

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS PROJECT (263-0142)

The Data Collection and Analysis (DCA) Project (263-0142) began on August 26, 1980. The aim of this project was to assist the MOA to improve its analytical and data base collection capabilities. The initial PACD of August 31, 1985 was extended to May 31, 1988, resulting in a seven and three quarter year Life of Project (LOP). Five million dollars were obligated over the LOP. There have been two deobligations totaling \$180,033, and there will be a final deobligation of approximately \$15,000. A mid-term evaluation was completed in October 1984 and a project assessment in February 1987. In July 1988, the project's prime technical assistance contractor, USDA, issued its final report which includes discussion of project achievements, chronology of events, problems and recommendations. Since project activities initiated under the DCA Project are being continued under the Agricultural Policy Analysis Component of the National Agricultural Research Project (NARP) 263-0152.03, a final evaluation of the project will not be undertaken. The items discussed below are in accordance with AID Handbook 3, Appendix 14A, Guidance for Preparing the Project Assistance Completion Report.

I. Present Project Status

All planned project elements were completed before the PACD. The only remaining task is processing of final invoices and deobligation of approximately \$15,000 which will remain unexpended.

II. Summary of Financial Contributions by AID and GOE

<u>Items</u>	<u>AID</u> <u>(in dollars)</u>	<u>GOE</u> <u>(dollar equiv)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>(in dollars)</u>
Planned Obligations	5,000,000	1,106,000	6,106,000
Actual Obligations	4,819,966.67*	1,400,000**	6,219,966.67

\* Does not include an estimated final deobligation of \$15,000

\*\* Estimated

III. Review of Accomplishments (outputs)

The following are specific accomplishments of the project:

A. Technical Skills Learned:

1. Objective yield forecasting techniques which include field procedures, laboratory methodology, editing and analysis of data, introductory model building, and the use of micro-computers in processing the data.
2. Cost of production estimation procedures which include field surveys, editing and analysis of data, and development of budget coefficients that can be operated on micro-computers.
3. Farm income estimation procedures which include field surveys, editing and analysis of data, and processing of data through micro-computers.
4. Developing farm labor data estimates, questionnaire design and testing, field procedures, manual editing, analysis and processing of data.

5. Poultry production data estimation, pilot sampling for broiler and egg production inputs/outputs, and prices, micro-computer processing of results.
6. Dairy production data estimation, survey methodology, editing techniques, and questionnaire design.
7. Marketing channel data for horticultural crops, questionnaire design, field procedures, editing techniques, and processing of data through microcomputers.
8. List frame construction techniques, pilot testing, micro-computerized sample selection, expansion of sample data, and computation of estimates of variances.
9. Data processing methodology, including microcomputer operations using programming and software packages, mainframe operation and programming, systems engineering, systems analysis, introductory data base management, and security precautions.

Although the above skills were learned by various staff members in both the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (AERI) and/or the Undersecretary for Agricultural Economics and Statistics (U/AES), the effectiveness of these skills learned has been greatly reduced due to the lack of coordination and cooperation between the two organizations. ✓

**B. Training Accomplished:**

In 1983, DCA funded four persons for doctoral degree training in statistics in the U.S. These participants are all expected to complete their degrees and return to Egypt by October, 1989.

Approximately 140 persons participated in short term training courses or specialized observational tours in the U.S. in the areas of data collection, survey design and sampling, objective yield and crop forecasting, microcomputer training, policy/economic analysis and commodity outlook and situation reporting. All of the participants have returned to Egypt, and the majority are making use of the skills and knowledge gained in the U/AES or AERI. Training programs ranged in length from three weeks to thirteen months.

C. Commodities Procured:

During the life of the project, seven vehicles were procured at a cost of \$90,000. All are reported in operating condition and are located at the U/AES, Ministry of Agriculture, Dokki.

Forty three microcomputers were procured. All but two of these are in use. Through the National Corporation Registered (NCR), a main frame computer, an Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) unit, and a special air-conditioning system were also purchased. The mainframe computer has been installed at the new U/AES site in Dokki. All equipment is operating.

Total cost of the computer equipment and site preparation is approximately \$700,000.

In addition to vehicles and computer hardware and software, crop and livestock survey, laboratory, and office equipment were purchased for an approximate value of \$250,000.

D. Other Accomplishments:

Besides technical skills learned, training accomplished, and commodities procured, several other achievements can be cited.

There have been over thirty-five seminars, workshops, and conferences held under the sponsorship of the project. The latest and most impressive was that of the Agricultural Economic Policy Reform Seminar, held in Cairo July 1987, in which representatives from nine (9) Arab countries, several international organizations, and a number of senior officials of the Egyptian Government participated.

Over twenty Situation and Outlook reports were issued during the project for various crop and livestock commodities and for agricultural inputs. Five special policy reports were prepared and published by Winrock International, a contractor under the project.

A number of reports and papers were produced by activity leaders describing the results of the pilot studies which were conducted.

#### IV Assessment of Project Purpose Achievements:

Project purposes as stated in the Project Paper were as follows:

- a. to improve the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) capacities to collect economic data and to carry out analytic and planning work; and
- b. to increase the use of analytic materials in agricultural policy development and planning activities.

Project purposes were to be achieved by two discrete but closely linked components:

- a. focusing on improving MOA capabilities, especially the Undersecretariat for Agricultural Economics and Statistics (U/AES) and the Agriculture Economics Research Institute (AERI), to collect, analyze and make available accurate, useful and timely agricultural statistics to improve its agricultural data base; and

- b. developing MOA capabilities to carry out needed planning and analysis. It was projected that this second component might involve additional data collection related to specific problems to be analyzed.

## B. Overview

Although considerable training and technical assistance was provided under the project and substantial progress was made in tailoring methodologies to the Egyptian context, efforts at setting up institutional systems for generating agricultural data on a nationwide basis were not totally successful.

In an institutional strengthening component such as this, organizational and management issues usually are as important as the methodologies and technology to be transferred. Until the basic Egyptian institutional issues of management, staffing, and delegation of authority are dealt with, even the best technical work is subject to the vagaries of ineffective organizational procedures.

The following quotations from the 1987 Project Assessment prepared by R. A. Ralston reinforces the above conclusion:

"USAID and the MOA should be fully aware that the AERI and later the U/AES has yet to develop either a reliable national database using probability sampling for areas in various crops and numbers of livestock or a national objective yield survey, to estimate production and make crop forecasts."

"There is no question that during Phase I (1980 - 1987) of the Project, a large amount of technology transfer took place, mostly acquired by individuals but not put together to form a cohesive unit."

In summary, individual staff members have gained a wide array of skills, knowledge, techniques, theories, and experience during the Project, but there has been only limited progress towards institution building, and very little progress toward building a national agriculture data base. ✓

B. Organizations and Management:

In most donor-funded projects, particularly of an institutional building nature, implementation of activities depends on each organization providing certain critical inputs and services. Failure by any one of these organizations to do so creates significant difficulty in successful implementation. While each organization provides critical inputs, many (if not most) of these need to come out of the host country counterpart institution. There is a critical need for careful, detailed and extensive planning in which all project "stake-holders" participate. The management organization of the host country target organization is particularly important. The recipient organization must be open to significant (frequently traumatic) change, based on the experience and evaluation of ongoing experiments.

In order to fully take advantage of new technologies and human resources capabilities, significant delegation of authority normally is necessary to assure that those to whom responsibility has been given have the adequate power and authority to fulfill them. However, the traditional legal, cultural and bureaucratic context in Egypt is not always conducive to application of such basic "modern" management principals. Authority is often jealously guarded and delegated sparingly to only the most trusted. Ultimately, unwillingness or inability to change accepted procedures, cultural management styles, or larger bureaucratic-political interests, too often overcome "institution-building" objectives however logical or necessary they may appear to be at the outset of the project. ✓

"Leverage" to motivate organizational change by the host country government is often needed to induce such changes. The ability to induce such change may exist in a donor agency, if time and effort is taken to monitor and evaluate on a continuing, consistent basis. This influence and, hopefully, support can be particularly important as a countervailing force to the fear of significant change that is prevalent inside the host country.

Frequent changes of USAID Project Officers and personnel has made implementation and continuity difficult. Due to the limited number of USAID staff and the large dollar volume of their portfolio of projects, the focus of the Mission's Agriculture Office's effort was often elsewhere. This institutional constraint has hindered project implementation and should be considered as an important constraint in future project design.

### C. Technical Assistance

In a complex project such as this, the importance of sufficient resident expatriate staff should not be underestimated. A mid-term project evaluation recommended a resident advisor/coordinator which was felt to be long overdue.

When the person arrived, he soon found himself overextended, and inevitably he was not always able to carry out all responsibilities effectively. Future project efforts need to be adequately "staffed" with a team of resident advisors to allow maximum utilization and effectiveness of project resources.

The contractor (USDA) was given specific responsibilities for providing the technical assistance, however, this was only limited to the disciplines of statistics, economics, and data processing. Although these disciplines implied the need for organizational change and flexibility, the contractor had little influence or control over such change.

V Recommendations for Final Adjustments in Project Design

Since the project is now completed, design changes are no longer relevant.

VI Post-project AID Monitoring

Final project monitoring activities were completed on May 31, 1988 for this project. However, the new agricultural policy activity designed as a component under the National Agricultural Research Project (NARP), will in fact continue to be monitored.

VII Remaining Data Collection Results or Evaluations

There are no remaining evaluations or data collection activities for this project.

VIII Lessons Learned

1. Institution Building for a National Database:

Although a computer center was installed and equipped, a large amount of technology transferred, many individuals trained and a number of well qualified T.A. professionals worked long and hard, only limited progress was made developing the institutional capacity to build and utilize a national agricultural database. As a result, the technical skills developed are not being used fully.

Lesson:

The acquisition of new technical skills and of sophisticated equipment is not sufficient to increase the output of a recipient organization. In addition, there must be an organizational capability and the desire to use those skills to increase output. In the case of this project, the organizational capability was deficient in that there was inadequate delegation of authority and

little apparent demand for the expected improved statistical outputs. Continued demand for output might have forced the U/AES to adapt its capabilities to allow for an increased output. The lesson is that technical training may be necessary, but it may still be insufficient.

Attainment of success was further hindered by such management constraints as (1) a high turn over of USAID Project Officers and lack of Mission priority attention; (2) the lack of a TA resident advisor/team leader; (3) a change in focus by new MOA Project Director, and (4) less than full time involvement by the MOA Project Director.

In designing the Agricultural Policy Analysis Component of NARP, these issues were discussed and addressed recognizing that some of these constraints are often outside the control of project officers and implementors.

## 2. Policy Studies:

The five policy studies, designated by the Senior Agricultural Policy Advisory Group, did not achieve their goals of including MOA staff members in their activities and of providing new direction for the MOA.

### Lesson:

To be effective policy studies must be carried out as part of the overall integrated project activities rather than as an independent outside activity. They must also be desired by senior host government officials.

In the new Agricultural Policy Analysis Component under NARP, policy studies are driven by the policy reform agenda established by the Ministry of Agriculture and concurred in by USAID.

Training:

The selection of poorly prepared (especially in English skills), long term training candidates resulted in extended and expensive PhD programs and in less than effective short term training activities.

Lesson:

In future projects, greater attention must be given to the selection of candidates and to their English skills and/or preparation. This is now being done under the new Agricultural Policy Analysis Component with English training being provided through the Mission's English Language Testing/Training Program (263--0125.5)

VIII Recommendation


That the status of the project be designated by the Mission Director as completed, with no formal follow-on monitoring. Follow-on activities under the Agricultural Policy Analysis Component of NARP should be carefully planned, managed and monitored taking heed of lessons learned.

APPROVED: 

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: Sept 29 1983

Clearances:

- AGR/ACE: DSchroder 
- OD/AGR/ACE: JFoti 
- AD/AGR: EStains 
- FM/FA: HPangan 
- LEG: MWard 
- PDS/P: VKunkle 
- DD: CWeden (Draft)