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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**MID-TERM EVALUATION
OF SWAMP
(PROJECT #645-0218)
Volume I of II**

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USAID/SWAZILAND**

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PREFACE

In accordance with Project Paper requirements, a multidisciplinary team conducted a mid-term evaluation of the Swaziland Manpower Project (645-0218) during April and May of 1988. This Executive Summary, and accompanying Final Report, concludes that activity.

The team thanks all parties -- the Government of Swaziland, USAID, and the SWAMDP Contractors -- for the outstanding support we were given. We were able to maintain a very productive pace due to the cooperation we received from all quarters. Our sense of being welcomed as guests was especially assured through the efforts of the USAID Mission and the Kingdom of Swaziland via the Ministry of Labour and Public Service. For all the people whose names appear in Appendix A of Volume II (and for a number whose names do not), Thank You.

In light of everyone's cooperation and support, we hope that all will use the Executive Summary as it is intended -- as a management tool built upon a critical analysis of SWAMDP. Indeed, as a "critique" the report does focus on "negatives"; this is an unfortunate consequence of evaluations. Positive findings need little or no elaboration. Negative findings, on the other hand, always require more documentation. The Mid-Term evaluation of SWAMDP is no exception to this rule.

But, the fact is that SWAMDP is achieving, or can achieve, much of what was conceived in the planning stages. For example, the Long-Term Participant Training program is meeting the U.S. policy objective of providing U.S. College educations for a Cadre of leaders who will be running the Swazi government for the next 15, 20, 25 years. Since approximately two-thirds of the total project resources are earmarked for this component, and although certain improvements are recommended, this component's relative success should be given due weight when reviewing the report itself. And, there are other successful features of the project.

In sum, the project is more successful than not. Where shortfalls do detract from or impede project success, they are identified along with appropriate recommendations. Indeed, this is the salutary side of a formative evaluation; the intent is to encourage programmatic improvements. Therefore, we hope that this report succeeds in being a positive force.

The Evaluation Team

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: SWAMDP MID-TERM EVALUATION.....	1
1.0	TECHNOLOGY/SKILLS TRANSFER.....	2
1.1	Outputs: Technology/Skills Transfer Resources.....	2
1.2	Long-Term Technical Advisors.....	2
1.3	Short Term Technical Assistance in the "Modern" Sector....	4
1.4	Short Term Technical Assistance in the Traditional Sector.	4
1.5	Operational Experts [Opex].....	5
1.6	Mid-Term Status and Recommendations.....	5
2.0	DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE/LEADERSHIP CADRE.....	7
2.1	Outputs: Participant Training.....	7
2.2	Outputs: In-Country Training.....	7
2.3	Participant Training.....	8
2.4	In-Country Training.....	9
2.5	Mid-Point Status and Recommendations.....	10
3.0	DEVELOPMENT ORIENTATION FOR TRADITIONAL LEADERS AND WOMENS ASSOCIATIONS.....	12
3.1	Outputs: Development Orientation.....	12
3.2	General Findings.....	12
3.3	Traditional Sector Breakthrough.....	13
3.4	Mid-Term Project Status and Recommendations.....	13
3.5	End of Project: Recommendations for the Future.....	15
4.0	DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATIONS.....	16
4.1	Outputs: Personnel Resources.....	16
4.2	Outputs: In-Country Training.....	16
4.3	Outputs: Long- and Short-Term Training.....	17
4.4	Project Design and Implementation (DC Versus DSC).....	17
4.5	Observations on the SDSU Delivery Capability.....	17
4.6	General Findings.....	18
4.7	Mid-Term Status and Recommendations.....	19
5.0	INSTITUTION BUILDING AND INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES.....	21
5.1	Output.....	21
5.2	Institution Development as a Component Part.....	21
5.3	Mid-Term Status and Recommendations.....	21
6.0	MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS OF SWAMDP.....	22
6.1	AID.....	22
6.2	Transcentury Corporation.....	23
6.3	AED.....	24
6.4	GOS.....	24
6.5	Mid-Term Status and Recommendations.....	24
6.6	Recommendations for the Future.....	25

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: SWAMPD MID-TERM EVALUATION

Swaziland is a small, landlocked kingdom located at the northeast quadrant of the Republic of South Africa; it is bordered to the east by Mozambique. Its two major population centers, Mbabane [the Capital] and Manzini [the major center of commerce] have roughly equal populations of around 50-55,000 people. The other 80-85% of the population is primarily rural agrarian. In relative terms, per capita income and literacy rates are high. For a number of long standing reasons, Swaziland maintains close socio/eco/political connections with the Republic of South Africa.

The Kingdom of Swaziland has been the beneficiary of fifteen years of USAID-funded Human Resource Development efforts via four separate projects. The fourth and current project, the Swaziland Manpower Development Project [SWAMPD], is the focus of this report. SWAMPD is a large and complex endeavor which combines some standard HRD elements with some approaches and processes which can be described as "experimental."

The span of the Life-of-Project [LOP] and grant agreement is seven years [FY 85 through FY 91]. Two contractors, TransCentury Corporation (TCC) and the Academy for Educational Development (AED) have contracts with USAID which run from December 1984 to December 1989. Project funding was established as follows:

	AMOUNT	TOTAL
AID: Cash Contribution	\$19.6 mm	74%
GOS: Cash and In-Kind Contribution	<u>\$ 6.8 mm</u>	<u>26%</u>
TOTAL TO PROJECT	\$26.4 mm	100%

"The purposes of the project are to: [a] expand the capacity of selected Swazis and Swazi institutions..to independently plan and direct development activities; and [b] encourage an increased level of informed participation by the general Swazi population in a variety of such activities." The project has five major elements. They are:

- Technology/Skills Transfer;
- Development of an Administrative/Leadership Cadre;
- Development Orientation for Traditional Leaders and Rural Womens Associations;
- Development Communications; and
- Institutional Linkages.

The body of this executive summary is organized by project elements. It concludes with statements on key project management issues.

1.0: TECHNOLOGY/SKILLS TRANSFER

Funded for \$3,370,000, the Technology/Skills Transfer project element is implemented by TransCentury Corporation. The purpose is to provide technical resources from which Swazi institutions will have been enabled to build the capacity to sustain the momentum of SWAMDP.

1.1 OUTPUTS: TECHNOLOGY/SKILLS TRANSFER RESOURCES

A Contractor Field Representative [Chief-of-Party], budgeted for 60 months, has served a total of 36; 24 months remain for the 19 months left to the project.

Five long term technical advisors [LTTA] were targeted for 108 person months, approximately 56 months have been used, and 52 remain. 93 person months of short term advisors were scheduled, approximately 34 person months have been used, and 59 remain.

Up to nine expatriate operational experts [OPEX] were targeted for 216 person months; inclusive of all OPEX (pass through and/or those inherited from SAMDP) approximately 200 person months have been used or scheduled under the aegis of SWAMDP, thus leaving one person-year available (see Section 1.5).

1.2 LONG-TERM TECHNICAL ADVISORS

There have been problems from the inception with either job design, fulfillment of stated requirements, or underutilization of the LTTAs. Perhaps the single exception has been the Traditional Sector Specialist.

1.2.1 Community Leadership Specialist

A citizen of Swaziland was to be appointed as the Community Leadership Specialist for 36 months. However, the appointment was never made. Presuming that this position was intended as a quasi-counterpart function to be developed in conjunction with the Traditional Sector Specialist activities, it is not clear why this vacancy remains.

1.2.2 Traditional Sector Specialist

The long term technical assistance advisor (LTTA) for traditional sector activities departed in August of 1987 after the scheduled two years of service. This LTTA was the most productive in terms of fulfilling the job description and in generating quantitative and qualitative outputs. Mission approval of additional activities in the traditional sector to include a new traditional sector specialist [short-term], was made on August 27, 1987.

1.2.3 Manpower Planning

The project paper defined the original purpose of this activity as manpower planning and economic analysis. Within seven months after the Manpower Planner was in place, it was agreed by all parties [GOS officials, USAID and TCC] that it had been premature to place a Manpower Planner/Economist in government. Focus then shifted to human resource development activities.

1.2.4 Manpower Development and Training Planner

The major tasks of the Manpower Development/ Training Planner [MDTP], as originally envisioned, were broad and encompassing. But, the actual thrust of work during the two years (February 1986 to February 1988) the position was filled was narrower than that described in the job description.

Developing a GOS Training Officer Cadre became a full time job for the MDTP. This narrow organizational development focus in part relates to the absence of an overall strategy or conceptual framework that would link the manpower development activities to the in-country training and participant training components. It should be pointed out, however, that the MDTP's work with the Ministry of Labour and Public Service has contributed conceptually toward the development of a GOS training policy and lays the ground-work for a more broadly based in-country training strategy during the time remaining in SWAMP.

However, officials in the mission continue to express concern about the need to develop a capacity within GOS to be able to project long term manpower needs both sectorally and within GOS, a responsibility which was built into the job description of the Manpower Development and Training Planner. Furthermore, a key role of the MDTP was to be the development of a "Personnel Management Information System." Even though MLPS continues to voice a strong interest in such a system, it has not been developed.

1.2.5 In-Country Training Manager

By early 1986, both the mission and TCC had come to the conclusion that it was necessary to separate the In-country Training Manager functions from those of the CoP. TCC's candidate for the position was approved on September 25, 1987 and the position was filled on September 29, 1987. At that point TCC was completing the third year of activities under the project.

A number of points that bear directly on this position need to be addressed. First of all, there is a clear overlap between the In-Country Training Manager's position and that of the Manpower Development/Training Planner activity. It also must be noted that there continues to be disagreement between TCC and the USAID mission as to whether the

In-Country Training Manager was to be a trainer or a training manager/conceptual specialist. Also, much of his activity during the last eighteen months has involved manpower development and training activities and some traditional sector activities. Because of the mission's serious concerns about the 1988-89 workplan, there have been no authorized post-April 1, 1988 activities for the In-Country Training Officer other than the completion of a revised training assessment and any pipeline activities left from earlier phases of the project.

1.3 SHORT TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE "MODERN" SECTOR

As of May, 1988, only four consultant months have been utilized for modern sector project activities. The consultancies resulted in reports which focused on: (1) an Assessment of Accountancy Standards and Training; (2) the Potential for a Business Management Certificate; (3) the Provision of Advice to the GOS on negotiations with South Africa with regard to water rights; and (4) the Assessment of the Potential of In-Country Training. The first has been particularly useful and has led to the development of a [pass-through] OPEX position.

1.4 SHORT TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE TRADITIONAL SECTOR

Consultants have been used to support the traditional sector component for at least 30 person months. If correct, this means that no short-term technical assistance remains available for this component.

1.4.1 Follow-on to the Traditional Sector Specialist.

The departure of the Traditional Sector Specialist in July 1987 put a brake on the momentum established during his 25 month tenure. TCC engaged a short-term consultant from September 15, 1987 to March 15, 1988 to: [a] coordinate on-going rural training; [b] conduct impact assessments; and [c] plan specific rural training activities for phase four of SWAMP. Subsequently, TCC apparently decided [with reluctant Mission approval] to concentrate only on the impact assessment of rural sector activities on women's organizations. To mid-May, 1988, however, no written material had been submitted to USAID on the impact assessment study on Zenzele women's organizations. No alternative arrangements have been made to carry out the impact assessment on traditional leaders.

1.4.2 Other Consultant Outputs.

Other Short-term Consultants were used primarily during the tenure of the original Traditional Sector Specialist. Some of the work was "hands-on" in nature and cannot be evaluated. The value of documents which were produced were found to be at least adequate to very useful. One in particular, which was delivered very late (the Patrick report), is

thorough and offers a menu of training needs as expressed by the rural leaders as well as an analysis of their attitudes concerning training received. The material within this report is most useful and could be said to be, in part, a training impact study.

1.5 OPERATIONAL EXPERTS [OPEX]

Priority was to be placed on the recruitment of OPEXers for positions within high policy level units and positions which provide an opportunity for substantive technical and/or policy input and where the OPEX would have a potential impact in terms of technology transfer, policy analysis and institutional development. The contract was amended to allow recruitment of OPEXers for projects other than SWAMP and to provide for pass-throughs for "ad hoc advisors" funded from other projects.

The number of operational experts and consultants funded through SWAMP to-date indeed suggests that the projected number of long term technical advisors may be met by the end of the project. However, financial resources provided for this activity will be significantly under utilized because almost all of the advisors and operational experts have been funded through and for other projects.

A major anomaly has been the absence of GOS of salaries -- one of the definitional terms of OPEX. And, the absence of OPEX, other than via pass-throughs, suggests that USAID/Swaziland and the GOS have not been able to identify such needs as they relate to SWAMP.

1.6 MID-TERM STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The use of Technical Advisors has, in balance, been less than optimal. Furthermore, at current rates of utilization, a significant number of budgeted person-months will not be used. Given this circumstance, USAID needs to review and take action regarding the long- and short-term advisory functions and OPEXers. The actions range from [a] using available/budgeted slots, [b] re-activation of dormant slots, and/or [c] reprogramming funds to enable assistance in select areas.

1.6.1 Community Leadership Specialist Function

If the Community Leadership function is deemed no longer necessary [a] TCC and/or GOS should provide a written rationale, and [b] administrative action should be taken by USAID to amend official documents to delete the requirement. The review should take place within the context of: [1] What bridging capacity the CLS function was to have provided between TCC activities, project completion, and GOS institution capacity building, [2] current TCC activities in the traditional sector, [3] current TCC capacity/ capability in the traditional sector, and [4] USAID's longer range plans for a successor project.

1.6.2 Traditional Sector Support

In conjunction with the void in the CLS function and other problems concerning the output of the current short-term Traditional Sector consultant, serious consideration should be given to reactivating the Long-Term Advisor function in the Traditional Sector.

1.6.3 Manpower Planning

A major conceptual and capacity issue is raised with the cessation of the Manpower Developer/Trainer function regarding how the Personnel Management Electronic Data Processing System [EDP] system will be built. This issue is serious because such a system would require system requirements and analysis input from someone familiar with the project, MLPS, USAID systems, and manpower planning.

1.6.4 In-Country Training Manager Function

TCC should deliver, as soon as possible, both a conceptually sound assessment of in-country training and a cogent strategic plan for training activities through December 1989. Assuming successful completion of the in-country training assessment plan within a reasonable amount of time, USAID and TCC should undertake either corrective action to assure that the In-Country Training Manager's current job description is fully met, or modify the current job description to reflect scope revisions acceptable to USAID.

1.6.5 OPEX Slots

Considering the LOP time remaining in the SWAMPD project, it is recommended that the mission carefully examine the continued need for OPEX. This needs assessment should be accomplished within the context of GOS civil service regulations which [apparently] constrain the OPEX placement process and thereby result in a significant blurring between OPEX and Long-Term Technical Advisor status. Also, the mission needs to decisively clarify the appropriateness of funding long-term OPEXers without a GOS or NGO salary as a precursor to the topping up arrangement.

2.0 DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE/LEADERSHIP CADRE

This activity, implemented by TCC, was funded for \$11,230,000; \$10,230,000 for long-term participant training; \$730,000 for short-term participant training; and \$270,000 for In Country Training.

The purpose of long and short-term participant training is to "expand the capacity of selected Swazis and Swazi institutions, both public and private, to independently plan and direct development activities."

The purpose of In-Country Training is that In-Country Trainees will be functioning at a higher level of skill and efficiency than before training. It is also expected that these trainees will transfer skills to others in their organizations.

2.1 OUTPUTS: PARTICIPANT TRAINING

As of March 1988, 95 long-term trainees had been selected and sent for training to the U.S. Thirty-seven have completed their training and returned to Swaziland. Considering an additional 23 selected for the 1988 class and the 15 projected for the class of 1989, the EOP total will be 133 long term participants likely to be trained under the project [exclusive of 20 from SAMDP]. This is 32 less than the upper limit target of 165 indicated by contract amendment 2.

It was expected that the project would fund up to 25 regional long-term participants during the life of the project. Five students (presently in training) represent the total outputs to date.

The target for short-term training is 50 to 60 persons. Sixteen participants have been sent to the U.S. and three to other African countries for training. Three more participants have been selected recently for training during the summer of 1988. Therefore, the shortfall is projected to be between 28 and 38 short-term participants.

2.2 OUTPUTS: IN-COUNTRY TRAINING

The contractor is to provide training for approximately 500 Swazis in about 40 in-country programs or courses averaging between 5-6 courses per year. In-country training is to be concentrated in order to enable one person to attend 2-3 courses during the life of the project.

As of May, 1988 a total of 133 people have attended 14 training courses. An average of four courses a year were organized by the Transcentury. This would suggest that approximately 367 more people should attend between 6-8 workshops prior to the end of the project.

2.3 PARTICIPANT TRAINING

Participants Training represents both the largest and longest term investment in SWAMP. It has been the most successful project element to date.

2.3.1 Participant Selection Process

The Long-Term Participant Selection Process is a vigorous, formal process involving advertised outreach, testing, and interviews. The Short-Term Participant Process is shorter, less formal, and more flexible.

Advertisements for long-term participants have generally been placed in the spring. The selection process includes screening, aptitude tests, collection of transcripts, employer endorsements, and consultations between USAID, GOS Ministries, and the private sector. However, a problem which began with the first cycle apparently is insufficient time to conduct the entire process, thus leading to late applications to U.S. universities.

A number of sources feel that training plans have not always targeted the best universities either in terms of quality or appropriateness. This can be explained partially by the fact that applications are generally late. It can also be explained by the fact that the advisor teams on which TCC plans heavy emphasis do not appear to have the best background for making placement suggestions.

Despite the problem of late applications and potentially questionable placements, a large majority of participants said their institution was appropriate for their training plan. Most participants found university faculty advisors helpful and friendly.

There is a consensual feeling, (i.e., among AID, GOS, participants), that the benefits of giving all Swazi a chance to apply for long-term training outweigh the disadvantages of the long and complex process. And, the outcome of the selection process seems to result in well-qualified participants, most of whom do well in their studies.

By comparison, what seems to be lacking for the short-term participant selective process is a defined and agreed upon set of manpower development objectives and a corresponding set of criteria for short-term participant selection. As a consequence, the mission and GOS are not always in agreement regarding short-term participant training candidates.

2.3.2 Participant Support Systems

Participants are highly complimentary about the TCC support they have

received. Long term participants have received both a two and one-half day computer familiarization course and a one day orientation course before departure. TCC meets all participants in the U.S. and conducts several days of orientation in the TCC offices in Washington. In 1987 TCC experimented with a monthly newsletter for Swazi participants; it was well received. The mid-winter seminar initiated by TCC for all long-term participants seems to be popular.

There are some problems, however. Participants did comment on the difficulties of finding housing once they arrived at their campuses; if undergraduates chose not to live in a dorm, the difficulty of meeting expenses for off-campus living was especially cited as a problem. A letter from the Mission to TCC was worded in a fashion which precluded TCC from providing housing allowances in excess of local dormitory rates.

The GOS has been paying the participant's salary for one year but no half salaries thereafter (as is required under the grant agreement). The GOS dependent allowance of about E25 to E30 per month per dependent child if felt to be so low by participants that some do not apply for it.

During the first two years of implementation of SWAMP, an alumni association was formed which engaged in activities suggested in the project paper. A computer course, several management/supervisory courses and a research methodology course were organized. The alumni association played a role in the computer familiarization course presented to departing participants. A quarterly newsletter, Luvatsi, was published. A library of periodicals was set up at TCC. A large, highly publicized, awards ceremony was held in late 1985. However, for the last two years, the Alumni Association has been dormant.

2.3.3 Career Paths and Job Mobility

For a number of reasons, it is difficult to draw anything but general conclusions regarding re-entry. General observations are that a few returnees have had some problems finding appropriate jobs, or that promotions have not occurred from within old positions except for returned UNISWA faculty; There is some loss of GOS engineers to the private sector. And, TCC has not initiated an advocacy role for developing career paths and job mobility for returned participants. USAID and GOS claim that they are often not aware that a participant has concluded studies until the participant returns.

2.4 IN-COUNTRY TRAINING

In-Country training could have been a "linch-pin" component to the project by establishing a process by which (a) GOS employees had access to up-grade training and (b) returning participants could have academic skills reinforced. To-date, this potential has not been realized.

2.4.1 Organizational Development [OD] and In-Country Training.

The original design of SWAMP called for close collaboration with the Swaziland Institute of Management and Public Administration [SIMPA]. The decision was made in early stages of the project not to collaborate with SIMPA until it resolved certain organizational issues. Consequently, to this point, the focus of in-country training has been on support for training planners rather than on training senior managers.

This aspect of in-country training indeed has had a significant impact upon the GOS capability to set training priorities. However, spin off effects of the activity occur slowly and incrementally and are hard to measure. No more than 20-25 training officers have been directly impacted by the OD activity. In this regard, one area that needs to be addressed is the question of what will be the primary responsibility of the Training Officer (e.g., in-service training or training planning). A related issue which remains is how this activity will be institutionalized as an on-going activity within Government as required by the Project Grant Agreement.

2.4.2 Overlap Between In-Country Training and Rural Sector Training

There has been a significant overlap between the in-country training and rural sector training components of this project. This overlap has been complicated by the disagreement between the contractor and the mission over the definition of in-country training. The misunderstanding, only recently resolved, has contributed to delays in the development of a conceptual framework for in-country training and certainly has influenced the workload for the in-country training manager.

2.5 MID-POINT STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At the mid-point of the project, the Participant Training Component is the strongest part of the project. Some portions bear closer examination for potential replication elsewhere. The in-country training element has been very poorly implemented. Beyond the organizational development strategy, the in-country training activities under the in-country training component of SWAMP have been meager. And, as yet, a critical needs assessment of the ICT function has not been accomplished.

2.5.1 Recommendations: Participant Training

AID might want to consider using American trained faculty from Southern African Universities in the training plan and university targeting process. U.S. based Advisory group members should belong to one of the recognized associations [e.g., AACRAO, NAFS, ACPA, and so forth]. USAID should consider having the advisory group review candidate

folders in Washington. Finally, the participants' applications must be prepared and sent to target universities by January 1st to enable optimal placements.

When dormitories are not available, all participants should be granted the normal academic maintenance rate as is stipulated in the relevant Training Notice.

The Alumni Association should be reactivated and TCC's In-Country Training Manager should play an implementing role; a complete list of alumni should be computerized either on TCCs Participant Tracking System [PTS] or on the Participant Training Management System [PTMS] in AID. Furthermore, TCC should be asked to get precise statistics on how many SWAMDP returnees are without jobs or are in positions which are not related to their training.

Either the GOS should put a bonding system into law to ensure the return of participants to the positions for which they were trained, or the Project Grant agreement should be amended to remove the requirement. GOS also should be reminded of its responsibility under the Grant Agreement to provide "half salaries after the first year of study";

Because the success of the long term regional component has been limited both in terms of output and number/quality of institutions being used, for successor projects AID should therefore either lower its sights, or have its contractor review the SADCC Regional Directory to determine the "inventory" of institutions and courses of study available.

The marginal success of the short-term training component -- coupled with the failure of the in-country component -- represents perhaps the largest missed opportunity of SWAMDP. USAID and GOS should exert their influence, and provide expeditious support, to ensure that TCC meet the output targets for short-term training.

2.5.2 Recommendations: In-Country Training

Given the resources committed to the Training Officer group and the importance of training activities to the overall development of the public service in Swaziland, GOS should firmly commit to the establishment, in all ministries, of a cadre of full time training officers who are able to plan and develop priorities for in-country and overseas training. This should be done in conjunction with the development of a computerized personnel and training analysis capacity.

The first CoP produced a detailed set of observations and conceptual outlines for In-Country Training in February 1986. It appears that this early work provided an approach which is consonant with the project paper and the TCC contract. It is recommended that it be resurrected by TCC and used as the nucleus of an ICT plan.

3.0 DEVELOPMENT ORIENTATION FOR TRADITIONAL LEADERS AND WOMENS ASSOCIATIONS

Managed by TCC, this project element focuses on two distinct groups, Womens groups [Zenzele] and traditional Leaders. It is funded at \$1,060,000 by USAID partly as an experimental effort. The general purposes of this element are to: [a] expand the capacity of traditional Swazi leaders and rural women's associations to plan and direct development activities; and [b] encourage an increased level of participation in development activities on the part of traditional leaders and rural women's associations.

3.1 OUTPUTS: DEVELOPMENT ORIENTATION

According to a letter from TCC to USAID, the training output from project inception to March of 1988 was 1,171 rural leaders (4849 training days) and 3,945 Zenzele women (12,473 training days), respectively. This far exceeds the contract target of 150 training sessions for each group.

3.2 GENERAL FINDINGS

Workshops and seminars appear to be thorough, well-thought out, and the content is geared to the expressed needs of the trainees at the time of their production. As the needs for training have shifted, the training curriculum has concurrently been adjusted so as to meet these needs in a timely fashion. However, the TCC training workshops and seminars, as well as those provided by the HEO's and CDO's are not offered to individual leaders and Zenzeles more than once or [rarely] twice a year. Weaknesses were found [1] in an ability to provide adequate monitoring and follow-up; and [2] in the quality or paucity of training materials produced and distributed.

GOS coordination of activities in the rural areas with other in- and out-country institutions has been continuous since the incipient stages of the contract. This is a good sign in term of integration of the development orientation.

TCC has been instrumental in designing a Community Development certificate course. A curriculum outline was completed in March, 1987; Either UNISWA [DEMS] or SIMPA is projected to become the institute responsible for providing the inputs for the certification training.

Programs on nutrition, sanitation, government policy, and announcements of upcoming meetings, seminars, and so forth have been taped and turned over to the SBS for dissemination to the rural communities throughout Swaziland. Many trainees feel, however, that audio media presentations move too quickly for them to be able to absorb most of the content.

Aside from isolated problems, the two most critical constraints cited by every field officer interviewed dealt with transportation and funding. GOS has not provided adequate transport for traditional sector training activities. The other cause for problems, and a more serious constraint, has been the lack of or long delays in funding the various training projects.

3.3 TRADITIONAL SECTOR BREAKTHROUGH

Towards the end of the original Traditional Sector Specialist's two-year tenure, success in developing a measurable "development awareness" -- particularly with traditional leaders -- began to accelerate. The reason for this acceleration is rather simple. Realizing that lectures in nutrition, sanitation, and health were of little interest to the Tinkhundla leaders, the Traditional Sector Specialist used either income producing or construction project themes to generate interest. Once the leaders had come to the seminars and once the requested projects had been discussed, health and sanitation topics were then delivered to the captive audience.

Note, however, that this tactic should not be used unless GOS and USAID are prepared to meet a number of rising expectations. And, there is evidence that rising expectations indeed have developed.

Fortunately, the HE field workers have not felt the need to employ these tactics. The Zenzele associations, doubled in number since 1986, enjoy meetings and seminars.

3.4 MID-TERM PROJECT STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the traditional sector of the SWAMPD project, and in terms of outputs, TCC has met much of its quantitative contractual obligations. If one measures the outputs of training in terms of the growing awareness of government resources and the myriad of requests for more training on the part of the rural leaders, it must be concluded that the training workshops and seminars have been very successful. It might actually be concluded that too good a job has been done inasmuch as neither TCC or GOS is in a position to meet the increase in demand for more training or provide the funding and logistical support for such training.

And, unfortunately, due to TCC's inability to produce the needed impact assessments, much of what it proposes in its Phase IV work plans for ongoing and/or additional traditional sector training is difficult to seriously consider or support because many proposed actions cannot be justified by impact data.

3.4.1 Impact Data.

The activity requiring immediate attention is the completion of the

impact assessment activity. However, considering the time remaining, no new field data collection should occur. Rather, usable impact data currently exists from which a credible report could be written. The Hitchcock and Patrick reports would serve as two sources of data. Additionally, a list should be compiled of the number of trainees in both seminars and workshops, in terms of their position in the community [e.g., chief, indvunas, and so forth], the subjects that each were taught, and the amount of time devoted to each topic. If possible, the list would denote frequency of workshop attendance per individual.

3.4.2 CD Certificate Program.

UNISWA, rather than SIMPA, is the preferable location of the certification program. It has expertise in short-term training, and in long-term training followed by long-term fieldwork [Distance Education]. The University has a competent staff, is relatively inexpensive, and is eager and willing to do it.

3.4.3 GOS Budget Inputs.

A recurring budget needs to be made available on a timely basis to both CD and HE. In this regard, USAID should impress upon GOS the importance of complying with the terms and conditions of the Grant Agreement. Project funds cannot continue to be relied upon to finance recurrent cost items.

3.4.4 Training Manuals.

No further manual-writing expenditures should be approved; funds should be allocated for the purchase and modification of the already-existing training materials available from other donor organizations.

3.4.5 Tours of Projects.

All trainees expressed a need to be shown a successful project at which venues they would be able to talk with other participants to exchange problems and successes encountered in their respective daily duties.

3.4.6 Resource Allocation and Training Focus.

If additional funds are to be made available to maintain training for both the Zenzele and the traditional leaders, then USAID should consider consolidating the TCC effort. This could occur by: [a] Concentrating solely on Tribal Leaders; [b] Concentrating solely on Zenzele;

[c] Selecting the most successful groups from each component; or [d] Selecting marginally successful groups and providing reinforcement.

3.5 END OF PROJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The over-riding goal of the traditional sector element of SWAMPD is sustainability of GOS capabilities to continue the effort on its own. There are strong indications that this sustainability is possible. Nonetheless, there will still be some area of weakness which will remain at project completion. Therefore, it is recommended that some follow-on effort be considered either in a contract extension or a newly designed project successor.

If a SWAMPD successor project does occur, then a development focus will be a natural theme. Requests from traditional authorities tend to be for construction [schools, meeting halls, and irrigation canals]. Since there are few artisans in the country, a training program for artisans may be worth considering.

If a follow-on project occurs which includes transferring specific income generation or construction related skills, both course content and desired output should be carefully considered before implementation. For example, while sewing and weaving are potentially major income-producing activities for Zenzele associations, existing skills are minimal and cannot be acquired in the existing short-term workshops.

Additionally, before developing training for income-producing activities, great care should be exercised in terms of advising the HE division concerning the need for researching the availability of markets, and the fact that each introduction of a cottage industry should be planned, not with the Zenzele in mind, but with the national or regional ability to absorb the product or products.

More attempts should be made to utilize local talent in the various ministries who could well serve as training consultants. For some small scale construction projects, it may be necessary that a basic construction engineer be recruited from an African country for the training of those artisans who are needed to meet the needs of the growing development project demands. The Peace Corps might be another source of assistance.

4.0 DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATIONS

The Development Communication [DC] element, funded at \$1,710,000, is relatively isolated from the rest of SWAMPD by virtue of being managed by another contractor [the Academy for Educational Development]. Applications to the mainstream activities of SWAMPD are peripheral.

The purpose of the Development Communication component of the Swaziland Manpower Development Project is to engender the capacity to plan, prepare, disseminate, and evaluate development communication activities in those government ministries and non-governmental organizations [NGOs] mandated to bring development to the people of Swaziland. To help achieve this purpose, a Center for Development Communications [CDC] was to be created.

4.1 OUTPUTS: PERSONNEL RESOURCES

Funding for technical and management resources for this project element was provided separately from the rest of the project.

A U.S.-based Project Director has exceeded a ten-month budget by approximately one month as of May 1988. A Development Communications Specialist (who also serves as a Chief-of-Party) with 39 months budgeted, will have used approximately 41 months upon scheduled departure in December 1988.

Of 39 months scheduled for short-term advisors, at least 35 months have been used. However, depending upon other activities were charged [e.g., listenership survey], the person-month budget may have been exceeded.

4.2 OUTPUTS: IN-COUNTRY TRAINING

AED has fulfilled, and on occasion exceeded its In-Country training mission. It has held four to five workshops per year on topics ranging from sample testing, interviewing, broadcast script writing, voice training, radio performance and public relations practice. This exceeds the 3 to 4 workshops per year required under the contract. Close to 50 participants, 20 more than had been targeted under the contract, will have successfully undergone comprehensive DC training by June 1988.

The provision of in-service training in studio care and maintenance for SBS technical staff was successfully completed over a period of six months by a technical advisor from the USA. Two operators were especially trained to take charge of the two new DC studios.

4.3 OUTPUTS: LONG- AND SHORT-TERM TRAINING

Long term training in the USA was to occur for five participants. Other short term training for Swazis was to be funded separately by USAID and was to include sending participants to DC oriented training of one to two months duration in the USA, elsewhere in Africa, or site visits to other successful DC projects outside of Swaziland and to professional conferences related to D.C.

The CDC Coordinator received only six months of largely inappropriate freshman-level training in SDSU's Continuing Education program. Two SBS engineers are currently pursuing B.S. [engineering] degrees at SDSU rather than four other professionals who were to have undergone training in journalism and educational broadcasting. AED does plan to place three other participants in long-term training via TCC's next placement cycle. Apart from the Coordinator's short period of study in the USA, little advantage has been taken on the short term training for Swazis in the USA or elsewhere in Africa.

4.4 PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (DC Versus DSC)

A major conceptual issue exists regarding project design and implementation. Radio-based Development Communications [DC], the approach used in the initial stages of the project, is concerned with providing the general public with information about development innovations, initiatives, activities, and policies and possibilities. Radio, with its capacity to blanket every square inch of a country, is particularly well suited to these ends. However, radio is not suited to teaching new behaviors or effectuating changes in old behaviors other than those of the simplest variety usually dealt with in commercial advertising.

Conversely, Development Support Communication [DSC] is concerned with providing specific knowledge and skills about specific innovations targeted to specific segments of the general public. Radio -- with its limited capacity to tell but not show -- is but one ingredient of a multi-media mix which best serves the purposes of DSC.

The Development Communications component, which began with a DC focus, eventually has evolved into a DSC approach to communication for development, thereby supplying the project with many of its missing elements.

4.5 OBSERVATIONS ON THE SDSU DELIVERY CAPABILITY

AED has supplied Development Communications training through a Sub-Contractor -- San Diego State University [SDSU] and its affiliate, the Center for Communications. The Center for Communications, however, is a research rather than a teaching institution. It has no mandate to offer courses or to issue diplomas or certificates of any kind.

The course numbers and descriptions it used for the Swaziland project do belong to SDSU's TeleCommunications and Film department, but this department claims no special DC expertise nor does it have a well known reputation as a center of DC scholarship in the USA. The TCF department, apart from allowing its course numbers and descriptions to be used [indirectly through the continuing education department], appears to have participated in neither the design nor the implementation of the curriculum used in Swaziland.

Nonetheless, the Swazi students seemed genuinely satisfied with the quality of instruction. Successful students earned a maximum of 18 SDSU credits. However, the 18 credit hour program was essentially built by the Center for Communications without collaboration with SDSU. Therefore, at best, SDSU was prepared to issue a document "certifying" that 18 credit hours had been earned. As a result, the students claim that the value of the program has been misrepresented. Swazi Civil Service guidelines recognize a diploma for upward mobility and promotions -- but not a certificate.

Furthermore, many participants claim that they were told that those who graduated successfully would be entitled to admission to SDSU, other U.S. universities, or the University of Swaziland even though they did not otherwise qualify under normal entry requirements of admission. The certificate will only enable applicants some extra consideration for enrollment either in the U.S. or Swaziland.

4.6 GENERAL FINDINGS

The primary GOS responsibilities included providing administrative oversight for the CDC and its production activities and housing it physically in SBS. In addition to providing the CDC Coordinator and a secretary, this was to include two operators to run the DC studios, adequate space for offices, a reference library, a teaching classroom, a production training studio, and two on-air production studios -- one to be reserved exclusively for user institutions and the other set aside for priority use by the same institutions.

Project inputs were to include the renovation and re-equipment of two radio studios, the provision of portable cassette and reel-to-reel recorders for outside production, the installation of a high speed cassette duplicator to support educational broadcasting, general equipment for a training classroom, and production studio along with reference library commodities such as books, audio tapes, and training materials.

One of the two staff trained to operate the DC studios has been re-assigned elsewhere within SBS. Of 18 portable recorders provided by USAID for use in outside production, only 12 are currently available. CDC is still without permanent classroom facilities. A large empty hall in SBS is earmarked for conversion to a training facility but plans are not yet beyond the drawing board. The bulk of the library materials have yet to be acquired.

A key concept promoted in AED's post contract award feasibility study was to encourage GOS to establish a scheme of service for DC professionals similar to those already existing for accountants and administrators. The contractor has not been successful in promoting this concept with GOS.

For a number of reasons, SBIS has proven not to be the most suitable location for the CDC. And, certain problems appear so intractable that continuation of SBIS as a site for the CDC may mitigate against long-term sustainability of the CDC training and development awareness functions.

Finally, the GOS counterpart was to play a critical role in the project. Development and transfer of the skills required to run the CDC upon the end of the project must occur if the DC functional capacity is to have any sustainability. This transfer of skills has not occurred.

4.7 MID-TERM STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In many respects, the Development Communications component has been a success. However, in light of the facts that [a] limited funds will be left after December 1988, [b] SBS is considered to be unenthusiastic about the CDC, and [c] the CDC coordinator is unprepared to assume leadership, the long-term sustainability of the Development Communications element is doubtful. In essence, AED will spend the remaining year of its contract as a long distance caretaker. In light of this, AID has three basic options it should consider.

4.7.1 Short-Term Option

The first option entails providing no additional funding for the CoP [Development Communications Specialist] beyond the current contract budget. This would essentially end contractor presence in Swaziland in one year prior to the scheduled end of the project. This would necessitate that the CDC and its equipment would be transferred to government a year early. Nonetheless, by then the project would have achieved its primary short-term goal of providing user institutions, both public and private, with capacity to "plan, prepare, disseminate and evaluate" radio communication initiatives in support of their development programmes. SBS will be left a better place than it was found--better off by two up-to-date radio production studios, by two engineers trained to a degree level in the USA, by technical operators trained in studio care and maintenance, and by several of its production staff having received the formal training they lacked in the art and craft of radio production, broadcasting and performance.

4.7.2 Intermediate-Term Option

The second option would entail additional funding to retain a CoP for

one more year to December 1989. This would enable sufficient time to assure that targets will be firmly established for long-term training of DC professionals; at least two, if not three long-term fellowships still need to occur to satisfy original output requirements.

An important action to be initiated in this option would be to assemble a Steering Committee to provide policy and operational guidance for the CDC. Any such committee must involve to the largest extent possible the very entities for which the CDC created -- the user institutions and their designated professional communicators. It should also entail creation of a scheme of service establishing a cadre of professional communicators in the Swazi civil service. Finally, during this time, a counterpart successor to the contractor CoP must be found.

4.7.3 Long-Term Option

The third option also entails providing another year of funding [to December 1989]. This would provide a bridge whereby problems resolved and lessons learned could be applied to planning for a successor project.

This last option reflects the preference of all the user institutions. User institutions generally expressed interest in continuing to expand the scope of the project from its narrow bias towards radio to include knowledge and skills associated with the show-and-tell media as well as with interpersonal intervention.

Two alternative locations have been suggested for the CDC: UNISWA and SIMPA. Both, however, have disadvantages similar to SBS. A solution would be to locate the CDC physically at SIMPA for easy user institution accessibility but administratively under UNISWA's Division of Extramural Studies [DEMS] through which course certification and curriculum oversight could be provided. DEMS gives UNISWA its distance teaching outreach to benefit the mature non-academic public and would therefore find little difficulty administering an off-campus, SIMPA-based CDC.

However, this would mean giving up the studios at SBS and building production studios at SIMPA along with a teaching classroom, library facility, and studio equipment. In addition, a separate production facility as distinct from one strictly for training would be needed exclusively for user institutions. Furthermore, a print media emphasis should be considered as an ingredient of the communication for development media mix. Finally, commensurate with practice in developed countries, the long term academic training of communication professionals should accrue to an institution in Swaziland.

5.0 INSTITUTION BUILDING AND INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES

The final project element, directly managed by the Mission, is the linkages activity which was funded at \$500,000. According to the Project Paper, the purpose of this element is that "Institutional Linkages will be contributing to the development, organizational efficiency and operations of selected Swazi training institutions."

5.1 OUTPUT

About six U.S. training institutions were to establish linkages with the same number of training institutions or programs in Swaziland. At this point only one linkage has been developed. This is between the Swaziland College of Technology and Western Carolina University. Four other potential linkages have been discussed.

5.2 INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AS A COMPONENT PART

The institutional linkage program raises a broader question as to the extent to which SWAMDP is an institutional development program as well as a human resource development program. The project paper supports the view that SWAMDP was intended to have a very strong institutional development component. Further, it was the intent of the designers of SWAMDP that evaluations of the project should examine the extent to which in-country activities could be sustained after the completion of the project. This is further buttressed by the argument from SIMPA and the Ministry of Labour and Public Service that discrete training activities held separately from an institutional base cannot be sustained after the end of the project.

5.3 MID-TERM STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

From the SCOT perspective, its linkage was fruitful. Some transfer of knowledge clearly took place, but perhaps to the extent that a demand was created which exceeds the available supply of linkage support.

With regard to in-country training capacity, consideration should be given to the idea of using the Institute of Development Management [IDM] to assist SIMPA in the development of training courses on a consultancy basis -- particularly considering that MLPS apparently plans to use SIMPA as the venue for training activities.

Finally, With regard to institution-building, both the University and SCOT have been targets for institutional development under SWAMDP. These are both examples where a relationship has developed out of a linkage between participant training and technology transfer in an institutional development mode. It is a model that could be more widely applied.

6.0 MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS OF SWAMP

Exclusive of funds earmarked for programmatic activities, the Project Paper established \$1,700,000 for general project administration and management activities -- to include funds for the mid-term evaluation. Therefore, the purpose of a management analysis of SWAMP is to evaluate how well the project has been implemented, administered, and controlled.

6.1 AID

Beginning in 1984, the Mission's staff and portfolio began to grow rapidly. This entailed a process whereby internal management systems had to be developed coincident to the implementation of large projects. Included in this evolutionary process were problems which are only now being resolved. These problems were caused by (a) prior management philosophy regarding contractor monitoring and control; and (b) over-reliance on "flexibility" in contract administration and interpretation. Concomitantly, inconsistencies or variations are evident regarding inputs, outputs, and responsibilities depending upon whether the project paper, contracts, or the grant agreements are referenced. Some of these inconsistencies have created contractual problems between the Mission and the contractors.

Resolution appears to be occurring following an increase in the oversight control applied by the Contracts Officer and Legal Advisor functions. Furthermore, there has been a cessation of direct contractor access to the Mission Director. Both of these steps have signaled major improvements in project/contract administration/management.

SWAMP was to have been managed and staffed with the [a] Human Resources Development Officer, [b] Education Officer/Project Management Officer, and [c] Training Officer.

Since the departure of the earlier HRDO in June of 1986, acting HR/GDOs have been appointed for large blocks of time [two weeks to two months]. The total FTE portion of time required for this back-up management support has been approximately 25%. Considering the fact that the mission's staff resources appear to be stretched, this situation seems to have constrained the ability of USAID to closely monitor and manage some of the more mundane administrative elements of the project.

The budget for the SWAMP Project Management Officer indicates a full time assignment to SWAMP. From the project beginning, the slot has been filled with PSC personnel whose dedicated time to the project is only 50%. The HR/GDO maintains direct management responsibility for all AED activities and other elements of TCC activities. Therefore, during absences of the HR/GDO, project responsibility has been assigned to the Program Officer, or more frequently, the Deputy Director -- all of which generally entails delegation of duties to the PSC Project Management officers.

Aside from manpower resources and allocation, the financial monitoring and control element of management is USAID's greatest single weakness as regards keeping SWAMP on track. What seems to be lacking is: (a) a system for reporting GOS inputs; (b) definition of terms regarding GOS in-kind contributions; (c) definition of terms regarding cost components to allocate contractor expenses; (d) a single source document to record contractor expenditures on an actual versus budgeted basis; and (e) a tracking system used to trigger USAID action when contractors and GOS do not produce inputs or reports when required.

6.2 TRANSCENTURY CORPORATION

The TCC operation is divided into two components, a field staff and a Home Office staff. The home office element has apparently run smoothly, whereas the field component has had major problems.

The TCC planning process began as a minor problem and has become a major problem. There also exists an apparent inability of TCC to develop plans in congruence with its contract and with the various statements of work of its various advisors and consultants. The five year implementation plan and phase I work plan [revised] was delivered nine months into the project; Phase II, Phase III, and Phase IV were also delivered late. None of the yearly work plans were approved in their entirety. Rather, approvals have occurred for discrete elements -- but not necessarily for all -- during the course of each "operating" year.

Conversely, USAID has contributed to the problem by either lack of action, or partial action on TCC documents or requests. The problem is further exaggerated by the lack of documentation when verbal approvals have been made. Furthermore, TCC makes apparently reasonable claims that it cannot always differentiate between matters of substance or format when the Mission rejects a workplan.

The period of highest productivity [in-country] occurred during the tenures of the first Chief of Party and Traditional Sector Specialist. It was during this period that an intensive amount of work was accomplished. Except for the tenure of the Traditional Sector Specialists, there has been poor continuity or transition in many of the slots TCC is authorized to fill. The poor transition seems to be caused by re-definitions of job duties for incoming individuals who, ideally, should be providing follow-up to activities initiated by prior consultants. And, there is insufficient compliance with terms and conditions of short- and long-term advisor job descriptions.

The Participant Process Selection Manager, whose two year contract ran out has left a void regarding the current round of participant selections. Furthermore, the Participant Process Selection Manager apparently acted as a "gatekeeper" of the PTS computer system; the consequence of his departure has been to leave TCC with no apparent ability to readily access or manipulate its data bases.

6.3 AED

In comparison to TCC, AED is a much smaller project component. Home Office support is basically a logistics and accounting function. The field office is staffed with The Chief of Party, an office assistant, and currently a radio broadcast consultant. The AED staff is supplemented by a GOS official, who serves as Coordinator, and a typist.

The Chief-of-Party is scheduled to return to a University post in the States where tenure is probable. This means that as of January 1989, the project will essentially become "headless". At this point it is doubtful that project activities can be sustained.

Past AED work plans have also had problems -- but of a smaller magnitude; AED's latest workplan [patterned on the Logframe] has been accepted by USAID and work is progressing accordingly.

6.4 GOS

There are a number of GOS inputs which do not appear to be in place; this has created attendant problems for the contractors. This absence also represents a compliance problem regarding planned GOS inputs. But, lacking sufficient GOS reports, the shortfalls cannot be quantified.

Using a single ministry as the implementing agent for SWAMDP has resulted in a funding bottleneck. Either funds are released late, or when they are released, project implementors may not receive their Order Books [from which purchases are made]; it is also claimed that many vendors or suppliers simply will not accept the order forms as a transaction mode.

A number of project personnel within USAID, GOS and contractor organizations have mentioned trade accounts, or "revolving funds" as a solution to the funding problem. This, however, would not address the problem of institutionalizing [i.e. creating a recurrent budget line] for targeted project elements.

6.5 MID TERM STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The size and complexity of SWAMDP does not have to imply that administrative and management requirements need be proportionately complex. Put simply, the administrative requirements are basically the same for a \$2,000,000 project and a \$20,000,000 project. There might be twice the detail to track and absorb in the larger project, but certainly not ten times the amount. In other words, with some relatively easy fixes, SWAMDP can be brought on track.

6.5.1 AID Resource Allocation

AID is at a critical juncture where it is: [a] attempting to rectify current contractor performance problems; [b] developing a strategy to bring the project to a smooth close with additions or

deletions of scope and funds; and [c] incorporating lessons learned into a potential SWAMP successor project. In this regard it is recommended that action be taken to strengthen and broaden the role of Project Management Officer. The recommended changes are: [a] Increase the level of support up from 50% to a 100% dedicated slot [as per the project paper]; and [b] Delegate all day-to-day administrative and oversight functions for the entire project from the HRGDO to the PM;

6.5.2 Contractor Cost Tracking System

In order to effectively measure and monitor contractor costs against project line items, it is recommended that a PC-driven spread-sheet should be developed; one such spread-sheet was developed in order to generate the Gonson Report.

6.5.3 TCC Workplans

USAID and TCC should make a concentrated, joint effort to close on a workplan which is clearly understood by both parties. Since the contract ends December 15, 1989, the plan should run to that date. The objective should be to identify all activities inclusive of staff and consultants and their associated timelines [and costs]. Authorization to proceed should cover all activities; incremental action should occur only to terminate an activity, or to modify an activity.

It is strongly recommended that discussions between the Mission and TCC concerning contractual requirements [and related functional definitions] be held in the presence of the Contracts Officer; the CO should be the final arbiter. If possible, his decision should be rendered during the time of the meeting[s].

6.5.4 GOS Contributions

AID should gather more detail on the proposed legislation to change the GOS budget to a rolling three year cycle. A three year budget cycle could provide an excellent opportunity to lock-in longer-term funding.

Concurrently, in order to facilitate end-of-project accounting, a reporting system should be developed to measure GOS inputs to the project. This would initially entail working with GOS accountants to determine the most effective means to access expenditure data to enable timely reporting.

6.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Finally, the most dominant longer-term issue is whether to split a successor project into component parts, or to maintain the current umbrella concept. The natural tendency may be to view some of the current operating problems as having been caused by too "large and complex" a project. However, before USAID comes to a conclusion that down-sizing and compartmentalizing is the necessary approach, it should carefully consider all the pros and cons of either approach.