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**EVALUATION REPORT**  
**STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC**  
**INSTITUTIONS PROJECT**

**IV - Democratic Leadership Training**  
**Summary of Evaluation**

**USAID/Honduras**  
**Contract No. PDC-5317-I-00-8127-00**  
**Work Order No.41**

**Development Associates, Inc.**  
**2924 Columbia Pike**  
**Arlington, Virginia, 22204**

**January 29, 1991**

## Foreword

USAID/H believes that readers of this evaluation would benefit from information on the historical context in which this project began implementation, an update on activities that have developed under the project since the evaluation was conducted, and additional background on several issues raised in the evaluation.

The August, 1987 signing of the Project Agreement was followed by an unusually complex process of awarding and negotiating the project's primary contract with Georgetown University (GU). The Honduran presidential campaign was in full swing when the GU contract was finalized one and a half years later. As a result of the campaign, politics permeated the Honduran Government's decision-making process and greatly hampered the implementation efforts of both USAID and GU in many areas of the project. The relationship between USAID and GU, initially strained by implementation delays suffered in early stages of the project, is now harmonious.

The project designers considered passage of career legislation a cornerstone of the project out of recognition that professional career civil service personnel are essential to de-politicizing democratic institutions. Since the evaluation was conducted in August of 1990, the Honduran Supreme Court accepted the organizational development plan designed by GU and the Court for implementation of the Judicial Career Law, and the President of the Court declared the Law in effect March 1, 1991. The Court has since worked diligently under the technical assistance and training of GU to develop the personnel regulations and procedures required to fully implement the law. The Honduran Congress has accepted a design drawn up by GU and congressional committee for a legislative information center (CIEL) and is laying the groundwork for its development. The law authorizing establishment of the CIEL, passed December 15, 1989, contains the desired merit employment procedures for the CIEL. An electoral reform law to provide for the professionalization of RNP staff has been drafted and submitted to Congress.

In closing, the Mission adds its own lesson learned from this project, that of the need for Democratic Initiatives project designs to be flexible enough to allow project implementation to keep step with changes in the political environment.

## **PREFACE**

This is the fourth and summary volume in an evaluation of the Strengthening Democratic Institutions project done for USAID/Honduras.

Earlier volumes in this series are:

- I - Administration of Justice, December 28, 1990
- II - Legislative Enhancement, December 28, 1990
- III - Voter Registration and Elections Improvement, January 11, 1991

As prescribed by the Honduras Mission in the scope of work for this major evaluation of a large and complex project, this Volume IV has two purposes:

1. provide in summary form the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the earlier volumes and discuss elements common to more than one component.
2. provide a summary for the Democratic Leadership component of the project and, in an accompanying annex (Annex E), a broader exposition of that subject. This component is treated somewhat differently than the others because it is limited in scope and is to support the other components.

All four volumes of this series also appear in Spanish translation.

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADAI	El Ateneo de la Agro Industria, a Honduran consulting firm
AID or A.I.D.	U.S. Agency for International Development
AID/W	Washington headquarters of Agency for International Development
AIFLD	American Institute for Free Labor Development
AOJ	Administration of Justice
CAPEL	Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral - an affiliate of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights which provides electoral advisory assistance
CIEL	Centro de Informatica y Estudios Legislativos (Center for Informatics and Legislative Studies)
CIPRA	The office in Georgetown University which oversees the unit in charge of supporting the SDI project in Honduras
C.P. CSLA	Condition Precedent Consortium for Services to Latin America (a consortium of U.S. universities, a subcontractor of Georgetown University)
DA	Development Associates, Inc. (a consulting firm)
GEMAH	Gerentes y Empresarios Asociados de Honduras, a Honduran management consultant firm
GOH	Government of Honduras
GU	Georgetown University
GU/H	Honduras office of Georgetown University
HRD	Human Resources Development office of USAID
HSC	Honduran Supreme Court
ILANUD	Instituto Latinoamericano de las Naciones Unidas para la Prevención del Delito y Tratamiento del Delincuente (Latin American Institute of the United Nations for Crime Prevention and Treatment of Criminals)
INCAE	Instituto Centroamericana de Administración de Empresas (Central American Institute of Business Administration)
IRM	Information Resources Management office of AID/Washington
JP	Justice of the Peace
LAC/DI	The Democratic Initiatives office of the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C.
LAC/CAP/H	The Honduras desk in the Office for Central American and Panamanian Affairs of the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Agency for International Development

**MBO** Management by Objectives  
**MOU** Memorandum(a) of Understanding  
  
**NJRC** National Judicial Reform Commission  
  
**PACD** Project Agreement Completion Date  
**PD** Public Defender  
**PID** Project Implementation Document (an AID document)  
**PIL** Project Implementation Letter (an AID document)  
**PIO/T** Project Implementation Order/Technical Services (an AID pre-contracting document)  
**PP** Project Paper (an AID document)  
**PSC** Personal Services Contractor  
  
**RAJO** AID's Regional Administration of Justice Office located in San Jose, Costa Rica  
**RFP** Request for Proposals  
**RNP** Registro Nacional de Personas (National Registry of Persons)  
  
**SDI** Strengthening Democratic Institutions project  
  
**TA** Technical Assistance  
**TDY** Temporary Duty  
**TFG** The Futures Group (a GU subcontractor)  
**TNE** Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones (National Elections Tribunal)  
**TNE/RNP** Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones/Registro Nacional de Personas (National Elections Tribunal and its affiliate the National Registry of Persons)  
  
**UCR** University of Costa Rica  
**U.S.** United States  
**USAID** U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Honduras.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction

On September 20, 1987, a Grant Agreement was signed by the President of Honduras and the Ambassador of the United States to initiate the Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) project. The purpose of the SDI project (see the Logical Framework for the project at Annex D) is to:

"improve the capability of key democratic institutions (the Judiciary, the Congress, and the National Elections Tribunal/National Registry of Persons), develop local leadership and increase the knowledge and participation of the Honduran populace in the democratic process."

To implement three components of the project, separate Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) were signed: with the Supreme Court on October 14, 1987; with the Honduran National Congress on October 16, 1987; and with the National Elections Tribunal on September 21, 1987. A fourth component provided for democratic leadership training in support of the other three components.

On August 27, 1990, A.I.D. signed a contract with Development Associates, Inc. (DA) to provide a five-person team to undertake a mid-course evaluation of the SDI project (See Annex A for the scope of work). The DA team met in Washington, D.C. September 5-7 to meet with A.I.D. officials and representatives of the prime contractor (Georgetown University). Members of the team were in Honduras from September 10 to October 2 reviewing documentation (see Annex C) and interviewing senior officials of the GOH participating agencies, other GOH officials, USAID officers, and personnel from the Bar Association, the Law School, the Honduran office of Georgetown University (GU/H) and GU sub-contractors (see Annex B for a list of people contacted). Part of the team also visited Costa Rica where they met with people from IIANUD, CAPEL, the Asamblea Legislativa, the University of Costa Rica, INCAE, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and AID's Regional Administration of Justice office. The team also coordinated a survey of attitudes regarding the integrity of the November 1989 election.

A draft report was submitted to USAID on October 2, 1990. Comments on the draft report were provided by the prime contractor on October 16 and November 29, 1990 and January 4, 1991 and by USAID on November 16 and December 7 and 14, 1990. Comments are reflected in this final report as appropriate.

### Project Progress

There follows a summary of the priority tasks to be achieved by each component, followed by the evaluation team's conclusions about the progress achieved.

### A. Administration of Justice

Initial priority in the Administration of Justice component was to be given to four tasks:

1. implementing a professional Judicial Career Service, including establishing experimental development programs for Justices of the Peace and Public Defenders;
2. strengthening the Judiciary's administrative structure;
3. instituting a major training program to support the career service; and
4. developing a public information program to increase awareness, understanding, appreciation and utilization of the legal system by the population of the country.

Summary conclusions on component progress are as follows:

1. The level of achievement against project plans has been low, but it seems likely that project outputs can be realized by the end of the project (August 1992) if: (a) The Court and the Government of Honduras have the will and political strength to implement the Judicial Career Law; (b) the Court and the contractor, with USAID's support, give high priority to the activities called for in the MOU; (c) USAID allows greater direct interaction between the Court and the contractor and does not allow needs in other components to slow up activities in this component.
2. Support to training programs should increase substantially as project implementation accelerates. For USAID-funded support to be effective, a number of issues need to be addressed: (a) the contractor's training role needs to be reviewed; (b) there is need for more analytical work on the working conditions of the Justices of the Peace and Judges of First Instance (Jueces de Letras) and on the application of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (c) there is need for greater coordination between CSLA, the Judicial School, and ILANUD; and (d) GU will need to have a full-time person attached to the GU/Honduras office.

### B. Legislative Enhancement

To accomplish the objectives of this component, priority was to be given to two areas:

- (1) establishing a National Center for Legislative Support Services designed to provide legislators with more and higher quality information; and

- (2) improving the functioning of the Congress by:
- (a) enhancing the current administrative structure;
  - (b) streamlining the legislative process; and
  - (c) strengthening the committee system of the Congress.

Summary conclusions on component progress are as follows:

1. Overall, implementation performance has been minimal, primarily due to the delays within USAID in contracting the prime contractor.
2. The passage of the legislation for CIEL, although delayed, is the most important accomplishment of this component. USAID would be justified in accepting CIEL in its present form as meeting the spirit of the MOU, even though it is not a separate institution as called for in the MOU.
3. There is still no technical analysis that justifies the hardware configuration planned for CIEL as a least cost solution. The team recognizes, however, that using the Brazilian software provides a means of eliminating the need for an extended and detailed technical analysis. Given that, and the general delay in project implementation already encountered, the IRM proposal appears reasonable under the circumstances.
4. There appears to be within the Congress too much faith in computer hardware and too little appreciation for what it takes to build and utilize data systems (see discussion in Annex E of Component II evaluation report).
5. The Holt recommendations for streamlining Congressional operations offer possibilities for improving the effectiveness of Congress comparable to those afforded by a functioning CIEL and could probably begin to show results in less time.
6. Condition Precedent (2)(2), regarding a career service for the RNP, is inconsistent with the stated intent in the Project Paper to insulate each component from delays in the others. This Condition Precedent would be better stated as a covenant--with an appropriate target date in 1991 for implementation.

#### C. Voter Registration and Elections Improvement

Two major activities were proposed for this component:

- (1) Up-dating, microfilming and computerization of the Civil Registration Lists. This was to be broken into two stages:

- (a) Up-date, verify, and microfilm, within 18 months of the signature of the MOU, all documents from 1880 to 1987 required by the Civil Registration process.
  - (b) Support the institutionalization of an improved and effective civilian registration process at all levels of the Republic.
- (2) Provide support to the 1989 national election (in-service training of administrative personnel and of election workers); provide technical, administrative, training and commodity support to facilitate the implementation of the general elections scheduled for November 1989; and strengthen the permanent institutional base for future elections.

Summary conclusions on component progress are as follows:

1. Virtually no progress has been made in up-dating, verifying, and microfilming Honduran civil registration lists. Further assistance under the project for up-dating the RNP rolls is justified only for technical assistance to carry out a feasibility study to explore alternative procedures for the up-dating process and for preparing a detailed implementation plan and budget for the most feasible process. Concurrently, an alternative process might be considered for electoral registration.
2. No progress has been made in the institutionalization of the RNP as called for in the MOU, and it is not clear that any can be expected in the near future. A high level discussion with GOH authorities is needed to confirm whether or not the political will exists to seek a career law for RNP and TNE.
3. The evaluation team concurs with the USAID and TNE assessment that, as a result of an improved training program and an effective public education campaign, the voting places were better managed in 1989 than in the 1985 election. The evaluation team believes, however, that follow-up surveys, both among the election workers and the general public, should have been undertaken to verify this conclusion and to obtain information that could be used to strengthen future training programs, public education campaigns, and electoral processes in general.
4. Although there were temporary crises in the delivery of some of the project-funded activities, and TNE dissatisfaction with some of the USAID-funded technical assistance experts, project support to the TNE for carrying out the election generally was effective and was appreciated by TNE.
5. The level and nature of U.S. participation in support of the Honduran election was not healthy for the election process.

The objective of any additional assistance under the project for this activity should be to put the Hondurans in a position to manage future elections without external assistance. Further, no U.S. assistance should be provided once the electoral campaign has begun.

#### D. Democratic Leadership Training

This component is not included in the Logical Framework, but the text of the PP calls for a broad-based program of training conferences for locally-elected officials and key individuals in organizations that participate in one way or another in the democratic process in Honduras. The prime contractor was to organize several national seminars each year for specific groups of officials or organizations to analyze their role in the democratic process and to identify ways to involve their constituencies more effectively in constructive support of the democratic institutions of the country.

Summary conclusions on component progress are as follows:

1. The only activity undertaken to date has been seminars organized by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) for union members. Funded under a Memorandum of Understanding between USAID and AIFLD, six seminars on political theory and eight seminars on the principles of economics have been carried out. The seminars are reported to be well received. There has been no effort to date to determine the impact of the seminars. The content of both the Political Theory and Principles of Economics seminars is only marginally related to the purpose of the project.
2. This component is begging for a strategy, a plan, some thought. It could be used to promote discussion about, and possibly foster support for, some of the unfilled conditions precedent and covenants in the MOUs for the other components. The other groups mentioned in the PP, as well as labor unions, are worthy of some attention--as are women who were not mentioned in the PP. Support for formal and informal civic education could also be fostered.

#### Major Problems, Concerns, and Constraints

A major policy issue that has arisen in the three main components of the project is the lack of progress in creating career services in the three counterpart agencies--a Condition Precedent in all three Memoranda of Understanding. The evaluation found no evidence that this issue has been brought to high levels of the GOH; thus, it is not clear whether there is a political will to carry out what appears to be the single most important action under the project to strengthen democratic principles and create public confidence in the three counterpart organizations.

## General Recommendations

Priority I recommendations for each component are included in the main text of this report. In addition, the complete Recommendations section from the reports for Components I, II, and III are presented in Annex I. There follows the general recommendations of the evaluation team.

1. USAID should engage in high level talks with senior GOH officials, not just with the counterpart organizations, on the GOH position on establishing career systems, particularly in the Judiciary and at the RNP.
2. If it is not possible to get a clear commitment to a career service, or some other means of insulating the judges and registry workers from political influence, USAID should consider terminating assistance to the Judiciary and TNE/RNP.
3. Assuming a positive outcome to the career service issue, USAID should modify its project management approach and allow the contractor greater freedom in dealing with the Court and the Congress on a day-to-day basis on the implementation of an approved work plan. Concurrently, USAID should focus on policy issues (e.g., 1 above), routine monitoring, and ensuring appropriate coordination of effort between bilateral and regionally-funded activities.
4. USAID and the contractor should work out a new staffing pattern for GU/H, taking into account the implications of recommendation 3, the recommendations of the evaluation team regarding other GU/H staffing needs (see reports on Components I and II), the reduction taking place in the contractor's home office support per existing contract provisions, and the likely USAID staffing for project support.
5. USAID and GU should re-examine the structure of the GU contract with regard to the need for so many subcontractors and determine if it would be possible to increase GU/H's capability to contract locally for resources rather than having most, if not all, of this done through expatriate subcontractors.

## Lessons Learned

The evaluation team believes that the experience in Honduras in setting up the first bilateral project to strengthen democratic institutions offers four general lessons and one with somewhat less generalized application. The less general lesson learned relates to the problems that arise when the Agency attempts to move from regional funding to bilateral funding; this is discussed in the report on Component I. The more general lessons, which are summarized in the main text of this report, cover Scope of the Project, Information Sharing, Marking of Election Commodities, and Planning and Monitoring a New Initiative.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The USAID Project Paper for the Strengthening Democratic Institutions project was approved August 12, 1987. The initial obligation of funds took place with the signature on September 20 of a Grant Agreement by the President of Honduras and the U.S. Ambassador. The purpose of the agreement was "to improve the capability of key democratic institutions [the Judiciary, the Congress and the National Elections Tribunal (TNE)/National Registry of Persons (RNP)], develop local leadership and increase the knowledge and participation of the Honduran populace in the democratic process." Separate Memoranda of Understanding were signed with the Honduran Supreme Court, Congress, and TNE.

The Grant Agreement calls for a mid-course evaluation. On August 27, 1990, AID signed a contract with Development Associates Inc. (DA) to undertake such an evaluation. See Annex A for the scope of the work for the evaluation. DA fielded a five-person team to carry out the evaluation:

James L. Roush	Team Leader--Economist, Evaluation Specialist
Mitchell Seligson	Political Scientist, Latin American Specialist
James Rowles	Specialist in Comparative Law and Latin American Law and Legal Systems
Joseph Alessandro	Educator, Training Specialist
Carlos Ferro	Commodity Procurement Specialist

Mr. Roush visited Honduras August 28-31 to obtain preliminary briefings from USAID, to prepare a work plan for the work of the team, and to make arrangements for the team's visit. The team (except for Mr. Ferro) met in Washington D.C. September 5-7 to study the scope of work for the evaluation, review documentation, and meet with officials of AID and the prime contractor (Georgetown University -- GU).

The team arrived in Tegucigalpa Sunday September 9 and initiated the evaluation the following day. It met with senior officials of the Court, the Congress, and the TNE. Drs. Seligson, Alessandro, and Rowles visited Costa Rica September 12-15, contacting officials of ILANUD, CAPEL, the Asamblea Legislativa, the University of Costa Rica, INCAE, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, and AID's Regional Administration of Justice office (RAJO).

In Honduras, the team interviewed officials from other GOH offices, the Bar Association, the Law School, USAID, the Honduran office of Georgetown University (GU/H), and GU sub-contractors--both external and in-country--(see Annex B for a list of people contacted). The team reviewed documentation in TNE, USAID, and GU/H files (see Annex C for a list of the published documents reviewed). The TNE arranged a special visit to, and briefing on the work of the RNP. Dr. Seligson arranged for and coordinated a survey of attitudes regarding the integrity of the November 1989 election (see Annex E of the Component III report for methodology and other details).

In conformance with the objective of the evaluation, the team reviewed the progress made against targets established in USAID's Project Paper and the Memoranda of Understanding, analyzed policy issues and implementation problems, reviewed the basic design for the project component, and made recommendations regarding future assistance to each component. A draft report was submitted to USAID on October 2, 1990. GU provided comments on the draft report on October 16; USAID's comments were received November 16, December 7, and December 14. These comments are reflected in this final report.

## II. SUMMARY OF PROJECT PROGRESS

### A. Administration of Justice

Initial priority in the Administration of Justice component was to be given to four tasks:

1. implementing a professional Judicial Career Service, including establishing experimental development programs for Justices of the Peace and Public Defenders;
2. strengthening the Judiciary's administrative structure;
3. instituting a major training program to support the career service; and
4. developing a public information program to increase awareness, understanding, appreciation and utilization of the legal system by the population of the country.

There follows a summary of the principal findings from the Component I evaluation report, followed by summary conclusions. The priority I recommendations are included in Section V below.

#### 1. Judicial Career Service

A judicial career law was passed in 1980 which, when implemented, would provide the basis for a career service. Some of the implementing regulations had already been prepared with ILANUD assistance at the time the SDI project was being designed and the Supreme Court had taken some actions to implement the 1980 law. The earlier momentum was lost. Neither of the two Conditions Precedent nor the Covenant in the MOU relating to this element of the project have been fulfilled.

The new President of the Supreme Court has promised to implement the Career Law by January 1, 1991. Although this may be optimistic, the logjam in implementation has been broken and the new government is committed to judicial reform. Thus, there are good possibilities for progress in this element.

## 2. Justice of the Peace Program

This element includes two activities:

- (a) an experimental program assigning new law graduates as Justices of the Peace for a year each and, if the program proved successful, incorporating the graduates into the to-be-established career service; and
- (b) one-week in-service training workshops (legal and administrative) for all 350 Justices of the Peace in the country.

The experimental program has been successful in the sense that three groups of 27 law school graduates have been assigned as Justices of the Peace and most have been retained as Justices of the Peace or promoted. Their salaries have been moved from USAID funding to the Judiciary's budget. Some questions have been raised about the selection process for candidates for the program. There has been no evaluation of the program (in contrast to performance evaluations of the justices). The President of the Court told the evaluation team that the Court does not intend to continue the program.

The in-service training proposals in the MOU were drastically changed shortly after GU came on board (January 1989). Meetings were held with Court and ILANUD officials, and it was decided that ILANUD would continue to provide all legal training; GU's sub-contractor, CSLA, would be limited to administrative training. The legal training organized by ILANUD has been well received. ILANUD has also prepared a manual for use by Justices of the Peace. It recently prepared a training needs assessment, which has been well received by the Court.

The limited amount of administrative training carried out by CSLA has not been as well received as the legal training organized by ILANUD. CSLA has had less direct contact with Court officials and with the trainees. Furthermore, less data is available on the type of administrative training that is needed. Because administrative re-organization has been lagging, it has not been possible to establish training needs to support that activity.

## 3. Public Defender Program

One of the most significant achievements of the project has been the successful establishment of a Public Defenders program in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. The evaluation team understands that current plans are to extend the program to the interior of the country. The Public Defender System study proposed in the MOU has not been done. No legislation has been passed authorizing the Public Defender Program.

4. Strengthening the Administrative System of the Judiciary

The contractor submitted a study in June 1989 on the organizational structure of the Judiciary, but no action was taken on the report. A new report was submitted in September 1990 and was under review during the evaluation team's visit. Although it proposes activities outside the scope of the project, the new report provides a solid basis for future collaboration between GU and the Court in the area of administrative reorganization.

5. Training Program to Support the Career Service

The only in-service training provided is discussed under 2. above. No technical training for permanent staff of the support offices has taken place, reflecting delays in creating a permanent staff and lack of progress in carrying out administrative reforms. Of eight international observation visits proposed under the project, two were carried out to the United States in 1988, with two Court officials each, to review court administration. Of two long-term graduate level fellowships planned for the project, one has been used by an official of the National Agrarian Reform Institute to study agrarian law at the University of Costa Rica.

6. Public Information Program

The MOU calls for two mass media campaigns to increase the understanding of the population of the laws of the country and the functioning of the court system. A Covenant calls for a permanent public information officer to be hired by the second year of the project and the position to be maintained after the end of the project. There has been no project activity in this area.

Summary Conclusions on Component Progress

1. The level of achievement against project plans has been low, but it seems likely that project outputs can be realized by the end of the project (August 1992) if: (a) The Court and the Government of Honduras have the will and political strength to implement the Judicial Career Law; (b) the Court and the contractor, with USAID's support, give high priority to the activities called for in the MOU; (c) USAID allows greater direct interaction between the Court and the contractor and does not allow needs in other components to slow up activities in this component.
2. Support to training programs should increase substantially as project implementation accelerates. For USAID-funded support to be effective, a number of issues need to be addressed: (a) the contractor's training role needs to be reviewed; (b) there is need for more analytical work on the working

conditions of the Justices of the Peace and Judges of First Instance (Jueces de Letras) and on the application of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (c) there is need for greater coordination between CSLA, the Judicial School, and ILANUD; and (d) GU will need to have a full-time person attached to the GU/Honduras office.

## **B. Legislative Enhancement**

To accomplish the objectives of this component, priority was to be given to two areas:

- (1) establishing a National Center for Legislative Support Services designed to provide legislators with more and higher quality information; and
- (2) improving the functioning of the Congress by:
  - (a) enhancing the current administrative structure;
  - (b) streamlining the legislative process; and
  - (c) strengthening the committee system of the Congress.

There follows a summary of the principal findings from the Component II evaluation report, followed by summary conclusions. The priority I recommendations are included in Section V below.

1. On December 26, 1989, at least a year later than planned, the President of Honduras signed the legislation creating the Centro de Informatica y Estudios Legislativos (CIEL) -- Center for Informatics and Legislative Studies.
2. The law passed was much weaker than the draft law proposed by the experts, which had been structured to isolate the center from politics. Nevertheless, Congressional leaders say there is bipartisan support for a professional legislative support center.
3. GU consultants submitted a revised plan in August 1990 for equipping and staffing CIEL. The plan calls for a mainframe computer for CIEL. The evaluation team took issue with the proposals and recommended that the Information Resources Management (IRM) office of AID/Washington review the GU proposal (for reasons given in Annex E of the Component II evaluation report). The IRM team submitted its recommendations in November and they are now being reviewed by USAID and the Honduran Congress.
4. The contractor submitted in 1989 proposals for improving Congressional organization and functioning, including the functioning of committees, but no action had been taken by the Congress at the time of the team's visit and none appeared to be in the offing. Priority was being given almost exclusively to CIEL.

5. Conditions Precedent and Covenants in the MOU have not been complied with; yet, they have not been changed and the team found no official correspondence with the Congress regarding its noncompliance. For example, no enabling legislation has been passed to allow for the implementation of an administrative career service and a career service for CIEL [Condition Precedent (2)(1)] and no enabling legislation has been passed to permit the creation of a career service for the National Registry of Persons [Condition Precedent (2)(2)].

#### Summary Conclusions on Component Progress

1. Overall, implementation performance has been minimal, primarily due to the delays within USAID in contracting the prime contractor.
2. The passage of the legislation for CIEL, although delayed, is the most important accomplishment of this component. USAID would be justified in accepting CIEL in its present form as meeting the spirit of the MOU, even though it is not a separate institution as called for in the MOU.
3. There is still no technical analysis that justifies the hardware configuration planned for CIEL as a least cost solution. The team recognizes, however, that using the Brazilian software provides a means of eliminating the need for an extended and detailed technical analysis. Given that, and the general delay in project implementation already encountered, the IRM proposal appears reasonable under the circumstances.
4. There appears to be within the Congress too much faith in computer hardware and too little appreciation for what it takes to build and utilize data systems (see discussion in Annex E of Component II evaluation report).
5. The Holt recommendations for streamlining Congressional operations offer possibilities for improving the effectiveness of Congress comparable to those afforded by a functioning CIEL and could probably begin to show results in less time.
6. Training activities to date under the project have been minimal, but they should become very important for the rest of the project life; this will increase the need for training collaboration and coordination.
7. Condition Precedent (2)(2), regarding a career service for the RNP, is inconsistent with the stated intent in the Project Paper to insulate each component from delays in the others. This Condition Precedent would be better stated as a covenant--with an appropriate target date in 1991 for implementation.

**C. Voter Registration and Elections Improvement**

The MOU proposes two major activities:

- (1) Up-dating, microfilming and computerization of the Civil Registration Lists. This was to be broken into two stages:
  - (a) Up-date, verify, and microfilm, within 18 months of the signature of the MOU, all documents from 1880 to 1987 required by the Civil Registration process.
  - (b) Support the institutionalization of an improved and effective civilian registration process at all levels of the Republic.
- (2) Provide support to the 1989 national election (in-service training of administrative personnel and of election workers); provide technical, administrative, training and commodity support to facilitate the implementation of the general elections scheduled for November 1989; and strengthen the permanent institutional base for future elections.

There follows a summary of the principal findings from the Component III evaluation report, followed by summary conclusions. The priority I recommendations are included in Section V below.

**1. Up-date, Verify and Microfilm the Civil Registration Lists**

Only about 200,000 records were microfilmed by June 1989, the target date for completing 20 million. Even those microfilmed probably will not be used. It has not been determined whether the method planned for up-dating the records will achieve the goal of a reliable electoral roll even if the 20 million records are integrated.

**2. Support the Institutionalization of the RNP**

This activity was planned as a follow-on activity to 1., to be undertaken after the election; however, the action contemplated has not taken place because the GOH has not fulfilled the Conditions Precedent in the MOU regarding the establishment of a career law and the adoption of a new personnel system.

**3. Support to the 1989 National Election**

- a. Project-funded training of election workers was important to the successful administration of the election. Forty-one supervisors were trained and they in turn trained 295 instructors. The latter trained 58,841 election workers.

- b. Three public education campaigns were successfully and effectively carried out, covering voter registration, the work of the TNE, and the electoral process.
- c. TNE staff generally was not pleased with the technical assistance provided by expatriate contractors, but spoke highly of GEMAH, the Honduran firm that conducted three seminars for TNE and RNP and provided technical support in planning for the election.
- d. About \$1.5 million of commodities and services were programmed for supporting the election, about one-third of them being purchased in Honduras and the balance in the U.S. or Puerto Rico. Purchases included paper for ballots, printing of ballots, indelible ink, transparent plastic bags for transporting ballots, FAX machines, ball point pens, paper towels, etc. In general, both offshore and local procurement were handled well.
- e. Unrelated to project activity, election preparations were complicated by changes in procedures passed by the Congress (e.g., where people were to vote and what identification would be accepted) and by political in-fighting within the TNE Tribunal. Also, three of the five members of the Tribunal were new in their jobs. Problems also occurred in getting commodities delivered to polls; some polls opened late.

#### Summary Conclusions on Component Progress

1. Virtually no progress has been made in up-dating, verifying, and microfilming Honduran civil registration lists. Further assistance under the project for up-dating the RNP rolls is justified only for technical assistance to carry out a feasibility study to explore alternative procedures for the up-dating process and for preparing a detailed implementation plan and budget for the most feasible process. Concurrently, an alternative process might be considered for electoral registration. Because of the influence of the political parties on the hiring of RNP employees and running the TNE, political parties must be included in any discussions involving future USAID support to TNE/RNP for improving the general Civil Registry rolls or the electoral rolls.
2. No progress has been made in the institutionalization of the RNP as called for in the MOU, and it is not clear that any can be expected in the near future. A high level discussion with GOH authorities is needed to confirm whether or not the political will exists to seek a career law for RNP and TNE.
3. The evaluation team concurs with the USAID and TNE assessment that, as a result of an improved training program and an effective public education campaign, the voting places were

better managed in 1989 than in the 1985 election. The evaluation team believes, however, that follow-up surveys, both among the election workers and the general public, should have been undertaken to verify this conclusion and to obtain information that could be used to strengthen future training programs, public education campaigns, and electoral processes in general.

4. Although there were temporary crises in the delivery of some of the project-funded activities, and TNE dissatisfaction with some of the USAID-funded technical assistance experts, project support to the TNE for carrying out the election generally was effective and was appreciated by TNE. The election took place on schedule in a relatively orderly and peaceful fashion with a high level of voter participation and a relatively low level of complaints.
5. The level and nature of U.S. participation in support of the Honduran election was not healthy for the election process. The objective of any additional assistance under the project for this activity should be to put the Hondurans in a position to manage future elections without external assistance. Further, no U.S. assistance should be provided once the electoral campaign has begun.

#### D. Democratic Leadership Training

This component is not included in the Logical Framework, but the text of the PP calls for a broad-based program of training conferences for locally-elected officials and key individuals in organizations that participate in one way or another in the democratic process in Honduras. The prime contractor was to organize several national seminars each year for specific groups of officials or organizations to analyze their role in the democratic process and to identify ways to involve their constituencies more effectively in constructive support of the democratic institutions of the country.

A total of 10 specialized national leadership conferences were to be sponsored by the project over a three-year period. The project was expected to initiate about half of the conferences. The other half were to be sponsored in response to proposals submitted by Honduran organizations. Guidelines are offered in the PP for selecting among proposals.

There follows a summary of the principal findings from Annex E of this report, followed by summary conclusions. The priority I recommendations are included in Section V below.

1. The only activity undertaken to date has been seminars organized by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) for union members. Funded under a Memorandum of Understanding between USAID and AIFLD, six seminars on political theory and eight seminars on the

principles of economics have been carried out. The seminars are reported to be well received. There has been no effort to date to determine the impact of the seminars. The content of both the Political Theory and Principles of Economics seminars is only marginally related to the purpose of the project. For a fuller discussion of the AIFLD initiative, see Annex F.

2. This activity has been accorded low priority. It was not mentioned in the contractor's approved work plan for 1989. In the January-June 1990 work plan, the contractor proposed that CAPEL conduct a seminar related to the issue of the treatment, under Honduran law, of those charged with having committed a crime. No further action has been taken.

#### Summary Conclusions on Component Progress

1. Based on talking with participants during a seminar held while the evaluation team was in country, the AIFLD program appears well received; there are, however, no participant evaluation data available for analysis. The subject matter of the principal seminars funded under the project is only marginally related to project objectives or to overcoming problems encountered in project implementation.
2. This component is begging for a strategy, a plan, some thought. It could be used to promote discussion about, and possibly foster support for, some of the unfilled conditions precedent and covenants in the MOUs for the other components. The other groups mentioned in the PP, as well as labor unions, are worthy of some attention--as are women who were not mentioned in the PP. Support for formal and informal civic education could also be fostered.

### III. MAJOR PROBLEMS, CONCERNS, AND CONSTRAINTS

Implementation progress has lagged in all components. The principal contributing factors, which are discussed in some detail in the reports for Components I, II, and III and in Annex H to this report, are:

- (1) contracting delays, which resulted in the prime contractor not coming on board until January 1989--16 months after the project was initiated;
- (2) inadequate and/or inappropriate project management staffing in USAID--there was no full time project officer for the SDI project until January 1989 and the person assigned then had no previous experience with this type of project. Appropriate and adequate staffing is still a problem;

- (3) unsatisfactory (at times recriminatory) contractor-USAID-GOH counterpart organization relationships--in part because of the previous two problems; and
- (4) the November 1989 election, which virtually brought to a halt all other activities under the project.
- (5) rushing into the up-dating of the National Registry data without adequate analysis of the problem and the proposed solution.

A major policy issue that has arisen in all three of the other reports is the lack of progress in creating career services in the three counterpart agencies--a Condition Precedent in all three Memoranda of Understanding. There is no evidence that this issue has been brought to high levels of the GOH; thus, it is not clear whether there is a political will to carry out what appears to be the single most important action under the project to strengthen democratic principles and create public confidence in the three counterpart organizations.

The potential impact of the project on women was not discussed in the Project Paper or in any of the Memoranda of Understanding, and the evaluation team found no indication that it had been considered during the implementation of the project up to mid-1990. In the evaluation scope of work, however, USAID asked the team to suggest mechanisms that could be incorporated into the project to measure the impact on women. Such suggestions have been provided in the Recommendations section of the reports for Components I, II, and III.

#### IV. PROJECT DESIGN

There follows the principal conclusions relating to the design of the SDI project. These are based on, or drawn from, the evaluation reports of Components I, II, and III and from Annex G to this report, Analysis of Project Design.

1. The Project Paper does not provide a project purpose which will permit subsequent evaluators to determine whether the project has been successful; a number of the End of Project Status indicators are not appropriate. Nevertheless, the achievement of the project outputs proposed in the Project Paper clearly would make a significant contribution to strengthening democracy in Honduras.
2. There was no provision in the project for base line studies to determine the public knowledge of and attitudes towards the institutions whose credibility and standing were to be improved.
3. The principal assumption in the design is that there was a commitment by political leaders to the changes being

proposed, particularly regarding the establishment of career services in the counterpart organizations--this assumption has not been borne out to date.

4. There was inadequate study of the issues surrounding the cleansing of the voting rolls, leading to an attempt to do something on a crash basis which, even if successful, might not have contributed to a higher credibility for the election.
5. Given the extreme political sensitivities surrounding the election, which is acknowledged in the PP, one would expect that the design would have provided for a reduced and less obtrusive role for USAID in supporting the 1989 election than it had played in the 1985 election.
6. Although the PP speaks of compartmentalizing the different components so that delay or problems in one component would not create problems for the others, the actual design had the opposite effect. Election support, when it is significant in magnitude, should be handled as a separate project.
7. The USAID would have been well advised to have taken more time in the design process, and involved outside experts more in the design process.
8. Greater attention should have been given to the transition from regional funding to a bilateral project--both in terms of assuring adequate funding for ongoing activities and the interaction of implementing agencies.

## V. PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

There follow some general recommendations that flow from the reports on Components I, II, and III and the annexes to this report. Subsequently, the most important (Category I) recommendations unique to each component will be presented. Annex I presents a complete listing of recommendations from the reports on Components I, II, and III.

### A. General Recommendations

1. USAID should engage in high level talks with senior GOH officials, not just with the counterpart organizations, on the GOH position on establishing career systems, particularly in the Judiciary and at the RNP.
2. If it is not possible to get a clear commitment to a career service, or some other means of insulating the judges and registry workers from political influence, USAID should consider terminating assistance to the Judiciary and TNE/RNP.

3. Assuming a positive outcome to the career service issue, USAID should modify its project management approach and allow the contractor greater freedom in dealing with the Court and the Congress on a day-to-day basis on the implementation of an approved work plan. Concurrently, USAID should focus on policy issues (e.g., 1 above), routine monitoring, and ensuring appropriate coordination of effort between bilateral and regionally-funded activities.
4. USAID and the contractor should work out a new staffing pattern for GU/H, taking into account the implications of recommendation 3, the recommendations of the evaluation team regarding other GU/H staffing needs (see reports on Components I and II), the reduction taking place in home office support per existing contract provisions, and the likely USAID staffing for project support.
5. USAID and GU should re-examine the structure of the GU contract with regard to the need for so many subcontractors and determine if it would be possible to increase GU/H's capability to contract locally for resources rather than having most, if not all, of this done through expatriate subcontractors.

**B. Component I--Administration of Justice**

1. USAID should give highest priority to encouraging and facilitating the Court's effective implementation of the Judicial Career Law, with the immediate focus of attention on insulating the justices from politics.
2. USAID should let the Court know that: a) A.I.D. considers this the most important element of the component; and b) USAID is unwilling to make significant contributions to other elements of the component, let alone support any new ideas put forth in the September workshop, until:
  - a. a detailed implementation plan has been prepared for implementing the law and action has been initiated in accordance therewith;
  - b. current hiring by the Court is being done on the basis of public announcements of openings, competition among candidates, and selection by an impartial selection process that ensures political affiliation is not an element of decision.
3. Assuming that a strengthening of "will" is needed to bring about effective implementation of the career law, USAID should request the Court to ask the Bar Association or the Law School to take the lead in convening a workshop, with representation by political parties, to discuss the de-politicization of the Judiciary.

4. USAID should encourage the Court to ask for a joint U.S.-Honduran study to evaluate the experimental Justice of the Peace program, analyze some of the issues raised in the Component I report, and recommend its future.
5. USAID should facilitate the early drafting and submission to the Congress of enabling legislation for Public Defenders.

**C. Component II--Legislative Enhancement**

1. Settle all MOU issues so that CIEL and other procurement can go forward, with the procurement of CIEL computer hardware being spaced as the capability develops to use it.
2. Initiate review of, and take action on, recommendations for improving committee operations and other functions of the Congress.
3. USAID should request the contractor to add a systems expert to its in-country staff to coordinate the systems development work in all components and arrange for training of systems personnel and potential users of the automated data systems.
4. Undertake a systematic analysis of the need for and cost of obtaining the various data bases that have been proposed for inclusion in the Congressional automated system; this is needed to establish priorities for data development.

**D. Component III--Voter Registration and Elections Improvement**

1. USAID should not provide additional assistance for up-dating the Civil Registry rolls at this time, but it should indicate its willingness to fund: (a) a study of the feasibility of up-dating the rolls; and, if found feasible, (b) the preparation of a detailed implementation plan and budget for carrying out the task.
2. USAID should discuss with senior GOH officials problems related to the electoral rolls and indicate USAID willingness to finance a study to review the problems of the current system and analyze the pros and cons of other options for the electoral registration process.
3. USAID should discuss with senior GOH officials whether or not the GOH is interested in seeking a career law for RNP and TNE (or otherwise providing for greater personnel continuity) and adopting revised structures and procedures which could provide greater assurance of fair and complete coverage in the registration process.
4. USAID should inform the GOH and TNE that USAID is prepared to assist TNE now in preparing for the 1993 election (e.g., studies/surveys and technical assistance in planning), but it

does not intend to provide any assistance once the electoral campaign has begun.

**E. Component IV--Leadership Training**

1. USAID should authorize the contractor to: (a) seek information from LAC/DI in AID/Washington on the PARTICIPA program in Chile and other civic education or related programs that could offer ideas for consideration in Honduras and (b) initiate discussions with interested parties as a preliminary to developing a strategy for this component and a work plan for 1991 for presentation to the GOH at a high level.

The "interested parties" to be contacted should include the three project counterpart organizations, the Law School, the Bar Association, political parties, representatives of labor unions and women's organizations, and private sector individuals (profit and nonprofit) who have an interest in promoting democracy in Honduras.

2. Any further extension of funding for the AIFLD activity should be contingent upon: (a) the development of a curriculum for the principal seminars that is more closely related to project objectives; and (b) attention by the AIFLD sub-contractor to the methodological issues raised in Annex F.

**VI. LESSONS LEARNED**

The evaluation team believes that the experience in Honduras in setting up the first bilateral project to strengthen democratic institutions offers four general lessons and one with somewhat less generalized application. The less general lesson learned relates to the problems that arise when the Agency attempts to move from regional funding to bilateral funding; this is discussed in the report on Component I. The more general lessons are summarized below; see the report on Component III for a fuller treatment of A, B, and C.

**A. Scope of the Project**

The SDI project was essentially an umbrella project composed of three separately identified components: one to work with the Judiciary, one to work with the Congress, and one to work with the Elections Tribunal and the National Registry of Persons. These three components are really three different projects. It is questionable whether the umbrella concept reduced project management workload in relation to what it might have been with two or three projects. In any case, the cost in implementation difficulties and delays does not seem worth maintaining the umbrella concept.

**B. Information Sharing**

The evaluation team found that neither USAID nor contractor personnel were well informed about similar activities being carried out by AID in other Central American countries. There appears to be a need for more systematic sharing of information about programs and actions being taken to deal with fairly common problems within the LAC region.

**C. Marking of Election Commodities**

Since it is not in the interest of either the U.S. or a host government for commodities that are to be used in polling places to have the AID symbol on them, USAIDs should waive marking in the authorization for future activities. Further, AID/W should consider the possibility of issuing a worldwide waiver on AID marking of commodities to be used directly in elections.

**D. Planning and Monitoring a New Initiative**

It was emphasized to the evaluation team that this was a new type of initiative for the USAID, the first bilateral Democratic Initiatives project in the region. This suggests to the team that broader based and unrushed planning would have been in order.

While some outside experts were brought in by USAID and prepared some draft background documents, the experts were not involved in the final design. Further, the USAID was rushing to get the project obligated. Taking more time and having the experts involved throughout the design process might have helped avoid some of the pitfalls encountered.

A.I.D. has at times contracted with organizations for assistance in both the design and implementation of a project, subject to USAID and the host country being satisfied with the contractor's work in the design phase. This contracting mechanism would seem an appropriate one to consider for this type of project.

Given that this is a rather new type of activity for USAIDs and there is not a pool of expertise available within the agency, it would seem appropriate to establish mechanisms to obtain outside review and advice fairly regularly during implementation of the project. This could be arranged by establishing a multi-disciplinary advisory committee with representation from the host country, the U.S., and possibly one or more regional countries. The group might meet within six months of the start of the project to review plans and to offer ideas for future activity. Thereafter, the committee might meet annually or when important project decisions were to be considered. The representation would be from organizations without responsibility for the implementation of the project.

## EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

### OBJECTIVE

To provide a team which shall evaluate the progress made to date under the project and to provide guidance for any midcourse adjustments that may be necessary. This objective will be achieved in a four-part process:

For each of the four project components:

1. A comparison of accomplishments to date against the planned outputs;
2. An analysis of problems and constraints that have impeded project implementation and achievement of planned inputs;
3. An analysis of the continuing validity of the original project logical framework and assumptions;
4. Recommendations for midcourse adjustments, if any.

### STATEMENT OF WORK

The contractor shall conduct an evaluation which addresses the following areas:

#### A. Overall Project Progress

For each of the project components, the evaluation will provide answers to the following questions:

1. What are the project accomplishments to date?
2. How do these accomplishments compare to planned project outputs?
3. For planned outputs not yet realized, what are the prospects of achieving the outputs by PACD?
4. What achievements or accomplishments occurred that are beneficial toward achieving project objectives but that were not envisioned in the original design?
5. The cost effectiveness of supporting each component should be reviewed and compared against results and planned outputs.

6. What mechanisms should be incorporated into the project to measure the impact on women?

**B. Analysis of Problems and Constraints**

The evaluation will answer the following questions:

1. What have been the principal constraints to achieving the planned outputs in a timely and cost effective manner?
2. What factors, if any, have constrained the ability of contractors and subcontractors to achieve the targets established for their work.
3. Is the balance between contractor responsibilities and Mission Project backstopping appropriate for timely and cost effective implementation? If not, why not?
4. Is the overall project management appropriate for effective project implementation? If not, why not?

**C. Project Design Validity**

The evaluation will answer the following questions:

1. To what degree are the logical framework and Project Paper analytical assumptions still valid?
2. Is the institutional analysis contained in the Project Paper still valid for each component? If not, why not?
3. Where assumptions and analyses are no longer valid, will there be a negative effect on achieving planned outputs? If so, in what way?
4. Is the recurrent cost analysis contained in the Project Paper still valid? If not, how will this impact the project?

**D. Midcourse Adjustments**

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Based on the analyses in Sections A, B, and C above, the evaluation will describe what, if any, midcourse adjustments are necessary to achieve the project outputs by the Project Assistance Completion Date.

**LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED**

**SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE**

OSWALDO RAMOS SOTO	President, Supreme Court
RIGOBERTO ESPINAL IRIAS	Magistrado, Supreme Court
JOAQUIN ALCERO	Magistrado, Supreme Court
MARIO ALBERTO GUZMAN ZUNIGA	Magistrado, Second Court of Appeals
JUAN CARLOS PEREZ CADALSO	Secretary of the Supreme Court
ISRAEL GONZALEZ	
EDGARDO ORELLANA	
OTILIA CARASCO	

**NATIONAL JUDICIAL REFORM COMMISSION**

JOAQUIN ALCERRO  
JORGE ALCIDES AGUILAR SOSA  
WILFREDO BARRIENTOS, JR.  
RICARDO ESTRADA IGLESIAS

**OTHER HONDURANS**

ROBERTO BOGRAN	USAID/H Liaison Officer with Court
JOSE HUMBERTO PALACIOS	

**ILANUD**

OSCAR ARCE  
MARIA GABRIELA FERNANDEZ  
EMILIA GONZALES  
CARLOS JOSE GUTIERREZ

**COSTA RICA**

Carl Cira	USAID/RAJO
Lynn Hammergran	USAID/RAJO
Daniel Zovatto	CAPEL
Jorge Rovira Más	Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR)
Hugo Muñoz	Asamblea Legislativa/UCR

HONDURAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

RODOLFO IRIAS NAVAS	President
TEOFILO MARTEL	First Vice President
RAFAEL PINEDA PONCE	Former Second Vice President
JORGE ARTURO REINA	Deputy
HUGO ALFARO MUÑOZ	Deputy
NICOLAS CRUZ TORRES	Deputy
JORGE CARRANZA	Deputy
ADILIA ZELAYA	Secretaria Adjunta
VIVIAN RODRIGUEZ	AID/GU/Congress

OTHERS IN HONDURAS

MARCO ANTONIO SIKAFFY	Director, Centro de Desarrollo Integral Alternativo
BESSY VAQUERO DE PAZ	Dirección General de Estadística
MARIO PONCE	Executive Director, ADAI
CARLOS AVILA	Former Head of GEMAH

ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA/COSTA RICA

HUGO ALFONSO MUÑOZ	Diputado
LILIAN FALLAS	Servicios Técnicos

UNIVERSIDAD DE COSTA RICA

JORGE ROVIRA	
MIGUEL ANGEL GOMEZ	Departamento de Estadística

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES

ALLAN KELLUM	Computer Expert
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TRIBUNAL NACIONAL DE ELECCIONES (TNE)

CESAR AUGUSTO TOME RAPALO	President
GUILLERMO CASCO CALLEJAS	Vice-President
MARIO AGUILAR GONZALEZ	Secretario
JUAN MANUEL LAGOS	Vocal
TOMAS LOZANO REYES	Vocal
XIOMARA IRIAS	
CARLOS OVIEDO	
HEBERTO RUIZ MESA	Sub Director National Registry of Persons
ADAN PALACIOS	TNE Consultant
PABLO VALLADARES	TNE Legal Advisor
RAFAEL RIVERA	Former member of the TNE Comisión de Informática

OTHERS IN TEGUCIGALPA

MARIO PONCE C. Executive Director, ADAI

CAPEL - COSTA RICA

Doctor DANIEL ZOVATTO Assistant Director, CAPEL

OTHERS IN COSTA RICA

RAFAEL VILLEGAS	Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones
ROBERTO QUIPOZ CORONADO	Executive Vice-President, ASELEX, S.A.

INCAE

JOYCE OSLAND	Costa Rica
CESAR GONZALEZ	Executive Director, Honduras

AID/WASHINGTON

TOM PARK	Former Director of HRD, USAID/H
NORMA PARKER	Former Director of LAC/DI, AID/W
ANTHONY VOLLBRECHT	Former Project Officer, USAID/H
KAREN OTTO	Administration of Justice Officer, LAC/DI
JOHN FASULLO	Former Project Officer, USAID/H
LINDA ANDERSON	General Counsel Office
LOUIS MACRAY	Honduras Desk Officer, LAC/CAP/H
WILLIAM SCHOUX	Director, LAC/DI
MARIA MAMLOUK	LAC/DI

USAID/HONDURAS

JOHN SANBRAILO	Director/USAID
GEORGE WACHTENHEIM	Deputy Director
MICHAEL WILLIAMS	Regional Legal Advisor
JAMES ATHANAS	Contracting Officer
CONSTANCE PARASKEVA	Special Projects Division
ROBERT MURPHY	Formerly w/USAID/H
ROBERTO FIGUEREDO	Special Projects Division
CLAY EPPERSON	Special Projects Division
EMILY LEONARD	Director, Human Resources Dev. Office/USAID
EUGENE SZEPESY	Director, Office of Development Programs
EMIL FALK	Agriculture Division
MELISSA STEPHENS	Formerly in Special Projects Division
MARGARET KROMHOUT	Project Backstop Officer
CARMEN ZAMBRANA	Evaluation Officer

GU/WASHINGTON

GERALD PAGANO  
IRWIN LEVY  
RICHARD BARRET  
RAY GARUFI

Deputy Director, CIPRA  
Project Manager  
Assistant Project Manager  
Former Chief of Party in  
Honduras

GU/HONDURAS

STEVE LIAPIS  
DOUGLAS ROBERTSON  
SONIA QUINONEZ  
MARGARITA ARIAS  
GUILLERMO PEREZ CADALSO

Former Chief of Party  
Acting Chief of Party  
Training Support Officer  
Comptroller  
Legal Advisor

CLAPP & MAYNE

EDIBALDO SILVA  
CARLOS RUIZ COX  
LARRY POSNER

President, C&M Puerto  
Rico  
Consultant, C&M Puerto Rico  
C&M Washington

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY (FIU)

MARK ROSENBERG

SUPPLIERS

XEROX DE HONDURAS, S.A.

RICARDO SALGADO  
RICARDO F. TABORA

Gerente de Territorio  
Ejecutivo de Ventas

PEXI - AUTO DEALER (Miami)  
HEINZ HIRSCH

Gerente General

AGENCIAS PAN AMERICANAS  
RAINIERI CERNA  
(KONICA Facsimile Machines)

Gerente de Ventas

IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS INC.  
Hudson, MA.  
CHARLES BENZ

SPECTRONICS CORPORATION  
New York  
BILL COOPER

MOORE BUSINESS FORMS  
Maryland  
LANISE HEALTH

PUERTO RICO CONTAINER Co.  
ANGIE ROSARIO

GINNS OFFICE SUPPLY  
Maryland  
MR. FRIEND

SIRCHIE FINGERPOINT  
North Carolina  
JAMES GOCKE

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LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

**STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS  
(522-0296)**

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p><u>Goal</u></p> <p>To strengthen Honduran democracy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- continuing open elections</li> <li>- public's confidence in the system</li> <li>- increased access and participation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Analysis of elections</li> <li>- Central Bank Statistics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regional political stability</li> <li>- stabilized economy</li> <li>- Continued political will to consolidate the democratic process</li> </ul>
<p><u>Purpose</u></p> <p>improve the capability of democratic institutions (the Judiciary, the Congress and the National Elections Tribunal/National Registry) to provide local political leadership, and increase the knowledge and participation of the Honduran populace in the democratic process.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- universal suffrage</li> <li>- increased number of bills initiated in Congress</li> <li>- reduction in time for court case processing</li> <li>- separation of power enhanced in accordance with the constitution</li> <li>- relative increase in the number of participants in the system and awareness of the democratic process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- project reports</li> <li>- surveys</li> <li>- evaluations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- political acceptance of targeted institutions to change</li> <li>- maintenance of internal political stability</li> </ul>

**Narrative Summary**

**Objectives Verifiable Indicators**

**Means of Verification**

**Assumptions**

**Outputs**

1. Administration of Justice  
 -- to strengthen the court system making it more efficient and responsive to the Honduran populace in matters concerning civil and criminal justice and better able to mediate intra-governmental conflicts

- judicial career implemented
- 40 law school graduates participating in experimental justice of the peace; public defender system consolidated
- strengthened administrative system
  - improved planning, programming and budgetary capability
  - organizational and procedural manuals written
  - financial, management and personnel system functioning
  - procurement capability established
  - information system strengthened and utilized
- 400 judges trained
- 20 administrative staff trained
- public information program initiated

- project reports
- surveys
- site visits
- evaluation

- enhanced elite political commitment to rejuvenated judicial process
- appropriate human resources available
- increase in allocation of national budget to 3% for the judiciary by 1990.

2. Legislative Enhancement  
 -- to improve the effectiveness of the Honduran Congress in formulating and passing laws which govern the country and to increase contact with the (SIC)

- Establish a National Center for Legislative support
  - permanent staff
  - reference service functioning
  - policy research service functioning
  - career service established for congressional administrative staff and employees of the National Legislative Support Center

- Project Reports
- Surveys
- Evaluations

**Narrative Summary**

**Objectives Verifiable  
Indicators**

**Means of  
Verification**

**Assumptions**

- Creation of the Congressional administrative office
  - improved planning, programming, budgeting
  - organizational and procedural manuals written
  - financial, management and personnel systems functioning
  - improved information systems
- legislative process streamlined
  - calendar established
  - debates scheduled
  - deadlines maintained
  - tracking system developed
- committee system strengthened and utilized
- 134 legislators trained in orientation session
- 120 trained in committee procedures
- 150 administrative staff trained
- 23 congressmen partake of observational trips
- public information program functioning

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p>3. Voter Registration/ Elections improvement - to assist in the improvement and professionalization of the TNE and the RNP; enhancing their ability to manage an effective registration process and guaranteeing the Honduran people universal suffrage and fraud free elections.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Registries from 1980 - 1983 updated, verified and microfilmed</li> <li>- 45,000 registries including 20,000,000 documents and over 2,000,000 identity cards</li> <li>- establishment of a career service for the RNP</li> <li>- an improved administrative structure for the RNP               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- financial, management and personnel systems functioning</li> <li>-- improved programming, planning and budgeting</li> <li>-- organizational and procedural manuals written</li> <li>-- information system improved</li> </ul> </li> <li>- department and municipal register activities enhanced and linked better with the National Registry</li> <li>- 30 administrative support officers trained</li> <li>- 620 National Registry employees trained</li> <li>- 1000 local registry employees trained</li> <li>- improved conduct elections</li> <li>- strengthened administrative office</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Project reports</li> <li>- Site visits</li> <li>- Evaluations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Multi-partisan support</li> <li>- human resource availability</li> </ul>

<b>Narrative Summary</b>	<b>Objectives Verifiable Indicators</b>	<b>Means of Verification</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
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- 80 administrative support officers trained
- 52,000 election workers trained
- 1989 Presidential elections carried out
- public information program functioning.

**COMPONENT IV -- DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP TRAINING****A. Evolution and Current Status of Project Component****1. Component Objectives**

This component is not included in the Logical Framework, but the text of the PP calls for a broad-based program of training conferences for locally-elected officials and key individuals in organizations that participate in one way or another in the democratic process in Honduras. Examples of groups who were expected to have access to the National Leadership Conference program were:

- elected officials, including mayors and governors
- labor leaders
- rural sector campesino organization leadership
- journalists and media owners
- small businessmen

Each year of the project, the prime contractor was to organize several national seminars for specific groups of officials or organizations to analyze their role in the democratic process and to identify ways to more effectively involve their constituencies in constructive support of the democratic institutions of the country. A total of 10 specialized national leadership conferences were to be sponsored by the project over a three-year period.

The project was expected to initiate about half of the conferences. The other half were to be sponsored in response to proposals submitted by Honduran organizations. Guidelines are offered in the PP for selecting among proposals.

**2. Accomplishments to Date**

The only activity undertaken to date has been seminars organized by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) for union members. Funded under a Memorandum of Understanding between USAID and AIFLD, six seminars on political theory and eight seminars on the principles of economics have been carried out. The seminars are reported to be well received. There has been no effort to date to determine the impact of the seminars. The content of both the political theory and principles of economics seminars is only marginally related to the purpose of the project. For a fuller discussion of the AIFLD initiative, see Annex F.

**B. Implementation Issues**

This activity seems to have been an after-thought by the project designers. Perhaps for that reason, it has not received much

attention, other than support to the AIFLD program. The activity was not mentioned in the contractor's approved work plan for 1989, indicating that USAID did not wish the contractor to undertake any activity. In the January-June 1990 work plan, the contractor proposed that INCAE conduct a seminar related to the issue of the treatment, under Honduran law, of those charged with having committed a crime. While USAID theoretically approved that work plan, it told the contractor that no activity in it could be initiated without USAID's concurrence on the specific item. No further action has been taken.

### C. Conclusions

1. The AIFLD program appears well received, but the subject matter of some of the seminars is not focused on achieving project objectives or overcoming problems encountered in project implementation.
2. This component is begging for a strategy, a plan, some thought. It could be used to promote discussion about, and possibly foster support for, some of the unfilled conditions precedent and covenants in the MOUs for the other components. The other groups mentioned in the PP are also worthy of some attention, as are women who were not mentioned in the PP. Support for formal and informal civic education could be fostered.

### D. Recommendations

1. USAID should authorize the contractor to: (a) seek information from LAC/DI in AID/Washington on the PARTICIPA program in Chile and other civic education or related programs that could offer ideas for consideration in Honduras; and (b) initiate discussions with interested parties as a preliminary to developing a strategy for this component for presentation to the GOH at a high level.

The "interested parties" to be contacted should include the three project counterpart organizations, the Law School, the Bar Association, political parties, representatives from the labor unions and women's organizations, and private sector individuals (profit and nonprofit) who have an interest in promoting democracy in Honduras.

The proposed strategy and work plan should provide for the contractor to provide the funding mechanism and overall coordination for this component, but the conferences and activities of the component should be implemented by some of the "interested parties" mentioned above or by other organizations that may be identified during the discussions proposed above.

2. Any further extension of funding for the AIFLD activity should be contingent upon: (a) the development of a curriculum for the principal seminars that is more closely related to project objectives; and (b) the AIFLD sub-contractor giving attention to the methodological issues raised in Annex F.

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## TRAINING ACTIVITIES

### COMPONENT IV -- DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP TRAINING

#### A. Evolution and Current Status of Training

The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) received a one-year grant effective April 1, 1989 of \$198,000 to strengthen democracy in Honduras. The purpose of the grant was "to improve the capability of Honduran democratic trade unions to develop local leadership and increase the knowledge and participation of trade union members in the nation's political process." AIFLD was to manage the grant; the programs were to be carried out by two Honduran labor federations. As it turned out, only one federation participated. The money originally allocated to the other federation was re-programmed in a grant amendment in April 1980 to fund seminars on economic principles; the grant was extended to December 31, 1990.

The objectives were to:

- o Introduce democratic principles and practices to union members via democratic leadership training;
- o initiate through Civic Education Committees a national voter effort obliging members to teach others to further this campaign;
- o assist the trade union movement to effectively represent its economic and political interests;
- o assist the close linkages between trade unions and other Honduran democratic institutions for unified efforts to defend and strengthen the nation's democratic system and support the growth of the civic culture to sustain it.

All civic education committee members receive training in:

- o political theory;
- o voter education techniques;
- o political system of Honduras;
- o political organization; and,
- o relationship between economic and political development.

This represents a training component of full time one-week courses (given in evenings or weekends). Expected training

outputs were:

- o 32 full time, one-week courses;
- o 168 evening/weekend conferences;
- o 5 regional meetings;
- o 2 forums;
- o 1 national conference; and,
- o 2,000 course participant training days.

Evening and weekend courses are taught by local journalist professors and party leaders. Regular day time courses are taught by Honduran instructors or instructors visiting Honduras. The study circle is a supporting feature of the overall program. It consists of lively discussions among education commission members. These are held monthly. When topics are selected, AIFLD's Central office prepares instrumental materials for the central office of the local trade unions, to be used by discussion leaders and study circle members.

These seminars are intended to raise the level of general understanding of potential leaders who have not had the opportunity to acquire such knowledge elsewhere.

Approximately in March/90, USAID suggested that the seminars include economic studies in the curriculum. This was done and, to date, eight such seminars have been successfully completed. Six seminars on political theory have also transpired.

Some of the themes and topics discussed in these seminars are: (a) economic systems; (b) the public sector; (c) introduction to macro-economics; (d) the structure of the market; and (e) formulation of prices. The professor in charge makes an effort to bring these concepts to the learning ability levels of the students. The professor draws from his experience life-like examples so that students understand the implication of economic events in Honduras.

Some themes and topics in political theory are: (a) political contemporary doctrine; (b) democracy; (c) communism; (d) socialism; (e) neoliberalism; (f) social democracy; and (g) national security. Whereas this seems like an over ambitious teaching task in the time allotted, the coordinator stated that efforts were made to compare the values of each ideology and not to provide a comprehensive treatment of each.

A coordinator is in charge of providing logistic services and supervision of the seminars. Participants are provided: (a)

transportation to and from the seminar; (b) sixty lempiras daily for food; and (c) lodging.

The professor teaches the participants in the seminar; the coordinator is on-site to manage problems that arise.

**B. Implementation Issues**

1. The selection of participants for seminars is left completely with the unions, and no suggestions can be given to the Union relative to the selection process. The educational level of the participants selected have ranged from fifth grade to university graduates.
2. Four professors of economics from the University of Honduras have been contracted to teach the basic economics seminars. These professors must adapt the conceptual portion of their lectures to meet the different ability levels of the group.
3. The professor/participant ratio is from 25 to 35 per seminar. The professor has no assistant or aide to assist in the instructional process.
4. There are no texts for participants and no especially prepared instructional materials to support the professor's lecture.
5. The mastery of the content is dependent upon the participants' ability to take good notes in class.
6. Due to the sensitivity of the learning situation, no participant evaluation is made to determine the participants' grasp of the concepts. All students are given the same diploma upon termination of the course based on regular attendance at all sessions of the seminar.
7. The seminar is programmed for a period of 25 hours. Participants feel that 34 hours might be more realistic. Discussions are in progress to increase the program to 29 hours.
8. The present design has no provision for follow-up with participants so there is no built-in mechanism for obtaining any empirical evidence of impact.
9. Although the grant agreement specifies that all new members of the Civic Education Committees are to receive training in the five subjects mentioned above, most participants attend but one seminar because of the difficulty in securing released time.

**C. CONCLUSIONS**

**1. Adequacy of Performance**

- a. It appears that an excellent teaching staff has been secured for the instructional phase of the project. Most of them are professors from the National University and are experienced teachers. They also bring a mastery of the discipline being presented.
- b. The Coordinator has been with the project since inception and is proficient in providing good living conditions as well as an attractive setting for learning.

**2. Validity of Component Design**

The concept laid out in the Grant Agreement appears appropriate, but implementation emphasis appears to be weak in relation to the plan. The two seminars (political theory and economic principles) appear to be only marginally related to the objective of the grant.

**3. Methodology**

Based on discussions with participants in one of the seminars and discussions with those coordinating the activity, there appear to be some ways to improve and/or measure the effectiveness of the training.

- a. The professor in charge might wish to find ways to seek student evaluations on insights and understandings gained, concepts not grasped, and what could be done to make the delivery more meaningful.
- b. A group of 25-35 represents a wide range of abilities to be taken into account by the instructor. The application of an appropriate teaching strategy might assist reaching this widespread level of abilities more effectively. Group teaching on the basis of interest and ability is one way of meeting these needs. To teach effectively in this manner, an instructor needs graded instructional materials which can be used with the various groups.
- c. Some sort of evaluative procedures could be employed to determine the extent of mastery of content offered in the seminars. It would be invaluable feedback for the professors in preparation for future seminars. It would also provide some insights relative to the capacity of seminar leavers to teach others.
- d. Some follow-up activities could be conducted of seminar leavers to determine the extent in which the training has been beneficial.

- e. Because it is expected that seminar graduates will teach others, it might be wise to incorporate in the program a small unit on pedagogy of teaching. The intent would be to assist them prepare a lesson and use a simple delivery system to convey the message.
- f. The development of instructional materials relative to basic economics as well as political theory for use by these seminar leavers would assist the instructional process with others.

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**COMPONENT IV  
DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP**

Training Proposed

• Organization and implementation of a broad-based program of training conferences for locally elected officials and key individuals in other Honduran organizations that participate in the democratic process in Honduras. Expected output: a) thirty two full-time, one week courses; b) one hundred sixty eight evening-weekend conferences; c) five regional meetings; d) two forums; e) one national conference; and f) two thousand course participated training days.

Training Completed

• Six seminars on political theory and eight seminars on the principles of economics have been organized by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) for union members.

## ANALYSIS OF PROJECT DESIGN

### A. Findings

USAID/Honduras was the first mission in the region to design a bilateral project for strengthening democratic institutions. The Project Implementation Document (PID) was prepared in the mission. Subsequently, a team was contracted to come to Honduras and prepare concept papers for use by the USAID in preparing the Project Paper (PP). The latter was the basis for the authorization of the project by the Acting Mission Director.

#### The Logical Framework

According to the Logical Framework and the text of the PP, the goal to which the project was addressed was the strengthening of Honduran democracy. Objectively verifiable indicators to measure the success of the project in meeting this goal included:

- continuing open elections
- public's confidence in the system
- increased access and participation

It is not clear whether all three of these statements were related to elections or whether the latter two were referring to the political system in general. The means of verification of progress were analyses of elections and Central Bank statistics. Exactly how the latter related is not clear.

The project purpose is stated as follows:

"To improve the capability of key democratic institutions (the Judiciary, the Congress and the National Elections Tribunal/National Registry), improve local political leadership, and increase the knowledge and participation of the Honduran populace in the democratic process."

The end of project status that would indicate success of the project included the following:

- universal suffrage
- increased numbers of bills initiated in Congress
- reduction in time for court case processing
- separation of powers enhanced in accordance with the constitution
- relative increase in the number of participants in the system and awareness of the democratic process.

It is not clear from the Project Paper which groups of people did not have suffrage, but presumably reference was made to those who theoretically were qualified voters but did not find themselves on the voting register because of inefficiencies in the National

Registry of Persons. No base line survey was proposed to try to determine how many people might not be enfranchised that should be. An increased number of bills initiated in Congress would be no indication of progress; improved quality would be much more relevant. Similarly, the reduction in time for court case processing was certainly needed (and still is), but it should not have been the only indicator of improved justice.

Presumably an enhancement of separation of powers means that the Congress and the Judiciary would be on a more equal footing with the Executive, yet the strategy statement for both components states that the emphasis will be on providing technical support rather than on the political goal of strengthening their power in relation to the Executive. It is not clear how the designers planned to measure this element of project success.

The "relative increase in the number of participants in the system and awareness of the democratic process" is very vague. There is no indication of what it is to be measured or how; no base line surveys are proposed; no indicators of measurement of success are offered. The fourth component of the project appears particularly to be lacking solid technical input.

Based on the logical framework, one is led to conclude that there really was no project purpose as defined in A.I.D. literature. Rather, there was a general strategy to carry out a number of activities in each of the three institutional components that could, if implemented fully and effectively, increase the efficiency of the institutions. This hopefully would improve the effectiveness of the institutions and increase their credibility with the Executive and the public. The process, it was hoped, would provide information and experience that would permit the design of activities for a follow-on project.

### Judiciary

In the Judiciary sector, it was proposed to:

- 1) complete the technical work needed to implement fully the Judicial Career law that was passed in 1980;
  - 2) support, and test the feasibility of, an experimental program to use graduating law students as temporary justices of the peace and public defenders;
  - 3) strengthen the administrative system of the Judiciary;
  - 4) develop and institutionalize training programs for the career service; and
  - 5) improve the understanding by the public of the country's legal system.
- 
-

Of the foregoing, 1) is clearly the most important. There appears to have been an assumption that implementation of the Judicial Career law required only the completion of some technical work. Since there was little of that to do, and since there has been virtually no progress in implementing the career law, it appears that political will was the crucial element needed to achieve this objective. The generation of political will was not addressed in the design.

### Congress

The proposed program for the Congress (a Center for Legislative Support, administrative improvements, and strengthening the committee system) seems quite appropriate.

### Elections Tribunal/National Registry

The most sensitive component of the project, support of the Elections Tribunal and the National Registry, seems to have had the poorest design. This appears to be the result of accepting on faith some things that needed to be researched and tested. For example, it was assumed that up-dating the Civil Registry would permit the creation of reliable voter registration list. A USAID-funded contractor has questioned whether this is feasible using the procedure proposed by TNE. This issue is discussed in Annex E to the Component III report.

Even if the procedure were considered appropriate, a background paper available to the design team suggested that a minimum of two years would be required for the up-dating process. It was unrealistic to assume that AID could contract a firm to do the job in the time frame available, i.e. by the end of May 1989.

The background papers available to the design team indicated that building a career service in the the National Registry would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain because the revenues of the political parties depend heavily upon fees received from recipients of party patronage. Yet, the design includes the creating of a career service in the National Registry as a principal element of the project and provides no suggestions for how to convince the politicians to accept the proposed change. The Memoranda of Understanding for TNE/RNP includes a Condition Precedent on the career service which, because it had not been fulfilled by May 1989, should have precluded the provision of any A.I.D. assistance, other than technical assistance, during the June-December 1989 period. Since this was the time when most of the commodities for the election had to be procured, USAID did not invoke the Condition Precedent.

### Compartmentalization

Recognizing the inherent risks in trying to implement a project to strengthen democratic institutions, particularly during an election period, the framers of the project proposed to reduce the risks by compartmentalizing the components of the project, so that if one particular activity became bogged down others could continue as planned. "No single activity can paralyze the project nor can the failure of any one activity or component entirely jeopardize the achievement of the project's overall objectives." (PP., page 18).

While the objective of insulating each component was a good idea, compartmentalization of activities did not actually take place. Although project liaison officers were proposed for each component, this was not sufficient to compartmentalize the components. There was only one USAID project officer responsible for all three components and one contractor providing support to all three components. Once the election campaign began, both of them had to give highest priority to that effort. Because of the importance of the event and the inflexible time frame in which everyone was working, it was inevitable that project personnel would be co-opted for the election effort.

### Project Budget

The drafters of the project originally came in with a budget of \$18 million, not including the local contribution (cash and in kind). The drafters were told that the project content was acceptable, but to reduce the budget to \$7.5 million -- the amount actually authorized. There have been five grant amendments and the project budget now totals \$16 million. Depending upon decisions on further activity with the TNE/RNP and the type of computer equipment provided to the Honduran Congress, it is likely that the budget will be further increased.

According to the Mission Director, the GOH Minister of Finance was unwilling at the time of project authorization to allocate to the project the full funding projected. Because the project has been incrementally funded, the workload of both USAID and AID/W has increased and additional delays were experienced -- e.g., while waiting for funding notifications to be submitted to the U.S. Congress and then waiting the period required once the notification is submitted.

### Length of Project

The project was authorized as a four-year project (August 1987 to August 1991). Because of the delays in getting the prime contractor on board, the project life was extended to August 1992.

**B. Conclusions/Lessons Learned**

1. The USAID would have been well advised to have taken a little more time with the design process, particularly since this was the first bilateral democratic institutions project being designed in the region.
2. USAID should have involve outside experts more in the design of the project. Having papers prepared by experts available for reference is not as valuable as having the experts in the discussions when the design is being finalized.
3. Greater attention should have been given to transition from regional funding to a bilateral project--both in terms of assuring adequate funding for ongoing activities and the interaction of implementing agencies.
4. Election support, when it is significant in magnitude, should be handled as a separate project.

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## ANALYSIS OF PROJECT ADMINISTRATION

### A. USAID Project Management

#### 1. What Was Proposed in the Project Paper

Because of the low level of administrative development of the recipient organizations and their lack of experience with A.I.D. projects, the PP states that USAID "will undertake significant project management to assure close monitoring and timely implementation." This was to be carried out by having a direct hire staff member with overall responsibility for project monitoring. He/she would supervise a U.S. PSC who would be knowledgeable about the intricacies of the Honduran constitutional and political system and would be involved in the day-to-day managing of the project.

The PSC would supervise three Honduran PSCs who would perform liaison responsibilities with the Judiciary, the Congress, and the TNE/RNP. Each PSC would work with one institution and coordinate with an institutional contractor in planning short-term technical assistance for their respective components. The Honduran PSCs would be familiar with A.I.D. procedures and project implementation requirements.

The PP calls for USAID to contract with one or more institutional contractors to provide technical assistance to all of the components of the project. The contract was to be monitored by the U.S. PSC. The contractor was to be responsible for providing all of the resources needed: technical assistance, commodities, training, local cost financing of activities of the Honduran counterpart institutions.

#### 2. What Actually Happened

##### Staffing

The first management task was to assign the project to an office. This was a new activity that did not fit in the regular USAID organization and potentially was a political hot potato. Hence, no office was anxious to have responsibility for the project. It was assigned to the Human Resources Development Office.

Although not specifically stated in the PP, one would have assumed that the U.S. direct hire Project Officer would be full time. In fact, however, the Training Officer served as part-time Project Officer for the SDI project until January 1989, i.e., for the first 17 months. The first full-time Project Officer was evacuated for medical reasons five months

after arriving. His successor had other duties (deputy office director); however, he devoted more than full time to the project through the election and continued to devote almost full time until his departure on home leave in mid-1990.

A U.S. PSC who was already working for USAID had helped provide U.S. assistance to the 1985 Honduran election and had been involved in the design of the SDI project. He assumed the role described in the PP, i.e., general responsibility for day-to-day activities. Subsequently, with a change in Project Officers, he became the liaison officer with the Honduran Congress. In the summer of 1988, another U.S. PSC (without A.I.D. experience) was hired to assist with the management of the project.

Two Honduran PSCs were hired, one to work with the Court and one with TNE. Their roles seem largely to have been helping the counterpart organizations rather than serving as liaison officers as envisaged in the PP. Both had excellent contacts and relations with the two counterpart organizations, but neither had prior experience with A.I.D. Thus, they were not in a good position to assist the counterpart organizations in dealing with USAID procedures and documentation. Neither ever received any training in A.I.D. procedures--which could have helped somewhat to overcome the lack of A.I.D. experience.

The contracts of the U.S. PSC who worked with the Congress and the Honduran PSC who worked with TNE have expired; the one with the PSC working with the courts was up for renewal in October 1990.

Because of serious implementation problems involving the contractor that was working to clean up the voting lists, and the increasing pressure to procure the commodities needed for the November 1989 election, other USAID personnel (direct hire and PSC) were detailed to the SDI division to ensure that the USAID support to the election was provided on time.

### Contracting

Because of the overriding concern about the election, the USAID set about quickly to contract with a firm to manage the up-dating of the Civil Registry in order to prepare accurate voting lists. It reviewed the capability statements of some 8(a) ("disadvantaged") firms, then selected two and asked them to submit work plans for carrying out the task with the TNE/RNP. After final selection, USAID obtained AID/W approval to contract directly with the firm rather than following the usual process in which the U.S. Small Business Administration does the contracting.

A letter contract was used to initiate action because the USAID Contract Office was overloaded with contracting

activities awaiting action and did not have time to prepare a definitive contract. The contract was for a fixed price and the work specified in the contract was to be completed by May 31, 1989. Because of conflicts between the contractor and the TNE, the USAID Director was frequently asked to resolve issues related to day-to-day operations.

There was considerable delay in initiating the contracting process for the prime contractor for the project. The PIO/T was not initiated until November 10 and it was not signed until March 10, 1988. Once selection was made (July 1988), it took until January 1989 to get the contractor on board and August 1989 before the definitive contract was negotiated and signed. The delays in the contracting, once selection was made, stemmed largely from the nature of the contract negotiations.

One of the major issues in the contracting negotiations related to the degree to which ILANUD and CAPEL would be utilized in the Judiciary and TNE/RNP components respectively. AID/W recommended to USAID by cable on March 19 and May 21, 1988 that those organizations be utilized in the project. In the bidders conference on May 23, USAID could have dropped those activities from the Request for Proposals (RFP) and issued an amended RFP. USAID chose not to take this action "because of time constraints and Honduran pressure to complete the procurement of the TA package."

This was a costly decision in terms of time lost in contract negotiations and relations between the contractor and subcontractor with the Judiciary.

A major management issue that arose was the role to be played by the prime contractor. According to those involved in the design and early administration of the project, it was intended that the prime contractor would be "out in front" in relations with the Honduran institutions and AID's liaison officers with the three agencies would work closely with the contractor. The contractor's representatives say that they understood that they were to be out front, so that the USAID could keep a low profile.

Here again, the plan was not followed. Because of the long delay in getting the prime contractor (Georgetown University) on board, and the problems that had developed within the project (particularly with the Dual & Associates contract), the counterpart agencies had already established the pattern of working with the USAID liaison officers and having direct relations with USAID officers on a frequent basis. Thus, it would have been difficult for the contractor to step into the role anticipated in the best of circumstances.

However, these were not the best of circumstances. One of the counterpart agencies initially had objected to the

contractor and subsequently to one of its subcontractors. Furthermore, everyone was under extreme pressure to provide all of the assistance needed to permit the TNE to administer an election by November 1989. Result: the contractor was never really "out in front" and an extremely tense and frustrating relationship developed between USAID and the prime contractor.

NOTE: A chronology of the principal project administration actions is attached at the end of this annex.

### 3. Conclusions

- a. The USAID did not have adequate and/or appropriate personnel resources devoted to the SDI project from the outset, and has been behind the curve ever since. This has been reflected particularly in delays in contracting for the prime contractor and delays in implementing the Judiciary and Congress components during the pre-election period.

NOTE: The evaluation team is not in a position to judge whether, given the magnitude and content of the USAID program, adequate resources could have been given to the SDI project without creating even worse problems elsewhere in the project portfolio. Further, the team cannot say whether the management requirements for this new venture were underestimated, because USAID was not able to hire the kind of people that the designers proposed nor have everyone on board in a timely manner. It does seem, however, that the USAID might have been able to get more outside TDY help (e.g., to help get the contracting started and implemented sooner) or to get TDY help earlier (e.g., in relation to the problems between TNE and Dual and Associates).

- b. The delay of nearly 17 months in getting the prime contractor on board meant that it was almost impossible for the contractor to play the "out in front" role originally intended.
- c. Although the USAID had changed its position on the prime contractor's role by the summer of 1989, it was not until January 1990 that the contractor and USAID management formalized the restricted role permitted the contractor. ~~This not only exacerbated relations between USAID and the contractor, but also between the contractor and the Honduran participating organizations. This in turn led to reduced performance.~~

B. Contractor Performance

1. Dual and Associates

Because litigation is pending between Dual and Associates and A.I.D., the evaluation team was instructed not to evaluate Dual performance. The team has gathered information about the Dual operations only to the extent necessary to make recommendations for future project activity in the area in which Dual worked.

2. Georgetown University

Contract Negotiations

Georgetown University (GU) was selected in July 1988 to be the prime contractor for the project. The contract negotiations, which began in September, were long and difficult. USAID, at AID/W's request, sought to have CAPEL and ILANUD included as part of the implementation team. This required additional discussions by the contractor with the two organizations. Further, the possibility of dropping the contractor's proposed subcontractor (CSLA) in favor of using ILANUD resulted in an intervention from the U.S. Congress. The subcontractor was then retained -- over the objections of the Honduran Judiciary.

Because time was needed to settle the above issues, the contractor began work in January 1989 on the basis of a letter contract -- with the issue of CAPEL and ILANUD participation to be settled later. Even after these issues were settled, negotiations dragged on over relatively minor issues. The contract was finally signed in August 1989, two years after the start of the project. The negotiations led to strained relations between contractor and USAID personnel that have persisted to the present.

Activity Under the Project

The first contractor personnel arrived in January 1989, with the chief of party following a little later because of illness. A draft work plan for 1989 was prepared and submitted to USAID by March. Some activities began even before the work plan was finalized. Studies were done for the Congress: draft legislation for, and proposed equipping of, a legislative support center; studies offering ideas for improving the administration of the Congress and the working of the committees. Not all of this was passed on to the Congress immediately because the USAID was already deeply immersed in problems related to its support for the upcoming November 1989 election. CSLA also sent personnel to implement training in the Judiciary, but they were not well received.

For the last half of 1989, both USAID and GU were almost totally engrossed with obtaining commodities and services related to the upcoming election. Because of the late start in initiating these activities, there was extreme pressure on all concerned. This contributed to a further strain in relations between the contractor and USAID.

The chief of party was changed in January 1990, and USAID made it clear that GU was to take no initiatives and to have no contacts with counterpart agencies except in the presence of, and upon invitation by USAID.

There was little project activity during the first few months of 1990. GU prepared a work plan for the first six months of 1990 which USAID nominally approved without sending it to the counterpart organizations. However, GU was told that it could not implement the work plan without prior USAID approval of each activity on the work plan; the general approval, in effect, meant nothing.

The new chief of party had to resign in May 1990 because of family illness; prior to his departure, an acting chief of party arrived to replace him.

Later, USAID gave GU the go ahead on elements of the work plan and subcontractor personnel have come to Honduras in recent months to work with the Congress and the Judiciary. Tripartite discussions took place in August on an implementation plan for the legislative support center (CIEL). In early September, there was a workshop with members of the Supreme Court to work out a revised work plan for presentation to Court leadership for approval. Thus, progress has been taking place recently in two components; the third has been on hold since the election awaiting an internal appraisal by the TNE.

#### Comments on the Contractor's Performance

GU does not have a good reputation with USAID officers or with most of the Honduran officials interviewed. Some of the complaints are against the performance or attitudes of some subcontractor personnel (see the next section). Some of the complaints are against the first chief of party, e.g., insufficient attention to detail (crucial in bringing in commodities for the election) and inadequate supervision of subcontractor experts.

The complaints of Honduran officials in the Congress and the Judiciary that GU was not working in their components until recently should more fairly have been levied against USAID, which was restricting GU activity and, at times, holding up the transmission of GU reports to the GOH.

The evaluation team feels that some of the complaints against GU, and especially some of its subcontractors, are valid. At

the same time, the team recognizes that everyone was under extreme pressure during the pre-election period. Many of the problems cited are not uncommon in development projects; however, it seems that the GU team encountered a number of problems with which it was not as well equipped to deal as one would have been expected given the resources that presumably were available to it.

For example, in GU's proposal to A.I.D. in response to the Request for Proposals for the project, some 10 different departments or organizations making up Georgetown University were cited as resources the project could draw on. Especially cited were the Law Center, the Government Department, and the Latin American Studies program. Although there is a GU advisory committee on the project, the team found no evidence that the committee has been meeting regularly or that any of the three groups mentioned had made any substantive input to the GU effort in Honduras.

### Reporting Requirements

USAID and GU/Washington have been at odds for some time over the financial reporting provided by GU in support of its payment vouchers. The financial information is not provided in sufficient detail to relate the information to the budget categories. GU/W has complained that USAID is trying to make GU re-do its accounting system.

The evaluation team concurs with USAID on this issue. The accounting being done by GU/W does not provide adequate information for its own Project Manager to manage the project. The result has been that GU/H has had to request raw data from GU/W and prepare reports for their own use and that of the USAID. GU/H has found errors in the data from GU/W; further, it does not receive total information.

The GU/W contract provides in Section B.3.(c) that:

"the contractor agrees to furnish such additional data which the Contracting Officer may reasonably request on costs expended or accrued under this contract in support of the budget information provided herein, e.g., itemization of costs supporting line items contained in fiscal reports submitted to AID/W."

The evaluation team finds specious the GU argument that USAID is trying to cause GU to change its entire accounting system. Every A.I.D. contractor and host government is required to provide appropriate financial data to justify reimbursements. They do not revise their accounting systems, but they do set up special accounts to provide useful and verifiable information. Congress has chastised A.I.D. when it has not taken appropriate steps to insist that handlers of A.I.D.'s money provide an appropriate accounting for those

funds. If GU does not provide appropriate reports, USAID will need to consider stopping payment on vouchers until the situation is rectified.

The evaluation team notes that GU has submitted only one semi-annual report; GU is now delinquent two reports. We found no written communication from USAID either absolving GU of the requirement or requesting compliance with the contract. The lack of such reports created problems for the evaluation team and will make more difficult and time-consuming the orientation of the new chief of party. GU/W did make available to the evaluation team copies of their subcontractors' reports for July-December 1989.

### Where Do We Go From Here?

GU has nominated a new chief of party, and he has been interviewed and accepted by USAID and the counterpart agencies. Programs are now moving in two of the components, and chances are good for an acceleration of progress. For best results, there needs to be some re-thinking about GU's modus operandi and staffing and the relationships between USAID and GU and between GU and the counterpart organizations.

GU's proposed in-country staffing was reduced by USAID in the contract negotiations. Thus, the prime contractor was left with one half-time liaison officer with the counterpart organizations while USAID had three -- one for each organization. Further, the contract provides for the contractor to rely very heavily on offshore subcontractors, some of whom have sub-contracted with local firms or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to carry out the tasks assigned to them.

Now that the election is over, the main project activities outstanding are essentially institution building in nature. Therefore, it would be appropriate for USAID to return to a more traditional relationship with the prime contractor. That is, USAID should unfetter the contractor, within the context of approved plans, and revert to its normal monitoring function.

### 3. GU Subcontractors

Clapp & Mayne has handled offshore procurement for the TNE for the election, local procurement for the same purpose, recommended procurement for the Congress and the Court, and provided technical assistance to all three counterpart organizations. In reviewing the offshore procurement, the evaluation team found that A.I.D. procurement rules had been followed. Further, outside of minor problems, the procurement had been handled well. The team had some questions about one local procurement transaction; the consultant insists that appropriate procedures were followed,

but the team was not able to find the documentation which would have established this beyond any doubt.

Some TNE officials complained that some of the Clapp and Mayne technical assistance experts were condescending and tried to insist on a Puerto Rican solution rather than trying to help develop Honduran solutions. The evaluation team heard no complaints about the technical assistance provided to the other counterpart organizations. The team took issue with the subcontractor's recommendations for computer procurement for the Congress, but this reflected disagreement with the terms of reference established by the Congress for the procurement rather than with the technical judgment of the subcontractor's expert. This is discussed in Annex E of the report on Component II.

### The Futures Group

The main activity of The Futures Group (TFG) has been to conduct three major public education information campaigns: 1) voter registration; 2) the work of the National Electoral Tribunal; and 3) the electoral process. TFG successfully completed all components of their project, and it is believed to have made a significant contribution to the electoral process of 1989. Unfortunately, their request to do a follow-up survey to determine the effectiveness of the different themes of the campaigns was turned down by USAID.

TFG also made an effort to assist TNE stage a presidential debate. This effort aborted, however, through no fault of the sub-contractor.

### CSLA

The Consortium for Service to Latin America (CSLA) is GU's sub-contractor for providing training to court personnel under Component I of the project, Administration of Justice. Activities have involved the training of trainers and an evaluation of the public defenders program. The evaluation was well done. The first training of trainers activity was not well received, but the second showed improvement. The training of trainers concept needs to be reconsidered -- see the evaluation team's report on Component I.

### Delphi

Delphi was subcontracted to plan and carry out observational visits and travels to the U.S. and Latin America for members of the Court and the Congress. Its services have not been used by the contractor.

### INCAE

INCAE, the Central American Institute for Business Administration located in Costa Rica, was subcontracted to support the Leadership Training component and to organize workshops for the Congress. It organized the orientation retreat for the new Deputies which took place in March 1990. As discussed in Annex F of the report on Component II, this was a very difficult assignment because of problems in obtaining agreement with the Congress on the structure of the meeting. It appears that INCAE performed well.

### CAPEL

CAPEL, the Inter-American Center for Electoral Promotion and Advisory Services, is an appendage of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights; both are located in Costa Rica. CAPEL was responsible for the overall conduct of the training of electoral workers and departmental and local election tribunal members. It carried out this activity by contracting to a local organization, GEMAH, who then trained trainers within the TNE. The evaluation team believes that CAPEL's oversight of the training will not be necessary in the future.

## 4. Conclusions

- a. The extended contract negotiations (almost a year) contributed significantly to a number of the implementation problems that have plagued the project. Although the contractor got started in January 1989, the additional seven months of negotiations took energy from project implementation and exacerbated already strained relations with USAID.
- b. Although GU tried to play an "out in front" role which had been desired initially by USAID, the long delay in the contracting meant that it was virtually impossible for GU to play the role effectively by the time it was on board -- particularly given that preparations for the November 1989 election were already dominating the local scene. Its initial attempt to do so exacerbated relationships with USAID and counterpart agencies.
- c. ~~Because of USAID's overriding concern and involvement with the election and the tight management of the contractor, GU was unable to accomplish much in the other two areas (the Court and the Congress) until mid-1990.~~
- d. GU/H has not had a handle on the program in its entirety and has not always managed well the performance of experts from some of the subcontractors. However, this is not just a function of the leadership in GU/H as alleged by some USAID personnel. USAID cut the GU/H staff in

contract negotiations from that proposed by the contractor and left it with few resources in relation to the size of the job. Further, the subcontracting structure further dilutes the responsibility and flexibility of GU/H to respond project needs.

- e. GU has been remiss in both financial and project progress reporting. USAID has been actively trying to get better financial reports, but not project reports.
- f. Now that the election is over, a new chief of party is coming in, and the bulk of the project activities coming up are institution building in nature, it is time to reconsider the USAID-GU relationship, the role of GU, and GU's staffing. USAID could now step back into a more normal monitoring role and let the contractor increasingly take responsibility for day-to-day activities within approved work plans.
- g. The performance of GU subcontractors has been mixed. As new work plans are worked out for the different project components, it would be appropriate to review the structure of the GU contract. It may be that greater use of local contractors will be needed for the up-coming activities. If so, it might be appropriate to reduce the number of offshore subcontractors and staff the GU/H office so that it could contract locally when appropriate and supervise the contracts.
- h. Because of the strained relationships between the contractor and USAID, the changing of the GU chief of party in Honduras, and the large use of subcontractors for implementing the project, GU/Washington has played a more dominant role that would normally be expected for a project of this type. Yet, that office is small and it has not benefitted significantly from input from the home office organizations that were cited in GU's proposal in response to the RFP (Law School, Latin American Center, Government Department).

### C. Recommendations

1. USAID should re-examine its relationship with GU/H and gradually reduce USAID's direct involvement in day-to-day activities and allow the contractor to carry out its normal role.
2. USAID and the contractor should work out a new staffing pattern for GU/H, taking into account the implications of recommendation 1, the recommendations of the evaluation team regarding other GU/H staffing needs (see reports on Components I and II), the reduction taking place in home office support per existing contract provisions, and the likely USAID staffing for project support.

3. USAID and GU should re-examine the structure of the GU contract with regard to the need for so many subcontractors and determine if it would be possible to increase GU/H's capability to contract locally for resources rather than having most, if not all, of this done through expatriate subcontractors.

#### D. Lessons Learned

##### 1. Scope of the Project

The SDI project was essentially an umbrella project composed of three separately identified components: one to work with the Judiciary, one to work with the Congress, and one to work with the Elections Tribunal and the National Registry of Persons. These are really three different projects. It is questionable whether the umbrella concept reduced project management workload in relation to what it might have been with two or three projects. In any case, the cost in implementation difficulties and delays suggests that umbrella projects may not be appropriate for Democratic Institutions projects. This issue is discussed in the Lessons Learned section of the reports for each of the three components.

##### 2. Project Documentation

Reference is made in various places in this evaluation to the lack of project documentation. In a number of cases in which the evaluation team, in the draft report, criticized USAID inaction, the USAID responded that matters had been discussed and action was not taken for specific reasons. However, the team did not find documentation relating to such meetings and the USAID did not provide copies of such documentation in defense of its position. The team concludes that such documentation does not exist. The lack of it is all the more serious because USAID was excluding the contractor from many policy and planning discussions, leaving the contractor dependent upon oral, filtered information -- if provided at all.

##### 3. Dealing with a New Initiative

It was emphasized to the evaluation team that this was a new type of initiative for the USAID, the first bilateral Democratic Initiatives project in the region. This suggests to the team that broader based and unrushed planning would have been in order.

While some outside experts were brought in by USAID and prepared some draft background documents, the experts were not involved in the final design. Further, the USAID was rushing to get the project obligated. Taking more time and having the experts involved throughout the design process might have helped avoid some of the pitfalls encountered.

A.I.D. has at times contracted with organizations for assistance in both the design and implementation of a project, subject to USAID and the host country being satisfied with the contractor's work in the design phase. This contracting mechanism would seem an appropriate one to consider for this type of project.

Given that this is a rather new type of activity for USAIDs and there is not a pool of expertise available within the agency, it would seem appropriate to establish mechanisms to obtain outside review and advice fairly regularly during implementation of the project. This could be arranged by establishing a multi-disciplinary advisory committee with representation from the host country, the U.S., and possibly one or more regional countries. The group might meet within six months of the start of the project to review plans and to offer ideas for future activity. Thereafter, the committee might meet annually or when important project decisions were to be considered. The representation would be from organizations without responsibility for the implementation of the project.

**CHRONOLOGY**

**Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project**

1987

- Jan Project Implementation Document (PID) approved.
- Apr Development Associates Inc. (DA) team submitted concept papers to USAID.
- Jul 24 USAID Program Office requests information on firms involved in the microfilm project for the Salvadoran Election Council in 1983.
- Aug 10 Project Paper (PP) approved by USAID Director.
- 12 Grant Agreement signed, obligating \$3.4 million out of approved Life of Project (LOP) funding of \$7.5 million. Government of Honduras (GOH) LOP Lempira contribution set at \$2.5 million, including in-kind contributions.
- 19 State 258424 advises that Deloitte, Haskins & Sells was the prime contractor for the Salvadoran microfilm project.
- Sep 21 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed with the Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones (TNE).
- 30 Grant Agreement Amendment No. 1 signed, obligating \$630,000 and bringing total A.I.D. contribution to \$4.03 million.
- Oct In order to save time, USAID decides to contract with an 8(a) firm for updating the Honduran National Register and asks AID/W for a list of potential contractors.
- 14 MOU signed with the Corte Suprema de Justicia.
- 16 MOU signed with the Congreso Nacional de Honduras.
- 20 Project Implementation Letter (PIL) No. 1 advised that Conditions Precedent (C.P.s) 4.1.a, 4.1.b (except for signatures of 3 cooperating agencies), and 4.2.a had been fulfilled. Deadline for meeting initial C.P.s extended from September 11 to October 31st.
- 23 AID/W provides the names of five 8(a) firms (see first entry in October) and sends their capability statements.
- 30 PIL No. 2 advised that C.P. 4.1.b had been fulfilled; all C.P.s for initial disbursement now met.

- Nov 10 Preparation of PIO/T for prime contractor initiated.
- 18 USAID evaluation panel ranks the five 8(a) firms plus Dual & Associates which had provided its capability statement directly to USAID. USAID decides to ask top 2 (Creative Associates and Dual & Associates) to specify how they would carry out the project.
- Dec 11 Tegucigalpa 20576 reports the selection of Dual & Associates as contractor to work with TNE on the updating of the civil register and requests AID/W concurrence to contract directly with Dual rather than follow the usual 8(a) process through the Small Business Administration.
- 18 PIL No. 3 sent providing a number of clarifications and amplifications of the terms of the Grant Agreement, particularly with regard to A.I.D. procurement regulations. It also states:
- a) the GOH contribution of \$2.5 million equivalent will be in cash (ESF local currency generations) plus in-kind contributions;
  - b) a joint interim evaluation will be held after the 1989 elections and subsequent inauguration;
  - c) all offshore procurement will be made by USAID directly.
- [NOTE: There is no record that this was ever signed by the GOH, even though it changed the amount of the GOH contribution to the project.]

1988

- Jan 28 Letter Contract signed with Dual & Associates.
- Feb 9 PIL No. 4 advised that L. 3 million was being made available to TNE for personnel (L. 2.8 million) and office rental (L. 200,000).
- Mar 10 PIO/T signed authorizing initiation of procurement of prime contractor for project.
- Apr 7 Formal contract signed with Dual & Associates.
- Apr 13 PIL N. 5 sent to confirm with the TNE the arrangements for the updating, verification, and microfilming activity of the National Registry. The PIL covered: (a) organization; (b) planning; (c) finance (including budget); (d) personnel; (e) monitoring and evaluations (quarterly work plans and progress reports; Dual to develop an information system.

- May 2 The Request for Proposals (RFP) was issued for procuring the prime contractor for the project. The RFP was modified May 25; the closing date was June 20.
- Jun 21 Grant Agreement Amendment No. 2 was signed obligating an additional \$1.6 million for the project--new total \$5.63 million.
- Jul 6 The evaluation panel made its selection of a prime contractor.
- 29 Bidders advised of selection of prime contractor.
- Sep 27 Negotiations began with Georgetown University (GU) to become the prime contractor for the project.
- Oct AID/W receives Congressional enquiry about USAID contract negotiations with GU and requests USAID to suspend negotiations.
- Nov 17 State 373984 advises USAID of AID/W's response to Congress and authorizes negotiations with GU to resume.

1989

- Jan 9 Letter Contract signed by Georgetown University.
- Apr 12 IRM-contracted systems consultant submitted his report on the status of the data processing resources to support the electoral process -- in particular, updating the civil register. This was requested because of USAID concern that Dual & Associates would not complete its work by the end of its contract (June 30, 1989).
- 18 Grant Agreement Amendment No. 3 signed, obligating \$5.37 million additional for the project (new total \$11 million), revising project description and budget, and extending Project Agreement Completion Date (PACD) by 1 year to 31 Aug 92.
- 28 A one-year Grant Agreement for \$198,000 was signed with the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) "to improve the capability of Honduran trade union members to develop local leadership and increase the knowledge and participation of trade union members in the nation's political process."
- Jun 30 Dual & Associates contract is allowed to terminate.
- Aug 9 Formal contract signed with Georgetown University.
- 28 PIL No. 15 requests Honduran participating entities to submit requests for technical assistance, training, public information activities, or commodities to the

USAID Project Office for approval and submission to the appropriate action offices.

[There is no evidence that GOH signed this PIL.]

Nov 24 PIL No. 17 authorized funds to be used to help finance TNE's election observer program.

26 Honduran election held.

1990

Jan USAID held a meeting with GU Project Director and advised him that GU is no longer to take initiatives in the project, that USAID will provide hands on management of all facets of the project; new GU Chief of Party (COP) is designated.

31 Grant Agreement Amendment No. 4 signed, obligating an additional \$3 million -- new total \$14 million.

Mar 28 Grant Agreement Amendment No. 5 signed, obligating an additional \$2 million -- new total \$16 million.

Apr 18 Amendment No. 1 to the Grant Agreement with AIFLD signed, providing additional funding and extending the termination date to December 31, 1990.

May 19 GU Chief of Party resigns because of illness in the family; an interim COP is assigned.

Aug 23 Contract signed with Development Associates to carry out mid-term evaluation of the project.

Sep 13 New GU Chief of Party selected, to arrive early October.

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LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMPONENTS I, II, AND III

COMPONENT I--ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

A. Mid-Course Adjustments

The evaluation team does not see the need for a change in basic design, but it does wish to recommend some changes in emphasis and offer some ideas for alternative approaches.

1. USAID should give highest priority to encouraging and facilitating the Court's effective implementation of the Judicial Career Law, with the immediate focus of attention on insulating the justices from politics.
2. USAID should let the Court know that: a) A.I.D. considers this the most important element of the Judiciary component of the project; and b) USAID is unwilling to make significant contributions to other elements, let alone support any new ideas put forth in the September workshop, until:
  - a. a detailed implementation plan has been prepared for implementing the law and action has been initiated in accordance therewith on a priority basis; and
  - b. current hiring by the Court is being done on the basis of public announcements of openings, competition among candidates, and selection by an impartial selection process that ensures political affiliation is not an element of decision.

To implement the career law requires additional technical work and it should be finished soonest. For the implementation of the law to be effective, however, it may be necessary to work out arrangements with the political parties to insulate the appointment and tenure of justices from politics.

In its draft report, the evaluation team recommended that USAID determine what, if anything, besides "will" is needed to implement the career judiciary law. Further, it proposed that the USAID Liaison Officer provide a detailed report on the status of the implementation of the career law. The team understands that this was done, but it has not seen the report.

3. Assuming that a strengthening of "will" is needed, USAID should request the convening of a workshop to discuss the de-politicization of the Judiciary.

The Bar Association or the Law School could be asked to arrange the meeting, possibly utilizing an outside facilitator. There should be representation from the political parties. The agenda should

include: a) the rationale for insulating judges from politics; and b) developing a plan for de-politicization. The USAID Program Officer discussed with the evaluation team why an efficient, honest Judiciary is important to the development of the country and quite possibly could offer names of potential participants who could discuss this theme in the meeting.

The evaluation team sees the Justice of the Peace and Public Defender programs as part of the effort to create a Judiciary worthy of career status and offers the following recommendations related thereto:

4. USAID should encourage the Court to ask for a joint U.S.-Honduran study to evaluate the experimental Justice of the Peace program and recommend its future. The study should also review the items identified in III.B.5.b. above.

If current GOH budgetary problems are the reason for the reluctance of the President of the Supreme Court to continue with the Justice of the Peace program, possibly USAID could absorb the salary costs for two years for an additional 27 Justices of the Peace, provided that the Supreme Court felt it could absorb the funding of these positions subsequently. If jobs for displaced justices is part of the problem, the joint study team proposed in Recommendation 4. above might be able to recommend ways to alleviate the problem.

5. USAID should facilitate the early drafting and submission to the Congress of enabling legislation for Public Defenders.

## B. Training

1. USAID should propose that NJRC, with contractor support, or the contractor, following the completion of the study recommended above (A.4) hold a workshop, similar to the September 1990 one on judicial organization, which would focus on:
  - a. the relationship between administrative and legal training;
  - b. the role of the Judicial School in all elements of judicial training and its relationships with ILANUD and USAID contractors; and
  - c. the development of a plan for expanding and improving training in court administration and other areas of judicial operations not currently covered.
2. The contractor should proceed with the purchase and delivery of the furniture to the Judicial School. This overdue procurement was agreed to before there were delinquencies in meeting the MOU Conditions Precedent.
3. Assuming that the contractor will have an expanded training role in the near future in both Components 1 and 2, USAID

should authorize the contractor to add a full-time training coordinator position to its Honduras office.

**C. Project Management**

1. Given the arrival of a new chief of party for the contractor and the positive working relations developed with members of the Court, USAID should modify its project management approach and allow the contractor greater freedom in dealing with the Court on a day-to-day basis on the implementation of an approved work plan.
2. Concurrent with the foregoing, USAID should focus its attention on policy issues (see A. above), routine project monitoring, and ensuring appropriate coordination of effort between bilateral and regionally-funded activities.

**D. Impact on Women**

There are two issues related to women that should be of concern to USAID. One relates to the openness of the Judiciary to participation by women; the other to any special problems that women may have in obtaining justice under the law.

1. With regard to openness, USAID should arrange for a study to be funded under the project to (a) identify and assess the obstacles to female participation in the Judiciary; and (b) review the Career Judiciary Law and its enabling regulations for potential for discrimination.
2. Depending upon the results of the foregoing study, it may be appropriate to establish a monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance with provisions of the Honduran Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights (to which Honduras is a party) to ensure compliance in hiring and promotion within the career judiciary.
3. Regarding justice under the law, a study should be undertaken to determine whether there are special problems that women have in obtaining justice that could be dealt with under the project. A particular area for review would be the system of family law and child support payments.

**E. Priority of Recommendations**

A complete ranking of all recommendations (e.g., 1,2,3 etc.) does not make sense because some are contingent on other recommendations or actions, the timing of which the team cannot determine. Nevertheless, there follows a categorization of priorities which should help give the team's perspective if it is not already obvious from the text above.

Category I

1. Recommendations A.1,2,and 3 regarding the implementation of the career judiciary.
2. Project management recommendations (C.1. and 2.)
3. Recommendations A.4 and 5 on the experimental programs.

Note: 1. and 2 are primarily USAID action while 3. will involve contractor action if the Court concurs in the proposal.

4. Delivery of furniture to the Judicial School (in process).

Category II

1. Recommendations B.1 and 3 on training
2. Recommendations under D. regarding impact on women.

COMPONENT II--LEGISLATIVE ENHANCEMENT

A. Mid-Course Adjustments

1. Increased attention should be given to improving committee operations and other functions of the Congress, while maintaining a high level of priority for the establishment and functioning of CIEL.
2. USAID should agree to converting MOU Condition Precedent (2) (2) to a covenant with target dates for implementation in 1991; however, it should insist on detailed plans and targets to meet Condition Precedent (2) (1) and Covenant (1) before agreeing to go ahead with procurement for CIEL.

B. Development of Data Management Systems

1. USAID should request the contractor to add a systems expert to its in-country staff to coordinate the system development work in the Congress, the Court, and possibly TNE/RNP and arrange for training of systems personnel and potential users of the automated data systems.
2. Hardware procurement should be stretched out over the remaining period of the project, being spaced as the capability develops to use it.
3. Priority should be given to undertaking a systematic analysis of the need for and cost of obtaining the various data bases that have been proposed for inclusion in the Congressional automated system; this is needed to establish priorities for data development.

**C. Training**

1. USAID should encourage the Congress to establish a training position, as covenanted in the MOU; in the interim, the Congress should establish a training committee to work with the contractor and others in developing a training need assessment for the balance of the project and carrying out the large amount of training that will be needed.
2. Assuming that the logjam in activity in Components I and II is now broken, USAID should authorize the contractor to add a training coordinator to its staff in Honduras to coordinate the extensive training that will be needed by the Congress and the Court and to provide quality control over the contracted trainers and the training programs.

**D. Impact on Women**

There are two issues related to women that should be of concern by USAID. One relates to the openness of the political system to women who may wish to run for Congress; the other relates to whether women will have equal access to employment possibilities in the career systems being established with project assistance.

1. USAID should fund a study to ascertain the degree of openness of the electoral and party system to women participation and evaluate any obstacles encountered.
2. USAID should monitor the hiring policies established for the career service of the Congress.

**E. Priority of Recommendations**

A complete ranking of all recommendations (e.g., 1,2,3, etc.) does not make sense because some are contingent on other recommendations or actions, the timing of which the team cannot determine. Nevertheless, there follows a categorization of priorities which should help give the team's perspective if it is not already obvious from the text above.

**Category I**

1. Settle all MOU issues so that CIEL and other procurement can go forward, with CIEL hardware being procured per Recommendation B.2.
2. Initiate review of, and action on, recommendations for improving committee operations and other functions of the Congress.
3. Recommendation B.1. -- add a systems development expert to the contractor's in-country staff.

4. Organize a detailed requirements analysis to establish priorities in the development of the CIEL and administrative data bases.

#### Category II

1. Recommendations on Training -- timing depends on actions in Category I.
2. Recommendations on Impact on Women.

#### COMPONENT III--VOTER REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS IMPROVEMENT

##### A. Mid-Course Adjustments

1. USAID should not provide additional assistance for up-dating the Civil Registry rolls at this time, but it should indicate its willingness to fund: (a) a study of the feasibility of up-dating the rolls; and, if found feasible, (b) the preparation of a detailed implementation plan and budget for carrying out the task.

The team to carry out such a feasibility survey should include an expert on Central American historical demography and an expert from the Costa Rican Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.

Depending upon the outcome of the study, USAID could consider whether it would provide assistance to the effort to up-date the Registry rolls. If so, the evaluation team suggests that a separate project be established just for assistance to the RNP--without any time pressures related to the next election.

2. USAID should discuss with senior GOH officials the various problems related to the electoral rolls and indicate USAID willingness to finance a study to review the problems of the current system and analyze the pros and cons of other options for the electoral registration process.

Depending upon the outcome of the study, if approved, and whether USAID assistance was needed, USAID should try to ensure that any USAID follow-on role was limited to funding ~~observational visits and assistance by recognized~~ international organizations or experts in the planning and coordination of training that might be needed to implement the effort.

##### B. Institutionalization of the National Registry of Persons

1. USAID should discuss with senior GOH officials whether or not the GOH is interested in seeking a career law for RNP and TNE (or otherwise providing for greater personnel continuity) and

adopting revised structures and procedures which could provide greater assurance of fair and complete coverage in the registration process.

2. If the GOH response to 1. is favorable, USAID should indicate its willingness to finance the study called for in the MOU to analyze the requirements to improve the RNP registration process at all levels of the Republic.

This study should focus on personnel needs (quantity and quality), equipment needs, and processes and procedures. Based on the results of the study, and GOH action on building consensus for a career law, USAID could determine what type, if any, of assistance it could provide to meet the needs that were identified in the study.

### C. Support for the Next Election

1. USAID should inform the GOH and TNE that USAID is prepared to assist TNE now in preparing for the 1993 election, but it does not intend to provide any assistance once the official electoral campaign has begun.

The type of assistance that could be furnished now would be studies/surveys and technical assistance in planning. The types of studies/surveys the evaluation team has in mind are the following:

- (1) obtaining feedback on the operations of the last election -- training provided to poll workers, the delivery of commodities to polling places, and the voter education messages used;
- (2) determining what would be necessary for TNE, or a local agent, to handle all of the procurement (including offshore) for the next election; and
- (3) ascertaining the public's attitudes toward the 1989 election and the election process.

The team does not believe that it is too late to carry out studies (1) and (3).

With the results of the various studies and surveys, it would be appropriate to have a workshop/retreat to integrate the findings into the thinking of political party officials, and perhaps municipal leaders, as well as representatives of the organizations involved in direct administration of the election (e.g., TNE, the military, contractors). Hopefully, a consensus could be reached on a certain number of actions that could be expected to increase the confidence of the electorate in the next election.

**D. Impact on Women**

There are two issues related to women that should be of concern to USAID. One relates to the access of women to participation in the electoral process (registration and voting); the other relates to whether women will have equal access to employment possibilities in the career systems that are to be established with project assistance.

1. USAID should fund a study to ascertain the degree to which current electoral procedures and practices openly or indirectly discriminate against women becoming included on the electoral rolls and/or being able to cast their vote.
2. USAID should monitor the hiring policies established for the career service of the TNE/RNP.

**E. Priority of Recommendations**

A complete ranking of all recommendations (e.g., 1,2,3, etc.) does not make sense because some are contingent on other recommendations or actions, the timing of which the team cannot determine, and some could be taken care of, at least initially, in a single meeting. Therefore Category I recommendations would be A.1. and A.2., B.1. and C.1., all of which could be discussed in a single meeting with GOH and TNE officials. Category II priority would be B.2., Impact on Women recommendations, and any follow-up activity which resulted from the proposed high level meeting.