

CARE INTERNATIONAL IN SOMALIA

FOOD DISTRIBUTION, SOUTHERN SOMALIA
FINAL REPORT

OFDA/USAID Grant # AOT-1032-G-00-2172-00

October 1992 to March 1994

Introduction

CARE International received this grant from OFDA in October 1992 to implement an emergency food distribution program in southern Somalia. Under this grant, CARE was able to establish operations in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Bardhera. Responding to the growing crisis in both Baidoa and Bardhera, CARE was one of the first international NGOs to establish operations in those locations in August and September 1992 respectively. Outreach to other locations near these towns was achieved as conditions permitted.

The initial grant period was extended through March 1994 and this final report therefore covers the complete grant period. The mid-term report, submitted after the first six months of project implementation, provided details on activities completed at that time. This report therefore provides complete information and details on all project activities implemented by CARE in southern Somalia under the grant. The grant permitted CARE to respond rapidly to the emergency and establish a strong capacity to undertake a large distribution program as well as complementary emergency interventions as needs were identified.

This grant was enhanced by additional support to CARE's activities in southern Somalia through the OFDA grant No. 968-1032-G-00-2010-00, Southern Somalia Emergency Airlift. Both grants covered similar goals and objectives, therefore some of the figures and information is duplicated in the final reports on these grants.

Background

Following the overthrow of President Siad Barre in January, 1991, the civil war erupted as different factions fought to obtain absolute power. The prolonged civil war in southern Somalia destroyed crops, infrastructure, and disrupted all social services, resulting in a widespread migration of people in search of food and shelter. By May 1992, it was estimated that over 4 million people in Somalia were at risk of starvation.

CARE has been operating in Somalia since 1982. Responding to the emergency, CARE requested OFDA and other donors for support in order to assist those vulnerable groups who had no access to basic

Southern Somalia Food Distribution
December 1992 - November 1993

History of Mogadishu Dry Food Distribution

By November 1991, civil strife in Somalia and particularly in Mogadishu, seriously disrupted the operation of the port. As a result of the fighting, the Mogadishu sea port was not operational for several months. CARE, as the principle operating partner of WFP and managing the port, was responsible for approximately 2,000 MT of relief commodities stored in the port transit warehouses at that time. On January 21, 1992, the entire quantity was looted from the port within 24 hours, reportedly, with the port security guards fully participating in the looting.

A cease fire agreement was signed between the two prominent factions of Mogadishu (General Aideed's group and Ali Mahadi's group) during March 1992. In order to continue the relief operation, a committee, known as the JCRA (Joint Committee of Relief Assistance), was formed under UN auspices. The JCRA consisted of three members from Mogadishu North (Ali Mahadi's group), three members from Mogadishu South (General Aideed's group) and three members from UN/WFP. CARE was requested to attend the JCRA meetings with observer status. The primary function of the JCRA was to equitably allocate the relief supplies coming into southern Somalia for the residents of Mogadishu and its outlying areas. Based on rather old district population figures, the JCRA allocated a ratio of 54% for southern Mogadishu and 46% for northern Mogadishu against each individual shipments. This ratio did not take into account the numbers of displaced persons in Mogadishu from other parts of the country nor the movement of people within Mogadishu.

After the March 1992 cease-fire, the first relief ship arrived in Mogadishu sea port on May 3, 1992. CARE was asked by UN/WFP to carry out the commodity handling and distribution in Mogadishu on behalf of WFP. CARE undertook this responsibility and became the implementing partner of UN/WFP in Somalia.

Due to the unstable security situation, it was difficult for any agency to undertake direct distribution in Mogadishu and its underlying areas during this period and as such the JCRA decided to deliver the allotted quantity of food to the district relief committees for each of the 15 districts in the city.

The JCRA estimated the beneficiaries in each district and food was thus allocated for the 1.2 million estimated population of the city. Each district relief committee identified 3 to 4 drop off points for each district and the allotted food was delivered to these points for the ultimate distribution to the beneficiaries. Unfortunately, the poor security situation severely hampered CARE's ability to accurately monitor the distribution.

From May to July 1992, CARE and WFP monitors did accompany the food convoys from the port to their destinations. However, when one of the WFP monitoring vehicles was ambushed and people injured, it was decided not to accompany the convoy, exposing the monitors to danger. Due to the lack of law and order throughout the city, orderly distribution at the centres and other drop off points was absolutely impossible and therefore it was determined that CARE/WFP staff members would not supervise the food distribution at centers. Nevertheless, CARE's field monitors subsequently carried out house visit to ascertain the food received by people in households and neighborhoods. From August to November however, the limited monitoring activities conducted by CARE indicated that less and less food was reaching the intended beneficiaries.

As a result of the civil war, the city stood divided in two -- North and South. Consequently, administrative procedures, political liaisons and the like were conducted separately. Trucking contractors from North and South Mogadishu were appointed by the respective political factions, thereby negating normal tendering procedures. Although CARE was uncomfortable with the arrangements adopted by the JCRA, especially with respect to the monitoring and accountability, there was an obvious, although unquantified, need in the city and the program proceeded under this arrangements until early December 1992.

During October and November 1992, food delivery under the JCRA arrangement was a difficult operation. Armed individuals either in the port or en route routinely stopped the operation for hours and often days, demanding 'special' payments of food and or cash. Protracted and often continuous negotiations with clan elders and political factions were necessary for any truck movement.

Prior to the UTF arrival, the 'appointed' trucking contractors, Dabul & Co. in the north and Awiye Brothers in the south provided their own security for convoys delivering food. Heavy looting of these convoys despite the expensive private security was a regular occurrence.

The first contingent of United Nation peace keeping forces (Pakistani) arrived in Mogadishu in September 1992. However, their mandate was limited and they were unable to make a significant impact on the lawlessness and tension in the city. When the tension between the Ali Mahadi controlled north and General Aideed controlled south reached a flash point in late October 1992, food delivery and distribution had to be suspended for several weeks.

After the UTF presence was established, CARE conducted a proper tendering process, reducing the cost of truck rental by more than 50%. Provision of UTF escorts for convoys eliminated the looting and convoys reached the destinations.

The Dry Food Distribution Program - Mogadishu

The United Task Force (UTF) of "Operation Restore Hope" landed on the beaches of Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. The United States Marines immediately secured the port and airport. As a result of the fighting, the JCRA was no longer operational and food distribution had been suspended for several weeks. The port likewise had been virtually closed for several weeks prior to the arrival of UTF.

With a new "authority" in the city, CARE seized a window of opportunity to develop a more equitable and effective food distribution system. Because a thorough needs assessment was not possible (if done properly it would have been tantamount to a census in Mogadishu and subject to widespread abuse and accusations), CARE devised the Dry Food Distribution Program (DFD). The main objective of this program was to self-target the vulnerable sections of the population by giving out a small ration, 2 kgs per day, that presumably only the real needy people would collect.

CARE introduced the intended objectives and modus operandi and identified nine other international NGOs to participate in the DFD program. Thirty five distribution centers were opened in early February 1993 in both north and south Mogadishu city, targeting the most vulnerable areas. CARE hired a commercial trucking company (Indian Ocean Corporation Ltd.) through a bidding process to deliver 10 tons of dry cereals to 35 sites, six days per week (Saturday through Thursday). In theory, with 10 tons and a ration of 2 kgs, 5,000 people per site or 175,000 persons per day can be fed. However, CARE and other participating NGOs, noticed that many people were queuing up for the ration more than once, a practice that was not discouraged. It was estimated that during February and March, between 130,000 to 150,000 beneficiaries were receiving food daily through the DFD Program. These figures were later revised to an estimated 109,300, after CARE monitored numbers of persons at most sites in May 1993.

As a result of a more accurate count of beneficiaries, CARE reduced the number of distribution days from 6 days to 3 days per week, effective July 17 1993.

The project was initially designed for 90 days commencing on February 6, 1993 through June 3, 1993. However, continued perceived need, coupled with the urging of UNOSOM to continue providing food in the city, the program continued up to August 16, 1993. The initial funding for the Project period February through June 1993 was received from OFDA. Food commodities were provided by WFP. After June 3, 1993, ODA and CIDA provided commodities and operation costs to DFD. The details are as follows:

- a) World Food Program in Mogadishu, Somalia provided the required dry cereal for the period from February 6, 1993

to June 3, 1993 together with transportation costs to deliver the food to the designated distribution sites.

- b) Disaster Assistance and Relief Team (DART) of OFDA approved a grant totalling \$ 561,328.00 to cover the operation cost of 35 centers, CARE's staff salaries (local and international) and other related administrative support costs. This grant was completed on June 5, 1993.
- c) CIDA, through CARE Canada, provided food and operation costs for the period June 5, 1993 to July 24, 1993.
- d) ODA, through CARE Britain, provided required food and other related operation costs for the period July 25, 1993 to August 16, 1993.

Total food distributed during this period was as follows:

February 6 to June 3, 1993

Wheat	: 14,460 MT
Maize	: 13,213 MT
Wheat Soya Blend (WSB)	: 2,069 MT
Chick Peas	: 690 MT
Sorghum	: 1,740 MT

Total:	32,172 MT
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June 5 to July 24, 1993

Wheat	: 5,090 MT
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July 25 to August 16, 1993

Wheat	: 3,143 MT

Grand Total	: 40,405 MT
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Both the UTF and later UNOSOM forces played an important role in the success of the Mogadishu DFD program. The forces of several nations assisted with dispatch of the trucks from the port, provided security for the trucks en route to the sites and secured the areas around distribution sites to ensure peaceful distribution. Although, there were crowd control and other security problems, the UTF provided the security which allowed the program to be implemented. In addition, the UN organized several hundred "ex-policemen" into what was called the Interim Auxiliary Force. One of the first assignments of this force, was to assist the various NGOs with crowd control at the 35 distribution sites in the city.

(approximately 333 tons) bags were collected, or 45%. A total of 4,211 MTs of food were distributed covering a population of approximately 36,000 per distribution day.

The World Food Programme in Mogadishu, Somalia provided the required dry cereal and ITSH costs for the project.

Southern Somalia - December 1992 to March 1994

As UTF control spread throughout most of southern Somalia, it became possible to deliver food and other relief commodities by road to the major population centers outside of Mogadishu. Based on a tender process, CARE hired a trucking company, Indian Ocean Company, and dispatched convoys carrying food and non-food relief commodities to Baidoa, Bardhere. During this time, the World Food Program Transport Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE) lent 70 ten ton trucks and 50 ten ton trailers to WFP/Somalia. These trucks were ideally suited to long haul transportation and soon regular convoys were serving Jalalaxi, Huddur, Wajid, Beletweyn as well as Baidoa and Bardhere.

Beneficiary Population

The Southern Somalia Emergency proposal targetted free food distribution to 500,000 vulnerable persons for 360 days at a daily ration of 400 grams or 72,000 MTs. The following chart shows the estimated number of beneficiaries served by this relief operation during the grant period.

It should be mentioned that in the early stages of the emergency, it was extremely difficult to identify vulnerable members of the population. Because of the severe conditions and the nature of emergency operation, an exact count of beneficiaries was not possible. As conditions improved, especially after the arrival of the UTF, CARE was better able to target food assistance to truly needy people. It should also be mentioned that certain methods of coercion and veiled extortion were used by certain groups in several communities in order to secure relief supplies for their clan or sub-clan. As one of the largest distributors of food during the period, CARE certainly was not immune from these tactics.

Vulnerable Population Targeted by CARE

Month	Baidoa	Bardhere	Mogadishu	Total
October '92	323,000	129,000	846,915*	1,316,916
November '92	205,000	129,000	210,833*	544,833
December '92	205,000	129,000	13,500*	347,500
January '93	200,000	80,228	-	280,228
February '93	199,300	88,613	140,000 @	427,913
March '93	151,000	95,207	140,000 @	386,207
April '93	144,200	- **	109,300 @	253,500
May '93	100,380	- **	109,300 @	209,680
June '93	80,560	- **	109,300 @	189,860
July '93	17,175	- **	109,300 @	126,475
August '93	- ***	- **	109,300 @	109,300
September '93	- ***	- **	109,300 @	109,300
October '93	- ***	- **	109,300 @	109,300

* indicates the number of beneficiaries who should have received rations; calculated by dividing the tonnage delivered by 400 grams per person per day.

** indicates no delivery of food in Bardhere as CARE pulled out as of 1st April 1993.

*** indicates no delivery of food in Baidoa as general food distribution was no longer required.

@ indicates estimated beneficiaries of Dry Food Distribution Program per day of distribution. Note that from August 21 until October 7, 1993, the dry food distribution was part of the Mogadishu Clean-Up campaign.

Free food distribution ceased in October 1993.

7

Shipment Arrivals

The following is a summary of food commodity tonnage received by CARE into and dispatched from the port of Mogadishu during the grant period from October 1992 to November 1993. Total commodity receipts detailing vessel name, commodity type, receipt, delivery and balance for the period from May 1992 to November 1993 are attached as Annex 1.

Month	Open Bal	Receipt	Delivery	Loss/dam	Balance
Oct '92	5,052.70	22,354.10	10,819.60	2,014.25	14,572.95
Nov '92	14,572.95	-----	2,530.00	-----	12,042.95
Dec '92	12,042.95	13,000.00	4,275.58	-----	20,767.37
Jan '93	20,767.37	9,970.20	9,304.62	705.25	20,727.70
Feb '93	20,727.70	2,902.59	16,238.02	73.40	7,318.87
Mar '93	7,318.87	16,544.75	12,569.57	95.15	11,198.90
April '93	11,198.90	11,118.42	16,540.34	111.15	5,665.83
May '93	5,665.83	13,451.22	13,342.66	101.70	5,672.69
June '93	5,672.69	14,633.65	6,255.19	553.19	13,497.96
July '93	13,497.97	5,490.76	7,397.62	5.80	11,585.30
Augus '93	11,585.30	225.40	6,691.12	75.14	5,044.44
Sept '93	5,044.44	17,025.39	6,708.77	201.36	15,159.70
Oct '93	15,159.70	4,999.52	5,531.14	72.80	14,555.28
Nov '93	14,555.28	3,051.53	3,715.55	23.66	13,867.60
Total:		134767.53	121919.78	4,032.85	

In November 1993, CARE turned over its responsibilities at the port to the Mogadishu Port Operation Corporation (MPOC). A summary of CARE's commodity handling during the period from when CARE began port management operations under the grant, October 1992 through November 1993, is presented below. Despite the insecure working environment and constant overt threats to CARE staff at the port, the total loss or damage to commodities in the port during CARE's period of operation was only 2.99%.

SUMMARY

The following summary covers CARE's activities in the Mogadishu Port during the grant period.

Oct 1992:		
Opening balance:	5,052.70 tons	
Total receipt :	134,767.53 tons	
Through Nov. 1993	-----	139,820.23 tons
Less : Total delivery:	121,919.78 tons	
Loss/damaged :	4,032.85 tons	
	-----	125,952.63 tons

Balance handed over to MPOC (Mogadishu Port Operation Corporation)		13,867.60 tons
		=====
Total Loss/damage :	2.99%	

Prior to the arrival of the UTF, CARE hired local trucking contractors together with their own security for convoys to both Baidoa, Bardhere and in Mogadishu. Heavy looting of these convoys persisted, despite the expensive private security. After the UTF began escorting food convoys, the looting stopped, and the convoys began reaching their destination intact.

Annex 2 presents the distribution of different commodities within Mogadishu, regions and for the DFD and MCC projects.

Supplementary Feeding

Bardhere

In the very difficult days of early September in Bardhere, CARE opened two supplementary feeding centers, one in the village of Doble and one in what was called the Italian village, approximately three kilometers from Bardhere town. The estimated beneficiary population at the centers were 600 and 5,000 respectively. Maize meal was cooked for adults and UNIMIX for the children. Estimating from the average size of containers, most beneficiaries received about 500 grams of prepared food.

By October 13th, when the SNF forces captured Bardhere, the estimated population of the Italian village was 14,000 all of whom were receiving supplementary feeding. CARE had distributed over 2,500 plastic sheets (4m x 4m) as well as blankets and other non-food items. CARE was forced to evacuate Bardhere in October during the worst fighting and returning in late October, found an estimated 6,000 people left in the Italian village. It was not possible to return to Doble village because the road had been mined. CARE did manage to visit Doble village in early December by

helicopter. There were approximately 1,000 people in the village all of whom were in very bad shape. Many of them managed to come to Bardhere.

By December, the Italian village had risen to about 12,000 people and a second supplementary feeding center was opened. During the grant period, more than 130 MT of Maize Meal and 275 Mt of UNIMIX was prepared and distributed to a maximum population, in early October, of 14,000 people. Small amount of Blevit, high protein biscuits, milk and oil were also distributed or added to the prepared food especially in the early months of 1993.

Due to increased insecurity to CARE staff in Bardhere, CARE closed its program and evacuated at the end of March. More detail on the Bardhere program, including dry food distribution figures, is provided in the final report on the Southern Somalia Emergency Airlift (Grant no. 968-1032-G-00-2010-00).

Baidoa

In Baidoa, CARE distributed over 13,007 MT of various commodities to the population in and around the Baidoa area. Additionally, five supplementary centers were opened in September 1992 and grew to seven centers by January 1993. The centers were established in the following villages: Grenada, BP2, Horsed, Bootis, Sabiyo, Robbay Gaddud, and Hobishole. The operation of these centers continued until July 1993. The Bardhere evacuation did not interrupt the Baidoa operation, however, Grenada center was closed at the end of June 1993 to encourage the people to return to their villages. During operational period of these seven centers, 272.35 MT of UNIMIX, 2,657 boxes of high protein biscuits, 19.8 Mt of milk powder, 8,450 blankets and 62 rolls of plastic sheets were delivered to a population of approximately 7,000. In addition, 61 bales of used clothes were distributed among 310 men, 1,427 women and 1,400 children.

By July 1993, the population receiving supplementary feeding had fallen to 4,000 and nutritional surveys indicated that wet feeding was no longer required. As a result, CARE closed the last feeding center during the month of July. Dry food distribution also ceased in the month of August in anticipation of the September harvest.

Further discussion of CARE's activities is provided in the final report on the Southern Somalia Emergency Airlift, Grant no. 968-1032-G-00-2010-00.

Sanitation

Within two displaced camps in Baidoa, BP 1 and Grenada, CARE initiated a sanitation campaign to ensure minimum hygienic conditions for the residents. Activities included garbage

collection, cleaning, spraying for vectors and digging five (5) disposal pits.

Complementary Activities

The grant called for CARE to "contribute to the rehabilitation of the social, physical and economic infrastructure through rehabilitation and development activities." The grant permitted CARE to establish a strong infrastructure in both Mogadishu and Baidoa from where complimentary activities could be supported.

During the grant period, CARE implemented a seed and tools project in the Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions of the southern Somalia. The broad objective of this project was to provide agricultural inputs and follow up technical assistance to resettle rural families and thereby contribute to the overall food security of the country. During the reporting period of the 1993 "GU" and "DEYR" seasons, CARE distributed different kinds of crop and vegetable seeds and locally fabricated hand tools as follows:

Table showing seeds and tools distribution during the 1993 Gu and Deyer

Type of Seed and Tools	Bardhere 12,605*	Baidoa 30,600*	Quorioley 40,000*	Jowhar 9,142*	Total 92,347 *
Sorghum	200 MT	464 MT	-	-	664 MT
Veg.Seeds	-	16 KG	7,015 KG	-	7,031 KG
Maize	20 MT	-	-	-	20 MT
Cowpeas	10 MT	105 MT	-	-	115 MT
Sesame	40.4 MT	-	275 MT	46 MT	361.4 MT
G.Nut	-	40 MT	-	-	40 MT
H.Tools	7,000	15,000	41,560	9,200	72,760

Note : * indicates covering of farm families.

Out of these 72,760 pieces of hand tools, 50,380 pieces were KAWAWA and 22,380 pieces were HOE which were fabricated locally in Mogadishu through local craftsmen. Except for vegetable seeds, all other seeds were procured from the local farmers.

CARE received additional funding for this activity from numerous donors including the European Community, Overseas Development Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norge and many other smaller donors. For additional information on the activities undertaken by this intervention please refer to the separate project report submitted to USAID Somalia.

Primary Health Care Program

To avoid over dependence of the rural and urban populations on CARE's emergency health interventions, CARE phased out the supplementary feeding program as soon as nutritional statistics indicated that vulnerable populations were no longer at great risk. This also coincided with a significant harvest as a result of the seeds and tools distributed by CARE's agricultural program.

The improving security environment had encouraged many persons in the Baidoa displaced camps to return to their villages and therefore CARE shifted the focus of emergency health care from purely curative to include preventative primary health care managed at the village level. The initial program was implemented in six villages and focused on immunizations, nutritional education for children and lactating mothers, refresher training of traditional birth attendants, etc. During the period of the grant, CARE in collaboration with UNICEF and other NGOs in the Bay Region, conducted a measles vaccination campaign reaching over 1,650 children in CARE's area of operation. Training of over 40 TBAs and CHWs was completed in the six villages focusing on preventative health care practices that strengthened mothers knowledge and practices related to the care of their children. Topics included oral rehydration therapy, nutrition, immunisations, hygiene. Additional TBAs and CHWs have received training under the expanded health project funded by OFDA.

With the departure of MSF Holland from Baidoa in June 1993, CARE assumed responsibility for the OPD (Out Patient Delivery) at the former 'Bay Project' area; located nearby is a large displaced persons camp. The OPD receives over 3,000 persons a month for a variety of disorders and preventative health care. The maternal health program at the OPD offers tetanus toxoid vaccine to pregnant women along with chloroquine, ferrous sulphate and nutrition education. Given the weakened health status of women in the region as a result of the famine, coupled with a 1986 WHO study that found 22% neonatal tetanus mortality rate in the area, the OPD services are an important contribution in the prevention of maternal and child mortality in the area. The OPD also serves as a training ground for mid-level health workers and as a referral center for villages.

To further strengthen and expand CARE's activities in this intervention, OFDA awarded a separate grant for the primary health care activities in the Bay region which has permitted CARE to expand this intervention to 22 villages. Separate project reports address accomplishments in this program.

Monetization Activities

The grant also called for CARE to "closely monitor the [food security] situation and as possible, make the transition towards initiating a market sales program in the Southern Region." In December 1992, CARE initiated an on-shore monetization program in southern Somalia which much success.

As of December 31, 1993, the project had sold 5,591 MT of wheat flour, 1,425 MT of sugar and 46 MT of macaroni which generated approximately \$ 2,522,000.00 in Somali schillings. Seventy seven international and local NGOs projects were funded, committing almost \$ 2,022,000.00 to create short term employment opportunities for about 16,000 unskilled, semi-skilled workers living in urban and rural areas of southern Somalia.

As noted above, the northern and southern monetisation efforts were merged into a national effort under a separate grant. Information on the accomplishments of the continuing national program is provided in separate quarterly reports to USAID.

Collaboration with other NGOs and agencies

Throughout the grant period CARE has established strong collaborative relations with other NGOs and agencies working in the various locations of CARE's interventions.

In pre-UTF Mogadishu, there were a small number of international NGOs working in Somalia. To ensure effective communication and collaboration, CARE and several international NGOs, established the NGO Consortium. CARE has played an important role since the inception of the Consortium, serving on the executive committee and participating in the various sector coordination initiatives.

Close NGO coordination was also assured through regular meetings in Bardhera and Baidoa. In Bardhera, CARE shared warehouse facilities with UNICEF, ICRC, Swede Relief and MSF France. OXFAM supplies pumps and tanks to CARE established camps and feeding centers. CARE provided a daily water tanker to Swede Relief and MSF therapeutic and supplementary feeding centers. UNICEF provided drugs, UNIMIX and shroud material. Throughout CARE's presence in Bardhera, CARE covered all costs of porters at the airfield for unloading relief supplies for all consignees.

NGOs in Baidoa had similar and equally laudable coordination. Needs in emergency feeding, medical care and water supply were identified and supplies and resources allocated accordingly to ensure that a maximum of vulnerable people in the Bay region received the necessary assistance. Medical supplies were contributed by ICRC and MSF Holland and UNICEF provided UNIMIX for the supplementary feeding centers. CARE has played an important

role in coordinating public health initiatives in the Bay region to ensure that policies are coherent and appropriate among all agencies. CARE's infrastructure in Baidoa enables CARE to maintain a strong capacity to respond to emergencies that may arise in the region, including food security and epidemics such as cholera.

Problems and Constraints

Without question, the most serious and constant problem faced by CARE during this period was the safety and security of the international and national staff based in southern Somalia. On several occasions during the grant period, international staff were evacuated from various locations in southern Somalia during periods of heightened insecurity.

Day to day security needs to ensure protection of warehouses, vehicles, commodities, personnel, continues to require a notable amount of time and resources. Before the arrival of UTF, agencies regularly shared security concerns and often implemented joint security arrangements for compounds and warehouses. While UNOSOM continues to offer escort support for the delivery of commodities and the safe passage of humanitarian workers, the provision of escorts is irregular and vehicles have been 'abandoned' by the escort convoy. Protection of NGO personnel, their offices and houses continues to be the responsibility of the NGO. Vehicles are rented and are supplied with their own security guards.

During 1992, food delivery under JCRA arrangements was a very difficult operation. Armed individuals either in the port or en route to destination would stop convoys for hours and sometimes days on end by demanding "special" payments of food and/or cash. Protected and often continuous negotiations with clan elders and political factions were necessary for any truck movement. Furthermore, heavy looting of convoys despite the extremely expensive private security was a regular occurrence.

Addressing specifically the Mogadishu Dry Food Distribution program, the following constraints were experienced:

- a) After departure of the US marine who organized the "Bull Dog" control system for providing escort and securing at distribution sites, and the confusion among some contingents of UNOSOM on command authority, problem occurred with the organization of convoy escorts. On several occasions, contingents did not show up at the port or were late, resulting in cancellation of delivery of the food to that site.

In addition, instances occurred where the soldiers would leave site before distribution was completed, resulting in the looting of remaining food by the crowd.

- b) Crowd control was a problem throughout the project. DFD depended on the local or international NGO, in collaboration with community elders, to ensure control at the distribution sites. This was not always done. As there was adequate food for everyone to go through the line twice, person would rush to get back in line, creating disruption at the end of the line.
- c) To assist the local elders in ensuring site security and crowd control, approximately 30-40 interim auxiliary forces (local police) recruited by UNOSOM were assigned to each center. As their authority to perform their duties was not clear this hampered their ability to perform their duties. Nevertheless, they contributed to the overall site security as best as they could. When UNOSOM did not provide them with the promised benefits, their attendance at the sites was irregular, disrupting security and/or canceling distribution at certain centers.
- d) Due to the unstable security situation, particularly after June 5, sporadic shooting occurred at some DFD sites, preventing the project to monitor those sites.
- e) The contribution of the community elders in crowd control was to be voluntary at all the DFD sites. However, many NGOs and site supervisors authorized a food for work scheme whereby the elders would receive 15-20 bags for their services. This practice, once implemented at the site, was impossible to stop.

The Mogadishu Clean Up Campaign encountered the following constraints during its period of implementation:

- a) Increasing insecurity in the city was reflected in crowd control problems at several sites on a daily basis.
- b) Lack of UNOSOM provided escorts on a day to day basis made it difficult to plan deliveries to all sites. Often the escorts would not be at the port and delivery to certain sites had to be cancelled. This caused disruption at the site where people were expecting the food.
- c) Insecurity in Mogadishu during this time made it difficult for CARE staff to provide adequate monitoring of the activity and hampered efforts to continue regular dialogue with the communities to ensure project targets were met.

Upon the formation of the Mogadishu Port Operation Corporation (MPOC) by UNOSOM in late 1993, CARE was asked by WFP to hand over its responsibilities of warehouse management to the MPOC. CARE and WFP completed the inventory of stock during the month of October

15

and the formal handing over of the warehouses occurred in November 1993. During this time, labour disputes arose between over 200 port workers who had been at the port since 1991 and MPOC who refused to consider continuation of their employment. The port workers seized control of a warehouse and refused admittance to anyone else. CARE assisted WFP and the MPOC in seeking a resolution to the problem and a solution was identified:

- a) The 286 persons would be given one month ration (per WFP FFW ration scale) by WFP;
- b) MPOC would consider employment of 15 watchmen and 10 tally clerks from among the group;
- c) Fifty persons would receive salary of 20,000 shillings from CARE per day for the number days they were in occupation of warehouse;
- d) Seventy persons would receive a temporary access pass to the port to look for jobs when private vessels arrive at the sea port.

Baidoa

As noted above, security was the most serious problem faced by CARE in Baidoa. Assuring the safety of the international and national staff was difficult under the operating conditions in Baidoa. During the grant period, international staff based in Baidoa were evacuated on several occasions when security risks were high. More recently in February 1993, CARE along with other NGOs operating in Baidoa, suspended operations for about two weeks after a targetted attack occurred against another international NGO.

During the height of the emergency, security needs for the warehouses, vehicles, commodities, and personnel, required a notable amount of time and resources. Agencies regularly shared security concerns and often implemented joint security arrangements for compounds and warehouses. At present UNOSOM continues to offer escort support for the delivery of commodities, but the provision of escorts is irregular and vehicles have been 'abandoned' in villages or on the road by the escort convoy.

Clan fighting and banditry continue to contribute to the insecurity facing NGOs operating in the Bay region. Until there is local resolution of political differences, an improved economy and secure food supplies in the villages, such incidents will no doubt continue.

Bardhere

CARE's operations were suspended in Bardhere after what can best be termed 'creative extortion'. The increased demands for high payments of rent and vehicle hire, coupled with veiled threats of the local authorities and others unwillingness to protect the staff in Bardhera, was an unacceptable security risk leading to CARE's decision to withdraw.

The constant uncertainty and often outright fear of living and working in a war zone in Bardhera and what can be described as a 'power vacuum' in Baidoa created numerous operational problems and constraints, and caused an inordinately high level of stress in both international and national staff. This high level of stress was a factor in many illnesses and general fatigue among the staff and resulted in several medical evacuations during the project period.

Accomplishments/Lessons Learned

Operations in Somalia during the emergency have required a great amount of flexibility and creativity to resolve problems effectively and efficiently. CARE's strength has been in the presence of a strong national staff who have many years of experience with CARE and who were able to resolve difficult, and oftentimes seemingly insurmountable, tasks with integrity and professionalism.

The difficulties of distributing food through the JCRA in Mogadishu had resulted in a situation where CARE was unable to monitor the commodities or ensure that they reached the most vulnerable. Upon the arrival of the UTF, CARE seized the opportunity to change the methodology and through a daily ration size of 2 kg distributed at pre-arranged sites, was able to break away from the JCRA and distribute directly to those who arrived at the sites. The program self-targetted those truly in need who waited long hours in line to receive a 2 kg. ration.

The DFD program contributed to the spontaneous repatriation of displaced persons by ensuring a food supply for family members during the cultivation period. Food received in Mogadishu was shared by those remaining in Mogadishu as well as sent to those who had returned home to work in the fields.

When UNOSOM was unable to provide military convoys to escort the food to the distribution sites, CARE, in collaboration with the communities, ensured the safe passage of the truck and distribution to the community. Throughout the DFD program in Mogadishu, CARE despatched 78 unescorted trucks; of these, only 3 loads were diverted.

In order to move away from free food distribution and towards a focus on community participation, CARE shifted the distribution

activities to the Mogadishu Clean-up Campaign. Food was distributed to communities in return for trash collected in bags. CARE arranged for Indian Ocean Transport Co. to pick up the trash and deposit the bags in two identified rubbish pits. An average of 20 communities participated in this effort, demonstrating a willingness to move away from free distribution to an activity requiring community organisation and participation.

To discourage a rural migration to Baidoa and Bardhera, CARE's distribution focused on villages, rather than urban distribution sites. As soon as was possible, supplementary feeding centers were turned over to the communities to manage; CARE continued to provide monitoring support but withdrew from the day-to-day running of the centers.

CARE's interventions in Baidoa and Bardhera formed an integrated package of assistance to the vulnerable populations. In addition to providing dry food rations and supplemental feeding, CARE implemented an emergency health program that included mobile clinics and an OPD in Baidoa. In Bardhera, CARE operated mobile clinics and began a retraining of CHWs which was cut short as a result of CARE's withdrawal from that area.

While curative care was the initial focus of the emergency health intervention, preventative practices in primary health care have also been addressed. Through this, a smooth transition from a purely curative intervention to addressing primary health and improved health care practices has been possible. Such an approach will provide women and children with the necessary knowledge and health practices to better cope with the continuing precarious health situation in the Bay region and lay the basis for a community managed health care system.

Seeds and tools were distributed to families in the rural areas around Baidoa and Bardhera in order to assist them in regaining food self-sufficiency. Because the seed distribution was accompanied by a program of dry food distribution, families were willing to plant the seeds rather than consuming them.

The emergency water program focussed on water supply to Baidoa town and to several larger villages. Provision of water was critical to improve sanitation and health conditions both in villages and the town.

CARE has been privileged to participate in this large-scale effort to alleviate the wide-spread suffering of the people of Somalia. Through the military-assisted humanitarian intervention, the broader goal of arresting the immediate emergency was achieved.

ANNEX 1

Commodity Shipments by Vessel

CARE - WFP SHIPMENT DETAILS
 AT HOGADISH PORT
 AS ON 14 NOV. 1993

Appendix 1

S. N.	VESSEL	DONOR	ARRIVAL DATE	COMMODITY	QTY (MT)	DISCHARGE COMMENCED	DISCHARGE COMPLETED	DELIVERY COMMENCED	DELIVERY COMPLETED	WAREHOUSE
1	FELIX I	WFP	03-May-92	Wheat	5,000	03-May-92	07-May-92	05-May-92	12-May-92	5A
2	FELIX II	WFP	07-Jun-92	Wheat	7,000	07-Jun-92	14-Jun-92	03-Jun-92	03-Jul-92	6,3A
3	Arab Al Jazira	SAUDI	14-Jun-92	Assorted	4,362	16-Jun-92	26-Jun-92	28-Jun-92	17-Aug-92	9A
4	HARINA C	WFP	30-Jun-92	Maize/Beans	6,856	03-Jul-92	13-Jul-92	30-Jul-92	13-Oct-92	13,3A
5	Ida Eriankais	FRANCE	04-Aug-92	Assorted	1,205	05-Aug-92	16-Aug-92	08-Aug-92	11-Oct-92	12,6A
6	Rafana Harve I	WFP	19-Aug-92	Sorghum	10,000	23-Aug-92	31-Aug-92	14-Sep-92	13-Oct-92	10,1A
7	RIVER NAJE	NIGERIA	30-Sep-92	Maize/M. Powder	2,972	09-Oct-92	11-Oct-92	11-Oct-92	16-Oct-92	4A
8	Rafana Harve II	WFP	10-Oct-92	Cornei	5,397	12-Oct-92	11-Oct-92	13-Oct-92	27-Jan-93	3A
9	SOUSSI TIDE	AUSTRIAN	13-Oct-92	Wheat	4,000	17-Oct-92	21-Oct-92	15-Dec-92	30-Jan-93	1,5A
10	Ida Pimporaise	FRANCE	22-Oct-92	Assorted	3,885	22-Oct-92	27-Oct-92	21-Oct-92	31-Jan-93	8,4A
11	Sea Pearl I	WFP	25-Oct-92	Wheat	3,000	29-Oct-92	29-Nov-92	16-Nov-92	22-Feb-93	0,99A
12	Sea Pearl II	WFP	13-Dec-92	Wheat	3,000	13-Dec-92	18-Dec-92	26-Jan-93	02-May-93	0,45A
13	ETOCAS	WFP	25-Dec-92	Wheat	10,500	25-Dec-92	22-Jan-93	19-Jan-93	20-Feb-93	0,28A
14	RAMONA BAY I	CARE	06-Jan-93	W/Flour (Home)	340	06-Jan-93	11-Jan-93	13-Jan-93	23-Jan-93	5,7A
15	Ferla One	WFP	29-Jan-93	Wheat	3652	29-Jan-93	04-Feb-93	06-Feb-93	19-Mai-93	0,95A
16	RAMONA BAY II	CARE	05-Feb-93	SUGR/W/Flour	367,5	03-Feb-93	05-Feb-93	09-Feb-93	18-Feb-93	1,03A
17	RAMONA BAY III	CARE	18-Feb-93	SUGAR	350	18-Feb-93	13-Feb-93	22-Feb-93	27-Feb-93	3,4A

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SI#	VESSEL	DONOR	ARRIVAL DATE	COMMODITY	QTY (MT)	DISCHARGE COMMENCED	DISCHARGE COMPLETED	DELIVERY COMMENCED	DELIVERY COMPLETED	HARINE PORT/LOSS
18	Sea Pearl III	WFF	22-Feb-93	WBB/OIL	1185.090	22-Feb-93	26-Feb-93	23-Feb-93	23-Feb-93	6.061
19	FALUN	WFF	06-Mar-93	COIN	5000	06-Mar-93	11-Mar-93	11-Mar-93	07-Apr-93	0.241
20	Nelouay Cape	WFF	06-Mar-93	WBE	3044.75	06-Mar-93	11-Mar-93	14-Mar-93	17-Aug-93	5.144
21	Sea Pearl IV	WFF	12-Mar-93	WHEAT	3400.0	12-Mar-93	13-Mar-93	13-Mar-93	11-Apr-93	2.331
22	SULLIN	WFF/TRAI	19-Mar-93	RICE	300.0	19-Mar-93	19-Mar-93	25-Mar-93	05-Jul-93	2.011
23	Coed. SIF	WFF	26-Mar-93	COIN	4900.0	26-Mar-93	31-Mar-93	01-Apr-93	22-Apr-93	0.361
24	Sea Pearl V	WFF	03-Apr-93	Wheat	3700.0	03-Apr-93	08-Apr-93	03-Apr-93	21-Apr-93	0.241
25	Nelou Folo I	WFF/CARE	11-Apr-93	Wheat	1200.0	11-Apr-93	12-Apr-93	03-Apr-93	02-May-93	1.631
26	Sea Pearl VI	WFF	22-Apr-93	Associated	3279.0	23-Apr-93	28-Apr-93	28-Apr-93	13-Oct-93	-
27	HEALIC	WARRISH	22-Apr-93	Associated	1032.39	22-Apr-93	25-Apr-93	21-Apr-93	13-Jul-93	5.34
28	Nelou Folo II	WFF/CARE	26-Apr-93	Wheat	980.03	26-Apr-93	27-Apr-93	27-Apr-93	01-May-93	5.831
29	Adventure I	WFF	02-May-93	COIN	3200	02-May-93	05-May-93	01-May-93	10-May-93	0.251
30	Rosald	WFF	05-May-93	CH/peas	1304	05-May-93	07-May-93	11-May-93	09-Sep-93	-
31	Jovely Lady	WFF	11-May-93	Associated	3450	11-May-93	10-May-93	12-May-93	10-Oct-93	-
32	Sea Pearl VII	WFF	17-May-93	COIN	1700	17-May-93	20-May-93	17-May-93	27-May-93	0.091
33	Salveta	CARE	20-May-93	W/FLOUR	350	21-May-93	21-May-93	03-Jul-93	13-Jul-93	-
34	HEALIC	CARE/WFF	03-Jun-93	COIN/WHEAT	8000	03-Jun-93	10-Jun-93	04-Jun-93	06-Aug-93	2.371
35	Adventure II	WFF	09-Jul-93	Wheat	2300	09-Jul-93	17-Jul-93	08-Jul-93	26-Aug-93	-

BU#	VESSEL	DONOR	ARRIVAL DATE	COMMODITY	QTY (MT)	DISCHARGE COMMENCED	DISCHARGE COMPLETED	DELIVERY COMMENCED	DELIVERY COMPLETED	HARINE	PORT/LOSS
36	SEA FEAR VIII	HFP	11-Jul-93	COIN	3576.70	19-Jul-93	22-Jul-93	27-Jul-93			
37	Silvia Boye I	HFP	05-Jul-93	Assorted	1750	05-Jul-93	07-Jul-93	08-Jul-93			
38	Aventura III	HFP	17-Jul-93	Assorted	3103.825	17-Jul-93	19-Jul-93	02-Aug-93			
39	Silvia Boye II	HFP	18-Jul-93	Assorted	1550.30	18-Jul-93	20-Jul-93	18-Jul-93			
40	LOTTELIN	HFP/CARE	02-Sep-93	RICE/HMT	1516.01	02-Sep-93	04-Sep-93	02-Sep-93			
41	GREEN TIGER	HFP	03-Sep-93	CH/Peas	3,166.00	03-Sep-93	07-Sep-93	08-Sep-93			
42	TAY	HFP/CARE	11-Sep-93	HFP/OIL	6,031.97	11-Sep-93	27-Sep-93	18-Sep-93			
43	Gulf Queen	Kuwait	24-Sep-93	Assorted	3085.12	24-Sep-93	30-Sep-93	06-Oct-93			
44	Aventura IV	HFP	16-Oct-93	Assorted	2653.536	16-Oct-93	13-Oct-93	17-Oct-93			
45	Rosen	HFP	30-Oct-93	MICE/Biscuits	2014.35	31-Oct-93	01-Nov-93	05-Nov-93			
46	AVENTURE V	HFP	05-Nov-93	HAIZE	3000	05-Nov-93	09-Nov-93	05-Nov-93			
	TOTAL				166,207.36						

ANNEX 2

Commodity Delivery from Mogadishu

COMMODITY DELIVERY FROM MOGADISHU

APPENDIX 2

MONTH	COMMODITY	REGIONS MT	MOG MT	DFD/MCC MT	TOTAL MT
Oct. '92	Maize	-	315	-	315.0
	Sorghum	-	2809	-	2,809.0
	Cereal	-	5054	-	5,054.0
	Assorted	655.0	1985	-	2,640.0
Total		655.0	10163		10,818.0
Nov. '92	Cereal	-	830	-	830.0
	Assorted	-	1580	-	1,580.0
	Wheat	-	120	-	120.0
	Total		2,530.0		2,530.0
Dec. '92	Cereal	2,721.0		-	2,721.0
	Wheat	1,045.0	162	-	1,207.0
	Assorted	347.0		-	347.0
	Total	4,113.0	162.0		4,275.0
Jan. '93	Cereal	509.0			509.0
	Wheat	2,895.0			2,895.0
	Assorted	968.0			968.0
	Wheat	2,585.0			2,585.0
	Wheat	2,026.0			2,026.0
	Total	8,983.0			8,983.0
Feb. '93	Wheat	63.0		-	63.0
	Wheat	1,634.0		640.0	2,274.0
	Wheat	5,705.0		2,900.0	8,605.0
	Wheat	1,932.0		2,620.0	4,552.0
	Total	9,334.0		6,160.0	15,494.0
Mar. '93	Wheat	2,908.0		3,500.0	6,408.0
	Assorted	669.0		-	669.0
	Corn	558.0		4,416.0	4,974.0
	WSB	508.0		-	508.0
	Rice	5.0		-	5.0
	Total	4,648.0		7,916.0	12,564.0

MONTH	COMMODITY	REGIONS MT	MOG. MT	DFD/MCC MT	TOTAL MT
April'93	Assorted	2,129.23	572.63	439.00	3,140.86
	Corn	906.00	257.80	3,637.90	4,801.70
	WSB	137.00	-	1,618.02	1,755.02
	Wheat	3,911.00	56.60	2,792.15	6,759.75
	Rice	-	83.00	-	83.00
	Total	7,083.23	970.03	8,487.07	16,540.33
May'93	Assorted	905.35	432.06	2,250.05	3,587.46
	Rice	122.25	52.95	-	175.20
	Wheat	-	-	15.70	15.70
	Corn	2,550.15	140.55	4,272.70	6,963.40
	Sorghum	325.00	-	1,390.00	1,715.00
	Peas	-	-	885.90	885.90
	Total	3,902.75	625.56	8,814.35	13,342.66
June'93	Assorted	1,387.86	594.36	-	1,982.22
	WSB	0.50	1.45	-	1.95
	Rice	6.80	9.35	-	16.15
	Sugar	-	290.65	-	290.65
	Peas	100.20	1.80	-	102.00
	Sorghum	-	-	350.00	350.00
	Corn	1,067.60	-	-	1,067.60
	Wheat	-	24.60	2,420.00	2,444.60
Total	2,562.96	922.21	2,770.00	6,255.17	
July'93	Assorted	271.09	1,144.24	-	1,415.33
	WSB	10.00	77.79	-	87.79
	Rice	16.20	1.40	-	17.60
	W/lfour	-	596.25	-	596.25
	Peas	20.00	46.50	-	66.50
	Wheat	490.00	-	4,016.25	4,506.25
	Corn	407.00	300.90	-	707.90
	Total	1,214.29	2,167.08	4,016.25	7,397.62
Aug'93	WSB	-	329.78	-	329.78
	Peas	45.55	115.20	-	160.75
	Assorted	369.43	216.37	-	585.80
	Wheat	825.70	0.30	2,920.60	3,746.60
	Corn	491.40	426.50	950.30	1,868.20
Total	1,732.08	1,088.15	3,870.90	6,691.13	

25

MONTH	COMMODITY	REGIONS MT	MOG MT	DFD/MCC MT	TOTAL MT
Sep'93	WSB	15.00	34.05		49.05
	Peas	584.20	182.85		767.05
	Assorted	516.67	560.20		1,076.87
	Corn	120.70	311.30	2,811.90	3,243.90
	W/flour	382.50	1,189.40	-	1,571.90
	Total	1,619.07	2,277.80	2,811.90	6,708.77
Oct.'93	WSB	-	21.70	-	21.70
	Assorted	629.42	1,112.91	-	1,742.33
	Corn	1,535.10	498.05	588.60	2,621.75
	Peas	883.65	261.70	-	1,145.35
	Total	3,048.17	1,894.36	588.60	5,531.13
Nov.'93	W/flour	-	40.00		40.00
	Assorted	1,234.31	2,063.61		3,297.92
	WSB	14.75	-		14.75
	Peas	159.52	192.25		351.77
	Corn	-	11.10		11.10
	Total	1,408.58	2,306.96		3,715.54
G. TOTAL		50,304.13	25,107.15	45,435.07	120,846.35

26