and the continued existence of Non-Project Assistance to the sector;

- iv. the significance and the limitations of the combination of Non-Project and Project Assistance;
- v. the relevance or the objectives and terms of Non-Project Assistance in the current context of Mali.

As far as BEEP's financial management is concerned, the terms of reference for the present evaluation focused on the following issues:

- i. the cost/benefit ratio among BEEP's various activities;
- ii. BEEP's financial operation procedures, the immediate procedures in particular;
- iii. the trends indicated by the education expenditure indicators;
- iv. the problems linked to the financial implementation of the Project and the sector concerned;
- v. the efficiency and predictability of BEEP's operating procedures and framework;
- vi. the impact that BEEP's program initiatives and activities have had on primary education in Mali, in terms of costs and benefits;

The agencies in Mali involved in Non-Project Assistance implementation were identified equally within technical departments in charge of national education and other departments of the Ministry, as well as staff or partners involved in school management or in monitoring the structural adjustment program. These are:

- Departmental Staff of the Ministry of Basic Education
- Departmental Staff of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
- Administration and Finance Directorate
- Departmental Staff of the Ministry of Secondary Education
- Bureau of Education Projects
- Directorate of Regional Education
- National Institute of Pedagogy
- Inspectorates of Fundamental Education
- National Directorate of Fundamental Education
- Schools
- Departmental Staff of the Ministry of Finance, Economy and Planning
- National Budget Bureau
- National Treasury Bureau
- Central Bank of the West African States
- Parent Teacher's Association (APE)
- Local Development Committees
- College and High School Students' Association of Mali
- National Union for Education and Culture
- Federation of National Education

C. Description and Basis of Non-Project Assistance

In 1989, the Conference on the State of Education (*Etats Généraux de l'Education*) painted a harsh diagnosis of the state of the education in Mali -- the broken-down conditions of the schools, the

lack of efficiency in the system, the lack of teaching methodology, etc. -- and advocated the broadening of the base of the education system through the introduction of several components, such as In-Service Training, Monitoring and Evaluation, Community Support, Management Information Systems, and an increase in Girls' Enrollment. These objectives are in agreement with BEEP's primary objectives, such as the improvement of quality, efficiency and equity in the educational system of four regions in Mali (Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou, and the District of Bamako).

In a letter to the president of the International Development Association (IDA) dated April 28, 1989, the Ministry of National Education highlighted the government's intentions to implement a program of sectorial adjustment. The Government of Mali thereby wished to secure a profit from the investments which were to be carried out through the framework of education consolidation. These investments in turn would help restore the balance of the system through a broadening of the base as well as providing better quality education and improved management of human resources. To reach these goals, the Government had already undertaken a number of measures, such as the closing of the "internats," (boarding schools) in 1983; the decrease in the scholarship amounts from CFA francs 3.8 billion in 1985 to CFA francs 3.0 billion in 1989; setting up a public service competitive entrance examination for the civil service in 1983 and encouraging voluntary early retirement in the system in 1987-88.

The credit adjustment component of the International Development Association suggested an adjustment of the education sector with the co-financing from sponsors and donors to the sector of US \$12 million. For this component of the Fourth Project, called the Education Sector Adjustment Project (PASED), the USAID grant was to be US \$3 million (or 25 percent of the global Adjustment component) to be supplied in three installments of US \$1 million each. Some sponsors and donors were named in the Education Sector Adjustment Project to justify disbursements in favor of the national budget. The disbursement of the last two installments (second and third installments) that have not yet been allocated are contingent upon the satisfaction of a number of criteria, among which the most significant include:

- limited matriculation in general secondary education (2,500 students per year) and in higher education (1,500 students per year);
- increasing the part of the primary education budget in the education budget (an expected increase from 35 percent to 45 percent); the gradual reduction of the scholarships' budget (of 10 percent each year for two years, then of 5 percent per year for two years), etc.; and
- internal efficiency in the Project (double school sessions, a new book policy, reassignment of personnel, etc.).

In 1990, as part of the agreement associated with the Fourth Education Project, the Government made the commitment to fulfill eleven specific conditions. The current state of their satisfaction is as follows:

1. The first measure consists of closer monitoring of the number of students entering secondary and higher education establishments, although limiting entrance rates to 2,500 and 1500 did not occur. In 1991-92, 4,892 students went on to secondary education and 1,772 to higher education.
2. The second measure consists of the promotion of the private education sector to help broaden the education base. The development of Koranic schools (*medersas*) and of basic schools has continued. Today there are at least 105 basic schools, but there are no clear regulations regarding their status. The distinctions between basic

schools, community schools, cooperative schools and village schools are vague. The several-day seminar on private basic schools was followed by the submission of a bill to the Ministry. Presently, unscrupulous private school promoters are seen to take advantage of the number of basic students, endangering children in the long run.

3. The third measure consists of increasing girls' enrollment and graduation rates. The director of the National Directorate of Fundamental Education decided to create a cell for girls' schooling, responsible for designing a national policy focusing on the promotion of girls' schooling. The decision to create this cell was signed on October 28, 1992, whereas the Girls' Schooling component of the Project had been in operation since 1990.
4. The fourth measure consists of recruiting new teachers in the General Education Pedagogical Institute graduated from high school (*baccalauréat*) and reviewing training programs. Not only were the candidates recruited from high school but they also had to go through a competitive entrance examination to enter the IPEG. But at the beginning of the 1992-1993 school year, under the pressure of the number of students and in order to diffuse a mounting crisis, the Ministry proceeded with a new, less discriminating effort to send high school graduates to the IPEG.
5. The fifth measure consists of revising the programs of the first cycle, reinforcing basic subjects and reducing time spent in school from 32.50 hours to 25-27 hours per week. The schedules of the fundamental education schools were not modified, but the reform of the programs and the application of the OPO model did take place.
6. The sixth measure consists of restructuring secondary education according to the available resources and the needs of the market. In practical terms, this means that, since June, the bureau of secondary education has been functioning separately from the bureau of technical and professional education. Each bureau maintains all the divisions and sections of the former organization, adding to the heavy bureaucracy and depriving school classrooms of teachers, who are called in to work in the various divisions of both bureaus.
7. The seventh measure consists of adjusting the education budget so as to allocate more resources to basic education. The education budget must represent at least 25 percent of the national budget. In the education budget, the part allocated to the first cycle must gradually increase from 33 percent to 45 percent in 1993. The budget allocated to the second cycle will be frozen at its 1988 level, those of the general and technical secondary schools to, respectively, 1.7 and 0.83 billion CFA francs. The budget of higher education will not exceed 19 per cent of the total education allocation. The current education budget was reorganized to clearly show the part allocated to each category of education. Measure #7 has not been fulfilled. The part of the first cycle in the ministry's operational budget was around 36.1 percent against the targeted 42 percent. In 1992, this dropped to 30.7 percent while the level of scholarships for higher education largely exceeded the expected ceiling for the period concerned, about 1,832,444,000 CFA francs compared to 991,152,000 CFA francs in 1991.¹⁴

¹⁴ -- "Higher education scholarships exceeded the anticipated ceiling of 1,832 million compared with the 991 million used in 1991 without going over the targeted 19 per cent in comparison with the Budget of the sector (education expenses)." (remarks of the Ministry of Basic Education)

8. **The eighth measure consists of limiting salary growth by a transfer of surplus personnel. A census of the ministry personnel took place in 1992. The director of the National Directorate of Fundamental Education decided to redeploy the substitute teachers to the most needy regions. One hundred unmarried teachers from Bamako had been transferred to those regions. Without the support of the unions (at the time the National Union for Education and Culture), only fifty had joined their newly appointed post. Then, with the help of "interventions," many of those who had been transferred to the regions returned to Bamako. The teachers' return, which they justified by citing personal problems or professional inadequacies has continued to empty classrooms and inflate school administration. Frequent changes at important posts in the Ministry encourage this situation. For example, at the end of the 1991-1992 schoolyear, the director of the Regional Directorate of Education for Bamako had, by memorandum, taken all the teachers from the fundamental schools who had been appointed to the libraries, the assistant principal's office, and the superintendent's office of secondary school establishments and reassigned them to schools in the District of Bamako. But with the departure of the director before the beginning of the 1992-1993 school year, most "managed" to come back to their former post.¹⁵**
9. **The ninth measure consists of an allocation from the FAEF of first 50 percent, then 75 percent of the global cost of the renovation of decaying school plants in order to increase the availability of education. As a consequence of this policy, at least 450 classes have been renovated.**
10. **The tenth measure consists of an investment program over three years to be implemented primarily with the funds provided within the scope of the Fourth Project. An important part of this Project was completed under the transition government (Amadou Toumani Touré [ATT] school).**
11. **The eleventh measure consists of a revision of procurement procedures in order to buy at a better price. In practice, this new procedure has proved to interfere and cause delays jeopardizing the implementation of policies. On account of this procedure, for example, several months may pass between the end of the renovation or building work and the outfitting of classrooms in tables and benches.**

After the events of March 26, 1991, the new political context led the Government to negotiate an Emergency Plan for the Education Sector (PUSE) with the World Bank in order to address the mismanagement of the Fourth Project. This emergency plan reaffirms the Government's intention to expand basic education by giving priority to the first cycle of the fundamental school. It also foresees the expansion of the technical track in secondary education, making the double school session more effective and establishing stricter criteria to diminish the number of scholarships in higher education.

A new education policy was initiated by the Departmental Staff of the Ministry of National Education of the first Government of the Third Republic, but has not yet been adopted. On account of a profound, uncontrolled school crisis and of an explosive political situation, the Government collectively resigned. The composition of the new Government completely changed the organization of national education which is now divided into three ministries: the Ministry of Basic Education, the Ministry of General, Technical and Professional Secondary Education, and the Ministry of Higher Education and of Scientific Research.

D. Key Questions

BEEP's Assistance Grant agreement is beginning its fourth year of execution. In order to appreciate the extent to which the objectives of Non-Project Assistance were reached, and the difficulties associated with the expected measures and actions, it is important to answer two fundamental questions:

1. What is the relevance of Non-Project Assistance (its objectives, its procedures, its mechanisms, and particularly its conditions) in the expansion of basic education within the current context of Mali?
2. What alternatives are there in terms of financial assistance in the basic education sector, given the institutionalization of the support activities and their sustainability?

It is also important to assess the degree of application of the strategies and policies of basic education expansion that were designed at the time BEEP was conceived. Therefore, a third question needs to be asked:

3. Does the distribution of Project activities adhere to the financial execution schedule and to what extent is this conditioned by the contextual variables in the basic education environment?

E. Implementation of Non-Project Assistance

Brief chronological description

Authorized in December 1989, the disbursement of the first installment of BEEP's Non-Project Assistance (US \$1 million) became effective on March 20, 1990. Because of budgetary difficulties observed by the evaluation missions conducted by the World Bank in 1991, the second and third installments of Education Sector Adjustment Project (US \$2 million) were not released at the expected dates. The process of quick disbursement remains contingent upon the satisfaction of the conditionalities created for that purpose.

In 1991, negotiations between the Malian Government and the financial assistance and other donor partners led to the design and adoption of an Emergency Plan for the Education Sector. From that point, the disbursements were to be subjected to the implementation of the new measures contained in the Emergency Plan for the Education Sector. The application of this plan ought to modify significantly the tendency toward financial mismanagement and to indicators related to student flux in the secondary and higher education. But the context in which these new measures and requirements had been defined has gone through important changes (in January and March 1991), the effects of which have not been integrated in the Emergency Plan for the Education Sector.

In spite of the relevance of Non-Project Assistance objectives in the expansion of basic education, the political and institutional changes which Mali underwent these last few years -- induced by the democratic transition after the fall of the military regime on March 26, 1991 -- seem to have affected unfavorably the realization of these requirements. Due to renewed political upheaval and the fear of social turmoil, the implementation of Non-Project Assistance is once again at an apparent impasse. The evident inflexibility of the International Development Association with regard to the complete satisfaction of the disbursing conditions led to the outright cancellation of its contribution to Non-Project Assistance of the Fourth Project.

Virtually all partners (Canadian Agency of International Development, Norway, and particularly USAID) are aware that Non-Project Assistance conditions, common to all sponsors and donors (loans, donations, and grants) appear unworkable in the short-term in the current Malian political climate. Also, for the Malian authorities, conditions need to be redefined (according to urgent current needs), within the context of solutions to be pursued through BEEP to strengthen the Non-Project Assistance component and its importance to overall basic education. It is in this hope that USAID and the Malian authorities are currently pursuing negotiations in order to find acceptable solutions for both parties, so that the disbursing of the last two installments of Non-Project Assistance to basic education can be carried out.

Contrary to the World Bank (IDA), who canceled its contribution to Non-Project Assistance component, USAID -- present in the field with active, full-time technical assistance and institutional administration -- is renegotiating new requirements with the Malian Government to release the last two installments of the non-project component. This attitude on the part of USAID has helped other sponsors, e.g. the World Bank, to appreciate better the difficult political and economic environment of Mali since 1991. According to USAID and the Government of Mali, the advent of a new political and economic context warrants a redefinition of the requirements of Non-Project Assistance. In this framework, both parties have engaged in a process of unblocking the situation (momentarily interrupted by the arrival of the new Director of USAID, but which now seems resumed), in order to preserve the positive results gained by the Project.

In 1992, the Government of Mali had included the requirements of Non-Project Assistance within the Emergency Plan for the Education Sector. However, the Government cannot meet its commitment towards the social partners of education (memorandum, Association of the High School and University Students of Mali/Government, social pact, ...). These commitments negated the trends for the majority of the progress indicators related to the allocation of State financial resources. In particular, the Government and USAID are convinced that the data, assumptions and context of 1988, upon which the requirements and measures were based, are today questionable when considering the real capability of the Government to satisfy the conditions. One could consider that mutual belief (if it truly existed), in the Government's capability to reach the strategic objectives designed in the eleven measures of the investment component was compromised by the new socio-political context. Indeed, the overestimation of the capability of the Malian Government to satisfy the requirements of the funders and donors can be attributed to several factors: (i) change in government administration, with a military dictatorship reigning over the country at the time the requirements were being formulated and accepted, which yielded to a new civil regime; (ii) the repercussions of the events of March 1991 were not incorporated into the initial Project, with a completely new political situation which occupied the Government during that period and with certain partners, like the World Bank, who did not want to incorporate the "cost of the advent of democracy" in the education sector; and (iii) the deterioration of the public finances and of the political situation of the country, whose outcome was not adequately considered by the Government. The financial criteria would not be well defined in this case. Donors and sponsors ought to consider the foregoing analysis, for a better redefinition of the requirements. The application of the social pact which binds the workers (union of workers) to the Government may affect the financial criteria, and in particular the structural ratios of the education budget.¹⁶

¹⁶ -- With regard to the massive pressure of the students (continuous school crisis) and the threat of the teachers' unions, the Government cannot meet the initially anticipated requirements, at least in the period allowed. Apprised of this fact, USAID is committed to a definition of new requirements that would be feasible for the Malian Government, given the current context.

Success: encouraging factors

The satisfaction (or attempts in that regard) of the conditions of Non-Project Assistance provoked several encouraging results, the full impact of which is not yet well known. Financially, the reorganization of public education spending in favor of stabilizing the education pyramid system by widening the base of fundamental education is far from being effective. In the best of cases, the system of financial indicators (reorganization of educational expenses) pressured the school and budget administration to emphasize strategies and practices that would be likely to improve the management of public resources allocated to the overall education sector, in particular:

- * the definition of new criteria for granting scholarships to students;
- * the reallocation of the BSI of education to the exclusively basic education subsector for the fiscal year 1993;
- * the encouragement of community support (FAEF);
- * the encouragement and support of the organization of the private education sector in Mali, in particular lay schools, Catholic schools and Koranic schools (*medersas*), which have recently experienced remarkable growth;
- * the encouragement of private initiative in the subsector of basic education through the FAEF.

The satisfaction of the conditions of the disbursement of the first installment of BEEP's Non-Project Assistance seems to have had the following positive consequences:

- * the reinforcement, and the redirection of the management capabilities and financial administration of projects in the BPE;
- * the modification of the budget line items of the Ministry of National Education (MEN) in order to distinguish the scholarship allocations from the equipment allocations, as well as the First Cycle from the Second Cycle of fundamental education; and
- * the signature of the Implementation Letter of FAEF/USAID.

Despite the implementation and disbursement difficulties encountered, at the current stage of development of the Project, the rate of financial execution disbursements, under its various forms, is at an acceptable level. This is demonstrated in the Table on the following page, which presents the percentage of commitments and disbursements for the various BEEP components.

Institutionally, the Malian Government ostensibly has worked to meet its commitment to favor basic education, a top priority in the education sector. The Government has sought to reinforce this sector with:

- * the creation of a separate ministry in charge of basic education -- the department in charge of basic education changed into a ministry at the last governmental reorganization;
- * the joining of preschool and special education to basic education; and
- * the establishment of a single directorate in charge of preschool and special education.

BEEP's level of execution	
Nature of realization of financial execution rates	Value as a percentage
1. Non-Project Assistance * Disbursement rate of Non-Project Assistance	33.33 per cent
2. Project Assistance * Financial execution rate of Project Assistance in comparison with initial previsions	48.97 per cent
3. BEEP * Overall rate of Project financial execution	78.96 per cent
* Disbursement rate in comparison with the commitments (or in comparison with the activities in the process of execution)	55.82 per cent
* Financial execution rate in comparison with the program of activities	50.79 per cent

From the perspective of the organization and coordination of education policy in Mali, a short and long term plan is being designed. A manual of the procedures of the management of BEEP's activities is being written, so as to define better the respective responsibilities of the Bureau of Education Projects (BPE) and BEEP in their management of the program.

Overall, the objectives and concerns of the various beneficiaries and partners of the program are in agreement. The Project has targeted the needs and preoccupations of the beneficiaries accurately. On the other hand, the expected opening of the University of Mali remains a significant source of contention between the donor partners and the Government.

Limitations: problems and failures

The failures in the implementation of Non-Project Assistance and of its requirements and measures common to the Education Sector Adjustment Project (and to the Emergency Plan for the Education Sector, later on) were revealed by the various monitoring missions of the World Bank. The most significant failures may be grouped in three categories. The first category is related to the structure of expenses for the education sector. Generally, negative trends since 1990-1992 have been evident in current tendencies, which are contrary to the ones anticipated by the agreements of the Fourth Project, i.e.: (i) the budget increase of primary education in the education budget, expected to be 35 to 45 per cent; and (ii) the progressive decrease of the scholarship budget, of 10 percent each year for two years then of five percent a year for two years. The second category is related to the monitoring of education expenses. These last few years, the indicators related to the ceilings of general secondary education entries (2,500) and higher education entries (1,500) have been negative, fixed in 1990-1992 at 5,500 and 2,200 respectively. The last category concerns efficiency. The evaluators observed in this case: (i) a diversity in the understanding of the book policy; (ii) a timid application of the double school sessions policy and of multigrade classes; and (iii) the lack of application of the redeployment policy for the national teaching personnel to the first cycle.

Failures in the application of Non-Project Assistance are listed in detail in the monitoring mission report of the World Bank (10 to 20 October 1992) and the Tables of the division of expenses of

BEEP in Annex B. These failures are in part due to a number of factors in two categories of limitations. The first category includes limitations derived from the Project and the inconsistencies of the structural adjustment:

- * the overestimation of the capability of the Malian Government to meet the requirements and implement conditionalities;
- * the inflexibility of the common conditions of the funders and donors;
- * the definition of indicators linked to other areas of education (secondary and higher) as conditions of assistance to basic education (risk of penalizing the expansion of basic education by poor performance in the secondary and higher education);
- * the loss of teachers to the first cycle of the fundamental school as a result of the voluntary retirement program;
- * the acceptance of new recruitment of teachers within the program of sectorial adjustment of the civil service;
- * the absence of a feasibility study in the design of BEEP and in the application of the conditionalities; and
- * the delay, in 1991, in the effective implementation of BEEP's activities, while the first disbursement took place in March 1990.

The second group of limitations is linked to the political climate and the environment of the educational system:

- * the underestimation of the repercussions of the commitments between the State and the social partners of the school (e.g. Students' Union (AAEM) memorandum with the Government, and the social pact with the workers, signed in 1991);
- * the fear of a social and political crisis;
- * political turmoil and financial difficulties following the transition to democracy and the state of emergency after the events of January and March 1991;
- * the economic crisis and the precariousness of the national financial situation;
- * the instability of the school administration officials and the lack of leadership;
- * the mismanagement of public finances;
- * the relatively low amount of BEEP's Non-Project Assistance (US \$3 million), which is not enough to motivate the Ministry of Finance to be more involved in reaching the financial indicators;
- * the weak capability of the mobilization of additional resources by the Malian Government;
- * the difficulties in the promotion of alternative resources for financing basic education (the Regional and Local Development Tax (TDRL));

- * turmoil in the educational system;
- * the political weight of the unions (and of the social partners of the school, in general);
- * the standstill, or even reduction, of the basic education budget; and
- * the overall context of structural adjustment.

These limitations have severely impeded the aims and mission assigned to Non-Project Assistance, including four major objectives. The first objective is to improve the use of public (and private) resources set aside for education through a reinforcement of budget procedures and accounting, and controlled spending. The related task of the Ministry of Basic Education (MEB) is three-fold: (i) to transfer the budget of the first cycle of the fundamental schools to the regional budgets; (ii) to computerize budget management; and (iii) to assign the whole BSI of education to the basic education subsector. The attainment of this objective was hampered by the following difficulties: the fear of social upheaval; the scarcity of additional financial resources in the country; the lack of flexibility in budgetary procedures; financial mismanagement observed in 1991; and the low amount of the budget allocated to Non-Project Assistance (US \$3 million), which is not a sufficient sum to stimulate or support some of the desired interventions. In order to overcome these various constraints, several alternatives could be considered: modernize the management of the financial resources; decentralize the budget management of basic education; increase the amount of the Non-Project Assistance component; and promote and encourage the local and community sources of financing of individual schools. These strategies constitute important elements of the technical side of BEEP.

The second objective of Non-Project Assistance is to favor the expansion of the role of the private sector with the following complementary strategies. The first strategy would be to help bring private resources to the education sector through additional contributions. The second would involve setting up modalities of repayment. The third strategy would consist of measures aimed at improving the existing Catholic and Muslim schools and establishing new kinds of private schools. Several measures have been undertaken in this respect. The carrying out of initiatives contingent upon the FAEF within the framework of the Fourth Project would promote private initiative in the basic education sector. Politically, several texts were consulted to ease the procedures for establishing private schools and new texts are being designed for the organization of this sector. In order to give more practical support to this sector, schoolbooks have been distributed by the Government (with the help of BEEP) in private schools, with the pedagogical assistance of the Inspectorates, in the same manner as for public schools. Next to the public schools, the Project favored the establishment of private schools within PACEF. The Government also encouraged the establishment of professional schools by private promoters in the secondary education. Since the national conference on the *médersas*, the Koranic schools have benefited from an increased support from the Ministry. Finally, studies were undertaken on the reorganization of the secondary and higher education.

The limitations the Project and the Government experienced concerning this second objective were evoked on several occasions in interviews conducted by the present evaluation. These include: (i) the weak capability of the private sector in some areas, especially the unprivileged rural and urban areas; (ii) the general economic slump; (iii) the heavy bureaucratic procedures for acquiring land for school building; (iv) the slow procedures authorizing the establishment of schools; (v) the past failures of the Government with schools in the rural areas; (vi) difficulties in obtaining APE contributions through the Tax of Regional and Local Development (TDRL); (vii) difficulties in obtaining the monetary participation of the rural population to the FAEF additional fund; and (viii) the lack of means and resources thereby limiting interventions in the tertiary education sector. Three possible measures can be considered. The first would be the promotion of community

financing in the rural areas as one among several initiatives to encourage a stronger participation in the management of the communities and the local fundamental schools. To encourage the private sector, the alleviation of the authorization procedures for the establishment of schools could be desirable. A rigorous sensitization would likely ensure that the communities could count on human investment as their 25 percent contribution. Finally, potential benefits should be derived from supporting the outfitting of schools teaching a technical and professional curriculum.

The third chief objective of BEEP Non-Project Assistance lies in the allocation of sufficient education resources (as much for investment as for operation) in order to bring about the improvement of the training in human capital. This is about a general and sustainable boost of the development of the education sector. The expansion of the volume of resources would be completed by a better use of the existing potential and resources. In order to achieve this objective, the principal action to undertake would be the allocation of a maximum budget of investment of the education sector to basic education. Unfortunately two factors have limited the durable impact of this measure: (i) the BSI of the indication is for 80 percent, financed by the funders and other donors; and (ii) the context of structural adjustment creates an artificial political and socio-economic environment. The following palliative measures are suggested: (i) promote the private initiative of the communities in terms of financing; (ii) establish a national fund for education; or (iii) decentralize the management of basic schools.¹⁷

The fourth objective is to diminish the effects of the adjustment process by socially supporting a critical sector -- education. A key obstacle to the realization of this objective is the inflexibility of the common conditionalities to the Education Sector Adjustment Project and Non-Project Assistance. A careful objective consideration of these requirements would certainly have led to the conclusion that the Malian Government could never meet the required conditions by the sponsors in the Non-Project Assistance program. The current evidence is the almost total financial abandonment by the World Bank of the Fourth Project and the US \$2 million (out of the US \$3 million) of USAID Non-Project Assistance funds which remain blocked. Two initiatives could serve to improve the situation: (i) authorize the unconditional recruitment of basic education teachers; and (ii) take social factors into account and integrate them in the sectorial adjustment of education.

F. Recommendations and Future Directions

On the basis of the preceding analyses, the precise actions to be undertaken are situated on two levels, i.e. the definition and the implementation of (i) new requirements for the disbursement of the last two installments of Non-Project Assistance; and (ii) future directions for USAID assistance to the basic education sector in Mali. These recommendations are important as much for the disbursement of the last two installments of Non-Project Assistance as for the future agreements on Non-Project Assistance financing. The major strategy at this level must take into account the real capability of the Government of Mali to meet the requirements of Non-Project Assistance. The political context in which the requirements were defined back in 1988 (under a dictatorship administration) has no longer been valid since the events of March 1991. For the new requirements to be workable, they should be directly linked to the evolution of the current development policy of basic education. They would have to be negotiated with the partners in a new democratic context and in the perspective of the democratization of school management. Only in this way could quantifiable indicators, at the level of redeployment of personnel and the promotion of private education, be retained for the disbursement before the end of the Project.

¹⁷ -- "Regarding proposal and alternatives chapter II, 'decentralize the management of Basic Schools,' seems ambiguous because of the possibility of establishing community or village schools by the populations together with the existing public schools." (Boubacar Gaye, Head of Training Division, National Institute of Pedagogy)

For the requirements regarding the redeployment of personnel, which still remain to be met, one could foresee two actions: (i) the use of the USAID study on the personnel of national education (*Proposal of Personnel Redeployment Policy*) and (ii) the design of a plan of redeployment of teaching personnel who are not teaching. For the requirements concerning the promotion of private and community initiative in the basic education sector, one could consider the preparation and adoption of texts regulating private education, including the lay, Catholic, and Muslim (*médersas*) schools. A policy promoting community action and in particular, but not exclusively, community financing initiatives in the subsector of basic education should also be articulated.

Generally the current tendencies seem to compromise the overall objectives of the Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP) in Mali. The combination of Non-Project Assistance and Project Assistance and the inflexibility of the common requirements of the funders and donors (loans and grants), coupled with the low capability of the Government to meet the short-term requirements, considerably limit the anticipated efficiency of BEEP. Various structural inconsistencies are also evident in the adjustment program, such as the early voluntary retirement of teachers in the fundamental schools, and the limited recruitment of primary education teachers, and contradict the concept of broadening the school base of the country. Therefore specific assistance strategies for basic education are urgently needed to remedy this situation, as recommended below:

1. Define conditions and indicators directly contingent upon the expansion and the development of basic education.
2. Understand fully the distinction between loan (International Development Association) and grant (USAID) conditions.
3. Alleviate the repercussions of financial mismanagement in the higher education (scholarships) and secondary education of the basic education system. Therefore, the financial requirements contingent upon these two sectors of education (higher and secondary) ought to be handed over to USAID assistance, the program of economic reform, or a kind of assistance specific to secondary and higher education. It is worth remembering that the BEEP objective is and has been the expansion of basic education in Mali.
4. Define efficient ways and means to reach the objectives and satisfy the education needs of the direct beneficiaries. This implies a greater involvement on the part of the local partners of basic education, basic communities, and the decentralized school administration. The involvement of the local partners (local groups, ONGs, APEs, other local development organizations and local school administrators), warrants a redefinition of the content and proceedings of technical assistance towards more direct involvement in the field.
5. Limit assistance to the central school administration to (i) defining a basic education policy through the reinforcement of planning, programming, and budgeting capabilities of basic education activities; (ii) defining and implementing the policy's methods and techniques; (iii) supporting alternative ways of financing and allocating additional financial resources in favor of basic education, including the encouragement of private school promoters in urban centers and community schools in rural areas; and (iv) involving and accounting the Ministry in charge of the finances in the implementation of Non-Project Assistance.

CHAPTER III ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT'S TECHNICAL COMPONENTS

A. Community Support

The evaluation team met with the implementors and the beneficiaries of the Community Support component at the local, regional and national levels. The following persons were consulted, often on the school sites: the accountant for BEEP and the Bureau of Education Projects (BPE); Basic Education Support Fund (FAEF) officials from Koulikoro, Segou, the District of Bamako and Sikasso; the regional management technical advisor from Koulikoro; the regional directors of education for Bamako, Koulikoro, Segou, and Sikasso; all the inspectors of the Basic Education Inspectorates (IEF) from Koulikoro, Segou, Sikasso, and Bamako; elementary school teachers and principals from Soninkoura (A and B), Konobougou; two elementary school principals and the representatives of the Parents' Associations (APE) of Kati, Soninkoura-Segou and Konobougou.

The implementors and the beneficiaries had the opportunity, at each meeting or interview, to express their opinions concerning the pertinence of the component's objectives, the results achieved, the problems encountered, and their recommendations for future directions. Similarities between viewpoints were pointed out whenever possible. A number of exchanges took place around the possibility for the establishment of community schools in urban centers and of private schools in rural areas.

Component Objectives -- The component objectives aim to encourage parent and community participation in the decision-making process and the development of initiatives to improve local schools. The following results are expected:

- i. the fostering of the social demand for education by furthering community involvement in school management and,
- ii. the promotion of access to education for all by increasing the supply.

Those who will primarily benefit from the Project are the neighborhood or village communities, as organized within the APEs, and those most directly involved in the implementation are the school principals, the basic education inspectors, the FAEF official in the region, the local authorities, the BPE and the FAEF/USAID agencies.

Strategies -- The underlying strategy of the component consists of providing a supplementary fund to the communities, through the BPE, to enable them to renovate classrooms and build latrines. The Project input was intended to provide a subsidy of 65 per cent initially, but through further negotiations with the Government, this rose to 75 per cent. The community input (25 per cent) could be supplied as cash, equipment or labor. However it is important to recall that local community participation in school renovation dates back to 1962 and became widespread in 1970 with the said communities taking responsibility for infrastructure.

Key Questions -- Each target-group was asked the following key questions:

- How would you describe FAEF (Basic Education Support Fund) activities and objectives?
- How would you rate the usefulness of FAEF?
- How does a community have access to FAEF?
- How do you explain the level of response, or lack thereof, to the Fund's requests: an incomplete application; the lack of funds at FAEF; the unavailability of the DET; or the procedures?

- What is your opinion regarding the communication between the APEs and the School Development Committees?
- Is FAEF intervention in the Mali school system helping BEEP to reach its objectives, especially regarding quality, efficiency, and equity in the educational system?
- What are the possible alternatives to FAEF?

Community involvement in school construction, renovation, and provision of classroom equipment and school supplies was already customary policy in Mali. FAEF, who subsidized 75 per cent of the investment activities, helped to relieve the communities' heavy financial burdens. From April to July 1992, the APEs and the village communities of the Koulikoro region organized a sensitization campaign throughout all the schools. Its success can be attributed to the local authorities, school principals and parents who were already familiar with BEEP and FAEF's procedures for classroom renovation and furnishing.

The campaign raised the communities' consciousness: it mobilized them to request FAEF aid for the renovation of their schools; it also created a consensus among the communities about school management. From July 1992 to February 1993, 73 requests were accepted by the FAEF/USAID steering committee. These requests came from the District of Bamako as well as from the five IEF of Koulikoro. The need for new classroom buildings, expressed by the APEs, the school principals, and the IEF had not been taken into account by the FAEF/USAID.¹⁸ The APEs and school principals are doubtful whether or not the rural communities, who do not have steady incomes at their disposal, are able to manage their community schools on their own. They believe that the private or community schools are more apt to develop in urban centers. The problems encountered by the Community Support component are related to:

- * disbursement difficulties in paying the Regional and Local Development Tax (TDRL) in Kolokani and Banamba, due to disparities in income between these two regions and the Southern regions;
- * disbursement difficulties in paying the Regional and Local Development Tax (TDRL) in the Kati and Koulikoro municipalities, who are obliged to find other means to finance the 25 per cent, due to a lack of sharing of community responsibilities by a fraction of the population; and
- * lack of feedback or inadequate communication between the APEs, the schools, the IEF and the DRE (Regional Education Bureau) on the one hand, and the BPE and the FAEF unit in Koulikoro on the other.

The limitations are the following:

- * due to the absence of local development committees, the allocation funding is clearly under the 30 per cent required from the global volume of the Regional and Local Development Tax (TDRL) earmarked for school development; and
- * exhausted funds from the FAEF/USAID initiative for the renovation and building of new classrooms.¹⁹

¹⁸ -- According to an official of the USAID/Mali education program, the USAID regulations for new construction are so stringent that this strategy proves too impractical. Given the existing condition of many school buildings, the FAEF implementors and beneficiaries assert that the renovations could often be considered new constructions.

¹⁹ -- The consultant asserts that one of the FAEF/USAID constraints is the exhausted funds for renovation. This statement is incorrect. Rather, the World Bank funds are no longer available for new construction in the public schools -- priority being given to new construction in the private schools (including the *medersas* and the basic

The Community Support component's accomplishments, led by FAEF, are nonetheless considerable, as summed up in the table below. From July 1992 to April 30 1993, 23 requests had been satisfied in the DRE of Koulikoro for a total amount of 86,603,639 CFA francs, of which 84,006,014 are FAEF/USAID support and 2,597,625 are from APE support. In that DRE, 112 classrooms were renovated, with the construction of 30 latrines. The IEF of Diola leads with 45 renovated classrooms for a total amount of 28,481,736 CFA francs, followed by the IEF of Kati with 31 classrooms, for a total expense of 24,594,823 CFA francs. During the same period, for 26 granted requests, the District of Bamako was renovating 366 classrooms for a total amount of 74,752,014 CFA francs, with FAEF/USAID support.

FAEF/USAID -- Koulikoro and District of Bamako		
Completed and current renovations, July 1992 - April 1993		
IEF	Renovated Classrooms	Total FAEF input (in CFA Francs)
DRE Koulikoro		
Diola	45	28 481 736
Koulikoro	20	19 324 605
Kati	31	24 594 823
Baguineda	16	14 202 475
DRE Bamako		
ComI	46	11 712 569
ComII	32	99 920 143
ComIII	44	15 640 881
ComIV	117	17 372 088
ComV	61	8 302 499
ComVI	56	11 803 834
Total	468	161 355 653

At a steering committee meeting on April 30, 1993, 45 requests were approved for a total amount of 257,340,740 CFA francs with 210 classrooms to be renovated and 61 latrines to be built, 193,005,565 of which was FAEF/USAID support. The IEF of Diola are in the lead with 79 classrooms to be renovated for a global amount of 106,875,988 CFA francs, followed by the IEF in Kolokani, who projects 63 classrooms to be renovated and six latrines to be built, although the IEF has already encountered administrative snags in getting the work started.

Next Stages -- For a better functioning of this component, we suggest the following:

- * the effective establishment of the FAEF unit in Koulikoro, with strengthening in quantity and quality;
- * the effective mobilization of the 30 per cent of the TDRL tax to benefit the school development project;

community schools), the public schools are no longer able to benefit from the World Bank subsidies for new constructions. (remarks by Ibrahima Sissoko, FAEF/USAID Technical Advisor/Monitor).

* **APE management training.**

Two more fundamental questions were asked on several occasions, requiring a serious discussion between USAID, the MEB, and APE and community representatives:

1. **With the school age population on the rise, the position of the donor to finance only classroom renovations stands in contradiction with the Project's objective to increase school attendance rate in basic education. The decision not to start new construction also contradicts the goal to improve the equity of the educational system in Mali, especially in the most impoverished zones which have never benefited from classrooms. Although the renovation strategy is no doubt useful, new classroom buildings would likely have an impact on the scope and distribution of the supply with a potential consequence which really is not possible at the present moment.**
2. **The strategy to encourage the local communities to invest in school renovations, both financially and personally, is directly linked to the goal of transferring the management of the schools to them. However, the evaluators learned that the communities regard this contribution more as a tax imposed by the government than an investment and affirmation of their authority over the management and curriculum of the school. According to several beneficiaries and staff associated with the FAEF, the communities have only been acquainted with two types of schools: government-run and private. Community management is a new concept. Given this situation, it would be useful to broaden the function of the Community Support component to include initiatives, such as training and awareness, to prepare the community to undertake effectively the management of the school. The Technical Support component in Koulikoro could serve very well as a model for such an effort. It could be initiated through extra-curricular activities, following the Save the Children model in Kolondieba.**

B. Education Management Information Systems²⁰

The people involved as implementors or beneficiaries of this component were consulted at the local, regional and national levels. The first week of the evaluation mission was devoted to the design of the BEEP evaluation, which included a list of the evaluation tools and a work schedule. The persons interviewed were staff of the Administrative and Financial Directorate (DAF), the consultant of the Education Management Information System (EMIS) component, the head of the Bureau for Education Projects (BPE), two representatives of the School Enrollment Division of the National Directorate for Basic Education, the director and assistant of the Planning and Statistics Cell, the Regional Education Bureaus of Bamako, Koulikoro, Segou and Sikasso, a few members of the Inspectorate of Fundamental Education (IEF) from Bamako, all the Inspectorates of Fundamental Education and academic advisors from Koulikoro, Segou and Sikasso, and several principals from the Regional Education Bureaus of Bamako, Koulikoro, Segou and Sikasso. At each interview, the beneficiaries had the opportunity to express their opinions on the relevance of the BEEP components, the anticipated and achieved results, the problems encountered, and the recommendations for future improvements.

Component Objectives -- The central objective of the EMIS component is to reinforce the Ministry's capability to plan and monitor the development of the education sector. This Project objective is to be reached through a strengthening of the technical services and methods used for

²⁰ -- Please refer to Annex G for the general remarks by Daniel Gifondorwa, Technical Advisor in charge of the Education Management Information Systems, ABEL/USAID Project.

data gathering and analysis. The work was originally supposed to take place at the School Statistics and Planning Cell; the Project was to supply equipment, technical support, logistics and training to the Cell to solidify management infrastructure in the various zones covered by the Project. This assistance is to benefit the central agencies, the Ministry in Bamako, and the DRE offices of the four regions covered by the Project. The goal, then, of the EMIS component is to improve the assessment and management capability of the Ministry through the creation of a management and planning information system. The two strategies to be used are:

- i. the development of a computerized database for the management of human resources; and
- ii. the development of a system of indicators, tailored to each level of decision-making and designed to enhance pertinent decisions (central, regional, and local).

Initially, the Malian institutions involved in the implementation of this component were the National Directorate of School Planning and Equipment and the Directorate of Administration and Finance. The National Directorate of School Planning and Equipment was disbanded soon after the component's inception; the Directorate of Administration and Finance, as a functioning and administrative board, showed little interest in the development and practical implementation of this component. Today, several institutions are involved, such as the Directorate of Administration and Finance, the School Statistics and Planning Cell, the Bureau of Education Projects, the National Directorate of Basic Education, the DREs, the IEFs, and the school administrators, who gather the data. Nevertheless, this remains a partial, indirect or more or less superficial involvement.

Strategies -- The implementation of the component is carried out with the help of an expatriate advisor for the long-term and a technical consultant for the short-term. The Project has established an education management information systems capacity within the Ministry. Some computers were also sent to the Project-related DRE offices to establish a computerized capability in the regions, but these systems are not yet functioning.

Before the financial assistance agreement of the Project was signed, this component was administered partly by the National Directorate of School Planning and Equipment and partly by the Directorate of Administration and Finance. The National Directorate of School Planning and Equipment was adequately staffed to produce a book of school statistics, and had begun the process of producing a school mapping operation for the expansion of the school system in Mali.

At the Planning Conference of Selingué (February 10-14, 1992), where all the implementors and beneficiaries of the Project were present, the various components were analyzed while keeping in mind the difficulties encountered by the implementors and beneficiaries, and long-term solutions were suggested to help solve these problems. At the Conference on the Reform of the basic education information systems (July 28-29, 1992), and after an analysis of the current situation, a consensus was reached regarding the content of the conference and the reliability and consistency of data-gathering. One information system was chosen to help each level of education decision-making (school, inspectorate, regional and national bureaus). The data would be gathered at the school level; the DRE would proofread it and publish charts, including general statistics and indicators, and pass these on to the IEFs, the National Directorate of Basic Education and the Ministry's Cabinet.

Training sessions have been planned by the EMIS component for:

- * the education advisors, who would in turn train school administrators on how to use the questionnaires²¹; and

²¹ -- "Once again, the evaluator is not telling the truth. The component never dealt with the pedagogical advisors; they are part of the in-service training component. The component works closely with the academic

- * the staff of the DRE, the National Directorate of Basic Education, and the Directorate of Administration and Finance on how to use the computers.

Other management training sessions were organized by the technical advisor to improve the service or project management capacities of the DRE administrators and of the major departments of the Ministry. In collaboration with representatives of the Directorate of Administration and Finance, the Project published several documents related to the management, monitoring and planning of the education sector:

- * School Statistics Report, 1990-1991, Mali;
- * School Statistics of Higher Education, 1990-1991;
- * School Statistics of Secondary Education, 1990-1991;
- * Selected Data on Primary School Enrollment in Mali; and
- * Personnel of the Ministry of National Education: a general introduction, assignments, and staffing.

With the help of BEEP's technical assistance, the local, regional, and central services used questionnaire and interview guidelines for their utilization. These were formulated and circulated (somehow unilaterally) by BEEP's technical advisor. However, there are still two separate questionnaires, one from BEEP, and the other from the Bureau of Education Projects, which were sent around during the 1992-1993 school year.^{22, 23}

Key Questions -- The main concerns of this BEEP component can be summarized by three major questions:

1. How knowledgeable are the Malian representatives in the technical aspects of the Management Information Systems?
2. How important is the existence and the analysis of regular data, now entered in the ministerial procedures, in the establishment of educational policies and general decisions, at all levels in the education system?
5. To what extent were the material and technical capacities passed on to the regional offices?

Even though a management information system was established and collection and data-gathering procedures were initiated, the EMIS is not well organized at the Ministry. First of all, although the

advisors... The evaluator... should [have] congratulated the academic advisors who supply the school data. Without their participation, there would be no school statistics and the component would not be functioning. They represent the sensors of the component in the inspectorates." [remarks by Daniel Gifondorwa, Technical Advisor in charge of the Management Information Systems, ABEL/USAID Project]

²² -- "This is wrong. The goal of the conference on the reform of the information system in the fundamental education system was to result in one sole questionnaire, as the document clearly states... 'It takes place from an amended questionnaire destined to replace two existing questionnaires: the first one on enrollment and the second on infrastructure, an initiative of the Bureau of Education Projects. This questionnaire also hopes to integrate the information required by the National Institute for Pedagogy for one hundred classes being the object of an assessment.' " [remarks by Daniel Gifondorwa, Technical Advisor in charge of the Management Information Systems, ABEL/USAID Project]

²³ -- "It is incorrect to say that two questionnaires were sent to the school Principals. The Bureau of Education Projects and the ABEL Project used the same questionnaire for the year 1992-1993 for the regions covered by the Project (Bamako, Ségou, Koulikoro, Sikasso). The Bureau of Education Projects sent the usual questionnaire in the other regions (Kayes, Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal). The questionnaire that was sent to the zones of the Project is much better documented. It was decided to extend it to the other regions of the country from this year on." [remarks by the Ministry of Basic Education]

Planning and School Statistics Cell was recently established at the Ministry, it is still not involved in the management of this component, and is working jointly with the technical advisor and the consultant, who gather the data for the ABEL Project.²⁴ To date, there are no computerized unit functioning in any zone of the Project. Personal computers are found at DREs of Bamako, Koulikoro, and Sikasso, but they have not yet been set up, in some instances due to a lack of suitable quarters. Moreover, the local administrators have not yet been trained, or their training has been too superficial for them to be truly effective.

At the central level, the component is located with the ABEL Project, and functions with practically no Malian intervention.²⁵ Without the selection of specific counterparts or agencies, the information system and the collection of data were almost exclusively conceived by the technical advisors, with the sporadic participation of a representative of the Directorate of Administration and Finance. Should this practice continue, there would be no transfer of technical competence, which would jeopardize the long-term Malianization, and would make the Project look like a "foreign element" to the working of the Ministry. Some representatives of the Directorate of Administration and Finance openly question the technical competence of the technical assistance, with the statement that the latter has not produced consistent results since its beginning, and the little that has been accomplished could not have happened without additional assistance. The technical qualifications of the Ministry's representatives were also questioned: some have been trained or are experienced in fields that have very little relation with the technical demands of administration and finance. For example, one can find former biology and language teachers among the directorate personnel.

Moreover, contrary to what had been anticipated, the DREs do not really participate in the data-gathering and processing before they are brought to the central computer center. On the other hand, the schools reportedly sent their forms (specially conceived for that purpose) directly to the center, and specifically to the representatives of the ABEL Project. While this method enables the

²⁴ -- "It is inconceivable that the assessment of the component begins with the Planning and Statistics Cell, which has just been in operation since a decree on February 1, 1993. The evaluator does not seem to be informed of this decree either. The component has been located at the DAF since September 1, 1990. What could this component have accomplished during the two years preceding the establishment of the unit?"

"Furthermore, the evaluator did not ask clear questions to understand how the unit was involved. It is necessary to point out that the technical advisor has always collaborated with the Assistant Director of the unit, even before its establishment. Upon his arrival, the technical advisor considered Mr. Mamadou Y. Diakité as his counterpart in statistics. The annex F1 of the first Project amendment proves it. He is constantly in touch with the head of the statistical division about school statistics, such as the list of schools, the enrollment numbers, the elaboration of the school map, the analysis of the data, the choice of computer equipment for the unit, the writing of the report on school statistics, etc. The Director of the Unit and the technical advisor are working on the staff (staff reappointments) and the school map (choice of GIS software, the equipment and the available data for the GIS). From March to September 13, the technical advisor worked closely with the unit on the indicators of the Malian education system.

"Of course, the unit is not fully equipped in staff or equipment, but it is working. Had the evaluator consulted the unit paper, 'Program of Activities of the Planning and Statistics Cell (CPS) for the Third and Fourth trimesters 1993,' he would have seen how the unit was involved in the component. He should have examined the ministerial decree of February 1 regarding the basis of the unit. He would have seen that the two anticipated programmers have not yet been hired for the unit." (remarks by Daniel Gifondorwa, Technical Advisor in charge of the Management Information Systems, ABEL/USAID Project)

²⁵ -- "This statement is incorrect. It shows that the evaluator knows nothing about the Project and did not read the terms of reference. The technical advisor is associated with the DAF and works in the DAF locale, where the computer center and the technical advisor's office are located. In the same paragraph, the evaluator says that the technical advisor performs the data acquisition. This is wrong. The acquisition is done by the acquisition representatives at the central level. He should have asked why the acquisition is done at the central level instead of the DRE, as was anticipated: that's about the computers and the setting up of the locales. It is not all the fault of the component." [remarks by Daniel Gifondorwa, Technical Advisor in charge of the Management Information Systems, ABEL/USAID Project.]

center to obtain rapidly the forms and proceed to their entry and analysis, problems will arise at the level of the DREs and Inspectorates. These forms, replacing the older data reports, contain crucial information for the Inspectorates and the DREs. By sending them directly to the central computer unit, the regional bureaus are not able to perform the testing and control of the data, nor do they have the information they need to do their work. The central computerized unit should return the forms after recording the data. Everywhere in the DREs, we were told that the forms were never returned, which has paralyzed one aspect of their work.²⁶

At the central level, the team was made to understand that it was better to postpone the decentralization and reinforce the capacity of the central level because, the evaluators were told, the DREs do not have the (local) material or human resources at their disposal to carry out the decentralization.²⁷ Wherever we passed on this information and asked for confirmation (the DREs of Bamako, Koulikoro, and Sikasso), the DREs confirmed their eagerness and their impatience to begin with the computerization and testing of the data.

The DREs made their wish more explicit when they assured the evaluators of their capacity to provide people for the training, but they expressed their dissatisfaction about the training of some of the representatives, which they considered inadequate and insufficient (they were trained for IBM computers, but they were sent Macintosh). The DREs of Bamako and Koulikoro, who received the computers, are waiting anxiously for the additional training of the already identified representatives, and for equipping the offices which should be housing the equipment. The DRE of Sikasso is anxiously waiting for the renovation of the buildings so that it can shelter the computer unit; the representatives to be trained have already been identified. These delays seem to result equally from the actions of the BEEP and the DREs. Everywhere, the DREs are demanding the decentralization of all Project activities.²⁸

Other problems evoked by the various staff involved in or appointed (actual or proposed) by the EMIS activities include: (i) the existence of two separate questionnaires sent to the schools by the Project and the Bureau of Education Projects; (ii) the various actors in the system; (iii) the delay in the printing of the annual statistics for the years 1991/1992 and 1992/1993, thereby preventing the school principals and the IEF who are outside of the data processing circuit, to publish their enrollment reports.²⁹

Finally, since the beginning of the implementation of this component, we have not seen the establishment of the introduction of systematic procedures which would help decision-makers at the Ministry to use the information, the figures, the data, the analyses or whatever other

²⁶ -- "This is wrong. The schools never send the forms directly to the central level, not even to the DRE [Regional Bureaus]. The evaluator asked my colleagues about the channeling of the investigation forms on school enrollment, but he [probably did not understand]. He should have read, first of all, the two documents named "Reform of the Information System in the Fundamental Education" (August 1992 and June 1993) and "Suggestions for an Information System: the Case of Koulikoro." He would have seen the chart of data channeling from the schools to the central level and the outline of the decentralized system which the component suggested in June 1992, which gives the DRE the responsibility of data processing. Besides, the evaluator contradicts himself below." (remarks by Daniel Gifondorwa, Technical Advisor in charge of Management Information Systems, ABEL/USAID Project)

²⁷ -- "What is the central level about? In any case, decentralization today is a national option and all the structures are in place to implement it." (remarks by the Ministry of Basic Education)

²⁸ -- "Regarding the regionalization, the institutions managing the component are at fault. The technical advisor is not concerned with the educational policy or the management of the education system. He is there to provide the necessary tools." (remarks by Daniel Gifondorwa, Technical Advisor in charge of Information Management Systems, ABEL/USAID Project)

²⁹ -- "It is not fair to say that the enrollment reports are made in the IEF from the statistics report done at the central level of the component." (remarks by Daniel Gifondorwa, Technical Advisor in charge of Management Information Systems, ABEL/USAID Project)

information in the decision-making processes and formulations of policies.³⁰ As to the limitations represented in the possible establishment of such an information system, which would be under Malian management, they can be summed up as the following:

- an overload for the Directorate of Administration and Finance (DAF), which is responsible for its traditional activities and those left behind by the National Directorate of School Planning and Equipment;³¹
- the shortage of qualified staff at the Directorate of Administration and Finance for this kind of activity;
- the structure of the Directorate of Administration and Finance, not ready to accommodate the EMIS component, the functions or the technical assistance;
- the concentration of the activities at the level of the technical advisor; and
- the expected guidance of the EMIS component by an office, which was until only very recently not yet operational: the Planning and Statistics Cell.

The other activities of the component, such as the design of the school map and the improvement of the staff and budget management are already under way or will be in the years to come. Overall it is becoming apparent that a more efficient planning and management are necessary.

Next Steps -- As it is the wish of the regional directors and inspectors, it is therefore important to proceed to the transfer of technical competence for an efficacious and adequate training of the DRE workers and for the effective installation of the regional units. At the national level, the Computer Cell must work jointly with the Planning and Statistics Cell or train Malians to work with them so that after the Project, the Ministry will be able to continue the work with the adequate technology. Considering the serious criticism of this BEEP component, and given the important contribution of an EMIS for the planning and the monitoring of the education system, it is paramount to question all the aspects of its implementation plan.

Generally, the following initiatives may prove useful and important to the subsequent development of this component:

- i. for the DREs to assume certain recurrent expenses for EMIS;
- ii. to institute an effective guidance capacity for EMS through the new Planning and Statistics Cell, by finding a location and transferring the technical assistance there

³⁰ -- "This is wrong. Thanks to the component, the decision-makers and researchers always have access to the information. Without the component input, how could we manage the distribution of school manuals? How could we think about staff transfers? How could we know the status of the scholarships that have been given? How could the project of creating indicators be carried out without statistics? How could the Ministry and the donors know the varying enrollment rates in the schools? How could we learn about the existing basic schools? The component has already begun collecting data on the Koranic schools (see the appendix to the statistics reports), etc.? How about the statistics reports mentioned by the evaluator in this report." remarks by Daniel Gifondorwa, Technical Advisor in charge of Management Information Systems, ABEL/USAID Project.)

³¹ -- "It is not correct to explain the non-implementation of the EMIS component... by: the DAF overload, its shortage of qualified staff and its lack of preparation in accommodating the EMIS. The cause must be found in the work habits of the technical advisor, which has operated mainly in a vacuum. The transfer of technology did not take place. On the other hand, the Planning and Statistics Cell (CPS) has been operational for several months." (remarks by the Ministry of Basic Education)

physically, preparing terms of reference for the unit and the workers, and with the recruitment of a qualified staff;

- iii. to articulate indicators of planning and management for the three levels of education management (national, regional, and local);
- iv. to make the offices supposed to house the computer equipment operational, as soon as possible, at the DREs;
- v. to organize a complementary training for the staff of the DRE and the Planning and Statistics Cell who are involved in the collection, processing, and analysis of the school statistics, and to conceive new terms of reference for the technical advisor, by giving primary importance to (i) the regionalization, or decentralization of the technology and the management of the Education Information Management System; and (ii) the malianization process of the component, with a complete transfer of technology;
- vi. as for the staff, update the registration from January to February 1992 and to choose applications for staff terminations; and
- vii. to study the indicators and other data that are in the process of being collected, with the intention of developing them and determining their relevance and usefulness at each level, when a conference will take place. This could start by an ongoing dialogue between the staff attached to the Information Management System and the technicians and administrators of the national and regional bureaus so as to ensure: (i) the identification of pertinent information; (ii) efficient and understandable procedures for the collection of the information; (iii) a working analysis of the data; and (iv) an adequate distribution of the results.

C. Management Technical Assistance

Agencies and Individuals Consulted -- The evaluation team contacted the various persons involved, i.e. the officials and beneficiaries of the Project at the national and regional levels of management and administering of the schools in the regions covered by the Project. Some of these people are associated with the donor agency (USAID), including the advisors recruited by USAID to implement the Project (ABEL) -- particularly in the area of regional school administration -- or the national or regional institutions of the beneficiary country, in particular the DRE of Koulikoro.

At each meeting or interview, the partners or beneficiaries were able to express their opinions on the pertinence of the component's objectives, the results gained, the implementation difficulties they encountered, and their recommendations for future directions. Similarities between viewpoints were pointed out whenever possible. A number of exchanges thus took place around the possibilities of capitalization and internalization of the administrative capacity and staff management within the institutions of the educational sector in general and of the basic education sector in particular.

Objectives -- In the Summary of the Project, BEEP is presented as a contribution of the Government of the United States of America to the consolidation efforts of the education sector in favor of basic education. In the document, the education sector is characterized by an insufficient budget and by an inadequate employment of human and financial resources invested in that sector. The central objective of the Project is then to improve the performance of the basic education system, which will be regularly monitored, quantitatively and qualitatively, throughout the duration of the Project. "Performance" here refers to the scholastic results of the children, as well as to the

management and administration of resources -- human, material, and financial -- devoted to the education sector. The Management Technical Support component was established to improve that performance by applying an approach largely based on the strategic use of precise data. This component is linked closely to the Education Management Information Systems component, which has the objective to:

create a management information system to supply information for the monitoring and evaluation system in conformity with the conditionalities, and planning procedures of the World Bank consortium (excerpt of BEEP's Grant Agreement, August 1989; Annex 1, p.4)

The objective of the component is best and most clearly defined in the first Amendment of the Grant agreement, which was just mentioned, to "expand the management capacity at all levels of the hierarchy of education." This would allow the education sector to expand and have at its disposal -- at the national, regional, and local levels -- analysis, evaluation, and planning action capabilities based on reliable data. The Management Technical Assistance component is responsible for helping, at all levels, the decision-makers and the beneficiaries of the education sector to look for and utilize information in the decision-making processes and the creation of policies.

Malian Agencies Involved -- Within the Ministry of Basic Education, the major institutions involved are the Administrative and Financial Directorate (DAF), the Planning and Statistics Cell (CPS), and in the regions, the DRE of Koulikoro. (The DREs of Sikasso and Ségou are also involved, although with less focused initiatives.) It is worth mentioning that the improvement of the management capacity (of personnel, equipment, and finances) and planning concern all education sector officials, particularly the national directors, the assistant national directors, the heads of division, the heads of departments, the regional directors of education, the heads of division of the DREs, the inspectors of fundamental education, the academic counselors, the pedagogical advisors of the Inspectorates of Fundamental Education (IEF) and finally, the school principals and the APEs.

Strategy Developed -- Originally, the Project was supposed to set up, together with the Administrative and Financial Directorate (DAF), the National Bureau of School Planning and Equipment (DNPES) -- disbanded since -- the DRE of Koulikoro, and apart from the necessary equipment, long-term and short-term technical assistance which would help to implement some of the following tasks:

- Policy and planning analysis;
- Administrative and financial management;
- Education expansion project execution;
- Reinforcement of technical services and data gathering, processing and distribution methods, including the computerization of these services;
- Establishment of Regional Pedagogical Centers;
- Coordination with local authorities (APEs, village committees, local governments, etc.) in the management of fundamental community schools;
- Assistance in organization, management, and transfer of staff; and
- Help in the outfitting of a Planning and Evaluation Cell within the education sector.

Key Questions -- The key questions of this component can be summarized as follows:

1. What is the relevance of the Management Technical Assistance; particularly regarding: the Ministry's objectives and those of the DREs; the strategies used and the activities

implemented; and the involvement of the employees of the Ministry, the DREs, and local people in the decisions and actions of that component?

2. What measures were adopted to sustain and internalize the accomplishments of the component; particularly regarding the institutions or structures to be retained; the outfitting of offices with equipment; staff training; staff mobility; and the future tendencies or directions of the component?

Component Implementation -- This component should be implemented partly by the National Directorate of School Planning and Equipment (DNPES) and partly by the Administrative and Financial Directorate. In the first amendment of the Grant Agreement, the Project was to provide technical assistance to help the Malians establish and reinforce the Regional Pedagogical Centers. These centers were to house the "cascade" teacher training activities and offer assistance with curriculum and provide teaching material editing services as well as information and advice on teaching and management aspects of the fundamental schools. The component interventions that were directed towards the regional and central authorities included the assistance in the areas of policy and planning analysis, financial and administrative management, project execution of educational expansion, and the reinforcement of technical services, especially those involved in the gathering, processing, and distribution of the data.

This component was actually abandoned for various reasons, although some of its functions have remained and have been incorporated in other components. One reason for relinquishing this component is the absence of ministerial authorities ready to take on these responsibilities. This gap is evident in the difficult collaboration existing between the Education Management Information Systems and the Bureau of Administrative Affairs. However, one should say that the major reason lies in the absence of a technical advisor, who is capable and accountable for providing the necessary expertise in management and administration. The individual who was to take this position was assigned other responsibilities, though still in the management domain. Jim Toliver was appointed as a technical advisor for the regional school administration, a position created by USAID/Mali for the sole region of Koulikoro.

In spite of a difficult beginning and the vacuum created in the anticipated technical program -- due to (i) a lack of clarity in the component objectives (please refer to the Grant Agreement of 1989), (ii) the discontinuation of the National Directorate of School Planning and Equipment by the Government at the end of 1989, and (iii) the difficult choice of appointing a long-term technical advisor responsible for the whole component (not yet chosen to date) -- some important activities were able to be carried out by short-term technical advisors or by other BEEP components, like:

- a recording of the personnel of the Ministry of National Education, which began in September 1990 and was published in 1992;
- a study of needs of the Ministry's personnel in formal and in-service training accomplished in September 1991;
- the planning conference at Selingué (February 10-14, 1992), which focused on training, infrastructure, monitoring and evaluation, and management;
- the in-service training conference for the school managers (April 1-July 31, 1992), gathering all the directors, assistant directors, heads of division, and heads of section of the four national bureaus of the Ministry of National Education (MEN).
- at the level of the regions, two workshops took place in Ségou and Sikasso for the DREs, the inspectors of fundamental education, and the heads of division of the

Regional Bureaus of Education. The District of Bamako, the DRE of Koulikoro, and some inspectors of other regions in Mali attended the workshops in Bamako;

- a study conducted on the personnel of the Ministry of National Education, between August and September 1992; and
- a study on the reform of the information system in fundamental education, in order to prepare the conference on management information systems, which took place on July 28 and 29, 1992 in Bamako.

It is also worth mentioning that, in 1992 and 1993, the In-Service Training component administered two modules regarding school and classroom management issues. In particular:

- the operation of the FAEF, the conditions surrounding access to school, the identification and sensitization of the schooling population, and the inventory of a school heritage; and
- the preparation of the annual statistics report for the beginning and end of the school year, the inventory and identification of renovation needs.

The personnel involved in these modules were the school principals, the first-grade teachers, and the pedagogical advisors of the areas covered by the Project.

The regional school administration activities of the technical advisor in Koulikoro served somewhat as a pilot program for the other regions. Certain interventions launched by USAID in all regions covered by the Project -- e.g. the FAEF and the computerization of the DREs -- took advantage of a truly consistent support in Koulikoro, which had a tremendously positive impact. Although some criticism was expressed about the presence of an expatriate for a somewhat logistical post (i.e. "why should we pay for a foreigner when a Malian could do the same work?"), the superior results in Koulikoro cannot be ignored when comparing them to the same initiatives attempted in the other regions under the auspices of the Project. DRE officials of Koulikoro are the first to offer this view and suggest three possible explanations for this situation: (i) a foreigner is not distracted by cultural, political, social, and familial obligations as a native would; (ii) the expatriate is more knowledgeable about how USAID works and how to make it work; and (iii) the expatriate represents, for the local inhabitants and authorities, the donor's entire commitment to this activity, thereby eliciting more confidence and interest.

The specific actions which benefit from the technical assistance of the regional school administration advisor in Koulikoro concern the following:

- a thorough recording of the conditions and needs in buildings and classrooms of the 383 fundamental schools of the region, including data collection on schooling, relationships with surrounding communities, and the school identification card;
- a sensitization of the communities and school personnel about the FAEF program;
- a training seminar for community members to participate directly in the management and decision-making process concerning the school and the education of their children, and a program (anticipated for November 1993) of subsequent seminars to train and elicit individual community participation (in 41 districts) in the maintenance of the local schools;
- the formal assessment, by written request, of the Inspectorates of Koulikoro, on the conditions of the buildings and classroom furniture, the management information and

archive systems, transportation, staff, training, equipment, and the hierarchical coordination of each inspectorate of the DRE of Koulikoro -- the final report was at the outline stage at the time of the present evaluation;

- the implementation of the book-keeping and inventory systems for the receiving and monitoring of the material provided by the Project;
- the computer training of the staff of the DRE (performed by the Management Information System component), using IBM computers³²; and
- the introduction of a new filing system at the DRE Koulikoro, with accompanying training for its implementation.

The recording of school conditions was presented in the document "Assessment of the Infrastructure of the Fundamental Schools in the Koulikoro Region." This initiative was essential to the planning and budgeting of the assistance in school furniture for the region, thereby helping the Project to prioritize the schools most in need. The sensitization concerning the FAEF provoked a considerable response, outnumbering the requests of the other regions as well as the available resources of the Fund. According to the director of the DRE of Koulikoro and the technical advisor who works with him, the overall actions had an impact which goes beyond the relatively simple transfer of expertise and the documentation written below. More specifically, they observed a perceptible level of interest, energy, and trust, demonstrated as much by the employees of the DRE as by the schools and communities (more evident in the large number of requests to the FAEF) with whom they work. There are no miracle stories, but the importance of a high morale in the staff of the Regional Bureaus and the Inspectorates, especially given the school conditions in Mali, should not be minimized.

Maybe the most striking conclusion from this situation is the possibility of soliciting the active participation of the population -- i.e. employees of the education sector and community members -- when the assistance is organized in a collaborative, consistent and comprehensive manner. The component dealt with a large range of issues, targeting mostly the principal preoccupations identified by the officials and beneficiaries directly involved. The technical advisor was constantly present in the field. And each partner seems to have been conscious of his or her particular role, and to have fulfilled it, with the regular assistance of the technical advisor, according to his or her technical capabilities.

However, at the level of the center (the Ministry), the absence of a long-term technical advisor in charge of the component, the discontinuation of the National Bureau of School Planning and Equipment (DNPE) in December 1989, and the constant staff mobility at the level of the Administrative and Financial Directorates (DAF), constitute the chief limitations encountered in the implementation of this component, which seems a little to have been executed by fits and starts. All was not rosy in Koulikoro either, where problems can be summarized as a lack of sufficient consistency with other aspects of the Project, including other components and the top officials of USAID/Mali. For example, the conference on community training in school management had to be postponed because it conflicted with other conferences. (Other components complained of the similar conflict, with other components and activities programmed by the Government.) Another example is the considerable response roused by the sensitization of communities for the FAEF which outstripped the current available funds for the intervention. The negative impact created by this disappointment is difficult to assess.

³² -- After the training, the DRE received Macintosh computers, for which it is still awaiting for more appropriate training.

Recommendations, Strategies, and Future Trends -- The objectives of the Management Technical Assistance component are still current at the local, regional, and national level. Decentralization will require even more pressing needs for the development of data collection and processing capabilities, planning and assessment of the education system, because of the type of communication links that exist between the regions and the center.

Meeting the needs for training through short-term interventions will not be sufficient alone to stimulate successful and sustainable achievements; apart from setting up a management technical assistance, it is necessary to:

1. describe the tasks of the various positions at the national bureaus of the education sector, in order (i) to inform those who need to carry out these tasks and (ii) to achieve gradually a consistent recruitment (the same is true for the DREs);
2. establish routine and formal channels for the regular dissemination and processing of the data concerning the state of the fundamental education in Mali;
3. determine the needs for formal and in-service training of the employees, with the following objectives: (i) the establishment of a management capability, and (ii) the use of data in the decision-making and articulation of policies; and
4. the formulation and implementation of a new amendment to the Grant Agreement, which would include non-project assistance, with disbursements contingent to meeting certain task requirements mentioned above in (1) and (3).

In order to consolidate and sustain the initiatives launched to realize the regionalization of the administrative and financial management of the sector, the experience of Koulikoro needs close examination. The model is quite pertinent. The responsibility, on the part of DREs and the Inspectorates of Fundamental Education, for material and equipment, training, monitoring and evaluation, and funding obliges the local employees to adopt a culture which is still new to them; essentially, a culture of transparent book-keeping. Limited expertise may represent less of an impediment than socio-cultural pressures. If the relatively simple efforts by ABEL's manager to transfer Project vehicles to the regions provoke aggressive reaction regarding book-keeping norms, one can anticipate greater difficulties with further regionalization initiatives. A foreign advisor could prove very useful in such a situation, as much for his or her technical expertise as for what he or she represents.

D. Girls' Schooling³³

As for all the Project's components, the "fourth generation" evaluation method was used to gather information and perspectives on BEEP's Girls' Schooling component. Those partners most interesting to the evaluation mission were the following: the USAID technical advisor for girls' schooling, the Malian staff of the national and regional girls' schooling cells, and the APEs and students, who are directly involved in the component activities. Also included are indirect actors, such as the technical advisors and staff of the other components, the ministerial officials, the DRE, the Inspectorates of Fundamental Education, and others who have contributed their opinions on the unfolding and progress in this area. The following people were contacted in particular:

³³ -- Please refer to the general remarks of Mrs. Mara Yakhare Soumano, officer of the National Cell of Girls' Schooling, National Directorate of Functional Literacy and Applied Linguistics (DNAFLA) and Mrs. Korotoumou Konfé, Technical Advisor, Girls' Schooling component, in Annex G.

- USAID officials;
- Staff of the DRE of Bamako, including the chief administrator, the school principals and teachers, APE representatives, and DRE staff involved in the implementation of certain components (Girls' Schooling, Information Systems, and School Statistics);
- Staff of the National Bureau of Functional Literacy and Applied Linguistics (*Direction Nationale de l'Alphabétisation Fonctionnelle et de Linguistique Appliquée*) and of the National Institute of Pedagogy at the Ministry;
- Staff of the National Bureau of Fundamental Education, especially the national cell in charge of the Girls' Schooling, together with BEEP's technical advisor;
- Malian staff involved in the realization of activities organized and supervised by the component in the regions, especially the regional directors, the inspectors, pedagogical advisors, school teachers and principals, APE representatives, and other administrators and technicians related to the DRE of Bamako, Koulikoro and Sikasso; and
- in Bougouni, the pedagogical advisors, the school principals and teachers and the APEs.

Objectives -- The goal of this component is an increase in the girls' participation and opportunities for success in school. In order to achieve this goal, the following objectives are tackled: (i) increase enrollment and retention rates; (ii) increase promotion rates and encourage the girls in their studies; (iii) improve the quality of the teaching for girls; and (iv) increase the participation of the female teachers in the schools.

Strategies -- The interventions conducted by the BEEP Girls' Schooling component were designed back in 1990, at the beginning of the Project, in the document "Girls' Schooling: 7 Pilot Projects." This document constitutes the initial plan and included the following components, adapted from similar projects in the developing world -- e.g. Nepal, Bangladesh, and Guatemala. The original conceptualization is the following:

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| Project 1 | the increase in female participation in the educational system of Mali through incentives and improved work conditions; |
| Project 2 | the establishment of conditions and contexts favoring women's participation in the training of teachers; |
| Project 3 | the initiation of informal educational programs for women's education to free women from permanent child care responsibilities, for example adult literacy, daycare, morning classes for unenrolled girls', and flexible school hours to accommodate housework, in particular; |
| Project 4 | the implementation of scholarship and award programs or prizes for the girls coming from unfortunate backgrounds but who keep attending school; |
| Project 5 | the design of teaching programs which minimize the differences between the sexes, but which at the same time favor topics that are most relevant to the girls and their parents; |
| Project 6 | the implementation of a media campaign to inform parents of the advantages of a female education so as to encourage the adult population to send them to school; and |
| Project 7 | the implementation of complementary activities to the media campaign, including especially direct contacts with mothers. |

The technical consultant for the component stated that five of these projects are currently in operation, but that the current implementation of the action plan divided into seven constituents diverged in several ways, even for the projects which were maintained. For example, Project 4 -- scholarships and prizes -- has chiefly become a competitive examination with a prize distribution to the girls and boys who are at the top of their class, and to the schools who recruited most girls. This activity and the media campaign seem to have dominated the efforts of the staff of the component. The prize distribution was the last intervention organized by the component and consequently met numerous responses among the people contacted.

Key Questions -- The analysis of the impact of the Girls' Schooling component can be articulated by three major questions:

1. Have the quantitative objectives, such as the increase of the girls' participation rates, been fulfilled?
2. What has been the impact of the strategies that were applied by the component on the observed results?
3. How should the design and the implementation of the component be considered?

It is important to approach the discussion with an overall appreciation and to consider the fundamental conceptualization of the component.

Back in 1992, an evaluation of the Girls' Schooling component conducted by the African Research and Technology Unit of USAID/W (ARTS) concluded that the actions of the component were mostly conducted without an adequate understanding of the significant factors which influenced the decision of girls (and their parents) to attend school. This means that the choice of intervention was based rather on anecdotal and impressionistic familiarity with the topic rather than on objective and thorough local research. The use of the lessons gathered from similar projects in other developing countries is very positive. Nevertheless, there is also a disadvantage in borrowing the components of these other projects without a thorough study or adequate understanding of the original context from which the strategy is drawn. This context encompasses the social and cultural milieu in which the project is unfolding as well as the complementary actions of the activity, which include factors that are directly and/or indirectly related to a girls' education program. The adaptation of such interventions borrowed from foreign contexts, however carefully selected, to the situation in Mali requires a level of research not found explicitly in the texts or discussions which the team consulted at the time of the evaluation of this component.

Similar concerns were reiterated upon several occasions, albeit expressed differently, by the USAID staff, the other technical advisors, and various officials of the Ministry and the DREs. It is clear that the strategies developed and implemented by the staff of the component are based on judicious remarks and that they target real issues vis-à-vis female school participation. But conducting a media campaign for the promotion of girls' schooling does not exclude major factors which prevent the realization of the objectives sought. In short, neither the advertising nor the prizes themselves will eliminate or improve the conditions which provoke the greater dropout rates or dismissal of girls than of boys.³⁴

This being said, the indicators still show a positive, consistent tendency in the collected figures. USAID has pointed out, for example, a steady increase in the gross figures for the girls' schooling

³⁴ -- This conclusion appears in studies on girls' schooling in Mali (cited above) and in Guinea (Tietjen and Laurent, 1992).

in the fundamental schools in Mali, from 115,300 (16.16 per cent for girls of schooling age) in the first six grades in 1989 to 139,430 (18.74 per cent) in 1992. It has also pointed out a significant increase for the girls -- from 25.2 to 27.2 per cent -- in the completion rate for the sixth grade. However, BEEP's Monitoring and Evaluation report finds it difficult to ascertain if the Project has had an impact on female participation as well as on the dwindling repeater rates. Progress was found in all these categories, but the fact that there are other interventions with the same objectives in the target areas of the Project (particularly noticeable in Sikasso) does not allow the singling out of the impact by the BEEP component. The monitoring and evaluation report also indicates evident gains regarding the lack of discrimination between boys and girls. The report explains that the Project establishes no difference between the performance of girls and that of boys, and that no results demonstrate the impact due to women's participation in teaching (*Monitoring and Evaluation Report of Project of Expansion of Basic Education*, 1992; p.42); although the staff of the Girls' Schooling component explained that the questions asked by the staff of the Monitoring and Evaluation component to come to the same conclusion, this did not sufficiently cover the issue.³⁵

There are other factors which explain why these conclusions are difficult to confirm by the present evaluation mission. There are no indicators of impact as a result of the interventions nor figures since the beginning of the Project that relate directly and uniquely to BEEP initiatives. The local authorities state, for example, that 1,403 more girls were recruited this year in the Sikasso region, than last year.³⁶ But it is not known if these positive tendencies are due to the sensitization campaign or to the general enrollment rate increase and the classroom renovations and constructions, which permitted a marked increase in the recruitment rates for boys and girls. It is evident that female participation in the fundamental schools is on the increase, as stated earlier, and that the joint efforts around this goal, even though they may not be singled out, have a positive effect. That is why the actions must be maintained if not amplified, but it is necessary to ascertain how to maximize their complementarity and make each undertaking efficient.³⁷

The fourth generation methodology applied in the evaluation of this component has made possible the identification of a certain number of problems, which are intrinsic to its implementation. BEEP's Girls' Schooling component began in 1990 with a technical advisor responsible for the conceptualization of the program of action with the National Directorate of Fundamental Education and other partners (APEs, key individuals, women's associations). Two years later, in October 1992, the decision # 0882/SECEB placed the National Girls' Schooling Cell under the auspices of the National Directorate of Fundamental Education.³⁸ This cell was responsible for the design and

³⁵ -- "The evaluation report in question is the one written in July 1992 by the Monitoring and Evaluation team. This evaluation was based on an evaluation questionnaire, which included only two questions regarding girls' schooling: (i) are the children grouped by gender in the classroom?; (ii) does the teacher ask the girls questions in class? It seems obvious that these two items are not enough to conclude that the 'Project had no impact on girls' schooling... It would have been advisable to analyze the statistics relative to the enrollment, repetition, and dismissals from the beginning date of the Project up to July 1992, date of the evaluation.' " (remarks by Mrs. Yakharé Soumano, officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

³⁶ -- "At the various meetings of the Inspectorates (IEF) preparatory to the beginning of the school year, the school principals had been asked to sensitize the student recruitment offices so as to reach a certain equality between both genders. Without underestimating the other factors, we think that this decision strongly influenced the recruitment of 1,403 more girls than last year." (remarks by M'Bo Ba, Regional Director of Education, Sikasso)

³⁷ -- "It is undeniable that the number of recruited girls has increased from 1990 to 1992 in the four regions of the Project, even if the report only mentions the case of Sikasso. Only a specific study could precisely ascertain the reasons for this female recruitment increase. The joint actions of the various components of the Fourth Project enable the realization of these objectives. It would be preposterous to think that the sole activities of the Girls' Schooling component are able to realize the assigned objectives." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakharé Soumano, Officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

³⁸ -- "With the decision # 0882/SECEB of the 28 December, 1992, the National Girls' Schooling Cell is responsible for the design and implementation of the national policy outline in the area of girls' schooling and for

implementation of a national policy outline in the area of girls' schooling, and it was to ensure the coordination and technical supervision of the local and regional cells.

The delayed creation of a national cell, after a five-year action plan was established and several regional cells were already in operation, to organize the development of female education, engendered misunderstandings between the officers of the national and regional cells.³⁹ This situation was exacerbated by the fact that there was no change in the Project's technical advisor's terms of reference with the establishment of the national cell. Both demand a clearer description of their respective responsibilities and areas of intervention as well as the definition of a collaborative strategy.

Interviews with the various participants enabled the evaluation team to ascertain clearly that there was considerable discomfort within the central team responsible for the implementation of this component, and at all levels. At the national cell level, the feeling was expressed that there was no true possibility of impact on the program, having jumped on the train while already moving.⁴⁰ The officer affirms her strict adhesion to the programs and action plans of the regions. The men who are working at the National Cell did not ask to be there, and declare that the Girls' Schooling component is an idea of the donors. They apparently do not see its necessity, and would have preferred this component to be an integral part of the general struggle against illiteracy and have advocated a system that would ensure equity between the different regions.

At the level of the regional cell of Bamako, the feeling was expressed that there was an overlap of responsibilities and areas of intervention between the national and regional cells. At the level of the regional cell of Koulikoro (which, according to the technical advisor, was established upon recommendation of the national cell), the staff members have the feeling of being overwhelmed by the national cell, which decides everything for them, they say.⁴¹ We were told that the central

ensuring the coordination and technical supervision of the local and regional cell. As such, we believe that it is responsible for conceiving programs in the direction of the National Policy, by taking into account the basic needs and implementing them with the help of the local and regional cell. For example: the regional cell were to suggest selection criteria for the winners of the 1992-93 school competitions. Only the inspectorates of Bougouni I and II have made suggestions, which gave the basis of the selected criteria. (The message was communicated at the time of the school visits in January 1993). The regions were also to select the kind and the quantity of awards." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakharé Soumano, Officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

³⁹ -- "The action plan mentioned is purely indicative, not at all dogmatic. It is surprising to read, in this paragraph: 'The Officer of the National Cell (who feels that she does not have any initiative)...' She can take initiatives; otherwise her position could not be justified. The annual 1992-93 program was designed by the National Girls' Schooling Cell, the Coordinator and the technical help of a USAID consultant from Abidjan. This program was then submitted for approval by the National Directorate of Fundamental Education (DNEF), the Bureau of Educational Projects (BPE), and USAID. Nonetheless, it remains (understood) that a clarification of responsibilities between the Coordinator and the Officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell regarding the decisions to make in the financial area, is of high necessity." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakharé Soumano, Officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

⁴⁰ -- "In spite of its slow start, the cell is working jointly with the Coordinator to design the program of activities of the component. On top of that, she helps out the regional structures in the design of regional plans of activities. Contrary to what has been mentioned, I quote "the men who are working at the National Girls' Schooling Cell did not ask to come there... to ensure equity between the different regions." The men stated they were civil servants willing to serve where needed. They remarked that the education policies are not at all discriminatory; but if within the framework of the USAID/Ministry cooperation, a particular program is devoted to girls' education, this can only increase the potential for the realization of our objectives." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakharé Soumano, Officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

⁴¹ -- "The Regional Cell of Koulikoro was established through a memorandum of the Regional Director, who had been instructed to do so by the National Cell.

All the missions initiated by the National Girls' Schooling Cell were carried out with representatives of the respective Regional Cellules and Inspectorates; likewise in all the other regions of the zone of the Project. A vehicle problem arose only in Koulikoro, during the last prize distribution ceremonies. As they were

agency was the one which decided and programmed the missions within their region; there are no seats reserved for them aboard the vehicles during the on-site visits. The national cell apparently notified them clearly that the regional cells were to undertake no action which necessitated expenses and that they were to manage with the means that the Regional Bureaus and Inspectorates could put at their disposal for the implementation of their program of activities.⁴²

A great sense of frustration exists among the staff of the local girls' schooling cells in the DREs. They identified the obstacles to female education, the schools not attended by girls in the region, and those the girls systematically leave after the third grade. They then took upon themselves to act in those zones, by addressing the parents in their own language. The choices of the national cell (who did not consult them) were different but were eventually implemented, thereby depriving the local staff of any initiative and imposing decisions which were thought inappropriate for their region.

At the level of the regional cell of Sikasso, the same feelings of frustration and lack of initiative have been felt⁴³. The national cell makes independent choices and acts on its own in the region as though there were no regional cells. Moreover, the latter had to manage alone with practically nonexistent means supplied by the DREs and Inspectorates. The regional cell strongly advocates decentralization, which would grant it the power and the funding to carry out independent initiatives.

Concerning the means implemented to reach the Project's objectives, the opinions are mixed as to their pertinence. The sensitization is almost unanimously accepted by everyone, but some believe

simultaneously taking place in all the regions (with the exception of Bamako), the National Girls' Schooling Cell asked the support of two persons from the Regional Cell in Bamako, who had been involved in the process since 1991, to accompany a member of the National Cell. The Project cameraman was also part of the Koulikoro mission. But the budget designed for the organization of the ceremonies included fuel under one of its headings -- CFA Francs 22,500 multiplied by the five inspectorates, or 30 gallons of gas multiplied by the five inspectorates -- to ensure the transportation of the Inspectors, members of the Regional Cell and consultants for the component in the inspectorates. This setup, which was a widespread customary practice, posed no problem elsewhere.

The National Cell did ask the regional structures to implement the activities of the regional action plans that did not necessitate special disbursements. Indeed, the design of the regional action plans was neither followed by a financial evaluation nor by a budget allocation for their implementation. It is the National plan of action (whose cost was estimated to be CFA Francs 125,000,000) which is being implemented; it is therefore logical that the National Cell be its mastermind." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakhare Soumano, Officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

⁴² -- "We have welcomed all the good initiatives in favor of the Girls' Schooling. However, we do not have funds at our disposal for the regions. Some of them have undertaken actions with their own means, and by contacting the local NGOs. (As is the case of Sikasso, where the Regional Cell and the Inspectorates of Bougouni realized many missions of sensitization.) If specific programs are submitted, we will be able to forward them to USAID, who has the last word on the sponsorship and financing." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakhare Soumano, Officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

⁴³ -- "In Sikasso, there are two frustration points, so to speak. (1) Each Inspectorate of Fundamental Education (IEF) had planned a program of activities. It was expected that a conference would occur (which had been promised) in order to do a synthesis and have a new plan of action, at the level of each region. This conference did not take place, because of a lack of funds. (2) The criteria for the prize distributions suggested by some of us were not taken into account. For these two points, it is not necessary to generalize this feeling of frustration. We were told that the national cell is the only one who chooses and acts accordingly... I think that this is not fair insofar as whenever the national cell was to carry out missions in the region, one or two members of the regional cell added themselves to the national delegation. This mixed delegation was reinforced by the officer responsible for the girls' schooling at the Inspectorate concerned by the visit. The national cell chose the place to visit. That's quite normal because it was supplied a list of the municipalities by the regional cell, where the girls' schooling is very low. So, isn't this a choice made from the suggestions of the regional cell? I think that the financing of the various regional plans of action would solve all those problems. It is important to recognize that the National Cell also has a role to play." (remarks by M'Bo Ba, Regional Director of Education, Sikasso)

that the current format must change, as well as the recipients.⁴⁴ Some teachers doubt the efficacy of sensitization programs on radio and television in the rural countryside. Now the issue of girls' schooling in the urban centers does not come up, or much less. So why sensitize people who already believe in the cause? The issue in the cities, like in rural areas, is especially a deficiency in being able to accommodate everyone. The case was related of a father who had come from the bush with his daughter and his son to the school recruitment. There he was told there was no room available for his son, but that his daughter could be selected (because of the regulation to select all girls who show up for recruitment).. The father decided to go back home with his daughter and son.

The principal strategy used by the Project is a general sensitization based on the prize distribution to the students (girls and boys) at the top of their class and to the schools who have the highest girl recruitment. Even though the prize distribution is not regarded as the award of a real competition (the student's grades are only taken into account), this strategy is generally viewed as having as much an impact on the girls (which may motivate them to remain in school), as on their parents (emulation among the villages).⁴⁵

Both regional educators and administrators, along with the national staff, were very enthusiastic about this competition both at the level of student and community and at that of the teachers and schools. The enthusiasm of the teachers, the APEs, and the inspectors was evident in their full participation in planning the competition -- scheduling, choice of the awards, criteria of selection for the winners, information diffusion -- as well as for preparing all the subsequent stages. The collective reports on the prize distribution ceremonies reveal the same kind of enthusiasm, shared by the students, their parents, and the whole community. The only negative comments made about the actual ceremonies were: (i) the decision (considered unilateral by the USAID and Malian staff of the component) for the local teams organized to set up the activity not to accept all the chosen prizes (through a negotiation with the members of the National Cell); (ii) the exclusion (*de facto*, at least) of the members of the regional cells and of certain local personalities from the prize distribution ceremonies, because of a lack of room in the vehicles sent by the central office; and (iii) the considerable lateness of the Ministry representatives arriving to the ceremonies. The popularity of the events should not be overlooked.

However, the local administrators' appreciation for the long-term impact of this strategy varies considerably. Some school teachers and principals think, for example, that these very festive distributions may become a deterrent in the long run. As soon as the prizes decline, so will the populations' interest. Those of Sikasso think that the awards should not be extended to the laureate but to the communities instead. In Koulikoro, the regional cell approves of the current format of prize distribution and feels that one of the prizes, a storm lamp, is really appreciated by the populations in an area still lighted traditionally. An award to the schools which recruited the most girls and which had the lowest rates of school dropouts or repeaters may have, and this was unanimous, an impact on the behavior of the inspectors, the directors and the school teachers.

If, overall, the relevance of the Girls' Schooling component is certainly well perceived by all contacted, its implementation is a problem at all levels. Everyone said that the best formula had not

⁴⁴ -- "The sensitization is almost unanimously accepted by everyone, but some believe that the current format must change as well as its recipients. All right, but let them make concrete suggestions. We are open to any pertinent suggestion." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakhare Soumano, Officer the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

⁴⁵ -- "The prize distributions are a secular school tradition. The format is related to the objective and the targets. The suggestion to extend the awards to the communities does not seem judicious insofar as the student is rewarded for his/her work, attendance and behavior. The pilot projects, on the other hand, will enable the initiation of actions in favor of the communities." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakhare Soumano, Office of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

yet been found. The current technical advisor feels that there is too much improvisation and not enough preliminary study, which would establish the causes of the situation on a better footing and allow more adequate interventions. The program of sectorial adjustment anticipates a study analyzing the familial, scholastic, and sociological factors which have an impact on female participation in schools, and will suggest realistic solutions to improve the situation and reinforce the participation of women in the teaching body. This study has not yet taken place.⁴⁶

In all the cells (national and regional), there are men involved in the implementation of the Girls' Schooling component. This masculine presence is sometimes negatively perceived. If this is not an issue in the urban centers, the opinion is quite different in the rural areas. The fact that men dominate in the bush schools may put a brake on the parents' desire to send their daughters to school or incite them to take them out as soon as they become women. The sensitization action would be more effective with women who could serve as role models for the benefits of education, as much for the parents as for the girls themselves. In Koulikoro, the strong interest from the girls towards the women who showed up for the sensitization is well documented; they look at them admiringly and affectionately, come close to them to touch their hairdo, to look more closely how a scarf has been knotted, and to touch the outfit. It is likely that this may be an incentive for the girl to go to school and to remain in school.^{47, 48}

The various interviews show that the issue of money creates a dangerous prejudice in the atmosphere of this component. The excessive centralization of the initiatives (the selection of missions, their location, duration, and the composition of the delegations) is perceived by the staff of the regional cells as a means for the central staff to maximize the money earned in the form of *per diem*. The following suspicion was evoked: the program of intervention and visits by the component staff conceived by the national cell, is more influenced by the wish to maximize the *per diem* than by technical concerns. For example, for the prize distribution in its region, the regional cell of Koulikoro could not understand why the national cell had sent a representative accompanied by all members of the regional cell of Bamako and that not one seat for one member of the regional cell had been reserved aboard the vehicles. It also could not understand why the national cell expressly requires the initiatives which do not require any expenses, while at the same time it has to operate in a rural area to convince the parents to send their daughters to school. The regional cell does not benefit from any logistics; although, each time the national cell wanted to, it could initiate and implement sensitization missions in the Koulikoro region.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ -- "The studies focus on: (i) the socio-economic and pedagogical factors which impede the girls' schooling; and (ii) the means to promote the participation of women in the teaching body will be able to be utilized, as soon as the means become available." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakhare Soumano, Officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

⁴⁷ -- "The presence of men in the girls' schooling cell should not suffer from misinterpretation. The girls' education is not a problem which needs to be administered solely by women. It is a national problem which needs to be administered jointly by men and women. As such, the belief that only women must work in the cell would be synonymous with the establishment of segregated services for men and women. Such an attitude would strongly contradict the women's promotion policy which aims at establishing an equality between men and women on the one hand, and with the gender-blind policies about civil service. The High School for Young Women (*Lycée de Jeunes Filles*) is an establishment attended by both men and women teachers." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakhare Soumano, Officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

⁴⁸ -- "Caution is necessary with statements of this kind. The non schooling or under schooling of the girls, cannot be solely explained by the factor of absence of identifiable models. It is strongly linked to economic constraints and backward socio-cultural ponderousness, such as the status of women, the religious practices, the early marriages..." (remarks by the Ministry of Basic Education)

⁴⁹ -- "All development projects are created after an insufficiency was recognized in one sector. Supplemental means are a welcomed addition to the existing situation. Therefore, incentive measures are largely employed. As far as the Girls' Schooling component is concerned, the personnel involved do not benefit from bonuses. The only advantage (if you can call it that!) is the *per diem* allocated to the employee visiting a locale other than his or her place of residence for the activities of the component. The rates of CFA Francs 6,000 per night for those who leave

Next Steps -- The current format of the component's implementation is so dependent on money that some are worried about its survival after the funding is over. But according to many, administrative measures may be able to carry on the activities all the more so since work in that direction had begun before the Project's inception. Is the improvement of the current rate of recruitment due in part to the result of this work?

In the absence of indicators of impact and success, it is impossible to assert confidently that the increase in the girls' recruitment rates and the decrease in the repetition rates of classes and school dropouts are the result of actions initiated within the framework of the Girls' Schooling component. The fact that the 1992-1993 school year was declared optional makes this estimation even more difficult.

Given the great disarray in the design, the implementation, and the analysis of the impacts, a complete reformulation of this component is suggested below. Objectives, structures, and strategies all have to be reconsidered. In particular, the evaluation mission presents the following suggestions, to be discussed collectively by USAID, the staff directly involved in the activity, the other staff of the Ministry at the central and regional levels, the APEs and the students.

1. Articulate a research program which will illuminate (i) the current situation regarding female education in the areas of intervention and the country overall; and (ii) the various causes -- common and unique to some regions or various groups -- for the low participation and persistence of the girls in the fundamental school system. This program could be implemented by the national staff with BEEP's and the national cell's assistance.
2. Based on the results of the research activities, identify and initiate pilot interventions so as to define strategies to be promoted on a larger scale. Because of the results of the present evaluation, it is deemed important to consider strategies covering a large gamut, including interventions targeting the school and the girls, as well as the home, the community and the parents (especially the mothers).
3. Restructure BEEP's program so as to enhance the collaboration between the DREs and the local cells in the design and implementation, and the monitoring and evaluation of the activities promoting female education.
4. Enlarge the orientation and the direction, or management, of the sector so as to include the girls' schooling issue on the overall fundamental education agenda. Female participation and performance concern all -- the families, the country, the communities -- therefore, solutions are sought which pertain to all educational issues and engage the direct participation of everyone involved. The current state of the sector as an administrative and functional ghetto shows little promise of impact in the long run.
5. If it is necessary to keep a Coordinator and a Team for this component -- which could be an additional issue to be examined -- it is strongly suggested that the establishment of a formal cell (or committee) composed of people from various directorates and services at the Ministry, which would conceive and manage a program of coordinated

Bamako for the regions and the districts, and the CFA Francs 7,000 for the visits of the regional and district agents in the vicinity of Bamako, are hardly sufficient to cover the overnight, food, and care expenses (everything is possible during a mission). It would be unwise to think that the *per diem* is the essential objective of the employees. Concerning the vehicles, we are in agreement upon the necessity of endowing the Regional Bureaus of Education with vehicles for the implementation of the activities of the Project." (remarks by Mrs. Mara Yakhare Soumano, Officer of the National Girls' Schooling Cell, DNAFLA)

activities with an impact on the whole educational system. This cell would establish contacts with the other ministries in order to identify and conduct extra-curricular activities which could have a positive effect on girls' schooling.

6. Conduct a more thorough evaluation of the sensitization campaign -- examinations and prizes, and the media campaign -- led by the national cell and BEEP. All aspects will have to be studied -- goals and objectives, the agencies in charge of its implementation, strategies, criteria and evaluation modalities, and the areas of intervention -- and to be articulated in another way in a new plan. As an initial task, the trans-ministerial Girls' Schooling Cell (suggestion #5) could begin this evaluation and planning activity with outside assistance. The research activity (suggestion #1) will bring much information for the reprogramming of this component.

E. In-Service Training and Distribution of School Books

1. Identification of the agencies and individuals consulted and description of the evaluation process

Teachers' in-service training is one of BEEP's most important components, destined to improve teaching quality and equity in the first cycle of the fundamental education system. In-Service Training is not easily separable from another aspect of the Project, which is the supply of textbooks and manuals to the students and their teachers. To appreciate the impact of these two components requires contacting the several decision levels implied; it is essential to gather their reactions, their opinions and their current or future needs.


The first level is the teachers and principals who manage the classroom and the school, and who in that capacity are potential beneficiaries of in-service training and of the textbooks and teachers' manuals. These beneficiaries depend on an Inspectorate of Fundamental Education (IEF) composed of one inspector and several pedagogical advisors. The Inspectorate is responsible for the following major/principal missions:

- visit the public, private, and Koranic school classrooms and write up reports;
- assess the teachers' services and write up a report on the basis of the principals' suggestions;
- select the school principals;
- draft the annual statistics report;
- keep the school lists updated;
- establish school statistics;
- establish the inventory of school furniture and locales;
- suggest staff transfers;
- specify the needs for staff;
- keep the staff lists updated;

- suggest possible staff disciplinary sanctions;
- organize in-service training seminars and workshops;
- to suggest dates and places of the official examinations (end of cycle).⁵⁰

The pedagogical advisors assist the inspector with these various missions, in particular with the visits and evaluations of teachers' services.


The Inspectorates of Fundamental Education (IEF) of one region are coordinated and managed by a Regional Bureau of Education (DRE), which is structured in the chart below.



- DEFA: Fundamental Education and Literacy Division (*division de l'enseignement fondamental et de l'alphabétisation*)
- DRF: Research and Training Division (*division de la recherche et de la formation*)
- DPAAF: Administrative and Financial Planning Division (*division de la planification des affaires administratives et financières*)
- DESS: Secondary and Higher Education Division (*division de l'enseignement secondaire et supérieur*)

Each Division includes several sections. The Regional Bureaus of Education (DRE) depend administratively on the Cabinet, and technically on each national bureau, such as the National Bureau of Fundamental Education (DNEF)

⁵⁰ -- "The Inspectors' role is not entirely limited to suggesting dates or designating the places where official examinations take place. The inspectors also have the mission to organize these examinations and especially to ensure their development." (remarks by Boubacar Gaye, Head of the Training Division, IPN)



Several supervising missions are expedited by the IPN, which is hierarchially of the same status of the National Directorate of Fundamental Education (see IPN chart in Appendix C). In that sense, the Inspectorate is called to coordinate the teachers' training in the DREs. Most Inspectorate divisions are affected by the Project. The Training Division, in particular, is responsible for implementing the In-Service Training (currently assisted by USAID). The "Humanities" and "Science and Technology" divisions are responsible for their own choice of textbooks. The National Directorate of Fundamental Education and the IPN depend directly on the Ministry Cabinet.

Meetings were set up by all the evaluators to look at the national and regional directorate, and the Inspectorates for the four regions involved -- Bamako, Koulikoro, Ségou, and Sikasso -- in the Fourth Education Consolidation Project. Moreover, the consultant responsible for assessing the impacts of In-Service Training and Distribution of School Books was able in the individual meetings to gather the opinions and needs relative to these two Project components.

The method used was the fourth generation evaluation method, which entails basically giving the floor to the people interested, without expressing judgments during the interviews. It was sometimes felt necessary to reiterate opinions heard elsewhere to the participants simply by naming the agencies where these opinions originated and not the individuals. The transcription of the responses, brought by the participants, allowed the team to attest to the concordance or divergence of the expressed opinions after the fact. Contradictory facts led the same individuals or some of their colleagues to meet a second time to make the necessary corrections. Statistical data and the reports on fundamental education and literacy in Mali (written up from May to August 1993 by UNESCO) were available for consultation to complete and sometimes verify the facts quoted by the people interviewed.

The meetings to do the synthesis organized by the team of the six consultants, gave them the opportunity to clarify the concepts and observations related to the various components of the Project, and in particular to clarify the existing articulations between the components. The consultation of the documents published by the Project and describing its various facets and developments since 1989 enabled the team to learn about the objectives of the methods and results reached as they were being realized. This literature gave the team the possibility of situating strategically various Project components and of assessing the ambitions and the variety of initiatives employed. This information, given prior to the meetings, facilitated the interviews of the officials of the various components, in particular of Mr. Bernard Gagné, BEEP's technical advisor, and his Malian colleague, Mr. Ario Maiga, overseer/manager for the In-Service Training

component. The exchanges flowed easily and dealt with the publication of the training modules and the concrete understanding of their conceptualization and implementation. On two occasions, when assisting with retraining sessions given to the regional directors, the evaluator of this component was able to observe by himself the implementation of an important stage of the in-service training.

The relationship between the opinions and needs expressed by the Malian partners and USAID officials will be able to clarify which immediate or future initiatives would be likely to lead the overall in-service training actions and distribution of school textbooks to its goal.

2. Objectives of the In-Service Training and the Distribution of School Books Components

A determination of the improvement in the quality of the teaching in the first cycle of the fundamental education of the component due to the in-service training and the distribution of school books (the main objective of the component) necessitated the assessment of the efficiency of these actions, and in particular:

- the overall efficiency of the in-service training actions;
- the impact of the in-service training on the teacher's behavior in his or her classroom;
- the improvement of the school management capability (in particular for the principals);
- the integration of the results of the monitoring and evaluation in the in-service training programs;
- the impact of the retraining activities on the accommodation of school curriculum;
- the impact of the retraining activities on the evaluation procedures of the student performances; and
- the current or anticipated steps to ensure the institutionalization and sustainability of the retraining activities.

These questions identify a series of concepts which clearly reveal the effects of the component: (i) the knowledge of the goals to be reached; (ii) the expectations and hopes concerning the current Project; (iii) the feasibility; (iv) the availability; (v) the quality; (vi) the efficacy; and (vii) the future and long-term needs. These concepts applied to the various levels of decision-making described earlier, cover the matrix of the areas of investigation anticipated in the terms of reference of the evaluation mission (see Annex D).

The clear objectives of this component are clarified as the following in the official documents:

The goal of the training is to boost the professional basic techniques of the elementary school teachers and of the teaching staff of other fields so as to obtain an improved educational system.⁵¹

In Mali, the goal is to change the atmosphere of the classroom, currently characterized by rote learning, a paucity of teaching material and strict discipline, and to replace it with another atmosphere where learning is an active process which makes use of more material and flexibility through its teaching method.⁵²

The Malian agencies involved in the In-Service Training are the following:

- Departmental Staff of the Ministry of Basic Education
- National Directorate of Fundamental Education
- National Institute of Pedagogy

⁵¹

-- Excerpt from the first clause of the Basic Education Expansion Project 688-0257; p. 11.

⁵²

-- *ibid.*: p. 13.

- Regional Bureaus (4) of Education
- Inspectorate of Fundamental Education
- Bamako Adult Education Center

The beneficiaries are the school principals and the appointed teachers.

3. Strategy Developed for the In-Service Training

As anticipated in Annex 1 (clause III.C.1) of the BEEP's financial agreement (August 30, 1989), the in-service training of the teachers

constitutes the heart of the Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP). . . Located at the Institute of National Pedagogy, the In-Service Training Center, known as the In-Service Training Center (CFC), is the central nervous center of the component. . . Established in May 1990, the Center first completed an analysis of the needs in training, assisted by the Monitoring and Evaluation component. . . Being three-tiered, the In-Service Training component developed a sequential in-service training, including inspectors and pedagogical advisors, elementary school principals and teachers. . . Based on the In-Service Training Center and supported by the USAID initiative, this component has the ambition to establish regional units in Ségou, Sikasso, and Koulikoro as part of the Regional Pedagogical Centers (CPR). . .⁵³

As early as 1990, the IPN restructured its "Teacher Training" division and located it in the buildings of the Inspectorate of the training schools. This was to ensure the missions of the Center of In-Service Training, which have been under the direction of the head of the division/division head (since 1992), Boubacar Gaye and M. Maiga, the latter being assisted by a USAID expert (M. Gagné). This first module was able to implement the anticipated activities for the center. The Regional Pedagogical Centers (CPRs) have not yet been operational, however, although the "cascade" approach used for the in-service training has been in operation since 1991. Nonetheless, the Project of decentralization of the in-service training is performed at the level of each Inspectorate of Fundamental Education with the direct participation of the Regional Bureau of Education, and should be operational some time in the year 1994.

The composition of teams of facilitators at each inspectorate level has been anticipated in the USAID Project introduced by M. Gagné (detailed 1993 budget) for September 1993. Each of these teams at the inspectorate level should include the head of Training Division of the DRE, the inspector, four pedagogical counselors, and ten well-seasoned and trained teachers. The conception and implementation of the training modules could remain under the auspices of the Center of In-Service Training; the decentralized in-service training would be performed by the officers of the DREs, the inspectors, and the pedagogical counselors. The training could be disseminated within each inspectorate. It could involve all the appointed teachers.

The training modules get established as more urgent needs are felt in the field. A module is first designed by the team of the In-Service Training Center, which included three participants in 1990, nine in 1991, thirty in 1992, and forty-two in 1993. The designed and printed module is then "reviewed" and discussed at the In-Service Training Center by the regional directors, the inspectors, and the pedagogical counselors. Once amended and edited, it is distributed throughout the Inspectorates, who organize a "cascade" training of the teachers and principals to complete the training administered by the Center itself.

There are currently eleven operational modules (see Annex E), gathered in a 75-page printed document which is ready for distribution.

⁵³

- Excerpt from the first clause of the Basic Education Expansion Project 688-0257; p. 10-12.

1. Operational Pedagogical Objectives	4 pages
2. Areas and Level of Pedagogical Objectives	5 pages
3. Interpersonal Relationships in the Classrooms	13 pages
4. Assessment of Scholastic Learning	5 pages
5. Language through Dialogue	5 pages
6. Pedagogy of Larger Groups	6 pages
7. Classroom Interactions	11 pages
8. Reading -- Writing	5 pages
9. Arithmetic Workshop	4 pages
10. Establishment of a propitious school environment	5 pages
11. Methodology of a Model Lesson	12 pages

There is also now a completed "School Property" document, formerly called "Vademecum", for the management of the school materials, equipment and infrastructure.

MODULES DEVELOPED			
1990	1991	1992	1993
* OPO	* OPO	* OPO - applied to reading/language/ arithmetic classes	* Use of books reading/language in the first year
* Standard Form	* Interactions	* Interactions	* Arithmetic
* Establishment of propitious school environment.	* Large Numbers/ Double division Classes	* Large groups Pedagogy	* Self-assessment
* Creation of "Vademecum"	* Vademecum	* Teaching Materials	* Management tools: School property, statistics reports.
* Assessment Inspectorates/Pedagogical advisors/School principals	* Assessment	* FAEF	

In the table above, provided by the technical advisor of the component, the modules were applied according to the assigned calendar. Also in 1990, the team illustrated each point of the official program of the first cycle of the fundamental education by at least two operational objectives, which made clear a student's performance observed in class, and which could indicate learning acquisition, apprenticeship or attitudes. 2,000 copies of this printed program were distributed in 1991, thus making it available, in at least one copy, to each school involved in the Project.

The in-service training given at the Center of Professional Training in Bamako and the cascade training which followed are illustrated in the following list of seminars or workshops lasting from 5 to 15 days. Five modules were conceived in 1993 and presented in August of that year by the trainers of the Center of Professional Training, the DREs and the Inspectorates of Fundamental Education (IEF). They are:

1. The school property (formerly called "vademecum;")
2. Language through dialogue (use of new book by Hatier Publishers);
3. Arithmetic 1993 (analysis and application of arithmetic program of first and second year);
4. Reading/Writing (use of new book by Hatier Publishers); and
5. Self-assessment form of the lesson by the teacher.

In-Service Training Provided				
	1990	1991	1992	1993
In-Service Training Center of Bamako (DRE, IEF, Pedagogical advisors)	124	145	144	175
IEF Cascade				
Directors	400	552	1036	1255*
Teachers	700	2460	1929	2675*
Total	1224	3157	3109	4105

Sixteen available modules are anticipated for 1994.

The monitoring and evaluation performed by the trainers themselves included observations of 36 schools and 108 teachers in 1990, 87 schools and 168 teachers in 1991, 126 schools, 252 teachers and 64 directors in 1992. The (unpublished) results do not show the inventory of the new teaching behaviors, but by comparing them with the observation of teachers from other regions, Mr. Gagné reckons that there is a difference in the teachers' competence.

In 1990 and 1991, the teachers of the first and second grades had been trained in the new methods. In 1992, the component officers, together with the other technicians and decision-makers of BEEP and the Ministry, considered that it would be more efficacious and efficient to focus on the teacher training of first and second year. For it is at that level that the basis of learning is established for each child for his or her entire school career. Even with this concentration of efforts by the component, the monitoring and evaluation performed at the end of 1992 by the trainers showed that, unfortunately, most trained teachers had been transferred to upper classes. Instead, the first and second grade classes had been given to some recently recruited provisional teachers.

This finding had the effect of dampening the trainers' enthusiasm. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that 12 radio programs were produced in 1991 and 12 others in 1992; the teaching materials were put by three designers working at the center since 1992.

Finally, the Center of Professional Training carried out the distribution of 148,396 textbooks in 1991 and 313,500 textbooks in 1992. They covered many different grade levels and subjects. These books were available at the IPN. A lack of funds had prevented their distribution until then.

BEEP's assistance in in-service training has been conceptualized around six central themes:

1. Cumulative Knowledge and *savoir-faire* are added when judged necessary.
2. Concerted Consensus and experimentation guide the main regional officials regarding the contents.
3. Organized The beneficiaries -- teachers and principals -- are trained by the Inspectorates of Fundamental Education (IEF) and especially by the pedagogical advisors using a "cascade" approach.
4. Practical Based on the teachers and student's activities
5. Massive Has already involved more than 7,000 individuals and should reach 11,000 by the end of 1993.

6. **Unevenly** **Individual teachers have benefited from zero, five, seven, or eleven modules distributed**

4. **Key Questions**

The following questions were asked as a complement to the spontaneous interventions for the evaluation of the scope of the component:

A. **Regarding the In-Service Training**

1. Are you familiar with the teachers' in-service training organized by the IPN and the USAID assistance? (awareness of the objectives)
2. Are the in-service training actions sufficient? (expectation level/immediate wishes)
3. Have the teachers had access to the training modules? (operability/accessibility)
4. Are the trained teachers satisfied? What are the most useful modules? (quality)
5. Did the students benefit from these in-service training actions? Did the trained teachers change their teaching methodology as a result? (efficacy)
6. What do you believe should be done in the future for the improvement of this Project component? (future needs and sustainability)

B. **Regarding the distribution of school textbooks and teachers' guides/didactic material**

1. Are you familiar with the USAID distribution of school books to the students of the first cycle of the fundamental cycle? (awareness of the objectives)
2. Were the teachers' manuals and the student textbooks useful? (level of expectation/immediate wishes)
3. Were the kits and the textbooks distributed throughout all the schools? (operability)
4. Were the students given the textbooks? (accessibility)
5. Are the textbooks now in storage? And in what state? (quality)
6. Did the students receive the book titled Reading and Language (*Lecture and Language*) in Le Flamboyant series? (efficacy)
7. Which textbooks will still be useful? What should be done in the future? (future needs, sustainability)

5. **Identification and attribution of appreciations regarding the implementation of the In-Service Training and the Distribution of School Books**

In-Service Training

Following the fourth generation evaluation methodology, the appreciation of the formulation of the various implementors and beneficiaries are presented separately.

At the In-Service Training Center

The In-Service Training Center is regarded by its officials as a really important tool for the Ministry of Basic Education to improve significantly fundamental education. They are hoping for a generalized in-service training and especially its inclusion in the university network where the teachers' trainers are being trained. The efficiency of the In-Service Training Center seems to them to be affected by the administrative loads and changes this year in the attribution of per diems. However, for the three years that the center has been in operation, the officials have the feeling that a number of things have been realized. The training accessibility seems an important achievement as is shown by the figures (more than 7,000 teachers reached).

Regarding the quality of the training, the positive aspect stems from the fact that the trainers are experienced and trustworthy in the eyes of their former colleagues. The negative aspect expressed was that the trainers were still lacking in training techniques appropriate for adults.

Regarding efficiency, the officials of the In-Service Training Center reckon that the center is the only existing cell for the trainers' retraining. After conducting a (non-published) monitoring and evaluation, the Center discovered an active implementation of the new didactic behaviors in the classrooms. Much to their regret, the observers noted that the teachers trained for the first and second year had been appointed to other classes.

A better coordination among the Project's components was one of the needs expressed for the future. The Center officials also hope to be able to follow a "logical" calendar: the module preparation will have to be completed before the month of May and the in-service training to be done during the vacation months.

The collaboration among international experts in in-service training would be welcomed as well as the actualization of the library documentation. Furthermore, scholarships for foreign study for the center trainers could allow for a more complete preparation.

The Center officials would like the World Bank and USAID to reach an agreement so that they can proceed with the installations operations of the center. They have a plan which was already submitted to the various authorities.

Finally, they would like some logistics for the management and implementation of the modules.

According to the regional directors, the inspectors, and the pedagogical counselors of the regions of Bamako, Koulikoro, Ségou, and Sikasso

Because of their on-site participation and implementation, the regional directors and the inspectors are perfectly aware of the objectives set by the in-service training modules. Their immediate hopes are to reinforce the in-service training for the first and second year, to generalize the retraining, and to set up Regional Training Centers.

It appears to them that the current training, which uses a cascade approach, has worked well. As to its accessibility, several feel that too few teachers were retrained. For example, in the Sikasso region, a good proportion of them did not get the appropriate retraining for teaching arithmetic.

The quality of the modules was recognized by all as depending on the school management, the OPOs and the lesson plan. In one inspection, it was estimated that 30 to 60 per cent of the teachers are now using the OPOs. In another, it was estimated at 80 per cent. Generally, all seem to be in agreement about the improvement of the quality of the teaching. More and more teachers use the active methods prescribed. Furthermore, according to some, the students' achievements were more numerous. For example, they went from 70 to 80 per cent by the end of the first cycle in the Koulikoro region. Progress was noted within the first year in the Ségou region.

The in-service training set up during the school year poses organizational problems. According to a regional director, some pedagogical advisors were not able to acquire the teacher training competence required due to the short amount of training time allowed, especially in the active techniques for adults. It is concluded that caution is necessary in this area if the cascade training approach is not to suffer.

According to one other director, more teachers should be made available to avoid the double appointment for one teacher. Because of structural adjustments, substitutes need to be recruited, who are not familiar with the new methods. It should be possible to break this "vicious cycle."

As far as the future needs and sustainability are concerned, many regretted that the initial training was not included. For some, the teachers should really be more apt to adapt the appropriate techniques and processes to the objectives that they have set for themselves. Therefore, "in-depth" changes would need to happen.⁵⁴

According to the School Principals and Teachers in the regions of Bamako, Koulikoro, Ségou, and Sikasso

The principals and teachers contacted are well aware of the in-service training objectives and wish them to be generalized. They generally share the observations expressed by their superiors. Of the specific observations which attracted the attention of the evaluators, the following have been retained:

- In Ségou, there is a wish for training in the instruction of the Bambara language to be taught in the forty pilot classes by teachers in need of this training.
- In one school, the training of the principal and of one of the two teachers in the first year was judged insufficient.
- One teacher uses the "labels" in arithmetic, a didactic tool discovered at a teachers' retraining session, and is very satisfied with the response of the class.
- Several regret that the OPOs anticipated in the programs are not always "feasible."⁵⁵

Distribution of Textbooks and Instructional Material

According to the officials and beneficiaries

⁵⁴ -- The initial training is quite concerned, as a matter of fact. Indeed, all the teachers of fundamental education were trained with teaching by objectives. The vocational school teachers (schools annexed to the IPÉG) were trained in the same manner to allow the student-teachers during their training to have access to the pedagogical innovations in Fundamental Education." (remarks by M'Bo BA, Regional Director of Education, Sikasso)

⁵⁵ -- "And yet the OPOs are formulated with the context in mind: student-teacher milieu, teacher experience, etc." (remarks by the Ministry of Basic Education)

Almost unanimous observations were made in the four regions. Both regional directors and teachers have a good knowledge of the pursued objectives. Each expressed the wish for school books and equipment for all students. The distribution procedure of the reading/language books (*Le Flamboyant*) was criticized for several reasons:

- The teacher's guide, which consisted of gradual learning acquisition, was not distributed;
- The language textbooks arrived in February, while the first language acquisition takes place at the beginning of the school year for the first year; and
- the teaching posters arrived late.

The availability of the textbooks was postponed because some inspectors and directors preferred to wait for their distribution.

The quality of the textbooks was questioned because of their weak binding and their little relevance in the rural areas.⁵⁶ Already some teachers, who had left the books in the hands of the students found some of them in a terrible state ("rags!"). Regarding the efficacy of the distribution, many regretted that, in many cases, the number of books was too low, at times with a ratio of one book for three students.

Regarding future needs and sustainability, a defined book policy is desirable and in-service training should precede textbook distribution.⁵⁷ The cost exemption of the books was questioned. The Regional Bureaus of Education (DRE) and the Inspectorates of Fundamental Education (IEF) wished they had been included in the book distribution. They added that they wished there were more creative books more adapted to the development of the student's imagination and creativity. The distribution of textbooks for arithmetic does not take into account the program changes of 1992, which contain new topics.

6. Synthesis of the Collected Information

Successes, encouraging factors for the In-Service Training: common perspectives

- **Common knowledge of objective attainment** -- All participants are well aware of the In-Service Training component and specify its practical orientation.
- **Unanimous wish for generalization, stabilization, and decentralization of the In-Service Training** -- The new concepts are useful but time is needed for all teachers to become acquainted and experienced.

⁵⁶ -- " This assertion cannot be taken lightly. It is too easy to destroy. Nobody bothered to ask whether the "terrible state" of the textbooks is a question of resistance or maintenance. Were the said textbooks compared with other textbooks? If so, which ones?" (remarks of the Ministry of Basic Education)

⁵⁷ -- "The evaluation gives the impression that the World Bank did not fulfill its obligation to finance textbooks, which is misleading. The World Bank consistently demonstrated its willingness to finance textbooks as soon as a textbook policy acceptable to both the Government and the World Bank was put into effect. (This is shown in the World Bank's agreement to finance 400,000 textbooks within one month of accepting the Government's proposed textbook policy.) On three separate occasions, the World Bank financed technical assistants to help the IPN draft such a policy, and each time, their suggestions were not incorporated. Lacking such a policy, particularly pertaining to authorship of manuscripts, printing, and cost recovery, the World Bank believed that textbook financing was unsustainable and therefore unjustified. The evaluators imply the World Bank was mistaken in this, but later argue that a systematic approach in the development and execution of the textbook component was required. . ." (remarks of Sam Carlson, Human Resources Economist, World Bank/Mali)

- **The usefulness of the Center of In-Service Training is unanimously recognized --** As the only place for the conception of a pedagogical renewal in in-service training, the Center of In-Service Training is thought to have a primary role to play presently and in the future for the promotion of quality education.
- **The efficacy is recognized with the technique of the OPOs and the management of the school property --** The technique which uses the operational objectives has truly brought about changes in the teachers' behavior and the efficacy of their teaching methodology, particularly in the first year.
- **The improvement of lessons plans has been observed with all the teachers trained by the component --** the inspectors, together with the employees of Monitoring and Evaluation, found the classrooms targeted by the Project, had adopted the OPOs, not only in the planning but also in the presentation of the lessons in class.

Successes, encouraging factors for the In-Service Training: divergent perspectives

- **Insufficient availability --** the cascade training has not been functioning smoothly everywhere and the actual productivity and number of teachers actually trained by the component and is actually lower than anticipated.
- **The lack of teaching material has led some teachers to revert to former methods --** Maybe a sign of resistance to change or a lack of teaching material, the reversion to traditional teaching methods has been observed in some places.
- **School achievements do not depend solely on the improvement of the teaching method --** School achievements are sometimes linked to the availability of classrooms for the next grade. Overall, however, the improvement of the teaching method has been regarded as facilitating the number of achievements and diminishing the percentage of doubling of classes.
- **Change of classroom atmosphere is not general --** Despite the achievements mentioned in this case, some believe deeper changes are rarely seen.
- **Efficacy is not pertinent to general modules --** Out of the eleven operational modules that were in operation in 1992, those concerning the pedagogy of the larger groups, the interpersonal relationships in the classrooms, and the assessment of learning have not been quoted or been the object of convincing observations.
- **Efficacy of the modules concerning the new books is deemed important and necessary --** Several officials have depended on the In-Service Training to assist them master the new books, anticipated or already distributed in language and reading, and arithmetic.

Problems, limitations, failures for the In-Service Training: common perspectives

- **Wish for inclusion of initial training --** The teachers that graduated from the teachers' training schools did not receive a practical training similar to the in-service training; they also do not use the same teaching concepts.
- **The number of teachers trained by the component remains insufficient --** The third through sixth grade teachers should be trained as soon as possible. Only the first and second grade teachers are present in significant numbers.

- **The cascade training should be replaced by regional training centers -- The cascade training is doomed because it is unfeasible during the school year and also because the newly trained (pedagogical advisors and directors) had not gained the trainers' skills in the few days that were reserved for that purpose.**

Problems, limitations, failures for the In-Service Training: divergent or isolated perspectives⁵⁸

- **The Center of Professional Training has not benefited from construction and renovations, and materials necessary for its smooth functioning -- Though included in the general program, the outfitting of the locales and the distribution of material have not yet been realized.**
- **The reduction of per diem will dampen teacher's enthusiasm for in-service training -- Although some feel that in-service training is an integral part of the teaching duty, others think that the reduction of per diem will have negative consequences.**
- **Wish for training on the part of the trainers of trainers -- The Conceptualization Cell of the Center of In-Service Training has expressed needs in specialized books, scholarships for foreign study, and the visits of international specialists for actualizing and improving their skills in adult training and teaching methodologies.**
- **The use of national languages in teaching has been neglected -- The need to train teachers in this area is judged important in the Ségou region.**
- **The double session school day raises many questions -- Several times cited as a palliative measure for the lack of teachers and/or buildings, the double session has not been sufficiently approached in the in-service training.**

Successes, encouraging factors for the distribution of textbooks and teaching material: common perspectives

- **Common knowledge of objective attainment -- All participants are well aware of this component of the Project.**
- **Unanimous wish for availability of textbooks for students of all classes.**

Successes, encouraging factors for the Distribution of Textbooks and Teaching Material: divergent perspectives

- **The distribution of textbooks in 1991 and 1992 seems to have gone unnoticed -- Focused on the expected new reading/language and arithmetic textbooks, few mentioned the books that had been published by the National Institute of Pedagogy (all subjects), provided with USAID help in 1990 and 1991 (460,000 books).**

⁵⁸ -- "Problems and limitations in the distribution of textbooks. The lack of coordination which has been observed but not pointed out between the National Institute of Pedagogy (IPN), agency for the conception and the publication of the textbooks, and the National Bureau of the Fundamental Education (DNEF), responsible for the use of the textbooks, made the implementation of an efficient and consistent book policy difficult." (remarks of Boubacar Gaye, Head of Training Division, National Institute of Pedagogy, IPN)

- **The distribution of kits was not widespread -- Appreciated in the Koulikoro region, the kits are apparently unknown in the other regions.**
- **The first, second, and third-grade students received the Language and Reading textbook (*Language et lecture*, published by Hatier) -- Opinions vary regarding the ratio of one book per student (one book for one to three students). In some regions, like Bamako apparently, the numbers were far superior in 1993 to those of 1992, year on which the orders were based. In the Sikasso region, certain schools recruit once every other year only. The data of 1992 were not always reliable for the distribution in 1993.**

Problems, limitations, failures for the Distribution of Textbooks and Teaching Material: common perspectives

- **The Language/Reading textbooks are not considered very sturdy -- All participants who gave the textbooks to the students were returned to them in poor state at the end of the school year.**
- **The Regional Bureaus of Education (DRE) and the Inspectorates of Fundamental Education did not receive the "Reading and Language" textbooks -- Apparently the officials were not included in the distribution of textbooks.**
- **Delayed arrival of the textbooks for their use in the curriculum -- The first year is devoted to language acquisition. The books came only in February.**
- **The teacher's guides never came -- Without the teacher's guide, the teachers were not able to use the idioms and sentences needed in conjunction with the images from the textbooks.**
- **The teaching aides for hanging came late -- The distribution of textbooks and that of the teaching poster were several months apart.**

Problems, limitations, failures for the Distribution of Textbooks and Teaching Material: divergent perspectives

- **The delay of the supplies postponed the use of the school books -- Expecting the teacher's guide and the teaching posters, some inspectors and teachers kept the textbooks aside.**
- **Topics relating to stimulating students' imagination and creativity (cognitive and psycho-motor development) are not included in the textbook distribution -- Only language/reading and arithmetic are currently quoted.**
- **Schools using national languages do not have books written in Bambara -- Particularly in the Ségou region, the pilot schools bitterly complain about not having books for reading.**
- **Request for a book policy -- The recent unpleasantness experienced lead some to request a debate on this topic.**
- **The appreciations for the didactic qualities of the "Reading and Language" textbook are mixed -- Opinions differ but criticism is directed at the "global" method and too rapid a progression.**

7. Next Stages

In-Service Training

Knowledge of the Component Objectives -- Assuredly, both officials and beneficiaries have a good knowledge of the clear objectives of the component. Unfortunately teachers could not be interviewed separately from their superiors. It seems that, apart from a minority of more autonomous teachers who have already received further training, the others remain attached to a form of didactic servility to the Ministry's directions passed on to them through the ministerial officials. The desire to endow the teachers with various teaching techniques was observed during the interventions heard at the in-service training conference during the month of August 1993. More conservative trends were also expressed. These debates witness a promising dialectic process. A subsequent stage is maybe to identify which initiatives will actually be left to the teachers under the form of a consensus.

Levels of expectation and immediate hopes -- The relative failure of the cascade in-service training and the hopes expressed for widespread regionalization show that it would be useful to:

1. Set up the Center of In-Service Training at the level of each region;
2. Outfit the Centers of In-Service Training like the units at the National Institute of Pedagogy to work jointly with each training division of the regional bureaus involved;
3. Appoint to these Centers of In-Service Training the pedagogical advisors to facilitate the training seminars. The pedagogical advisors responsible for the in-service training should no longer be involved in the assessment of teachers. The assessments should be the responsibility of the Inspectorates; and
4. Slow down the kind of training regarding general teaching methods to allow enough time for teachers to absorb them.

Operation - Regarding the component organization and operation, three actions are suggested.

1. The administrative and financial difficulties (e.g. the per diem policy) experienced at the time the in-service training was organized could be resolved by a solution which would guarantee equity in compensation between the trainers and the beneficiaries of the training.
2. The Center of In-Service Training and the Regional Centers of In-Service Training should be able to benefit from an autonomous budget, which would give them the necessary means of transportation and production of teaching materials to perform mobile training in various areas.
3. The Center of In-Service Training should be able to benefit from foreign universities' input regarding general, linguistic, and scientific teaching methodologies.

Accessibility -- It seems that the directors and a part of the first and second grade teachers have been familiarized with the eleven modules; nevertheless, many teachers do not know about them and still others have received only partial training. Teachers' involvement from the third to the sixth grade is desirable; they could subsequently be given the knowledge and know-how about the modules of general teaching methodology. Priority should be given to the in-service training of the first and second grade teachers to familiarize them to various practical uses of the reading/language

textbooks (which have already been distributed), and of the arithmetic textbooks (whose distribution is imminent).

Quality of In-Service Training -- Despite the scant information directly obtained about in-service training, several overlapping opinions seem to infer that:

1. the teacher trainers should be specialized and "professionalized;" and
2. before entrusting trainers with the training of their colleagues, one should make sure that their training is adequate.

Efficiency -- It has not been easy to assess the training level of the so-called "trained" teachers, who have apparently been enrolled or taken one or several modules from five to fifteen days. A subsequent stage ought to be the gathering of all modules -- teaching general methodology, languages, science/mathematics and school administration -- and transforming them into four chapters. At the end of the training, each of these chapters would be able to assess the level of knowledge and know-how of the trainees. A certificate could be issued to those with passing a mark on a final test.

The evaluators of Monitoring and Evaluation thus ought to be able to distinguish the various levels of training when comparing the teachers' teaching capabilities with the students' performance. Also, if they are assessing the management of the school they are visiting, they will be able to determine whether the director has been well prepared to ensure the security of the institution's property.

The statistical indicators to be derived from the effect of the in-service training need reexamination. The flow of enrollment, the achievements and repetition of classes are subjected to multiple factors, such as the availability of teachers and places, the dual sessions approach, the presence of school equipment, etc... Only an experimental study, fully cognizant of these factors, will lead to reliable conclusions. Before the monumental and difficult task of carrying out studies of the whole country, it would be possible to study in detail the repercussions of the in-service training in some selected schools regularly assessed over time.

Future Needs and Sustainability -- A Center of In-Service Training that is well-equipped for the efficient dissemination of information and operational training will be a sure gauge of success for the permanent improvement of fundamental education. The Regional Centers of In-Service Training modeled on them ought to keep up teachers' enthusiasm in the field.

Since the goal is to enable teachers to devise for themselves the operational objectives of their lessons and the more pertinent teaching processes so as to help the students master the expected program, the expected students' results will have to be available in that sense. The stage which consisted of anticipating two operational objectives per program subject will not have been useless. But it should leave room for a situation where, from general program objectives, teachers will consistently manage their operational objectives and teaching processes in conjunction with the intellectual, social, and emotional characteristics of his or her class.

The institutionalization of the In-Service Training component is well under way since the Center of In-Service Training is an official mission of the National Institute of Pedagogy (IPN) and has been successfully set up (though still in need of some improvement). As to the Regional Centers of In-Service Training, they are to be set up and become operational very soon with the ready use of the 16 modules that were established at the Center of In-Service Training.

Supplying Textbooks

Knowledge of the Attainment of the Objectives -- Now that all participants interviewed are well aware of the Project's intentions, it is undoubtedly necessary to sensitize parents and students to the value of the books and their preservation. The policy of cost exemption could also be subject to reexamination.

Level of Expectation -- The purchase of published books ought to meet part of the needs; adequate equipment at the National Institute of Pedagogy (IPN) ought to perform duplication and maintenance on location thereby easing the cost of numerous requests, e.g. the teaching of national languages.

Operation -- The division of fundamental education at the Regional Bureau of Education (DRE) would no doubt be able to shoulder responsibility for the distribution of textbooks and teaching materials through the Inspectorates of Fundamental Education (IEF), who are the most informed about school sizes.

Accessibility -- In order to keep costs down, it is imperative that the books be preserved for several years. The principle of cost exemption should be reexamined.

Quality -- Ill-regulated distribution should be avoided, e.g. the distribution of the students' textbooks without the teacher's guides.

Efficacy -- The supplying of the new textbooks should be monitored by the Regional Bureaus of Education (DRE), under three preliminary conditions: (i) teachers are to be trained for their use; (ii) places and products are needed for their storage and maintenance; and (iii) timely delivery is a must.

Future Needs and Sustainability -- The needs for textbooks and teaching materials will diminish with the promotion of quality education and educational programs adjusted for a greater number of students. The cost-free provision of textbooks by USAID is an understandable palliative in a difficult situation, but cannot be considered as a long-term solution. The National Institute of Pedagogy (IPN) and the Regional Bureau of Education (DRE) ought to be endowed with reproduction and printing equipment in working order, *with a maintenance contract*. Modern equipment requires little manpower and could rapidly be paid off, considering how important the needs are.

A book policy ought to be discussed within the scope of decentralization and the APEs involved in the management of a "school library" necessary for any school deemed to be operational.

8. Conclusion

The choice in the training modules should imply a greater involvement for the Monitoring and Evaluation component, so that it can be seen how an external evaluation can gather useful information for the improvement of the overall system. The monitoring and evaluation performed by the trainers of the In-Service Training Center is not useless, but constitutes a monitoring rather than an evaluation, except when the trainers make the observation that teachers who had been specially trained for the first or second year were assigned to teach the upper classes. This latter observation cannot be generalized only in an evaluation procedure, which integrates the various action constituents with a systemic point of view. For example, the notion of "complete school," such as was defined in a seminar organized upon the initiative of the Koulikoro region represents an interesting orientation to integrating the notion of "teacher trained" to the other constituents of the Project.

F. Monitoring and Evaluation

1. Evaluation of the Component

Two key questions, framed with BEEP's terms of reference, fundamentally guided the task of the monitoring and evaluation specialist:

1. Is the Monitoring and Evaluation component introducing relevant information which contributes to the development of other BEEP components?
2. What steps have been taken and what progress has been realized to ensure the institutionalization of the Monitoring and Evaluation component within the Ministry of Basic Education?

To elucidate these questions, the evaluator's task consisted of focusing on the following elements associated with the implementation of the component: (i) the official program, including the objectives and the strategies; (ii) direct contacts with the users; (iii) the implementation of the program; (iv) the application of the results of the undertaken studies; and (v) the self-evaluation and the evaluation of the other partners in BEEP's activities.

Adhering to the "fourth-generation" evaluation methodology, the evaluation team concentrated its efforts on putting together the component implementors with the potential users in group situations. Such a forum only took place once, when a discussion was organized by gathering the Malian officials of the component with their colleagues from other divisions of the National Institute of Pedagogy and the Bamako Regional Bureau of Education. BEEP's technical partners were also interviewed, i.e. the technical advisors and their Malian colleagues, and they presented and discussed the various elements of the Project in one of the formal monthly meetings.

Unfortunately additional contacts between the executives and beneficiaries of the Monitoring and Evaluation component could not be arranged. It would have been especially useful to set up such a dialogue between the users at the Regional Bureaus and the Inspectorates of Education. A discussion, comparing the diverse perspectives, as they turned out to be in the separate discussions, would certainly have been most fruitful, given that the regionalization, or decentralization, of the Monitoring and Evaluation activities is one of the Project's main objectives. Instead, in this case, the evaluator had to make do with presenting the observations and opinions of one partner to another while noting the various reactions and responses. It is important that this kind of exchange take place so that a consensual perspective be reached; unfortunately, the present evaluation was not able to do so.

2. Specific Objectives

According to the BEEP's official agreement, the *main objective* of the Monitoring and Evaluation component is to "monitor and evaluate the work in the classrooms so as to determine and demonstrate the impact of the various changes made in the system" (§ III.C.3). In other words, the component has to inform the Project on its performance. The Malian employees belonging to the Monitoring and Evaluation component are responsible for observing and measuring the level of efficiency and impact of the other Project interventions on the educational system in the regions covered by the Project. Does each component contribute to reaching BEEP's fundamental goals, such as improved internal performance and improved quality in the teaching? What is their respective contribution? Then, it is deemed necessary to engage the various components of the Project in a permanent on-going dialogue in order to identify the weaknesses in their strategies and to find ways to strengthen them. When speaking with the implementors of this component, it is evident that they see their work for the Project in this perspective.

On the other hand, the *official goal* for this component, as it is presented in Annex 1, "Detailed Description of the Project," of BEEP's initial agreement, states more general goals: "The goal of this Project's component is not to monitor and evaluate the Project itself but to enable the Ministry to monitor and evaluate the consequences of the various measures on the educational system. (§ III.D.3; PAAD; p. 19) Therefore, BEEP is especially concerned with establishing a system with procedures for permanent monitoring and evaluation at the Ministry. This system will have to be based on the principles of a regular collection and gathering of data and subsequent analyses, to be guided by the routine and provisional needs of the technical and operational services of the Ministry. In that sense, the component activities of the Project serve as a model for the services which the employees involved will have to perform under the permanent agencies of the Ministry. The current strategies of the Monitoring and Evaluation component aimed at the official goal of the Project are much less evident than those aiming at the main objective.

With the first amendment of the Project, USAID added a second objective to that component, which was also added on to the other components: decentralization. The Monitoring and Evaluation component consists of forming teams at each Regional Bureau of Education in order to meet the needs, provisional as well as regular, for the monitoring and evaluation at each regional level.

3. The Organization of the Component

The department that is responsible for implementing the Monitoring and Evaluation component is the Division of Pedagogical Research and Innovations. This division is located at the National Institute of Pedagogy and has been in existence for almost 15 years, originally called Bureau of Studies and Evaluation, as referred to in brief #0049/National Institute of Pedagogy dated July 14, 1979. The aim of the Division of Pedagogical Research and Innovations is to offer support in research and evaluation in the various departments of the Ministry. The current work implemented with USAID financial and technical support is still in keeping with its existing functions. The main difference lies in a greater annual budget assured by USAID to carry out specific on-site research.

In its function for BEEP, the Division of Pedagogical Research and Innovations must answer the needs in research and evaluation of other Project components; in particular, the In-Service Training, the Girls' Schooling, and Community Support. (The activities and the program of the Education Management Information Systems are not listed in the annual evaluation carried out by the Division of Pedagogical Research and Innovations for BEEP.) In order to perform this responsibility, it uses two different strategies: (i) an annual report; (ii) special studies, or technical reports. The annual report (the first one came out in 1991), represents an evaluation of all BEEP's activities, particularly the actual changes made in the classrooms of fundamental education. The Division of Pedagogical Research and Innovations' team meets with the staff of the various components to identify specific criteria for the evaluation. The results of the study enable the technical advisors to assess the efficacy and performance of their efforts. They also allow for strategic adjustments to the interventions for the following year. The other components may also solicit the Division of Pedagogical Research and Innovations to carry out special studies to answer more immediate questions. Sometimes, these other employees work directly with the members of the Monitoring and Evaluation team to bring about these activities.

4. Technical Assistance Strategies

Since August 1990, the group of researchers involved with BEEP has been assisted by a full-time consultant, Dr. Yolande Grandvaux-Miller, hired under the ABEL contract. The role of BEEP's technical assistance program for monitoring and evaluation is essentially three-fold: (i) to increase the technical expertise in monitoring and evaluation of the individual researchers and particularly of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research as a whole; (ii) to foster stronger planning and management techniques in the program implementation of monitoring and evaluation; and (iii)

to ensure that the development of the sector be coupled with monitoring and evaluation. Cultivating a real *esprit de corps* with her direct Malian colleague, Idrissa Diarra, and the other members of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research, the technical advisor's approach consists of the following two strategies: (i) planning seminars and workshops in specialized technical areas; and (ii) setting up training periods and carrying out the component's activities with the team.

The team of Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research already had several technical experts among its employees, whose degrees included Master's (three), Bachelor's (seven), and even PhDs (three). Together with the BEEP advisor, they identified several areas suffering from organizational and technical inadequacies, particularly those of testing and reading, and qualitative research. The Project, with testing as a priority, hired experts from the University of Liège, Belgium, to assist a group of Malian researchers in designing, planning, and launching an evaluation of the second and fifth grade students' learning outcomes in all the regions of the Project. Indeed this consulting served as a type of on-the-job training. Additionally, one of the IPN staff took an intensive course in Liège to improve his skills on the subject. In collaboration with the Improving Educational Quality Project (IEQ), a specialist from the Florida State University led a workshop on classroom observation and qualitative research. The component also conducted special studies of the basic schools, the use of local languages, educational indicators, and the research program in Mali. In this manner, the Project is seeking to extend the expertise of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research, and therefore the usefulness of the Division within the Ministry.

Essentially the approach developed by the technical advisor and the employees of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research involved in the component seeks to be useful to the operational divisions of the Ministry: everything that is being done must affect someone in or some department of the Ministry. The chief contribution of technical assistance thus falls under two categories: technical and communication. With the direct participation of the technical advisor in the component's activities, the team seems to have progressed considerably in the planning and execution of a formal and consistent program of monitoring and evaluation. This is evident in the clear and logical plans and budgets of operation of the annual activity of BEEP's Monitoring and Evaluation. The objectives, tools, schedule, and division of tasks all seem to have been well organized and successfully carried out, given all the constraints in the field, similar to the annual report of monitoring and evaluation, which shows a remarkable level of professionalism, both in its written presentation and in its distribution program.

The "Monitoring and Evaluation Report of the Fourth Project of Basic Education Expansion," annually prepared by the Monitoring and Evaluation component, essentially aims to present a constructive evaluation of BEEP's activities. Education Management Information Systems is the only component which has not yet been listed as an explicit subject in this evaluation. Its objective (whose contributions were mentioned by other components and the evaluators) is to provide some information and an assessment which other components may use to adapt their strategies for better results. Among the corrective actions proposed by this annual report (or by other special studies produced by the employees of Monitoring and Evaluation, such as "SOS Training"), are found: the distribution of textbooks by USAID; focus on first and second grade teachers by in-service training; clarifications in the content of the in-service training program; and formal testing of a sample of students' performance, which will allow (i) the measurement of the Project's direct impact on student learning and (ii) the identification of specific topics of language and mathematics which would warrant particular interventions or corrections. USAID and Ministry officials involved in the Project are now discussing other conclusions and recommendations presented in this report. One recommendation, included in the present evaluation, is the need to find additional possibilities to include in the FAEF component in order to help communities really take charge of their local schools. (*Annual Report*, 1991; pp. 20 & 34)

Another skill that the monitoring and evaluation team seems to have mastered particularly well is their regular communication with other divisions of the Ministry. This is most evident in the subsequent stages anticipated at the time of the publication of the annual report. Other components' employees -- In-Service Training, Community Support, Girls' Schooling -- all agree on their active participation in the design of the annual monitoring and evaluation program. Then the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research would organize a series of informal meetings where the employees involved in other components discuss both the preliminary and final results of the study. The selective participation of the employees of Monitoring and Evaluation would complement both these regular consultations and the other components' activities. It is clear that communication between services is institutionalized and that the purpose of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research is to provide help to the operational divisions of the Ministry. Although this attitude may have previously existed, only now is the reinvigorated Division prepared to adopt it with BEEP's support.

5. Component Implementation and Impact

The component objectives are very clear, -- skills improvement, institutionalization, and regionalization. The strategies for their implementation have been well designed. Nevertheless further study is necessary in order to determine to what extent the various strategies have really contributed to the realization of the objectives. To do so, evaluation team sought answers to four fundamental questions with the various partners involved:

1. What is the technical quality of the research and evaluation conducted by the Monitoring and Evaluation Team?
2. How relevant and interactive are the activities of the Monitoring and Evaluation component to the technical needs of other BEEP components of BEEP and the Ministry?
3. What is the component's contribution to the realization of BEEP objectives: a better internal output; a better quality in the fundamental education; and an administrative and operational decentralization?
4. To what extent have the activities and skills of the Monitoring and Evaluation component been institutionalized at the National Institute of Pedagogy (IPN)?

The BEEP participants' responses are summarized in the following discussion, with remarks and a review by members of the evaluation team:

Technical Quality. Overall, the activities and results of the Monitoring and Evaluation component seem both serious and useful. With quite a striking lack of equipment, especially in computers, the dozen staff of the Division of Research and Pedagogical Innovations who work with BEEP's technical assistance, conducted pertinent studies, with valid scientific basis, and remarkable professional care. The team has sought to enhance the quantitative observations and analyses with qualitative remarks, in order to foster a deeper understanding of the educational phenomena and also to fill some quantitative gaps caused by logistic limitations (in particular, restricted access to schools and computers). The investigation instruments are appropriate for the chosen applications, as they are formulated jointly with the staff of the operational services of the Project to ensure coherence and precision. The component reports are succinct and lucid. Finally, the recommendations presented are based on a fundamental understanding of the topic and its context and are consistent with the concerns of the other components.

This attention to the fundamental issues of the Project is revealed in the substantive reflection brought to the analyses. The researchers of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research do not limit themselves to figures but also examine considerations of several sources. For example, in analyzing the success of the In-Service Training component of the distribution of the OPO strategies, the researchers went further than the teacher's lesson plan to focus on the actual implementation. With the new testing initiative in 1992, the research team wished to verify the impact of the training workshops in the OPOs up to the students' results. (This area has not been sufficiently developed and remains too superficial to draw valid conclusions and recommendations.)

Although the progress in Monitoring and Evaluation is remarkable, several difficulties remain to be identified, which would indicate (i) that the ability to draw firm conclusions to direct the action is always restricted and (ii) that there always remains a considerable need for permanent technical assistance. The first technical problem lies in the possibility of emphasizing the experimental testing in research.⁵⁹ With the current approach, it is very difficult, and almost impossible, to know what is owed to the Project's impact and what comes from independent initiatives or internal factors. For example, by trying to assess quantitatively the impact of the distribution of OPOs by the Project, two variables are targeted: (i) the training, (or cause) and (ii) the application of the technique in teaching, (the effect). As was explained in the preceding chapter, the impact on students' results is also being assessed. Nevertheless, the assessment would remain impressionistic if other influencing factors (internal and external) were not considered, at least as far as the results of the students are concerned.

It would seem that the statistical assessment remained primarily at the level of the testing of hypotheses, and that the application of the assessments of regression are somewhat limited. The assessment of impact of the training in OPO is further complicated: the attempt is to compare the use and the impact of the OPOs between the regions concerned by BEEP and two non-Project regions -- Kayes and Mopti. In the annual report of 1992 (p. 18), it is indicated that over 80 per cent of the teachers in these two regions have been applying the OPO techniques. This phenomenon has two possible explanations, according to the staff of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research. One, teacher transfers between regions is fairly common, and so the presence in other regions of teachers trained by the Project from Bamako, Koulikoro, Ségou, or Sikasso is easy to understand. Two, only the immediate in-service training of the teachers is circumscribed to BEEP's area of intervention; the cascade training -- at least in principle, since the initial training targeted directors and inspectors of all regions -- affects the whole national territory. Given this situation, one must use great caution, when comparing teachers' behavior or students' results, in drawing conclusions about the OPOs, or even about other Project initiatives.

A similar example is the case of female enrollment. The annual report of Monitoring and Evaluation, the figures of Education Management Information System, and sources of the Ministry all show the growing rate of female participation in the fundamental school. Can this be solely attributed to the sensitization efforts of Girls' Schooling? It is not evident that the component's role is that important, considering the positive observations in this area over the last four years, even before the Project's inception. In this case, as for the OPOs and other Project initiatives, rigorous research is required before valid conclusions might be drawn, which could direct future actions. Controlled experiments, more detailed hypotheses, and a more complete strategy will be needed.

⁵⁹ -- "The remarks on experimental testing are justified and the various recommendations will be taken into account by the Monitoring and Evaluation Team. On the other hand, there is little information on school, classroom, and student sampling." (remarks of Idrissa Diarra, Officer of Monitoring and Evaluation, Institute of National Pedagogy)

The problem of large aggregation and stratification levels in the assessments correlates the weakness in experimental control.⁶⁰ For the time being, the field of analysis is vast, i.e. the regions. From a theoretical perspective, this proves insufficient because too much information gets lost when such large statistical groups are constituted. There are characteristics depending on a school, a community, a certain teacher, even an inspectorate which will defy analysis but which can be very significant when explaining school results; e.g. the level of training of the teacher, the native tongue of the students, the quality of the furniture, the composition of the heritage, and the access to pedagogical constituents, among others.

From a practical perspective, this lack of consideration towards potentially circumstantial factors considerably limits the strategic possibilities to answer the observed deficiencies. The operational components of the Project ought to seek how to make a better use of the identified strategies, e.g. the training will continue to improve the distribution of the OPO strategy, but will probably never be directed towards other behaviors by the results of the annual report. For the teacher, the principal, the pedagogical advisor, this level of analysis is still of little use. This group is seeking the most appropriate precision possible so as to bring remedy to specific deficiencies with the school principals and teachers; e.g. a school strong in arithmetic but weak in language, the teachers of one inspectorate trained several times in OPO but very little in school management, one district having special difficulty with absences. Without deepening the analysis at the operational level of these actors, the monitoring and evaluation will only provide too general information.

The design and implementation of the testing strategy has raised other issues.⁶¹ To begin with, the way questions were asked -- multiple choice -- was often a novelty to the Malian students. Several teachers remarked that this unknown way of asking students must have biased the results. The researchers of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research reply that they were very careful about ensuring that the students thoroughly understood the form of the questions. Nevertheless, the issue was raised. Regarding both the form and content of these tests, very little variety appeared in the questions supposedly testing a single skill: the student were asked to identify a sound by "underlining 'pl' in the following sentence." If the students missed the question, did it mean that they could not distinguish the sounds in French, that they do not know the "pl" sound, that they did not understand the question? (According to the researchers, pre-testing could reassure them on the last point.) Without being able to answer definitively this question, the consequent conclusions and rectification strategies are not at all evident. According to the teachers, the conditions in which the tests had been taken this year also increased considerably the risk of biased results. Having to gather, at the end of the year, a number of the activities of Monitoring and Evaluation, the employees of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research often had to administer testing unevenly; the teachers sometimes made the students come from the fields in order to take the tests. At times they wrote under the dim sunset light. One can also wonder if it is statistically necessary to incorporate such a great sample of schools, especially given the logistic constraints. Finally, the usefulness of the testing activity is very limited; without any information about the student -- apart from gender -- and without an assessment which incorporates the school or teacher characteristics -- apart from the application of the OPOs, yes or no?-- the testing results may only serve as a mere description.

⁶⁰ -- "The data analysis on a reduced scale (inspectorate, school, classroom) is quite pertinent and will be expanded by the Monitoring and Evaluation Team within the scope of decentralization." (remarks of Idrissa Diarra, Officer of the Evaluation Team, [IPN])

⁶¹ -- "The results of the various components since the beginning of the project are seldom present in the report. In particular, the report does not say much about the tools of data gathering used by the Monitoring and Evaluation Team. The remarks on school performance testing are quite debatable as well as the explanations given about student performance on these tests. The conditions described for taking the tests are anecdotal and do not correspond to reality." (remarks of Idrissa Diarra, Leader of Evaluation Team, IPN)

This weakness is particularly evident in the lack of consideration of socio-economic factors in the assessment of the Project's activities. Regarding testing, for example, the inferior score of a student may be much more due to the fact that he did not eat that morning, or that she spoke a different language at home from the community than to the teachers' application of the OPOs. The researchers at the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research explained that they were more interested in socio-economic factors, but that the Project constrained them to stay very focused on the Project's immediate and practical concerns. It seems that for the rest, the Project favored more academic or theoretical research. One wonders if a strategy entirely based on school interventions, supposedly to ensure the intellectual, physical, and moral development of a child, is not even more academic?

Another observation was made in the annual report on technical quality. Sometimes there is an informal or scanty use of statistical figures to present an argument or a conclusion. For example, it is not always highlighted which statistical technique is being referred to when the term "correlation" is used. Other times, it seems that the report is referring to "Pearson's R," the test of hypotheses, or still quotients of analysis of regression. The researchers explained that more scientific reports exist in which these distinctions are more formally presented. The use of statistics is limited in the annual report which has a large distribution, it was explained, in order not to confuse the decision-makers. The Project evaluation team was not able to consult these basic documents to determine to what extent this confusion is effectively clarified there.

The use of statistics in the reports of Monitoring and Evaluation presents another problem. Statistical conclusions are sometimes presented in a manner which could guide a decision-maker towards a policy which did not fit the real situation. For example, the final report of "Assessment of Learning French and Mathematics for First and Second Grade Students in the Fundamental Schools" (1992) presents the statistical result that the "student/teacher interactions" had no significant impact on the students' results. Without qualitative precision in the text (p. 47), how is the decision-maker to understand that this result is due to a practically complete absence of valid interactions initiated by the teachers in their classrooms; is this an issue of quality, and not of quantity? The ability to make such a distinction is essential in order to choose between a policy emphasizing assistance to the teachers in this area and a policy which ignores that need. The researchers of the Project are normally capable of addressing these questions thanks to the qualitative data that they have been gathering as a complement to the quantitative collection of data. The incorporation of these nuances in the component's reports would of course be very useful.

The preceding remarks are mostly criticisms which could be found anywhere in a monitoring and evaluation effort, or any other context, North or South. For example, the testing program was conceived in collaboration with the Belgian technical advisors. However, this first national testing initiative is an important initiative for the sector and for the country. In spite of critical remarks, the activity produced a rigorous statistical effort and produced interesting results. Never before had such an approach been undertaken in Mali, which especially should not be undermined by a technical criticism. That the Ministry of Basic Education has already arrived at this level of research and evaluation and that the discussion has reached this technical stage should be considered a very positive development. In short, this technical commentary should serve especially as a guide for the future on-going development of important activities of monitoring and evaluation of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research.

Degree of pertinence and collaboration. The issue of the usefulness of the research realized under the direction of the Project must be raised at two levels: (i) for BEEP's own activities; and (ii) for the more general activities of the Ministry, especially at the level of the regions and the inspectorates. As far as the (theoretical and practical) rapport are concerned between the Monitoring and Evaluation component and the other Project's components, all the staff involved expressed satisfaction. The same cannot be said for the component's relations and influence with colleagues at the Ministry not directly affiliated with BEEP.

Relationships with the In-Service Training component look most solid. The staff of Monitoring and Evaluation and those of In-Service Training are unanimous in their getting along together in their work. The researchers contribute and execute modules in the seminars conducted by the In-Service Training component. They also evaluate these seminars, and others. The staff of In-Service Training contribute to the preparation of the tools of Monitoring and Evaluation for their annual assessment of BEEP. Then they participate in the analysis of the results. The only criticism expressed by the staff of In-Service Training about this collaboration was the wish for more regular and timely feedback from the researchers. The distribution of the final report arrives too late in the work schedule of the In-Service Training to allow the incorporation of the results in the module design. Even the technical brief "SOS Training" arrived after the design of the modules. It was also said that the Monitoring and Evaluation could consider the formal and continued training of the staff of In-Service Training in the design and implementation of the annual program of Monitoring and Evaluation; however, this remark was not expressed by all.

Relations with the Girls' Schooling component are not as close. The Monitoring and Evaluation employees say that they do not really understand the objectives of Girls' Schooling. They have difficulties in knowing what is supposed to be monitored and evaluated: the enrollment, the results, the performance, parents' attitudes, teachers' behavior...? Moreover, Girls' Schooling has its own research program to construct (it has not been entirely designed), although the staff did conduct several investigations locally. Certain elements of that research are incorporated in the Monitoring and Evaluation instruments, with the direct input of the Girls' Schooling component staff, but the issues remain vague and incoherent according to the Monitoring and Evaluation staff. Most staff of Girls' Schooling seem satisfied about their joint work with Monitoring and Evaluation, although they do not expect much from the latter's research. The annual report does not contain much on this component. Nevertheless, the potential for collaboration between the two is very real fruitful, though it does not seem fully developed. (Regarding Monitoring and Evaluation, it may be significant that only one woman is working with the Project team in the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research.)

No assessment came from the staff of the Community Support component on their collaboration with Monitoring and Evaluation. The staff of Monitoring and Evaluation said that they have consulted them as they consult the others for their contribution to the design of the research instruments for the annual report and then for the writing of the final report and the distribution of the results. The particular interest of Monitoring and Evaluation in the activities of this sector of intervention is especially evident in the issues that imply APE involvement in the financing, management, and operations of the schools. Once again, this is especially a descriptive assessment that seems to be given in the annual report. Closer and deeper investigations are deemed necessary to be able to assess the strategies, and not just the impacts, of the Community Support component.

Relations with Education Management Information Systems component are positive, but largely reversed: Monitoring and Evaluation depends on Education Management Information Systems for information, whereas the other components depend on it for information. In fact, the staff of Monitoring and Evaluation take advantage of the technology and computer expertise of that component for the gathering and evaluation of the data. On the other hand, they apparently perform no monitoring or evaluation of the activities of the Education Management Information Systems, e.g. their rapport with the Regional Bureaus and the Inspectorates, their needs for information at the regional level, the command of new forms by the school principals, etc. Although the usefulness of such collaboration was not raised in the discussions with staff of both components, the relevance of these issues was felt in the remarks of the Regional Bureaus and the Inspectorates. The lack of attention to Education Management Information Systems in the final report, given these reactions, could benefit from being reconsidered.

The practical usefulness of Monitoring and Evaluation at the regional level is not obvious. The regional directors and inspectors (we consulted all the directors and inspectors of Sikasso, Ségou, and Koulikoro) generally feel deprived of regular and relevant information. They fill out questionnaires and answer questions, but they say these are not often returned to them. They are sent BEEP's annual report but it seems that it is of little interest to them, given the arguments just cited. In their analysis of the activities of Monitoring and Evaluation, the directors and inspectors stress above all: (i) they do not understand the research objectives; (2) they feel removed from the process, with neither a role in the articulation of the target themes, nor in the design of the tools, or the implementation and analysis; and (iii) the results do not reach them in a useful way. In short, BEEP's Monitoring and Evaluation program does not meet their principal concerns. (It is necessary to add that the Education Management Information Systems is equally addressed by this criticism.) They also expressed their disappointment in the decentralization promise of the activities of Monitoring and Education. They were told about training and the purchase of equipment. They started forming teams to execute that component, and the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research even launched initial training workshops, but the inspectors and directors find that they have not heard anything about it since then.

The representatives of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research did express their concern about the need for regionalizing the activities of their field. They already have sketched an outline, which they have tried to initiate. But the time and resource constraints, especially this year with the budgetary difficulties experienced by the overall Project, has led them to a halt. Regionalization does not exist in the original terms of the component; this became a priority only with the first amendment. But the design and the program of the component had already been definitively formulated, said the technical advisor of the component. It thus became very difficult to integrate the objective of regionalizing the component without jeopardizing the rest of the program. As is suggested below, one ought to consider that the consequences are not all negative.

For the time being, this initiative actually seems to be of secondary importance for the component employees. The two partners -- the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research and the Regional Bureaus/Inspectorates (DRE and IEF) -- seem to share similar ideas as to the reasons for and the elements of regionalization. The perspective of a consensus is also under way on sharing tasks in a national strategy of monitoring and evaluation: the local cell would essentially oversee the technical monitoring at the level of the schools; the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research would monitor the issues of national policy and standards and would provide specialized technical expertise. To date, the time and strategy of execution of the current regionalization plan have not been set.

From the Project's point of view -- especially given the argument expressed earlier in favor of a more thorough qualitative and quantitative analysis -- decentralization is an entirely logical step. By giving it first priority, the current activities of the Project would then be redirected. The decision in favor of decentralization will certainly have short-term consequences on the technical development of the sector; but these effects should not all be adverse. For example, a local perspective would be better equipped in clarifying what is needed or what has been lacking up to now -- e.g. specificity in data processing or too general issues. The regional cell would be in an excellent position for adding qualitative details and incorporating socio-economic constituents to classroom pedagogy. A well-monitored technical assistance for these cells -- with advising, computerized services and so forth -- would ensure that the qualitative and quantitative improvements in research studies would be completed by analyses based on solid technical bases.

Contribution of BEEP's objectives. The principal concern of Monitoring and Evaluation lies in the clarity of BEEP objectives. In the annual report, the analysis is focused on individual component objectives and not on the overall Project issues of internal efficiency and student performance. One seeks to meet BEEP's official indicators, which are at times relatively superficial, -- e.g. female enrollment rates, OPO application, use of textbooks -- apparently with

the aim of implementing BEEP's plan. Sensitive to the intrinsic weakness of these indicators, the employees of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research seek to deepen their analyses with qualitative investigations. For example, here is the appreciation of one of the teachers interviewed about the current impact of the OPOs on student learning: "The teachers see a positive difference in their students' performance thanks to the OPOs." (*Annual Report*, 1992; p. 21) This kind of assessment is really limited to anecdotal remarks, probably for the technical reasons evoked earlier in the section on technical quality, e.g. weak experimental monitoring, and too vast a scope of analysis.

The Monitoring and Evaluation does not really offer anything for measuring the degree of success of the Project in carrying out the objective of increasing the internal efficiency of the system. This is really handled by Education Management Information Systems, which keeps the school data updated. It seems that, because this objective does not really belong to an operational component (i.e. with a direct impact in the classroom), it is probably present in the analysis of the annual assessment of the Project.

This situation shows that the improvement of internal performance is really an objective without a strategy. It is above all a question of faith: the sensitization at the level of the communities and the qualitative improvements in the classroom brought about by the Project will bring forth improvements in the efficacy of the fundamental schools in Mali. There is no evident experimentation in the program of Monitoring and Evaluation in order to examine this hypothesis. The employees of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research explain this situation by saying that the Project wants them to limit themselves to the immediate issues of the components. A study comparing the schools with a high internal efficiency with a sampling of other schools with low performance could identify possible interventions not yet undertaken by the Project. Apparently this option of experimental stratification is excluded, or simply not yet considered, by the Project. Without this possibility, the component will never really have been involved in the realization of this objective. Without the kind of analytical monitoring -- the monitoring of Management Education Information Systems is rather descriptive -- one can venture to say that the Project in general will only reach this objective by chance.

Regarding the objective of improved quality, Monitoring and Evaluation is especially reliable in its analysis of the impact and evolution of the inputs associated with the Project. The quality of education is more or less defined by these elements and the behaviors associated with quality: the evidence of the OPOs in the current behavior of the teachers; the presence and the use of textbooks distributed by the Project; the number of girls and the attitude and behavior of the teachers towards them. For technical reasons, observed earlier in the section with the discussion of the technical quality of the component activities, one has to limit oneself to this sort of inventory of elements and behaviors of "quality" without the real possibility of measuring or observing their actual impact on the current performance of the students. What is the actual impact on a student's learning of having a textbook? What are the conditions which serve as a catalyst or which have a positive consequence? What conditions minimize the efficacy of this element? The Project does not really ask these questions, which would be appropriate, for a case studies approach: to be fair to the Project, very few education projects really do.

The testing initiative is very positive in that regard, but the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research will have to initiate controlled experiments -- with carefully defined stratifications -- before being able to go on to the next stage. Furthermore, the entire analysis of the quality realized by the Project remains internal. One does not ask what is the impact of this improved education on the child in her life after school? Especially if one pays attention to the current ministerial rumors inferring that the education given to a Malian child is not sufficiently adapted to the real needs of the individuals or society as a whole, it would seem of utmost necessity for the Project to consider the issue of external performance of the school in its program of research and evaluation.

The contribution of Monitoring and Evaluation to the realization of the objective of regionalization is still weak. The component did not use the Project's objective of speeding up regionalization as a priority neither in its own program nor in the analysis of the programs of other components. As was indicated above, it is a relatively new priority suffering from a twofold inertia, the Project's and that of the Government of Mali. The component employees claim that they do not have the time nor the resources to fulfill this objective. They carry out a program which is already quite heavy, whose demands have not diminished with the introduction of this new objective. Only the Community Support component pays attention to an analysis of regionalization efforts, since it is directly concerned by this aim. Even though the analysis of Monitoring and Evaluation remains superficial for that aspect. The indicators are binary -- yes or no -- or limited to a series of behaviors: number of meetings with parents, frequency of APE meetings, community contributions to the school. There is no real qualitative analysis -- as allowed in a case study -- about what entails real community control. As far as the other components are concerned, there has not been an overall discussion of what it means, technically and logistically, to decentralize the various activities of the Project. This could constitute another domain of monitoring and evaluation taken into account by the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research.

Institutionalization. The activities of research and evaluation of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research precede BEEP, and even the Fourth Project. Regarding the issue of institutionalization of the component, at least technically, one can be fairly sure that the service will remain active after Project's financing comes to an end. Without financial support from USAID, the employees from the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research say that the service will probably return to the former system: (i) provisional actions realized for the various divisions of the Ministry of Basic Education; (ii) carry out research in Bamako; and (iii) solicit foreign donors to finance specific studies.

Other reasons seem to be present to assume trust in the institutionalization of the component. First, the employees of Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research, the technical assistance and the other services of the Ministry have all observed that the technical expertise of the Division, like individual employees, has considerably grown, in depth as well as in size. Moreover, the range of technical services offered in the other divisions of the Ministry developed with the quality of the analysis. The quantity and the quality of the *demand* seems to have grown parallel with those of the *supply*, the contacts between the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research and the other services having become more habitual and formalized.⁶² The rapport with the external research institutes also appear to be promising, inspiring trust financially and technically. Finally, the impact of the Project on the management, planning, budgeting habits of the division seem to be positive.

Given this favorable diagnosis, one chief question comes to mind: should financial or technical support of the component be continued? There are practical and theoretical factors to answer this question. BEEP now provides all the working budget of the Division; without these funds, the activities pertaining to the Project would certainly not continue. When asked the question, the employees expressed their fear about losing access to the Education Management Information Systems component, which they rely on for all data gathering and processing. The decision to end financial assistance to the component would also hurt the decentralization of the expertise and the activities of monitoring and evaluation.

⁶² -- This remark especially concerns the other divisions directly associated with the BEEP. The same cannot be said about the other services of the Ministry (MEB); a situation worth the consideration of the component and the Project. It really is not worth consolidating relations with the other services, since all the operational budget of the component is exclusively reserved for the areas directly covered by the Project. (Should one really want to stress setting up the DRIP as the monitoring and evaluation division for the whole Ministry, then this financing policy needs to be reconsidered.)

Regarding the issue of continuing technical assistance, the team has affirmatively expressed its assent, as long as the assistance is maintained in the same spirit as it has currently been exercised. They describe the current technical advisor's technique as not controlling. They appreciate her judicious advice and her sensible answers to the technical and managerial needs solicited by the Malian colleagues. They consider this kind of technical assistance useful and necessary and ask that it continue. From an external point of view, two reasons can be put forth in support of technical assistance: (1) to help introduce to the monitoring and evaluation activities (i) a subcomponent which favors a more qualitative and experimental approach, (ii) a level of analysis which tends towards closer and more practical stratifications (inspection, schools, classrooms), and (iii) an analytical approach which incorporates socio-economic elements; and (2) to help plan and implement the regionalization of the activities and expertise of Monitoring and Evaluation. Provisional or permanent? The employees ask for both. This issue will be examined in depth in Chapter 5.

Next Steps

In the discussion regarding the observations presented in the preceding section, "the implementation and impact of the component," several ideas came up for the direction and development of the education sector. These are described below as possible steps to follow in order to further the development of Monitoring and Evaluation:

1. Regionalization. There is a considerable gap between the activities and priorities of the Monitoring and Evaluation component and the expectations of that component by the regional directors and the inspectors of fundamental education. Furthermore, the regionalization of the activities and expertise of Monitoring and Evaluation have not yet taken place, although they have been asked for by the regional directors and the inspectors and although the employees of Monitoring and Evaluation seem to appreciate its importance. If the Project and the component staff truly consider regionalization as an absolute priority, then immediate strategic discussions between both partners are highly desirable in order to design and implement a plan right away which will program three fundamental elements: (i) identification of the necessary materials; (ii) training -- content and schedule -- and (iii) specification of the first research activities. One group at the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research should take on this initiative as its principal activity; this could be a team composed of two to three staff members of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research and two to three inspectors per region.

2. Experimental Approach. The level of analysis granted by the statistical protocol currently used by the Monitoring and Evaluation component is relatively simple and consists in the research of the relation between certain factors (i.e. does A have an effect on B?) and often of superficial comparisons. In order to allow more solid and useful conclusions and allow the study of other strategic options for the Project or for other partners, it is suggested to establish plans of controlled experiments, with more detailed criteria, e.g. OPO schools vs. non-OPO schools; schools using textbooks vs. not using; schools with double period of duty--same teacher vs. two teachers -- which allow the testing of specific hypotheses.

3. Stratified Analysis. The level of stratification in the statistical analysis incorporates vast groupings, remaining principally at the level of the regions, thereby limiting the strategies resulting in relative indications, or global policies or actions, e.g. a national distribution of textbooks, or a new module for the in-service training. More detailed geographical data exist, but they have not been processed in a way that allows the local school officials -- inspectors, pedagogical advisors, school principals and teachers -- to perceive the particular situation of the schools they are involved in, and to bring more precise actions to it. Data analysis should be executed for smaller populations so as to allow all the actors in the overall system to understand what is occurring at the level they are interested in directly; for a principal, his school; for a pedagogical advisor, her district; and for an inspector, all the schools and the entire inspectorate.

This strategy is compatible with the wish to regionalize the Monitoring and Evaluation component. It would spur the attention of the center to the particular needs information of the specific localities. With the regionalization of expertise, resources, and management, the local staff could become responsible for the analyses which directly involve them.

4. Socio-economic Factors. The data that are incorporated in the sector only take into account the factors associated with the school per se; no attention is given to socio-economic factors. However, it is known that these factors play important roles in a student's performance. By ignoring these factors, one risks attributing too much or too little importance to the individual educational factors. Furthermore, the research tends to focus exclusively on pedagogic interventions for educational problems, which really should be defined more broadly -- e.g. the present approach will never yield information concerning the impact of hunger on the results of a student of a school. It is therefore desirable to incorporate these socio-economic factors in to all statistical analyses conducted by Monitoring and Evaluation. These data ought to be included in the annual report of school statistics provided by the school principal to the Education Management Information Systems at the beginning of the school year. They would thus constitute an element of the annual research carried out by the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research.. They also ought to be part of the annual assessment of student learning. Together with the inspectorates, the researchers ought to be able to identify the most salient factors from that kind of study.

5. Formal Links with Other Components. The contribution of Monitoring and Evaluation to the programs of Girls' Schooling, Education Management Information Systems, and Community Support remain somewhat superficial. Major indicators have been identified and described, answering the most immediate needs of the Project. Moreover, the complexity of these operational components goes largely beyond the analyses that were carried out with the few data currently collected. Research teams ought to be established for each of the other components which would be formed of members of the operational component and one or two staff of Monitoring and Evaluation. These teams could design research programs with the help of a mixed budget. This would allow an efficacious transfer of expertise of research specialists to the staff of other components.

6. Qualitative Research and Case Studies. The Monitoring and Evaluation component essentially stresses quantitative analyses, often completed by qualitative observations. However, there are several important issues which do not allow quantitative research only -- e.g. what are the characteristics of an active APE; what does the teacher do to foster good results from students in a classroom with multiple grade levels; what are the conditions favoring the participation and success of girls in school? Already there have been special studies in the component program, and only one was implemented. Furthermore, the staff of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research took a workshop on qualitative research in April of this year. In order to go beyond the descriptive aspect to get to understanding and prescription, one ought to consider research which will allow for case studies. By targeting a few schools which seem to present the expected results or behaviors, one could make a thorough study which would undoubtedly be quite revealing. With staff of other components and inspectors, one could identify the key questions which would necessitate such consideration. The realization of this study could also include staff from other components.

7. External Efficiency. The statistical analyses conducted by the Project raise questions of internal performance exclusively. In the research program, nobody asks: "is what is done in school going to help the child when he or she graduates, and how?" The contribution of the schools and the suitability of the programs to life is accepted without question; except, apparently, by the proportion of parents (especially for girls) who decide not to send their children back to school. External efficiency could be a reasonable theme for a case study. The results ought to interest those who organize sensitization campaigns for girls (e.g. explaining to the parents that what is learned at school does contribute directly to the management of family

economy) as well as those who design and present the in-service training (e.g. showing the teachers how to use teaching materials in a manner which should be directly relevant to the work and the home environment.

8. Broadening the Scope of the Component. The operational directorates of the Ministry of Basic Education (MEB) that are not under the auspices of BEEP hardly take advantage of the expertise of the Monitoring and Evaluation staff. This can be explained by two reasons: (i) they do not have at their disposal execution funds for evaluation; and (ii) they do not have much experience with the contribution of the research for planning and articulation of the policies. Considering that this issue is linked to the institutionalization objective of Monitoring and Evaluation, strategies ought to be reconsidered in order to stimulate such an interest for the national bureaus. Two possible strategies could be: (i) carry out a formal sensitization campaign for the two research evaluation services (DRIP and EMIS); and (ii) name employees of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research who would work jointly with colleagues of the national bureaus so as to define pertinent areas of research. The Project could even consider a non-designated fund in the budget to finance special studies requested by the Ministry's other directorates and which would be carried out by the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research.

9. Continuation of Technical Assistance. With BEEP's financial and technical assistance, the Monitoring and Evaluation component is developing favorably in its expertise and contribution to the sector of fundamental education in Mali. There remains, however, progress to accomplish. It seems that this twofold assistance could be both useful and interesting to the Project and the Ministry of Basic Education, the teachers as well as the students.

Conclusion

The technical level reached by the employees of the Division of Pedagogical Innovations and Research -- individually and collectively -- represents considerable progress for the National Institute of Pedagogy and for the Ministry of Education. The researchers, their superiors, the BEEP staff, and their colleagues at the Ministry have noticed the improvement of technical expertise in the planning and management of their activities, in the level of communication and integration with other services at the Ministry, and in the relevance of their research, particularly concerning the immediate needs of BEEP.

However, the component remains constrained technically and in its direction. The present evaluation of Monitoring and Evaluation raises certain priority issues if the continued development of expertise is to be ensured in that section. Among the needs, it appears essential to make a more thorough study -- both qualitatively and quantitatively -- of the factors which influence the teaching and learning by refining the levels of analysis and by asking precise questions. This more thorough research ought to bring answers which go beyond only pedagogical recommendations. Education is not limited to the action of the school, and the level of learning is function of several other factors than only the teaching method. It is suggested that priority efforts allow a rapid regionalization of the activities of the component. Eventually a reduction of the range of activities at the central level could allow the regional and local representatives to participate in research which directly meet the problems identified at the level of the schools.

The progress of the component has been remarkable. Assistance to its continued development seems well deserved. One needs to go beyond immediate and exclusive concerns of BEEP to approach all the factors which affect fundamental education.

CHAPTER IV OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE PROJECT

As far as the overall assessment for the Project is concerned, six questions were asked directly by USAID in the terms of reference for the evaluation: (i) the factors; (ii) the stages and the participants of both the initial and the on-going design; (iii) the environment in which the Project evolved and the major factors of its implementation; (iv) the influence of the Project on the equity of the educational system; (v) the Project's contribution to the improvement of the quality of the fundamental education; and (vi) the Project's impact on the efficacy of the educational system in Mali.⁶³

A. Project Design and Various Interventions

One of the terms most referred to by BEEP partners in the interviews, when regarding the whole process, was that of "improvisation." This uneven but also dynamic development of the Project is evident both in the identification of the areas and strategies of intervention and the articulation of the operation and management systems and procedures. Ever since the abrupt initial establishment of the Project in Mali, imposed by USAID/W on USAID/Mali Mission, there has been a persistent feeling of catching up, looking for a theoretical and strategic center, or reference point, for the Project.

In order to guide the evaluation through this dynamic planning process, the evaluation team formulated four questions:

1. How involved have the partners and beneficiaries been in defining the Project's objectives and strategies?
2. Do the Project's objectives reflect the Government's concerns and the current needs in the regions?
3. Does the Project offer a consistent strategy to respond to the major concerns of the education sector?
4. Does the Project's structural design allow the implementation of the education sector objectives?

Consolidation Project of the Education Sector in Mali by the World Bank

⁶³ -- "I was very surprised to see that the issue of sustainability was not chosen as one of the 'thèmes opérationnels.' USAID's financing of TA, textbooks, training and monitoring/evaluation has indisputably accomplished many things, but I fear the departure of the TA, the lack of cost recovery for textbooks, the limited financial participation in the training by the Government, and end of 'hands-on' daily Project management by USAID, will curtail the long-term impact of USAID's important investment in primary education. I have the sense that the Ministry 'delegated' to the TAs primary responsibility for Project execution, and that the interest and capacity of the Ministry to take over the functions of the TAs at the end of the Project is somewhat limited. These are simply personal impressions, and perhaps I am mistaken. In any case, the evaluation team did not really address this issue, which I would argue is a critical one for any successful project." (remarks of Sam Carlson, Human Resources Economist, World Bank/Mali)

Program of Sectorial Adjustment Objectives	Investment Objective Component	Investment Strategies Component
<p>1. Control the flow of students admitted in the secondary and higher education, depending on the budgetary resources... and control the expected evolution of the demand on the labor market.</p>	<p>1. Increase supply and demand in primary education in three regions of the country</p>	<p>a. undertake a vast program of construction, renovation, and repair; b. use of low-cost participatory techniques; c. increase efficacy of teachers and of classrooms d. develop private educational services; and e. increase participation of underprivileged groups.</p>
<p>2. Improve education efficacy and relevance, by revising the school book policy and teachers' training, and adapting primary ed. programs.</p>	<p>2. Improve the efficiency and relevance of primary education in all regions of the country.</p>	<p>a. qualitative system of monitoring and evaluation b. revision of teacher training and primary ed. programs; c. vast training program for primary ed. staff; d. pedagogic supervision and support reinforcement e. furnishing of school textbooks and materials.</p>
<p>3. Restructure the budget so as to benefit primary education, intensify the utilization of personnel and equipment and the mobilization of private funding and improve the efficiency of schooling's response to market/employment signals</p>	<p>3. Define and apply a strategy for restructuring secondary and higher education. 4. Increase the planning and management capacity of the education sector.</p>	<p>a. reinforce role of involved offices; b. reduce scholarships; c. and others.</p> <p>a. reinforce Ministry bureaus responsible for planning, budget, staff and equipment, decentralized management, and for project design and execution.</p>

(World Bank, pp.i-ii)

Partners and Beneficiaries' Involvement. Starting with the partners, two groups were considered: (i) the other donors; and (ii) the Government of Mali, or more precisely the Ministry of National Education (MEN). The other donors were involved in the Project design only indirectly; this is due to the fact that USAID used part of the Fourth Project of the World Bank, which already included other sponsors. In its initial conceptualization, the Fourth Education Consolidation Project had a relatively consistent strategy. Its major objectives and strategies are represented in the Table above as presented in the original document. Each sponsor would bring an input to the overall program, the balance of which was both precarious and essential. According to the World Bank,

the realization [of the Fourth Project] will require...from the donors a redoubled assistance and a sound coordination of their actions capable of supporting the reform process and the investments that this will imply." (World Bank; p. 18)

With the overall upheavals in the education sector and in the country since 1991, a lessening or ending of the role several other sponsors had played in this collective initiative has occurred.⁶⁴ Since USAID remains one of the few donors (along with the World Bank) to maintain a high level of assistance to the sector, the implementation of the Fourth Project has lost an element (or several) of its cohesion. The negative effects of the weakened or missing components to the sector's development turns out to be quite high, pressuring USAID to satisfy needs originally (or potentially) to be met by another donor, e.g. the distribution of textbooks. The initiatives of the In-Service Training component were considerably weakened because the students and teachers had not received the textbooks, since under the Fourth Project the distribution should have been managed by another donor. USAID took action, though tardily. This kind of situation has contributed to giving the impression that USAID program is being defined a bit ad hoc as new priorities occur.

Theoretically, the program of the Fourth Education Consolidation Project was included in the national educational initiative of the Ministry (MEN). The fact that this agreement was signed by the World Bank (and by the International Monetary Fund for the structural adjustment program) would seem to indicate that the Government was involved fully in the articulation of the program and its requirements. Later on, it followed that the Government was doubly involved in the design of BEEP's program, having granted the authorization of the Project and the one which inspired it: the Fourth Project. This principle does not seem to have been confirmed in reality. Indeed, neither the investment project nor the conditionalities benefited from a real strategic participation of the Government of Mali. (One wonders if the motivations on the part of the Government to accept the joint program of the World Bank and USAID were based primarily on considerations directly linked to the educational sector. What part did the need for foreign exchange and other political concerns have in the Government's decision to accept conditions that all partners suspected to be intolerable?) In the design document of the "Education Sector Consolidation Project" of the World Bank, it is stated that

...the Government proposes to promote the development of a more efficient use of the physical, human, and budgetary resources put in the service of education, to broaden the base of the resources of the education sector through an increased support of all interested partners, and to decentralize the administration of the educational system by a widespread participation of the regions and the APEs. (p.18)

One wonders if the discrepancy between these intentions and the implementation of the current strategy does not require a level of political will and power that exceeds the means of a government and country that have just come out of a long period of authoritarian rule. In short, the idea that the Government of Mali participated fully in the design of the BEEP's program is not altogether credible, especially when the agreements were signed under a former toppled government. Moreover, even though it is evident that the Government of Mali is interested in a collaboration with the various donors for the expansion of the basic education, for the Government the agreement conditions tend to compromise two educational categories which today are equally

⁶⁴ -- "... The statement is made that USAID remains the only donor making an effort in the sector. Where does this come from? Even subtracting the US\$2 million of quick disbursing money, the World Bank's involvement in the sector remains considerable, if not the largest. The French, the Germans, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Dutch, UNICEF, etc. are all involved. And we are all involved with the primary objective of improving basic education access and quality..." (remarks of Sam Carlson, Human Resources Economist, World Bank/Mali)

needy of technical and financial help: the secondary and higher education. The Government views the educational system as a whole.⁶⁵

USAID continued to design and negotiate new objectives, e.g. regionalization and new strategies, often, according to some, in a unilateral fashion. Regionalization, the major strategy introduced in the first amendment, can serve as a significant exception to this observation since it was designed by USAID with the close collaboration of the former director of the National Institute of Pedagogy.⁶⁶ It was observed that USAID responded naturally to the needs perceived and articulated by the Ministry, e.g. the actual possibility of supplying textbooks to the Koranic schools, but the response to the requirements of a Government does not make USAID a true equal partner in the design of the program: USAID reserves the right to say "no." The divergence is evident, for example, in the recent refusal of the Minister of Basic Education to sign the agreement of a third clause suggested by USAID. When seeing the refusal of US\$1 million for the basic education of Mali, the first reaction on the part of USAID was to consider that the Ministry did not have a sincere interest in the expansion of that sector. This kind of reaction is all the more understandable given that the preparation of that clause had begun with a partnership, and a positive understanding, among USAID, the National Institute of Pedagogy, and the Ministry of the former Government and that Government had already been supporting the efforts targeted by the amendment for about two years. The apparent sudden reversal could easily be interpreted as an untimely change of policy. Another interpretation of the Ministry's response would be to consider that this is the first time that a Government asserts a direct involvement in the conceptualization and the overseeing of the strategies begun under its jurisdiction. USAID was proposing an entirely new strategy for BEEP. Since, sooner or later, the Ministry would be held responsible for this initiative, it seemed natural for the Ministry to examine carefully the dossier and consider its relevance to the overall national policy and program for fundamental education. Even though seen from that point of view, the reaction of the Ministry could be considered as a favorable rather than negative development towards the Project, it is not ever possible to know the true motivations of people.

The beneficiaries that were targeted for the Project -- teachers, APEs, students -- can only be considered as consumers of the Project, and this within a monopolized market. The executors of the Project may adapt some strategies to certain exigencies of that group, but are truly limited in their options. For example, the FAEF component decided to decrease the amount of the local contribution amount for school renovations from 35 to 25 per cent. Now the inspectors realize that even this contribution level is not feasible for some really deprived communities. Furthermore, many communities and inspectors request new construction, pointing out that the impact of new classrooms on the schooling rate would be much greater than that of school renovations. However, USAID officials of the education sector assert that the agency regulations concerning

⁶⁵ -- "The statement that the Malian Government did not participate 'strategically' in the preparation of neither the investment components nor the adjustment components of the Fourth Education Project and the BEEP seems a little sensational. It would be quite easy for the World Bank to document the Government's participation in both Project and program preparation. It is entirely true that the Transition Government and the subsequent governments of the Third Republic inherited the Project as negotiated during Moussa Traore's regime, but this is not a statement about Project 'ownership' at the time the Project was prepared. Moreover, the evaluation states that the Government's 'need' for foreign exchange forced it to sign agreements it could not keep, implying that donors were to blame for proposing these agreements. This suggests a lack of sovereign decision-making capability and responsibility on the part of the Government, which smacks of paternalism. In fact, I would still argue that all of the policy measures which were agreed to remain valid in terms of their potential contribution to developing primary education, and the we should continue to pursue them. Whether or not they were (or are) realistic is up to the Government to determine." (remarks of Sam Carlson, Human Resources Economist, World Bank/Mali)

⁶⁶ -- One of the suggestions offered by the former Director of the National Institute of Pedagogy concerned the Centers of Regional Services, to be located in the offices of the DRE, and meant to assist local administrators and teachers with the identification and mastery of techniques, the development and use of equipment, and the utilization of other pedagogical inputs.

new construction are such that this strategy is effectively prohibited. The inspectors of the Malian schools also pointed to the enormous contribution that USAID could make in the education sector, if it would accept to finance the salaries of the provisional workers for a year, as is done by Canada (the PREDEP). Reasons for this reticence on the part of USAID regarding these proposals can easily be understood. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the past and present lack of involvement of the beneficiaries in the design of BEEP's program. Consequently this entails problems of relevance and sustainability for the Project.

Consistency regarding the Government's concerns and current needs. According to community representatives, -- the APEs -- and Ministry staff in the field -- especially regional directors and inspectors -- consulted by the evaluation team, the first priority for the expansion of the education sector is to increase supply. A great majority of the beneficiaries consulted in the regions covered by the Project felt that USAID should do like the Canadians, i.e. build new schools and pay salaries of temporary teachers. No doubt USAID takes it upon itself to increase the number of school places, but to limit the FAEF interventions to renovation is certainly limiting the impact of this component as regards this objective, both relating to quantity and to equity. It appears that USAID policy not to begin new construction is in direct conflict with the objective to increase the number of school places. One USAID administrator assured the evaluators that the FAEF-assisted renovations usually were much more than purely superficial; that, in fact, in many cases, the effort was to make operable a classroom that was no longer in use. The team was not able to obtain an actual figure for the number of new places that were created by the Project, and this parameter does not appear among the official indicators.⁶⁷

Regarding quality, the Project also only partially responds to the major needs of the education sector. It is evident that it cannot do everything, but the lack of a systemic approach⁶⁸ in the design and implementation of initiatives sometimes leads to insufficient results of no real impact. The distribution of textbooks serves as an example. The need for textbooks in the classrooms was acute; USAID initiative to act quickly was admirable. Nonetheless, the results were far from those expected for a number of reasons, which denote the importance of beginning actions with a consistent strategy and of following a systemic approach. Although the teachers were very grateful for receiving the textbooks, it was found that most teachers had not used them, offering the following reasons: (i) the textbooks arrived after the trimester for which they were destined; (ii) they arrived without the teacher's guide; (iii) the training the teachers had gotten for teaching oral French had been based on other materials; and (iv) the textbooks are not well-adapted to Mali. This is not the fault of USAID, but this still shows the insufficiencies linked to the way the "improvised" interventions were carried out, without a coherent method or plan for initiatives that would complement or reinforce each other.

⁶⁷ -- Consistency regarding the Government's concerns and the current needs: the consultant claims there is an inconsistency between the USAID refusal to build new classrooms and the government policy to increase schooling rates. I think there is no inconsistency because the FAEF objective of USAID is not to raise schooling rates with an increase in the number of classrooms, but rather to improve attendance in the rural areas through a viable environment which will incite parents to send their children to school and to remain there during the duration of its cycle." (remarks of Ibrahima Sissoko, Technical Advisor/Coordinator FAEF/USAID)

⁶⁸ -- "Repeatedly, the evaluators confuse poor Project execution with 'the lack of a coherent, systematic, and strategic approach,' asserting the latter is to blame for limited Project results. This assertion is arrived at often with little consideration of other factors affecting Project results, and appears to me to be a 'knee-jerk' explanation on the part of the evaluators (seen in Section III [of the Introduction] as well). Personally, I would argue the Project was well-designed (with the exception perhaps of the relatively small adjustment component), but poorly executed, because of political and institutional/bureaucratic factors on the Malian side, and because of inadequate supervision from the World Bank side. But nowhere in the evaluation is there a thorough analysis of the Government's capacity and responsibility for Project execution. This is particularly so in the case of the textbook and training components." (remarks of Sam Carlson, Human Resources Economist, World Bank/Mali)

Another example, raised during the discussions is the strategy of the In-Service Training. The current in-service training is theoretically limited to the teachers of the first three years of the fundamental school. One can imagine the problem students will face in their fourth year with a traditional teaching method after experiencing three years of innovative instruction.

To be sure, one cannot expect USAID to respond to all the deficiencies of the education sector. However, a dialogue between the implementors -- i.e. the teachers and the Minister -- proves imperative to ensure a close and productive coordination between the designed program and the primary needs of the sector. This dialogue is necessary for understanding problems, needs, constraints, and options. There is no better way to ensure the adequacy between the design of the Project and the real needs, even though the intervention options are limited.

The need to listen to the partners proves to be especially important, with the appearance of a new priority -- which seems of great interest to USAID: the non formal sector. At the conference on national education sponsored by UNESCO, and which took place at the Ministry of Basic Education (MEB) at the same time as the present team's activities, the need was evoked to question the usefulness of the traditional school for the elementary needs of the Malian people. The non formal education activities conducted by local NGOs recently attracted the interest of USAID. With this fortunate convergence of USAID interests and the present concerns of the Government, an important opportunity presents itself to begin the dialogue in order to design the future directions of USAID projects in the education sector.

A Coherent Strategy. The examples related to the lack of coordination between the textbook distribution and the activities of the in-service training are repeated by virtually all the Project partners to say that aspects of USAID's interventions constitute an "improvised" strategy. Because of the urgent pressure by USAID in 1989 to initiate a program right away, there was no time to think through fully or to engage the Government in adequate discussions in order to design a consistent strategy. With the political events since the revolution, the Ministry has not really established a long-term focus to influence or inform USAID objectives and actions. With all those changes, the Government had a hard time articulating and implementing strategies and policies which USAID could attempt to complete or reinforce.

The Structural Conception of the Project. We noticed that the lack of consistency in BEEP's programming is closely linked to a lack of structural coherence in the Project's organization; another probable consequence of its hasty beginning. Just like the activities, the definition of the management and coordination structures were defined as they were being designed. This phenomenon is as evident in the internal structure of the Project as in the formal relations between the Project and the Ministry. For the Project itself, the indicators of the absence of structural consistency are the following, among others:

- i. the three distinct administrative components of BEEP -- (i) ABEL technical assistance, (ii) USAID technical assistance, and (iii) the purchasing of material and equipment;
- ii. a lapse of about two years without a Project coordinator -- one is to be hired in September 1993;
- iii. according to several technical consultants, the formal and informal coordination among the Project's technical advisors was discouraged by the more centralizing USAID/Mali officials;
- iv. the relatively recent establishment of a monthly meeting that includes the participation of Ministry officers from the various components fills this lack only partially: the meeting seems to be used more to present programs than to study

together joint possible strategies;⁶⁹

- v. at the beginning of the Project, each component presented its own budget, without coherence in the presentation, and the same is true for the plans of action;
- vi. the responsibility for supervision of the budget was given to one of the pedagogical counselors, without any regular controls; and
- vii. the important efforts for the last two years to introduce serious discipline and uniformity in administration, planning, and budgetization of BEEP have had an evident impact on the management (at least on its appearance), although USAID introduced these structures somewhat unilaterally, and somewhat by fits and starts.

The Project seems to be functioning very well now; there are clear procedures that all technical consultants and their counterparts have learned and respect, and very fine plans and rigorous, uniform budgets are produced. The technical advisors quickly add to this observation that good management is of no use without action in the field. USAID and the technical advisors assess the balance between good management and rigorous techniques very differently. The two are necessary, but the considerable lack of dialogue in the design of BEEP's routines and actions does not allow a shared resolution of these management issues which demand a joint application.

Moreover, the obligation this year to utilize the new administrative and management systems without any transition upset significantly the activities in the field. USAID froze all Project expenses in February because of new USAID regulations (for the Project) regarding budgeting. This decision slowed down the Project's operations for over two months. There were significant repercussions on the actions of several of the components, particularly those linked to the school year calendar. One cannot criticize the initiative to rationalize the management of the budget. But the way it was institutionalized deserves criticism. Ill-fated consequences for the Project could have been avoided with (i) a more cooperative approach to the design and initiation of management innovations; and (ii) a single responsible officer -- a Project leader -- could have served as go-between between USAID and the technical advisors to negotiate and direct the application of new procedures.

As far as the lack of dialogue between USAID and the Government, it is necessary to point out that USAID often attempted to rectify this situation. The authority of the Bureau of Education Projects is more and more felt regarding the monitoring and the supervision of the Project's activities. Previously, the BPE only learned about the actions and decisions pertaining to the Project after the fact, whereas now procedures have been established (and respected) to involve directly the BPE in the approval of action plans and the supervision and management of the implementation of these activities. Structures are still missing which would link the Bureau, as manager of the Project, to the departments and bureaus of the Ministry which are directly implicated in the technical work; an issue of horizontal communication. This situation has been brought about by deficiencies in the vertical communication between the Project's implementing departments and the hierarchical superiors who are supposed to have complete knowledge of these dossiers. This results in a kind of disjuncture between the Project and the remaining initiatives and strategies of the Ministry. The same situation also exists at the broader governmental level between the center and the regions.

⁶⁹ -- USAID had been scheduling weekly meetings with all technical advisors and their Malian counterparts since 1991.

B. Context of the Project

Context should be understood here as the prevailing political and administrative setting surrounding the Project; it exercises a positive or negative influence, depending on the case. Thus the Malian and USAID administrative backgrounds have repercussions on the unfolding of the Project.

At the USAID level, the bureaucracy consists of long and complex procedures, numerous control systems, and frequent changes in procedure without sufficient warning (e.g. the manner of presenting the budget, discussed above). Moreover, the changes in official appointments and the imposition of American administrative norms have created some difficulties for the Project. The overwhelming presence of USAID/Mali in the implementation of the Project in the daily management has also often been criticized. However, the positive appreciation regarding the direct involvement of the technical advisors in the field needs to be underscored, as well as the conscientiousness brought to the management of the Project by USAID/Mali.

The Malian context is characterized, in variable degrees, by a heavy bureaucracy, a lack of information or insufficient information on the Project and its unfolding, the slowness in the decision-making process, the inconsistency of the system at times, the cloistering or the overlapping of responsibilities transferred to other administrative services, the "improvisation" and the lack of authority over the implementation of the dossiers, and the lack of taking authority by the Government of Mali regarding the Project. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, to a certain degree, the lack of a heavy supervision by the Malian authorities has favored a certain autonomy for the Project.

On the other hand, the overall political context in Mali has had an impact on the unfolding of the Project. The many administrative changes, due to a unstable political context, have disrupted the implementation of the Project. With each new administration, a delay was experienced while the new officials obtained an adequate level of information so that the Project could continue to develop. The absence of continuity in the monitoring of the dossiers on the part of the Government of Mali, the change in structures (e.g. the disbanding of the Bureau of Planning), the absence of "ownership" of the Project and of strategic management by the Ministry, and the easy acceptance by the Government of the still impossible requirements have all influenced the Project. The political turmoil and the frequent interruptions in the progression of the school year have affected the evolution and the implementation of the Project. Yet the new democratic context has permitted the flowering of a new framework for discussion between the Government and USAID/Mali, whose initiatives often appeared "improvised" or ill-timed. From this time on, it was necessary to negotiate, persuade rather than impose. It has therefore been possible to determine a number of problems in the implementation of the Project and to find viable solutions to them.

The Project has also had an influence on the existing Malian backdrop in other ways. If the per diem system⁷⁰ was a real incentive for the Malian technical staff involved in the Project, its institutionalization poses a problem today and could jeopardize the Project's objectives as soon as USAID funding ends. The authoritarian, uncoordinated decision by USAID to decrease the level

⁷⁰ -- The per diem situation blew up when the new USAID director announced (i) the enforcement of the existing USAID exclusion policy of the practice of awarding premiums to governmental employees and (ii) the global application of USAID norms for the payment of these per diems. The rates paid previously by the Project went considerably over those norms, several with whom the evaluators spoke mentioned the abuses of the system. Also common were the observations regarding the "unilateral" change of the per diem policy. The effects of this decision on the work of the Project are not clear yet; regarding the In-Service Training in particular, negative repercussions are greatly feared in the area of trainers' cooperation and teachers' or principals' participation. The new policy appears more equitable, especially for the people in the regions, but rumors still persist. It would be interesting to reexamine this issue in a year from now, and the year after next.

of salary bonuses has created some frustrations and concerns. The per diem has fostered a new attitude which could put the Project's sustainability at risk, hence the necessity to consider a new system of incentives which is not exclusively based on money.

However, the Project has had some beneficial effects on its environment. It has elicited and maintained the needs for management, planning, sharing of information, etc. It has been able to create a national potential in many areas, foster a spirit of accountability, and even of autonomy. The professional behavior often modeled by the technical advisors was in itself of practical value. Finally, the Project has helped to draw attention to the necessity to involve the local and regional levels.

C. Project Execution

Regarding the overall Project execution, the evaluation team asked three fundamental questions.

1. What were the degree and quality of involvement of the various partners, technical staff and beneficiaries in the implementation, coordination, and management of the Project's activities?

To various degrees, USAID, the technical advisors, the national bureaus and the APEs are all partners in BEEP's implementation. The role played by USAID is no doubt the principal one in the Project execution. USAID finances and approves the technical advisors recruited by ABEL. There is another kind of technical assistance, engaged by local contract recruited by USAID in Bamako and contracted locally, involved in the Project execution (accountant, Koulikoro/FAEF unit, and girls' schooling).

The technical advisors (ABEL or local) design and program the activities along with the Ministry (MEN). The activities are centralized at the level of the BPE, and discussed and adopted in a meeting of the departmental staff. The program of activities is then submitted for approval to USAID (who can accept it or amend it). One can conclude that USAID has a more dominant role in relation to that of the other actors in the Project's execution. This stronger role may weaken the level of authority assumed by the other partners.

The technical advisors (ABEL or local) also play the role of administrative, financial, and technical support. This role, mentioned nowhere in the Project's paper, overlaps the roles of the BPE and those cited earlier by USAID. It is desirable that the technical advisors' role of technical support not be overshadowed by the role of administrative and financial support.

Until September 1992 or January 1993, the BPE, theoretically the coordinator of all Fourth Education Project components, was practically removed from the Project; consequently, implementation was carried out between USAID and the technical advisors located or not in the national bureaus. As far as the National Institute of Pedagogy is concerned, for the In-Service Training and Monitoring and Evaluation components, there is a separation between the Project's activities and the normal activities and divisions of that institution. This represents an attitude which may be detrimental to the sustainability of the achievements of the Project. There is no technical steering committee of the Project which could have lessened the friction if USAID could have given up one of its three roles (that of executor).

2. Do the current activities conform to the overall spirit of the Project?

The answer is yes. The activities within the six components of the Project are able to fulfill the objectives, which are: to improve the quality, the efficiency, and the equity of the educational system in Mali. In spite of the improvement of certain indicators (many more children attend

school, the schooling rate is getting better, the rate of repetition of classes is decreasing, the infrastructures are improved, more teachers are trained in OPO), one can assert that:

- Certain actions are not consistent: e.g. many trained teachers did not have all the pedagogical materials required;
- If the Koulikoro example is in the process of fulfilling the regionalization plan for technical expertise and material possibilities, the national bureaus are still reticent about the decentralization of power and responsibility;
- Instead of alleviating the urban/rural gap, the Project remains largely in the urban and semi urban centers. Limiting itself to regions already favored, the Project will have contributed to widening the gap between the areas of the Project and the rest of Mali.

3. What are the major questions raised when implementing the Project?

They concern, among others:

- the reticence towards the regionalization of responsibilities and authority over the activities of the Project (the determination, on the part of the center, to keep all or most of the power);
- finding a balance between the technical function of the technical advisors on the one hand, and their function as managers (administrative and financial) on the other;
- the professionalism of the teacher trainers -- at the level of the DRE -- and the necessary distinction between the trainers and the evaluators of the teachers (school inspectors); and
- the marginalization of non-project assistance.

D. Equity

BEEP covers four regions: the District of Bamako, and the regions of Koulikoro, Sikasso and Ségou. The Republic of Mali is divided into eight regions plus the District of Bamako. The problems of low enrollment, lack of teaching and learning materials, of insufficient teacher training, insufficient pedagogical support and supervision, and the overburdened school curriculum are all acute throughout the whole national territory. By selecting from the start of the Project already relatively privileged zones for a significant intervention of an integrated set of large scope reforms, while ignoring the rest of the country, BEEP has based its action on an inequity which runs the risk of widening the gap between the regions. In 1987-88 (before BEEP), out of the 1418 schools of the first cycle in the country, 958 were located in the four zones to be covered by the Project. Whereas the region of Koulikoro counted 355 schools in the first cycle in 1987-88, that of Tombouctou counted only 69, Gao's 82, and Mopti's 56. Out of 306,679 first cycle students in the first cycle in 1987-88, 211,301 were in the zones to be covered by the Project. 53,587 students were enrolled in the first cycle in the Koulikoro region, in comparison with 12,023 in Tombouctou, 15,556 in Gao, and 31,528 in Mopti. These figures produce average ratios of 151:1 students per school for Koulikoro, 174:1 for Tombouctou, 190:1 for Gao, and 231:1 for Mopti. The figures remained basically the same four years later, in 1991-92.

The insufficiency in the number of classrooms in these other regions is even more striking if we consider the population density of the remote regions is lower than that of the regions covered by the Project. For the students enrolled in the low density regions, it is easy to conceive that the

distance to cover is significant, and that, without new construction, the non-participation rate at school will be reduced with difficulty.

The evaluation team received only one explanation for the choice of these target zones. The Assistant Director of the BPE determined that the regions of Bamako, Ségou, and Sikasso were selected for two principal reasons: (i) the density and the absolute population figures are higher in these three regions; therefore, the possibility of reaching a greater number of children -- a question of efficiency -- was greater; and (ii) given the obligation imposed by the Fourth Project, just as with BEEP, of reaching a relatively ambitious quantitative objective, it was considered that the best strategy was to concentrate on the activities where progress in education was already beginning. Concerned with the imbalance and inequity inherent to this strategy, USAID tried to catalyze the actions in the other regions through encouraging other donors to intervene, e.g. the Germans in Mopti, the Swiss and UNESCO in Tombouctou, Gao, and in the North, the World Bank in Mopti and in Kayes, and the Canadians throughout the country. BEEP also directed some of its activities towards schools in all regions; in particular, with the distribution of textbooks, the cascade teacher training approach, and the training of the regional directors and inspectors of fundamental education for the whole country while supplying them with training materials.

Nevertheless, by concentrating its efforts in certain zones, the Project has reinforced existing inequalities instead of correcting them. Inequalities were observed also within the zones of the Project, i.e. between urban centers and rural areas. In the urban zones where the mobilization of resources is relatively easier, the FAEF interventions, for example, are much more significant than in the rural zones where there are hardly any resources. It also appears that the impact of the Project is much more visible and more important in the Koulikoro region than in others even though Koulikoro was adopted by the Project later than the other regions. Is it the geographical proximity of Koulikoro near to the center of decision-making -- USAID Mission and the Ministry of Basic Education in Bamako -- that permits easier and greater impact or lessons learned from the experience acquired with the first zones? There is no easy answer.

The principal question which concerned the evaluation team regarding equity is the following: do the measures and interventions undertaken by the Project to ensure equity in the educational system support the reaching of this objective? Regarding Non-Project Assistance, the obligation on the part of the Government of Mali to control better the flow of students entering the secondary and higher education institutions, as a condition for the allocation of installments, would appear to favor the fundamental education by supplying it with more financial and human resources. On the other hand, the measure promoting private education for a broadening of the education base does not raise any problem in the urban centers; there many parents fully understand the need for schooling and can raise the income to finance the schools and the education of their children. But in the rural areas, the parents are sometimes hostile about schooling as much for their sons as for their daughters. To favor the broadening of the base of education by the expansion of the private schools leads, in the absence of the habit of paying for education, to benefiting the urban centers over the rural areas. (Already a greater demand for education in an urban area favors the mobilization of more resources -- 25 per cent of the FAEF funds of the Koulikoro region were transferred to the District of Bamako.) With the possible mobilization of resources to finance the schools, FAEF has renovated many more classrooms in the urban areas than in the rural ones.

The double session school day, which is soon to be generalized in spite of a great reticence on the part of teachers, also raises an issue of equity in its current practice. The Project anticipated teacher training to address the double session strategy in the classrooms, a reform of the programs, along with the furnishing of classrooms with lighting to prolong classes after sundown. But none of these accompanying measures were carried out. In the case of double sessions-- when there are two groups per day for one teacher -- the teacher takes one group of students in the morning and another in the afternoon, or each group every other week. In the absence of a specific program, the teacher is obliged to reduce the normal program. Isn't it true that children who receive only

part of the program part time are penalized in comparison with those who receive the classes normally full time?

As another example, FAEF/USAID intervenes only for the renovations. If the renovations indeed improve the work conditions of both teachers and students, and therefore increase the performance of the education system, new constructions allow the school attendance of many more children. Even though USAID acknowledged that renovations involve reparation to totally collapsed classrooms, it cannot be ignored that the action is limited to populations already served by the system, albeit often insufficiently.

The Project also foresees the community's support where its members would involve themselves directly in the management of their schools. In practice, the community intervention in school management is exclusively limited to a participation in new construction and renovation so as to supply the necessary counterpart contribution to release the FAEF funds. All other school management details are left to the school administration and the teachers. The parents have no real say in which programs, training, or school they would like for their children. Even the classrooms they are helping to build are conceived without their consideration.

For reasons of equity, one of the conditions of the Project was to increase the State budget in favor of basic education. At least 25 per cent of the State budget was to be devoted to education, and the part for basic education was to grow gradually from 35 to 45 per cent between 1989 and 1994. The public education expenses increased between 1988 and 1992, from CFA Francs 17.4 billion in 1987 to 24.2 billion in 1992, i.e. an average annual increase of 8.6 per cent. The first cycle of the fundamental education received 38 per cent from the Project in 1992 whereas higher education received 20 per cent. If we consider that the first cycle of the fundamental education includes 80 per cent of the Malian school enrollments, and the higher education only one per cent, then the percentages of the budget allocated to each raise an equity issue; even if, in absolute terms, the part allocated to the second cycle of the fundamental education has increased.

The enrollment rates still remain low in Mali. In 1990-91, out of 1,354,205 children of school age, only 350,553 (25 per cent) actively went to school. But a gradual increase of the enrollment rate has been noted in the zones covered in the Project, as evident in the following figures:

- In 1986-87, 75,803 students were enrolled in the first year, 47,368 boys and 28,435 girls.
- In 1990-91, these figures go to 84,477, 53,128 boys and 31,349 girls. And in 1992-92, to 91,839, 56,322 boys and 35,517 girls.
- In 1986-87, out of the 75,803 students enrolled in the first year, 62,577 went on to the second year.
- In 1990-91, out of 84,477 students in the first year, 76,735 went on to the second year. In 1986-87, there were 29,252 students in the sixth grade (end of the first cycle), of which 18,877 boys and 10,375 girls. In 1990-91, they were 29,351 in the sixth grade, 19,183 boys and 10,168 girls. In 1991-92, they were 33,737 in the sixth year 21,988 boys and 11,749 girls.

The recruitment rate has increased by 10 per cent on average in the areas of the Project. But it is difficult to ascertain affirmatively that this is due uniquely to the Project. Aside from USAID/FAEF renovations, there was new construction and renovation by the World Bank-sponsored Fourth Project, and the Canadian program (Amadou Toumani Touré schools). An increase in the girls' participation rate was also observed in the areas covered by the Project, but in the absence of indicators of impact, it is not possible to assert that this increase is the result of the actions initiated by the Girls' Schooling Cell. Much before the beginning of the component,

actions had been undertaken in some regions to increase girls' schooling (i.e., Sikasso); the component started at the beginning of the 1992-93 school year, which means there are no available figures for a valid comparison. But it is known that, in 1987-88, 29,596 girls were enrolled in the first year. In 1988-89, this figure went up to 30,124, in 1989-90, it dropped to 29,622, to come back up in 1990-91, to 31,349, and in 1992-93, to 35,517.

If the regionalization, anticipated by the Project, had been effective, a widening of the basic education would have undoubtedly been possible, especially in the rural areas. In the current situation, everything is centralized in Bamako (except for Koulikoro to a certain extent), and a resistance has been observed at the center in the design of a regionalization implementation strategy. But is it realistic to share the authority, and especially the accountability, without the necessary resources? For the moment, the regional pedagogical centers, the regional centers of the Ministry, the management information system and the activities of monitoring and evaluation are not yet in place at the level of the DREs.

E. Quality

Two major questions were asked by the evaluation team members about the quality of the program and the implementation of BEEP.

1. What influence does the Project have on the quality of teaching?

The quality of education is the result of many factors, such as the class atmosphere, the program content, the teaching methodology, the condition of school sites, adequate furniture, and teaching competency.

The Monitoring and Evaluation component attempts to measure the quality level of basic education in the areas covered by BEEP through an evaluation of various influencing factors. Should the indicators selected all be positive, the conclusion could be drawn too quickly about a better quality of education than is the case.

The issue can be assessed further through an examination of the coherence of the interventions and the presence of a systemic approach. Training the teachers without the necessary teaching material and distributing the textbooks without the teacher's guide (indispensable in this case) showed the presence of positive indicators (the books were indeed distributed and the teachers trained). But, without coordination, one cannot conclude that there was a truly improved quality of instruction or learning.

The indicators which take into account the successful examinations of the first cycle are useful, but the question needs to be raised as to what is due specifically to the Project. Some external reasons at school may explain certain variations, both favorable and unfavorable: the socio-economic factors related to learning are especially not taken into account by the Monitoring and Evaluation component.

2. What is the relationship between the criteria for assessing the quality of education and the social priorities to which the Project subscribes?

The criteria which are capable of assessing the internal quality of the education must still find external validation, such as a better performance in the social and economic life. In other words, does the fundamental school really prepare the student to perform what will be expected of him or her, once he or she becomes an active member of the Malian society? Getting a degree is certainly a measure of success. But does it ease one's adaptation to one's environment or open the door to a degree in higher education? It is, therefore, important to clarify the aims of fundamental education and the expected profile of a student at the end of the first cycle. The work of the Ministry of Basic

Education, together with UNESCO, in August 1993 (mentioned earlier), focused on that kind of definition in the national conferences for the three levels of education fundamental, secondary, and tertiary. The Project must therefore pay attention to the decisions made for the testing of the external validity of the selected criteria of quality chosen. Moreover, it has been proven that pedagogical interventions are not sufficient for improving student performance. A student not suffering from malnutrition certainly learns better than the one who was not able to eat before arriving to school in the morning. Therefore elementary conditions for access to education -- the cognitive and physical pre-requisites and foundation for learning -- should not be overlooked when articulating criteria for assessing school quality, for example, in assessing the installation of school cafeterias.

F. Efficiency

The issue of efficiency may be examined at several levels:

- the influence of BEEP procedures on its management;
- the impact of the Project on the realization of the indicators;
- the validity and relevance of the indicators; and
- the impact of the Project on the governmental initiative of decentralization,⁷¹ and the sustainability of the results gained.

The first point, *the influence of the Project's procedures on management of BEEP* as regards the various departments of the Ministry where the components work, contains positive and negative aspects. Regarding the negative aspects, we noted the disbursement procedures and the instability of the methods for programming the activities affecting the implementation of the Project's components. Similarly, the coordination procedures have not been really formalized. At the level of USAID, this observation is evident in the fact that five supervision and decision steps exist -- the offices of BEEP, Control, Management, Programs, and Contracts. Moreover, the involvement of the ABEL and USAID technical advisors, the Bureau of Management, and the Bureau of Control in the daily management of the Project's activities seems to have compromised verification procedures of USAID. This should grow even more cumbersome when adding the functions of the BPE.

Regarding the positive effects of the Project on the efficiency of the Ministry departments concerned, first of all the evaluators observed a transfer of new management procedures by the technical advisors and the technical training of their Malian colleagues. One example is the introduction of computers in the daily management of activities of the beneficiaries, which has lightened the work load of a few offices involved with routine tasks. The Project also helped promote a steering committee for the education sector. This idea now seems to have been taken seriously. Finally, the evaluation team observed the appearance of an increased acceptance in favor of the planning of rational management and integrated budgeting.

For the second point, *the influence of the Project on the realization of the indicators*, it is difficult to separate the influence of the Project from other interventions in the education sector. For

⁷¹ -- The decentralization policy of the Ministry of National Education is being designed within the framework of the law on decentralization in Mali. The decentralization of the Project's activities is facing the tardiness in the publication of the work of the Delegation for Decentralization of the Ministry of the Interior, anticipated for 1994. Consequently the decentralization of the Project's activities is currently faced with an absence of institutional framework. This explains, in part, why the BEEP regionalization objectives have not been reached.

example, already favorable tendencies existed before the Project (e.g. community support), which have been encouraged or accentuated. Moreover, BEEP intervenes within the framework of the Fourth Education Consolidation Project where several partners are involved. The actions of the Project are best felt in the Koulikoro region, which seems to have experienced more concrete results than the other zones of the Project.

Certain indicators, i.e. school books or in-service training in Operational Pedagogic Objectives (OPO), can best be attributed to BEEP's intervention. The development of indicators can be appreciated in the programming table on indicator performance in Annex F of this report. However, it is important to have a more thorough research at this level for determining the extent of BEEP's part in the modification of larger tendencies of the indicators present in the table.

The validity and the relevance of the indicators chosen is debatable. As was stated in the analytical section of the Monitoring and Evaluation component, BEEP's official indicators are much more revealing of the Project's success than of the overall progress in the fundamental education sector in Mali. The evidence of these indicators' significance is limited for several reasons. First, the exclusion of extracurricular or socioeconomic factors may obscure certain key elements in identifying the students' or schools' success and attribute too much importance to other factors being considered. Furthermore, the realization of some indicators does not really permit the inference that the educational situation has improved, and even less so attributes gains directly to the interventions of the Project. The choice of indicators may also bias the analysis of the Project if it is limited to issues of internal quality. Without taking into account the external performance associated with pedagogical actions, one cannot ensure a positive influence at the level of schools on the life of a child after school, in his or her family or in his or her community.

The impossibility of determining the success of the Project by the indicators reached should not in itself lead to a total questioning of BEEP's interventions. BEEP indicators are valid, but not sufficient. There must be an integration of indicators relative to planning, to the improvement of management, and to the desire and capacity of the beneficiaries in order to conduct the Project and reach the expected results. In short, there must be indicators capable of detailing BEEP's strategic objectives, as well as those of the Fourth Education Project and the Government of Mali especially.

Regarding the impact of the Project on the governmental initiative of decentralization and on the sustainability of the results gained, through several strategies BEEP and the Fourth Education Project generally set the stage for the decentralization of the management of basic education. The support of the establishment of various institutionalized structures within the Ministry constitutes an important approach that the Government reinforces by a considerable contribution (i.e., regional FAEF units and the Center of In-Service Training), or by parallel actions (the Girls' Schooling Cells). For some of the components, the Project's technical assistance program seriously undertakes to reinforce the institutional capacity of the Ministry with the transfer of technical competence and management to the national counterparts appointed to the central divisions of the Ministry. Except in the case of Koulikoro, these actions on behalf of the decentralized agencies, are evidently insufficient.

The decentralization and perspective of sustainability of the educational activities promoted by BEEP are at an embryonic stage, as a complement, having surpassed intentions only in the case of Koulikoro. Means must be allocated on the regional and local levels so that these BEEP initiatives can be actively operational. It would be important that the Government of Mali make a political choice in favor of decentralization. This process seems to have begun.

CHAPTER V FUTURE DIRECTIONS ("RECOMMENDATIONS")

The evaluation team considered eight future directions for the Project. They were suggested to USAID and the Ministry of Basic Education as recommendations subject to discussion and modification with the priorities to be negotiated by the two parties. The team was very sensitive to the limitations of its role in the assessment of the Project and the design of recommendations for the following stages. As a result of using the fourth-generation evaluation methodology, the many partners shared a diversity of opinions regarding the past and future of the Project. The team found that it was neither possible nor desirable for the team to take on the responsibility of tracing the future directions of the Project. But, through the expression of the major ideas and priorities which the partners involved in BEEP had the opportunity to share with the team, it is hoped that a discussion between the key actors will lead to precise recommendations and strategies based on consensus. In that sense, the evaluation team sees its work as a catalyst for a joint reflection and planning between USAID and the Government of Mali.

1. Financing Alternatives

There are essentially two levels of financing alternatives: (i) private initiatives by the communities; and (ii) USAID and the other sponsors. Regarding private participation in the rural areas, one must differentiate between a communal financing initiative and between other typical national sources, public funds and funds from private entrepreneurs. This distinction proves important in the light of stimulating more participation on the part of communities at the financial level, and in particular, in the management of their schools. For the time being, the concept of a third form of school administration -- the community school -- is quite foreign to the vast majority of the municipalities. Certain actions are necessary, including the following:

- i. clarify the concept of the basic school or community school;
- ii. promote specific efforts leaning towards the concept of the community school. (The APE contribution should probably be separated from the Regional and Local Development Tax);
- iii. involve the school in other community development actions likely to generate resources and sustain actions connected with the management of local educational institutions; and
- iv. provide direct assistance designed to reinforce community responsibility concerning strategic management and school financing.

It is also suggested that more resources be devoted to the areas of education financing, school environment, education research, and non-formal education. In this proposal, special emphasis should be devoted to defining a new approach to schooling, a new concept of education, assuring adequate financial means to ensure technical support, and to develop pilot projects.

Regarding the donors, more promising options ought to be explored regarding the development of the fundamental education system. Two suggestions emerge: (i) prompt the sponsors and donors to direct their efforts to government initiatives; and (iii) develop a new AHP strategy, based on actions defined in the structural adjustment.

2. USAID Support in the Definition of a New Education Strategy

The current efforts led by the Malian authorities to clarify the purpose of the entire educational system should be a central focus of USAID in order to bring about the necessary logistical support this work demands. Such support might include technical assistance needed to define what is expected of both students and teachers at the end of the fundamental cycle. Similarly, support would be useful in the creation, planning, financing, and distribution of new programs, both formal and informal. Finally, USAID could serve as a catalyst (together with UNESCO, which has already devoted resources) in order to encourage the other sponsors to consider the initial discussions and the forthcoming development of a new vision of education in Mali.

3. Structural Adjustment

The evaluation mission proposes that the Government of Mali and USAID begin contemplating the following recommendations concerning the structural adjustment program:

- i. They should consider abandoning unrealistic, and therefore unworkable conditionalities. A rigorous review of these conditionalities is advisable.
- ii. They should revise those conditionalities which penalize basic education. The conditionalities system, and especially the liaison between certain conditionalities concerning other sectors or other levels of education (secondary and higher education) must not impede the expansion of basic education expansion or its financing. On the contrary, the conditionalities must promote its expansion.
- iii. They should authorize the recruitment of new teachers of basic education. Given its importance, the recruitment must be delegated at the level of the sector as is the case in Senegal and in Burkina Faso. To refuse is to jeopardize all schooling efforts. Likewise the early retirement of basic education teachers is equally damaging and should be ended. The policies affecting temporary employees also warrant careful study.
- iv. The design of new conditionalities merits full collaboration of efforts between the Government and the donors. Recent history suggests that the donors have been imposing the requirements. Despite the pretense of choice, the Government of Mali is actually obliged to defer to the conditions of the donors. Given the history of this relationship, it is advisable that both the Government of Mali and the donors commit themselves to a thorough examination of these requirements.

4. Construction

The current USAID policy not to finance new construction contradicts the chief objective of the Project to increase enrollment in the fundamental education system, especially in the least privileged areas of the country. The team has appreciated -- both in terms of quality and quantity -- the renovation of the school buildings that has occurred, often so dilapidated that they are no longer functional. The team does not propose that this area of intervention be abandoned. But, given the equity objectives and their major impact on the broadening of the educational base, USAID should also finance new classroom and school construction.

5. Decentralization and Regionalization

Because the democratization of education and the autonomy of the regions hinges on decentralization, the evaluation team recommends that USAID budget adequate funds in its education support program to help the regions assume responsibility for managing their schools, and reorient these actions by acting in parallel, not in subordination, with the center (MEB) and, consequently, perform a service role rather than a management one.

6. Establishment of a Steering Committee for the Basic Education Expansion Project

As mentioned in the initial Project Paper, the coordination of the Project will be handled by the Bureau of Education Projects. Memorandum No. 0573/Ministry of National Education/CAB dated 17 March, 1992, reminded each bureau of its responsibility to select an official to coordinate the Project's activities within the bureau and serve as a member of the Monitoring Committee. This decision, once applied, will allow an official representative of each department to serve as its sole representative in the meetings and activities of the new committee.

The necessity of establishing a Project Steering Committee became evident when evaluating individual components. The mission of the committee will be:

- i. to direct, prioritize, coordinate, supervise and monitor BEEP's activities and procedures;
- ii. to ensure the consistency between programs and strategies of the Project and of the Government; and
- iii. to examine the Quarterly Report of the Project's state of progress.

The Steering Committee will be governed by the BPE and will include a representative from each regional bureau involved in the Project, the regional directors of education of the zones of the Project, and a USAID representative.

At the regional level, a Monitoring Committee including the DRE, the APEs, and the teachers should also be set up.

7. Continue the Program of Technical Assistance to the Components

USAID should continue its technical assistance to the various components being implemented by consultants. This proposal comes especially from the Malian counterparts involved in these interventions, who expressed a few reservations and two preconditions:

- i. the terms of reference of all consultants and components should be redefined in order to emphasize the primary importance of regionalization;
- ii. for each individual component, recommendations from the present evaluation should be taken seriously into account; even if not all are applied, they constitute the basis of an enlightened discussion between the consultant, his or her immediate Malian colleagues, USAID, and the Malian officials involved in order to lead to a consensual redefinition of the goals desired (immediate and long-term), essential strategies, relevant indicators, and an implementation plan for the continuation of the activities.

Four principles for the continuation of this assistance are suggested:

- i. the chief responsibility of the consultant is the transfer of skills, especially technical competence;
- ii. the consultant must limit his or her role as a technician and not as a decision-maker, as such responsibility is reserved to the Malian personnel involved in each component;
- iii. in the Project's budget, and for each component, distinct statements must be presented to show the cost of technical assistance, separate from other Project expenses; this principle would ensure an open style of management and would allow mutual agreements, i.e., between USAID and the Ministry -- on a fair division between these two areas of expenditure in terms of the component objectives and the available resources; and
- iv. USAID and the BPE should jointly assess each consultant, considering as the primary criterion the transfer of technical expertise to the immediate Malian colleagues and other Malian staff involved.

8. Extension of the Project

The evaluation team was obliged to notice that the regions affected by the Project are those which have always been the subject of project interventions involving the educational sector. If this is justified by the density of the population and the strong demand for education in these zones, it would still be necessary to assume responsibility for the very pressing needs of the other regions and thus avoid the creation of a dearth of education in the most underprivileged and forsaken regions. Hence the possibilities of future frustrations carrying the seed of many dangers. To avoid this, the evaluation team strongly recommends the extension of the Project to all the regions of Mali.

CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION

USAID's Basic Education Enhancement Project (BEEP) has quite obviously contributed positively to primary education in Mali in many ways. Among the more obvious of the impacts are: (i) the basic in-service training of nearly 7000 primary school teachers and of the country's entire corps of regional directors and inspectors; (ii) the renovation of over 400 classrooms; (iii) increased girls' participation rates in the Project's zone of intervention; (iv) improved collection, processing and analysis of basic school data; (v) the institution of a standardized national testing capacity and broader monitoring and evaluation competencies; (vi) the nationwide distribution of reading texts in grades one and two; and (vii) the overall improvement of the capacity within targetted divisions of the Ministry to plan, manage, implement and evaluate sectoral initiatives. (See Annex F.) These activities have all occurred within the joint framework of the Malian Education Reform and the World Bank-sponsored Fourth Education Project.

Despite these considerable successes, it is difficult to conclude that the Project has had a systemic or lasting impact on schooling and education in Mali. Some of the reasons for this situation are attributed in the present report to design or implementation flaws. Most, however, may be associated with contextual circumstances, both associated with the start-up and structural elements of USAID's management of BEEP, and with the social and political changes and turmoil experienced by Mali over the past three years. It is also relevant to say that four years of project implementation are hardly adequate to resolve a problem as entrenched and pervasive as that of education in Mali.

Considering this fact especially, the contributions of the Project stand out all the more as noteworthy. The challenge of USAID, with the Government of Mali, now seems to be to exploit the strengths or promise of the Project in a manner that can assure their lasting nature and their further evolution in directions not yet satisfied, either by individual Project components or by the overall effort. Perhaps what the Project has shown best is that if sufficient resources and quality technical support are provided, dedicated, fully competent Malian agents will emerge from within the Ministry of Education to help make better education happen. But how does this process of improvement continue without the possibility of the sort of supplemental resources (US\$20 million) associated with the USAID intervention? Neither the Monitoring and Evaluation, the In-Service Training, nor the Girls' Schooling operations of the Ministry will be able to maintain even close to their present levels of activity without continued USAID (or other donor) support.

A few aspects of the Project stood out for the evaluators as inhibiting the full and lasting impact of the Project's contributions on Mali's fundamental education system. The first of these is the design and implementation of the Project as essentially a discrete set of strategies, modelled in this regard faithfully after the World Bank's Fourth Education Project. Although some overlap or coherence was observed between certain components, for the most part, the Project does not involve a systemic approach. The opportunity to reinforce a set of gains made by one component (e.g., increased girls enrollment) is generally not exploited by actions programmed within another component, especially by undertaking some manner of sustained complementary action. (The exception to this is the Monitoring and Evaluation component, which exists primarily as a complementary effort, to monitor the other components and to provide prescriptive evaluations.) Similarly, the accomplishments of one component may be diminished by the failure to plan and execute (whether at all or just in a timely manner) necessary complementary strategies; such as the distribution of school manuals without the teacher's guide. This argument also extends beyond the school-bound scenario to include a purposeful choice by the Project not to consider non-school

factors as they relate to student performance, whether it be a matter of keeping girls in school or of understanding how a child's home environment -- physical or cognitive -- affects his/her ability to learn French in the classroom. There is no expectation within this evaluation that USAID tackle the entire education system with the Project. Yet any interventions should (a) be designed with a complete understanding of what the existing system is and (b) integrate its own components in a systemic manner. (The recommendation to help communities undertake to manage their schools -- the FAEF objective -- by first helping them manage a more typical community activity is consistent with this theme.)

The second adverse aspect of the Project that stood out for the evaluators was the frailty of strategic communication links; representing the implementation side of the weak systemic approach described above. Collaboration and cooperation was seen to be constrained horizontally between USAID and the Ministry, as well as between different units within the Ministry, and even reported to a certain degree between the different components of the Project. This was observed and reported to occur vertically both within the hierarchy of the central Ministry and between the center, the regions and the localities, as well as between the Mission and the Project's technical assistants. The reasons for the regular "static" on these lines are many. Many can be related to structural and cultural characteristics, particularly as they pertain to internal MEN lines of communication. Some were explained by Project participants as having to do with idiosyncratic management techniques. Finally, the regularly changing roster of collaborators, especially in the Government, confounded the many efforts to establish regular, convivial relations between the Mission/Project and the Ministry. The absence of a consistent formal institutional authority for the Ministry to represent the Government's interests in the Project -- such as suggested with a Steering Committee (*Comité de Pilotage*) -- exacerbated this situation. Establishing these lines of communication is seen as fundamental and crucial to the positive evolution of the Project and, more importantly, of Mali's fundamental education system; although there is no mistaken expectation that this will be easy.

A third unfavorable aspect of the Project's current configuration and execution is the varying inability of the components to move beyond rhetoric to implementation in achieving USAID's and the Ministry's regionalization objective. Plans exist and initial training and the purchase of equipment have occurred in some cases; for example with Monitoring and Evaluation and Education Management Information Systems. The Girls' Schooling component has even engaged in joint efforts with regional counterparts, as has the In-Service Training component through its cascade approach (although these strategies have been shown to have their own flaws). Yet, for the most part, the Project remains a centrally managed and designed initiative, diminishing the potential positive impact on the national education system in a few ways. For one, a centrally located technical staff is able to reach many fewer schools or other target groups than will their regional counterparts, due to greater distances, smaller numbers or more limited transport opportunities. Two, regional staff are usually more alert to particular local situations, able to customize national strategies or initiatives for more effective outcomes. Three, regionalization seems to possess the greatest potential for Project sustainability, as (i) more people will have been trained who will have the skills to continue the particular work, and the interest to do so, (ii) the regions possess greater budget expenditure flexibility, allowing them to invest more readily in research, promotion, training or other initiatives even after the Project's eventual demise, and (iii) the regions appear better placed than the central technical divisions to affect the priorities of the national education budget. Other benefits are discussed in the body of the report. There are surely detriments to regionalization, such as greater variety in quality and a loss of central control over implementation and accountability, but these issues can be addressed directly in a regionalization strategy.

A fourth shortcoming observed by the evaluation team was the apparent disjuncture between the Project and the Ministry's Education Reform objectives and program. Given the almost routine changes of major partners on the side of MEB, the Ministry seems to have very little sense of ownership, or even of strong affiliation, as regards the Project; whereas those individual sections

and regions (especially Koulikoro), that are directly involved in and affected by the Project, and specifically by individual Project components, do express and demonstrate a strong engagement. An important element of the situation described here can be explained as the Government's inability to concentrate adequately on a technical education agenda, with so many changes of key ministerial officials and with such a volatile socio-political context. It is not reasonable, nor do the evaluators wish, to criticize the Government for its courageous struggle to introduce democracy; yet, until this situation reaches some sort of stability, at least within a part of the sector, the prognosis for a lasting progress is unlikely. The Bureau of Education Projects (BPE) could have provided this sort of constancy, and there is increasing hope it will do so, but so far it has neither benefitted from consistent direction of its own nor from the full collaboration of USAID or the technical divisions of the Ministry. The existence of a Project Steering Committee could also have served this purpose, if it existed and was assured adequate legislative or formal ministerial authority. Until the Project becomes an integral part of the Ministry's Reform program, both implementation and sustainability will be problematic. BEEP indicators may be met, but a lasting impact upon the national education system will not be likely.

The reasons for these shortcomings are only truly important within the context of a formative evaluation insofar as they pertain to options for their remediation. The evaluation team felt that the most prominent of these was the absence of consistent, complete collaboration between USAID, the Ministry and the other international donor partners. With four different governments and ministries with which to plan and cooperate over a three-year period, coherence and continuity have basically been impossible. This situation was exacerbated by the uneven management and coordination performed by the Ministry's Education Project Bureau (BPE). Another important apparent reason for the shortcomings of some of the components was the lack of integration of some of the Project's activities with the responsibilities and primary concerns of the intended Malian counterpart division; perhaps most evident with the much-criticized collaboration between the Project's Education Management Information Systems initiative and the host Division of Administration and Finance.

Finally, the evaluators identified another major reason for the Project's shortcomings to be USAID's strong focus on its part of the Fourth Education Project, BEEP, rather than on a broader, systemic national education reform strategy articulated by the Government. BEEP emphasized efforts to execute the specific Project components in the regional target areas, paying less attention to the integration of these initiatives, both fully and institutionally, into the Ministry's or even into regional education efforts. An example of this is the unique focus of the Monitoring and Evaluation component's annual report on BEEP activities, not considering non-Project initiatives. In this regard, the data-gathering efforts of the Education Management Information Systems component are more consistent with a program designed to serve the needs of the whole Ministry. This observation is not a matter of attributing blame. Such integration was effectively proscribed by the absence of a clear policy or definition by the Government pertaining to its national education priorities and interventions. The absence of blame does not, however, eliminate the effects of the situation.

Now the focus of both USAID and the Ministry is on moving the Project forward. In some cases this involves evolving from progress that has already been achieved (particularly for Monitoring and Evaluation, In-Service Training, and the FAEF programs) and in other cases requiring a more thorough re-assessment of the component's and overall Project's objectives, strategies and criteria for success (particularly for the Girls' Schooling and Education Management Information Systems initiatives). Three major steps constitute the strategy that the evaluation team proposes to launch this process. These may be taken as more general to the eight future directions presented in Chapter 5. Additionally, it is understood that these steps may result in a different set of (or modified) future directions than those offered by the team. If this is the result, so be it.

1. **USAID and the Ministry must collaborate closely and in full partnership to articulate a joint set of objectives and strategies, and to prioritize these for the Project within the broader context of the National Education Reform and other donors' initiatives. Program implementation will require similar unity of purpose and action, predicated upon full communication and sharing of decision-making authority as regards the Project. A critical precursor to this is the articulation of clear objectives and priorities within a coherent national education reform agenda by MEB.**
2. **The regionalization objective must occur as the top Project priority, represented as such both in the strategic plans for the individual components and the overall Project, and in the Project budget. The timing of this must be rational -- e.g., assigning vehicles to the regions in a manner and schedule that are consistent with the implementation of an operative Project plan -- and speedy.**
3. **Systemic linkages must be introduced into the Project, bringing logistical, theoretical and practical coherence to (i) the different BEEP components, (ii) the components and their associated national Reform strategies, and (iii) the overall Project and the Ministry's comprehensive Reform Plan. These linkages must be planned and monitored; another function for a Project (or Reform) Steering Committee.**

The evaluators believe that the most important finding of the evaluation is that the Project has evolved without adequate communication among the key partners; sometimes due to poor program design, sometimes due to useful opportunism, and probably most often due to the unfortunate vagaries of social and political change. There is no pretension by the present evaluators that they have been able to discern all the successes and shortcomings of the Basic Education Enhancement Project, and even less confidence that full and fair reasons have been provided for all these situations. The "Future Directions" of Chapter 5 are only called "recommendations" because these are routinely expected of a formal formative evaluation.

However, the only firm recommendation that the evaluation team will propose with strong conviction is that USAID and the Ministry step away from the present Project and discuss together where they wish to go with the Education Reform and USAID's supportive role in this ambitious effort. Hopefully, the present evaluation can serve as a satisfactory catalyst for this extended discussion. The main purposes of the present report have been to try to (i) identify the most salient issues relating to the Project, articulated by the many partners, and (ii) present the divergent relevant viewpoints on these matters. If some of these have served to generate frank discussion among the different Fourth Education Project partners, then the evaluators have accomplished one of their major objectives. If the error of emphasizing some voices over others was made, the subsequent discussions between the full-time partners can re-establish a more proper balance.

Six people worked for four weeks to understand and say intelligent things about a Project that has involved directly surely well over forty people operating within a very challenging environment for four years. The resulting report does not (cannot) hold THE TRUTH. Rather, it presents a group of professional outsiders' views of the Project's design, implementation and monitoring, as well as of how most of the relevant insiders perceive these same issues. The true evaluation of BEEP is just begin. A set of ideas is on the table. Let the collaboration resume!

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Banque Mondiale/ACDI, "République du Mali: Revue des dépenses Publiques d'Education, 1987-1992," juin 1993.

Banque Mondiale, "République du Mali, Projet de Consolidation du Secteur Education."

BEEP (voir les pages suivantes)
(see following pages)

Diambomba, Miala, "La Réforme Scolaire au Mali: Essai d'Analyse des Facteurs qui Atténuent ses Résultats," Faculté des Sciences de l'Education, Université Laval, No. 15, mai 1980.

Guba, Egon G. & Lincoln, Yvonna S., Fourth Generation Evaluation, 1989.

Guba, Egon G. & Lincoln, Yvonna S., "The Countenances of Fourth-Generation Evaluation: Description, Judgement, and Negotiation."

Institut Pédagogique National, "Suivi et Evaluation du IV Projet Education -- Plan d'Action Annuel, Année Scolaire 1992-93."

Institut Pédagogique National, "Suivi et Evaluation du Projet de Développement de l'Education de Base, IV Projet Education -- Etude Qualitative, Année Scolaire 1992-93."

Lai, Morris K., "Field-based Concerns about Fourth-Generation Evaluation Theory," Paper Presented at the annual meeting of the American Education Research Association, Chicago, Curriculum Research and Development Group, College of Education, University of Hawai'i, 4 April 1991.

Mariko, Modibo, "Rapport de l'Atelier de Formation à la Méthode Accélérée de Recherche Participative (MARP), Equipe de Suivi et Evaluation de l'IPN, Bamako du 17 février au 15 mars 1993."

Morch, Axel, "Création d'une Ecole pour les Enfants Sourds au Mali -- Rapport d'Activités," juin 1993.

Projet ABEL, "Rapport Annuel, 1992."

Projet ABEL, "ABEL/Mali Quarterly Report, January - March 1993 --M&E, E/MIS, & RSA Components."

USAID/Mali, "Project Grant Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mali ("Cooperating Country") and the United States of America Acting through the Agency for International Development ("A.I.D.") for Basic Education Expansion," 30 August 1989.

USAID/Mali, "Amendment No. 1 to the Project Grant Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mali and the United States of America Acting through the Agency for International Development ("A.I.D.") for Basic Education Expansion," 27 August 1991.

USAID/Mali, "Amendment No. 2 to the Project Grant Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mali and the United States of America Acting through the Agency for International Development ("A.I.D.") for Basic Education Expansion," 31 December 1992.

USAID/Mali, "Amendment No. 3 to the Project Grant Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mali and the United States of America for Basic Education Expansion -- Draft," August 1993.

USAID/Mali, "Extrait de l'Avenant du Projet de Développement de l'Education de Base, Projet No. 688-0257."

USAID/Mali, "Mali Basic Education PAAD and Project Paper."

White-Henry, Freda, "Notes on Mali's Basic Education Expansion Project, Draft for Discussion," 26 April, 1993.

11

ANNEX A

112.

ANNEX A

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE BEEP PROJECT

AI/USAID

Ali Cissé	Adjoint, Projet BEEP
Medjomo Coulibaly	Responsable d'Education, Bureau Régional à Abidjan
Boubacar Diarra	Directeur de Cabinet Education
Dr. Freda White Henry	Responsable du Programme Education
Chahine Rassekh	Administrateur, Projet BEEP
George Thompson	Directeur Général

Au Ministère de l'Enseignement de Base à Bamako

Gaye Boubacar	Chef de la Division Formation, IPN
Moussa Soussin Dembélé	Direction Nationale de l'Alphabétisation Fonctionnelle et de Linguistique Appliquée
Mamadou Y. Diakité	Directeur Adjoint, Cellule de Planification et de Statistiques
Mme Fatoumata Camara Diallo	Ministre de l'Education de Base
Amadou Dao	Cellule de Planification et de Statistiques
Abou Diarra	Directeur Adjoint, IPN
Boubacar Diarra	Directeur du Cabinet
Idrissa Diarra	Chercheur, Division de la Recherche et des Innovations Pédagogiques, IPN (homologue, volet suivi et évaluation)
Mohamed Kanté	Directeur Adjoint, BPE
Abou Bakar Konaté	Direction Administrative et Financière
Fadjigui Konaté	Directeur, Direction Nationale de l'Enseignement Fondamental
Souleymane Koné	Directeur Adjoint, Direction Nationale de l'Enseignement Fondamental
Abdoulaye Ky	Ancien Directeur, IPN
Ario Maïga	Chef de la Section Formation Continue (homologue, volet formation continue)
Lamine Malé	Directeur, IPN
Simpara Mariam Ongoïba	Conseiller Technique
Mme Yakharé Soumano	Responsable Cellule Nationale de Scolarisation des Filles, DNEF (homologue, volet scolarisation des filles)
Adama Sy	Direction Nationale de l'Enseignement Fondamental
Barthélémy Togo	Directeur Général, BPE
Abdou Touré	Direction Administrative et Financière

Ministère du Travail et de la Fonction Publique

Fodé Coumaré	Consultant, Commissariat à la Réforme Administrative
--------------	--

Du Projet BEEP

John Ennis	Coordinateur, Projet ABEL
Bernard Gagné	Conseiller Technique à la Section Formation Continue de l'IPN

Issa Koné
Korotoumou Konfé

Nseka Vita
James Toliver

A Koulikoro

Lassiné Bagayoko
Karamoko Berthé
Abdoulaye Coulibaly
Seydou Coulibaly
Yacouba Coulibaly
Mme Coulibaly Sadio Diaby
Bâ Diakité
Mary Diarra
Sekou Oumar Dicko
Hamidou Gambi
Modibo Goumané
Djigui Keïta
Mamadi M. Keïta
Binkoro Koné
Mamadou Konta
Mamadou Soumaré
Mohamed Nanakassé
Mamadou Timité
Mamadou Lamine Traoré

A Ségou

Souleymane Camara
Beydi Coulibaly
Djibril Coulibaly
Mamadou Coulibaly
Zana Coulibaly
Adama Dagnon
Ousmane Diakité
Souleymane Diakité
Abdoulaye Baba Diarra
Mme Barry Adama Diarra
Mme Dakouo Haoua Diarra
Kalmé H. Diaw
Alhousséni Dicko
Souleymane Doucouré
Sibiri Doumbia

Mme Fané Mafounè Fané
Amadoiu Guidjilaye
Bréhima Kanté
Mme Koné Aïssata Keïta
Mme Diarra Sama Christine Koné
Mme Niang Tata Koné

Yoro Koné
Mme Mariko Niélé dite

Gestionnaire Financier, Projet BEEP/BPE
Conseiller Technique, Scolarisation des Filles, Projet BEEP
Consultant, SGI/E, Projet ABEL
Conseiller Technique à la DRE Koulikoro, Gestion et Administration Regionale, Projet ABEL

Conseiller Pédagogique, IEF-Baguinée
DPAAF
Directeur, Noumorila Kati
APE Commune Koulikoro
Division Enseignement Secondaire/Superieur, DRE
Chef Section formation, DRE
IEF-Kati
Directeur, Ecole Baguinéda A
Directeur, Direction Regionale de l'Education
IEF-Koulikoro
Conseiller Pédagogique, IEF-Koulikoro
IEF-Kolokani
Division Planification, DRE
IEF-Kati
Directeur, Kati camp
IEF-Doïla
IEF-Baguinée
Directeur IPEG Kangaba
Division Recherche Formation, DRE

Adjoint, Ecole Expérimentale de Konobougou
Chef de quartier Bougoufié
MSC, Ecole Soninkoura A
Conseiller APE Soninkoura
Conseiller Pédagogique, Math, Ségou I
Directeur, Ecole Fondamentale Soninkoura
Chef, Division Recherche et Formation, DRE
MSC Ecole Soninkoura A
Directeur, Ecole Soninkoura B
Ecole Soninkoura A
Adjointe, Ecole Soninkoura B
Consultant
Conseiller Pédagogique, Français, Ségou II
Conseiller Pédagogique, Anglais, Ségou
Chef, Division Enseignement Secondaire et Superieur, DRE
MSC, Ecole Soninkoura A
Adjoint, Ecole Soninkoura B
Adjoint, Ecole Soninkoura B
Adjointe, Ecole Expérimentale de Konobougou

Responsable Promotion Feminine, membre Cellule Régionale Scolaire Filles
Directeur, Ecole Expérimentale de Konobougou
Soninkoura "A" Ségou

Djènèbou Coulibaly
Moussa Sidibé
Kéfa Togola

Baba Sidi Traoré
Chiaka Traoré
Mme Dembélé Awa Niakalé Traoré
Frédéric Traoré
Mamadou Sékou Traoré
Mme Oumou Sy Traoré
Siaka Traoré

A Sikasso

Moro Bagayoko
Mamadou Berthé
Mme Aminata Bingaly
Gaoussou Bougoudogo
Abdoulaye D. Cissé
Seydou D Cissé
Abdoul Salam Coulibaly
Fadiala Coulibaly
Nama Coulibaly
Gabriel Dakouo
Cheik Kader Diabaté
Bamoussa Diakité
Oumar Diakité
Sambou Diakité
Oumar A. Diallo
Yaya Diallo

Zahama Diarra
Ibrahim Djondo
Lassine Doumbia N° 2
Siné Fomba
Mme Diallo Habibatou
Issaka Keita
Boubacar Abass Kida
Boubacar Sekou Konaté
Mme Fatoumata Koné
Mme Korotoumou Konaté
Bakary Koné
Mamadou Koné
Seydou B. Koné
Malamine Konobara
Balla Kouyaté

Brehima Kouyaté
Badara Aly Maïga
Fatimata Mariko
Bambo N'Diaye
Moussa Onogo
Fatogoma Ouattara
Koulamegué Ouattara

Adjoint, Ecole Expérimentale de Konobougou
Chef Division Planification Affaire Administrative et
Financière, DRE
Président, APE Konobougou
Chef, Division Enseignement Fondamental
Adjointe, Ecole Expérimentale de Konobougou
MSC, Ecole Soninkoura A
Président, APE-Soninkoura
Adjointe, Ecole Soninkoura B
Chef Division Enseignement Fondamental

Directeur, Ecole Medine C
Conseiller aux Sports
Directrice, Ecole BII, Sikasso I
Directeur, Ecole Kourouma, Sikasso II
Conseiller Pédagogique, Sikasso I
MSC, Ecole Nièna A, Sikasso II
Directeur, Ecole Tièba B, Sikasso I
Conseiller Pédagogique, Sikasso II
MSC, Ecole Nièna A, Sikasso II
MSC, Ecole Lanzana, Sikasso II
Conseiller Pédagogique, Bougouni I
APE-Bougouni
Conseiller Pédagogique, Sikasso II
Antenne FAEF
Conseiller Pédagogique, Bougouni II
Division Enseignement Fondamental et
Alphabétisation, DRE
APE-Kadiolo
Directeur, Ecole Hèrèmakono, 1er cycle
APE-Bougouni
Conseiller Pédagogique
Scolarisation des filles, Sikasso I
Antenne FAEF
Antenne FAEF
Conseiller Pédagogique, Sikasso II
Ecole Ouayerema I, Sikasso I
DRE
Directeur, Ecole Zanton Ziasso, Sikasso I
Conseiller Pédagogique, Bougouni I
MSC, Ecole Kadiolo Dialakoro, Sikasso II
Division I, DRE
Division Enseignement Fondamental et
Alphabétisation, DRE
MSC, Ecole Hèrèmakono, 1er cycle
Division Enseignement Secondaire, DRE
MSC, Sikasso I
Division Planification et CAF, DRE
Conseiller Pédagogique, IEF I
Directeur, Ecole Hamdallaye A, Sikasso I
Division Enseignement Fondamental et
Alphabétisation, DRE

Ladji Ouattara
David Sagara
Alfousseyni Sall
Lamissa Sanago
Mme Nakamissa Saganogo
Sidi Diotié Samaké
Zoumana Sidibé
Moussa Singaré
Yaya Togola
Bréhima Traoré
Broulaye Traoré
Ibrahima Traoré
Maciga Laïco Traoré
Tiémoko Traoré

APE-Kadiolo
1er Adjoint au Commandant de Cercle
Division Enseignement Secondaire, DRE
Division Recherche et Formation, DRE
MSC, Ecole Medine B
Conseiller Pédagogique, Bougouni I
Conseiller aux Sports, IEF-Bougouni I
Ecole N'Kourala, Sikasso II
Directeur, Ecole Massablacoura
Conseiller Pédagogique, Sikasso II
MSC, Ecole Medine C
MSC, Ecole Farakala, Sikasso II
Directeur, Ecole Mancourani C, Sikasso I
MSC, Medine A, Sikasso I

ANNEX B

REPUBLIQUE DU MALI
PROJET DE CONSOLIDATION DU SECTEUR DE L'EDUCATION
(CR.2054-MLI)
MISSION DE SUPERVISION 10-20 OCTOBRE
AIDE MEMOIRE

1. Une mission composée de Mme. Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard, chef de mission (économiste), Messrs. Makha Ndao et Djamaiddine Rouag (éducateurs), à laquelle s'est joint Mr. Samuel Carlson, chargé du suivi des projets des secteurs des ressources humaines à la mission résidente, a visité Bamako du 10 au 20 Octobre 1992. L'objet de la mission était de procéder à la supervision du Projet de Consolidation du Secteur de l'Education et spécifiquement (a) d'examiner les progrès accomplis dans la mise en place des mesures d'ajustement du système éducatif prévues dans la deuxième phase du processus, objet de la revue de la deuxième tranche du volet ajustement du crédit 2054-MLI, et (b) de définir, avec le Gouvernement et les bailleurs de fonds, le calendrier de cette revue qui avait été reporté dans le but de donner le temps au premier d'en satisfaire les conditions. Les résultats de l'examen des mesures d'ajustement ont amené la mission, après consultation de son siège, à élargir son champ et à considérer les recommandations possibles. Outre les autorités sectorielles, la mission a aussi discuté avec les représentants des organisations bilatérales et multilatérales (FAC, USAID, PNUD, UNICEF, ACDI) et a informé la KFW des résultats et des conclusions de ses travaux.

2. La mission remercie Son Excellence Mr. le Président de la République du Mali pour l'audience qu'il lui a accordé et qui a porté essentiellement sur les problèmes de l'enseignement de base et les perspectives de collaboration dans ce sous secteur. La mission remercie également S.E. Baba Akhîb Haidara, Ministre d'Etat chargé de l'Education Nationale, S.E. Fatimata Diallo Camara, Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Enseignement Fondamental et l'ensemble des responsables et personnels du Ministère d'Etat chargé de l'Education Nationale pour leur disponibilité et leur franche collaboration. La mission remercie tout particulièrement les responsables du Bureau des Projets pour l'aide apportée.

3. De manière générale, la mission tout en s'en tenant strictement aux conditions légales du projet, comprend la genèse et le contexte ayant conduit aux conditions défavorables pour le déblocage de la seconde tranche du volet ajustement. Les plus hautes autorités du pays ont largement expliqué cette situation et n'ont pas manqué de réitérer la fidélité du gouvernement aux objectifs de rationalisation du système éducatif et d'expansion de l'éducation de base. La mission a confirmé la disponibilité de l'IDA pour chercher avec le gouvernement des voies nouvelles, hors des chantiers battus, afin d'assurer un développement soutenu de l'éducation de base.

A. Programme d'ajustement du secteur

4. Bien qu'un progrès certain ait été accompli, tant par rapport aux mesures prévues que par rapport à des problèmes en dehors de l'ajustement, pour les aspects essentiels, la mission n'a pu que constater la divergence entre les contenus des mesures stratégiques, les objectifs quantitatifs visés par la deuxième phase du processus d'ajustement, et les effets des décisions effectivement

prises. Les constats pour les aspects fondamentaux sont donnés ci-dessous (voir annexe). Du fait des constats effectués, de la fin prochaine de cette année civile qui avait été retenue pour une décision sur la seconde tranche, et de la faible probabilité de modification des tendances budgétaires rendue plus difficile par le contexte de rentrée scolaire, la mission considère que les aspects techniques de la revue sont pratiquement achevés, et qu'il ne lui sera pas possible de proposer à l'Association la continuation du volet ajustement (US\$2 millions), ce qui l'obligera en conséquence, à recommander l'annulation de celui-ci. Il est évident que la partie investissement du projet (US\$23 millions) continuera d'être disponible pour la poursuite du financement des activités prévues et celles préparatoires aux perspectives offertes. Les conclusions et recommandations de la mission sont basées sur les divergences constatées au niveau des mesures stratégiques ci-dessous définies comme celles dont l'impact serait négatif (au lieu de positif) sur un développement quantitatif et qualitatif équilibré du système éducatif à tous les niveaux, et en particulier sur une expansion soutenue de l'enseignement fondamental.

Les mesures financières.

5. Les indicateurs relatifs à la part du budget de l'Education (au moins 25%) dans le budget national de fonctionnement, et celle de l'enseignement supérieur (au plus 19%) dans celui de l'éducation sont positifs pour les années considérées (1989-1992). La part du budget de matériel didactique semble positive (accroissement prévu de 4 à 8%), toutefois le changement introduit dans la définition de cette ligne et notamment l'inclusion des dépenses de matériel accordées directement aux élèves et étudiants (frais scolaires et universitaires) rend l'appréciation difficile en l'absence de détails.

6. Les indicateurs relatifs à la part du budget de l'enseignement primaire dans celui de l'Education (accroissement prévu de 35 à 45%) et à la réduction progressive du budget des bourses (de 10% chaque année pendant deux ans puis de 5% par an pendant deux ans) sont significativement négatifs au sens où même les tendances sont négatives. La part du budget de l'enseignement primaire compte tenu de l'augmentation des dépenses aux niveaux supérieurs, s'est retrouvé à environ 33,8% en 1992. Parallèlement, le budget des bourses (secondaire et supérieur) a augmenté de manière très importante pour représenter, en 1992, approximativement consacré à l'enseignement fondamental.

Les mesures quantitatives

7. Les indicateurs relatifs aux plafonds d'accès aux enseignements secondaire général (2500) et au supérieur (1500) sont négatifs particulièrement pour les années récentes. En 1991, 5500 élèves ont été orientés vers l'enseignement secondaire général allant au delà des capacités d'accueil et parallèlement à un repli de l'orientation d'élèves vers les établissements privés pour des raisons sans doute justifiées. Le nombre total d'étudiants de l'enseignement supérieur au Mali, en 1991/92, s'élevait à 7500 et contraste avec une capacité d'accueil d'environ 4000 places. Pour l'année scolaire 1992/93 le nombre des orientés est supérieur à 2000 pour une "capacité disponible" d'environ 1100 places. Les conditions d'enseignement déjà difficiles sinon peu favorables, seront certainement aggravées par cet accroissement des effectifs.

8. La mission a pris note du report de l'application des critères d'attribution des bourses. Le ministre a expliqué que l'objet de ce report devra permettre au gouvernement de mener une campagne d'information, de sensibilisation et de recherche de consensus sur la question des bourses. La décision de ne pas accorder de bourses aux enfants des hauts fonctionnaires d'état

constitue un pas important. La mission a également pris note des mesures prises en faveur des étudiants maliens à l'étranger, essentiellement dans les pays de l'est, afin de pallier à la défection des pays hôtes. Toutefois, la mission estime que l'élargissement significatif de l'accès à l'enseignement supérieur dans des établissements déjà surchargés et l'accroissement en conséquence du volume financier des bourses au détriment des aspects qualitatifs à ce niveau et surtout l'accroissement en parallèle de leur montant de 75 % décidé en Mai 1991, transforme le "dérapage" constaté jusqu'ici en tendance lourde dont les effets cumulés vont se faire sentir dans les toutes prochaines années. A cela s'ajoute l'ouverture prévue de l'Université en 1993-94. Ces décisions contredisent les objectifs du volet ajustement du projet, rappelés dans les aide-mémoires de Novembre 1991, mars et juin 1992, mais surtout aggravent les distorsions du système éducatif et freinent le rythme de réalisation des objectifs de démocratisation de l'enseignement et de développement des ressources humaines par l'expansion de l'enseignement primaire.

Les mesures d'efficacité

9. Les principales mesures d'efficacité prévues dans le projet, spécifiquement le redéploiement des enseignants en "surplus" et l'introduction de la double vacation n'ont pas été mises en oeuvre au rythme et volume retenus. En ce qui concerne le redéploiement des enseignants, les informations sur la localisation et la réalité des surplus sont partielles et contradictoires (études encore en cours). Cette faiblesse des données est aggravée par les incertitudes introduites par l'apparent succès auprès des maîtres, du programme de dégraissage de la fonction publique. La mission rappelle que le PAS exclue les maîtres du fondamental de ce programme. Le ministère explique les difficultés d'introduction de la double vacation par la résistance des enseignants à l'augmentation de leurs horaires et par leur exigence, dans cette éventualité, d'une majoration de salaire beaucoup plus importante que celle initialement prévue (50% au lieu de 30%) pour huit heures de travail additionnel.

B. Les perspectives

10. Au cours de la supervision, le Ministère de l'Education Nationale et la mission sont tombés d'accord que les contraintes pesant sur le secteur, particulièrement sur l'enseignement primaire sont difficilement compatibles avec une croissance significative de cet ordre d'enseignement si important pour le développement. Ces contraintes s'articulent autour (a) du nombre réduit de postes budgétaires alloués, aggravé par le départ d'instituteurs dans le cadre du dégraissage de la fonction publique et les contradictions entre le système de valeur des enseignants et les mesures d'efficacité, (b) de certaines mesures préconisées dans le cadre même du volet ajustement du projet, en particulier le niveau de recrutement des enseignants pour le primaire (baccalauréat plus deux années de formation) avec la résistance des bacheliers pour cette orientation et surtout le risque qui commence à se vérifier d'une demande de reclassement à un niveau supérieur, et (c) de l'aggravation de la distorsion dans l'allocation des ressources du secteur. Par ailleurs, les responsables maliens et la mission s'accordent que la capacité du Ministère de l'éducation nationale en matière de collecte et analyse d'informations, de développement de politiques, de programmes et de mise en place des procédures opérationnelles de gestion, aurait besoin d'être renforcée rapidement. Le projet en cours prévoit le financement des renforcements nécessaires.

11. Compte tenu du nouveau contexte social malien, le moment est favorable pour l'élaboration d'un programme de croissance rapide et soutenu visant une scolarisation de base

120

significativement élevé à un horizon à retenir. Ce programme, pour réussir devrait s'inscrire dans une stratégie sectorielle prenant en compte les besoins légitimes de renforcement qualitatif des enseignements secondaire et supérieur: il devrait corriger la tendance récente de moindre exigence de travail; il devrait être volontaire face à la nécessité de contrôler les flux dans le secondaire et le supérieur; il devrait aussi être imaginatif quant aux solutions; il devrait enfin pouvoir bénéficier d'une mobilisation nationale autour de l'objectif de scolarisation et des modalités dictées par le rythme et les moyens disponibles dans un contexte de rationalisation des dépenses de transfert.

12. Les besoins légitimes des niveaux post-primaires doivent s'organiser autour de l'amélioration des conditions et de la pertinence de l'enseignement dans une enveloppe financière strictement respectée. Cette enveloppe devra être diminuée pour retrouver un niveau acceptable et pour s'équilibrer avec le financement des autres niveaux d'enseignement le plus tôt possible. A cet effet la croissance ne pourrait être considérée qu'à moyen terme et serait déterminée par les effets de l'amélioration de l'efficacité, les signaux du marché de l'emploi, et les possibilités de financement découlant de la stratégie ayant fait l'objet d'un consensus national. La stratégie de financement des aspects récurrents du programme pourrait pour l'essentiel être basée sur l'allocation des ressources en fonction de la priorité retenue.

13. L'IDA est disposée à entamer avec les responsables sectoriels et en collaboration avec les l'UNICEF, l'USAID, le PNUD, l'UNESCO, la BAD et la BID, les travaux techniques préliminaires à la structuration des problèmes posés. Ce travail reposerait sur la définition de l'horizon et des objectifs de scolarisation possibles compte tenu du cadre technique et financier retenu dans lequel pourrait s'inscrire ce programme. Cette démarche implique aussi le report de toute initiative majeure devant entraîner des coûts récurrents importants particulièrement pour l'enseignement supérieur. En effet, il conviendrait d'évaluer une programmation de développement quantitatif, qualitatif, financier et technique au vu des missions de l'enseignement supérieur. Ces approfondissements permettront de comparer les résultats obtenus à ceux résultants d'une restructuration et d'une amélioration de la qualité des institutions existantes. Ils permettront aussi d'établir l'impact financier et les mesures éventuelles d'accompagnement qui seront compatibles avec la stratégie de développement accéléré et soutenu de l'enseignement primaire et avec la priorité donnée à l'amélioration qualitative à tous les niveaux.

14. Dans l'immédiat et sur la base de propositions que pourrait faire le gouvernement, l'IDA considérerait favorablement le financement à travers le crédit 2054-MLI des activités suivantes:

(i) l'étude et le renforcement de certaines fonctions principales du MEN tels que les systèmes d'information, de planification, de programmation. La faiblesse et la discordance des informations statistiques nécessitent une action urgente de mise en place des systèmes cités ci-dessus;

(ii) des études complémentaires à celles qui seraient menées dans le cadre du projet PNUD UNESCO et de l'ACCT (Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique) pour le développement rapide et soutenu de l'éducation de base, de ses conditions pédagogiques et du cadre financier dans lequel ce développement prendrait corps;

(iii) les études sur les objectifs, la stratégie et les cadres financiers, quantitatifs et académiques de la restructuration de l'enseignement supérieur et sur les divers modalités de support aux étudiants y compris les dépenses sociales(transferts), en relation avec les objectifs (a) de

développement soutenu et accéléré de l'enseignement de base, (b) d'amélioration de la qualité et de l'efficacité de l'enseignement à tous les niveaux du système éducatif, et (c) de cohérence financière de l'ensemble du secteur.

La mission suggère que ces études puissent démarrer au plus tard en janvier 1993 et que les termes de références de ces études soient discutés avec l'IDA avant fin novembre 1992.

Fait à Bamako le 23 octobre 1992

Pour l'Association,
le Chef de mission

Mme Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard

MINISTRE D'ETAT CHARGE DE L'EDUCATION
NATIONALE

BUREAU DES PROJETS EDUCATION

REPUBLIQUE DU MALI
UN PEUPLE - UN BUT - UNE FOI

ETAT D'AVANCEMENT DU
PASEP 2ème TRANCHE

Domaines

Objectifs

Situation

A/ Accès et Equité

1/ Rééquilibrage de la pyramide

- 1990-1991/1991-1992
1.1. Institution de différents plafonds SGPT =
2 500/Sup cumul 3ans < 4 500 = 1 500.
1.2. Orientation des autres -----) Techn. Prof
& cycles courts.

Satisfait - 1990 - 91 - 2488 S.G ; 1496 Supérieur
Non satisfait 1991-92 - 5500 S.G. ; 2062 Technique
1679 Supérieur.
Non satisfait 1992-93 - 4380 S.G ; 3235 Technique
2000 Supérieur

2/ Incitation du Secteur Educatif Privé

2. Elaboration de textes réglementaires en
faveur de ce secteur : privé, base, village,
médersas (Nov. 1989)

Fait : Conventions existantes entre l'Etat et le Privé
catholique et les médersas.

En cours : Texte pour les écoles de base en zone
urbaine et rurale.

3/ Promouvoir Scolarisation Féminine
& participation femme dans l'enseignement

3. Réalisation & discussion avec IDA identifier
difficultés filles du secteur -----) solutions
correctives.

Conforme au programme. Exécution en cours.

B/ Adéquation - Efficacité

4/ Rationalisation formation des maîtres
Enseignement Fondamental

- 4.1. Trois Ecoles Normales /G fermées & des
Accords doivent exister quant à utilisation
de ces écoles.

Réalisation : 3 ENSEC ont été fermées et mises à la
disposition de l'enseignement secondaire.
- 4 IPEG fermées.

RG

5/ Renforcer chez les élèves du Primaire la maîtrise des disciplines fondamentales & réviser programmes du cycle I

. réduction nombre d'heures/semaine (32,5 à 27)

. temps consacré Français/Arabe, calcul 2/3 du total.
. mieux TP aux objectifs cognitifs.

. améliorer efficacité enseignement en Langue Nationale.

6/ Améliorer inf. avec emploi développement & mettre en oeuvre Stratégie de Restructuration des Enseignement Secondaire et Supérieur.

0/ Gestion des Ressources Sectorielles

7/ Élargir l'accès au Fondamental & améliorer la qualité à tous les niveaux maintenir & restructurer budget du MEN.

4.2. Décret modifiant niveau de recrutement (BAC) & durée études (2) IPEG

4.3. Introduire dès année scolaire 1990-1991 (91-92) programme révisé des IPEG commun avec IDA.

5.1. Evaluation qualitative des programmes de l'enseignement en Langues Nationales & ruralisation

5.2. Envoi d'une quinzaine de spécialistes en développement de progr./livres scolaires IPN en 2 vagues.

6.1. Accord Gouvernement/IDA sur Plan Directeur visant ces restructurations sur base paramètres convenus.

6.2. Avant entreprendre tout nouveau investissement dépassant 300 millions FCFA préparer étude économique et financière en consultation avec IDA.

Ent. depuis 1989/90 - Décret 90/403/PRM² du 18/10/90 (pour les E.N.)

Ent. Décret 90/459/PRM du 8/12/90 (pour les IPEG)

ruralisation supprimée depuis 1991.
- évaluation des programmes en langues nationales en cours.
- réduction horaire au stade de proposition.

Non réalisé

En cours de finalisation

Pas encore applicable

Voir annexe

7.1. Progrès satisfaisant vers objectifs convenus (maïs)

Améliorer transparence budgétaire

- . maintien de la part du MEN à 25% Atteint
- . Intérieur budget :
 - 35% en 1988)
 - 40% en 1990) Ens. Fond. Pas atteint
 - 22 < 19 % Ens Sup. Atteint
- . type de dépense :
 - augmenter part du matériel (4% en 1988 & au (-) 8% en 1992 Satisfait
 - réduction des bourses de 10% en 1989 & 1990 par rapport à initial de 2,5 Ncn atteint

8/ Contenir l'accroissement par des coûts salariaux dans coûts unitaires.
 Faire passer ratios élèves/maitre :
 de 34/1 à 38/1 pour cycle I
 de 13/1 à 26/1 pour cycle II

de 8/1 à 15/1 pour secondaire

8.1. Accord annuel sur Plan de recrutement :
 .redéploiement de 10 à 15% des maitres suppléants & des maitres déchargés de cours (soit au 1600.)

- .Introduction Ens.Double vacation 5 s.d.c/Région.
- .Introduction classes à plusieurs divisions (250 s.d.c)
- . Réduction du nombre enseignants du cycle II & du Secondaire par redéploiement vers cycle I.
- . Ratios : 35/1 CI, 18/1 CII & 9/1 Secondaire.

- Recensement du personnel fait.
- Plan de redéploiement non encore élaboré (781 redéploiement interne. au cycle I voir annexe)
- double vacation : objectif non atteint : 17 atteints en 1991/92 au lieu de 45.
- classes à plusieurs divisions : objectif dépassé 1352 pour 250 initialement prévues.
- Pas de redéploiement d'enseignants du cycle II et du secondaire au cycle I.
- Ratios - objectif atteint : cycle I : 47/1
- secondaire 12/1
- cycle 2 18/1

8.2. Soumission & discussion avec IDA.
 Rapport étude sur le personnel

Pas fait

9/Élargir la base des ressources affectées à Ens Fond. Mobiliser contribution parents d'élèves. ONG Comité de Développement.

9.1. FAEF créé
 Affectation d'au moins 30% de la TDRL au secteur

FAEF créé. APE financement directement contre partie

Handwritten mark

10/Assurer cohérence entre Objectifs de la Stratégie du Gouvernement et affectation des ressources d'investissement. Accord sur un programme triennal d'investissement sectoriel à horizon mobile.

11/Permettre Economies sur Achats du MEN Améliorer procédures de passation des marchés.

10.1. Accord sur programme d'investissement 1990-92 et P.I. 1991-93 .
à examen annuel 1990

11.1. Respect des principes.

1001/1001/1001/1001/1001

4

Fait à chaque examen annuel

En exécution.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

126

+

BUDGET 1992 DU MINISTRE DE L'EDUCATION NATIONALE PAR ORDRE D'ENSEIGNEMENT
(avant collectif) en milliers de F CFA.

ORDRE D'ENSEIGN.	Chap. 11	Chap. 12	Chap. 13	Chap. 14	Chap. 16	Chap. 24-10	Chap. 12-90	TOTAL
Enseig. Fond. Cycle I	3 451 159	75 340	32 538	-	11 248	-	322 593	3 882 878
Enseig. Fond. Cycle II	2 848 832	36 577	13 290	-	4 330	-	131 763	3 035 232
Enseig. Sec. Général	1 305 712	22 702	6 956	-	10 121	-	754 381	2 129 772
Enseig. Sec. Tech. Prof.	545 644	32 061	518	-	9 153	116 670	693 445	1 628 651
Enseig. Norm.	331 879	10 203	962	-	6 908	17 171	157 370	624 493
Enseig. Sup.	130 122	12 300	-	-	11 742	1 729 722	-	2 553 866
Enseig. Sup. (Niveau Sup.)	250 652	12 300	6 386	100	14 390	-	290 096	1 012 418
TOTAUX	9 723 702	445 740	60 548	160	67 800	1 863 563	2 366 048	15 027 610

Budget Régional : Charges Communes non comprises

BUDGET 1992 DU MINISTERE DE L'EDUCATION NATIONALE PAR ORDRE D'ENSEIGNEMENT
(après collectif) en milliers de F CFA.

Services	Chap. 11	Chap. 12	Chap. 13	Chap. 14	Chap. 16	Chap. 22	Chap. 24	Chap. 89	Chap. 12-90	TOTAL
Cabinet	40 732	2 022	-	160	2 131	-	-	-	-	45 045
IAF	55 539	89 844	3 500	-	1 469	-	-	-	354 000	504 352
PSE	17 332	151	-	-	200	-	-	120 000	-	137 743
DRE	246 799	2 239	-	-	2 606	-	-	-	-	251 644
CN-UNESCO	15 104	1 788	-	-	77	-	-	-	-	16 969
DNAFLA	72 525	1 820	-	-	3 355	-	-	-	-	77 700
ISFRA	-	207	-	-	604	-	1 170	-	-	1 981
TOTAL (a)	448 091	98 071	3 500	160	10 442	-	1 170	120 000	354 000	1 035 434
DNEF	6 053 057	85 801	45 828	-	12 527	151 100	-	16 584	470 606	6 835 503
DNEGTP										
(ESC)	1 323 959	13 931	3 686	-	7 625	56 900	-	-	601 484	2 007 585
(ETP)	374 245	58 572	3 686	-	7 117	257 100	67 449	-	523 679	1 291 848
D-IPN-EN	479 024	23 126	3 848	-	12 029	-	39 266	-	121 725	679 018
DNES										
- MALI	791 692	16 909	-	-	11 255	-	1 052 065	-	582 043	2 453 964
- ETRANGER	-	-	-	-	-	-	418 150	-	-	418 150
(b)	9 021 977	198 339	57 048	-	50 553	465 100	1 576 830	16 584	2 299 537	13 686 064
(a) + (b)	9 470 068	296 410	60 548	160	60 995	465 100	1 578 100	136 584	2 653 537	14 721 502

N.B : Les Budgets Régionaux et Charges Communes non compris.

BUDGETS COMPARÉS 1992

Avant Collectif (Mars 92)
(en milliers de F CFA)

1°)	Budget du MEN	15 027 650	
	-----	-----	= 15,98%
	Budget d'Etat Reccurent	94 000 000	
2°)	Dépenses Publiques d'Education	19 339 310	
	-----	-----	= 20,60%
	Budget d'Etat Reccurent	94 000 000	
3°)	Budget du Cycle I Fondamental	6 540 038	
	-----	-----	= 33,8 %
	Dépenses Publiques d'Education	19 339 310	
4°)	Dépenses Cycle I et II Fondamental	9 833 914	
	-----	-----	= 50,84%
	Dépenses Publiques d'Education	19 339 310	
5°)	Dépenses Enseignement Supérieur	3 025 934	
	-----	-----	= 15,64%
	Dépenses Publiques d'Education	19 339 310	
6°)	Budget du Matériel (Optique large)	3 494 517	
	-----	-----	= 18,07%
	Dépenses Publiques d'Education	19 339 310	
7°)	Part affectée à l'Enseignement Fondamental : <u>470 606</u>		

4

BUDGETS COMPARES 1992
Après Collectif (Octobre 92)
(en milliers de F CFA)

1°)	Budget du KEN	14 721 502	
	-----	= -----	= 15,66%
	Budget d'Etat Recurrent	94 000 000	
2°)	Dépenses Publiques d'Education	19 033 162	
	-----	= -----	= 20,25%
	Budget d'Etat Recurrent	94 000 000	
3°)	Budget du Cycle I Fondamental	6 553 397	
	-----	= -----	= 34,43%
	Dépenses Publiques d'Education	19 033 162	
4°)	Dépenses Cycle I et II Fondamental	9 751 247	
	-----	= -----	= 51,23%
	Dépenses Publiques d'Education	19 033 162	
5°)	Dépenses Enseignement Supérieur	3 344 199	
	-----	= -----	= 17,57%
	Dépenses Publiques d'Education	19 033 162	
6°)	Budget du Matériel (Optique large)	3 135 725	
	-----	= -----	= 16,48%
	Dépenses Publiques d'Education	19 033 162	

7°) Part affectée à l'Enseignement Fondamental : 470 606

N.B. : L'abattement opéré sur les chapitres 12 et 16 dans les budgets des Régions n'a pas été pris en compte. Cela est négligeable. Cependant, il est à noter que ces ratios doivent être considérés comme provisoires

**Evolution des Dépenses de Bourses (Chapitre 24 et 12-90)
De 1986 à 1992 en milliers de F CFA**

Année	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Prévisions	3.400.000	3.400.000	3.000.000	3.000.000	3.000.000	3.500.000	4.800.000
Dotations	3.400.000	3.400.000	3.000.000	3.000.000	3.000.000	4.500.000	4.200.000
Exécutions	-	3.016.776	2.967.910	2.721.176	2.939.900	4.453.321	5.000.000

N.B. Le Chiffre cité en exécution au titre de 1992 est maximal. Il variera de 4,8 à 5 Mds et sera connu définitivement en fin d'année.

Source: DAF
Serge Cuenin

Evolution du Budget Cycle I du Fondamental

Dotations en Milliers F CFA

Année	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Dotations	6.191.571	6.143.515	6.075.298	6.836.771	6.540.038
Ratios (1er Cycle) Dépenses Education	33%	35,5%	34,4%	36,7%	33,8%

N.B. Les chiffres de 1992 sont obtenus avant le Collectif Budgétaire

Source: DAF
Rapport S. Cuenin

19/

MALI-10-21-92

QUELQUES DONNEES STATISTIQUES
IER CYCLE DU FONDAMENTAL.

	1988-89	1989-90	1990-91	1991-92
TOTAL ELEVES	311 873	323 354	340 573	374 045
% FILLES	36.9	36.6	36.5	37.3
% REDOUB	28.8	29.8	27.1	31.0
TOTAL IERE ANNEE	80 046	79 961	84 477	91 846
% FILLES	37.6	37.0	37.1	38.6
% REDOUB	28.4	30.4	26.3	27.8
NOUVEAUX ENTRANTS	57 340	55 637	62 211	66 271
Variation		-1 703	+6 574	+4 060
DOUBLE VAC (1 maitre)			20	17
DOUBLE VAC (2 maitres)			117	156
DOUBLE DIVISIONS				1 352

Sources: DAF et DNEF- MEN

132

A. UTILISE

NBRE AGENTS
RECENSES: 16 997

MAITRES ENSEIGNANT
CYCLE I 7 002

MAITRES ENSEIGNANT
CYCLE 2 2 927

REDEPLOIEMENT: 781 dont 354 des chefs lieux de région
vers les cercles et arrondissements, et 427 des cercles et
arrondissements vers les écoles rurales.

DEPARTS VOLONTAIRES: 1991: 303 agents dont 264 Instituteurs
(MSC) et 39 MPC.

B. DISTRIBUTION DE LA CHARGE D'ENCADREMENT
MAITRES DU CYCLE I

- 10 ELEVES 114 MAITRES

ENTRE 10 ET 14 ELEVES 225 MAITRES

ENTRE 15 ET 19 ELEVES 300 MAITRES

nombre total de maitres encadrant moins de 20 élèves:
639 soit 9% de l'effectif maitre du 1er cycle.

ENTRE 20 ET 29 ELEVES 666 MAITRES

ENTRE 30 ET 39 ELEVES 709 MAITRES

40 ELEVES ET PLUS 4 886

NON DETERMINE 102

C. DISTRIBUTION DE LA CHARGE HORAIRE
MAITRES CYCLE 2

- 8 HEURES 577

ENTRE 8 H ET 9 H 268

ENTRE 10 ET 11 H 240

ENTRE 12 ET 13 H 474

ENTRE 14 ET 15 H 395

1954 maitres du cycle 2 font moins de 16 H par semaine, soit
plus de 66% du personnel de ce niveau. 19% du
personnel assure moins de 8H de cours par semaine.

ENTRE 16 ET 17 H 225

PLUS DE 18 H 748

sources: DAF- DES- DFEN- MEN

137

(I)

Le Tableau 1 donne une répartition détaillée des coûts du projet par volet.

Assistance du Programme	- 3000
Assistance du Projet	7000
1. Amélioration de l'Enseignement Primaire	4405
A Formation continue	(3873)
B Scolarisation des filles	(90)
C 4-H	(154)
D Langues Maternelles	(166)
E Projets Pilotes	(122)
2 Appui de la Communauté (FAEF)	825
3 Suivi et Evaluation	1000
4 Gestion du Projet par l'AID	770

(II)

PLAN FINANCIER
PROJET DEVELOPPEMENT EDUCATION DE BASE
PROJET NO. 688-0258
(En milliers de dollars)

Rubrique	Engagements Anterieurs	Par la Presente	Engagements Prevus	Total
I. Aide "Hors Projet"	3,000	0	0	3,000
II. Assistance en Projet	7,000	5,000	5,000	17,000
A. Amélioration de l'éducation de base	4,075	2,405	2,265	8,745
1. Formation continue	3,543	1,134	448	5,125
2. Gestion de Systemes	0	350	700	1,050
3. Scolarisation des Filles	90	900	1,150	2,140
4. Ruralisation				
5. Langues Nationales	154	0	(54)	100
6. Projets Pilotes	166	17	17	200
	122	4	4	130
B. Support Communautaire	825	800	1,072	2,697
	825	800	1,072	2,697
1. FAEF				
C. Suivi et Evaluation	1,000	1,256	912	3,168
1. Suivi et Evaluation	500	550	800	1,850
2. SIG/E	500	706	112	1,318
D. Gestion du Projet par l'AID	770	539	12	179
1. Equipement	270	0	(91)	712
2. Administration du Projet	370	342	0	
3. Support				
4. Court terme	0	119	0	119
5. Assistance au Projet	0	13	14	27
6. Evaluation Conjointe	0	65	68	133
7. Audit	51	0	0	51
	79	0	21	100
E. Contingences	330	0	739	1069

135

Plan Financier
(en milliers de dollars)

Rubrique	Engagements Antérieurs	Cet Amendment	Engagements Futurs	Vie du Projet
TOTAL	10,000	5,000	5,000	20,000
Assistance du Projet	7,000	5,000	5,000	17,000
Assistance "hors- projet"	3,000	0	0	3,000

Bp. i

(III)

BEEP FINANCIAL PLAN
(In \$000 of Dollars)

BUDGET ELEMENT RUBRIQUE BUDGETAIRE	ORIGINAL ORIGINAL	1st AMENDMENT, OBLIGATION #1 1er AMENDEMENT, ENGAGEMENT #1	1st AMENDMENT, OBLIGATION #2 1er AMENDEMENT, ENGAGEMENT #2	LIFE OF PROJECT DUREE DU PROJET
I. Non-Project Assistance Aide "hors-Projet"	3,000	0	0	3,000
II. Project Assistance Assistance au Projet	7,000	5,000	5,000	17,000
A. Improving Primary Ed. Améliorat. de l'Ed. de Base	4,405	2,405	3,000	9,810
1. In-Service Training Formation en cours de service	3,873	1,134	500	5,507
2. Management (Complete School) Gestion (Fin de la Scolarité)	0	350	1,000	1,350
3. Female Enrollment Education des Filles	90	900	500	1,490
4. Ruralization Ruralization	154	0	0	154
5. Maternal Languages Langues Maternelles	166	17	0	183
6. Pilot Projects (NGO Grants) Projets Pilotes (Subventions des ONGs)	122	4	1,000	1,126
B. Community Support Appui Communautaire	825	800	1,000	2,625
1. FAEF FAEF	825	800	800	2,425
2. APE Development Renforcement des APEs	0	0	200	200
C. Monitoring and Evaluation Suivi et Evaluation	1,000	1,256	500	2,756
1. M&E S&E	500	550	250	1,300
2. MIS SIG	500	706	250	1,456
D. AID Project Management Gestion de Projet AID	770	539	500	1,809
E. Contingencies Imprevus	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	10,000	5,000	5,000	20,000

PIO/Ts POUR ABEL		
NUMERO	DATE	MONTANT EN \$
688-0258-3-90132	1990	1.863.599
688-0258-3-90132	1991	2.193.599
688-0258-3-10123	1992	1.362.946
688-0258-3-30016	1993	300.005
TOTAL		5.720.149
PIO/Ts POUR L'ASSISTANT TECHNIQUE EN FORMATION CONTINUE (Bernard Gagné)		
688-0510-3-90030	1989	42.000
688-0258-3-90120	1990	74.000
688-0258-3-90123	1990	1.360.000
688-0258-3-90112	1990	469.338
688-0258-3-90177	1991	33.000
688-0258-3-10117	1992	226.632
688-0258-3-90112	1992	469.338
TOTAL		2.674.308

$$\begin{array}{r}
 5.720.149 \\
 + 2.674.308 \\
 \hline
 8.394.457
 \end{array}$$

- Salaires + Avantages 4 Assistants tech.
- Support logistique pour l'Assist. Tech.
- Fonctionnement Bureau ABEL au Mali
+ salaire personnel ABEL (Administrateurs,
secrétaire, chauffeurs, planton, etc)
- Honoraires consultants nationaux et
expatriés
- Frais généraux payés à ABEL (25% du
coût du contrat).

RECEIVED

AUG 02 1993

EIHRDO C. I.

BASIC EDUCATION EXPANSION PROJECT
FINANCIAL REPORT STATUS

Vietnam


MONTH: JUNE, 93
SOURCE: MACB-BUREAU DE CONTROLE-USAID

GRANT AGREEMENT										
BEEP FINANCIAL STATUS REPORT										
BUDGET LINES ITEMS	1	2	3	4	5	6				
	OBLIGATION	EARMARKING	FUNDS AVAILABLES	%	COMMITTED	EXPENDED	REMAIN.COMMIT.	%	ADVANCED	ACCRUALS
	(1)	(2)	3=(1-2)	(3/1)	(4)	(5)	6=(2-4)	(5/4)		
1. PROGRAM FUNDS	3,000,000	1,000,000	2,000,000	66.67%	1,000,000	1,000,000	0	100.00%	0	
2. INSERVICE TRAINING	5,192,000	4,488,152	703,848	13.56%	4,342,996	3,088,877	145,156	71.12%	32,604	47,541
3. MANAGEMENT	1,800,000	1,393,554	406,446	22.58%	1,383,086	948,459	10,468	68.58%	8,768	312,636
4. EDWID	1,090,000	593,859	496,141	45.52%	464,780	145,860	129,079	31.38%	51,704	14,212
5. RURALIZATION	154,000	9,158	144,842	94.05%	9,158	4,391	0	47.95%	0	
6. MATERNAL LANGUAGES	183,000	34,875	148,125	80.94%	34,875	28,994	0	83.14%	0	
7. PILOT PROJECT	1,122,000	0	1,122,000	100.00%	0	0	0	0.00%	0	
8. FAEF	2,584,000	1,568,501	995,499	38.83%	1,539,925	551,960	28,576	35.84%	367,216	49,693
9. MONITORING & EVALUATION	1,300,000	1,625,402	(325,402)	-25.03%	1,356,680	921,006	268,722	67.89%	11,264	203,114
10. E/MIS	1,456,000	1,430,956	25,044	1.72%	1,341,485	930,979	89,471	69.40%	11,618	223,283
11. PROJECT MANAGEMENT BY AID	1,809,000	1,216,360	592,640	32.76%	894,789	682,367	321,591	76.26%	0	
12. CONTINGENCIES	330,000	0	330,000	100.00%	0	0	0	0.00%	0	
TOTAL	20,000,000	13,380,817	6,639,183	33.20%	12,367,754	8,302,893	993,063	67.13%	483,174	850,579

129

ANNEX C

ORGANIGRAMME DE L'INSTITUT PEDAGOGIQUE NATIONAL.



Annexe I

141

ANNEX D

142

**USAID MALI
EDUCATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
BASIC EDUCATION EXPANSION PROJECT**

STATEMENT OF WORK

I. Background:

The Government of Mali launched the Fourth Education Consolidation Project in 1989, with financial support from the World Bank, France, Canada, Norway, the United Nation Development Program, and the Agency for International Development. To date, donors have authorized approximately \$66 million including a total of \$12 million adjustment component.

USAID's contribution, the Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP), amounts to \$20 million - \$17 million in project assistance and \$3 million in non-project assistance. This includes a \$10 million Program Amendment signed in August 1991.

The project provided non-project assistance to assist the Government of the Republic of Mali (GRM) to overcome its fiscal difficulties and project assistance to help improve the effectiveness of the basic education system and to increase rural household production, productivity and incomes.

Objectives for the first amendment are designed to assist the Ministry of Education address the efficiency, equity and quality of the primary education system, particularly, impact internal efficiency indicators such as enrolment, drop-out, retention and repetition rates.

The project serves four regions intensively. It also provides some services nationally to all seven regions as well as to the central Ministry of Education. In all 370,000 children are served or approximately one quarter of the school age population. (Annex I, Mali Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP 688-0258) 1990 - 1991 Project Regions).

USAID anticipates authorizing a second amendment in 1993 to increase the life of project funding by \$10 million in order to enhance the Ministry of Education's capacity to improve the quality of education. It emphasizes support for communities who want to create and improve local schools. It supports GRM efforts to implement a decentralized basic education system.

143

Prior to completing the design for this amendment, USAID Mali wishes to evaluate the impact of three and half years of interventions. We want to determine what components warrant further support, what lessons can be drawn from our experience, and what activities might complement the ongoing project.

II. Objectives:

The contractor will provide a team of five persons which will evaluate the Basic Education Expansion Project, a component of the Fourth Education Consolidation Project, and make recommendations to USAID Mali on the advisability and nature of additional activities in the sector.

III. Personnel:

Contractor shall provide five evaluation team members:

1. Evaluation Specialist/Team Leader
2. Education Planner (Malian)
3. Education Economist
4. Education Policy Analyst
5. Curriculum and Instruction Specialist

IV. Approach:

To achieve the objectives of this evaluation, the team will use the collaborative fourth generation evaluation methodology with special emphasis on the impact of project interventions in the basic education sub-sector since 1989. Where possible, the team will reference comparative experience from other education programs in Africa, and other parts of the world.

The fourth generation evaluation methodology is participative. The team will be required to:

- * hold a team planning meeting to identify the role and responsibility of each team member and reach consensus on evaluation design, instruments, and report outline. Meeting will be facilitated by external professional;
- * identify stakeholders and beneficiaries (donors, education administration, parents, pupils) across the nine areas of project interventions;

144

- * collect data (reference materials, statistics, group and individual interviews);
- * keep diaries (each team member) and hold team meetings daily to negotiate consensus;
- * provide feed back of findings to stakeholders and beneficiaries to verify conclusions drawn;
- * at least meet weekly or as needed, with USAID Project Officer and Project Administrator.

V. Statement of Work:

The contractor shall conduct an evaluation within the framework of the Project Evaluation Matrix below. Specifically, the contractor will address the following:

- * Design;
- * Political, Social and Economic Environment during design and implementation timeframes;
- * Implementation Mechanisms;
- * Impact of Project Interventions on Equity of Education System;
- * Impact of Project Interventions on Quality of Education System;
- * Impact of Project Interventions on Efficiency and Effectiveness of Education System;

Assessments shall be made for each of the following areas of intervention:

- * Community,
- * School,
- * Inspectorate,
- * Regional Directorate,
- * Administrative Directorate,
- * Fundamental Schools Directorate,
- * Pedagogical Directorate,
- * Education Project Implementation Unit (BPE),
- * Cabinet or Policy.

With reference to the areas of intervention identified in the project matrix above all consultants will address the following questions:

1. What role did the availability of non-project assistance ^{phy} in furthering project activities?
2. Were non-project assistance conditionalities appropriate ?

145

3. **What role, if any did problems in project design play in the success or failure of non-project assistance and of project activities ?**
4. **What role did uncertainty play in impeding or furthering the meeting of project objectives? Particular attention will be paid to uncertainty in the political, social and economic environments of Mali during the design and implementation timeframe ?**
5. **What role, if any, did choices in implementation mechanisms, personnel, resources and procedures, play in impeding or furthering project activities ?**

**USAID MALI
EDUCATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
BASIC EDUCATION EXPANSION PROJECT**

PROJECT INTERVENTIONS MATRIX

PROJECT EVALUATION WILL DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH THE FOLLOWING AREAS									
Evaluation Interventions	A Community	B School	C Inspectorate	D Regional Directorate	E Administrative Directorate	F Fundamental Schools Directorate	G Pedagogical Directorate	H Project Implementation Unit	I Cabinet
1. Design	A1	B1	C1	D1	E1	F1	G1	H1	I1
2. Environment	A2	B2	C2	D2	E2	F2	G2	H2	I2
3. Implementation	A3	B3	C3	D3	E3	F3	G3	H3	I3
4. Equity	A4	B4	C4	D4	E4	F4	G4	H4	I4
5. Quality	A5	B5	C5	D5	E5	F5	G5	H5	I5
6. Efficiency	A6	B6	C6	D6	E6	F6	G6	H6	I6
7. Future Directions	A7	B7	C7	D7	E7	F7	G7	H7	I7

EMRDO FW11 4.15.93

Issues:

1. Design: Objectives
2. Environment: Political, Social, Economic
3. Implementation Methods: Resource allocation:
personnel contracting mechanisms, finance
4. Equity: Access, Geographic Scope
5. Quality: Evidence of improvement
6. Efficiency: Evidence of improvement
7. Future direction

147


6. What effect did project complexity and scope have in the ability to successfully implement project activities and meet project objectives ?
7. What effect did the innovativeness in the structure of the multi-donor project, as well as its management structure, play in the ability to successfully implement project activities?
8. What role, if any, did institutional capacity, i.e., management, value orientation, and organizational structures, play in the Ministry of Education and the Project Implementation Office's ability to coordinate donor activity and implement project activities ?
9. What role, if any, did institutional capacity, i.e., management, value orientation, and organizational structures, play in the USAID, and the Basic Education Expansion Project's ability to implement project activities ?
10. What changes were forced in planned activities as a result of the constraints mentioned 3), 4), 5), and 6) above? What impact did those changes have in impeding or furthering efforts to meet project objectives ?

The contractor shall include the evaluation of specific activities for the following project components as appropriate:

- * In-service Training,
- * Management Information System,
- * Girl's Enrollment,
- * Management Technical Assistance,
- * Community Support,
- * Monitoring and Evaluation.

Major tasks for each component are outlined in the chart below:

**USAID MALI
EDUCATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
BASIC EDUCATION EXPANSION PROJECT**



149

In addition to the general items noted above, evaluation team members will address the following.

1. **Evaluation Specialist/ Team Leader**

- design evaluation process using fourth generation education model,
- determine report format and arrange for contribution of each team member in composing final report.

Consultant will act as the team leader responsible for the design of the report and the process which leads to its completion.

Consultant will assess donor roles and determine impact of donor effort in the implementation of the reform effort in Mali. Consultant will determine impact of decentralization and regionalization in overall program design and implementation and identify roles key stakeholders played.

Consultant will determine if Monitoring and Evaluation information has been used to support other components. Consultant will assess Ministry of Education's capacity to continue Monitoring and Evaluation activities and determine what efforts have been made by the Ministry to institutionalize this aspect of the program.

2. **Education Planner (Malian)**

- assess Ministry of Education role in encouraging local participation.

The consultant will examine the extent to which the central authorities at the Ministry of Education involve regional and local authorities in decision making processes, and in the development of initiatives to improve their schools.

Consultant will recommend interventions in support of local authority, agency and community efforts for improvement of local education initiatives.

3. **Education Economist**

- assess cost/benefits of various project inputs, and issues of sustainability.

Consultant will review and assess Non-Project Assistance aspects of education program, specifically.

1. Review performance of government in responding to performance conditions of Non-Project Assistance agreement and issues surrounding disbursements;
2. Determine if Non-Project Assistance was proper approach for educational development in Mali and whether its use was based on accurate analysis and projections.
3. Determine if Non-Project Assistance and project assistance were structured appropriately.

150

4. Assess validity and reasonableness of conditions and requirements from both the standpoint of the government to fulfill them and their efficacy in meeting Agency for International Development program objectives.
5. Assess government ability to meet Non-Project Assistance conditions from budgetary and institutional standpoints.

Consultant will work closely with the Education Policy Analyst to 1) look at performance of government to fulfill conditions and ability to manage Non-Project Assistance; 2) analyze sustainability of program initiatives; and 3) analyze impact of program initiatives and pilot/projects: school infrastructure; Koulikoro Complete Schools; textbook distribution; girls education cellule; training; Management Information Systems; Evaluation and Monitoring.

Consultant will review adequacy of financial reporting procedures and will review financial and sustainability aspects of project activities.

Consultant will address sustainability issues by assessing government capacity to assume funding, obligations and institutionalize project activities.

4. **Education Policy Analyst**

- to assess policy dialogue and conditionality and Ministry institutional capacity.

Consultant will assess the impact of Ministry of Education efforts to create a policy environment which supports the Education Project initiatives.

Consultant will also evaluate Ministry's initiatives to enhance girls's educational opportunity and determine sustainability of these efforts at the policy level.

Consultant will evaluate role Ministry of Education and other Ministries have had in the development of the reform effort including identification of issues, establishment and negotiation of conditionalities, and Malianization and institutionalization of reform initiatives and program components.

Consultant will work closely with the Education Economist to 1) look at performance of government to fulfill conditions and ability to manage Non-Project Assistance; 2) analyze sustainability of program initiatives; and 3) make recommendations regarding future directions.

Consultant will evaluate policies in place if any, which support the Education Project components and determine what Ministry's initiatives have been taken to sustain program objectives.

Consultant will assess the development of a Management Information System: 1) the kind of data produced, dissemination and use; and 2) data collecting and analysis. The consultant will assess initiatives made by the Ministry to institutionalize the work of this component without the support of donor technical assistance.

Consultant will make recommendations regarding possible funding options in support of the governments efforts to decentralize the education system.

5. Curriculum and Instruction Specialist

- **evaluate project efforts to improve the quality of primary education through teacher training, textbooks, and other inputs. program.**

Consultant will evaluate Project performance to determine 1) overall effectiveness of In-service Training activities; 2) transfer of training activities into teaching behaviors at the classroom level; and 3) improvement of school management capacity.

Consultant will also evaluate Ministry of Education efforts to institutionalize and sustain In-service Training and the establishment of Regional Pedagogical In-service Centers without donor supplied technical assistance. Consultant will determine if effective feedback has been established between evaluation and monitoring results and the training agenda of the central training center. has been established.

Consultant will assess Ministry efforts to 1) adapt the curriculum, 2) develop competency based learning objectives, 3) develop strategies to help students achieve those objectives; and 4) develop effective measures (to be implemented) at the classroom level to evaluate student achievement.

Requirements:

All team members must be fluent in French (FSI rated S3, R3). All must be available for four work weeks in country and one week at home (2 days preparation reading and 3 days finalization of evaluation report). Six day work weeks in Mali are approved. The Matrix below provides the framework for evaluation interventions.

All consultants will be available for 4 weeks in country and 1 week in U.S. (2 days preparation before trip to Mali and 3 days after trip to finalize report). Consultant must be available for a 6 day work week in Mali.

All consultants will assist other team members in development of a written evaluation report including summary and recommendations. Responsibility for report assignments will be made at team planning meeting. Draft of evaluation due before team leaves Mali. Final report due 30 days after departure from Mali--20 days after USAID Mali's comments have been submitted.

132

VI. Data collection:

The team will have the following sources of information:

1. Reference documents, background and working papers, statistical information and key indicators include, but are not limited to, Project Paper (August 1989); the Project Paper Amendment (July 1991); Grant Agreement and Agreement Amendments One and Two; Project Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; and, consultancy reports including an institutional description of the Ministry of Education. Other relevant documents include reports from donor organizations participating in the Fourth Education, Project Education Statistical Yearbook, the Personnel Census and Analysis, Infrastructure data, Koulikoro data and budget and finance data. List of Reference Materials for Basic Education Expansion Project is attached. (Annex II).
2. Individual and group interviews. A series of collective interviews with stakeholders and beneficiaries. List of Resource Persons and Contacts for Basic Education Expansion Project. (Annex III).
3. Site visits and observations. Sites will include central ministry offices, regional offices, schools, communities. Instruments will include observation grids and questionnaires.

Two project vehicles will be available for team members use. Logistics will be coordinated by the USAID Project Office.

VII. Calendar:

- Week 1: Team planning meeting. Consult reference materials. Identify stakeholders and beneficiaries. Set up interviews, site visits, appointments. Develop evaluation instruments. Design Evaluation Report and plan schedule.
- Week 2: Individual and group interviews with stakeholders and beneficiaries. Site visits.
- Evaluation diaries maintained. Evaluation group findings synthesized. Case studies identified.
- Week 3: Collection of information and validation at meetings with stakeholders and beneficiaries. Main findings and recommendations identified. End of week debriefing with AID. Case studies identified and diaries presented.
- Week 4: Final report drafted, disseminated to stakeholders and beneficiaries. Final debriefing held.

153

VIII. Reports and Deliverables:

1. The report should include seven main sections as shown in the Project Matrix. Vignettes highlighting main project accomplishments will be recorded. All areas of Project Matrix will be included as appropriate.
2. The report outline will be approved by USAID by the end of week 1.
3. The contractor will be responsible for delivering a completed draft of the evaluation report prior to departure from Bamako. The report will include a summary and recommendations section at the beginning of the report. The report will be designed to highlight site visit observations, interviews. Particular care will be made to distinguish observations from conclusions. Conclusions will be drawn with reference to context and explicitly stated in the report. Conclusions will be validated with stakeholders.
4. USAID Mali will provide feedback on the draft report to the Contractor within ten working days.
5. Ten copies of the final report will be delivered to USAID Mali Human Resources Development Office within 30 days of the contractor's departure from Bamako. The final report will take into account USAID Mali's comments on draft report.

IX. Roles and Responsibilities:

The team will report to the USAID Mali Project Development and Evaluation officer and will work closely with the Education and Human Resources Development Project Officer.

X. Level of Effort:

Five weeks total, team will work 4 weeks in country. In addition, one week will be spent outside of Mali: 2 days preparation prior to field work and 5 days to finalize report after departure. Team must be available for 6-day work weeks.

XI. Dates:

The evaluation work in-country must be completed by the end of June 1993.

154

ANNEX E

15

ANNEX E

Summary of the Concepts and Content of Training Modules Project BEEP - In-Service Teacher Training Component

Intitulés	Principaux concepts et contenus
1. Les objectifs pédagogiques opérationnels (OPO)	Définition - Critères - Exemples - Exercices - Comportement observable
2. Domaines et niveaux des objectifs pédagogiques	Cognitif - affectif - psycho-moteur Taxonomies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domaine cognitif (BLOOM): connaissance - compréhension - synthèse - application - analyse - évaluation • Domaine affectif: attitudes - intérêts - appréciation • Domaine psycho-moteur: Initiation manipulation - précision - articulation - naturalisation.
3. Relations interpersonnelles dans la classe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sociométrie: interaction - classe - communication - émetteur - récepteur - structuration • Anarchiques; imposées; coopératives • Discipline traditionnelle; libertaire; coopérative • Techniques de travail de groupe • Techniques de discussion • Ecoute critique - Tour de rôle
4. Evaluation des apprentissages scolaires	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Critères - validité - fidélité - objectivité • Congruence - examens
5. Le langage par le dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Présentation phonétique compréhension - réemploi - exploitation - exercices structuraux - révision
6. La pédagogie des grands groupes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recherche collective d'idées • Elaboration progressive • Leçon - débat - Projet d'activité • Le photo-langage - le blason • Les intergroupes - Technique du scintillement - Langage gestuel
7. Les interactions en classe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jeux d'orthographe - Jeu d'enrichissement lexical - Jeu de message - Jeu de devinettes - Fonctionnement du groupe de travail - Le travail en groupe - Etude de cas (sensibilisation)
8. Lecture - Ecriture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activités de construction du sens - activités fonctionnelles de l'oeil - activités de manipulation de textes entiers - activités d'utilisation de l'écrit - Préalables à la lecture - écriture - activités d'analyse - activités de synthèse - activités favorisant l'acquisition et la fixation du vocabulaire - Fiche-type de leçon pour la lecture-écriture
9. Atelier de calcul	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phase concrète - Phase semi-concrète - Phase abstraite - Fiches-types de leçons pour le calcul
10. Création d'un environnement propice à l'apprentissage scolaire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environnement physique - Environnement social - atmosphère de la classe - organisation de la classe et son administration
11. L'approche méthodologique d'une fiche-type de leçon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thème et contenu - Objectifs pédagogiques opérationnels - Pré-évaluation - stratégies - Evaluation

Nouveaux modules	expérimentés en août 1993 avec les principaux responsables (DRE et IEF)
12. Le patrimoine scolaire (anciennement appelé Vade Mecum)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patrimoine - Domaine scolaire - patrimoine immobilier - Budget - Patrimoine bâti - Conditions de création d'écoles fondamentales - normes de construction - gestion du matériel scolaire - conservation du matériel scolaire
13. Le langage par le dialogue (livre collection de Flamboyant, Ed. Hatier)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Démarche méthodologique - préparation des leçons de explication, mémorisation, exploitation, réemploi et vers l'expression libre
14. Calcul 1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activités prénumériques - Phase concrète - Phase semi-concrète - Phase abstraite - rangement - classement - structuration de l'espace topologique élémentaire - mesure - Exemples de préparations de leçon de calcul
15. Lecture - Ecriture (manuel de langage-lecture première année collection Le Flamboyant, Ed. Hatier)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activités psycho-motrices - Positions relatives • Latéralisation - Espace - Temps - Schéma corporel • Activités perceptivo-motrices - Perception auditive - Perception visuelle - Perception spatio-temporelle - Symbolisation - La leçon de lecture - Vocabulaire - orthographe d'usage - orthographe grammaticale - Expression écrite - Exemple de préparation de leçon
16. Fiche d'auto-évaluation de la leçon par le maître	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pour une leçon de lecture • Pour une leçon de calcul

-151-

ANNEX F

USAID/MALI
EDUCATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
BASIC EDUCATION EXPANSION PROJECT (BEEP)

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

	Base: 1989	1990 ACT.	1991 ACT.	1992 ACT.	1993 PL.	1995 PL.
The number of primary school children completing 6th grade increases.	19,379 (6%)	26,100 (8%)	28,900 (8%)	33,714 (9%)	42,300 (10%)	50,600 (11%)

The number of students completing the six grades has increased. The rate for girls has increased significantly from 25.26% to 27.2%. Though BEEP is committed to an overall increase regardless of gender, these figures point to progress being made by the Education WID program and awareness at both the school and the policy levels.

	Base: 1989	1990 ACT.	1991 ACT.	1992 ACT.	1993 PL.	1995 PL.
Enrollment: The number of children enrolled in grades 1-6 increases.	311,873 (22.16%)	323,354 (22.39%)	340,573 (22.97%)	374,041 (25%)	(Range) 399,545 440,213 (28%)	(Range) 485,289 528,000 (31%)

The overall enrollment in primary grades has increased by 9.8% over last year as compared to an increase of 9% in the previous reporting period. The new Government has reiterated previous commitment and is aggressively acting for an even further improvement to this major category in the 1992-1993 school year.

	Base: 1989	1990 ACT.	1991 ACT.	1992 ACT.	1993 PL.	1995 PL.
Gender: The number of girls enrolled in grades 1-6 increases.	115,300 (16.66%)	118,284 (16.50%)	124,407 (16.95%)	139,430 (18.74%)	(Range) 150,469 165,827 (20%)	(Range) 183,779 200,000 (22%)

151

Though the ratio of girls to boys has remained relatively constant, 1992 saw a 1% percent increase from 36% to 37% percent. At a time when the population is outpacing related increases in overall enrollments, this upward trend encourages continued efforts at targeting enrollment. Because of strategies aimed at girls, concomitantly, the efficiency rate of the number of pupil years to complete the 1st cycle has decreased to 22.2 years, from 23.75 years in 1990-1991.

	Base: 1989	1990 ACT.	1991 ACT.	1992 ACT.	1993 PL.	1995 PL.
Training: Number of teachers and other staff retrained in more efficient pedagogical and management skills increases.	0.	1200	3264	6170	To be determined	5500 (To be revised)

In-Service teacher training is outpacing targets set for 1995 at 5500 staff to be retrained. The 1992 number of 6170 is far exceeding the most optimistic expectations. Data collected from follow-up evaluation shows that 90% of those trained are actually applying techniques and skills developed from BEEP training curriculum. This is markedly improved from 54% shown during the 1991 monitoring data.

	Base: 1989	1991 ACT.	1992 ACT.	1993 PL.	1994 PL.	1995 PL.
Student-Teacher Ratio: The number of students per teacher decreases.	51:1	49:1	46:1	44:1	40:1	35:1

Though the overall enrollment rate in primary grades has increased by 9.8%, there has also been considerable improvement in the student-teacher ratio. This is probably due to effective teacher redeployment, which is one of the conditions associated with non-project assistance.

	Base: 1988	1989 ACT	1990 ACT	1991 ACT	1992 ACT	1994 PL	1995 PL
Repeater Rate: The number of students repeating primary school grades decreases.	30%	28%	29%	27%	34%	15%	10%

The 1991-1992 period saw a decrease in the overall repeater rate. The drop-out rate of 1-6 cycle has improved from 12% in 1990-1991 to 10.9% 1991-1992. Promotion rates from one grade to the other have remained constant from 1990-1991 to 1991-1992 for boys as for girls but the drop-out rate has significantly improved: it is 65% lower for girls over the previous year. This is a trend that will help achieve two of BEEP objectives: keep as many children as possible through the six grade cycle; and lower the gap between boys and girls which research has shown is directly related to macro indicators of development.

199

	Base: 1989	1990 ACT.	1991 ACT.	1992 ACT.	1993 PL.	1995 PL.
Textbook availability: the number of textbooks available per student increases.	.3 text-books per student	No change	.22 book per student	.5 book per student	2 books per student	2 books per student

Follow-up evaluation has shown that ratio of textbooks to students for 1991-1992 was 1 to 2, up from 1 book to 3 students in the 1990 reporting period. The numbers reported for 1991 were based on the number of books already in the classroom with the additional books in stock to be delivered (225,000). Actual book distribution for 1991-1992 school year was 148,396 which was lower expected and which decreases student/pupil book ratio for 1991. Nevertheless textbook distribution shown to be equitable between rural and urban areas.

	Base: 1991	1992 ACT.	1993 PL.	1994 PL.	1995 PL.
Textbook use: (a) percentage of teachers using textbooks increases;	(a) 10%	22%	40%	50%	50%
(b) Percentage of classrooms where students use textbooks increases.	N/A	6%	40%	50%	50%

The percentage difference between teachers' use of textbook and pupils' use of textbooks in 1991 and 1992 is explained in the following manner: our research shows that while teachers might use the book for instructional purposes, students might not have access to textbooks in class. We assume that this difference will be reduced when the book/student ratio reaches the 2 books per student. Monitoring has shown that 90% of teachers who have received BEEP OPO training have been observed, in follow-up evaluation, to utilize those materials in the classroom. By comparison, only 22% of teachers observed make classroom use of distributed textbooks. As a result for the upcoming year, BEEP will be holding "textbook specific" training seminars for the actual books to be delivered to the classrooms.

	Base: 1989	1990 ACT.	1991 ACT.	1992 ACT.	1994 PL.	1995 PL.
Budget restructuring: (a) MEN's share of GRM central budget increases;	(a) 25%	25%	27%	26%	27%	27%
(b) primary education share of MEN budget increases.	(b) 38%	35%	37%	34.43%	44%	45%

The MEN's share of the total budget reflects a global change in the way the GRM now manages expenditures and allocations. Thus the 20% figure must be viewed within the context of redeploying allocations in a totally restructured budget document. More significantly for our efforts, the share allocated toward primary education was relatively static for the 1991-1992 year, when compared with previous fiscal periods. GRM budget calculations have been modified this year to include Donors contributions. This new all inclusive budget is the "Budget Special d'Investissement" (BSI). According to this new budget, the share of the MOE is 20.25% in FY 1992 whereas the target is 18.2%. Compared to the old budget figures and calculations, this percentage would have been 26% for a target of 25%.

	Base: 1990	1991 ACT.	1992 ACT.	1993 PL.	1994 PL.	1995 PL.
Decentralization: (a) School Parent Groups (SPPGs) increase their share of funding for school improvements;	(a) 20%	To be determined	To be determined	30%	35%	40%
(b) the number of classrooms increases.	(b) 7300	7591	7788	8500	9000	9450

The number of classrooms has increased to 7788 from 7591 just below the projected target.

	Base: 1992 ACT.	1993 PL.	1994 PL.	1995 PL.
Student performance improves in the 3 Rs in 2nd and 5th grades.	14.4	50	60	75

6,160 2nd and 5th grades tested in 1991-1992 school year. This percentage represents the mean of correct answers to the criteria reference test administered from May to June 1992 in 110 schools. Student Achievement scores are higher in project area than non-project area specially in grade 5. Correlation is 0.13 in 2nd grade and 0.31 in 5th grade. There was no significant difference between boys' and girls' achievement.

ANNEX G

ANNEX G

General Comments on the First Draft of the Evaluation Report

Observations du Ministère de l'Éducation de Base sur le DRAFT Rapport d'Évaluation PDEB

I. Procédure de transmission du document:

A l'avenir il serait souhaitable que l'USAID fasse parvenir au Cabinet du Ministère de l'Éducation de Base, tout document officiel par l'entremise du seul Bureau des Projets Éducation (BPR).

II. Observations de fond:

2.1 Il y a lieu de se poser la question de savoir si l'évaluation n'est pas passée à côté de l'objectif qu'elle s'est fixé, à savoir être une évaluation d'étape, ayant pour ambition de 'se prononcer... sur la meilleure trajectoire à programmer pour la continuation (ou pas) du projet.'

Et pourtant, pendant toute la durée de l'évaluation, toutes les structures et tous les acteurs (à tous les niveaux) du département se sont impliqués dans le sens de l'atteinte de cet objectif. Plusieurs rencontres ont été organisées et toute la documentation a été mise à la disposition de l'équipe d'évaluation. C'est ce qui explique la frustration que ressentent tous ceux qui ont 'collaboré' à l'évaluation après la lecture du draft.

Si c'est là le sens de l'évaluation de la 4^e génération, on peut affirmer qu'elle est inappropriée pour l'objectif visé, car elle reflète plus les opinions, attitudes et perceptions des différents intervenants et bénéficiaires du projet qu'elle ne mesure l'impact réel de celui-ci, sans compter que l'échantillon des personnes interviewées n'est pas représentatif.

2.2 Le travail réalisé peut être qualifié de superficiel. Des questions fondamentales sont soit ignorées, soit très vite évacuées: Le département de l'Éducation de Base avait souhaité que la performance de l'assistance technique soit évaluée. Ce travail n'a pas été fait, et paradoxalement, l'on conseille de garder cette assistance. L'évaluation, se basant sur le niveau d'exécution actuel du projet et l'expérience acquise, aurait pu préciser les domaines d'expertise de cette assistance, nécessaires à la bonne exécution du projet.

III. Conclusion:

L'évaluation a suscité beaucoup d'espoir chez tous les acteurs, surtout à un moment où le Ministère de l'Éducation de Base et l'USAID cherchent à définir un cadre adéquat de collaboration pour l'exécution du projet. Un diagnostic sérieux du chemin parcouru aurait permis de faire des choix éclairés pour la poursuite du projet.

Contrairement aux assurances qui avaient été faites lors des rencontres, l'évaluation n'a pas pu échapper au piège des incriminations trop faciles. Elle est très peu analytique et contient beaucoup d'imprécisions, cadrant mal avec des assurances, telles que 'ont permis d'établir de façon certaine.' (p.48)

Le rapport ne fait pas de véritables propositions de nature à éclairer et aider les décideurs, les acteurs et les bénéficiaires du projet.

164

M'Bo Ba, Directeur Régional Education, Sikasso

Le document comporte beaucoup de fautes. Toutefois, nous pensons qu'il a tenu compte, de façon exhaustive et assez fidèle, de recommandations des différentes personnes rencontrées dans la région de Sikasso. Nous ne proposons pas de corrections, mais nous donnons ici quelques éclaircissements permettant de revoir les idées contenues dans les différents paragraphes ci-dessous.

Idrissa Diarra, Responsable de l'Equipe d'Evaluation, IPN

1. Inégalité de cohérence et de profondeur de l'analyse due à la rédaction à plusieurs. Certains volets sont analysés de façon pertinente tandis que d'autres sont analysés de façon superficielle. Il faut donc harmoniser le style de présentation du rapport.

2. Le rapport est assez sévère dans son analyse. Il met peu l'accent sur les réussites et au contraire amplifie les limites et les difficultés rencontrées et donne l'impression aux acteurs d'avoir perdu leur temps depuis le début du Projet. Il y a notamment une référence excessive au caractère incohérent et "improvisé" du Projet au début de sa mise en oeuvre et les efforts de rationalisation des activités apparaissent peu.

Boubacar Gaye, Chef de la Division Formation IPN

I. Observation générales

La méthodologie d'évaluation de 4e génération appliquée a posé quelques problèmes qui ont notablement affecté les résultats de l'évaluation au niveau des déclarations des personnes interrogées. C'est ainsi qu'au lieu d'un simple recoupement des informations recueillies de manière isolée auprès des partenaires d'opinions différentes souvent divergentes, une discussion en "table ronde" par concertation aurait permis d'aboutir à des conclusions plus objectives. Du coup, cela éviterait des interprétations hasardeuses de certaines déclarations basées parfois sur des suppositions ou des hypothèses non-confirmées. La qualité du travail déjà appréciable y gagnerait davantage. (chapitre sur la scolarisation des filles pages 48 et 49 au sujet du problème d'argent)

III. Remarques et suggestions sur l'implication de l'administration scolaire

L'administration scolaire au niveau des Inspecteurs n'a pas été suffisamment impliquée dans l'évaluation pour en mesurer l'efficacité réelle. Les multiples difficultés et obstacles rencontrés par les Inspecteurs -- étendue géographique de leur circonscription, importance quantitative des écoles à suivre, insuffisance notoire de personnel d'encadrement (conseillers) -- ne semblent être pris en compte dans cette évaluation. Cependant, ces facteurs ont une influence notable sur le fonctionnement du système éducatif.

En conclusion, la disparité de style, dû probablement à la diversité des évaluateurs, a joué négativement sur la qualité du travail appréciable malgré ces difficultés qui, souvent ont rendu la compréhension et l'exploitation du document difficiles, parfois malaisés.

M. Many Hanne, Direction Administrative et Financière

1. Est-ce que le Projet doit fournir l'équipement, l'appui logistique et la formation de la Cellule de Planification et de Statistique du Ministère de l'Éducation?

2. A propos des cellules informatiques dans les régions du Projet, il avait été acquis 12 micro destinés une à chaque région et quatre aux structures centrales; mais aujourd'hui on ne sait pas ce qu'ils sont devenus. C'est pourquoi, à mon avis le démarrage des cellules informatiques dans les régions a connu ce retard que nous constatons.

C'est la raison pour laquelle il a été suggéré de maintenir dans un premier temps le traitement des données au niveau central et de laisser faire chaque DRE la latitude de créer ses bases de données. En ce moment, le rôle de la cellule informatique centrale se limiterait seulement à la centralisation des données élaborées par les DRE. Ceci aura pour effet la rapidité de traitement des données et leur édition.

165

3. Il y a lieu de revoir comment la collecte des données se fait par "la cellule informatique centrale" car, les données sont fournies par les IEF qui seront traitées au niveau central dans le cadre de l'élaboration de l'annuaire des statistiques scolaires et non les DRE et à partir des rapports de rentrée. (p. 42)

Il faut que les gens sachent ce que c'est un annuaire statistique, le critiquer en vue de son amélioration. Je me demande si réellement les annuaires sont exploités par les décideurs puisque plusieurs copies ont été faites?

Mme. Mara Yakharé Soumano. Responsable de la Cellule Nationale de Scolarisation des Filles. DNAFLA

Conclusion: Observations générales sur l'évaluation du volet scolarisation des filles

Sur le plan méthodologique -- Les évaluateurs ont généralisé à partir d'une situation isolée. De ce fait, on ne peut pas dire qu'une évaluation véritable a été effectuée. Nous nous attendions à des analyses sur: (i) les objectifs du Projet tels que contenu dans le document initial; (ii) le bien-fondé du volet en rapport avec la politique éducative du gouvernement, les aspirations des populations et le ciblage des régions retenues; (iii) l'efficacité du volet: les intrants ont-ils été correctement fournis (financement, ressources humaines, matériels didactiques, etc...) pour atteindre les objectifs du volet? Quels extrants ont été produits? On aurait voulu voir même schématiquement: les prévisions; les réalisations; les écarts constatés et leur explication. Sans cette analyse, il est difficile de mesurer l'efficacité du Projet. Concernant l'efficience du volet, les questions de communication, de collaboration, de recrutement et de profil du personnel et sa motivation, d'appropriation auraient pu être abordées plus explicitement. A propos des propositions concrètes, nous nous attendions à des (i) propositions sur le plan d'opération du Projet; et (ii) propositions de réajustements au niveau du personnel et du mode de gestion.

Sur le contenu de l'évaluation -- Les évaluateurs ont simplement rapporté les commentaires de certaines personnes interviewées. Ces commentaires ne devaient en aucune manière être plus importants que l'analyse des résultats et de la démarche du Projet: choses que les évaluateurs ont ignorées.

Sur le plan général -- Cette évaluation est plutôt descriptive et très subjective, et elle contient beaucoup d'imprécisions (certaines cellules régionales, p. 48) qui cadrent mal avec des assurances telles que "ont permis d'établir de façon certaine..." (p. 48) Par ailleurs, il n'y a pas de véritables propositions, de nature à éclairer et aider les décideurs, les acteurs et les bénéficiaires du Projet.

Daniel Gifondorwa. Assistant Technique chargé de Système d'Information en Gestion. Projet ABEI/USAID

Observations d'Ordre Général

1. Méthodologie

A lire le document entier, il semble bien qu'il n'y avait aucun évaluateur dans l'équipe qui maîtrisait bien la méthodologie imposée à l'équipe. Dans tout le rapport, il y a des phrases qui expliquent en quoi consiste la méthodologie, mais on ne trouve rien comme évaluation. Pour les autres volets, les évaluateurs se sont seulement contentés de reproduire les documents qui leur sont présentés. Dans le cas du volet système d'information en gestion, l'évaluateur n'a même pas pris du temps pour visiter la salle informatique. Quand il a essayé de reproduire le rapport des interviews, il a inventé des bêtises telles que "les écoles envoient directement les fiches au niveau central," ou "les IEF se servent de l'annuaire pour faire le rapport de rentrée."

Quand il traite de l'informatisation des DRE, il aurait... [dû rapporter] que les ordinateurs ont été distribués au ministère et que l'assistant technique n'a pas un si.....

[On a ignoré les acquis du volet. L'évaluateur] aurait dû [rapporter] que le Ministère de l'Education Nationale est le seul ministère qui a pu faire le recensement exhaustif de son

16/6

personnel... Bien plus, l'évaluateur n'a pas mentionné la collaboration entre le volet système d'information en gestion et la Commission à la Réforme Administrative depuis la saisie du recensement jusqu'aujourd'hui. C'est la base de données des ressources humaines, actualisée, qui fournit toutes les informations sur le personnel du Ministère...

pour la conclusion que les maliens ne sont pas impliqués dans le volet...

Il faut savoir que le volet ne consiste pas seulement de saisir les textes ou les données. En général, chaque activité comporte trois éléments: la collecte des données, le traitement, et l'analyse. Si les maliens ne sont pas directement impliqués dans la saisie..., ils sont certainement impliqués dans la collecte et l'analyse. Je peux citer (a) le recensement du personnel, et (b) les statistiques scolaires. Par exemple, les données de l'annuaire 1991/92 en entier et les données de l'année 1992/93 provenant en dehors des zones du Projet (les régions de Kayes, Mopti, Tombouctou, et Gao) ont été saisies à la DNEF par un agent qui a bénéficié de la formation en informatique l'année dernière. Les données sur le budget sont directement saisies par les agents de la DAF; presque partout, on saisit les textes. [On] ignore qu'il n'y avait pas de traitement de texte à l'ordinateur à la DAF avant le volet.

... A dire que le volet n'est intégré ni à la DAF, BPE ou DNEF, cela est faux. Toutes les directions du Ministère utilisent les résultats des activités du volet. L'assistant technique n'a pas de territoire: là où il y a un besoin, on l'appelle et il répond... L'intégration du volet avec les autres volets du Projet [est aussi évidente]. Le volet donne les statistiques et d'autres informations sur le budget et le personnel aux autres volets. La seule chose que l'évaluation a déploré est le volet lui-même n'est pas évalué par le volet suivi et évaluation...

pour la conclusion que le consultant et l'assistant technique font la saisie...

[On ignore] qu'il y a plusieurs fonctions au sein de la profession des informaticiens. Le consultant est un programmeur-analyste. Il conçoit les systèmes et fait la programmation pour le volet. L'assistant technique est gérant et en même temps analyste. Notre collègue Mahy Hanne, de la DAF, a déjà terminé sa formation académique avancée en informatique: l'USAID, sous la recommandation du volet, a payé pour la formation; lui ne s'occupe plus de la saisie; il est formé comme futur analyste qui s'occupera du volet à la fin du financement. A la CPS, l'assistant technique attend l'arrivée des agents d'informatique pour transférer les applications relatives aux activités de la CPS.

Observation d'Ordre Général sur l'Evaluation

1. L'équipe entière ne maîtrisait pas la méthodologie décrite dans les termes de références: on se demande pourquoi alors des individus qui ont employé cette méthodologie --la quatrième génération -- n'ont pas été choisis pour faire l'évaluation du Projet.

2. Les évaluateurs ont reproduit les rapports des volets et/ou quelques commentaires recueillis pendant les interviews. Il n'y a pas d'analyse et les recommandations contredisent ce qui est écrit dans le rapport. Par exemple, dans le volet système d'information et gestion, l'évaluateur a copié les indicateurs que nous avons choisis pour publication à la fin de ce mois. Ainsi il a gaspillé toute une page. (pp. 46-7)

3. Les évaluateurs ont plutôt évalué les assistants techniques. Ils ont oublié l'environnement dans lequel les volets fonctionnent. Malgré toutes les contraintes physiques, financières et politiques, les assistants techniques n'ont jamais cessé de travailler.

4. Les évaluateurs ont totalement raté le processus normal de l'évaluation: input --output -- impact. On a l'impression que les évaluateurs ont directement sauté sur l'impact. Conséquemment, c'est la troisième année du Projet qui a été évalué et les acquis des deux premières années sont perdus.

5. Les termes de référence n'ont pas été respectés à la lettre. Il y a eu des omissions; il n'y a pas de synthèse; la présentation du rapport ne conforme pas aux termes de référence.

Conclusion

Pour ce qui concerne le volet système d'information et gestion, le rapport est inacceptable.

167

Je demande une autre évaluation. Pour tout le Projet, le rapport est insatisfaisant. Il n'y a pas moyen de l'utiliser pour améliorer l'exécution du Projet. Il faut reprendre l'évaluation, mais je doute fort si l'équipe est capable de faire mieux. Je recommande qu'une autre équipe soit constituée pour faire une autre évaluation. Mieux encore, il faudrait confier l'évaluation à une organisation spécialisée en évaluation des Projets.

Koro ??, Conseillère Technique, Volet Scolarisation des Filles

A la lecture des termes de référence de la présente évaluation, on s'attendait à un rapport qui fournirait des données précises sur l'état d'exécution des activités de chacun des volets et leur impact sur les objectifs fixés, cela en rapport avec l'environnement politique, social et économique. En fait, pour le volet scolarisation des filles, le contenu du rapport se résume en une évaluation des activités des cellules nationale et régionales, qui n'avaient que huit mois d'existence puisqu'elles n'ont été créées qu'en novembre 1992 alors que le volet a démarré depuis 1990. L'évaluation ne fait référence à aucune des activités du plan d'actions général qui est en cours d'exécution depuis plus de trois ans. Or, l'existence des cellules nationale et régionales n'est en fait que le résultat des efforts déployés durant les trois ans. Cette stratégie devait faciliter l'institutionnalisation des acquis du Projet par: (a) l'élaboration d'une politique nationale en matière de scolarisation des filles; et (b) la création de structures officielles dotées d'un personnel permanent qui serait chargé de la conception, de l'exécution, et du suivi des activités en vue d'atteindre les objectifs fixés.

Le rapport ne fournit aucune données sur: (i) la situation de la problématique de l'éducation de base pour les filles avant l'initiation du Projet; (ii) les innovations introduites par le Projet (les intrants et extrants produits); et (iii) l'impact de ces innovations. Autrement dit: Quelles étaient les prévisions faites par ce volet? Lesquelles ont pu être réalisées? Quels ont été les résultats de ces réalisations? Quelles sont celles qui n'ont pas pu être réalisées? Pourquoi? Quel est l'impact de ces réalisations sur les objectifs fixés?

Une simple comparaison du contenu du plan d'actions général par rapport aux activités en cours aurait permis à l'équipe de constater que les activités actuellement en cours sont en étroite conformité avec le contenu du plan d'actions général conçu depuis le démarrage du volet. Cela leur aurait évité de croire à une exécution improvisée des activités. (p. 50, para. 7) Le plan a certes connu des amendement conformément à des besoins réels qui ont pu être identifiés. Par exemple, l'appui aux communautés à travers des projets pilotes permettrait de surmonter certains obstacles liés à des facteurs socio-économiques qui ont un impact négatif sur l'accès et le maintien des filles à l'école. Donc, il y a bel et bien un plan d'actions cohérent pour ce volet.

Un simple calcul numérique permet de se rendre compte que sur sept tâches identifiées en 1990, cinq ont pu être effectivement initiées. Certaines tâches ont été exécutées à près de 80 pour cent (cf. tâche I du plan d'actions général; II, IV, VI et VII, à 90 pour cent).

Ce document se présente comme un simple rapport des entretiens que l'équipe d'évaluation a eu avec les différentes personnes impliquées dans ce Projet. Ces informations seraient utiles si d'une part, elles n'avaient pas été dominées par des interprétations et généralisations abusives et d'autre part, elles avaient été soumises à une analyse approfondie, analyse qui aurait certainement trouvé une réponse aux préoccupations essentielles, à savoir: (i) qu'est-ce qui existait au sein du Ministère de l'Éducation en matière de scolarisation des filles avant ce Projet; (ii) quelles sont les innovations apportées par ce Projet; (iii) comment est-ce que ces innovations ont-elles été menées; (iv) y a-t-il eu différentes séquences/phases dans la conception et/ou l'exécution des activités du volet; (v) qu'est-ce qui existe actuellement sur le sujet; (vi) y a-t-il eu une différence -- si oui, à quels niveaux, si non, quelles en sont les causes; et (vii) quelles sont les recommandations pour favoriser l'atteinte des objectifs fixés? La présente évaluation ne saurait atteindre ces objectifs sans répondre aux questions ci-dessus formulées.

Ces constats ci-dessus énumérés me permettront de rejeter tout au moins partiellement la conclusion du présent rapport d'évaluation. Il est difficile d'admettre de telle conclusion non-soutenue par une démonstration logique. En tant qu'assistant technique, ce rapport ne me permet pas de savoir si la présente évaluation ambitionne de fournir des données sur l'impact des interventions des trois ans de déterminer les volets qui méritent davantage d'appui, d'identifier les

162

activités ayant eu un impact positif et celles n'ayant pas eu d'impact par rapport aux objectifs fixés et de faire des recommandations/suggestions quant à la nature des activités supplémentaires à initier. Il est certain que les informations fournies ne répondent pas aux attentes.

En dépit des difficultés mentionnées, force est de reconnaître qu'il y a eu une amélioration significative dans le sens de la résolution de la problématique de l'éducation de base pour les filles d'une manière générale... Des améliorations ont pu être constatées dans le recrutement des filles cette année même si le rapport, tout en formulant des réserves quant aux facteurs explicatifs ne fait allusion qu'au seul cas de la région de Sikasso.

Il serait prétentieux de s'attendre à des résultats extraordinaires en si peu de temps dans un domaine aussi sensible que l'éducation, en particulier la problématique de l'éducation de base formelle pour les filles. La scolarisation des filles étant une partie intégrante de la politique nationale sur l'éducation, seuls les effets conjugués des actions de tous les volets du Projet permettraient d'atteindre les objectifs fixés.

Yolande Miller Grandvaux, Assistante Technique Suivi et Evaluation, USAID/Projet ABEL

Comments Pertaining to Monitoring and Evaluation

Concerning the technical comments, all the answers may be found in the technical reports which are available at IPN; i.e., choice of aggregation and stratification levels, use of regressions, the voluntary choice not to include socio-economic variables, etc.; the use and explanation of the Pearson's R correlation can probably be found in any textbook. It was deemed important to distinguish between an academic research report and a result-oriented and action-oriented report that would enable decision-makers (from the minister to school principals and teachers) to read the report, understand the results and take action.

The objectives of M&E were to monitor and evaluate the Project itself rather than the Malian education system, and to reinforce M&E capacity rather than reinforce research capacities. (See TA's scope of work, World Bank Implementation Manual, 1990, AID PAAD, 1990, etc.) In that sense, the question, in paragraph 7, p. 94 may not be relevant to what M&E was expected to achieve, but is relevant to what the Ministry and its educational policy would be expected to accomplish. The lack of national educational policy combined with poor management practices has been the major obstacle to a real improvement of the efficiency of the educational system and that has affected the completion and achievement of all Project (and non-Project) activities.

It may be useful to look at the impact of the M&E component on the Project through a historical/longitudinal perspective. Again, the original objective of the M&E component (as stated in PAAD and World Bank Implementation manual and the M&E TA's scope of work) is to monitor project inputs and evaluate their impact on the quality of education at the school level in all Project regions. The 1991 and 1992 Project evaluation reports, as well as the several issue papers produced, did what they were supposed to, that is, provide information on crucial issues and lead decision-makers to act accordingly. The course of the Project was strongly influenced by these reports, as you may see in the history of Project inputs. For instance: (i) the first 1990/91 M&E report showed that there was no curriculum in the schools; as a result, action was taken by the Ministry and USAID, and in 1992, 99 percent of schools had one curriculum, as reported in the 1992 M&E evaluation report; (ii) the first 1990/91 M&E report alerted the Ministry and donors on the school book situation: the book/pupil ratio was one book for eight students, and 36 percent of schools had no books; as a result, action was taken by the Ministry and donors, and in 1992 the book/pupil ratio was one book for two pupils, and three percent of schools with no books, as reported in the 1992 M&E evaluation report; and (iii) the first 1990/91 and the 1992 M&E reports showed that the teacher training program "en cascade" worked for the first year, but not for the second year, for the reasons explained; as a result, action was taken and in 1993, the teacher training program was revised and a new methodology devised to adjust to those concerns. Again, it may be useful to look at the original document (World Bank implementation manual) on which all TA's scopes of work are based.

164

General Observations

Methodology:

Even though the fourth generation evaluation methodology is clearly explained in III.A.a, it lacks adjustment to specific Project content and needs. The analysis of all reported comments combined with the analysis of Project outputs (reports, documents, etc.) and observation of Project impact activities would have been helpful. As a result, the evaluation seems to only convey the Ministry's concerns and perceptions.

Methodology and presentation of results differ according to each component. For example, the teacher training component (26 pages long) and the WID component (5 pages long) are treated differently. The former is a non-analytic description of the teacher training curriculum contents while the latter seems to focus on criticism of behaviors.

Further description of the Project should result from such questions as: (i) what has actually happened with the Project since 1990; (ii) what has changed; (iii) what difference has the Project made; (iv) where did the Project start; (v) how did it address problems; and (vi) what was in place before, and after? The methodological flaw stems from the theoretical stance that "the evaluator's objective is to have gained global impressions of the situation at one fixed moment in its course." (p. 1) Although this is a valid approach, it prevents readers and users of the evaluation from getting a clear picture of what existed before and what changes took place. All project activities are taken for granted when their mere existence can be seen as an accomplishment; for example, in 1990, no statistics on the educational system were available, other than World Bank statistics derived from unreliable documents. In 1993, statistics on the educational system are available for years 1990 - 91 - 92. In 1990, *scolarisation des filles* was but a phrase that made Malians giggle. In 1993, a national cell is officially constituted and is functioning in several regions. In 1990, the book/student ratio was one book for eight students; in 1992, one book for two students.

Context

The historical context of the Project needs to be emphasized: six months after its start, the country underwent tremendous upheavals: the first successful coup in 23 years. The Ministry of Education was attacked, TAs were evacuated at least 20 times over two months, the Project ABEL office was tear-gassed, the Minister with whom the Project was working was burned alive, the officials with whom the Project was working were beaten and their offices burnt, the schools with which the Project was working were destroyed, Project teams were prevented from entering schools, 80 percent of the inspectors and regional directors were removed and replaced. All donors' technical assistants withdrew and USAID's stayed. Schools were closed for most of the year, chaos and anarchy were predominant; the already failing educational system was simply brought to a halt and was disintegrating. Two years later, five "ministerial cabinets" later, in 1993, the educational system still hasn't recovered.