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FINAL REPORT

EVALUATION OF

BOTSWANA WORKFORCE AND SKILLS TRAINING (BWAST)

PHASE I

Prepared for

U.S. Agency for International Development

under

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Preface

This report is based on the findings of an evaluation which assessed the Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project (Phase I) of USAID/Gaborone, from August 28 to September 15, 1989.

The team consisted of Dr. Terence F. Kelly, Team Leader, and Dr. Larry J. Kenneke, provided under an A.I.D. contract with TvT Associates.

The team worked under the technical direction of Will Elliott, Project Officer, and was assisted by Oduetse Motshidisi, Project Assistant and Goitsemodimo Mokgwathi, Program Economist.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We gratefully acknowledge the cooperation and assistance given us by USAID/Gaborone, AED field and Washington staff, the private sector, GOB Ministry Officials, former BWAST participants, USAID library staff, and especially Sreeni Perera and Kathy Blaine for their assistance with word processing.

We further give our appreciation and credit to those whose research writing and publications we relied upon for so much of our work. Without such a wealth of information, we could not have accomplished our task in the brief time allotted us.

ACRONYMS

AED	-	Academy for Educational Development
ATDO	-	Association of Training and Development Officers
BAC	-	Botswana Agricultural College
BCU	-	Botswana Cooperative Union
BDC	-	Botswana Development Corporation
BEF	-	Botswana Employers' Federation (now the BOCCIM)
BIAC	-	Botswana Institution of Administration and Commerce
BOCCIM	-	Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (formerly BEF)
BRIDEC	-	Brigades Development Center
BWAST	-	Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project
CDIE	-	Center for Development Information and Evaluation, A.I.D./Washington
CDSS	-	Country Development Strategy Statement
DANIDA	-	Danish International Development Agency
DOP	-	Directorate of Personnel
DPSM	-	Directorate of Public Service Management
EEC	-	European Economic Community
ESAMI	-	Eastern and Southern African Management Institute
FAP	-	Financial Assistance Policy
GOB	-	Government of Botswana
GATT	-	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
IDM	-	Institute of Development Management
ILO	-	International Labor Organization
MCI	-	Ministry of Commerce and Industry
MFDP	-	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MLGL	-	Ministry of Local Government and Lands
MLHA	-	Ministry of Labor and Home Affairs
MOA	-	Ministry of Agriculture
MOE	-	Ministry of Education
NDB	-	National Development Bank
NDP6	-	National Development Plan 6, Government of Botswana (1985-91)
NORAD	-	Norwegian Agency for International Development
OPEX	-	Operational Expert (An expatriate technician provided under the project)
PAMA	-	Poultry Agriculture Management Association
RIIC	-	Rural Industries Innovation Center
SAMDP	-	Southern Africa Manpower Development
SAAST	-	Southern Africa Academic and Skills Training Project
SIDA	-	Swedish International Development Authority
TA	-	Technical Assistance
UB	-	University of Botswana

UCB	-	University College of Botswana
ULGS	-	Unified Local Government Service
UNCTAD	-	United Nations Commission for Trade and Development
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Program
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/BOTS	-	Mission to Botswana
WTC	-	Wildlife Training Center

BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. Country: Botswana

2. Project Title: Botswana Workforce and Skills Training, Phase I

3. Project Number: 633-0231

4. Project Dates:

   a. First Project Agreement: 5/06/82
   b. Final Obligation Date: FY 86 Planned
   c. Most recent Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD): 31 March 1990

5. Project Funding: (amounts obligated to date in dollars or dollar equivalents from the following sources)

a.	A.I.D. Bilateral Funding (grant)	US$ 14,558,000
b.	Other Major Donors	US$ 0
c.	Host Country Counterpart Funds	US$ 4,796,000
Total		US$ 19,354,000

6. Mode of Implementation: A.I.D. direct contractor

   Academy for Educational Development

7. Project Designers: The Government of Botswana and the USAID/Botswana

8. Responsible Mission Officials:

   a. Mission Directors:
      (1) Louis Cohen 1982
      (2) Paul Guedet 1982 to 1986
      (3) John Hummon 1986 to present

   b. Project Officers:
      (1) Laurier Mailloux 1982 - 1986
      (2) Ann Domidion 1986 - 1989
      (3) Will Elliott 1989

Previous Evaluations:

Mid-Term Evaluation. September 5, 1985.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is a final evaluation of the Botswana Work Force and Skills Training Project (BWAST), a 7-year, $19 million investment (including a $14.6 million USAID contribution) characterized by the following general features:

- The project carried forward skills-upgrading activities first initiated regionally by USAID in 1973 under two separate but similarly-focused projects.
- There was an emphasis on skills development for middle- and senior-level Government personnel (80 percent of participants). Although limited (20 percent), the inclusion of participants from the private sector was one of the first instances of such direct USAID funding on record. Today, USAID is the major donor agency in Botswana providing direct training assistance to the private sector.
- Participant training focused on managerial, technical, and administrative skill levels.
- The bulk of project funding financed long-term training in U.S. academic institutions, much of it at the Master's level. Short-term training, both in country and in the U.S., was also provided.
- There was an attempt to substitute U.S. operational experts (OPEXers) for some of the overseas participants while those participants completed their training.

Project inputs were funds, continuity, technical assistance, imagination, dedication, and trust among actors. Its primary

outputs were, first, a number of trained and educated middle- and high-level cadre who are increasingly assuming positions of trust and who are preparing the path for Botswana's future development. Most concede that a managerial and administrative skill base is a prerequisite to the successful execution of more specific employment-generation projects. Second, the project (with its successor, BWAST II), has produced a management system to further the development of the human resource base in Botswana. An operative system is in place and functioning for the public sector, and one is emerging in the private sector. The total system has been 16 years in the making, which appears to be about the minimum period necessary for skills-development programs to have an appreciable effect and measurable impact on broad-based national development processes. Taking into account the combined effects of previous skill-upgrading programs, the activities of the Government itself, BWAST, and programs of other international donors, Botswana's system of skills development appears to be 3-5 years in advance of those of many of its neighboring countries.

Most of what the project did, it did well. However, while the Project Paper emphasized rural-sector development, only 21 percent of courses taken by participants were related to rural or agricultural activities. Also, the expectation of immediate direct employment impact might have been a bit more modestly presented in the Project Paper, as training was targeted on already-employed individuals. Indirect effects are likely of

much greater significance, but many of these will not be realized until some time in the future. This should not detract from project outputs, many of which have been clearly beneficial for the development outlook; rather we are suggesting that some of the rhetoric initially used to describe project objectives was overstated.

We find no evidence of resource wastage in the implementation of the project, although overseas training, particularly in academic institutions, is intrinsically expensive. Outputs exceeded targets for every category for which measurable indicators could be derived, and the project has been brought in under budget.

The use of OPEXers proved highly effective, even though linkages with participant trainees were tenuous. On-the-job training by OPEXers was less than originally envisioned as the Government seemed more interested in production than training, which is certainly a Government prerogative. The technical assistance function of the project has been particularly effective. Lack of overlap between OPEXers and participants could have been anticipated, given the numbers and timing of this component. This points to a larger problem of reintegrating people who are away for training for 2 to 4 years.

The primary contractor, the Academy for Educational Development, managed a complex logistical problem admirably. Field staff members have provided a further valuable source of technical assistance, particularly with the design and implementation of a management-of-training system. As with all such projects, there were initial problems of implementation, but they were uncovered and, where feasible, corrected.

USAID's analysis of project performance could be improved. Costs per participant should be routinely analyzed and a data base developed of participant backgrounds and systematic measures of project achievements (number of jobs created, regulations improved, wage histories, etc.) It would have been useful if the data kept on participant backgrounds were such that they were more suitable for analysis and assessment. The evaluation plan in the Project Paper was neither specific nor comprehensive, particularly lacking rigorous monitoring and adherence to record keeping benchmarks.

The training system which has been developed under BWAST is sustainable. What is not likely sustainable without additional assistance or internal financing, is funding for overseas training and technical assistance. Further development of the private-sector component will require further funding. Such a commitment is well justified by experience to date.

In the form of a suggestion for the Mission's planned activities of a similar nature, it is recommended that skills development should be approached as an investment decision. Skills development should first and foremost be directed to the maximization of economic growth within the context of appropriate technology. The objective is to select one or more interventions (investments) which could maximize the employment content of economic growth, subject to constraints on fiscal and monetary policy, the international competitive situation, the human capital base, tastes and customs, the efficiency of Government operations, and the like. Interventions would then be selected either because they appear to have a high payoff, in the sense of yielding a large number of jobs directly or indirectly, or because they have low costs, in the sense that they are intrinsically inexpensive or because they can be directed at the reduction of one or two critical constraints.

If such a procedure were followed and the costs and benefits of the alternatives were to be listed, it would be likely that attention would focus on: export opportunities, the service sector, construction, and certain distributive activities (retail and wholesale trade, informal sector, transportation, communications, business services, etc.). Moreover, skill constraints would be most apparent in the areas of basic attitudinal and commercial skills and supervisory skills (foremen). We thus urge that USAID begin to move down into the

heart of the skills pyramid, with less reliance on academic credentials as selection criteria. Attention would thus shift beyond exclusive focus on white-collar jobs to encompass more blue-collar and other operative occupations.

Short-term courses in country would be emphasized in an effort to further strengthen the private sector. We particularly favor the concept of work attachments (internships) in the U.S. or in third countries. Interventions should not be limited to skills upgrading, but should comprise a package of inputs including technical assistance to smaller firms and aspiring entrepreneurs. Coordination of the various elements of such a package approach is essential, and a system which provides for that coordination is set out in Section V. Financing is of equal importance, and we urge the introduction of cost-sharing and user charges where appropriate. We further suggest that a levy/grant system be analyzed for possible implementation in the future. Such an analysis, along with other research studies, could be covered by funding under the AED core contract (BWAST II).

I. INTRODUCTION

Project Features

The Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project (BWAST I) is an outgrowth and refinement of the Southern Africa Manpower Development Project (SAMDP-USAID, 1978) and should be viewed within the context of a great many predecessor or complementary workforce skill-training activities: Southern Africa Development Personnel and Training Project (SADPT-USAID, 1973); Southern Africa Academic and Skills-Training Project (SAAST-USAID, 1978); the Bursaries Department of the Ministry of Education, United Nations Development Program (UNDP); World Bank; Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA); the British Council; and others. BWAST I was approved in May 1982 as a 7-year, $19.4 million project, supported principally by a USAID contribution of $14.6 million. The Government of Botswana (GOB) was to contribute an additional $4.8 million (25 percent of the total project cost). Although data are not available on actual expenditures, the GOB did follow through on all its obligations by paying local salaries for OPEXers, international airfares for participants, employees' salaries while in training, and other items agreed to in the Grant Project Agreement. The project was to increase the number of trained Batswana in the public and private sectors in skill areas related to employment generation by financing the costs of: (a) long- and short-term training in

the United States and third countries, (b) in-country training for Batswana in several critical areas including public administration, (c) technical assistance, including long- and short-term OPEX personnel (Operational Expert - an expatriate technician provided under the project), and (d) training materials. An ancillary project objective was to localize positions in both the public and private sectors by replacing expatriates with trained Batswana.

In support of the project's objective to train manpower in areas which impact directly and indirectly on the Government's ability to create employment opportunities, project-financed training focused primarily on: (1) specific central government ministries and related institutions which support the objectives of those ministries; (2) the Unified Local Government Service; and (3) the private sector. Central Government training under the project focused on the Ministries of Commerce and Industry (MCI), Agriculture (MOA), Local Government and Lands (MLGL), Education (MOE), and related institutions. Public-sector requests for training, except a scholarship fund, were coordinated through and approved by the Directorate of Public Service Management, then known as the Directorate of Personnel. Those from the private sector were submitted to and selected by the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) and approved by the Labor Department before being sent to USAID for final approval. The Academy for Educational

Development (AED), under contract with USAID/Botswana provided the technical and support services needed to carry out the project's training and technical assistance activities. The contractor further assumed responsibility for assisting the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM), the Botswana Employers' Federation (BEF)--now called Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM)--various government ministries, local government institutions, and parastatal and private sector organizations in developing and institutionalizing a system for management of training. For the first two years of the project, under subcontract to AED, Creative Associates, Inc., staffed the position of Director of In-Country Training.

This project was also to assist in financing the costs of completing certain training which was initiated but not completed under the Southern African Manpower Development Project.

Planned Outputs

Key planned outputs of the BWAST I project were:

Administrative and management training (principally but not exclusively at the Masters level):

1. 36 participants in long-term training in the U.S. and third countries.

2. 15 participants in short-term training--in the U.S. and third countries, and 595 participants in short-term in-country training.

Technical training:

1. 36 participants in long-term training in the U.S. and third countries.

2. 22 participants in short-term training in the U.S. and third countries, and 405 participants in short-term in-country training.

Technical assistance:

1. 52 person-years of long-term OPEX technical assistance, and 4 person-years of short-term OPEX technical assistance.

2. 4 person-years of non-OPEX technical assistance in the Directorate of Public Service Management to coordinate in-country training programs for key ministries.

Purposes of the Evaluation

The purposes of this evaluation are to examine the lessons learned under the BWAST I project. Since previous evaluations of BWAST I, BWAST II, and USAID's training and technical assistance programs in general have reviewed many and varied project issues, this evaluation emphasizes BWAST I's overall impact and potential for sustainability for the future. Process issues have been more than adequately covered in prior evaluations, so that this report attempts to focus on outcomes; that is, project costs and benefits. As specified in the Evaluation Scope of Work (Appendix A), the team paid particular attention to the management-of-training and private-sector components of the project. Of

special interest is the determination of whether the project's decision-making process efficiently and effectively identified opportunities for and assisted in employment generation. Additional project aspects that have been addressed include the "Delivery Order" process and various ordering mechanisms, the performance of the general contractor, and the role of returned participants.

Analytical Questions

In response to the guidelines set forth in the AID Evaluation Handbook (USAID, 1987) and the Evaluation Scope of Work, the evaluation team developed a conceptual framework and criteria for assessment of BWAST I (Appendix B). A four-tier heirarchial pyramid conceptualized the team's approach to this evaluation. The project design, within the context of the project environment, is viewed as the basis or foundation upon which the remaining analysis rests. In ascending order, project implementation, outcomes, and lessons learned complete the conceptual pyramid. Six substantive areas and 24 supportive analytical questions were drawn from this framework. The six major substantive question areas addressed in this evaluation are:

1. How relevant was the project design to the development constraints faced at the time of project implementation?

2. Did the project make satisfactory progress toward meeting its stated objectives?

3. Were the effects of the project produced at an acceptable cost compared to alternative approaches for accomplishing the same objectives?

4. What were the positive and negative effects resulting from the project?

5. What intervening variables served to influence the project?

6. Will the effects of the project likely continue after A.I.D. funding has stopped?

The evaluation is meant to be forward-looking. BWAST I is history, or nearly so, and of interest primarily by way of providing guidance regarding where to go from here (and how to get there). This report, therefore, attempts to identify directions for the future, based on what has been learned.

Evaluation Process

The evaluation procedure is described in the Scope of Work (Appendix A) prepared by USAID/Botswana and included a number of specific orientation, design, data collection, analysis, and reporting activities. These activities are detailed in Appendix B.

It should be noted that this evaluation covered only 3 weeks, with a first draft of our report prepared in only 2 weeks.

Although extensive background data were available from previous reports, time limitations precluded adequate discussion with Government staff and other relevant personnel. The Government and private-sector representatives (BOCCIM) were given the opportunity to vet an early draft and their comments have been incorporated into this report.

Sources of Evidence

The evaluation team relied heavily upon previously conducted studies and reports -- BWAST I Mid-Term Evaluation (USAID, 1985); the Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project (USAID, 1982-a); Baseline data collection study (Tarnoff and Elmer, 1986); a Report on the Impact of OPEXers for USAID/BOTSWANA (Deloitte Haskins and Sells, 1987); the BWAST II Interim Evaluation (Smith, et. al., 1988); and a tracer study on returned participants (Thomas, 1989). See Appendix C for a complete listing of documents consulted and references.

Outline of Report

The remainder of this report is organized around what we perceive to be a logical progression of project activities-- Section I has provided an overview of the project; Section II covers project design; Section III, project implementation; Section IV, project outcomes; and Section V, conclusions and

recommendations. The first four sections present the team's observations and analysis in narrative form. These sections focus on the team's (and others') analytical views about selected project components. The final section focuses on lessons learned and possible directions for the future.

II. PROJECT DESIGN

Project Environment

Botswana's unique economic structure has been described in numerous documents (for example, Edwards et al., 1987; USAID, Botswana, 1989; and Smith et al., 1988). The economy is characterized by a relatively strong recent performance but a precarious underlying structure, as illustrated by the following indicators:

- Its enviable growth pattern (GDP grew at 12.9 percent per annum between 1981/82 and 1987/88) was almost entirely derived from mining (primarily diamonds) and cattle production. Excluding mining and quarries, GDP grew 4.6 percent annually.
- Only 34 percent of the labor force is employed in the modern sector.
- The unemployment rate is 25 percent and underemployment has nearly reached an additional 20 percent of the labor force.
- Foreign exchange reserves are sufficient to cover nearly three years of imports, yet there are serious constraints on credit for small- and medium-sized firms. Indeed, excess liquidity has helped fuel a current annual rate of inflation of 11 percent.
- Population growth has averaged 3.6 percent in recent years and is one of the highest in the world.
- Resulting from the above, the income distribution is extremely unequal, with 40 percent of the population living in poverty. The problem is particularly acute in rural areas. Wealth is unevenly distributed.

These structural weaknesses were evident in 1982, when the BWAST project was initiated. Given the project's focus (managerial, administrative, and technical training for employed workers in the public and private sectors), the structural weaknesses do not appear to have affected adversely the probability that stated objectives would be attained. To the contrary, they provided the rationale for those objectives. In a labor-surplus (high unemployment) economy where the financial constraint is not particularly binding, the ability to manage and effect resource allocations is a precondition for alleviating some of the structural weaknesses noted above.

Moreover, the policy environment has been relatively favorable as well. The Government of Botswana has been pursuing an enviable macroeconomic policy, resisting the temptation to squander resources on short-term consumption at the expense of longer term development. The Government has shown an awareness of the need for contingency planning, recognizing that the price of diamonds, trade relations with South Africa, and current favored trade status with the EEC are all subject to sudden reversal.[1] Policy has favored private-sector growth and, in comparison to other developing countries, market distortions are few. There are, however, some anomalies which deserve mention:

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[1] The evaluators are aware that there are two sides to every issue and that not everyone would agree with such a strong risk-adverse approach to development or to the role that the public sector should play in that development.

- Imports are denominated in South African Rand, and highly significant diamond exports in U.S. dollars, complicating the calculation of foreign exchange. To the extent that there are any distortions in the trade of Rand for dollars (say, undervaluation of the Rand to compensate for embargoes against South Africa), these could affect Botswana's foreign exchange position artificially. The effect could be beneficial to Botswana's immediate consumption patterns, but is likely detrimental to long-term development prospects by eroding comparative advantage and discouraging investment here. It could also induce a substitution of imports (capital and material) for Batswana labor. Part of the recent rise in foreign exchange reserves is due merely to the recovery of the dollar in world markets. Finally, foreign exchange is dominated by the price of diamonds rather than reflecting Botswana's comparative advantage in activities which could further future economic development. One study team went so far as to urge consideration of the option of introducing a two-tiered system of foreign exchange in response to the undue influence of diamond prices (Edwards et al., 1987).

- Product prices are often set on an arbitrary basis rather than reflecting cost or competitive factors.[2] This can be a serious hindrance to both export and import-substitution efforts.

- Wages appear relatively high in comparison with international competitors, but low in relation to domestic food costs (Edwards et al., 1987).[3] Moreover,

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[2] To illustrate, an enterprise has recently been established to produce egg cartons domestically in substitution for imports from South Africa. In setting his price to compete with the imports, the proprietor was not aware that the Ministry of Agriculture was subsidizing egg producers by selling cartons at a rate lower than import costs.

[3] Although hesitant to disagree with a more reasoned analysis than time permitted this evaluation, we note that the statement about relatively high wages does not accord with casual observation. We suspect the divergence in views stems from the use of average wages from a bimodal distribution (many low and high wages, and few in between). We would concur that unit labor costs are relatively high in Botswana, due to low perceived productivity levels, but we do not believe that South African crews are here because they are paid less than Batswana; in fact, they are

the wage distribution, which is bimodal, does not appear congruent with the distribution of productivity and is significantly influenced by public-sector wage decisions.

Our conclusion is that these anomalies, while of importance for general development prospects, are not of sufficient magnitude to have affected project performance or outcomes. Two other mutually reinforcing factors likely are of much greater importance for any project aimed at skill upgrading:

- Favored trade status with the EEC allows Botswana beef to be sold at four times the world market price, with an implicit subsidy to cattle production of 300 percent. This may not have had much impact on the BWAST target population, which was heavily weighted by mid- and senior-level public officials, other than reducing the size of that target population, but it helps explain why it is sometimes difficult to draw people into modern-sector commercial activities which would fuel the development process.

- There is a cultural constraint on development prospects in Botswana, and it is well-recognized. It is difficult to superimpose a modern growth strategy on top of a traditional--in this case, largely pastoral--society. There appears to be a lack of awareness of principles of commerce and of the necessary linkages between rewards and performance. What some social anthropologists consider an enlightened form of consensus decision making is seen by employers as a manifestation of risk avoidance and an unwillingness to accept responsibility. In international commerce, the problem is not merely knowing how to do a job. In fact, specific skills are generally not that difficult to impart. But knowing when a job needs doing and taking the initiative to see that it gets done are fundamental to productivity and growth. Such intangibles are rarely addressed in donor skill-development strategies.

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generally paid more.

Taken together, the above factors actually provide a justification for the somewhat "top-down" skill-development approach followed under BWAST. When skills deficits are pervasive, as they are acknowledged to be in Botswana, the priority becomes the effective utilization of the few skills available, which implies the need for management, organization, supervision, and administration. In summary, we find, in retrospect, that the project environment was suitable, indeed conducive, to the successful attainment of its objectives.

A final, somewhat intangible factor deserves mention. Botswana is a pleasant place to work; in fact, uniquely so. Friction and confrontation are kept to a minimum, yet details are pursued and decisions get made. Relations among USAID, AED, and the Government are harmonious, and sincere appreciation exists for USAID/AED efforts in the country. USAID and AED staff are deservedly respectful of Government officials and policies. These good working relationships have contributed significantly to the successful attainment of project outcomes, and they contribute to the likelihood of sustainability.

Objectives

To reiterate, the basic project intent was to provide skill upgrading through short- and long-term training of private- and public-sector managerial, administrative and technical personnel. To prevent the productivity loss normally associated with the absence of staff during training, U.S. operational experts (OPEXers) were provided, with the intent that they would provide additional training on-the-job at the completion of the institutional training of counterparts. Matters have not entirely worked out that way, as will be noted subsequently (Section IV).

Emphasis was to be placed on the rural sector, in consonance with USAID priorities at the time and because of lessons learned under the SAMDP project. BWAST I tried to concentrate on key sectors rather than taking an unfocused approach. "Generating income and employment in rural areas are the goals of ongoing GOB programs and USAID activities in agriculture and small-scale enterprise. The BWAST project will complement these efforts by focusing training to fill key administrative and technical positions critical to policy formulation and implementation in the four ministries with primary responsibility for creating rural employment." It is our view that this emphasis has been

slightly shifted in recent years.[4] In part, this reflects the complexity of employment generation in rural areas.

We are in complete accord with the Interim Evaluation of BWAST II: "Although training individuals who have a role in formulating policy which impacts on private-sector development, and providing technical assistance to foster employment generation and stimulate foreign investment are key elements of this strategy, nevertheless, training per se is largely a subordinate support function." (Smith et al., 1989, p. ix).

One unfortunate consequence of the rural-sector emphasis was the initial exclusion of certain key actors in the employment-generation process, such as the Labour Department and the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications. (This has been corrected in BWAST II.) The project was also limited to employed (for at least a year) workers. This raises a number of questions of a conceptual nature regarding project intent. This complex issue is addressed in Section V of this report.

A particular problem raised by the BWAST approach is that of measuring project impact (Section IV). It is very difficult to state with precision that, say, the addition of an OPEX economist

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[4] For example, OPEXer funding has been discontinued for the Rural Industries Innovations Centers and will soon be discontinued for the Bridges Development Center.

to the faculty of agriculture has generated this or that many jobs, but the impact may be no less real in the absence of measurability. The project paper discussed this problem in some detail. The longer-term implication points to the difficulty of establishing criteria for project success, completion, and eventual closure. When can it be said that enough staff have been trained to justify the diversion of funds to other, higher priority, pursuits? Likely (and hopefully), the answer will be provided by competing claims on donor funds, thus reflecting perceived national development priorities. It must be admitted, however, that there is a certain lack of clarity and some uncertainty inherent in the process of investing in skills upgrading, which is why we later recommend that much greater attention be given to monitoring and evaluation of project outcomes than appears to have taken place under BWAST I.

The Project Paper was a carefully drafted, extremely thorough piece of work. It kept exaggerated claims to a minimum through the use of judicious phraseology: ". . . increase the number of trained Batswana in skill areas <u>related to</u> employment generation" (USAID, 1982-a, p. 2. Emphasis added). It discussed the measurability problem in detail. Nonetheless, the distinct impression is given that the project was somehow going to increase employment and in the supporting Logical Framework, discussion is forced into the trap of specificity by speaking of the objective that: "Modern sector employment exceeds 9% growth

rate" (USAID, 1982-a, p. 100). This goal was not met as latest available data show an average annual growth in modern-sector employment of about 8 percent between 1982 and 1988. The design paper, we feel, might have been a bit more modest in stirring expectations by emphasizing that the project was (and is) targeted on already-employed individuals, so that first-round employment effects, once training is completed, would have to be zero. In all, however, we feel this to be a minor concern. If the Project Paper is read with care, there should be no confusion.

Assumptions

Implicit in the design of BWAST I were several assumptions: First, that there were skill shortages which were significantly constraining growth prospects. Few would quarrel with this (although we note in Section V that matters are somewhat more complex than this reasoning would imply). Second, that skills shortages in the areas of management, administration, and technical fields should be accorded priority over basic or industrial skills. This is the "top-down" approach referred to earlier. Third, that the public sector was to be given emphasis over the private sector (training for the private sector was targeted at 20 percent of the project). And, fourth, that the ultimate goal was to generate employment in the rural sector by

selecting four ministries with primary responsibilities for creating rural employment.

The key assumption was explicitly noted in the project paper: "It is anticipated that the increased number of trained Batswana will improve the GOB's capacity to implement programs which will create employment opportunities." (USAID, 1982, p. 2). For reasons given above, we accept this line of reasoning, noting that the development literature consistently cites lack of government capacity to implement and manage as the key constraint on project effectiveness. The improvement of the management and analytical capability of the bureaucracy is an improvement of the economic environment, which most concede to be a sine qua non for the effectiveness of employment-generation projects (Bowles, 1988). It must be admitted that the logic is indirect and perhaps not intuitively obvious to some. More than likely, the emphasis on training management staff in the public sector resulted from the historical momentum generated by the two predecessor projects mentioned in Section I. Then too, USAID emphasis on the private-sector theme was only beginning to emerge in 1982. The notion that effectiveness in Government is a prior condition for effectiveness of development policy and programs does not strike us as unreasonable, however.

Over time, BWAST I and its follow-on, BWAST II, introduced a number of changes in design and operation: a much greater

emphasis is now being placed on private-sector participation, on short-term training and on training in third countries. These changes provide evidence of the positive feature of flexibility. As limitations were recognized, modifications were introduced, which is how the system is supposed to work. We would anticipate that yet further changes will be required in the operation of BWAST II, and note that the report of the interim evaluation team provides a number of recommendations in this regard. This report will add to that list of recommendations (Section V), but we see nothing fundamentally wrong with the original model or design. The only questions are matters of emphasis.

An additional project objective was facilitating the replacement of expatriates with Batswana, known as "localization."[5] The tie between OPEXers and participant trainees was seen as a mechanism for insuring that the localization objective would be met by targeting skill upgrading for indigenous workers to specific jobs being temporarily held by expatriate OPEXers.[6] For a number of reasons, the process has

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[5] Terminology can be a bit confusing here. In speaking of "expatriates" and "localization policy," it should not be overlooked that there is a growing proportion of foreign workers from neighboring African countries at lower skill levels in the construction sector.

[6] BWAST I had a specific localization requirement that participant training would be funded only if it was for a position which would be localized. Candidates were scored in accordance with this criterion before being selected. "By the time the first BWAST I participants began returning (from the U.S.) in 1984, the vast majority of Government supervisory posts had been filled by nationals. Thus, the specific requirement could be dropped under

not worked out entirely as intended (see Section V). There is often zero or insufficient overlap between OPEXers and participant trainees, a point to be elaborated in Section III and one thoroughly discussed in the interim evaluations of BWAST I and II (USAID, 1985, and Smith et al., 1988). Although there is now a four-year limitation on the (BWAST II) jobs for which OPEXers are recruited, a number have been given new job descriptions and extended. The reality seems to have been that there is a certain degree of complementarity between OPEXers and trained local staff, rather than the presumed substitution relationship. Trained people like to work with good people, and the fact that OPEXers are sometimes extended suggests that, in these instances, the benefits from OPEXer productivity are perceived by the Government to exceed the benefits of localization. This strikes us as perfectly appropriate. Such judgements are best made on a case-by-case basis, guided by the assessments of costs and benefits, rather than subject to blanket exclusions. We further note that in the aggregate, localization appears to be advancing at a satisfactory pace with the share of expatriates in local employment falling from 8 percent in 1979 to around 5 percent in 1987 (ILO, 1987). A study of early experience of BWAST I concluded that a significant number of participants who received long-term training later "either filled expatriate shoes or prevented an expatriate from being hired."

BWAST II." (Tarnoff and Elmer, 1986, p. 33).

(Tarnoff and Elmer, 1986, p. 33). Recent survey results show that only 5 percent of BWAST (I and II) overseas participants had their jobs filled by OPEXers (Thomas, 1989).

Inputs

Project inputs, in terms of planned and realized person-months and expenditures, are presented in Appendix D. Various tables in that appendix indicate the percentage distributions of inputs according to selected criteria, in an effort to indicate the relative emphasis placed on the various factors in the project design. For example, while the discussion in the Project Paper suggested that the project would strongly favor activities related to the rural sector, realized inputs (that is, courses) were skewed in favor of non-rural activities (Appendix Table D-5).

The project design did not explicitly consider the gender distribution of potential trainees, but there is evidence of some increase in the rate of female participation throughout the life of the project. In the early 1986 Tarnoff-Elmer study of returned participants (which included some from SAAST and SAMDP as well as BWAST I), 75.2 percent of the sample was male. By the end of 1988, AED data, which include both BWAST I and BWAST II participants, show that male participation had decreased to 69.1 percent, or that female participation had increased 6.1

percentage points.[7] Note that the 31 percent female share compares with a total share of women in the modern-sector employment of 38 percent in 1985/86 (Kann, 1989, p. 11).

One item of extreme importance in skill-development strategies is that of scale. Until a critical mass of skills is available in an economy, employers are reluctant to follow labor-absorptive expansion paths. Instead, they break tasks into their simplest components, they keep their scales of operation modest, they build expected delays into production scheduling, and they compensate by keeping wages low. Mostly, they substitute capital or materials for labor within the feasible limits imposed by financing. Only when they are assured of the availability of a secure supply of productive labor will they be induced to reverse the substitution in favor of labor. Clearly, the scale of BWAST I has not, in and of itself, been of sufficient magnitude to swing the pendulum in the desired direction. The project must be viewed in terms of a continuing process, however. BWAST is an outgrowth of SAMDP which built upon SAAST. The process has evolved, with improvement yet continuity, since 1973. This is the kind of consistency and perseverance required in skill-development efforts, and we feel it has been the most positive attribute of USAID/Botswana efforts in this field. Moreover,

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[7] However, data on BWAST I alone (excluding participants with funding from the Government Trust Fund), which are not comparable with the earlier Tarnoff and Elmer data, show 27 percent of the participants to be female instead of 31 percent.

the project should not be viewed in isolation. The Government has been funding overseas training and university study since 1968 through its Bursaries Department at the Ministry of Education. The British Council has been funding a much larger program of overseas study for much longer than USAID. In-country training--both short and long-term--has been provided by the Government and a great many foreign donors: Germany (GTZ), Sweden (SIDA), Denmark (DANIDA), UNDP (ILO), the World Bank, Norway (NORAD), the Netherlands, and others. Taken together, these efforts have resulted in a system, not well-coordinated perhaps, but one which seems to be 3-5 years in advance of others found in many neighboring countries.

Two important additional inputs would be the quality of personnel selected for training or technical assistance, and the quality of the institutions in which they are trained. Regarding OPEXers, we have little to add to previous evaluations--they appear to be of the highest caliber, and are motivated and dedicated. They are given uniformly high marks by the Government. AED field staff members are excellent.[8] They have taken the initiative on numerous occasions to perform beyond the call of duty. As to participants, they are subject to a rigorous

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[8] We caution that any replication of this scheme might require a significant salary review. We are quite frankly surprised that such good people could be recruited at such modest salary levels. We note that improvements in the international demand for labor may generate upward wage pressures on project costs.

selection procedure (Section III) and by all accounts are well-qualified for the training provided, subject to expected limitations in terms of language (English rather than American) and the quality of early education, which is being addressed in other USAID projects. Errors of commission are unlikely in this regard, but there may be some of omission. On the Government side, selection is predicated on prior rank and seniority, two factors not necessarily correlated directly with expected future productivity. We note that the average age of participants is 36 years (Thomas, 1989), and the subsequent promotion patterns of returned participants provided some reassuring inferences in that a high proportion has been promoted (Tarnoff and Elmer, 1986, and Thomas, 1989). Three-quarters of those interviewed by Thomas had been promoted at least once, and one-third had received more than one promotion. In the private sector, a number of expected problems have been noted in the two interim evaluations. Smaller firms can ill-afford to sacrifice their most able employees for long-term training, and often their planning horizons do not extend much beyond the coming year. This is why the private sector has been pushing for a shift in project resources to in-country short-term courses, as is taking place in BWAST II. An additional concern is the matter of equity. Does it make sense for AID to finance overseas study for larger, well-financed firms? (BWAST I did not.) Equity was not a specific concern addressed in the project design, but it should be a matter for future consideration.

As to the quality of training itself, the only available pertinent data on the overseas component are the views of returned participants, which are not necessarily valid objective indicators. We view this to be a serious shortcoming of this evaluation and of the BWAST evaluation process in general. On the other hand, participation is limited to accredited institutions and the prime contractor, AED, has had many years of experience in this sort of placement activity. It has been noted that some of the best institutions or most appropriate study programs could not be accessed due to cost ceilings (Smith et al., 1988). At the same time, the educational background of participants might not have supported successful matriculation at these advanced, highly competitive institutions. With a few exceptions, participants report general satisfaction with the training provided under BWAST, which includes both short- and long-term training in-country and abroad. A number felt, however, that the experience would have been improved had they been allowed to gain practical on-the-job experience (Thomas, 1989). The few Government officials we had time to interview were laudatory about the skills acquisition of participants. We later recommend an extension of these sorts of employer interviews within a systematic evaluation design.

An evaluation plan is an additional input to projects of this sort. In accordance with USAID standard operating

procedures, an evaluation plan was included in the initial project paper. It was perfunctory, however, merely mentioning that evaluations would be carried out from time to time. The upshot is that there was a serious lack of data of an analytical nature, at the time the evaluation team arrived in Gaborone. Even such fundamental statistics as cost per participant were not available. The fault lies neither with the Government nor the contractor, since they followed USAID reporting guidelines. It is too late for action in BWAST I, but steps can be taken in BWAST II to improve reporting of analytical data. Given the uniqueness of this project (BWAST I was one of the first USAID skill development projects to target the private sector directly), it is curious that such little attention has been paid to research and analytical aspects. The time to collect the necessary indicators of project success and cost is at the beginning and throughout the project, not after the fact. We are confident that OPEXers could have kept logs of measurable accomplishments, had they been asked to do so at the beginning of their assignments. We later recommend a strengthening of this research/evaluation function in future project activities and suggest that AID-Washington, the primary beneficiary of such data, be involved (Section V). However, basic project management, a responsibility of USAID/Botswana, should be distinguished from evaluation, and we suggest later that management improvements should be made on site.

In summary, we feel that project inputs were commensurable with intended results, subject to the few reservations noted in the above discussion.

Relevance

Given the apparent pervasiveness of skills deficits in Botswana, it would follow that almost any efforts at skills upgrading would have to be deemed relevant to the development needs of the country. The only question would have to be the emphasis placed on management and administration skill upgrading for senior staff in the civil service and the private sector, which are matters that have been touched on in previous discussion. Management and administrative skills, we feel, are logically prior and necessary adjuncts to other skills-development activities and the priority accorded to the Government reflected the fact that, at the time, it was the public sector which was the impetus for those other activities. Moreover, dealing with public-sector skill needs is more manageable than dealing with those of the private sector. There were enough problems facing BWAST in its early years without adding additional complications. Further, the private sector was rather small in 1982, as it is indeed today. There was, as we have said, logical justification for the ways priorities were established at the project's inception, particularly in view of

the foci of other donors who were concentrating on lower levels of the skill pyramid (the "bottom-up" approach).

We are quite naturally impressed by the inclusion of the private sector in the project and are gratified by the growing importance accorded it under BWAST II. It is to be noted that USAID is the major international donor in Botswana currently serving the skill needs of the private sector directly. We anticipate, and later recommend, further emphasis on this aspect. This requires other shifts in project components--more short-term courses, in-country, and perhaps even a degree of cost sharing.[9] A reduction in educational requirements as selection criteria might be required. Again, we feel this to be part of a logical process. As certain constraints are addressed, attention can be turned to others. We note that these developments are in accord with the recommendations of previous evaluations.

We caution that a pervasiveness of needs requires a multiplicity of solutions. We would not favor, for example, dropping the overseas component of the project nor would we favor exclusive focus on the private sector. Looking to the future, we see two potential gaps which we feel should be addressed: (1)

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[9] This might be required for larger firms with high apparent labor-absorptive capacity. A specific example would be hotels and tourism enterprises. Occasionally, the constraint on training may not be financial, but rather, lack of information on how to gain access--for example, concerning overseas work attachments or internship opportunities.

supervisory personnel (line or shop supervisors, for example), and (2) general commercial skills, decision making, and awareness of the world of work.[10] As mentioned, the latter should be addressed in the schools, but it would be unwise to await the completion of what will surely be a lengthy process of educational reform. The Institute of Development Management (IDM) is well placed to expand its commercial course offerings.

Finally, we note that small- and medium-sized employers are often unable to identify their internal training needs. Market forces cannot be relied on exclusively to generate skills development. We later offer a set of recommendations for a skills system which would involve training audits and related technical assistance under the auspices of BOCCIM and certain training institutions.

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[10] IDM, at the urging of USAID and AED, recently offered a course entitled "Supervising for Results and Profits." It was oversubscribed. This complex area covers such diverse topics as work organization, plant layout, inventory and quality control, personnel relations, etc.

III. IMPLEMENTATION

Delivery of Project Outputs

Project activities were generally implemented as called for in the Project Paper. By all accounts, BWAST I has been a well-managed and well-executed project. The rate and manner of implementation and administration could serve as a model for other USAID skill-development projects. Such objectively verifiable indicators of project delivery as could be derived are presented in Appendix D. Where feasible, we have attempted to show realized activities in relation to those initially planned. The provision of long-term and short-term training exceeded expectations by 150 percent. Long-term overseas training, in particular, had a very high rate of realization (172 percent). Of interest is the fact that while long-term training accounted for only 7 percent of project participants, it accounted for 60 percent of the person months of training provided. Private-sector participation accounted for 29 percent of the total number of project participants which exceeded the targeted minimum of 20 percent. Naturally, private-sector participants were clustered in short-term courses in-country. A weighted average of

participation by course duration shows the private-sector share to be 24.7 percent.[1]

As mentioned in Section II, no gender targets were set for the project; thus, no data are available for the sex distribution of participants in short-term training in Botswana. For the overseas component, the weighted average (short- and long-term) of female composition is 25 percent. We have the impression that this share compares favorably with female participation in training programs in other African countries, and we would expect female participation in in-country courses to be higher than their share of overseas training. In any event, female participation in BWAST is somewhat incidental to the more fundamental issue of female participation in the labor force. In this connection, Botswana appears rather advanced in comparison with other African countries. We would also note only three female technical consultants were provided under BWAST I, but there has been significant improvement under BWAST II.

Only two third-country placements were made during the project.[2] This issue was not specifically addressed in the Project Paper, but a 1987 audit suggested that the use of third-

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[1] Average duration weights were: long-term training (U.S.) 26.4 months, short-term training (U.S.) 3.3 months, and short-term training in Botswana, 1.3 months. These are estimates prepared by this evaluation mission.

[2] Both involved short-term training in Tanzania.

country training institutions could have saved BWAST I as much as $640,000. Subsequent to that audit, the Mission specified an objective of at least 15 percent placement in third-country institutions, but this was too late to have an impact on BWAST I. Constraints on the use of other African training facilities include quality, accessibility, available housing, and cost. The overhead costs of monitoring and assisting Batswana in third-country settings may be extremely high, but we note that other USAID projects in Botswana place trainees in African institutions. Moreover, two management training institutions, in Tanzania and Swaziland, are known to the Mission.[3] There has been an increase in third-country placements under BWAST II, but it generally involves short-term courses and therefore accounts for a small proportion of person-hours provided in the project. The logic for expanding the use of third-country training is persuasive. The matter is, however, sufficiently complex to require further study, including an on-site assessment of the third-country institutions, which is outside the scope of this evaluation.[4]

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[3] They are East and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI), and Tanzania and Staff Training Institute (STI), Swaziland.

[4] AED is currently undertaking a study financed with BWAST II funds to assess third-country training institutions, including the necessary on-site assessments.

As mentioned, training specifically related to the rural sector fell short of expectations (accounting for 20 percent of overseas training). (See Appendix D-5.) Admittedly, there is a high degree of arbitrariness in our classification system (for example, some training in business administration was used in the rural sector), but we see no evidence that the project had a decidedly rural flavor.

The delivery rate of both OPEXers and short-term consultants (technical assistance) was well in excess of plans. Slightly over 68 person-years of OPEXers were provided (32 percent above the requirement specified in the Project Paper) and nearly 100 months of short-term consultancies (more than double the planned amount). Targeted ministries were served, staff were well-qualified and served in responsible positions, and the institutions to which they were assigned were reportedly well-satisfied with results. These matters have been more than adequately discussed in previous BWAST evaluations (USAID, 1985, and Smith et al., 1988).

Problems

Inevitably, in a project of this scope, problems will surface. In BWAST I, training problems were associated with initial delays in selection and delivery order processing, occasional mismatches between expectations and course content,

lack of practical on-the-job training (in academic institutions), culture shock, homesickness, and reintegration into employment. Again, these issues have been thoroughly discussed in the interim evaluations of BWAST I and II. The problems noted are within the range of normal expectations and we are particularly impressed by the fact that once they surfaced, they were addressed and corrected, where feasible. For example, early complaints about insufficient orientation are no longer voiced. The selection process has been speeded up so that a list of candidates is presented to USAID a year rather than 9 months prior to participant departure. Three follow-up studies of participants have been conducted, reflecting improved monitoring.

One problem which has been noted but not yet resolved concerns OPEXers and the insufficient overlap they have with participants. This concern was voiced in both interim evaluations (BWAST I and II). Obviously if participants are out on a three-year program and an OPEXer is assigned for a two-year period, overlap will be less than complete. That an empirical basis exists for this concern is attested to by the fact that relatively few participants reported that their jobs were filled by an OPEXer during their period of overseas training (Thomas, 1989). If overlaps were complete, the percentage would have been 36 percent (see below). It appears to us that the Government views OPEXers as far more than replacements for trainees who are abroad. They use them precisely as a form of general technical

assistance, beyond the specific replacement of productivity losses which occur during the training period. We view this as entirely reasonable and it should not be a matter of great concern to project authorities. Moreover, if a direct link between OPEXers and participants was of such concern, why did the project design call for only 26 2-year OPEXers to replace 72 Batswana (36 percent replacement rate)? We do feel that, where feasible, overlap should be encouraged, particularly at the end of the training period. Three months would appear to be the minimum target, but 6 months would be preferable still. Yet we do not see training as the sole function of OPEXers, unless it can be considered as "training by example." In other words, if the Government feels it needs technical assistance more than training (or both, in this case), we see nothing wrong with USAID accommodating that decision. Naturally, we would not favor an OPEXer withholding training for fear of working himself/herself out of a job, and we are aware that this has occurred in Botswana (but not necessarily in BWAST). However, this seems a matter covered by the fixed duration of OPEX contracts. It is also a matter to be addressed by the Government of Botswana rather than specified in project design.

The Interim Evaluation of BWAST II suggested that OPEX contracts be lengthened to 4 years to accommodate the lack-of-overlap problem. We see nothing wrong with this if coupled with a probation period and a right for dismissal with cause.

Moreover, it adds a further degree of consistency to the process, which we strongly favor. If such a recommendation is to be considered, however, we feel that it should be justified on other grounds and that the issues of contract extension and overlap should be kept separate. Basically, this matter should be resolved on a case-by-case basis.

Management of Training

In 1982, the Government of Botswana did not have a clearly articulated or effective management-of-training system to help achieve policy goals. What it did have was a network of formal and informal organizations that supported the GOB's efforts for manpower planning, resource allocation, and training for managerial and administrative posts. Therefore, the BWAST I project made good use of an existing structure and a functioning system--drawing on the resources of each component, and modifying procedures as appropriate (AED, 1988).

Project activity was directed at assisting the Government and private industry to develop a permanent capability to plan and manage training. To achieve this, means were sought to develop a capacity to determine critical manpower requirements, to assess training needs, and to plan the budgeting and implementation of training programs. The Academy for Educational Development assumed responsibility for assisting the Directorate

of Public Service Management, the Botswana Employers Federation (now called BOCCIM), various Government ministries, local training institutions, and parastatal and private-sector organizations to develop and institutionalize a system for management of training. The contractor designed and operationalized a management-of-training system that is composed of four interrelated components: policy formulation; planning, management and coordination; implementation of training and instructional design; and evaluation (Appendix E).

During the design and implementation process, AED facilitated the development of instructional materials related to management of training (Appendix E). The contractor also trained training coordinators and worked to institutionalize a process so that the management-of-training system could be maintained in view of personnel changes. Technical assistance was given to BEF (BOCCIM) in anticipation of its becoming a coordinating body for managing training within the private sector. Finally, the contractor worked to increase the ability of training institutions to be responsive to the needs of consumers, while at the same time providing quality programming.

One of the more effective mechanisms used to achieve objectives was OPEXer and short-term consultant technical assistance. For example, OPEXers holding the positions of Manpower Planning Advisor and the Organization and Methods

Advisor at DPSM and of National Manpower Planner at MFDP implemented important system components.

Core contract technical assistance (AED field staff in Gaborone) was also used to strengthen the management-of-training system. In 1986 a core contract consultant worked with AED, DPSM, and IDM staff to design and implement a course for both public- and private-sector training coordinators. Still other consultants were provided to develop: a resource guide for training coordinators, a report on private-sector training needs, and a computerized personnel management information system (MIS) for DPSM. This MIS is operational and being run by Botswana operators.

The team believes that the development and strengthening of the management-of-training system has significantly increased and improved participation in external and in-country training by the public sector and to a lesser degree by the private sector. Several examples support this belief--the management-of-training system for the public sector is now coordinated by DPSM, a system to identify and fulfill training and manpower needs is operational, meetings of training coordinators occur monthly, each GOB Ministry has identified a cadre of training coordinators, and the course developed for training coordinators is offered on an annual basis by IDM.

Much work remains to be accomplished before the system developed and tested in the public sector is fully operational in the private sector. There is sufficient process documentation to enable the private sector to adapt the system to meet its unique and specific needs (Appendix E). What remains is to modify elements of the public-sector system to meet the requirements of the private sector.

Other Management Issues

As mentioned, relations between USAID and the Government of Botswana appear to be good. This may explain why reporting between the respective agencies is minimal. USAID has no data on Government expenditures on BWAST and cannot verify whether planned cost contributions have been realized. While not having a specific GOB expenditure figure, USAID does know that the GOB has made its full contribution by paying local salaries for OPEXers, international airline fares for students, employees' salaries while in training, and other costs agreed to in the Project Grant Agreement. Data on the characteristics and composition of participants have not been collated in a central place but are available from various sources at GOB, USAID and AED offices. It would have been useful if the cost data were collected and kept in a manner that would enhance internal monitoring and assessment.

USAID's analysis of project performance could be improved. Costs per participant should be routinely analyzed and a data base developed of participant backgrounds and systematic measures of project achievements (number of jobs created, regulations improved, wage histories, etc.) The evaluation plan in the Project Paper was neither specific nor comprehensive, particularly lacking rigorous monitoring and adherence to record keeping benchmarks.

Private Sector

That progress in the development of a system for the management of training in the private sector has not been more rapid than it has been, should not be surprising. It is just one illustration of a more general problem of trying to organize and coordinate the activities of private-sector entrepreneurs. In Botswana, at least five factors contribute to the problem:

- The private sector is not well-developed or experienced.
- Some employers are competitors and little disposed to cooperate because of that.
- There are particular problems with identifying the needs of smaller firms and new enterprises.
- In many firms, the value of skills development is not well-known or appreciated.
- As a rule, producers want to produce, not to organize and coordinate. They are often extremely busy and have little time for meetings to benefit society and not their own firms.

In fact, it has long been known that private market forces cannot be relied on alone to generate a socially acceptable level of skills development. Employers fear that if they incur costs of training, their employees may quit and take their skills to competitors. Of course, if every firm were providing training, there could be a circular flow of skills and all would benefit. But even with enlightened cooperation, there are problems of training for new enterprises and with absorbing redundant skills from declining industries.

Training being an investment, it requires a certain degree of planning. A management-of-training system such as that developed by AED starts with some notion of skill requirements in the future. This is rather difficult to predict in a small, open economy like Botswana. Moreover, many small firms lack planning capacity. Quite a few simply have no idea of their current training needs.

BWAST I has taken a number of steps to upgrade private-sector capacity through training (in excess of target levels) and the provision of technical assistance. Particularly useful has been the assignment of OPEXers to BOCCIM and the Botswana Development Cooperation under BWAST II. Moreover, AED core staff have provided direct technical assistance to smaller entrepreneurs which has resulted in the creation of new

enterprises (Appendix F). Other international agencies, such as the International Trade Center of GATT/UNCTAD, are also active in this area.

The recommendations presented in Section V attempt to address the problems noted above, through further strengthening of BOCCIM and short-term technical assistance to smaller firms (for example, training audits). At the same time, it does not make sense to let the "training tail wag the private-sector dog." Smaller firms, in particular, need advice on training and training management. Some also need advice on quality or inventory control, marketing, pricing, and production even more. We are gratified to learn that USAID will be funding a modest effort to have established employers in Botswana (that is, members of BOCCIM) provide technical assistance to smaller, less well-established firms.

In all, the work that has taken place under BWAST I has been beneficial for the training needs of the private sector. BWAST II has made further strides in this direction. A great deal more remains to be done, but a system is beginning to emerge. Accomplishments have far exceeded objectives because, although private-sector participation was mentioned in the Project Paper, there really was no separate component envisioned for this sector.

IV. PROJECT OUTCOMES

Cost-Effectiveness

The previous section notes that immediate project objectives were actually exceeded in every component for which objective indicators could be derived. Moreover, the project has been brought in at or slightly under cost, as nearly as we can tell.[1] It appears as though the project was overbudgeted in the sense that certain inputs cost less than originally anticipated, in part because of an unanticipated rise in the value of the dollar relative to the pula. From this standpoint, cost-effectiveness exceeded initial expectations.

Overseas training is an inordinately expensive proposition, requiring subsistence allowances over and above tuition, fees, and foregone productivity during training. These costs are shared between the Government and USAID in BWAST.[2] Because of this sharing of responsibility and diffusion of data, the

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[1] It appears to us that the reasons cost savings were achieved were: (1) most long-term training participants were able to complete their studies and return to Botswana prior to the depletion of time and funds for their studies; (2) the retention of the same contractor allowed a single management fee as opposed to paying two fees if two contractors were used; and (3) the dollar's depreciation in value.

[2] The Government of Botswana pays the salaries of participants during training, though at a reduced rate (50 percent) after the first year of training. It also pays round-trip air fares to Washington, DC, and a local salary for OPEXers.

evaluation team was unable to calculate costs per participant for such components as short- and long-term programs or in-country training versus that in the U.S. or elsewhere. Given the magnitude and importance of this project, it would have been useful if data were kept for purposes of calculating the costs. The collection and maintenance of such data are recommended for current and future USAID projects of this kind.

We do have data on AID expenditures, but not on government contributions or on AED direct core staff and overhead expenditures. Some ancillary data are available, however. The Inspector General's 1987 audit presented an estimate indicating that it cost USAID $22,400 per participant year for long-term training in the United States, but there was no discussion of how the estimate was prepared (USAID, 1987). It could have been simply the maximum annual costs permitted at the time, but the report does state that the estimate reflects a weighted average of long-term and short-term training costs, at least hinting that actual data, rather than allowable maxima, were used. USAID-Botswana is now using an assumed $21,600 per year for long-term training and $3,100 per month for short-term training in the U.S., but this excludes overhead and direct charges for support staff (that is, AED core staff in Washington, D.C., and Gaborone).

Moreover, these estimates do not include the contribution of the Government, which covers participant air fare to Washington, salary in Botswana (at 50 percent after one year abroad), and the Government salary of OPEXers where applicable. OPEXer salaries are "topped up" by USAID. The Project Paper budgeted $70,000 as the average cost of an OPEXer,[3] but, we have the impression that current annual costs are running closer to $90,000, which would be in line with costs allowable within the UN system.

The cost of in-country training ranged from $175 for a 2-day seminar to $5,000 for a 7-week course. The estimated cost of short-term work assignments (on-the-job training, work experience, or internship programs) in the U.S. was $3,500 per month. The Mission had no experience with sending participants for work assignments in third countries under BWAST I.[4]

We stress that we see no major inefficiencies in BWAST I. We have noted repeatedly that the project has been well-administered and highly effective. University study in the U.S. is simply inherently expensive. It is the model, rather than the administration, which is intrinsically costly. Although there may be options such as training in other African institutions,

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[3] Mistakenly reported as $50,000 in Project Paper, p. 98.

[4] The Inspector General's audit suggested that training costs in African institutions outside of Botswana were $3,100 per person year (USAID, 1987).

these alternatives should be carefully assessed in terms of their feasibility and cost-effectiveness.

Impact

Problems in measuring the employment impact of the project have been mentioned previously (Section II) and have been thoroughly discussed in the Project Paper and the two previous interim evaluations (BWAST I and II). There are four distinct project impacts to be considered:

- Direct employment generation; for example, when a returned participant opens a business which employs others, or expands an existing business.
- Indirect employment generation, such as when a participant provides a service, say, accounting or management consulting, which allows others to expand output.
- Streamlining of overhead activities, such as when a Government participant simplifies regulations which allows new businesses to form. Reducing the waiting time to obtain export licenses would be an example of this.
- What, for want of a better term, we would call "system development." This refers to the macroeconomic effect of the project: skills development in a coordinated framework which facilitates the absorption of appropriate technology and ultimately expands the employment base. (See Section V.)

While this last effect is the hardest to quantify, in part because it will show up only in the longer term, we feel that it will ultimately prove to be the project's most significant

impact. Botswana is relatively advanced in terms of the development of an integrated skills-upgrading system. Much remains to be done, but the system is emerging. Such a system is a precondition for the implementation of a labor-absorptive growth strategy, which is the ultimate objective of BWAST I and II activities.

Even in the areas of more direct linkage between employment creation and project inputs, measurement problems apply, as we have no way of determining what activities would have taken place in the absence of BWAST. New businesses do get started without Government or USAID interventions, and this sometimes implies employment creation. Sorting out the project's impact from the influence of general economic growth is simply not feasible.[5] To illustrate, one OPEXer with the Botswana Development Corporation has been involved in the preparation and management of a number of projects which have generated some 3,400 jobs in the last 3 years. However, it cannot be determined whether these projects would have been carried out in the absence of the OPEXers.

Appendix F provides illustrations of the kinds of impacts generated by BWAST (includes both I and II). Three perspectives

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[5] Multivariate analysis, such as multiple regression techniques, could assist in the process by holding constant extraneous influences, but the data requirements are considerable and the data are not readily available. Controlled experimentation is probably the only way to handle the measurement problem. And it can be costly.

are presented: participants, OPEXers, and advisory technical assistance to the private sector. Since the question of impact was not directly provided for in the original project design--that is, a proper evaluation design was not built into the project from its inception--we are forced to rely on this sort of anecdotal evidence. While the evidence is not systematic, it is reasonably impressive and there is no reason to believe it is unreliable or biased.[6]

New businesses have been and are being created, existing businesses have been strengthened, and employment has been generated both directly and indirectly. Beyond this, the project has generated some inherently useful outputs, such as the maintenance of wildlife resources or reduction of crop damage by insects. Such outputs may actually have an adverse effect on immediate employment generation, while expanding employment potential in the longer term. Our general impression is that much of the employment which has been generated has been in the distributive sector (a possible exception being electronics export); that is, improved distribution of goods (retail sales, operations and maintenance, information-related activities), rather than increased production, but the illustrations do not support a refined analysis. Even if our impression is correct,

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[6] With the possible exception of one-sidedness. These are success stories and we imagine that there are a few unreported failures--for example, failed businesses, or OPEXers who did not work out--to balance the equation.

however, it should not be particularly bothersome. Switzerland has been built on precisely this sort of distributive growth, and Botswana's conditions imply that a significant proportion of future employment growth will be accounted for by the distributive sector (the service and retail sectors, in particular).

The illustrations of project outputs do not suggest a particular rural emphasis, which coincides with our previous observations on the kinds of courses taken by participants (Section III). There are some specific accomplishments with a direct bearing on rural employment, such as a leather goods factory, the development of new technologies for agriculture, and OPEXer technical assistance to the Brigades and to the Poultry Agricultural Management Association. Other activities support rural development in less direct fashion. That outcomes have not exactly accorded with expectations could be a sign that the expectations, or at least the rhetoric supporting them, were perhaps unrealistic. To our minds, the idea has been to create jobs for rural people, not simply rural jobs. We are satisfied that this has been occurring, but we feel it would be stretching objectives and purposes to suggest that the project has had a decidedly rural focus.

In total, the material provided in Appendix F is sufficient to permit us to answer in the affirmative the question of whether

the project had a significant impact on employment generation, but with the caveat that measurable impacts are modest. Participant accomplishments (as opposed to OPEXers) of only 94 demonstrable jobs created do not appear to justify project costs, even if 235 participants indicated that they are involved in activities related to employment creation. We do, however, concur with the statement that the project's full effects on employment have yet to be felt.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

General Conclusions

We would associate ourselves with the generally positive perceptions voiced by others about this project (USAID, 1985; Smith et al., 1988). Most of what the project did, it did well. Project particulars have likely played less of a role in the apparent successful outcomes than have general features--scale, duration, and consistency. BWAST is an outgrowth of efforts initiated in 1973. By now, project problems have been uncovered, addressed, and many of them resolved. There is now an emerging skills development system in Botswana--admittedly more developed for the public than for the private sectors--but an emerging system nonetheless. What remains is to perfect the particulars of the system.

We consider the project relevant to the skills-deficit problems facing the country at the time of initial implementation. While we understand the project's focus on employment generation, we feel that skills development should first and foremost be directed to the maximization of economic growth within the context of appropriate technology. Employment is both an input to and a consequence of economic growth. It is not, strictly speaking, an objective in its own right, nor is it particularly efficient to consider it so. Some project outputs

have been incidental to the direct employment-generation objective, yet they have improved the economic environment which, in turn, will favor employment growth for the longer term. Therefore, we consider some of the rhetoric (concerning rural emphasis and direct employment creation effects) included in the original design--admittedly in response to AID-Washington concerns--to be slightly exaggerated. Some of these conceptual issues are discussed below.

The project has been run efficiently in the sense that there was no apparent resource wastage in implementation. Overseas training in academic institutions is an inherently expensive approach to skills development. The less costly alternative of in-country training is being further emphasized under BWAST II and we can only recommend further emphasis in future efforts, to the extent that other policy objectives permit. The alternative of third-country training, particularly in other African institutions, deserves careful study which could not be undertaken during the course of this evaluation. We are not in a position to make a firm recommendation on this option, noting that considerations of cost and quality must be addressed during on-site assessments before an informed opinion can be offered. We further note that BWAST II has improved utilization of third-country training. As mentioned earlier, AED currently is conducting a survey of third-country training under BWAST II.

Management of the emerging training system, as well as of BWAST I in general, has been capably performed by AED. We are impressed with the system developed in this regard but reiterate that further development is required for the private sector.

The OPEX system has functioned admirably, with high-quality people being placed in high-visibility jobs, and with notable contributions to the development process. The training provided by OPEXers has been less than anticipated, but this likely reflects Government priorities which sometimes favor production over training. Moreover, there is a training component provided by example. In general, technical assistance has proved highly effective and the OPEX model developed for Botswana deserves to be considered for replication elsewhere.

The only significant criticism we would offer concerning BWAST I is the absence of a comprehensive evaluation component from the outset, and a certain lack of rigor in establishing and adhering to record-keeping benchmarks. Data of various sorts are collected, but not in a form suitable for analysis and assessment. Particularly notable has been the lack of data on costs per participant under the alternative project modes, data on participant backgrounds, and systematic measures of project achievement (number of jobs created, regulations improved, wage histories, etc.). We believe this to be a matter for consideration by AID-Washington, as well as by the Botswana

Mission. As decision-making authority and responsibility are decentralized, training needs will increase at the Mission level.

We are informed that extra funds remain in the AED core contract which could be used to finance analytical studies of the sort we are recommending: employer surveys, participant background analyses, and various cost-benefit studies (for example, what would be the cost of allowing one return trip for participants after 2 years of study abroad?). We urge that such studies be taken under consideration by the GOB, BOCCIM, USAID and AED. Funds under the BWAST II Planning Studies component could be used to explore such issues. Systematic data collection could also assist in the design of the new USAID Basic Education and Private Sector projects.

The training system which has been developed under BWAST is sustainable. It is in place and in operation in the public sector and underway in the private sector. What is not likely sustainable without additional assistance is funding for overseas training and technical assistance. Further development of the private sector component will require further funding. Such a commitment is well-justified by experience to date.

The unique positive environment in Botswana suggests caution about concluding that the results of this project could be replicated in other countries. Certain project features, such as

the management-of-training system described in Appendix E, have been and should be considered for replication. However, it is not the particulars alone which have produced success, but certain general features which are, in our view, replicable. A system has been allowed to reach maturity; there has been consistency in the approach; and good people have been involved. This experience shows that the development of an effective skill-development system requires a long time horizon--sufficient time for trial and error, for the identification and correction of problems.

The previous observations are summarized in Table 1, which is keyed to the initial evaluation questions posed in Section I.

Conceptual Framework for the Future

If one were faced with the task of designing a BWAST-like project at this point in time and with the benefit of hindsight, there would no doubt be a great many differences in comparison with the BWAST I design. For one thing, policy outlooks and priorities have shifted over time: private-sector development and women in development are now emphasized more than rural development and employment creation, for example. But more than the particulars, there would likely be a striking shift in the way the design problem would be approached.

Table 1

SUMMARY OF ANALYTICAL EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND FINDINGS

Evaluation Questions	Findings
1. Was project design relevant to constraints at time of implementation?	1.1 Project relevant to skills deficit facing the country at the time. Future efforts would require change in emphasis accorded certain objectives.
2. Did project make progress toward meeting objectives?	2.1 Project implementation with no significant resource wastage. An inherently expensive approach to skills expansion.
3. Were project effects produced at acceptable cost compared to alternatives?	3.1 Outputs delivered well in excess of targets and within budget.
4. What were positive and negative effects?	4.1 Orderly process and procedures in place to manage training. Training system well-developed for public sector and emerging for private sector.
	4.2 Rural sector job creation not as high as initially prescribed.
	4.3 Development process facilitated through contributions of OPEXers.
	4.4 Decisions made without benefit of data derived from comprehensive evaluation component.

Table 1 (Continued)

SUMMARY OF ANALYTICAL EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND FINDINGS

		4.5	Long-term overseas training raises unnavoidable problems of reintegration.
5.	Is the project sustainable?	5.1	Traiing system is sustainable--it is in place and operating in public sector--and well documented.
		5.2	Overseas training and technical assistance not likely sustainable without outside funding.
		5.3	Unique, positive environment contributed to project success. May be a condition precedent to replication of project elsewhere.

The problem faced in national skill-development policy is similar to an investment decision, in that one would like to select one or more interventions (investments) which would maximize the employment content of economic growth, subject to constraints of fiscal and monetary policy, the international competitive situation, the human capital base, tastes and customs, the efficiency of Government operations, and the like. Interventions would be selected either because they appear to have high payoffs, in the sense of yielding a large number of

jobs directly or indirectly, or because they have low costs, in the sense that they are intrinsically inexpensive or because they can be directed at the reduction of one or two critical constraints.

Carried to its logical conclusion, this analytical process would yield three immediate conclusions:

- The most efficient way to maximize employment is to maximize growth, and particularly, growth in high labor-absorbing sectors or occupations.
- Labor absorption in the future may work at odds with labor intensiveness in the present. Because employment is now concentrated in rural areas, it does not follow that further job growth can be counted on to come from those areas. As a corollary, areas or sectors with high unemployment are not necessarily the areas on which to target interventions, because the expected returns to the investment may be low (declining industries, for example).
- When skills-upgrading interventions are to be considered, attention should be directed to sectors, areas, or occupations where skills are in shortage and where this shortage is constraining further growth. It is often forgotten that producers can work around specific skill shortages by redesigning production processes. At the same time, other factors, such as lack of credit or markets, may be more fundamental constraints on the expansion of output and employment. Far too many developing countries (though not Botswana) have launched massive skills-upgrading programs in anticipation of an industrialization which later failed to materialize.

The process thus requires three particular steps: first, the identification of sectors (industries or occupations) with the highest growth potential; second, within this, the identification of those sectors with the highest likelihood of

significant labor absorption; and third, the identification of those sub-sectors in which skills deficits are most critical; that is, most constraining on future employment growth.[1]

In the Botswana context, account would have to be taken of the limited resource base (narrow, not shallow) and its competitive strength relative to South Africa. For although the political future is extremely uncertain, recent developments are somewhat favorable for South Africa to retain a comparative advantage in industry for some time to come. At the same time, growth targets should not be set passively and a listing of current imports from South Africa might show that a number could be produced economically in Botswana (such an exercise is being undertaken under BWAST II).

If such a procedure were followed and the costs and benefits were to be listed, it would be likely that attention would focus on: export opportunities, the service sector, construction, and other distributive activities (retail and wholesale trade, informal sector, communications, transportation, operations and maintenance). Moreover, skill constraints would be most apparent in the areas of basic attitudinal and commercial skills and supervisory skills. Particularly important would be the need to

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[1] By constructing the problem in terms of an investment decision, it is amenable to simulation modeling and empirical analyses of alternative scenarios. We would urge consideration of such empirical modeling for the future.

ensure that the internal distribution of resources is efficient in the sense of corresponding to market forces. This suggests that private-sector enterprises need to be further developed. It suggests further that training for trades would be accompanied by training (and technical assistance) for business ownership.

An outgrowth of this procedure is the almost self-evident observation that growth and development require a package of inputs extending well beyond the provision of skills. Training does not create jobs, it only allows them to be filled. Sometimes the problem is not a lack of skills but a lack of information on how to access opportunities. Other times the problems are tangential to the question of human resource development entirely. It is for these reasons that we earlier offered the caution that training should respond to the private sector and not the reverse. A package approach to growth is, we feel, to be preferred to univariate interventions, and this prompts our suggestions for future activities noted below. Obviously, no single project can impact simultaneously on the many constraints on economic development and employment, but a package approach operated within a general framework has the greatest chance of success.

Before a particular project can be designed, it must take account of the project environment, which we have noted to be

extremely favorable in Botswana. That positive environment is partially due to the operation of the BWAST projects themselves, and three particulars are impressive in this regard: (1) scale, (2) consistency, and (3) flexibility. Underlying the last is the importance of trust among actors. To replicate this is no easy matter, but that is why Botswana is in a unique position for further projects aimed at upgrading its human resource development system.

Future Activities

At this late stage--the project officially closes within six months of this writing--an evaluation of BWAST I can be of interest only to the extent that it provides guidance for future activities. That "guidance" will have to cover a number of general issues: organization, structure, funding, target populations, content, management, and coordination. An overview of one possible approach is presented here. We stress the tentative nature of this approach, recognizing that some elements require much more careful study than has been possible during the limited period allotted for this evaluation. The levy/grant system underlying the envisioned Trust Fund, in particular, is controversial (see below).

In terms of organization, the primary agents would be the Government, donors, the private sector (BOCCIM), trainers (ATDO),

and participants: BOCCIM would play a key role in the process, providing technical assistance to smaller, recently established firms, and even to rural cooperatives. This technical assistance would extend beyond the mere identification of training needs, covering such basic business services as how to obtain credit, quality control, marketing, etc. In all these activities, BOCCIM's role would be limited to facilitation rather than provision. In this regard, we follow a recommendation provided in the Interim Evaluation of BWAST II, which suggested that BOCCIM become the administrative arm of a private-sector service center, while retaining its current primary functions (Smith et al., 1988). BOCCIM would provide the linkage among donors, the Government, and the private sector. It would remain a small, targeted, facilitating organization, but it would also attempt to voice private-sector training needs. We recognize that the additional focus on smaller, recently established enterprises would imply a slight reorientation of traditional BOCCIM activities but note that this is already underway. We feel that the function of facilitating technical assistance for these smaller enterprises would generate the necessary experience and linkages to support the desired reorientation.

BOCCIM's activities on the private-sector side could be matched on the public-sector side by an Interagency Coordinating Council. As noted by others, there is some concern that under the current system, each agency is merely addressing its own

needs, with insufficient concern for complementarity and coordination. USAID has considerable experience with this kind of interagency model in other countries around the world.

We consider potential public- and private-sector linkages to be of the utmost importance to the creation of a system of skills development in Botswana, and have noticed what appears to be a less than satisfactory arrangement in this regard. There is a certain stand-off relation between the two sectors, with the Government urging private employers to provide more training, and employers noting that there are serious constraints on their ability to do so. Public-sector authorities sometimes fail to appreciate the urgency of private-sector needs, and employers are sometimes unaware of the social value of regulations or the best way to comply with them. We feel that improved dialogue between the two sectors would be worthwhile, noting that a private-sector emphasis in development does not mean leaving employers entirely to their own devices. What is required is a partnership, not a divorce.

What we have in mind with such an approach is the development of a fully integrated system of skills development in Botswana--not merely USAID's portion of that system. Until a comprehensive system exists, it does not seem justifiable to speak of "sustainability" for the longer term. Although outside the terms of reference of this particular evaluation, we have

observed a certain lack of linkage between private-sector employers and certain training programs, such as industrial skills for first-job seekers. The suggested approach would address this shortcoming. Moreover, it would require donors to address the coordination question specifically. (We recognize that Botswana's small size is conducive to informal coordination.) We have noticed a certain gap in combined donor assistance programs for skills development; namely training for supervisory skills. Regarding USAID and BWAST, it is not much of an overstatement to note that there is a general perception of an academic orientation for long-term training, such that "less than O-level holders need not apply." We are urging that USAID begin moving further down into the heart of the skill pyramid just as we would urge other donors to move upward. In any event, we believe that donor activities should be coordinated by the development needs of the nation rather than by the segmented needs of particular target groups.

We have noted that the training component of BWAST I was limited to workers who had been employed for at least one year, thus excluding the unemployed and first-job seekers. On the positive side, this targeting saves project funds and reduces budget requirements. It also accords with experience which suggests that returns to training are higher for experienced workers than for first-job seekers. On the down side, it reduces project flexibility and overlooks a significant portion of the

human resource base. It does not accord very well with our observation that skill-upgrading programs should be driven by the development needs of the country. We feel that this matter also deserves further study as to potential costs and benefits, and suggest it be carried out under AED core contract funding. For even if USAID is precluded by budget constraints from expanding its target population, the Government might wish to consider the option on its own.

Changes in the composition of the target population would require changes in other components of the system. As one example, there would have to be more opportunities for work attachments and internship programs, either in-country or abroad, than took place under BWAST I. Study tours for potential entrepreneurs would have to be given greater emphasis. We are informed that such activities are taking place under BWAST II, and can only urge that they be further strengthened over time.[2]

Skills development without provision for skills utilization has historically resulted in resource wastage, unfulfilled expectations, and discontent. It is for this reason that our proposed approach has a strong private-sector production

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[2] We are aware that short-term overseas programs are more costly per participant hour than longer term degree programs, but strongly feel that costs per completed particpant, and ultimate cost-effectiveness, would be enhanced by shorter term attachments and on-the-job training.

orientation, over and above its training component. Direct technical assistance is useful in this regard and, again, we urge further strengthening of this activity. We have heard that representatives of SCORE have visited Botswana, and we are aware that the American Management Association is starting to get involved internationally. OPEXers and shorter term technical assistance under BWAST (I and II) has proved particularly useful for the private sector, providing justification for continuation of such activities.

With a (nonexclusive) reorientation of emphasis to the private sector, a deemphasis of academic credentials, shorter courses targeted to specific labor market needs, etc., greater use of community colleges seems called for than took place under BWAST I. AED data indicate that less than 3 percent of participant training resulted in Associate of Arts degrees, while Master-level degrees accounted for 38 percent of the total. (Data include Trust Fund participants and thus are not strictly comparable with other numbers presented in text.) We are impressed with the community college concept not merely as a source of overseas training, but as a model for educational development in Botswana. Community colleges (as well as some other colleges and universities) have a traditionally community and labor market orientation, which fits precisely within the framework we are proposing.

We note, briefly, the admittedly complex area of trades testing. USAID has been actively involved in promoting trades testing and certification in other countries (Honduras, for example), and the ILO is currently providing such testing in Botswana. The reason this is mentioned is that we feel it is a necessary adjunct to any reorientation of activities toward non-academic outcomes. This may not be a particular USAID-project concern, but it is of significant concern to the development of a system of skills development.

In earlier sections, the need is discussed for the development of an evaluation design prior to project implementation and continuous monitoring within that design. The purpose and utility of this is not merely general research and analysis, but rather, specific management and planning assistance. Predicting private-sector skill requirements is an extremely complex business, but short-term monitoring of project outcomes does provide a low-cost method of signalling needs for redirection. (Edwards et al., 1987, provide a useful discussion of problems inherent in traditional manpower planning.)

The most problematic component of the proposed training system is that of funding, which, in turn, relates to the evaluation question of sustainability. We have previously noted that while many components of a skill-development system are in place, and thus theoretically sustainable, the level of funding

is not, without continued external assistance (which we recommend). Looking to the longer term, there is a question as to how much external assistance will be available. The goal, of course, is a reduction and replacement with internally generated funds. Currently, the Government operates a Trust Fund, financed from general revenues (the development budget), which is administered by the Ministry of Education and used for general educational purposes. We feel it may be time to reconsider the option of a levy/grant system such as that found in many other developing countries. We are aware that the idea has been discussed within the Government and the private sector and has thus far been rejected, but we believe it is a suitable approach for the longer term. Developing a system of skills provision is truly difficult, but operating it in the longer term may be harder still. External assistance is often directed toward activities with a high foreign-exchange component, which implies facilities, equipment, technical assistance, and overseas study. The problem for the longer term is often supporting recurrent or operating costs (for example, instructor salaries). Moreover, donor assistance cannot be counted on to be available forever.

From a public finance perspective, costs of skill upgrading should be borne by beneficiaries, to the extent feasible. This is why there is justification for taxing employers, whose profits are presumably enhanced by skills and productivity upgrading. User fees can be charged to training participants whose wages

should increase with improved skills. The idea, then, is the development of a self-reliant system. Employers would be taxed, with proceeds contributed to a Training Trust Fund. The Government might continue to add general revenues to the Fund, which could be augmented by donor contributions and user fees. The Fund would be used for a variety of skill-development activities, such as support for vocational training centers, competency-based testing, and rebates to employers or individuals who provide or purchase approved training activities.

We would by no means favor a traditional levy-grant system based on a payroll tax, as this appears to us to be at odds with the objective of employment maximization. A factor-neutral tax, such as on value added or revenues, seems far preferable. We would favor a system whereby taxes would be rebated to firms providing on-the-job training and whose employees are able to pass a certified examination. We are aware that this would require integration with FAP, and that it would actually be a mere extension of FAP.

We stress that this evaluation is not recommending the introduction of a levy/grant system--only that it be studied with the care we feel it deserves.

Appendix A

Evaluation Scope of Work

ARTICLE I - TITLE
Activity to be Evaluated

Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project, Phase I (BWAST I), Project No. 633-0231; Life-of-Project Funding: $14,558,000; Project Agreement Date: 7/15/82; PACD: 9/20/89

ARTICLE II - OBJECTIVE

Purpose of the Evaluation

The implementation of BWAST I will be completed on October 16, 1989. The Mission desires that a Final Evaluation be performed to examine the lessons learned under this project. This evaluation effort will build upon prior assessments and will focus on the management of training and private sector components of the project. Evaluation findings will be used by USAID staff, public and private sector implementing partners and the implementing contractor to further improve the follow-on BWAST II which already is well underway. The findings also will be used by USAID staff and host-country officials (public and private sector) who will design a new project in FY 90.

ARTICLE III - STATEMENT OF WORK

Background

The Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project, Phase I (BWAST I) has provided training and technical assistance to certain key ministries and to the private sector. The training provided consists of long and short-term external (U.S. and Third Country) training and in-country training. BWAST I Technical Assistance has included long-term personnel who hold line positions (Operational Experts - Opexers) and Short-Term Consultants. BWAST I was preceded by the Southern Africa Manpower Development Project (SAMDP - started in 1979) and has been followed by Phase II of BWAST (BWAST II).

BWAST I, as well as SAMDP and BWAST II, has sought to alleviate the critical shortage of skilled manpower, which is generally accepted as one of the major constraints to economic development in Botswana. A principal difference between BWAST I and SAMDP is the increased focus by BWAST I on identifying those factors which are likely to have the greatest impact on employment generation and localization. For this reason, BWAST I has concentrated on fewer ministries than SAMDP and has initiated USAID/Botswana's first assistance to the private sector under a major training and technical assistance project.

Since previous evaluations of BWAST I, BWAST II, and USAID's training and technical assistance programs in general have reviewed many project issues, this evaluation will focus on the management of training and private sector components. The evaluation team will be assisted in its work by the BWAST I Mid-Term Evaluation (1985); the Botswana Workforce and Skills

Training Project (BWAST): Baseline data collection study (Tarnoff/Elmer), November 1986; a Report on the Impact of OPEXERS for USAID/BOTSWANA (Deloitte Haskins and Sells - Botswana), December 1987; and the BWAST II Interim Evaluation (December 1988). Also, a tracer study on returned participants currently underway will assist this evaluation.

These previous efforts provide methodologies, data, and insights upon which the BWAST I Final Evaluation can be built. Additionally, an IG audit was conducted in July 1987 and is available.

In addition to USAID, the implementing agents in the project have included the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM), the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs (MLHA), the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM) and the Academy for Educational Development (AED). DPSM coordinates and prioritizes requests from the target ministries, MLHA approves private sector submissions received from BOCCIM, and AED is USAID's implementing contractor.

Scope of Evaluation

This evaluation should follow guidelines set forth in the AID Evaluation Handbook, April 1987.

The following five questions deal with issues (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability) that should be considered in evaluating any type of development assistance, including BWAST I:

Relevance: are the development constraints the project was initially designed to address germane to current Botswana or U.S. interest development strategies?

Effectiveness: is the project achieving satisfactory progress toward its stated objectives?

Efficiency: are the effects of the project being produced at an acceptable cost compared to alternative approaches for accomplishing the same objective?

Impact: what positive and negative effects are resulting from the Project?

Sustainability: are the effects of the project likely to have sustainable development impacts - that is, will they continue after AID funding has stopped?

BWAST I's impact on employment generation is of particular importance in this evaluation. The methodology, however, for measuring such impact is very limited. The evaluation team should make full use of existing studies already performed by AID's PPC Bureau, especially AID evaluation special study No. 53, AID's Experience with Selected Employment Generation Projects, by Donald Bowles. A general question the team should address is whether the project's decision-making process efficiently and effectively identified and assisted activities of both policy formulation and program implementation activities.

The external consultants should perform the following task:

(1) summarize the final level of inputs and outputs provided through the activity,

(2) cite end-of-project status regarding achievement of objectives (using data from ongoing and interim evaluations),

(3) assess the sustainability of development accomplishments, and

(4) articulate lessons learned from this particular project as guidance for future similar development activities.

While focussing on the management of training and private sector components, the evaluators also should comment on other areas, including the "Delivery Order" process and various ordering mechanisms under the project, the overall performance of the general contractor, the Academy for Educational Development, and the role of returned participants. These comments basically should be a summary of relevant points made in previous studies on BWAST I and II.

The evaluation team should consider the following elements as it addresses the issues cited above:

A. Training

1. General description of the Training Activity:

(a)Long-term participants
(b)Specialized courses/seminars
(c)Local series of courses or certificate program
(d)Analysis of relevance
(e)Institutions

2. Work Duties and Methodologies

(a)Tasks and position of participants prior to training
(b)Tasks and position of participants after training
(c)Difference of the above and assessment of the changes

3. Cost of Training Activities

(a)Actual cost of participants
(b)GOB input costs
(c)AID input costs
(d)Assessment of cost effectiveness

4. Selection process for participants

(a)Selection criteria for training and for individuals
(b)Logistical arrangements
(c)Program areas

5. Overall findings and recommendations

B. Technical Assistance

1.Description of the Technical Assistance Activity

(a) By OPEXER or short-term consultant
(b) Job Description and Working Environment
(c) Observed duties/roles
(d) Relationships with colleagues

2. Operation system changes made through technical assistance

(a) Description of Design and Implementation
(b) Net Results of Changes
(c) Analysis of Effectiveness

3. Training done by T.A. Personnel

(a) On-the-job type described
(b) Seminar or course work description
(c) Assessment of relevance and effectiveness

4. Overall Assessment of Performance

(a) By supervisor
(b) By OPEXER/Consultant
(c) By the Ministry and Colleagues
(d) By the study team

C. Recommendations

1. Emphasis in Training

   (a) Short-Term vs. Short-Term
   (b) U.S., Third-Country and Local
   (c) Specialized vs. General
   (d) Institutional Appraisal
   (e) Effectiveness by Ministry/Skill area

2. Emphasis in Technical Assistance
   (a) Short-Term vs. Long-Term
   (b) Quality and Skill Areas
   (c) Selection criteria guidelines

Methods and Procedures

The team will draw heavily upon previous studies and update the data where necessary. The team should review the relevant documents, cited earlier, and hold interviews with AID/W staff (AFR/PD/SAP, PPC/CDIE and AFR/SA) and AED/Washington staff prior to departing for Botswana. The local environment is conducive to the evaluation effort, in terms of the accessibility of individuals and data.

Evaluation Team Composition

The evaluation team should consist of a Economist/Human Resources Specialist, who will act as team leader, and a Private Sector Specialist. The Mission's Project Development Officer will guide the evaluators and the Mission's Project Assistant will assist the team on a nearly full-time basis. GOB and private sector individuals also will assist and contribute to the evaluation.

The two contracted team members will work collaboratively, but the Economist/Human Resource Specialist will cover overall project impact and the management of training component, while the Private Sector Specialist will assess the private sector component. Project impact on the private sector should be reviewed in terms of both direct and indirect assistance/benefits.

Appendix B

Conceptual Framework and Criteria For Assessment of BWAST I

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND CRITERIA FOR

ASSESSMENT OF BWAST I



SUBSTANTIVE ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED IN FINAL EVALUATION OF BWAST I

Terence F. Kelly
Larry J. Kenneke
TvT Associates
23 August 1989

A. Relevance

1. Has lack of skills been a significant constraint on Botswana's development?

2. Have skill deficiencies in the public sector limited employment growth in general and in the private sector in particular?

3. Were the skills targeted by the project critical to Botswana's development?

4. Have skill deficiencies in the Botswana labor force contributed to the employment of expatriates?

B. Effectiveness

5. Has the project met its objective of increasing the number of Batswana in skill areas related to employment generation? Has modern sector employment in fact exceeded the 9 percent growth rate?

6. What has been the placement rate of completed trainees? Are their new jobs related to the training they have received?

7. What have their subsequent mobility patterns been (occupational, to private sector, to South Africa or other countries)?

8. Number of individuals trained, person years of training, person years of OPEXers.

C. Efficiency

9. Costs: fixed, variable, travel, lodging, tuition, fees, overhead, per trainee, per year, per hour, wages.

10. Has the project been duplicative of other available sources of skill development (United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, regional)?

11. Do there exist alternative sources of training which could yield the same degree of skill upgrading at lower cost (on-the-job training, project-related training, third-country training)?

12. What has been the quality of training?

13. Have selection procedures affected project costs? Project effectiveness?

D. Impact

14. How has the project affected productivity and employment? Direct and indirect effects?

15. Project effect on incomes--of trainees, of selected population groups?

16. Effects on rate of "localization" of jobs held by expatriates?

17. Effects on organization, decision making. Have project completers or OPEXers generated new projects, have they helped to streamline operations? Has there been any perceptible impact on new business formation? On rural sector development?

E. Intervening Variables

18. Was the project design conducive to its execution? Were the assumptions on which the project was based realistic? Were they appropriate for the circumstances?

19. In retrospect, were project objectives attainable, given the resource levels provided?

20. Have circumstances changed since the project was initiated? Have there been significant shifts in the social or economic environment (terms of trade, foreign exchange constraint, demographic, political)? Was the design sufficiently flexible to accommodate unanticipated changes?

F. Sustainability

21. Was the project originally designed as a "one-off" investment? When can it be said that a critical scale of skills development has been reached?

22. How committed is the Government to the policy of localization in view of the obvious advantages of continued utilization of expatriate labor?

23. Is the Government prepared to shoulder the burden of skills upgrading in the future? What proportion of total costs for skill development is represented by the project?

24. Is there organizational/bureaucratic stability?

PROCESS DESIGN, FINAL EVALUATION
BWAST I

Terence F. Kelly
Larry J. Kenneke
TvT Associates
23 August 1989

Project Design

1. Were assumptions realistic given conditions existing at the time? Were allowances made for contingencies?

2. Was an analysis made of training requirements? Did the design reflect that analysis?

3. Were objectives realistic? Attainable? Measurable? Were the measures appropriate given expected inputs?

4. Were inputs in line with objectives? Levels, types, phasing?

5. Were alternative approaches given adequate consideration (work experience, third-country training, private-sector participation)?

6. Was the initial structure appropriate concerning implementing or participating agencies?

Implementation/Operation

7. Were inputs delivered in timely fashion? Was the project implemented and operated as planned?

8. Were there significant changes in the project environment? Was the design modified to account for these?

9. Were there special problems of note in the selection of trainees or OPEXers? Particular administrative problems regarding their placement or functions?

10. Were there particular problems of management? Were they recognized and corrected during the implementation process?

Outcomes

11. Were project outcomes as initially anticipated? Were there any unanticipated outcomes, either positive or negative?

12. How many Batswana were trained in what fields? How many person-years of OPEXers were provided?

13. What has been the impact of this skill upgrading on the country's development or employment creation prospects?

14. What has the project's impact been on the employment and wage prospects of passed-through graduates?

15. What have been the project costs (start-up costs, overhead, travel, subsistence, fees, stipends/salaries, non-monetary effects on productivity)? By whom have they been paid? Are there alternative configurations which would have reduced costs? Which components account for the largest shares of the total? Which components are most significant? Which are most important?

16. Given the costs and benefits noted above, what is the apparent cost-effectiveness of the project?

Lessons Learned

17. Given the 6-7 year experience of BWAST I, what lessons have been learned for the future: For skills development in Botswana? For skills development in general? For the likely impact of skills development on national, social and economic development? For employment generation? For localization efforts?

BWAST I FINAL EVALUATION SCHEDULE



INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

INFORMATION	DOCUMENTATION	SOURCE
Number of Training Participants	Monthly Participant Status Reports	AED
Number of Training Requests	Long-Term Training Requests	AED
	Overseas S-T Training	AED
Short-Term Monitoring	Monthly S-T Technician Reports	AED
	Monthly OPEX Reports	AED
Technical Assistance Requests	Long-Term TA Requests	AED
	S-T TA Requests	AED
Financial	Obligations	AID, AED, GOB
	Expenditures	AID, AED, GOB
	Costs/participant, alternative modes of delivery	AID, AED, GOB
Project Progress	Project Implementation Reports	AID
Impact	Placement and Subsequent Occupational Pattern Reports	Interim Documents
	Effect on General Development Prospects	Conversations with Public & Private Sectors and Participants

Appendix C

Persons Contacted

and

Documents Consulted

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WILLIAMS, Sue. OPEX Business Lecturer, Botswana Institute for Administration and Commerce.

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Appendix D

Project Inputs, Rates of Realization, Expenditures and Participant Views

Table D-1

Rate of Realization for Planned Training Activities,
by Duration and Location

Type of Training	Planned Participants		Realized Participants		Rate of Realization (No. Realized/No. Planned)
	No.	%	No.	%	
Long Term U.S.	72	6.5	124	7.1	172%
Short-Term U.S.	37	3.3	38*	2.2	103%
Short-Term Botswana	1000	90.2	1563	90.6	156%
Total	1109	100.0%	1725	100.0%	156%

* Includes two participants trained in Tanzania.

Table D-2

Rate of Realization for Planned Long-Term
Administrative and Technical Training
in the U.S. and Third Countries,
in Person Years

Type of Training	Projected No. of Person Years	%	Actual No. of Person Years	%	Rate of Realization (Actual/Projected)
Long-Term Administrative	108	50%	130	48%	120%
Long-Term Technical	108	50%	143	52%	132%
Total	216	100%	273	100%	126%

Table D-3

Rate of Realization for Planned Short-Term
Administrative and Technical Training
in the U.S. and Third Countries,
in Person Months

Type of Training	Projected No. of Person Months	%	Actual No. of Person Months	%	Rate of Realization (Actual/Projected)
Short-Term Administrative	30	41%	40	32%	133%
Short-Term Technical	44	59%	86	68%	195%
Total	74	100%	126	100%	170%

Table D-4

Rate of Realization for Planned Short-Term
Administrative and Technical Training in Botswana,
by Person Months

Type of Training	Projected No. of Person Months	% of Total	Actual No. of Person Months	% of Total	Rate of Realization (Actual/Projected)
Administrative	1190	60%	N/A	N/A	N/A
Technical	810	40%	N/A	N/A	N/A
Total	2000	100%	3,907	100%	195%

N/A - Data not available in disaggregated form.

Table D-5

Number of Long- and Short-Term
U.S. and Third Country Trained Participants,
by Fields of Study

Field of Study	Long Term	%	Short Term	%	Total	%
Business/Management Administration	59	48	12	31	71	44
Rural*	31	24	3	8	34	21
Engineering/ Science/Technology	22	18	3	8	25	15
Other	12	10	20	53	32	20
Total	124	100	38	100	162	100

* Includes all participants from Ministry of Agriculture plus selected others who took such courses as Animal Science, Entymology, Community Development, and a portion of Home Economics.

Table D-6

Number of Long- and Short-Term
U.S. Participants, Third Country and
In-Country Short-Term Trainees,
by Sector

	Number of Trainees							
	U. S.				Botswana			
Sector	Long Term	%	Short Term	%	In-Country	%	Total	%
Public & Parastatal	108	87	30	79	1,066	68	1,204	70
Private	16	13	8	21	497	32	521	30
Totals	124	100	38	100	1,563	100	1,725	100

Table D-7

Number of Long- and Short-Term
U.S. and Third Country Participant Trainees,
by Gender

	Number of Trainees					
	Long Term	%	Short Term	%	Total	%
Female	30	24	14	37	44	27
Male	94	76	24	63	118	73
Total	124	100	38	100	162	100

Table D-8

Number of Degrees Conferred,
By Type

Degree	Number of Degrees	Percent of Total
Associate	5	3%
Bachelors	106	56%
Masters	71	38%
PhD	2	1%
DVM	3	2%
MD	1	*
Total	188**	100%

* Less than 1 percent

** Includes Trust Fund Participants

Table D-9

Projected and Actual
Technical Assistance

Category	Projected	Actual	Rate of Realization
OPEXer	52 person yrs	68.4	132%
Short-Term Consultant	48 person mo.	99.5	207%
Non-OPEX Tech Assist in DOP	4 person yrs	0	0

Table D-10

OPEXer and Short-Term Consultant Placements,
by Target Ministry and Related Institutions

Ministry/Institution	Number Placed		
	OPEXers	Consultants	Total
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)	4	3	
BAC	1		
NDB	2		
BCU	1	—	
Total MOA	8	3	11
Ministry of Commerce & Industry (MCI)	2		
RIIC	3		
WTC	1	1	
Total MCI	6	1	7
Ministry of Education	3	1	
BRIDEC	3	4	
Total MOE	6	5	11
Ministry of Local Government & Lands (MLGL)	1	3	4
Unified Local Government Services (ULGS)	0	0	0

Table D-11

Number of OPEXers
and
Short-Term Consultants by Sector

Sector	Number of OPEXers	Number of S.T. Consultants	Total
Public	34	19*	53
Private	0	3**	3
Totals	34	22	56

* plus 3 additional core contract consultants

** plus 3 additional core contract consultants

Table D-12

Number of Participants Reporting Various Levels of Satisfaction
With Program, by Years
Since Completion of Program*

Years Since Completion	Scale of Satisfaction: Very Satisfied 1	2	3	4	Very Dissatisfied 5	TOTALS
0-1	6	1	1	0	0	8
1-1.9	8	7	6	0	1	22
2-2.9	8	7	0	1	3	9
3-3.9	12	5	8	0	1	26
4-4.9	12	3	3	1	0	19
5-5.9	6	4	2	1	1	14
6-6.9	2	2	1	0	0	5
TOTALS	54	29	21	3	6	113

* Christopher Thomas. "Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Participant Follow-up Study." AED, mimeo, August 1989.

Appendix E

AED Management-of-Training Model

Botswana's Model for Manpower Development

Five interrelated components make up the management of training system in Botswana. They include:

- **Policy:** The aims and values of the nation as formulated through the democratic processes of kgotla (district councils) and national institutions, and as defined by various governmental regulations and procedures as well as company plans.

- **Planning:** This component has four steps: establishing general manpower projections at the national government, local government, and company levels; assessing specific training needs by studying each organization, its jobs, and its personnel in detail; prioritizing training requirements; and scheduling the appropriate training for the appropriate employees.

- **Management and Coordination:** Supporting trainees prior to, during, and after training; monitoring and reporting training; and communication training issues/consulting skills within the organization.

- **Implementation of Training and Instructional Design:** The development and implementation of training programs which respond to the needs of an organization. This includes external training or in-country training through such means as degree, diploma, certificate, or workshop training, correspondence education, and on-the-job training.

- **Evaluation:** The process of determining or judging the value of training based on the objectives of training. Evaluations can be conducted by training institutions, training coordinators, and department or company staff, or coordinating bodies such as the Directorate of Public Service Management.

Source: AED BWAST II Project Proposal, 1988

The policy component (1.0) of the management of training system is a participatory one based on democratic principles emanating from the kgotla (district councils) and the national parliament. The aims and values as expressed through these mechanisms are defined by various governmental decision-making bodies. These include the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) and its various tripartite committees (government, companies, and labor unions) and bodies such as the National Employment, Manpower, and Incomes Council and the Rural Development Council. Many other organizations are also involved in the policy formulation process. These include the Directorate of Public Service Management, which deals with policy issues affecting central government personnel, and the Ministry of Labor and Home Affairs, including its Department of Labor and various tripartite committees. Additionally, within the private sector, companies formulate individual policies based upon market force conditions. Many of these policies are expressed through the implementation activities of such coordinating bodies as the Botswana Employers' Federation.

The broad policy guidelines regarding workforce development and employment generation are contained within the National Development Plan 6 and various policy papers on, for example, employment, labor, education and training, and localization.

The policy guidelines shape the formation of manpower projections and planning (2.0) through the development of national requirements at MFDP, central government requirements at DPSM, and local government requirements at the Ministry of Local Government and Lands. Additionally, company workforce requirements are shaped by these broad government policy decisions as well as by company requirements.

Data on the various manpower projections are fed into the assessment of specific training needs (2.1) by each company and at various levels within the government. This assessment involves gathering data on training needs at the organization-wide level, at the job level, and at the individual level.

The areas identified for training are then prioritized within each organization (2.2). This training prioritization process is accomplished by using policy information (1.0) and the manpower projections (2.0) and data on training needs (2.1).

Training plans and training schedules (2.3) within the Government of Botswana are developed at each unit and department level within a ministry. This process is based upon the aforementioned policy guidelines, projections, and priorities. The DPSM develops a broad national training plan to encompass all ministries and departments. Additionally, ministries and their

training coordinators prepare ministry-wide plans, and individual departments prepare specific plans for staff training. This process is mirrored to some degree within the private sector. The Botswana Employers' Federation and its training committee prepare a general training plan which reflects broad private sector priorities. Companies and their personnel or training officers prepare training plans and schedules. These plans and schedules provide details on the various training programs which will be provided to the employees.

The training management and coordination component (3.0) initiates the training process. The implementation process within the government is normally shared by DPSM, the ministry training coordinators, and the department head and supervisors. DPSM is the central government focus for civil service manpower development. It encourages, coordinates, and facilitates the implementation of ministry and department training plans. The ministry training coordinators are the key figures in each ministry's human resource management team. These coordinators act as well-informed training advocates, administrators of all ministry training, and problem-solving consultants. They support trainees prior to screening and selection (3.1), during monitoring and communications (3.2), and throughout their reintegration after training (3.3). Department head and supervisors have the primary responsibility for organizing the introductory, specialist, technical, and professional in-service

training required by their employees, including on-the-job training.

The design of training programs (4.0) is the responsibility of the organization that delivers the training. Training design is based on an assessment of specific training needs (2.1) in the context of manpower projections (2.0). The training design and implementation process (4.1) results in a variety of training options. These include external training (4.3) and in-country training (4.2) for degree, diploma, or certificate programs; workshops and correspondence education; or on-the-job training.

The final component of the management of training system is evaluation (5.0). This completes the management of training cycle. Evaluation and feedback data then impact on all other components of the system.


MANAGEMENT OF TRAINING
1.0 Policy
2.0 Manpower Planning
3.0 Training Management and Coordination
4.0 Training Program Implementation
5.0 Evaluation
2.1 Assessment of Specific Training Needs
2.2 Training Prioritization
2.3 Training Plans and Schedules
3.1 Screening and Selection
3.2 Monitoring and Communications
3.3 Reintegration
4.1 Training Program Design
4.2 In-country Training
4.3 External Training

TRAINING PRODUCTS DEVELOPED

The management-of-training system resulted in development and publication of the following products:

- Training Plan Procedure Manual: A guide to completing the BWAST training plan format.

- Managing Training: Training needs assessment techniques and other management of training suggestions for the BWAST training coordinators.

- BWAST Training Officers Manual: Procedures and practices to guide the BWAST training coordinators through improved management of training within the GOB.

- Training Coordination Course Facilitator's Handbook: An instructor's handbook to use for the teaching of the "Training Coordination" course.

- Preparing for Jobs: Training Opportunities in Botswana: Provides detailed information on all available courses in Botswana as well as guidance on how to seek employment after receiving appropriate training.

- Training Methodologies and Training Resources in Use at Local Training Institutions: Inventory of training methodologies currently in use at Botswana's training institutions as well as recommendations on how to improve the quality of instruction.

- Private Sector Training Needs Assessment Report: Report which provided macro data on private sector training needs as well as guidance on training areas which BWAST should fund.

- BEF Training Committee Terms of Reference and Criteria and Procedures for Selecting Participants for Training: Guide for BEF Training Committee members on the selection of participants for training.

- Private Sector Training Officers Handbook: A "how to do it" guide for private sector training officers (initiated under this contract).

- Correspondence Course Handbook: An inventory of relevant correspondence courses available to Batswana (initiated under this contract).

- <u>Training Institution Program Evaluation Handbook</u>: Handbook for the training institutions' management and instructors on how to measure the effectiveness of training programs. Details on roles and responsibilities of DPSM, ministries, and training institutions for evaluations.

Appendix F

Impact: Examples of Successful Activities

Illustrations of Project Impact

The ultimate impact of BWAST I activities can best be indicated by illustration. The examples below attempt to illustrate, first, how former participants are or have been involved in direct and indirect employment-generating activities; second, how OPEXers assisted in employment generation; and last, how technical assistance benefited the private sector and subsequent employment generation.

Former Participants*

A number of former BWAST participants are involved in direct employment generating activities. Five examples illustrate how:

1. A study tour arranged for the owner of a small labor-intensive leather works factory provided new ideas for product design and production, and allowed him to make connections necessary for product export. Consequently he has expanded his workforce from 15 to 20 and anticipates hiring an additional five workers.

2. Another participant attended a workshop on Women in Development where she got the idea and motivation to start her own bakery. She now employs 12 women in her business.

3. An MBA participant has initiated her own electronics import/export firm which employs four workers.

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* C. Thomas, "Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project Participant Follow Up Study," AED, Gaborone, 1989.

4. Several liquor distribution centers employing 30 workers have been started by a returned economics participant-trainee.

5. Thirty-three additional new jobs were created in a new enterprise started by a returning business trainee.

The following table illustrates the types of participant-owned businesses and the number of new posts created.

Participant Owned Businesses

Type of Business	Number of New Employees
Leather Goods Factory	10
Bakery	12
Electronics Import/Export	4
Liquor outlets I	30
Liquor outlets II	6
Temporary Maid Service	18
Linen Shops	11
Business Advisory Service	3
TOTAL	94

Former participants have also had an important indirect effect on employment generation. One former participant played a significant role in the development of sorghum milling machines, windmills, and blacksmithing tools. These devices are now being produced in rural village workshops across the country. An agricultural extension agent who underwent training in irrigation technologies is helping selected farmers construct small-scale irrigation channels to facilitate year-round crop production--this employs four people continuously throughout the year for each irrigated hectare.

Former BWAST participants indirectly involved in contributing to employment creation are shown below by type of activity and number of participants involved.

Participants Involved in
Activities Contributing to Employment Generation

Activity	Number of Participants Involved
Providing management assistance	47
Providing marketing assistance	16
Expanding credit and financial services	10
Securing supplies of raw materials	9
Introducing new technologies	19
Providing training to colleagues	63
Streamlining bureaucratic regulations	30
Providing advice on starting a business	27
Developing new agricultural technologies	14
Total	235*

* Includes an unknown amount of double counting

OPEXers

Long-term experts have assisted the GOB and private sector leaders in identifying and reducing contraints to private-sector growth. According to information from the Botswana Development Corporation (BDC), Limited, OPEXers assigned to that organization have been instrumental in helping new and established private enterprises to expand their output and employment. The BDC's Commercial/Industrial Division estimates that its efforts resulted in the creation of 738 jobs in Fiscal Year 1988 and 964

jobs in Fiscal Year 1989. BDC projects 1,322 jobs will be created in the fiscal year ending in 1990.

The three following examples illustrate how OPEXers in GOB offices formulated and/or implemented programs designed to promote public- and private-sector growth and employment generation.

One result of OPEX assistance is a liberalization of residency and work permit regulations for foreign investors. In the past, a foreign investor had to renew permits every two years, for the lifetime of the business. Because of OPEX assistance, permits may now be granted indefinitely after two 5-year permits.

A second result is the provision of serviced land and housing. Lack of these has served as a serious constraint to private-sector growth and new investment. Formerly, most housing was provided by the GOB with only a small amount supplied by the private sector. Now one-half of nonself-help housing is provided by private sector housing and land development enterprises.

A third example of OPEXer impact is found at the Poultry Management Association (PAMA). The NDP-5 goal of reaching self-sufficiency in poultry and egg production by the mid 1980s has been partially realized in Gaborone but not in the rest of the

country. Poultry products are still imported from South Africa, particularly by large-volume consumers such as hotels and fast-food outlets. Poultry consumption increased by 40 percent in 1988 and is expected to increase another 25 percent by 1990. Responding to increased demand, PAMA is expanding hatchery operations to 50,000 chicks/week with BDC funding. PAMA, an umbrella organization of producers, represents potential for direct impact on rural income generation by providing chicks and materials to villagers who start small-scale poultry production units. These units employ village residents in production; PAMA handles slaughter, distribution and marketing. As production units increase in number, more people are employed at the village level and, as nationwide production increases, PAMA itself employs more people. With OPEX assistance for three years, PAMA is in stronger financial situation than ever before, nearing the point when the government can privatize the organization. Aside from meeting employment-generation objectives, the PAMA operation contributes to the government goals of attaining food self-sufficiency and reducing dependency on South African imports. (David Benedetti, Impact of OPEXers on Employment Generation, memorandum, 21 August 1989).

Technical Assistance

Technical assistance has also had its impact on the private sector. While most significant impacts have occurred late in the

life of BWAST I, they nonetheless should be credited, where appropriate, to the early groundwork laid by the project. A Director of Private Sector Initiatives, hired under BWAST II, has for 18 months provided technical assistance to small, medium and large industries, Brigades, IDM, and entrepreneurs. Several examples illustrate the impact on entrepreneurs:

1. A government employee was assisted in starting his own manufacturer's representative firm.
2. A female petrol pump attendant was given assistance in starting a bookkeeping business.
3. A female dress manufacturer with 10 employees was convinced to make leotards for domestic and export markets--she moved to a new facility with 50 work stations.
4. Encouragement was given to an entrepreneur to upgrade his skills in the design and fabrication of coffins and caskets so that his firm will employ at least 10 more people.

Large firms also have been alerted to possibilities of getting licenses from the U.S.A.; for example, Motor Centre became a Jiffy-Lube licensee. (F. Dolton, September 11, 1989, memorandum to T.F. Kelly).

Appendix G

Project Paper Logical Framework

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Botswana Workforce & Skills Training

Project Title & Number: 633-0231

Life of Project: From FY 82 to FY 86
Total U.S. Funding 14 509
Date Prepared: 2/22/82

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
Program or Sector Goal: The broader objective to which this project contributes: (A-1)	Measures of Goal Achievement: (A-2)	(A-3)	Assumptions for achieving goal targets: (A-4)
To generate employment for Batswana through work force training directed at the public	Modern sector employment exceeds 9% growth rate Traditional sector employment increases by 10% Real per capita income increases by 10%	Updated rural/urban employment survey Updated rural/urban income distribution survey	That employment generation continues to be a government objective

Annex IV-A
Page 1

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Project Title & Number: Botswana Workforce & Skills Training 633-0231

Life of Project: From FY 82 to FY89
Total U.S. Funding 14,509
Date Prepared: 2/22/82

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
Project Purpose (B-1)	Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved: End of project status (B-2)	(B-3)	Assumptions for achieving purpose (B-4)
Increase the number of trained Batswana in skill areas related to employment generation	Increase number of Batswana in positions of responsibility with substantive inputs into the planning, design and imple-tation of employment generation activities Maintenance of high-level operational efficiency of GOB offices with OPEX staff while counterparts are off on training	Directorate of Personnel annual reports on training accomplishments. Training plans for target ministries and ULGS USAID project reports	GOB adequately applies the selection criteria AID through a contractor will be able to provide OPEX technicians with the technical skills and cultural sensitivity required to carry out operational responsibilities under the direction of the GOB

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Project Title & Number: Botswana Workforce & Skills Training 633-0231

Life of Project: From FY 82 to FY 89
Total U.S. Funding 14 509
Date Prepared: 23/2/82

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
Project outputs (C-1)	Magnitude of outputs (C-2)	(C-3)	Assumptions for providing outputs (C-4)
Batswana trained in the US or third countries to replace US-funded OPEX personnel Batswana trained through in-country training programs A sustained or improved level of organizational efficiency in government departments in which OPEX technicians serve	1. 595 Batswana will receive in-country training in administration/management. 15 Batswana will be provided US and third country short-term training in administration/management 36 Batswana will be provided long-term training in the US in administration and management 2. 36 Batswana will receive training in the US in technical fields 405 Batswana will be provided in-country training in technical fields 22 Batswana will receive short-term training in the US or third countries 3. 52 person years of long-term technician assistance will be provided 48 person months of short-term technicial assistance will be provided	USAID project reports Training plans for target ministries Directorate of Personnel reports	Qualified applicants available for training Local training institutions remain operational

AID 1020-20 (11-79)
SUPPLEMENT 1

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Project Title & Number: Botswana Workforce & Skills Training 633-0231

Life of Project:
From FY 82 to FY 89
Total U.S. Funding 14 509
Date Prepared: 23/2/82

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
Project Inputs: (D-1)	Implementation Target (Type and Quantity) (D-2)	(D-3)	Assumptions for providing inputs: (D-4)
Long-term administrative training	108 person years of long-term training	AID records	that funds are available
Short-term administrative training in-country	1 190 person months of short-term in-country training	GOB records	
Short-term administrative training in US and third countries	30 person months of short-term overseas training		
Long-term technical training	108 person years of long-term training		
Short.term technical training in-country	810person months of short-term training in-country		
Short-term technical training in US or third countries	44 person months of short-term training in US or third countries		
Long-term technical assistance	52 person years of long-term technical assistance		
Short-term technical assistance, including for the project evaluation	48 person months of short-term technical assistance		