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Guinea Education Sector Reform Support Program

Guinea Education Sector Reform Support Project

MID-TERM EVALUATION

A.I.D. Project Numbers:
675-0222, 675-T-602, 675-0223
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April 30, 1993

MAPS OF GUINEA



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

ORGANIGRAMMME DU MINISTERE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT

PRE-UNIVERSITAIRE ET DE LA FORMATION PROFESSIONNELLE



ACRONYMS

AFDB	African Development Bank
AFR/ARTS	A.I.D. Africa Bureau Office of Analysis Research and Technical Support
A.I.D.	The United States Agency for International Development
A.I.D./W	A.I.D. Headquarters in Washington
BANK	World Bank and IDA
BNR	National Census Office
BOP	Balance of Payments
CCEF	Economic and Financial Coordination Committee
CEPEC	Center for the Study of Pedagogy for Experimentation and Advice
CER	Center for Rural Education
CIP	Commodity Import Program
CNPG	National Center for Management Improvement
COP	Chief of Party
CPL	Center for Language Training
CPSP	USAID's Country Program Strategy Statement
DAAF	Department of Administration and Finance (per Ministry)
DNEE	National Director for Primary Education
DNESec	National Director for Secondary Education
DNET-FP	National Director for Professional Training
DPE	Direction Prefectorale d'Education
DPSP	Directeur Pedagogique Sous Prefectural
ECPR	A.I.D./W's Executive Committee for Project Review
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ENI	Teacher Training School
EOPS	End of Project Status
FAC	Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation
FNUAP	United Nations Family Planning Program
FSU	Florida State University
GESG	A.I.D.'s Guinea Education Sector Grant
GF	Guinea Franc
GOG	The Government of Guinea
HRDO	Human Resources Development Office(r), USAID
IDA	International Development Association
IEES	Improving Education Efficiency Systems (A.I.D. Buy-in)
IGEPU	The Office of the Inspector General in MEPU-FP

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPN	Institut Pedegogique Nationale
IRE	Inspection Regional d'Education
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation Program/Plan
MEN	Ministry of National Education
MEPU-FP	Ministry of Pre-University Education and Professional Training
MPF	Ministry of Plan and Finance
MRAFP	Ministry of Administrative Reform and Civil Service
NPA	Non Project Assistance
PAAD	Program Assistance Approval Document (for A.I.D. NPA)
PAIP	Program Assistance Initial Proposal
PASE	Programme d'Adjustement Sectoriel d'Education
PIO/T	Project Implementation Order for Technical Services
PP	Project Paper (for an A.I.D. Technical Assistance Project)
PSC	Personal Services Contractor
PL 480	U.S. Food Assistance Program
PREF	Program of Economic and Financial Reform
PTA	Project Technical Advisor
RTA	Resident Technical Assistant
SAAF	(Field)Service of Administration and Finance
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SCTP	Service de Cooperation Technique et des Projects
SEEPU	Secretariat d'Etat Pour l'Education Pre-Universitaire
SIDA	Service d'Information, Documentation, et Archives
SOW	Evaluation Team Scope of Work
SSP	Planning and Statistics Office
ST	Secretariat Technique
STA	Senior Technical Advisor under SID's Technical Assistance Project
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
WID	Women in Development Office/Officer/Program
USAID	The A.I.D. Mission in Conakry, Guinea

Dates Month/Day/Year system used throughout this report despite the system used in the original document.

PREFACE

Through the 1980's A.I.D. was involved only to a limited degree in supporting primary education programs, certainly very few in a Francophone African country, and none in Guinea. Since 1989, the A.I.D. Africa Bureau began operating under an Agency-wide Congressional Basic Education earmark, which specifically required the creation of new basic education programs in sub-Saharan Africa between 1989 and 1991.

Prior to 1989, A.I.D. employed traditional project assistance approaches in primary education whereby A.I.D. designed, implemented, monitored, and evaluated technical inputs and interventions pretty much on its own. Under this approach, A.I.D. staff could be accountable for most inputs intended to produce changes, either directly or through contractor intermediaries. But as with technical assistance projects in general, it was difficult for A.I.D. to become involved in sector-wide policy issues, such as assuring that governments allocated ample financial support to the education sector, and assuring the rational distribution of resources within the sector. And, as with technical assistance projects in other sectors, outcomes were not always institutionalized nor financially sustained once A.I.D. ceased to fund them.

In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, A.I.D. introduced a non project assistance approach to enhance host-country ownership and capacity for reform. Under this approach A.I.D. pressed for a) the creation by host country officials of national education plans, b) host country officials to take maximum responsibility for identifying, designing, implementing and evaluating their programs as supported by A.I.D. and c) coordination of A.I.D.'s inputs with those of other donors.

Guinea was selected by A.I.D. as one of the countries to experiment with the new non project assistance approach. There was much discussion within and among the design team and with USAID/Conakry and A.I.D./W on how the project should be structured. In its approval A.I.D./W required USAID/Conakry to re-evaluate the approach at the end of the first year and to assess the GOG performance in meeting its obligation to provide increased resources. A.I.D. conducted that internal review of the program and project in January 1992.

That internal review prepared A.I.D. to participate in the first annual donor review of PASE which took place in Conakry in February 1992. Later, in December 1992, an evaluation of the project was conducted under the direction of the GOG/PASE Comite de Suivi. The PAAD stated that a summative evaluation was also to be carried out by A.I.D. toward the end of A.I.D.'s NPA portion of the project, to determine the success of the project to date. This present document is the report of that evaluation which was carried out in Guinea during the period February 10 to March 22, 1993. In addition to reviewing progress in instituting the GOG's reform measures, the evaluation was to address the effect of the reform on the primary educational system and on the intermediate and final beneficiaries--administrators, teachers, students, and parents.

The evaluation team is aware that there is much debate within A.I.D. and that there are strongly held views on the use and applicability of non project assistance in the education sector. It must be made clear that the present evaluation is of A.I.D.'s participation in a particular education project, in a particular country, at a particular time. The evaluation team does not wish to take sides in the larger debate on non project assistance but are evaluating the Guinea Education Sector Program and Project on its own merits.

The Executive Summary in the front of this evaluation report is somewhat longer than usual because of the large number of detailed findings and recommendations which resulted from the evaluation. Similarly, for the reader who does not have the time to read the entire report, we have included a section, immediately following the Executive Summary, which details the report's major findings and recommendations. That section does contain certain syntheses not found in any one of the substantive chapters.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This evaluation was carried out under a USAID/Conakry contract with Creative Associates International, Inc. but included participants from USAID/Conakry, A.I.D./W, REDSO/WCA and the Government of Guinea. Irving Rosenthal, a former A.I.D. Mission Director led the evaluation team. Uli Locher, a Professor at McGill University focused on educational and pedagogical issues. Renee Yates, an economist, formerly an A.I.D. and a U.S. Treasury Department employee, concentrated on macro-economic and financial issues, including NPA, conditionality and PL 480. Greta Shultz, a specialist in educational management with substantial experience in Francophone Africa analyzed the capacity-building and institutional improvements which were to have resulted from the educational reform program.

The Creative Associates evaluation team was assisted in the field by Julie Rea, Basic Education Officer in the A.I.D. Africa Bureau Office of Health and Human Resources in Washington and by Esther Addo, Education Specialist at REDSO/WCA in Abidjan. The Government of Guinea provided two senior officers of the Ministry of Pre-University Education and Professional Training to work with the team full time. Mr. Alpha Boubacar Barry is a former Regional Educational Inspector in the Moyenne Guinee Governorate who is presently working on action research programs at the National Pedagogical Institute. He led members of the evaluation team on field visits to schools, villages, construction sites, educational offices, and government officials in Moyenne Guinee. Mr. Alpha Aliou Barry a senior official in the Office of Educational Planning and Statistics led the field visits to the forest zone.

USAID/Conakry, at all levels, assisted the team in its work. Sarah Wright, the recently arrived HRD officer, provided boxes of briefing material to the team, participated in interviews, and joined the team on visits to the field. Wilbur Thomas, the Mission Director, came to every Mission briefing and review session for the team and encouraged the evaluators to leave no stone unturned that might provide information to help understand the constraints to educational reform in Guinea and to suggest what improvements might be made in the A.I.D. project to help achieve quality education for the children of the country. Note must be made of Stanley Handelman, a retired former A.I.D. education officer who came on TDY to Guinea to fill in between the former and the present Mission HRD. It was he who most recently called to the attention of the Mission that implementation delays were making it difficult to impact on the reform program and that to achieve educational results and action needed to be taken. Staff of the GDO and PPDO rounded out the team's briefers at USAID.

The team had briefings with senior people in the Guinean Government, most notably Hadja Aicha Bah, Minister of MEPU-FP, Mr. Soriba Kaba, Minister of Plan and Finance, Aly Badara Doukoure, Secretary General of MEPU-FP, Saidou Souare, the National Coordinator of the Educational Sector Adjustment Program (PASE), and Amadou Sadio Diallo, Director of the DAAF. The team was well received by GOG government and educational officials at all levels in Conakry and the interior, many of whom traveled with the team to school sites.

The team spent hours with village and district leaders, school construction contractors, parents, teachers and children--some who were students and some who were not--getting impressions, receiving complaints and encouraging ideas, on how to reform the system and improve primary education in Guinea.

Joshua Mushkin, the home office representative of the technical assistance contractor, Florida State University, was in Conakry at the time of the field work and the team had the opportunity to review issues with him as well as with Andre Courtemanche the FSU Senior Technical Advisor in Conakry and Serge Delorme, the Public Sector Accounting Specialist.

The Creative Associates International Inc. evaluation team acknowledges the participation and support of others too numerous to mention, but not forgotten, but accepts full responsibility for the views and recommendations in this evaluation report.

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A.I.D. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA SHEET

1. **Country:** Guinea

2. **Project Title:** Education Sector Reform Support Program
   Education Sector Reform Support Project

3. **Project Numbers:** 675-0222, 675-T-602, 675-0223

4. **Project Dates:**

   a. First Project Agreement: 10/14/90
   b. Final Obligation Date: 08/26/95 3rd Tranche Release
   c. Most Recent PACD: 08/26/95

5. **Project Funding for 3 Years of the PASE (1991-1993):**

A.I.D. Bilateral	- 0222	$ 5.7	Technical Assistance
	- 0223 #1/2	$14.1	NPA released
	- 0223 #3	$8.2	Not yet released
	- PL480	$ 5.8	$ equivalent
World Bank/IDA	- Ed Sect #1/2	$13.0	Released
	- Ed Sect #3	$ 7.0	Not yet released
FAC		$10.0	Estimate
Other Major Donors(FED/JICA)		$11.0	Estimate
TOTAL From Donors		**$73.8**	
MEPU-FP Expend. 1990-92		$137.0	
Of which from donors		$60.0	Estimate
Net From GOG		$77.0	
Local contributions-Cash/kind		$ .2	
TOTAL For Primary Ed.		**$151.0**	

6. **Mode of A.I.D. Implementation:**

   a. Non project assistance: A.I.D. grant to GOG

c. PL 480: Local currency generation through sale of food commodities

7. **Project Designers:**

PAIP: Julie Rea, William Rideout, Robin Horn, Kazim Oezimer, Roger Paulin, and Wayne King

PAAD: Ron Levin, Karen Tietjen, David Plank, Joe DeStephano, Lynellyn D. Long

8. **Responsible Mission Officials:**

Mission Directors: Byron Ball(7/87-7/90), William Kaschak(8/90-7/92), Wilbur Thomas(8/92-Present)

Project Officers: Steve Grant(9/90-7/92), Stan Handleman(7/92-4/93), Sarah Wright(1/93-Present)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Creative Associates International, Inc. carried out this mid-term evaluation of the Guinea Education Sector Reform Support Program and Project for USAID/Conakry, Office of Human Resources during the period February 8 - March 22, 1993.

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess progress toward achieving the outputs, purpose and goal of the A.I.D. project, as well as to look at the multi-donor PASE project, beyond the USAID inputs. The evaluation was to assist USAID/Conakry and the GOG to reassess the need and effectiveness for continued non-project and technical assistance to PASE. It was to provide recommendations for mid-term adjustments to the project design and will be used by USAID and GOG to direct follow-on project redesign.

Assessment of the impact of the PASE is a multi-level, complex exercise. Recognition of Guinea's developmental level as well as the complexity of interventions within the PASE are necessary ingredients in the analysis. The reform nature of the PASE and the experimental nature of the A.I.D. project challenges analysts to identify indicators which accurately assess progress.

Accomplishments of the PASE have been described as:

- the confidence that the PASE inspires on the part of local communities: they see that the government is working for them. They see that PASE is not just an international effort, but that it brings effects home. People see schools and tables and benches.

- the motivation toward schooling that PASE inspires on the part of local communities.

- the provision of financial, material and capacity-building and human resources to the education sector, e.g. increased operating budget; school and office renovations, furniture and equipment; training, and redeployed teachers.

Through assistance to the PASE, donors have contributed to the sense of commitment and enthusiasm for Guinea's reform that is evident on the part of providers, consumers, and other partners in the primary education enterprise. The social, political and professional environment is more hospitable to primary education than during the pre-PASE years. Village communities are participating in school construction, maintenance, and teacher monitoring. These changes are crucial to the systemic development of a supporting learning environment and a professional cadre of educators and educational administrators.

Through conditionality requirements, USAID supported GOG educational reform policy as seen, for example, in the successful redeployment of civil servants from secondary and administrative positions to primary school classrooms. Through technical assistance, USAID attempted to enhance MEPU-FP's institutional capacity to, for example, prepare its annual budget and establish a system to track expenditures. While some quantitative improvement targets have been realized in the primary education system during the period of A.I.D. assistance, little direct connection can be made, nor did the PAAD intend for there to be any direct connection, between quantitative improvements in primary education and the cash grant portion of A.I.D.'s assistance or the specific technical assistance provided. A.I.D.'s logframe outputs encompass results from funding by all donors to the PASE, not just A.I.D.

From a pedagogical point of view, PASE, the Guinea educational reform program, is judged to be exceedingly conventional with emphasis on a central Ministry and its extensions, school construction, and standardized curricula and pro forma teacher training. All these elements are necessary, but improvements in these areas alone still leave Guinea with an educational system rooted in approaches developed during colonial days. Even France has moved on to a much more modern, innovative, participatory pedagogy--and Guinea should, too.

In the 1991/92 school year, the Guinean primary education system had 359,400 students but produced 24,100 6th grade graduates. This represents 15.0 student-years per graduate. In an ideal case - no dropouts and no repeaters - 359,400 students should produce 59,900 graduates. While improvements are being put into place, this wastage currently accounts for approximately 60% of all school places, all teachers' salaries--in short, 60% of the whole system cost And this does not account for the children who are denied access because school spaces are taken up by students who may never graduate.

There is evidence of non-central administrators and school directors putting results of the school mapping and statistical documentation to good use, e.g. in the assignment of additional teachers. Critical weaknesses remain in (1) the absence of computers, inappropriate model choices and inadequate training levels; (2) dependence upon a single FAC technical assistant at the SSP central research facility; and, (3) authority relationships and administrative structures which discourage autonomous analysis and the rapid dissemination of research results.

PASE activity is creating an expansion in demand for access to primary education which MEPU-FP is not able to meet now or over the next few years. But an expansion in access can be created and efficiency gains can be reached if the GOG, USAID, and other donors take action to produce quality instead of quantity education, and graduates instead of dropouts. For example:

- the private sector must be let to expand; it will respond to the parental demand for school spaces;

- selection of teacher training candidates should be made among Brevet graduates rather than Bac failures, and training should take longer, perhaps four, not three years;

- a larger number of textbooks should be introduced as quickly as possible, in complete sets, supplied for next-to free and become the property and responsibility of parents or parents' associations;

- student-teacher ratios should be reduced to 40, with a maximum of 50 enforced;

- an incentive system should be devised which makes teachers and school directors respect quality based rules.

By avoiding risks associated with more original approaches (radio educative, audio-visual teaching aids, community control, curricular flexibility, private schools, performance rewards and the like), the PASE, World Bank, and USAID designed program makes it unlikely that the present effort will improve the quality of primary school education in Guinea in the near term. Indeed, neither PASE nor USAID has developed criteria to determine what constitutes an increase in primary education quality, nor has the GOG or A.I.D. developed a monitoring, diagnostic or reporting systems to help determine when quality or quantity increases (or decreases) have taken place.

No significant impact has occurred as a result of PASE on difficult issues such as equity access provided to girls. While some USAID and World Bank officials take a long view that institutional improvement must proceed direct educational impact, these same officials are not prepared to indicate when this direct impact should begin to tale place in Guinea. Satisfaction with minor improvements over what existed in the past has interfered with aggressive attempts to achieve quality impact in the future. The old A.I.D. adage that "if you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there" seems to have been forgotten by those managing the present project.

Timely delivery of high quality technical assistance to the GOG by A.I.D. has been impeded by a number of difficulties, whose roots lie in management and performance weaknesses on the part of USAID/Conakry, FSU, A.I.D./W and the GOG. The project got off to a slow start, given delays in processing A.I.D.'s first delivery order and the inappropriateness of the first long term advisor. FSU encountered difficulties in locating in the United States French-speaking experts with specialization in French systems of accounting and budgeting, willing to relocate to Guinea. USAID/Conakry experienced turn-over in personnel, which may have impeded a supportive, supervisory presence. This has been exacerbated by A.I.D. staffing for technical positions in education which has grown leaner over the years. However little pro-active problem-solving or detailed operational planning is evident on the part of any of the project partners; rather, a pattern of intermittent, reactive management interventions seems to be the case.

Many of the deliverables requested of A.I.D.'s technical assistance contractor were not produced, some were delivered late, and the quality of many is questionable. One of the more serious management deficiencies was the lack of an overall programmatic and budget strategy prepared by either USAID or FSU to determine an overall goal for technical assistance to achieve the goal of "education for all" in Guinea by the year 2,000. Communication among the technical assistance contractor and the other project partners, most importantly the GOG and FAC, is strained. The project's emphasis on training of GOG personnel has not taken place. USAID has used individual delivery orders to buy into a previously competited, world wide, A.I.D. central Bureau, educational management project, which has not met its expectations, at least in Guinea, to facilitate timely project execution.

After two years of experience in Guinea the need for action to improve implementation is necessary and the need for reconsideration and selected redesign of A.I.D.'s future contribution to primary education is evident. The evaluation report provides detail on specific recommendations.

1. While institutional improvement of the educational establishment is crucial, and sustainable budgets and increasing enrollment numbers are important, qualitative impact on primary school children within a reasonable period of time is a more important criteria for a successful primary education program. A.I.D. should state clearly its desire to contribute to this sector in Guinea for the long term--as much as 15-20 years and clarify both institutional and educational impact it hopes to achieve within this period.

2. In order for A.I.D. to decide what it can reasonably accomplish in this sector over the next 15-20 year period, A.I.D. should immediately, in concert with the Government of Guinea, and in cooperation with other donors, develop more detailed base line data on the state of primary education in the country, more realistic quantitative goals on what can reasonably be accomplished over this period given demographic trends, and pedagogical criteria for knowing when success has been achieved, or is not taking place, at the student level--in short a (modified) educational sector data study. A.I.D. should work with the GOG to help it develop similarly realistic quantitative and qualitative goals.

3. Although A.I.D.'s present technical assistance project (675-223) still has two years to PACD, USAID should organize a project design for Phase II, complementary to the proposed sector data collection activity. Suggested guidance for the design are recommended below.

4. USAID should continue its assistance in support of accounting, budgeting, and administrative improvement of the DAAF/SAAF structure in MEPU-FP, but in the Phase II project, A.I.D. should:

- support Guinea's decentralization reform by giving greater attention to budget and administrative operations at the school and DPE level within MEPU-FP with the goal of supporting and encouraging bottom up (full staff involvement) approaches to management of primary education;

- support an educational program management system throughout MEPU-FP that helps the ministry improve the quality of education. Education administrators need to be brought more into the program decision loop. They must understand the unique importance of the programs they are managing, the implications of budget decisions, and participate in decisions on policy matters.

5. To help Guineans achieve a broader range of educational experiences, and be better able to make well considered decisions on educational issues, a number of pedagogically specific elements should be added to A.I.D.'s technical assistance project in Guinea. For example:

   - short term familiarization visits to the United States of key Guinean educational personnel such as school directors, DPEs, animators, key service and program personnel, and as incentives, even teachers at the classroom level;

   - a GOG/USAID commission concerned with private education should be funded to evaluate private sector education in other countries in West Africa looking into norms for the legal status of private schools, curriculum conformity, and other elements critical for liberating private sector initiatives in education;

   - support for in-country action-research on issues such as teacher training, determinants of learning outcomes, and student testing, to discover what is pedagogically relevant and interesting for Guinea;

   - support for research and action in new subject matter areas such as mathematics or social studies that will provide an opportunity to demonstrate important aspects of new educational system, in such areas as teacher training, curriculum reform, and child centered learning;

   - computer software packages should be improved to enable the conduct of research, collect relevant data, and address analytical, financial, and substantive needs rapidly and efficiently;

- funds to expand the planning, production, supply and distribution of didactic material such as student books and teacher manuals would make a critical contribution throughout the primary education system.

Further discussion must be had with GOG education officials and other partners in the effort before new directions can be determined.

6. The proposed expanded technical assistance effort should only be attempted if A.I.D./Washington and the Mission are prepared to provide the necessary technical and financial resources to carry out the work and, of course, if the GOG is prepared to consider a larger TA presence. With regard to long term experts, the team proposes:

   - an advisor in DAAF to continue to improve accounting, budget, administration and program management of MEPU-FP, particularly at the field level;

   - a computer systems analyst, probably in SSP, to help A.I.D. and the technical assistance team develop and manage a computerized monitoring and evaluation system, and to provide technical support to the analytical work of the expatriate advisors and Guinean professionals in MEPU-FP;

   - an advisor to work in IPN on educational action research and to help develop text books, related material, teacher training, etc. for pedagogical topics such as mathematics at primary grades one to six;

   - a long term advisor, for at least a year, in the Office of the Director of Primary Education, to develop and manage long term programs for access to education for rural populations and girls and to guide the development of private sector education;

   - A management training/organizational development specialist, in the Office of the Secretary General, to ensure that the technical assistance package is grounded in commitment to transfer of skills and knowledge to all MEPU-FP staff and education administrators. This specialist would complement the work of technical experts who get the systems up and running but who may not be expert in teaching other people how to do it.

   - A senior professional educational administrator, as contractor Chief of Party, to develop long term plans for the technical assistance contractor, to manage the other experts, to help MEPU-FP prepare programs to meet conditions precedent to release of new cash grants, to oversee the monitoring and evaluation system and to be the professional educational link between PASE/MEPU-FP and A.I.D./Conakry. The Chief of Party should be situated

in MEPU-FP as an advisor to the Minister and as a counselor to the PASE Coordinator, (depending on how the Secretariat might be reorganized.

7. Some of the proposed activities, e.g., the educational sector data study and the expanded familiarization effort should be implemented immediately with the funds remaining unearmarked in the present technical assistance project. The suggested technical services should be secured through a new, competitive contract with a qualified educational consulting firm or another university. At least 60% of the contract evaluation criteria for the firm should be for the key technical personnel to be proposed by the firm or university for the project. The RFP should let it be known that the USAID encourages proposing African professionals.

8. Responsibilities for the details for present and future PL 480 programs, including site visits to determine that engineering, construction, and contracting are proceeding according to plan, should be consolidated in a strengthened Unite Technique. The Chief of the Unite Technique should keep the Chief of Party of the education technical assistance contractor informed of developments, particularly when there are pedagogical issues on the table, such as the size and location of schools, which books are to be purchased, and the substance of programs such as use of media for girls sensitization programs. PL 480 generated local currencies should be considered an add-on to, but not a pre-planned, financial contribution to the education sector budget.

9. On an annual basis, the above technical assistance recommendations would require $ 3-4,000,000 for long and short term technical assistance, familiarization training in the U.S., in country training programs and seminars for MEPU-FP cadre, special program support for rural areas and girls education, support for a private sector education program, a monitoring and evaluation system, local costs and equipment for SSP, and action research on special subjects such as mathematics development at IPN.

10. A cash grant should continue to be provided to the GOG in order to permit USAID to impact on critical education policy, overall institutional development, and government-wide application of resources for education. A level of $3-4,000,000 per year is suggested to be used for production, purchase and distribution of student books, teacher manuals and other didactic material.

11. A number of changes are suggested in management of the cash grant component:

    - provision of U.S. dollars to the GOG should no longer be tied to repayment of debt;

    - instead, these funds should be earmarked, and used only for primary education purposes as agreed to between A.I.D. and the GOG (for books, as

suggested above.) This is sometimes referred to as an (education) sector grant;

- a separate local currency account should be established in the Central Bank into which the GF equivalent of the U.S. dollars will be deposited;

- procedures should be established to assure appropriate release of funds for purposes negotiated between USAID and the GOG. A monitoring system should be established to track the application of the local fund;

- Budgetary and financial pre-conditions prior to the release of funds should be shifted to, and managed by, the World Bank, while USAID focuses on more pedagogical conditions, such as the development of an improved nationwide student testing program.

12. An assumption of NPA is that by providing financial resources through MFP at the national level, macro-economic budget management institutional improvement would be improved and resources would flow to the education sector. This institutionalization is not automatic, however. USAID should assure that technical assistance is also provided to MPF so that macro level financial and institutional improvements occurs. This might be carried out, for example, in cooperation with the World Bank's PAGEN program or A.I.D.'s Economic Policy Reform Project.

MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Major findings

1. Clarification of PASE

a. The PASE was created in response to the GOG's 1989 National Education Policy, which called for a complete reform of Guinea's educational system. The Policy was grounded in the conviction that the efficient delivery of quality education to an increasing proportion of the population was the key to Guinea's transition from its status of economic disrepair to one of successful development of its great wealth of resources, both natural and human.

b. Guinea's education sector is evolving in the absence of clear GOG policy priorities or detailed, time-phased plans. The GOG's educational policy statements focus on long-term accomplishments. But it is unclear whether the reform is, for example, to increase schools and classrooms or a commitment to a new educational philosophy in a market-oriented economy. It is unclear whether the PASE is a structure or a strategy.

c. PASE has identified the need for strong central institutions capable of controlling and distributing increasing resource flows to schools throughout the country. But an even broader base of support appears both desirable and possible. Agencies such as the National Pedagogical Institute (IPN) could be mobilized further, and other Ministries dealing with development activities could provide more support to basic education as an indispensable part of developing human resources.

d. USAID is supporting Guinea's pursuit of its primary educations goals and objectives through a combination of non-projectized budgetary support and projectized technical assistance. USAID's project goals are to support MEPU-FP in obtaining and managing an increased level of funding, and to reinforce administrative and financial management capacity-building at the central and decentralized levels of the MEPU-FP.

2. Status of education sector budget management

a. The DAAF, assisted by USAID technical assistance, played a key role in planning and executing the 1991, 1992 and 1993 MEPU-FP budgets. The Statistics and Planning Division produced budgetary and financial data based on input from the regional SAAFs. The Office of the Inspector General (IGEPU) prepared a plan for the salary adjustments of teachers. But the budget planning process has been based on availabilities of funds, as opposed to a needs assessment at the prefectural level with the goal of educating all (70%) by the year 2000.

b. While the education budget follows the same general format as the national budget, which is prescribed by the GOG national finance law, the MEPU-FP budget is reportedly the most detailed and well-thought-out of all the ministry's budgets. However, standard GOG budget funding categories make it difficult to extract quantity and quality information that USAID and GOG program managers would find useful, such as disbursements on educational activities by function, gender or geographic regions.

c. The percentage of the national budget allotted to the education sector exceeded 19 percent in 1992 consistent with the PASE objectives. Primary education's share was a major part of this increase. Field visits, however, revealed that money has been spent primarily on equipment and furniture for the central and regional DPE administrative offices and student desks and armoires for both rural and urban class rooms. Pedagogical materials, especially books, are missing in many of the schools visited.

d. Even though the MEPU-FP's budget as a percentage of the national budget has increased, it is difficult to determine whether expenditures, especially at the local level, have increased proportionately. There have been funding delays and reductions by the MPF due in part to macro-economic constraints, but there have also been delays by MPF and MEPU-FP in transferring funds to the prefectures and sous-prefectures.

e. Significant problems remain in the management and execution of the education budget. The DPEs are informed of their budget levels late in the fiscal year. In order to meet disbursement deadlines, the DPEs have had to begin making commitments against their budgets without knowing how much of their budget would be covered by the central treasury. The late communication of budget information makes systematic planning of activities for the fiscal year difficult and results in some contracts going unpaid.

f. There are figures in the Education Sector budget for administrative and teaching expenses. Administrative expenses are divided into central and regional, and teaching expenses by elementary, secondary, technical, professional and normal. However, the budget presentation does not break down prefecture-level expenditures, nor does it provide management information as does a "program budget" in the United States.The indicator for annual expenditures per student does not measure what A.I.D. intended. The numbers reflect expenditures for renovations and school furniture, as opposed to pedagogical materials that affect students directly.

g. PL 480 local currency is being used to implement the construction and other activities of the PASE program. Local currencies generated by the PL 480 program belong to the GOG and go into the GOG central treasury. The GOG factors these currencies into their public investment program. Long-term use of this mechanism may, however, build an unhealthy dependency on U.S. agricultural resources whose on-going supply cannot be guaranteed.

3. Impact of A.I.D. assistance

a. USAID/Conakry's education reform support activity uses both NPA (non project) and project modes of assistance, presently about 80% NPA and 20% project. Criteria for determining implementation progress and impact should be based on both non project and project modes of assessment. NPA conditions, for example, seek to improve systems, addressing problems in areas such as planning and programming, expenditure tracking, decentralization, improved resource management and donor coordination, are trigger the release of higher levels of local currency. The outputs are less tangible. Project assistance, on the other hand, is expected to result in more discrete quantifiable outputs.

b. While USAID/Conakry has its own six-month internal monitoring system (the PIR), USAID has not, under the TA portion of the project, worked with the GOG to develop the proposed tracking system to monitor resources going into the education sector and to determine the impact of U.S. and other donor assistance on primary school education.

c. USAID technical assistance did enhance the Ministry's capacity to prepare its annual budget. A rational budget was developed, and in the first and second years, the sector received over 90% of its requested allocations. Problems persist, however, in actually obtaining funds from the Ministry of Finance and Plan, despite the rationale of MEP-FP's budget. The working relationships between the central government and the decentralized officials vary in terms of the degree to which department level officials have input into budgeting decisions, the reliability of expenditure monitoring, and the speed of transfers from Conakry to the regions.

d. While a PL 480 program was not part of the original project design. a more apparent connection can be made between improvements in primary education and the direct provision of GF 5.5 billion of PL 480 generated local currencies ($5.8 million) for rehabilitation of rural classrooms in the rural area, purchase of school furniture for four rural zones, purchase of textbooks and construction of IRE/DPE warehouses. These funds were provided because the GOG could not meet its budgetary commitments from internally generated resources.

e. But PL 480 generated counterpart have drawbacks. These funds may allow the GOG to substitute PL 480 generated GFs for funds budgeted under the PASE. And PL 480 procedures are time consuming. The use of the PL 480 management system, though effective, adds another layer of bureaucracy to PASE program implementation. The unpredictability of PL 480 resources from one year to the next makes it disruptive to include such funds in any kind of macro level systematic planning and budgeting process.

f. Nothing in the A.I.D. program/project funded activities was specifically designed to support the GOG's efforts to improve the <u>quality</u> of primary school education. USAID has developed no criteria, on its own or with the GOG, to determine what constitutes an increase in primary education quality, nor has A.I.D. developed a monitoring, diagnostic or reporting

system, as required by the PAAD, to help A.I.D. or the GOG determine when such quality increases (or decreases) have taken place.

4. Issues of project implementation

a. There has been a major turnover of personnel in USAID/Conakry over the past 6 months, including the Mission Director and his Deputy and the Human Resources Development Officer. While such turnover is dislocating, in this case, it has provided a unique opportunity for the Mission to look at the design and implementation of the primary education project with fresh vision and a critical eye. The present evaluation is taking place at the same time that new Mission staff are considering how to improve and modify the project during its remaining years and for the next phase. This gives the evaluation team the opportunity to look at the design and implementation of the present project, and the occasion to make recommendations for future action.

b. This project has turned out to be more complicated, with more issues, and more labor intensive than the designers had anticipated. A.I.D./Washington and the Mission did not provide a sufficient quantity of quality manpower and support necessary to properly supervise, manage, and follow up on project problems.

c. The majority of deliverables provided by FSU have been driven by day to day, task to task requirements. Few contributions to longer-term institution building have been introduced during the 18 months since the original work order was negotiated. The technical assistance contractor has met some but not all of the terms of its work orders.

d. The contractor <u>has</u>:

- provided routine technical support to the GOG, notably in the preparation of financial review and budgetary documents,
- liaised with other donors regarding coordinated assistance to the PASE,
- provided a number of short-term consultancies, as well as seminars and workshops in financial management, administration and administrative roles within the sector reform,
- begun to establish a basic internal records management system at the central DAAF level,
- provided recommendations on staff moves in the form of a requested transfer of personnel to the DAAF (Cellule Budgetaire)
- contributed to the process of identifying hardware (vehicles, office equipment and computers) requirements for the DAAF,

- provided one special study on gender and rural equity,
- contributed to developing criteria for the selection of overseas training participants,
- is developing a French-language guide to budget procedures within the DAAF.

e. The contractor has not:

- secured approval from the Minister of an organizational manual of the DAAF,
- delivered an accounting systems manual,
- delivered, while the evaluation team was in country, a training manual on accounting (although a draft was approved by DAAF,
- worked with the Personnel sections of the DAAFs and SAAFS to improve their management systems. Due to both a delay in the contractor's intervention in personnel management, and the Mission's inability or unwillingness to act quickly, the Personnel section is now being trained and organized by the FAC,
- produced a training needs assessment for use by PASE (a plan was drafted during the team's visit),
- developed a monitoring and evaluation system to be used in monitoring conditionalities, assessing technical assistance and evaluating the overall impact of the PASE on the educational system. Assessment of critical issues, such as the degree of capacity-building within the DAAF and other institutional settings, and the degree of skills transfer to Guinean counterparts, to name just a few, is consequently impossible.

f. Delays in PASE school construction are evident. Given the negative experiences of donors (such as the 51 experimental multigrade classrooms associated with the World Bank's first tranche and 105 classrooms which were to have been constructed under the second tranche) and the positive experience of USAID's PL 480 - financed construction, it appears that the approach of direct contribution to achieve educational results has a better prospect for success.

5. Equity access for girls and rural populations

a. The PAAD identified school access for disadvantaged groups (girls, rural children) as a high priority but the PAAD is less than explicit concerning the means and a schedule to achieve greater equity. Given the recency of USAID involvement in Guinean education this may be understandable. However, a more energetic and pro-active approach by USAID and/or its technical assistance contractor is called for. It was not until PL 480 local currency became

available were A.I.D. funds used for such purposes, e.g. construction of schools in the rural area.

b. The equity component is potentially the most original aspect of the project. It is one of the only place in the project document where conventional approaches are challenged and where the potential of foreign donor assistance confronts the ambivalent nature of state intervention. It has provoked into existence the only PASE/GOG committee dealing with substantive issues rather than implementation or coordination processes.

c. Existing data have not yet been analyzed sufficiently from an equity viewpoint. New topics for action research have been identified but no major study has been carried out. New action research, though still needed, should not prevent action in favor of equity to take place. Rural-urban equity issues have been covered less than gender issues; they should be included in any future research.

6. Conditionalities

a. The World Bank/IDA Credit to the PASE includes (depending on how one counts) 13 conditions for the three tranche releases and 18 "mesures d'accompagnement". These Bank/IDA conditions and reform measures are intended to improve national policy and strategic framework, to improve general sector management, financial resource use and resource generation, to address underdevelopment, to increase the relevance of the educational system, and to improve personnel performance.

b. USAID's PAAD has a total of 24 general and specific conditions for the three tranche releases aimed at accomplishing diverse objectives such as GOG expenditures against budget allocations; the development of annual work plans, reports and studies; and debt repayment schedules. USAID's introduction of PL 480 financing carried with it another set of monitoring and reporting requirements, if not conditions.

c. The objectives of some USAID conditions are similar to those of the Bank's conditions and reform measures, although the documentation and reporting requirements are different for the two sets of conditions and reform measures. This overlap causes a duplication of effort by the GOG, USAID and the Bank. This necessitates substantial effort at donor coordination and causes management confusion regarding timing and verification of GOG compliance with conditions and reform measures. The management of conditionality is not only labor-intensive, but requires a wide range of management skills for effective monitoring.

d. Since USAID has not yet worked with the GOG to develop a monitoring and evaluation system to track implementation of conditions, USAID depends in part on the World Bank conditionality review system through the Comité de Suivi. All conditions for the release of the second tranche of both the World Bank and USAID funds have been satisfied recently, although it is unclear to what extent some conditions and reform measures were

actually met in view of the complexities of the conditionalities and the process. The Bank did waive the conditionality which required 20% of rural classrooms to be multigrade because the Bank ultimately did not believe this to be realistic.

7. Donor coordination issues

a. The three principle providers of assistance to PASE (the French, World Bank, and USAID) and the GOG meet on a weekly basis in Conakry to share information and coordinate efforts. USAID and the World Bank in Washington often exchange documentation on the project and brief one another's consultants going to the field. An A.I.D./W Africa Bureau staff person recently participated on a World Bank mission to Guinea. While these meetings and joint efforts enhance donor cooperation, the three players have their own institutional requirements and agenda, so they sometimes either neglect or choose to work independently in an uncoordinated manner. Information sharing between USAID with the FAC has proven difficult.

b. Periodic meetings and the governing committees of PASE (Comité de Pilotage, Comité de Suivi and the Secrétariat Technique) assure a certain degree of coordination and synergy of actions. However, there is room for improvement. On the other hand, it is unfortunate if A.I.D. has limited or delayed interventions which it considers essential, in favor of following the lead of other donors.

c. The GOG and donors have been working through the committee structure and routine diplomatic channels to strike a balance between autonomy and coordination. The GOG has expressed concern about recent trends toward territoriality and indicated that donors should work more closely together. The GOG may have given mixed signals about donor's placement on a continuum ranging from complete autonomy to complete collaboration. The GOG has, for example, given donors free reign to work out planning and implementation among themselves. It has, at the same time, indicated to particular donors where a match between Guinea's needs and a donor's strengths might exist. The donor committee is not intended to serve as a decision-making body. While information sharing and initial planning may occur within that forum, it is the GOG who plays a decisive role in assessing the value of individual donor's present and future contributions to the PASE.

8. Pedagogical considerations

a. Costing out education reform targets in the context of the demographic evolution demonstrates that the present pedagogical approach is not sustainable. Two policy decisions are necessary in order to avoid costly failure. First, the emphasis of primary educational reform must switch from quantity to quality, from producing more illiterate dropouts to producing more well education, successful, graduates. Second, the obstacles to expanding private education must be removed.

b. Project design is exceedingly conventional with its emphasis on a central Ministry and its extensions, school construction, and teacher training. It remains tied to inefficient governmental structures and processes. By avoiding the risks associated with more original approaches (radio educative, audio-visual teaching aids, community control, curricular flexibility, private schools, performance rewards and the like), PASE makes it less likely, for examples, that equity issues can be addressed effectively.

c. Insufficient numbers of teachers are presently being trained, virtually none are being hired and the selection of candidates for teacher training (exclusively among Baccalaureate rejects) is less than optimal. In service training cannot make up for such serious deficiencies.

d. PASE has retrained virtually all teachers (7125 out of 7771). While there seems to be considerable satisfaction with these "stages de perfectionnement" at the CPL, problems are apparent in two areas: (1) supply and distribution problems made it impossible for the teachers to take with them the new manuals and teachers' guides after completion of the course (Beyla); (2) the integration of new knowledge and teaching methods into everyday teaching activities is uncertain and not sufficiently monitored.

e. There is no system in place which rewards performance in pedagogical areas. Teachers get paid whatever their performance, directors have little incentive for ensuring that their charges have textbooks. When teachers go for training, classes are often closed down. Since quality pedagogical results are the only justification for having schools, it follows that merely expanding the existing system is uneconomic.

f. Instructional materials are scarce in most classrooms. What little is available is hardly put to optimal use. The system has adapted to functioning largely without textbooks and other instructional materials. Introducing textbooks will probably be the single most productive aspect of the educational reform now under way.

g. In the absence of a baseline study and standardized, controlled examinations, it will be difficult to attribute learning gains to particular actions under the program. It is fortunate that the FAC has now taken the initiative to produce an initial evaluation tool; even so the lag time for measurable improvements will make it unlikely that policy-relevant research results can be produced in the near future.

h. While the evaluation of cognitive outcomes is now being organized, the monitoring of school expenditures, specific material inputs, teacher quality and school management appear insufficiently covered in the CEPEC proposal. USAID and its technical assistance contractor should undertake such monitoring at least in pilot regions.

9. Program and project design

a. By concentrating resources in the central government and the capital city, PASE will contribute to, rather than ameliorate, rural/urban imbalances. Since the PAAD, as presently designed, aims primarily at capacity building at the center--certainly in the early stages of the program, USAID will have little early influence on institutional improvement at the rural level.

b. The Project design reflects a reliance on periodic short-term consultancies. The intent of the design may have been to enhance a sustained, long-term technical assistance package with repeated, intensive substantive injections. The relationship between long- and short-term assistance has, however, become inverted -- rather than having consultants support the overall longer term goals, the Project has become driven by consultancies. Availability of consultants has determined the timing and substance of short term interventions.

B. Major recommendations

The issues to be analyzed in this evaluation were only partially proposed in the scope of work for the evaluation team. Because the program/project has an element of experimentation, the team was asked to help identify the issues. It was instructive for the Mission to be aware of the many issues and they were included in the evaluation team's March 7, 1993 presentation to the Mission of the Preliminary Evaluation Report. Although the issues could not all be analyzed in the body of this evaluation report, many findings on these issues are included in the section above. And because AID is considering the option to fund a project continuation, the team has presented recommendations below on other of these issues for further consideration by the Mission.

1. Guiding recommendations - thrust into long term quality education

a. While A.I.D.'s present primary education program and project assistance has been authorized for five years, primary education must be a longer term effort. The FAC has planned a 10 year program with every indication that its build up of technical assistance will continue beyond that point. The World Bank is planning for a 2nd educational sector program. It is recommended that A.I.D. reconfirm that it intends to contribute to this sector in Guinea for the long term--as much as 15-20 years. Some of the recommendations, however, should be introduced immediately into the present project using remaining funds and add-ons of new funds which could be made available without redesign authorization.

b. Although the logframe lists over 30 outputs and indicators, several of which are scheduled to be achieved by the end of PASE, the thrust of the present PAAD is that measurable outputs will not occur before 1996. The technical support package in the present project was intended to impact indirectly by strengthening the administrative and management capacity of MEPU-FP at both the central and local level. The evaluation team supports the

position that more direct improvement of the quality and efficiency of the educational systems is the best way to impact on Guinea's educational sector reform.

c. In order for A.I.D. to know what it should accomplish in this sector over the long term A.I.D. should, in concert with the Government of Guinea, and in cooperation with other donors, develop more detailed base line data on the state of primary education in the country, more realistic quantitative goals on what can reasonably be accomplished over the period given demographic trends, considered assumptions on what resources might be available from internal and external sources, and qualitative pedagogical criteria for knowing when success has been achieved at the student level.

2. Modifications in the GOG and PASE

a. The GOG should further elaborate and disseminate its reform policies to address the disparities and ambiguities that prevail and to assure that all partners, stockholders, agents, cadre and educational personnel fully understand the purpose and nature of the reform and how each can exercise initiative to help achieve educational reform.

b. Since the creation of PASE, the Ministry of Education was restructured into its present form, the MESRS and the MEPU-FP. The PASE organizational structure has not been modified to reflect this change. GOG should examine the present committee structure to ensure that ample attention and resources are being given to primary education.

c. Improvements in school quality and internal efficiency should take precedence over central expenditures. Central expenditures should be tied to previous performance in the area of school quality.

3. Design changes in an amended or future A.I.D. project

a. USAID should investigate the possibility that private schools can expand and take over a part of primary school education. A.I.D. can do this by (a) using its influence to ensure that legal and administrative procedures are changed to facilitate the opening and accreditation of private schools as well as the recognition of the diplomas it confers; (b) starting a pilot project assisting PVO's to open private schools and, (c) providing small loans through its Private Sector Office to a few entrepreneurs interested in opening private schools.

b. Outputs and indicators should be reexamined to determine whether they remain relevant and measure real quantitative or qualitative improvements in the education sector. A.I.D. should review the program/project logframe outputs and indicators to categorize them according to whether they relate to program or project objectives.

c. USAID should continue its assistance in support of accounting, budgeting, and administrative improvement of the DAAF/SAAF structure in MEPU-FP, but in the Phase II project, A.I.D. should:

- support Guinea's decentralization reform by giving greater attention to budget and administrative operations at the lowest field level within MEPU-FP with the goal of instilling a bottom up (full staff involvement) approach to management of primary education;

- support reform to a more integrated educational program management system throughout MEPU-FP that helps the Ministry actually improve the quality of education. Educations administrators need to be brought more into the program decision loop, in terms of understanding the programs they are managing, the implications of budget decisions, and participating in decisions on policy matters.

- explore the creation of a career development program for the personnel within MEPU-FP to make the ministry a more attractive career option, able to recruit higher quality teachers and administrators and reduce the temptation for MEPU-FP personnel to seek perks from outside the ministry.

d. USAID should make a major push to ensure that all Guinean schools are equipped with textbooks and that teachers and school Director find it in their interest to put the books to use. While this can partly be done by assisting IPN in the production and distribution of textbooks, other avenues, such as more creative teaching methods, especially in the interior, need to be explored.

4. Equity access for girls and rural populations

a. Equity issues should be given more systematic attention and support by assigning permanent technical assistance to them. A.I.D.'s technical assistance contractor should collaborate with GOG to produce an equity action plan based on sound analysis of school data and other information.

b. Support to education in rural areas must be coordinated with other development activities such as roads, agriculture and rural development, and with health and access to water, if the right environment and structure is to be put into place. Pilot projects should be started to ascertain the relative importance of cost and cultural factors as barriers to school enrollment for these groups.

c. The sensitization campaign being planned focuses on the retention of girls and the improvement of their treatment and achievement in school. Merely aiming for higher female enrollment in inadequate schools is not enough. A small data gathering effort should be undertaken (before-and-after) to measure the impact of the campaign.

5. A modified USAID technical assistance package

a. The proposed expanded technical assistance program should only be attempted if A.I.D./Washington and the Mission are prepared to provide the necessary technical resources to carry out the work. With regard to long term experts, the proposal here is for:

- an advisor in DAAF to continue to improve accounting, budget, administration and program management of MEPU-FP, particularly at the field level;

- a computer systems analyst, probably in SSP, to help A.I.D. and the technical assistance team develop and manage a computerized monitoring and evaluation system, and to provide technical support to the analytical work of the other advisors and Guinean professionals in MEPU-FP;

- an advisor to work in IPN on educational action research and to help develop text books, related material, teacher training, etc. for pedagogical topics such as, for example, mathematics or primary grades one to six;

- a long term advisor, at the Direction de l'Enseignement Elémentaire, for at least a year, to develop and manage long term programs for access to education for rural populations and girls and to guide the development of private sector schools;

- a management training/organizational development specialist, in the Office of the Secretary-General level, to ensure that the technical assistance package is grounded in a commitment to transfer of skills and knowledge to all MEPU•FP staff and educational administrators. This specialist would complement technical experts who get the systems up and running but who may not be expert in teaching other people how to do it.

- a senior professional educational administrator, as contractor Chief of Party, assigned to the Ministerial level, to develop long term plans for the technical assistance contractor, to manage the other experts, to help MEPU-FP prepare programs to meet NPA conditions precedent to release of any new funds, to oversee the monitoring and evaluation system, to serve on the Secretariat Technique as a Counselor to the PASE Coordinator (depending on how the PASE Secretariat will be reorganized), and to be the professional contact between PASE/MEPU-FP and A.I.D./Conakry.

b. On an annual basis, the above technical assistance recommendations would require $3-4,000,000 for long and short term technical assistance, substantial observation training in the U.S., in country training programs and seminars for MEPU-FP cadre, special program support for rural areas and girls education, support for a private sector education program, a monitoring and evaluation system, local costs and equipment for SSP, and action research,

mathematics development at IPN. Another $3-4 million is recommended for the cash grant for books and other didactic material.

c. some of the proposed activities, e.g., the expanded participant training familiarization effort should be implemented immediately with the more than $2 million remaining unearmarked and unexpended in the present technical assistance project. The increased number of personal services should be secured through a new competitive contract or a cooperative agreement with a qualified educational consulting firm. At least 60% of the contract evaluation criteria should be on the key personnel to be proposed for the project. The RFP should let it be known that the USAID encourages the inclusion of African professionals in the proposal.

6. Improvements to budget management

a. Review the disbursement procedures at both the national and regional levels with a view to reducing the number of persons involved in the approval process. Increase training of the SAAFs of both the MEPU-FP and MFP. On-the-job training, as well as formal seminars at the national and regional level should be stepped up to insure that the responsible government agents are knowledgeable about all rules and regulations, especially as they relate to expenditures.

b. A basic assumption of the present non project assistance is that by providing financial resources through the Ministry of Plan and Finance at the macro-economic level, institutional improvement will occur and resources will flow to appropriate sectors such as primary education. This institutionalization is not automatic, however. USAID, with its donor partners, should assure that technical assistance is also provided to the Ministry of Plan and Finance so that institutional improvement does occur.

c. PL 480 local currency should be used to finance PASE activities only in cash-flow emergencies, or to finance education sector activities that are additional to the normal PASE program, or for programs in which A.I.D. has a special program interest.

7. Non-project cash grant assistance

A cash grant should continue to be provided to the GOG in order to permit USAID to impact on critical education policy and overall government wide application of resources. Based upon the first two year of experience a number of changes are suggested in the management of the cash grant component:

- provision of U.S. dollars to the GOG should no longer be tied to repayment of debt to the United States;

- these funds should be earmarked, and used only for primary education purposes as agreed to between A.I.D. and the GOG. This is sometimes referred to as an (education) sector grant;

- a separate local currency account should be established in the Central Bank into which the GF equivalent of the U.S. dollars will be deposited;

- procedures should be established to assure appropriate release of funds to purposes negotiated between USAID and the GOG and a monitoring system should be established to track the application of the local fund;

- one suggested use of $3,000,000 per year of the cash grant would be funds would be for production, supply and wide distribution of student books, teacher manuals and other didactic material

8. Conditionality in a redesigned A.I.D. Program

a. The design team for the follow on project should review the present conditions and determine which are still applicable and which should be updated. Based on the proposed educational sector study, the new educational sector grant, and Mission and GOG agreements on which primary education sector activities USAID/Conakry wished to support, new sets of conditions would be in order.

b. Review of budgetary and financial conditions should be shifted to the World Bank, while USAID focuses on more pedagogically significant conditions, such as the development of an improved nationwide student testing program.

c. Modify the conditionality review process by coordinating with other donors to enhance uniformity/congruence of required documents and to regularize timing of conditionality reviews.USAID should review with IBRD and GOG the number, content and documentation requirements for conditionalities with the view to reducing their number, complexiity, overlap, inappropriate interconnections, and timing to make the conditions simpler, more flexible and relevant to the effective delivery of education sector services.

9. Donor coordination within PASE

a. Since it can be assumed that U.S. resources alone -- financial and technical -- will be insufficient to meet the totality of primary education sector needs in Guinea, A.I.D. must make a deliberate effort to work with, and secure the cooperation of other donors. It must at the same time not minimize the potentially beneficial effects of its own, unique contributions. A.I.D. should work more closely with the FAC, and take advantage of the large number of French speaking technical personnel already working in MEPU-FP. A.I.D. should associate itself with the base line study on the Guinean education system being carried out for the PASE/FAC by CEPEC. A.I.D. should continue to work closely with the World Bank.

b. USAID should determine what other donors, not associated with PASE, are contributing to the primary education sector. The Canadians, for example, are doing interesting work in literacy, non-formal education, use of radio and other audio-visuals. JICA, EEC and the Peace Corps are constructing schools in rural areas. Since the Minister and the Secretary General of MEPU-FP have stated that there is enough work for all donors, USAID should encourage the GOG to assist in exchange of information among donors.

c. The challenge facing donors is to assist in ways that "play to their strengths." Their priorities and attention should lie first and foremost with serving Guinea, in the ways most suited to their resources. While cooperating, they must not allow their unique potential to be lost, out of concern for managing a comprehensive, integrated operation.

10. Improved USAID project management and A.I.D./W support

a. The nature of A.I.D.'s new educational efforts in Francophone Africa, such as in Guinea, requires the A.I.D./W Africa Bureau's ARTS/HRD office to be prepared to provide a greater amount of high level technical personnel and attention in support of field programs.

b. Within USAID/Conakry, because the education project has such high visibility and importance to A.I.D., the Mission should give the HRD office greater management attention. One way to do this would be to have the HRDO report directly to the Deputy Mission Director who would be assigned this additional responsibility.

c. USAID/Conakry should develop a long term, detailed, strategic plan for managing the primary education sector program that has benchmarks, time lines, progress criteria, decision points and an internal monitoring and reporting system that changes the present approach to a system that is more prioritized and systemized.

d. Monitoring cash grant progress and assisting with the preparation of documentation to satisfy conditionality is a difficult job, requiring special skills and attention not ordinarily expected from a HRDO. The USAID Program Office should be assigned the additional responsibility to work with HRDO and the GOG in satisfying PASE budgetary, and other macro level economic conditions and issues.

e. Assure the selection of a technical assistance contractor that has experience working in Francophone Africa, that has links with French speaking educational specialists in the United States, and which has demonstrated that it can operate fairly independently with a high level of technical skill in a country whose educational and supporting institutions are still being developed.

f. USAID must assume a more purposeful approach to proposing, negotiating and managing interventions with the GOG and supervising the work of technical assistance contractors. Mission management must introduce closer supervision to assure that daily operations at the HRD level are in accord with agreed upon work plans f . this project.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Macro-economic context and economic background in Guinea

Guinea began its transition from a state-controlled to a market economy in 1985 when it started a reform program with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Two structural adjustment loans and two stand-by loans are beginning to have an impact on the Guinean economy. The growth rate of Guinea's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in real (inflation adjusted) terms was 5.9% in 1987, 6.0% in 1988, 4.1% in 1989 and 4.3% in 1990. Per Capita GDP was approximately $410 in 1990. With renewed economic vigor and considerable natural resources in agriculture, energy, fisheries and mining, it's principal exports being bauxite, alumina, diamonds, gold, pineapples, bananas, palm products and coffee, Guinea's economy has potential for rapid growth. Over 30% of the world's bauxite, and nearly 7% of the world's iron ore are found in Guinea. Guinea's economic potential is frustrated by a serious lack of infrastructure and low levels of education and training, weak institutions and the administrations's limited capacity for economic and financial management.

Guinea is continuing to undergo structural economic readjustment, requiring systemic change. The reform program is designed to enhance efficiency in production and in public sector management. The program is currently being supported by an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the IMF and World Bank/IDA loans, including the PASE which is designed to improve the performance of the education and training sector. Guinea received a very positive IMF Board review of its Article IV consultation and ESAF program on October 30,1992. The US Treasury concurred in the review. The result was that on November 18 the Paris Club rescheduled $203 million of Guinea's debt as of December 31, 1992. Additional financial support for Guinea was provided by the World Bank Board's approval in December 1992 of release of the second half of a $50 million IDA loan to improve the business and investment climate for the private sector.

There is an important relationship between education and macroeconomic adjustment. Rapid macroeconomic adjustment in Guinea is hampered by the lack of trained and experienced manpower. Guinea's current education and training system produces school-leavers who are ill-prepared for employment. Since employment is expected to grow commensurate with the growth in each sector of the economy a skilled, productive work force will be important in sustaining economic growth.

Some macroeconomic adjustment measures, however, have repercussions on the education sector. For example, the public administration reform had an impact on the government's recurrent budget for the education sector. One measure called for the reduction of redundant and unskilled civil servants and granting significant salary increases to remaining

staff. The combined effect of these two measures is estimated to have increased the Government wage bill by 50% between 1986-1989. Taking into account other macroeconomic measures such as reduced deficits, the increase in the wage bill will have to come from reductions in expenditure on goods, services, transfer payments and other operating expenses. Given the inadequate funding of materials in education, the potential effects of these macroeconomic adjustment measures on the sector could be damaging if the sector budget for recurrent costs is not protected.

B. USAID program

This section draws liberally from USAID/Guinea's Country Program Strategy Plan for 1992-1996, the Annual Budget Submission for FY-1994, the Mission's January 1992 CPSP Performance Indicators and the November 1992 Assessment of Program Impact for 1992.

1. Outline of overall USAID economic assistance to Guinea

The Mission believes that only by comprehensively addressing key economic, socio-political, and institutional constraints can broad-based development and growth occur and be sustained in Guinea. The constraints to development include limited macro-economic and sectoral policy formulation and implementation; an insufficiently trained and experienced human resources base; cultural constraints which inhibit decision making, risk taking and financial management transparency; weak and non-productive public and private sector institutions; and high population growth rate. Throughout its FY 92-FY 96 planning period, USAID/Guinea intends to emphasis inter-relationships among its activities in order to overcome these constraints and achieve concentrated impact.

The USAID Guinea Country Program Strategy Objective Tree contains two sub-goals and three strategic objectives. The full Objective Tree is in Annex 3. The Mission's sub-goals are:

- Increased per-capita income from non-mining activities; and
- Improved human resources for sustainable economic growth.

The three program strategic objectives under these sub-goals, in approximate priority order, are:

- increased marketed private sector agricultural output for specific commodities;
- improved quality and increased enrollment in primary schools with emphasis on rural and female participation; and
- increased ability of families to determine household size.

This present evaluation is concerned with the second sub-goal and the second strategic objective. This second strategic objective, itself, has three interrelated tracks.

- The first track is a large participant training program designed to have an immediate impact on strengthening public and private sector human resources;

- The second track addresses public sector institutional constraint (e.g. poor management capacity, need for technical assistance, overly centralized and inefficient government capacity, and insufficiently transparent financial accounting systems.). This track is implemented through A.I.D.'s Economic Policy Reform Support Project, the principal beneficiaries which are the Central Bank, the Ministry of Plan and Finance, and the Ministry of Agriculture.

- As its third track, in concert with the World Bank and the French, and with the support of other donors, USAID has initiated a major effort to assist the GOG restructure the country's primary education sector. This third track is the subject of this evaluation.

2. USAID program and project assistance to the education sector in Guinea

Guinea was selected by A.I.D. as one of the countries to experiment with a new non project assistance approach. The team which designed the activity was under great pressure to complete the PP/PAAD in time for an FY 1990 obligation. They had limited information such as that which would be found in an education sector study. And in the case of Guinea, the United States was relatively inexperienced in what was going on in the country. The design team, therefore, drew much of its information from material prepared by the World Bank. They designed an initiative which was fairly limited, but expandable, once USAID knew its way around the educational sector in Guinea.

USAID/Guinea's approved primary educational sector reform program consists of an allocation of $22.3 million in the form of cash disbursements over the three year period 1990-1993, provided the government meets certain conditions. These include allocating adequate funding for teaching materials and other operating expenditure; assuming an increasing share of recurrent costs associated with PASE until donor support ends; and training and redeployment staff and redistributing resources within the educational system to encourage more equal access to schooling throughout the country, especially for girls and children in rural areas. USAID is also providing technical assistance to produce improvements in the administrative and financial management of the Guinean educational system to make the PASE successful.

There was much discussion within and among the design team and with USAID/Conakry and A.I.D./W on how the project should be structured. A.I.D./Washington (The Executive Committee for Project Review-ECPR) felt that this activity was ambitious and that there were serious questions regarding the sustainability and feasibility of what was proposed. The ECPR decided, however, that the potential benefits to be gained from the reform program were worth the risks. It was A.I.D./W's view that USAID/Conakry and the activity design had enough monitoring and evaluation points designed into it to enable adjustments to be made if performance faltered. A.I.D.'s agreements for these activities were signed with the GOG in October 1990.

The education program and project was continued as a key USAID/Conakry effort in the Mission's Country Program Strategic Plan - FY 92-96, issued in September 1991. USAID noted at that time that Guinea continued to be hampered in its economic growth by lack of an educated and trained work force. The percentage of the national budget allocated to formal and informal training continued far behind other countries in the region. And the severely deficient human resources in the public sector seriously limited the GOG's capacity to use scare financial and other resources available to it to achieve project goals.

In January 1992, USAID/Guinea, in response to an A.I.D./W request to refine performance indicators for its FY 92-96 CPSP, made what was a potentially important change. The memo to A.I.D./W stated that the word "quality." was to be deleted from the (second) strategic objective covering the project. The memo said:

> "the Mission fully supports other donor initiatives to improve the quality of education. However, USAID's focus in education is on the budgetary and financial measures that will expand the outreach of education services, but will not necessarily improve quality during the CPSP period."

This issue of quantity vs. quality as defining USAID's approach to education in Guinea appears to have been unresolved during project design and continues to today.

In the same January 1992 memo to A.I.D./W, the Mission also modified Project Target 3.2 by deleting the words "skills of" from the statement "Improved financial and administrative skills of Ministry of Education officials." The memo stated that

> "although the USAID program will help improve management skills in the Ministry of Education, the actual improvement of skills is difficult to measure. More accurately, the USAID program will enhance management performance, an objective which is more readily measurable."

The real reason for this change is unclear but it would appear to reflect an unresolved project design issue, that is, technical assistance vs. non-project assistance. Skills training is what technical assistance is all about; while indirect macro level institutional changes is what is hoped to be leveraged by non-project, cash grant assistance. It is the evaluation team's clear view that, in Guinea at the present time, the trickle down benefits of non-project assistance to assure that the Guinean government can, on its own, identify, procure, manage and evaluate technical assistance that it needs, would be difficult to accomplish. More traditional technical assistance for the transfer of skills, provided by a donor--in this case A.I.D.--done well, is a necessary and the better approach to assure that GOG and MEPU-FP staff are given the necessary guidance and skills to carry out the required steps.

In July 1992, in its FY-1994 Annual Budget Submission (ABS), USAID/Guinea proposed increasing the LOP of non-project assistance from $22.3 million to $40.3 with a new PACD of 9/96 and proposed increasing the LOP for technical assistance from $5.7 million to $13.3 million with a new 9/99 PACD. That is, USAID proposed increasing overall project support from $28 million to $53.6 million over a four year period, i.e., $6.4 million per year, under the same terms and conditions as the original activity. The ABS did note,

however, that the present evaluation "would guide preparation of the amendment of those activities based on key lessons learned."

It is interesting, but confusing, that in the statement of project purpose in its 1994 ABS, the Mission returned to the original wording in the strategic objective and again called for improved "quality" of education. It is quite probable that this was not a conscious decision but that there was insufficient understanding, or lack of communication among key Mission staff, as to the implications of using or not using the word "quality." When the word was first used in the strategic objective there was little in the project that would have achieved quality education, certainly not in the short or median term. When the word was taken out of the strategic objective in January 1992, no policy, logframe, or implementation changes were made in the project. And now that the word is being used again, the ABS proposed no specific change in project approach.

In its October 1992 response to the Missions ABS, in State 344022, A.I.D./W wrote that there was insufficient reporting from the field on the primary education project on which to judge the merits of the expansion proposed in the ABS. A.I.D./W approved the new design (NPD) for the project but advised that issues associated with NPA would require that the amendment which proscribes program progress and expected achievements of additional financing be reviewed by A.I.D./W at the concept stage. At the same time, and in the interim, A.I.D./W asked to be assured that the project would receive adequate management attention by the Mission.

C. Prior evaluations and methodology of the present evaluation

1. Internal A.I.D. review of conditionalities

The PP/PAAD for this activity required USAID/Conakry to re-evaluate the approach at the end of the first year and to assess the GOG performance in meeting its obligation to provide increased resources without the need to manage a separate local currency account. A.I.D. conducted this first internal review of the program and project with the help of the REDSO/WCA education advisor in January 1992. In brief, that review concluded that:

- The Ministry for Pre-University Education was fully committed to the project and believed that the system of conditional disbursements had instilled a spirit of awareness, accountability and openness in the GOG.

- Project implementation had a very slow start because of
  - inability of the GOG to fulfill conditions precedent to disbursement on time;
  - complicated A.I.D. contracting procedures and the delayed arrival of the long term advisor.

- The donor collaboration mechanism was exemplary but there were some differences of perception on
  - the role of A.I.D. contractor technical assistants;

- the role of the French technical assistant.

- There appeared to be a communication problem among GOG, USAID and the Federal Reserve Bank on handling NPA.

- The project was more labor intensive for USAID than anticipated in the design which increased the need for more long-term and effective technical assistance.

2. Multi-donor first year evaluation of PASE

That evaluation prepared A.I.D. to participate in the first annual donor review of PASE which took place in Conakry in February 1992. The 25 page report of that evaluation, after clarifying the goals of the donor supported educational structural adjustment program (PASE), made 56 specific observations. These included:

- at the central level, positive progress was:
  - development and use of the Annual Action Plan as a tool to decentralize programming and budgeting,
  - production of a data base which would provide valuable information to manage the Carte Scolaire,
  - preparation and execution of the best education budget up to that day,
  - a plan to improve the capacity of personnel in the sector, and
  - training of teachers in multigrade schools in several prefectures.

- at the local level, positive progress was:
  - improvements in class construction and furniture,
  - delivery of the first new teaching manuals in five years,
  - new enthusiasm and participation of local communities,
  - improved motivation of cadre and teachers,
  - increases in primary school enrollment.

- at the management level, progress was:
  - creation and functioning of the Comité du Suivi and Comité de Pilotage,
  - a more active role and importance given to PASE by the GOG,
  - the Technical Secretariat was working well as an all round coordinator, but additional attention was needed to coordinate donor activity in the investment budget.

- with regard to the operating budget:
  - spending for primary education increased from 15% to 19%,
  - while improvements were made in accounting and budget management, more needed to be done,
  - DPEs are not yet informed of budgetary resources made available to them,
  - certain budget categories such as receptions, ceremonies, and seminars need clarification,
  - attention needs to be given to systems for purchase, distribution and warehousing of stock,

- more attention needs to be given to accounting and budget management at the field level (at SAAFs),
- attention needs to be given to the financial execution of the Annual Action Plan and its integration with accounting and budgeting systems,
- delay in provisions of the 1992 budget allocation.

- with regard to the investment budget:
  - better overall management is needed of the school construction program,
  - the GOG had not yet provided its analysis of the 1991 investment program,
  - at least one donor (JICA) does not follow PASE school construction standards,
  - construction of 51 classrooms which were supposed to have been completed in 1991 was not begun until January 1992,
  - the government had not yet presented its plan for restructuring the School Construction Service,
  - MEPU-FP needs to update norms and standards for management of the school construction program.

- with regard to personnel:
  - the condition of redeployment of teachers from higher levels and administration to primary schools had not yet taken place,
  - a personnel plan is needed to relate numbers and types of teacher requirements to the PASE plan.

- with regard to multigrade schools, workshops were held on the issue, but concrete steps had not yet been taken.

Many of the points in the REDSO review of January 1992 and the donor review of February 1992 were reported to A.I.D./W in July 1992 in State cable CONAKRY 03674. But there is little evidence that either the Mission or A.I.D./W took concerted action to follow up on the findings until the arrival of new staff noted above.

3. GOG mid-term evaluation of PASE

In December 1992, a two day meeting and evaluation of PASE was conducted under the direction of the Comité de Suivi, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs as the Chairman. All donors, bilateral and multilateral, contributing to education, in addition to the three principal PASE donors, were represented.

The report of the evaluation had 14 recommendations organized under six major themes.

a. Theme No. 1. Financial mechanisms and budget execution procedures

Recommendation 1 - Technical services should develop and administer the PASE budget and related documents in strict accordance with the Finance Law.

Recommendation 2 - In order to reduce delays in budget execution, the conditions and methods of work of personnel in accounting and financial services should be improved through additional sensitization, training and information sharing. This refers to actions on délégations de credits, fiches d'engagements, mandats, marches, etc.

b. Theme No. 2. Restructuring administration and services

Recommendation 3 - It is necessary to carry out additional management studies on the functioning of MEPU-FP before undertaking further reorganization of the ministry. Recommendations for reorganization should be made to a commission made up of MEPU-FP, MRAFP and MPF.

Recommendation 4 - At the same time it would be useful to study the structure of the PASE to see how it could be further integrated with MEPU-FP.

c. Theme No. 3. Improvement of human resources and international technical assistance

Recommendation 5 - Although improvement of MEPU-FP is a priority, it is necessary to carry out a preliminary study to determine how to protect the careers and jobs of MEPU-FP employees.

Recommendation 6 - It is necessary, immediately, to determine ways to provide adaptive training to those employees who have been redeployed.

d. Theme No. 4. Planning, evaluation and reform of the education system

Recommendation 7 - All plans for external financing and development, and local initiatives for school construction, must be carried out according to the approved educational plan.

Recommendation 8 - It is necessary to intensify studies on pedagogical training that relate to employment needs and incorporation of youth into productive sectors.

Recommendation 9 - It is necessary to coordinate the efforts of all organizations working on literacy training.

Recommendation 10- To improve enrollment rates and increase educational opportunities, we should seek ways to promote private sector education.

e. Theme No. 5. A long term action plan to achieve the PASE goal of basic education for all

Recommendation 11- All donors should support the Declaration of Educational Policy being executed by the PASE, in a manner coordinated by the Government.

f. Exchange of views on international cooperation after PASE

Recommendation 12- It is necessary for the responsible ministries and the principle donors to study financing mechanisms to guarantee the continued operations and sustainability of the education sector (after PASE).

Recommendation 13- It is indispensable, as the end of PASE approaches, to consider how to insure and enlarge the activities of the education sector to achieve basic education for all.

Recommendation 14- Rehabilitation of higher education should be the subject of further study.

4. USAID mid-term evaluation

Toward the end of A.I.D.'s NPA cash grant portion of the project, an evaluation was to be carried out for A.I.D. to determine the success of the A.I.D. project to date. In addition to reviewing progress in instituting the GOG's reform measures, the evaluation was to address the effect of the reform on the educational system and on the intermediate and final beneficiaries--administrators, teachers, students, and parents. This present report is the result of that evaluation. Although the main purpose of the evaluation is to assess past achievements, another outcome of the present evaluation is to recommend to USAID mid-course changes to the present project and suggestions for a future courses of action.

The present evaluation was carried out in Guinea during the period February 10 to March 22, 1993. By that date approximately $3.5 million of the $5.7 million obligated by USAID had been earmarked for technical assistance through Florida State University ($2.2 million), direct PIO/Ps issued by USAID for long term training in the U.S. ($340,000), and direct contracts ($760,000) issued by USAID for evaluation and other technical assistance. At that time the second of three NPA tranches had just been approved by USAID for release, bringing total USAID releases of $14.1 million against the total $22.3 NPA obligated in the project. By that date, approximately $5.8 million of PL 480 generated local currency, not envisioned in the original project design, had also been made available by the United States.

Before the team went to Guinea, a briefing was held in Washington among the evaluation team members, senior contractor officers, and key Africa Bureau educational personnel, some of whom had been on the original project design team. In addition to substantial document review and content analysis, field surveys were carried out based on a standardized questionnaire, participant observation and open-ended interviews constituted the evaluation methodology used. A basic thrust of this evaluation has been that local participants and stakeholders are the real source of knowledge about the project and that their views on criteria for success and project progress are key to the evaluation. (The Fourth Generation approach to evaluation.) It was the task of the evaluation team to ferret out this knowledge, and organize it, rather than substitute for it.

D. Review of logframe goals, objectives, inputs and outputs

USAID/Guinea's education reform activity was designed to use both NPA and project modes of assistance to complement and support one another; presently 80% ($23 million) NPA and 20% ($5.7 million) project assistance. Criteria for determining implementation progress and impact were based on both program and project modes of assessment. But the project logframe does not easily distinguish between those outputs ordinarily associated with NPA conditionality and those outputs ordinarily associated with the technical assistance (TA) portion of A.I.D. assistance. A.I.D. recognizes its relative inexperience with assessing performance and managing conditionalities associated with NPA. This subject was the focus of an Education Workshop held in Abidjan in February 1993.

Through conditionality requirements, USAID did support the GOG's reform policy as seen in the successful redeployment of civil servants from secondary and administrative positions to primary school classrooms. And this did lead to an increase in enrollment. While quantitative improvements have taken place in the primary education system during the period of A.I.D. non project assistance, little direct connection can be made, nor was it intended to be made in the PAAD, between these improvements and the cash grant portion of A.I.D.'s assistance.

USAID technical assistance did enhance the Ministry's capacity to prepare its annual budget. A rational budget was developed for the first time ever and in the first and second years the sector received over 90% of its requested allocations. Problems persist in actually obtaining funds from the Ministry of Finance and Plan, despite the rationale of the sector's budget. The working relationships between the central government and the decentralized officials vary in terms of: the degree to which department level officials have input into budgeting decisions, the reliability of expenditure monitoring, and the speed of transfers from Conakry to the regions.

The present status of logframe outputs is included in the Table on the next two pages. Some outputs may be specifically related to A.I.D. activities; for example, outputs k, l, w, aa, bb, cc, ee, ff, and GG. The remaining logframe outputs actually encompass results from funding by all donors to the PASE, not just A.I.D. Some indicators were not to be accomplished by the time of this evaluation; some sooner, some by the end of the project, and some by reform year of 2000. A mark in the "no/not yet" column, therefore, may be a statement of fact and not necessarily an evaluative observation.

Logframe Outputs and Verifiable Indicators*

	YES	NO/ NOT/ YET	INSUF-FICIENT DATA
a. 3% increase in primary enrollment by 1992	X		
b. Maintain 30% girls enrollment in 1992	X		
c. 5% increase in rural enrollment by 1992	X		
d. 30% admission rate by 1992	X		
e. Increase completion rate from 40% to 72% by 2000		X	
f. Reduce yrs instruction to graduate from 16.1 to 8.2 years by 2000			X
g. Revised and implemented organization chart	X		
h. Computerized personnel files	X		
i. Remaining staff positions filled	X		
j. Annual action plans according to budget categories prepared by MEPU-FP departments, IREs and DP.	X		
k. Budget estimates prepared according to national budget categories prepared by departments, IREs and DPEs	X		
l. All DAAF central personnel trained		X	
m. 16% of GOG recurrent and investment budget to MEPU-FP and MESR by 1992			X
n. 35% education budget to primary education by 1992		X	
o. Creation of matching local currency fund for school construction		X	
p. Revised certification standards for private school		X	
q. $4/primary student annual expenditure on non-salary inputs	X		
r. All primary school children provided with textbooks and other teaching material		X	
s. All primary classrooms equipped with teaching material		X	
t. 2100 classrooms constructed by 1993		X	
u. 27% of rural classrooms operating on multigrade basis by 1992		X	
v. 30% reduction of repetition in 1993 over 1990		X	
w. Studies of obstacles to girls and rural children's enrollment data collected		X	

	YES	NO/ NOT/ YET	INSUF-FICIENT DATA
x. 7,852 teachers trained in French and mathematics	X		
y. 100% teachers tested	X		
z. 20% of teachers redeployed (1,700)	X		
aa. Provide technical assistance identified by the GOG		X	
bb. Provide equipment for MEPU-FP/DAAF		X	
cc. Conduct at least 10 workshops and seminars in educational and financial management		X	
dd. Provide overseas training to key MEPU-FP personnel		X	
ee. Disburse CY 90 NPA funds of $5.3 million	01/31/92		
ff. Disburse CY 91 NPA funds of $8.8 million	03/06/93		
gg. Disburse CY 92 NPA funds of $8.2 million	X		

* Notes on the status of logframe outputs included as Annex 7.

II. SUBSTANTIVE POLICY, REFORM AND QUALITY OF THE GUINEAN EDUCATION SYSTEM

A. Summary of past approaches

The decolonization of 1958 led to the rapid installation of an educational system of the most noble intentions - a radical (first) reform took place. Secondary education was expanded in order to train manpower to replace the departed colonial administrators. Egalitarian principles were instituted in accordance with socialist ideals, e.g. in the expansion of free primary education into remote areas and in the automatic admission of primary school graduates to secondary schools. The curriculum had to focus on Africa to reduce the alienation of students from their own society. A centralized administration and a nationally standardized curriculum had to further guarantee fairness and equality. Starting in 1968, vernacular languages replaced French as language of instruction. This reform was far-reaching and profound. The new system lasted until 1984 when a change of government put an end to African socialism in Guinea.

One of the changes in Guinean society introduced in 1984 was the restructuring of educational policy. This (second) reform included consolidating the education ministry, reorganizing regional educational management, and in-service training for teachers. In primary education French was re-instituted as the language of instruction which it had been under colonial rule. Conceived in haste and under political pressure, underfinanced and not addressing structural deficiencies, this reform remained somewhat ill defined. Its most visible element, the move back to French, had great symbolic and political importance; it did not address basic pedagogical and administrative deficiencies.

In its comments to the draft of this evaluation report, AID/W wrote that there was much more than far reaching and profound reform from 1958 to 1984. AID/W stated this period was more chaotic and wasteful than had been indicated in the draft, with the "top imposing one experiment after another on Guineans, to the point where parents preferred to keep ;their children out of school." AID/W referred to Section II. A. of the PAAD which noted the following:

> "During its short history, educational policy in Guinea has seen a number of upsets and reversals. Until the end of the colonial period, the Guinean education system was structured like the system in France. After independence, Guinea's education system attempted to assert its own character. In parallel with its revolutionary political orientation, education policy makers adopted, in the 1960s, a set of policies inspired by the Chinese cultural revolution. The emphasis of education was more focused on acquiring the "practical knowledge" of the people than academic competencies. This resulted in a tremendous increase in the number of "productive activities" (i.e., agricultural production) that took place in schools."
>
> "But the revolutionary leaders in Guinea saw education as a way to further their goals. In the first two decades after independence, the government of Guinea invested

tremendously in education. As a result, primary enrollments increased six-fold (42,000 to 252,000), and more than 2,000 new primary schools were constructed (from 370 to 2370). Three factors combined to support this growth in primary education: (1) a strong government commitment to education; (2) the near guaranteed recruitment of graduates into the civil service; and (3) the widespread belief (supported by the international community) that the lack of qualified manpower was the key obstacle to development. In fact, until the 1970, education was one of the highest priorities of government policy."

"In the 1970s, serious macroeconomic problems surfaced, undermining educational development. The economic crisis of 1977 dealt the first major blow to the sector. Economic stagnation strained public finances, and the Government redirected its scarce financial resources to public enterprises and parastatals in an attempt to achieve higher economic gains. Second, urban areas, which achieved the greatest growth in public schooling, were particularly hard hit since they did not have access to funds for commercializing agricultural products. Third, the public sector was unable to absorb any additional qualified manpower. Fourth, government policy turned away from primary education in favor of post-primary education, where they saw the greatest opportunity to produce "qualified manpower." In 1965, nearly half of government resources were directed to primary education (46.2 percent). In 1977, only about one quarter of the education budget went to primary schooling (24.5 percent). Fifth, the social demand for public primary schooling was on the decline, especially as child labor (especially for girls) in family farms became more important in the face of economic deterioration and as the growth of independent Koranic schools in certain regions increasingly satisfied the public's demand for schooling."

"Since 1970, educational development in Guinea can be characterized by a striking lack of continuity. Government policy has been as inconsistent, and planning has been exceptionally poor. During the 1970s and early 1980s, each of the levels of education (primary, secondary, and tertiary) has been marked by a lack of stable trends in enrollments and investments."

B. Summary of current policy

The education strategy of 1989 and the education sector adjustment (started in 1990) occasioned a profound (third) reform of primary education. The goals of the reform were the following:

- increase the resources allocated to primary education;
- expand primary level coverage;
- improve the quality and efficiency of primary education;
- promote equity in the system;
- strengthen the Ministry's management capacity; and
- promote decentralized management and planning capacity.

What the present reform intends to install is essentially a Western educational system, with few concessions to local reality beyond the content of some of the reading materials. Wide parts of the public perceive this system as incompatible with the local Islamic culture. Some observers note that the system trains students neither for the agricultural work nor for the informal sector jobs where most of them will end up. The country has had, and cast aside,

its first educational reform which had aimed at a "politically correct and culturally appropriate" system. It is now installing a system more attuned to the modern Western world, at least as far as formal content and structures are concerned.

C. The promise and limitation of a new approach

The new strategy is intended to integrate education progressively into the newly established market economy and to restructure the system according to the needs of the labor market (MEN, 1989: 12). It does not go into any detail concerning specific aptitudes and skills to be acquired nor does it expand on pedagogical methods. While school quality issues are not absent from the strategy's diagnostic part, the overall policy focus is quantitative: raise enrollment rates, raise the numbers, income and training cycles of teachers, reduce repetition rates, build more schools and, increase budgetary allocations for primary education. Even qualitative objectives are transformed into quantitative targets.[1]

This emphasis on quantitative goals has a positive aspect in that it sets clear targets and leaves no doubt about medium-term objectives (70% admission rate by 2000). It is open to criticism, however, for avoiding the hard questions of course content, learning objectives and the appropriateness of an overall pedagogical paradigm relying on authority, control, examination and negative sanction. The comments on quality in the first part of the strategy formulation (e.g., "la qualité de l'enseignement est particulièrement mauvaise", p. 7) are not followed by quality targets in the policy section.

PASE (Programme d'ajustement sectoriel de l'éducation) is the organizational expression of the new strategy. It is "extra-hierarchical" which gives the program the independence and flexibility but also defines its limitations. The independence implies that PASE can attract, absorb and channel foreign donor resources without necessarily being subject to the inefficiencies of Guinean public administration; this applies particularly to French resources which are handled in a project mode under "gestion directe". Among the limitations we find that PASE is limited to public sector work; the potential contribution of private education is ignored, and this despite the fact that it had received ample consideration in the strategy document (sections II.5 and III.6). It is this limitation which will make it difficult for PASE and the new educational strategy to reach their quantitative objectives. The public sector of primary education will not be allowed to more than double (from 23 to 47 Billion GF) its expenditures, in real terms, because this implies simply far too many opportunity costs in

[1] School quality is defined here as having two components: (a) the level of material inputs allocated per pupil (resource concentration), and (b) the level of efficiency with which fixed amounts of material inputs are organized and managed to raise pupil achievement (sometimes referred to as non-material inputs). Material inputs include such items as textbooks, desks, writing materials; one may also add space per student and "teacher availability" per student. In other words, student per classroom ratio and student per teacher ratio should be seen as reflecting material inputs. Non-material inputs affect how efficiently material inputs are put to use. They include teacher quality (schooling and training, social background, verbal proficiency and motivation), teacher behavior in class (e.g., use of instructional time, level of performance standards, quality of evaluation and feedback to students, ability to motivate students) and the organization of the school (e.g., director's honesty and management capability, collaboration between teachers, norms of achievement and, the schools legitimacy and "fit" in the community). Simply increasing material inputs does not guaranty any positive effect upon learning outcomes.

other parts of a state apparatus already undergoing restructuring. (For cost estimates and scenarios see the annex of this report).

USAID's country program strategic plan singles out primary schools "with emphasis on rural and female participation" in the third of its principal objectives (p. 1, par. 1). This emphasis is justified and laudable but it is also an example of donor-driven programs. Guinea's educational strategy paper pays little attention to girls and rural children. It is only in the World Bank (1990) and USAID (1990) documents that they receive some attention and in the recent USAID country strategy (1992) that they move to full prominence.

Whether PASE is implemented the educational reform in an efficient and effective way cannot yet be determined. Many of the quality improvements hoped for (such as lower classroom densities and student-teacher ratios, the supply of textbooks and higher levels of teacher training) take several years to achieve and to have a large-scale impact. Baseline data are weak in most areas which precludes an assessment of the cost of change. What can be said, however, is that so far most of the resources have been targeted at central units and their regional extensions, in the form of training, offices, cars, computers, trips abroad, technical assistance, etc., and that very little impact at the school level can be seen.

Some policy success, on the other hand, has been undeniable. The reform started with the Strategy paper of 1989 and led to structural adjustment in the education sector, restructuring of the ministry, redeployment of one quarter of the teaching force and many other changes. The prospects are much better now than they were in 1988, to provide basic education services of an increasing quality to increasing numbers of Guinean children. Further quality increases, however, are very much called for. Annexes 5 and 6 show that the number of graduates can be doubled, and access to schooling widened at the same time, if policy shifts to focusing on quality rather than quantity from now on. As it stands right now, close to 60% of the entire resources in primary education (salaries, buildings and everything else) are still wasted on students who will inevitably drop out. This can and should be changed.

The one policy matter which still awaits action is the opening up of private sector education. Both the Strategy of 1989 and the World Ban and USAID recommend that obstacles be removed and (at least non-monetary) resources be provided to enable the private sector to carry a greater share of the education burden. Nothing concrete has been done. This prompted the December, 1992, donors' meeting to call once more for a mobilization of the private sector. It can only be hoped that this essential step be finally taken.

D. Main issues in basic education

The shortcomings of Guinean education are expressions of the country's financial and political difficulties, the recency of the transition from colonialism, the scarcity and weakness of modern institutions, the low level of urbanization and the poverty of the population. While each of these conditions affects educational systems and performance in different ways, none of them is likely to be overcome without significant improvements in education. International comparison suggests that improving education has the potential of alleviating poverty,

strengthening institutions, accelerating urbanization and promoting democracy and other benefits of development.

The most salient issues in Guinean education include: (1) restricted access and limited enrollments; (2) the low quality of instructional delivery; and (3) the inefficient management of educational resources.

1. Restricted access and limited enrollments

Only 34% of primary school aged children (ages 7-12) attended school in 1992, mainly because of the lack of schools and the high cost of education. About 75% of Guinea's population lives in rural areas, mostly in dispersed settlements, yet there is only one school for about every 100 square kilometers (2,586 schools). Roads and public transportation are inadequate in large parts of the territory. School attendance is difficult for children who sometimes have to walk for more than one hour to school; the poor health and nutritional status in some regions tends to aggravate this difficulty even more. The direct and opportunity costs of education also make schools inaccessible for many, especially in poor, remote and rural areas; the relative weight of these costs tends to be inversely related to economic status. As a result, there are large rural-urban disparities in school attendance; few rural children complete the first cycle of education (6 years of primary schooling) and according to official statistics rural enrollment rates appear to be about half of urban rates. Female enrollments lag behind, and the gender gap is by no means only a problem of cultural patterns in rural areas: it is a structural feature everywhere, a response above all to economic constraints.

PASE started from a premise which turned out to be correct both in cultural and economic terms, that low enrollments are due to supply rather than demand factors (e.g., see IIPE/UNESCO, 1990: 1). In fact, there are many indications that most Guinean families do want to enroll their children in primary school but are prevented from doing so by the absence of schools which are close enough, culturally appropriate and affordable. Wherever available, schools are filled to capacity and beyond, communities contribute to their construction and renovation and families try to enroll at least their male children (on gender equity issues see chapter III).

Although starting from the right premise, the PASE approach has so far been incomplete in three ways:

- First, private sector education has not received much attention. The pedagogical potential and contribution of Koranic schools and Medersas is virtually ignored and the permission and certification procedure for conventional private schools have not been improved despite the calls included in both the Educational Strategy and PASE documents.

- Second, the PASE construction and renovation program has not been linked to any performance goals. This has lead to a simple expansion of access (which in fact has been successful only where French (1991), USAID (1992), EEC or other help was available). Expanding access to inadequate schools is a rather dubious achievement.

- Third, the PASE approach to quality improvements, has not gone very far yet. Improving school quality is by far the best way of increasing access to education. PASE has not had much impact yet, even in those areas targeted for early and sustained impact, such as school furniture and books.

One response to restricted access and insufficient supply is to provide double shift schools and multigrade classrooms. Both have been on the PASE program from the beginning and are now starting to have some impact. According to the Annuaire statistique 1991/92 there were 182 schools operating double shifts during that year, serving some 47,500 students or 13.2% of total enrollments. Double shift schools are a management problem only. Multigrade classrooms are a much more ambitious target in that they imply changes in pedagogical technique and teacher qualification. Instead of reaching 27% of students by 1993 (Logframe target), they cover presently only 9,300 students or 2.6%. However, training seminars and revised teaching plans are being worked on; it can be assumed that the proportion of multigrade classes will rise steadily over the next few years. They are essential in the one to three room schools typical of many rural areas.

Neither USAID's Technical Assistance project nor the NPA program, at the outset, focused on access and enrollment. However, PL 480 resources, not envisioned in the original project, were instrumental in achieving what little has been achieved by PASE in the area of school construction, USAID involvement has positively affected access to education in some remote areas. It can be estimated that the enrollment of some 5,000 students in 35 new schools will be at least partly attributable to the USAID effort. (For comparison purposes, the EEC can boast to have taken care of 225 new schools and some 10% of all students in the system but the level of completion of this effort appears uncertain at this time).

2. Low quality of instructional delivery

Even under the most difficult circumstances there are some teachers who make schools worthwhile. However, the average quality of instruction in Guinea is low. This low quality is associated with insufficient teacher training, incoherent recruitment practices, limited in-service training and classroom supervision, the lack of instructional materials and books, the absence of reliable achievement testing, and the poor physical condition and equipment of schools. These various school quality elements as well as the focus and impact of the PASE and USAID programs will be discussed on the basis of existing enrollments. The implications of future enrollment increases upon the cost of educational delivery will be discussed in annexes 4,5 and 6.

a. Insufficient teacher training

Considering present enrollment levels, Guinea has an insufficient number of teachers but most of the teachers meet certification standards. According to recent SSP documents (Programme prévisionnel and Annuaire statistique 1991-92), 97.1% of a total of 8,450 teachers (7,373 according to the Annuaire statistique) have the required academic preparation and the title of "instituteur" (either ordinaire or adjoint and, in each case, either stagiaire or not). The adjoints and stagiaires are awaiting promotions as they advance normally in their

careers. This is an excellent situation, compared to what is typical of many other countries. qualified teacher.

The nine teacher training colleges (Ecoles Normales d'Instituteurs), five of which are currently training primary school teachers, have the capacity to graduate about 500 fully trained teachers per year; current output is about 300. Given the present number of positions, this might appear to be sufficient. Nevertheless, teacher training is quantitatively insufficient because (a) the global student/teacher ratio (48.5) is much too high, (b) a rapid expansion of enrollments has set in and is likely to continue and, (c) a certain (unknown) proportion of ENI graduates do not go into primary school teaching and, (d) informal evidence suggests that the length of the average teaching career does not exceed 15 years.

One significant issue has attracted the attention of planners and authorities alike: the fact that an entire generation of teachers has been trained, between 1968 and 1984, to teach in National languages rather than French. As a result, the efficiency of these teachers is reduced whether French be the subject or the medium of instruction.

The content and quality of instruction at the Ecoles Normales are not included in the present evaluation but it appears that they are still open to improvement. French, Canadian and other donors are presently focusing their attention on this issue.

b. Incoherent teacher recruitment practices

Due to fiscal constraints, few ENI graduates have been hired over the last three years. Such a temporary hiring freeze has significant long-term implications in that (a) the diminished job prospects lead to a negative selection of candidates while (b) many of the most dynamic recent graduates will have drifted off towards other careers. Like all training institutions, the Ecoles Normales function best when their numbers of students and graduates remain constant over a number of years. The flow cannot be turned on and off at will without seriously affecting the quality of the product.

PASE has not had much effect, so far, upon recruitment practices. Neither the "Statut particulier de l'enseignant" nor other measures to strengthen teachers' careers and career expectations have been implemented. Even the 100% salary increases of 1991 affected the entire civil service and did not do much to improve the status of teachers as such.

In one way PASE has had a very positive effect on recruitment: close to a quarter of all teachers have been assigned to new positions. This redeployment of teachers appears to have exceeded the plan. While the plan was to move 1466 teachers into new posts in primary schools, in effect a total of 1862 teachers were moved either vertically (from secondary to primary schools) or geographically (to other primary schools where they were more urgently needed).

One risk of such an operation of massive redeployment is that it introduces an element of uncertainty into the system and the careers of individuals. In some cases such is the intention: the message is that the employer is no longer willing to tolerate fictitious names on the payroll, sinecures, teaching assignments of two hours per week at full salary and the like.

As a cleaning-up operation the redeployment effort was justified, even overdue. Human resources are now allocated in a more rational way. However, it has to be noted that the re-allocation was a purely quantitative measure, in no way connected to quality measures such as experience or classroom performance. It even appears that the tests which led to massive firings in other parts of the civil service had very little such impact in the education sector. Most teachers were simply scheduled for more in-service training, whatever the test results.

USAID potentially has a significant contribution to make to the implementation of a coherent system of recruiting and assigning manpower for primary schools. This is one aspect of the proposed monitoring and evaluation system where administrative and pedagogical considerations coincide. The monitoring of manpower characteristics including training levels, in conjunction with the school mapping already under way at PASE, will allow an optimal use of the human resources available as well as coherent recruiting for annual replacements. It is high time that an adequate monitoring system be put into place.

c. Limited in-service training

Up to the arrival of PASE, the responsibility for in-service training resided within the IPN. Individual teachers were singled out for additional training by inspectors in response to particular needs observed and reported. In effect, however, most teachers were pretty much left to their own devices once they had been trained, hired and assigned. Pedagogical supervision and support on an ongoing basis was not much in evidence in the pre-PASE days. Some observers have attributed this to internal weaknesses of IPN while others have blamed the general public service mentality. The result is the same: despite official certification, large numbers of teachers remain inadequately trained.

PASE has successfully implemented a massive in-service training program aimed at the near-totality of teachers. The justification of the program was that an entire generation of teachers was lacking adequate French language skills, having been trained for teaching in vernacular languages during the time of the First Republic. The goal of this program was to provide four months of training (in French, mathematics and sometimes in pedagogical methods) at a Centre de perfectionnement linguistique (CPL) to 7,771 teachers. Progress reports indicate that all but 646 of them have by now been trained. The remaining candidates are scheduled for this Spring. While there seems to be considerable satisfaction with these stages de perfectionnement at the CPL, problems are apparent in three areas: (1) supply and distribution problems made it impossible for teachers to take with them the new manuals and teachers' guides after completion of the course; (2) the integration of new knowledge and teaching methods into everyday teaching activities is uncertain and (3) teaching activities are insufficiently monitored.

One of the effects of the massive in-service training campaign has been that IPN has lost a significant part of this market. Since 1992 lines of function, authority and budgets lead from the Centre de formation continue (CFC, which houses the Centre de perfectionnement linguistique CPL) to the DPE and from there to the IRE and MEPU-FP. IPN is thus bypassed and relegated to its many other functions.

In-service training turned out to be disruptive. In the absence of substitute teachers, classes were left unattended, teachers and directors had to supervise several classrooms at once, teaching was interrupted for weeks at a time and teaching schedules could not be implemented. Such outcomes are probably unavoidable in a system stretched to the limits even during normal times. But it must be noted that after correctly identifying the problem, PASE has reacted to the challenge in only the most conventional ways. There was, for example, no attempt to mobilize university students as substitute teachers, to use parents for supervisory duty, to install radios or other audio equipment, to stimulate teams, peer teaching or any other pedagogical innovation. The only options used were to send the children home for the duration or to provide them with partial supervision by teachers who had already too many other children on their hands.

d. Limited classroom supervision

MEPU-FP has a corps of about 348 inspectors (DPSP or Directeur Pédagogique Sous-Préfectoral) who carry out mainly administrative functions. School visits by these educators could mitigate the effects of inadequate or inappropriate teacher training. They represent the most important outreach of the reform movement and are in theory responsible for making sure that the curriculum is followed, class size limits are respected, normal teaching schedules are applied, and the like. School quality depends very much on school directors but inspectors have an important supervisory role to play.

In any hierarchical order the list of priorities is all-important. It appears that pedagogical matters presently rank rather low on that list and get no more than scant attention. MEPU-FP's inspectorate is very good at delivering some services, e.g., office furniture and cars to those high in the hierarchy. It is good at delivering some flow of information such as directives from top to bottom and enrollment figures from bottom to top. What it is not very good at is assuring that DPEs and IREs provide essential pedagogical services such as classroom supervision, textbooks and pedagogical counseling. The evaluation team has confirmed that many school visits do take place, at least in the more accessible schools. But the inspection seems to be formalistic: the DPSP checks that enrollment figures are posted and something resembling school registers are kept. What is rarely taking place is what the inspector's title (directeur pédagogique) implies - pedagogical direction is not being given very often. It appears that many DPSPs have neither adequate training nor motivation to go beyond formal compliance in their work.

School quality and learning achievement suffer accordingly. As the evaluation team observed, incompetent teachers continue to teach and receive their salaries, the absence of textbooks is tolerated, outdated pedagogical methods (exemplified by the often-present whip and the stultifying memorization technique) remain in place and little progress seems to be made despite the extensive in-service training which occurred over the last three years.

PASE symbolizes the educational reform and has already started to strengthen the inspection functions e.g., by supplying motorcycles). However, establishing additional control structures alone is an expensive and inefficient way of raising school quality. Only when pedagogical services, training and school materials are combined will a stronger inspection apparatus be justified.

USAID has so far aimed at building up the kind of institutional, especially administrative, capacity which should provide the general frame within which classroom supervision and support services take place. More will be said about this activity in chapter 4 of this report.

e. Curricular definition

The Institut Pédagogique National is in charge of defining and adjusting the curriculum, preparing teaching plans for each subject and grade level and supervising the application of this overall program. IPN has a proud history: built and co-financed by technical assistance from socialist countries (mainly GDR) during the First Republic, it has been the principal center for and advocate of educational reform. The combination of nationalist and anticolonialist sentiment, progressive pedagogical thinking and development orientation of the 'sixties and 'seventies made the IPN into an institution of great national importance: this is where the most progressive forces of the nation came together to devise ways to mold children into the "new man" so dear to revolutionary ideologies at the time. The curriculum imposed teaching in vernacular languages, which became much more than a pedagogical tool: it was the expression of an ideology, a structure and a government. It was widely opposed by parents (as well as some of the older teaching establishment) who saw French language skills as the indispensable condition for social promotion. When French was re-instituted as the language of instruction in 1984, there was dramatic impact with enrollment in first grade doubled approximately from (59,000 to 110,000).

A formal curriculum, programs and teaching schedules (elaborated in 1987) presently exist at IPN but their dissemination and implementation is irregular. None of the teachers interviewed by the evaluation team had a printed copy of the program and teaching schedules at hand. In other cases, however, the team discovered excellent adaptations to the condition of scarcity. E.g., in several schools the director (or his substitute) had teachers prepare a detailed teaching program for every day and every hour of the day. This program was reviewed every morning before the beginning of classes and checked and initialed by the director or his representative. A teacher's "carnet" worth 80 cents thus became a principle curriculum tool.

Another tool to ensure program implementation is the posting, on the classroom wall next to the teacher's desk, of a handwritten copy of the program for the month or the entire school year; this was observed in about one quarter of the classrooms visited by the team.

PASE has brought movement into a situation of extreme scarcity. By providing training to most teachers and by mobilizing administrative and pedagogical structures, PASE has certainly had some impact upon administrative efficiency and curricular conformity (which are the proper functions of any inspectorate). But much work remains to be done, both in disseminating programs and in supervising their application.

Baseline data and adequate monitoring and evaluation are unfortunately not available yet but there can be little doubt that more frequent monitoring of classroom activities and increased adherence to the official curriculum will improve instruction and raise achievement levels. This is what has been found elsewhere, including in the Botswana primary school program sponsored by USAID (Loxley quoted in Fuller, 1986: 47). Monitoring and

evaluation will receive major attention from the proposed new Chief of Party of proposed new A.I.D. technical assistance contractor.

USAID is not active now in the area of curriculum but has the potential to contribute significantly to its implementation. The single greatest obstacle to curricular conformity at the school level is the absence of books and teachers' manuals. By stimulating activity in the area of conception, production and dissemination of books and by installing an adequate system for monitoring school resources in general, USAID can also have an essential impact on the pedagogical improvement.

f. Lack of instructional materials and books

Greater availability of texts and reading materials will almost always raise the quality of learning activities and thereby increase achievement levels. "Un élève sans livre est condamné" -this universal truth about primary education is demonstrated in Guinea every day. The book situation is so desperate that immediate and sustained action is called for. Most Guinean students do not have a single book of any kind and those who do have a book frequently do not have the appropriate one in hand during class time or for their homework.

The SSP's annual "enquête" collects data on the availability of books in every school. According to last year's Annuaire Statistique, there were a total of 385,564 books for 359,406 primary school students. A full set of books for all students in all schools, controlled for grade level, would mean that there would be 1,248,416 books or 3.75 books per student.

SSP's book counts are probably overly optimistic. Impressionistic evidence and informal counts by the evaluation team suggest that fewer than 30% for the children have any book at all and fewer than 10% have a complete set required at their grade level, whatever the formula for ownership may be. The situation seems to be a highly polarized one: on the one hand there is the majority schools where books are hardly ever used and on the other hand there is the minority of schools where all the students have all the necessary books. The aggregate results published by SSP do not help us understand the determinants of this polarized distribution of books. Yet there clearly are schools which do not compromise concerning textbooks: the evaluation team visited one school where every single student from grade 2 upwards had the appropriate book. The school was private, run by a protestant mission in N'Zérékoré. One implication of this observation is clear. Private schools do better than public schools in assuring that students have sufficient pedagogical material.

The best approach to affecting learning outcomes by supplying books is an integrated one: curricular reform, teacher training and the distribution of books should be coordinated in order to ensure appropriate use and maximum effect. However, even an unsophisticated and partial approach can do a lot of good; this is the lesson learned from the Mexican reform which flooded the country with books in a most generous fashion.

IPN is officially charged with the elaboration and publication of textbooks but has edited few books in recent years (it appears that seven books are in various stages of conception and testing). Even among those which have come out, none has been produced in IPN's own printing facility for several years. In 1992, IPN published a new textbook for first year

French, complete with an extensive teacher's manual. Both were used in the latest series of in-service teacher training but with few exceptions had not arrived in the hands of either teachers or students. Other books currently available (in limited numbers) at IPN include:

- Calcul, 3e année, 1989
- Sciences d'observation, 3e année, 1989
- Histoire, 3e année, 1989
- Histoire, 5e et 6e annqes, 1986
- Géographie, 4e année, 1986
- Géographie, 5e et 6e années, 1986
- Histoire et sciences d'observation, 3e année (Guide du maître), no publication date.

The latter guide is the only booklet among the above seven works which was published in Guinea; all of the others were printed in France or Belgium.

PASE is attempting to make inroads in the textbook area, as evidenced by the new IPN French textbook. But the transition will be slow and gradual since the pedagogical approach currently dominant in Guinea is still reminiscent of a traditional French approach - highly structured and relying on authoritative teaching and memorization more than some more modern approaches. On the positive side this means that books produced in France, Sénégal, Morocco and Côte d'Yvoire can be and are being put to use in Guinea without requiring a total revamping and rewriting of every other book. On the negative side it suggests that the day is still far off when Guinean children will profit from the stimulation and liberation promised by modern participatory pedagogy.

USAID is not active in the area of textbooks through its T.A. project but has recently become involved through a PL 480 program (for the Second grade French textbook and teacher's manual). Unless USAID chooses to go into the area of textbooks and teachers' manuals in a big way, e.g. in collaboration with IPN, the American contribution in this field will remain indirect. Stronger and decentralized administrative structures will ultimately lead to a more general and more timely distribution of books.

g. Poor physical condition and equipment of schools

Guinea presently has 2,586 primary schools containing 8,415 classrooms, 7,374 teachers and 359,406 students. The average school is thus small, and small schools (one to three classrooms) are frequent (1,762 or 68% of schools). 1,972 or 23% of the classrooms have been identified by the 1991/92 enquête as being in a bad state, i.e., in need of extensive renovation (e.g., because of a lack of doors and windows). In addition, about one seventh of the school furniture (benches, closets, teachers' desks) are described as needing repair or replacement. Many schools lack latrines and few have water.

However, the most important problem is not the physical condition as such but the overcrowding of the schools. It is not uncommon to see four students on a rickety bench designed for two and to find well over 100 children in a single classroom (the record observed by this team was 142 of whom 132 were present). One wonders how much learning can go on under present conditions of congestion and noise.

PASE has so far set out to build and/or renovate classrooms. The administrative and financial difficulties associated with this program component are dealt with elsewhere in this report.

USAID has been instrumental in bringing the school construction program to a partial success. Thanks to the infusion of PL 480 funds some of this work is now progressing well. But it is clearly no more than a modest start. If present enrollment increases should become permanent and if pedagogical and learning outcomes are to be improved, a massive expansion and renovation of the physical installations will have to take place.

Parents' Associations (Association des parents d'élèves et amis de l'école, APEAE) have played an important part in putting new schools on the map, be it by financing a whole school or - more frequently - by supplying labor (sand, rocks, water) when a new project is launched. Their efforts have not always been rewarded by PSAE or MEPU-FP: stories abound about APEAEs having made their contribution but still waiting for the government's.

3. Inefficient management of educational resources

a. Quality management

In the 1991/92 school year the Guinean primary education system had 359,400 students and produced 24,100 6th grade graduates. This constitutes an improvement: 15.0 student-years per graduate, compared with 16.1 three years earlier.[2] However, it is still an expression of low internal efficiency. In an ideal case - no dropouts and no repeaters - 359,000 students should produce close to 60,000 graduates. But Guinea's system produces a lot more dropouts than graduates. This wastage at present accounts for 60%[3] of all school places, all teachers' salaries, in short, of the whole system cost. Again, this is a slight improvement, down from 62% three years ago.

The principal problem is that the system drags along vast numbers of students who must drop out after having wasted some years and public resources. We are not talking here of the majority of children who never make it into school; they are a serious, but different, problem. Many of them are denied access because most school spaces are taken up by students who will never make it.

Without much expansion and without any increase in public expenditure, the system could produce twice as many graduates. Costing out school quality improvements has convinced this team that great efficiency gains can be reached if the decision is taken to produce quality instead of quantity, and graduates instead of dropouts.

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[2] This quick estimate does not account for system expansion (1991/92) or contraction (1990/91). There is an urgent need for better data and more analytical treatment of what data exists. Even a partial education sector study would help.

[3] 15.0 student-years expended for every 6-year cycle means that 9.0 student-years, or 60% are taken up by dropouts who never graduate.

How can this be achieved and what is the cost? First, the private sector must be let to expand; it will respond to the parental demand for school spaces. Second, selection of teacher training candidates should be made among Brevet graduates rather than among Baccalauréat failures, and their training should take four, not three years. Third, textbooks should be introduced in complete sets, supplied for next-to free and become property and responsibility of either parents or parents' associations. Fourth, student-teacher ratios should be reduced to 40, with a maximum of 50 enforced. Fifth, and most importantly, a socially appropriate incentive system should be devised which makes it imperative to both teachers and school directors to respect the rules concerning textbooks and class sizes.

b. Administrative management

Chapter four of this report will specifically address management issues. But it may be useful here to point to a few school-level management issues which affect educational outcomes. They are selected on the basis of observations made by outsiders during recent school visits and are in no way intended to cover the field completely.

1) School directors

- School directors frequently lack managerial skill or inclination. In any event, since they have no power over payroll and staffing they do not have much leverage when teachers leave something to be desired in motivation, conduct or performance. But they do have influence over course content, examinations and many other elements if they so desire.

- The storage and use of books also fall under the director's authority and there is no inherent need to keep books locked up rather than putting them to use in class.

- Directors could impose maximum class sizes rather than permitting the overcrowding which makes pedagogical progress just about impossible.

- One of the big wastes in many schools is the neglect of girls, and much of this waste could be avoided by better management of even very low existing resources. Directors and teachers are frequently aware of particular school and teacher attributes which reduce enrollment, retention and achievement of girls but do little about them. If some responsible directors can manage their schools in such a way that curriculum and pedagogy become serious matters, then it should also be possible to encourage and reward behaviors which specifically promote and encourage girls.

2) Community associations

- Some parents' associations do little beyond collecting de facto school fees (e.g., for a repairs fund or a books fund) and mobilizing unpaid labor for school construction (which can be interpreted as a form of regressive taxation). Other associations do nothing at all. But there are also APE's which take interest and pride in their school, which meet frequently and which discuss issues such as uniforms, subsidies, choice of textbooks, egalitarian and efficient formulas for book ownership and the like.

Directors and teachers can be mobilizers of APE resources or they can let them sleep. Community participation is very much a management problem at the local level.

There is a tendency to conceive of and solve management problems in a top-to-bottom fashion and PASE has only started to reverse this tendency. If experiences made elsewhere are applicable at all they would tend to teach us that sustainable improvement at school level depends not only upon an efficient central administrative apparatus capable of channeling resources out to the periphery but also upon the periphery's capacity to put these resources to good use, claim ownership over them and instill pride in the users. The USAID contribution to monitoring and evaluating educational resources will ultimately lead individual schools to putting them to better use, protecting them from misuse, theft or neglect and establishing a better balance of resources and responsibilities between the center and those remote areas making up three quarters of Guinea.

E. Summary of findings

In the previous sections we presented the Guinean educational reform and its major target: a school system in need of repair. In the following pages we summarize our main findings in the areas of project design, implementation and the research component. There are three overall findings which strikes us as more general and more important. They sum up what are the principles limitation to the PASE approach.

- So far, PASE has concentrated expenditures in Conakry and supported an expansion of a very conventional educational system. Only little additional resources has arrived in the classroom and made a difference for the students and what they learn. Nobody should find a situation acceptable where central expenditures are so great and pedagogical results so meager.

- Costing out the reform targets in the context of the demographic evolution has convinced us that the present approach is not sustainable. Two political decisions are necessary in order to avoid costly failure. First, the emphasis must switch from quantity to quality, away from producing more student-years and school leavers ill prepared for employment, to producing more well trained graduates. Second, the obstacles to expanding private education must be removed.

- The emphasis on material inputs (e.g., school construction) and organizational upgrading (e.g., redeployment of teachers) has diverted attention from the question of how to effect change in socially appropriate ways. It is pointless to inject resources in a neutral or "technically optimal" way. Only if the users of the new resources have the motivation to put them to the intended use will there be a positive effect in the classroom.

1. Findings concerning project design

a. Emphasis on developing institutions capable of increasing school quality

PASE has identified the need for strong central institutions capable of controlling and distributing increasing resource flows to schools throughout the country. But a broader base of support appears both desirable and possible.

b. Conventional nature of interventions

Project design is exceedingly conventional with its emphasis on a central Ministry and its extensions (IRE, DPE), school construction, and teacher training. By avoiding the risks associated with more original approaches (e.g.,radio éducative, audio-visual teaching aids, community control, curricular flexibility, private schools, performance rewards), PASE makes it less likely that equity issues can be addressed effectively. It also remains tied to inefficient governmental structures and processes.

c. Concentration of resources in central places

By concentrating resources in the central government and the capital city, PASE will contribute to rural/urban imbalances. Since the PAAD, at present, aims primarily at central institutional capacity building, USAID will have little influence on increasing support to rural areas.

d. Socially inappropriate methods of resource delivery

Little social-scientific thinking appears to have gone into the project design. To give just three examples: (1) It is assumed that retrained teachers will put their newly sharpened pedagogical techniques to work in the classroom. Will they do so? This means more work without any additional benefit. (2) It is assumed that printing and distributing textbooks means that students will have books in their hands. Why should that be so, when there are neither incentives nor penalties for inspectors, school directors and teachers, to make sure books will actually be used? (3) It is assumed that budgeting funds in the Ministry for school construction will mean that schools will be constructed, and that construction cost will be roughly equal to the budgeted amount. Why should this be so? The request of the PASE Coordinator for PL 480 funds may indicate that the assumptions were incorrect. More attention must be given to socially and politically appropriate ways of targeting, managing and monitoring donor resources.

2. Findings concerning project implementation

a. Pre-service teacher training insufficient

Insufficient numbers of teachers are presently being trained, virtually none are being hired and the selection of candidates for teacher training (exclusively among Baccalaureat rejects) is less than optimal. In service training cannot make up for such serious deficiencies.

b. In service teacher training without follow-up

PASE has retrained virtually all teachers (7125 out of 7771). While there seems to be considerable satisfaction with these "stages de perfectionnement" at the CPL, problems are apparent in three areas: (1) supply and distribution problems made it impossible for the teachers to take with them the new manuals and teachers' guides after completion of the course; (2) the integration of new knowledge and teaching methods into everyday teaching activities is uncertain and (3) insufficient monitoring of teacher activity.

c. Pedagogical priorities rank low

There is no system in place which rewards performance in pedagogical areas. Teachers get paid whatever their performance, directors have no interest in seeing that their charges have textbooks and when teachers go for training, classes are often closed down. Since pedagogical results are the only justification for having schools it follows that expanding and reinforcing the existing system is pointless.

d. School construction and renovation outside regular budgets

School construction delays were the norm rather than the exception. Given the negative experiences of other donor in this area and the positive experience of USAID's PL 480 - financed construction program it appears clear that the latter direct approach has good prospects in the foreseeable future.

e. Critical lack of instructional materials

Instructional materials of any kind are scarce in most classrooms and what little is available is hardly put to optimal use. The system has become adapted to functioning largely without textbooks and other instructional materials. Introducing textbooks can be the single most productive aspect of the educational reform now under way - yet one perceives little urgency in this matter.

3. Findings concerning research

a. Uncertain learning outcomes

In the absence of a complete baseline study and standardized, controlled examinations, it will be difficult to attribute learning gains to particular actions under the program. It is fortunate that the FAC has now taken the initiative to produce some of the evaluation tools; even so the lag time for measurable improvements will make it unlikely that policy-relevant research results can be produced much before 1995.

b. Need for monitoring and evaluation

While the evaluation of cognitive outcomes is now being organized, the monitoring of school expenditures, specific material inputs, teacher quality and school management appear

insufficiently covered in the CEPEC proposal. The USAID contractor should now be in a position to undertake such monitoring at least in pilot regions.

c. Research needs not served adequately

There is evidence of non-central administrators and school directors putting results of the school mapping and statistical documentation to good use, e.g. in the assignment of additional teachers. Critical weaknesses remain (1) the absence of computers, inappropriate model choices and inadequate training levels; (2) dependence upon a single technical assistant at the SSP central research facility; and, (3) authority relationships and administrative structures which discourage autonomous analysis and the rapid dissemination of research results.

d. Need for partial education sector study

Implementation of the PASE and the educational reform in general would greatly profit from the availability of more and better data concerning many aspects of education in Guinea. Educational planners have many questions but have only the most inadequate bases on which to make decisions. To give just three examples of such questions.

- What effects can be expected of such an intervention as the construction of an additional six classrooms in a village? School mapping data are terribly flawed (see annex 4), and it is nearly impossible to estimate local demand and saturation levels. The cost of schooling to families is unknown; hence it is hard to assess what additional demands will be placed upon them.

- How will an intervention (such as the supply of textbooks) affect other variables in the educational process? Little is known today about the relative contribution textbooks make to learning outcomes in Guinean children. For example, we do not know what type of teacher in what type of school setting will get the most use out of the books.

- Should there be an intermediate exam or certificate within the 6-year primary cycle? We have observed that 60% of all resources are used to produce dropouts. This situation cannot be changed radically but some intermediate solutions and improvements may be within reach. To select them, some preliminary questions should be raised, such as: Is there value in a partial primary education? Are dropouts literate or illiterate? It might be possible to lead a lot more children to a grade 4 completion - which might constitute basic literacy and numeracy -, but is there any point in doing so? There is no data base to even address such a question.

F. Recommendations

1. A mini (partial) education sector study should be undertaken. It should develop data on the following topics in reference to primary education:

Economic aspects

- School fees (and their equivalent in formal or informal contributions) and family budget studies to describe more adequately the magnitude and incidence of educational costs.

- Special analysis of opportunity costs as they affect the enrollment and retention rates of disadvantaged children

- Unit costs, cycle costs and educational financing

- Returns to Guinean education, with special attention to social vs. private returns.

Social aspects

- Demand for public and private education.

- Role of Koranic schools in promoting literacy, and their possible complimentarily with Western education.

- Schooling as a determinant of migration to cities and emigration

- Projection of population and demand for schooling at national, regional and sub-regional levels.

Educational system performance aspects

- General system documentation (admissions, enrollments, repetition etc.) similar to what is currently being done at SSP but with an emphasis on more complete, in-depth analysis.

- Recruitment, profile and performance of teachers.

- Level, type and distribution of material inputs, as defined earlier in this report.

- Student flow analysis to determine the types and proportions of students who repeat, drop out and are promoted at each level.

- Analysis of transfers between schools and system subdivisions, especially to determine where and when dropouts can re-enter.

- Comparative performance of school types and educational innovations in terms of learning outcomes, 6th grade graduation, 7th grade admission, selection and retention of students and costs per cycle and per graduate.

Some of these analyses can be started almost immediately since data is readily available at SSP. Other aspects will necessitate new collections of empirical data. Some topics will need

time series data collections which can only be started, but not completed, in 1993. One aspect specifically excluded here is the comparative analysis of Guinean schools and educational innovations and those in other parts of West Africa. Such comparison is important but should be handled as a separate research task. The same holds for ethnographic studies of classroom settings and learning processes in schools; such studies are important but would slow down the mini-sector-study proposed here.

2. Improvements in school quality and internal efficiency should take precedence over central expenditures. Central expenditures should be tied to previous performance in the area of school quality.

3. USAID should make a major effort to ensure that all Guinean schools are equipped with textbook and that educational cadre and teachers find it in their interest to put them to use. While this can partly be done by assisting IPN in the production and distribution of textbooks, other avenues, such as supporting the growth of private schools, need to be explored as well.

4. USAID should investigate and encourage the growth of private schools in order to relieve MEPU-FP of the growing pressure of increasing enrollment. This can be done by (a) using its influence at the highest level to ensure that legal and administrative procedures are changed to facilitate the opening and accreditation of private schools as well as the recognition of the diplomas it confers; (b) starting a pilot project assisting PVO's to open private schools and, (c) providing small loans through the Private Sector Office to a few entrepreneurs interested in opening private schools through, perhaps, cooperation with A.I.D.'s Rural Enterprise Development Project (675-0215).

III. ENROLLMENT, EDUCATION AND BENEFITS TO GIRLS AND RURAL CHILDREN

A. The basic dilemma: structural discrimination

The disadvantages of women compared to men and of rural compared to urban populations are neither new nor superficial or ephemeral. In the case of girls and women they are the result of a long evolutionary process, of deeply rooted cultural patterns and of what today is called structural discrimination; to help women you must alter parts of the socio-economic structure. In the case of rural populations the penetration of modern states, communications and economic exchanges has undercut old patterns of self-determination and self-sufficiency. The imbalance of political and economic power today is such that the city can extract resources at will from rural areas. Price differentials are the mechanism to achieve this extraction in the case of economic resources and the product of labor. Migration is the mechanism with extracts human resources. Unequal exchange has been the norm. To help rural populations one must change the rules of the game.

Three processes can alter the established patterns of structural discrimination. The modern state penetrates society and economy as no state has done before. Economic development can shake traditional structures. Mass education can provide a more equal start to everybody. All three processes are at work in Guinea and can potentially break open old structures, redefine roles and empower the disadvantaged. But these are ambivalent processes which can also reinforce established stratification and aggravate the position of women and other disadvantaged groups.

This, then, is the basic dilemma for PASE and the USAID project: Can resources channelled to the state benefit groups which can neither lobby nor control the state? In a more general sense, can established interests be trusted to help those who have been victims of their neglect for so long?

These questions go to the heart of development aid targeting central institutions. Answers concerning PASE will have relevance well beyond the education sector.

Here is how the PAAD expected the project to work : "If the administrative reforms enhance the capacity of the sector to expand primary schooling, then the program will also benefit primary school teachers, administrators, students and their parents. If resources are redistributed as intended, the reforms will also benefit school-aged rural populations and girls."

To the credit of the PAAD authors they were uncertain and their own statement. Not only did their "risk analysis" question whether any of the expected equity impacts would quickly take place, but in a different section of the PAAD they proposed to research the low levels of school enrollment of the disadvantaged groups. In other words, they wanted to find out why those groups do not automatically "also benefit" in the world of trickle-down economics.

To some observers, e.g. those of Simon Fass' convictions (see his 1992 paper on the place of education in the Sahel), the PASE approach is more than a dilemma, it is a "Mission Impossible". To others, most notably the UNESCO trained specialists gathering in IPNs throughout the francophone world, the carefully targeted infusion of resources at central structures can incite them to dispense services benefitting all. Later parts of this chapter will explore which position is supported by the Guinean evidence, but let us first go through a listing of which equity actions were planned and which were carried out under the project.

B. Equity actions proposed by USAID

The social analysis of the PAAD identified girls and rural populations as the most disadvantaged groups and recommended that USAID encourage and support the Government to carry out the following actions which would accomplish equity objectives outlined in the PAAD:

- social marketing campaigns at every level of Government to increase demand for primary schooling;
- school construction and rehabilitation (including construction of school latrines) to increase the supply of schooling in rural areas;
- specific interventions to promote quality (incentive programs and recognition for good schools, in-service training of teacher and directors, improved inspection systems);
- redistribution of public resources to increase the share of schools in rural areas (thereby decreasing costs for parents who might not otherwise be able to afford schooling);
- interventions and pilot programs at regional levels to address specific constraints to girls schooling (e.g. nursery schools, lower age limits, changes in school hours and calendar);
- recognition of those koranic schools that impart literacy and numeracy skills to girls.

The PAAD thought that specific interventions to address equity must necessarily come from the Government and also stated that evidence that the interventions outlined above are incorporated in Government planning and implementation of the PASE would satisfy specific conditions.

C. Implementation of equity actions

1. Conditionality

The particular condition concerning gender and equity is Condition F which stated that prior to the second disbursement, GOG will have:

"Conducted a study to be funded by the technical assistance component of the GESR, to determine the factors involved in household decisions to enroll children in primary schools and developed a plan to redress constraints at national and regional levels to the enrollment of children in rural areas and girls ..."

A first response to Condition F by the GOG (at the March, 1991, review) did not prove satisfactory to USAID. Following the review, A.I.D. had a meeting with SSP to explain conditionality and the types of data and information required. By the time an FSU consultant returned in 1992, new documentation had been submitted by GOG which the consultant was asked to review.

The GOG produced the reports which apparently satisfied condition F. Among the documents put on the table were the following

a. "Valorisation des Ressources de l'Education et de la Carte Scolaire en République de Guinée: Enseignement Primaire" (2/12/91);

b. "Rapport sur le Données de Base de la Scolarisation en Guinée 1990" (4/91);

c. "Analyse des Statistiques scolaires 1990-91" (1/92);

d. "Etude portant sur les aspects socio-culturels et socio-économiques de la scolarisation des filles au niveau du primaire: Cas de la Guinée" (4/91) by Passy Kourouma and,

e. "Réalisation d'une analyse de la situation des jeunes filles dans tous les cycles de l'enseignement public et privé en République de Guinée (4/90) by Becaye Camara (UNICEF);

f. "Orienting report on analysis of barriers and factors influencing the educational participation of girls and rural children in Guinea" (5/21/92), by Karen Tiejen under the FSU contract.

While these studies were deemed sufficient to fulfill condition F they should not be considered as more than a small first step in the direction indicated by the PAAD. For one thing, studies #a and #b contain little or no text; tables and routine administrative statistics do not constitute a study. Secondly, the PAAD was surely asking for a new study to be done, not a previous UNICEF piece (#e) to be unearthed. Studies #c and #d are thin by any measure, containing an honest but limited effort. #c is not much more than routine annual updating of education parameters without much focus on girls. #d contains some good descriptive reporting of field data. Interestingly, it refers (p.21) to a future equity study to be done in PASE (to fulfill condition F); hence it is not itself that study! Studies #a to #e simply ignore much that has been done in the field. Finally, the last on the list (#f), was well-informed, comparative in scope, lucid and written with true passion. It stands out as the only study which should be acceptable to the authors of condition F.

4 2. Specific actions undertaken by USAID

a. National Committee on Gender and Equity

In 1991, USAID encouraged the GOG to create a national committee on gender equity to study the question of girls education and rural children, the obstacles, disparities, and factors influencing parental decisions to educate these children, especially girls, and to come up with a plan of action to address the issues. The 6-person committee is headed by the Secretary General of Primary Education, Dr. Aly Badara Doukoure, and is made up of the following members: Mme. Passy Kourouma DNES, Mr. Kandet Sylla DNEE, Mme. Diariou Sow S.E.C.F.E, Mr. Bilo-Barry, SSP, Mr. Mamadou Tamsir Diallo, IPN. Since its creation in 1991, the commitee has been able to achieve the following:

- identified and reviewed all the studies conducted on the subject of gender, equity and access;
- analyzed and interpreted data available at the SSP which show that girls and children in rural areas are discriminated against;
- identified factors and constraints associated with the education of the least advantaged children.

USAID provided assistance to the commitee to accomplish the above tasks through an FSU consultant who visited Guinea a number of times to provide assistance to the committee. The review of the various documents culminated in an orienting report prepared by the same consultant identified the various levels where problems and obstacles exist (School level: lack of infrastructure, distance from home to school, pregnancy, etc.; Household level: socio-economic factors, high cost of education, household chores, indifference to value of education etc.).

b. In depth research

The orienting report also proposed in depth action research into specific areas such as (1) costs of education, to identify pressure points in parental decision to send their children to school; (2) structure and quality of schooling to identify how schools can be made more effective and accessible in the eyes of parents; (3) classroom interaction and behavior to identify factors which encourage or discourage children in the classroom; (4) and religious schools to determine if they present a viable option for extending primary education. This proposed research was planned for October 1992 but has been put aside for the time being in favor of a social marketing and mobilization campaign. An identical research design is now being studied by a joint A.I.D./Washington-World Bank team.

c. Social marketing campaign

With the assistance of USAID, the gender equity committee decided to organize a social marketing campaign as its first intervention. Since the current funding situation of the GOG will not permit the committee to have access to funds for its activities at the moment, USAID

has agreed to the use of PL 480 funds to finance the campaign. The target audience will be two prefectures per region. The prefectures selected will be those which have the lowest enrollment rates. The commitee hopes to make use of existing communications facilities--radio, television, printing press, local performing artists, etc. In each of the eight prefectures, a local committee made up of prominent members in the community will be created to carry on with activities after the national campaign ends. To address the question of the high cost of schooling, the commitee is proposing to supply girls in these pilot prefectures with all the school supplies while boys in the same prefectures will receive half of the supplies.

This experiment would have to be followed closely to assure that it is not counterproductive in creating a negative response on the part of boys and their parents. As an incentive to all students and schools, each school in Guinea will receive dispensary supplies (boîte à pharmacie) which the committee hopes will encourage children to go to school.

The committee has developed an implementation plan for the campaign and is ready to go into action as soon as funds become available. The exact topical focus, the messages to be used and the impact measurements will presumable be developed at that time.

d. Assistance through the FSU contract

Through the FSU contract, the orienting document on gender equity was produced. The national committee has benefitted from the technical assistance of the FSU consultant in defining needs and identifying possible solutions. All three members of the committee interviewed confirmed this fact. Since the committee is relatively new, it still relies heavily on guidance and advice from the USAID TA. On the social marketing campaign, for example, the committee is still waiting for A.I.D./FSU to identify a media expert to help with the campaign.

D. Questions raised by the evaluation Scope of Work

From what has been said so far, equity issues concerning girls and rural children have not received the highest priority since the project was started in the Fall of 1991. But a new awareness has set in and the interest in equity issues is now greater than it has been for some time. One expression of this interest is that USAID/Guinea has shown comprehension and flexibility so as to accede to the equity committee's call for a social marketing campaign to give the gender issue a national prominence. Another expression is that the Mission has raised a number of specific questions concerning gender equity in the Scope of Work of the present evaluation. We shall now address those questions in the order they were raised.

#11 A.I.D. Obligation Mechanisms--Gender Issues: What has been the impact on the effectiveness of the Project of the planned disbursement schedule and A.I.D.'s internal obligation pressures to obligate tranches according to a fiscal year schedule?

As far as we can see neither the study nor the action plan referred to in Condition F have been implemented. Accepting the "studies" listed above, with or without an action plan, was a mistake. Under pressure to obligate a tranche, A.I.D. sent the message that gender

issues could be handled by lip service. The project, the counterparts, and the PASE treated them accordingly.

#12 How were the interests and role of women (compared to men) taken into account in each of the design, appraisal and implementation stages of the project/program?

On the positive side, the Equity Committee does exist and a certain momentum concerning gender equity has built up, in particular during the times when S.T.A. was provided. Given the Guinean starting point in this issue, the lethargy confronting any donor-driven problem and the fact that few resources were allocated to gender equity, the result is quite respectable. But this applies only to the USAID part, not the program. The Program has provided interest in gender issues to maintain the flow of funds, not more.

#13 In what ways did women (compared to men) participate in these processes?

On the American side, at least two women had significant impact during the design phase: The present basic education officer in AFR/ARTS as an advocate of the NPA approach and Karen Tietjen as one of the persons in charge of gender issues. There were also two women on the PAAD team, Lynelle Long, agenda specialist and Karen Tietjen, an M&E and training specialist at that time. As far as project implementation is concerned, the T.A. in charge of equity was tremendously active when present but absent most of the time. On the Guinean side the single most important contribution may be the fact that there is a female minister at MEPU-FP who follows PASE activity constantly and involves herself and other women in reform activities. E.g., she attended a full two days at a seminar on gender issues in February, 1993, and also had made girls' enrollments the focus of her trip to N'Zérékoré earlier in the year.

#14 How were the interests and roles of women taken into account in the evaluation stage?

The present evaluation team (containing, among the expatriates, two women and two men, plus two female professionals as resource persons), has

- paid particular attention to the literature on the topic, the Guinean material and studies, and the discussions surrounding Condition F;
- extracted and partially analyzed data from the national data base to determine factors associated with female enrollment and success in the end of 6th grade examinations;
- visited the only school with a female director and an all female teaching staff;
- raised gender issues in every school visited;
- produced the present chapter of the evaluation report.

#15 Were significant factors concerning women (compared to men) overlooked at the appraisal stage?

The trickle-down hopes of the NPA approach are naive as far as disadvantaged groups are concerned. There is much evidence worldwide on the effects of centrally controlled resources on equity. The evidence shows that in many cases centrally controlled resources tend to solidify established stratification systems rather than changing them.

#16 Were gender-specific data available for each of the program/project objectives (design, appraisal/approval, implementation, monitoring, evaluation)?

The answer, so far, is no. What is more important, however, if that with one exception, nobody seems to be aware of the necessity for multi-variate analysis instead of just frequency distributions and simple bivariate tables. The effects of gender are often indirect, confounded and subtle. Without control variables a sensible study of gender issues is not possible. Studying gender effects by relying on crude enrollment rates, as it is done in SSP based data, is doubly pernicious. Not only are multi-variate designs omitted, but the enrollment rates are so unreliable as to be practically worthless for any detailed analysis. As part of another project, USAID is negotiating with Cornell University to conduct a multi-variate household survey to develop data on the impact of education on women in Conakry.

#17 How did women's integration in A.I.D. activities affect the sustainability of project/program outcomes? Were outcomes more sustained (or less sustained) when women were taken into account in A.I.D. activities?

Ex-post reconstruction of situations, determinants and causality are useless when there are no baseline data and little institutional memory. But it can be stated with some confidence that the entire gender emphasis as included in the PAAD is new to Guinean culture. The Déclaration de politique éducative, the relatively most Guinean of the three basic documents of the reform, hardly mentions girls. The World Bank document goes a bit further but it is the USAID PAAD which brings the gender issue to the fore partially, at least, because women were involved in all three of these designs.

So far, there are no sustained outcomes discernable in the project, whether women were involved in the design or not.

#18 Are the results achieved by the programs equally sustainable between men and women beneficiaries?

This evaluation team has not found program results which could be called sustainable in the sense that Guinean funds, Guinean initiative and Guinean politics could be counted on to reduce the gender gap in the absence of foreign donors. Data on their learning achievements and other results of schooling are not available in a form which would allow to determine gender-specific program impact.

E. Rural access as an equity issue

Only one of the equity issues (girls) has so far received particular attention in the research and planning components of the project. The second issue (rural children) has been neglected. There is no special committee, not a single research report and no administrative division of any kind that is specifically concerned with rural children. Of the hundreds of pages of tables submitted to satisfy condition F no more than 5% contain rural/urban breakdowns. No analysis has been done to define precisely what it is about rurality which makes rural populations disadvantaged (political weakness, economic specialization, seasonal employment, traditional culture, geographic isolation, high cost of inputs, human resource drain, other factors or combinations of factors). While there has been less talk and less writing about rural children than about gender issues, the USAID PL480 financed school construction appears to have supported remote rural areas.

F. Government action against structural discrimination

At the beginning of this chapter we raised the question whether the state and central institutions can be expected to reduce the structural discrimination of which girls and rural children are victims. We shall now divide this question into two components and rephrase them for separate answers.

First, precisely what is it in governmental actions which makes them potential tools for reducing structural disadvantages of particular groups? Positive and effective governmental action in this area would respect the following four principles.

- Government should deliver services, not just exercise control, extract resources, impose taxes and erect obstacles which allow informal rent collection.

- Services should be targeted, not just offered on a general basis. E.g., just increasing the installed capacity of classrooms will not in itself reduce female disadvantage. Targeting what is more frequently perceived as a problem for girls is more appropriate (e.g., in the installation of latrines).

- What is needed is real, concrete, tangible services; short-term, non-sustainable actions should be avoided.

- Community participation and consultation at every stage appears to be a condition of successful service delivery. Few actions have been found to be meaningful and sustainable unless they have been locally influenced and controlled.

As long as these four principles are respected and communication and exchange are taking place between government and population and between rural and urban areas, governmental action can indeed help to alleviate the fate of the disadvantaged, build equity and counteract the ever-present tendency to concentrate resources within a class of privileged urbanites. But the issues should not be confused and the spirit of the four principles should be respected, e.g., what is presently called "community participation" in PASE school

construction can be considered just a form of local taxation and regressive at that, in which poor communities may pay higher amounts than better off urban communities.

The second part of the basic question is: is the Guinean government implementing policies and programs to establish more equity in schooling? The Equity Committee's Orienting Report contains an excellent review of this issue. Among current policies and impacts it identifies tuition-free schooling (probably positive), tax relief (positive), multiple repetition policy (negative) and pregnancy policy (negative; policy has since been modified). Among current programs the following are listed as having positive, though sometimes limited, equity impacts: school mapping, multigrade classes, bonus for rural teaching, preschools, publicity campaigns, education radio and promotion of women. Programs sponsored by other donors are also mentioned.

Impact measurement for these policies and programs is beyond the scope of this evaluation and will be difficult at any rate since reliable baselines have rarely been stablished.[4] But it is clear that the Orienting Report supports these policies and is looking for the government to be an agent of change. As the social marketing campaign takes off and as schools become better and the educational system becomes more efficient, output variables will no doubt improve as well. There will be fewer illiterate dropouts and more graduates moving on to the secondary level.

But there is another side to the Orienting Report, a final section which talks about NGOs, nontraditional schools and adult literacy campaigns and ultimately questions whether public primary schools can really be the answer to the needs of disadvantaged groups. Is it not true that "public primary schools in Guinea are not compatible with the cultural, social, religious and economic milieu"? The report answers in the affirmative but rather than recommending that the GOG abandon those incompatible schools it suggests that they be rendered more compatible and more acceptable. The solution is not to avoid and condemn the public school but to improve it.

G. Summary of findings

1. Originality of the equity component

The equity component is potentially the most original, rewarding and important aspect of the project. It is the only place in the project documents and research reports where conventional approaches are challenged and where the positive potential of foreign donor assistance is confronted with the ambivalent nature of all state intervention. It aims at providing education for girls - arguably the most influential investment which can be made in the Third World today (Summers, 1992). And, it has provoked into existence the only PASE/USAID committee dealing with substantive issues rather than implementation process.

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[4] One impact, however, is patently obvious. If PASE and USAID add an annual 2 Billion GF to the national economy (with the remainder going for imports), virtually the totality of this amount will be spent in Conakry or on goods moving through Conakry. Adding 2 Billion GF to the economy of the capital city creates a minimum of 2000 informal sector jobs there, attracting about 1000 migrants. Like many foreign aid projects, PASE tends to increase the imbalance between rural and urban areas.

2. Momentum is now gathering

After a slow start due to the fact that baseline and other research components were not scheduled early in the project, the equity component is now receiving considerable attention and additional financing for a social marketing campaign. It is advisable that the campaign be focused on the retention of girls and the improvement of their treatment and achievement in school. Merely aiming for higher female enrollment in inadequate schools is not enough. With the marketing campaign, gender and equity issues will receive national attention. A small data gathering effort should be undertaken (before-and-after) to measure the impact of the campaign.

3. Existing data and new studies

Existing data have not yet been analyzed sufficiently from an equity viewpoint. New topics for action research have been identified by T.A. but no major study has been carried out. But some of the determinants of low female enrollment are now well known. New action research, though still needed, should not prevent action in favor of equity to take place. Rural-urban equity issues have been covered less than gender issues; they should be privileged in any future research.

H. Recommendation

It is recommended that equity issues be given more systematic attention and support by assigning permanent technical assistance to them. If mid-course corrections are undertaken, USAID or its technical assistance contractor should still collaborate with GOG to produce an equity action plan based on sound analysis of school data and other information.

IV. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR EDUCATION

Through the lenses of capacity-building, institutional development and potential for institutional sustainability, this chapter will analyze primary education reform in Guinea and its relationship to the PASE, assess the contributions of donors, particularly A.I.D./W and USAID/Conakry, identify lessons learned from the PASE to date, suggest benchmarks for future assessment, and suggest recommendations for future PASE implementation.

A. Guinea's Education Sector Reform and the PASE

1. Description of PASE

Guinea's educational reform is a call to restructure, expand and improve Guinea's educational system. It promotes a complete overhaul of the educational system, which had over the last 25 years degraded into a state of inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

The PASE was created in response to, and as support of, the GOG's national educational reform. It was designed as a multi-donor, inter-ministerial mechanism, through which the GOG would coordinate strategies and interventions. A committee-based management structure was designed to enhance complementarity of donor contributions, and to ensure the GOG's participation in the PASE's day to day operations and longer term evolution.

2. PASE structure and processes

The PASE serves as an organizational strategy for implementing the educational reform. Its management system consists of a National Coordinator, an inter-ministerial Evaluation Committee (Comité de Suivi), a Steering Committee (Comité de Pilotage), a Technical Secretariat (Secrétariat Technique) and a recently created Economic and Financial Coordination Committee (Comité de Coordination Economique et Financière). PASE donors meet on a weekly basis, to share information and coordinate activities.

a. Evaluation Committee (Comité de Suivi)

This inter-ministerial evaluation committee is charged with overseeing the links between the education sector and the overall sector adjustment. It is presided by the Assistant Director General of Budgeting at the Ministry of Finance and Plan. Other members represent the Ministries of Public Service and Administrative Reform, ad the Ministry of the Interior. It is mandated to meet quarterly. It provides financial and status reports to donors.

Prior evaluations found that the Committee began with a limited emphasis on reviewing financial documents. Donors emphasized that the committee also played a role as "spokes-person" for the sector, and they accentuated the need for interministerial cooperation.

So far this Committee has not functioned according to expectations. Meetings have been held infrequently and the anticipated inter-ministerial support to the PASE has not been demonstrated, i.e. funds have not been transferred from MFP to Education as expected. Verbal reports indicate that Committee members do not find it in their interest to support Education.

b. Steering Committee (Comité de Pilotage)

Membership is comprised of line officers of the MESRS and the MEPU-FP. The Committee was originally presided by the Secretary-General of the Ministry for National Education, but after the MEPU-FP was created, the MEPU-FP Secretary-General assumed the presidency. It is responsible for the technical oversight of the PASE. It meets monthly, and submits quarterly reports to the Comité de Suivi.

Donors and the GOG have found the Committee effective. In addition to routine problem solving in the PASE, it organized the Atelier de lancement du PASE and the Atelier de Rentrée, 1991-92, established action plans to make PASE operational, and provided support documentation for the Joint Review.

Current assessment is positive, with the caveat that tension and frustration between the two Education Ministries should be flagged. As noted during the Joint Review held in December 1992, a study of the Education systems should be conducted, in light of the recent restructuring.

c. Technical Secretariat (Secrétariat Technique)

The PASE National Coordinator heads up this committee, whose additional members are the FAC Expert in Sectoral Adjustment and the FSU Senior Technical Advisor. They provide technical guidance to the Coordinator. The Committee's roles are to manage the interaction between the Comité de Suivi and the Comité de Pilotage, and to provide technical assistance to the Comité de Pilotage. It meets on an as-needs basis and submits reports to the Comité de Pilotage. Unlike the other committees, the Secretariat is a temporary structure, with a three-year mandate to correspond to the life of the PASE.

The Committee has by all accounts performed well -- it has organized legions of meetings, prepared and archived program documentation and coordinated directly with donors. It serves a capacity-building role, in that the two expatriate advisors provide ongoing technical support and guidance to the National Coordinator.

Confusion and tension over the roles and loyalties of the two expatriate advisors are evident. USAID suspects that the FAC expert promotes the interests of the French, even though his official function is independent of the French assistance efforts in Guinea. The PAAD (p. 26) states that, "The division of responsibility between USAID and the FAC will be institutionalized in the Technical Secretariat of the PASE, where a Guinean coordinator will be joined by two Senior Technical Advisors: a French advisor in the areas of curriculum

and pedagogy, and an American advisor in the areas of administrative and financial management."

d. Economic and Financial Coordinating Committee (Comité de Coordination Economique et Financière)

This Committee is presided by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and its members represent the Ministries of Finance and Plan, Industry, Administrative Reform, as well as the Central Bank. One of its roles is to examine PASE's portfolio in relation to the national and international macro-economic situation. It reviews financial documents after the Comité de Suivi has analyzed them, i.e., reports on conditionalities. One GOG official said, "It is here that the decisions of government are made." Currently this committee appears to usurp the decision-making and representational power intended to reside in the synergy of the other committees.

e. Assessment of PASE structure and processes

The PASE is a complex structure, designed to facilitate communication and coordination between and among all the major stakeholders in the program. It has to that extent been effective. Representatives from several ministries and donors have together mounted a large scale effort in a very challenging context.

The PASE structure does compete with formalized, permanent institutional structures in Guinea, thereby defeating the capacity-building purpose it was founded on. The PASE and the two ministries of education have two separate organizational identities, two separate sets of key personnel, separate sets of procedures and priorities. Further, there is evidence that the formal PASE procedures and structures are not followed uniformly, but that a more effective means of operation is to contact individuals directly.

Management responsibility is not easily assigned within the PASE. The committee structure is unwieldy. It facilitates shared authority and decision-making, but the identification of appropriate contact persons, with real authority over programmatic and administrative issues, has been enigmatic.

Since the creation of PASE, the Ministry of Education was restructured into its present form, the MESRS and the MEPU-FP. The PASE organizational structure was not modified to reflect this change. Donors and the GOG should examine the present structure to ensure that ample attention and resources are granted to primary education.

The evaluation team suggests that the PASE be re-structured, with the specific purposes of clarifying lines of responsibility and accountability, and ensuring coordination with the MESRS, in light of the 1992 restructuring.

3. Donor collaboration in the PASE

a. Impact of other donor assistance

The FAC has contributed to the PASE via an extensive corps of technical assistants, working most notably in the area of teacher training, but reaching also into the domains of administration and finance (through the Ministry of Plan and Finance and the Personnel section of the DAAF) and educational planning (through the SSP). Their success has been in beginning to improve teachers' French language capacity, but a lack of follow-up, to date, to its teacher training activities inhibits sustainable, classroom level pedagogical improvements. Their MFP and Personnel interventions are too recent to be evaluated with any certainty. The FAC SSP technical assistant is computerizing statistical information, but he is not, as of yet, assisting Guinean counterparts to acquire the skills and knowledge required for a new computer-based system. Neither has he made much progress in introducing an analytical orientation to the process of collecting and recording statistics. Statistical analysis, the attribution of meaning to selected numerical compilations, is a crucial step in Guinea's transition to a more rational educational system.

The EEC and the Japanese government have been taking the lead in the area of school construction. Construction carried out by PASE, under construction norms established under the World Bank loan, is behind schedule. The USAID introduction of PL 480 funds was designed, in part, to bring PASE construction progress back in line.

The Bank has contributed to Guinea's policy reform, through leverage applied via reform measures and conditionalities, and increased resources which translated into additional equipment, materials and supplies at school and administrative office levels.

b. Analysis

The PASE is a multi-donor effort, whose success is contingent on coordinated efforts between all donors and the GOG. The three principal donors (World Bank, the FAC and USAID) meet weekly, with the GOG represented by the Guinean PASE Coordinator who is head of the Secretariat Technique. The first year of PASE showed the importance that donor solidarity implies, e.g. through joint conditionality reviews. This was consistent with the view of donor collaboration expressed in the PASE -- to assess GOG performance vis-a-vis conditionalities.

> (p. 39) The donor technical review meeting will provide an opportunity to discuss perceptions of GOG performance, flag constraints to disbursements, and harmonize discussions with the GOG. Neither institution, however, is constrained by the other's assessment of GOG performance. Should, for example, USAID not be satisfied with GOG responsiveness, this by itself need not affect the World Bank's decision to proceed with fund disbursement.

As PASE matured, the "donor technical review meeting" evolved into a "donor coordination committee." The three principal providers of assistance to PASE (USAID, World Bank, FAC) meet weekly to exchange information and coordinate efforts. But in the course of

PASE's development, new and different needs evolved that are not addressed through the weekly committee structure and procedures. Rather, bi-lateral channels of communication have proven more effective in meeting the new needs of planning, implementing, evaluating and reporting on individuals donors' activities. The FAC, for example, discussed directly with the GOG its interventions in monitoring and evaluation, as well as in the Personnel section of the DAAF.

Donors and the GOG need to re-conceptualize and re-strategize the purposes of, and means by which, they coordinate and collaborate. Current tensions, if not addressed, run the risk of damaging the potential for collegial relationships and complementary actions. Donors and the GOG should examine the following issues, and identify mutually acceptable responses.

4. GOG educational policy

a. USAID involvement

USAID would like to have more input into educational policy formulation. Some USAID representatives would like to have membership on the Comité de Pilotage, in order to ensure this leverage. USAID and the GOG must explore possibilities for donor input into policy issues, while at the same time striking a balance with the GOG's autonomy in setting its own goals and priorities.

b. GOG leadership

The GOG has at times sent mixed signals to donors, by, on the one hand, leaving donors to decide among themselves who would propose activities, and on the other, inviting specific donors to intervene in specific areas. The GOG should take more initiative in inviting specific donors to intervene in areas where their strengths match the priorities identified in the policy. In the absence of GOG leadership, those donors with the most experience, personnel and financial resources will influence ("drive") policy and seek to promote their own interests.

GOG representatives noted that different donors working in PASE have different institutional as well as individual working styles. The nature of these differences and the extent to which they impact on program implementation have not been explored. In the context of such a complex program as the PASE, however, the GOG and donors should assure greater responsibility for learning to work in mutually complimentary ways. One forum for such learning could be workshops designed and facilitated by the management training specialist proposed in this report. Workshop objectives could be to explore each participant's assumptions about their efforts, communications, authorities, timing of actions, etc., and to identify strategies for working collaboratively in ways that respect donors' and the GOG's unique styles.

c. Bi-lateral assessment in a multi-lateral effort

USAID has expressed frustration in that the log frame reflects outputs not directly tied to USAID inputs.

d. Reporting requirements

The PASE has been described as donor-driven, to the extent that conditionalities prescribe performance. Additionally, a distinction has emerged between meeting conditionalities and reporting on them. "Conditionalities have become the PASE" is a frequently heard remark. The GOG, World Bank and USAID should explore ways to enhance the congruence of required documents and regularize the timing of conditionality reviews.

5. Perceptions of PASE

The evaluation team's interviews and observations in Conakry and the interior of the country reveal diverse perceptions of the nature of the reform, the role of the PASE in the reform, and the quantitative and qualitative successes achieved to date.

For example, perceptions of the influence of the reform on the education sector have usually referred to the expansion of enrollment and the reinforcement of management and administrative capacities. Additional perceptions have included:

- the shift from education as preparatory for the civil service. Rather, education is now directed toward preparing children for private sector employment. Education now focuses on training children to take initiative, to develop a spirit of initiative. Education trains children to take individual responsibility for their lives. Children are no longer taught to assume a career in the civil service,

- priority to girls and children in rural zones,

- one of the steps in the reform, a strategy toward achieving the reform's objectives, the move toward rehabilitation of the system,

- the reform made concrete,

- a new educational conception and method,

- the opportunity for the beneficiary to be the actor (for Guineans to determine their own development),

- beautiful school buildings, children who go to school,

- a philosophy: basic education as a priority,

- another layer of bureaucracy,

- the Ministry -- not a parallel structure because it will be dissolved and the Ministry will endure. After the PASE the government will take over the functioning of the system.

6. Accomplishments of PASE

Accomplishments of the PASE have been described as:

- the confidence that the PASE inspires on the part of local communities: they see that the government is working for them. They see that PASE is not just an international effort, but that it brings effects home. People see schools and tables and benches,

- the motivation toward schooling that PASE inspires on the part of local communities,

- the provision of financial, material and capacity-building and human resources to the education sector, e.g. increased operating budget; school and office renovations, furniture and equipment; training, and redeployed teachers.

B. Effectiveness of GOG in implementation of PASE

1. The GOG has a capacity to adjust

The GOG has demonstrated the capacity to adjust the national education structure and policies, in tandem with the PASE and the educational reform, in the following ways:

- teachers and administrators were successfully redeployed,

- teachers were granted a 100% salary increase (as were all other public sector employee),

- the Ministry of National Education was divided into the Ministry of Pre-University Education and Professional Training, and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research,

- the Direction des Affaires Administratives et Financières (DAAF) was created,

- regional administrative and technical offices (antennes) were created and staffed to manage school renovation and construction (SCTP),

- an administrative office was created and staffed to manage projects under PL 480 funds (Unite Technique),

- an additional budget and accounting unit in the DAAF has been approved (Cellule Budgetaire).

2. Adjustment difficulties

GOG performance that impeded the implementation of the PASE included:

- delayed and insufficient transfer of funds to the education sector,
- resistance to granting release time to personnel for purposes of participating in training activities,
- delays in filling vacant civil service positions.

3. Ability of the national education structure to carry out the national education policy

The GOG has begun to effect changes that respond to the policy's directives, often in response to donor and GOG evaluations of PASE.

- The Ministry of Education has been receiving an increasing share of the national budget.
- Decentralized programming and budgeting have begun.
- Management training of staff has begun.
- Teachers have been trained.
- An Annual Action Plan has been developed and used at the Ministry's central level.
- Schools and classrooms have been constructed.
- The PASE management structure was created and is functioning with some success.

Much work remains to be done before Guinea's capacity for sustained reform is assured. The nation experiences great developmental needs and its institutional capacities are weak due to inadequate infrastructures and human resource, financial and material resource deficiencies. Recommendations suggested through prior evaluations have yet to be implemented, i.e., management studies on the functioning of MEPU-FP. The PASE still suffers from insufficient program guidance; this report's suggestion to reconsider the committee structure is aimed at clarifying the PASE's purpose and priorities.

C. Internalization of the reform

The educational reform, while not articulated in specific terms, clearly promotes the prioritization of education in Guinea. The PAAD emphasizes the importance of the reform:

"USAID's support to the GOG will help to re-establish an organizational and policy framework which will make possible subsequent enrollment expansion and quality improvements in the system. In the absence of the reforms associated with the PASE, the present deterioration of the system will almost certainly continue."

Commitment to and internalization of a reform cannot be measured solely by quantitative assessments of discrete, tangible outputs. Rather, indicators must be identified which reveal gradual and gradually discernible changes. In the case of Guinea, which had suffered extreme socio-economic and political stagnation during the last twenty-five years, any improvement, e.g. in management, planning, equitable access, etc. must be considered as a step toward progress.

1. Reform goal: enhanced status of (primary) education

The GOG has set its efforts to improve education in Guinea in the context of a system-wide reform. It has identified education as a necessary tool in Guinea's development process. Through the PASE, the GOG has begun to rationalize the system, to increase the professional status and skills of its personnel, to prioritize primary education within the sector and to incite demand for primary education nation-wide. These changes stand in stark contrast to the role accorded education in pre-reform and pre-PASE eras in Guinea.

2. Indicator of internalization: lack of political disruption

The PAAD accurately identified obstacles likely to block such a dramatic socio-economic transformation. It noted "political, bureaucratic and professional opposition to the redeployment of staff and the redistribution of resources." Political pressure groups could well have resisted any challenge to their privilege deriving from the status quo. The PAAD cited "potential pressure groups, including public sector employees and university students, especially in light of recent events in neighboring countries (university student strikes in Abidjan and Dakar) and signs of student unrest in Conakry."

Political unrest as a reaction to the reform and its implementation through the PASE would not have been a surprise. Rather, peaceful conditions prevailed, despite:

- the redeployment of 1,800 secondary teachers and administrators to primary education and the interior, implying professional demotion and geographic relocation, and

- the initial implied risks to other sectors, university students and professors, in the form of the loss of stipends and a decrease in other financial resources, as a consequence of prioritizing education, and specifically primary education.

Admittedly, peaceful acceptance of the above measures may be indicative of factors other than deeply-seated commitment to the reform, e.g., a power imbalance between those who are supportive of and those who are resistant to it. Also, initial peaceful acceptance may not be indicative of long-term internalization of the reform. But given that the very real possibility of initial resistance from threatened groups has not been actualized, Guinea's

educational reform can be seen to be securely inaugurated. Continued monitoring of resistance-to-change factors such as:

- the movement of redeployed personnel,
- their degree of professional commitment to performing newly assigned roles, and
- reactions on the part of disempowered pressure groups will reveal the degrees to which the educational reform is being embraced by those who, from their own perspective, may stand to lose from it.

3. Indicator of internalization of the reform: hospitable social environment to education

Guinea's social environment is notably more hospitable to education, and especially primary education, than during either the pre-reform or pre-PASE years. A sense of commitment, motivation and enthusiasm is evident on the part of consumers, potential consumers and other partners in the primary education enterprise. For example, the demand for primary education has increased multi-fold, as shown by the long waiting lists for entrance into newly constructed and renovated schools and classrooms, even in the most isolated, rural areas. Community-based associations have mobilized to provide raw materials and labor for school construction. Community leaders have participated in the process of identifying school sites and hiring construction contractors. Individual parents and parents' associations have provided funds and labor for minimal textbook procurement and school maintenance.

The degree to which these factors indicate a true commitment to the socio-economic transformation implied by the reform is, as above, subject to continued analysis. Problems persist in even the immediate assessment of the areas noted here: very few textbooks are being used in classrooms; the intersection of private enterprise (contractors) in public education necessarily implies long-term study, etc. But a careful consideration of Guinea's severely underdeveloped starting point must temper the impulse toward searching for immediate, deeply-internalized changes. Demand for education and community mobilization for education were not characteristic of the pre-reform and pre-PASE social environment. Continued monitoring of these and related social factors will indicate the degree to which, and the ways in which, Guinea's population responds to the reform.

4. Hospitable professional environment in education -- educational services providers

One goal of the educational reform is to improve the quality and efficiency of primary education. Technical assistance in pedagogy and administration is one natural conduit toward the accomplishment of that goal. (See section D.2. for assessment of technical assistance.) The systematic development of a professional cadre of educators and educational administrators in Guinea implies however, a necessary condition -- precedent to -- the transfer of skills and knowledge. Theories in human resources development, organizational development, adult education, social change and other fields have proven that factors such as

motivation, reward and favorable conditions play decisive roles in the process of skills and knowledge acquisition.

These considerations are addressed in section C.5. Their relevance here is in relation to the reform and its impact on the education sector as a professional career locus. Civil service functions during the pre-reform period were reputed for their low incentives, lethargy and low productivity, with public education being no exception. The challenge facing the craters of the reform, then, was to revitalize, re-invigorate and re-energize the education sector.

They were challenged to enhance the status and viability of education as a professional option, in the eyes of the teachers and administrators within the system. Faced with both a shortage of teachers and pervasive civil service attitudes and practices, they were confronted by the need to invoke a sense of pride in and commitment to the role of education in Guinea. They were also challenged to instill personnel with professional aspirations toward "something better." It was incumbent upon them to set the stage for technical skills and knowledge transfer, by first affecting the attitudes and perceptions of education sector personnel.

Evidence that such attitudinal and perceptual changes have begun to evolve is apparent in Guinea at several levels.

- Professional self-concept. Administrators and teachers, even those in the most remote regions of the country, describe themselves as participants in a program to rebuild Guinea's education sector. These are in many cases the same individuals who during the pre-reform period considered themselves removed and detached from centralized, top-down policy formulation.

- Professional motivation. Administrators and teachers express and demonstrate pride in and commitment to their work. Formerly, apathy and absence from the office or classroom were normalized. Administrators and teachers now often devote long hours to their work, even in the evenings and on weekends.

- Professional enrichment. Administrators and teachers participate actively in training and request continued training opportunities. They express their dissatisfaction with certain current conditions and their willingness to effect improvements. Formerly, a complacency vis-a-vis accepted standards was prevalent.

The degrees to which these indicators of attitudinal change are demonstrated vary between and among locations and individuals. Factors external to the reform and the PASE also influence levels of readiness to adopt professional change, e.g., an already extant affinity for one's profession, a personal proclivity toward self-enrichment, etc. Problems of ambiguity persist as well, related to the vagueness of the reform policy and to Guinea's relative lack of exposure to educational systems elsewhere: teachers and administrators are actors in a program to rebuild the educational system, but are unsure as to precisely what the new system should be; teachers and administrators are unclear as to what specific training objectives to pursue, etc.

These concepts must, however, not be minimized. The reform's and the PASE's successes are contingent on the willingness of Guinea's educational cadre to "buy into" a process of professionalization. Recasting the education sector as a viable entity is a necessary element of that process. Significant progress is demonstrated in that regard. Teachers and administrators attribute that progress, particularly, to the efforts extended by senior GOG personnel to convey the message of the reform, e.g., the Minister of Pre-University Education's visits to the remote corners of the country, the Atéliers de Rentrée Scolaire, and the Minister's consistent communication, through postal and messenger services.

Continued monitoring of these and related attitude and perception factors will indicate the degree to which, and the ways in which, Guinea's education sector personnel respond to the reform.

5. Barriers to the internalization of the reform

a. Overarching barriers

The PAAD accurately identified several factors likely to inhibit the reform's and the PASE's success. Team interviews and observations revealed additional potential obstacles. A partial consideration of obstacles relative to both pedagogical and administrative reform includes:

- resistance to change,
- little immediate return on the reform effort. Often the costs are immediate and the benefits more diffuse. Benefits are not in the form of tangible rewards,
- a lack of understanding of or exposure to different systems or methodologies,
- a loss of privileges deriving from the status quo (loss of influence and status or even loss of a job),
- uncertainty of the duration of the proposed reforms and political support for the reform,
- Guinea's under-developed infrastructure and severe human, material and financial resource needs.

Some of the above conditions are currently being addressed through the PASE and other mechanisms. Infrastructure refurbishment, international finance measures, training and other efforts will alleviate to a great extent the problems common to developing countries' transition from relative poverty to prosperity.

Three critical flaws, however, are evident in Guinea's move toward educational reform, require additional attention: insufficient transition mechanisms, an ill-defined sense of direction, and a lack of reward for those individuals or institutions which demonstrate performance in accordance with the reform.

The Ateliers de Rentrée Scolaire and increased communication between central Ministry officials and the interior have served well in introducing the reform to the Guinean population. The lack of a comprehensive plan for bridging the transitions between the past, present and intended state of Guinean education has, however, contributed to a pattern of desultory interventions. It is difficult for the intended beneficiaries of the reforms, as well as international partners in it, to participate in its enactment to their fullest potential.

Finally, the costs and benefits of the reform, as well as the role of rewards, have not been fully explored. Benefits have to date been in the form of a discrete, tangible output, e.g. salary increase or new school, but the broader-based transformations, e.g. establishment of efficient systems or more gender-balanced enrollment, have gone to a great extent unnoticed.

b. Barriers to institutional development in the context of the reform: paradigm shift in management

The reform champions a departure from historically and culturally grounded notions and methods of management. Two of the goals of the reform are to strengthen the Ministry's management capacity and to promote decentralized management and planning capacity. These goals portend significant implications for the Guinean administrators and managers to whom they apply. Implicit in these notions are assumptions about authority, initiative, communication, uses of power, and decision-making, to name just a few. Sufficient attention has not been brought to bear on this aspect of the reform. Rather, the GOG and A.I.D. have leapt immediately to the skills transfer step. Examples of the paradigm shift include:

1) Central level support for decentralization.

The movement from centralized to decentralized management systems implies an organizational and functional link between the managers closest to the program implementation level and the decision makers at the higher program and policy formulation levels. PASE has mandated that SAAFs, DPEs and IREs should have input into budgeting decisions made by the DAAF, and the DAAF and senior Ministry officials should lobby the Ministry of Finance and Plan for its budget allocations.

No steps have been taken to ensure that each successive level in the hierarchy supports or will take into account the lower level's inputs. Sufficient top-down incentive has not been provided for the increased effort. Field visits revealed that some SAAFs are not using the "fiches" designed to identify budgeting needs because they have no evidence that DAAF officials are using them.

2) Rationality as a basis for decisions.

PASE appears to be based on an assumption that higher level government decisions are based primarily on rationality alone. "The Ministry of Education must work for its resources" is a frequently employed phrase in the PAAD. The assumption was that the creation of a rational budget, defended on grounds of programmatic (educational) needs, would empower the Ministry of Education to lobby the Ministry of Finance and Plan for a sustained increase

in budget allocations. Administrative difficulties in fund transfers, and an overall national shortage of resources, despite a well elaborated MEPU-FP budget, has proven this assumption erroneous. While complications relative to the NPA modality may account for some of the difficulties, the assumption that funds would be disbursed to the sector and the regions on a basis of development budget needs and macro-economic and institutional rationality, devoid of personal, political or ethnic loyalties, and other cultural practices is open to question.

3) A rationalized, efficient system implies transparent management procedures and processes.

In a context of political and professional insecurity, where resources are scarce and knowledge is power, the shift to broad based access to information, and regulated access to resources, is dramatic. Resistance to innovations such as public records, organizational charts and inventory logs is not unexpected.

4) An efficient system implies integrated, coordinated functions between services.

In some contexts, the obtention of a civil service position was tantamount to gaining a fiefdom. The shift from autonomous, discrete operations to an integrated organization implies uniform levels of effort, extensive access across organizational divisions, and collegial reciprocity.

5) The professionalization of the education cadre implies the upgrading of junior colleagues' skills.

Inherent in the move toward improved skills of subordinate personnel is the threat of loss of position and status to those who were formerly secure.

While immediate responses to these issues are not obvious or easy, serious reflection is called for. Donors and host country partners should continue to examine the historically and culturally grounded assumptions on which their institutional practices and procedures are based. The transfer of skills and knowledge alone will not ensure that institutional development will proceed or be sustainable. Measures such as institutional support to those individual or units that are receptive to change, examination of risks, costs and benefits, and other measures yet to be identified, should be explored further.

D. A.I.D.'s efforts in the PASE

1. Technical assistance: Florida State University

Through a buy-in to a previously competed central A.I.D./W Bureau educational management project, IEES, Florida State University was secured to provide long-term and short-term technical assistance to the Direction des Affaires Administratives et Financières (DAAF) at the Secretariat of State for Pre-University Education. The first delivery order (D.O.6.) was signed on August 27, 1991; the first modification was signed on Dec. 17, 1991,

for a cumulative total of $1,874,083. A PIO/T was signed in Conakry in December 1992 for $607,359 and a second modification to the delivery order, in the amount of $607,359, was approved in March 1993. Total A.I.D. funds being managed by FSU is therefore $2,481,432. The technical support package includes two long-term technical assistants, a Senior Technical Advisor in Finance and Management/Chief of Party and a Resident Technical Advisor/Public Sector Accounting Specialist, 36 person months of short-term assistance, as well as commodity procurement and home office backstopping (this latter increased) as per the December 1992 PIO/T.

FSU was mandated to provide technical assistance in the areas of administration and financial management, to each of the services in the DAAF: Accounting and Budgeting, Materials and Equipment, and Personnel and Training. Primary components of the technical assistance are training and logistical support to the DAAF and the decentralized offices, computerization of budget management and computer training of DAAF personnel, the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system and guidance to the PASE National Coordinator through membership on the Technical Secretariat.

The history of FSU's service to the DAAF is complex. The quality of technical assistance provided to date is by all accounts less than expected. FSU, USAID, A.I.D./W, and the GOG each bear some responsibility for this result.

2. Broad-based findings concerning FSU performance

a. Recruitment of technical experts

FSU encountered more difficulty than anticipated in recruiting and hiring French-speaking experts willing to relocate to Guinea. During the first year of the PASE, there was a seven month period during which no RTA was present in Guinea. The first RTA who was sent to Guinea was inappropriate and was transferred sent back to the U.S in November 1991. A second full-time PTA arrived in Guinea in June, 1992. An Interim PTA served 3 months of that period. Consultancies that FSU should deliver have been postponed as the recruitment process is prolonged. One effect has been that the rate of project implementation has been delayed. Credibility in the eyes of the GOG has eroded.

b. Communicating skills or completing work

On the spectrum of performing a job and helping the host country nationals perform their job, FSU long-term technical assistants fall closer to the former. Their work plans and project reports reflect a greater emphasis on accomplishing tasks than on facilitating skills transfer on the part of the Guinean colleagues. GOG officials would like the technical assistants to be better "communicators."

c. Dependency on technical assistance

One consequence of the above situation is that the GOG makes no distinction between FSU and the DAAF, thereby institutionalizing a reliance on technical assistants to perform tasks. A contradictory, but ambiguous reward and incentive dynamic has evolved between

FSU and the GOG. A dependency on the technical assistants, especially the Public Accounting Specialist has been created. His strong technical skills have been accentuated. His ability to accomplish tasks in the short-term, e.g. producing financial reports, elaboration of budgets, has outweighed the need to train counterparts to acquire skills to be used in the long-term.

d. Lack of capacity building

FSU's approach to providing technical assistance is not consistent with the PAAD's intended goals: to assist in the reorganization of the Ministry, promote capacity-building throughout the DAAF and regional level services, and assist in the rationalization of the system-wide management and budget procedures. The achievement of those goals is seriously jeopardized due to three factors. FSU never conducted:

- a comprehensive, organization-based diagnosis of the Ministry's financial and administrative systems, or
- a needs assessment within the system,
- FSU has therefore not been able to design or deliver a quality training plan or restructuring plan built upon a systems analysis.

The degree to which any of the technical assistance deliverables is appropriate to the Ministry's needs is questionable. Rather, FSU's organizational analysis has consisted of informal observation of central administrators at work and infrequent visits to the interior. The needs assessment techniques that the TAs have employed consisted primarily of: asking DAAF and regional level administrators to identify their needs, or collecting resumes from DAAF personnel and comparing them with job descriptions, in some cases, or perceived job functions. A training plan was only submitted to USAID in March 1993.

FSU's technical assistance package, therefore, has not contributed significantly to capacity-building on the part of DAAF personnel. It is not grounded in a thorough analysis of the system; the training plan does not include training objectives, activities or means of evaluation; and with the exception of hands-on training in the use of computers it, like the training sessions offered thus far, reflects a preponderance of lecture and "top-down" teaching styles rather than a more appropriate practical, experiential approach.

FSU's Mid-Year Report for Year Two of Guinea USAID/FSU Technical Assistance Project, submitted on January 14, 1993 is significant in that plans for 1993 include "Provide a short-term technical assistant to analyze training needs of the DAAF" (p. 7). Not only is this critical activity well behind schedule, but FSU concedes the need to rely on a short-term consultant for an activity that would necessarily require long-term, concentrated attention.

3. Contract management by FSU: deliverables

Delivery order #6 and Modification #1 specify the following deliverables to be provided by FSU. The current status is as follows.

a. RTA: the RTA (COP) shall perform the following duties

Through the Technical Secretariat, serve as primary consultant to GOG for the implementation of $5.7 million from A.I.D. (technical support package) in direct assistance.

Status: The RTA attends meetings of the Technical Secretariat and performs administrative and coordinating duties implied therein. The National Coordinator of PASE, to whom the RTA should deliver primary assistance through the Secretariat Technique, assesses his performance as very favorably intentioned, but lacking in the technical skills which were anticipated.

Prepare with Ministry staff statements of work for short-term consultants.

Status: The Public Accounting Specialist and FSU "Summary of Project Activities during Project Year Eight"* report that complete Scopes of Work were delivered to USAID in December 1991. Current USAID personnel do not have these documents. During October 1992 discussions between USAID and FSU the need to amend both T.A.s' Scopes of Work was agreed upon. Scopes of Work for some consultancies have since been provided to USAID, e.g., Procurement/Inventory, Computerization, Media Specialist, etc. but complete Scopes of Work corresponding to the March, 1993 training plan are still outstanding.

Monitor progress and coordinate the related technical assistance toward meeting adjustment benchmarks and conditionality. Contribute to the compilation of the documents necessary to meet conditionality.

Status: The Public Accounting Specialist has primary responsibility within the DAAF of monitoring conditionalities and preparing necessary documents. He devoted almost full-time efforts to preparing for the 1st Tranche Review, February through mid-May 1992.

Identify data needs for monitoring project progress and impact and monitor collection of statistics.

Status: See Monitoring and Evaluation, Section G.1.a.

Facilitate formative and summative evaluations by providing information to mission and evaluation teams concerning such items as evaluation design.

Status: No input has been provided.

Coordinate the identification and conduct of special studies.

Status: One special study has been conducted on gender and rural equity.

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* Year "eight" of the overall FSU worldwide central contract with A.I.D./Washington.

Make recommendations for the procurement of all project-funded equipment and services.

Status: Recommendations for vehicles, office equipment and computers have been made. DAAF and PASE offices have been established. Regarding services, see Section D.2.

Submit semi-annual written reports to USAID/Conakry and participate in quarterly project management committee review meetings.

Status: Acceptable

Assist the DAAFs and key line officers to understand their administrative role and lines of authority within the context of the sectoral reform. Coordinate the activities of these services.

Status: Participation in the Ateliers de Rentrée Scolaire.

Provide advice to DAAFs and key line officers in addressing their tasks.

Status: Informal on-the-job consultations. GOG officials express dissatisfaction with the quality of this service.

Directly assist the DAAFs and key line officers in preparing annual plans of action for their respective services. Help prepare budgets for those plans of actions.

Status: No plans of actions or budgets developed.

Organize seminars for MEN and SEEPU managers on specific areas.

Status: Six seminars organized. See section D.2.d. concerning appropriateness of training. See section D.3.d, short-term consultancies.

Contribute to the development of the annual budget exercise.

Status: Public Accounting Specialist performed this service.

Work with the office of personnel management in the DAAFs.

Status: Service not performed. See Section G.1.b., Personnel.

Work with the financial sections of the DAAFs to improve their capacity to administer the financial activities of the sector. Develop improved systems.

Status: On the job training was assessed by MEPU-FP/PASE as unsatisfactory. Technical Assistant has developed system to improve the tracking of funds to the regions. One Guinean counterpart has mastered a significant portion of the budgetary process.

Work with the procurement sections of the DAAFs.

Status: One consultancy delivered.

Provide guidance to the DAAFs and key line officers in planning for obtaining and making use of short and long term technical assistance and work with Ministry personnel.

Status: Unsatisfactory. See section D.3.a., item 2 -- statements of work for short term consultants.

Help plan and implement the training necessary to improve the decentralized administrative authorities' ability to manage personnel and finances and to participate in the annual budget exercise.

Status: Assessment from DAAF-level GOG is unsatisfactory, and field visits revealed disturbingly low level of management capacities, e.g., disorderly files, imprecise treatment of receipts, dissociation from a budget planning exercise.

Liaise with the World Bank, FAC, and other donors.

Status: The PTA has established important collegial relationships with donors.

Determine overseas training needs, develop with the MEN and SEEPU criteria for selection of trainees.

Status: The PTA contributed to the planning process for overseas training.

b. Specialist in Public Accounting

The Contractor shall produce the following deliverables.

Organizational manual in French.

Status: Not prepared. RTA and the DAAF report that this is a low priority task.

Accounting systems manual in French, designating accounting work flow charts.

Status: Not prepared. RTA and DAAF report that this is a low priority task.

Specification and employment of all hardware and administrative elements necessary to the smooth functioning of a simplified yet modern and responsive working filing system.

Status: Specifications for such has been provided for the central DAAF offices.

Production of both internal accounting and client/user manuals in French to maximize internal comprehension and training.

Status: Production of a guide to budgeting procedures has begun.

Recommendations for staff redeployment or recycling moves.

Status: Request for 4 accountants to be transferred from MFP and the MESRS to the intended Budgetary Unit ("Cellule Budgetaire") was forwarded to the Minister in November 1992. The creation of this Unit was recommended by donors during the Feb. 1992 Tranche Review. One candidate declined the transfer out of frustration with the delayed approval. One candidate has been transferred. Approval for the two remaining candidates has been unofficially granted, but no movement can take place without official approval.

Four Guinean staff were hired: two persons to work in the DAAF budget office, one person to work in the Procurement/Inventory section, and one person to work with the P.L. 480 activities.

c. *Follow up on deliverables*

The majority of deliverables provided by FSU have been driven by day to day, task to task requirements, e.g. the production of periodic financial reports. Very few contributions to longer-term institution building have been introduced. For example:

- the provision of hardware,
- the identification of a new administrative unit and the request for transfer of personnel,
- training and short-term consultancies,
- improvements in the DAAF expenditure tracking procedures have also been introduced, and one Guinean counterpart manages the verification and recording of expenditure receipts. The 1992 Donor Review Committee recommended that a system for double-checking invoices and receipts be instituted, and a process has been created. As noted in the 1992 Review, "tableaux synthetiques" are managed by one Guinean, but the analysis is still performed by the Public Accounting Specialist, and
- plans for computerization of the budget process, expected to greatly improve the system's efficiency, are in place but implementation is contingent on the arrival of the hardware.

d. Short-term consultancies provided by FSU

The table on the next page lists ten consultancies (twice for Tietjen) provided by FSU during the fifteen month period September 1991 December 1992 and which expended $135,000 of the $150,000 provided for in the work order with FSU.

DATE	CONSULTANTS	TASK
Sept.-Nov. 1991	Serge Delorme	DAAF budget preparation, accounting systems analysis
November 1991	John McLanahan	Transfer 1st PTA, establish PASE office, equipment
Jan.-March 1992	Ibrahima Bah-Lalya	Interim PTA
Jan. 1992	John McLanahan	Establish PASE office, equipment
February 1992	Karen Tietjen	Monitoring & eval.
April 1992	Karen Tietjen	Gender & rural equity study plan
May 1992	Joe DeStefano	Prepare tranche review, SAAFs training and guidelines, SAAF manual (Med-evac interrupts #2&3)
May-August 1992	Daniel Bilodeau	Begin DAAF computerization & training
October 1992	Joshua Muskin	2 year Action Plan, draft contract amendment, SOW Media Consultant, proposal for Monitoring & Eval.
Oct.-Dec. 1992	Sylvain Normandeau	Analysis of inventory, procurement systems, regional trainings

Examples of future short term consultancies could include the development of a career development program for personnel within the MEPU-FP. Such a program would make MEPU-FP a more attractive career option, attract higher quality teachers and administrators and reduce the temptation to seek salary increases or other perks directly from the Ministry of Administrative Reform.

E. Technical assistance: design issues

1. Short-term training

The Project design reflects a reliance on periodic short-term consultancies. The intent of the design may have been to enhance a sustained, long-term technical assistance package with repeated, intensive substantive short-term injections. The relationship between long- and short-term assistance has, however, in fact become inverted -- rather than having consultants support the overall longer term goals, the Project has become driven by consultancies. Availability of consultants has determined the timing and substance of short-term interventions. This is exacerbated by the difficulties in identifying French speaking consultants, and by the failure to develop a comprehensive, long-range training plan, based on a thorough organizational analysis. The short-term consultancies are, therefore, taking place in a virtual programmatic vacuum.

2. Long-term technical assistance

The PAAD proposed one Technical Advisor in the Technical Assistance package. A second T.A. position, Public Sector Accounting Specialist, was approved in December 1991. The PAAD had underestimated the work load inherent in the technical assistance component.

3. Emphasis on computerization

The technical assistance component has shown an increasing emphasis on computerization of the DAAF's accounting, reporting, budgeting and materials management systems. Computerization will certainly improve efficiency in the long term. A.I.D. and the GOG should attend, however, to the tendency to prioritize computers over other capacity-building needs. Fifty computers are being obtained under Modification 2 to FSU's contract. Fundamental management skills and practices, such as organizational skills and office management, are still lacking in Guinea, especially in the interior. Training must be directed toward all aspects of management and administration, not just computerization.

4. Cost-effectiveness

The cost-effectiveness of long-term vs. short-term assistance cannot be accurately assessed at the present time, given the need to conduct a thorough organizational diagnosis and training needs assessment. A more appropriate question relates rather to the qualitative effectiveness of technical assistance. The PASE/FSU technical assistance experience to date has shown that continuity is sacrificed to the staccato rhythm of short-term interventions, and that high quality, long-term assistance is required to ensure the sustainable of institutionalized improvements.

F. Management of technical assistance

1. Timely delivery of technical assistance

The Agency has experienced delays in decision-making and approval procedures, which have impacted technical assistance implementation. The PAAD was signed in May of 1990, the contract with FSU was signed in January of 1991, and the FSU Delivery Order was signed in August of 1991. Although the first phase of the PASE is currently nearing completion, FSU's participation began only 19 months ago.

A.I.D. required seven months to process the required authorization for FSU to procure computers and equipment (Modification No. 2). As a consequence computerization of the budget and corresponding training has been delayed.

2. Incomplete and delayed definition of an overall role and goal for FSU

Extensive turnover in personnel in USAID/Conakry since the start of PASE has inhibited the development of a consistent programmatic and budgetary strategy of technical assistance. A time-phased work plan for the contractor was developed only in October, 1992. It covers only a ten-month period and does not reflect budgetary needs. The Contractor, while mandated by a Scope of Work, was not equipped with the necessary planning tools conducive to the design or implementation of a comprehensive strategy.

FSU did not request support or take the initiative to create a plan in accordance with the Scope of Work and responsive to the long-range needs of the Ministry.

3. USAID's inconsistent requests for technical assistants' time and attention

The Mission has occasionally requested FSU to perform duties inconsistent with its approved Scope of Work, e.g., to follow up the P.L. 480 school construction procedures. These time consuming "extra" duties impinge on the Contractor's ability to accomplish deliverables contained in its delivery orders.

4. Communication systems

a. Written documents

FSU has reportedly submitted documents to the Mission, which the Mission does not acknowledge having received, e.g. short-term consultants' scopes of work, an organizational (MEPU-FP) flow-chart, etc. The temporary misplacement of the January 26, 1993 letter from the Secretary General concerning SSP has provoked tension among all parties concerned.

b. Verbal communication

The Mission should continue to actively monitor the TAs' progress, and to offer support and guidance as necessary. Some misunderstandings about expectations persist, e.g, the Public Accounting Specialist's budget manual and training manual.

5. Technical advisor's dual roles

Questions of authority, accountability and required approval have inhibited the contractor's ability to deliver technical assistance in a timely manner. The RTA/COP's scope of work states that "The RTA has two complementary roles, one in relation to A.I.D. and the other in relation to the Ministry of Education." In the long term, these two roles are directed toward the same goal, but in the day-to-day context of task accomplishment they frequently conflict. USAID, the PASE Coordinator and/or the DAAF Director should maintain contact to ensure that they are directing the contractor's efforts toward the same ends.

Also, requests for information are treated with great caution by the GOG. The time involved in securing authorization, e.g. appropriate signatures, for release of plans, reports or other PASE-related documents, is longer than the Mission staff have realized. The Contractor has frequently been obliged to mediate such differences. USAID should consider its expectations in relation to GOG standard practice.

G. Management of the PASE program/project

1. USAID's detached, reactive management style

Particularly in the period from 1991 to mid-1992, USAID maintained a relative detachment from the Project. It demonstrated a reactive, rather than pro-active management style.

a. Monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation figures in the PAAD as one of the critical elements of the PASE. It was conceived as a multi-purpose system to provide quantitative and qualitative information for use in making mid-course corrections on strategy and management. Yet no system has to date been designed or implemented.

The purpose of monitoring and evaluation has not been sufficiently clarified among AID/W, USAID, the Technical Assistance contractor, the GOG, and the PASE principal donors. The PASE design team envisioned a multi-purpose system to address a number of programmatic and management needs (PAAD, pp. 36-37):

- to monitor conditionalities,
- to evaluate the effectiveness of the T.A. in improving the Ministry's institutional capacity,

- to evaluate the overall impact of the PASE on the educational system in terms of both policy reform and effects at the school level and on the target population,

- to draw out a number of generalizable lessons for possible application to the educational sector reform in other countries, and

- to strengthen the GOG's own monitoring and evaluation capacity.

These purposes imply different kinds of information, different users of the information, different analytical procedures, and different presentation models. Conditionalities, for example, might be addressed in part through an understanding of budgetary allocations and expenditures, while effects of PASE at the school level might be addressed in part through an understanding of school children's learning outcomes. It is extremely doubtful that one system will be sufficient to fulfill such a broad range of quantitative and qualitative goals. Rather, multiple systems are needed, designed and managed by different organizations and different individuals. The PAAD clearly indicated the need for intensive, coordinated planning among all partners in the PASE in order to assess the intermediate effects and long-term impacts of the PASE.

Given the critical need for identifying and assessing progress in a reform-oriented project/program such as the PASE, USAID should have a) supervised FSU to ensure that monitoring and evaluation was prioritized, b) been cognizant of the FAC's potential interest in monitoring and evaluation, and c) acted more assertively as the FAC moved into the design of an evaluation system.

Instead, an FSU consultant arrived in February 1992 to find the FAC already in the Ministry (Statistical Planning Service), negotiating M & E plans. The FSU consultant was then requested by the Technical Secretariat and the Mission to try to identify complementary areas for A.I.D. intervention. The consultant's subsequent drafts of evaluation options were not addressed until December 1992, when FSU (J. Muskin) wrote to the Secretary-General of the MEPU-FP, proposing options for interventions in the SSP. At a subsequent meeting between USAID, the GOG and the FAC, a misunderstanding that led to further delays ensued. USAID intended to identify an area of evaluation activity in the SSP, and the GOG understood that USAID was offering to give training in computerization in the SSP. The GOG's letter inviting USAID to offer this training had not yet been acted upon at the time of this evaluation.

Rather, the GOG and the Mission are each waiting for the other to take the initiative. The Mission's intent is to identify an entire area of intervention, before discussing details with the FAC. The GOG welcomes USAID in SSP, and does not see computer training as a limited possibility, but rather as one possibility among others.

Consequently, the GOG agreed to authorize the FAC to continue plans for monitoring and evaluation through 1992, in part due to USAID/FSU's inaction (February to December 1992). The Mission should actively pursue the SSP training option, immediately, and continue dialogue concerning other possible monitoring, evaluation, and training possibilities.

(See also Section G.1.d. on the data review committee).

b. Personnel section of the DAAF

FSU was and continues to be mandated to work in the Personnel and Training section in the DAAF. Because of inaction of FSU that area has de facto, if not yet officially, been assumed by the FAC.

FSU/USAID have not to date intervened in the Personnel and Training section, but have concentrated first on the Finance/Accounting and Materials/Equipment section. In the spring of 1992, the FAC proposed to the PASE National Coordinator to provide training and assistance in the Personnel section. The Coordinator consulted with the Minister, who affirmed her commitment to have Personnel remain with A.I.D.. The National Coordinator consulted the Mission Director, who said the Mission would "study the situation." The Coordinator's response was, "You have been warned."

The Mission Director at the time met with the FAC, and agreed that FAC could intervene in Personnel, that their work would not be mutually exclusive of A.I.D./FSU's. The FAC announced their plans at a Monday donor meeting.

The National Coordinator provided the FAC Scope of Work to USAID for comment, and insisted that the FAC work under the immediate supervision of the FSU/RTA/COP, with ultimate reporting responsibilities to the Director of the DAAF. The Coordinator advised the FAC to coordinate with FSU.

An awkward situation has resulted in which one donor has supervisory responsibility over another, and the GOG has two donors (USAID and FAC) working in a service where it had preferred only one (USAID).

Due in part to the Mission's delayed response, A.I.D. has effectively lost leverage in the Personnel section. Project staff verbally report plans to amend the FSU contract to reflect the change. The evaluation team's recommendation to expand technical assistance is geared to avoiding such occurrences in the future.

c. Ongoing project assessment

Periodic reports from the Mission to AID/W have indicated a general satisfaction with PASE progress, in spite of significant problems: cumbersome conditionalities reporting requirements, delayed school construction, an ineffective inter-ministerial commitee, and FSU's inability to deliver appropriate technical assistants. In July 1992 the Mission Director telexed A.I.D./W an 18-month report on the PASE in which he described the 1992 Tranche Review as having given the PASE "a favorable bill of health." FSU is not even mentioned in the telex, and the telex is glowingly favorable. No pro-active steps are indicated through which to address the program's problems.

The April-September 1992 PIR also indicates that the Mission was generally satisfied with PASE progress. Immediate attention is not directed to any of the problems facing the

program, and the Director checked the second of the assessment options at the end of the report, indicating that the program was experiencing only moderate difficulties.

Previous evaluators signaled the need for increased monitoring of the PASE (see Chapter 1), as does the Mission for its intermittent concern about insufficient monitoring (e.g., one Mission representative's comment that "We're not really ready for the evaluation -- we don't have an information system in place"). The Mission deserves some acknowledgment as well for using the reporting mechanisms in place. The extent to which these mechanisms were just pro-forma is, however, not clear. Some questions are not easily answered.

- Who was/is "in charge" of the PASE?
- Who had/has responsibility for ensuring the program's success?
- Who took/takes leadership in initiating pro-active measures?

d. Gaps in program implementation

Some elements which were included in the program design have been omitted from program implementation. The PAAD states, for example, that "the Mission, in collaboration with other donors, should work with the GOG to institutionalize an educational testing system." Student testing was never included in any of the FSU buy-ins, and the issue of student testing has not been taken care of directly by the Mission. So far, testing has been addressed solely by the FAC.

The PAAD and A.I.D.'s Grant Agreement state that "The USAID Senior Technical Advisor will initiate the creation of a data review committee which will identify specific donor data needs and review the responsiveness of GOG data collection, analysis and reporting activities." That activity does not figure in the STA's scope of work nor has A.I.D. worked on this requirement directly. A.I.D./W, the Mission and/or FSU should have noted this omission through reporting systems or better supervision.

It is clear that internal A.I.D. management and systems must be strengthened to assure that such gaps are discovered and corrected as expeditiously as possible. Since both of these PAAD requirements continue to be valid, immediate steps should be taken by USAID/Conakry to implement them.

2. Procurement of goods and services

A.I.D. has used numerous procurement modalities in the project. Some services have been purchased from FSU, some have been managed by the Mission Director and some were procured directly.

The buy-in arrangement was intended to facilitate timely project execution. It has been proven to have been less effective than hoped. At the time of project start-up, eight months elapsed (May 1990-Jan. 1991) between the PAAD approval and the signing of the FSU contract. Another fifteen months passed before the recruitment and arrival of the first RTA.

The Mission recently determined that computers and equipment would be most appropriately secured by FSU, given resource shortages at the Mission. A.I.D./W experienced delays in processing the PIO/T. Also, the process by which FSU's capacity and experience in large procurement exercises was determined is not clear.

Training has become another management issue. Different aspects of training have been handled separately, and appear to be somewhat disconnected. Some short-term trainings were provided under the FSU contract, and some were contracted directly through A.I.D./W. Long-term training, which is closely related to needs in the field, is not in FSU's contract but is being managed through A.I.D./W.

3. Notions of quality

The discussion (see Chapter I) of the inclusion or omission of the term "quality" in recent correspondence between A.I.D./W and USAID indicates an ambiguous approach to technical assistance. The Agency should revisit the quality question in order to better assess current technical assistance and to guide decisions regarding the nature of future technical assistance.

H. Findings

1. Guinea's education sector is evolving in the absence of clear GOG policy guidelines, priorities, strategies or time-phased plans. The GOG's educational policy statements focus on long-term accomplishments, in both pedagogy and administration. It is unclear whether the reform is beautiful schools or a commitment to a market-oriented education. It is unclear whether the PASE is a structure or a strategy. It is unclear whether motivating local populations toward education is as important as educating those children who are already in school.

2. Assessment of the impact of PASE to date is a multi-level, complex exercise. Donors and the GOG have expressed some frustration about their inability to monitor their own or the collective impacts of PASE, and the organizational and management structures of the PASE are complex.

3. While USAID has its own six-month internal monitoring system (the PIR), USAID has not, under the TA portion of its project, worked with the GOG to develop the proposed tracking system to monitor resources going into the education sector and to determine the impact of U.S. and other donor assistance on primary school education.

4. The donor coordination mechanisms (Donors Committee meetings and joint conditionality reviews) do not meet the needs implied in a complex program such as the PASE -- needs for planning, implementing, evaluating and reporting on individual donors' contributions to the PASE.

5. An unproductive sense of fear, hesitancy and negativity on the part of USAID is obstructing communication and cooperation with the FAC. The FAC has at times neglected to share information that would have been useful in coordinating efforts with USAID. The GOG has expressed concern about nascent territoriality and indicated that "There is enough room for everyone."

6. The majority of deliverables provided by FSU have been driven by day to day, task to task requirements, e.g. the production of periodic financial reports. Very few contributions to longer-term institution building have been introduced.

7. USAID, FSU and the GOG conducted discussions in October 1992 to address FSU's unsatisfactory performance to that date. Terms of reference for managerial positions within the DAAF and analyses of DAAF accounting and budgeting relationships resulted as additional deliverables. These have not yet been produced.

8. This project has turned out to be more complicated, with many more issues, and more labor intensive than the designers had anticipated. A.I.D./W and the Mission did not provide a sufficient quantity of quality manpower and support necessary to properly supervise, manage and follow up on project problems.

9. Timely delivery of high quality technical assistance has been impeded by a multitude of difficulties, related to management and performance weaknesses on the part of FSU, USAID, A.I.D./W and the GOG. While each of these institutions bears some responsibility for the current unsatisfactory status of the T.A., the technical assistance package has been implemented in the absence of a central manager.

I. Recommendations

1. The GOG should further elaborate and disseminate its reform policies to address the disparities and ambiguities that prevail and to assure that all partners, stakeholders, agents, cadre and educational personnel fully understand the purpose and nature of the reform.

2. The GOG and donors should consider restructuring the PASE committee structure, to ensure collaboration with the MESRS, and to clarify lines of authority and accountability.

3. USAID should take the lead, to:

- facilitate the development of a shared, coherent perspective of monitoring and evaluation needs among all parties involved (donors, AID/W, technical assistance contractor, DAAF, SSP, other Ministry departments, and PASE management committees);

- adopt a Monitoring and Evaluation plan, with timelines and responsible personnel, for the design of appropriate systems, including objectives; instruments, tools, analytical processes and reporting mechanisms. USAID should

refer to the plan previously elaborated during the February 1992 FSU consultancy, and should actively seek ways to complement the FAC (CEPEC) evaluation currently in the implementation stages;

- follow up on the status of the M & E plan;

- ensure that monitoring and evaluation needs within the Ministry, and not just in response to donor requirements, are addressed. USAID should be vigilant in assuring that the Ministry will feel ownership of the systems, and that the information generated will be used within the Ministry;

- ensure GOG capacity building, at all levels: planning, data collection, data analysis and reporting. The ultimate goal of instilling in the Ministry a system-wide, self-reflective spirit of analysis must not be lost in the time-intensive, day to day process of designing and managing such mechanics as tracking systems and quantitative reports.

4. USAID must assume a more aggressive stance in proposing, negotiating and managing interventions with the GOG and supervising the work of technical assistance contractors. The Mission must introduce closer supervision to assure that daily operations at the HRD level are in accord with agreed upon Mission work plans.

5. USAID should continue its assistance in support of accounting, budgeting, and administrative improvement of the DAAF/SAAF structure in MEPU-FP, but in the Phase II project, A.I.D. should:

- support Guinea's decentralization reform by giving greater attention to budget and administrative operations at the lowest field level within MEPU-FP with the goal of instilling a bottom up (full staff involvement) approach to management of primary education;

- support reform to a more integrated educational program management system throughout MEPU-FP that helps the Ministry actually improve the quality of education. Educations administrators need to be brought more into the program decision loop, in terms of understanding the programs they are managing, the implications of budget decisions, and participating in decisions on policy matters.

6. The proposed expanded technical assistance program should only be attempted if A.I.D./W/ARTS/HRD and the Mission are prepared to provide the necessary technical resources to carry out the work. If A.I.D./W/ARTS cannot provide this support USAID/Guinea should reconsider such an expanded primary education program suggested in this evaluation report. With regard to long term experts for administration and budgeting:

- an advisor in DAAF to continue to improve accounting, budget, administration and program management of MEPU-FP, particularly at the field level;

- a computer systems analyst, probably in SSP, to help A.I.D. and the technical assistance team develop and manage a computerized monitoring and evaluation system, and to provide technical support to the analytical work of the other advisors and Guinean professionals in MEPU-FP;

- an advisor to work in IPN on educational action research and to help develop text books, related material, teacher training, etc. for pedagogical topics such as, for example, mathematics or primary grades one to six;

- a long term advisor, at the Direction de l'Enseigement Elémentaire, for at least a year, to develop and manage long term programs for access to education for rural populations and girls and to guide the development of private sector schools;

- a management training/organizational development specialist, in the Office of the Secretary-General level, to ensure that the technical assistance package is grounded in a commitment to transfer of skills and knowledge to all MEPU-FP staff and educational administrators. This specialist would complement technical experts who get the systems up and running but who may not be expert in teaching other people how to do it; and

- a senior professional educational administrator, as contractor Chief of Party, assigned to the Ministerial level, to develop long term plans for the technical assistance contractor, to manage the other experts, to help MEPU-FP prepare programs to meet NPA conditions precedent to release of any new funds, to oversee the monitoring and evaluation system, to serve on the Secretariat Technique as a Counselor to the PASE Coordinator (depending on how the PASE Secretariat will be reorganized), and to be the professional contact between PASE/MEPU-FP and A.I.D./Conakry.

7. On an annual basis, the recommendations would require $6-7,000,000, as follows:

Long Term Technical Assistance	$ 2,500,000
Short Term Technical Assistance	100,000
Observation Training in the U.S.	300,000
Special program support for rural areas and girls education	200,000
Monitoring and Evaluation in Guinea	200,000
Local Costs and Equipment for SSP, action research, mathematics development at IPN	200,000
Total	**3,500,000**
Cash grant for books and other didactic material	**3,000,000**
Total Annual Program	**6,500,000**

8. Some of the proposed activities, e.g., the expanded participant training familiarization effort should be implemented immediately with the more than $2 million remaining unearmarked and unexpended in the present technical assistance project. The increased

number of personal services should be secured through a new competitive contract or a cooperative agreement with a qualified educational consulting firm. At least 60% of the contract evaluation criteria should be on the six key personnel to be proposed for the project. The RFP should let it be known that USAID encourages the inclusion of African professionals in the proposal.

9. Within USAID/Conakry, because the education project has such high visibility and importance to A.I.D., and needs greater management attention, the Mission should:

- have the HRDO report directly to the Deputy Mission Director who would be assigned the additional responsibility of supervising HRDO projects;

- develop a long term, detailed, strategic plan for managing the primary education sector program that has benchmarks, time lines, progress criteria, decision points and an internal monitoring and reporting system that changes the present approach to a system that is prioritized and systemized; and

- assign to the USAID Program Office the additional responsibility to work with HRDO to monitor progress of the cash grant and assist with the review of conditionality documentation that relates to satisfying PASE budgetary, and other macro level conditions and issues.

10. A.I.D./W and USAID/Guinea should assure the selection of a technical assistance contractor that has more experience working in Francophone Africa, that has greater links with French speaking educational specialists in the United States, and which has demonstrated that it can operate fairly independently with a high level of technical skill.

11. A basic assumption of non project assistance is that by providing financial resources through the Ministry of Plan and Finance at the macro-economic level, national level institutional improvement will occur and resources will flow to appropriate sectors such as primary education. This institutionalization is not automatic, however. USAID, with its donor partners, should assure that technical assistance is also provided to the Ministry of Plan and Finance so that institutional improvement does occur at the national level.

V. FINANCIAL IMPLICATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR EDUCATION

A. Education sector financing

1. Overview

The education sector has 21 projects in the 1993 GOG investment budget, which is published each year as part of the national budget. Six of those projects are part of the PASE program. Partial USAID grant financing has been provided under PASE for the construction and equipping of rural schools and the rehabilitation of the offices of the IRE, DPE and ENI from PL 480-generated local currency. The GOG national budget finances GF 4755 million, or 87%, of these costs, while PASE (FED, USAID, FAC, IDA) finance the remaining 13% or about GF 738 million. Education sector investments make up about 7% of the total GOG investment budget for 1993.

For investment in general, the role of domestic funding is less dominant with the majority of the investment budget being financed by external sources (87% in 1992). Past investment has been slow, however, with an implementation rate of 58% in 1988. 69.4% of the domestically financed budget for 1992 was expended (realized). While domestic public and private sources are nominally responsible for maintenance and construction of schools (local districts and Parents' Associations (APEs) for primary, and prefectures for secondary), high investment costs and limited domestic funds leave the real burden to the external donor community.

Total public spending on education was estimated at 1.8% of GDP in 1989. The Government finances almost all recurrent spending for education and, in 1989, it allocated 12.9% of its total recurrent budget for the education sector. France and USSR made some contributions to operating expenditures for teacher training, language programs and higher education but, for the most part, recurrent budget support or direct financing of operating expenses has been the responsibility of the GOG.

2. Analysis of the education sector budget

Three GOG documents explain the education sector budget. The first is the GOG's national budget (Loi de Finances), referred to as the "budget notifie." The national budget is published each year and consists of the aggregate allocations for each ministry. The second document is the detailed Ministry budget prepared by the DAAF. The Ministry budget shows allocations to specific budget line items within the education ministry. The third important document is the DAAF's financial report of budget executions. This report shows the amounts for which there is financial coverage from the GOG central treasury that will probably be disbursed if the proper documentation is provided to the MPF. (Actual expenditures are not reflected in the documentation until the following GOG budget year. At the time of the Team's visit in March 1993, expenditures were still being made against the

1992 budget allocations. The 1993 GOG national budget does not reveal actual 1992 expenditures, only 1992 allocations).

PASE secured a donor infusion of approximately US$60 million over the three year period from 1991-1993. Under PASE, the USG will contribute a total of US$28 million, with US$22.3 million for NPA and US$5.7 for U.S. technical assistance. The World Bank/IDA will contribute US$20 million and the FAC approximately US$10 million. The FAC assistance goes directly for French technical assistance and, like the US$5.7 million of technical assistance, does not pass through the GOG budgeting system. The FAC recently made a contribution of GF 3,000,000,000 to the overall GOG recurrent budget for 1993 and the United States has provided an additional $5.8 million PL 480 generated local currency.

Other donors (FED,SICA) have provided another $11.0 million over this period. PASE financial assistance from the Bank and USAID was to be disbursed in three tranches based on the successful fulfillment by the GOG of certain conditions. The timing of the tranche releases, however, is different for the World Bank/IDA program and the USAID program. Also, PASE's budget cycle runs from October through September compared to the GOG budget cycle which, according to the GOG finance laws, runs from January to December. The incongruence of the tranche releases of the World Bank and USAID programs and the different budget cycles of PASE and the GOG complicate the interpretation of budget data as it relates to PASE.

The GOG national budgets indicate that, in absolute terms, allocations to the education sector have gone from 12,121,000,000 FG in 1988 to 35,126,000,000 FG in 1991. As a percentage of the national budget, in 1988, education expenditures made up 11.4% of the national budget; in 1989, 12.9%; and 15% in 1990. These percentages show the GOG's commitment to education sector financing even before the PASE started in 1991.

With the start of PASE in 1991, education expenditures increased to 19.2% of the 1992 national budget. Expenditures on pedagogical inputs and operations (non-salary, non-capital and non-subsidy expenditures) increased in absolute terms (from GF 2,637,207 in 1990 to GF 10,103,296 in 1991) and as a percentage of the total MEPU-FP budget (from 16% in 1990 to approximately 29% in 1991). Capital expenditures were 9% of the MEPU-FP budget allocations in 1991 and slightly less than 9% in 1992.

Maintenance was allocated about 3% of the MEPU-FP budget in 1991 and about 4% in 1992. The total recurrent costs, not including salaries and fringe benefits, were approximately 19% of the total MEPU-FP budget allocations in 1991 and about 18% in 1992. Coherent data on the total amounts allotted to the central offices versus the various regions were not available. (See Annex 12)

For the second year of PASE, Oct 1991 - Sept 1992, a DAAF report showed a total 1992 allocation to the education sector (MEPU-FP and MESRS) of FG 59,652,000,000; GF 47,116,000,000 or 79% of the education sector total for MEPU-FP and FG 12,536,000,000 or 21%, for MESRS. Primary education received FG 21,460,601,000, or 36% of the total Education Sector allocation and 45% of MEPU-FP allocation. Administrative costs made up 13% of the budget allocations and total personnel costs were FG 41,388,500,000 or 70 % of

the education sector budget. Personnel costs are FG 34,326,000,000 or 73% of MEPU-FP - FP's budget.

Regarding expenditures, the DAAF reports that for the period October 1991 to September 1992, 91% of the MEPU-FP budget of GF 44,184,508 has been committed ("ordonnancements") or paid. Data on the actual expenditures for 1991 were not available to the team, although an internal USAID memo states that the Ministry confirmed that it received all allotted amounts from the MPF for the first year of PASE.

According to the 1993 GOG national budget, MEPU-FP has been allotted GF 50,164,000,000 compared to an allocation of GF 47,406,000,000 in 1992.

3. Financing recurrent costs

Inadequate levels of recurrent financing has been identified as a fundamental problem confronting the education as well as other sectors in Guinea. The effects have been the near total lack of pedagogical materials, a situation that is particularly pronounced at the regional level.

After PASE, the GOG is not sure how it will continue to increase allocations and expenditures to the education sector at the same levels. Increases will, of course, depend on the success of Guinea's macro economic program. Presently, GOG current expenses are increasing faster than internal receipts. The budget deficit in 1992 was GF 225,900,000,000. If there are slowdowns in GOG budget increases, additional amounts may have to come from reallocations from other ministries such as Defense and Foreign Affairs. These decisions, of course, are not within the MEPU-FP's authority.

4. GOG budget planning process

The GOG's Finance Law and General Rules for Public Accounting (Loi Organique Relative aux Lois de Finance, January 26,1991 and the Règlement General sur la Comptabilité Publique, January 26, 1991) set forth in detail the laws and procedures for planning and executing the national budget. The Direction des Affaires Administratives et Financières (DAAFs) are responsible for preparation and management of the national budget. The Services of Administration and Finance (SAAFs) have field representatives in the various regions.

All public funds are deposited obligatorily in a single fund at the central bank, except when there is an exemption given expressly by the MPF. Personnel funds are not included in this account. Rules, regulations and the responsibilities of administrators, managers and accountants are delineated in the finance law. At the central level the MPF has the sole management responsibility for the State's expenditures. He can delegate all or part of his authority to the Director of the National Budget. Under the authority of the MPF the National Budget director is the State comptroller. He is the executor of all operations (receipts and payments) of the general budget and special accounts of the Treasury.

At the decentralized level, the State has accountants as follows: "les Trésoriers-Principaux" of each region; "les Trésoriers Prefectoraux" responsible for receipts and payments of the State at the Prefectoral level; and, "les Payeurs des representations diplomatiques" charged with personnel, equipment and investments required for the operation of embassies.

The national budget is made up of the sum of receipts and expenditures of the State. Revenue are classified as "internal" and "external." Internal receipts are subdivided into fiscal and non-fiscal consisting of taxes and customs duties; registration of goods and postal stamps; property taxes; receipts for services rendered; loan repayments and advances; gifts and fines/misc. External receipts consist of grants and loans.

Expenditures are divided into five categories: (1) Public Debt; (2) Personnel Expenses; (3) Operating Expenses; (4) Transfers and Subsidies; and (5) Public Investment. Investments are further divided into domestically-financed investments and externally-financed investments.

A national budget is authorized each year. The Minister of Plan/Finance requests the other ministries to submit their proposed expenses seven months before the beginning of budget deliberations. Proposals must be transmitted not later than July, with all necessary justifications attached. The MPF can propose modifications and require any amount of detail that he considers necessary to clarify the expense and propose modifications. The National Budget Director and the representatives of the different ministries discuss and evaluate each proposal. The MPF gets directly involved with the other ministries only in the case of disputes.

The MPF is required to communicate the annual finance law (the national budget) not later than November 15 of the preceding budget year. The budget is deliberated in the Council of Ministers and adopted by the President. In the event the annual budget is not adopted before the first of January of the year it is to be executed, provisional credits equal to one twelfth of the previous year's budget are opened by Presidential decree.

While the procedures and timing of budget actions laid out by law are more or less followed, planning and deliberation deadlines have been missed, and budget executions have been delayed for a variety of administrative, budgetary and political reasons. Credit advances to the ministries, as specified in the law, have also been delayed or unavailable due to revenue shortfalls.

5. GOG budget execution

There are four steps in the process to disburse budgetary funds: the budget allocation (budget notifie); earmarking (engagements); obligations (ordonnancements); and, payments (montant payé). All obligations from the budget must be made by the end of the budget year (December). Actual payments can be made as late as March 30 of the following year; there is an automatic one month extension, after which time funds go back to the central treasury. In cases where financial coverage of the budget comes as late as November, two months is often not sufficient time to secure signatures required for disbursements, especially at the regional

and prefecture levels. Guinea's physical infrastructure is poor and authorized government agents must personally travel long distances by road to make disbursements.

MEPU-FP had 91% of its budget executed during the PASE fiscal year (Oct 1991-September 1992), compared with 80% of the MESR budget having been executed. The GOG fiscal year is January to December; the PASE fiscal year is October to September. This difference presents a problem with satisfying conditionality, since some of the conditions are linked to actual budget expenditures, not allocations or obligations, that are usually not made until the last quarter (Oct-Dec) of the GOG fiscal year, or the first quarter (Jan-March) of the new GOG fiscal year. The incongruence of the GOG and PASE fiscal years can give the impression of no movement of funds at the time yearly PASE conditionalities (percentage expended for education, for example) should be satisfied and discrepancies are easily attributed to different years.

The second year of PASE ending September 30, 1992 was more difficult than the first year. The following difficulties were encountered: 1) the annual Finance Law was adopted on February 4, instead of January 1); 2) Notification of ministries of their budget allocations was late; 3) Earmarking and commitments to the interior of the country by the MPF were late; 4) Administrative delays in the completion of paperwork to delegate credits; and, 5) Lack of funds to cover credits in the provinces until September 1992, resulting in several programmed activities going unfunded.

The disbursement problems are on two levels, at the national level resulting from macro-economic conditions (shortages of funds), and at the regional level related to administrative bottlenecks and irregularities. Communication and transportation are difficult and regional agents are inadequately trained in the numerous rules and regulations. The system for tracking expenditures at the regional level is cumbersome and fraught with opportunities for unauthorized payments, over-invoicing and unnecessary delays. Too many people are involved in the "ordonancement" approval process. What was intended to be a system of bureaucratic controls has become, a bottleneck, and an opportunity for rent seeking behavior.

6. Findings

a. The DAAF, assisted by USAID technical assistance, played a key role in planning and executing the 1991, 1992 and 1993 MEPU-FP budgets. The DAAF produced basic budgetary and financial data based on input from the regional SAAFs. The Office of the Inspector General (IGEPU) prepared a plan for the salary adjustments of teachers.

b. IGEPU also developed a planning system based on PASE's action program and incorporates regional and prefecture-level needs. Regional Inspectors, each year, collect data from each region which elaborates the training, construction, renovation, equipment, and pedagogical material requirements of students, teachers, school directors and administrators. The linkage between the IGEPU Action Plan and DAAF budget preparation has not yet been demonstrated.

c. The education budget follows the same general format as the national budget, which is prescribed by the GOG national finance law, based on the French system. The funding

categories make it difficult to extract the information that USAID finds useful, although disbursement information by function and geographic region is available within the DAAF. An overall analytic budget based on program needs has not yet been developed. As it is, the MEPU-FP budget is reportedly the most detailed and well-thought-out of all the ministry's budgets.

d. The percentage of the national budget allotted to the education sector exceeded 19 percent in 1992 consistent with the PASE objectives. Primary education's share was a major part of this increase. Field visits to the Gaoual, Koundara, Kindia and Labe revealed that money has been spent primarily on equipment and furniture for the central and regional DPE administrative offices and student desks and armoires for both rural and urban class rooms. Village classrooms have been renovated and equipped with chalk and furniture. Pedagogical materials appear to be missing in many of the schools visited.

e. The DAAF has put into place an accounting system to track expenditures at the central level, an important management step for the sector. With the budget increases resulting from PASE, the DAAF's responsibilities of the management of inventory and its distribution throughout the regions, have increased. This has resulted in more staff time devoted to the task and the need for better trained DAAF and SAAF staff to insure successful budget execution.

f.. Significant problems remain in the management and execution of the education budget. The DPEs are informed of their budget levels very late in the fiscal year. In order to meet disbursement deadlines, the DPEs have had to begin making commitments against their budgets without knowing exactly how much of their budget will actually be covered financially by the central treasury. The late communication of budget information makes systematic planning of activities for the entire fiscal year difficult and results in some contracts going unpaid.

g. As with other ministries, the MEPU-FP recurrent budget is broken down into two main categories: Personnel and Operating Expenses. The Operating Expenses are divided into moving expenses, equipment and furniture, consumable products, automobiles, property maintenance, allowances, misc, including receptions and ceremonies.

h. There is a breakdown in the Education Sector budget between administrative and teaching expenses. Administrative expenses are divided into central and regional, and teaching expenses by elementary, secondary, technical and professional and normal. The budget presentation does not break down prefecture-level expenditures, nor does it provide information as a "program budget" as is usual in the United States.

i. Salaries are paid on time, but the rest of the budget goes unexecuted until late in the GOG fiscal year, or early the following fiscal year.

7. Recommendations

a. Increase and improve the quality of training of the SAAFs of both the MEPU-FP and MPF. On-the-job training, as well as formal seminars at the national and regional level

should be stepped up to insure that the responsible government agents are knowledgeable about all rules and regulations, especially as they relate to expenditures.

b. Institute a system of penalties for agents responsible for delays or irregularities in disbursements.

c. Review the disbursement procedures at both the national and regional levels with a view to reducing the number of persons involved in the approval process.

d. A cash grant should continue to be provided to the GOG in order to permit USAID to impact on critical policies for basic education. The team proposes a cash transfer that generates local currencies which would in turn be earmarked for basic education. Based upon the first two year of experience a number of changes are suggested in the management of the cash grant component:

- provision of U.S. dollars to the GOG should no longer be tied to repayment of debt to the United States;

- instead, these funds should be earmarked, and used only for primary education purposes as agreed to between A.I.D. and the GOG. This is sometimes referred to as an (education) sector grant;

- a separate local currency account should be established in the Central Bank into which the GNF equivalent of the U.S. dollars will be deposited;

- procedures should be established to assure appropriate release of funds to purposes negotiated between USAID and the GOG and a monitoring system should be established to track the application of the local fund;

- one suggested use of $3,000,000 per year of the cash grant would be funds would be for production, supply and wide distribution of student books, teacher manuals and other didactic material; and

- The conditions precedent to release of the cash grant, and management of the condition require careful consideration. We suggest shifting budgetary and financial conditions to the World Bank, while USAID focuses on more pedagogically significant conditions, such as the development of an improved nationwide student testing program.

B. Expected logframe outputs

There are six logframe outputs that are related to administration, accounting, budgeting and finance.

- Improved budgeting and tracking of expenditures;
- Trained management personnel at all levels;

- Increased share of national budget for MEN;
- Increased share for basic education within the education sector budget;
- Promotion of local and private initiatives in education;
- Implemented spending norms for non-salary inputs.

These outputs are a combination of measures for both the reform Program No. 675-0222 (also referred to as NPA) and the reform Support Project No. 675-0223. A clear distinction has not been made between those outputs and indicators that are associated with the NPA conditionality and those that are associated with the Support Project, or technical assistance and training portion of A.I.D.'s assistance package. Outputs 3, 4 and 6 relate to budget allocations and expenditures and, conceptually, are associated with the NPA program geared to systemic improvements at the national planning and budget allocation levels. Outputs 1, 2 and 5 concern training and are more project-oriented.

The conceptual distinction is important when one attempts to assess outcomes after only two years of program/project implementation. Program assistance conditions are intended to improve the management and budgeting system as a whole. Systemic improvements require longer-term efforts and, when accomplished, are less tangible because improvements are reflected in changes in attitudes, philosophies, modus operandi, etc. Systemic improvements are the net result of the synergetic effect of many factors (eg. resources from other donors, macro-economic conditions, institution building, behavioral changes, etc.) and cannot be linked directly to any one input. Project outputs, on the other hand, are more tangible, and therefore can be more easily measured.

A.I.D. has not yet developed standard criteria for evaluating NPA programs, and recognizes its relative inexperience with assessing performance and managing conditionalities. The subject was, in fact, the focus of a recent Education Workshop held in Abidjan in February 1993. It is within this context that the progress on each output is discussed below.

1. Improved budgeting and tracking of expenditures

The indicators in the logframe for this output are computerized personnel files; remaining staff positions filled; annual action plans and budget estimates according to national budget categories prepared by the education sector departments, IREs and DPEs; the education sector's annual budget, incorporating the above. Considerable progress has been made in the planning and preparation of annual budgets, but additional work is needed to speed up and better track expenditures, especially at the regional and prefect levels. Budgeting and expenditure tracking are handled by the DAAF of the MEPU-FP at the national level and the SAAFs at the regional, prefect, and sub-prefect levels. The DAAF personnel files have been computerized (at the Ministry of Administrative reform and Civil Service), but several staff positions remain unfilled. This is probably due to the IMF ESAF program condition requiring the GOG to reduce the number of civil servants.

The MEPU-FP has been credited with having the best budget of all the ministries. The MEPU-FP budget is broken down into relevant categories (consistent with those of the national budget) and MEPU-FP has initiated a process whereby the SAAFs and DPEs

participate in delineating the education needs in each region. At the present time, however, there is little relationship between real program requirements and the budget presentation.

Tracking expenditures has been more problematic. The GOG's finance laws require that funds be transferred to the prefecture Treasury before suppliers are paid directly by the prefecture Treasury. There have been delays in disbursements due to shortages of funds at the central Treasury as well as administrative delays caused by the long list of signatures required before the prefect approves the release of funds. It has been suggested to the evaluation team that funds are sometimes lost during the process of obtaining signatures. It is also unclear why there are not receipts from the sale of pedagogical material.

2. Trained management personnel at all levels

All DAAF central and SAAF regional personnel have received some formal training carried out by long-term and short-term consultants to the USAID project. There was a two-week formal training session with DPEs held in October 1991, and three sessions for all SAAFs in November 1991. A short-term consultant followed up with the SAAFs in subsequent informal sessions. Formal training sessions, while necessary, are not ideally suited to the DAAF's needs. On-the-job training would be preferable, although additional training of both types is needed. The evaluation team spoke to SAAFs in Kindia, Temilia, Gaoul, Koundara, and Labe that had attended training sessions sponsored by the DAAF. Each participant felt he had benefitted and said that more training and follow-up are needed.

3. Increased share of national budget for the education sector

The logframe indicator for accomplishment of this output is 16% of GOG recurrent and investment budget allotted to the education sector by 1992. The 1992 GOG national budget shows that the education sector has been allotted 26% of the combined recurrent and investment budget which totalled GF. This amount is only significant if it reflects actual expenditures in the sector. The 1992 budget has not yet been fully executed. The DAAF estimates that so far, actual expenditures are about 85% of the 1992 budget allocation.

4. Increased share for basic education within education sector budget

The indicator for this output is 35% of education sector budget allocated to primary education by 1992. In the 1992 education sector budget, primary education received 36% of the total allocation. Again, the executed budget reveals that only about 85% of this amount has actually been disbursed for basic education.

5. Promotion of local and private initiatives in education

The indicator for this output is the creation by local communities of matching local fund for school construction. This indicator appears to be the same as the World Bank reform measure which calls for the creation of a matching fund mechanism to increase locally generated resources for educational investment. The GOG is required to "create and operate a mechanism to match funds allocated from regional taxes and parent contributions, with funds from the central investment budget. To address the disadvantaged position of rural

communities and schools, the proportion of the central investment budget allocated to rural schools will exceed that allocated for urban schools..." The GOG was to propose procedures for the operation of the matching fund mechanism for primary school development.

Parents, through Parents Associations, now maintain school buildings and repair school furniture. Parents are also required to buy school books and supplies for each child attending school. PASE now, in addition, requires the local community to contribute at least 10% to the construction of schools in the form of cement, gravel, transportation and some labor. These additional contributions have proven to be difficult for some communities, especially the poorer, more remote areas, where the cost of providing the material is higher than in urban, and is beyond the means of many families.

6. Implemented new spending norms for critical non-salary inputs

An annual expenditure of $4/primary student on non-salary inputs is the indicator for this output. This indicator is not specific enough to be meaningful. Non-salary inputs can include direct expenditures on students but also indirect expenditures such as school building repairs and school furniture. The amount expended for pedagogical materials that benefit students directly has not been determined. The MEPU-FP reports that for the period October 1, 1991 - September 30, 1992, GF 12,696 per elementary student was disbursed, exceeding the target.

7. Findings

a. The A.I.D. project design, as expressed in the logframe, does not distinguish between those outputs and indicators that relate to program objectives and those that relate to project objectives.

b. Outputs and indicators associated with program objectives should be evaluated differently, taking into consideration the longer time frame required to see systemic improvements, and the intangible nature of these benefits. PASE program outputs cannot be traced to any one donor or input.

c. Project outputs are more easily quantified and lend themselves to measurement by A.I.D.'s "objectively verifiable indicators."

d. The indicator for annual expenditures per student does not measure what A.I.D. intended. The numbers reflect expenditures for renovations and school furniture, as opposed to pedagogical materials that affect students directly.

8. Recommendations

a. A.I.D. should review the program/project logframe outputs and indicators to categorize them according to whether they relate to program or project objectives. Outputs and indicators should also be reexamined to determine whether they remain relevant and measure real quantitative or qualitative improvements in the education sector.

b. A basic assumption of the present non project assistance is that by providing financial resources through the Ministry of Plan and Finance at the macro-economic level, resources will flow to appropriate sectors such as primary education. This result is not automatic, however. USAID, with its donor partners, should assure that technical assistance is also provided to the Ministry of Plan and Finance so that macro-level budget management is also improved.

C. Conditionality and reform measures

1. World Bank and USAID conditions

Before receiving funding under the PASE program the GOG must satisfy no less than 54 formal conditions and reform measures monitored by the World Bank/IDA and USAID. This number does not include covenants and the monitoring and reporting requirements associated with the PL 480 Title III program that was introduced to PASE last year. The World Bank/IDA Credit may be said to have 13 conditions and 18 reform measures for its three tranches. USAID's PAAD has a total of 23 conditions for its three tranches.

a. World Bank/IDA conditions

The World Bank/IDA program is driven by an Action Plan of monitorable policy reform measures, where disbursements are conditioned upon progress made in implementing key reform actions. Satisfactory performance means respect of minimum targets, strict application of expenditure norms, and increasing allocation of funds to the education sector from the government's budget. Conditions of second and third tranche releases are that progress in implementing the overall education sector reform is satisfactory and that the macro-economic policy framework is consistent with the objectives of the education sector adjustment program.

1) Conditions prior to release of the Bank/IDA first tranche the GOG were that the GOG: (Numbers in brackets refer to World Bank/IDA policy reform measures listed below).

(a) adopted the Statement of Sector Policy as the overall framework for guiding Government and donor interventions. (#1)
(b) set-up the inter-ministerial monitoring committee ("Comité de Suivi du PASE), the sector coordination committee ("Comité de Pilotage du PASE"), and the Technical Secretariat with the appropriate mandates, and ensured that adequate managerial and budgetary expertise is available to support the sector coordination committee and the MEN/SEEPU directorates. (#2,3,4)
(c) consistent with program objectives and priorities, agreed on: (i) minimum spending norms for teaching materials/primary pupil (2,800 FG/pupil/year), and operation spending/administrative staff (210,000 FG/staff/year); (ii) a recurrent educational budget which permits application of revised spending norms and enrollment increases; and (iii) increased proportions of the education budget for primary education (34% in 1990), and materials/operation expenditures (16% in 1990). (#6,10)

(d) developed procedures, acceptable to IDA, and an implementation schedule for matching local community initiatives in primary classroom construction with funds from the education budget. (#7,8)
(e) prepared a sector staffing strategy for 1990-1993, satisfactory to IDA, with targets for redeployment, training, recruitment, staff utilization to ensure that 7% of all rural primary classes operate with multigrade teaching in 1990. (#15,16)

2) Conditions prior to release of the Bank/IDA's second tranche were that the Government will have provided evidence that its macroeconomic policy framework is consistent with the education sector adjustment program and:

(a) reviewed with IDA previous budgetary period's actual expenditures for respect of minimum spending norms, budget allocation and distribution targets (in 1991): 34% for primary and 17% for materials and operation) and agree on the levels for next budgetary period. (#5,10)
(b) made budgetary allocations for matching locally generated primary classroom construction funds consistent with the objective of increased enrollments, and agree with IDA on an implementation calendar for primary school construction and rehabilitation. (#5,8,11)
(c) agreed with IDA on annual sector-wide program of staff redeployment, recruitment and training and an acceptable personnel management strategy aimed at increasing the proportion of rural primary classes using multigrade teaching to 20% (1992). (#16,18)
(d) revised entrance requirements for primary teacher trainees to allow training of holders of lower secondary certificates. (#17,18)

3) Conditions prior to release of the Bank/IDA's third trance will be that the Government will have provided evidence that its macroeconomic policy framework is consistent with the education sector adjustment program and:

(a) reviewed with IDA previous budgetary period's actual expenditures for respect of minimum spending norms, budget allocation and distribution targets (in 1992: 35% for primary and 18% for materials and operation) and agree on the levels for next budgetary period. (#5,10)
(b) made budgetary allocations for matching locally generated primary classroom construction funds consistent with the objective of increased enrollments, and agree with IDA on an implementation calendar for primary school construction and rehabilitation. (#5,8,11)
(c) agreed with IDA on annual sector-wide program of staff redeployment, recruitment and training and an acceptable personnel management strategy aimed at increasing the proportion of rural primary classes using multigrade teaching to 27% (1993). (#16,18)
(d) submitted proposals to IDA for the continued operation of the sector coordination committee beyond the credit period, with a view to consolidating the sector's organizational and managerial improvements. (#3,4)

b. Wold Bank/IDA reform measures

In addition to conditions, the World Bank/IDA credit had 18 reform measures.

1. Adoption and exploitation of a comprehensive statement of national policy for the sector.
2. Creation of a committee to monitor the implementation of key policy changes in the sector ("Comité de Suivi du PASE").
3. Creation of a streamlined senior Sector Management Committee.
4. Internal reorganization of the MEN and SEEPU.
5. Regular monitoring of both budget allocations and actual expenditures in the education and training sector.
6. Adoption of spending norms for critical non-salary inputs at all levels of education.
7. Adoption of new construction costs norms and building techniques.
8. Creation of a matching fund mechanism to increase locally generated resources for educational investment.
9. Promotion of private education at all levels.
10. Allocation of an increased proportion of Government operation of the education and training system.
11. Promotion of a revised primary school (multi-grade rural schools and double-shift urban schools).
12. Adoption of limits on grade repetition.
13. Completion of higher education rationalization.
14. Rationalization of the current technical education and vocational training system.
15. Introduction of a computerized personnel management system.
16. Application of new staffing norms to achieve improved staff utilization.
17. Creation of a consultative body charged with coordinating teacher training activities.
18. Introduction of in-service training programs.

c. USAID conditions

Of the 23 USAID PAAD conditions, three are standard. The others relate directly to adjustments to the primary education sector. They are as follows.

General conditions

1. An opinion of counsel that the Program Grant Agreement has been executed on behalf of and duly authorized and/or ratified by the Grantee and that it constitutes legally binding agreement of the Grantee in accordance with all of its terms.

2. A statement of the name of the person holding or acting in the office of the Cooperating Country and of any additional representatives, together with a specimen signature of each person specified in such statement.

3. Quarterly administrative accounting reports (comptabilité administrative) for the current year as evidence of timely execution of allocations in the education sector.

4. Evidence that the GOG has broken down allocations and expenditures in the education sector budget by level of education (e.g., primary secondary) and by type of expenditure (e.g., central administration, salaries, non-salaried recurrent costs, decentralized administration).

Conditions related to first disbursement

5. Evidence that GOG has established a special separate non-commingled account in the federal reserve bank of New York, the number of which shall be furnished to A.I.D., into which disbursements under the Grant will be deposited, and from which payments to approved creditors will be made. (Note. USAID has made the approved payees the IMF and IBRD tied to GOG debt repayment).

6. Evidence that GOG has secured adequate financial resources from other donors or its own revenues to cover the cost of the PASE for the upcoming year.

7. Prepared a plan that provides for the assumption by the GOG of the recurrent costs associated with the PASE upon withdrawal of donor budgetary support at the end of the second phase of the PASE. The plan should make provision for steady, incremental growth in the percentage of total GOG recurrent expenditures realized by MEN/SEEPU. The plan should specify annual levels increasing from 14 percent to 17 percent to 21 percent within three years after the end of the PASE. The plan should also present a framework for choices with respect to corresponding reductions in other components of the budget.

8. Prepared a report providing base line data at the prefecture level on indicators including school facilities (i.e. building and equipment), teachers (i.e. numbers and qualifications), salary and non-salary recurrent expenditures, enrollments by gender and region (i.e. urban/rural), and other indicators requested by USAID/Guinea.

9. Prepared plans specifying targets for 1) training, retraining, and redeploying teachers and 2) school rehabilitation and construction that are consistent with A.I.D.'s gender-equity objectives and that provide for more equal access to schooling throughout the country by the end of the second phase of the PASE.

Conditions for second disbursement of cash grant

10. Secured adequate financial resources from other donors or its own revenues to cover the cost of the PASE for the upcoming year.

11. Managed the education budget in the first year of the PASE such that expenditures amount to at least FG 2,300 for teaching materials per primary pupil, and FG 210,000 for operating expenditures per administrative staff, and the proportion of the education recurrent budget allocated to primary education in the second year of the PASE is at least 34 percent and to material and operating expenditures is at least 17 percent.

12. Allocated the education budget for the second year of the PASE to achieve a level sufficient to match locally generated primary classroom construction funds, consistent with the objective of increased enrollments.

13. Increased the percentage of GOG expenditures by MEN/SEEPU during the first year of the PASE in conformity with the targets established in the plan described in paragraph 3 (c) of the Agreement with USAID.

14. Increased the percentage of the annual recurrent budget allocated to MEN/SEEPU by the GOG for the second year of the PASE in conformity with the targets established in the plan described in paragraph 3 (c).

15. Conducted a study to be funded by the technical assistance component of the GESG, to determine the factors involved in household decisions to enroll children in primary schools and developed a plan to redress constraints at national and regional levels to the enrollment of children in rural areas and girls.

16. Produced an annual report demonstrating reasonable progress toward the targets specified in the plans described in paragraphs 3 (c) and 3 (e), based of prefecture-level data on indicators including construction and rehabilitation budgets and expenditures, assignment of teachers, salary and non-salary recurrent expenditures, enrollments by gender and region (i.e. urban/rural) and other indicators requested by USAID/Guinea.

Conditions for third disbursement of USAID cash grant

17. Secured adequate financial resources from other donors or its own revenues to cover the cost of the PASE for the upcoming year.

18. Managed the education budget in the second year of the PASE such that expenditures amount to at least FG 2,800 for teaching materials per primary pupil, and FG 210,000 for operating expenditures under the education recurrent budget during the second year of the PASE have been at least 34 percent for primary education, and 17 percent for material and operating expenditures; and recurrent budget allocations for the third year of the PASE have been increased to 35 percent for primary education, and 18 percent for materials and operating expenditures.

19. Allocated the education budget for the third year of the PASE to ensure sufficient central funds will be available to match locally generated primary classroom construction funds, consistent with the objective of increased enrollments.

20. Produced quarterly reports which demonstrate that the percentage of GOG expenditures by MEN/SEEPU has continued to increase in conformity with the targets established in the plan described in paragraph 3 (c).

21. Increased the percentage of the total recurrent budget allocated to MEN/SEEPU by the GOG for the third year of the PASE in conformity with the targets established in the plan described in paragraph 3 (c).

22. Produced an annual report demonstrating reasonable progress toward the targets specified in the plans described in paragraphs 3 (c) and 3 (e), based on prefecture-level data on indicators including construction and rehabilitation budgets and expenditures, assignments of teachers, salary and non-salary recurrent expenditures, enrollments by gender and region (i.e. urban/rural) and other indicators requested by USAID/Guinea.

23. Demonstrated that the secretariat technique will be dissolved at the end of the PASE, including any extension thereof.

d. Analysis of congruence of conditionalities

This exhaustive list of conditions and reform measures was intended to improve the national policy and strategic framework for primary education; to improve general sector management, financial resource use and resource generation; to address underdevelopment; to increase the relevance of the primary educational system; and to improve personnel performance. USAID's conditions are aimed at accomplishing diverse objectives such as GOG expenditures against budget allocations; the development of plans, reports and studies; and debt repayment schedules.

Annual tranche reviews were to be conducted and on-going monitoring of conditionality was not thought to be necessary. A.I.D. assumed that NPA management would not be labor-intensive. This basic assumption may prove to be false in Guinea.

Several of the IBRD/IDA reform measures and USAID conditions overlap (IDA measures 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 18 and USAID conditions 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22; satisfying some of the USAID conditions (conditions 6, 17) depends on the GOG's ability to satisfy the IBRD measures; some conditions depend on factors outside of the MEPU-FPs control (conditions 6, 15, 17); some are dependent on timely USAID actions (e.g., condition 15); others are open-ended and highly subjective, their satisfaction dependent on the opinion of a constantly changing USAID/Conakry staff (conditions 8, 16, 22). The documentation requirements are rigid and subjective (eg. "and other indicators requested by USAID/Guinea"). Further, the timing of tranche releases is not the same for the IBRD/IDA and USAID parts of the PASE program.

Compliance with these conditions and reform measures is a management challenge. Satisfaction of some conditions could easily call for management inputs equivalent to those required for a more straight-forward project activity. In addition, given the range of objectives to be accomplished, a very wide range of management skills are appropriate, i.e., macro-economic, pedagogical, financial, engineering, etc. The full-time energies of several PASE, USAID, IDA, PL 480 and other staff (skilled in the preparation of USG and IBRD/IDA documents) have been required to keep up with the necessary program and project actions and the numerous reporting and documentation requirements. Since USAID does not have a monitoring system to track actual implementation of conditions, it dependents, in part, on the IBRD/IDA system through the Comité de Suivi, Comité de Pilotage, informal donor coordination group, and the Comité de Coordination Economique and Financière (CCEF). Coordinating among these committees is time-consuming and complex. This situation is clear evidence that A.I.D.'s initial management assumption about NPA in Guinea must be reexamined.

There is duplication of effort on the part of the GOG and USAID and IBRD with regard to Conditions 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22. The objectives of these two sets of conditions are the same, but the documentation and reporting requirements are slightly different. Even though the committee process above is intended to synchronize reporting requirements for similar conditions, the coordinating process has not been entirely satisfactory, since each donor continues to have its own unique set of documentation requirements.

The USAID conditions related to finance (6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22) that have the same intent as those of the World Bank/IDA should be managed by only one institution. The Bank/IDA is in a superior position to handle these conditions because of its close association with the IMF and superior leverage, due to other, larger concessional loans in its portfolio. USAID, is probably better positioned to manage the micro-level conditions, especially those associated with the quality of pedagogy in Guinea. New conditions that would indicate quality improvements in primary education should replace those financial conditions that would now be handled exclusively by the World Bank.

2. Non-project vs project assistance modes

The use of non-project assistance (NPA) for economic structural adjustment is relatively new to A.I.D.. To accomplish macro-level adjustments, such as those required by the IMF and World Bank, cash disbursements are made directly to the central treasury. It is assumed that funds will flow through the system and eventually reach desired targets. The objective of this type of non-project assistance is to support the country's general budget, which encourages the recipient country to comply with sometimes difficult economic adjustment measures such as exchange rate adjustments, parastatal conversions, reductions in the civil service payrolls, etc. This type of NPA is sometimes referred to as balance of payments (BOP) support and is not tied to a specific sector or project activity. Conditions are established for the release of these funds.

A.I.D. has had more experience with "sector grants", another type of non-project assistance. Sector grants are linked to supporting only a specific sector's budget. While conditions can also be established that impact on macro-economic policy changes, the conditions are usually used to effect policy changes at the sector level.

Both types of cash disbursements are non-project assistance, Confusion has arisen when distinctions are not made as to whether the NPA supports a country's general budget, or its sector budget. Since both types of non-project assistance are used to effect policies, it is especially important to gear the general support to overall economic policy adjustments and the sector support to sector policy adjustments. NPA conditionalities, therefore, should be aimed at bringing about adjustments and policy changes at the appropriate level.

Financial conditions in NPA programs often serve as an indication of government commitment to its reform program. All conditions for the release of the second tranches of both World Bank and USAID funds were satisfied recently (February 1993.) The GOG met the conditions for the release of the first USAID tranche January 31, 1992.

At a USAID Education Workshop in Abidjan in February 1993, "Conditionality in Education NPA Programs" was discussed. The Workshop noted that conditions in NPA programs generally fall into four broad categories: Financial (specifying levels of education sector allocations or expenditures); Administrative reform (indicating specific policies or administrative and institutional changes to be implemented); Technically Specific (addressing technical elements of educational reform (e.g. curriculum development, materials production, teacher training, etc.); and Program Management (establishing procedures or institutions for management of the program). Some conditions are detailed and inflexible, while others are

flexible. In the Namibia and Benin programs, conditionality at the time of design was only included for the first two tranches of financing. Subsequent conditions are negotiated on a yearly (or two yearly) basis, allowing for adjustments in expectations depending on the evolution of the reform.

Guinea has a set of the most detailed and inflexible financial and other conditions of all seven NPA recipient countries. Also, financial conditionality in Guinea's NPA requires verification of both budgeted and actual expended amounts in the various budget categories. The difficulty in obtaining this information has been explained previously.

3. Findings

a. The substantive objectives of 12 USAID conditions are similar to those of the Bank's reform measures. This overlap causes a duplication of effort by the GOG, USAID and the Bank.

b. The documentation and reporting requirements are different for the two sets of conditions. This situation necessitates excessive donor coordination and causes management confusion regarding timing and verification of GOG compliance with conditions.

c. Thirteen of the USAID conditions related to finance have the same intent as the IBRD conditions. The IBRD has more experience with financial conditionality and has superior leverage due to their larger overall portfolio in Guinea. USAID, with its superior on-the-ground capacity, is in a better position to manage project-related conditions.

d. Several conditions are inappropriately interconnected or depend on factors outside of MEPU-FP's control. Other conditions are open-ended and subjective. In one case, compliance depends on timely USAID actions (condition 15).

e. The management of USAID's conditionality is not only labor-intensive, but requires a wide range of management skills for effective monitoring. USAID's management staff has changed three times since PASE began in 1991; USAID-sponsored TA has changed twice.

f. The USAID conditions do not address qualitative improvements in pedagogy.

4. Recommendations

a. USAID should review with IBRD and GOG the number, content and documentation requirements for conditionalities with the view to reducing their number, complexity, overlap, inappropriate interconnections, and timing to make the conditions simpler, more flexible and relevant to the effective delivery of education sector services.

b. USAID should omit or reduce financial conditions that duplicate IBRD/IDA conditions, and leave management of these conditions to IBRD/IDA. A.I.D. should substitute fewer, well-thought-out conditions aimed at supporting A.I.D.'s new thrust to improve the quality of pedagogy in Guinea.

c. USAID should designate a person in its Program Office to monitor any remaining budget and macro-level conditionalities, leaving to the HRDO the responsibility for pedagogic conditions.

d. Regarding the desired actions for the disbursement of the third tranche of PASE, USAID should:

1) Accept the documentation of the IBRD for USAID financial Conditions that overlap with IBRD measures.

2) Designate the MEPU-FP as the authorized payee on the grant agreement, and take off the IMF/IBRD. This would eliminate the debt linkage and effectively make the cash disbursement a "sector grant."

3) Develop at least two conditions to measure qualitative improvements in MEPU-FP pedagogy.

e. Regarding actions for project redesign:

1) Omit financial conditions that are related to expenditures that overlap with IBRD measures.

2) Develop a new list of qualitative conditions and logframe outputs and indicators.

D. Linkages to debt repayment

1. Analysis

The project design links the NPA portion of U.S. assistance to repayment of debt. While one can appreciate the design team's intention, this condition does not provide USAID additional leverage with the GOG and, in fact, may be counterproductive. Any perceived leverage this linkage provides is artificial because GOG payments under IMF program would be made without such a provision. Also, this type of earmarking could create cash flow problems in the education sector and work against building GOG institutional capacity.

The IMF provides short-term financing to fill BOP shortfalls when a country cannot afford essential imports or to pay its international creditors, both official and private. The BOP gap may be caused by revenue shortfalls due to low export receipts, overspending, or loan repayment obligations. As long as the GOG needs BOP support, it will stay in compliance with its IMF program and keep its payments current because new monies are not be released if a country is in arrears under an IMF program.

USAID has no real leverage on debt issues. The GOG will repay the IMF because they need resources to finance their BOP deficit, not because USAID insists that the GOG pay the IMF/IBRD before it pays other creditors. The GOG would repay the IMF as a priority regardless of USAID's opinion.

From an institutional development perspective, such a process (the resources never leave the United States) denies the GOG the experience of managing its resources, which is an important part of building institutional capacity in Guinea. Specifically, it denies the GOG the option of timing the use of NPA resources in a flexible way to insure that the funds have the maximum impact on the education sector. For example, in an internal A.I.D. memo to the files it was noted that when USAID staff inquired about the status of the GOG payment to the IMF and World Bank, they were informed that "at the time of the transfer to the Federal Reserve Bank, there were no outstanding payments owed by the GOG. Therefore, GOG decided to keep the funds in the account until the next maturity. Subsequently, A.I.D. requested written information on Guinea's projected debt service payment to the World Bank and the IMF for the remainder of the 1991 calendar year but has not yet received it." (p. 9 of Addo memo to Files, dated 2/28/92) This memo suggests that A.I.D. funds were sitting in an account in United States unavailable for the education sector, or other purposes, even though no IMF/IBRD payments were due at that time.

Without the debt linkage, USAID's NPA resources could be used for purchases in the education sector while the GOG awaits revenue from exports or domestic taxes. The inability to use NPA funds for current account expenditures has not aided the GOG cash flow situation in the education sector.

The Federal Reserve Bank sent a signal to USAID when it refused to release certain GOG payment data without an official request. Debt servicing is a sensitive financial area that is clearly the domain of authorized players. The US Treasury, not A.I.D., has the mandate to negotiate debt issues on behalf of the USG.

If one accepts that A.I.D. may be contributing to primary education in Guinea for as long as 15-20 years, USAID can expect the GOG's BOP situation to change many times as Guinea moves from a deficit position to payments equilibrium or surplus. One cannot assume that GOG indebtedness to the IMF/IBRD will remain the same over the long term. Flexible assistance that can be adapted to Guinea's changing BOP position will be needed.

2. Findings

a. The evidence is not clear that linking the NPA portion of the USAID grant to repayment of IMF/IBRD debt gives USAID additional leverage with the GOG.

b. The linkage may be counterproductive in that it undermines the GOG institution-building process and could contribute to cash flow problems in the education sector.

3. Recommendation

Future tranches of USAID NPA to the GOG should not be linked to debt repayments.

E. PL 480 and the use of local currency

Little was being made on rural school construction and other PASE activities that were to be financed by GOG local currencies. The MPF was struggling to cope with spending ceilings imposed by the IMF, export revenue shortfalls and related macro-level constraints. Despite the importance of its primary education policy and program, the GOG elected to provide scarce funds to other national programs. The doubling of salaries for the civil service, for example, increased personnel costs which the government decided it had to pay first.

Although the allocation of PL 480 generated counterpart funds for primary education expenditures was never explicitly included in PL 480 agreements between Guinea and the United States prior to 1992, their use in this manner is consistent with PL 480 programming criteria. Because of budgetary shortfalls during the first years of the PASE program, A.I.D. agreed in mid 1992 to provide GNF 998 million for the supervision and construction of 105 classes that had been identified by the World Bank.

By August 1992, the construction component of the PASE program, which depended on financing from the GOG, continued to be seriously off-track. MEPU-FP was advised that only GF 1,743,600,000 of the GF 2,521,600,000 budgeted in 1992 for the rehabilitation of the IRE, ENI and DPE offices, warehouses and the construction of rural classrooms would be covered by the central treasury. There was a GF 778,000,000. shortfall. Agreements made by the GOG with local communities throughout the country, to provide certain costs of construction if these communities provided local material and labor could not be honored. The PASE was in trouble.

Faced with this difficult situation, the PASE national coordinator approached USAID for additional assistance. In view of the importance of primary education to the overall A.I.D. program in Guinea, the Mission determined that the PASE program objectives were consistent with the PL 480 requirements. On February 14, 1993, following further negotiations with the GOG, USAID/Conakry agreed to provide GF 3,342,000,000, significantly more than had been originally requested, from local currencies generated by the PL 480 program for the following purposes, subject to a successful review by the PL 480 management committee:

1.	Rehabilitation of 122 rural classrooms	650,000,000
2.	ENI of N'Zerekore	782,000,000
3.	Rehabilitation of IRE/DPE warehouses	320,000,000
4.	Books	240,000,000
5.	Sensitization campaign	800,000,000
6.	Equipment and furniture for schools in four regions	550,000,000
	TOTAL	**3,342,000,000**

(An additional GF 1.2 billion was provided for school construction and furniture, bringing the total to GF 3,342,000,000.) As of mid March 1993, USAID was attempting to verify cost estimates and workplans with a view to approving the use of 1.2 billion FG for classroom construction, 240 million FG for books and the 800 million FG for the sensitization

campaign to increase the enroliment of girls in rural areas. The other requests are being reviewed to insure that the activities falls within the GOG Public Investment Program (PIP) and that there is no duplication of funding. Significant PASE construction and other activities 4were launched under the PL 480 management system. During visits to the interior in February 1993, the evaluation team was taken to a number of school construction sites, and carpentry shops, where work had begun a month before.

In a February 1993 report of its visit to the field a month before, a World Bank team observed that construction of schools, which was one of the measures related to release of its funds, had finally begun. It is interested to note that the World Bank team did not give credit to the United States as the source of the local resources which went into construction, nor did the Bank recognize that a dependency relationship could be developing wherein the GOG was counting on U.S. to provide local currency on a continuing basis for this purpose. The GOG, for example, is now projecting PL 480 as a long term source of funds in its budget planning.

The local currencies are managed by the PL 480 technical unit and all activities must conform to the design and implementation rules of the PL 480 program. The PL 480 monitoring staff makes regular site visits to assure the proper use of local currency resources. The infusion of PL 480 local currencies has resulted in tangible progress on the PASE program. The evaluation team observed on-going construction activity in Koundara, Gaoul, and Labe, including school building, furniture construction and warehouse renovations. The villages the Team visited appreciated the assistance and, though there are still problems with water supply and transportation of supplies in the more remote rural areas, the local communities were enthusiastic and participating actively in the PASE school construction activities.

Despite the apparent convenience of using the PL 480 program as a funding source, caution should be exercised in its use. The PL 480 program has the potential to undermine the macro objectives of the overall PASE sector adjustment program in several ways. Even though Guinea has had a PL 480 program for many years, PL 480 grants are still not a reliable funding source. PL 480 allocations are made on a yearly basis with the available amounts dependent on US agriculture production levels and the priority Guinea has relative to the political and economic requirements of other countries. The type of commodity that is available (i.e., rice, soybeans, corn, etc.), and the amount of local currency that is generated from its sale, can vary from year to year. If the GOG were to develop a dependency on PL 480-generated local currency and substitute it for LC it would have otherwise gotten from other sources, the budgetary discipline that the macro structural adjustment program is intended to instill could be lost.

1. Findings

a. PL 480 local currency is being used successfully to implement the construction and other activities of the PASE program. Local currencies generated by the PL 480 program belong to the GOG and go into the central treasury. The GOG factors them into their public investment program. Long-term use of this mechanism may, however, build an unhealthy dependency on U.S. agricultural resources whose on-going supply cannot be guaranteed.

b. On the macro-level, the PL 480 Title III grant reduces the need for GOG budgetary discipline, which is a key element of Guinea's structural economic adjustment program.

c. The use of the PL 480 management system, though effective, nonetheless adds another layer of bureaucracy to PASE program implementation.

d. Imported agricultural commodities can be a disincentive to domestic agricultural production.

2. Recommendation

a. The PL 480 program be used to finance PASE activities only in cash-flow emergencies, or to finance education sector activities that are additional to the normal PASE program.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED

A number of broader lessons are learned from this evaluation.

A. A.I.D./W must consider local conditions when applying broad policy and methodological guidance.

It is AID/W's responsibility to determine broad guidance for field implementation of the Foreign Assistance Act. But there are different political, cultural and developmental situations in the 80 or so countries in which AID is working. To apply policies agency wide, or even Bureau wide, without taking into account the local situation is courting failure. Guinea, for example, because of its unique history vis a vis France, may be a generation behind other West African counties in terms of its human resource development and institutional capability. In addition, it may be the only West African country which seriously experimented with a Russian type socialist planned economy. The failure of that approach is evident in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; the negative results are greater in Guinea. In Guinea, at the present time, non-project assistance may not therefore be the best instrument to improve macro-economic management. More direct technical assistance, well managed, is Guinea's need at the present time.

B. A.I.D. should work in sectors in which the United States has special capability and comparative advantage.

In view of the limitations on the availability of technical and financial resources for international development, the United States should work in sectors in which there is reasonable chance for positive results from a U.S.intervention. Does the United States, for example, have a comparative advantage to work in the education sector in Francophone Africa? Experience would seem to indicate that this is not the case. And because of the historic interest of the French in this sector in West Africa, might it not be better to leave education, certainly primary education, to the French, while the United States concentrated, for example, on roads, agriculture, health, or higher education? If, however, A.I.D. has decided to work in primary education in Francophone Guinea, -as it has- A.I.D. must make a special effort, to provide the best technical staff and supporting resources to help ensure project success. A.I.D. should for example, review field reports and documents with the intention of providing real help, not merely a critical review.

C. A.I.D./W and the Africa Bureau should be responsive to field Mission needs, particularly where local conditions are difficult, by providing support requested.

A.I.D./W can not force certain results in the field without providing necessary help to field Missions. Guinea is one of the more difficult countries in which to work, given weak levels of local human resource skills, logistic limitations such as a nearly non-functional telephone system, and the fact that for A.I.D., Guinea is a two year posts resulting in a high staff turnover. Under such circumstances, since the U.S. government has decided to conduct a major primary education project in Guinea, A.I.D. should make a major effort to assign its most experienced people to the post. A.I.D./W staff offices such as Contracts, Procurement and the Africa Bureau, itself, should be more timely in responding to Mission implementation orders or other requests for document at review or approval.

D. The United States should maintain high standards of performance for development projects.

It is a challenge not to be co-opted by local approaches and standards, in the name of cultural sensitivity. While A.I.D. staff should want to learn about local standards, it must not be forgotten that one purpose of A.I.D. assistance is to effect change in attitudes and approach. Financial accountability, transparency in use of public funds, encouragement of private initiative, and governments responsible to their people are concepts that A.I.D. believes are necessary to achieve sustainable development. Guinea is a country with, at present, somewhat different ideas toward the public good as compared to private gain. A.I.D. should not support approaches in Guinea that experience in other countries indicates will not achieve development objectives. Specifically, infusion of funds at the center should only be done if socially appropriate mechanisms are in place to assure control of these resources.

E. Cooperation with other donors should not limit A.I.D. from exercising its own best judgement.

When donors coordinate their approach and combine their technical and financial resources, there is a greater chance to effect macro-level policy changes. The reverse is also true that donors can cancel out each others efforts when they work at cross purposes. At the same time different donors have their own policy guidance and operational strengths. A.I.D., and other donors, should work with local governments to clarify their roles and goals and to make clear what the GOG and each donor wants to accomplish. With regard to the basic education project,if A.I.D. is not satisfied with another donor, FAC for example, A.I.D. should not hold back, in the interest of coordination, but should propose action it thinks will accomplish the best results.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

Evaluation Scope of Work

SCOPE OF WORK

Background

The literacy rate in Guinea is less than 25%, but until 1989, the Guinean government (GOG) devoted less than 13% of its actual recurrent expenditures to education. This level of expenditure is well below the West African regional average of 21%. In addition, a relatively small proportion of it is allocated to basic education. Beginning in 1989, the GOG began promulgating a national education policy which is aimed at reforming Guinea's educational system to address these problems.

In September 1990, the U.S. and the Guinean governments signed two grant agreements in basic education: Education Sector Reform Support Program (675-0222/675-T-602) and Education Sector Reform Support Project (675-0223). Their objective is to provide a continuously improving quality of schooling to a continuously increasing percentage of the school-age cohort and to ensure equitable access to girls and rural children, through support of the implementation of the national education policy of the Guinean Government.

With a project completion date set for 1995, the two projects together comprise a complementary blend of non-project assistance (675-0222) and technical assistance (675-0223). They also constitute USAID/Guinea's main contribution in support of the multiple donor Education Sector Adjustment Program (known by the French acronym PASE). Furthermore, a combined life of project funding of USD 28 million makes USAID the leading foreign donor in support to the PASE. Other major donors contributing to education sector reform include the World Bank/IDA with USD 20 million, and French assistance with USD 12 million, over a three-year period.

Under the terms of the Grant Agreement, non-project assistance in the form of budget support is provided to the GOG in three annual tranches. Disbursements are conditioned on the GOG's commitment to: continually allocate adequate funding for teaching materials and other operating expenditures throughout the adjustment period; train, retrain and redeploy staff, and reallocate resources within the education system to assure more equal access to schooling throughout the country, with special regard to girls and rural children.

The conditions precedent to the disbursement of the first tranche of non-project assistance required the establishment of baseline data needed to track progress on the PASE in later years. In May, 1991, the GOG submitted documentation which satisfied these conditions. Likewise, in July, 1992, it was determined that the GOG had met all conditions precedent to the disbursement of the second tranche of NPA.

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These called for increased levels of GOG budget allocation in the education sector and the development of an action plan to address the constraints affecting girls' and rural children's access to basic education. USAID anticipates the release of the second tranche in December, 1993, subsequent to its reception of GOG correspondence requesting this disbursement and delineating a plan for the use of the funds in the repayment of foreign debt. USAID has now obligated a third tranche of budget support for the PASE.

Another key feature of the project involves technical assistance provided under a contract with Florida State University. FSU long- and short-term consultants train and advise GOG education counterparts in an effort to strengthen their capacity to manage sector reform. USAID's major areas of expertise have been financial management, improvement of the administration of the public education sector, evaluation of education reform and assuring the equity of enrollment of girls and rural children.

To date, two important general assessments of USAID's Education Sector Reform Support Program/Project have been undertaken. The two documents which were produced as a result of these reviews are: "Review of the first year of AID activities in the Education Sector Adjustment Program," by Esther Addo, Deputy Human Resources Development Officer REDSO/WCA, February 1992; and "Aide memoire conjoint, World Bank/FAC/USAID, PASE;" February 1992.

Article I: Title

Project: Guinea Education Sector Reform
Numbers: 675-0222/675-T-602 and 675-0223

Article II: Objective

The objective of this contract is to provide a team of four persons to conduct an evaluation for the USAID Guinea Education Sector Reform Project, according to the terms specified herein.

Article III: Statement of Work

A. General

1. Purpose of the Evaluation: The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the actual versus planned progress toward the outputs, purpose and goal of the project, as well as to look at the multi-donor PASE project, beyond the USAID inputs. It will assist the USAID and the GOG to reassess the need and effectiveness for continued non-project assistance and technical assistance. It will also provide recommendations for any midterm adjustments in the project design. The evaluation findings and recommendations will be used by USAID and the GOG to direct possible follow-on project design.

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The very nature of this project prescribes that its evaluation should concern itself with Women in Development issues. One of the principal objectives of Program/Project 675-0222/0223 is to ensure the equitable access of girls to primary education by supporting the implementation of the Guinean Government's national education policy. The gender analysis, conditionalities, and activities called for in this program represent the Mission's largest WID commitment. The particular gender issue of girls' access has been addressed in the design, and implementation stages of the project/program, and should therefore be reflected in the performance of the evaluation.

2. Orientation: The AID Education Sector Grant requires a mid-term evaluation prior to the third tranche disbursement, approximately 1.5 to 2 years into the AID program. The evaluation will primarily address the AID-funded program/project (675-0222/223) but will also, on a more global level, look at the PASE in areas beyond those of AID inputs (see Article III, section C below). In the AID funded project, the evaluators will assess the Project design, and the effectiveness of Florida State University (FSU), AID and the GOG in implementing the Project.

3. Collaborative approach: The evaluation will involve an external team of four working in close collaboration with a host country national. The GOG team member will be selected by the Ministry of Education with input from USAID/Guinea. Travel per diem for this individual will be funded through the contract. In the interests of capacity building, this mid-term evaluation will be a participatory or collaborative evaluation, encouraging and relying on host country personnel working alongside the external team members. The external team will include a representative from AID/W Office AFR/TR/HHR and will be assisted by the REDSO/WCA Education Specialist as required. Additional resource persons will include the USAID/Guinea Human Resources Office Chief, Project Development Officer and the Program Officer.

4. Relationship to Mission country program: The evaluation report should define, in a summary fashion, the relationship between the program/project and the USAID Country Program Strategic Plan FY 92-96 (CPSP) and the performance indicator "contract" with AID/W, and to a more thorough degree demonstrate the performance at mid-point of the program/project as compared to the logical framework projections.

B. Specific Questions on the Technical Assistance and the Grant

1. Implementation vis-à-vis design: Has the project design, as stated in the logical framework, been implemented according to schedule? What problems have appeared, and solutions tried?

2. Impact: Although the Program Assistance Approval Document (PAAD) states categorically that, during the first phase of the PASE, one should not expect significant program impact, are there any indicators of "nearer-term benchmarks" of impact from Program/Project 675-0222/223 that the evaluation team has discerned? What has the team observed regarding impact of other donor assistance, whether in relation to USAID assistance or not?

3. Conditionality: Both AID non-project assistance and other donor assistance are built on the principle of the use of conditionality to achieve policy and program objectives. What have been the advantages and disadvantages of the means by which conditionalities have been applied to the PASE? What specific suggestions can be made to AID regarding the nature of future conditionalities, or regarding the role of conditionalities in the PASE? Does non-project assistance contribute to the achievement of USAID's objectives in the sector?

4. Donor collaboration: What have been the positive and negative features of donor collaboration in the case of the PASE? What recommendations can be offered for the future?

5. Donor solidarity/autonomy: Although each donor deals directly with the GOG, together they can act as a powerful leverage from a position of solidarity. Has the PASE donor community used this leverage, and could/should it? In which ways? Although solidarity has its advantages, a donor might decide to disengage itself from a common position under certain circumstances. It has been suggested that if the World Bank's second tranche is not disbursed, AID might still make its second disbursement. What are the evaluation team's views on donor solidarity/autonomy?

6. Effectiveness of Technical Assistance: AID/FSU has provided long-term and short-term expertise for the PASE. What have been the contributions of and problems associated with the technical assistance provided? It is now thought that long-term assistance would be more cost-effective than numerous short-term experts. If the evaluation team agrees, in what areas should further long-term, and short-term assistance be proposed? What has been the experience of USAID/Guinea in using the buy-in contract arrangement? What are the pluses and minuses of using other, more direct contracting to supply technical assistance services?

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7. The nature of the technical assistance: With external advisors or experts collaborating with host country civil servants, the expatriate's role lies somewhere along the spectrum of "helping the host country national perform his job" and "performing the job." Where do the AID/FSU consultants lie on this continuum? What progress has been accomplished in capacity building leading to program/project sustainability, and how could AID/FSU consultants improve skill transfer?

8. Internalization: It has been said that the PASE is essentially donor driven, and that the GOG mobilizes itself to respond to conditionalities, but that (despite official pronouncements) the deeper commitment to educational reform on the part of the host country is lacking. What observations can the evaluation team make on this point, and what particular suggestions for improving the "internalization" of the reform?

9. Debt reimbursement: It has been difficult to track debt reimbursements made under Program 675-0222. It has been difficult to determine what debts have been repaid under the project. Given Paris Club meeting postponement, given a lack of clarity on what debt there is to repay when, and given the changing situation regarding debt relief, what suggestions can the evaluation team make regarding these and other aspects of debt reimbursement?

10. Local currency: The main reason that the debt reimbursement alternative was adopted in 1990 for cash transfers was that the local currency situation in Guinea was in disarray. Given the re-establishment of the Mission's counterpart fund program and the difficulties which have occurred regarding the debt reimbursement alternative, should the Program 675-0222 be altered in favor of local currency generation rather than debt repayment? What are the implications of such a change?

11. AID Obligation Mechanisms--Gender Issues: What has been the impact on the effectiveness of the Project of the planned disbursement schedule and AID's internal obligation pressures to obligate tranches according to a fiscal year schedule ?

12. How were the interests and role of women (compared to men) taken into account in each of the design, appraisal and implementation stages of the project/program?

13. In what ways did women (compared to men) participate in these processes?

14. How were the interests and role of women taken into account in the evaluation stage?

15. Were significant factors concerning women (compared to men) overlooked at the appraisal stage?

16. Were gender-specific data available for each of the program/project objectives (design, appraisal/approval, implementation, monitoring, evaluation)?

17. How did women's integration in AID activities affect the sustainability of project/program outcomes? Were outcomes more sustained (or less sustained) when women were taken into account in AID activities?

18. Are the results achieved by the programs equally sustainable between men and women beneficiaries?

C. Specific Questions on the Education Sector Program

1. Implementation: What implementation problems have occurred in the PASE, and what remedial action can be taken?

2. Given GOG and donor inputs to the PASE, has the kind of environment that is essential to improvements in the education sector been created (e.g., redeployment of teachers, better distribution of textbooks, accelerated school construction)?

3. Sustainability: To what extent has the MEPU-FP (French acronym for the Ministry of Pre-University Education and Professional Training) been able to improve its internal management and administration? What are the barriers to institutional development, and how should they be addressed? Has the GOG assumed greater responsibility for financing the education sector, and can it continue to do so?

4. Cost and cost-effectiveness: What evidence is there that the results of the overall educational reform program have been achieved in an efficient and cost-effective way?

5. Policy success: What success has been achieved in educational policy reform in Guinea under the PASE?

6. Community participation: What has been the degree of community participation in the PASE, such as the ten percent local contribution to school construction and efforts of Parent Teachers Associations?

D. Qualifications

1. Evaluation Specialist/Team Leader

--MA degree in Education required with Ph.D preferable.

--A minimum of five years experience in educational system design and evaluation, both formative and summative, desired; preferably in Africa.

--Experience as a team leader for a donor funded project in a developing country, required.

--Knowledge of AID project design methodologies, including the logical framework, required.

--French language ability at a level equivalent to FSI S3, R3 or higher, reqired.

--Experience working in francophone Africa in the field of education, required.

2. Basic Education Specialist

--MA in Education required with a Ph.D preferable.

--A minimum of five years experience in the planning and implementation of basic or primary education in a developing country requrired.

--Knowledge of AID's rationale for supporting basic education, preferred.

--Experience working in francophone Africa in basic education, required.

--French language ability required at a level equivalent to FSI S3, R3 or higher.

3. Institutional Development/Training Specialist

--MA in education or public administration, or organizational theory and practice required. Ph.D preferable.

--A minimum of five years experience required in education or public administration in a developing country.

--Background in human resources development desired, with emphasis on manpower training both on-the-job and external.

--French language ability required at a level equivalent to FSI S3, R3 or higher.

4. Financial Management Specialist

--MA or Ph.D in public administration, accounting, economics, finance or related field required.

--A minimum of three years experience required in a developing country working with ministries of planning, finance and/or education with an emphasis on financial management. The consultant should be familiar with such areas as budgeting, cost-effectiveness, recurrent and capital cost investments, debt financing, including optimal use of limited financial resources.

--French language ability reqired at a level equivalent to FSI S3, R3 or higher.

5. Guinean Evaluation Specialist/Social Scientist (to be selected by GOG with concurrence of USAID/Guinea)

--MA or BA in education or sociology.

--Experience in project evaluation.

--Fluent in English.

Article IV: Methodology

The evaluation team will work in Conakry and take appropriate field trips up-country. Following their work in Guinea, the Team Leader and the Basic Education Specialist will spend NTE 3 days at AID/Washington for debriefing to relevant offices in the Africa Bureau (AFR/ARTS/HRD).

The Team Leader will arrive in Conakry 4 working days ahead of the other members to deal with matters such as initiating contact with key GOG officials and concerned PASE donor representatives, scheduling of breifings and field trips, etc.

Following the arrival of the other members in Conakry, the team will be joined by its fifth member, the Guinean Evaluation Specialist/Social Scientist, who is to be designated by the GOG. The entire team will have an initial briefing at the USAID/Guinea office, involving the Human Resources Office Chief or his designee, the Education Assistant, the Evaluation Officer, the Program Officer, Program Economist, Project Development Officer and the Mission Director. Additional briefings should be held at the Ministry of Pre-University Education and Professional Training, (MEPU-FP) at the Technical Secretariat with the Coordinator and his staff. Since this is a collaborative effort, the office in the Ministry responsible for evaluation, the Statistics and Planning Service (SSP), should also be present at these briefings, and at critical discussions throughout the evaluation. Weekly meetings between the team and USAID/Guinea

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will be held to review progress. Field trips should be planned with the DAAF (Directorate of Administrative and Financial Affairs) personnel. The up-country travel will include meetings with regional education authorities (Inspecteurs Regionaux de l'Enseignement, Directeurs Prefectoraux de l'Enseignement), as well as the Finance and Accountant Service agents. In addition, a sample of schools should be visited.

Article V: Reporting Requirements

The team will be required to submit a complete preliminary draft evaluation report and a final evaluation report. The team will also draft the abstract and detailed summary portions of the AID Evaluation Summary Form. Furthermore, the team will participate in a debriefing/review of the draft report findings with the GOG and USAID/Guinea. Finally, in Washington, selected team members (as per Article IV above) will brief relevant AID offices.

The format for the evaluation report is detailed below.

A. Executive Summary
B. Project Identification Data Sheet
C. Table of Contents and Body of the Report
D. Appendixes

A. The Executive Summary is a two to three page, single-space document containing a clear, concise summary of the most critical elements of the report. It should be a self contained document covering the basic findings of the

evaluation team and its recommendations to the PASE and to USAID/Guinea. The Executive Summary will have the following format:

1. Name of Mission or AID/Washington Office initiating the evaluation, followed by title and date of the full evaluation report.

2. Purpose of the evaluation and methodology used: Why was the evaluation undertaken and, if a single project or program evaluation, at what stage--interim, final, ex post? Was the evaluation done? Briefly describe the types and sources of evidence used to assess effectiveness and impact.

3. Findings and conclusions:. Discuss major findings and conclusions based on the findings as related to the scope of work. Note any major assumptions about the activity that proved invalid, including policy-related factors. Cite progress since previous evaluation, if any.

4. Recommendations for mid-course corrections in this project and possible project follow-on: Specify the pertinent conclusions for USAID in design and management of the project, including recommendations for fundamental changes in any follow-on activities. Note any recommendations from a previous evaluation that are still valid but were not acted upon.

5. Lessons Learned: This is an opportunity to give AID colleagues advice about planning and implementation strategies: how to tackle a similar development problem, key design factors, and factors pertinent to management and to evaluation itself. There may be no clear lessons. Do not stretch the findings by presenting vague generalization in an effort to suggest broadly applicable lessons. If items 4-5 above are succinctly covered, the reader can derive pertinent lessons. Conversely, do not hold back clear lessons even when they seem trite or naive. Address particularly the following issues:

- Project design implications:. Discuss findings and conclusions about this activity that bear on the design or management of other similar activities and their assumptions.

- Broad action implications: Include elements that suggest action beyond the activity evaluated and that need to be considered in designing similar activities in other contexts (e.g., policy requirements, procedural matters, factors in the country that were particularly constraining or supportive).

B. The Project Identification Data Sheet outline should include the following:

1. Country:
2. Project Title:
3. Project Number:
4. Project Dates:

   a. First Project Agreement
   b. Final Obligation Date: FY___(planned/actual)
   c. Most recent Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD)

5. Project Funding: (amounts obligated to date in dollars or dollar equivalents from the following sources

a.	AID Bilateral Funding (grant and/or loan)	US$
b.	Other Major Donors	US$
c.	Host Country Counterpart Funds	US$
	Total	US$

6. Mode of implementation: (host country or AID direct contractor? Include name of contractor.)

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7. Project Designers: (organizations) names of those involved in the design of the project, e.g., the Government of Guinea, USAID/Guinea, and the Florida State University (FSU).

8. Responsible Mission Officials: (for the full life of project)

a. Mission Director(s)

b. Project Officer(s)

C. The body of the report should include discussion of (1) the purpose and study questions of the evaluation; (2) the economic, political, and social context of the project; (3) team composition and study methods (one page maximum); (4) evidence/findings of the study concerning the evaluation questions; (5) conclusions drawn from the findings, stated in succinct language; and (6) recommendations based on the study findings and conclusions, stated as actions to be taken to improve project performance. A page limit of 100 pages of text, with more detailed discussions of methodological or technical issues placed in appendixes, and not to exceed 200 pages, is preferred.

D. The appendices should include a copy of the evaluation scope of work, the most current Logical Framework, a list of documents consulted, and individuals and agencies contacted. Additional appendixes may include a brief discussion of study methodology and technical topics, if necessary.

Time frame/Schedule: Specifics for draft and final evaluation report submission and debriefings follow:

1. Preliminary draft report due date: o/a 02/15/93. Delivered to USAID/Guinea: a copy of the report on floppy disk, 5 copies in English, and 5 French copies; and to the GOG/MEPU-FP, 5 French copies. The draft abstract and detailed summary portions of the AID Evaluation Summmary are also due on this date.

2. A feedback session in which team will respond to GOG and USAID/Guinea commentary on the preliminary draft report will be held o/a 02/19/92.

3. Final draft report due date: o/a 02/26/93.

4. A debriefing to pertinent offices in AID/Washington will be held on o/a 03/01/93.

4. Final Report due date: o/a 03/05/93. Delivered to USAID/Guinea in 25 English copies and 25 French copies and to the GOG in 25 French copies. The Final Report, including input for the Evaluation Summary, will also be provided to USAID/Guinea in floppy disk in an IBM readable format.

ANNEX 2

AID PP/PAAD Logframe

UPDATED VERSION 3/92

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR
SUMMARIZING PROGRAM DESIGN

Project Title: Guinea Education Sector Grant

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	OTHER INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION
PROGRAM GOAL To increase the capacity of the Guinean people to define, direct and contribute to their own economic and social development	MEASURES OF GOAL ACHIEVEMENT. 1. Increased political participation: constitution, more newspapers, resource diffusion to local level 2. Increased mobilization of local resources: taxation, parent–teacher associations # of NGO's, private constituents 3. Increased private sector activity: private schools, local enterprise 4. Increased literacy, especially for women: literacy rate 5. Reduced fertility 6. Reduced infant mortality		1. Copy of Constitution 2. Copies of newspapers 3. National budget accounts 4. tax records 5. lists of APE's 6. NGO registration records 7. private school certification 8. tax receipts 9. Statistical Yearbook 10. Mortality of public health
PROGRAM PURPOSE To provide a continuously improving quality of schooling to a continuously increasing percentage of the primary school age cohort and to ensure equitable access to girls and rural children, through support of the implementation of the National Educational Policy of the GDG	EOPS 1. 3% increase in primary school enrollments by 1992 2. No decline in % (30%) of girls' enrollment through 1992 3. 5% increase in enrollment in rural areas by 1992 4. 30% admission rate by 1992 5. Increased completion rate (40%), reaching 72% by 2000 6. Reduced years instruction/graduate (16.1) to reach 8.2 by 2000	CPSP Performance Indicator: CPSP – increase rural girls' enrollment, 17% to 20% by 1992 CPSP Performance Indicator AID Program Performance Plan Increased progression rate Increased transition rate Reduced drop–out rate	1. Analyse des Statistiques Scolaire Annuaire Statistique, Revue Conjoint 2. Analyse des Statistique Scolaire Revue Conjointe, AID Report on G 3. Analyse des Statistique Scolaire Annuaire Statistique, Revue Conjoint 4. Analyse Statistique Scolaire 5. Calculate from Annuaire Statistique 6. Calculate from Annuaire Statistique

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OUTPUTS: (More efficient management of resources) 1. Internal reorganization of MEN	1. Revised and implemented organizational chart 2. Computerized personnel files		1. GOG decree, organizational chart 2. FSU Annual Report, Plans d'actions du PASE; spot checks
2. Improved budgeting and tracking of expenditures.	3. Remaining staff positions filled. 4. Annual action plans and budget estimates according to national budget categories prepared by MEN departments, IRE's, and DPE's 5. MEN annual budget, incorporating the above.	CPSP Performance indicator – accurate and timely financial tracking of budget expenditures	3. Revue Conjointe; must request info 4. Plans d'action du PASE, Avant Projet du Budget (DAAF); Budget Notifie (MOF)
3. Trained management personnel at all levels.	6. All DAAF central personnel trained 7. 36 workshops given	CPSP – establish reporting system on primary school expenditures CPSP – train central, regional, DAAF/SAAFs in improved data collection, analysis and report	5. Plans d'action du PASE, Avant Projet du Budget (DAAF) 6. Revue Conjointe, FSU semi-annual and annual reports 7. FSU semi-annual and annual reports
(Increased resources to) 4. Increased share of national budget for MEN 5. Increased share for basic education within MEN budget 6. Promotion of local and private initiatives in education.	8. 15% of GOG recurrent and investment budget to MEN by 1992 9. 35% of MEN budget allocated to primary education by 1992. 10. Creation of matching local fund for school construction.	CPSP – increase non-salary operating expenditures per teacher training student from $120 to $153 by 1993	8. Budget National (MOF), Analyse Financiere Annuelle (DAAF) 9. Analyse financiere annuelle (DAAF), et trimestrielle Revue Conjointe 10. Revue Conjointe, Budget d'investissement (MOF); Rapport de Service du Construction Scolaire
7. Implemented new spending norms for critical non-salary inputs	11. Revised certification standards for private schools 12. $4/primary student annual expenditure on non-salary inputs 13. All primary school students provided with textbooks and materials 14. All primary classrooms equipped with teaching materials	Percentage of schools reaching identified minimum quality levels	11. GOG official notice, request info 12. Analyse financiere du budget(DAAF) Analyse financiere annuelle(DAAF) 13. Revue Conjointe, Section des manuels scolaires(DAAF); Inspectorat Carte scolaire; spot checks 14. Plans d'action; Service d'achats (DAAF); spot checks
8. Construction of new classrooms according to new construction norms (Redress of Structural Deficiencies) 9. Instituted multigrade and double-shift teaching 10. Limit grade repetition 11. Preparation of plan to redress constraints to enrollment of girls and rural children (Improve human resources) 12. Provision of in-service teacher training 13. Testing and redeployment of teachers and administrators to primary classrooms	15. 2100 classrooms constructed by 1993 16. 27% of rural classrooms operating on multigrade basis by 1992 17. 30% reduction of repetition 18. Studies of obstacles to girls and rural children's enrollment, data collected 19. 7,852 teachers trained in French and mathematics 20. 100% teachers tested 21. 20% teachers redeployed	Equitable, not equal, distribution of recurrent, nonsalary resources, with more going to more needy, rural schools *Students per teacher* Class to classroom ratio Teachers per class Routine statistical reporting on girls' educational status in Annuaire Statistique, Analyse des statistiques scolaires	15. Budget d'investissement(MOF); Budget de Fonctionnement(DAAF), Entretien et Reparation des Batiments 16. Revue Conjointe, spot checks 17. Analyse des Statistiques Scolaires, Annuaire statistique 18. Rapport sur la scolarisation des filles(SEEPL – Fassy Kourouma); FSU study report 19. Revue conjointe; FAC report, Rapport du IPN-CPL; Bilan Annuel du PASE 20. Revue conjointe; FAC report, Rapport du IPN-CPL 21. Revue Conjointe; Bilan Annuel du PASE

INPUTS: (Technical Support Package) 1. Place Senior Technical Advisor in Secretariat 2. Provide technical assistance, identified by the SCS. 3. Provide equipment for DAAF/SEEPU. 4. Conduct workshops and seminars in educational administration and financial management. 5. Provide overseas training to key MEN personnel INPUTS 1. Discourse NPA funds	1. TSP budget 1. CY 93 $10.1 million Tranche 1 2. CY 94 $7.1 million Tranche 2 3. CY 95 $5.1 million Tranche 3		1. Technical Assistance contracts 2. STA Annual Reports

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ANNEX 3

USAID/Guinea Country Program Strategy Objective TreeS

USAID GUINEA
CPSP 1992-1996
Sept 1991



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Table 1: USAID/Guinea
Country Program Strategy
Objective Tree

Meme 1/24/92
Koschak to Cobb



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ANNEX 4

Estimating the Demand for Primary Education

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ANNEX 4

ESTIMATING THE DEMAND FOR PRIMARY EDUCATION

There is considerable uncertainty, at present, concerning the size and distribution of the Guinean population. All demographic projections are based upon the 1983 population census, the 1992 census having turned out to be unreliable (with average undercounts in excess of 20%). While several parameters derived from 1983 are reliable and can be manipulated easily, some elements are simply missing, especially those concerning migration. An estimation of the present population is thus relatively easy as long as we stay with global figures, such as the total population and the age distribution for the entire country. Everything becomes more tentative once migration is included. Finally, regional and sub-regional distributions are least reliable. They are best characterized as rough guesses or mission estimates.

As it happens, it is precisely those sub-regional distributions which are of the greatest importance in educational planning. They are at the very basis of both the logic and the practice of school mapping because they allow those calculations of regional enrollment rates which in turn are the key data element for the allocation of educational resources. Thanks to the PASE, school mapping has now become an important planning tool in Guinea. It is most unfortunate that it rests upon a population data base which is much less than satisfactory.

Before presenting our mission estimates, a few comments concerning the existing data are in order:

1. The MEPU statistics and planning unit contains two divisions which independently produce enrollment rates - the statistical unit and the school mapping unit. They use population projections based on different assumptions concerning fertility and life expectancy. Although there is a tendency in both divisions to select "medium" assumptions when in doubt, the results are significantly different. The statistics unit estimates the national school age population (7-12) at 1.146 million in 1992 while the school mapping unit (FNUAP based) comes to only 0.937 million even under high fertility assumptions. The 22% difference is enormous by any standard. It is even more astonishing since the figures for Conakry are almost identical (0.138 and 0.139 million) even though FNUAP assumed zero net migration for the capital city 1983-1992!

2. Between the two projections, the FNUAP study is preferable. Once the migration data are factored in, the estimates come within close range of those produced independently by the World Bank and by our evaluation team. The following estimates can be accepted with some confidence: the population of Guinea is close to 6.3 million; the Conakry metropolitan area has about 1.4 million inhabitants. In each case the school age population is between 15.2% and 16.2% of the total population.

3. The FNUAP assumptions concerning fertility and mortality declines are optimistic. In all likelihood the total fertility rate will remain at 6.7 for several years to come (World Bank), and the average life expectancy will not exceed 44 years before 2000.

4. Both the statistical and the school mapping unit lack demographic expertise. Their estimates of enrollment rates suffer from this weakness.

The following tables contain the estimated population and enrollment rates produced by the evaluation team. They are far from perfect and can be no substitute for more complete demographic work, but they do attempt to correct some of the most misleading figures used elsewhere. They suggest the following conclusions:

a) The overall enrollment rate (36%) is close to what has been found by the two SSP units (32% and 34%).

b) Our estimate is probably too high for the urban areas of Basse Guinée and Moyenne Guinée because the FNUAP projections do not allow good estimates of urban populations outside Conakry.

c) The Conakry metropolitan area contains rural areas. Taking this into account would bring the enrollment rate in urban Conakry to about 42%.

d) SSP is overestimating Conakry enrollment rates because it underestimates the population base.

All rates presented here are crude enrollment rates relating the number of students enrolled in grades 1 through 6 to the population 7-12 years of age. Net rates would be much preferable.

Projecting present trends into the future allows us to see the effect of the high Guinean fertility rate. The country is clearly engaged in the "population explosion" phase of the demographic transition. The return of several hundred

thousand Guinean refugees from war torn countries to the East aggravates the situation further. The population has increased overall by 36% over the past 9 years. It can be expected to rise by at least another 2.5% annually for the next decade.

POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR GUINEA, 1983 TO 1992

POPULATION ESTIMATE BEFORE CORRECTION FOR RETURN MIGRATION

	1983 RURAL	1983 URBAN	1983 TOTAL	1992 RURAL	1992 URBAN	1992 TOTAL
BASSE GUINEE	757	135	892	871	199	1070
MOYENNE G.	1155	98	1253	1353	150	1504
HAUTE G.	779	144	923	894	214	1108
G. FORESTIERE	749	134	883	859	200	1060
CONAKRY		892	710		1300	1300
TOTAL	3440	1403	4661	3978	2063	6041

NET INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION SINCE 1984

	1983 RURAL	1983 URBAN	1983 TOTAL	1992 RURAL	1992 URBAN	1992 TOTAL
BASSE GUINEE				6	24	30
MOYENNE G.				8	32	40
HAUTE G.				6	24	30
G. FORESTIERE				20	80	100
CONAKRY					90	90
TOTAL						

TOTAL 1992 POPULATION

	1983 RURAL	1983 URBAN	1983 TOTAL	1992 RURAL	1992 URBAN	1992 TOTAL
BASSE GUINEE	757	135	892	877	223	1100
MOYENNE G.	1155	98	1253	1361	182	1544
HAUTE G.	779	144	923	900	238	1138
G. FORESTIERE	749	134	883	879	280	1160
CONAKRY		892	710		1390	1390
TOTAL	3440	1403	4661	4018	2313	6331

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ESTIMATING THE SCHOOL AGE POPULATION FOR GUINEA
1983 TO 1992

TOTAL POPULATION

	1983 RURAL	1983 URBAN	1983 TOTAL	1992 RURAL	1992 URBAN	1992 TOTAL
BASSE GUINEE	757	135	892	877	223	1100
MOYENNE G.	1155	98	1253	1361	182	1544
HAUTE G.	779	144	923	900	238	1138
G. FORESTIERE	749	134	883	879	280	1160
CONAKRY		892	710		1390	1390
TOTAL	3440	1403	4661	4017	2313	6332

SCHOOL AGE POPULATION (7-12)

	1983 RURAL	1983 URBAN	1983 TOTAL	1992 RURAL	1992 URBAN	1992 TOTAL
BASSE GUINEE	115	20	136	133	37	171
MOYENNE G.	176	15	190	207	31	237
HAUTE G.	118	20	134	137	40	177
G. FORESTIERE	114	20	134	134	47	181
CONAKRY		136	136		234	234
TOTAL	523	211	730	611	389	999

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SCHOOL AGE POPULATION, 1992

NUMBER OF STUDENTS AND ENROLLMENT RATES

SCHOOL AGE POPULATION (7-12), IN THOUSANDS

	1992 RURAL	1992 URBAN	1992 TOTAL
BASSE GUINEE	133	37	171
MOYENNE G.	207	31	237
HAUTE G.	137	40	177
G. FORESTIERE	134	47	181
CONAKRY		234	234
TOTAL	611	389	1000

NUMBER OF STUDENTS, IN THOUSANDS

	1992 RURAL	1992 URBAN	1992 TOTAL
BASSE GUINEE	36	32	68
MOYENNE G.	46	23	69
HAUTE G.	30	24	54
G. FORESTIERE	55	21	76
CONAKRY		91	91
TOTAL	167	191	358

ENROLLMENT RATES, IN PERCENT

	1992 RURAL	1992 URBAN	1992 TOTAL
BASSE GUINEE	27	86	40
MOYENNE G.	22	74	29
HAUTE G.	22	60	31
G. FORESTIERE	41	45	42
CONAKRY		39	39
TOTAL	27	49	36

ANNEX 5

Projection of Primary School System Expansion, 1992 to 2000, According to Constant and Reform Scenarios

ANNEX 5

PROJECTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL SYSTEM EXPANSION, 1992 TO 2000 ACCORDING TO CONSTANT AND REFORM SCENARIOS

Population projections on the basis of the 1983 census and the 1992 estimates presented in annex 4 suggest that over the 1992-2000 period the Guinean population will increase from 6.3 Million to 8.2 Million, and the school age population, from 1.0 Million to 1.3 Million. This will necessitate the allocation of considerable new resources to primary education in order to just maintain the present crude enrollment rate of 36%. It is doubtful whether these resources can be found either locally or among foreign donors.

Current (1992) parameters of the system are: student/teacher ratios of 41 (rural) and 62 (urban); student/classroom ratios of 32 (rural) and 67 (urban). Fur the purpose of our estimates we add the following assumptions: annual teacher training needs of 7% of the workforce; replacement of classrooms after 30 years of use; unit cost of student/year: GF 48.000; unit cost of initial teacher training cycle: GF 1,767.000.

Given these parameters the system needs 787 new teachers and 567 new classrooms per year. By the year 2000 these figures will have risen to 940 teachers and 644 classrooms annually. The budgetary implications of this expansion, even excluding central costs for MEPU and its regional and prefectoral structures (IRE and DPE), are quite significant. Total costs in constant GF will rise by 29%, from 23.7 Billion GF to 30.6 Billion.

The Education Strategy (1989), the PASE documents (1990) and the PAAD (1990) all speak of quality improvements in the delivery of teaching services. Quantitative targets for these quality improvements are rarely specified but they appear in other documents (e.g., SSP, 1992: Programme prévisionnel). We take them to be: student/teacher and student/classroom ratios of 40 (rural) and 50 (urban). In addition, the less crowded schools should be housing a larger proportion of the school-age population, 53% on the combined rural-urban average. Other parameters and cost estimates can be held constant.

Adopting the reform targets and implementing change gradually will mean that the number of teachers and classrooms will rise to 15,247. Annual recurrent costs will increase by an estimated 101.3%, from 23.7 Billion to 47.7 Billion. The difference between this reform scenario and the previous one is significant, amounting to 17.1 Billion by 2000. In addition, there will of course be proportional increases in central MEPU/IRE/DPE funding if present levels of administration, supervision and curricular

control are to be maintained. It appears most unlikely that GOG will be able to afford the reform objectives of the PASE.

A third scenario suggests a solution to the foreseeable budgetary impasse. This solution rests upon two political decisions which could be taken without delay:

- Emphasize quality instead of quantity; produce graduates instead of just students and illiterate dropouts.

- Unleash the energies of the private sector; certify any private school which respects the national curriculum and quality standards.

The first of these two decisions implies that we turn our attention to what education specialists call internal efficiency. When PASE was conceived it took 16.1 student-years in Guinea to produce a single 6th grade graduate. This terrible waste could be reduced without any decline in the quality of the graduates. Better-trained teachers, better overall school quality, lower drop-out rates can only be reached slowly but dramatic improvements in learning outcomes could be reached if only the students had something to read and work with. The lack of books in Guinean schools is as tragic as it is scandalous.

Almost two thirds of the capacity of the primary school system are now wasted, if we accept the "Basic Education For All" premise that the point of schooling is not to produce scores of illiterate dropouts but primary school graduates with basic skills, including literacy and numeracy.

Quality improvements need concrete and tangible stimulation. Scenario 3 proposes, following a suggestion of the Director of Primary Education, to recruit ENI students from a new base: Brevet graduates instead of Baccalaureate failures (close to 100% of new ENI students are presently recruited among individuals who have been denied access to the university because they failed the Baccalaureate test). With four years of training these students could be made into better and more permanent teachers. Such an improvement, in combination with other measures concentrating on such issues as multigrade classrooms and textbook distribution, could help to achieve a dramatic reduction of the waste now going on in the schools (e.g., by 20%).

The second decision to be taken concerns private schools. There are many reasons why the obstacles to opening a private school should be removed. One of the most obvious reasons is that it is quite unlikely that the public sector will be able to mobilize anything close to the financial resources required to implement the reform in the public schools. If the private sector were left to develop freely it could possibly absorb 20% of primary schooling within a few years. Such a possibility should be

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explored in some depth. Its financial implications for public sector school financing are sketched out in a very preliminary way in scenario 3.

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PROJECTION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL SYSTEM EXPANSION
GUINEA 1992 TO 2000

	1992 RURAL	1992 URBAN	1992 TOTAL	2000 RURAL	2000 URBAN	2000 TOTAL
SCHOOL AGE POPULATION ('000)	611	389	999	716	585	1300
SCENARIO 1 (CONSTANT 1992 PARAMETERS)						
STUDENTS ('000)	167	191	358	196	287	483
TEACHERS	4586	2765	7351	5374	4158	9532
ANNUAL TEACHER TRAINING NEEDS						
REPLACEMENT	321	194	515	376	291	667
EXPANSION	99	174	273	99	174	273
TOTAL	420	368	787	475	465	940
CLASSROOMS	5810	2581	8391	6808	3881	10690
ANNUAL CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION AND RENOVATION NEEDS						
REPLACEMENT	194	86	280	227	129	356
EXPANSION	125	163	287	125	163	287
TOTAL	318	249	567	352	292	644
SCENARIO 2 (REFORM PARAMETERS)						
STUDENTS ('000)	167	191	358	315	369	684
TEACHERS	4586	2765	7351	7876	7371	15247
ANNUAL TEACHER TRAINING NEEDS						
REPLACEMENT	321	194	515	551	516	1067
EXPANSION	99	174	273	99	174	273
TOTAL	420	368	787	650	690	1340
CLASSROOMS	5810	2581	8391	7876	7371	15247
ANNUAL CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION AND RENOVATION NEEDS						
REPLACEMENT	194	86	280	263	246	508
EXPANSION	125	163	287	258	599	857
TOTAL	318	249	567	521	844	1365

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COST ESTIMATE OF PRIMARY SCHOOL SYSTEM EXPANSION, GUINEA 1992 TO 2000

	PROJECTION OF NUMBERS						PROJECTION OF COST (BILLION CONSTANT 1992 GF)					
	1992 RUR	1992 URB	1992 TOT	2000 RUR	2000 URB	2000 TOT	1992 RUR	1992 URB	1992 TOT	2000 RUR	2000 URB	2000 TOT
SCENARIO 1 (CONSTANT 1992 PARAMETERS)												
STUDENTS ('000)	167	191	358	196	287	483	8.0	9.2	17.2	9.4	13.8	23.2
TEACHERS	4586	2765	7351	5374	4158	9532						
ANNUAL TEACHER TRAINING NEEDS												
REPLACEMENT	321	194	515	376	291	667						
EXPANSION	99	174	273	99	174	273						
TOTAL	420	368	787	475	465	940	0.7	0.6	1.4	0.8	0.8	1.7
CLASSROOMS	5810	2581	8391	6808	3881	10690						
ANNUAL CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION AND RENOVATION NEEDS												
REPLACEMENT	194	86	280	227	129	356						
EXPANSION	125	163	287	125	163	287						
TOTAL	318	249	567	352	292	644	2.9	2.2	5.1	3.2	2.6	5.8
TOTAL RECURRENT COST							11.6	12.1	23.7	13.4	17.2	30.6

UNIT COST ESTIMATES (GF ,000)

STUDENTS: 48 FOR 1 YEAR IN SCHOOL PER STUDENT (EXCLUDING CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION AND TEXTBOOKS)

TEACHERS: 1767 FOR 1 ECOLE NORMALE D'INSTITUTEURS TRAINING CYCLE (AVERAGE TEACHING CAREER LENGTH PER ENI GRADUATE IS 15 YEARS; ANNUAL REPLACEMENT: 7%)

CLASSROOMS: 9000 FOR CONSTRUCTION OF 1 CLASSROOM (AVERAGE USE OF 30 YEARS; REPLACEMENT BUDGETED AS ANNUAL INVESTMENT)

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COST ESTIMATE OF PRIMARY SCHOOL SYSTEM EXPANSION, GUINEA 1992 TO 2000

	PROJECTION OF NUMBERS						PROJECTION OF COST (BILLION CONSTANT 1992 GF)					
	1992 RUR	1992 URB	1992 TOT	2000 RUR	2000 URB	2000 TOT	1992 RUR	1992 URB	1992 TOT	2000 RUR	2000 URB	2000 TOT
SCENARIO 2 (REFORM PARAMETERS)												
STUDENTS ('000)	167	191	358	315	369	684	8.0	9.2	17.2	15.1	17.7	32.8
TEACHERS	4586	2765	7351	7876	7371	15247						
ANNUAL TEACHER TRAINING NEEDS												
REPLACEMENT	321	194	515	551	645	1196						
EXPANSION	99	174	273	99	174	273						
TOTAL	420	368	787	650	819	1469	0.7	0.6	1.4	1.1	1.4	2.6
CLASSROOMS	5810	2581	8391	7876	7371	15247						
ANNUAL CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION AND RENOVATION NEEDS												
REPLACEMENT	194	86	280	263	246	508						
EXPANSION	125	163	287	258	599	857						
TOTAL	318	249	567	521	844	1365	2.9	2.2	5.1	4.7	7.6	12.3
TOTAL RECURRENT COST							11.6	12.1	23.7	21.0	26.7	47.7

UNIT COST ESTIMATES (GF ,000)

STUDENTS: 48 FOR 1 YEAR IN SCHOOL PER STUDENT (EXCLUDING CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION AND TEXTBOOKS)

TEACHERS: 1767 FOR 1 ECOLE NORMALE D'INSTITUTEURS TRAINING CYCLE (AVERAGE TEACHING CAREER LENGTH PER ENI GRADUATE IS 15 YEARS; ANNUAL REPLACEMENT: 7%)

CLASSROOMS: 9000 FOR CONSTRUCTION OF 1 CLASSROOM (AVERAGE USE OF 30 YEARS; REPLACEMENT BUDGETED AS ANNUAL INTEREST)

Scenario 3: A Different Vision

The Guinean primary school system will not change radically overnight but some improvements introduced now could have a significant effect over the short and medium term. Of all school quality elements affecting learning outcomes there are three which strike the observer as susceptible to rapid improvement:

1. Classrooms are too crammed. With up to 142 students per classroom observed by the evaluation team, pedagogy becomes tyranny and little useful learning takes place. There should be more classrooms or fewer students.

2. Teachers have inadequate training and low motivation. No in-service training can make up for inadequate initial training and inappropriate selection of candidates. Given the selection of candidates who didn't really want to be teachers and who are made to work under most difficult conditions, the low motivation and low productivity observed by the evaluation team is understandable. Future teachers should be selected from a different pool and should receive better pre-service training.

3. In most schools, textbooks are virtually absent. A student without a book is condemned to learn little, to become a repeater and finally to drop out or be expelled. The lack of textbooks is one of the most obvious causal factors in the low internal efficiency of Guinean schools. The whole system is geared to producing many student-years and few graduates. If our goal is to produce 6th grade graduates rather than illiterate dropouts, we must recognize that presently close to two thirds of all spaces in school is wasted. Internal efficiency must increase.

The three points are interrelated. If there were fewer students and books for every student, fewer students per teacher and per classroom, and if teachers were better trained and selected, learning outcomes and internal efficiency would rise dramatically. Without much physical expansion, the system would produce a lot more graduates.

How can this be achieved and what is the cost? First, the private sector must be let to expand; it will respond to the parental demand for school spaces. Second, selection of teacher training candidates should be made among Brevet graduates rather than among Baccalaureate failures, and teacher training should take four, not three years. Third, textbooks should be introduced in complete sets, supplied for next-to free and become property and responsibility of either parents or parents' associations. Fourth, student-teacher ratios should be reduced to 40, with a maximum of 50 enforced. Fifth, and most importantly, a socially appropriate incentive system should be devised which makes it imperative to both teachers and school directors to respect the rules concerning textbooks and class sizes.

This system can produce twice as many graduates with no increase in the cost per graduate.

In 1991/92 there were 33,870 students in grade 6. 24,104 can be assumed to have graduated after accounting for 5% dropouts and about 23% repeaters. The following table shows that twice as many graduates can be produced at two thirds only of the cost per graduate while letting overall enrollments rise to what is politically desirable and financially feasible.

COST ESTIMATE OF PRIMARY SCHOOL SYSTEM EXPANSION
GUINEA, 1992 TO 2000 (SCENARIOS 1 AND 3)

			PUBLIC SECTOR COST		COST/ GRAD
	1992	2000	1992	2000	2000
SCENARIO 1 (CONSTANT 1992 PARAMETERS)					
STUDENTS ('000)	358	483	16.4	22.1	
TEACHERS	7374	9532			
ANNUAL TEACHER TRAINING NEEDS					
REPLACEM.	515	667			
EXPANSION	273	273			
TOTAL	787	940	1.4	1.7	
CLASSROOMS	8391	10690			
ANNUAL CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION AND RENOVATION NEEDS					
REPLACEM.	280	356			
EXPANSION	287	287			
TOTAL	567	644	4.9	5.5	
TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR RECURRENT COST			22.7	29.3	1215
SCENARIO 3 (EFFICIENCY (20%) AND PRIVATE SECT. (TO 10%) INCREASE)					
STUDENTS ('000)	358	547			
PUBLIC	342	492	20.2	29.1	
PRIVATE	16	55			
TEACHERS	7351	13680			
PUBLIC	6998	12312			
PRIVATE	353	1368			
ANNUAL TEACHER TRAINING NEEDS (IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS)					
REPLACEM.	515	684			
EXPANSION	791	791			
TOTAL	1306	1475	3.1	3.5	
CLASSROOMS	8391	13680			
PUBLIC	8042	12312			
PRIVATE	373	1368			
ANNUAL PUBLIC SECTOR CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION AND RENOVATION NEEDS					
REPLACEM.	280	410			
EXPANSION	287	534			
TOTAL	567	944	5.1	8.5	
TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR RECURRENT COST			28.4	41.0	852

UNIT COST ESTIMATES (GF ,000)
STUDENTS: 59 PER STUDENT/YEAR INCL. TEXTBOOKS BUT EXCL. CONSTRUCTION COST
TEACHERS: 2356 PER ENI CYCLE; AV. CAREER: SCENARIO 1: 15 Y; SCENARIO 3: 20 Y
ANN. REPL.: SCENARIO 1: 7%; SCENARIO 3: 5%
CLASSROOMS: 9000 PER CLASSROOM; AVERAGE USEFUL LIFE: 30 YEARS

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ANNEX 6

The Private Sector of Primary Education

ANNEX 6

THE PRIVATE SECTOR OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

This annex will first present what little data there is about private schools in Guinea. It will explore next whether there is a possibility for significant growth in the private sector and what the conditions of such growth would be. Finally, it will present a few comments on what is really at this time the most important part of private education in the country, Koranic schools. The cultural contribution of the latter is enormous in that they help integrating diverse ethnic groups into a coherent cultural universe sharing values essential to the maintenance of national society. Besides, it is thanks to Koranic schools that illiteracy is far less prevalent in Guinea than official statistics would suggest.

Under colonial rule in Guinea, Western-style private education was almost synonymous with catholic education. Nationalized under the First Republic, a few catholic schools gradually started to open again after 1984, following the invitation by a government eager to satisfy a variety of groups. But private education became more diversified. According to 1992 SSP statistics there are currently the following types and numbers of private schools:

Type	Conakry	National total
Lay school	15	21
Catholic	3	4
Medersa		7
French-arabic	6	37
Protestant		1
Total	22	70

The single largest group of (27) private schools is franco-arabic, a type which tries to follow an orientation which is both politically realistic and culturally appropriate. The smallest group (1 protestant school) has now started to grow, as have some of the others, without, however, having found much public recognition yet. Taken together, private schools in 1992 accounted for 16,484 students or 4.6% of total primary enrollments.

Why are there not more private schools in Guinea? The most important reason appears to be the legal uncertainty surrounding their status. Revised certification standards were one of the expected outputs of the PASE/USAID project but such standards have yet to be defined; present standards appear to be limited to minimal architectural norms. The recent report of the Section de promotion de l'enseignement privé at SSP/MEPU ("Plaidoyer pour la

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promotion de l'enseignement privé en Guinée", 2 February 1993) talks of a "judicial void" which makes both the creation and the administration of private schools difficult. Two documents are needed for the official operation of a private school: (1) an "autorisation de création" which 195 school presently have (i.e., in 1991/92) and an "arrêté d'ouverture" which has been issued to only 79 schools. It appears that several hundred schools operate in "clandestine", meaning unauthorized ways.

According to the analysis of the "Section de promotion" there are good reasons for expanding private schooling at the primary level. They increase general enrollment levels, free the state from some of its obligations and create employment. With very little help from the state the private sector could expand and make a very positive contribution to Guinean education. In terms of quality, this contribution is already being made: the best schools of the Republic are private. They set performance standards many educators are aware of. In quantitative terms the energies of the private sector are waiting to be unleashed. Accreditation, supervision and recognition of diplomas is all that is required to instill confidence and open the market.

The largest number of private schools - Koranic schools and Medersas - are largely ignored by the Ministry; whether they can and should be counted, monitored or supervised is not currently discussed despite sporadic attempts to present them as valuable parts of Guinean education, e.g., in L'éducateur, #11/12, 1992. Medersas are regular schools offering a full curriculum on a full time basis; 21 of them are recognized by the Ministry - 14 public and 7 private.

Koranic schools are much more informal, most often consisting of a two-hour gathering of 20 to 40 students around a master under whose direction they learn the verses, chants and formulas essential to the practice of their religion. Koranic schools do not aim at immediate comprehension of the meaning of the verses memorized. They can produce students who have recited the entire Koran without having understood its meaning. The attachment of the student to the master (in Guinea referred to as Karamoko) is lifelong and the exchange of help, gifts and benedictions between them is one of the constant elements of Guinean culture.

According to some sources most Guinean children go to Koranic school for at least a few years. Many parents consider this education sufficient and do not bother with officially recognized primary schools which they consider too Western, even catholic. Many of the students in public primary schools attend there only after having spent the first two hours of the morning with their Karamoko. There are some notions in the literature about a perceived incompatibility between public and Koranic education but the extent of such apprehensions has not been verified. One school director explained with pride how he had countered such ideas by adapting school hours and personally leading students to

afternoon prayer. It seems that enrollments doubled once these minor changes were introduced.

Koranic schools make three essential contributions to Guinean culture:

(1) Like all schools, Koranic schools establish some order and discipline. Lines of authority are drawn and sex roles are learned. All this falls under the heading of socialization.

(2) Basic alphabetization is achieved. Most students will neither learn Arabic nor acquire much knowledge of Arabic civilization. But they do learn to use Arabic letters to transcribe their mother tongue. Communication via letters and notes in large parts of Guinea, most notably in the Fouta Djallon, takes place in national languages written with Arabic letters.

(3) There are economic benefits associated with Koranic schooling which are still far from sufficiently understood in the literature consulted by this team. The instrumental value of basic literacy clearly has economic aspects for all, but for girls Koranic schooling may be even more essential by increasing their marketability in arranged marriages.

Understanding Koranic schooling more fully will be most useful if we intend to increase access to schooling and literacy in Guinea. So far the emphasis has been on the negative side: Koranic schools and Islamic values have been identified as obstacles to girls' enrollment in French school. It may be that Koranic schools could be viewed more appropriately as an access to education for populations who are, for one reason or another, presently excluded from French schools.

A word of caution is in order concerning charlatans. Private schooling has always produced some unscrupulous or incompetent entrepreneurs. They are found among Guinean Koranic schools just as they are found among the "écoles borlettes" in Haiti. Should Koranic schools be given a larger place and a higher level of recognition in Guinean schooling, some performance standards would have to be defined. After all, to many the very mention of Koranic school brings back memories of all that is bad in education: brutal enforcement of authority and stultifying memorization of incomprehensible material.

On balance one can conclude that the official educational establishment would do well to pay more attention to Koranic schools. Not only do they probably have a total enrollment exceeding that of the public schools. They also constitute a resource which should not be ignored in a country where other educational resources are not abundant.

Annex 7

Notes on the status of logframe outputs

Annex 7

NOTES ON THE STATUS OF LOGFRAME INPUTS

a. 3% increase in primary enrollment by 1992

Total enrollment increased from 314,381 in 1989/90 to 360,018 in 1991/92 which represents an increase of 45,637 or 6.9%. Figures for the present school year (1992/93) are not yet complete but we do have advance figures for 6 Prefectures which appear to be based on a sample of schools. These figures suggest a dramatic increase of total enrollments (23.4% over 1991/92) and especially of first-grade enrollments (68.4% over 1991/92). Complete figures for the present school year will probably be available by March 20, 1993.

b. Maintain 30% girls' enrollment in 1992

Girls' enrollment as a percentage of total enrollment has been maintained above 30% since 1989/90 although it has declined slightly from 31.7% to 30.4% over the 2 year period. Figures for 1992/93 are not yet available.

c. 5% increase in rural enrollment by 1992

Estimated rural enrollment in 1992 was 189,085; in 1991 it was 156,002; increase therefore is 21%.

d. 30% admission rate by 1992

If admission is meant to be net enrollment in grade one, the figure is 34.82.

e. Increase completion rate from 40% to 72% by 2000

While the percentage is no doubt higher, it is not clear whether appropriate figures are available to determine the present rate. In 1986/87, for example, there were 56,161 students in first grade; in 1991/92 33,870 were in sixth grade. This would seem to indicate a 60% completion rate.

f. Reduce years of instruction per primary school graduate from 16.1 to 8.2 years by 2000

Current figures are unavailable. There is now a rule, however, that primary school students can only repeat a class two times. If that rule were followed, the maximum number of years for a student to graduate would be 12.

g. Revised and implemented organization chart

Revised organization chart of MEPU attached. Implementation contingent on GOG filling positions which we are informed have all been filled. See i, below.

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h. Computerized personnel files

Presently available at the Ministry of Administrative Reform and Civil Service. USAID had planned to amend FSU's Scope of Work to reflect a modified deliverable to supervise improvements in personnel section
of DAAF. That decision is being held up pending completion of this evaluation.

i. Remaining staff positions filled

Official printed information differs from verbal reports and direct observation. It is unlikely that all positions are filled on a full-time basis.

l. All DAAF central personnel trained.

Some staff received training through consultancies and formalized training sessions. Others have received on the job training through long-term technical assistance. While all personnel probably have been exposed to some form of training, appropriateness and results of both needs assessments and training are reportedly less than expected.

p. Revised certification standards for private schools

Such standards have yet to be defined; present standards appear to be limited to minimal architectural norms. The recent report of the Section de promotion de l'enseignement privé ("Plaidoyer pour la promotion de l'enseignement privé en Guinée", 2 February 1993) talks of a "judicial void" which makes both the creation and the administration of private schools difficult. Two documents are needed for the official operation of a private school: (1) an "autorisation de création" which 195 school presently have (i.e., in 1991/92) and an "arrêté d'ouverture" which has been issued to only 79 schools. It appears that several hundred schools operate in "clandestine", meaning unauthorized ways.

The largest number of private schools - Koranic schools and Medersas - are largely ignored by the Ministry; whether they can and should be counted, monitored or supervised is not currently discussed despite sporadic attempts to present them as valuable parts of Guinean education, e.g., in L'éducateur, #11/12, 1992.

q. $4/primary student annual expenditure on non-salary inputs

According to MEPU figures, the input per student for the 12 month period ending September 1991 was the equivalent of $4.60.

r. All primary school children provided with textbooks and other teaching material

Impressionistic evidence and informal counts suggest that fewer than 30% of children have any book at all and fewer than 10% have a

complete set of books required at their grade level, whatever the formula for ownership may be.

s. All primary classrooms equipped with teaching material

Supply and present availability of teaching materials is not sufficiently monitored. Impressionistic evidence suggests that fewer than 50% of classrooms have teaching materials of any kind. Chalk and blackboards, however, are available everywhere.

v. 30% reduction of repetition in 1993 over 1990

The overall rate of repetition for 1990-91 is 22%; for 1991-92 it is 20%. The trend would therefore appear to be in the right direction. Detail for 1991-92 is below. Note that the rate for girls is consistently higher.

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th
Total	19	20	22	19	21	24
Girls	22	23	26	23	23	23

w. Studies of obstacles to girls and rural children's enrollment

Status of this activity is presently unknown to the team. The Passy-Kourouma study does not have the scope and depth of what is required while the excellent review paper by Tietjen does not contain any new Guinea data. Multivariate analysis of the 1991/92 school data at SSP is called for before engaging on new data collection activities. The school mapping data base could be augmented by including socio-economic characteristics of a sample of areas.

x. 7,852 teachers trained in French and mathematics

The in-service training for all primary school teachers has been carried out successfully and is nearing completion; the last batch of some 646 teachers will be trained this Spring/Summer. The training in mathematics and the testing of teachers were part of these same courses.

z. 20% of teachers redeployed

Redeployment of teachers appears to have exceeded the plan. While the plan was to move 1466 teachers into new posts in the primary schools, a total of 1862 teachers were moved either vertically (from secondary to primary schools), geographically (to other primary schools where they were more urgently needed, or specifically from office jobs into classrooms. Although some "redeployed" teachers had drifted back the program should be considered a success.

cc. Conduct workshops and seminars in educational and financial management.

Some workshops in financial management have been conducted.

dd. Provide overseas training to key MEPU personnel

Four MEPU officials are in English language training in the United States in advance of long term training for a Master's degree in Educational Management.

ANNEX 8

Number of Primary Schools and Classes - 1990 to 1992

RENOVATION et CONSTRUCTION DE CLASSES NOUVELLES

N° ORD	PREFECTURES	CLASSES PREVUES en 1991		CLASSES REALISEES en 1991		POURCENTAGE DE REALISATION	
		RENOVAT°	CREAT°	RENOVAT°	CREAT°	RENOVAT°	CREAT°
	I.R.E CONAKRY	68	607	19	24	27,94	3,95
1.	Conakry 1	13	76		24	0,00	31,58
2.	Conakry 2	20	197			0,00	0,00
3.	Conakry 3	35	334	19		54,29	0,00
	I.R.E KINDIA	73	164	95	60	130,14	36,59
4.	Boffa	13	25			0,00	0,00
5.	Boké	14	35	13	13	92,86	37,14
6.	Coyah	13	12			0,00	0,00
7.	Dubréka	8	12	37	6	462,50	50,00
8.	Forécariah	11	20		6	0,00	30,00
9.	Fria	5	12	16	3	320,00	25,00
10.	Kindia (1)	5	22			0,00	0,00
11.	Télimilé (2)	4	26	29	32	725,00	123,08
	I.R.E LABE	71	250	61	0	85,92	0,00
12.	Dalaba	3	24			0,00	0,00
13.	Gaoual	8	25	27		337,50	0,00
14.	Koubia	2	22			0,00	0,00
15.	Koundara	10	24			0,00	0,00
16.	Labé	4	28			0,00	0,00
17.	Lélouma	3	22			0,00	0,00
19.	Mali	4	26	34		850,00	0,00
18.	Mamou	8	25			0,00	0,00
20.	Pita	12	28			0,00	0,00
21.	Tougué	17	26			0,00	0,00
	I.R.E KANKAN	65	200	68	40	104,62	20,00
22.	Dabola	9	23	20	26	222,22	113,04
23.	Dinguiraye	9	24	12		133,33	0,00
24.	Faranah	12	24			0,00	0,00
25.	Kankan	4	30	12	4	300,00	13,33
26.	Kérouané	8	26			0,00	0,00
27.	Kourousa	5	25			0,00	0,00
28.	Mandiana	3	23	14		466,67	0,00
29.	Siguiri	15	25	10	10	66,67	40,00
	I.R.E N'ZEREKORE	108	230	70	24	64,81	10,43
30.	Beyla	12	27	12	24	100,00	88,89
31.	Gueckédou	16	44			0,00	0,00
32.	Kissidougou	30	32			0,00	0,00
33.	Lola	10	31			0,00	0,00
34.	Macenta	16	28			0,00	0,00
35.	N'Zérékoré	15	44	58		386,67	0,00
36.	Yomou	9	24			0,00	0,00
	ENSEMBLE	385	1451	313	148	81,30	10,20

NB: (1) LES PREFECTURES DONT LES DONNEES NE SONT PAS DISPONIBLES ONT DES POURCENTAGES EGALES à ZéRO SOIT 20 PRéfectures pour L'ensemble du pays

(2) LES POURCENTAGES TRES ELEVES SONT DUES A LA SOUS ESTIMATION DE LA SITUATION REELLE A L'ANNEE DE BASE (en 1990)

PRIMAIRES

M.E.P.U-F.P.
S.S.P.
section carte scolaire

TABLEAU EVOLUTIF DES ECOLES/ET SALLES DE CLASSES
(de 1990 à 1992)

Préfectures	1989-1990		1990-1991		1991-1992		Accroissem 90-92	
	École	Classe	École	Classe	École	classe	École	Classe
CONAKRY 1	11	169	12	114	13	129	18,18	-23,67
CONAKRY 2	41	309	39	315	42	381	2,44	23,30
CONAKRY 3	46	501	77	615	71	675	54,35	34,73
TOT.V.Conakry	98	979	128	1044	126	1185	28,57	21,04
BOKE	70	256	67	249	67	281	-4,29	9,77
BOFFA	54	204	59	200	62	222	14,81	8,82
DUBREKA	33	113	47	152	48	169	45,45	49,56
COYAH	26	124	28	132	28	131	7,69	5,65
FRIA	13	90	16	93	15	100	15,38	11,11
FORECARIAH	55	173	55	183	53	184	-3,64	6,36
KINDIA	74	248	81	262	80	279	8,11	12,50
TELIMELE	105	201	103	208	100	216	-4,76	7,46
TOT.IRE.Kindia	430	1409	456	1479	453	1582	5,35	12,28
DALABA	70	162	74	187	80	192	14,29	18,52
GAOUAL	65	154	56	151	53	151	-18,46	-1,95
KOUBIA	40	80	38	89	42	95	5,00	18,75
KOUNDARA	39	110	42	118	42	121	7,69	10,00
LABE	100	313	110	343	116	387	16,00	23,64
LELOUMA	47	113	52	125	49	123	4,26	8,85
MALI	66	145	74	183	83	196	25,76	35,17
MAMOU	61	183	71	231	71	228	16,39	24,59
PITA	72	225	77	256	83	269	15,28	19,56
TOUGUE	48	127	53	148	53	158	10,42	24,41
TOT.IRE.LABE	608	1612	647	1831	672	1920	10,53	19,11
DABOLA	29	99	30	107	30	118	3,45	19,19
DINGUIRAYE	46	95	47	98	48	101	4,35	6,32
FARANAH	63	170	70	194	74	224	17,46	31,76
KANKAN	76	299	87	304	96	313	26,32	4,68
KEROUANE	46	118	48	127	54	139	17,39	17,80
KOUROUSSA	50	143	52	153	51	174	2,00	21,68
MANDIANA	50	108	51	119	56	137	12,00	26,85
SIGUIRI	81	159	79	173	67	169	-17,28	6,29
TOT.IRE.KanKan	441	1191	464	1275	476	1375	7,94	15,45
SEYLA	98	191	94	200	87	202	-11,22	5,76
KISSIDOUGOU	133	439	132	444	148	449	11,28	2,28
GUECKEDOU	123	357	126	388	131	379	6,50	6,16
MACENTA	148	341	147	374	150	389	1,35	14,08
N'ZEREKORE	145	512	147	507	190	514	31,03	0,39
LOLA	81	230	79	226	93	242	14,81	5,22
YOMOU	55	138	56	163	60	178	9,09	28,99
T.IRE.N'zérékoré.	783	2208	781	2302	859	2353	9,71	6,57
TOTAL GENERAL	2360	7399	2476	7931	2586	8415	9,58	13,73

ANNEX 9

Schools Constructed Under PL 480 Generated Counterpart Funds

PHASE 3ème PHASE (1992)

Répartition par Préfecture des 105 Classes
DU PASE
MONTANTS ESTIMATIFS EN F.G.

PFEFECTURE	NOMBRE DE CLASSES	MONTANTS ESTIMATIFS GNF
KOUNDARA.....	21	184.800.000
GAOUAL.....	21	184.800.000
DABOLA.....	9	79.200.000
DINGUIRAYE.....	12	105.600.000
KOUROUSSA.....	3	26.400.000
MANDIANA.....	6	52.800.000
KEROUANE.....	3	26.400.000
BEYLA.....	27	237.600.000
SIGUIRI.....	3	26.400.000
T O T A L.....	105	924.000.000

Conakry le 18 Mars 1992
DCTP/MEF.PP

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MINISTERE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT
PRE-UNIVERSITAIRE ET DE LA
FORMATION PROFESSIONNELLE

SERVICE STATISTIQUE ET PLANIFICATION

Conakry, le 18 Mars 1992

PROGRAMME DE CONSTRUCTION 1992

REPARTITION DES 105 SALLES DE CLASSE.

N°D'ORD	PREFECTURES	S I T E S	Nbre de salles de classe
1	**GAOUAL**		
1-1		Foulamory	3
1-2		Touba	6
1-3		Malantan	9
1-4		Kounsitel	3
	Sous-Total		21
2	**KOUNDARA**		
2-1		Kamabi	3
2-2		Saraboïdo	3
2-3		Guingan	6
2-4		Termesse	9
	Sous-Total		21
3	**BEYLA**	- Diassadou-centre	3
		- Gbessoba-centre	3
3-1		- Gboma Karala	3
3-2		- Komodou-centre	3
3-3		- Kissiboula /Beyla-	3
3-4		- Diakolidou /Beyla-	3
3-5		- Fouama /Bola	3
3-6		- Hermakono /Sinko	3
		- Kouloundou /Sinko	3
	Sous-Total		27
4	**DABOLA**		
4-1		Hankama	3
4-2		Windoye	6
	Sous-Total		9
5	**DINGUIRAYA**		
5-1		Banora	3
5-2		[illegible]	3
5-3		[illegible]	3
	Sous-Total		

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6	**KOUROUSSA**		
6-1		Menédji	3
7	**MANDIANA**		
7-1		Koundian-centre	6
8	**KEROUANE**		
8-1		Damara-centre	3
9	**SIGUIRI**		
9-1		Nankö	3
	Total Général		**105**

LE CHEF DE SERVICE

MINISTERE DE L'EDUCATION NATIONALE
LE DIRECTEUR
S.E.E.P.U-SSP

BAKARY DIAWARA -

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ANNEX 10

Agreement on use of PL-480 Generated Local Currencies

CONTRAT POUR L'UTILISATION
DES FONDS DE CONTREPARTIE

Ce contrat est établi entre l'Unité Technique du SGFC représenté par M. Ousmane DIOP, Directeur Exécutif, et PASE/Ministère de l'Enseignement Pre-Universitaire et de la Formation Professionnelle, dénommée ci-après agence d'exécution, représenté par M. Saidou SOUARE, Coordonnateur National du PASE, pour autoriser la mise en oeuvre du suivi du PASE - Construction des Classes Rurales à réaliser à Labé, Kankan et N'Zérékoré. Le financement sera fourni par l'Unité Technique du SGFC pour un montant de GnF 131 221 186. L'agence d'exécution accepte d'utiliser ces fonds selon le budget à postes individuels ci-joint et selon les stipulations suivantes:

1. Tous les fonds reçus de l'Unité Technique seront déposés sur un compte séparé à la banque de l'agence d'exécution. Le compte peut être un nouveau compte ou le sous-compte d'un compte pour un projet plus large. Les fonds de contrepartie reçus de l'Unité Technique ne sauront en aucune manière être combinés avec des fonds provenant d'une autre source.

2. Tous les fonds doivent être dépensés selon le budget à postes individuels approuvé. L'agence d'exécution peut modifier le montant d'un poste individuel jusqu'à 10% du total de ce poste, à condition que la modification ne résulte pas en un changement dans le montant du budget total. Toute modification de poste budgétaire individuel supérieure à 10% devra obtenir l'autorisation écrite de l'Unité Technique. Toute augmentation du budget doit être requise par écrit et soumise au CS pour révision sous le SGFC.

3. L'agence d'exécution est responsable pour maintenir une documentation financière exacte pour les fonds de contrepartie reçus et doit fournir des rapports financiers trimestriels à l'Unité Technique. Tous les rapports financiers doivent inclure les copies des reçus originaux et des bordereaux appropriées. L'agence d'exécution accepte de soumettre ces rapports financiers trimestriels au Comité Technique au moins deux semaines avant l'expiration du trimestre, selon le calendrier accepté par l'Unité Technique et l'agence d'exécution. La soumission avec retard ou la soumission non satisfaisante des rapports résultera en une suspension du financement jusqu'à réception et approbation des rapports par l'Unité Technique.

4. L'agence d'exécution retiendra les copies de tous les documents et reçus financiers pour une période de trois ans après l'achèvement du financement du projet pour satisfaire aux exigences de vérification du programme.

5. L'agence d'exécution suivra toutes les règles d'acquisition du Gouvernement de la République de Guinée lors des achats effectués avec les fonds de contrepartie, à moins qu'un mode d'opération différent n'ait été approuvé par le Gouvernement de la Guinée. Si tel était le cas, la preuve devra être fournie par écrit.

6. L'agence d'exécution accepte que ses livres comptables soient vérifiés par l'Unité Technique ou tous autres groupes de vérification externe représentant l'Unité Technique, l'USAID/Guinée ou le Gouvernement de la Guinée à tout moment jusqu'à la période de trois ans après l'achèvement du projet.

Toute violation des termes du présent contrat peut entrainer un arrêt immédiat du financement avec notification au Gouvernement de la Guinée.

Fait à Conakry, en deux exemplaires,

ce _____ 1992 ce _____ 1992

POUR L'AGENCE D'EXECUTION

Saidou SOUARE
Coordonnateur National
du PASE

POUR LE SYSTEME DE GESTION
DES FONDS DE CONTREPARTIE

Ousmane DIOP
Directeur Exécutif de
l'Unité Technique

BESOINS EN MOBILIER (Primaire)
Direction Nationale de L'Enseignement Elémentaire

N°	Direction Prefectorale Education	Nombre d'Ecoles	Tables Bancs	Bureaux du Maître	Chaises	Armoires maitres	PRIX en GNF
1	Kaloum	11	637	117	192	0	
2	Dixinn	14	2 257	138	144	0	
3	Ratoma	18	1 544	82	142	0	
4	Matam	29	3 364	310	368	0	
5	Matoto	26	4 498	157	281	0	
	Sous-Totaux Conakry :	98	12 300	804	1 127	0	1 480 960 000
6	Fria	15	690	18	39	45	
7	Boffa	58	2 668	69	150	44	
8	Boké	66	3 036	79	171	135	
9	Coyah	27	1 242	32	70	24	
10	Dubreka	44	2 024	52	114	5	
11	Forécariah	54	2 484	64	140	99	
12	Kindia	76	3 496	91	197	154	
13	Télimélé	101	4 646	121	262	110	
	Sous-Totaux B.Guinée :	441	20 286	526	1 143	616	2 440 840 000
14	Dalaba	73	758	6	104	105	
15	Gaoual	56	612	124	276	72	
16	Koubia	42	491	71	132	49	
17	Koundara	42	593	41	60	69	
18	Labé	114	1 990	129	110	186	
19	Lélouma	52	426	60	56	42	
20	Mali	76	737	46	74	38	
21	Mamou	67	921	57	182	27	
22	Pita	80	956	50	106	51	
23	Tougué	52	593	52	94	82	
	Sous-Totaux M.Guinée :	654	8 077	636	1 194	721	1 282 770 000
24	Kankan	81	3 097	92	132	115	
25	Dabola	29	1 334	34	75	60	
26	Dinguiraye	46	2 116	55	119	4	
27	Faranah	67	3 082	80	174	140	
28	Kérouané	45	2 030	55	120	72	
29	Kouroussa	49	2 254	58	127	64	
30	Madiana	50	2 260	60	129	32	
31	Siguiri	77	3 500	95	266	149	
	Sous-Totaux H.Guinée :	444	19 673	529	1 142	636	2 387 060 000
32	Beyla	91	4 186	109	236	0	
33	Guéckédougou	123	5 658	147	319	0	
34	Kissidougou	132	6 072	158	343	233	
35	Lola	78	3 502	97	268	0	
36	Macenta	145	6 670	174	377	0	
37	N'Zérékoré	145	6 670	174	377	0	
38	Yomou	55	2 530	66	143	0	
	Sous-Totaux G.Forest. :	769	35 288	925	2 063	233	3 960 390 000
	TOTAUX :	**2 406**	**95 624**	**3 420**	**6 669**	**2 206**	**11 552 020 000**

*PRIX:

Une table-banc	100.000 GNF
Un bureau-maitre	200.000 GNF
Une chaise-maitre	80.000 GNF
Une armoire-maitre	350.000 GNF

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ANNEX 11

Field Visits
Team A
Team B

ANNEX 11

FIELD VISITS - TEAM A

2/22 Governorate: Guinée Maritime
Prefecture: Kindia
Town/District: Kindia
Principal People Contacted:
Bernard Haoumou DPE, Director
Ibrahima Sory Toure DPE/SAAF, Director

Observations and Comments:

The Préfecture consists of six sous-préfectures, with 89 primary schools, 3 lycées, and 5 collèges. In 1993 there were approximately 4,200 students at the GOG public primary schools. Children start learning the Koran at age 6 and speak better Arabic (that they learn informally from their parents) than French. French instruction begins at the third grade. Teachers receive scholarships to Egypt and other Arab countries to learn Arabic. The Koranic schools have about 16,000 students.

There were 17 people working at the SAAF. The accountant had five manuals that he used to keep track of inventory. He had learned this bookkeeping system at a two-week training session sponsored by the DAAF in Conakry that is held once a year. It was reported that PASE had renovated the building and supplied furniture. Once a year in August, the DPE Director and SAAF accountant visit all schools to determine needs; a standard form is used. A budget is planned based on the visit. The SAAF accountant goes to Conakry to present the budget to the DAAF for analysis. The DAAF extends credit after completing its analysis. The SAAF works with suppliers in preparing invoices and the bills are sent to the central treasury for payment. There were complaints about funding delays, poor infrastructure and equipment.

The Team was told that the elementary teachers needed more training, as did the administrators. The accountant received training for about two days, once a year. The DPE Director had been trained for two years in Dakar before the start of PASE, but observed that the Senegalese system is different from Guinea's and he would like some additional administrative training. There was a need for pedagogical materials for the classrooms and libraries.

2/22 Governorate: Guinée Maritime
Préfecture: Telimele
Town/District: Telimele
Principal People Contacted:
Camara Almamy Samba DPE, Director
Tamba Tolno DPE, Charge du Service Examen et du Controle Scolaire
Mamadou Dalaba Diallo Proviseur, Lycée Ley Wenolou

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Observations and Comments:

This was a short visit in transit. With an overall population of 180,000 people, only 9,500 children in the Préfect are in primary school. Approximately 27,000 eligible children, however, are not in school. While the Telimele system was short of teachers manual, books, and other didactic material, it had available class space and teachers thanks to 30 who had been redeployed from the secondary school level. The low level of school attendance was not because of lack of class space but because the major activity of the local Peul population is herding cattle. During the transhumance period whole families and especially school age children move away from the towns and can not attend schools. While improvement must certainly be made for the children who remain in schools, new programs must be devised to reach the more nomadic populations.

The major problem was the standard complaint that for 1992, funds for educational expenses such as gasoline and supplies did not become available for expenditure for 6 - 9 months after the end of the appropriate budget quarter.

2/22 Governorate: Moyenne Guinée
23 Préfecture: Gaoual
Town/District: Gaoual
Principal People Contacted:
Albert Peve Guila V DPE, Director
Mohamed Diaby DPE/SAAF, Director

Observations and Comments:

There are 8 sous-préfectures in the Gaoul préfecture: 1) Gaoul 2) Koumbia (about 35 km from Gaoul); 3) Foulamoky (120 km from Gaoual; 4) Wenlou M'Boiou (110 km); 5) Kounsitel (17 km); 6) Kakoni (65 km); 7) Touba (53 km); and Malanta (113 km). There are 56 primary schools and 3 secondary schools in the préfecture. The DPE must travel to each sub-prefecture to inspect classrooms and learn of any problems the teachers are having. There are two people and one vehicle available to cover this vast area. The Team was told that the DPE makes about 5 visits to each school every year. The lack of pedagogical material was identified as a problem. There were complaints that the DPE was loosing credibility with suppliers during the long periods of time that they must wait for funding from the treasury. It was suggested that funds be given directly to the DPE instead of going through the prefecture-level treasury where there were often blockages. In order to obtain funding for even small expenditures, the SAAF must go through the préfecture-level signature process. Information on funding availability from the central treasury is word-of-mouth and the amounts received are often less than the amount requested. The lengthy disbursement management and administrative structure were explained to the Team. The Team was told that the main problems were the complicated process of obtaining signatures for disbursements; the lateness (about 8 months) before funds are available to pay suppliers; and the fact that there are too many students per classroom.

2/23 Governorate: Moyenne Guinée
Préfecture: Gaoual
Town/District: Soolou
Principal People Contacted:
Terno Saikou Diallo President, Management Committee
Dahouda Diallo Vice President, Management Committee
Ibrahima Diogo Diallo Council Member
Alhassane Pete Diallo Primary School Teacher

Observations and Comments:

Site of a new 3 class school, originally planned as a World Bank condition for release of World Bank non-project funds, but now being built with local funds generated under a USAID PL 480 Title I food program. This rural village, 50 kms from the town of Gaoual over a very difficult dirt and rock track, has approximately 1,600 inhabitants. 120 primary school age children, only 22 of whom are presently registered as 3rd year students in a one room banco and thatch school which has one teacher. Seven of the 22 students are girls. As with other World Bank, now USAID, sponsored schools, the villagers provide the gravel, sand, stone and water; the GOG, through the DPE, provides funds for cement and the labor costs of construction. The new school, when built, will require a school director and two teachers. The community will also provide a house for each of the teachers.

The villagers were proud of their new school and the children seemed excited about the class. But this was a village where few of the villagers spoke French; and none could write in French. One must wonder about the usefulness of French to these children. None of the adults could supervise the work of the teacher whose pedagogical approach was judged poor by the team. The teacher's ability to do simple mathematical calculations was lacking.

If the GOG and USAID are serious about improving the equity of education for the rural areas, villages such as Soolou need greater financial support as well as pedagogical attention. While special attention must also be given to the low attendance of girls, improving the conditions for overall attendance will also serve to improve girls attendance.

2/23 Governorate: Moyenne Guinée
Préfecture: Gaoual
Sous-Préfect: Malenta
Town/District: Malenta
Principal People Contacted:
Ousmane Tamara Primary School Director
Ibrahima Diallo President, CRD
Dallas Thea Sous Prefect
Alpha Mamadou Balde DP/SP

Observations and Comments:

This site of a World Bank/USAID supported three classroom school, is 72 kms from the Préfecture over a non-marked, bolder covered track which fords streams and climbs the side of a mountain. The village has 2,800 inhabitants, 800 primary school age children, and two classes of 39 and 13 students each. Only 2 students are girls; the villagers expressed some doubt that girls were eligible to go to school.

Although the team visit was during a school period and one of the teachers participated in the discussions with the team, neither class was in session that day. The community saw no problem with this situation; a school child in the crowd, however, expressed unhappiness with the school being closed.

None of the villagers spoke or wrote French so could not communicate with their children in French. The DPE could not speak Peul and could only communicate with the villagers through a translator.

The teacher indicated that teaching was difficult because pedagogical material was in short supply. The DPE indicated additional supplies would be made available to the village "soon." As with other USAID supported schools construction began in mid January 1993 when the PL 480 generated cash became available. Construction contracts are for 90 days and the work here and in other villages is about 50% completed. Indeed, the work must be completed by April/May when the rainey season begins. Construction was delayed in this village because a pick was not available, but someone had gone to Gaoual just the day before our visit to get the tool.

The villagers complained that the economy in the village was dying. Many asked the team for jobs in Conakry or the United States. Some of the men had been to Liberia as traders but had come back because of the civil war there. The people did not want girls to enter school because they feared they might then move away. It would appear that Malenta can not be treated as just another town. Without additional financial support and educational supervision from MEPU the school and educational system in Malenta will founder. Without economic development support the village itself may founder. Why this village was chosen to get a new school, in isolation from other economic and social problems must be seriously addressed.

2/24 Governorate: Moyenne Guinee
Préfecture: Koundara
Town/District: Koundara
Principal People Contacted:
Seny Camara DPE, Director
Diallo Fassou DPE/SAAF, Director

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Observations and Comments:

The préfecture has about 65,000 people, 4,235 primary school students; 154 primary education teachers. There are seven sub-prefectures and 43 primary schools. Koundara is considered an urban area compared to Malanta, but rural compared to Conakry.

The budget planning system was explained. A workshop is held each year in November where each DPE presents the needs of his region for the following year. The needs assessment is based on last years needs and are divided into categories such as personnel, construction, program documents and required manuals.

The SAAF accountant had received training for one week in December in Labe, sponsored by the DAAF. Bookkeeping and the budget planning procedures were covered in the seminar. The DPE expressed an interest in overseas training in administration and pedagogy to understand better the American system. More and better teaching materials were needed.

2/25 Governorate: Moyenne Guinee
Prefecture: Koundara
Town/District: Koundara
Principal People Contacted:
Primary School Director, Teachers and students in grades 3,4,5 and 6

Observations and Comments:

This was a large, well organized school in the capital of the Koundara Prefect with 563 students and 6 active primary grade levels. Average class size therefore was 93; girls representing approximately 27 of the total. Boy and girls sat next to one another; teachers were men and women; girls seemed to be called upon as much as boys. The School Director, teachers and students all seemed involved and enthusiastic, despite the overcrowding. Walls were covered with pedologic materials but students lacked books and writing materials.The school benches were old and rickety. Teachers tended to talk and write to the blackboard rather than addressing the students; involvement of students was not encouraged and corrections were not always made.

The school director said that the teaching conditions have improved since the start of PASE. He indicated that before PASE there were no desks or books, although every student still does not have books. There are seminars two times a month on Saturday for teachers organized at the regional level. The team was told that an "active," as opposed to "classical" teaching method is now being used -- a change initiated at the national level. The Director expressed an interest in more pedologic material and called for supplies and equipment to upgrade the quality of the school. There was an active Parents Association, one of the teachers, was the President of the APE. Parents are involved in the school maintenance, and teacher

monitoring.

2/25 Governorate: Moyenne Guinée
Préfecture: Koundara
Town/District: Sambalde
Principal People Contacted:
Sadou Diallo Vice-President, Management Committee
Elhadj Amadou Boiro Member, Council of Elders
Mamadou Yero Diallo President, APE

Observations and Comments:

Sambalde is a small, poor rural community of Peul who make their living raising animals; the people are sedentary rather than nomadic. The village has a school building of banco and thatch which leaks in the rainy season. Some children go to the one grade here; most go to the local Koranic school.
Villagers speak only Peul; no French. Class was not in session and none knew the number of students. The elders thought it was a strange question when asked how may students were girls. Few have ever left the village even to go to the main city, Koundara. None have been to Conakry. They pointed to the sky when asked where the United States or France were located. They were not sure what the children were doing in school, but they did asked for help in getting a health clinic, roads, and water and relations with the local government. It was the DPE who decided that a new school should be constructed here and the villagers agreed to provide the local material-water, gravel and blocks. They did complain of the high cost to them, particularly the cost to transport material from another site. (These small villages, on a per capita basis, probably pay more for their school than people living in urban areas and represents an extra tax, rather than a support, to the rural areas.) Before the team left, villagers asked

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2/25 Governorate: Moyenne Guinée
Préfecture: Koundara
Town/District: Kapparabina
Principal People Contacted:
Enawa Pascal Préfect, Director of Urbanism and Habitat
Garba Sande Member, Council of Elders
Ibrahima Niabaly Member, Council of Elders
Ibrahima Boumbaly President, Council of Elders

Observations and Comments:

A brief stop was made to view the construction of a new school being finance by PL 480 local currency. The financing arrangements were the same with MEPU paying the costs of contracted labor and the villagers providing local material. At this site, however, villagers had complained both through the MEPU/DPE system and through the Prefect system that the costs to them, particularly for transport were too high. Neither, MEPU nor the Prefect could provide extra

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funds, so the local contribution, i.e., a tax, had to be provided by the local people.

While AID provided funds for construction to MEPU, actual construction contracts and designs on contractors were made by the Prefect. Handling of money, and the opportunity for usage or blocking of funds are therefore with the Prefect, rather than the DPE.

2/26 Governorate: Moyenne Guinée
Préfecture: Gaoual
Town/District: Bantala
Principal People Contacted:
Mamadou Aliou Koulibali President, Management Committee
Mamadou Dioulde Camara President, Committee of Elders
Boubacar Diallo Primary School Director

Observations and Comments:
This was a small village of 1400(?) people, 26 kms from even a hard pack road. It had 270(?) primary school age children; 60 of whom had place in the two room, two class school--3rd and 6th grade. leaders seemed more aware than those in Kapparabina. One leader who spoke French said education would be helpful for local development. The Prefect had decided to build a new school here; the villagers agreed to provide the standard local material but they also noted the lack of money for transport or to fix the local water pump. Families took turns in providing their own carts to haul material to the school construction site.

Although the school director was in the village and participated in the discussion with the team, and although this village seemed more aware than others visited, neither class was in session at the time of the visit-- for administrative reasons.

2/27 Governorate: Moyenne Guinée
Town/District: Labe
Principal People Contacted:
Alpha Oumar Balde Regional Inspector of Education

Observations and Comments:
During visits to DPEs and schools in the Governorate, people often told the team that problems were bucked up to the senior IRE level for resolution. Perhaps because this IRE is new in his post he did not seem to be aware of many specific problems. As with most other officials he said that things were better in the educational system because of PASE and noted that new schools were being built, more benches were being provided to schools, and more books were available to students.

The IRE seems to have little authority to reallocate funds within the Governorate, which in any event, he said was up to his SAAF, the DAAF in Conakry, and the Ministry of Finance. He was

aware that the availability of 1992 funds for actual expenditures (decouvrement) was late but said this was a problem caused by the Ministry of Finance. In response to a question he agreed that providing funds directly to MEPU would enable budgeted funds to be available on a more timely manner. He had little feel as to how much of an additional budget would be necessary to bring the educational system to achieve overall PASE goals--perhaps a two to three fold increase.

The Regional Inspector had little to say on pedagogical matters and in response to a specific question indicated that he knew little about the differences between the French and American educational systems other that the French system is more theoretical and the American system is more practical. He thought it would be a good idea for Guineans to learn something about the American system.

2/27 Governorate: Moyenne Guinée
Prefecture: Labe
Town/District: Labe
Principal People Contacted:
Mamadou Tamsir Bah DPE, Director
Abdourahmane DPE/SAAF, Director
Convocation of all teachers in the town

Observations and Comments:

While other visits to the field were with village or district leaders, or with groups of ministry cadre, this was the only meeting with teachers; approximately 30 attended, 4 of whom were women. Most of the discussion was with the DPE. Neither the DPE nor any of the teachers had been to the U.S., one had been to Canada, so they understood primarily their own system. They said U.S. education was more practical; the French system more theoretical--but they had little detail on the differences. They agreed more interchange of experience would be useful for them as teachers, and for the Guinean educational system.

He/they knew about PASE and credited it with increased teacher salary and construction or renovation of schools. They said enrollment in Labe had increased from 28% to 64% as a result of PASE and that the percentage of enrolled girls had gone from 20% to 40%. The DPE did not see the enrollment of girls as a priority. In any event there was an overall lack of space--for boys or girls--so additional incentives were not needed. A women teacher suggested building a new school just for girls which would increase overall space, as well as provide incentive for parents to send their daughters to a school where they could be better protected and where special educational programs for girls could be developed.

While the DPE noted a shortage of books and teaching material, and that training of teachers in French and mathematics was at a low level, he seemed satisfied with educational results and quality.

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Teachers also asked for additional educational material, sports equipment, and other aids to improve their condition of teaching. In response to a question, however, the DPE said if had to make a choice, training of educational administrators, e.g. himself, was more important than training of teachers. In response to another question about shortage of classroom space, he said enrollment at the beginning of each school year was on a first come, first served basis and that there was a lot of pushing and shoving among parents to enroll their children. One can only wonder how actual enrollment decisions were actually made.

2/27 Governorate: Moyenne Guinée
Prefecture: Labe
Town/District: Labe
Principal People Contacted:

Alpha Boubacar Barry	Owner, Private School
Madame Barry	Directrice

Observations and Comments:

The previous IRE for the Moyenne Guinée has invested in and is building a private secondary level technical school. The first year has begun with 25 girls and one boy studying typing, stenography and English. The school plans to expand its program to a full business school curriculum including basic accounting, office procedures, and computer word processing. Since students pay approximately $185/year for tuition there appears to be a demand for such training and the ability to pay. While public education for girls may be at a low level, parents seem to be willing to send their daughters to a good technical training school.

ANNEX 11

FIELD VISITS - TEAM B

2/22/93 Kindia

IRE Office: Souleymane SANGARE, IRE
Abdoul Aziz SOUMA, SCTP
M. GABY, Planification de l'Education
M. KONE, Enseig. Elementaire

Good example of decentralization working. Collect statistics locally and requests based on statistics. Governorate level officials' accountability ("responsibilisation") and decision making. Construction norms are announced centrally, followed by the book. Needs for classrooms and materials sent directly to DPE. A problem was noted in that the IRE is notified of its "delegation de credits."

52 new teachers received through redeployment. Added to 1,438 teachers they already had. Opening of new classrooms led to enrollment increases. Good sense of decentralized manner of in-service teacher training. Evaluation needs. Would like to be able to act upon exam results of previous tests.

Girls' enrollment statistics at finger tips. Concerned that girls make little effort and drop out of school while still illiterate.

2/23 Faranah

M. Amadou Camara, DPE Faranah
Chef de Section, La Statistique et la Planification

Role of DPE changed w/PASE. Construction expenses directly through DPE. Very impressive brand-new office furniture. "Office renovation at DPE has led to increased prestige." SAAFs training from FSU. Supervision, report writing, community relations.

Redeployment of teachers: emphasizes that this was very recent. Discussions in Jan. and training sessions only held in Feb. 1993. Teachers not given much choice on location of the extra teachers; this is decided on the basis of the carte scolaire.

Pedagogical matters: Multi-grade classes: teachers are reluctant to teach them and have requested extra pay. Muslim element: Parents were reluctant towards public schools. He took the decision to personally rearrange some teaching schedules in the morning and pick up students after Koranic school. Students led to prayers from 4:00-4:30 every day. This symbolic recognition of Koranic school and religious values led to enormous enrollment increases. He put effort

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into overcoming cultural barrier which had identified French school with Catholic education. Reported effective APE.

2/23 Kissidougou

Sidi Lamine BARRY, DPE

Elaborate visual representation of scholastic statistics on chalkboard. Modified when inspectors come back from school visits.

2/23 Gueckedou

Lamine KOYOTE, DPE

Majestic, white office.

Explanation of monitoring construction funds.

Suggestion to improve speed of funds transfer is to open own account, on signature of DPE, SAAF and Treasurer.

Misunderstanding on book prices. Parental co-ownership of books termed unreasonable.

2/24 N'Zerekore.

Martin Bonamou, IRE

Learned lessons from past: Tranche release had been too slow so PASE sent 50% construction costs for sch. construction.
morning,

2/25 BEYLA

Courtesy visit to Chef de Cabinet
Mamadou Traore, Gouvernat, Chef de Cabinet.

Planning Meeting: DPE, Fodefissa Sylla
Ousmane, Elem. Educ.
Koulimou, Sec. Educ.

8 CEE schools constructed since 1988, none completed, 2 functioning. Problem was that funds were blocked by Ministry of Finance. PASE seen as great relief. General comment that Treasury signature should be removed from the circuit.

2/25 <u>Visit to schools under construction: Gbona, Diassodou, Gbessoba</u>

Construction of all schools had begun in mid- to late January,

1993 and the anticipated 4-month completion rate appeared to be realistic. The SCTP Chef de l'Antenne scrutinized technical aspects of the construction at each site, and made recommendations to the contractor. The contractor had pre-financed construction costs at each site. Materials and equipment were reportedly stored in small warehouses (depots) at each site.

2/25 Meeting with the school construction contractor, M. El Hadj

M. El Hadj described the process by which he had been hired to perform the work. While all the established procedures had been respected (e.g., DPE's and community collectives' review of dossiers), the collectives had ultimately selected M. El Hadj because he was a member of the local community. ("We knew him.") He is completing work according to schedule in a very challenging context. There is, however, no visible system in place to monitor his actual expenses on materials. To that point, no one had asked him how much money he had spent. Rather, he would submit a bill for the total after completion and be reimbursed.

2/26 <u>Offices of the DPE, Beyla</u>

Meeting with M. Foumba Kone, Secretary

The offices are very poorly equipped, with two rickety typewriters being the most efficient pieces of technology in use, and one was in need of serious repair. The secretary had only two blue pens at hand, and recounted a story of recently having had to make a trip to the market because a certain form required a red pen. His staples, paper clips and tape were in short supply, and he reported that requests for additional materials were not always respected. The system of recording incoming and outgoing correspondence was--

Statistics Office

The office of Statistics was in complete disorder, with dusty piles of ten year old papers stacked, unlabeled, on dirty metal shelves.

Meeting with M. Ben Sala Traore, SAAF

M. Traore appreciated the FSU SAAF training sessions, especially the sessions on hiring contractors according to explicit criteria. He emphasized that he, like most SAAFs, is not an accountant by training, so he is glad for any additional professional support.

The two most significant problems faced are that the financial disbursement system is too cumbersome (funds are blocked at the Treasury level), and that the Treasury has attempted to impose taxes on PASE funds ("Patentes", "Taxes Indirectes", and "Benefices Industrielles et Commerciales").

<u>Meeting at the Sous-Préfecture, Beyla</u>

M. Amara Laya Kourouma, Secretaire-General Charge des Collectivities Decentralisees

M. Diawara, Administrative Officer at the Sous-Préfecture

This was a conflict-ridden meeting, in that tension between the DPE and SAAF, and the Préfecture officials came to be aired, despite the expressed intent that issues not come to the attention of the evaluation team.

-- The Préfecture had required "patente" taxes (2%) from merchants ("fournisseurs") working on PASE construction projects, before any payments for work performed could be made. In addition, 10% in Taxes indirectes and 30% B.I.C. were to be paid. This was presented as coming to a total of 31 M GF out of 75 M GF in contracts.

-- The SAAF had provided to the Préfecture the names of merchants who were "fictious," i.e., whose names did not figure on the Préfecture's list of registered businesses, e.i., they had not made the payments necessary to obtain a Patente.

-- the Préfecture has not been collecting taxes and other legal fees (business registration fees) on a regular basis, so they attempt to recuperate these funds at the time of large scale infusion of funds through the PASE.

After a heated discussion revolving around these three points, the conversation switched from French to a local language so that the evaluation team would be excluded. Then the Sous-prefect closes the meeting with the wish that the evaluation team take note that there had never been any intention to take out of PASE funds what individual businessmen owe, at years end, the government.

<u>School visit: Almami Samouri Toure (Ecole des Femmes)</u>

full school, 6 grades, 6 women ts, female director, sch. of interest to DPE who had brought Minister there. Nevertheless little evidence of a modern pedagogical approach. Lethargic, 1/3 of students had book (French IPN mannual), 1st grade size was 133 students, incl. 54 girls.

<u>School visit: Ecole du 3 avril</u>

- converted villa
6 grades, 307 kids, 1/3 girls
- latrines prob -- no water source
- students had some IPN manuals, all of which were school owned and lent to students at school only
- IPN: no continuity; donors should take over the whole provision of textbooks
- school construction committee, good relationship w/SCTP
- Confusion about taxes on fournisseurs
- Highest priority is to get out of their improvised building, a converted villa, and to get a real 6-class school built

Meet with Alpha Diabaté, President of APEAE:

APE meets 2x/wk re renovation and contributions
Girls' enrollments are low because there are not enough spaces classrooms - that is the only problem. But girls also have a high dropout rate: there is no point in trying to hold them back. They have low motivation.

APEAE (6 members) meets 2-3 times every month to talk about many different matters, including individual children who are frequently absent (- talk to parents and make them come) and parents who have not paid their contribution (they must pay). De facto this very active committee is enforcing the payment of school fees in free schools. But they are serious, active, take a real interest in school matters. The fees are needed for school repairs; e.g. to build latrines and to repair the roof (which was blown off twice over the last three years). Books: no books; nothing they can do.

School visit: Ecole Primaire Alpha Yahaya Diallo

Short visit; no notes taken.

School visit: Ecole Primaire Aviation

APE committee mobilized to welcome us but time constraints prohibited much conversation.

School visit: Centre 1

M. Sekou Camara, Director
APE mobilized for school construction
Suggestion to include practical curriculum -- sewing -- to girls.
Appreciate having girl students since provide labor around school -- cleaning, pump repairs.

School visit: Centre 2

M. Traore Djiba, Director

Suggestion to eliminate DPSP from construction funds process
Difficult for students to pay for tables/benches
Enrollment increasing as result of Liberian refugees -- tendency among people who had been to Liberia to send girls to school.
PASE created private sector jobs through employment for carpenters.
Disorderly procurement records. Centre 2
The Director maintained a very disorderly records system. He was unable to locate requested inventory files.

School visit: Sobakano

2nd grade: 58 students. 1/4 girls
3rd grade: 45 students, 1/6 girls

latrines problems
no armoires

School visit: Diakolido, in Beyla

1 class, 1st grade housed together w/1-6th grade Liberian refugee schools
Complaints about acoustics because Liberians distract Guinean children
Liberians follow L. curriculum and calendar -- presently on vacation.
APE has not met since 1991, newly supplied classroom furniture -- desk, armoire were of poor quality.
Few books, no t. guides. Books bought and owned by individual parents at what seemed high prices.

2/27 N'Zerekore

Meeting with M. Ben Camara, Chef d'Antenne and Aide-Ingénieur, SCTP

M. Camara offered a clarification of the roles of the various committees in the school construction process, and commented that the tax issue could be most easily settled if the Government followed more carefully its schedule of tax collection.

2/27 Meeting at the DPE, N'Zerekore
M. Pierre Simon Goepogui, and staff

The most significant problem encountered in PASE is that the system of financial disbursements is too cumbersome. Funds are transferred from Conakry to the SAAF via this channel:

Regional level bank to

Treasurer to

Director of Budget (Treasury) to

Treasurer to

Director of Budget (Préfecture) to

Ordonnateur du Préfet (Préfecture) to

Secretary General in Charge of Administrative and Financial

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Affairs (Préfecture) to

Director, Economy and Finance (Préfecture) to

Director of Budget (Préfecture) to

SAAF (Préfecture) to

SAAF (DPE)

Visit to Tilepoulou School
Director (name omitted) and Chef de Quartier, Alexi Lamah

This was a brand new school, 3 classrooms including a first grade, a double shift 3rd and 4th grade, and a 6th grade. Two of the teachers were women. Tables and benches, office equipment and visual aids (globes, etc.) were visible.

The local community had been mobilized to the point of organizing young people to guard the school against vandalism on Sundays. Their system was to contribute to a local fund to provide a small salary to the "guards," and to charge a fine to anyone caught defacing the school.

Meeting with M. Bonamou, DPE, N'Zerekore
Summary remarks and acknowledgments for all the efforts that had contributed to a successful visit in the Forest Region.

2/25 Visit to the offices of IRE, N'Zerekore
Elaborate colored charts of PASE indicating timeliness, deadlines and budget allocations were posted on the walls.

N'Zérékoré school visits

School visit: Ecole Nyem ("Ecole PASE")

This is a school of 210 children (incl. 65 girls) which has only grades 1.3.4.6. No multigrade provision for other children, but two grades are together in one room in an informal way (school has only 3 classrooms as is the PASE norm.

APEAE did exist during the construction phase (to organize the 10% contribution consisting of local labor) but went out of existence.

Good stock of books in the director's office, but obviously not used on this day. Books exist not only for those children whose parents had paid, but also as school (not APEAE) owned for the rest. Only 60 books were received. Upon closer inspection it becomes clear that the only book available in sufficient numbers is the brand-new 1st grade French book.

Enrollment of 80 kids (38 girls) in first grade. Limit was 60 but they took 80 anyway. They would like the PASE to pay for another 3-classroom building and to add a fountain and fencing for the yard. The bureaucrat adds that there is also an urgent need for a house and motorcycle for the director, a telephone, typewriter and other office equipment.

School visit: Ecole Kéréma

6 class school built in 1956 by the local community, still in ok shape. 360 students incl. 87 girls. 6 male teachers. 3 classrooms were built by APEAE. Inadequate supplies, not a single book anywhere. Alls supplies have to be taken home by teachers since the school has no locks. No latrines. They refused more than 60 kids in the Fall.

Excellent adaptation of director to a situation of extreme poverty. IPN program arrives once per year. Director holds monthly meetings and makes all teachers write down the program for the month, then post it on the wall in their classrooms; this was taught at one of the periodic meetings at the Préfecture level. (So some pedagogical instruction does get through!).

School visit: Ecole "Bambino"

Private school run by the Eglise protestante évangélique (Assembly of God; Canadian connection for support). This religious PVO has "several dozen" schools (?). It is also assisted by Mission Philafricaine (Suisse).

Teachers: 7 incl 1 female; only 2 of them are protestants.

School fees: payable by semester, 5-6000 GF/month + one yearly payment of 6,000 for books. From grade 2 up all kids have all books (verified). 1 month after start of school year all books are in hand.

Salaries: beginning teacher gets 60,000/m; payment fluctuates somewhat with enrollments and parental paying-up. Most teachers seem presently to receive 95,000/m; none over 100,000/m.

Would like to receive state subsidy so their school could look as good as the (only) catholic school which has a nice fence.

Issues emerging from this trip

1. Per student expenditure condition adapted

The general condition and especially the furniture in IRE and DPE offices are striking: everything is either renovated or scheduled to be renovated, and the furniture choices are demonstrative. Prestigious looks is clearly important to the office holders. How was all this financed? We were told that this was the way in which the WB/USAID conditionality concerning non-salary expenses per student ($4.00 or more) was fulfilled.

This is a most imaginative adaptation on the part of administrative authorities. The reason for the condition had been the scarcity of pedagogical materials in schools; learning tools of any kind were virtually non-existent. Instead of getting textbooks and other essentials which have a direct impact upon learning, what was bought was prestige items to make administrators more comfortable and to emphasize their exalted position.

The spirit of the condition had been to spread the resources and to acquire items on a per-student (and by implication: for student) basis. This was perverted into a central office expense of no pedagogical value whatsoever. PASE/USAID let it happen.

2. Migration cannot be ignored

In N'Zérékoré and especially in Beyla there is evidence of a large influx of refugees from neighboring Liberia and Sierra Léone. According to the #2 municipal office holder of Beyla, the population has gone from 8,000 to 38,000 in a matter of about five years. Many more people seem to have filtered back into smaller towns and the countryside and taken up housing with relatives. He has confidence in his numbers because of the head tax collection. The total refugee stream seems to be of the order of 300,000 to 500,000. We saw camps, registration stations, HCR Jeeps and at least two schools teaching six classes each in English for Liberian kids. This refugee movement is bound to affect school enrollment and enrollment rates. It may in itself account for the increase in the enrollment rate which SSP announced for 1992/93 but there is no way of assessing this.

More importantly, driving out of Conakry we were struck by the vastness of the city. Impressionistic estimation would suggest that this city holds a lot more population than the 710,000 indicated in Carte scolaire data. The numbers of enrolled students are probably correct as is the sex rate but the demographic base data appears badly flawed. This would mean that migration has not been taken into account sufficiently and that rural populations are probably somewhat smaller, and urban, especially Conakry populations larger than what the SSP assumes. If this is so, enrollment rates should be corrected. They are probably somewhat higher than the published ones in rural areas and much lower in Conakry.

3. Central expenditures increase economic stratification

There is an inherent tendency in governmental organizations to concentrate resources and power at the center, to retain control over even trivial matters and to reward personnel in proportion to their service to central powers rather than remote populations. Any infusion of foreign aid resources at the center will only reinforce this basic tendency, especially if it is done in a budgetary support mode. Some foreign aid projects explicitly try to counteract this by earmarking funds for regional offices, rural associations, local credit unions and the like.

The furniture in the DPE and other offices visited is a textbook example of this. Resources meant for school children were diverted to the benefit of the central administration (and its extensions).

Unless there are specific corrective measures, strengthening central authorities will increase their advantage compared to rural and marginal populations. Foreign aid, therefore, frequently contributes to increased socio-economic stratification. But financing basic education is one of the few aid activities which actually have the potential to correct the tendency and to distribute resources (in this case human capital) more widely. PASE has so far concentrated resources at the center. It is high time that the spreading effect get started.

4. Buildings vs. books

Investing heavily in "concrete" structures is not usually a sign of quality in development projects. However, there can be no doubt that the local populations would like to see schools and think that they are entitled to get them under the PASE. In the interest of relieving the pressure on the present infrastructure and get classroom densities down to pedagogically more acceptable levels, it will probably be desirable levels, hundreds of schools will have to be built every year in the near future.

5. Delegations de credits

The IREs and DPEs are not notified, in a timely fashion or at all, of their delegations de credits.

Financial management forms introduced through previous training were not in use.

6. Financial distribution circuit

The financial distribution circuit is too cumbersome. Delays and reductions in funds that finally arrive at the SAAF level result. The most prominent solution suggested was to eliminate some of the Préfecture level signatures currently required.

7. Construction norms

The construction norms currently in place should be re-examined. The relationship between actual costs incurred and payments granted to contractors is not clear. Systems of invoice verification and collection should be improved.

8. Tax collection

The local tax collection procedures impact on project implementation. The relationship between préfecture-level officials and education sector activities should be clarified.

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ANNEX 12

Finance and Budget Data Tables

BUDGET DU SECTEUR DE L'EDUCATION
AVANT-PROJET DE BUDGET ET BUDGET NOTIFIE
POUR LES ANNEES 1991-1992-1993

/000	1991			1992			1993		
	PROJET	NOTIFIE	P/N	PROJET	NOTIFIE	P/N	PROJET	NOTIFIE	P/N
MEPU									
PERS	16,215,241	25,243,000	1.12	30,868,714	34,616,000	1.12	33,682,472	36,050,000	1.07
FONC	10,561,205	10,103,296	0.94	13,599,360	12,790,000	0.94	13,866,000	13,914,000	1.00
TOTAL	26,776,446	35,346,296	1.10	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1.05
MESRS									
PERS	3,225,480	5,835,000	1.81	8,217,008	7,062,500	0.86	7,467,000	7,420,000	0.99
FONC	3,124,604	2,996,773	0.96	8,747,890	4,272,500	0.49	6,183,200	5,600,000	0.91
INT	2,257,426	1,653,205	0.73	3,030,643	2,390,000	0.79	3,619,160	2,250,000	0.62
TOTAL	8,607,510	10,484,978	1.22	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	15,270,000	0.88
SECTEUR EDUCATION									
PERS	19,440,721	31,078,000	1.60	39,085,722	41,678,500	1.07	41,149,472	43,470,000	1.06
FONC	13,685,809	13,100,069	0.96	22,347,250	17,062,500	0.76	20,049,200	19,514,000	0.97
INT	2,257,426	1,653,205	0.73	3,030,643	2,390,000	0.79	3,619,160	2,250,000	0.62
TOTAL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

AVANT-PROJET DE BUDGET 1992: TOTAL SEEPU (en milliers de frs)

CH.AR.	NOMENCLATURE	BUDGET 1990	BUDGET 1991	AVANT-PROJET 1992
2	DEPENSES DE PERSONNEL	13.906.024	25.243.000	30.868.714
21	REMUNERATIONS	13.906.024	25.243.000	30.868.714
2101	Rémunérations principales	13.500.000	24.703.000	29.187.300
2191	Autres rémunérations	406.024	540.000	1.681.414
3	DEPENSES DE FONCTIONNEMENT	2.637.207	10.103.296	13.148.060
31	FRAIS DE DEPLACEMENT	102.750	558.668	1.021.060
3101	Missions à l'int.Indemnités	42.500	272.443	349.000
3111	Missions à l'int.Transport	59.500	195.475	287.000
	Déplacement Définitif			106.260
	Missions à l'ext.Indemnités			16.800
	Missions à l'ext.Transp.			15.000
3161	Autres Transports à l'int.	80.750	90.750	247.000
32	MATERIEL ET MOBILIER	190.970	3.291.605	4.623.000
3201	Achat Mat. et Meb. de Bureau	65.000	616.699	704.000
3211	Entretien Mat. et Meb. de Bureau	13.000	85.512	107.000
3221	Achat Mat. Technique	57.850	330.000	321.000
3231	Entretien Mat.Technique	7.000	71.891	116.000
3291	Autres Mat.et Meb.	47.320	2.187.503	3.375.000
33	PRODUITS CONSOMMABLES	1.978.994	3.547.531	3.866.000
3301	Fournitures de Bureau	600.000	585.341	477.000
3311	Fournitures Scolaires	850.000	1.830.478	1.973.500
3321	Denrées Alimentaires	364.744	429.310	490.000
3331	Produits Pharmaceutiques	0	18.500	37.000
3341	Produits Vétérinaires	4.250	4.500	10.000
3351	Produits Phytosanitaires	25.500	159.916	162.500
3361	P.Pétroliers hors Véhicules	60.000	139.740	209.500
3371	Habillements et Uniformes	7.000	38.892	42.000
3381	Imprimés Divers	30.000	117.903	46.500
3391	Autres Produits Consommables	37.500	222.751	428.000
34	PARC AUTOMOBILES	149.443	1.283.950	1.118.000
3401	Achat de Véhicules	0	805.000	216.000
3411	Entretien de Véhicules	34.000	128.950	209.000
3421	Carburant et Lubrifiant	115.443	350.000	688.000
	Assurances Véhicules	0	0	5.000
36	ENTRETIEN D'IMMOBILISATIONS	75.000	1.056.600	2.026.000
3601	Entretien et Restaur.Bât.Administ.	75.000	988.100	1.906.000
	Entretien et Restaur.Logements	0	68500	120000
37	PRESTATIONS DE SERVICES	39.100	67.067	124.000
3701	Location et Hébergement	39.100	24.942	40.000
	Frais de transit et Manutention	0	40.125	75.000
3751	Abonnements et publication	0	2.000	9000
38	DEP.DIVERSES ET IMPREVUES	20.950	297.875	370.000
3811	Réceptions et Cérémonies	5.950	220.400	220.000
3821	Manifest.Sport.et Cult.	0	0	44.000
3831	Stages et Séminaires	15.000	77.475	106.000
4	INTERVENTIONS	0	0	32.650
41	CONTRIBUTIONS	0	0	22.200
4111	Contributions internationales	0	0	22.200
43	INTERVENT.SCOLAIRES & CULTURELLES	0	0	10.450
4301	Bourses Scolaires	0	0	0
4391	Interventions Sies.Cult.Scient.	0	0	10.450
	TOTAL	16.543.231	35.346.296	44.049.424

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MINISTERE ENSEIGNEMENT PRE-UNIV. ET FORMAT. PROF.

EN MILLIERS DE F.G

CH. ART	NOMENCLATURE	BUDGET 1992	BUDGET 1993
2	TITRE II DEPENSES DE PERSONNEL	34 616 000	36 050 000
21	REMUNERATIONS	34 590 000	36 000 000
2101	Rémunérations principales	33 780 000	35 000 000
2191	Autres rémunérations	810 000	1 000 000
22	CHARGES SOCIALES	26 000	50 000
2201	Frais d'hospitalisation	26 000	50 000
3	TITRE III DEP. FONCT.	12 790 000	13 914 000
31	FRAIS DE DEPLACEMENT	1 136 000	985 000
3101	Déplacements définitifs à l'intérieur	300 000	200 000
3111	Missions à l'intérieur indemnités	349 000	250 000
3121	Missions à l'intérieur F.transport	287 000	335.000
3161	Autres transports à l'intérieur	200 000	200 000
32	MATERIEL ET MOBILIER	4 025 000	4 710 000
3201	Achat matériel et mobilier bureau	704 000	600 000
3211	Entretien matériel et mobilier bureau	107 000	205 000
3221	Achat matériel technique	321 000	150 000
3231	Entretien matériel technique	116 000	230 000
3241	Achat mobilier de logement	32 000	150 000
3291	Autres matériels et mobiliers	2 745 000	3 375 000
33	PRODUITS CONSOMMABLES	4 006 000	4 389 000
3301	Fournitures de bureau	510 000	510 000
3311	Fournitures scolaires	2 059 000	2 300 000
3321	Denrées alimentaires	480 000	540 000
3331	Produits pharmaceutiques	37 000	52.000
3341	Produits vétérinaires	10 000	15 000
3351	Produits phytosanitaires	163.000	163 000
3361	Produits pétroliers non véhicules	210 000	264 000
3371	Habillements et uniformes	42 000	50 000
3381	Imprimés divers	67 000	150 000
3391	Autres produits consommables	428 000	345 000
34	PARC AUTOMOBILE	1 210 000	1 221 000
3401	Achats véhicules	371 000	216 000
3411	Entretien véhicules	209 000	320 000
3421	Carburant et lubrifiant	620 000	700 000
3431	Assurances véhicules	10 000	15 000
36	ENTRETIEN D'IMMOBILISATIONS	1 920 000	2 120 000
3601	Entretien restauration bâtiments Adm.	1 800 000	2 000 000
3611	Entretien restauration logements	120 000	120 000
37	PRESTATIONS DE SERVICES	133 000	134 000
3701	Locations et hébergements	49 000	50 000
3731	Frais de transit et manutention	75 000	75 000
3751	Frais de publication	9 000	9 000
38	DEPENSES DIVERSES ET IMPREVUS	360 000	325 000
3811	Réceptions et cérémonies	210 000	175 000
3821	Manifestations sport. et cult.	44 000	44 000
3831	Stages et séminaires	106 000	106 000
	TOTAL DEPENSES DE FONCTIONNEMENT	47 406 000	49 964 000

15 mars 1993

FINANCEMENT DU BUDGET DES DÉPENSES
DE FONCTIONNEMENT HORS RÉMUNÉRATION
DU SECTEUR DE L'ÉDUCATION
POUR LES ANNÉE 1991-1992-1993

FG/1 million

ANNÉE	1991		1992		1993	
SOURCE	B N D	G D	B N D	G D	B N D	G D
(2)USAID	3,052.8	(3)	5,632.0	(3)	6,232.0	(3)
(4)IDA	3,456.0		4,480.0		5,320.0	
(5)FAC		847.8		779.4	[redacted]	622.2
GRG	6,591.2		6,950.5		4,814.0	
TOTAL(6)	13,100.0	847.8	17,062.5	779.4	19,366.0	622.2

1.- Taux de conversion.
1991: USD = FG 720
1992: USD = FG 800
1993: USD = FG 950

91-92- :FF 1 = FG 146

2.- Ces contributions représente 80 % d'un don de USD 22.3 millions devant servir au remboursement de la dette nationale. Les 20% restant devant être viré au budget d'investissement.

1991.- USD 5.3 millions X 80% X FG 720 = FG 3,052,800,000.
1992.- USD 8.8 millions X 80% X FG 800 = FG 4,608,000,000.
1993.- USD 8.2 millions X 80% X FG 950 = FG 6,232,000,000.

3.- Une assistance en Gestion directe de l'USAID d'un montant de USD 5.7 millions répartis sur les trois années n'est pas incluse dans ce tableau, cette dernière étant destinée au financement de l'assistance technique et des bourses d'études.

4.- Ces contributions représentent 80 % d'un prêt de USD 20.0 millions. Les 20% restant devant être virés au budget d'investissement.

1991.- USD 6.0 millions X 80% X FG 720 = FG 3,456,000,000.
1992.- USD 7.0 millions X 80% X FG 800 = FG 4,480,000,000.
1993.- USD 7.0 millions X 80% X FG 950 = FG 5,320,000,000.

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5.- a) Ces montants ne représentent que le financement des dépenses de Fonctionnement.(Exclus le financement de l'assistance technique.)

b) Un support au BND de FG 3,700 millions a été agréé pour l'année 1993. La part attribué au budget de fonctionnement (FG 3,000 millions) est identifié à des lignes budgétaires spécifiques et le remboursement est sujet à la présentation des pièces justificatives pertinentes.

6.- **BUDGET DES DÉPENSES DE FONCTIONNEMENT HORS RÉMUNÉRATION DU SECTEUR DE L'ÉDUCATION POUR LES ANNÉE 1991-1992-1993**

FG /000.000

	1 9 9 1	1 9 9 2	1 9 9 3
MEPU-FP	10,103.3	12,790.0	13,866.0
MESRS	2,996.7	4,272.5	5,500.0
TOTAL	13,100.0	17,062.5	19,366.0

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15 mars 1993

FINANCEMENT DU BUDGET DES DÉPENSES
DE FONCTIONNEMENT HORS RÉMUNÉRATION
DU SECTEUR DE L'ÉDUCATION
POUR LES ANNÉE 1991-1992-1993

FG/1 million

ANNÉE	1991		1992		1993	
SOURCE	B N D	G D	B N D	G D	B N D	G D
(2)USAID	3,052.8	(3)	5,632.0	(3)	6,232.0	(3)
(4)IDA	3,456.0		4,480.0		5,320.0	
(5)FAC		847.8		779.4	[redacted]	622.2
GRG	6,591.2		6,950.5		4,814.0	
TOTAL(6)	13,100.0	847.8	17,062.5	779.4	19,366.0	622.2

1.- Taux de conversion.
1991: USD = FG 720
1992: USD = FG 800
1993: USD = FG 950

91-92- :FF 1 = FG 146

2.- Ces contributions représente 80 % d'un don de USD 22.3 millions devant servir au remboursement de la dette nationale. Les 20% restant devant être viré au budget d'investissement.

1991.- USD 5.3 millions X 80% X FG 720 = FG 3,052,800,000.
1992.- USD 8.8 millions X 80% X FG 800 = FG 4,608,000,000.
1993.- USD 8.2 millions X 80% X FG 950 = FG 6,232,000,000.

3.- Une assistance en Gestion directe de l'USAID d'un montant de USD 5.7 millions répartis sur les trois années n'est pas incluse dans ce tableau, cette dernière étant destinée au financement de l'assistance technique et des bourses d'études.

4.- Ces contributions représentent 80 % d'un prêt de USD 20.0 millions. Les 20% restant devant être virés au budget d'investissement.

1991.- USD 6.0 millions X 80% X FG 720 = FG 3,456,000,000.
1992.- USD 7.0 millions X 80% X FG 800 = FG 4,480,000,000.
1993.- USD 7.0 millions X 80% X FG 950 = FG 5,320,000,000.

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ANNEX

DEPENSES RECURRENTES HORS DETTE 1991 MILLIERS DE.GNF

	DEPARTEMENTS MINISTERIELS	TOTAL DEPENSES	TITRE 2 DEPENSES PERSONNEL	TITRE 3 DEPENSES FONCTION.	TITRE 4 DEPENSES INTERV.
1	PRESIDENCE	11.010.940	593.000	9.217.940	1.200.000
2	DEFENSE NATL & SECURITE	26.463.890	20.003.000	6.240.890	220.000
3	INTERIEUR & DECENTR	1.768.734	1.575.000	193.734	
4	SEC ETAT DECENTR	174.425	100.000	74.425	
5	PLAN & COOP INTER	1.274.589	537.000	737.589	
6	INFORM. CULTURE; TOUR	1.760.153	575.000	1.185.153	
7	SEC ETAT TOUR HOTEL.	132.735	70.000	62.735	
8	SEC PERM DU CRMN	170.027	51.720	118.307	
9	SEC GENERAL DU GOUVT	123.883	45.000	78.883	
10	CONTR ECON & FINANCIER	191.125	65.000	126.125	
11	ECONOMIE & FINANCE	3.559.400	2.600.000	959.400	
12	JUSTICE	1.847.105	500.000	1.347.105	
13	AFFAIRES ETRANGERES	16.046.460	2.150.000	11.896.460	2.000.000
14	REFORME ADMIN & FON PUB	884.063	315.000	352.968	216.095
15	INDUSTRIE COMM. ART.	1.065.600	820.000	245.600	
16	AGRIC. & RESS ANIMALES	8.232.645	7.800.000	432.645	
17	SEC ETAT PECHE	457.212	375.000	82.212.	
18	RESS NATURELLES & ENVIRO	883.305	790.000	93.305	
19	SEC ETAT ENERGIES.	289.124	190.000	99.124	
20	URBANISME & HABITAT	993.165	740.000	253.165	
21	TRANSPORT & T.P.	4.514.581	1.250.000	3.264.581	
22	EDUCATION NATL.	8.367.458	3.225.460	3.088.773	2.053.205
23	SEC ETAT ENS PRE UNIV	26.758.463	16.215.241	10.543.222	
24	SANTE PUB & POP	7.455.880	5.800.000	1.655.880	
25	AFFAIRES SOC & EMPLOI	576.125	328.000	248.125	
26	JEUNESSE & SPORTS	806.338	185.000	621.338	
27	POSTES ET TEEECOM	4.731.700	1.102.000	3.629.700	
28	RESIDENT G. MARITIME	397.595	340.000	57.595	
29	RESIDENT MOYENNE G.	362.595	305.000	57.595	
30	RESIDENT HAUTE G.	392.595	335.000	57.595	
31	RESIDENT G. FORESTIERE	207.595	150.000	57.595	
32	SEC GEN LIGUE ISLAMIQUE	145.985	40.000	105.985	
33	DEPENSES COMMUNES	39.784.039	10.516.619	18.217.420	11.050.000
	TOTAL GENERAL	171.829.529	79.687.060	75.403.169	16.739.300

ANNEX 13

School Visit Questionnaire

M.E.P.U.- FP

INSPECTION REGIONALE EDUCATION POUR LA MOYENNE GUINEE LABE

DIRECTION PREFECTORALE EDUCATION DE KOUNDARA

Ecole Primaire de _____

REPUBLIQUE DE GUINEE

Travail-Justice-Solidarité

BULLETIN INDIVIDUEL D'INSPECTION

I.- RENSEIGNEMENTS GENERAUX

Prénoms et Nom : _____

N° Matricule: _____ N° Recensement: _____

Date et lieu de naissance: _____

Situation de famille : _____ Femmes: _____ Enfants: _____

Diplôme et titres: _____

Date d'engagement: _____ Fonction actuelle _____

Grade actuel: _____ Date de promotion: _____

Date d'arrivée dans l'établissement: _____

Cours tenu : _____

Nombre d'élèves inscrits: Garçons: _____ Filles: _____ Total: _____

Nombre d'éleves présents: Garçons: _____ Filles: _____ Total: _____

Date d'Inspection: _____

III.- ORGANISATION MATERIELLE ET PEDAGOGIQUE:

Etat de la classe (propreté et présentation): _____

Mobilier (quantité et qualité) _____

Etat des élèves (tenue et activités) _____

DOCUMENTS OFFICIELS:

Répartition du programme _____ Etat d'avancement: _____

Régistre d'appel: _____

Emploi du temps: _____

Cahier de compositions: _____

Cahier de roulement : _____

Cahier de préparations: _____

Fiche de préparations: _____ Cahier journal _____

Tableau de chants et récitations: _____

Règlement intérieur: _____

Groupe de balayage: _____

OBSERVATIONS SUR LA TENUE DES DOCUMENTS: _____

Leçons écoutées: Portee éducative et contenu scientifique:

1.- Titre de la leçon: _____

OBSERVATIONS: _____

2.- Titre de la leçon: _____

OBSERVATIONS: _____

TRAVAIL ECRITS DES ELEVES :

Devoirs écrits des élèves: _____

Tenue des cahiers : _____

RAPPORTS SOCIAUX :

Responsabilité extra-scolaire: _____

Rapports avec les supérieurs : _____

Rapports avec les collègues : _____

Veleur sociale : _____

APPRECIATIONS GENERALES : _____

Note d'Inspection : _____/20

A : _____, le ____/____/199__/

LE DIRECTEUR PREFECTORAL DE L'EDUCATION

=:= _____ =:=

Appréciations de l'Inspecteur Régional de l'Education LABE

_____

Noté: _____/20

Labé, le _____ 199__

L'INSPECTEUR REGIONAL DE L'EDUCATION

=:= _____ =:=

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d. What are the condition of book? (destroyed, covered, etc)_____

e. How long have they been in use?_____

2. Has the school received books?_____ How many?_____
If not, why not?
_____

3. For what grade? In what subject? A teacher guide? (yes) (no)

For what grade?	In what subject?	A teacher guide? (yes) (no)

4. Have the books been distributed to students?_____ If no, whnot?_____

5. What is the student distribution system? Who is responsible?
_____
_____

6. What is the formula for ownership?
a. Purchased by parents_____
b. Purchased by PTA, then loaned_____
c. Other (share, etc.)
_____
_____

7. How many books have been sold?_____ Rough %_____

8. Are certain books more often purchased by parents? What grade, subject?_____

9. What is the sales price?

Subject/grade	Price	Subject/grade	Price

10. What impedes parental purchase? (Price, quality, etc)
_____
_____

11. What can be done so that more children have books?
_____
_____

Other Observations:
_____
_____

Teacher Guides: (ask directors and teachers)

1. Have teachers received teacher guides? _____

2. What subjects? what grades?
_____ _____
_____ _____
_____ _____

3. If they have not, why not? _____

4. Do teachers have copies of student books? _____.

5. Do they use guides/book to prepare/teach lesson? _____

6. Are they helpful? _____

7. What can be done to help teachers? _____

Other Observations: _____

Girls' Educational Participation: (ask directors, teachers, parents, students)

1. Classroom Observation:
   a. What percentage of girls are represented in classes you observe? _____
   b. In which grades do they seem more numerous? _____.
   c. Where are they seated? (front/back of room)? _____
   d. Do they have less or more materials, books, etc.? _____
   _____
   e. Ask: how many girls have repeated? _____% boys? _____
   f. Observe: are girls older/younger/same age as boys? _____
   _____

2. Is there a specific grade and/or age where girls drop-out of school?

3. What are the major reasons for dropping out? (list in precedence)
   1. _____ 3. _____ 5. _____
   2. _____ 4. _____ 6. _____

4. What percentage drop-out because of pregnancy? _____

5. Are girls as good a students as boys? _____
   If not, why not?
   _____
   _____
   _____

7. Should girls go to school and have the same education as boys? _____
If not, why not? _____

8. What type of education is best for girls? _____

9. What could be done increase girls' enrollment? _____

10. What could be done to improve persistence and performance? _____

Other Observations: _____

School organization: (ask director, parents, APE, teachers)

1. Is there an APE? _____

2. What does it do? _____

3. What has it done for the school? _____

4. Has it bought furniture, materials, book? _____

5. Do all parents participate? _____ What %? _____

6. How is it organized? _____

7. What other support does the school receive? _____

Discussion with Teachers
1. Training
2. Performance

Discussion with SAAF
1
2

Discussion with APE/DPE

Discussions with Project

ANNEX 14

Individuals Contacted During the Evaluation

ANNEX 14

INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED DURING THE EVALUATION

METU/Office of the Minister

Hadja Aicha Bah	Minister

METU/Service du Statistiques et Planification

Bakary Diawara	Directeur

MEPU/Service Coopération Technique et des Projects

Abou Soumah,	Directeur

MEPU/Department of Administrative Affairs and Finance

Amadou Sadio Diallo	Director
Jean Pierre Dupont	French Advisor

MEPU/Department of Primary Education

Alpha Mamoudou Diallo	Director

MEPU/Institute Pédagogique Nationale

Ninguelande Diallo	Director
Thieno Hamidon Bah	Chargé d'études
Amadou Balde	Chef Division Curricula et Formation
Sekou Chérif Fofana	Section ENS & Designe
Joseph Pierre Kamano	Chef Division Manuels et Publication
El Hadj Karamoko Kouyabe	A former employee
Mamadou Aliou Sow	Chef Division Appuis Pédagogiques et Enseignement à Distance

PASE

Sadiou Souare	National Coordinator

Ministry of Plan and Finance

Camara	Minister

Florida State University

Andre Courtemanche	Chief of Party and PASE Technical Advisor
Mamadou Maz Diallo	Administrative Assistant
Serge Delorme	Financial Advisor
Joshua Mushkin	Home Office Backstop

World Bank

Jeane Claude Hamedat	Financial Development Officer
Robert Prouty	Project Officer, PASE
Cherif Diallo	Economist, Principal Operations Officer
Seydou T. Ly	Economist, Operation Officer

FAC

Joseph Brandolin	PASE Technical Advisor

Unite Technique SGFC (PL480)

Ousmane Diop	Directeur Executif
Paola Lang	Director

Europeran Economic Community (CEE)

Guy Petitpierre	Délégué
J.P. Reymondet	Economist

AID/Washington

Charles Morgan	Guinea Desk Officer
Julie Ray	Director AFR/ARTS/HRDO
Karen Tietjan	AFR/ARTS/HRDO
Joe DeStepano	AFR/ARTS/HRDO

American Embassy, Guinea

	Ambassador
Sherry Steeley	Economic and Commercial Officer

USAID/Guinea

Wilbur Thomas	Mission Director
Tom Parks	Deputy Mission Director
Alpha Bah	HRD Project Management Assistant
Steve Hakin	Program Economist, Evaluation Officer, PPDO
Stan Handelman	Education Specialist (PSC on TDY)
David Hess	Director, Program and Project Developmnet Office
Phillipe Montaiga	Director, GDO
Rebecca Nice	Project Development and WID Officer, PPDO
Bintia Stevens	Assistant to the Controller
Steve Watson	Education Assistant (PSC)
Sarah Wright	Education Office Director

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ANNEX 15

Documentation Referred to During the Evaluation

ANNEX 15

DOCUMENTATION REFERRED TO DURING THE EVALUATION

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