MID-TERM EVALUATION REPORT
SAHEL POLICY PROJECT (SPAP)
(625-0980)

August 1992

Presented to:
A.I.D./AFR/SWA/RGL
Washington, DC



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Project #936-5451

ACRONYMS

A.I.D.	U.S. Agency for International Development
ACCESS	Access to Land, Water and Other Natural Resources II
ADS	Africa Development Support Project
AEPRP	Accelerated Economic Policy Reform Program
AFGRAD	African Graduate Fellowship Program
AFR/ARTS/FARA	Bureau for Africa/Office of Analysis, Research and Technical Support
AFR/ONI	Bureau for Africa/Office of New Initiatives
AFR/SWA	Bureau for Africa/Sahel West African Affairs
AGRHYMET	Centre d'Agro-Hydro-Meterologie (CILSS)
AIRD	Associates in International Resource Development
AMIS	Agricultural Marketing Improvement Strategies Project
APAP	Agricultural Policy Analysis Project
API	Assessment of Program Impact
APEX	USAID/Mali Livestock Project
ARD	Associates in Rural Development
BAME	Bureau d'Analyses Macro-Economiques
CCWA	Office of Central and Coastal West Africa
CEBV	Communaute Economique du Betail et de la Viande (Entente Countries)
CERPOD	Centre de Recherche en Population et Demographie
CESAG	Centre Africain d'Erides Superieurs en Gestion
CFA	Currency of the West African Monetary Union
CDSS	Country Development Strategy Statement
CILSS	Comite Permanent Inter-etats deLuttle Contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel
CLUSA	Cooperative League of the U.S.A.
CPSP	Country Program Strategic Plan
CNRS	Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques
CREA	Centre de Recherche Economique Appliquee
CREDIBLe	Conference to Support Local Governance Alternatives (Fr: Conference Regionale pour le Dveloppemennt des Initiatives sur des Bases Locales)
CTTA	Communication for Technology Transfer in Agriculture Project
DAA	Deputy Assistant Administrator
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
DFM	Decentralization: Finance and Management Project
DIAPER	Diagnostique Permanente
ENEA	Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquee (Senegal)
FM	Office of Financial Management
FSS	Foreign Service Staff
FY	Fiscal Year
GC	Office of the General Counsel
GEMINI	Growth and Equity through Microenterprise Investments and Institutions Project
GIS	Geographic Information System
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INSAH	Institut du Sahel (CILSS)

IPC	Implementing Policy Change Project
IRAM	Institut de Recherche et d'Application des Methods du Developpement
ISRA	Institut Senegalais de Recherches Agricoles
LOP	Life of Project
LTC	University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center
MDI	Management Development International
MSI	Management Systems International
MSU	Michigan State University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPA	Non-Project Assistance
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPAM	Malian Cereals Marketing Parastatal
OSU	Ohio State University
OYB	Operating Year Budget
PACD	Project Activity Completion Date
PADRES	Programs for Applied Development Research in the Sahel
PARTS	Policy, Analysis, Research and Technical Support Project
PD&S	Project Development and Support
PID	Project Identification Document
PIO/T	Project Implementation Order/Technical Services
PIR	Project Implementation Report
PM&R	Program, Management and Research Funds
PPC	Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination
PRE	Bureau for Private Enterprise/
PRISAS	Sahel Regional Program for Strengthening Institutional Research Capacity on Food Security in the Sahel
PRISM	Program Performance Information for Strategic Management
PRMC	Malian Program for Cereals Market Reform
RD/EID	Office of Economic and Institutional Development, Research and Development Bureau (formerly S&T/RD)
RSSA	Recitprocal Support Services Agreement
RFP	Request for Proposal
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference
SAGE	Project Sahelien pour la gestion de l'Environnement
SARSA	Human Settlements and Natural Resource Systems Analysis Project
SDP	Sahel Development Program
SIM	Systeme d'Information sur les Marches (Market Information System (MIS))
SPAP	Sahel Policy Project (sometimes called SPP)
SRI	Sahelian Regional Institutions Project
S&T	Bureau for Science and Technology
SWA/ REGL OR RGL	Office of Sahel West African Affairs, Regional Division
UPA	Unite de Production Agricole
USDH	U.S. Direct Hire Officer
USGS/U.S. Geologic Survey	

SPAP EVALUATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Sahel Policy Project (SPAP) was authorized in July 1985 with LOP funding of $8 million. Its goal was "to carry out a program of economic policy studies, advisory services and training that will strengthen the bases for appropriate economic policy in the Sahel". Its PACD was extended in 1990 to September 1995, with no increase in LOP funding. It is a companion project to the Sahel Regional Institutions Project (625-0975), that provides support to the CILSS and the Club du Sahel. Present LOP funding for SRI is $15 million under a 1990 Project Amendment.

The relative proportions of SPAP's components--technical assistance, studies, and training--have changed over the LOP, the emphasis after the PACD extension in 1990 moving toward focussed studies as Sahel Missions grew, and had other options for technical assistance. As earlier SPAP-funded TA and long-term study programs led to the development of country-level policy projects, this shift in emphasis increased the number and variety of studies available to further policy dialogue and deepen understanding of regional and sub-regional issues such as trade, environmental management, food security, decentralization, finance, and to catalyze A.I.D. and other-donor activities in these and other cross-sectoral areas.

The evaluation team found that SPAP-funded activities have had both direct and indirect impacts on policy selection and implementation both at the national level in targeted countries, and at the regional level, through interaction with the CILSS and Club du Sahel secretariats, and the Sahel Institute. Particularly clear examples are cereals marketing liberalization, marketing information systems and broader economic policy reform in Mali, agricultural research improvement and environmental policy in Senegal, sub-regional livestock marketing reform, and private sector policy reform in the Sahel region and beyond.

A.I.D. Missions and SWA itself, using the SPAP project to buy into one or another centrally-funded cooperative agreement with a land grant university or a non-university cooperator, were highly successful, in building up capacity and in generating analytic products at the same time. From 1988 on, Missions buy ins were fewer the SWA Office bought into the same and additional centrally-funded activities to fund studies and some shorter-term TA to address particular problems that had been identified within A.I.D., or through the Club and CILSS Secretariats. Recently, SPAP has served primarily to expand and reorient the policy analysis agenda at the regional level. This seems an appropriate evolution given the changing political and policy environments in the Sahel and West Africa as a whole. The team recommends that the project be extended, but combined with the Sahel Regional Institutions Project, to reinforce the links between the policy analysis activities and other support to Sahelian institutions.

SAHEL POLICY PROJECT MID-TERM EVALUATION

Background:

The Sahel Policy Project (625-0970) was authorized in July 1985 with LOP funding of $8 million. Its goal was "to carry out a program of economic policy studies, advisory services and training that will strengthen the bases for appropriate economic policy in the Sahel". Its PACD was extended in 1990 to September 1995, with no increase in LOP funding. It is a companion project to the Sahel Regional Institutions Project (625-0975), which provides support to the CILSS and the Club du Sahel to generate "improved understanding by Sahelian and donor decision-makers of the potential impact of social, economic and other development policies and implementation strategies", in the context of the overall project goal of food self-reliance and ecological balance within and among Sahelian states. Present LOP funding for SRI is $15 million under the project amendment number 1 of 1990, through a 1997 PACD.

The PACD extension for the Sahel Policy Project (SPAP) was approved based on an internal review of the project's continuing utility, but without an external evaluation. In the context of a recent review of the Sahel/West Africa Office's regional portfolio, and the development of a Sahel regional strategy, an external evaluation of the SPAP project was considered desirable.

SWA carried out the evaluation in two stages. First, a management evaluation was conducted by a contractor who had been a member of the Office in the past, and who represented a considerable store of "institutional memory" about the project's history and original orientation. The contractor, Irving Rosenthal, prepared a report entitled Improved Regional Project Support to Sahel Country Programs (February 1992), which discussed the history of the project, traced the various buy-ins, identified most of the individually-funded activities, and made recommendations for reinstituting the contracted technical staffing feature of the original project design.

The second, "substantive" phase of the evaluation was funded by SWA through a buy-in to the Implementing Policy Change Project (IPC) which provides technical support to host countries, Missions and Bureaus regarding the management aspects of policy reform implementation. RD/EID project management for IPC as well as the IPC contract staff at Management Systems International (MSI) believed that this evaluation would serve the purposes of the IPC project well, in that it would provide data for an eventual cross-country analysis of macroeconomic policy reform efforts conducted in a regional context. IPC provided the services of two evaluation specialists--a political anthropologist and a political economist--to carry out the evaluation. The political economist, Samba Ka, is a Senegalese citizen trained in the U.S.; the political anthropologist, Alice Morton, is an American who first worked in the Sahel in 1977.

Approach:

Due to the pressure of time, it was decided that the team would visit the Club du Sahel for a joint briefing, and travel together to Mali to assess the impact of SPAP on the Mission policy program and on national-level policy, and on INSAH programs and staff. They would then separate, with one member continuing on to Senegal, to explore SPAP-funded activities there, and the other proceeding to Burkina Faso, to discuss the project and related policy issues with members of the CILSS Secretariat, the A.I.D. Representative and the CEBV. Both team members returned via Paris to debrief the A.I.D. representative to the Club Secretariat and his colleagues. The fieldwork took place between May 5 and May 20. Subsequent interviews were conducted in A.I.D.\Washington, and with university and other contractors in Vermont, Washington, DC and by phone. The scope of work is provided as Annex A; a list of persons contacted is provided as Annex B, and a list of documents consulted is given in Annex C.

To the extent possible, we were rigorous in our approach, developing and asking the same set of questions of all donor staff interviewed, and a somewhat different set to Sahelian policy-makers and implementors interviewed. We made a range of contacts that included those who had been directly involved in SPAP-funded activities, those who had been involved in follow-on activities, those who had never been involved but were active in policy analysis and reform, both within governments and donor agencies, and in the private or para-public sectors. We also made some effort to interview the university and other contractors who had benefitted from SPAP funding, but focused more on their Sahelian trainees and counterparts.

As may be seen from our scope of work, our emphasis was on the impact of SPAP-funded activities rather than on a detailed analysis of how the project operated at a managerial level, since the latter aspect had been fairly thoroughly explored in the first phase of the evaluation. In the sections that follow, we first present a retrospective assessment of the impact of the project from 1985 to 1988. Next, we do the same thing for the period since 1988, and especially since the PACD extension--1990-1992. We discuss the changes in the regional policy and institutional context in terms of the demand for SPAP activities. Finally, we present our conclusions and recommendations in light of that assessment of the changing policy and institutional context.

We would like to thank all the officials and private citizens who allowed us to interview them at home and at work, and to express the hope that we have reflected their comments and views accurately. We take responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation.

SPAP's FIRST THREE YEARS

Background:

The impact of the Sahel Policy Project (SPAP)--a regional effort at policy analysis and support--should be assessed in the context of the region it is designed to serve. The Sahel has a history of regional collaboration and interchange that pre-dated both colonialism and independence. Most recently, regional coherence was strengthened by the severity of the drought of the mid-1970s, and the attendant multi-donor attention the region began to receive. In recognition of the coherence of the region, the CILSS and the related Club des Amis du Sahel were created to focus efforts of member states and donors on food security and environmental protection issues for the region as a whole. A.I.D. was a prime mover in the Sahel regional drought relief and development effort.

SPAP was designed at the end of the period when A.I.D.'s Sahel Development Program warranted a separate Congressional appropriation, and was managed by the equivalent of a regional Mission based in Washington (Rosenthal, 1992). Closely tied to the existence of the CILSS and the Club in Paris--which were receiving A.I.D. funding through a companion project, Sahel Regional Institutions--SPAP was designed in part to provide bilateral A.I.D. Missions with a mechanism through which to fund technical support services and focused studies over periods longer than one year. The project was "projectized PM&R funds", allowing these funds to be spent over longer periods than was usual. Long-term technical assistance and studies funded through SPAP could, then, have a better chance to build and support Sahelian capacity while helping to answer complex research and policy questions. Subsequently, Missions designed similar bilateral projects to meet the same need.

SPAP was one of many regional projects when it was designed, although in 1992 it is one of the last survivors of the heyday of regional programming in the Sahel. Rosenthal aptly describes the evolution of the relationship between regional projects and country programs:

> "As the regional projects, studies, and analyses improved the knowledge of the region, and as country programs increased in size, the number of staff at field Missions was increased. Field representatives were made Mission Directors, with greater authority. The Washington Mission began to resemble a more traditional geographic office. This was accelerated in 1987 when the Sahel Development Program line item was eliminated and [later when] the Development Fund for Africa was created.
>
> "In the late 1980s, regional projects began to be eliminated in favor of country programs. While these decisions affected the entire Africa Bureau, it [sic] had greater impact on programs for which SWA has responsibility...."

It is also worth noting that the Operating Year Budget (OYB) for FY 1992 has reduced the funding level for SWA regional programs to only 5% of the total planned OYB for SWA, ($6.3 of a total of $117.3).

Mission-Level Activities:

SPAP was initially designed as "projectized Program Management and Research Funds" (PM&R) a source of additional funding to Missions and the regional institutions A.I.D. was supporting. As noted in a memorandum accompanying the Action Memo justifying the SPAP PACD extension in 1990, "PD&S [sic] is too short term: Some...independent strategizing...can be, and is, done with PD&S funds. However, much of it requires a longer term presence with greater institutional continuity. Thus, Sahel Policy Project...funds continue to be used as long term buy-ins to S&T, PRE and PPC Bureau projects covering the requisite subject area...".

In fact, as may be seen from Figure 1, the record of project utilization shows that it was actually the comparatively larger Missions, such as Mali and Senegal, that used their own funds to "buy in" to SPAP to carry out studies and to obtain TA services for which they did not have a convenient project venue. They used the OYB transfer mechanism to do so. Missions were allocated buy-in ceilings each year, often in the area of $2-300,000. Chad, a smaller Mission, bought in for $400,000 in FY 1985 alone to obtain technical support services, and again in FY 1987 for over $200,000. Mauritania was also a significant SPAP user, with Gambia next, and Burkina Faso last.

Those interviewed indicated that, in 1990, when the PACD was extended, and they were informed that they could no longer buy into SPAP, they regretted the absence of the mechanism. Chad was the only Mission that successfully lobbied to continue to buy-in after the orientation of the project changed in 1990.

There are many examples of successful use of this buy-in mechanism by Sahelian bilateral Missions. Here, we will highlight the Mali cereals market liberalization efforts--which include market information systems as well as food security policy analysis--and the Senegal agricultural research efforts. Both these activity sets were carried out in collaboration with Michigan State University, under buy-ins to the MSU Food Security Cooperative Agreement, managed by the Office of Economic and Institutional Development, Research and Development Bureau (RD/EID, formerly S&T/RAD). We have selected these two examples because they demonstrate different kinds of impact derived using similar mechanisms; we have the most data on them; both are still having an impact on policy development and implementation in the region and in specific countries today, and finally, because collectively, they represent a significant proportion of all SPAP funds ever disbursed. We present these examples as mini case studies in boxes accompanying the text. Impacts on policies at the national and regional levels will be discussed in detail in the text below.

FIGURE 1A
SPAP FUNDING CHRONOLOGY

BUY-IN	PIO/T NUMBER	OBLIGATION AMOUNT	A	BUY-IN TO	GRANTEE	PURPOSE
FY 85						
Burkina		60,000				Support to 5 yr. plan
Chad		400,000		Direct	Stallsmith	Financial policy services
Senegal	50077	71,000	A	IQC	Louis Berger (Hady Ly)	Seed Storage Study
Senegal	50078	60,000	A	Direct	GOS Statistics Bureau	Male attitude to family planning
Senegal	50124	90,000	A			Legal constraints to cereals marketing
Senegal		45,000	A			Reorganization of seed multiplication
Senegal	50085	20,000	A			Bank financing of development
Senegal		15,000	A			Balance of payments analysis
FY Total		761,000				
FY 86						
Chad		231,500				
Chad		20,000				Macro-economic analysis
Gambia		50,000				Analysis of reform under Sec. 206
Gambia		30,000				Relationships between bankers and farmers
Gambia		40,000				Agricultural pricing
Mali	60003	28,500	A	RD/AMIS	Abt Assoc.	Cereals marketing policy analysis
Mali	60004	22,000				AEPRP studies
Mali		95,000				Policy study of food security
Mali		235,000			Tufts	Demand consumption analysis
Mali	60007	93,000				Private sector analysis
Mali	60026	—			Oppenheim	Food security analysis
Mali		14,000				Computer support to food security analysis
Mali		108,000				
Mali						

FIGURE 1
SPAP FUNDING CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

BUY-IN	PIO/T NUMBER	OBLIGATION AMOUNT	A	BUY-IN TO	GRANTEE	PURPOSE
Senegal		120,000	A		Mich. State Univ.	Food security analysis
Senegal	50081	25,500	A			Economic policy study on enterprises
			A			
Senegal				Direct	U. of Claremont-Ferrand	Fiscal policy assessment of direct taxation
Senegal	50124	90,000	A	Af Food Sec	Mich. State Univ.	Strengthening food security
Senegal	60002	69,500		Direct	J.F. Damon	Monitor National Agr. Policy
Senegal	60005	10,000		Direct	N. Shafik	Analysis of GOS budget receipts/expenditures
Senegal	50081	22,500	A	Direct	L. Lawson	Economic policy study on enterprises
	60006	6,000			Oliver Oldman	Direct Taxation Study
	60007	2620		Direct	J. de la Geroday	Privatization TOR
FY Total		1,313,120				
				FY 87		
Chad		193,000				Famine prevention policy unit
Chad		55,000				Grain marketing study
Senegal	50124	273,000		Ag Food Sec.	Mich. State Univ.	Technical Assistance 1986-1988
Senegal	60017	5,000		Direct	Papa Ndao	Study of Structural Adjustment Impacts
Senegal	50124	335,000	A2		Mich. State Univ.	Food security study - New Agr. Policy
Senegal		245,000	A2		Mich. State Univ.	Food security study - New Agr. Policy
Senegal		200,000	A3			Study of primary health care
Senegal		122,000	A3			Privatization strategy
Senegal		28,000	A3		Mich. State Univ.	Food security study - New Agr. Policy
Mali		650,000				Food security study
Mali		237,000				Revenue administration
Mali		20,000				PMRC evaluation
Mali		260,000			Mich. State Univ.	Food security study
Mali		135,000				Private sector study
Mali		200,000				AEPRP self-help studies
Mauritania		200,000				Private sector initiatives
FY Total		3,158,000				
				FY 88		
SWA	8616107	68,600		DFM	ARD	User based public goods strategy dev.

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FIGURE 1
SPAP FUNDING CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

BUY-IN	PIO/T NUMBER	OBLIGATION AMOUNT	A	BUY-IN TO	GRANTEE	PURPOSE
Chad		150,000				Food Policy Analysis
FY Total		218,000				
				FY 89		
SWA	9615105	300,000		RD/FSS	Mich. State Univ.	Regional cereals research
SWA	9615106	159,500		RD/AMIS	Abt Assoc.	Strengthening agricultural marketing
SWA	9615107	110,000	A	RD/FIRM	Ohio State University	Research on rural financial markets
SWA	9615108	51,000	A	RD/ARIES	Nathan Assoc.	Analysis of the informal sector
FY Total		620,500				
				FY 90		
SWA	0615002	224,782	A	RD/ACCESS	Wis. Land Tenure Center	Research on land tenure models - Froidenberger - LTC
SWA	0615003	296,436		GEMINI	Development Alternatives	Organize regional private sector conference
SWA	0615003	40,000		DFM	Assoc. in Rural Devel.	Decentralization in the Sahel - strategy paper
SWA	0615004	70,000		CTTA	Academy for Educ. Dev.	Communication for technology transfer in Agr.
SWA	0615006	72,500		CAER	Harvard College - Tufts	Strykker Exchange Rate Study
SWA	0615008	137,000	A	RD/SARSA	Clark University and IRG	Develop natural resource data base
SWA	0615010	7,000		Direct	S. Tucker	SRI PP amendment
SWA	0615012	300,000		RD/FSS	Mich. State Univ.	Food security research - PRISAS
SWA	0619000	89,961		DFM	ARD	Decentralization advice to Gov't. of Mali and decentralization study
SWA	0615003	38,771		DFM	ARD	Synthesis paper on user-based RNR mgt., Cape Verde decentralization research OECD conference _____ _____
FY Total		1,276,450				
				FY 91		
Chad		200,000				Food policy analysis

FIGURE 1
SPAP FUNDING CHRONOLOGY (Cont'd)

BUY-IN	PIO/T NUMBER	OBLIGATION AMOUNT	A	BUY-IN TO	GRANTEE	PURPOSE
SWA	1614001	178,000		CAER	Assoc. for inter RD	AIRD exchange rate study
SWA	1614002	250,000		RD/FSS	Mich. State Univ.	Food security research - PRISAS
SWA	1614003	72,000		RD/AMIS	Abt. Assoc.	Livestock trade policy action plan
SWA	1614004	210,000		GEMINI	Development Alternatives	Small enterprise development
SWA	1614006	64,000		RD/APAP	HIID	Land Tenure, Decentralization
SWA	1614007	20,000		AMIS	Abt Assoc.	Agricultural marketing - livestock amendment
SWA		50,000			Ohio State U. - Africa Rural Financial Markets	
FY Total		1,044,000				
				FY 92		
FY Total		0				
Project	Total					

Figure 1B
SPAP Buy-Ins from USAID/Mali and USAID/Senegal

Buy-In	PIO/T Number	Obligation Amount	Buy-In To	Grantee	Purpose
Mali	70091 ---		---	---	Employment and enterprise creation round table ---
Mali	70094 ---	--- ---	--- ---	--- ---	PSC contractor - WID coordinator ---
Mali	60003 ---	28,500 ---	AMIS ---	Abt ---	Cereals market situation
Mali	60004 ---		IQC ---	--- ---	Studies
Mali	60005 ---	235,000	Coop Agreement	Tufts	Impact of food policy reform on consumption and nutrition
Mali	6007	95,000	Ag. Food Security	MSI	Food security policy study ---
Mali	60026		Oppenheim		Formal and informal sector employment study
Mali	60029	237,000(?)			Private sector, tax and regulation (AEPRP?)
Mali	70076		---	---	PSC-WID Strategies
Mali	70080		---	---	Rural and regional credit study
Mali	70029		Coop agreement	Tufts	Consumption studies, 3rd round
Mali	70057	260,000	Ag. Food Security	MSU	Grain market Stabilization and policy studies
Mali	70010		IQC		AEPRP evaluation
Mali	70011		Aj Food Security	MSU	Food Security Studies
* There are 5 other PIO/C's for commodity and equipment procurement; and two PIO/T's for invitational travel.					
Senegal	50085	16,500	Direct	C'e gen. Fiduciere	Banking Liquidity Study
Senegal	50103	70,000	Direct	U. Clermont-Ferrand	Fiscal policy assessment of direct taxation
Senegal	50077	75,000	IQC	Berger (Hady Ly)	Seed Storage Studies
Senegal	50081	28,500	Direct	Oliver Oldman	Economic Policy Study on Enterprises
Senegal	60005	12,195	Direct	Nemat Shafik	GOS budget receipts/expenditures analysis
Senegal	60006	6,000	Direct	Oliver Oldman	Enterprise Study
Senegal	60007	2,620	Direct	Jean de la Giroday	TOR for World Bank TA on privatization
Senegal	60017	5,000	Direct	Papa Ibrahima Ndao	Monitoring Structural Adjustment
Senegal	50078	65,000	Direct		Study of Male Attitudes toward FP.

FIGURE 1B
SPAP BUY-INS FROM USAID/MALI AND USAID/SENEGAL (Cont'd)

Buy-In	PIO/T Number	Obligation Amount	Buy-In To	Grantee	Purpose
Senegal	50124	335,000	Ag. Food Sec.	MSU	ISRA, Ag Policy Advisor
Senegal	60002	43,000	PSC	J.F. Damon	Monitoring New Ag Policy
Senegal	50095	76,500	Direct	Arthur Anderson	CPSP Audit

Regional-Level Institutions and SPAP Activities:

SWA began what became a trend toward preponderant use of the SPAP mechanism in FY 1988, with the first of three buy-ins to RD/EID's Decentralization: Finance and Management Project (DFM) (see Figure 2). By FY 1989, the Office was buying in in a major way, with a total for that year of $620,500, divided among four buy-ins. Of these, one was again to MSU, complementing what was being done in Mali and Senegal, but sponsoring food security research capacity at the Sahel Institute (INSAH) under an activity known as PRISAS--the Sahel Regional Program for Strengthening Institutional Research Capacity on Food Security in the Sahel. This activity is on-going, and will now be continued and expanded under a new project called PADRES, under which additional components support work on natural resources management, and a management unit to assist in the institutional development of INSAH itself. There is an anticipated research grants component to foster continuing work by Sahelian researchers, and there will be an on-going relationship with MSU (see box).

A second buy-in in FY 1989 funded what is now considered a landmark study on livestock marketing in the Sahel, carried out under a buy-in to Abt Associates' AMIS Project--another of the cooperative agreements managed by RD/EID. This study, carried out by John Holtzman and Nicholas Kulibaba, has set the baseline for work which is still on-going on the various aspects of livestock marketing in the Sahel and between the Sahel and the coastal states, and was significant in reorienting research and policy efforts away from livestock production per se toward improved and liberalized livestock marketing. The study also provided the background for a joint A.I.D.-World Bank Action Plan, "Liberalizing Regional Markets for Livestock Products: An Action Plan for the Mali, Burkina and Cote d'Ivoire Corridor" (1992). Since the Action Plan was developed, the work done by Holtzman and Kulibaba, and being furthered by Kulibaba under SPAP/ONI funding, has helped the Club and the CILSS advance the policy dialogue on regional livestock marketing which was furthered at the recent Nouakchott conference (March 1992), and which will be a key case study presented at the forthcoming Africa Bureau Agricultural Development Officers' conference. The study, action plan and policy dialogue have also had an impact on the design of USAID/Mali's APEX project in the livestock sector. Livestock marketing patterns and policy are a key issue in the growing debate on protectionism versus free market zones, and the overall dialogue on regional integration in West Africa.

The third buy-in, to the Ohio State University cooperative agreement on rural financial markets, funded a literature review on Sahelian credit explored informal financing in Senegal, Niger and Chad, with the idea of funding a conference on informal trade financing in 1990, based on the study results. The individual studies were deemed useful, but at first, there was apparently not sufficient interest to move on to a next, workshop or conference phase. According to the researcher interviewed, there appears to have been no impact of this analysis at the individual country level that he is aware of; the two credit movements that were analyzed in Niger--the Would Council of Credit Unions program and the CLUSA program--are still in place, but so far as he is aware, the case studies did not lead to any redirection of the programs. He argues that this may be because the review was fairly positive in both cases, pointing up risks rather than uncovering problems.

The conference on finance and rural development in West Africa did take place, in Ouagadougou in 1991, under the parent cooperative agreement. SWA funds were used specifically to enable African participants to present papers, and for translation of these papers from French into English and vice versa, so that the proceedings will be accessible to the broadest possible audience. It may be worth noting that OSU is now doing a strategic framework for agribusiness financing for AFR/ARTS/FARA, so that the same themes are, to some extent, being pursued, arguing for a multiplier effect from the original SPAP funding.

The final, significantly smaller buy-in by SWA for FY 1989 was to the PRE-managed ARIES project with Nathan Associates, to analyze the informal sector in the region. This analysis was carried out by Jenefer Bremer, and led to the development of a strategy statement on the informal sector in the Sahel. A report was prepared for the Club, and it appears that this work was a complement to later work on small and medium enterprise carried out through a buy-in to GEMENI (see below), as well as to the work just discussed carried out by OSU. The relative impact of these activities at the national and regional levels on policy formulation, implementation, institutional development and on A.I.D. programming is discussed in the following section.

Figure 2 shows an internal SWA assessment of impacts on policies from SPAP-funded activities prepared in conjunction with the recent portfolio review. In the evaluation team's estimation, these impacts are appropriately assessed, and the figure in very summary form makes the case that in many instances, rather a little money went a long way to affect policy change. The assessment is based on cables, PIRs and informal communications from the field.

FIGURE 2

Internal A.I.D. Assessment of SPAP Impact

FY	COUNTRY	SUB-ACTIVITY	IMPACT
85	Senegal	Seed Storage study	Farmers not dependent on GOS for seeds
	Senegal	Study of Parastatal reform	Abolition of two parastatals
	Burkina	Study of private sector strategies for 5-year plan	Tax incentive reform and critique of state owned enterprises
	Chad	Fiscal Analysis to encourage economic reform	Preparation for IMF Negotiations; Census of public employees
86	Gambia	Analysis of reform under Section 206 agreement. Pricing study on major Agr. products	g. lization
	Senegal	MSU Food Security Analysis Project	ed Agr.
	Mali	Design of Section 206 Cereals Market Restructuring Project	Guided and Monitored Agr. Policy Reform
	Chad	Support to Famine Prevention Policy Unit	Data base on all food aid needs, to ensure timely delivery of the appropriate amount
87	Senegal	Further support to MSU food security analysis	Criteria for perpequation determinations set
	Mali	Food Consumption Study	Household-level analysis of effect of Mali cereals policy on nutrition levels
87	Mali	MSU Food Security Analysis Project	Understanding of constraints on farmers trying to increase production; evaluation of PRMC program; design of liberalized grain marketing system

FY	COUNTRY	SUB-ACTIVITY	IMPACT
	Mali	Agricultural Policy Project	Critique of GRM 1985 market intervention
	Chad	Support to Famine Prevention Policy Unit	Institutional basis for moving beyond famine relief towards development and reconstruction
88	Chad	Further Support to Famine Prevention Policy Unit	National-level guidance for local-level cereals banks
88	SWA/RGL	User-based public goods strategy development	Data and analysis supported decentralization policy dialogue.
89	SWA/RGL	MSU Food Security Analysis Project	Further liberalization of trade
	SWA/RGL	Informal Sector Study	Proposed means to assist small enterprises
	SWA/RGL	Informal Rural Finance	Increased availability of rural credit
	SWA/RGL	Regional Marketing Study	Improved potential for inter-regional livestock trade Mali, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast
90	SWA/RGL	Land Allocation Study	Improved methods of land dispute resolution
90	SWA/RGL	Decentralization studies and advice to Gov. of Mali	Examples for other Saheline states of _____ models)
90	SWA/RGL	Synthesis of experience with user-based RNR management	Examples for enhanced policy dialogue on-going
	SWA/RGL	Land Tenure/ Decentralization	Forestry and tenure regulatory reform in several Sahelian countries
	SWA/RGL	Private Sector	Research and support for a regional workshop on sector issues

FY	COUNTRY	SUB-ACTIVITY	IMPACT
	SWA/RGL	Exchange Rate and Trade	Cereals and exchange rate policy research
90	SWA/RGL	Geographic Information Systems and INSAH	Technology introduction and use in NRM problems in the Sahel
91	SWA/RGL	Livestock Action Plan	Joint-funded with World Bank, regulatory and policy reforms which could increase average returns to livestock producers by 57%
	SWA/RGL	MSU Food Security in Africa Project	Policy research and capacity building
	Chad	Food Policy Analyst	Monitoring/Design support to Mission Food aid program
	SWA/RGL	AIRD Exchange Rate Policy Study	Incremental increase to fund development of multi-commodity analysis framework for comparative advantage
	SWA/RGL	Conference on Financial Markets in Africa	Funding provided for African participants
	SWA/RGL	Private Sector Conference	Additional funding for regional conference

Impact on Policies

The first A.I.D. program in the Sahel designed in the aftermath of the great drought of 1968-1973 focused on food production (including livestock) and health care. In the mid- 1980s, both the international donors and the Sahelians, realized that Sahelian food problems were not only agronomic and technical, but also political and institutional. Even though scientific research and data collection are important, the adoption of certain policy instruments can help or hinder efforts to change the economic environment in the Sahel. SPAP was designed to make the connection between available data and information, and policy formulation. Very often, policy dialogues between donors and government officials tended to be void of meaning since they were not informed by research. On the other hand, the results of the research done in various institutes was sometimes seen as only relevant to academics and not relevant to policy formulation or implementation.

To fill the gap, SPAP has funded new programs or added resources to on-going programs to provide technical assistance to different Sahelian countries. It has also provided vital information directly to policy makers, to help governments identify the best combination of policies/programs with the best outcomes, and to train Sahelians in policy analysis. The impact of the program has been far-reaching.

Impact on Sahelian Institutional Capacity

SPAP has also widened the disciplinary coverage of national research programs. One of the characteristics of Sahelian research centers is typically the poor quality of their economic and political analyses. These institutions have inherited the French research tradition which has tended to work on ambitious and all-encompassing analytical frameworks, instead of highly focused economic issues or problem-oriented studies. Moreover, the research centers serve more as training centers leading toward academic degrees, than as source of policy recommendations, i.e. Ecole Nationale d'Economie Appliquée (ENEA) or Centre de Recherche Economique Appliquée (CREA), both in Senegal. SPAP programs have enabled U.S. institutions, such as MSU, to provide Sahelian countries the necessary technical assistance, and also training and supervision for some 100 Sahelians enrolled in Masters and Ph.D. degrees in agricultural economics, rural sociology, and computer science. MSU has also organized training sessions for junior Sahelian researchers in their respective fields and in computer science.

In addition, important and intangible benefits were acquired by the Sahelian researchers, long isolated and out-of-date in their fields, who have the opportunity to interact with their colleagues, to criticize or be criticized by them. U.S. researchers have also benefitted from that communication and access to new information and perspectives. Soon, a wealth of new knowledge on farmer behavior, dynamics of production, marketing and consumption, was made available to the public and to policy makers for use.

SPAP also directly strengthened local institutions, a key element for the sustainability of the various programs. Many Sahelian institutions are weak. Even where physical facilities are in good condition, they are underutilized for lack of staff and salaries, and modern equipment. The budgetary allocations made by Sahelian governments to research institutions has been decreasing in absolute terms since the late 1970s. The trend was accelerated by the governments' moves to cut spending on public institutions (structural adjustment). SPAP funding has enabled Sahelian institutions to acquire more equipment, especially to computerize some departments and help in the publication of results of research on those institutions (see papers and articles published by ISRA, some of which were published in English in MSU's International Development Paper Series). The computer equipment and supplies were turned over to Sahelian institutions at the end of the projects. Computer files with improved data bases were also left to these institutions (database on food security ISRA, CESA).

Senegal - Hady Ly and Seed Storage

The first structural reforms initiated by the Senegalese government focused on the agricultural sector. Agricultural reforms were urgently needed, and they have been on the policy agenda longer than any other sector. USAID/Dakar has been involved since 1981 in policy discussions with the Government of Senegal, and with other donors, and has pushed for a liberalization of the input market and specifically, for the development of a private sector network for seed storage, input distribution and output marketing.

In April, 1984, the Government adopted the Nouvelle Politique Agricole (NPA), whose stated objectives were to increase farmers' power and initiative vis a vis state developmental agencies and to take over tasks formerly undertaken by state-run institutions, a policy that came to be known as "responsibilisation".

An important component of that policy was the withdrawal of the state from seed storage activities. Almost immediately, sparked heated debates within the Government. But in April 1985, the President of Senegal decided that starting with the 85/86 cropping season, government entities would no longer be involved with peanut seed storage, and farmers would keep their own peanut seed. This was a sharp departure from past practices under which farmers received their seeds from state agencies, such as ONCAD and SONAR. It was a political decision backed by insufficient study on farmer behavior and storage techniques. So as to settle the argument, USAID/Dakar, through SPAP, hired a local consultant, Hady Ly, to determine the extent to which reserves were kept by farmers, their storage techniques,and how viable their stored seeds were. It was expected that analyses of the data would lead to specific actions by the GOS, contributing to a more assured withdrawal of the state from the seed supply business.

The consultant, a Senegalese agronomist, longtime director of a major agricultural parastatal and government advisor on agricultural policies, opened his own consulting company in the late 70s, and since then has had contracts from local institutions as well as from international ones. He designed and conducted the seed storage project, hired and supervised all personnel needed to conduct surveys, and coordinated closely with the firm that was selected by A.I.D. for the computerized tabulations of survey results. The study confirmed that farmers kept their own peanut and cereal seeds. In a public debate on tv, the Minister of Agriculture, then Famara Jagna, relied heavily on Hady Ly's study to make the government's point. The study also stressed the fact that facilities for storage were weak. Consequently, USAID/Dakar later financed storage facilities adapted to the real and specific needs of Senegalese farmers.

MSU Support to ISRA:

The SPAP/MSU/ISRA program has helped the reorganization of ISRA. ISRA is the major food research institution in Senegal, created in the mid 1970s. It has five, primarily product-based, research departments. SPAP funding went to the Department of Farming Systems (Systèmes Agraires et Economie Agricole). This Department hosted the Bureau of Macroeconomic Analysis (BAME) which was of major interest to MSU. SPAP/MSU intervention has strengthened that institution. A significant part of its output and visibility was based on collaborative research carried out with Michigan State University. The general focus of the work was on food aspects of rural food security, crop marketing, adoption and distribution of fertilizers and other inputs, and on farmer organizations. BAME research has been instrumental in building up CSA's Market Information System. BAME has also had a significant input into the NPA program. Although the NPA was initiated before the existence of BAME, the NPA was not adopted before the second half of the 1980s and a series of workshops and seminars based largely on BAME research have contributed to finalize its design.

BAME, currently an independent unit in ISRA, has a program that cuts across the ISRA departments. Moreover, BAME is member of two Committees: the Food Security Information Task Force under the tutelage of the Direction of Agriculture, and of the Committee on Inputs that advises on policies related to input markets, particularly fertilizers. In addition, BAME is presently conducting a research program with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) on income generation and diversification in rural areas. BAME success led the World Bank to finance a new unit within the Ministry of Rural Development, the most important decision making body in the agricultural policy area. The new unit, the Unité de Politique Agricole (UPA), has the mandate to guide and monitor agricultural reforms programs. UPA has relied on BAME research.

The BAME experience was repeated in Mali in terms of visibility and impact of the local institutions. In that country SPAP/MSU has worked with the state marketing agency (OPAM) and the technical secretariat of the Commission for Food Security (CESA). An MSU agricultural economist from Mali, acting as a Policy Information Analysis Specialist was available to work with OPAM on a consulting basis to assist in the design and monitoring of the plan of action. The CESA alliance with MSU made that institution's work available to the public, and especially the policy makers.

National-Level Policy Impacts

Sahelian governments, and especially the Senegalese and Malian governments, have relied to an increasing extent on the information and policy analysis by ISRA/MSU, Hady Ly, and CESA studies. The formulation and implementation of the Nouvelle Politique Agricole (NPA) in Senegal and the Cereal Markets Restructuring Program (PRMC) in Mali were heavily influenced by studies and recommendations by MSU/ISRA or MSU/CESA teams, namely the decision to place more responsibilities for input and output marketing and credit in the hands of private traders and farmer organizations.

In December 1989, the Senegalese government tried somewhat to revise its policy of liberalization of the agricultural sector by reintroducing subsidies. That policy, known as PASA, after the French name (programme d'adjustement structurel de l'agriculture), was criticized by the major donors such as the World Bank and A.I.D.. Those two institutions, meanwhile, continued their pressure for the government to speed up the pace of change.

Negotiations for PASA started early in 1990 and the debate became quite acrimonious at some points, as the government refused to accept a series of donor advice and conditions, notably in the area of rice pricing policy and fertilizer subsidies. In order to alter the terms of the debate, both the USAID and the World Bank started disseminating the results of SPAP-funded studies, e.g., the J.A. Duncan study on agricultural policy. The same studies were the major documents discussed in workshops and seminars within the ministerial units, as well as between Senegalese officials and researchers, A.I.D. and the World Bank staff. Those debates were critical in helping to resolve the differences among the various actors in the agricultural sector some two years later.

Many Sahelian countries in the mid-1980s and early 1990s witnessed the formulation and the beginning of implementation of different new industrial policies. Very often, however,

governments neglected factors such as the banking sector or tax policies that can help or hinder efforts to revitalize the industrial sector. SPAP was helpful in funding inter-related studies on tax, banking and enterprise.

This information, and resulting understanding, were important to the major actors as the state began its disengagement from the banking sector. For example, in Senegal, data obtained from the study on enterprises served to assist in the evaluation of the potential impact and improvement in the liquidity of Senegalese banks. It was also used in making a selection of enterprises and banks which were reimbursed as a matter of priority by the government.

Following the recommendations of studies of these kinds, the various governments at different speeds, have adopted a series of policy reforms more attuned to market analysis. As in the agricultural sector, the formulation and the implementation of measures were concomitant with the rise of the technocrats associated with the SPAP studies to positions of leadership (e.g., Bakary Kone in Mali in the Ministry of Budget), since they acquired the scarce professional and technical skills that the new adjustment policies required.

Cereals Market Liberalization in Mali:

Agriculture market liberalization was the first step to legitimate the concept of comparative advantage in countries where public opinion was molded by interventionist ideologies.

The PRMC experience in Mali, which has been much studied, was interesting for a number of reasons. One was that this was one of the first times that group of donor countries got together to try to positively affect policy in a recipient country through the mechanism of food aid. A.I.D., which had usually been very leery of collaborating with other donors in this area, and which was specifically enjoined from commingling funds and from designing multi-year food aid programs except under very special conditions, nevertheless became a significant actor in the PRMC initiative, which was originally organized by WFP with the Government of Mali (GRM). Cereals market liberalization had a number of aspects, and was accomplished in several stages. One of the mechanisms that A.I.D. used to assist in liberalization was support to OPAM, the agricultural products marketing parastatal, which had developed significant deficits, so as to help it to make needed cuts in staff, improvements in internal management, as well as to cut back significantly on its intervention into the rural economy. The market information system work funded through MSU was based on OPAM.

There were a number of aspects to the reform, including a series of studies that were prepared by a bilateral team of scholars, headed initially by MSU, through a series of buy-ins to SPAP. These studies were used to help inform GRM decision makers as well as USAID/Bamako staff, about policy choices and their likely impact on food security. Like the ISRA example, the PRMC example shows that scholarly collaboration and training for advanced degrees under MSU academic supervision have helped develop Sahelian economic analysis capacity while, at the same time, helping to develop Sahelian institutions. These benefits were realized in addition to the nature and scope of the policy reforms achieved themselves, which were also considerable.

Mali had been characterized by extreme intervention into the rural economy, both in the provision of inputs and the marketing of outputs, with the existence of a sort of fiscal police force monitoring internal trade--and exacting high rents--as well as the usual panoply of parastatal organizations, and extremely restrictive regulations on private trade in cereals. There were strong incentives for the GRM to keep this system in place, since it favored urban-based workers and civil servants, while exacting the greatest cost from producers who were politically less vocal. Little was understood about food security issues, including issues of access, or about seasonal or regional disparities in food security. There were a number of beliefs closely held among government officials--and some donors--about the necessity of government intervention in the market, and about farmer behavior, that were not based in real data.

USAID/Mali, both through the cereals marketing liberalization program, and through other efforts, including a farming systems research project, attempted to establish and disseminate the results of a series of data gathering and analysis efforts that would help to change policy and eliminate distortions in the market.

Food Security Networking

Josue Dione, Dramane Coulibaly, and Nango Dembele, among others,have continued to be involved in work on food security in Mali and in the Sahel more broadly, through continuing relationships sponsored by A.I.D. through SPAP-funding and brokered through the MSU Food Security Project. Of these, the latest is PADRES, and the one on-going is PRISAS, which was mentioned earlier in this report.

Dione and Dembele, both of whom were involved with USAID/Mali bilateral and SPAP funded activities in support of GRM cereals marketing reform, have studied at MSU, where Dione maintains a faculty appointment. Dione is also a key member of the technical complement at INSAH, the Institut du Sahel, where he is closely involved in the work of PRISAS in collaboration with Dramane Coulibaly at the CILSS Secretariat in Ouagadougou. Under PADRES, the proposed A.I.D. follow-on project, Dione is likely to be able to become the coordinator of a program of small grants which will encourage other young Sahelian researchers to embark on agricultural economics and related reacarch on food security issues.

Dramane Coulibaly was a participant trainee in agricultural economics at MSU in 1977 under the special Sahelian program, selected when he was a Malian civil servant in Mopti. Coulibaly was first involved at CILSS with under an Italian-funded project, and has had a number of different, donor-funded positions at the Secretariat. He was at one point supposed to be reassigned to INSAH, where he would have been able to continue his collaboration with Dione and others more directly. Under the proposed CREPAG, the Projet de Cordination Regionale des Politiques Agro-Alimentaires--a multi-donor funded effort designed to link more closely the results of research on food security and policy makers' decision making--Dione and Coulibaly are likely to be able to continue the collaboration they have forged under PRISAS and will also be able to reinforce it under PADRES, while continuing their relationship with MSU. They are hopeful that Nango Dembele, who is still at MSU, and who was involved with PRMC at OPAM, will be able to continue to work with them under one programmatic relationship or another when he completes his studies.

This set of Sahelian applied researchers, who are now becoming relatively senior in the CILSS institutional hierarchy, have been able to capitalize on their academic work at MSU, as well as on the relationships forged with MSU academics through the Food Security Project. Their work on food security issues and related questions of cereals marketing and distribution has had a catalytic effect on policy dialogue in the region, and some of this work was originally funded by SPAP buy-ins to the Food Security Project. Dione is still working informally with the new Malian Government through ties established when he was a graduate student working on the SPAP-funded PRMC studies.

It is noteworthy that at first, Mali Mission program staff believed that the proposed SPAP-funded studies would not yield policy-relevant conclusions in time to affect the policy dialogue, and recommended against funding them. The Mission Agricultural Economist, however, who had a substantive as well as a bureaucratic interest in the outcome of these efforts, urged that they be funded, and guided the process along for the duration of her tenure in the Mission. Fortunately, a modality was arrived at to ensure data availability early--working papers, and reports of work in progress were systematically provided to PRMC members more or less as soon as data were available. Mission staff who were closely involved describe results as truly startling, as those who had been basing policy decisions on "myths" about farmer and trader behavior had their basic assumptions radically changed through exposure to real data presented in a tactful but compelling manner by Sahelian researchers, backed up by senior MSU faculty.

Another major impact of SPAP-funded programs is the availability of price data, a new development in Sahelian countries. In Senegal for example, the Food Security Commissariat (CSA) has instituted a Market Information System or SIM (French acronym) that surveys local cereal markets to gather price data to communicate to traders in various areas. The Malian government adopted the same measures. Thus, the transparency of the Malian market is assured by a wide distribution of information pertaining to factors affecting the cereal market, such as price, export and import policies, volume and date of anticipated food aid.

To reach producers and consumers, the SIMs in both countries used radio broadcasting in local languages, while the urban users were reached through written media. For policy makers and institutional users of SIM data, the distribution channels are largely the written press (every two weeks in "Essor" or "Le Soleil") and SIM bulletins. The information is so well received in Mali that traders have used SIM data in their negotiations with the authorities. Government officials and donor representatives have also used SIM data in their policy dialogue, especially during the implementation of the structural adjustment programs.

Regional-Level Policy Impacts

The regional impact of SPAP funding through USAID Missions is more difficult to assess since the Missions have usually remained focused on the domestic agendas of their respective countries, just as the Sahelian governments have been. During the earlier stages of the project, then, regional impacts are perhaps better seen as beneficial side effects than as planned outcomes. However, research done at the national level has served as baseline information to conduct regional-level reviews and dialogues. The increasing dialogue among Sahelian institutions and among Sahelian experts through regional committees, associations and council meetings as well as at seminars and workshops has stimulated new research on regional food security issues in these countries. The USAID/World Bank workshop on food security and economic growth in the Sahel in September 1989 is also an outcome of the SPAP studies. There was a subsequent workshop held at IFPRI in 1988, with contributions from MSU, Elliott Berg, Tufts and IFPRI.

At the institutional level, BAME and CESA among other institutions, are members of the "Committee of Experts" that has been put in place by CILSS to advise on national policies with respect to local and cross-border trade.

In sum, SPAP funded-activities have encouraged the emergence of a new type of researcher and practitioner in the Sahel, one who is more pragmatically oriented. They have enabled A.I.D. to make inroads in systems controlled by the French. SPAP funding has also helped upgrade pre-existing institutions and make them more visible in the national debate. All of these elements have helped Sahelian governments to identify problems that have prevented growth, analyze programs more thoroughly, and formulate strategies liberating market forces. At the same time, foreign institutions such as Michigan State University have found umbrellas under which to develop their programs, and were able to work with Sahelians using the same baseline.

Impacts within A.I.D.:

It is fair to argue that the SPAP funded activities discussed in some detail above served to inform A.I.D.'s analytic agenda, as well as those of the CILSS and the Club. They also served to strengthen other regional foci, and to strengthen A.I.D.'s hand vis a vis those of other donors in terms of introducing new policy questions or strengthening existing policy orientations at the national level and in the region, which in turn meant reorientation of A.I.D. bilateral programming. It is important to note as well that the RD and PRE-managed cooperative agreements were still in their first and second generations during this period, and were supposed to be "demand driven".

Therefore, the significant buy-ins from Missions through SPAP, and from SWA, meant that RD (then S&T) could justify continued funding to the university and other cooperators to explore specifically African--and Sahelian--topics. Given that in the late 1970s and early 1980s many of these cooperators--particularly Wisconsin/LTC and Ohio State for example--had little or no African expertise, and were given funding specifically to enhance their capacity in the African area, this additional tangible source of support for capacity building was very important. It is also significant that SPAP buy-ins were at high levels during the various "slumps" in S&T's credibility within the Agency, reflected in periodic attempts by the regional bureaus to "redline" large parts of the S&T budget.

S&T funding to universities and consulting firms, as well as PRE funding to consulting firms, and PPC/EA funding to Tufts University, to maintain and enhance levels of expertise in Africa also meant that support was available for Sahelian and other African experts. As we have seen in the text boxes, individuals who began as host government officials, and were later sent for Masters or Ph.D.-level training at cooperating institutions such as MSU--returned to the Sahel to work as researchers at CILSS institutions such as INSAH, at universities, and to design and implement policy reforms within their home governments. This is part of the capacity building picture both at the U.S. institutions, and then at the Sahelian institutions. Through these former trainees, who in some cases were funded by SPAP, linkages to these U.S. institutions are maintained.

THE PAST FOUR YEARS

As we have already noted, FY 1988 was a watershed year for SPAP, starting a trend toward regionally-oriented utilization of project funds which continued after the PACD extension in April 1990. In part, this change, reflected changes in the regional environment SPAP is designed to influence. In part, it may be seen as also reflecting an adaptation to the changing internal A.I.D. environment which, itself, is linked to that broader regional reality.

This change was taking place as the Sahel Development Program was being replaced by the Development Fund for Africa, which allowed Missions to spend bilateral funds on topics which had broader than bilateral relevance. That this sort of regional funding utilization by Missions had been precluded by the SDP had been one of the key arguments for maintaining SPAP as a mechanism for funding studies and technical support which had a regional focus. There does not seem to be an immediately obvious answer to the question why SWA, under these changing circumstances, felt it necessary to so firmly lead the way in the regional direction, given that Missions now could, theoretically, take some of the steps along the same path themselves.

When the PACD was extended, as we have noted, Missions were in fact precluded from buying into SPAP as they had done before 1990. The reasoning behind eliminating the Mission buy-in ceilings seems to have been based on instructions from the Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Africa Bureau embodied in the approval of the PACD extension. As reported in the cable notifying the field of that extension, the bureau guidance was:

> "2. ...DAA/AFR stipulated that in utilizing the project, AFR/SWA/REGL office should be careful not to substitute its sahel regional portfolio funds for purely bilateral purposes. Missions should continue to utilize their own funds through PD and S and various buy-ins to support their own studies and policy analyses. AFR/SWA/REDL is to utilize SPAP <u>for policy analysis support to CILSS/Club du Sahel and other regional policy dialogue fora. Nevertheless, if bilateral missions wish to continue to buy into subject project for longer term policy analysis work with their own funds, this use of subject project can still be considered.</u>

Missions are reminded that the new ADS project is also now available for longer term buy-ins of this kind" (Italics added, State 149764).

When the PACD was extended, the stricture against buy-ins from Missions was in part derived from the fact that SPAP already had a very significant pipeline, while there was a perception that SRI was under-funded. Thus, the idea was to use SPAP funds to supplement the SRI monies, without having to deobligate them and reobligate them under the amended SRI project. It was SWA staff who came up with the policy analysis agenda and rational, a primarily regional one, to allow for project continuity rather than deobligation.

Other changes in the internal A.I.D. environment already alluded to above made it less necessary to support Sahel Missions in their policy related endeavors. They had, for example, access to the Accelerated Economic Policy Reform Program (AEPRP), and other policy-based grant mechanisms to stimulate policy-related projects. By 1990, the move toward non-project assistance (NPA) was well along, and sector grants and other performance-based programs were

becoming more prevalent. Thus, it was probably appropriate for the emphasis of SPAP funding to shift from the Mission/national level to the regional level. This would also seem to have been appropriate given the somewhat activist role taken by a series of U.S. Representatives to the Club in Paris, and the A.I.D. Representatives based in Ouagadougou whose role was to deal with regional programs in general, and the CILSS in particular.

The extension of SPAP in 1990 was in part justified in these terms, as may be seen from the language of the Action Memo:

> "The Key Issue: The attached Action Memorandum explains how our management of this Sahel Regional institutions program, toward such a bilateral support end, depends upon our access to independent policy analysis support services. In this sense we resemble any bilateral mission: we need our own policy analysis perch from which we can strategize for the collaborative policy dialogue and information management work with host, African institutions. This work is the focus of our project portfolio; in order to design and manage it we need to elaborate our input more independently than is possible through the collaborative work funded out of the CILSS projects themselves...
>
> "Conclusion: The Sahel Policy Project is the only non-CILSS Sahel Regional project that we have ever sought to retain since the Sahel Development Program (SDP) funds were melded into the DFA. We have sought to retain it, however, precisely because, for the reasons noted above, it is crucial to our effectiveness in managing this CILSS portfolio on behalf of our Sahel bilateral missions" (italics in original)".

AID and the Other Donors:

A related "Information Memorandum for the DAA of the Africa Bureau spells out the "USG" purposes of SPAP even more concretely, given the likely differences of the U.S. position on a variety of policy matters from those of other donors and, indeed, the Sahelian states. Once again, SPAP is clearly linked to the CILSS/Club mechanism:

> "Why CILSS/Club du Sahel?
>
> a) economies of scale in development information (including policy analysis) management for a subregion with common problems;
>
> b) routinized access to decision-making levels in other donor agencies for donor co-ordination understandings which can be perpetually recalled, revitalized and renewed; and
>
> c) an Africanization of these policy analysis understandings before the bilateral policy dialogue confrontation begins.

Figure 3
SPAP-Funded Interventisons Related to Club/CILSS Activities

Dév de l'entreprise de Lattre	CREDI-BLE (foncier/ décentral isation.) Lewis (7)	NEXUS Snrech (7)	Espaces régionaux (CREPAG) Pradelle	Elevage (8)	Sécurité alimentaire	Dossiers horizon- taux
Diagnostic sur les pays (Coureolle)	Forums locaux (Bourgoignie)	Modélisation INSAH/PADRES (1, 2) (Sarech)	PRISAS et al.	commer-cialisa-tion (Guéria)	Evaluation de la Charte (d'Agostino)	*Etudes, Publications (S31S)* Bienefelt
Comité de pilotage élargi (4)	Avant-Praïa (3, 7) (Bourgoignie)	Wageningen et suivi (6)	Ateliers agences (d'Agostino)	Nouakchott (8)	Réseau: prévention des crises	*Réunions*
Organisation des entrepreneurs (Grant) (4)	Observatoire foncier/Gestion des terroirs (3)	Charte d'Harmo -nisation et Programme SAGE (6)	CINERGIE (BAD) (1, 2) (de Lattre)	CEBV	DIAPER/ PAROC, Plans céréaliers (1)	*Coordination* *Lewis*
Etat de dri-	Démocra-tisation (éducation)	Aménagement du territoire	WALTPS (PNUD/CE) (Cour)	Transhumance	Advantages comparatifs (2)	*Prospective* *Snrech*
PME et Code d'investis-sement (Grant) (4)	"Gouver-nance" (éducation) (7)	Politique dév.agr.et env. (e.g. fertiliser subsidies)	Intégration Régionale (2)	(Range Management)	Charte d'aide alimentaire	*APD/ODA et politiques d'Aide* *Bienefeit*
(crédit et épargne) (5)	Femmes/ Foncier (3)	Planification familialc INSAH/ CERPOD	Migration	(Femmes et l'élevage)	(Banques céréalières,, stratégies domestiques)	*Femmes, Env. et Dév. FEEDEV Bourgoignie*

SPAP - Funded Interventions:

(1) MSU Food Security
(2) AIRD Economic Modelling
(3) Land Tenure Center/Wisconsin
(4) GEMINI
(5) Ohio State University Financial Markets
(6) SARSA/Clark/IRG
(7) ARD/DFM
(8) Abt/AMIS

"Why a long-term, independent studies fund?

a) to influence the terms of reference for CILSS/Club studies, and, therefore, the workplan for those two organizations, we need to be able to prove, with our own analytical resources, our points;

b) it is a lot easier to introduce U.S. ideas, than U.S. experts, into the CILSS/Club policy debates: for every U.S. expert the Club agrees to fund, a non-U.S. point of view has to be heard from;

c) the acceptance of these new ideas requires that their originators be on hand, over a long period of time, to help, unobtrusively, the Sahelians (CILSS) and the other donors (Club) to absorb them" (April 17, 1990).

Interviews at the CILSS, the Club, in individual member countries, and in A.I.D.\Washington indicate that in the past two to three years, A.I.D. has been instrumental in moving the policy agenda of the CILSS/Club considerably toward a series of new and important topics. In part, this move was stimulated by the Sahel Futures Study, to which the Club and the CILSS took an approach/avoidance stance when it first came out in 1988. But the areas of emphasis which it pointed toward have largely been espoused first by A.I.D.--and understanding of them deepened through SPAP funded studies--and then by the two institutions themselves.

Figure 3 gives an indication of how the regionally-oriented, SWA buy-ins funded through SPAP, have related to the CILSS/Club activity and policy agendas. A 1990 statement previewing these relationships stresses a number that actually were carried out, as can be seen from the Figure.

"* Furnish a two year, Francophone analytical presence from the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure Center...to all CILSS fora and collaborative research efforts being organized in the wake of the land tenure reform mandate of last years Natural Resources Management round table at Segou, Mali.

* Insinuate, over an initial period of sixteen months, a macroeconomic model building framework, through a Tufts University...presence...into ongoing French, European and Sahelian research efforts on West African, intraregional agricultural commerce. Without such "anglophone" models, this other research is likely, as has previously been the case, to give insufficient attention to comparative advantage questions and, therefore, to end up, once against, with protectionist conclusions. Many of our Sahel missions are counting on us to ensure that this regional trade research leads to policy recommendations inducing their West African state to guarantee, this time around, more open borders.

* Contribute, whole cloth, a microenterprise development vision to the Club du Sahel's Private Sector Development encounter scheduled for 1991 in Abidjan. This contribution would consist of research, discussion paper and organizational preparations provided, over the next year and a half, through AFR/ONI's and PRE/GEMENI project. It is well recognized by other donors in the Club that the United States has been practically alone, until recently, in giving serious attention to the development potential of the informal sector...

* In spite of the more than $30 million invested (over the last 15 years) in the CILSS/AGRHYMET program, there is a danger that CILSS's new Natural Resources Management information system could get set up....using computerized mapping technology incompatible with the system that we have established with AGRHYMET. To ensure compatibility of computer engineering and strategic NRM objectives, we need to get out in front of these multi-donor, NRM monitoring systems plans. Through an eighteen month buy-in to ST/RD's Geographic Information System (GIS) project (SARSA), combined [with] AFR/TR/ANR funded support from USGS/EROS, we hope to anticipate these other donor efforts so that, when they (inevitably) come, they will be obliged to build upon our software/hardware design".

Our evaluation demonstrates that these plans have almost all come to fruition, and have indeed had the desired impact on the policy initiatives and dialogue pursued in these domains by the CILSS/Club and some individual Sahelian states. The exception, on which the jury is still out, may prove to be the GIS effort. The prediction that other donors would be likely to try to put in place other soft and hardware for regional monitoring certainly proved prophetic in the light of recent events concerning the OSS initiative. As we will see in further detail below, the micro-enterprise initiative under GEMENI has had impacts both at the national level, as in Mali, and at the regional level through the broader Club program on the private sector.

Similarly, the work done by ARD under the RD/EID Decentralization: Finance and Management Project (DFM) has had considerable influence on the resources management, decentralization and participation agendas across the region and in particular countries (again, Mali is an example). ARD, under the AFR Governance and Democracy Project, is able to capitalize further on the knowledge base developed with SPAP funding. LTC's land tenure work has also had a continuing impact on the policy agenda and dialogue being pursued by the Club and the CILSS, and that going on within member states concerning security of tenure and local-level management of natural resources.

Decentralization and User-Based RNR Management

SPAP funding has been used to advance the dialogue on devolution and decentralization in the Sahel, largely through work done by ARD under the DFM Project. ARD, in turn, has involved a number of Sahelian scholars and consultants in this work, creating a critical mass of Sahelian expertise in this domain. Initial work on a draft strategy to promote user-based management of public goods was funded under a first SWA/REGL buy-in to DFM in 1988. This strategy development provided background documentation for an historic Sahel-wide Club/CILSS roundtable held in Segou, Mali in May 1989. This roundtable was attended by representatives of local rural organizations, as well as donor agency officials and government agency personnel. The purpose of the meeting was examine natural resources management in the Sahel. At the end of the meeting, the participants issued a declaration, concluding that:

"-This first 'trialogue' among village-level rural peoples, the governments of the Sahel, and the donors had to continue and had to lead to new approaches;
-The preferred modality for continuing the work at Segou would be a series of analytical studies by mixed teams plus regular meetings of working groups to consider the strategic policy level issues and to make action recommendations to all parties;
-Focus on three priority themes should begin to shape a new 'shared vision' for the Sahel and should lead quickly to specific policy recommendations for collaborative and collective action. These three themes are ecological preservation, decentralization, and land tenure."

The Government of Mali then requested assistance in developing a decentralization policy. This assistance was provided under a further buy-in to DFM from SPAP, along with a three-volume study on decentralization, service provision and user involvement in the Republic of Mali. A third buy-in funded the preparation of a synthesis paper summarizing findings from Chad, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Cape Verde about the relationship between decentralization and the provision of public services , and between governance and the sustained yield management of renewable natural resources (RNR), as well as decentralization research in Chad, in Cape Verde, and, finally, participation in the OECD Experts' Seminar on decentralization, education and the private sector.

SWA/SPAP/Impact on Policies 1988-1992

As we will see in further detail below, in FY 1988, the AFR/SWA office in A.I.D./Washington took over SPAP utilization and has used it ever since to expand the policy analysis agenda in the Sahel by funding activities and studies through the Club du Sahel and/or the CILSS. To some extent, this is going back to the early thinking when A.I.D.'s bilateral programs were conceived in a broader context in which the donors and the Sahelian countries agreed to come together within two new fora, the CILSS and Club, to achieve food self-sufficiency in the region. Indeed, it is necessary and illuminating to understand the context of the particular geographical zones in order to come to grips with specific cases and a comparative view reaching across the entire Sahel zone.

SPAP funding from 1988-1992 anticipated this return to a more regional orientation, and has tried to strengthen regional Sahelian institutional capacity to carry out policy analysis, extend their span of activities, and disseminate the results of their research more widely. SPAP has also stimulated new research on issues which are too sensitive to pursue at the national level, i.e. land tenure and user-based management of natural resources, decentralization, exchange rates, private sector deregulation, and the like. (This has been done under buy-ins and other support to projects and institutions such as GEMENI, CEBV, CERPOD and CREDIBLe).

On all of those issues and activities, SPAP provided studies and/or technical assistance (see Figure 3). The CILSS and the Club du Sahel umbrella allowed A.I.D. to intervene in traditionally "French" domains. Even French expertise embodied in such institutions as CERDI, CIRAD, IRAM and CNRS was mobilized by A.I.D. to work on programs ("dossiers") whose agendas were set in whole or in part by A.I.D.. In some cases, U.S. based researchers, such as Dirk Striker, have been able to collaborate with French researchers to broaden the scope of analysis of key regional economic issues.

One successful example of integrating a "U.S." concern with a French-funded activity through the Club has been the buy-in to GEMENI mentioned above. This is an example in which a SPAP buy in first supported Mission-level work, and later moved to the regional level, as may be seen from the text box.

West Africa Business Network

In 1989, SWA/RGL bought into the GEMINI Project to provide an innovative source of assistance to the Club du Sahel (OECD), to study the nature of micro and small-scale enterprises (MSE) in the Sahelian countries,and to help the Club to organize a major seminar of West African businessmen. The seminar was held in Dakar from November 22-25, 1991. Most of the financial assistance required to organize the seminar was provided through a SPAP buy-in to GEMINI, with additional funding from AFR/ONI. These activities are part of the culmination of five years of work on the regulatory framework for private enterprise carried out through OECD by Anne de Lattre and Michel Courcelle.

The businessmen's network is an instance in which A.I.D.--through the Club and the Steering Committee--is trying to work directly through private operators rather than through governments, to help to catalyze the private sector which, in turn, will bring pressure on governments in the Sahel region to create an enabling environment for private business. Foci for study and action include the regulatory climate in general, and restraints to free trade in the region.

Business people from each of the Sahelian countries and from Nigeria and other coastal countries are involved in this network, and under a new A.I.D. buy-in through SPAP, the Implementing Policy Change Project will be helping the Steering Committee to organize country based conferences which will replicate the one held in Dakar, and to move forward in implementing the 'private operators' perspective on an agenda for action". The Steering Committee have recently visited A.I.D./ Washington and the Club, and further activities are currently in the action planning stages.

At first, GEMINI, a centrally-funded project implemented by Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) and its subcontractors, was carrying out bilateral Mission strategy and evaluation tasks in the small and medium-enterprise area. Of particular note is the work done under GEMENI in Mali, where GEMENI staff helped to develop the Mission's private sector strategy, which included NGOs and for-profit entities. A central feature of GEMENI's agenda is the exploration of business subsectors, and subsectoral research was carried out in Mali, and at the Mission's request, included Malian entrepreneurs and NGOs. The Mission staff person responsible for the private sector strategy development effort that grew out of the initial GEMINI subsectoral analysis indicates that without the SPAP funding, it is unlikely that the Mission would have been able to use these services to develop its private sector strategy. The Mission buy-in was for $25,000. The Mission was trying to develop some institutional capacity in private sector activity among Malian PVOs, and GEMINI provided the first formal processional training for this

group. According to the Mission staff person, the collaboration of the Malians provided through the NGOs "completely changed the subsectoral analysis approach" being used. At the same time, he characterized this as one of the few centrally-funded efforts that, in his experience, actually had an impact on policy development, since the GEMINI experts brought in new ideas and means, so as to be able to challenge people in bureaucracies with something new, concrete and generalizable.

Yet, despite these efforts, the question of how to integrate regional issues into A.I.D. bilateral Mission programs remains open. Generally speaking, recent, research results on the dynamics of regional trade and exchange relationships in West Africa have yet to be used by Missions to inform the policy debate, or to serve as a conceptual basis for their strategic planning documents (CPSP, CDSS). At the project level, the same generalization applies, except for the recently designed Mali APEX livestock project, which specifically includes a regional marketing dimension. The need for coordination is pressing, since the success of one adjustment program--especially in the agricultural sector--is likely to be obtained at the expense of the neighboring countries.

On the Sahelian side, there are new signs of a more pragmatic approach to regional integration, taking into account new knowledge on the circulation of goods within the region, as demonstrated by the documents discussed at the Conference of Ministers of Agriculture in West and Central Africa (March 18-20, 1991; December 1991). However, the ongoing debates do not take full advantage of the latest recommendations on regional integration.

In fact, the resistance to being overwhelmed by regional issues in great: national governments jealous of their sovereignty--and US bilateral Missions fighting for the exclusive control of a "territory"--and different local vested interests all play a part. But, if the MSU/ISRA, MSU/CESA experience teaches us one thing, it is that the debate will be won by highly-qualified Sahalian experts placed in very effective institutions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Changing Policy Environment and Demand for SPAP:

Beginning in the 1980s, each of the eight Sahelian countries launched its own structural adjustment program to stabilize its national economy. Beyond regaining macro-economic equilibrium, the programs sought to spur long-term economic growth through a series of policy reforms of the main sectors of the respective economies--agriculture and industry.

In agriculture, the adjustment reforms were designed to reduce the government's role in production and marketing activities, including the liberalization of input markets and the gradual elimination of subsidies on fertilizers as well as the transfer of functions from state agencies to private ones, or to agricultural producers themselves.

The industrial reforms took a back seat to agricultural reform. The measures, however, emphasized the liberalization of trade policies to lower the level of protection benefitting national firms. This included the ending of quantitative restrictions, the reduction and harmonization of tariffs, the elimination of special tariffs for specific industries, and the liberalization of import licensing procedures. As discussed above, USAID/Senegal used SPAP as a means of funding studies relating to the New Industrial Policy.

The deregulation of the agricultural and industrial goods markets and the trade policies were complemented by fiscal reform and--in some cases--by devaluations of the local currencies, all measures aimed at enhancing economic performance. Some economies did in fact get back to normal, even though the Sahelian economies remain fragile.

It is, however, more and more clear that the same programs have introduced new disparities in the regional market. The focus on establishing a distinct level of prices that reconcile the interests of the national producers, consumers and government budgets goes against maximizing the potential for economic growth of the Sahelian economies taken together at the subregional level. The distortions between different monetary zones have increased since the adjustment policies were adopted. Of interest as well are the disparities created among CFA economies themselves because of the lack of synchronization in the implementation of the structural adjustment programs.

Those disparities become impediments to the region when one knows that the success of one program is at the expense of the neighboring country. If current trends in trade liberalization--which are strongly advocated by donor missions in the Sahel--continue, looking at neighboring markets outside national boundaries will be increasingly important in the ex ante evaluation of the costs and benefits of agricultural and industrial projects. Besides, the porosity of borders should convince actors about a subregional or regional approach. Other recent developments (migration, environment) in the Sahel show again that the entire economic context in which A.I.D. Missions are operating is changing. Policies cannot be designed at the national level alone, as has recently been recognized in USAID/Gambia's Action Plan for 1991-1995.

The Changing Environment in A.I.D.:

Increasingly over the past two to three years, the benefits of regional activities are being brought into question. The Africa Bureau, in part because of the way in which the DFA legislation is interpreted by the General Counsel, has placed a ceiling on the total amount of funds that can be allocated to regional projects.

During last year's reorganization of the Bureau, regional projects--except those in AFR/SWA and AFR/ARTS--were placed under the aegis of the Office of New Initiatives (ONI), which had formerly been devoted to private sector activities. Some of the regional projects, such as the two Sahel projects, and some agricultural and natural resources management activities--and now mega project for health, population and education--were not taken over by ONI, but rather remained with ARTS. Apparently, ONI has neither the sectoral expertise nor the management capacity to take on any more new (or old) regional activities.

However, the regional projects which remain outside ONI are somewhat anomalous, and are probably likely to remain in bureaucratic danger to the extent that they are not clearly serving all of Africa, which is the case of those in ARTS. Thus, it is the SWA projects which are likely to remain in some jeopardy, even though the regional portfolio just passed its review with flying colors.

If regional projects are in question in the Bureau, regional organizations are even less popular of late. SADCC, which has demonstrated significant impact during the years when the front line states were defending interests of the continent against the Republic of South Africa, has achieved some credibility. The OAU, however, which is involved as a management entity for the Bureau's SAFGRAD project, has been under scrutiny for some time. And the CILSS/Club nexus are also receiving closer and closer attention from management, including the management of SWA. But in this, A.I.D. is not alone. Many other members of the Club are questioning the efficiency and effectiveness of the CILSS, if not of the Club, especially now that the member states are having so much difficulty paying their contributions, and when the idea of regional integration is reaching beyond the strictly defined borders of the Sahel.

The donors have asked that the CILSS submit to a financial and management audit, the results of which are to guide the restructuring of the CILSS (relancement), and thus condition donor contributions, including A.I.D.'s, and member state contributions. Results are supposed to be available by November, 1992. The evaluation team participated in a significant number of discussions about the CILSS/Club nexus and its immediate and medium-term future. Our recommendations, which appear below, take this matter of the evolving mandate, size, structure, and role of the CILSS/Club apparatus into account.

Need for Additional Sahelian Technical Expertise:

Nearly all of those whom we interviewed, both within A.I.D., in host governments, in regional institutions, and among other donors--as well as in the Sahelian and U.S. private sectors--agreed that there needs to be more Sahelianization of technical expertise in the policy analysis areas traditionally supported by SPAP. Interviewees seem also to agree that the problem is not

necessarily one of total numbers of experts, but rather one of accessing their expertise, and continuing to build individual and institutional capacity for policy analysis at national and regional levels. Specifically, there is the question whether such experts can and should be "housed" at the CILSS institutions, such as INSAH, a model already being pursued under PADRES and other-donor efforts, or whether they should additionally (or instead) be located in para-public national institutions (ENEA, CESAG), or in private sector consulting firms. Whichever option is chosen, or emphasized, there is the additional question of who will access them and how.

Part of the answer to each of these questions relates to the equally fundamental question of the continuing role of the CILSS--and its Club counterpart--and its own internal capacity to carry out policy related analysis and dialogue. Is it is be a "think tank" at which people really carry out research, or rather a research management institution, where experts guide research agendas carried out by others, both nationally and regionally? The latter model, which is symbolized by the expression "faire faire" --seems to be gaining ground, especially given the current financial crisis facing the CILSS. Most CILSS staff interviewed for this evaluation--as well as most Club consultants--agreed that it is now unreasonable to suppose that the limited CILSS professional staff located in Ouagadougou should be excepted to carry out research themselves, rather than to set agendas, managing research carried out by others, and then assessing the value of that research, drawing out the policy implications, disseminating them, and ensuring that they are discussed in national and regional fora.

Under this model, CILSS institutions, and especially the Secretariat General, will need to have more access to Sahelian and international experts with whom they can contract for short and longer-term policy analysis and related research tasks. Some of these experts will be available at or through INSAH and AGRYHMET, but others will have to be contracted for from outside the CILSS/Club system. While this has already been the case for some time, it is the proportion of contracting out that is likely to change, and therefore the number and variety of experts that will be required from the outside.

At the same time, A.I.D. bilateral Missions need a mechanism to enable them relatively painlessly to integrate regional dimensions into their program planning, and also into their project designs. There have been many successful examples of SPAP-funded activities which have led to results in this area. However, only recently have the experts provided been Sahelian when it has been a question of working directly with and about A.I.D. Mission programs. Many of those interviewed agreed that this is a trend that should be encouraged, since Sahelians can, ultimately, better provide continuity--and do so at less expense--especially when backed up by international expertise and technicity, as will be the case, for example, under PADRES.

Need to Maintain-Sahel Related Capacity at U.S. Institutions:

We have stressed, in previous sections, the healthy interaction that SPAP funding has helped to foster between and among Sahelian institutions and individual professionals, European-based individual scholars and institutions, and U.S. universities and consulting groups. It seems demonstrably true that the best, highest-impact SPAP activities have had all these characteristics.

While many of the U.S. institutions are now in the third generation of project funding from A.I.D. (some, which had 211(d) grants are even longer-term A.I.D. recipients), and have developed real and probably lasting capacity, others may be less able to continue to maintain that capacity if they are not continually used to inform policy agendas in and around the Sahel. This is particularly true for the private sector firms, but it is also ultimately true for the universities as well. Maintaining institutional capacity--and especially the ability to remain in touch with, and to support and disseminate the efforts of Africa-based faculty and/or former students--takes consistent infusions of funds. Alternatively, those funds must be provided directly to those Africa-based colleagues, shifting the balance toward genuine "Sahelianization" of the policy process.

The MSU/ISRA/CESA type of interaction is a major departure from the old way of initiating and implementing projects--researchers recruited individually to do the field work or an attitude where the primary concern was symbolic ("would it be possible to add another Sahelian to the team otherwise we will all be attacked for not having enough of a Sahelian perspective"). Not only were studies of high quality delivered by Sahelian personnel, but Sahelian expertise and involvement also saved time and energy in the diffusion of the results and in the follow-up programs.

Need for Technical Expertise within A.I.D.:

The original design for SPAP included an institutional contract which would provide technical experts to work with SWA to help to define the policy analysis agenda, and to carry out related studies and other activities. A.I.D.'s lawyers at that time felt that having one contractor carry out that sort of function risked giving one external organization too great an influence over A.I.D.'s internal policy setting.

In the intervening years--partly as a result of SPAP funding--more institutional players have been added to the mix, whose respective and collective capacities have been strengthened. Meanwhile, A.I.D. has gone through several iterations about what contractors can do as against what direct hire staff must do. Some of these interactions have been in the Africa Bureau specifically, with changes in RSSA responsibilities, the development of the ADS project, and the recent approval of PARTS. The advent of the DFA, which stresses measurable impact in Africa, has made it harder to gain approval for Washington-based analytical work, perhaps especially when done by contractors. However, the PARTS approval shows that when that analytical work is clearly demonstrated to be in support of field actions and programs, then approval can be achieved.

The reorganization of the Africa Bureau was supposed to put in place more coherent, focused support to the field, through the Country Development Office system, under which would be grouped technical as well as program experts. Unfortunately, staffing constraints have been such that in many such offices, the technical component is almost entirely lacking (CCWA has one USDH technical person, who is a division director; SWA has one who is working in a program slot). So the technical "braintrust" that is supposed to help Missions define and implement their strategies, as well as their projects or non-project assistance activities, is more fictive than real. This has led to the desire to reintroduce a central institutional technical contractor under SPAP. (see Rosenthal, 1992).

Mission staff interviewed, as well as CILSS/Club staff and A.I.D./Washington staff, seem to agree that some combination of U.S. technical expertise and increased funding for Sahelian expertise, would be desirable, so that regionally relevant knowledge could be transferred effectively to Missions, and national knowledge more effectively transposed to the regional level.

Given the volatility of the policy environment in the region--especially as a result of the review of the CFA zone, protectionism arguments, regional integration between the coastal and the Sahelian states, and attendant market liberalization, all in the context of structural adjustment--it is likely that additional technical expertise is going to be needed if A.I.D. and the regional institutions it supports through the Sahel Regional Institutions Project (SRI) are to be able to have an effective and continuing impact on policy decisions taken at the national and regional levels. This is probably particularly important for those areas--market liberalization, deregulation, private sector, natural resources management, popular participation and governance--where A.I.D. has taken the lead to date in defining the agenda.

Project Monitoring and Impact Assessment:

A.I.D. is developing performance indicators for virtually every sector in which it is involved programmatically, under the PRISM project. These also include the development of impact indicators for policy initiatives and cross-sectoral programs such as governance and gender issues. In some areas, this effort is further advanced than in others. Further, the Africa Bureau has developed a variety of indicators systems in connection with the DFA, including indicators for impact of agricultural research, and of democratization, which could be adapted for SPAP and related projects.

Since this evaluation was begun, SWA has embarked on a strategic planning exercise for its regional program, and has developed a program logical framework with a goal, subgoals, strategic objectives, targets and indicators, on which it will be possible to report in the near future. A number of the policy orientations that have so far been given a start through SPAP funding, or on which continuity has been maintained by SPAP-funded buy-ins, are naturally included in these strategic objectives and targets. Therefore, it should be easier than before to track SPAP-funded impacts while tracking impacts of the regional program as a whole.

In terms of tracking project disbursements, and maintaining a better paper trail, the existing FM systems are essentially adequate. When we visited the Mali and Senegal Missions, the respective program offices were readily able to provide us with printouts of all the PIO/Ts ever funded by or through SPAP, and with copies of the PIO/Ts themselves (see Figure 1B). The same FM system (MACS) should be able to generate a similar printout for SWA/REGL-funded activities in A.I.D./Washington.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The present evaluation leads the team to recommend that the kind of policy agenda setting research, workshopping, and technical assistance that have been funded by SPAP since 1988 should be continued, whether under an amended SPAP or--more efficiently--under a second

amendment to SRI. Subsidiary recommendations follow, concerning modalities, the contractor issues, and other factors included in our scope of work.

1. U.S.-Sahelian collaboration in the definition of research and policy analysis questions should be continued, as should the funding of investigations of new policy issues with other donors. The key factor in most of the successful SPAP-funded activities appears to have been a combination of percipient issue identification and of interaction between Sahelian researchers and US researchers and technical assistants. In the examples of MSU collaborations with ISRA in Senegal and with CESA and OPAM in Mali, the collaborative nature of project definition and implementation seems to have been very important to success, especially after the U.S. team left the country. Sahelians were co-owners of the projects, i.e. ISRA and CESA. They participated in the design and the monitoring of project activities, especially in the later years of project lives.

2. SPAP can still intervene at the national level, but it seems that it has set the foundations in the different Sahel countries to move to the regional level. For example, the national SIMs have the skills to develop a regional network of price data to inform consumers, traders and policy makers. CILSS institutions or programs (INSAH or DIAPER) can also be the main source of databases for regional consumption.

3. A restructured CILSS should seek to recruit existing Sahelian professionals, and have them push forward the CILSS agenda (see below). Regional institutions can recruit staff more widely because of better access to information, ability to pay higher salaries and generally greater direct access to foreign aid (CERPOD and the 4 Ph D's trained with CERPOD which guarantee them decent salaries). CERPOD is today one of the success stories in terms of strengthening Sahelian capacity.

4. The Club should continue to strengthen its efforts to build on the results of innovative policy analyses--including those funded by SPAP--in consultation with the CILSS and its member organizations, and in collaboration with other Club members. The U.S. Representative to the Club should continue to advance the policy agenda through skillful use of the buy-in mechanism with other centrally-funded A.I.D. projects, and outside the general A.I.D. consulting world where others have greater expertise. The AIRD/IRAM example is a good one to replicate. However, it is important that these initiatives not take on a life of their own outside Africa. Wherever possible, Sahelians should be involved in the research studies, in dissemination of research results, and on expert committees charged with oversight of particular dossiers.

5. A better means should be found to monitor the results of SPAP (and SRI)-funded activities. This evaluation, the 1990 SRI evaluation, and the various assessment documents cited here, all indicate that there has been considerable policy impact for the relatively modest sums invested over the life of the SPAP project. What is not so clear at present is what the best configuration may be to ensure that such impact continues at the same rate and level, and how this should be measured.

Recent strategic planning efforts undertaken by SWA will allow API-type monitoring of regional program impact, including the impact of policy related study activities, either under SPAP or SRI. The virtue of having an API for the AFR/REGL program is that it would be easier to demonstrate--in terms that the rest of the Bureau and the Agency are currently using--what the impact of scarce regional resources has been.

6. In order to demonstrate the cost/benefit and impact of SPAP and SRI, a PIO/T should be prepared to fund one of the SPAP collaborators to assess how much money Sahelian states and donors--including A.I.D.--have saved over the SPAP LOP because of the changes in policies affecting subsidies that SPAP-funded activities have helped to generate. AIRD, who have been developing a model for the region, are probably the best placed of the collaborators to do this quickly.

   Obvious examples are reduced farmer subsidies, reduced price subsidies, reduced protectionism (increased government resources from properly applied tariff systems), more appropriately targeted food aid, improved natural resources management, and the like. In a recent paper, AIRD has already taken some steps in this direction in terms of savings to Sahelian states, and they could probably quickly extend the work to include A.I.D. and other-donor funding. (We are indebted to Roger Simmons of USAID/Kenya for the basis of this recommendation.)

7. If the GC will allow it, SWA should amend the SRI project to include a component equivalent to the present SPAP project, to provide for studies and short and medium-term technical assistance and information dissemination activities in support of the regional policy agenda. Amending SRI rather than SPAP would serve to reduce SWA units of management by one.

   This component would be obligated separately from those which support the CILSS and the Club, so that the bilateral advantage of SPAP would be retained. Part of the component might be obligated through an institutional contract (see below) and part of the component's funds reserved for disbursement through OYB transfers and buy-ins to other projects.

8. If the GC will allow such an amendment to include an institutional contract, an RFP should be prepared to compete such a contract. The contract would include provision of technical expertise based in Washington, but with a clear understanding that the technicians would travel to the Sahel frequently, and spend approximately 50% of their time interacting at the national and regional levels with Sahelian and other donor counterparts, and with A.I.D. Missions. The rest of their time would be divided between providing strategy and policy analysis expertise to SWA and the Bureau, and synthesizing and disseminating results of on-going policy analysis work to Missions and regional organizations from Washington.

   The contract should also include funds to allow for the hiring of Sahelian experts, attached to INSAH or to the CILSS headquarters, who would be the first line counterparts of the Washington-based experts. This would close the loop constituted by the Club and the CILSS, but also amplify the capacity of the latter, as discussed above. Ideally, there would be provision of the Sahelian consultants to spend time in Washington each year, to become more

familiar with A.I.D., and with colleagues in collaborating institutions, so as to enhance their individual and collective capacities.

9. An amended SPAP or SRI should not be merged with the EGER project. Those interviewed agreed that SPAP's agenda is both more operational, and more clearly region-specific than the EGER agenda, and that there would not be a conflict if both were to continue. Similarly, there is apparently neither a need nor a desire on the part of other entities in the Bureau to consider merging the SPAP/SRI policy agenda with the new PARTS project.

10. Consideration should, however, be given to jointly managing the SPAP-like component of an amended SRI project with the CCWA Office or, if this is not practicable, at least allowing CCWA to buy into the project if they have sufficient funds to do so. At a minimum, close collaboration in defining policy research agendas of each office should continue and results of studies discussed and shared among the staffs and contractors of the respective offices. The trend toward West Africa-wide regional integration makes close collaboration between SWA and CCWA even more desirable than it may have been in the past. Further, as each office is suffering a shortage of technical staff, collaboration may be able to help each make the best of the limited resources it has at its disposal.

ANNEX A

STATEMENT OF WORK

Objective

To evaluate the Sahel Policy Project (SPAP, No. 625-0970) for progress toward achieving its purpose and impact of its outputs, and to recommend continuation, modification, or termination of the project.

Background

SPAP was designed in 1985 to provide technical and analytical assistance to Sahelian policymakers, USAID Mission staff and AID/W policymakers. In FY 90, it was extended to FY 95 without an increase in LOP funding. In FY 92, it will nearly exhaust authorized LOP funding, thus requiring an amendment. An evaluation is necessary to determine the progress of the project against its purpose and to suggest any changes in design that the amendment should contain.

The purpose of SPAP is: "To carry out a program of economic policy studies, advisory services, and training that will strengthen the basis for appropriate economic policy in the Sahel." The project is intended to lay the bases for the development and implementation of coherent economic policy in the Sahel.

A major premise of the project design was that, by improving donor coordination and forward planing on policy, by exposing host country nationals to and providing them training in policy analysis and reform processes, the project would attack several of the key bottlenecks to implementing policy reform. While it was understood that there many uncontrollable constraints to policy reform, e.g., personalities, political instability and institutional development, it was hoped that SPAP support could significantly promote policy reform processes in a region where inappropriate policies have been major contributors to weak economic development. The project was designed to provide a mechanism for the eight Sahelian Missions, host country governments and AFR/SWA/REGL to procure long-term (more than 12 months) technical assistance in the research, development, dialogue and implementation of economic policy reform.

The evaluation will assess the modes of assistance that have been provided through the SPAP project, the impact of project outputs, the continued relevance of the basic project design and how AFR/SWA can better help the Sahelians take charge of the application of the resulting policy research.

Specific Tasks

Vendor will review project documentation; interview project management and other officials in AID/W; travel to the Sahel to interview Sahelian, other donor, and USAID officials for their perceptions of SPSP-funded assistance; and prepare an evaluation report that will:

describe the evolution of project operations and the various modes of project assistance provided under SPAP;

from the point of view of the management of policy change, appraise the strengths and weaknesses of the assistance modes used under the project, e.g., long-term expatriate TA, long-term Sahelian TA, specific policy papers, regional workshops, etc.;

assess to what extent these assistance mode have:

- enhanced the capacity of Sahelians to analyze, plan, and implement appropriate economic policies;
- improved the linkage between analytic regional programs and policies and individual country operating program;
- led to dissemination of information throughout the Sahel;
- resulted in cross-fertilization of ideas among Sahel country programs.

evaluate SPAP for progress toward achievement of conditions in the End of Project Status box of Project Logframe:

- policy studies and analyses being disseminated and information/knowledge obtained from them is regularly being used in decision-making process;
- host country entities are themselves initiating, conducting and financing policy studies, analyses and dialogue;
- greater sharing of policy information and experience among Sahel countries;
- donor coordination on policy issues improves.

determine demand for the project in three contexts: the current demand for policymaking assistance among Sahelians, demand for support among USAID missions in the Sahel, and demand for data and technical assistance in AID/W;

reassess project design and implementation from a perspective of improving SPAP's impact on policy and program implementation and the africanization of the process;

assess the prudence of merging SPAP with the Economic Growth through Equity and Reform Project (EGER), now in design by the AFR/ARTS office;

recommend design changes as appropriate.

Resources

Vendor will have access to non-classified project files, studies funded under the project, evaluations of projects that SPAP has bought-into, and an assessment of SWA regional project support to Sahel country programs(February 92) that examined the SPAP project, among others. AFR/SWA will contact USAID Missions in the Sahel (prior to departure of the team) to arrange for retrieval of project documents in preparation for meeting with the team.

Schedule of Actions and Deliverables

Vendor will provide an evaluation team of two persons, an institutional reform specialist and an economist, both fluent in French and experienced in the Sahel. Experience or knowledge of regional dynamics in the Sahel is helpful.

Team will begin work on April 6, 1992 in AID/W. After 5 days of review of project documentation and meetings with project management and other AID/W officials, team will begin travel to the Sahel on or about April 12, 1992. Team will visit Club du Sahel Representative in Paris on April 13th and 14th, then travel to USAID Missions in Bamako, Ndjamean, and as well as the CILSS Executive-Secretariat in Ouagadougou. Travel will be completed by May 5, 1992. Team will then return to Washington to complete and submit a draft report by May 8, 1992. Within two weeks after review by the Africa Bureau and approval by AFR/SWA. Given limitations on funds, translation into French will not be funded at this time. Six day work weeks are authorized.

ANNEX B

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Washington, D.C.:

U.S.A.I.D.:

Tim Bork,
Ron Daniel,
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Roger Simmons, USAID/Nairobi

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OECD/Club Secretariat, Paris:

John V.D. Lewis, A.I.D. Representative
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Serge Snrech
Henri Josserand
Jean-Marc Pradelle
Bill Grant
Marcel Courcelle
Victoire D'Agostino
Mme Fatou Ba (CILSS)

Mali:

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Bassirou Sow, CERPOD

USAID:

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Richard Byess, Program Officer
John Bressler, Program Officer,
David Atwood, ADO
Doral Watts, Livestock Officer
Robin Poulton, Private Sector Officer
Vic Duarte, Program Economist

GRM:

Mr. Oumar MAKALOU, Charge de Mission aupres du Chef de l'Etat
Mr. Bacariy KONE, Budget Director, Budget Ministry
Mr. Moussa Khalifa TRAOURE, Ministry of Agriculture

Others:

Josue Dione, INSAH
Dr. Cheikh Mbacke Dione, CEPRPOD
Nancy Loftus, World Education
Dan Divine, World Education
Dotien Coulibaly, Consultant

Ouagadougou:

CILSS:

Dr. Ibrahima CAMARA
Mr. Dramane COULIBALY
Mr. Moustapha YACOUBA
Mr. Steve REID (A.I.D. Advisor)

USAID:

Mr. Wilbur Thomas, USAID Representative
Ms. Sally Sharp, Program Officer

CEBV:

Dr. Aloua Moussa, Director

Others:

Dr. Carlos Cuevas, Ohio State University
Dr. Jeffrey Wright, FEWS Project Representative, Burkina Faso

Dakar:

USAID:

Julius Coles, Director
Lance Jepson, ANR Officer
Ousame Sane
A. Thiam
Seydou Cisse

ISRA:

Dr. Magette Ndiaye
Dr. Valerie Kelly
Abdoulaye Fall
Moctar Gaye

Others:

Baba Dioum, Ministry of Agriculture
Dr. Moustapha Kasse, University of Dakar
Dr. Ely Manel Fall, University of Dakar

ANNEX C

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