



**International Foundation for Electoral Systems**

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PD-ABF-922

ISN 82433

## IFES HAITIAN ELECTION PROJECT

July 1990 - April 1991

Final Report

*This report was produced by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems pursuant to a grant from USAID/Haiti. Please attribute any information from the report to IFES if it is to be quoted or otherwise reproduced.*

International Foundation for Electoral Systems

Washington, D.C.

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under the terms of a \$1.8-million grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) awarded in July 1990, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was directed to provide technical election assistance and election commodity procurements for the 1990-91 election cycle in Haiti. The grant was administered by IFES staff in Washington, D.C. and implemented by a staff of consultants employed at a field office in Port-au-Prince. A number of specialized consultants were also retained to provide technical assistance, training assistance, and local-office financial management. IFES assistance to Haiti's Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP) included:

- Technical assistance;
- Election worker training;
- Civic education; and
- Election commodity procurements.

The CEP was established in mid-1990 and charged with the responsibility of organizing a national election, including staffing the CEP and its local offices, voter registration, civic education, administration, financing, security, and procurement. The 1990-91 elections were to fundamentally change the way political leadership was determined in Haiti, introducing a new government structure as well as new political traditions involving candidates, parties, and community participation in public decision making.

The security of voters and observers was a critical issue in the organization of the election. With the example of the 1987 Election-Day Massacre in recent memory, the new Haitian election system in 1990 was quite fragile. Public participation could be stifled quickly if violent attacks involving bombings, shootings, and arson against election administrators or voters recurred.

The CEP and election organizers successfully incorporated the Haitian military into the process as election policemen. The United Nations also sent UN military officers who were teamed with Haitian officers to provide a security presence during the elections. This relationship proved effective in precluding violence, as no serious acts were reported on election day.

The general election, with balloting for president, members of both houses of the national legislature, and local government officials, was held on December 16, 1990, followed by two run-offs in January 1991. This election was observed by official delegations from the United States, Canada, France, and Venezuela and by groups from the Organization of American States (OAS), Caribbean Community (Caricom), United Nations (UN), the Council of Freely Elected Heads of State, and the National Republican and Democratic Institutes for International Affairs (NRI, NDI). The published opinions of these observer groups stated that the Haitian election was free and fair and reflected the will of the Haitian people.

Following the elections, IFES was charged with the responsibility of recovering the capital equipment procured with grant funds. The recovery involved disassembling the computer hardware and dispatching teams of technicians to every communal and departmental office to recover radio equipment for storage. IFES local office furniture and equipment were also warehoused. IFES contractors were successful in recovering over 95% of the equipment.

The CEP ceased to exist on February 28, 1991. At this writing, it remains for the new president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, to appoint a permanent council. This council will be faced with the responsibility of developing a permanent election infrastructure for the country. The components of such an infrastructure include:

- reestablishing an authoritative list of registered voters;
- identifying a permanent pool of competent poll workers;
- refining voting procedures and administrative issues;
- resolving logistical problems with the distribution of materials;
- reinforcing the civic education messages which have already been presented to the voters;
- and
- establishing a staff of election administrators who will serve as a professional bureaucracy to manage elections on a full-time basis.

The 1990-91 election cycle in Haiti confirmed the importance of electoral assistance in countries with little experience in administering successful elections. IFES' activities in particular demonstrated the utility of a "rapid response" electoral assistance organization and the effectiveness of IFES in that role.

## II. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONSEIL ELECTORAL PROVISOIRE

The Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP) was established in mid-1990 as a provisional nine-member election tribunal to administer the 1990-91 election cycle in Haiti; it was the fourth such provisional body to be named since 1987. Initially, each CEP member represented a particular constituency, such as universities, cooperatives, and journalists, although several members of the CEP (and the groups they represented) gave up their seats on the council in advance of the elections. Although they had never before worked together and had little or no personal history or experience with free and fair elections, the members and staff of the CEP proved in the end that they were equal to the task of organizing these important elections. Their achievement is even more notable in light of the prevailing backdrop of economic and social problems, tension between supporters and opponents of the election process, and skepticism within the international community about the odds for success.

The CEP was charged with creating an entirely new election system by implementing the provisions of a body of election laws established in July 1990. The scope of the CEP's tasks included:

- identification of staff and facilities for 137 communal election offices, nine departmental election offices, and the CEP's central offices;
- establishment of a system-wide set of election procedures to implement the published election code;
- identification and training of over 50,000 voter registrars and election-day workers;
- creation and implementation of a voter registration system to register over 2.5 million voters in 22 days;
- designing, printing, and distributing ballots for both national and local slates of candidates;
- educating election workers and the voting public on specific voting questions;
- identifying and procuring millions of dollars in election equipment, supplies, and services;
- qualifying candidates for ballot certification; and
- establishing a security system to provide protection for voters, observers, and the overall successful completion of the election process.

One critical determination by the CEP was the decision to postpone the elections from October to December 1990. The CEP justified the decision on the grounds that adequate financing was not in place for the elections and the CEP was not yet ready. Although observers thought this was a poor decision which jeopardized the entire process, the extra time was used effectively to put structures and procedures in place.

The election system also withstood challenges from presidential hopefuls Leslie Manigat and Roger LaFontant. It was determined that Mr. Manigat did not meet the residency requirement for presidential candidates because he had been living in the United States since 1988. Mr. Manigat attempted a legal challenge to the election system on this point but was unsuccessful. Mr. LaFontant, on the other hand, had been associated with the regime of former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier. Article 291 of the Haitian constitution prohibits individuals associated with the former regime from running for office until 1996. Invoking this provision of the constitution would have been a volatile political step, though, and Mr. LaFontant's candidacy was invalidated on other technical grounds, including the use of forged documents in his filing for candidacy.

### III. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND PROJECT ADMINISTRATION

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was awarded \$1.8 million in July 1990 by USAID/Port-au-Prince to provide technical assistance and procurements for the 1990-91 election cycle in Haiti. An additional \$59,525 was awarded in September 1990.

Under the grant, IFES responsibilities were divided into four areas:

- technical assistance;
- election worker training;
- civic education; and
- election commodity procurements.

These four areas represented the essential election issues to be addressed in order to meet the proposed objective of providing operational and technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) so that the 1990 elections would be free and fair.

The program was implemented through IFES' Port-au-Prince office and staff, while the IFES Washington office provided financial management, project supervision, and substantial procurement assistance.

The IFES Port-au-Prince office was initially managed by Jean-Paul Poirier, a Canadian citizen residing in Port-au-Prince who had worked on an assistance project during the failed 1987 elections. However, the CEP president, M. Sabalat, advised IFES in August 1990 that he would not continue to work with M. Poirier due to the latter's manner of dealing with the CEP. In order to guarantee continuity in the project's management, IFES Washington decided to restructure the field office, designating the U.S.-based project manager and the civic education consultant as co-managers and committing them to a shared full-time presence.

The permanent field staff comprised an office administrator, a secretary, and a driver. Consultants were hired to provide special assistance in the areas of technical support, training, civic education, and local financial management. Job descriptions and a project plan were established at the outset of the project, and a field office administrative manual was created outlining office rules and procedures. Although created specifically for the Port-au-Prince office, the guidelines presented in the manual would be applicable to other field office situations.

A local bank account was used for small local currency disbursements: large local checks and all dollar payments were processed through the IFES Washington office.

Day-to-day administration of the project consumed more of the co-managers' time than initially anticipated. Communications with USAID/Port-au-Prince (including project reporting), facility management, equipment maintenance, asset recovery, and job performance evaluations were all proved to be quite time-intensive.

IFES' organizational structure and staff enabled it to respond quickly and effectively to a dynamic electoral environment despite many real and potential roadblocks.

## A. Technical Assistance

While attempting to frame a scope of work for technical assistance, one A.I.D. official stated during a pre-grant assessment meeting that an organization was needed that could serve as a "rapid deployment force" for the 1990-91 Haitian elections, responding quickly to election-related needs. IFES accepted this role despite the difficulties inherent in administering and evaluating such work.

IFES' technical assistance took many forms, including working with CEP members and staff to resolve election administration issues such as:

- the electoral law;
- voter registration;
- data processing, including analysis of the voter registration data entry project;
- availability and use of election commodities;
- ink analysis;
- forms design and control;
- selection of the poll workers and their training;
- education and motivation of the voter;
- systems management;
- finance and budgeting;
- transportation of electoral material;
- ballot design;
- security;
- polling place configuration and procedures;
- vote counting;
- the role of the different categories of observers; and
- certification of results.

IFES consultants worked closely with the technical team from the UN. Since there was no formal mechanism in place for coordinating the activities of the two technical teams, IFES and UN consultants established informal working relationships to ensure that all critical issues could be analyzed and resolved without contradiction or unnecessary overlap.

Other technical assistance was provided for election organization, political party formation, and observer support by the OAS, NDI, NRI, and the Carter Center.

Within the parameters established by the grant and in close cooperation with the CEP, technical assistance in the preparation of the electoral process began in July. The elections were originally set for October but were later postponed until December 16, 1990.

The dates for registration were also postponed due to serious problems in the organization of the registration stage:

- Lack of financial resources to pay the registrars;
- Failure to identify registration locations or *Bureaux d'Inscription et de Vote* (BIVs); and
- Delays in identifying personnel for the *Bureaux Electorales Departementales* (BEDs) and *Bureaux Electorales Communales* (BECs).

The first stage of the assistance involved voter registration, which took place from October 5 to 26, 1990. The CEP's position was that each voter must register in order for the electoral process to be credible, since Haiti had neither an up-to-date civil registry nor permanent voting lists. Voters were instructed to go to a registration site (BIV), furnish pertinent information, and receive an electoral card which would enable them to vote. Each BIV had the capacity to register 250 voters.

IFES aided in the design of the registration documents, provided all of the necessary documents and materials, and organized a system for the distribution and collection of the registration documents for each of the 12,000 registration sites.

IFES also designed a distribution numbering system which would have linked each registration kit to a particular BIV. The CEP staff decided not to use the IFES system, however, and each BED was left to coordinate the collection and return of its BIV's documents to the CEP.

Once the data reached the CEP for processing, concerns arose regarding the quality of the data. Two types of errors occurred:

- errors in the BIVs at the time of registration which could only be corrected by returning the registrations to their place of origin; however, no mechanism had been established for this.
- errors in the process of entering information into the system; such problems should have been corrected on the spot, but logistical problems associated with transporting corrections between election offices inhibited the correction process.

Following the registration period, voter lists were drawn up on the basis of the registration. On election day, one list was to be posted outside each BIV to indicate those eligible to enter the polling place, while another was placed inside the polling place for control purposes.

In order to generate the voter lists, IFES procured and installed the necessary computer hardware and software. The CEP's original plan was to provide the data entry workers and supervisors to staff the automation of the registration information. However, several days prior to the close of the registration period, the entire data processing department had been dismissed. As a

result, the CEP was forced to seek an independent contractor to staff and supervise the data entry project. Computec, the firm providing the system hardware and software, was retained by the CEP for this purpose.

Although IFES was responsible only for procuring the computer hardware and software, it became necessary for IFES to press the data entry contractor to ensure that the lists were produced in time for the election. This was especially important since the contractor did not have experience in the creation of such lists.

The contractor originally estimated that each data entry operator would type 5,000 keystrokes per hour and that there were 50 keystrokes per registration. After neither assumption proved to be valid, IFES consultants investigated the use of an optical character recognition (OCR) system to provide the input from the cards, but this option proved too expensive and time consuming.

IFES subsequently retained Gonzalo Brenes Camacho, president of Costa Rica's election tribunal, to undertake a special assessment of the data-entry workflow. Mr. Brenes' subsequent recommendations on the data entry process, including reducing the amount of entered data, cut the average entry time in half.

The UN technical team also sponsored two on-site visits by a systems analyst to evaluate the data entry process. The UN consultant recommended that the contractor switch from Informix, a powerful but relatively slow database software, to COBOL, an older but quicker language, in order to speed the data entry. He also expressed concern over batch controls on handling documents, the ability to correct source errors and entry errors, and document security.

Following a request from U.S. Ambassador Alvin Adams, two back-up tapes of each day's work were created. Prior to his request, only a single back-up tape had been created. After the UN technical team expressed its reluctance to assume the responsibility for storing a copy at a UN facility, the tapes were stored in two separate office facilities of the data entry contractor.

The high count of registrations entered on the computer system was 3,271,155 voters. However, given a voter turnout of around 2 million, the actual number of legitimate registrations was undoubtedly lower than the 3.2-million figure. Under the system used, multiple registrations by individuals were possible, and the election calendar did not permit a comprehensive review for the deletion of all possible multiple registrations. Although registration data was checked and data entered for one level of review, local customs of name use and the absence of a formal system of addresses made a thorough review process too time-consuming. Existing census data from the

Haitian Institute for Statistics was also outdated. Using the election council's own figure, some departments showed over 100% of the eligible population as registering.

These systemic weaknesses posed a credibility concern which had to be resolved. Staining a voter's thumb with indelible ink after voting is a commonly used practice to prevent multiple voting and had been introduced in Haiti in 1987. It is an easy and visible method of identifying those who have already voted, thwarting the objective of fraudulent multiple registration. Employed as an election procedure in Haiti in 1990, the inking procedure closed the control gaps opened by the potential for multiple registration.

A question may legitimately be posed about the necessity of voter registration when using indelible ink to prevent multiple voting. Interestingly, there was never any debate among Haitian election officials that a formal system of registration was needed. It was widely believed that despite any systemic weakness, formal registration was a necessary feature for election control and credibility. Voter registration also served a secondary purpose of involving citizens and political parties in the election process during its early stages.

In addition to voter registration, the vendor of the computer system believed that the software could be adapted to serve the candidate filing process and to provide an unofficial tabulation of the vote results. While the former did not prove feasible, the latter was put in place. At the same time, the CEP members remained concerned about the performance of the vendor on the registration data entry project and authorized the UN technical team to install a nine-terminal system two days before the election to perform a second unofficial automated vote count.

With respect to voting, IFES assisted the CEP through the:

- design and implementation of systems and work plans for the organization of all phases of the process;
- development of recommendations on the administrative organization of the CEP;
- study and preparation of the documents required by the electoral law for the organization of elections:
  - a) *proces verbal* of the opening and closing of the election;
  - b) *proces verbal* of the vote count;
  - c) instructions regarding voting procedures;
  - d) instructions on the transmission of the results;
  - e) documents to transmit the results;
  - f) instructions on the operation of the BIV; and
  - g) regulations for the members of the BIV;

- design of ballots for the election of President, Senators, Deputies, Mayors, and Members of the Communal Assemblies;<sup>1</sup>
- development of a checklist of the materials required by the BIVs on election day (ballot boxes, indelible ink, pens, etc.);
- development of recommendations on the organization of the procurement and distribution of election materials to facilitate delivery to the BIVs;
- development of recommendations on the packing, distribution, and collection of electoral documents;
- drafting a document for the development of the campaign standards, particularly regarding demonstrations and meetings in public places;
- analysis of vote tabulation systems and forms and drafting of instructions to facilitate and systematize this task;
- design of systems of data transmission including forms and methods for the collection of the reports; and
- provision of technical assistance for the run-off elections in January after most other sources of support had been exhausted.<sup>2</sup>

The December elections were observed by several hundred individuals representing the OAS, NDI, NRI, the Carter Center/Council of Freely Elected Heads of State, Caricom, CAPEL (Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance), and IFES, as well as official delegations from France, Canada, Venezuela, and the United States.

IFES extended technical support to the OAS team and to the NRI in preparation for observing the election. IFES representatives met regularly with the OAS coordinators to provide background information for the training of observer teams for both the registration process and the election and briefed the NRI observer group upon their arrival in Port-au-Prince.

IFES/Washington staff provided briefing materials for the White House observer team members, and an IFES-produced video was used in the observer orientation session held at the U.S. Ambassador's residence the Friday before the election. IFES also provided office service support for a visiting team of Venezuelan election officials working with the CEP and for the election observer team from CAPEL.

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<sup>1</sup> Using such models as the 1989 Nicaraguan ballot, IFES worked with the CEP in designing a ballot which was easy to use and clearly identified candidate selections. There was a ballot and ballot box for each election; those for President and Senator included photographs of the candidates. In order to facilitate voting, the reverse of each ballot had a band of the same color as that on the box in which it was to be placed. Approximately 14 million ballots were printed for the election of December 16, 1990. (Ballot specimens are included in the appendices.)

<sup>2</sup> Second-round support involved a significant level of procurements of a contingency nature; redesign of tabulation forms for easier use; and interacting with potential donor sources for any additional commodity procurement which might be available under their budgets.

Observers from these groups concluded that the Haitian election was free and fairly reflected the will of the Haitian people. Aside from some logistical problems associated with the distribution of election materials, the balloting was routine and a repeat of the 1987 election-day violence was avoided.

## B. Election-Worker Training

Although it was originally envisioned that IFES would conduct election-worker and voter registrar training, the CEP subsequently contracted CRESFED, a research group with no previous experience in such training programs. Funds in the IFES budget for training were then redirected to civic education to inform potential voters about proper voting procedures. CRESFED proved unable to implement a comprehensive training program, however, and the CEP asked IFES to organize a training program for voter registrars about four weeks before the registration period was to begin.

The training began in September after the CEP had completed naming the members of the BEDs. Since registration was scheduled for October, instruction was divided into two phases: the first on registration and the second on the vote.

For the training, IFES coordinated the drafting of a project based on a "multiplier effect" methodology. The project had initially been designed to train 26 *formateurs* (trainers of trainers) who were to train 435 *animateurs* (trainers) so that a total of 6,525 individuals, at least one from each BIV, would be trained. The program was modified due to the limited time available, and training was given to 42 *formateurs* in two seminars of three days each, which were held September 21 - 23, 1990 in Petit Goave and September 28 - 30, 1990 in Frer. These seminars were given by several members of the CEP, members of the UN technical team, CDRH (Centre de Developpement des Ressources Humaines) staff members, and the IFES consultant directing the program.

The 42 *formateurs* trained 260 members of BECs who then trained 739 communal delegates and 3,189 members of BIVs. The training took place in each department of the country for three weeks (September 24 to October 11) in spite of the fact that registration had already opened.

The training sessions covered:

- the Provisional Electoral Council and its role;
- review of the electoral law;
- registration of voters; and
- election procedures.

Despite the success of IFES' voter registrar training, the CEP training coordinator decided to retain direct supervision over the training program for the election day workers. Nevertheless, IFES consultants participated in this phase of the program at meetings with CEP staff members responsible for training and outlined the following suggested curriculum:

- general provisions of the electoral process;
- structure of the electoral bodies;

- role of the military;
- composition of the BIV;
- role of the members of the BIV;
- practical organization of the BIVs on election day;
- information on the voting process;
- explanation and practical exercises on completion of forms;
- vote counting procedures;
- procedure of reporting the results;
- receipt of electoral material in the BIVs;
- transportation of electoral material after the election;
- role of the representatives of the political parties;
- international observers roles and responsibilities; and
- sanctions for non-performance of functions or in cases of infractions of the penal law by the citizenry.

After lengthy negotiations with the CEP, IFES was asked to supply the CEP with materials in text, audio tape, and video tape formats to be used in the training program.

- Posters
  - Ten thousand posters were printed explaining the physical organization of the polling place: where each BIV member should be, where the cardboard screens should be placed to protect the secrecy of the ballot, and the location of the voting tables and the ballot boxes.
- Booklets
  - a) Guide for the members of the BIVs concerning vote counting, *Gid pou fonksyone ki pral konte vot.* (50,000 copies)
  - b) Instructions to set up the ballot boxes, *Gid pou preparasyon ak jou vot.* (22,000 copies)
- Radio and Television
  - Nine spots with clear instructions and explanations on how to vote were created for TV and subsequently adapted for radio:
    - a) motivation for voting;
    - b) freedom of choice in selecting candidates;
    - c) how to vote for the Presidential candidates;
    - d) how to vote for the Deputorial candidates;
    - e) how to vote for the Communal Section candidates;
    - f) how to vote for the Municipal Council candidates;
    - g) how to vote for the Senatorial candidates;
    - h) voting procedures in the polling place; and

i) consequences of illegal actions.

- Special Training Video

A special video was also created to explain the vote counting procedure, or *depouillement*, an especially difficult stage in the Haitian electoral process. The video dealt with the five different ballots and the color-coding of ballot boxes. The council had designed a number of forms (the *Process Verbal d'Ouverture*, the *Proces Verbal de Fermeture*, and the *Proces Verbal du Depouillement*) which created a complicated method of tallying the results. In addition, each required seven copies. This video graphically explained how to open the ballot boxes, organize the ballots for tabulation, and fill out the tally sheets.

IFES also rented a four-wheel drive vehicle for four weeks and provided fuel so that the CEP training coordinator could monitor the training in rural areas.

Although the registrar training was relatively successful, pollworker training was hampered by time pressures. This area is clearly critical to the future success of elections in Haiti and must be the focus of attention in the future.

### C. Civic Education

Civic education has two basic functions: 1) to inform the public of the rights and responsibilities of living in a democracy; and 2) to educate individuals on voting-specific issues such as ballot format and voter registration. All the messages which IFES helped produce fell into the second category, answering the who, what, and where questions which voters had to understand in order to participate in the process. Other US-based groups such as the NRI and NDI provided support for political party organization and voter education.

From the outset of the project, civic education programs were created to motivate, inform, and instruct the population on each stage of the electoral process. Brochures, videos, radio spots, and posters were prepared and distributed throughout the country. Caricom reprinted selected materials at its own expense for further distribution. The relatively low number of spoiled ballots (5% or less) demonstrates the effectiveness of these messages.

Some elements of the civic education program were intentionally blended with the pollworker training program to allow them to be used in both categories. For example, motivational video spots developed for television were also used in training sessions for election workers and observers.

- Brochures

Three different brochures were drafted in Creole:

- a) *Konsej pou Elekte jou Eleksyon*, Advice for Voters on Election Day (80,000 copies)
- b) *Moun Ki Kapab Vote*, Who can Vote (80,000 copies)
- c) *Gid pou elekte ki pral vote*, Guide for Those who Intend to Vote (80,000 copies)

- Posters

Fifteen thousand posters were printed for December 16, 1990 and another 15,000 for January 20, 1991 which graphically explained the use of the indelible ink.

- Flyers

Flyers in Creole listed the documents required by citizens for registration. A copy was included in the kit for each BIV along with registration forms. Copies were also provided to civic education groups which distributed them publicly.

- Radio

Several announcements were recorded in Creole:

- a) Invitation for Haitians to remain united in order to achieve desired changes; this announcement included information on who could and could not vote;
- b) Registration instructions including the required documentation;
- c) The importance of the electoral card;

- d) Information on the BIVs: location, members, and authority; and
- e) Procedure for challenging a registration.

Copies of print and electronic education media as well as other analyses concerning the election are on file at the IFES Resource Center in Washington, D.C.

## D. Procurement

IFES coordinated and undertook both budgeted procurements and contingency procurements. The budgeted procurements comprised three major items whose purchase represented nearly 50% of the original grant budget:

- 3.9 million voter registration booklets and related distribution supplies;
- computer hardware and software to automate the voter registration lists; and
- a nationwide radio communications network.

Other countries contributing materials included Canada (ballot paper, ballot boxes, voting screens), Venezuela (motorcycles, gasoline, ink), Jamaica (ink, helicopter), and Germany (video equipment).

### 1. Voter Registration Booklets and Kits

IFES consultants designed and procured the 3.9 million voter registration cards used by the CEP. These cards were combined in a booklet form with each booklet comprising 250 three-part carbon-paper forms. The voter registrar completed the registration form and simultaneously generated a carbon copy for the departmental election office and the card used by the voter. The original was to be retained by the CEP central offices and used as the source document for the creation of the automated registry.

In addition to the booklets, IFES procured paper, notebooks, pens, scissors, and carbon paper and coordinated the packing of distribution kits for a nationwide distribution of registration logs and supplies. IFES procured 12,000 carrying cases in Haiti to transport the registration supplies.

After the registration process was completed, there was concern that as many as 700,000 registration cards were still in the field and vulnerable to fraudulent use. Prior to election day, however, it was determined that most had been stored either at the BED offices or in a CEP member's office.

### 2. Computer Hardware and Software

In accordance with the recommendation from USAID/Port-au-Prince and an analysis by the UN technical team, it was determined that an automated voter registration list should be established. Potential benefits of such an automation process included an additional level of inspection of source

data, a database of registration data which could be sorted and analyzed, and an enhanced perception of control on the registration process through the introduction of computers.

IFES procured a Data General system with 48 terminals and two printers and the necessary operating system software to service the data entry project. IFES also retained a local programmer who created software specific to the registration task. In addition, IFES supplied the CEP with several microcomputers and laser printers for general office administration.

### 3. Radio Communications System

Based on a needs analysis performed for the CEP by the UN technical team, IFES procured a nationwide High Frequency (HF) radio communications system which linked 137 BECs and nine BEDs with the CEP central offices. The installations in the provinces were completed by early November 1990. Problems encountered during the installation were primarily environmental in nature. However, it was necessary for the CEP to credential the installation teams in order to stop the *chefs de sections* from halting the vehicles and occasionally taking temporary custody of the equipment. In the Port-au-Prince area, an Ultra High Frequency (UHF) system was set up for use by CEP members and key staff. This system utilized around twenty hand-held radios and about a dozen vehicle-installed mobile units. Both systems were equipped with scramblers to enhance broadcast security. The IFES office staff was equipped with three units. Both systems were used to support the logistics and coordination of the election process. The UHF system also served as an alternative telecommunications system. The system specifications were also forwarded to OAS coordinators in Washington, D.C. so that compatible equipment could be used by the observer teams.

Initially, many users thought that the HF system was not functioning properly. However, it was determined that the operators were not adequately trained to use the equipment correctly. An additional training session was organized, and the vendor provided an additional technician on site to aid with system questions.

In early November, there were several reports of jamming on the UHF frequency on units being used near the CEP. Verbal threats were also made using radio code names of CEP staff. Technicians concluded that whoever was jamming the radios was located near the CEP and did not have the capability of jamming the repeater, which would have affected the entire UHF system. Only a few hand-held and mobile units were interrupted and only at certain locations. Technicians monitored broadcasts for further episodes, but the jamming activity ceased within days and did not recur.

#### 4. Contingency Procurements

Other procurements which IFES managed were contingency in nature, unbudgeted and drawn from reserves in several line items. The requests for these goods and services were either generated by the CEP or identified by IFES consultants. These procurements included:

- a) 20,000 flashlights and batteries for lighting at polling places with no electricity so that votes could be counted at the polls after dark for both the general election and run-offs;
- b) nine facsimile machines for receiving transmissions from BED offices at the CEP central offices;
- c) 14,000 BIV signs for use during the run-off elections; and
- d) 15,000 pens, 14,000 notebooks, and 14,000 rolls of adhesive tape for clerical use at polling places.

IFES also responded to an urgent January request from the CEP for a rented helicopter for transportation of election-day materials.

#### 5. Indelible Ink

In the original grant budget, \$92,850 was allocated for indelible ink for staining voters' thumbs after voting. However, the OAS mission in Port-au-Prince had 12,000 four-ounce bottles of ink in storage which had not been used during the 1987 election effort. Because of the potential savings that this inventory represented, IFES wrote to the OAS observer mission coordinator in September 1990 and requested permission to utilize the existing ink in stock. The request was granted, and the ink line item was deleted from the budget. IFES later received a copy of an October 1990 communique from the OAS in Washington, D.C. stating that a laboratory in Mexico had determined that the ink was not suitable for use during the 1990 election. The ink was eventually donated to the Boy Scouts.

It was then necessary for IFES to assist the CEP in identifying new sources of ink. Indelible ink used in the general election and subsequent run-offs was eventually contributed by Venezuela, Jamaica, and the United Kingdom.

#### 6. Asset Recovery

Following the January 20 runoff election, IFES was asked to accept responsibility for recovering the capital equipment procured with grant funds, including the computer system, radio system, facsimile machines, and office furniture.

Although the computer system and office furniture located in the Port-au-Prince area did not pose recovery problems, the radio system did. Recoverable radio equipment was installed in 137 BEC offices, nine BED offices, and the CEP central office. Mobile units were located in the automobiles of CEP members and staff, and hand-held radios were used by key individuals. IFES solicited bids from computer and radio firms for the recovery contracts. In addition to the technical contract, IFES employed the former deputy director general of the CEP to act as liaison with local election officials.

The timetable for the recovery of the radio equipment was also problematic. The first plan was to wait until all run-off and make-up elections had been completed before picking up the radio equipment. However, small make-up elections were held in some areas until the first part of February. In other areas, the BECs had closed and equipment was either stored or had been forwarded to the BED offices or the local Catholic church. With the CEP and its local representatives disappearing in this uneven pattern, IFES began the recovery of the computer system and radio system. Since warehouse space had not yet been secured by USAID/Port-au-Prince by the time the first equipment was retrieved, the equipment was stored in the IFES office under 24-hour guard. The recovery process lasted five weeks and was largely completed by the last week of March, 1991.

The value of the equipment procured was approximately \$622,107, and IFES estimates that at least 95% of this was recovered. Equipment is currently stored at a USAID/Port-au-Prince warehouse.

#### IV. SECURITY

The security of the voters participating in this election was the pivotal issue upon which the success of the election hinged. The scenario of violence leading up to the failed 1987 elections was of paramount concern to the 1990 organizers. It was apparent that even with communications, computers, technical support, and observation, the opponents of free and fair elections could cause the process to collapse once again under the weight of violence.

Opponents of the election process had been concentrated in both the military and in the community of former Ton Ton Macoutes, the former enforcers for the Duvalier regimes. In theory, even if the Macoutes staged assaults, the Haitian military, in their police role, could step in and protect the process. This system broke down in 1987, though, with the military either not acting to protect the voter or being an accomplice to the violence.

In 1990, in the early stages of election organization, CEP members began meeting with Haitian military leaders and incorporating them into the process. The first such meeting was experimental in nature and occurred in September 1990. Other meetings followed, and special military liaisons were appointed to deal with election issues in each of the nine departments. The UN also helped bolster the Haitian military's compliance through the assignment of uniformed UN officers to accompany local military personnel in providing election security. Moreover, the presence of several hundred civilian election observers cannot be discounted as a deterrent to violence. The result was a relatively calm pre-election atmosphere which encouraged people to participate in the electoral process.

Incidents during the election process were generally limited to vandalism to election or registration offices, random violence directed at different party supporters, and incidents of verbal threats and intimidation. The single most significant security breakdown of the campaign occurred on December 5, 1990 in front of the St. Pierre Market in Petionville. An explosion and shooting at a rally for presidential candidate Jean Bertrand Aristide killed 7 people and wounded over 40. Following the incident, a moratorium was placed on further political demonstrations without prior authorization and security.

The military's involvement in and commitment to the election process paid dividends during the January, 1991 coup attempt by Roger LaFontant. In an attempt to nullify the election result, LaFontant and a number of followers entered the National Palace and forced President Truillot to announce her resignation. LaFontant badly miscalculated the military's willingness to support him, however, and was captured by the military and handed over to authorities 12 hours after the coup attempt had begun.

## V. FUTURE ISSUES

At this writing, the future membership of the CEP is unclear. At the close of the 1990-91 election cycle, the nine-member provisional council was disbanded so that a permanent council could be appointed. Once appointed by President Aristide, the new permanent election council will face many challenges in establishing a permanent election infrastructure in the country. Doing so will call for decisions on:

- voter registration lists;
- identification and training of a pool of election workers;
- development of an administrative bureaucracy for the election council; and
- resolution of logistical problems.

The issue of voter registration should be addressed first. A decision must be made whether to keep the existing automated list or whether new lists for each election should be produced. There was interest within the UN technical team of working with the new government on the creation of a civil registry to serve several purposes, including voter registration. If the existing list is used again, extensive verification and updating would be necessary, and new registration cards would need to be issued. The expense associated with revising the current list, however, likely exceeds that of preparing an entirely new list.

The same booklet form of recording registrations used in 1990 could be employed again in a future effort. The registration software used for the input of names in 1990 could also be reinstalled. However, a software solution to the problem of multiple registrations should be pursued.

Second, a permanent pool of competent election workers must be identified and trained. Each major election could require as many as 60,000 persons serving in the BEDs, BECs, and BIVs. The election council should lay the groundwork for recruitment and training as soon as possible. CEP payroll records can be used as a source for future recruitment. In addition, political parties could be viewed as sources for poll workers as they become better organized.

The human resource issue is not limited to election-day workers. Since CEP members represent different constituencies, relations among its members may become contentious at times. A professional team of administrators would ensure consistency in the day-to-day management of the CEP. Thus there is a substantial need for training of individuals who would become the professional election administrators for Haiti. Such training could occur through internships, seminars, and involvement in election observer missions in other countries. These administrators could begin developing specialties in specific areas of responsibility such as training, computer systems, voter registration, civic education, public relations, commodities, financing, and logistics. By learning

election management techniques, these administrators should be able to deliver better organized elections for less money than that spent in 1990.

Special attention should be given to the logistical issues associated with the distribution of election supplies. Shipping election commodities requires careful attention to timing; these items have an "expiration date" and cannot arrive too soon (for security reasons) or too late. Consultants from US-based courier or transport companies could assist the new CEP in devising distribution plans to address distribution problems.

The civic education messages disseminated in 1990-91 were designed to introduce the election process to the voter. In the future, political parties, civic groups, and labor and professional organizations will require support for sending new messages to citizens. Coordination among these groups will be critical to ensuring that there is neither a lack of coverage in some areas nor an unnecessary overlap in others.

The permanent CEP will have to construct an election system from the beginning. In this case, the process can be developed with greater certainty of success and a better understanding of the issues than was previously possible. The model which was constructed for the 1990-91 cycle was a workable one but would require streamlining of procedures, more training, and a better planning process.

By reducing the threat of violence associated with Haitian elections, organizers can focus on improving other logistical, administrative and educational issues which require attention and resources.

Great care should be given to the redeployment of the capital equipment purchased with grant funds. The computer system, radio system, and other equipment now stored in the USAID/Port-au-Prince warehouse should be transferred to the Permanent Electoral Council once it has been established by President Aristide.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

The 1990-91 election cycle in Haiti confirmed the importance of electoral assistance in countries with little experience in administering successful elections. The extraordinary effectiveness of the civic education messages, as demonstrated by the high participation rate and the extremely low rate of ballot spoilage by a largely uneducated electorate in a very complex election, was a direct result of the work of the foreign assistance organizations.

IFES' experience in Haiti demonstrated the utility of a "rapid response" electoral assistance organization and the effectiveness of IFES in that role. One of the factors which proved most critical to IFES' success was the ability to put a multinational team on the ground. It is also clear that donor coordination must be an important element of electoral assistance. The experience in Haiti will enable IFES to be more effective in future assistance efforts.

VII.APPENDICES

## Appendix A

### Political Background

#### 1. Political Division

The Republic of Haiti is made up of nine departments which are divided into communes and these, in turn, into communal sections, all of which are administrative divisions.

The communal section is the smallest political administrative unit. It is administered by a council of three members who are elected by universal and direct suffrage for terms of four years.

The commune, a territorial body with administrative and financial autonomy, is administered by a municipal council of three members, elected by universal and direct suffrage for terms of four years, and by a municipal assembly, with a representative from each of the communal sections.<sup>3</sup> The president of the municipal council is the mayor.

The department is the largest territorial unit and is administered by a three-member council, elected for terms of four years, and by the departmental assembly, with a representative from each municipal assembly.<sup>4</sup>

#### 2. System of Government

The Fundamental Law of the country is the Constitution of the Republic, which was adopted by public referendum in March 1987. The system of government set out in the Constitution consists of the classical division into three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.

#### 3. Legislature

Comprises the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, which make up the Parliament. Its members are elected by universal and direct suffrage but must obtain an absolute majority. Under the law, there is a deputy for each electoral district (*circonscription*) and three senators for each department, for a total of 83 deputies and 27 senators.

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<sup>3</sup> Art. 67 of the Constitution.

<sup>4</sup> Art. 78 of the Constitution.

#### 4. Judiciary

The Judicial Branch comprises the Court of Cassation, the Court of Appeals, the lower courts, the Courts of Peace, and the special courts established by law.

#### 5. Executive Branch

The Executive Branch comprises the President of the Republic, who is the Head of State, and the Government, headed by a Prime Minister.<sup>5</sup>

The President of the Republic is elected by universal and direct suffrage by an absolute majority for a term of five years; an individual may be reelected once but only after an interval of five years.

The Government is made up of the Prime Minister, who is named by the President of the Parliament, the Ministers, and the Secretaries of State.<sup>6</sup> However, it is not a parliamentary regime, strictly speaking.

#### 6. Provisional Government

Until the newly-elected government took office, the Provisional Government had a Head of State and President, Mrs. Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, and a Council of State of 18 members: Dr. Louis E. Roy, Ernst Malebranche, Marc Lamour, Lesly Voltaire, Michel Lominy, Suzie Castor, Chavannes Jeune, Gerard Blot, Venel Remarais, Marc Kernisant, Carl Auguste, Newton Jeudi, Emile Jonassaint, Paul Yves Joseph, Jean Bernadin, Rick Garnier, Edgar Cesar, and Delince Pierre Louis.

#### 7. Permanent Electoral Council

Title VI of the Constitution deals with "Independent Institutions," and its Chapter 1 establishes the *Conseil Electoral Permanent* (CEP) as an autonomous and decentralized administrative body responsible for the organization of elections. It is the ultimate authority in electoral matters and has national jurisdiction. Each department has a *Bureau Electoral Departemental* (BED), on which depend a *Bureau Electoral Communal* (BEC) in each of the communes of the departmental electoral district.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Art. 133 of the Constitution.

<sup>6</sup> Art. 155 of the Constitution.

<sup>7</sup> Arts. 1-2 of the Electoral Law.

The Electoral Council is made up of nine members chosen from lists of three names proposed by each of the Departmental Assemblies: three are selected by the Executive; three by the Court of Cassation; and three by the National Assembly.

At the overthrow of the Avril government (June 1990), in the absence of a legitimately constituted National Assembly and executive branch and in application of the transitory clauses of the 1987 Constitution, a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) was established with nine members chosen, one each, by the following: the Executive; the Conference of Bishops; the trade unions; the Court of Cassation; human rights organizations; the University Council; the Press Association; the Protestant churches; and the National Council of Cooperatives.

#### 8. Electoral Structures at the Departmental and Communal Level

The Permanent Electoral Council (CEP) is represented at the departmental level by the *Bureau Electoral Departemental* (BED) which consists of a President, Vice President, and Secretary, appointed by the CEP from among inhabitants of the district, and at the communal level by the *Bureau Electoral Communal* (BEC), with the same set of officers and chosen by the BED in accordance with the CEP.

The BEDs and BECs have administrative functions. Each communal section has a *Bureau d'Inscription et de Vote* (BIV), which is responsible for registration and election day and has a President, Secretary, two clerks, and a doorman.

#### 9. Political Parties

Article 31 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and freedom of association for political ends, while Article 31.1 provides that political parties and groups should participate in the expression of suffrage and that their establishment and the exercise of their activities are subject to the principles of national sovereignty and democracy.

The only norm that deals with political parties is the Decree of July 30, 1986. Many parties have been established under this Decree, but they cannot be considered true parties because they lack a national structure and do not fulfill the ideological conditions to contest an election. This is self explanatory in a country without a tradition of democratic institutions and one that has constantly been under dictatorial governments or states of emergency, which hinder the organization of political parties.

## 10. Principal Political Organizations

### Comite National du Congres des Mouvements Democratiques (KONAKOM)

Leader: Victor Benoit

Founded in February 1987, KONAKOM had as its goal the union of the democratic left. It began as a pressure group but became a political party at its Second Congress in September 1989. KONAKOM has observer status in the Socialist International.

### Front National pour le Changement et la Democratie (FNCD)

Leader: Jean Bertrand Aristide

Founded in October 1990, the FNCD is composed of populist parties and political groups of leftist intellectuals and a small group of businessmen. It can be said that it is the party of the urban poor, and Aristide, a Salesian priest, is seen by its followers as a symbol of the anti-Duvalierist struggle.

### Mobilisation pour le Developpement National (MDN)

Leader: Hubert De Ronceray

Founded in 1986 by Hubert De Ronceray, it openly opposed the Duvalier regime from early 1980 when De Ronceray was removed as Minister of Internal Affairs. The leader of the party was a candidate for the presidency in the elections of 1987. He also participated in the January 1988 elections in which Manigat was elected.

### Mouvement pour l'Instauration de la Democratie en Haiti (MIDH)

Leader: Marc Bazin

This is a conservative party founded in 1986 by Marc Bazin, a former high-level official of the World Bank.

### Mouvement Democratique pour la Liberation d'Haiti (MODELH)

Leader: Francois Latortue

Founded in the Dominican Republic by Louis Eugene Athis, who was assassinated in 1987 while participating in the presidential campaign, MODELH holds itself out as a party with a democratic structure. It boycotted the 1988 elections.

Mouvement d'Organisation du Pays (MOP)

Leader: Greger Jean-Louis

A party with populist leanings, founded in 1946 by Daniel Fignole. Its participation in the elections of 1988 and the naming of Gerard Philippe Auguste, its leader, as Minister of Agriculture in the Manigat Government led to an internal division of the party. Greger Jean-Louis was elected leader of the party at the October 1989 Congress by the dissident faction *MOP du Bel Air*.

Parti Agricole Industriel National (PAIN)

Leader: Louis Dejoie II

Founded in 1956 by Louis Dejoie, father of the current leader; the son was a presidential candidate in 1987. Boycotted the elections of 1988. The party is important in Les Cayes, Jeremie, Jacmel, and Saint Michel de l'Attalaye.

Parti Nationaliste Progressiste Revolutionnaire Haitien (PANPRA)

Leader: Serge Gilles

Founded in 1986, its president participated in the elections of 1987 as a candidate to the Senate for the *Plateau Central*. PANPRA is affiliated with the Socialist International since June 1989.

Mouvement National Patriotique de 28 Novembre (MNP-28)

Leader: Dejean Belizaire

Party of the center-left and a member, with MIDH and PANPRA, of the Alliance pour la Democratie et le Progres (ANDP), which had Marc Bazin as its presidential candidate in 1990.

Parti Democrate Chretien Haitien (PDCH)

Leader: Rev. Sylvio Claude

Rev. Claude, a traditional opponent of the Duvaliers, founded this party in 1979. He was one of the most important candidates in the elections of 1987 and is very popular with the urban masses. He is famous for having been jailed and beaten by the Duvalier regimes. The party is not affiliated with the Christian Democrats International.

Parti Social Chretien d'Haiti (PSCH)

Leader: Gregoire Eugene

Founded in 1979, Eugene participated in the elections of 1987 and boycotted those of 1988. After the coup that deposed Manigat, Eugene became one of the principal advisors to General Henri Namphy.

Parti Unifie des Communistes Haitiens (PUCH)

Leader: Rene Theodore

Founded in January 1969, PUCH is the political and ideological union of the pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninist parties. It participated in the armed conflict against the Duvalier government, which led to the massacre of the majority of its members. Only after the overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier did the party become public. Rene Theodore was its presidential candidate in 1987, and it boycotted the elections of 1988.

Parti National du Travail (PNT)

Leader: Thomas Desulme

Founded in 1986 by Desulme, a self-educated man of very humble origins who played a leading role in the "Revolution of 1946." He originally supported Duvalier in 1957, but three years later he emigrated to Jamaica where he made a second fortune. The principal platform of the party is the massive generation of employment.

Rassemblement des Democratres Nationaux Progressites

Leader: Leslie Manigat

Founded in 1979 by Manigat while in exile after he quarrelled with Jean-Claude Duvalier when he realized that Duvalier had dictatorial intentions. Manigat returned to Haiti in 1986 and was elected President in the elections organized by Namphy in January 1988. He assumed office on February 7, 1988 and was deposed four months later. He left the country but returned in October 1990 and presented his candidacy for the presidency in the elections of 1990. It was not accepted because of the restriction against two successive terms. Manigat challenged this decision of the CEP to the Court of Cassation but was unsuccessful because the CEP is the ultimate authority in electoral matters.

10. Other Political Parties

- RDC - Rassemblement des Democratres Chretiens  
Leader: Eddy Volel
- UDP - Union des Patriotes Democratres  
Leader: Wilfrid McNally
- PARADIS - Parti Haitien de Dieu  
Leader: Rev. Richard Vladimir Jeanty
- UNFD - Union Nationale des Forces Democratiques  
Leader: Lamartiniere Honorat
- URH - Union pour le Renouveau Haitien  
Leader: Dr. Edouard Francisque
- PNRD - Parti National Republique Democratique  
Leader: Jean Robert Mathon
- UNDH - Union Nationale des Democratres Haitiens  
Leader: Jean L. Theagene
- PPSC - Parti Populaire Social Chretien  
Leader: Edouard Tardieu

- MOU - Mouvement Democratie et Unite  
Leader: Maurepas Auguste
- PNPH - Mouvement National Populaire Haitien  
Leader: Alphonse Lahens
- PAN - Parti Authentique National  
Leader: Serge Beaulieu
- UCH - Union des Constitutionnalistes Haitiens  
Leader: Jean Claude Roy
- MKN - Mouvement Kombite National  
Leader: Dr. Volvick Remi Joseph
- CLFD - Comite Liaison des Forces Democratiques  
Leader: Claude Veillard Voltaire
- ARC - Alliance Revolutionnaire de Carrefour  
Leader: Durvi Leonel
- PUND - Parti de l'Unite Nationale pour le Developpement  
Leader: Joseph F. Jean Louis Milien Fineus

## Appendix B

### The Electoral System

Elections in an institutionalized political system are held under electoral laws that are relatively stable since they result from a consensus on the rules of the game. This is not the case of Haiti, where the political system is a synonym for dictatorship and where electoral standards are adapted to the needs of the government in power at the time.

Since the ouster of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, Haiti has fluctuated between frustrated attempts to organize the rules of the game and the difficulty of implementing them. Although the country has a Constitution adopted by a referendum, each election or attempt thereat has meant a new electoral law, more or less imposed by the government as a result of compromises of the moment, necessarily precarious, and not the product of a national consensus of the main socio-political forces. The Constitution of 1987 describes the electoral system and its governing principles, which should be implemented by an electoral law and its regulations. This instability of the electoral law runs parallel to that of the electoral power itself: four Electoral Councils in four years is a good example.

The President, the Parliament, and the Communal Administration are elected by universal and direct suffrage, according to the terms of the Constitution. National elections (President, Senators, and Deputies) are uninominal and by absolute majority, while local elections are by list and by plurality. In the event that no candidate in the national elections receives the necessary majority, there is a second round between the two candidates who received the most votes.

Since 1986, the Republic of Haiti has had a series of governments resulting from coups d'etat or from elections that did not meet the conditions of freedom and legitimacy.

When Duvalier fled in 1986, a National Governing Council, comprised of both civilians and members of the armed forces, took control of the government and promised to make the democratic and economic changes that the country required. Several months later, on March 29, 1987, a new Constitution, which provides for free and clean elections, was approved through a national referendum. A Provisional Electoral Council was named, which drafted an Electoral Law (Law of 1987). It set November 29, 1987 as the date for the first elections and February 7, 1988 as the date for the new democratic government to take office.

The November election was brutally interrupted by a massacre at the polls on Ruelle Vaillant. The government dissolved the CEP on the same day.

A new CEP was later appointed, and elections were held in January 1988 in which Professor Leslie Manigat received a bare majority. They were boycotted not only by most of the electorate (some estimate the turnout for these elections to have been only 5 percent) but also by four of the candidates for the presidency and by some candidates to the Assembly.

In April of that same year, a coup d'etat overthrew Manigat and placed General Namphy once again in the Presidential Palace. He, in turn, was ousted on September 17, 1988 by General Prosper Avril, who named a new CEP and called for elections. This third CEP drafted a new electoral law. Avril governed with extreme harshness for 18 months amidst much skepticism as to his intentions to hold free elections. The CEP III did not enjoy credibility among the people, and there was general discontent. Avril was finally forced into exile by the political and social tension, protest marches and the pressure of political groups and parties, especially the *Assemblée de Concertation* which united twelve of the most important political groups of Haiti.

On March 13, a provisional civilian government was installed under a *Protocole d'Accorde*, with Madame Ertha Pascal Trouillot as President and a Council of State of 18 representatives of different sectors of the civilian population, whose principal task was to assure that the President respected the Protocole.

Although this type of government was not provided for in the 1987 Constitution, it arose from a consensus among the different political actors as a way of organizing the State after the departure of Avril. Under this governmental structure, a body of election laws was adopted in July 1990 which provided the statutory basis for that year's cycle of elections.

## Appendix C

### IFES Project Team

Richard Soudriette	Director, IFES
Paige Carlson-Heim	IFES Finance & Administrative Officer
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Marta Maria de Ordonez	Project Co-Manager Technical Support Training & Civic Education
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Charles Tardieu	Training Consultant
Anthony Barbier	Assistant Training Consultant
Georges Brunet	Financial Consultant
Deborah Levine Roy	Local Office Administrator
Gussie Georges	Local Office Secretary
Pierre Andre Gilles	Local Driver

## Appendix D

### Glossary of Election Terms

ARRONDISSEMENT	Deputy district.
ARTICLE 291	Article in Constitution which prohibits a candidate from running for office on the basis of previous association with the Duvalier regime.
BULLETIN DE VOTE	Ballot which includes candidate photograph (for presidential and senate races), campaign colors, party symbol, party acronym and candidate name.
BUREAU D'INSCRIPTION ET DE VOTE (BIV)	Voter registration site/polling place.
BUREAU DE VOTE	Polling place.
BUREAU ELECTORAL COMMUNAL (BEC)	Election office on the commune level.
BUREAU ELECTORAL DEPARTEMENTAL (BED)	Election office on the department level.
CIRCONSCRIPTION ELECTORALE	Election district.
CONSEIL ELECTORAL PROVISOIRE (CEP)	Independent Provisional Election Council.
CONSEIL D'ADMINISTRATION DES SECTIONS COMMUNALES (CASEC)	Local provincial offices for which candidates contested.

CONSEIL MUNICIPAL

Local municipal offices for  
which candidates contested.

DEPARTMENT

Senate district.

DEPUTE

Congressional level offices for which  
candidates contested.

ISOLOIR

Voting privacy screen.

PROCES-VERBAL

Election-Day report form.

PROCES-VERBAL DE DEPOUILLEMENT

Form used to tally election  
results.

SENATEUR

Senate level offices for which  
candidates contested.

URNE

Ballot box.

This report prepared by

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