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SRI LANKA

AGRICULTURAL PLANNING AND ANALYSIS PROJECT
(383-0083)
FINAL EVALUATION



Presented By

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July 24, 1993

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The views presented in this study are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of any agency of the United States Government, the Government of Sri Lanka, or Datex, Inc.

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PREFACE

The team would like to thank all those who have made this evaluation possible: the officials of the various ministries, departments, and provinces of the government of Sri Lanka; the officials of the USAID Mission who offered support and views; the American Embassy staff who briefed the team; and the officers of various of the donor agencies and many others. All those who cooperated in supporting us and answering our many inquiries are not listed here, as the old line asserts, to protect the innocent.

We would, however, be remiss not to mention the helping hands of James Goggin in USAID, who cheerfully encouraged our efforts as he held us to our schedules; Cheryl Thangiah, who kept us on track by keeping track of us; and especially Seneka Abeyratne, who shared with us his intellectual concerns and with whom dialogue on these issues was a delight.

The correct answer to questions concerning errors of fact or interpretation, commission or omission, in the report, however, is 'none of the above.' Those are the responsibility of the team alone.

Colombo, July 23, 1993

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AID	Agency for International Development
APAP	Agricultural Planning and Analysis Project (383-0083)
APG	Agricultural Planning Group
GSL	Government of Sri Lanka
JVP	Janata Vimukti Peramuna (left wing nationalist group)
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil separatist insurrectionist group)
MADR	Ministry of Agriculture Development and Research
MASL	Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (of MMD)
MCI	Ministry of Coconut Industries
MFAE	Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
MLIMD	Ministry of Lands, Irrigation and Mahaweli Development
MLLD	Ministry of Lands and Development
MMD	Ministry of Mahaweli Development
MPI	Ministry of Plantation Industries
MPPI	Ministry of Policy Planning and Implementation
MRID	Ministry of Rural Industries Development
NADS	National Agriculture and Development Strategy
NAFNS	National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Strategy (1984)
NPD	National Planning Division, Ministry of Finance and Planning
UNP	United Nationalist Party
USAID	Overseas Mission of the Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

APAP was an important, successful effort to enhance the policy planning process in Sri Lanka. It was responsive to Sri Lankan needs, and was appropriately modified to meet the changing provincial roles. Although not originally designed directly to affect policy reform (but rather to create its intellectual and administrative infrastructure), it had a far greater positive impact than could have been anticipated. The provision of long and short-term technical assistance was combined with training and equipment in a judicious and supportive manner. The technical assistance advisor was eminently successful. The GSL implemented key policy reforms, for which the project provided intellectual leadership and/or analytical support.

Sri Lankan officials indicated that they were able to present sound, prioritized, policy alternatives to the cabinet on short notice because of APAP, and that its overall effect was positive. This type of project can speed the reform process when the direction has been determined, provide analytical data on which reforms may be justified, and train those that prepare policy options. But it cannot change policies that the state is unprepared to alter. The policy successes were a product of proper timing, the correct choice of policy issues, excellent technical assistance including the management of the research program, overall donor policy coordination, and the guidance of the National Planning Department.

Training will likely have the most lasting effect, and was the single element those interviewed regarded as most important. Language testing issues clouded the choice of some candidates. The computer equipment allowed use of data bases to contribute to timely responses, although procurement was probably the most delayed and troublesome aspect of project administration.

The formation of the Agricultural Planning Group (together with more trained staff) has created a habit of consultation and coordination together with networks of working relationships that had been lacking. These relationships will probably continue, but the future of the APG as an informal institution is problematic without resources to administer and share.

The technical assistance was effective and widely appreciated, the long-term advisor playing critical roles in the managing of policy and research papers. The host-country contract allowed him to operate independent of the Mission (which involved some lack of knowledge of progress), probably led to closer relationships with Sri Lankan counterparts and greater project effectiveness. The contractor overall performed efficiently.

Mission management and monitoring of the project were careful and thorough. Generalized AID regulations to which USAID had to adhere on English language testing and on procurement, however, materially slowed the project.

The team concluded that the government is providing adequate resources for planning within the relevant ministries and in the provinces; technical studies are being used and have clearly influenced policies; a functioning agricultural planning system is in effect; and a mid-term national agricultural strategy will be com-pleted by December 1993. The technical and analytical capabilities of the planning units have been strengthened, including the provincial units, whose outlooks have been broadened and whose staff capacities enhanced. Much closer links now exist between the NPD and the provinces, which are the base for the new agricultural strategy. Legislators and policy makers increasingly seem to have turned to these groups for policy advice and options. In retrospect, this was the right project at the right time.

The team reviewed the Mission's strategy and portfolio, concluding that APAP initiated many studies that provided the basis on which Title III policy goals were planned, but that the political aspects of agriculture be reviewed, especially in relation to its Title III market approach to land. It recommended that the Mission reconsider its emphasis on an 'agricultural development-led green, democratic industrialization' strategy to reach NIC status by 2001 as unrealistic, but stressed the importance of the agricultural sector and the need for an updated Mission strategy in conjunction with the new Sri Lankan one while not questioning the environmental and democratic aspects of the strategy.

The team recommends that the Mission study the likely role of all sub-national administrative units in the sector and monitor changes to determine what interventions would be most beneficial at what level, but that it continue to program at the Center, remaining sensitive to the needs of the periphery. The project should be terminated as scheduled, but that project funds be provided before closure to study, hold seminars, and otherwise consider the new agricultural development strategy that will not be completed until after the project ends. Substantive studies supported by the project should be placed in AID/W libraries and selected academic centers. The Mission should develop an alternative, policy-oriented flexible, and quick response project servicing the agricultural sector as a whole that could provide technical assistance, training, and studies responsive to local needs; such a project is the successful Indonesia ARSSP--Agricultural and Rural Sector Support Project.

The following generic lessons applicable beyond the project itself are as follows: [1] Technical assistance is highly ad hominem, and those most likely to be effective should have disciplinary competence, country experience, and cross-cultural sensitivity. [2] Host-country contracts create administrative headaches, but may provide the basis for host-country relationships that are more effective programmatically. [3] Agricultural and rural sector projects should be considered within the broad political economy. [4] Policy reforms will take place when governments perceive them to be in their interests; donors must be prepared--administratively and conceptually-to respond quickly. [5] It is usually impossible to pinpoint the genesis of policy change

and assign credit to any one donor. [6] Training is an important investment in long-term sustainable policy and developmental change. [7] Project modifications, training, and commodity procurement, because of the increasing complexity of AID and USG regulations, are becoming more and more difficult and require intensive staff effort in order to be successful.

AGRICULTURAL PLANNING AND ANALYSIS PROJECT

I BACKGROUND

The decade since project genesis has been marked by change--indeed trauma--in Sri Lanka. Ethnic fratricide and revolution, political assassinations, truncation of rights, continuing economic reforms, and a still evolving political restructuring between center and periphery have marked the era begun in 1983 with the production of the *National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Strategy* study, from which this project emerged. As the project draws to its conclusion in December 1993, it is time not only to assess its accomplishments in terms of its original and later revised objectives, but also to determine what the future needs of Sri Lanka in fields related to agricultural planning might be in these still turbulent and fluctuating times, and how the USAID might respond to these and other impending requirements.

1. Purpose and Scope of Work

The purpose of this final evaluation[1] is to determine the accomplishments of the Agricultural Planning and Analysis Project (APAP), its internal components, and its place and impact in the planning and policy reform processes of the Government of Sri Lanka. In addition to estimating the institutional sustainability of the project components, the team was tasked with relating the project to other Mission activities, most importantly the PL-480 Title III program. The team was also requested to recommend and outline the future directions of any follow-on activity that might be required or desirable. Thus, this evaluation is both retrospective and prospective.

These requirements and the nature of agricultural planning, policy formulation, and reform in Sri Lanka compel a broader look at the nature of the political economy and the processes that have had and will have an impact on policy beyond the project itself. The democratic tradition of modern Sri Lanka, most rare in Asia, politicizes most rural sector decisions.[2] The traditional cultural and political dominance of the Sinhalese paddy farmer have shaped, and continue to influence, these issues. The customary role of the state as supplier of largess, from subsidies to employment, has

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[1] See Appendix 2 for the complete scope of work for this evaluation. The evaluation was conducted early to allow time to consider whether post-project activities were justified.

[2] Mick Moore, in his *The State and Peasant Politics in Sri Lanka* (1985) characterizes the society, especially the Sinhalese, as 'highly politicized' (p. 205). This view is shared by many observers of the society.

come under fire. Further, this assignment, if it is both to reflect and influence reality, requires consideration of the present and the likely future administrative and financial capacity of USAID to respond to these new, and even unanticipated, evolving challenges, and mandates recommendations for administrative arrangements to meet such needs.[3] Review of Mission strategic planning and budgeting documents play a vital role in this process.

2. Methodology

The evaluative process is as much art as science. No foreign aid project operates under laboratory conditions, and thus causality can rarely be proven even if it may be reasonably inferred. Further complexities are created in projects designed to build both institutional and individual capacity (an inherently ephemeral task given human frailties) and affect positively policy reform. Thus, although one may judge what the project has delivered or produced (the outputs) and quantify these elements, and even attempt to devise indicators of achievement--all inherently useful functions--direct attribution of the project as the cause of reform, rather than a contribution to it, is much more difficult even in a multiple project context. To attempt it may sometimes indicate donor arrogance. As one study[4] of the APAP process noted, "AID has little or no control over accomplishment of IB [Institution Building]-type project purposes," and quantifiably attributable cause-effect links at that critical level are impossible.

In contrast, experience has generally shown that aid-recipient governments institute reforms when they perceive such reforms to be in their particular economic and political interests. The timing of assistance related to reform and the constant dialogue (implicitly in a peer relationship) are thus critical to the reform process. In Sri Lanka, because donors sometimes work in consort on policy and reform issues, an already complex web of attributions becomes even more complicated.

Because this essay must be prospective, and because we have witnessed profound changes in Sri Lanka during project life, changes that are still in flux and may evolve in unexpected directions, the evaluators must range beyond the project, indeed beyond economics, to be able to recommend administrative and program approaches that will provide the most effective institutional means to meet new demands under

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[3] Some of these issues are discussed in more detail in the appendices to this report. As Bruton notes, "A correct policy is a feasible policy, and feasibility depends in part on the policymaking process." *Sri Lanka and Malaysia. The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth*, p. 13.

[4] Kenneth F. Smith, "A System for 'Purpose-Level' Monitoring (PLM) of Economic and Social Development Projects. Case 3, APAP." June 1991, p. 17.

the constraints of attitudes toward and legislation on foreign assistance in the United States. USAID assistance now only represents some 8 percent of all (multilateral and bilateral) annual aid to Sri Lanka, and as that percentage has diminished it has become even more important to ensure its most effective impact.

This evaluation has been based on a review of official U.S. documentation, Sri Lankan public and private materials, interviews with key Sri Lankan officials and intellectuals, USAID and Embassy officials, and participants in the program. The project and its role in the donor community have been discussed with both multilateral and bilateral agency staff. A representative portion of the academic literature related to socio-economic and political issues has been perused in the time available. Field trips were arranged to four provinces to gauge the new, localized roles of the provincial councils, their interactions vertically with both the center and districts (and down to divisional level) and horizontally with other provinces. A few of the approximately 250 divisions were also visited, and a small number of farmers interviewed in their fields to accentuate sensitivity toward the purported beneficiary of reforms--the farm family. Sampling at any bureaucratic level in the time available must be statistically invalid, although it may be indicative and revealing.

The report length (with which the team has taken modest liberties) is restricted by the scope of work, but the team believes the reader should have access to more extended discussions of central issues. These are included in individually authored appendices, which the team urges the reader to review. These consist of works on the emerging importance of the provinces in planning (Appendix 8), future directions and needs in Sri Lankan agricultural planning (Appendix 9), Mission management issues (Appendix 10), an insider's view of the technical assistance process within the Sri Lanka context (Appendix 11), land and the commercialization of agriculture (Appendix 12), restructuring the state plantation sector (Appendix 13),and the planning process (Appendix 14). These essays essentially represent the views of their authors, although they may also reflect team opinions.

In any team effort, compromises in language and nuances in the body of the report have been made among team members to present a unified, stylistically coherent, approach. Where serious differences exist, they have been so noted. As the face sheet to this report indicates, the views expressed here are those of the authors, and represent neither the opinions of any agency of the United States or Sri Lankan governments, nor Datex Corporation, the contractor for this effort. Sins of commission or omission are attributable to the team leader.

3. The Political Economy, Agricultural Planning, and Project Formulation

Sri Lankan agricultural policy has been shaped by its long, pluralistic political process. With universal suffrage beginning in 1931, and state-sponsored welfare initiated during World War II, equity issues have remained important.

> Sri Lanka was an effective democracy, and governments were responsive to the electorate. The history of economic troubles necessitated a strong and direct role by the government in the form of various welfare programs for any government that wished to remain in power. The effectiveness of democracy also played a significant role in the decision making process of the government, as well as its capacity to implement its decisions and policies. The frequent disturbances made the decision making even more complex.[5]

The complex ethnic composition of the island, the historical roots of which go back well over one thousand years and have been in constant change, still have vibrant, often tragic, repercussions, not only for humanity, but for reform and policy formulation. Central to the issue of agricultural policy has been the cultural role of the Sinhalese paddy farmer. In caste, political, and social terms, he has exemplified the societal ideal, and affects and has been affected by these policy issues.

A critical, recurring issue of the political economy has been the problem of unemployment and underemployment, on both of which statistics are notoriously poor worldwide. Since independence, it has had a stark influence on the society, resulting most profoundly in the insurrection of 1971 by educated but unemployed youth, and contributing to the later terrorist activities of the leftist and ultra-nationalist JVP. In contrast to many developing societies, unemployment has not produced a rural push into urban areas (there have been few 'pull' factors in terms of employment opportunities), and the emigration of an educated elite from the country and the pull of the Middle East and elsewhere for both skilled and unskilled workers (some 300,000 in 1991) have provided some modest safety valves. The issue continues to be unresolved, and has important consequences for some PL-480 Title III policy reforms, for private sector industrial policy that was to provide jobs, and for the status of women.[6]

To meet social needs and alleviate absolute poverty, welfare schemes were instituted that drained the nation's resources even as it provided an enviable international reputation for Sri Lanka's Physical Quality of Life (PQLI) indicators.

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[5] Henry J. Bruton et al. *Sri Lanka and Malaysia. The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth.* Oxford: Oxford University Press (for the World Bank), 1992, p. 71.

[6] According to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, *Social Statistics of Sri Lanka*, unemployment in 1973 was 24.0 percent, 14.7 percent in 1978/79 (following liberalization), and 11.7 percent in 1981/82. The American Embassy ("Foreign Labor Trends--Sri Lanka,"1991-92), estimates unemployment at 14.1 percent in 1991. Field interviews in Central Province (Kandy) show unemployment at 18% in that area in 1981, but 32 percent in 1990. In Southern Province, it is said to be 22.4 percent, and in Galle Division some 48 percent. In Gampaha District (Western Province) officials estimate it as 25 percent. In North Central province, it is said to be 18-22 percent. Statistical inaccuracies may have influenced the numbers, but a restudy of unemployment seems warranted.

These were, however, paid for through taxing the exports of the plantation economy (tea, rubber, coconuts), which early was perceived to be foreign domina-ted but which diminished funds available to the state for developmental purposes, and which discouraged reinvestment in replantings and new technology, thus eventually reducing yields and world market shares.

The striking and unprecedented victory of the conservative United Nationalist Party (UNP) at the polls in 1977 brought about a determined relaxation of the most rigorous dirigiste controls over the private sector and imports, although there is evidence that considerable suspicion of the private sector still remains even at high bureaucratic levels.[7] The economy became more open to foreign investment and trade and more market oriented, there was a diminution of state interference in the economic processes, and a retrenchment of some welfare services (including rice rations). These positive policy shifts prompted massive increases in foreign aid which reached $540 million in 1984 and some $840 million pledged in 1993. In the 1981-85 period, foreign aid averaged 10 percent of GNP.[8] Foreign aid in 1987 was 28 percent of the national budget and in the previous year, Japan became the largest bilateral donor; in 1988 it provided 46 percent of all bilateral assistance.[9] The result was an increase in debt. Total foreign aid provided by the United States to Ceylon/Sri Lanka (1950-1990) was $1.208 billion.[10]

Although many positive economic effects were felt, income distribution became further skewed. Attempts to provide off-farm employment in the garment and other industries has not met with much success; in Southern Province alone, 43 percent of the Galle District population, 50 percent of Matara's, and 71 percent of Hambantota's were on food stamps--the clearest surrogate indicator of poverty.[11] These policy shifts were neither universally progressive nor export-oriented. In June 1993, for example, cabinet-level discussions were reported to have taken place on instituting in two years major restrictions on many food imports (excluding wheat)--in effect reverting to an import-substitution agricultural policy. How much these are seriously considered policies or political postures are unknown.

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[7] It is apparent, in the Mahaweli for example, that there is a strong reluctance by the government to give up control of any assets, including land and potentially commercially useful buildings.

[8] USAID, *Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) 1987*. Colombo, 1985.

[9] *Basic Strategy for Development Assistance*. JICA, Tokyo, March 1991.

[10] AID, *Congressional Presentation FY 1993*.

[11] Field interviews, Galle, July 1993. In Polonnaruwa it is 38 percent where water is abundant because of the Mahaweli project; but in Anuradhapura it is 57 percent because of a lack of water. Field interview, July 1993.

The recurrence of ethnic rioting and destruction in 1983 slowed growth and progress. The USAID noted in the CDSS of 1987 (written in 1985) that ethnic tensions were 'distracting resources needed for development.' But by 1991, the Japanese[12] characterized ethnic violence as the greatest obstacle to Sri Lankan development. However one describes the issue, it is evident that it has had a significant impact on funds available for development. A considerable percentage of the funds (perhaps $500 million in 1993, something under 5 percent of GNP) available to the state is targeted for military expenditures. Equally important, even if the violence were to cease, the movement of the Sri Lankan military into more capital intensive equipment and the unlikelihood of major demobilization (which would exacerbate unemployment) means that these expenditures will likely remain high into the future.[13] Two articles have noted the deleterious effects of military expenditures on Sri Lankan development.[14] The equivalent of well over one-half of foreign aid goes into military expenditures.

Significant changes in political leadership of the government and the opposition through assassinations, followed by the remarkably peaceful provincial elections in May 1993 (in which the opposition did reasonably well) may presage both political shifts at the center, and shifts between the center and the periphery (here, the provinces).[15] The devolution of various responsibilities to the provinces (embodied in Constitutional Amendment 13 in 1987 and passed as a means to diffuse ethnic violence through creation of regional and local autonomy in public administration) and the success of the opposition at some local-level elections may have important implications for future USAID agricultural policy and planning initiatives.

4. The Agricultural Sector and Project Genesis

Within this complex context, the Sri Lankan Government recognized that the development of a strategy was required to deal with new needs in the agricultural sector--needs that had impacts on the nutritional standards of the at-risk elements of the population. In 1982/83, some two-thirds of agricultural development expenditures

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[12] op. cit.

[13] Military size went from 100,000 to 200,000 men from 1960 to 1987, expenditures from $20 million to $204 million, and the budget from 1.0 Percent of GNP to 3.1 percent. See Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991*. Washington, D.C., 1991. The Far Eastern Economic Review *Asia 1993 Yearbook* notes $340 million budgeted in 1992, but expenditures will probably be over $500 million. Any significant demobilization would have adverse effects on the labor market.

[14] See Lisa Morris and Shiranthi Gnanaselvam, "The Economic Effects of the Sri Lanka's Civil War," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 1993; and Lee Ann Ross and Tilak Samaranayake, "The Economic Impact of the Recent Ethnic Disturbances in Sri Lanka," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVI, November 1986.

[15] For a more detailed discussion of the significance of this and its implications for USAID policy, see Appendix 8.

went into irrigation and land settlement, of which 90 percent were for the Mahaweli program.[16] This could not be sustained and needed to be changed.

The result was the preparation of the *National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Strategy*, published in 1984. The study was assisted by support from both the Netherlands and USAID. That document emphasized the need to improve agricultural planning.[17] It stressed that "...planning capabilities within the agricultural sector are generally weak," and further noted "The planning offices have not been adequately staffed, its technicians not adequately trained and its analytical input into policy decision-making rather marginal."

The study further called for institutional changes in the planning process and multi-disciplinary approaches to issues. It noted:

> The government's commitment to devolution of administrative and decision making powers to the district level [now changed to provinces] underscores the crucial importance of establishing a planning system at this level. The interchange between central and district level officials is often inadequate and consequently, central level plans and programmes are prepared without proper information or feedback.

It requested donor collaboration in aspects of the reform. This project was a direct outgrowth of that strategy paper.

5. The Project and Its Components

The APAP was approved in 1986, and the agreement signed on August 29 of that year. As later amended, it authorized the expenditure of $6.6 million in AID funds, of which $5.18 million was to be in grants, and $1,42 million in loans. The Sri Lankan government contribution was $2.7 million, for a total project of $9.3 million. The loan was to be for forty years, with a grace period of 10 years, and interest rates of 2 percent for the first ten years, and 3 percent thereafter. The life-of project was to be six years.

The rationale for the project was to utilize better the limited resources available for agricultural development through improved planning and relating such planning to the policy formulation process.

The goal of the project was "to enhance the contribution of the agricultural

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[16] *National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Strategy. A Change in Perspective.* National Planning Division, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Colombo, June 1984.

[17] See pp. 24-25.

sector to overall national economic development through increased production, expanded employment and higher real incomes." The purpose was to "develop an integrated national-level agricultural planning system which can provide a rational basis for policy formulation and decision-making in Sri Lanka's agricultural sector."[18]

The project was designed to develop two aspects of planning: [1] to create an institutional link among a select group of ministries[19] involved in the agricultural sector through the creation of an inter-ministerial Agricultural Planning Group (APG), led by the Ministries of Agricultural Development and Research (MADR), and the National Planning Division (NPD) of the Ministry of Finance and Planning; and [2] to increase the capacities of individual ministries to plan through improving human resources and the data required to draw up appropriate plans. There were three essential support components to the project: the provision of long and short-term technical assistance (that would also supervise the production of policy-related studies); training, both long term for degrees and short, on-the-job training both in the U.S. and third countries; and commodities, such as computers and support equipment. The Sri Lanka government contribution was mainly devoted to operations, some construction, and salaries for trainees. Modest funds were included for evaluations and seminars and publications.

The original design called for six line ministries plus the Ministry of Mahaweli Development and the National Planning Department to participate in the project through the Agricultural Planning Group as well as through training and studies. The AGP, however, was to remain an informal coordinating body.

The four projected outputs of the project were:

[1] Trained staff in participating ministries;
[2] The inter-ministerial Agricultural Planning Group institutionalized and functioning effectively;
[3] A minimum of 15 studies on agricultural policy or problem areas;
[4] A medium-term agricultural policy agenda that "identifies key issues and proposes a continuing strategy for the sector." Such a document would effectively update and extend the study that was the genesis of the project.

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[18] See Appendix 15 for the Logical Framework. All quotations are from the Project Paper.

[19] Those original institutions were the Ministries of Agricultural Development and Research (MADR); Lands and Development (MLLD), Rural Industrial Development (MRID); Coconut Industries (MCI); Fisheries (MF); Plantation Industries (MPI), and the National Planning Division (NPD) of the Ministry of Planning and Finance. The Ministry of Mahaweli Development (MMD), through its primary implementing authority--the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL) was also to participate.

Although a goal-level assumption postulated no deterioration in the security situation (one that has been proven false on both LTTE and JVP grounds), there are no purpose-level assumptions that address the political issues, particularly the political role of agriculture.

The end-of-project status indicators for achievement of project purpose were:

[1] "A functioning agricultural planning system producing numerous high-quality technical studies and analyses relevant to decision-making."

[2] "Technical studies and a revised NAFNS being used by decision-makers as guides to agricultural sector policy, program and investment decisions;"

[3] "Adequate resources being provided by the GSL for agricultural planning within all relevant ministries."

In 1992, 'purpose-level indicators' were developed that more systematically defined progress under the project. Those indicators are included in Appendix 15.

A mid-term evaluation was scheduled, and changes within the project were required as conditions changed within the country and administration.

II THE MID-TERM EVALUATION AND PROJECT AMENDMENTS

The mid-term evaluation (conducted under a contract with Devres, Inc.) was completed in April 1990. It concluded that the project had been delayed by internal project and external national circumstances. Political turbulence and ethnic warfare had disrupted the work of some of the ministries collaborating on the project, and the political decision to devolve certain functions to the provinces[20] had recast some agricultural planning needs. In addition, the issue of a host country contract that was combined with an intended delay of long-term technical assistance slowed early implementation. At the time of the evaluation, some 17 percent of USAID funds had been expended, compared to a planned total of 49 percent; Sri Lankan expenditures had done somewhat better--27 percent compared to a planned 40 percent.

Commodity expenditures were slowest; only 15 percent of planned expenditures took place, compared to 35 percent of technical assistance, and 44 percent of planned training expenditures. Training lagged because of the difficulty in some attaining necessary English competency.

The Agricultural Planning Group was originally conceived as coordinating sectoral planning and allocating resources. As the evaluation noted:

> In a word, the original objective of the APG was too ambitious and it failed to live up to earlier expectations. Failure is a result of: (1) excessive administrative detail that has prevented needed attention to be devoted to subject matter and (2) the unrealistic expectation that decision makers would freely relinquish decision making control to an inter-ministerial coordinating body.[21]

That characterization of 'failure' is excessive. Progress was indeed slow, and administrative detail sometimes seemed to predominate for periods, but there is little evidence that the original project designers actually thought that politicians (those who in fact make policy) would give up responsibility to do what they are publicly charged with doing. Indeed, there is no evidence in the original project paper that APAP was designed directly to contribute to policy reform (instead, it was to prepare some fifteen studies). It did much more, as we will demonstrate. At the policy making level, informed options are presented to the politicians,[22] and those often influence their actions, and it seems evident that no one was naive enough to believe

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[20] See Appendix 8 for an analysis.

[21] "Mid-Term Evaluation," p. 17.

[22] It should be noted here that those in Parliament or on the Provincial Councils have no professional staff. Information and data on which to make decisions, therefore, must come from other sources, often the national or provincial planning units or divisional secretariats.

that an informal committee would take over those functions.

Although the arrival of the long-term advisor had speeded implementation, the evaluation noted that project implementation was uneven--lagging in the Ministries of Lands, Irrigation and Mahaweli Development (MLIMD--reflecting ministerial reorganization) and Plantation Industries. The evaluation recommended additional technical assistance to those groups.

The evaluation advocated that the project be extended for one year, as planning reform was long term and implementation had speeded up with the arrival of the long-term technical assistance advisor. It suggested that training be extended to the new planning units in the provinces, and that short-term policy oriented studies be initiated by the planning units. The report also suggested that benchmarks be negotiated with the authorities on levels of governmental allocations.

The evaluation noted that a lesson learned was that host country contracts and delayed technical assistance not be combined.

Although a new National Agriculture and Development Strategy (to replace the original 1984 strategy) had been planned to be completed by the project's close, it was agreed that publication of the strategy would be delayed until the 1994 Sri Lankan presidential election to prevent politicizing the conclusions, although it would be informally circulated for discussion earlier.

On May 20, 1992 USAID approved of an action memorandum that reallocated $480,000 in already obligated funds from loan to grant. The pipeline on commodities proved to be excessive and the costs of such commodities, such as computers, had fallen while needs for technical assistance, training, and a new initiative had surfaced. Although there was agreement within the Mission that this was both appropriate and important, it took a long time and proved to be bureaucratically difficult to accomplish. That memorandum, however, served as an internal, additional evaluation that updated progress. Expenditures had risen to 58 percent of those planned. The termination of the project was still scheduled for August 31, 1993.

Funds were also internally reallocated to assist the government in plantation restructuring ($145,000) with technical assistance, office support, and the solicitation of private management contracts. An additional $75,000 was also newly allocated for seminars and pre-publication costs related to the strategy, with the government providing full publication costs. In addition to plantation restructuring, additional funds were provided to the Abt contract and for more training.

III THE FINAL EVALUATION--FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Project Components

A. Training--Findings and Conclusions

Training was financially the most important element of the project; $3.2 million were obligated for it out of $6.6 million, or 48% of the total funds obligated under the project.

All those interviewed by the team indicated that training programmatically, as well as financially, was the critical element.[23] Trainees have been sent from all ministries and departments involved in the project, and from all the provinces as well (See Appendix 4 for a list). Thirty-seven trainees (27%) went abroad on long-term training in M.Sc. or Ph.D. programs, fifty five (40%) for short-term training and the remainder went for diploma work or study tours both to the U.S. and third countries. The study tour element of the training program has proved particularly successful. Provincial officials interviewed by the evaluation team indicated that study tours to neighboring countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and other South Asian countries provided them with the opportunity to see how other countries are handling similar development planning problems. In fact, one provincial official felt very strongly that this type of training was much more useful for him than training in the U.S.

Several study tours were organized for various levels of GSL personnel, from Cabinet Secretary level to the planning technicians in the Provincial Councils. Most of the tours visited Indonesia and Malaysia, with the Cabinet Secretaries also visiting Korea. The tours were oriented towards showing the participants the planning systems operating in these countries, both at the national and local level. These tours have been very well accepted and were enthusiastically discussed by the participants.

Only two trainees have not returned as obligated under the program (excluding those still in the program). The GSL is continuing to make efforts to recover training funds. Both are Tamil, and their decision not to return may have been prompted by the continuing crisis in ethnic relations here.

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[23]. In a study by the team leader conducted in Korea on the effectiveness of concessional assistance for the World Bank, there was unanimous agreement, even at the prime ministerial level, that the greatest single contribution of the donors to Korean development was training. See D. Steinberg, *On Foreign Aid and the Development of the Republic of Korea. The Effectiveness of Concessional Assistance*. A.I.D. Special Study #42, December 1985 (for the World Bank).

Mission staff have met with all departing and returning grantees, and solicited their views on the program through interviews and questionnaires. Follow-up on grantees has been excellent, in contrast to some other Missions. The Core Planning Group approves trainees, all of whom are nominated by various ministries/ provinces/departments. Since competition for entry into the civil service is so strong, all candidates are considered capable, but USAID sometimes recommends disapproval of nominees on the basis of their occupying a position irrelevant to planning.

Three administrative problems have arisen external to the USAID: changing contractors in the U.S., budgeting, and language testing.

Since project inception, there have been three U.S. contractors placing and administering long-term trainees: USDA, the Consortium for International Development, and (since January 1993) Partners for Internationnal Education and Training. From a Mission vantagepoint, only the last has performed in a timely manner. Previously, there were inordinate delays in accounting and in conflicting budget costs for individual trainees.

To calculate expenditures, a 'confirmed budget' for each grantee must be sent for approval by the contractor to the AID Office of International Training, and then to AID Financial Management. A cable to the field indicating the 'confirmed budget' then allows the Mission to program prudently any remaining funds. Some such cables were delayed over a year, and in other cases there were conflicting figures. The team understands that this was a contractor issue, not a problem with AID/W. As only $85,000 remains uncommitted (at this writing) in training funds, it is important to the Mission to have an early and accurate accounting of the balance. If funds are not spent by September 30, 1993, they are lost to the project. Perhaps even more important in terms of Mission efficiency is the administrative burden in time and labor that this represents.

The third issue is English language. Long-term trainees must pass the TOEFL examination, shorter-term trainees the ALIGU examination. Passing has been a major problem even though students start English in the third grade. The Mission has felt that these tests have not accurately predicted academic or study tour success, and has attempted to have the ALIGU reconsidered. Although the issue cannot be resolved within this project context, it will no doubt arise in other projects. If the project were not close to closure, the team would have recommended sponsorship of in-service English language programs to try to circumvent this problem. The Mission did run two short-term English language courses under the project.

The team concludes that the training process has been programmatically successful and critical to project and planning success, notwithstanding its labor intensity. It is highly regarded by the government, and Mission management has been careful and monitoring excellent.

Training is, of course, a continuous process: upgrading of skills, absorption of new knowledge and techniques, the development of a new cadre of trained planners with different degrees of sophistication for different roles. The technical assistance advisor played a very important role in the on-the-job training. Training alone will not permanently institutionalize progress. Thus, training of planning staff should continue under some auspices. When this project ceases, USAID might well consider the recommendations at the close of this report, or discussing the need with other donors.

B. Research and Policy Studies--Findings and Conclusions

The APAP accounting process subsumes research and policy studies under the general rubric of technical assistance, for it is the long-term advisor who plays a critical role in the process, and funds for studies are included within this category. Although the original project paper envisaged a minimum of 15 studies, it did not consider that such studies could assume the role they have played in policy reform.

Appendix 5 provides a select list of policy studies, including only those that have or are resulting in policy changes. Twenty-five are included, with an additional nine ministerial studies and ten national studies. More important than the quantitative numbers are their influence. The research agenda has been pro-active, and at the same time responsive to the demands for accurate data and thoughtful analyses. These studies have already or are providing the analysis for or are instituting reforms. Some of the studies already implemented include the elimination of the fertilizer subsidy, divestiture of marketing department, a policy reform agenda for crops and livestock, restructuring of the Fisheries Harbour Corporation, etc.

The research/policy paper process, involving the long-term advisor at almost all stages (except at the Cabinet level), is complex: it begins with identification of the problem related to reform, the work plan for policy intervention, the terms of reference of the study, choice of consultant[s], the allocation of resources (from APAP or another donor), monitoring research progress, reviewing reports, holding workshops to discuss it and coordination issues, the preparation of a Cabinet Paper or other action document, and monitoring implementation and compliance when reforms have been officially approved.

At most stages the newly trained personnel, the computer equipment, the more collaborative relationships between technical assistance and government personnel all play a role in furthering the reform process.

The team concludes that without question APAP has contributed to the reform process to a degree not envisioned in the early stages of the project. The reasons for this success are in part attributable to the project: the competence and rapport of the advisor, the support of other elements of the planning process, and the flexibility it

programmatically illustrated. But the timing was also right as reforms were on the government's agenda, and were supported by the combined weight of other donors. The choice of policy issues on which to concentrate effort proved to be those both feasible and important, and the National Planning Department strongly backed the whole effort. The project did not operate in a vacuum; other influences contributed to reforms. But the team believes that without APAP, reforms would have come more slowly, perhaps less successfully. Research and policy studies have been critical to project success, and have accomplished far more than the 'end-of-project status' had anticipated.

C. Commodities--Findings and Conclusions

Commodities were a relatively modest financial element in the project; $720,000 was obligated for their purchase. By the end of June 1993, 71 percent of funds in this category had been expended ($514,179). As of June 30, 1993, extensive procurement of computer equipment, books and office equipment was in process, with approximately $61,900 planned (documents issued but not yet finalized or contracted) and an additional $139,415 committed but not yet expended.

Although commodities were relatively modest, they have been well received. Appendix 6 lists the basic commodities supplied, including computers, printers, software, air conditioners, books, and related supplies. Visits to various offices indicate that the computers are well housed and in use (in Southern Province, in addition to USAID supported planning functions, the computer is also employed to support an Asian Development Bank project). Training programs in computer use have been instituted, and the government has promised to supply computers to the 250 divisional units.

Procurement has been the most difficult of management problems. American source issues (Buy America), waivers, local limits of $5,000 for purchases from a single source, time lags, and slow selection by the government (and sometimes wrong specifications) all contributed to the low spending rates. The planned spending levels for commodities has already been reduced because of lower prices and changes in specifications, but both USAID staff and some interviewed discussed the problems associated with these supplies. One USAID person indicated they were not worth the administrative trouble because of the time-consuming mission and Agency procedures.

The team concluded that the commodities were well received, but that efforts must be made to simplify the process of procurement. In deciding on whether to purchase commodities under a project, a careful evaluation of the impact of the commodities versus the cost in staff time to procure those commodities must be completed to make the best use of limited USAID resources.

The team has been assured by USAID that the total commitment of the government of Sri Lanka to the project has been met and, indeed, oversubscribed.

D. Contractor and Technical Assistance Performance--Findings and Conclusions

The objectives of the Abt Associates host-country contract were:

> [1] To provide high quality technical assistance and related services to strengthen the institutional capacities of the planning units of the participating ministries in agricultural development and planning; and [2] to develop an integrated national-level agricultural planning system...[24]

A long-term advisor, Dr. Rolando Jiron, who had extensive previous knowledge of Sri Lanka, was assigned. At the sole request of the Sri Lankan government (since USAID was not a formal party to the contract), he had two very distinct and unrelated functions: technical and administrative.[25] This resulted in some time conflicts because the substantive aspects of the assignment were already overwhelming. Technical concerns, explicitly detailed in the contract, had to take precedence.

The advisor was, according to the contract, to prepare a life-of-project implementation plan, annual work plans, and quarterly reports. The first was delivered (a three-year plan since the technical assistance started late), the second category was not presented formally, but was conveyed through time charts to the satisfaction of project managers in USAID. Quarterly reports, however, seemed to be a problem. USAID complained that they were sporadic (the last one on file is combined #9 & #10 of September 1992), not sufficient, or did not always tell the Mission what it needed to know. But some in the Mission indicated that the USAID-stipulated requirements for the contents of these reports also shifted over time as the project itself evolved, and AID/W requests for performance indicators emerged. Some in USAID also stated that the Mission as a whole was not clear on what the advisor was doing, and wanted him to report more often to a wider range of Mission personnel.

The overall comments by Sri Lankan officials about the advisor were highly laudatory, and indeed he seems to have fitted into the administration admirably. He not only carried out his own technical and advisory duties, and assisted returned trainees, he also was responsible for the research and policy studies that were produced, and did fiscal management of the project as well. In addition, his role with

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[24] Abt Host Country Contract, 1989.

[25] This is spelled out in cable 91 Colombo #1214 to Nairobi in a response to an inquiry about the contractor. The issue in Sri Lanka was to lower administrative costs.

the provinces has been important; he established close rapport with provincial council planners and was credited by officials in the central government with much of the progress in improving their capacity.

The short-term technical assistance has involved both expatriates and indigenous experts. Three foreign advisors have come to date to assist at critical junctures: restructuring the Mahaweli Authority, the agricultural strategy, and plantation restructuring; more are planned for the review of the new agricultural strategy this fall. They were used 'strategically and well,' according to one informant. Domestic technical assistance was extensively used, from all accounts effectively, in the preparation of reports and studies, and a few have remained as consultants on daily policy matters.

The Mission has had issues with Abt's submission of vouchers in a timely manner (although they were first submitted to the government for approval, and then to USAID for payment), and some aspects of administration. Abt did assist in procurement, as a contract amendment stipulated, and then did so efficiently. Government officials indicated 'great satisfaction' with Abt performance. There have been no issues of consequence that cannot be traced to the technical-administrative nexus created by the Sri Lankan government.

The team concludes that overall, the contractor and the technical assistance (or more accurately, the contractor because of the technical assistance) performed well in this project. The stipulation of providing high quality technical assistance was unquestionably met, and the planning mechanisms developed to the degree possible within the project time and administrative limits. In fact, the policy agenda, which was not part of the original project, succeeded far beyond revised expectations because of the technical assistance. Many in the mission, however, did not find the administrative backstopping by Abt Associates to be adequate.

This project exemplifies, however, a major AID bureaucratic problem: host-country contracts. AID once promoted them to demonstrate host-country commitment to and involvement in the development projects AID was supporting, and to cut USAID's workloads. Yet AID/W continued to require USAID approval of contracts and subsequent critical actions (procurement, hiring of longer-term technical assistance, salary scales, reporting, etc.), and it did not attempt to change USAID's oversight of the personnel so hired. In this case, the result has been no diminution of Mission work load (some said it might as well have been an AID contract in terms of internal Mission work generated), and a feeling among some that the Mission did not see enough of the consultant to know what he was doing.

Yet under a host-country contract, it is this very intimacy between the advisor and the host institution, including continuous office presence there, that is its great advantage. Any Mission must sacrifice its close supervision for that of the host

institution. Although the advisor might have made a somewhat greater effort to keep a broader range of Mission personnel informed, and the contractor might have set up reporting systems to ease his considerable administrative burden, the team notes that this problem is endemic in such contracts, and yet this one worked reasonably well. The team understands that AID/W is now downplaying host-country contracts as a programming tool, but administrative staff cuts will probably force some new measure to reduce workload. If so, AID should undertake to relieve itself of some of the oversight previously required in any new system. Any sponsor should not assume that the same individual should necessarily carry out both technical and administrative duties; the latter might have been specifically assigned to a strong local employee.

E. Organizational Operations and Sustainability--Findings and Conclusions

The Agricultural Planning Group is inherently unstable. That is different from saying that it is not effective. It is inherently unstable because it is informal, having no legal standing in the extensive Sri Lankan bureaucracy. It has depended for its success on the good will of the ministers associated with it, the talented staff of the National Planning Division, the excellence and discretion of the foreign advisor, and the fact that it had resources (training awards, equipment, etc.) to distribute. It was also a useful mechanism with which to deal with donors.

Informality does not breed contempt. According to senior Sri Lankan staff, the habit of planning and inter-ministerial consultations on planning is now well established. Networks created by the project and the training exist, and are likely to continue. Although one senior official indicated that it would have been better to create an official APG as a technical committee under the cabinet, there are others who would probably say that the informal APG was more effective more quickly.

It is important to reiterate that the AGP does not make policy, and did not conceive of itself in that role. It does assist, of course, through framing options for ministerial decisions--often in a very quick response time, staff discussions with ministers on issues, and mobilizing data that can be used to further intelligent policy-making and explicitly influence the policy-making process. Such recommendations certainly do not prevail over broad or even strong particularistic political needs, but the record will show that when reforms were contemplated at a policy level, the AGP through its mechanisms was able to marshall the facts to defend them, improve the reform details, and push the process forward.

There is no uniformity in the effectiveness of the planning units in all ministries, their internal roles, and indeed their competencies. Some ministries have exhibited less interest in the process and have used them less effectively. In such cases, it becomes even more important that this be improved because it is likely that

environmental concerns will administratively be centered in these units, and any weak planning unit may have a deleterious impact on such activities.

The team concludes that Mission concern with sustainability is justified, but that even the most secure institutions that depend on relationships for coordination are always subject to political tides that wash over (but do not always cleanse) the administrative body. The APG, because of the importance of the sector, political needs, and the requirements of bureaucratic coordination, is likely to remain in spirit, although there is now no evidence that anyone is contemplating changes. The formal 'core group' meetings, held usually quarterly, dealt with administrative issues of project management for the most part. Whether they will continue is questionable. Sustainability of the process seems likely as long as current staff are in place; sustainability of the institution is problematic.

The team will below recommend some follow-on activities, although not necessarily in this project.

F. Gender and Social Considerations--Findings and Conclusions

The situation of women in Sri Lanka is much different from that of women in other South Asian countries. Sri Lankan women face few statutory restrictions, and religious constraints such as purdah or seclusion are not imposed. In fact, Buddhism, the predominant religion in the country, recognizes women as equals though Buddhism does teach that woman's primary contribution to society is to build a happy home and successfully bring up children. The position of women in Tamil society is much less favorable due to the influence of Hinduism. The same is true for Moor women, because of the teachings of Islam.

As a result of this social climate, there are many prominent women in Sri Lankan life, both in government and business. The project has recognized this in selecting a significant number of women, both for long and short-term courses. Of the 136 participants trained under APAP, 32 were women, that is, approximately 24 percent. Of the 32 trainees, six were selected twice. That is, actually 26 women were trained and six more went on more than one course. Of the long-term female trainees, one participant was enrolled in a PhD course in Agricultural Economics and seven in MS courses.

No women were sent on study tours. This was, however, essentially because of the composition of the tours. For example, the first study tour included only Ministry Secretaries from selected Ministries, none of whom happened to be women.

Of the women trainees, almost all have completed their course work or will be finished before the project ends. The women have all returned to Sri Lanka and have all been placed in positions making use of the skills gained during training. In addition, as mentioned above, six women have been selected twice for training. In all cases, the women initially completed degree courses and were selected for additional short-term training to build upon or enhance the skills they had learned during their university training. This is in accordance with AID policy, which recommends that follow-on training or other experiences be programmed for returned participants to maximize the impact of their training.

The project has trained a number of minority candidates. The selection of candidates has been limited by the composition of the pool from which the trainees are selected (the Civil Service). However, seven Tamils (5 percent of the total trainees) were sent for training and two Muslims (1 percent) also were selected. The only non-returnees under the project were Tamil, as discussed above, probably because of the difficult situation for Tamils in Sri Lanka at the time.

The project has made considerable efforts to incorporate women and minorities into the training plans. A significant percentage of trainees have been women. The percentage of women and minorities selected for training is less than their representation in the population in general but does not seem to be that unrepresentative of the composition of the Civil Service. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to obtain recent figures on female and minority representation in the Civil Service. The last detailed census was conducted in 1981 and because of the turmoil since then, these numbers are no longer representative. The project has, however, succeeded in including women and minorities and, furthermore, these trainees have been successfully reintegrated at a professional level into the Sri Lankan bureaucracy. In that respect, the project should be commended.

The project has also conducted many policy and analytical studies to facilitate the agricultural planning process. The LAMSCO report (Project Portfolio Review to determine the integration of women's issues into the USAID/Sri Lanka portfolio) faulted APAP for not focussing some of these studies on women. The Project Paper states that:

> the role of women and the potential impact of changes in agricultural policies and programs on women will be addressed in the area of the specific studies as appropriate through collection and analysis of disaggregated data.

The team concludes that the project has, however, dealt with many policy issues which impact indirectly on women. While the policy studies have not specifically targeted women, it cannot be categorically argued that women have not benefitted from the policy changes supported by APAP. Women have done so to the extent that all Sri Lankan farm families have done so. Therefore, though the project has not specifically fulfilled the requirements of the Project Paper, it has tangentially

benefitted women.

The issue of caste (in contrast to ethnicity) in the largely Sinhalese, Buddhist culture is important; it was significant and widely discussed that the previous President came from a lower caste, as most of the leadership of the state since independence came from an elite group. Data on caste of trainees is unobtainable, but it should be noted that in the inverted pyramid of Sinhalese caste structure in which the farmer is at the top, insofar as farmers benefit this group will be materially assisted.

G. Plantation Restructuring--Findings and Conclusions

For many years, USAID had avoided programming in the plantation sector, which had earlier been nationalized and seemed impervious to reform. Donor concern and a deteriorating situation finally prompted the government to agree to the privatization of the management of the state-owned tea and rubber plantations, although they continued to resist complete privatization (including the land) for political reasons. The task of implementing change was given to a new Plantations Restructuring Unit in the Ministry of Finance. At that time, when other donors were wavering in support to this effort because they felt it did not go far enough, USAID provided timely and important assistance.

APAP supported this effort by providing a study tour to other plantation economies for members of the Plantations Restructuring Unit. The support also assisted in international solicitation of interest in the Sri Lankan effort, and it provided legal services to the Unit in the pre-qualification and bidding stages of the change.

The team concludes that APAP was very helpful in bolstering the reform process and facilitating change by assisting in a reform already determined. (See Appendix 14 for an extended discussion of restructuring the state plantation sector.) It began operations at a particularly important period in policy evolution, and materially contributed to the process.

2. Project Contextuality

Projects exist within various milieu; in the case of APAP, these are the context of Sri Lankan administration, that of the USAID and its work, and that of the donor community.

A. The Changing Sri Lankan Political and Administrative Culture: Findings and Conclusions

Any project operates within a host political and administrative milieu. That milieu is especially important when policy formulation and reform are at the project's core. Policy reform may begin at the political level, but it is implemented through a bureaucratic culture, which is often conservative and slow to change fundamental values and redistribute power.

Since APAP began, political violence has been endemic. From the JVP or the LTTE or those who irregularly fought against either, the state has had to allocate additional funds for defense, and in certain parts of the country developmental activities have been impossible or sporadic. Policies have been advocated that reflect concern with these problems.

Partly in response to the perceived need to delegate responsibility or provide some level of control to local authorities to placate separatist sentiments among some Tamils in the north and east, in 1987 the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution was passed.[26] Shortly thereafter, the Parliament enacted the Provincial Councils Act No. 42 of 1987.[27]

These legislative actions delegated various functions to the provinces, including the authority for provincial planning, agriculture (except nationally designated agricultural research centers), irrigation within provincial boundaries, and a wide variety of social services (see Appendix 8 for a discussion). Other functions are reserved to the central government; still others require concurrence. Provincial elections in the spring of 1993 demonstrated that representative government at the provincial level was vibrant, returning some opposition leaders to local power.

The dynamics between center and periphery are still evolving, and are more complicated than those between the center and provinces. Interviews indicated that relationships are still in flux, and will likely remain so for some considerable period. The issue of devolution has a considerable history in Sri Lanka, and has at various times included the districts (which form provinces) and the approximately 250

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[26] *Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.* Colombo, October 1, 1987.

[27] Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, November 14, 1987.

divisions, of which districts are composed.[28] It is unclear how power will be shared between opposing political forces at the center, which has budgetary control, and in the provinces. What is evident, however, is that the new agricultural strategy which is under preparation will be built upon the individual provincial plans currently being formulated. The provinces in turn rely on their sub-units and various ministries for data. Thus the provinces have already enhanced status and influence in the planning process. There is considerable contact between politicians and all administrative levels, but more formally between the provincial legislators and District Planning Committee.[29]

The Mission recognized the changing administrative structure of planning, and began to build into APAP training opportunities and equipment supplies for the provinces. This was clearly an appropriate immediate response.

The evolution of the new center-periphery relationship is underway, but it is evident that by project close in December 1993 the issues will not be resolved, and may not end with the 1994 presidential election. The center will likely continue to have primary responsibility for setting policy and planning parameters. National planning staff have been assigned to provide links to the provinces, as each province has a planning unit, and planning staff are assigned down to the divisional (sub-provincial) level. Yet all evidence points to a greater role for the provinces, one to which USAID should well respond both for economic and agricultural sector planning, and as a contribution to the USAID mandate of "citizen participation in democratic systems," providing regional developmental balance within the state, and encouraging opportunities for private sector growth at the provincial level.[30]

The team concludes that provinces are likely to have increased influence, but USAID should continue to program with the center, for it is there that policy is made.

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[28] On July 7, the press carried a story on the complaint by the Minister of Western province that devolution had not yet worked effectively because divisional staff were still appointed by the center, and that the whole process of devolution continued to remain ambiguous. In one province, there is said to be good vertical relationships between the provincial offices and those of the divisions, but virtually no sharing of issues among divisions.

[29] This relationship is not always fruitful. In Gampaha District, field interviews revealed that the Chair of the District Planning Committee and the Chief Minister of the Province (Western Province) are on opposite political sides, little gets done. The 1993 development plan for the area should now be under implementation, but they have not yet started the planning process for it because of politics. They have not yet begun to prepare for the 1994 plan, which takes four months of preparatory work, so that then next year's program will be behind schedule. Political animosities are increased because the opposition parliamentarians have not got their development discretionary fund (R.25 lakhs, or about $50,000) approved by the Committee (chaired by the government party), while all the government parliamentarian projects were approved.

[30] USAID/Sri Lanka, "Strategic Framework, FY 1992-1996."

But USAID should be responsive to provincial issues, and work selectively with the provinces to strengthen their planning and administrative capacities. With the authority that they now have, they could make a significant contribution to local progress. Various donors have begun such programming, although only the Germans with the planning process directly.

B. The Project within the USAID Context

1. The CDSS and USAID Strategy: Findings and Conclusions

The USAID strategy and portfolio context have shifted since project initiation. The 1987 CDSS (written in 1985, essentially at project conception), emphasized three programming areas: agricultural productivity and farm incomes; off-farm employment and rural enterprise; and development of the Mahaweli (into which the USAID has now invested some $181 million).

In 1991 USAID strategy shifted with the promulgation of the "Strategic Framework FY-1992-1996." This avowedly optimistic document envisioned Sri Lanka as a "democratic, 'greener' NIC [newly industrializing country]" by the year 2001. This policy seems to have been first articulated in a general way by the Sri Lankan government, and then expanded and focused by USAID. It was to achieve this objective though pursuit of the strategic goal of "expanding opportunities through a new private-public partnership" and three subgoals: "an effective and dynamic market economy, a healthy environment and productive natural resource base, and an active pluralistic democracy." Five cross-cutting themes were articulated: project sustainability; human resource productivity; involvement of U.S. technology and investment; a clear policy agenda related to a market economy; and better regional balance. The project portfolio was to be streamlined and focused on these objectives. All this was to take place through "agricultural development-led industrialization." Further to the mission strategy, the Office of Agriculture and Natural Resources developed a Purpose, Strategy and Portfolio Statement (published on May 21, 1992), specific to that office. It took the principles espoused in the mission strategy and applied them in a practical manner to its portfolio in a consistent, thoughtful analysis. This further step defined the mission's goals in relationship to that office and provided a practical guide for the office employees.

The APAP is not mentioned in the mission strategy (except in financial tables), but agricultural reform, "in particular the articulation of policy changes, reduction of subsidies, and the development of a better knowledge base for diversification and commercialization," was stressed.

That document was further amended. The USAID "Implementation Report" (First Quarter 1993; i.e., through 1992) noted modified strategic objectives over the next four years to: [1] Increased competitiveness and growth of markets and enterprises; [2] Improved practices for sustained productivity of natural resources; [3] Increased influence of a broad range of citizens in selected development policies and institutions. Three cross-cutting issues were stressed: policy reform, women in development, and trade and investment.

The evaluation team in its interviews found extensive skepticism among Sri Lankans and donors about the feasibility of attaining the articulated NIC goal within the envisaged time, and also of the likelihood of the predicated success of "agricultural development-led industrialization." This skepticism is shared by the team, which applauds the hope but questions the likely attainment of the objective, and has doubts about the feasibility of the means. The team did not raise the environmental aspects of the strategy with those interviewed, but believes in the concept, and has accepted the democratic aspects of the strategy as already attained.

Although this evaluation will contend that the APAP project had many successes and has made a contribution to the policy formulation process, it seems apparent to the team that the past highly politicized nature of the state and the central role of agricultural policy in that politicization indicate that in areas that USAID has articulated as critical, rhetoric is preceding reality and that in the future policy reforms will likely be held hostage to the political process, Under these circumstances it is unlikely that APAP, the planned agricultural strategy due to be completed by December 1993, and the new policy formulation process will perform as USAID envisions in the strategy (which is not to gainsay project accomplishments). It seems evident to the team as well that although agriculture remains critical to the society, requires improvement, and is an important continuing focus of USAID activity, that by modest size, politicization, and potential growth it is incapable of sparking the industrialized green, democratic NIC process, although it can certainly contribute to it. The team recognizes the traditional, critical role of the tree crops in exports, and the potential that agro-business and the commercialization of agriculture as a whole could bring to the total economy. The Mission stress on this field and agricultural diversification is potentially very important, but prognostication is difficult at best and the issue revolves around subjective assessments of the potential of the sector over the medium term.

2. PL-480 Title III: Findings and Conclusions

The PL-480 Title III program has four major objectives: to contribute to overall food security for the state; "to promote development of free, private sector-dominated agricultural markets and of private sector farmer organizations to promote rural

interests;" use food imports to promote economic and agricultural policy reforms; and to provide balance of payments support.

Within this context, the funds from the sale of wheat donations are to be used toward:

1. Restructure and privatize the Fisheries Harbour Corporation;
2. Land surveys and titling;
3. Improving plant quarantine procedures;
4. Reducing export taxes;
5. Liberalizing food imports and trade;
6. Restructuring the Agricultural Insurance Board;
7. Expanding the private sector role in the agricultural sector.

Although Title III supplies the bulk of Mission program funds, it is APAP research that has led USAID to include certain items in its Title III reform agenda, rather than Title III leading APAP into studies leading to reform. APAP has done two studies on the privatizing of the Fisheries Harbour Corporation, research on lend tenure including the issue of titling, restructuring of the Agricultural Insurance Board, and other rated studies.

The team concludes that there has been a close and symbiotic relationship between APAP and Title III, and it has been productive in terms of Mission objectives.

3. Project Monitoring: Findings and Conclusions

There has been continuous Mission supervision and knowledge of the project and its components. Within the limits on reporting and relationships noted above, project monitoring has been conscientious and thorough. In a sense, the vague disquiet within the Mission outside of the APAP project managers may have occurred because the project slowly evolved before the technical assistance arrived, and although it fitted into the Mission strategy, by its nature it was not conceived as producing the major private sector reforms that the Mission was seeking. Training and coordination are unspectacular, although essential and often undervalued, elements of development.

The USAID had begun to develop performance indicators on APAP, and AID/W assisted the process through technical assistance and mandated that such indicators be set. There is no evidence that the technical assistance advisor met with the Sri Lankan officials to discuss them. Such performance indicators, if generated in the field in a collaborative style with participating institutions, are a useful monitoring

device on progress; they can rarely be used as examples of project-initiated reforms.[31]

The team concluded that monitoring was appropriate and professional, and that the relationships between the project managers, the contractor, technical assistance, and the Sri Lankan institutions were good and fruitful.

C. The Foreign Donor Community: Findings and Conclusions

Although the public reporting on the donor group meetings on Sri Lanka stress the agreements among and between the individual donors and the government, significant differences do exist. Most pronounced is that of the Japanese with (for example) the World Bank, as the Japanese regard the preoccupation by donors with the private sector as a developmental 'fashion' or fad.[32] Both USAID and the World Bank agree on the need for far-reaching reforms, and have worked in consort on some of the PL-480 Title III reform measures. USAID has also contributed to the privatization of plantation management through APAP. This area is a principle concern of the World Bank. The Bank had wanted to privatize the ownership of all estates, but politically the government has not been prepared to take that step.

Because of its more modest and focussed program, USAID seems to have stressed the private sector even more than the Bank. Although two decades ago AID led the World Bank in emphasizing poverty alleviation, today the Bank in its literature on Sri Lanka seems to place more emphasis on poverty than does USAID.[33] The Bank's role in Sri Lanka in terms of policy advice (some would say demands) seems pervasive. How its high visibility will fare during the next election should be studied, as it could become a focus of Sri Lankan nationalism.

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[31] One Indonesian official told the team leader that the performance indicator system, mandated in AID/W and agreed to by the Indonesian government, in fact demonstrated nothing, because the Indonesian government would not have agreed to their inclusion if that government had not already decided to implement them. Their attainment could not be contributed to foreign aid, but such aid may have speeded the process and improved the product.

[32] This has been reflected in disagreements between the Japanese and the World Bank worldwide on this issue, with the Japanese tending to rely more on the state. They are prevented by their regulations from lending directly to the private sector.

[33] See *Sri Lanka: Country Economic Update FY93. Public Sector Rationalization for Private Sector Development and Poverty Alleviation.* Washington: The World Bank, Report No. 11862-CE, June 2, 1993. USAID documents now rarely discuss either poverty or equity.

Bank staff have commented favorably on cooperation with USAID, and its capacity to provide technical assistance quickly and with grant funds, both of which are major problems for the Bank. According to Bank staff, the Sri Lankan government is prepared to accept loan funding for at least some technical assistance.

Japan has committed Y.46.835 billion in loans alone during FY 1991 for four projects, or four percent of Japan's worldwide loan portfolio. The total Japanese loan assistance (1966-1991) was Y.273.471 billion. Although the Japanese stress infrastructure projects and concentrate on the transport (especially ports) and telecommunications sectors, they have provided loans for the Mahaweli and for other irrigation activities.[34] In 1991, they provided a commodity loan of Y.13.0 billion for "economic restructuring credit."[35]

The German foreign assistance program is providing long-term technical assistance to the planning unit in Central Province, the only donor so involved.

The team concludes that there is reasonable coordination between USAID through APAP with the multinational donors (the Asian Development Bank does not have an office in Colombo and staff therefore could not be interviewed), and in some cases, such as that of plantation management, symbiotic. The quarterly reports by Dr. Jiron indicated that the planning unit played a leading role in determining how a Y.1.9 billion Food Production Grant and the counterpart funds generated by it would be used. It was also intimately involved with the Ministry of Fisheries in the JICA project to rehabilitate Kirinda Harbor. Dr. Jiron's reports indicate continuous consultations with and on World Bank and Asian Development Bank plans and projects. More explorations might, however, be attempted with the Japanese, who seem interested in such cooperation.

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[34] Conversations with the Japanese in Colombo indicate some interest but confusion on how better to cooperate with USAID. The team suggested separate but parallel interventions in environment (the Japanese providing infrastructure, the USAID policy and technical assistance) and perhaps in rural roads and private sector agricultural marketing.

[35] OECF, "Japanese Contribution to Economic Development of Sri Lanka Through OECF Loans." Colombo, March 1993.

IV CONCLUSIONS: THE OVERALL IMPACT OF THE APAP PROJECT

The team, in evaluating the Agriculture Planning and Analysis project did so within the context of the Sri Lankan political economy and the USAID program. It concluded that the APAP was an important, successful effort to enhance the policy planning process in Sri Lanka. It was overall responsive to Sri Lankan needs, and was appropriately modified to meet the changed role of the provinces.

Although the project was not originally designed to affect directly policy reform (but rather to create the intellectual infrastructure for it), it did have a far greater positive impact than could have been anticipated. Rather than follow PL-480 Title III reform leads, APAP did many of the initial studies that provided the basis on which Title III policy goals were planned.

The provision of long-term and short-term technical assistance was combined with training and equipment support in a judicious and mutually supportive manner. The long-term technical assistance advisor was so successful that he was no longer regarded as a foreign component of the project.

Training will likely have the most lasting effect, and was the single element that those interviewed regarded as most important. The training allowed the government to respond to policy questions in a timely manner, which would otherwise have been impossible. Language testing issues clouded the choice of some candidates. The computer equipment allowed for the development of data bases to contribute to these timely responses, although procurement was probably the most delayed and troublesome aspect of project administration. A significant number of women were trained, probably representing the equivalent percentage of the potential pool of candidates.

The specific policies reformed to which this project contributed are listed elsewhere, but Sri Lankan officials have indicated that through the project they were able to present sound, prioritized, policy alternatives to the cabinet on short notice, and that the overall effect of APAP has been positive. In this context, it is important to reiterate that a project of this sort can speed the process of reform when the direction has been determined. It can provide analytical data on which reforms may be justified. It can train those that prepare policy options. But it cannot change policies that the state is not yet prepared to alter.

The policy successes were a product of proper timing, the correct choice of policy issues, excellent technical assistance including the management of the research program, overall donor policy coordination, and the strong guidance of the National Planning Department.

The formation of the Agricultural Planning Group (together with more trained staff) has created a habit of consultation and coordination together with networks of working relationships that had been lacking. There is every indication that these relationships will continue, but the continuation of the APG as an informal institution is problematic without resources to administer and share. One senior official had indicated that it would have been better to institutionalize the Group as a formal, technical committee reporting to the cabinet, but this would have required a cabinet decision and might have resulted in the politicization of the group.

The technical assistance was effective and widely appreciated, with the long-term advisor playing critical roles in the performance and delegation of policy and research papers. In general, the effectiveness of the role of long-term advisory services is largely dependent on the individual assigned. In this case, that aspect of the project succeeded in a striking manner. The host-country contract allowed him to operate independent of the Mission, which although sometimes disquieting to some USAID staff, probably led to closer relationships with the Sri Lankan community and greater project effectiveness.

Mission management and monitoring of the project were careful and thorough. At each step the documentation of actions demonstrates thoughtful consideration of project needs. Generalized AID regulations to which USAID had to adhere on English language testing and on procurement, however, materially slowed the project.

The 'end-of-project' status indicators for achieving project purpose (see page 8) contain qualitative phrases subject to interpretation: 'high quality ...relevant... functioning...adequate' are subjective indicators. The team concludes, however, that an appropriate status has been (and in one case is about to be) achieved: the government is providing adequate resources for planning (i.e., reoccurring administrative costs, in contrast to project costs, which are in short supply) within the relevant ministries and in the provinces; technical studies are being used and are clearly influencing policies; a functioning agricultural planning system is in effect; and a mid-term agricultural strategy is being prepared built upon provincial planning, and will be completed (if not approved) by the end of the project in December 1993.

There is no question that the technical and analytical capabilities of the planning units have been strengthened. This includes the provincial units, whose outlooks have been broadened and whose staff capacities enhanced. It is evident as well that much closer links now exist between the NPD and the provinces, which are the base for the new agricultural strategy being prepared. Because of the increased competence of the central and provincial planning units, legislators and policy makers increasingly seem to have turned these groups for policy advice and options. It should be remembered that in a contest between sound policies that are politically unpopular and politically popular expediencies, the latter will still likely prevail.

In examining APAP's role within the USAID strategy, the team ended agreeing with many of those interviewed that the vision of Sri Lanka as a Newly Industrialized Nation (NIC), environmentally 'green,' by 2001 and achieving this goal through 'agriculture-led industrialization' was overly optimistic both as a goal and as a means to achieve it. It also concluded (Appendix 12) that the PL-480 Title III articulated goal of commercialization of a land market was politically and socially dubious at this stage of Sri Lankan development, and that the necessary commercialization of agriculture could and should be different from the broad commercialization of land. The agricultural sector's role in Sri Lankan development, however, should not be underestimated; it is critical to both economic and societal success, and should remain a major USAID focus.

Although the project was modest in size and contained elements of a more traditional AID effort, and thus may have appeared to lack contemporary Agency cachet, it was in retrospect the right project at the right time working with a group of talented Sri Lankan officials.

V RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the experience in this project and the continuing needs of the state in thee agricultural sector, the team recommends actions in the immediate future, and for a longer term perspective to meet Sri Lankan needs.

1. Agricultural Strategy and Project Continuation

The team recommends that the Mission study the likely role of all sub-national administrative units in the sector and monitor changes to determine what interventions would be most beneficial at what level, but that it continue to program at the Center, remaining sensitive to the needs of the periphery. The project should be phased out as scheduled, but that project funds be committed before closure to study, hold seminars, and otherwise consider the new agricultural development strategy that will be completed and by project end. Substantive studies supported by the project should be placed in the AID/W repository (CDIE) and selected U.S. academic centers. The Mission should develop an alternative, policy-oriented flexible, and quick response project servicing the agricultural sector as a whole that could provide technical assistance, training, and studies responsive to local needs. Models for such a project exist in many other USAID missions, such as Indonesia (the ARSSP--Agricultural and Rural Sector Support Project, which has proven to be both successful and innovative) and Morocco (the Development Studies and Technical Support Project, a bilateralized Program Development and Support project).

Beyond the project itself, the team recommends that the Mission reconsider its emphasis on an 'agricultural development-led industrialization' strategy leading to green, democratic NIC status by 2001 as unrealistic on both the goal of a NIC in that time (green and democratic are not questioned here) and the means toward it. Agriculture remains the most important single sector of the economy. Its improvement and diversification are vital for the society and environment as a whole. USAID should consider, following the completion of the Sri Lankan national agricultural strategy emerging from this project, a redefinition of its own strategy in this critical field based on three considerations: Sri Lankan needs, other donor activities in the sector, and U.S. competencies.

The team also recommends USAID review the language of the PL-480 Title III agreement stipulating the creation of a commercial market in land to encourage marginal farmers and producers to leave the land because of the potential political and social impact (see Appendix 12), to language which, so the team understands, reflects

the Mission position that is less encompassing and more socially concerned.

The team believes that the Mission should develop an alternative, policy-oriented flexible, and quick response project servicing the agricultural sector as a whole that could provide technical assistance, training, and studies responsive to local needs. The outlines of such a project are listed below and in Appendix 10.

2. Future Directions in USAID Agricultural Programming

Sri Lanka is in flux. Policy formation is hostage to such changes, which are profoundly political in nature. Under these circumstances, reformation is difficult, and the half-life of opportunity to affect policy change may be very short. To assist Sri Lanka effectively in the rural sector, USAID should consider developing in the fall of 1993 (i.e., before APAP completion) its own mechanism through which it can respond to what no doubt will be a series of changing needs requiring rapid responses.

USAID should consider developing a relatively small, three-year Sri Lanka Agricultural Policy Support Project, managed in the Mission. The project, managed in the Mission from program funds, would provide short-term technical assistance on policy issues, selected training of critical individuals, fund locally needed policy studies if deemed potentially useful, and generally act as a means for filling important, evolving gaps and testing of project or program ideas--a type of feasibility assistance. Efforts that required sustained support could, if appropriate, be spun off as separate projects with their own management. More details are included in Appendix 10.

A model for such a project exists in Indonesia (the ARSSP--Agricultural and Rural Sector Support Project, which has proven to be both successful and innovative). This would provide the Mission with the flexibility to monitor changes in agricultural policy and affect reform positively and rapidly, and build the basis for further work in the field. Should the private sector be the focus of agricultural activity for the Mission, then the project could be so defined.

VI LESSONS LEARNED

The following generic lessons applicable beyond the project itself are as follows:

1. Technical assistance is highly ad hominem, and those individuals most likely to be effective should have disciplinary competence, country experience, and be cross-culturally sensitive.

2. Host-country contracts create administrative headaches, and are no longer encouraged by the Agency. They may, however, provide the basis for relationships that are more effective programmatically.

3. Agricultural and rural sector projects need to be considered in the broad context of the political economy, and not in economic isolation.

4. Policy reforms will take place when governments perceive them to be in their interests; donors must be prepared--administratively as well as conceptually-to respond quickly to support those needs.

5. It is usually impossible to pinpoint the genesis of policy change and assign credit to any one donor for that action.

6. Training, despite its management-intensive nature, is an effective, long-term investment contributing to sustainable development, and an activity the U.S. does well.[36]

7. Project modifications, participant training, and commodity procurement, because of the increasing complexity of AID and USG procurement regulations, are becoming more and more difficult and require intensive staff effort in order to be successful. In designing projects with these components and needed flexibility, missions should carefully evaluate their likely impact, specially of commodities, versus the administrative time required to complete the procurement.

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[36] The World Bank's Project Appraisal Staff in its 1991 Report to the President took the Bank staff to task for not learning the lessons of the investment in Korean human resources, and emphasized that more attention should be given to training.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Project Data Sheet

Appendix 1:

OUTLINE OF BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. Country: Sri Lanka

2. Project Title: Agriculture Planning and Analysis Project

3. Project Number: 383-0083

4. Project Dates:

a.	First Project Agreement:	8/29/86
b.	Final Obligation Date:	FY 1992
c.	Most Recent Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD):	12/31/93

5. Project Funding: (amounts obligated to date in dollars or dollar equivalents from the following sources):

a.	A.I.D. Bilateral Funding (grant)	$	5,180,000
	A.I.D. Bilateral Funding (loan)	$	1,420,000
b.	Other donors		N/A
c.	Host Country Contribution	$	2,700,000
	TOTAL	$	9,300,000

6. Mode of Implementation:

Host Country Contract - Abt Associates, Inc.

7. Project Designers:

USAID/Colombo
Government of Sri Lanka
Abt Associates, Inc

8. Responsible Mission Officials: (for full life of project)

a.	Mission Director(s):	Robert Chase	1986-1987
		Peter J. Bloom	1987-1989
		George Jones (Acting)	1989-1990
		Richard M. Brown	1990-1993
		Douglas Tinsler	1993-PACD
b.	Project Officer(s):	John B. Flynn	1986-1987
		Jeffery Lee	1987-1988
		Gary E. Alex	1988-1990
		James L. Goggin	1990-PACD

9. Previous Evaluation(s):

Mid-term: April, 1990 (Devres, Inc.)

E:\apap\srilanka.a1 July 23, 1993

Appendix 2

Scope of Work

EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

I. Activity to be Evaluated:

Title: Agricultural Planning & Analysis Project No.383- 0083
LOP Funding: $6.6 million ($5.2 million grant; $1.4 million loan)
Date Projection Authorized: 8/28/86
Final Evaluation: 3/93 (planned)
PACD: 8/31/93

II. Purpose of Evaluation:

This is the planned final evaluation of the APA project. The mid-term evaluation was conducted in April 1990. The primary purpose of this evaluation is to provide USAID/Sri Lanka and the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) with an overall assessment of the project's effectiveness in terms of its achievements and impacts as well as clear guidance on what future action may be needed to ensure sustainability of the project's achievements. The latter will include an analysis of constraints the GSL may face in sustaining the project's momentum and recent achievements, primarily with regard to the development of analytical capabilities and an integrated planning network/policy framework for the rural-agricultural sector; and a PID like document containing a description of a possible limited follow-on project (that may be supported by USAID) to help sustain the momentum and achievements. Of specific importance is the project's relationship with the Mission's large policy-oriented PL-480 Title III Program and the analytical base and capabilities necessary to complement it.

The project design and financial plan have undergone considerable modification from time to time. With regard to project design, the most important modification was the extension of limited project support (training, commodities, and technical assistance) to the provincial councils, which were created in 1988, i.e., two years after the project was initiated. Recent changes in the financial plan include an increase in the overall grant component by $480,000 and a decrease in the overall loan component by an equal amount (as per Loan and Grant Agreement Amendment No. 1, signed on

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May 21, 1992), i.e., funding of technical assistance and training was increased with a corresponding decrease in funding for commodity procurement.

The Project Activity Completion Date (PACD) was extended by one year to give the project sufficient time to adjust to significant changes in Sri Lanka's administrative and political structure (including devolution), which occurred after the project was initiated. One of the key project outputs is the Agricultural Growth and Restructuring Strategy, (the "Strategy"), in the formulation of which both ministerial and provincial council planning units (thirteen in all) are participating. The Strategy (first draft) is due to be completed by June 30, 1993, but not all planning units are working at the same speed. Some are ahead while others (particularly the ministerial planning units) are behind schedule. Thus the Strategy may not be completed on time. (The PACD is August 31, 1993.) The evaluation must particularly examine whether it is critical to continue providing technical assistance (i.e., beyond the PACD) to enable the GSL to finalize the Strategy Report and undertake in-depth analysis of key policy issues, options and recommendations identified in that report or those targeted by the PL-480 Title III program. In the event that the evaluation determines there are continuing needs, it should also provide specific guidance on such questions as what kind of technical assistance or other analytical support may be needed, how much, for what length of time, to whom (i.e., which agency would benefit most), and possible modes of delivery of this assistance.

III. Project Background and Summary Description:

The basic rationale for the Agricultural Planning and Analysis Project (APAP) is that improved inter-ministerial policy analysis and planning capabilities are essential for achieving more effective use of limited investment resources in agriculture, for removing market distortions caused by poor macroeconomic policies and all-pervasive government controls and regulations, and for restructuring the agricultural sector in a manner that promotes expansion of private enterprise, increased factor productivity, and diversification of the export base - in short, a rapid improvement in performance of agriculture and related economic activity.

In 1984, the GSL completed its first integrated National Agriculture Food and Nutrition Strategy (NAFNS) with the active participation of the main agriculture line ministries. This activity was coordinated by the National Planning Division (now called the National Planning Department) with the assistance of a resident advisor provided by USAID. Through the NAFNS exercise the GSL ascertained that there was an urgent need (a) to adequately staff the planning cells of the individual agriculture line ministries and to develop these cells (through technical assistance, training and commodity support), (b) to promote inter-ministerial coordination and collaboration in agricultural policy analysis and formulation, and (c) strengthen the links between

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policy analysts and decision-makers. The APAP was thus established with USAID funding to fulfil these needs, and it is critical for the evaluation to determine whether the project has been successful in doing so.

The goal of the project is to enhance the contribution of the agricultural sector to overall national economic development through increased production, expanded employment and higher real incomes. The purpose of the project is to develop an integrated national-level agricultural planning system which can provide a

rational basis for policy formulation and decision-making in Sri Lanka's agricultural sector.
The project was designed to upgrade the overall agricultural planning system in Sri Lanka by bringing the planning units in several ministries to a higher level of capability and influence. The primary participating ministries are the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Research (MADR), the Ministry of Policy Planning and Implementation (MPPI), the Ministry of Lands, Irrigation and Mahaweli Development (MLIMD), the Ministry of Plantation Industries (MPI), and the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MFAR). The project is also providing limited support to provincial council planning units to upgrade their planning, analytical and research skills.

Total project cost is $9.3 million, of which USAID's share is $6.6 million (71%) and the GSL's share is the rupee equivalent of $2.7 million (29%). The MADR is the primary implementing agency for the project. (The MADR is in charge of general administration as well as specific project-related activities, such as shelf-item procurement, whereas intellectual leadership and technical guidance is provided by the NPD.) The APAP has a full-time (GSL) Project Manager located in the MADR, who reports directly to the Secretary of Agriculture and coordinates project-related activities with the participating ministries as well as with USAID.

The APAP Project Manager is guided in his work by the Core Group, which serves more or less as the steering committee for the project. Primary decision-making responsibility (on all project-related matters) lies with the Core Group, which includes the Secretary of Agriculture (Chairperson), the APA Project Manager, the Resident Advisor, the Director of Agriculture (NPD), and the Project Officer (USAID). The purpose of the Core Group, which meets once a month, is to facilitate project implementation by resolving problems (either technical or logistical) that surface from time to time, to continually review, revise and update the project's technical assistance, training and commodity procurement plans, and to provide technical advice to the participating ministries, particularly on policy-related issues.

The role of policy coordination under the APAP, theoretically, is played by the Agricultural Planning Group (APG). The APG comprises the Director or Senior Deputy Director from each of the five ministerial planning units participating in the project. In practice, however, the APG rarely meets to collectively discuss and review the

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project's research and policy analysis agenda, which function has been (more or less) taken over by the Core Group. The APG is supposed to serve as a critical link between policy analysts and decision-makers. Though the APG does not meet formally in the same way the Core Group does (to discuss specific APAP-related activities), there is nevertheless constant communication and interaction among APG members in respect of the GSL's macroeconomic and institutional policy reform agenda. Thus, informally, the APG is involved in policy review and coordination. There is an expectation on the part of USAID (as per Loan and Grant Agreement Amendment No. 1) that the APG will work collectively on developing an integrated policy framework for the agricultural sector based on the Strategy exercise (in which APG members are participating). This is a possible sustainability issue to which the evaluation should pay close attention.

Planned project outputs include: (a) trained and adequately-supported professional staff in planning units in each of the participating ministries (with special emphasis on MADR and MPPI); (b) an inter-ministerial Agricultural Planning Group with a distinct functional role in sectoral planning efforts; (c) Policy studies and reviews (a minimum of thirty); and (d) a medium-term agricultural development agenda that identifies key issues and proposes a continuing strategy for the sector, i.e., the Agricultural Growth and Restructuring Strategy (update/extension of the NAFNS).

The project's planned inputs include the following: an expatriate Resident Advisor (2 person-years each with the MADR and the MPPI); short-term technical consultants, both local and foreign (120 person-months and 26.5 person-months, respectively); long-term local consultants, both administrative and technical (10 person-years); overseas training in the U.S. and other AID Geographic Code 941 countries (including an estimated 2 Ph.D. and 46 M.S. degrees and a minimum of 40 person-months of short-term training) plus in-country training for recent recruits into the GSL's planning and administrative cadres; commodities (computer and office equipment, vehicles, books and other library materials); construction (housing, office renovation); and GSL operating expenses to undertake and support an expanded research and analysis program.

The Project Agreement was signed on August 29, 1986, and Amendment No. 1, on May 21, 1992. The project was designed in a way that allowed time for procurement and training to get underway (approximately two years) prior to commencement of the long-term technical assistance component (in June 1988). After a slow start the procurement and training programs were initiated, but due to delays in contracting, the long-term Resident Advisor provided under a host-country contract with Abt Associates Inc. did not arrive until August 1989.

In 1989, the GSL initiated a significant restructuring of ministries. The Livestock Development Division of the Ministry of Rural Industrial Development (MRID) was relocated in the MADR (and at the same time the Food and Cooperatives component

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was transferred out the MADR and re-established as a separate ministry); the Ministry of Coconut Industries (MCI) and two plantation parastatal bodies were subsumed under the Ministry of Plantations, which was re-named the MPI; the Ministry of Lands and Land Development was merged with the Ministry of Mahaweli Development, resulting in a new agency, the MLIMD; and the Ministry of Fisheries was renamed the MFAR so as to include aquaculture and inland fisheries. The reorganization thus reduced the number of ministries participating in the APAP to five (i.e., MADR, NPD/MPPI, MLIMD, MPI and MFAR). The two agencies that dropped out were the MRID and the MCI (subsumed as a Division under the MPI).

In 1990, the "size" and "breadth" of the APAP was increased with the inclusion of eight new planning bodies, i.e., the provincial councils. These new bodies are all now participating in the Strategy exercise, and they are also receiving limited support under the project in the form of computers and office equipment, offshore training opportunities (short-term), and technical guidance (from the Resident Advisor) on the Strategy exercise.

IV. Statement of Work:

The final evaluation will be conducted by a team composed of the contractor's expert (team leader), a U.S. AID project-experienced personal services contractor (PSC) resident in Sri Lanka, and a local Sri Lankan consultant. The PSC will be hired directly by USAID/Sri Lanka while the team leader and the local consultant will be supplied by the IQC contractor. The contractor team leader will be responsible for completing all items in the Statement of Work with the input and support of the other two members of the evaluation team. The PSC will work three-quarter time with the team leader while the local consultant need only be available on a part-time basis. The contractor will prepare an evaluation report which addresses the following major issues and specific questions in detail:

1. Life-of-Project Assessment

(a) How successful has the project been in realizing project inputs and outputs with respect to planned (LOP) targets and in monitoring and achieving purpose-level and output indicators? What were the successes and what were the weaknesses? What could have made the difference?

(b) To what extent has the project significantly improved the policy analysis and planning capabilities of the GSL agencies participating in the project? What are some examples that demonstrate that capacity?

(c) To what extent has the project led to the development of necessary analytical capabilities and an integrated agricultural planning system in

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Sri Lanka? What are some examples that demonstrate that capacity?

(d) To what extent has the host-country contractor (Abt Associates) lived up to expectations in terms of providing expert technical guidance under the project, facilitating key outputs (such as policy studies and reviews and the Agricultural Growth and Restructuring Strategy), and promoting institutional linkages not only among central ministries but also between central ministries and the provincial councils? What are some examples of his successes and weaknesses?

(e) What role has the project played in facilitating and promoting institutional and policy changes in the agricultural sector? Has the project done more or less than expected in this respect?

(f) What role has the Agricultural Planning Group (APG) played in the Strategy exercise and is the future role of the APG crucial for ensuring sustainability of project achievements (i.e., policy analysis and formulation, policy coordination, and development of an integrated policy framework for the agricultural-rural sector)?

(g) How successful has the project been in linking policy analysis to decision-making? What are some examples of successes and weaknesses and what else could the project have done that would have made a difference?

(h) How effective has the project been in providing analytical support and guidance to the PL-480 Title III Program, and in assisting with the formulation of policy benchmarks?

(i) To what extent have women participated in and benefitted from this project?

(j) Has the project enhanced the future career prospects and the opportunities for self-fulfilment for women in their work?

2. Sustainability Guidance

(a) To what extent has the project been successful as an institution-building activity?

(b) What appropriate steps has the GSL taken to sustain benefits after project completion?

(c) Are the project's achievements sustainable, or is follow-on assistance required to ensure sustainability?

(d) Is APAP follow-on assistance also crucial for the PL-480 Title III Program (with regard to policy appraisal and the formulation of policy benchmarks)?

(e) What are the options on the nature, scope, content, duration and cost of follow-on assistance (assuming there is a critical need for it)? The evaluation team will provide an initial outline of a project identification

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document describing major facets of any new follow-on project, as part of the Evaluation Report.

In the evaluation report, the evaluator will distinguish clearly between findings (i.e., the evidence) and conclusions, (i.e., interpretations and judgements about findings). As already mentioned, special attention should be paid to the issue of whether "after-project-life" assistance is required to make the project sustainable. A detailed analysis will be required with respect to item 2(d) above.

V. Methods and Procedures

A. In conducting the evaluation, the team will:

(1) review all relevant project documents; and
(2) interview a variety of key project personnel and those affected by the project, including key persons from the ministerial and provincial council planning units, USAID, and the host-country contractor.

B. All project files will be available to the evaluators in the Office of the Project Manager (Agriculture & Natural Resources, USAID/Sri Lanka). A review of the following background documents is essential:

- Project Paper
- Project Logical Framework (logframe)
- Loan & Grant Agreement, and Amendment No.1
- L.O.P. Workplan, including Training Plan (and periodic revisions)
- Abt Contract and Scope of Work (and Contract Amendments)
- The draft Agricultural Growth and Restructuring Strategy (progress to date)
- The National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Strategy Paper (1984) and supporting task force papers written in formulation of the Strategy.
- Selected policy studies, policy reviews, and other publications produced under the project (such as the APAP Newsletters)
- Resident Advisor's Quarterly Progress Reports
- APA (Quarterly) Project Implementation Reviews (PIRs)
- Academic reports of participant trainees

VI. Logistic Support:

The evaluators shall use funds provided in the budget to arrange for car rentals, micro-computer rentals, office materials, report reproduction, local secretarial support, office space, and any other miscellaneous expenses.

VII. Level of Effort:

Services of the contractor's team will be required for 26 working days (each) in Sri Lanka. A five-and-a-half-day work week is authorized, in-country.

VIII. Deliverables:

The contractor will submit ten (10) copies of a preliminary draft evaluation report no later than 18 working days after the effective date of the delivery order. Review comments/feedback will be given to the team within three working days of submission of the draft. A final report (at least 25 copies) will be submitted to the USAID project officer prior to the departure of the team leader from Sri Lanka but no later than the estimated completion date of this order. The report will address all questions contained in the scope of work and include, but not be limited to, the following sections:

1. Title page.
2. Table of Contents.
3. A basic Project Identification Data Sheet (outline attached, Attachment E).
4. An Executive Summary (see attachment F). (This section will be used for the Agency's computerized record of evaluation, so it should be able to stand alone as a separate document. It will be limited to 3 pages (single spaced), and contain all elements required on page 25 of ANE Bureau Evaluation Guidelines available in USAID/Sri Lanka.)
5. List of Acronyms.
6. The body of the report (no more than 25 pages with any specially lengthy analysis or listing of data placed in the appendices).
7. Conclusions and Recommendations.
8. Any useful annexes or appendices (including, as appropriate, the evaluation scope of work, the logical frame work with indications of any modifications during the life of the project, the description of the methodology used in the evaluation, a bibliography of written works consulted and an outline of a follow-on project to be expanded into a

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USAID Project Implementation Document by the Mission).

9. Project Evaluation Summary (PES).

The team leader will be responsible for preparing a Program Evaluation Summary (PES) which must be able to stand alone as a separate document for use in the Agency's computerized record of evaluations.

All copies of the report will clearly be labeled, "DRAFT". The title page of the final report will include the following disclaimer: "This report presents the independent findings and recommendations of the evaluators. It does not necessarily represent the official views of the Government of Sri Lanka or the Agency for International Development." The report will be typed using the "Word Perfect" software program, and a copy of the master file will be given to USAID, saved on a 3 1/2" or 5 1/4" diskette, prior to departure of the consultant(s).

A debriefing will be scheduled at USAID soon after submission of the preliminary draft report. A similar debriefing will also be scheduled for the Agricultural Planning Group.

IX. Relationships and Responsibilities:

The evaluators will report to the APAP Project Officer/USAID and are responsible to him for completion of the evaluation activities. The AID/W Backstop Officer for the team leader will be the ANE/TR Officer responsible for Sri Lanka.

X. COMPOSITION OF TEAM:

The evaluation team will consist of a team leader (U.S.), and a resident PSC (project specialist) assisted by one local Sri Lankan consultant. The contractor will furnish a team leader with prior experience in institutional analysis and appraisal of agricultural planning projects. The individual should have an advanced degree (preferably a Ph.D.) in a relevant field (such as agricultural economics, development economics, or development administration) and ten or more years work experience, preferably including at least five in agricultural planning and/or analysis. Familiarity with Asian (including South Asian) agricultural systems and extensive field experience in one or more Asian countries is highly desirable. (Prior assignments in Sri Lanka will be a definite asset.) Strong writing and analytical skills are necessary.

USAID/Sri Lanka will supply the PSC AID project specialist, a temporary resident of Sri Lanka who is a citizen of the United States, has an advanced degree in business

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administration, and has eight years of proven project development and appraisal overseas. The contractor will also supply the local Sri Lankan consultant, who will have an advanced degree/diploma in agricultural economics (or a related field, such as agribusiness or agricultural marketing) and have proven expertise in agricultural planning and analysis. A minimum of five years work experience in the agricultural sector will be necessary.

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Appendix 3

Financial Data

AGRICULTURE PLANNING AND ANALYSIS PROJECT
FINANCIAL DATA
as of June 30, 1993

A. Overall Project Financial Data

PROJECT FUNDING	GRANT ($)	LOAN ($)	TOTAL ($)
AID FUNDS	**5,180,000**	**1,420,000**	**6,600,000**
- Obligations	5,180,000	1,420,000	6,600,000
- Earmarks	5,066,367	1,411,585	6,477,952
- Commitments	5,030,787	1,287,778	6,318,565
- Expenditures	4,583,496	1,165,544	5,749,040
- Pipeline	596,504	254,456	850,960
- Mortgage	0	0	0
HC CONTRIBUTION	2,700,000		2,700,000
- Reported	1,973,000		1,973,000
- Verified	2,905,471		2,905,471
TOTAL FUNDS	**7,880,000**	**1,420,000**	**9,300,000**

B. Financial Data by Budget Element

PROJECT ELEMENT	OBLIGATION	EXPENDITURE	% SPENT
- Technical Assistance	2,347,734	2,074,877	88
- Training	3,207,478	2,968,440	92
- Commodities	720,000	514,179	71
- Operations	14,788	14,788	100
- Evaluation	90,000	24,070	27
- Seminars/Publications	75,000	9,745	13
- Plantation Restructuring	145,000	142,941	99
- TOTAL	**6,600,000**	**5,749,040**	**87**

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C. Planned versus Actual Expenditures

FY93 EXPENDITURE	1 QTR	2 QTR	3 QTR	4 QTR	TOTAL
- Planned	393,000	494,000	535,000	306,000	1,728,000
- Actual	306,906	368,000	226,368	-	901,274
- % SPENT	78.09	74.49	42.31	-	52.16

D. Rate of Pipeline Liquidation

PIPELINE	LAST YEAR'S EXPENDITURE	MONTHS TO LIQUIDATE	MONTHS UNTIL END OF PROJECT
850,960	1,792,000	6	6

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Appendix 4

Training Statistics (Including Gender Considerations)

APPENDIX 4.1

SRI LANKA
PARTICIPANT TRAINING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
(PTMS)
RETURNED PARTICIPANTS REPORT
SINGLE PROJECT 383-0083.

DATE OF REPORT
07/07/93

DIVISION : AGR
PROJECT TYPE : M
PROJECT NAME : AGRIC. PLAN & ANALYSIS
PROJECT OFFICER : JIM GOGGINS
PRIMARY CONTRACTOR:

PARTICIPANT'S ID NUMBER AND NAME / PARTICIPANT'S POSITION AND EMPLOYER / EMPLOYER'S LOCATION	DOCUMENT NUMBER / DOCUMENT TYPE / DOCUMENT AMOUNT	RETURN DTE	ACAD/ TECH G.P.A.
TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001973 ABEYSEKERA,BANDULA SENA M ACCOUNTANT, MIN.AGRICULTURE & RES. COLOMBO 7,	383-0083. -1-62172 PIO/P 13640	12/13/92	TECH
CERT U OF PITTSBURGH, PA, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA BUSINESS, FINANCE, GENERAL PIET		10/07/92 TO 12/03/92	
383-002141 ABEYSEKERA,RAJA S PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE SOUTHERN PROVINCE,	383-0083. -1-63184 PIO/P 5910	06/28/93	TECH
CERT NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		05/30/93 TO 06/19/93	
383-001656 ABEYSINGHE,A.M. A DIRECTOR, MIN.LANDS & IRRI.MAHAW ,	383-0083. -1-61124 PIO/P 12982	07/28/91	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		06/03/91 TO 07/26/91	
383-001965 ABEYSINGHE,SUMITH DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.FINANCE,FISCAL DIV ,	383-0083. -1-62159 PIO/P 14815	09/28/92	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		08/03/92 TO 09/25/92	

SRI LANKA
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SINGLE PROJECT 383-0083.

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07/07/93

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001955 ABEYWICKRAMA,DON W DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.LANDS,IRRI&MAHAWEL COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-62156 PIO/P 13445	08/23/92	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. NO MFOS CODE ENTERED CID		07/13/92 TO 08/21/92	
383-000069 ARINESARAJAH,SHAKTHIVALE DIRECTOR,PLAN.LIV.STOCK, MIN.RURAL INDUST.DEVL. COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-68043 PIO/P 9437	08/07/88	TECH
CERT OKLA ST, STILLWATER, STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		06/27/88 TO 08/05/88	
383-001877 ATURUGIRIYA,CHITRA ADDL. LAND COMMISSIONER, LAND COMMISSIONER COLOMBO 7,	383-0083. -1-62162 PIO/P 10145	08/02/92	TECH
CERT NORTH ILLINOIS UNIV, DE KALB, ILLINOIS ECONOMICS, GENERAL CID		06/22/92 TO 07/31/92	
383-001979 BANDARA,SAMARAKOON MUDIYANSELAGE J DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLAN., MIN.PLANTATION INDUST. COLOMBO 3,	383-0083. -1-62174 PIO/P 14170	11/16/92	TECH
CERT ARTHUR LITTLE, CAMBR, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		10/11/92 TO 11/13/92	
383-001664 BANDUPALA,K. K DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-61143 PIO/P 8019	08/25/91	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		08/05/91 TO 08/23/91	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001667 BANDURATNE,HETTIARACHCHIGE			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING BATTARAMULLA,	383-0083. -1-61136 PIO/P 11634	10/27/91	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		09/16/91 TO 10/25/91	
383-000062 BANDURATNE,HETTIARACHCHIGE			
ASST. DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-67026 PIO/P 55200	03/14/90	ACAD
MS W.VIRGINIA U, MORGTN, MORGANTOWN, WEST VIRGINIA ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		12/31/87 TO 03/12/90	
383-001601 BANDUSENA,WEERASEKERA M			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANNING, MIN.LANDS,IRRIG.& MAHA	383-0083. -1-60108 PIO/P 54415	12/31/92	ACAD
MS U OF ARKANSAS, FAYET, FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		01/03/91 TO 01/03/93	
383-001598 CHANDRASEKERA,C.M. M			
ASST. DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-60092 PIO/P 57600	05/31/93	ACAD
PHD U OF MO, COLUMBIA, COLUMBIA, MISSOURI ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		01/08/91 TO 05/16/93	
383-000066 CHANDRASEKERA,MUDIYANSELAGE M			
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-68046 PIO/P 10978	07/30/88	TECH
CERT COLO ST U, FT COLLIN, FT. COLLINS, COLORADO ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		06/06/88 TO 07/29/88	

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SRI LANKA
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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-002157 CHANDRASENA,P.H. G ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE ANURADHAPURA,	383-0083. -1-23185 PIO/P 5910	06/22/93	TECH
CERT NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		05/30/93 TO 06/19/93	
383-000065 DAHANAYAKE,UPALI K ASST. DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-67031 PIO/P 55200	04/06/90	ACAD
MS OKLA ST, STILLWATER, STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		12/31/87 TO 04/05/90	
383-002151 DASSANAYAKA,D.M. W PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE BADULLA,	383-0083. -1-63184 PIO/P 5910	06/28/93	TECH
CERT NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		05/30/93 TO 06/19/93	
383-002036 DASSANAYAKE,D.M.S. K DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, MIN.AGRICUL.DEVL.& RES	383-0083. -1-63175 PIO/P 14068	03/21/93	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		01/15/93 TO 03/19/93	
383-002030 DASSANAYAKE,M.R.G. H DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.OF NATIONAL PLAN. COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-23039 PIO/P 14685	03/18/93	TECH
CERT U OF CONN, HARTFORD, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT COMPUTER SCIENCE/TECHNOLOGY, GENERAL CID		01/06/93 TO 03/13/93	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-000077 DAYANANDA,GURUGE L			
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, MIN.OF COCONUT INDUST. COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-68050 PIO/P 55225	08/29/90	ACAD
MS ARIZONA ST U ● TEMPE, TEMPE, ARIZONA ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		01/03/89 TO 08/28/90	
383-000722 DE ALWIS JAYASINGHE,CHETWYND H			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.OF AG.RESEARCH COLOMBO 3,	383-0083. -1-60093 PIO/P 10690	08/22/90	TECH
CERT HARVARD U, CAMBRIDGE, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		07/09/90 TO 08/15/90	
383-000075 DE MEL,DULCY			
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-68044 PIO/P 5730	09/24/88	TECH
CERT ASEAN AG.DEVL.PL.CEN, BANGKOK, THAILAND ECONOMICS, GENERAL MISSION		06/27/88 TO 09/23/88	
383-000068 DE SILVA,EGODAGE V			
ADDL.DIRECTOR, PLANNING, MIN.OF LANDS&LAND DEVL COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-68042 PIO/P 9670	08/26/88	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		07/18/88 TO 08/26/88	
383-001688 DE SILVA,PRIYALAL P. H			
REGIONAL MANAGER, COCONUT CULTIVATION BD COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-61144 PIO/P 20122	03/17/92	TECH
DIP U OF CONN, HARTFORD, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT PUBL ADMIN, GENERAL CID		10/09/91 TO 03/14/92	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-000085 DE ZOYSA,AGAMPODI D ASST.DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-69066 PIO/P 16037	06/17/89	TECH
CERT BUREAU OF CEN., WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON D.C. ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		04/03/89 TO 06/16/89	
383-001978 DHARMASENA,W. V DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.AGR.DEVL.& RES. PERADENIYA,	383-0083. -1-62173 PIO/P 22140	03/16/93	TECH
CERT U OF CONN, HARTFORD, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT PUBL ADMIN, GENERAL CID		10/11/92 TO 03/20/93	
383-000079 DIAS,NANCY A DEVL.OFFICER, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNONG COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-67025 PIO/P 55200	10/02/91	ACAD
MS N.CAROLINA A&T, GREE, GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		01/03/89 TO 09/30/91	
383-001659 DISSANAYAKE,M. C ASST.DIRECTOR,GEN.TREAS., MINISTRY OF FINANCE COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-61139 PIO/P 25094	03/20/92	TECH
CERT ECONOMIC INST, BOULD, BOULDER, COLORADO ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		08/29/91 TO 03/15/92	
383-002042 DISSANAYAKE,SENEVIRATNE B DEP.CHIEF SECRETARY, MIN.POLICY & IMPLEMENT	383-0083. -1-63178 PIO/P 3156	02/14/93	TECH
OBSERV. & STUDY TOUR, , MALAYSIA OBSERVATION,SEMINAR & STUDY TOUR NO CONTRACTOR CODE ENTERED		01/26/93 TO 02/13/93	

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SRI LANKA
PARTICIPANT TRAINING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
(PTMS)
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SINGLE PROJECT 383-0083.

DATE OF REPORT
07/07/93

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-002045 DISSANAYAKE,Y. B			
CHIEF SECRETARY, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-63178 PIO/P 3156	02/14/93	TECH
OBSERV. & STUDY TOUR, , MALAYSIA OBSERVATION,SEMINAR & STUDY TOUR NO CONTRACTOR CODE ENTERED		01/26/93 TO 02/13/93	
383-002153 DOLUWEERA,RAJAKARUNA			
DIRECTOR, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE KANDY,	383-0083. -1-63184 PIO/P 5910	06/28/93	TECH
CERT NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		05/30/93 TO 06/19/93	
383-000061 EKANAYAKE,MARY B			
ASST. DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-67024 PIO/P 55200	03/29/90	ACAD
MS OHIO STATE, COLUMBUS, COLUMBUS, OHIO ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		01/03/88 TO 03/28/90	
383-001809 EKANAYAKE,MARY BEATRICE ABEYASEKARA			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-62153 PIO/P 12140	04/12/92	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. BUSINESS, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CID		03/02/92 TO 04/10/92	
383-000888 EKANAYAKE,SUMITHA ANURA B			
DIRECTOR, PLANNING, MIN.PLANTATION INDUSTR	383-0083. -1-60109 PIO/P 9585	11/19/90	TECH
CERT INTRADOS/INTER MGMT, WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON D.C. BUSINESS, GENERAL CID		10/29/90 TO 11/16/90	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001652 FERNANDO,HEWAWASAN S			
ASST. DIRECTOR, MIN.FISHERIES & AQUATI COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-61122 PIO/P 33401	08/28/92	ACAD
MS U OF RHODE IS, KINGS, KINGSTON, RHODE ISLAND MARINE AFFAIRS CID		08/26/91 TO 08/26/92	
383-001665 FERNANDO,MARY MONICA C			
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, PLAN, MIN.PLANTATION INDUST. COLOMBO 2,	383-0083. -1-61137 PIO/P 10084	10/21/91	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. PUBL ADMIN, PUBLIC PERSONNEL SYSTEMS CID		09/16/91 TO 10/18/91	
383-001825 FERNANDO,RATUGAMAGE CYRIL A			
SENIOR ASST.SECRETARY, MIN.AGR.DEVL.&RESEARCH ,	383-0083. -1-62154 PIO/P 3806	04/11/92	TECH
CERT ASIAN INST. TECHN., PATHUM THANEE, THAILAND AGRIC OTHER, GENERAL CID		03/30/92 TO 04/10/92	
383-002044 GUNAPALA,GABADAGE DON C			
DEPUTY SECRETARY, GOVERNOR,GOVERN'S OFFI ,	383-0083. -1-63178 PIO/P 3156	02/14/93	TECH
OBSERV. & STUDY TOUR, , MALAYSIA OBSERVATION,SEMINAR & STUDY TOUR NO CONTRACTOR CODE ENTERED		01/26/93 TO 02/13/93	
383-000086 GUNATILAKE,SHANTHI			
DEV.OFFICER,NAT'L PLN DIV, MIN.OF FINANCE COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-69066 PIO/P 16037	06/17/89	TECH
CERT BUREAU OF CEN., WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON D.C. ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		04/03/89 TO 06/16/89	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-000719 GUNEWARDENE,LAKSHMI			
ASST.DIRECTOR, PLANNING, MIN.FISHERIES & AQATIC COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-60089 PIO/P 11496	07/15/90	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT USDA		05/30/90 TO 07/13/90	
383-000093 HAPUTANTRI,SIRISENA			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.OF AGRICULTURE COLOMBO 3,	383-0083. -1-68036 PIO/P 55220	09/30/91	ACAD
MS N.CAROLINA A&T, GREE, GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		05/14/89 TO 09/29/91	
383-001661 HETTIARACHCHI,AMARAWANSA			
DIRECTOR (PLANNING), MINISTRY OF FISHERIES	383-0083. -1-61133 PIO/P 19381	12/02/91	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		08/19/91 TO 11/27/91	
383-002155 JAYASEKERA,HERATH RALALAGE M			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE BALADAKSHA MW, GALLE,	383-0083. -1-23185 PIO/P 5910	06/28/93	TECH
CERT NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		05/20/93 TO 06/19/93	
383-001957 JAYASINGHE,R.P.S. B			
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, MIN.PLANTATION INDUST.	383-0083. -1-62171 PIO/P 13240	08/23/92	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		07/13/92 TO 08/21/92	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001875 JAYASINGHE,W. A			
PROJECT CO-ORDINATOR, MIN.LANDS IRRI.& MAHA. ,	383-0083. -1-62155 PIO/P 12085	06/28/92	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRIC OTHER, GENERAL CID		05/26/92 TO 06/26/92	
383-002043 JAYAWEERA,DAYANANDA			
DEPUTY SECRETARY, CHIEF SECRET.'S OFFICE ANURADHAPURA,	383-0083. -1-63178 PIO/P 3156	02/14/93	TECH
OBSERV. & STUDY TOUR, , MALAYSIA OBSERVATION,SEMINAR & STUDY TOUR NO CONTRACTOR CODE ENTERED		01/26/93 TO 02/13/93	
383-002040 JEYARATNAM,APPUTHURAI			
PROVINCIAL SECRETARY, GOVERNOR,N/E PROVINCE TRINCOMALEE,	383-0083. -1-63178 PIO/P 3156	02/14/93	TECH
OBSERV. & STUDY TOUR, , MALAYSIA OBSERVATION,SEMINAR & STUDY TOUR NO CONTRACTOR CODE ENTERED		01/26/93 TO 02/13/93	
383-000092 KALUARACHCHI,KANTHI G			
PLAN IMPL.OFFICER, MIN.AGRI. FOOD & CO-OP COLOMBO 3,	383-0083. -1-69075 PIO/P 5683	09/10/89	TECH
CERT ASEAN AG.DEVL.PL.CEN, BANGKOK, THAILAND AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT MISSION		06/15/89 TO 09/09/89	
383-000071 KANDASAMY,PONNUCHAMY			
DIRECTOR, FINANCE, MIN.OF AG.DEV.RESEARCH COLOMBO 3,	383-0083. -1-68048 PIO/P 9920	10/29/88	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		09/19/88 TO 10/28/88	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-000723 KANENDRAN,ELAIYAPPAH			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-60093 PIO/P 10690	08/16/90	TECH
CERT HARVARD U, CAMBRIDGE, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		07/09/90 TO 08/15/90	
383-000718 KARUNARATNE,WIJESINGHE JINASENA S			
DIRECTOR, DEVELOPMENT, LIVESTOCK DEV./MLK PRO ,	383-0083. -1-60088 PIO/P 10497	07/01/90	TECH
CERT GEORGE WASHINGTON U, WASHINGTON, D.C. BUSINESS, MANAGEMENT & ADMINISTRATION USDA		05/23/90 TO 06/29/90	
383-002142 KODITUWAKKU,ANANDA A			
DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE RATNAPURA,	383-0083. -1-63184 PIO/P 5910	06/22/93	TECH
CERT NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		05/30/93 TO 06/19/93	
383-000720 KOPALASUNTHARAM,MUTHUSAMY			
ADDL.DIRECTOR, L/STOCK DEV,MIN.OF AGR ,	383-0083. -1-60090 PIO/P 9318	07/08/90	TECH
CERT U OF MD, COLLEGE PK, COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND BUSINESS, MANAGEMENT & ADMINISTRATION CID		06/04/90 TO 07/06/90	
383-000070 KULARATNE,NAGARE G			
TRAINING ADMIN.OFFICER, MIN.OF AG.DEV.RESEARCH COLOMBO 3,	383-0083. -1-68049 PIO/P 9670	09/17/88	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		08/08/88 TO 09/16/88	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001876 KULATUNGE,A. A ASST.DIRECTOR, FISH.& AQUA.RESOURCES TRINCOMALEE,	383-0083. -1-62164 PIO/P 12440	07/12/92	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		06/01/92 TO 07/10/92	
383-001646 KUMARADASA,M.A. ASST. DIRECTOR, M/LANDS,IRRI.&MAHAWELI ,	383-0083. -1-60087 PIO/P 29100	01/17/92	ACAD
MS COLO ST U, FT COLLIN, FT. COLLINS, COLORADO AGRIC OTHER, FORESTRY - GENERAL CID		07/01/90 TO 12/31/91	
383-002031 KUMARASINGHE,CHITRA S DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUDGET- TREAUSRY COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-23041 PIO/P 9465	04/02/93	TECH
CERT ASIAN INST. TECHN., PATHUM THANEE, THAILAND COMPUTER SCI., INPUT TECH. (KEYPUNCH) PIET		01/07/93 TO 03/31/93	
383-000177 KUMARASINGHE,CHITRA S ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-60085 PIO/P 19935	06/05/90	TECH
CERT BUREAU OF CEN., WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON D.C. AGRIC OTHER, GENERAL USDA		01/02/90 TO 05/31/90	
383-000074 LOKUHANNADI,MAPIE ASST. DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-68044 PIO/P 5730	09/24/88	TECH
CERT ASEAN AG.DEVL.PL.CEN, BANGKOK, THAILAND ECONOMICS, GENERAL MISSION		06/27/88 TO 09/23/88	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-000072 MALALASEKERA,SWINEETHA			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANNING, MIN. LANDS & LAND DEVL COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-68048 PIO/P 9920	10/28/88	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		09/19/88 TO 10/28/88	
383-000082 MARIKAR,SEYEDAHMED M			
DIRECTOR, PLANNING, MIN.LANDS & LAND DEVEL COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-67027 PIO/P 105913	12/04/92	ACAD
PHD COLO ST U, FT COLLIN, FT. COLLINS, COLORADO ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		08/16/88 TO 07/30/92	
383-002093 MENDIS,AMARAWATHIE I			
LIBRARIAN, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-23037 PIO/P 8645	06/16/93	TECH
CERT ASIAN INST. TECHN., PATHUM THANEE, THAILAND LIBRARY SCIENCE, GENERAL NO CONTRACTOR CODE ENTERED		03/15/93 TO 06/04/93	
383-001666 MOLLIGODA,PARAKRAMA B			
GENERAL MANAGERD, NAT'L LIVESTOCK DEV.BD COLOMBO 5,	383-0083. -1-61137 PIO/P 10084	10/21/91	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. PUBL ADMIN, PUBLIC PERSONNEL SYSTEMS CID		09/16/91 TO 10/18/91	
383-001817 MUHANDIRAMGE,DON BEDE R			
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIST, J.E.D.B., COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-61141 PIO/P 55800	06/20/93	ACAD
MS U OF WISC-RIVER FALL, RIVER FALLS, WISCONSIN ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		08/26/91 TO 08/26/93	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-000063 MUTHUKUDE,PALITHA S DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MINISTRY OF FISHERIES COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-67028 PIO/P 55200	12/12/89	ACAD
MS AUBURN U., ALABAMA, AUBURN, ALABAMA ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		01/09/88 TO 12/31/89	
383-001670 WANAYAKKARA,CHANDRA DIRECTOR, DEVELOPMENT, MIN.FISHERIES & AQUAT. TRINCOMALEE,	383-0083. -1-61131 PIO/P 5515	07/28/91	TECH
CERT DTCP/UNDP, METRO, MANILA, PHILIPPINES AGRICULTURE, GENERAL MISSION		07/01/91 TO 07/26/91	
383-001658 NIYANGODA,S.M.S. B SNR. ASST. SECRETARY, MIN.PLANTATIONS INDUST COLOMBO 2,	383-0083. -1-61125 PIO/P 10895	08/05/91	TECH
CERT WASH ST U, PULLMAN, PULLMAN, WASHINGTON AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		06/24/91 TO 08/03/91	
383-001690 OBADAGE,N. A SNR.ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIN.OF PLANTATION INDU COLOMBO 2,	383-0083. -1-62151 PIO/P 6380	11/17/91	TECH
CERT INTRADOS/INTER MGMT, WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON D.C. EMPLOYEES OF PRIVATE BUSINESS CID		11/09/91 TO 11/15/91	
383-001958 PATHIRANE,PIYASIRI J REGIONAL MANAGER, COCONUT CULTIVATION BD ,	383-0083. -1-62171 PIO/P 13240	08/24/92	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		07/13/92 TO 08/21/92	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-002037 PATHMANATHAN,N.			
DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-63178 PIO/P 3156	02/14/93	TECH
OBSERV. & STUDY TOUR, , MALAYSIA OBSERVATION,SEMINAR & STUDY TOUR NO CONTRACTOR CODE ENTERED		01/26/93 TO 02/13/93	
383-001808 PATHMANATHAN,N.			
DIRECTOR, ADMIN.& CO-ORDI, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-62152 PIO/P 10565	02/29/92	TECH
CERT CENT.FOR SKILLS DEVL, ROSSLYN, VIRGINIA BUSINESS, MANAGEMENT & ADMINISTRATION CID		02/03/92 TO 02/28/92	
383-001956 PEIRIS,MITIMANNAGE CHITRA L			
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, MIN.PLANTATIONS INDUST	383-0083. -1-62171 PIO/P 13240	08/23/92	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		07/13/92 TO 08/21/92	
383-000725 PEMARATNE,JAYASUNDARA WALPOLA K			
PLANNING ASSISTANT, MIN.OF COCONUT INDUST. COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-60098 PIO/P 10431	10/21/90	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, MISC. CID		09/10/90 TO 10/19/90	
383-000060 PERERA,ANTONY B			
DEPUTY DIRECTPR, MIN.AG.DEV.& RESEARCH COLOMBO 3,	383-0083. -1-67021 PIO/P 55200	12/20/89	ACAD
MS OKLA ST, STILLWATER, STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		12/31/87 TO 12/31/89	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001966 PERERA,BEDGAR A DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MINIST.AGRI.DEVL.&RES.	383-0083. -1-62159 PIO/P 14815	09/28/92	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		08/03/92 TO 09/25/92	
383-000091 PERERA,GALHENAGE N PLAN IMPL.OFFICER, MIN.AGRI.FOOD & CO-OP COLOMBO 3,	383-0083. -1-69075 PIO/P 5683	09/10/89	TECH
CERT ASEAN AG.DEVL.PL.CEN, BANGKOK, THAILAND AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT MISSION		06/15/89 TO 09/09/89	
383-000178 PERERA,GEEKIYANAGE DONA C DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-60085 PIO/P 19935	06/03/90	TECH
CERT BUREAU OF CEN., WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON D.C. AGRIC OTHER, GENERAL USDA		01/02/90 TO 05/31/90	
383-002032 PIYASENA,DANASOORIYALAGE DEP.DIRECTOR - BUDGET, YHE TREASURY	383-0083. -1-23041 PIO/P 9465	04/02/93	TECH
CERT ASIAN INST. TECHN., PATHUM THANEE, THAILAND COMPUTER SCI., INPUT TECH. (KEYPUNCH) PIET		01/07/93 TO 03/31/93	
383-001818 PIYASENA,GINIGADDARAGE ASST. DIRECTOR, MINISTRY OF FISHERIES MALIGAWATTA,COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-61134 PIO/P 34087	08/28/92	ACAD
MA U OF RHODE IS, KINGS, KINGSTON, RHODE ISLAND MARINE AFFAIRS CID		08/26/91 TO 08/26/92	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-000087 PIYASENA,GINIGADDARAGE			
ASST.DIRECTOR,PLANNING, MINISTRY OF FISHERIES COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-69078 PIO/P 11610	10/28/89	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		09/08/89 TO 10/27/89	
383-000726 PIYASENA,HEWA ULUWATTEGE K			
PLANNING ASSISTANT, MIN.OF COCONUT INDUST. COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-60098 PIO/P 10431	10/21/90	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, MISC. CID		09/10/90 TO 10/19/90	
383-001654 PREMADASA,RAJA M			
ACCOUNTANT, MIN.AGR.DEVELOP.& RES.	383-0083. -1-61145 PIO/P 41839	08/19/92	ACAD
MS CARNEGIE-MELLON,PITT, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA PUBL ADMIN, GENERAL CID		08/27/91 TO 08/15/92	
383-002038 PUSSEDENIYA,YASATILAKE B			
CHIEF SECRETARY, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-63178 PIO/P 3156	02/14/93	TECH
OBSERV. & STUDY TOUR, , MALAYSIA OBSERVATION,SEMINAR & STUDY TOUR NO CONTRACTOR CODE ENTERED		01/26/93 TO 02/13/93	
383-001653 RAJAPAKSE,ANANDA			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.OF FINANCE COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-61145 PIO/P 41839	08/18/92	ACAD
MS CARNEGIE-MELLON,PITT, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA PUBL ADMIN, GENERAL CID		08/27/91 TO 08/15/92	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-000076 RANASINGHE,INDRANI DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING, MINISTRY OF FINANCE COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-68039 PIO/P 55225	04/05/91	ACAD
MS S.DAKOTA ST U, BROOK, BROOKINGS, SOUTH DAKOTA ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		01/10/89 TO 03/31/91	
383-002143 RANASINGHE,THILAK T PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE PERADENIYA,	383-0083. -1-63184 PIO/P 5910	05/22/93	TECH
CERT NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		05/30/93 TO 06/19/93	
383-000724 RANAWEERA,NIMAL FELIX C DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE KANDY,	383-0083. -1-60096 PIO/P 3295	08/10/90	TECH
CERT VANCOUVER, CANADA, ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS MISSION		08/04/90 TO 08/08/90	
383-002154 RANGARAJAH,SIVAGURUNATHAN DEPUT SECRETARY, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE TRINCOMALEE,	383-0083. -1-23185 PIO/P 5910	06/26/93	TECH
CERT NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		05/30/93 TO 06/19/93	
383-001686 RATNAWEERA,PREMALAL ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, MIN.POLICY PLAN & IMPL BATTARAMULLA,	383-0083. -1-61144 PIO/P 20122	03/22/92	TECH
DIP U OF CONN, HARTFORD, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT PUBL ADMIN, GENERAL CID		08/09/91 TO 03/14/92	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-002035 RATNAYAKE,CHANDRA P DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-63175 PIO/P 14068	03/29/93	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		01/25/93 TO 03/19/93	
383-002039 RATNAYAKE,MUDIYANSELAGE A CHIEF SECRETARY, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-63178 PIO/P 3156	02/14/93	TECH
OBSERV. & STUDY TOUR, , MALAYSIA OBSERVATION,SEMINAR & STUDY TOUR NO CONTRACTOR CODE ENTERED		01/26/93 TO 02/13/93	
383-000081 RATNAYAKE,PALAMANDADIGE C ASST.DIRECTOR, DEPT.NAWTIONAL PLANNIG COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-67020 PIO/P 52705	10/01/90	ACAD
MS U OF MINN, MINN/ST.P, MINNEAP./ST.PAU, MINNESOTA ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		09/09/88 TO 09/30/90	
383-000721 RODRIGO,HETTIARACHCHIGE ANTHONY B STATISTICAL OFFICER, MIN.FISHERIES & AQUA. COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-60091 PIO/P 10249	08/05/90	TECH
CERT OKLA ST, STILLWATER, STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		06/25/90 TO 08/03/90	
383-001657 RUPASINGHE,HAGGALLA M DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL PLANNING DEPT	383-0083. -1-61125 PIO/P 10895	08/05/91	TECH
CERT WASH ST U, PULLMAN, PULLMAN, WASHINGTON AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		06/24/91 TO 08/03/91	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001668 SAMARASINGHE,DON G ASST. DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-61136 PIO/P 11634	10/27/91	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		09/16/91 TO 10/25/91	
383-000064 SAMARASINGHE,DON G ASST. DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-67030 PIO/P 55200	02/02/90	ACAD
MS COLO ST U, FT COLLIN, FT. COLLINS, COLORADO ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		01/17/88 TO 12/31/89	
383-000080 SAMARASINGHE,MALINI J ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-68038 PIO/P 55225	03/30/91	ACAD
MS UTAH ST U, LOGAN, LOGAN, UTAH ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		01/02/89 TO 03/29/90	
383-000067 SAMARATUNGA,RANEPURA R ASST. DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-67023 PIO/P 55200	09/03/90	TECH
MS U OF WISC-MADISON, MADISON, WISCONSIN ECONOMICS, GENERAL CID		08/16/88 TO 09/30/90	
383-001810 SAMARATUNGA,RANEPURA HEWAGE SAMANTHA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING COLOMBO 1,	383-0083. -1-62153 PIO/P 12140	04/12/92	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. BUSINESS, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CID		03/02/92 TO 04/10/92	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001689 SATHARASINGHE,SUNIL S			
REGIONAL MANAGER, COCONUT CULTIVATION BD COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-61144 PIO/P 20122	03/17/92	TECH
DIP. U OF CONN, HARTFORD, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT PUBL ADMIN, GENERAL CID		10/09/91 TO 03/14/92	
383-001705 SENEVIRATNE,MAPIE W			
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-61135 PIO/P 14163	12/08/91	TECH
CERT INT'L MGMT.DEVL.INST, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA BUSINESS, FINANCE, GENERAL CID		10/09/91 TO 12/05/91	
383-000717 SHIHIPAR,MOHAMED M. L			
ASST.DIRECTOR, MIN.AGR.FOOD & COOP. COLOMBO 3,	383-0083. -1-60084 PIO/P 54470	08/03/92	ACAD
MS NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		05/14/90 TO 07/31/92	
383-002152 SIVALINGAM,KANAPATHIPILLY			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE TRINCOMALEE,	383-0083. -1-63184 PIO/P 5910	06/26/93	TECH
CERT NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		05/30/93 TO 06/19/93	
383-000089 SKANDANAYAKE,SIVAGANASEKERAM L			
MARKETING OFFICER, LIVESTOCK PLANNING DIV COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-69070 PIO/P 11573	07/29/89	TECH
CERT COLO ST U, FT COLLIN, FT. COLLINS, COLORADO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL MARKETING * USDA		06/05/89 TO 07/28/89	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001663 SOMARATNE,WEDA G			
HEAD,IRI.WATR.MGT.AG.DIV., AGR.RES.& TRNG.INST. COLOMBO 7,	383-0083. -1-61130 PIO/P 7175	09/01/91	TECH
CERT STANFORD UNIV, CALIF, STANFORD, CALIFORNIA ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		08/05/91 TO 08/30/91	
383-000716 SOMASUNDARAM,SATHASIVAM			
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING ,	383-0083. -1-60099 PIO/P 12067	10/28/90	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		09/07/90 TO 10/26/90	
383-001660 SPELDEWINDE,K.P. M			
DIRECTOR, MIN.LANDS,IRRI.MAHAWE ,	383-0083. -1-61127 PIO/P 11941	08/25/91	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		07/16/91 TO 08/23/91	
383-000088 SUGATADASA,ALUJJAGE D			
SECTOR HEAD, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING ,	383-0083. -1-69083 PIO/P 8689	10/22/89	TECH
CERT LSU RICE RESCH STATN, CROWLEY, LOUISIANA AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT USDA		09/30/89 TO 10/21/89	
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT USDA		10/23/89 TO 10/26/89	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-000727 TENNAKOON,PRESENJITH BANDARA M			
STATISTICAL ASSISTANT, AG.RES.& TRNG.INST. COLOMBO 7,	383-0083. -1-60098 PIO/P 10431	10/22/90	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, MISC. CID		09/10/90 TO 10/19/90	
383-001662 TENNAKOON,W.			
SECRETARY TO THE MINIST.O, MINISTRY OF MAHAWELI D	383-0083. -1-61129 PIO/P 8732	09/01/91	TECH
CERT STANFORD UNIV, CALIF, STANFORD, CALIFORNIA ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		08/02/91 TO 08/30/91	
383-001687 UPASENA,THENUWARA A			
DEPUTY RUBBER CONTROLLER, RUBBER CONTROLLER DEP. COLOMBO,	383-0083. -1-61144 PIO/P 20122	03/17/92	TECH
DIP U OF CONN, HARTFORD, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT PUBL ADMIN, GENERAL CID		10/09/91 TO 03/14/92	
383-002156 WANNIARACHCHI,GAMINI			
DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPT.OF AGRICULTURE BADULLA,	383-0083. -1-23185 PIO/P 5910	06/28/93	TECH
CERT NEW MEX ST, LAS CRUC, LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PIET		05/30/93 TO 06/19/93	
383-000078 WARNAKULASOORIYA,MICHAEL A			
DIRECTOR, PLANNING, MIN.OF COCONUT INDUST. COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-68037 PIO/P 55225	12/29/90	ACAD
MS MICH ST U, E.LANSING, EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		12/27/88 TO 12/20/90	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-002041 WARNASURIYA,TISSA K SECRETARY, MIN.OF AG.UVA PROVINCE ,	383-0083. -1-63178 PIO/P 3156	02/14/93	TECH
OBSERV. & STUDY TOUR, , MALAYSIA OBSERVATION,SEMINAR & STUDY TOUR NO CONTRACTOR CODE ENTERED		01/26/93 TO 02/13/93	
383-000090 WIJAYASURIYA,SAROJINI M DEV.OFFICER,PLN.& PRO.DIV, MIN.FISHERIES COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-69065 PIO/P 9995	06/03/89	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. AGRICULTURE, GENERAL USDA		05/01/89 TO 06/02/89	
383-000096 WIJAYATILLEKE,DOUGLAS R DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.OF AGR,FOOD & COOP ,	383-0083. -1-69080 PIO/P 54470	01/14/92	ACAD
MS OHIO STATE, COLUMBUS, COLUMBUS, OHIO ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS USDA		12/24/89 TO 01/10/92	
383-001647 WIJEDASA,HEWA A IRRIGATION ENGINEER, DEPT.OF IRRIGATION ,	383-0083. -1-61111 PIO/P 55400	01/20/93	ACAD
MS UTAH ST U, LOGAN, LOGAN, UTAH FARMING, IRRIGATION CID		06/13/91 TO 06/11/93	
383-000084 WIJEGOONAWARDENE,ATHUKORALAGE D DIV.FISHERIES INSPECTOR, MIN.OF FISHERIES COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-69072 PIO/P 10910	07/14/89	TECH
CERT USDA GRAD SCH, DC, WASHINGTON, D.C. ECONOMICS, GENERAL USDA		05/31/89 TO 07/14/89	

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES	
383-001967 WIJEKOON,W.M. A ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR, MIN.AGRI.DEVL.RESEARCH PERADENIYA,	383-0083. -1-62161 PIO/P 10575	09/19/92	TECH
CERT U OF PITTSBURGH, PA, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		08/12/92 TO 09/17/92	
383-001671 WIJEWARDENA,DAVAWANSA DIRECTOR-NAT'L FERT.SECR, AGR.DEVELOP.& RESEARCH	383-0083. -1-61147 PIO/P 3365	09/21/91	TECH
CERT INT'L FERT DEVEL CTR, MUSCLE SHOALS, ALABAMA AGRONOMY, SOIL FERTILITY & MANAGEMENT CID		09/09/91 TO 09/20/91	

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DIVISION AGR
PROJECT TYPE M
PROJECT NAME AGRIC. PLAN & ANALYSIS
PROJECT OFFICER JIM GOGGINS
PRIMARY CONTRACTOR

PARTICIPANT'S ID NUMBER AND NAME / PARTICIPANT'S POSITION AND EMPLOYER / EMPLOYER'S LOCATION	DOCUMENT NUMBER / DOCUMENT TYPE / DOCUMENT AMOUNT	PACD	LST PRG RPT	VISA START DATE / VISA END DATE / VISA CTL NO.
TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES		
383-002148 ABEWICKRAMA,N ASST. DIRECTOR, MIN.FISHERIES & AQU.	383-0083. -1-63176 PIO/P 14685	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
CERT U OF CONN, HARTFORD, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS PIET		06/02/93 TO 07/31/93		
383-001874 BENEDICT,JAYASURIYA P.D. W DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.LANDS,IRRI.&MAHA D COLOMBO 10,	383-0083. -1-61146 PIO/P 36660	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
MBA U OF ILLINOIS, URBAN, URBANA/CHAMPAIG, ILLINOIS AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		06/07/92 TO 08/31/93		
383-002149 DANIEL,S.L. A DIRECTOR, MIN.OF AGR.DEVEL.& RES	383-0083. -1-63183 PIO/P 12890	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
CERT KANSAS ST U, MANHATT, MANHATTAN, KANSAS AGRIC OTHER, GENERAL PIET		05/14/93 TO 07/23/93		
383-001669 DAYANANDA,KURUPPU ARATCHIGE S HEAD, PUBLICATION UNIT, AGRARIAN RES.TR.INST. COLOMBO 7,	383-0083. -1-61126 PIO/P 21529	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
MS UNIV.OF PHILIPPINES, LOS BANOS, PHILIPPINES COMMUNICATIONS, GENERAL MISSION		06/05/91 TO 08/31/93		

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES		
383-001651 DE SILVA,PATABANDI MADDUMAGE A ASST.CONSERVATOR,FORESTS, MIN.LANDS,IRRI.&MAHAWE	383-0083. -1-61119 PIO/P 55800	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
MS U OF IDAHO, MOSCOW, MOSCOW, IDAHO AGRIC OTHER, FORESTRY - GENERAL CID		08/16/91 TO 08/16/93		
383-000886 DE ZOYSA,AGAMPODI DAMITHA N ASST.DIRECTOR/ECONOMIST, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING .	383-0083. -1-60102 PIO/P 80900	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
PHD OHIO STATE, COLUMBUS, COLUMBUS, OHIO ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		09/27/90 TO 08/30/93		
383-001599 GAMAGE,DHANAWARDANA HEAD, AGR.PLAN.& EVAL., AG.RESEARCH TR.INST. COLOMBO 7,	383-0083. -1-60105 PIO/P 80700	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
PHD U OF WISC-MADISON, MADISON, WISCONSIN ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		01/08/91 TO 08/30/93		
383-001600 JAYASENA,W. G RESEARCH & TRNG.OFFICER, AG.RESEARCH & TR.INST. COLOMBO 7,	383-0083. -1-61113 PIO/P 41490	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
PHD ASIAN INST. TECHN., PATHUM THANEE, THAILAND ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS MISSION		01/05/91 TO 08/31/93		
383-000083 MAHENDRARAJAH,MANICKAM FEED RES.DEV/PLAN.OFFICER, MIN.OF RURAL INDUS.DEV COLOMBO 3,	383-0083. -1-67029 PIO/P 8260	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
MS PENN STA U, U. PARK, UNIVERSITY PARK, PENNSYLVANIA ECONOMICS, GENERAL CID		08/11/88 TO 10/11/90		

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES		
383-002147 NAGODAVITHANA,MANGALA TISSA K DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.FISHERIES & AQU.	383-0083. -1-63176 PIO/P 14685	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
CERT U OF CONN, HARTFORD, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS PIET		06/02/93 TO 07/31/93		
383-001816 NAZEEM,MOHAMED DEPUTY DIRECTOR, STATE PLANTATIONS CORP COLOMBO 7.	383-0083. -1-61140 PIO/P 55800	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
MS S ILLINOIS U, CARBON, CARBONDALE, ILLINOIS ECONOMICS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS CID		08/12/91 TO 08/12/93		
383-001650 PEIRIS,R.A.D.R. M ASSISTANT SECRETARY, MIN.PLANTATIONS INDUST	383-0083. -1-61118 PIO/P 55800	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
MS U OF WISC-MADISON, MADISON, WISCONSIN AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CID		08/14/91 TO 08/16/93		
383-001645 PEIRIS,TELGE SOMASIRI D DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.LANDS,IR& MAHAWELI	383-0083. -1-69085 PIO/P 55470	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
MS U OF WISCONSIN, GR B, GREEN BAY, WISCONSIN ENVIRON/CONS, ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES CID		08/17/91 TO 08/17/93		
383-002158 SAMARASINGHE,M.K.M.J.M. J DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPT.NATIONAL PLANNING	383-0083. -1-63187 PIO/P 10545	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
CERT U OF ARIZONA, TUCSON, TUCSON, ARIZONA AGRICULTURAL TRAINING PIET		06/28/93 TO		

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TRG.OBJ. TRAINING FACILITY AND LOCATION / MAJOR FIELD OF STUDY / CONTRACTOR		TRAINING DATES		
383-001655 SENTHILVADIVEL,ARUMUGAM				
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MIN.OF FINANCE COLOMBO 1	383-0083. -1-61145 PIO/P 41839	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
MS CARNEGIE-MELLON,PITT, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA PUBL ADMIN, GENERAL CID		08/27/91 TO 08/15/92		
383-000887 WICKRAMASINGHE,GAMINI				
DIRECTOR, AG.RESEARCH & TR.INST. COLOMBO 7.	383-0083. -1-60103 PIO/P 80700	08/31/93	/ /	/ / / /
PHD U OF PENN, PHILADEL, PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA SOCIOLOGY, SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH/DESIGN CID		09/10/90 TO 08/30/93		

SINGLE PROJECT TOTAL PARTICIPANTS IN TRAINING: 16

Appendix 4.2

WOMEN TRAINEES FUNDED UNDER APAP

NAME	POSITION	COURSE/DEGREE /INSTITUTION	DATE COMPLETED
Athurugiriya, C.	Min of Land Commissioner	Effective Mgmt & Decision Making No. Illinois Univ	1992
De Zoysa, A.D.N.	Asst Director NPD	PhD Agric Economics Ohio State Univ	1993
De Zoysa, A.D.N.	Asst Director NPD	Data Analysis Specialization BuCen	1989
De Mel, D.	Devt Officer NPD	Ag Planning & Analysis Bangkok (ASEAN)	1988
Dias, A.A.H.A.	Devt Officer NPD	MS Agric Economics No. Carolina A & T State Univ	1991
Dias, A.A.H.A.	Dpty Director NPD	Natural Resource Policy (Soil Conservation) USDA	1993
Ekanayake, M.B.	Asst Director NPD	MS Agric Economics Ohio State Univ	1990
Ekanayake, M.B.	Dpty Director NPD	Human Resource Devt USDA	1992
Fernando, M.M.C.	Devt Officer (Plng), Min of Plantation Ind	Project Mgmt/Evaluation USDA	1991
Gunatilaka, S.	Devt officer NPD	Data Analysis Specialization BuCen	1989
Gunewardene, L.	Dpty Director Dept of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources	Project Anal. for Agric & Rural Devt USDA	1990
Jayasinghe, R.P.B.	Devt Officer Min of Plantations	Project Impl for Agric & Rural Devt USDA	1992
Kaluarachhi, K.G.W.	Asst Director Min of Agric, Food & Coops	Agric Plng & Anal, Asian Agric Devt Plng Ctr, Bangkok	1989
Kumaradasa, M.A.	Asst Director Planning MLIMD	MS Agric Economics Colorado State Univ	1991

NAME	POSITION	COURSE/DEGREE /INSTITUTION	DATE COMPLETED
Kumarasinghe, C.	Dpty Director (Budget) General Treasury	Information Technology AIT, Bangkok	1993
Kumarasinghe, C.S.	Asst Director NPD	Food & Agr Statistics Program BuCen	1990
Lokuhannadi, H.	Asst Director NPD	Ag Planning & Analysis Bangkok (ASEAN)	1988
Malalasekera, S.	Dpty Director Land Use Policy Plng Div MLIMD	Designing & Managing Integ Agric & Rural Devt Programs USDA	1988
Mendis, A.I.	Librarian NPD	Computerized Library Services AIT, Bangkok	1993
Peiris, R.M.	Min of Plantation Ind	MS Agric Extension Univ of Wisconsin	1993
Peiris, M.C.L.	Devt Officer Min of Plantations	Project Impl for Agric & Rural Devt USDA	1992
Perera, G.D.C.	Devt Officer NPD	Food & Agr Statistics Program BuCen	1990
Piyasena, H.U.K.	Plng Asst Min of Coconut Industries	Basic Agric Survey Statistics USDA	1990
Ranasinghe, I.	Asst Director NPD	MS Agric Economics South Dakota State Univ	1991
Ranasinghe, I.	Dpty Director NPD	Natural Resource Policy (Soil Conservation) USDA	1993
Ratnayake, P.C.	Asst Director NPD	MS Agric Economics Univ of Minnesota	1990
Ratnayake, P.C.	Dpty Director NPD	Project Impl for Agric & Rural Devt USDA	1992
Samarasinghe, M.J.	Asst Director NPD	Sustainable Devt of Land Regions: Plng & Mgmt for Multiple Use Univ of Arizona	1993
Samarasinghe, M.J.	Asst Director NPD	MS Agric Economics Utah State Univ	1990

NAME	POSITION	COURSE/DEGREE /INSTITUTION	DATE COMPLETED
Seneviratne, M.W.	Asst Director NPD	Budgeting & Financial Mgmt Inst of Int'l Mgmt Devt Univ of Pittsburgh	1991
Speldewinde, K.P.M.	Director MLIMD	Impl for Agric & Rural Devt USDA	1991
Wijasuriya, M.W.A.D.S	Devt Officer Planning & Prog Div Min Fisheries	Project Plng for Agric & Rural Devt USDA	1989

Appendix 5

Research and Studies Statistics

Appendix 5

PLANNING ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL PLANNING AND ANALYSIS PROJECT
(SELECTED LIST)

A. Ministry of Policy Planning and Implementation (MPPI)				
1. Design of integrated agricultural support services project	In process	Investment allocation	Unit providing major input into design, size and components of this project	Became the second Agricultural Extension Project
2. Production incentive study for tree–crop and food–crop sectors	Completed	Policy reform	Gradual elimination of export taxes recommended	Changes being implemented
3. Proposal for elimination of fertilizer subsidy scheme	Completed	Policy reform	Unit was focus for discussions with ADB leading to abolition of subsidy scheme	Changes implemented
4. Proposal for divestiture of Marketing Department	Completed	Institutional reform	Unit developed approach for divestiture	Changes implemented
5. Proposal for divestiture of Milk Industry Lanka Company (MILCO)	Implemented	Institutional reform	Director of Unit (Agriculture) conducting divestiture exercise	Changes implemented
6. Proposal for privatizing fertilizer marketing system	Implemented	Institutional reform	Unit developing procedures (jointly with MPI) for divestiture of fertilizer parastatals	Divestiture of the Ceylon Fertilizer Corporation is underway
7. Proposal for management divestiture of plantation agriculture parastatals (SLBDC study)	Completed	Institutional reform	Unit participated in study and in designing divestiture approach (jointly with MPI)	Completed
8. Proposal for divestiture of Ceylon Oils and Fats Corporation	Completed	Institutional reform	Unit designed approach for divestiture	Changes being implemented
9. Policy reform agenda for agricultural sector	Completed	Policy input	Unit integrated policy recommendations of individual planning units into sector–wide agenda	Agenda being implemented
10. Design of agricultural program loan 2 (ADB)	Implemented	Policy input	Policy reform package developed by Unit integrated into program	Conditionality attached to the program loan finalized
11. Design of multiyear food assistance program (USAID)	Completed	Policy input	Defined policy benchmarks (jointly with USAID)	Program being implemented
B. Ministry of Plantation Industries (MPI)				
12. Subsidy review for tea, rubber and coconut	Completed	Policy reform	Review proposed tax reforms for plantation sector	Changes being implemented
13. JEDB/SLSPC financial restructuring study	Completed	Institutional reform	Identified options for debt recovery and improved financial management of plantation agriculture parastatals	Restructuring of the JEDB/SLSPC underway according to study findings and guidelines
14. Policy reform agenda for plantation sector	Completed	Policy inputs	Provides policy framework for development of key crops, including tea, rubber, coconut, cashew, mulberry and palmyrah	Agenda being implemented

C. Ministry of Agricultural Development and Research (MADR)				
15. Review of floor–price scheme for field crops	Completed	Policy reform	Provided basis for transforming floor–price scheme from income–supporting instrument to efficiency–seeking instrument	Changes being implemented
16. Policy reform agenda for crops and livestock	Completed	Policy input	Provides policy framework for development of crop and livestock sub–sectors	Agenda being implemented
18. Strategy for crop research	Completed	Programmatic change	Integrated into crop research agenda prepared by Council for Agricultural Research Policy (CARP)	Strategy being implemented
19. Program for market–oriented agricultural production	Completed	Programmatic change	Designed and tested by Unit. Model being replicated in several areas	Program being implemented
D. Ministry of Lands, Irrigation and Mahaweli Development (MLIMD)				
20. Design of forestry sector development project	Completed	Investment allocation	Unit worked closely with donors (World Bank, FINIDA, ODA, and UNDP) in identifying design issues	Project being implemented
21. Design of national irrigation rehabilitation project	Completed	Investment allocation	Unit closely involved in designing project components and approach	Project being implemented
22. Policy reform agenda for MLIMD	Completed	Policy inputs	Provides policy framework for development of agricultural land and water resources	Agenda being implemented
E. Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MFAR)				
23. Preparation of five–year investment plan	Completed	Investment allocation	Developed by Unit, for guiding investment in fisheries sector	Plan being implemented
24. Policy reform agenda for fisheries sector	Completed	Policy input	Provides policy framework for development of fisheries sector	Agenda being implemented
25. Preparation of fish production and export plan	Completed	Policy input	Policy package and investment plan prepared by Unit	Plan being implemented

STUDIES CONDUCTED UNDER AGRICULTURAL PLANNING AND ANALYSIS PROJECT
(SELECTED LIST)

A. MINISTERIAL STUDIES	STATUS	IMPACT AREA	DESCRIPTION
1. Policy inventory (MLIMD)	Completed	Policy reform	a. Complete listing of policy guidelines for Ministry b. Identify areas for policy change
2. Project monitoring system (MADR)	Completed	Institutional reform	a. Establish Projects Division to monitor/evaluate projects using this system b. Accelerate expenditure rate
3. CTC tea manufacturing in Sri Lanka (MPI) (marketing strategy)	Completed	Policy reform	a. Convert 20% of orthodox teas into CTC teas b. Medium-term investment and development plan for CTC teas
4. Estimation of minor export crop production (MADR)	Completed	Research	a. Reform national accounts data on MECs (Central Bank)
5. Identifying development projects for fishing villages (MFAR)	Completed	Program design	a. To focus resources on target groups
6. Identifying projects for EEC assistance (MPPI) (up-country peasantry rehabilitation)	Completed	Program design	a. Portfolio of around 250 small-scale projects to be implemented in up-country b. Rationalize use of donor funds in project activities
7. Action plan to promote offshore and deep-sea fisheries (MFAR)	Completed	Program design	a. Identify key investment components
8. Action Plan for Department of Agriculture (MADR)	In process	Program design	a. Re-align research priorities
9. Market-oriented test case - Ibbagamuwa (MADR)	Completed	Program design	a. Rs 20 million allocated to expand test case to five provinces b. Janasaviya Round II using model in all AGAs (Rs 50 million allocated) c. Sabaragamuwa Province Development Project using same model (ADB-funded)

B. NATIONAL STUDIES

1. Production incentives for minor export crops	Completed	Policy reform	a. Narrow priorities from more than 10 crops to about four crops b. Phase out subsidy scheme c. Reject recommended export cess
2. Production incentives for rice and other crops	Completed	Policy reform	a. Examined/gave GSL extent of indirect subsidies
3. Land tenure study	Completed	Policy reform	a. Streamlined system for issuing land titles b. Improved survey system c. Identification of major land tenure issues in Sri Lanka
4. Restructuring of Mahaweli Authority	Completed	Institutional reform	a. Re-focusing of Mahaweli away from physical infrastructure development on commercial agriculture c. Significant downsizing of Mahaweli family of agencies d. Identify candidates for divestiture
5. Restructuring of Ceylon Fisheries Corporation I	Completed	Institutional reform	a. Divesting ownership (see Title III) b. Downsizing of CFC
6. Restructuring of Ceylon Fisheries Corporation II	Completed	Institutional reform	a. Divesting ownership (see Title III) b. Downsizing of CFC
7. Restructuring of Paddy Marketing Board	Completed	Institutional reform	a. Sale of assets b. Downsizing of PMB
8. Restructuring of Fisheries Harbor Corporation I	Completed	Institutional reform	a. Sale of assets b. Downsizing of CFHC
9. Restructuring of Fisheries Harbor Corporation II	Completed	Institutional reform	a. Sale of assets b. Downsizing of CFHC
10. Review of Agricultural Insurance Board	Completed	Institutional reform	a. Downsizing of AIB b. Cost-reduction; improved efficiency

LIST OF STUDIES, REVIEWS AND REPORTS

Studies

1 An Update on the Ministries involved in Agricultural Planning & Analysis Project

2 A Final Report by the PAO Contractor on the Implementation Status of the Agricultural Planning & Analysis Project

3 A Survey of the Operational Situation of Agrarian Services Committees of Sri Lanka

4 Agrarian Services Centres as an instrument in Planning & Implementaiton of Agricultural Development Programmes

5 A Comparative Study of the Selected ASC's

6 Action Plan to Promote Development of Offshore & Deep sea Fisheries

7 Desk Study of Offshore & Deepsea Resources

8 A Review of the Present Operations of the Paddy Marketing Board and its Restructuring

Addendum

9 Fertilizer Credit Scheme to Tea Smallholders through Informal Channels

10 Adapative Research for Rubber Smallholders Policies and Programmes for Improvement

11 Crop Production Incentives & Related Subsidy Schemes for Minor Export Crops

12 Final Report on Servicing the Village Level Dairy Organisations

13 Rationalization of the Ceylon Fisheries Harbour Corporation

14 Report of the Workshop to Develop a Monitoring System for the Min of AD& R

15 Short Term Consultancy on CTC Manfacture

16 Training Needs and Programme for Planners

17 Recent Trends in Fertilizer Consumption and other aspects of Yala Paddy Cultivation in Kurunegala

District

18 A Proposal for Strengthening the Policy Analysis and Planning Functions within the Ministry of Lands, Irrigation & Mahaweli Development

19 Restructuring of Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka Final Report Part I Volume II
Proposals on Restructuring

Annexures to the Proposals on Restructuring

20 A Policy Review of Impacts of Land Tenure in the Food Crop Sector

21 Policy Review of Impact of Land Tenure Problems on the Food Sector
(PL 480 Agreement: Self Help Measures)
Land Tenure Studies - Study III

Study on Registration of Title, Polonnaruwa

22 A Policy Review of Impacts of Land Tenure in the Food Crop Sector
Evaluation of the Swarnabhoomi Programme

23 Identification of Support Services required to enhance the Productivity of Different Size Categories of Tea Small Holdings

24 Identification of Support Services required to enhance the Productivity of Different Size Categories of Rubber Small Holdings

25 Identification of Support Services required to enhance the Productivity of Different Size Categories of Coconut Small Holdings

26. Road Rehabilitation of Settlement Schemes

27

28

29 Coconut Intercropping with Coffee, Pepper & Cocoa: An Economic Analysis of Present Constraints and Alternative Recommendations

30 Agricultural Insurance Board

<u>Reviews</u>

MAG
1/90 An Assessment of the Expected Impact of the Removal of

Fertilizer Subsidy on Production and Prices of Rice and other Important Food Commodities

2/90 A Close Analysis of 1981: The Year when Fertilizer Prices Increased Suddenly and Steeply

3/90 A Proposed Structure for Agricultural Policy Analysis & Planning for the Ministry of Agricultural Development & Research

4/90 A Critical Review of the Development Project Portfolio of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food & Co-operatives

5/90 Annual Agricultural Implementation Programme: A Review of Cultivation Targets and Achievements for Paddy

6/90 A Suggested Approach to meet the potential complications which may arise from the removal of the Fertilizer Subsidy

7/90 Emerging Issues in Fertilizer Use in Sri Lanka

8/90 The Three R's of Investing on Perennial Crops

9/90 In the Sphere of Policy Making for Development of Minor Export Crops

10/90
Proposed Structure for the Policy Analysis & Planning Divison - MADR

11/90
Review of Prodution Incentives for Rice OFC's, Fruit and Vegetables

1/91
Report on Incentive Scheme for Artificial Breeding Programme

MPI 1/90
Problems of the Coconut Industry and Possible Solutions

MPI 2/90
Report on the Review of Coconut Subsidy Schemes

MPI 3/90
Buffer Stock Operations in Coconut Oil

MFI 1/91
Strategies for Offshore Fisheries Development

MFI 2/91
Study on Increased Cost of Inputs to the Fishing

Industry

MFI 3/91
Strategies for Offshore Fisheries Development

LIMD 1/92
An Analysis of Resource Allocations in the Ministry of Lands, Irrigation & Mahaweli Development

MADR
2/92
Proceedings of the Workshop on National Productivity of Export Agricultural Crops

MADR
3/92
Socio-economic Characteristics of Upland Farming: the Case of Export Agricultural Crops

Reports

1 Quarterly Report - August _ October, 1989

2 Quarterly Report - November - January, 1990

3 Trip Report

4 Project Work Plan
January 1990 - August 1993

5 Trip Report

6 Trip Report

7 Pay Roll Package

8 Promoting Agricultural Development

9 Quarterly Report
Feb - April 90

10 Quarterly Report
May - July 90

11 Quarterly Report
August - December 90

12 Quarterly Report
January - March 91

13 Quarterly Report
April - June 91

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14 Trip Reports
June - September 91

15 Seminar on Implementation of Provincial Agricultural Programmes Summary of Proceedings

16 Trip Report
June - November 1991

17 Projects Identified in North Western Province Sinhalese

18 Projects Identified in North Western Province English

19 Policy Inventory Phase I

20. Short Term Trip Reports

21. Short Term Trip Reports

22. Projects identified in the Uva Province

23. Short Term Trip Reports

Appendix 6

Commodity Procurement

APAP COMMODITY PROCUREMENT
AS OF JULY 14, 1993

ITEMS	COMMIT	PLANNED	EXPEND	UNEXP	COMMENTS
Power Base	20,837		20,837		
Computer (GTSI)	79,329		79,329		
Computer (Valcom)	2,606		0	2,606	to be paid to Abt
Books (OMG)	31,113		28,334	2,780	awaiting final voucher
Shelf Items (PIL.25/31)	1,451		1,451		
Shelf Items (PIL.9/14)	24,959		24,959		
Vehicles (PIL.18)	50,114		50,114		
Shelf Items (PIL.33/37)	12,315		12,315		
Telephones (PIL.33/41)	1,890		1,890		
Shelf Items (PIL.33/47)	6,183		6,183		
Telephones (PIL.33/48)	11,394		11,394		
Partitions (PIL.50)	19,819		19,819		
Shelf Items (PIL.43/51)	5,479		5,479		
Vehicles (PIL.38/54)	32,905		32,905		
Relocation ADM Office (PIL.55/55)	11,847		11,847		
Shelf Items (PIL.43/57)	884		884		
Shelf Items (PIL.43/58)	575		575		
Shelf Items (PIL.43/62–68)	29,010		29,010		
Shelf Items (PIL.43/66)	18,830		9,599	9,231	decommit
Shelf Items (PIL.43/67)	39,106		38,739	367	decommit
Shelf Items (PIL.67/67)	8,260		1,286	6,974	decommit
Computer Printer (PIL.70/70)	3,414		3,414		
CRI Publication (PIL.74/74)	2,900		2,785	115	decommit
Shelf Items/A.C.s (PIL.75/75)	23,500		22,207	1,293	decommit
Computer Repair (PIL.78/78)	295		295		
Vehicle Proc. (PIL.65/80)	19,500		19,500		
Proc. Computer Equip. (PIO/C)	59,472		59,472		
Books (PIO/C)	24,000			24,000	in progress (1)
Computer Printers #1 (PIL.83)	4,344			4,344	voucher in process
Computer Printers #2		3,000		3,000	not done
Computers #1 (PIO/C)	55,535			55,535	L/Comm issued (2)
Computers #2 (PIO/C)	62,000			62,000	PIO/C issued (3)
Software (PIO/T)	20,000			20,000	PIO/T in progress (4)
NPD Phone System (PIL.86)	15,073			15,073	awaiting voucher
NPD Stabilizers (PIL.43/82)	2,463			2,463	awaiting voucher
Shelf–Items (PIL.43/88)	17,100			17,100	in progress
LAN Software		12,000		12,000	PIO/C in progress
	718,501	15,000	494,622	226,881	

Total Obligated:	**720,000**
Total Commitments:	(718,501)
Sub Total:	1,499
Decommitments:	17,980
Sub–Total:	19,479
Planned:	(15,000)
Balance:	4,479

Notes:

(1) Closing date for quotations is 7/23.
(2) L/Comm received by EIE; shipment by mid–August.
(3) Closing date for quotations is 8/15.
(4) Abt to be contracted with as PSA.

E:\COMMODITY

Appendix 7

Sri Lankan Financial Contribution Statistics

Attachment 1.

AGRICULTURE PLANNING & ANALYSIS PROJECT (PROJ # 383–083)
HOST COUNTRY CONTRIBUTION

16–Jul–93

Details	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	Total
Furniture, Fixtures, Etc 560–1–104–09(1)	0	0	297,284	0	273,769	52,453	1,707,541	2,331,047
Vehicles 560–1–104–09(2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Machinery & Equipment 560–1–104–09(7)	0	0	208,750	0	714,713	721,584	688,533	2,333,580
Land Improv & Structures 560–1–104–09(7)	0	0	0	0	0	3,586,975	10,507,070	14,094,045
Others 560–1–104–09(9)	91,992	0	892,266	2,494,733	2,062,674	2,043,009	2,304,560	9,889,234
Total – Cash (Rs)	91,992	0	1,398,300	2,494,733	3,051,156	6,404,020	15,207,704	28,647,905
Total – In–kind (Rs)							52,560,000	52,560,000
TOTAL (Rs.)	91,992	0	1,398,300	2,494,733	3,051,156	6,404,020	67,767,704	81,207,905
TOTAL (US $) (ROE $ 1.00 = RS 27.95)	3,291	0	50,029	89,257	109,165	229,124	2,424,605	2,905,471

TOTAL PROJECT COST	9,300,000	LOP COMLETED	86%
HCC AGREED	2,700,000	TARGET AS PER LOP COMLETED	2,322,000
ACTUAL HCC REPORTED	1,973,000	CTR HCC VERIFIED	2,905,471
% OF HCC AGREED	73%	% OF HCC AGREED	108%
% OF HCC TARGET AS OF LOP	85%	% OF HCC TARGET AS OF LOP	122%

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CTR/RS

Appendix 8

Change and Potential in the Sri Lankan Provinces

Seneka Abeyratne

Appendix 8

CHANGE AND POTENTIAL IN THE SRI LANKAN PROVINCES

Seneka Abeyratne

I. DEVOLUTION

The terms decentralization and devolution are used synonymously to describe the recent centrifugal drive in Sri Lankan politics and the emergence of democratically elected bodies over time to function as autonomous or semi-autonomous units of regional or local government. However, technically speaking, decentralization refers to the dispersion or distribution of functions and powers from a central authority to regional or local governing bodies, whereas devolution refers to the delegation or surrender of such powers. For convenience, we could regard decentralization as a general concept or "species," and devolution as a distinct "sub-species" displaying the unique characteristic of regional/local administrative autonomy within a unitary constitutional framework. Urban councils, gramodaya mandalayas and pradeshiya sabhas are examples of locally-elected governing bodies that do not have complete administrative autonomy, whereas provincial councils are examples of governing bodies that do. Hence the term devolution would be applied to the latter only, but with both bodies being subsumed under the general concept of decentralization.

Any system comprising regional or local bodies serving a central authority could be considered decentralized, but once those bodies achieve administrative autonomy, they are also devolved. The same applies to any activity or function. For example, agricultural extension, which was for several decades decentralized but controlled and coordinated by the national government (i.e., the central Ministry of Agriculture), has now come under the purview of provincial councils (i.e., the provincial ministries of agriculture). Hence it is devolved. On the other hand, agricultural research, which is also decentralized (i.e., a network of regional research centers serving the central ministry of agriculture), continues to remain under the control of the national government. Hence it is not devolved. Parliament has determined through legislative action which activities are to be retained by the state (the reserve list), which are to be devolved, and which are to be managed concurrently. A large number of functions are in fact now fully devolved. In other words, they have been voluntarily surrendered by the state to the regional authorities, i.e., the provincial councils, which are politically and administratively independent, even though they obtain their financial resources from the central treasury.

While the country's experience with decentralized public administration and local government goes back several decades, its history of devolution is very short. The

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provincial councils bill was passed by an act of parliament in 1987, and members were elected to the councils in 1989. The only elected body to which the central government has completely surrendered specific powers, functions, duties and responsibilities is the provincial council. It would be correct to say that provincial councils are the only examples of fully-devolved regional governing bodies in Sri Lanka. Hence the term devolution is used specifically with reference to the provincial councils act and the system of regional governance introduced under this act.

II. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKDROP

The provinces, even though they have come into political focus only in recent years, are historically important in that they served as the chief units of regional administration ("kachcheri" system) during the British colonial period (1796-1948), where the chief regional administrator/coordinator was the government agent (GA). However, the GA's kachcheri system was an extension of the central government and did not include locally or regionally elected bodies serving as representatives of the people.

Under the "Donoughmore" system (introduced in 1931) there was a massive proliferation of government departments with their sub-offices located in the provinces ("vertical departmentalism"). The departments, though they were directly under the control of their respective ministries located in Colombo, were not entirely independent of the GA. Thus at the time of Independence, the provincial administration was characterized by two parallel structure -- the kachcheri system and the departmental system -- with the GA playing a loose coordinating role. It is to be noted that under the Donoughmore Commission (1928) there was an attempt at devolution through the establishment of provincial councils, but it did not materialize. However, four types of locally-elected bodies, namely municipal, urban, town and village councils, were introduced and placed under the administrative supervision of the ministry of local government.

Soon after Independence, the district replaced the province as the chief unit of regional administration. Thus the latter ceased to be of administrative importance. A three-tiered administrative structure was established at the district level -- where villages were grouped into Grama Sevaka (GS) divisions, the GS divisions were grouped into Assistant Government Agent (AGA) divisions, and the AGA divisions were consolidated under the GA -- which has continued without modification up to the present time, though the district has been superseded once more by the province in terms of political and administrative importance.

The idea of provincial councils was resurrected when ethnic tensions erupted in 1983, which prompted the largest ethic minority to launch a full-fledged military

campaign to establish a separate state in the north and east. This time the idea came to stay. The was war so intractable and devastating that both government and separatist forces were compelled to settle for a compromise. Though there was a long hysteresis, the final outcome was the establishment of provincial councils in 1989, which has provided the basis for regional political autonomy within a unitary constitutional framework.

In this manner, devolution, or "democratic decentralization" became a reality. But in as much as it has provided the opportunity for all people of Sri Lanka, especially ethnic and religious minorities, to have a voice in their own affairs, it was driven by political exigencies. In other words, the spirit of devolution was evoked primarily as a response to the war-situation in the north and east. Ironically, devolution has taken off in other areas but has crashed in this area (even though a provincial councils has been established for the north and east) on account of militant forces ultimately rejecting the provincial councils act and resuming the struggle for a separate homeland.

III THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM

The provincial councils are democratically elected, autonomous regional bodies charged with harnessing the resources of their respective territories, involving the people in decision-making and institution-building, and providing poor and less-privileged families with the opportunities to obtain a decent and satisfying livelihood through broad-based participatory development. The provincial councils are coordinated by the Ministry of Provincial Councils, Public Administration and Home Affairs (located in Colombo) but are neither controlled nor regulated by it. Thus the above ministry plays primarily an advisory, facilitating and overall supervisory role but has no administrative authority over the individual provincial councils.

This new model of administration, based on regional political autonomy within a unitary constitutional framework, represents a point of departure from the previous model of vertical departmentalism, which was an bureaucratic extension of the center into the periphery and not an instrument of regional governance elected by popular vote. A key factor in devolution is the surrender of specific functions and powers previously exercised by parliament to groups of elected persons resident in the various areas. The new system, in contrast to the old, is a vehicle for horizontal coordination and democratic pluralism with a mandate for local politicians to answer not to the national government but to the people belonging to their respective constituencies, for any failure on their part to live up to popular expectations would mean probable defeat at the next provincial council elections.

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a. Structure and Distribution of Provincial Councils

A province is an aggregate of two or more districts. There are twenty five districts and nine provinces. The province is the unit of devolution on the basis of the existing nine administrative boundaries established by the British colonial government. The number of provincial councils total only eight on account of two provinces -- the north and east -- being amalgamated into one through an amendment to the provincial councils act. The eight provincial councils are as follows:

(a) Western
(b) North-Western
(c) North-Central
(d) Central
(e) Sabaragamuwa
(f) Uva
(g) Southern, and
(h) North and East.

The number of MPs per province varies in direct proportion to the size of its population.

Each provincial council has a chief ministry and a few line ministries. The executive head is the governor, appointed directly by the President, but in reality the chief minister (who is a provincial member of parliament) is the key administrator and decision-maker, the person most closely associated with the day-to-day workings of the provincial council. (The chief minister is appointed by the Governor.) A "model" provincial council -- there are minor variations from one to another -- has the following ministries:

(a) chief ministry (including the "sub-ministries" of law and order, planning, lands and education),
(b) cooperatives,
(c) agriculture, irrigation, rural development, cultural affairs and sports,
(d) local government, employment, labor, trade, information and infrastructure, and
(e) fisheries, health, social services, tourism, women's affairs, ayurvedha, child care and probation.

Thus all the above functions, such as education, health, social services, agriculture and fisheries have been devolved. (The integrated rural development projects have also been devolved.) But in reality, within some sectors, there are certain functions (or programs or projects) that have been retained by the central administration -- justice, national security, higher education, power and energy,

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environmental conservation, agricultural research, and the accelerated mahaweli program (AMP) being the key ones.

b. Organizational Framework

The provincial council ministries are organized in much the same way as central ministries, but are much smaller replicas in terms of staffing positions and patterns. The "model" administrative hierarchy comprises a secretary, a deputy secretary (one or more as per planning, finance and administration), a senior assistant secretary, an assistant secretary (one or more), a director (one or more, who are above the assistant secretaries in rank), a deputy director (one or more), an assistant director (one or more), several assistant government agents (AGAs), and several project implementation officers (PIOs). The administrative area that falls within the purview of the AGA is called the AGA division. The AGA was recently renamed the divisional secretary (and the AGA division is now simply called the division).

The secretary to the chief minister is known as the chief secretary. The chief secretary functions in much the same way as the secretary to the central cabinet. A key institution in the chief ministry is the planning unit (usually headed by the deputy chief secretary), which is charge of progress control and monitoring (reports are prepared on a monthly and/or quarterly basis) and formulation of capital budgets. The unit therefore plays a critical role in formulating programs and projects and in coordinating the planning activities of the other line-ministries.

It should be noted that while the GA continues to run the kachcheri system and to coordinate the reserve list functions, the divisional secretary and the grama sevaka (GS) niladhari (one for each GS Division) have been placed under the supervision of the chief ministry. The divisional secretary is now a key person, in effect the linchpin of the provincial administrative machinery, for his division has become the focal point for planning and allocation of capital resources. The divisional secretary thus has close links with the planning unit and has major responsibility for developing his division's human and physical resource base.

The "model" staffing pattern of the divisional secretary's office comprises an assistant divisional secretary, a rural development officer, a social service/housing officer, an agricultural instructor, a divisional officer (agrarian services), a community development officer, cooperative inspector (averaging around ten), technical officers (averaging around two), PIOs (averaging around three), and GS niladharis (averaging around thirty). When it is considered that there are around thirty to forty divisional secretaries per province, the manpower available for deployment at the field level is formidable. Until recently, the divisional secretary's office was an extension of the central government, playing and impersonal, bureaucratic role in development. But now, since it is serving directly under an autonomous regional governing body that is

increasingly targeting resources at the divisional level, it is under considerable political pressure to take an active and expanded role in both planning and implementing target-oriented projects. With increased funds flowing to the divisional secretary from the provincial council spigot (he is now authorized to operate an official bank account), he is in a position to organize his office in a manner that makes optimum use of its manpower and financial resources. But many divisional secretaries lack the experience and skills to effectively undertake this task, a problem which has to be addressed through training and technical assistance. Some also suffer from an attitudinal problem in that they are continuing to function in a routine administrative mode without adjusting to their new role as thinkers and agents of change. Though projects are being formulated, the approach is arbitrary and not driven by objective criteria or rationally-determined goals and priorities. There are exceptions, however, and in some areas divisional secretaries are playing a constructive role in development.

c. Funding Mechanisms

The provincial councils are financed almost entirely by the central government with regard to both recurrent and capital expenditure. A statute for generating provincial council revenues was passed by parliament in 1991. The sources of revenue that have been devolved include motor licenses, gun licenses, business turnover tax (which will be shared between the regional and national governments in the western province), land taxes, stamp duties and court fines. These revenues comprise a very small fraction of the total recurrent budget.

The two sources of recurrent expenditure are called establishment costs and block grants. With regard to capital expenditure, the two main sources are the decentralized (or public investment plan) budget and the criteria-based grant (also called the provincial-council fund). Each MP is separately entitled to a capital budget of Rs. 2.5 million. Another source of funds are the integrated rural development projects (one per province).

Up to 1990, the four components functioned independently of one another on the basis of annual plans. But as of 1991, the modus operandi is a single three-year plan drawing from all four sources of capital expenditure. However, planning is behind schedule, and until such time that the three-year plans are completed, the provincial councils will continue to operate in the annual plan mode. In some of the provinces there is a time-lag with respect to implementation of the annual plans as well (i.e., 1992 plans are being implemented in 1993, and 1993 plans are still being formulated).

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d. The Planning System

The provincial councils have adopted the so-called bottom-up approach for preparing the three-year plan, which go through four stages corresponding to the village level, the divisional level, the district level and the provincial level -- the rationale being that these plans must accommodate the needs and aspirations of the people.

The provincial line-ministries have the responsibility for preparing projects for the various sectors and sub-sectors falling within their ambit. This is done with the assistance of the GS niladharis and the divisional secretaries. The divisional secretary has a difficult role to play in that he has to reconcile the ideas flowing up from the GS niladharis (which ostensibly are those of the people) with those flowing down from the politicians. Future projects are discussed at the divisional level by a planning committee headed by the divisional secretary, which ideas are submitted to the various ministries, who proceed to crystallize them into projects with the assistance of the planning committees.

The capital expenditure plans of the line-ministries are all reviewed by the chief ministry with regard to budgetary constraints, economic viability, income and employment-generating potential, basic needs impact, etc. The planning unit plays a central role in this exercise and has the responsibility for preparing a draft multisectoral master plan for the entire province, on a district-by-district basis. This is essentially an implementation plan comprising a series of projects with their respective budgets and activity schedules. At the district level, the plan has to be reviewed and approved by the district coordinating committee (DCC), comprising the chief minister (chairman), GA (secretary), and provincial council MPs representing that district. The DCC is served by a planning committee headed by the GA. The three-year provincial master plan is thus a consolidation of individual district plans into a single document. There is no equivalent of the DCC at the provincial level. But the future is likely to see the creation of provincial planning commission (PPC), also headed by the chief minister.

The main drawback with the above system is that it is almost exclusively project-oriented and lacks a policy/program framework. The present approach (at least on the part of the politicians) is characterized by the desire to "put a bit of money into everything and hope for the best." However, during the past two years, the Agricultural Planning and Analysis Project (APAP) has been providing technical assistance to the provincial planning units to enhance their conceptual and analytical skills, and computer equipment and accessories to enhance their planning capacities. Funds have also been made available for senior provincial planners to undergo short-term training in the United States and also undertake study tours to selected countries. Under the auspices of the APAP, each provincial planning unit is preparing a draft development strategy (whose focus is agriculture), which will serve as the

basis for the formulation of future programs and projects. The value of the strategy exercise lies more in the process than in the end-product itself, i.e., it has got key provincial planners accustomed to a new way of thinking about development (such as defining problems and issues, developing viable options or alternatives, and identifying goals and priorities in the context of an overall strategic vision), which involves extensive use of their creative, intellectual and analytical faculties. The provincial planners are working closely with National Planning Department staff ("link persons") on this exercise.

Planning is a complex process, in which common-sense, social and political sensitivity, the ability to conceptualize problems and think logically, and the capacity to weigh options and arrive at optimal solutions all play a crucial part. In these respects, many provincial council planners and analysts (and key supporting staff, such as the divisional secretaries) lack skills and experience and would benefit greatly from training and technical assistance. This is of paramount importance, given that provincial councils are merging as the locomotives of regional development, and some are already racing ahead bravely but blindly.

e. Private Sector Initiatives

The provincial councils in principle support the idea of private sector development and are making efforts in some areas to promote it. For example, the southern provincial council has earmarked two large areas to be developed as industrial estates with full private sector participation, for which it is currently assessing the infrastructure requirements.

The north-western provincial council, which is the most progressive of these governing bodies, has established a semi-autonomous industrial services board (ISB) -- with German funding -- to support private sector participation in industrial development. This institution has twelve competent officers, is equipped with computer hardware and software, and provides assistance to the private sector in the following areas:

(a) investment promotion
(b) technology and quality control
(c) marketing and market promotion, and
(d) management development and training.

The ISB is primarily a coordinating and facilitating body, linking banks to potential investors, identifying potential areas for business, and providing an information service to the public. (Though it is only a six months old, it has already been instrumental in the establishment of an export-garment industry in Kurunegala district.) The board is also equipped to undertake training, whereby it coopts

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members from other institutions (such as NIBM) to teach short-term courses in specialized areas (such as marketing and business management). The ISB concept is highly innovative and would be suited for replication in other provinces, providing funding and qualified staff are available.

The rest of the provincial councils, thus far, do not appear to have taken any significant steps towards promoting private business activity in the industrial sector.

IV LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The local governing bodies and regional governing bodies are separately elected and politically independent of one another. The local governing body at the village and divisional level are the gramodaya manadalaya (of which the GS niladhari is secretary) and the pradeshiya sabha (headed by the divisional secretary), respectively. (The pradeshiya sabhas are nascent organizations and are not fully in some areas.) In urban areas the corresponding organizations are the urban councils (smaller towns) and municipalities (larger towns).

In administrative terms, local governing bodies are under the central Ministry of Local Government (but are increasingly coming under the purview of provincial councils). Their spheres of governance include domestic water and power supplies, construction, and housing. These bodies could be considered decentralized but not fully devolved, in that they do not enjoy full administrative autonomy like the provincial councils.

V CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS

The Provincial Councils Act and the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution collectively describe the powers, functions, duties and responsibilities delivered over to the regional governing bodies by the central government. However, there is a wide discrepancy between what is prescribed in these documents and the degree of political, legal and administrative autonomy actually enjoyed by the provincial councils. That is to say, the center still exercises a considerable degree of authority and control over the periphery. One reason is that the periphery does not have financial autonomy and has to depend on the center for its funds. Another reason is that until recently, there were no opposition parties in power in the periphery, which enabled the United National Party (UNP) to directly control the provinces from the center. Hence, by virtue of UNP hegemony, there was harmony between the center and the periphery, but very little devolution in practice.

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At the May 1993 elections, the combined opposition parties (the People's Alliance) secured power in three of the seven provincial councils that participated in the elections, namely the western province, the north-western province, and the southern province. (Ethnic warfare prevented elections from being held in the north and east.) It will be interesting to see what fate awaits the devolution experiment, now that political power has become diffused and the UNP no longer enjoys political hegemony in the provinces. The new Chief Minister of the Western province (who is from the opposition) recently stated that devolution exists only on paper and that she will endeavor to make it a reality, at least in the Western province. It would seem that the recent elections have provided the periphery with an opportunity to infuse flesh and blood into the Thirteenth Amendment, and to awaken the center to the reality of devolution. Center-periphery relations will no longer remain static and a realistic prognosis is that they are on the threshold of dynamic change, with the periphery pressing for greater autonomy for managing its own affairs. The constitutional changes embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment are fundamental and will enable the periphery to do so to a considerable extent. The greater the level of democratic pluralism at the provincial level, the greater will be the pressure on the center to fully implement these changes. We would like to end on the optimistic note that when Sri Lanka is ready for devolution (in the practical sense), it will happen.

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Appendix 9

Future Directions and Needs in Sri Lankan Agriculture

Rohan Fernando

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Appendix 10

Mission Management: Flexible Responses to Sri Lankan Needs

David I. Steinberg

APPENDIX 10

MISSION MANAGEMENT: FLEXIBLE RESPONSES TO CHANGING SRI LANKAN NEEDS

David I. Steinberg

Both Sri Lanka and AID are under stress: the former from civil war and political violence as well as from a process of administrative realignment, the latter from public and congressional disillusionment with the results of the foreign assistance process and budgetary constraints. Pressures are on AID to redistribute its limited resources to Eastern Europe and the new states of the former Soviet Union. Pressures, too, abound on personnel ceilings and administrative funds.

Compared to some USAID programs, Sri Lanka has not fared too badly. Modest program and administrative cuts are, however, expected in expatriate staff over the next few years. Both have already occurred over the past few years. AID/Washington is also under administrative siege. Staff have diminished, turnover is high, and program support is truncated.

USAID is then faced with two problems within whatever overarching strategy and 'vision' it might espouse in Sri Lanka. The first is to develop the analytical capacity to respond to new or newly articulated Sri Lankan needs in a timely and competent manner when such needs cannot now be identified with any precision either by the Sri Lankans or donors in this period of flux. To be sure, macroeconomic policy reforms may be evident and relatively constant, but shifting needs in the agricultural and rural sectors, the political growth in importance of the provinces, changing priorities in food production and exports all indicate that the period is one of constant change. One need only review the Mahaweli program and its problems to note the change in priorities and the recognition of new problems. Agricultural policy is subject to the intense politicization of Sinhalese society, which is well documented.

The second challenge is to develop an internal administrative mechanism that allows this intellectual capacity to program effectively with less administrative staff time. The long process of project preparation, followed by usually inordinate delays in contracting and the recruitment of technical assistance, as well as procurement issues that this project exemplifies could make the USAID project portfolio (in contrast to PL-480, Title III) essentially irrelevant.

Because the United States has become a minor donor in financial terms in Sri Lanka, only providing some eight percent of all foreign assistance, it has wisely opted out of major infrastructure support that other donors can better provide. This gives the Mission greater flexibility to respond to urgent needs if it could develop efficient project or programming mechanisms that allow it to do so. It also mandates that the

relatively modest funds available to it are used most productively in the interests of both states.

Fortunately such a model exists, enthusiastically supported by the host government and approved and endorsed by that Mission and AID/Washington. This is the USAID/Jakarta Agriculture and Rural Sector Support Program (ARSSP).

The ARSSP project, operating out of a Mission division, was designed to provide rapid response in issues related to policy dialogue. The project allowed the Mission as a whole (through a management committee) to draw upon it for support for a variety of needs. The ARSSP evolved over time and became better coordinated within the Mission, but there is no question but that it was deeply appreciated both by the Indonesian government and by even competitive Mission divisions, because its success was apparent and they too could draw on it for appropriate experiments.

The project was characterized by the following:

1. It was run by an outside professional with program funds.

2. It serviced the Mission as a whole.

3. It provided technical assistance, training, research as needed.

4. Once the project was approved in Washington, all decisions were made in the field.

5. It was policy oriented.

The ARSSP was helpful in testing policy support.[1] USAID/ Jakarta placed emphasis on institutional capacity and building within the policy context. But institution-building within this program may not necessarily result in continuing programmatic responsibility for sub-projects. One critical element of the program was its experimental nature; activities could be supported for limited periods and then terminated, some activities might in a sense act as feasibility studies with major projects taking on separate existences, and some might continue within the purview of ARSSP. No single approach was appropriate in a program that was designed to be demand driven and rapidly responsive to local needs.

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[1] The following is adapted from a report of July 15, 1992 to the USAID/Jakarta Mission by this author, and entitled "Policy Dialogue and Administrative Serendipity: Lessons from the ARSSP and EPSO in the Indonesian Context." The materials excerpted here deal with the ARSSP, rather than EPSO, the Economic Policy Support Office. EPSO offers interesting lessons but would involve major internal Mission restructuring if adopted elsewhere. ARSSP could stand alone within the USAID/Colombo.

The important characteristics and advantages of the ARSSP program are seen to be:

* Flexibility of response to host country requests.

* Flexibility of response within the AID and Mission administrative system. Because of the administrative attributes of the project, the Mission often could turn to the ARSSP to initiate project activities that might later find institutional homes in other USAID offices.

* The ability of the program to deny assistance when it was viewed as inappropriate.

* The rapidity of the response in providing technical assistance when needed, and not having to build projects into a Congressional Presentation years before they were to be implemented.

* The ability to give policy dialogue a prominent place within the Mission through ARSSP, and to deal cross-sectorally with development policy questions.

* The combination of policy dialogue with the financial capacity to respond to issues emanating from that dialogue. Dialogue alone would be far less effective, and diminish overall U.S. influence in foreign aid.

* The combination of administrative and technical competence in staff support, allowing the wedding of both policy and technical assistance capacities. For successful support and technical assistance, a peer professional relationship is necessary between the internal and external dimensions of the assistance--that is, between the staff and the technical experts.

* The program allowed for professional activities by in-house staff, if available, thereby creating an intellectual environment of excitement.

* In contrast to normal project or program design, this program allowed for gradual, incremental design by testing needs and interests, and formulating major activities through the prudent investment of modest funds and staff time that could expand as the needs and opportunities indicated, or be stopped with a minimum of investment. Thus ARSSP was a fiscally prudent means for programming and work on policy issues. It was also administratively prudent insofar as it did not commit major blocks of sparse Mission staff time to activities that seem increasingly inappropriate as the activities progressed.

* Within its approach to policy dialogue and its concentration on building institutional capacities, ARSSP committed a substantial percentage of its resources to all aspects of training, much of it in-country.

* Research was another prominent feature of the program in providing the data for policy formulation and refinement, and as an aspect of training and institutional strengthening. This program allowed research to be placed within a policy-relevant framework.

* With program funds, the Mission was able to hire individuals with types of competence that were unavailable within the Agency.

* The program allowed for a variety of contractual mechanisms for providing technical assistance, thereby increasing effectiveness and lessening response time. These included purchase orders, personal services contracts, institutional contracts, and IQCs.

The generic lessons from the ARSSP experience in Indonesia in relation to policy dialogue include the following:

* Policy dialogue must be adapted to local needs and sensitivities, and cannot be tactically managed outside the country of concern. Headquarters should supply support and guidance, but the micro-management of policy objectives, as demonstrated in the early stages of ARSSP, is unlikely to work.

* Policy implementation is a critical aspect of policy dialogue, and should not be ignored in the fervor to establish policies alone.

* Policy dialogue is likely to be more effective if it is combined with modest funds to test the implementation aspects of proposed policy changes.

* Policy dialogue can (perhaps should) be combined with the building of institutional capacities to implement policy changes.

* A Mission needs a flexible means of rapid response to host country policy requests. This becomes especially important as the fiscal means of the United States to respond with major funding to foreign aid requests diminishes. The advantage of the United States now, with much smaller funds, may be in its administrative efficiency and the rapidity with which it can respond to appropriate local needs.

* An ARSSP-like program is a useful avenue for prudent support to policy dialogue and resulting opportunities. Such a program needs professional management, and the flexibility of the administrative arrangements of the program allow the external hiring with program funding of professionals, concerned with substantive fields or the societies in which the programs operate, and who might be unavailable internally within the Agency.

* The ARSSP-like activity is an effective means to provide training and research support and gear them both to the policy implementation objectives.

* Although ARSSP was labor intensive because of the necessary number of contracts, it is likely to be far less so than the development of separate projects among disparate sections of the Mission.

USAID/Colombo could adopt an ARSSP model and attach it to the Office of Agriculture and Natural Resources within the Mission. It could act as a follow-on to APAP or other rural sector programs that deal with policy or planning. Under it, training could be provided, policy-oriented studies funded, modest commodities supplied, and technical assistance contracted.

Appendix 11

Technical Assistance Within the Sri Lanka Government

Rolando Jiron

Appendix 11:

LESSONS LEARNED IN PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS AND POLICY REFORM IN SRI LANKA AND SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES

Dr. Rolando Jiron

In the early eighties Abt Associates conducted a review of Policy Analysis and Planning Projects implemented by USAID worldwide. The purpose of the review was to identify the design and implementation characteristics which contributed to making such projects successful. The measure of success was framed in terms of the extent to which the projects created 'sustainable" capacity for planning and policy analysis in host countries Ministries and the degree to which policy makers made use of such capacity.

The Agricultural Planning and Analysis Project of Sri Lanka differs in many ways from the projects included in that Abt review. Foremost, the principal aim of the Planning Projects included in the review were to create policy analysis and planning units in Ministries which generally did not have one. Planning Units were created from scratch with the hope that upon project completion, Host Countries would continue funding them and making use of them. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, Planning Units existed from the outset. The need was to turn these units, which were principally involved in budgeting and passive project monitoring, into sources of policy advice and of new investment options together with the capacity to identify and implement needed policy and institutional reforms.

The technical assistance contract had a relatively small component of expatriate technical assistance. It also combined the role of resident advisor and chief of party in one person. Another distinct feature of the project was to begin the technical assistance component three years after the commencement of project activities such as training and procurement. Finally, the contract was awarded as a host country contract. There have been differing opinions regarding these project features. Each of these features are discussed below.

Small technical assistance teams is an important ingredient of success. These projects, however, are at times not attractive to donor agencies because they do not absorb a great deal of aid. From the standpoint of financial committments these projects appear to be somewhat unimportant but in the eyes of donor agencies require the same amount of administrative oversight as larger, more visible ones. The other side of the coin is that projects consisting of small technical assistance teams enable the chief of party to carry out his advisory role and not be totally absorbed by the technical supervision of the rest the team. The fact that the chief of party is performing advisory functions put him in a better position to identify the project areas

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deserving more attention and financial resources. Such areas are sometimes not apparent to host country officials nor to the funding agency. It is only after study results are observed that such committments are considered to be judicious and appropriate. This important and risky ingredient of success is only possible if the advisor is also able to perform technical work which is less possible in projects consisting of large technical assistance teams.

Arrival of technical assistance well after commencement of project activities generated a great deal of controversy during the mid-term evaluation. Retrospectively, however, delaying the technical assistance component has made it possible to use resources at the end of the project when they are most needed. Moreover, reformulation of the Strategy began at about the time the technical assistance component of the project got underway. It proved to be fruitful not to have the expatriate advisor term coincide with the beginning of the project because project activities were principally concerned with developing administrative systems and placing government officials in long-term training.

The host country co .tract issue has been a problematic one. USAID has sometimes felt it did not have sufficient control or information of project activities despite an effort to keep them informed. It is clear that Host Country contracts do give the Host Government greater ownership of the project but not without some complications to the technical assistance contractor. The idea of a Host Country contract was considered an acceptable course of action by the team staffing the USAID office during the Project Design phase. It was not considered so by subsequent teams.

The commitment, respectability and technical competence of the counterpart of the project has been essential to project success. The accomplishments of the project are largely due to the willingness of the counterpart to take the risks involved in promoting policy reforms in Sri Lanka. Equally important is the fact that the local team enjoys the trust of senior officials within the Government. In a sense, the technical assistance has been effective to the extent to which it has been able to support the counterpart with timely analysis and prompt organization of studies.

The APAP project has been able to accomplish a great deal of policy and institutional reforms because of its institutional home. The National Planning Department works very closely with the Treasury. In fact the allocation of capital expenditures to the various Ministries and the overall budgetary ceilings are provided to the Treasury by the National Planning Department. In this form, National Planning can align policy and institutional reforms with budgetary allocations. In the absence of this instruments, a good number of the reform proposals would not have gone beyond the proposal stage.

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The availability of local technical competence enabled the project to deliver much more technical support than initially envisaged. The project design did not make any provisions to support the planning units when most of their staff happen to be overseas undergoing training. Placing of long-term local advisors in the various planning units had several positive benefits. One was to forge a closer link between the Ministerial Planning Units and National Planning. National Planning was able to coordinate many activities with the various Ministries through these advisors. The Resident Advisor was also able to influence the direction of initiatives in the various Ministries working unobtrusively through the local advisors. In essence, local advisors have been an effective mechanism to amplify the project's sphere of influence while keeping it within budgetary limits and made possible steering of policy and institutional reforms in the participating ministries.

USAID projects which support policy and institutional reforms have a greater influence than the dollars invested would indicate. The present trend within USAID to emphasize quantifiable indicators to monitor project implementation needs to be modified to accommodate policy dialogue and reform oriented projects. In order to develop quantifiable indicators the number and pace of reforms need to be known before hand. This is extremely difficult to predict in projects where a certain amount of discretion and flexibility is essential.

Proposals for Future Assistance

One of the essential lessons learned from the APAP (See the evaluation for a more extensive listing of lessons learned) is the need to have the technical assistance team work closely (in proximity and intensity) with the key Government decision makers. Such a rapport and trust is critical to effective policy dialogue, reform, implementation and adjustments. The Government must "own" the reforms and the advisor should be a trusted professional who can translate a government's visions into feasible and viable policy instruments. An Advisor needs to be multi-disciplinary and multi-faceted because usually several disciplines are needed to solve any one problem. Problems often cut across sectors and ministries.

A change in policy usually has ripple effects and multiplier effects that are economy wide. In addition, an advisor needs to be not only a good analyst but also an astute manager. One must be able to discern the institutional, administrative and human resource requirements and constraints to the successful launching and sustainability of a policy reform. The economic, political and social ramifications need to be carefully assessed in order to increase the likelihood of a smooth transition from a traditional to a new policy framework. Opposition to such a change needs to be acknowledged and to the extent possible addressed in terms of assuaging fears of what is perceived to be a "strange new world". Against this set of idealized conditions the Sri Lanka AP&AP has exceeded expectations. The Project has opened a trusting policy dialogue and it has successfully launched specific policy reforms. It

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has also begun the implementation of several policies and it has set the stage for continued movement towards Sri Lanka's goal to move towards a higher degree of industrialization (if not by the year 2001 then sometime in the next several decades).

There is the need for a carefully thought out plan for the follow-on needed to sustain such exceptional accomplishments. Below we outline a model which we believe will simultaneously address the following objectives:

1. The continuation of a long-term relationship of advisors without the associated costs of a resident advisor;

2. A multi-disciplinary approach to technical assistance;

3. A multi-faceted approach to the implementation of technical assistance;

4. A leveraging of AID support to Sri Lanka in the critical area of Agricultural Planning and Analysis, which the Government sees as critical to obtaining its growth and sustainability goals; and

5. A mechanism which will allow a quick response to the yet undefined needs of policy support in the complex institutional setting of Sri Lanka.

The Model

The proposed model would take three or four senior people spanning several disciplines and approaches who would provide upon request, on a rotating basis, the type of assistance heretofore offered by a resident advisor. Such persons would be familar with Sri Lanka, known to AID and the Government officials and have participated in the APAP. Other specialists would be quickly accessed as needed through a purchase order, which could be initiated at the country or mission level.

The contracting mechanism could be a person month contract allowing for the higher salaries of certain high level, possibly renowned specialists whose access may require not only high remuneration, but also quick and flexible turn around of contracting procedures. Each of the core specialists would reside in the country for one to two months at a time thus allowing them systematically to set up follow up activities and consultancies upon their return.

Continuity will be provided by a full time Sri Lankan resident advisor who would coordinate the efforts of the intermitten core staff and provide a conduit to the Sri Lankan Government and USAID. It is proposed that this person report directly to a senior government official in the National Planning Department and have at his/her

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disposal an administrative assistant and other needed support staff and facilities. The long term Sri Lankan co-ordinator should be a highly regarded technical professional familiar with APAP and involved in ongoing policy analysis and reforms. Ideally, such a person would be committed to such reforms and if possible be the beneficiary of APAP training, technical assistance or oversight.

Such a model would allow the same packaging of development networks and technical assistance support as is now available under APAP. Technical assistance studies, training, acquisition of books and computers would be possible under such a model. It would allow a timely transfer of co-ordinating responsibility to shift to the Government and allow a continuous technical assistance provision of services by professionals already knowledgable and committed to the success of the reform enhancement process.

AID could leverage its continued financial support through such a model and the Government could take ownership of the ongoing reform process. The co-ordination with other donors would be easier at the Government level and other sources of funding could be elicited through the person month contract mechanism through donor "buy ins" to the contract.

Each professional would be responsible for the development of their module with respect to further analysis and study needs, provision of technical assistance and implementation and monitoring and fine tuning of reforms. The professional would outline plans for the module, which the Sri Lankan co-ordinator would oversee. Also the module leader would set up through the co-ordinator the activities and consultancies needed during subsequent trips. The core professionals would provide consistency and continuity and each could assist the other in a multidisciplinary approach, since each would be familiar with the other technical areas, as well as the analytical, managerial and financial considerations of the project.

In summary, this model combines the strengths of the lessons learned in APAP, while realistically recognizing the constraints of AID's budget and the need for leveraging and other donor support. It allows the Government to take "ownership" of the policy reform process and allows persons, who are known and committed to the process to provide a core competency of expertise on an ongoing basis to the Government of Sri Lanka.

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Appendix 12

Land and the Commercialization of Agriculture

David I. Steinberg

APPENDIX 12

LAND AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

David I. Steinberg

The growth of the private sector has long been an element of AID policy. Incorporated into the foreign aid legislation since 1963, it received added impetus and attention beginning with the Reagan administration in 1981. The new stress on the private sector and markets has also been an important element in the World Bank-IMF approaches to structural adjustment and economic growth, as centrally planned economies and dirigiste regimes have generally floundered on the road toward development.

The historical and social context should, however, be considered in advocating such seemingly objectively desirable economic policies. As Bruton has reminded us:

> But the use of the market mechanism is not independent of normative issues. In the industrial countries, market systems evolved along with other institutions and rules and ideas that have made them seem more acceptable and appear more natural. In the developing countries, many features of market systems were imposed by colonial powers and many more pushed by advisors, aid donors, and so forth on societies that have not experienced this evolutionary process. The policymaker must be sensitive to the fact that moral distaste for market mechanisms has remained widespread in these circumstances.[1]

The stress on market mechanisms led in the early 1980s to questioning of previous AID policies related to the desirability of AID involvement (on a country-specific basis) in land reform and land titling efforts, because theory required that land, as well as other assets such as capital and labor, should be subject to market forces and should be bought and sold and accumulated according to these market influences.

There were some, including this writer, who questioned the theory in relation to land within the AID context because in most societies in which AID worked, the colonial experience had led to preemption of the market by either or both the colonial

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[1] Henry J. Bruton, *Sri Lanka and Malaysia. The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth.* Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1992, p. 14.

powers or non-indigenous peoples.[2] Colonization had often previously prevented the market in land from functioning on a 'level playing field.' Indeed, land had often been alienated from the indigenous populations, and the equitable access to the credit mechanisms (through lack of titles, familial or clan ownership patterns unacceptable under western law, fragmentation, or even unfamiliarity with a monetized economy) required to ensure the 'level playing field' did not exist. The result in parts of Latin America and the Philippines was the hacienda system, and in other states the alienation of land to foreign ownership (the colonial powers, the Indians, Chinese, etc.). Burma is a prime example where Indian (Chettyar) moneylenders succeeded in alienating the best paddy land from the Burman population, with important nationalistic and political implications. Indeed, it could be argued that the alien monopoly of the market in Burma ultimately led to the formation of the socialist state.

Sri Lanka is a somewhat special case because of its varied colonial experience, its segmented colonization, and the introduction of the plantation economies in tea (first coffee), rubber, and coconuts. Sri Lanka is also unique in that its caste structure, in contrast to India, places the paddy farmer (the *govigami* caste) at the top of the inverted caste pyramid. As the Sri Lankan expression has it, if you wipe the mud from a farmer's feet he can wear the crown. The paddy farmer is in essence the personification of Sinhalese culture, and thus is an important component in Sri Lankan nationalism. Contrary to westernized concepts of market forces, the growing of a staple, such as paddy, although it may be uneconomic (in world market prices) is viewed as critical to family security in an atmosphere where the efficient and trustworthy operations of both markets and governments are in doubt. Thus, agriculture in a society still heavily rural is highly political. As one senior Sri Lankan official noted, agriculture is politics.

Land titling and fragmentation is indeed a problem in Sri Lanka, and has become worse through expansion of the plantation economies, growing population with added competition for both irrigated and *chena* (non-irrigated) fields. As early as the 1920s, the future of peasant agriculture in Ceylon was a concern of the (colonial) government.

The massive emphasis on the Mahaweli development (which, of course, is both a set of hydroelectric and irrigation projects) has forced the state to reconsider the previous, and virtually sole emphasis, on paddy production, for if the nation is close to self-sufficiency in rice, then much of the investment in the Mahaweli irrigation could become marginal. Although Sri Lanka is yet to be self-sufficient, it is self-reliant, however, in that it is able to buy any additional stocks it may need. (Wheat is a separate, but nutritionally related, issue.)

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[2] There are newly stressed concerns today about a completely unregulated market in land because of potential environmental problems.

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Sri Lanka is also unusual in that some estimates indicate that the state owns 82.3 percent of the total land, including a major portion of agricultural land.[3] Thus, providing freehold titles to state-owned land to individual farmers (especially in government resettlement schemes such as the Mahaweli) would alienate the land, and limit state control over the rural sector, result in excessive fragmentation or accumulation, which some would not like to see happen. It is normally difficult for any government to give up potential power over such an important political and economic asset.

Land reform, titling, and the cadastral surveys (which might require five years to complete) often combined with compensation to landlords required to make reforms work short of revolution and/or the redistribution of national assets have not been effective in Sri Lanka if the object were to provide a stable political and economic peasant base. The history of previous legislation in land reform and titling is complex, and involves consideration of the 1953 and the 1958 Paddy Lands Acts, and subsequent legislation such as the Agricultural Productivity Law of 1972, the Agricultural Lands Law of 1973, and the Agrarian Services Act of 1979.[4] Previous legislation that limited ownership of paddy to 50 (then 25) acres did little to redistribute economic power; rather it ratified the existing rural elites (and perhaps that was its goal). In fact, one of the remarkable attributes of the rural sector in Sri Lanka, so known for its equity policy orientation, has been the glacial work on land reform and entitlement.

A new policy paper has been prepared. "The Report on the Presidential Task Force on National Land Utilization and Distribution," was completed in December 1992, but which has not yet been made public, is soon due for presidential and cabinet review. Whether or how it will have an impact on past Sri Lankan government policies or USAID efforts is unclear at this writing.

Since 1981, with the passage of the 'Land Development (Amendment) Act No. 27' of 1981, the government has adopted the *Swarnabhoomi* land grant program.[5] The program provides 'only a conditional grant and not an absolute freehold.' It is designed to prevent land fragmentation (in a society that does not recognize primogeniture), and to prevent an unrestricted market in land, even though there are some who believe the era of protecting a vulnerable peasantry should be over. Land can only be alienated under a variety of restrictions. These grants do not necessarily

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[3] See APAP report, "A Policy Review of the Impacts of Land Tenure in the Food Crop Sector." December 1991, p.5.

[4] For a discussion, see Mick Moore, *The State and Peasant Politics in Sri Lanka*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, specifically Chapter 4.

[5] The following is taken from O. Charly Jayawardana, "Consultant's Report on the Evaluation of the *Swarnabhoomi* Programme." Colombo: APAP, January 1992.

guarantee access to rural credit, for the banks do not regard them as collateral. From 1982 to 1990, 308,157 grants have been made, but there is a backlog of 734,702 cases, which would take at least 15 years to clear. This program, which has been slowed because of local autonomy and the diminution of authority and competence of the districts, seems a reasonable compromise to ensure against the dire effects of land fragmentation.

Social and economic issues are obviously different when new land is opened to cultivation, in contrast to land subject to changing ownership or occupation by peasant cultivators. The commercialization of land in resettlement schemes, while likely to have political importance, might not raise the furor associated with the movement of marginal farmers from land some of then have occupied (as sharecroppers or without title) for generations.

USAID, perhaps in consonance with AID policy out of Washington, seems engaged through PL-480 Title III in an effort on land that, if literally implemented, raises serious political and social issues.

Although the USAID policy origins are unclear, an undated memorandum from 1990 by Mr. J.B. Flynn, USAID/AGR, articulated the policy clearly:

> Perhaps the most fundamental and potentially far reaching is the steps taken toward creating a dynamic rural land market...USAID has strongly encouraged the GSL to change its land policy to allow unrestricted trade in land. Very recently the GSL has framed a Land Titling Act, currently under consideration by the Cabinet, that is expected to be passed into law this year. This law will allow the large extents [sic] of agricultural land currently occupied by tens of thousands of smallholder farmers and others to be converted to private, fee simple ownership. This change will encourage greater investment, capital formation, and consolidation of land with subsequent large increases in productivity.

The USAID food assistance plan[6] called for the "revision of land tenure legislation to create a dynamic land market" as one focus of the plan. Annex 10 of that Plan (p.2) prescribes revising policy on land titling in 1993.

Through the 1993 PL-480 Title III program,[7] USAID and the Sri Lankan government have agreed to allocate $10 million from the sales of wheat over three years to 'Land Survey and Titling' efforts.

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[6] "Multi-Year Food Assistance Plan." USAID/Sri Lanka, March 1990.

[7] Agreement dated April 8, 1983, Annex A. This provision was also included in the Title III agreement signed in June 1991.

The document reads:

> Sri Lanka's land market is highly distorted because of the absence of titles. Land fragmentation is a problem and consolidation cannot occur because market forces cannot operate. These factors encourage (a) subsistence crop monoculture (particularly in paddy and coconut sectors); (b) low returns to scarce resources (i.e., land, water and capital); and (c) under-utilization of labor. Through this reform measure the creation of a competitive land market will be facilitated, thereby satisfying a major requirement for agricultural transformation. Holdings will be consolidated into economically viable units through market mechanisms; **marginal producers and subsistence farmers will move off the land.** [emphasis added].

USAID has called for the diversification and commercialization of agriculture through a variety of project approaches. Rural incomes rarely rise commensurate with urban incomes through increases in staple production alone because of the increased costs associated with higher yields of low value crops, unless they are artificially and highly subsidized. Crop diversification may be essential for increased rural incomes, better rural livelihoods, and as exports.

But the commercialization of agriculture is not necessarily the same as the commercialization of land. In the West they seem to have been in tandem, but in parts of Asia this has not necessarily been the case, and indeed when they have occurred in underdeveloped Asian societies, the social issues connected with that process (as noted above) have been widespread and severe.

The argument, as articulated by some in the Mission, is that with titles and a land market, farmers would be free to leave if they so choose, rather than forced out. It is true that freehold titles could give small farmers access to rural credit, now denied them without the collateral of land titles. Rural credit needs are acute in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. But it is naive to believe that a really free market in land would soon result; rather, there would be considerable pressures from those agro-businesses to promote sales, pushing the landless out to rural or urban centers or into the status of day laborers employed at the command of the agro-business corporations. No doubt some families would prefer to leave the land if they could get cash for their land, and they should be able to do so, but at their own free will.

It is no doubt true that some new crops are more labor-intensive than paddy, but questions exist whether this would mean additional jobs absorbing landless labor or more effective utilization of the existing labor pool for the marginal farmers. Further, while some crops might be produced more efficiently by the economies of scale of larger farms (less irrigation bunds, mechanization, etc.), in other crops the small holder might be equally or more efficient. There are thus economic benefits that should be reviewed. There also is likely to be a strong attachment of the farmer to land, even if he does not own it. It is also somewhat euphemistic to use the term "move off the land" under these circumstances. There are, as noted below, other alternatives.

The situation is complicated in the Mahaweli, because the government has ensured continuous penury for its settlers by limiting holdings to one hectare and only providing one year leases. The irrigation system hinders both crop diversification and diversified strains of paddy with differing maturation rates. In this case, the need is very clear for long leases and expansion of holdings to some reasonable, economic limit that fosters entrepreneurial farming, encouraging farmers to stay on the land, at least long enough for other sectors of the economy to absorb those who wish to leave.

Sri Lanka already faces massive unemployment problems and has done so since Independence. In other documentation, USAID has indicated[8] that some 150,000 people enter the labor force annually, for which there were only 35,000 new jobs annually between 1978-80. Grossly underestimated unemployment figures, which that document indicates are politically manipulated, indicated a 12-14 percent unemployment, cut in half since the economic changes of 1977. But field interviews indicate that in Central Province unemployment was 32 percent in 1991, up from 18 percent in 1981.[9] Whatever the trend, unemployment has been a major political and economic issue since independence. It must be disaggregated by gender, age, ethnicity, location, and education to delve into its political impact. It is significant that in 1991, 43.2 percent of the 15-19 year age cohort and 36.3 percent of the 20-24 year cohort were unemployed.[10] The JVP were recruited from this age group. It seems highly important in political terms at this stage that efforts be found to keep farmers on the land, rather than creating more urban unemployed.

It may be highly significant that two senior Sri Lankan civil servants who were well acquainted with the PL-480 Title III program and the general desirability of land titling under it did not know of this provision and its language. They privately indicated disagreement with the policy.

Any sweeping policy goal which involves moving peasants off the land has important implications for Sinhalese nationalism and political stability. This is especially important when some 27 percent of the rural population is already considered poor.[11] USAID and the Sri Lankan government are in essence creating 'push' factors; but there is no 'pull' into urban areas or other jobs, at least as yet. Should this policy succeed in achieving its articulated goal, USAID assistance may

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[8] CDSS, 1987.

[9] Field interview, June 1993. For further, informal figures, see main evaluation text, footnote 6.

[10] Department of Census and Statistics, *Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey*. Third Quarter, 1991.

[11] "Basic Strategy for Development Assistance". Sri Lanka Country Study Group Report organized by JICA. Tokyo, March 1991.

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inadvertently create a group of landless rural laborers or, should they migrate, perhaps an increasing urban unemployed class--a Sri Lankan proletarian *ronin*. In Northwest Province, there are already 86,084 landless families out of a total of 437,730 families (20 percent). An additional 65,024 families have less that 0.25 acres.[12] Any major land alienation would produce major social and political problems by adding a significant number of marginal farmers to the already high landless pool. If statistics are accurate, some 35 percent of the total provincial families could become landless.[13]

It is instructive to look at the case of Korea, which since 1961 (the start of the Park Chung Hee government and the origins of the export drive) has been transformed from a state 75 percent rural to one 75 percent urban, with critical implications for the development of political pluralism in that society.[14] As development intensified in the industrial sector, the 'pull' to urban areas became overwhelming, and farmer attitudes toward farm employment and spouse occupations shifted markedly away from agriculture, resulting in the urban flight of youth and the aging of the farm family. This change was effective because there were by then urban industrial and service jobs to which both males and females could aspire. Although both were exploited through rigid control of labor, the attraction of city lights was acute.

There is currently legislation before the National Assembly of Korea to change the land reform law from the early 1950s from a limit of three hectare holdings. This will commercialize agriculture, but it is reflective of the changes (renting out of land is illegal but widespread as families have moved to the cities, and villages are dotted with poor empty, decaying houses), rather than forcing populations off the land to become further marginalized. The political issue of whether the *Chaebol* (private business conglomerates) will be allowed to buy such land is important in that society, because it will further concentrate wealth. The political importance of land lies also in differentiation between income and wealth distribution. This is reflected in a recent World Bank study on Korea, indicating that although income disparities in Korea were not much greater than Taiwan or Japan (and far better than the Philippines and Sri

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[12] Field Interview, Northwest Province. June 1993.

[13] Sri Lanka does not practice primogeniture, so land fragmentation has been extensive. This is not allowed on government settlement lands, such as the Mahaweli. USAID has been attempting to alternative employment for the second generation in farm families.

[14] David I. Steinberg, *The Republic of Korea: Economic Transformation and Social Change*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.

Lanka), wealth distribution was enormously skewed because of the value and concentration of real estate holdings.[15] The political implications of this are important.

In spite of its public reputation for an equity orientation, income distribution in Sri Lanka is not good relative to its image. This PL-480 Title III policy reform measure, if implemented, has the potential to further inequalities that could exacerbate serious political and ethnic issues. It is most likely that any party in opposition to a government that articulated and/or carried out such a policy would seek to use it for partisan political advantage.

There are alternative and less potentially socially destructive means to encourage commercial agriculture through the production of commercial crops while retaining small holdings. (A review of the American Tobacco Company's contracting with Thai peasants through the company's supply of credit and inputs, and guarantees to buy the crop at fixed prices is a case in point.) Thailand has diversified its rice monoculture effectively without an explicit effort to move farmers off the land. We understand that an agro-business concern in the Mahaweli now contracts with farmers to grow gherkins for export, as well as having some of its own land. This approach to agro-industry seems to have great potential.

The past flawed Sri Lankan land policies should not be an excuse for espousing a doctrine that could rally the far right and create further tensions. This would not seem to be in the interests of either the Sri Lankan or the United States governments.

Since this was drafted, USAID has indicated that the language in the PL-480 Title III agreement does not reflect this policy reform measure, which is directed toward improving the *Swarnabhoomi* Program, and only in certain areas. USAID, we understand, has just changed the sweeping language in the Agreement on this policy reform measure to one more in accordance with its position.

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[15] D. M. Leipziger et al, *The Distribution of Income and Wealth in Korea*. Washington, D.C.: The Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1992.

Appendix 13

The Planning Process in Sri Lanka

Rohan Fernando

Appendix 13

PLANNING - A MACRO DIMENSION

Rohan Fernando

Planning is a commitment to the future, on what is to be accomplished and how. The process deals with future events and the rewards, if any, are deferred into the future. It is a rational series of steps taken to improve conditions and is a process in which personnel and resources in varying degrees are involved. Its function involves the establishing of clear objectives, strategies to reach those objectives, the commitment of resources for those actions and the establishment of a structure to carry out the strategies that have been planned. It is important that structure always follows strategy.

Planning could be defined by varying types of definitions but one that deals with economic development activity could be the most meaningful particularly within the context of a developing economy such as in Sri Lanka. Therefore it could be described as a "process involving the measurement and evaluation of economic performance, articulating a strategy for improving that performance, and pinpointing the investment and related activities by which the strategy can be implemented over time." Although this definition tends to give an economic bias it is most appropriate in the current circumstances.

The overall objective of planning is to improve the performance of an economy, a sector of an economy, such as agriculture, or a business enterprise. The means of bringing about this improvement in Sri Lanka involves the monitoring and analysis of current and future conditions, identification of problems that tend to constrain performance, assessment of alternative options for solving the issues at hand and then clear articulation of strategy or series of steps such as changes in policy, legislation or investment to improve performance. In the current context, the government's proposed change in policy on land commercialization needs to be built into the planning process for optimum benefits. It is important that these activities are ongoing and continuous, since planning is a dynamic process that needs revision and evaluation against the background of the ever changing macro and micro environment.

Successful planning articulates different strategies and proposes specific activities and tactics to carry out these strategies. It is not planners who normally make the final decisions on their implementation. In government, most critical decisions are made by politicians and senior officials, while in the private sector, such key decisions falls under the purview of company executives. Planners usually inform decision makers but normally do not take the decision themselves. Most often, planners become involved in the function of performance measuring and monitoring,

problem identification, formulation of strategy, and in the identification of alternative policies, programs, and investment projects. Rarely do they get involved in decision making and implementation. However, for the process of planning to be meaningful in Sri Lanka, planners must be in a position to obtain the required feedback to their plans after implementation and also, where necessary, develop mechanisms for testing out their plans in the environment before their final implementation.

There are two factors that are critical to the success of the function of planning: capacity for planning and direct access to decision makers. To be able to identify and find solutions to decision makers' problems, planners cannot afford to be purely engaged in academic research or be isolated from the decision makers. There have been several instances of planners losing credibility by providing solutions to problems that are politically, economically or administratively infeasible. Therefore, it is imperative that the decision making process is always suited to the needs of the current environment.

There are two approaches to planning; a top down approach and a bottom up approach. In the top down approach, resource allocation decisions are made by a centralized planning group and passed down to the levels of institution at the lower levels. Top down planning is thus a centralized planning process in which national planners call the shots. The development of the Public Investment Program is an example of this approach. In contrast, the bottom up approach is more decentralized, taking place primarily at the provincial level with provincial planners who have a better feel for the requirements at the provincial level developing the plans, which are then fed upwards towards the national planners.

In the context of agricultural planning, the area coming under the Agrarian Services Centers is the grass root level planning units. Plans formulated here are aggregated at the district level. Planning at this level takes into consideration future levels of production in different crops and their requirements of inputs such as seed etc while the implementation program is used by the officials as the working document. A monitoring mechanism is also set in motion under the implementation program through obtaining a number of progress reports monthly and bi-monthly. Collection of data for these reports begins from the level of the cultivation officers at the lowest levels and is fed upwards to the district level. This system tends to have certain weaknesses. It depends on a large number of officers to collect and disseminate the reports for rather small units of enumeration.

These two approaches display focus on both philosophy and end results where the top down approach focuses more on national resources whereas the bottom up approach takes a more meaningful look at environmental opportunities and risks by grass root level involvement. This latter approach appears to be more user-oriented in that it tends to satisfy the needs of the beneficiary more meaningfully in spite of it's weaknesses. It also tends to take external influences that are socially, culturally,

politically, and technologically important more into consideration as there is a greater involvement of users and beneficiaries by this approach. However, since devolution in Sri Lanka, planning is being carried out at provincial council level, by planning cells who yet do not appear to have the capacity to carry out this task.

The planning system is also closely linked to the budgetary system in the country. This has definite advantages in that the planning system then is driven by a realistic appraisal of resources while, on the other hand, it requires state agencies to place the entire exercise of budgeting into a planning perspective. This coordination is very vital for the development of a sound macro-economic framework for the medium-term management of the economy.

There are several other characteristics that are an integral part of a macro planning system with special reference to Sri Lanka in order to make it the prime guiding force in a country's development. Some of these aspects are discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.

The Public Investment Program, which reflects the economy's medium term investment strategy, is the instrument by which the government involves itself with both investment and development, in the public as well as the private sector. This is all the more crucial when the private sector is currently viewed as the engine of growth, particularly against the current developments concerning privatization of sectors of the economy. In Sri Lanka, this linkage could be further strengthened in many sectors of the economy where the private sector plays a dominant role. This phenomenon becomes all the more crucial against the background of change in land commercialization and developments in agribusiness.

Past analysis of the economy, specially of agriculture and industry, would reveal the disparity in growth patterns between the public sector and the private sector. This is all the more revealing in the areas of non traditional agriculture. Therefore, it is imperative that national plans do reflect private sector thinking and investment requirements in order to create the necessary linkages in the macro-economy. However, in such instances, it is important that government, through it's planning mechanisms, reflects the thinking that provides private investors and farmers with the stability and security they need on their land to encourage optimal investments.

The time frames of planning in Sri Lanka are largely limited to the medium-term, with very few exceptions, such as the Forestry Master Plan. However, the current status of some of the key sectors in the economy, such as agriculture, tree crops, energy, and education to name a few, demand a much longer time horizon in planning. The current scenario also raises many concerns on environmental, ecological and social aspects, where long term consequences needs to be addressed. Hence medium-term planning by itself may leave a vacuum in the problems that needs to be looked in the country's development needs. This would refer particularly to major

structural adjustments that have to be made to address chronic problems such as unemployment and deficiencies in the education system. Furthermore, project design must also take into consideration this long-term dimension and establish realistic time frames for expecting positive results. A good example in this context would be Singapore, now into the second phase of its long term development plan.

In this respect, it is necessary that macro planners mobilize appropriate research institutions and universities to develop a long-term perspective as an integral part of the national planning system in the country. The work required to reflect the long-term perspective should be directed in a manner having relevance for the medium-term plan. This can then provide signals to key policy makers on issues such as emerging structural problems, serious environmental issues affecting quality of life, and emerging technological and scientific developments in the global scenario, many of which will have an impact and influence future planning directions.

A related requirement to the condition stated above is the necessity for planners and planning organizations to effectively mobilize the professional expertise and intellectual resources available outside the framework of the nation's public sector. Their contribution on a regular basis in a carefully structured manner could provide a new dimension to national plans by being able to fill gaps that cannot be satisfied by public sector planners due to lack of exposure and appreciation to related issues. Such a multi-dimensional planning process is receptive to the needs of the environment. It has the capacity and capability to provide the necessary feedback on vital issues such as unemployment, discrimination and political favoritism from a tight network that will assist the planning process and permit a meaningful response. This promotes constructive criticism and objective appraisal of government policies and programs, which might not be readily available when the planning activity is exclusively limited to the government system.

Macro-planning requires in depth policy analysis. Furthermore, it analyses major environment and development issues, together with current and future issues relative to a given sector. In Sri Lanka, we see such efforts being made in the industrial sector through the Industrial Policy Statement. However, in many of the other sectors, there is less evidence of such in-depth policy analysis, particularly against the background of restructuring taking place in several sectors such as tree crops and transport.

Long-term planning, and the resultant investment programs, requires the establishment of very comprehensive information systems not only from the public sector but also more from the private sector. This permits meaningful bottom up planning and the involvement of all levels of activity in the planning process. If this takes place, it provides for more detailed analysis and appraisal of performance, policies and trends in the economy. The use of a computerized information system and the operation of a Planning information system is vital.

A national plan, in the ideal sense, will also provide systematic attention to inter-sectoral issues of a structural nature. Reference is made to issues such as the problems associated with unemployment, the disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and the related issues of poverty and income distribution, the impacts on environment and health, and also issues related to science and technology. Furthermore, social issues such as demographic and population changes, urbanization and the issues related to spatial planning also need to be addressed. The consideration of these issues should receive high priority both in terms of strategy, as well as in the different sector units, so that, at a macro-level, these combined issues will receive the priority they deserve.

Macro-planning activity at a national level requires quality cadres of manpower in order to develop, implement and monitor effective progress. A planned manpower development and training program, therefore, must be implemented to ensure that the personnel involved in planning are equipped with the required skills. To accomplish this purpose, planning structures must be evaluated and programs for training and development identified to obtain the best benefits from such an effort. It is essential that the training be a structured ongoing process rather than just a "one off" exercise. Furthermore it is also essential that the process of recruitment and selection to positions in the planning structure be made after careful development of job profiles and personnel profiles. Personnel so selected for recruitment should have clear career paths and performance appraisal systems developed in the planning organizations in order to motivate the cadres and get the best contribution from their services. This will minimize employee turnover to ensure continuity of policies and programs associated with planning. This system, therefore, calls for a set of personnel policies that will address the human resources development needs of the staff in the planning divisions.

In the final analysis, national planning must develop into a process of reconciling the divergent aspirations, which exist both spatially and socially in the country, so that the final consensus
translated into a plan is one in the implementation of which society as a whole can participate.

A planning framework on the lines described above will contribute much to make this a reality. However in order to achieve this quality of planning, one will have to reach beyond the realm of the public sector and professional elites. It is essentail to mobilize grass root level participation, if it is structured towards such a goal. To achieve this goal there have to be channels of communication which feed the responses of the general public into the planning process through informal systems. The involvement of non-governmental organizations to interact with the provincial elements and the larger public on planning objectives and needs would be the ideal dimension that could consolidate national planning. In this manner, the country can attempt to structure and institutionalize a national dialogue on development to create

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a more positive response to development from the beneficiaries. What this actually implies is the development of planning process that is geared to meet the aspirations and needs of the beneficiaries rather than one that suits those guiding the policy. Unfortunately many countries' planning processes have lacked this vital user focus and have tended more to be developed to suit political and other needs rather than the population at large.

Agricultural planning is a segment of macro-level national plans and is intended to develop policies, procedures and projects to improve growth and productivity to develop a sustainable agricultural economy. Agricultural plans in Sri Lanka are developed to improve inter-institutional policy analysis and planning capability. The aim is to optimize the use of investment resources in agriculture, to remove market distortions and restructure the sector in a manner that promotes and expands private sector enterprise and also creates diversification of the export base. The overall goal of agricultural plans is to enhance the contribution of the agricultural sector to economic development.

Agricultural planning systems differ from the system of national planning in Sri Lanka. While agricultural plans are preoccupied with production and are mainly institution based deals with sub sector strategies, national plans focus more on sector-wide issues and are nationally based, such as sector restructuring. Agricultural planning begins from the grass root level agrarian service units that exist in the provinces. These units are used to develop the higher level plans using the bottom up approach towards the regional levels. In Sri Lanka particularly, agricultural planning can best be done at this level due to the fact that most government departments dealing with agricultural development operate at this level. However, a weakness at this level of planning, particularly in Sri Lanka, is the absence of private sector input in the discussion and development process. These linkages need to be built up to make the plans meaningful.

Other strategic linkages, such as with the provincial councils, to implement agricultural development programs at the provincial level are also important. This type of linkage will be all the more crucial particularly in the future when they assume control of resource allocation and budgeting. Therefore, for such a scenario to take place, planning of agricultural activity must no longer be a macro-function but must be linked to planning cells at provincial levels.

Planning in general, and agricultural planning in particular, has certain important facets needing serious attention and which must be fulfilled in order to derive the best benefits of such plans. Some of these are listed below:

* In the area of policy analysis and planning activity, there must be real contact between analyst and decision- makers, since lack of such contact can alter the focus in the design and implementation of projects.

* Flexibility should be an integral part of project design and programs must have the mechanism to address this factor.

* It is also necessary that technical personnel involved in projects be kept away from administrative demands.

* The policy agenda must be a joint development process between both decision makers and analysts.

* Effective planning requires leadership and continuity of technically capable personnel.

* Agricultural policy and planning units should generally not have direct responsibility for data related activities. This function should be assigned to specific institutional units.

Past experiences in planning will also require changes in policy analysis and the planning of projects because greater diagnosis is required as part of the planning design to permit addressing specific policy issues. The recent past has seen Sri Lanka move from a policy of self sufficiency in agriculture to a policy which includes commercialization. This strategy of commercialization and stable land tenure is bound to attract the much needed foreign investment and technology to revitalize not only agriculture but also other sectors provided the commitment and sincerity of the government is strengthened. The struggle for self-sufficiency, therefore, will continue under a revised environment.

Appendix 14

Restructuring the State Plantation Sector

Rohan Fernando

Appendix 14

RESTRUCTURING OF THE STATE PLANTATION SECTOR

Rohan Fernando

Introduction

The role of the government in enterprise has currently become one of the crucial topics that is being increasingly debated across the world. This wave has been manifested by a global swing away from the state to the private sector to be the engine for economic growth in the developed as well as the developing countries. Evidence of these changes has already been manifesting itself in Sri Lanka as well.

In the Sri Lankan context, the government over the last few years has been taking steps to reduce the scale of operations of the state sector engaged in commercial activities. However, these changes have been so far confined, except in a few instances, to the divestiture of state institutions, which have been operating in the relatively less dominant part of the economy. At present there have been changes effected to many of the larger organizations owned by the state that are involved in the communications and plantation sectors in Sri Lanka. The continued poor performance of these parastatal organizations has been causing numerous constraints to the government as well as the general public.

Sri Lanka has had a very vibrant and dynamic plantation sector, which was initially set up by British planters, with tea being the dominant crop, and which subsequently came to be managed by private companies, both Sri Lankan and Sterling companies. During this period the Plantation sector was a significant contributor to the country's economy by way of foreign exchange earnings, employment, as well as in terms of other linkages. In 1972, the government decided to introduce the land reform law, which brought all company owned plantation land under state ownership. This period witnessed a wave of nationalization and socialist type policies in the global scene and Sri Lanka was caught up in this metamorphosis.

The JEDB/SLSPC

All plantation lands, which were previously company owned, were entrusted to the JEDB/SLSPC to manage. Thus they became two of the largest agricultural corporations in the world. They produced nearly two-thirds of the country's tea and one third of its rubber. As most of the produce was exported, the two corporations

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provided almost one-fifth of Sri Lanka's total foreign revenue. Except for a few profitable years mainly due to market factors, the period of their management was characterized by huge losses, waste, corruption, and inefficiency, creating a big burden on the government. Although the government intervened and tried to bail the two corporations out through injections of capital on several occasions, they went deeper and deeper into the mire.

Since nationalization, a major source of funds for development of the sector has come from international aid assisted projects such as the Medium Term Investment Program (MTIP). The MTIP, which ended in December, 1991, involved investment more than Rs.5 billion. The program was designed to rehabilitate 14,000 ha of tea, 12,000 ha of rubber and 1,500 ha of coconut, and convert 7,500 ha of marginal tea land to other crops. It also provided for renovation of worker housing, pipe-borne water, bathing units, latrines and the construction of 840 worker twin-cottages.

As such a review of performance suggests that although the agricultural condition of the estates was reasonably good the current management and organizational structure was no longer appropriate for the sector. However, this provided a good platform for the future, as a growing proportion of the hectarage reaches maturity. Other principal problems in the sector were:

* The very size of the corporations was unwieldy and unmanageable, leading to many other management problems;

* Lack of accountability in line management, as in many public sector enterprises;

* An overly bureaucratic and centralized system of planning and control, leading to delays and inefficiency in reporting;

* Shortages of specialist skills in areas such as marketing and finance and inadequate attention given to process engineering; and

* Lack of technology in processing, agronomy, management information systems etc., as a result of an overly bureaucratic and lethargic administration.

The plantations were losing their position as a significant foreign exchange contributor as a result of the inefficiency of the two corporations. They became a drain on the country's economy. This was in stark contrast to the small holder private sector, particularly in tea, which significantly grew in the period 1980 to 1990. For instance, in the past decade, the state sector production declined from 128,000 tons in 1980 to 119,000 tons in 1990, but private production increased rapidly from 63,000 tons in 1980 to 114,000 tons in 1990, a growth rate of over 6%. It became

clear therefore that, at least in terms of the private sector, tea was perceived to have a profitable future.

The Restructuring Process

The financial performance of the two corporations through 1990 was disastrous. As a result, the government appointed a task force in July, 1990, to study mechanisms for reversing the adverse financial results and recommend a long term solution for the growth and development of the sector. Based on the recommendations of the task force, the government decided to undertake the major restructuring of the state owned plantation sector. This was in line with the government's policy of liberalization of the economy and of using the private sector as the prime engine of future economic development. The actual implementation of the restructuring was entrusted to a newly created Plantations Restructuring Unit (PRU) within the Ministry of Finance.

The major element of this restructuring involved the transfer of 450 of the state-owned plantations to 22 newly formed limited liability companies. The estates in these companies were from different agro-climate groups, with different crops, and were, from a historical perspective, financially consistent. All estate companies were, therefore, equally attractive to the private sector.

The process that the government adopted in selecting the 22 private companies was done in two stages; pre-qualification and bid. Marks awarded on pre-qualification were also included in the aggregate bid score. Once successful negotiations were concluded and a contract signed for management of a particular estate company, the private companies who became the Managing Agent for the respective Estate companies assumed duties on behalf of the owner, the government, on the day that the company was formed under Act No.23 of 1977, which was between the 11th and 22nd of June 1992.

These companies are wholly owned by the government with 100% of the shares owned by the Secretary of the Treasury, who has appointed the directors. These directors will be responsible for protecting the government's interest as shareholder, but will not be responsible for the operation and management of the companies. In addition, the government has set up a monitoring system with international expertise to monitor the progress of the Managing Agents and keep a close watch on financial mismanagement or asset stripping in the short-term. Responsibility for the commercial operation and management of the newly formed companies has been transferred to the independent Managing Agents under contract.

The contract, though initially for a 5 year period, is in effect a 20 year rolling contract, with automatic renewal at the managing agent's option, subject only to the achievement of minimum average return on assets employed. However, the contract is considered an improvement on what is usually available in commercial practice, as from the owner's standpoint, a fee-based on a percentage of the share of the profits binds the managing agents to the success of the venture. From the managing agent's viewpoint, the mechanism provides the flexibility to operate in a manner that will optimize the profitability of the company.

As an interim measure, the remaining 50 or so estates of the JEDB/SLSPC, which are currently making large losses and whose agricultural condition is very poor, were retained together with the two head offices of the JEDB/SLSPC. They have been the subject of a study funded by the World Bank. However, it is now proposed to hand over some of these estates to private management under management agreements similar to those currently in place. In addition, it is also proposed to establish two marketing and warehousing companies under Act No.23 of 1987, utilizing the assets of the JEDB/SLSPC to absorb the majority of the staff remaining in the two corporations.

Almost twenty years of state control of plantation lands in Sri Lanka also brought the industry to a state of complacency and technical obsolescence when compared with our closest trading partners. In fact, a comparison of the state and private sector during the past ten years clearly reveals this disparity. The managing agents who have taken over the Regional Plantation Companies (RPCs) have recognized that Sri Lanka lacked technology in processing, agronomy, research, etc., and have therefore accessed these much needed skills and technical capability from countries that have surpassed Sri Lanka in these spheres, such as India, Malaysia and the United Kingdom. Experts in the field of agronomy, processing and marketing are providing the required technical support and the implementation of management systems on estates, apparently creating a sense of competition amongst all managing agents.

Future Goals

The government believes that the current management agreements for the 22 RPCs are only an interim step toward a longer term arrangement. They envision that private companies will take on a larger part of the financial risk associated with operation of the state owned estates, and will keep all the profits from such operations, except for making a relatively small payment to the government as the owner. In the pursuit of this objective, negotiations are already underway to reach agreement, at least with some of the Managing Agents for such a arrangement.

It appears that the present agreements, which have now been in existence for over one year, have given the private companies an opportunity to come to grips with the problems involved without being overly concerned with financial risk, since such risk is currenlty borne by the RPC (government). As a result, the private companies have gradually developed their confidence and a number of them appear to be more willing to take over the management of the RPCs under a new agreement with a greater part of the risk and return accruing to the private managing agents. From this dimension, the government decision to gradually privatize the management of the estates with full financial risk moving to the private companies over a period of time appears to have been the right approach.

APAP Contribution

The privatization process in the plantation sector was supported by donor institutions, notably USAID under the Agricultural Planning and Analysis Project (APAP). This consisted of a grant of US$145,000 for technical and infrastructure assistance. Major contributions of this support have been as follows:

* Study tours for key members of the restructuring team to study agriculture commercialization and divestiture programs in several countries that have vibrant plantation economies. This study tour provided ample evidence to the team of the disparity in development and growth of other plantation economies compared to Sri Lanka. This exposure allowed the team members to convince the policy makers in the government to invite foreign technical and management expertise to collaborate in providing technical and other assistance to the restructuring program.

* Subsequent to the study tour, the PRU solicited international institutional and personnel interest connected with plantations, by communicating, in selected publications, the government's intention to restructure the plantation sector. The promotion of these intentions through the media was supported by this funding.

* The project provided assistance to access the services of experienced technical personnel wellversed in developing management contracts and restructuring to advise the PRU. This input provided valuable support to the PRU at the pre qualification and bid stage in these areas where the PRU lacked experience.

* The formation of the 22 RPCs required the leasing of JEDB/SLSPC land on a 99 year lease to the relevant RPCs. This required considerable legal

procedure, to identify and describe relevant estates and their boundaries for which extensive land registry searches and other legal services were required. This became a matter of urgency in order to develop these leases for the management companies so that, among other benefits, leasehold rights could be pledged for financing purposes. The entire legal expertise that was required to carry out this extensive task was supported by this project.

The project has also provided assistance to the PRU by funding the services of key personnel required to continue the stabilization of the restructuring program in the sector and create the required growth to the economy.

The restructuring of the state plantation sector in Sri Lanka was a gigantic exercise and without the support of donors such as USAID, it would not have reached its current level of success. As such, the support provided through APAP should not be viewed merely in the context of technical support linked to specific areas, but rather in its totality as a package of technical assistance designed to help and stabilize the plantation economy of Sri Lanka within the overall economic goals in the country.

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Appendix 15

The Logical Framework and Amendments

APPENDIX 15

ANNEX B 4: LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
Goal: Enhance agricultural contribution to overall national economic development through increased production, expanded employment and higher real incomes	Agr production, employment, rural income levels and growth rates, nutritional status	Census & Statistics, Central Bank and other institutional surveys and census reports	1) No further deterioration in security situation 2) Continued economic growth at or near past rates
Purpose: To develop an integrated national-level agricultural planning system which can provide a basis for better-informed policy and program decision-making in agriculture	1) A functioning agricultural planning system producing numerous high-quality technical studies and analyses relevent to decision-making; 2) Technical studies and revised NAFNS being used by decision-makers as guides to policy, program and investment decisions; 3) Adequate resources being provided by GSL for agr. planning within all relevant ministries;	Evaluation, focusing on the quality, utility and impact of analytic work, agriculture planning and analysis budgets, staffing patterns	1) Decision-makers in agriculture will appreciate and increasingly demand quality analysis and be guided by the results; 2) APG effective in coordinating and providing analyses to decision-makers; 3) quality personel working in agr. planning.
Outputs: Trained and adequately supported professional staff in planning units of participating ministries, with special emphasis on MADR and NPD; An inter-ministerial APG with a distinct functional role in sectoral planning; Agricultural policy or program studies completed; Revised and expanded NAFNS.	1) 56 staff in 7 planning units 2) One 3) Minimum of 15 4) One	1) Project evaluation and audits 2) Budgets 3) Staffing patterns	Timing, quantity and quality of inputs to specification
Inputs:		1) Budgets of participating institutions; 2) Project records & reports; 3) Evaluation and audits.	AID and GSL policies, priorities and program environment conducive to implementation

	Budget ($'000)		
	AID	GSL	TOTAL
Training (71 pp LT, 7t pp ST	1,912	118	2,030
Commodities	751	37	786
Technical Assistance (15.5 pp LT, 13.5 m ST)	1,107	-	1,107
Facilities		730	730
Operations	253	855	1,108
Evaluation	90	-	90
	4,113	1,740	5,853
Contingencies	564	153	717
Inflation	1,923	807	2,730
Total (rounded)	6,600	2,700	9,300

Source: Project Paper, Agriculture Planning and Analysis Project (383-0083) dated August 28, 1986

Appendix 16

New Project Description for Follow-

New Project Description for Follow-On Activity is in draft and is being finalized in the Mission and GSL.

APPENDIX 16

NEW PROJECT DESCRIPTION FOR FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITIES

AGRICULTURAL POLICY PROJECT (APP)

David I. Steinberg

As the Agricultural Planning and Analysis Project (APAP) comes to a close in December 1993, it is now an opportune and indeed a necessary time to consider what the future policy and analysis needs of Sri Lanka are likely to be over the middle term (five years) in agriculture and rural development, under those circumstances whether any donor activity is appropriate, and if so, whether further activities by USAID (given programmatic constraints by both donors and recipients) in this broad field are warranted. The following paper addresses these issues.

I Background and Hypotheses

Both recipient and donors are operating under a set of particular constraints that will necessarily affect what might be done, and how such activities might be organized. These factors may be presented as a set of hypotheses that should be analyzed if a sound approach to Sri Lankan agricultural problems is to be built. Although it would be unwise to prognosticate the exact direction that any of the following propositions might take, it seems evident to this writer that the following conditions will prevail and must be taken into account in any analysis.

* Sri Lanka will continue to have acute needs for rural sector reform, trained people to manage the process, and sound planning analyses associated with it.

* Although there is an urgent need to simplify the dirigiste role of government to achieve state development objectives, the process is likely to be buffeted by more traditional centrist attitudes of some in high places.

* Politics and the rural sector are intimately intertwined at all levels, and because of this programming in agriculture is a process that must be constantly re-evaluated. Politics will lead and influence such planning.

* The Presidential election of 1994 and the changes in the Constitution and in the loci of power that may evolve will likely affect this process at the rural/agricultural sector level.

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* Although the exact present configuration of power among a president, the Parliament, provinces, districts, and divisions is unclear even to many of the critical actors, it seems likely that more and clearer authority will be given to some regional administrative units, although the center will continue to hold the critical purse strings.

* Sri Lanka is thus in political flux, and it would be inappropriate to tie either donor or recipient into a rigid project mode that would artificially link activities and expenditures to a single administrative unit or concept at any level. It is the author's understanding that the U.S. Ambassador is of the same opinion.

* Training, analysis, and data collection are a continuous set of interrelated needs that must be constantly updated and expanded if the planning and reform process is to be related to actual conditions in the society.

* Although the Sri Lankan government is occasionally prepared to accept technical assistance under loan funds, it prefers grant funding for these activities. Thus USAID is in an advantageous position compared to the multilateral banks to provide this type of assistance.

* USAID will be under severe constraints for Development Assistance (DA) funds; no activity should be too large. With limited funds, concentration on policy reforms becomes a more important programming concept to use effectively such funds.

* USAID will be also be under pressure to reduce its direct hire expatriate positions over the next several years, although it has local-hire capacity that may not be fully utilized in analysis.

* Any activity recommended must provide for flexibility in both programmatic and administrative terms.

II Sri Lankan Needs

Sri Lankan needs in the agricultural sector are myriad. They cover the complete spectrum, and range from infrastructure to water to administrative systems, training, credit, technical assistance, technological innovations, entrepreneurship, marketing, information, coordination, and leadership, and other areas.

Some of these needs must be met by the Sri Lankan authorities (i.e., leadership), while otners can be the province of other donors (i.e., infrastructure).

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It is apparent that any of the articulated or inchoate needs, or indeed accomplishments, of Sri Lanka in the rural sector are involved in a process. Infrastructure when built must be maintained, administrative systems must evolve as new needs are identified (viz., the Mahaweli structure), training is a continuing requirement, credit supplied only one year will not suffice, and so forth.

The APAP project has been successful, as this evaluation demonstrates. Yet the frustration that some observers have felt in relation to it has been in the very nature of the process (since the 'product' is difficult to measure); a natural lack of quantifiable indicators within some finite framework of reform that will demonstrate that the donor and recipient can walk away satisfied, recognizing a completed task accomplished. Training and analysis are not turnkey operations, however; they are complex, evolving and continuing needs.

If the APAP project has been successful, its closure is in a sense an arbitrary administrative event, neither a reflection of need nor process. It is thus programmatically natural that some sort of follow-on activity be considered, because such processes have continuing needs. Indeed, the capacity for the APAP project to affect reform is a further indication of both the need and the opportunity for follow-on activities. Sustainability of the policy reform process cannot be guaranteed by any single institution; it is part of the political cum administrative culture, but is strengthened by institutional capacity and competence.

Whatever administrative devolution of authority is eventually determined at whatever level, there are training needs, technical assistance requirements, and analyses and data collections that will be necessary to make policy formulation and planning responsive to actual needs and more likely to survive tortuous political scrutiny.

III A Proposed Agricultural Policy Project (APP)

This paper proposed that USAID develop a new Agricultural Policy Project responsive to evolving Sri Lankan needs and flexible in both program and administration. Funding should be obligated in FY 94.

1. Project Goal

To improve the agricultural sector in Sri Lanka in its productivity and diversity while increasing farm and rural employment and incomes.

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2. Project Purpose

To assist the agricultural policy reformation and analyses processes that contribute to the Project Goal.

3. Project Outputs

A number of policy changes (to be determined annually through an indicative work plan jointly approved by the government, after which further approvals would be unnecessary for activities included), trained staff at a variety of central and regional levels, and studies directly linked to the decision-making process related to such reform.

4. Project Inputs

A $3 million project over a three-year period that would annually provide:

A. A long-term, three-year assignment of a professional project manager under a contract (thus not subject to AID direct hire ceilings). $200,000 annually including local support costs. Although not hired under a host-country contract, the advisor would be expected essentially to work within the host institution. Funds would also be used to hire, as mutually agreed between USAID and the host institution, select long-term Sri Lankan consultants.

B. Short-term technical assistance to advise various ministries/departments in the agricultural sector on specific reform measures. $250,000 annually.

C. Short-term training abroad of Sri Lankan officials at any level on planning/agricultural issues. $300,000 annually.

D. Development and partial costs of operation of training courses in English and Sinhalese for central staff and regional staff of the divisions, districts, and provinces in planning, project identification, design, monitoring, and evaluation. $100,000 annually.

E. Support to studies and data collection related to policy reforms and analyses by outside, Sri Lankan consultants/scholars. $150,000 annually.

5. Project Elements

APAP has taught us a variety of lessons. The first is that the effectiveness of long-term technical assistance is in large part dependent on the advisor. An advisor for the new project, who would combine the roles of project manager within the USAID and advisor to the appropriate agency of the Sri Lankan government would operate at a peer level with planners within the government. He/she would be recruited for this assignment (PD&S funds to be used to allow for an on-site interview process involving the host institution). Such a person would combine broad professional understanding of and involvement in the agricultural sector, an appropriate advanced degree in some aspect of that field, knowledge of Sri Lanka, cross-cultural sensitivity, and an entrepreneurial spirit and presence and encouraged by USAID to develop the broadest contacts in a variety of related public and private sector institutions. This would not be a host-country contract, but it is important to attempt to retain the intimacy of the previous relationship of working with a Sri Lankan institution. The advisor, who need not be resident full time for the three years, but on a need basis for months at any one time, would be expected to work out of the host institution but also fulfill the critical need for USAID to have the project manager role filled outside of its administrative ceiling.

APAP also illustrates the effectiveness of combining technical assistance with funds available to provide support to move the process forward. This project would build on that experience.

A key issue will be 'indicators.' AID/W in the past has stressed the need for indicators of success. Too rigid a structure or definition of explicit policy reforms, however, would be an example of what has been called 'spurious specificity,' substituting administrative requirements for programmatic accuracy. As we have demonstrated in the APAP evaluation, the process of policy reform occurs when a state decides that the changes are in its political and economic interests. When (as in Indonesia) the state had already determined that such reforms were to be carried out in some manner, then it allowed USAID to include such reforms in a set of approved indicators. Thus the creative process in policy reform is the wedding of long-term technical assistance with the choice of which policies (and their relative priorities) the project could assist, the appropriate timing, and then the means to improve the analysis to contribute to reforms.

Thus, the role of causality in defining purposes and in attributing change to the project alone should be eschewed. The contribution of moving the reforms forward is itself sufficient in such a project.

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If the cardinal principle of such a project is the flexibility to respond to the Sri Lankan flux, how does one inculcate in the project a sense of direction, measure success, and evaluate progress while retaining such flexibility?

This is in part a matter of faith by both AID/W and USAID in [1] the process and possibilities of reform in Sri Lanka and their effective management; [2] the integrity of the long-term technical assistance; [3] sound Mission management; and [4] the Mission's commitment to reforms that contribute to an overall Mission strategy (such as development with a private sector emphasis, environmental concerns, democracy, etc.), in contrast to reforms that are a product of a USAID agenda rather than a Sri Lankan one. The means to such an achievement is necessarily a compromise: in this case an indicative annual plan that could be altered and supplemented for targets that cannot be predicted in advance and ones in which the windows of opportunity for reform may be restricted in time. Such a plan would provide a reasonable basis for an annual, collaborative evaluation. Such an annual plan, approved by both USAID and the Sri Lankan host institution, would obviate additional approval of included activities, thus speeding and simplifying the bureaucratic processes for both donor and recipient.

The choice of a counterpart Sri Lankan agency logically falls on the Ministry of Policy Planning and Implementation, National Planning Department, Agricultural Division. The subject of a host-country contribution been avoided until such discussions have taken place, but it might involve long-term consultant's housing, vehicle, etc. when in country, as well as individual contributions to training (salaries), and research/studies costs.

6. Timing

AID has generally suffered in projects that had long gestation periods. The gaps between project paper, bidding, and recruitment of personnel and actual project operation have often resulted in inefficiencies and even project failure.

Thus, it would be helpful if the Mission were to design a new project by early fall 1993, and at the same time explore the availability of a variety of potential long-term technical assistance advisors knowledgeable on Sri Lanka. It is unlikely that one could recruit before late spring 1994, but the possibility should be explored to see that the gap is not too long.

7. Mission Management

One essential purpose behind this approach is to provide a project that could service all of USAID/ANR, and would involve the least burden on the staff. This project is labor intensive in contracting, but less so in program management. It would place no burden on staff ceilings.

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Appendix 17

About the Authors

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

David I. Steinberg, Distinguished Professor of Korea Studies, Georgetown University, has written extensively on development issues in Asia, especially Korea and Burma. He was a member of the Senior Foreign Service, in AID, the Department of State, where he served in the Regional Office in Bangkok, and was Director of Technical Assistance on Asia and the Near East, among other assignments. He was a representative of The Asia Foundation in Korea, Hong Kong, Burma, and Washington, D.C., and was educated at Dartmouth College, Lingnan University (Canton, China), Harvard University, and the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He was the team leader of the AID evaluation of PL-480 in Sri Lanka in 1982.

Kay J. Freeman is a Project Development Officer with USAID. She has 10 years of A.I.D. experience, serving in the Regional Office in Cote d'Ivoire, Washington, Mali, Morocco and Sri Lanka. In addition, she has worked on temporary assignments in Egypt and Cameroon. She has a B.A. from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) in Geography and Sociology and an M.B.A. from the University of Maryland (College Park). She has worked in Sri Lanka since August 1992, participating in the evaluation of the Mahaweli Enterprise Development project and the design of the mission's new project to stimulate innovative participatory management of natural resources (SCOR).

Rohan M Fernando is Executive Director of the Estate Monitoring and Financing Division of the Plantations Restructuring Unit of the Ministry of Finance. He was one of the key members that was responsible for the key task of restructuring the state plantation sector in Sri Lanka. He has over 20 years experience in the agriculture sector in Sri Lanka and has been involved in extensive studies in this sector including a study on the "Restructuring of the State Plantations Sector" and the development of a "Medium Term Strategy for the Export of Fruits and Vegetables in Sri Lanka." He has held several senior positions in the plantation sector and holds an MBA from the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka, and a Diploma in Marketing From the Chartered Institute of Marketing (UK). He is also extensively involved in the development of marketing education in Sri Lanka.