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EVALUATION REPORT
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS PROJECT

III - Voter Registration and
Elections Improvement

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Foreword

USAID/H believes that readers of this evaluation would benefit from information on the historical context in which this project began implementation, an update on activities that have developed under the project since the evaluation was conducted, and additional background on several issues raised in the evaluation.

The August, 1987 signing of the Project Agreement was followed by an unusually complex process of awarding and negotiating the project's primary contract with Georgetown University (GU). The Honduran presidential campaign was in full swing when the GU contract was finalized one and a half years later. As a result of the campaign, politics permeated the Honduran Government's decision-making process and greatly hampered the implementation efforts of both USAID and GU in many areas of the project. Since the evaluation was conducted in August of 1990, the relationship between USAID and GU, initially strained by implementation delays suffered in early stages of the project, is now harmonious.

The project designers considered passage of career legislation a cornerstone of the project out of recognition that professional career civil service personnel are essential to de-politicizing democratic institutions. The draft elections law currently being debated by the Honduran Congress contains this provision for National Registry of Persons (RNP) staff.

In closing, the Mission adds its own lesson learned from this project, that of the need for Democratic Initiatives project designs to be flexible enough to allow project implementation to keep step with changes in the political environment.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADAI	El Ateneo de la Agro Industria, a Honduran consulting firm
AID	U.S. Agency for International Development
AID/W	Washington headquarters of Agency for International Development
CAPEL	Affiliate of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights for providing electoral advisory assistance
CIPRA	The office in Georgetown University which oversees the unit in charge of supporting the SDI project in Honduras
DA	Development Associates, Inc. (a consulting firm)
GEMAH	Gerentes y Empresarios Asociados de Honduras, a Honduran management consultant firm
GOH	Government of Honduras
GU	Georgetown University
GU/H	Honduras office of Georgetown University
HRD	Human Resources Development office of USAID
INCAE	Instituto Centroamericana de Administracion de Empresas (Central American Institute of Business Administration)
LAC/DI	The Democratic Initiatives office of the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C.
MBO	Management by Objectives
MOU	Memorandum(a) of Understanding
PACD	Project Agreement Completion Date
PP	Project Paper (an AID document)
RNP	Registro Nacional de Personas (National Registry of Persons)
SDI	Strengthening Democratic Institutions project
TA	Technical Assistance
TNE	Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones (National Elections Tribunal)
TNE/RNP	Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones/Registro Nacional de Personas (National Elections Tribunal and its affiliate the National Registry of Persons)
U.S.	United States
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Honduras

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

On September 20, 1987, a Grant Agreement between the Government of Honduras (GOH) and the U.S.A.I.D. Mission (USAID) was signed to initiate the Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) project. One of the four components of this project was the strengthening of the National Elections Tribunal (TNE) and its dependency the National Registry of Persons (RNP).

On August 27, 1990, A.I.D. signed a contract with Development Associates, Inc. (DA) to undertake a mid-course evaluation of the SDI project (See Annex A for the scope of work). The DA evaluation team met in Washington, D.C. September 5-7 to meet with A.I.D. officials and representatives of the prime contractor (Georgetown University). Members of the team were in Honduras from September 10 to October 2 reviewing documentation (see Annex C) and interviewing senior officials of the TNE/RNP, other GOH officials, USAID officers, and personnel from the Honduran office of Georgetown University (GU/H) and GU sub-contractors (see Annex B for a list of people contacted). Part of the team also visited Costa Rica where they met with people from CAPEL and the Tribunal Supreme de Elecciones.

A draft report was submitted to USAID on October 2, 1990. Comments on the draft report were provided by the contractor on October 16 and by USAID on December 7 and 14. Comments are reflected in this final report as appropriate.

Project Objectives

The objective of this component, as stated in the Memorandum of Understanding, is:

"to assist in the improvement and professionalization of the TNE and the RNP, enhancing their capacity to manage an effective registration process and guaranteeing universal suffrage."

The MOU proposes two major activities:

- (1) Up-dating, microfilming and computerization of the Civil Registration Lists. This was to be broken into two stages:
 - (a) Up-date, verify, and microfilm, within 18 months of the signature of the MOU, all documents from 1880 to 1987 required by the Civil Registration process.
 - (b) Support the institutionalization of an improved and effective civilian registration process at all levels of the Republic.

- (2) Provide support to the 1989 national election (in-service training of administrative personnel and of election workers); provide technical, administrative, training and commodity support to facilitate the implementation of the general elections scheduled for November 1989; and strengthen the permanent institutional base for future elections.

Project Progress

1. Findings

a. Up-date, Verify and Microfilm the Civil Registration Lists

Only about 200,000 records were microfilmed by June 1989, the target date for completing 20 million. Even those microfilmed probably will not be used. It has not been determined whether the method planned for up-dating the records will achieve the goal of a reliable electoral roll even if the 20 million records are integrated.

b. Support the Institutionalization of the RNP

This activity was planned as a follow-on activity to 1., to be undertaken after the election; however, the action contemplated has not taken place.

The following Conditions Precedent in the MOU were to have been fulfilled before June 1, 1989: (1) a career law for the RNP and guidelines for its implementation would have been submitted to the Honduran Congress; (2) all new personnel would be being hired under this system; and (3) 75 percent of the staff would have been employed under the career personnel system. A career law for the RNP was introduced into the last Congress, but not passed; it has been referred to the TNE for comment. The TNE is reported to be drafting its own career service legislation.

c. Support to the 1989 National Election

The training of election workers was important to the successful administration of the election. Forty-one supervisors were trained and they in turn trained 295 instructors. The latter trained 58,841 election workers.

USAID and TNE were pleased with the training program and believe that the voting places were better managed in 1989 than in the 1985 election. The evaluation team concurs in this assessment, but believes that follow-up surveys, both among the election workers and the general public, should have been undertaken to verify this conclusion and to obtain information that could be used to strengthen the training program and electoral process for the next election.

Three public education campaigns were successfully and effectively carried out, covering voter registration, the work of the TNE, and the electoral process. The evaluation team believes that a follow-up survey should have been carried out to determine more precisely the impact of the activities and to obtain information that would be helpful for future public education campaigns of this type.

[NOTE: For a fuller treatment of the training activities, media campaigns and observational visits, see Annex F.]

TNE generally was not pleased with the technical assistance provided by DUAL & Associates and Clapp and Mayne, but spoke highly of GEMAH which conducted three seminars for TNE and RNP and provided technical support in planning for the election.

About \$1.5 million of commodities and services were programmed for supporting the election, about one-third of it being purchased in Honduras and the balance in the U.S. or Puerto Rico. This included paper for ballots, printing of ballots, indelible ink, transparent plastic bags for transporting ballots, FAX machines, ball point pens, paper towels, etc. In general, both offshore and local procurement were handled well.

Unrelated to project activity, election preparations were complicated by changes in procedures passed by the Congress (e.g., where people were to vote and what identification would be accepted) and by political in-fighting within the TNE Tribunal. Also, three of the five members of the Tribunal were new in their jobs. Problems also occurred in getting commodities delivered to polls; some polls opened late.

2. Conclusions

1. Virtually no progress has been made in up-dating, verifying, and microfilming Honduran civil registration lists.
2. No progress has been made in the institutionalization of the RNP as called for in the MOU, and it is not clear that any can be expected in the near future.
3. Although there were temporary crises in the delivery of some of the project-funded activities and TNE dissatisfaction with some of the USAID-funded technical assistance experts, project support to the TNE for carrying out the election generally was effective and was appreciated by TNE. The election took place on schedule in a relatively orderly and peaceful fashion with a high level of voter participation and a relatively low level of complaints.

Analysis of Problems, Issues, and Constraints

The evaluation team's conclusions regarding the up-dating and verification of the civil registry rolls are as follows:

1. Under present conditions, further assistance under the project for up-dating the RNP rolls, is justified only for technical assistance to carry out a feasibility study to explore alternative procedures for the up-dating process and for preparing a detailed implementation plan and budget for the most feasible process.
2. Given the minimal accomplishments to date in up-dating the RNP rolls, it is likely that it will take years, if it is feasible at all, to clean up the RNP rolls to the extent that the reliability of electoral rolls would be significantly enhanced. An alternative process might be considered for electoral registration.
3. Because of the influence of the political parties on the hiring of RNP employees and running the TNE, political parties must be included in any discussions involving future USAID support to TNE/RNP for improving the general Civil Registry rolls or the electoral rolls.

On the institutionalization of the National Registry of Persons, the evaluation team concluded:

1. A high level discussion with GOH authorities is needed to confirm whether or not the political will exists to seek a career law for RNP and TNE, and to adopt revised structures and procedures which could provide greater assurance of fairness in the electoral process.
2. The unfilled study proposed by the MOU on Registry needs country-wide should provide information that could help build a consensus in favor of reform of RNP personnel policies and operating procedures.

The evaluation team felt that the support to national elections raised a policy issue. The team concluded that intimate participation by a U.S. government agency in support of the Honduran election is not healthy for the election process and that the objective of any further assistance for this activity should be to put the Hondurans in a position that they can manage the election without any further assistance once the electoral campaign begins.

Project Design Validity

The principal questions regarding the validity of the design of this component relate to the up-dating of the rolls and the establishment of a career service for the RNP. It is not clear that the process attempted by Dual & Associates and currently being carried out by RNP will really result in an up to date and accurate civil

register. The assumption by the drafters of the Project Paper that there would be multi-partisan support for this reform appears thus far not to have been valid.

Recommendations

A. Mid-Course Adjustments

1. USAID should not provide additional assistance for up-dating the Civil Registry rolls at this time, but it should indicate its willingness to fund: (a) a study of the feasibility of up-dating the rolls; and, if found feasible, (b) the preparation of a detailed implementation plan and budget for carrying out the task.

Depending upon the outcome of the study, USAID could consider whether it would provide assistance to the effort to up-date the Registry rolls. If so, the evaluation team suggests that a separate project be authorized for assistance to the RNP--without any time pressures related to the next election.

2. USAID should discuss with senior GOH officials problems related to the electoral rolls and indicate USAID willingness to finance a study to review the problems of the current system and analyze the pros and cons of other options for the electoral registration process.

Depending upon the outcome of the study, if approved, USAID should try to ensure that its follow-on role is limited to funding observational visits and technical assistance by recognized international organizations or experts in the planning and coordination of training.

B. Institutionalization of the National Registry of Persons

1. USAID should discuss with senior GOH officials whether or not the GOH is interested in seeking a career law for RNP and TNE (or otherwise providing for greater personnel continuity) and adopting revised structures and procedures which could provide greater assurance of fair and complete coverage in the registration process.
2. If the GOH response to 1. is favorable, USAID should indicate its willingness to finance the study called for in the MOU to analyze the requirements to improve the RNP registration process at all government levels of the Republic.

This study should focus on personnel needs (quantity and quality), equipment needs, and processes and procedures. Based on the results of the study, and GOH action on building consensus for a career law, USAID could determine what type, if any, of assistance it could provide to meet the needs identified in the study.

C. Support for the Next Election

1. USAID should inform the GOH and TNE that USAID is prepared to assist TNE now in preparing for the 1993 election, but it does not intend to provide any assistance once the electoral campaign has begun.

Assistance that could be furnished now would be studies/surveys and technical assistance in planning.

D. Impact on Women

Two issues are related to women that should be of concern to USAID. One relates to the access of women to participation in the electoral process (registration and voting); the other relates to whether women will have equal access to employment possibilities in the career systems that are to be established with project assistance.

1. USAID should fund a study to ascertain the degree to which current electoral procedures and practices openly or indirectly discriminate against women becoming included on the electoral rolls and/or being able to cast their vote.
2. USAID should monitor the hiring policies established for the career service of the TNE/RNP.

E. Priority of Recommendations

Category I recommendations would be A.1. and A.2., B.1. and C.1., all of which could be discussed in a single meeting with GOH and TNE officials. Category II priority would be B.2., Impact on Women recommendations, and any follow-up activity which resulted from the proposed high level meeting.

Lessons Learned**A. Scope of the Project**

The SDI project was essentially an umbrella project composed of three separately identified components: one to work with the Judiciary, one to work with the Congress, and one to work with the Elections Tribunal and the National Registry of Persons. These three components are really three different projects. It is questionable whether the umbrella concept reduced project management workload in relation to what it might have been with two or three projects. In any case, the cost in implementation difficulties and delays does not seem worth maintaining the umbrella concept.

B. Information Sharing

The evaluation team found that neither USAID nor contractor personnel were well informed about similar activities being

carried out by AID in other Central American countries. There appears to be a need for more systematic sharing of information about programs and actions being taken to deal with fairly common problems within the LAC region.

C. Marking of Election Commodities

Since it is not in the interest of either the U.S. or a host government for commodities that are to be used in polling places to have the AID symbol on them, USAIDs should waive marking in the authorization for future activities. Further, AID/W should consider the possibility of issuing a worldwide waiver on AID marking of commodities to be used directly in elections.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The USAID Project Paper for the Strengthening Democratic Institutions project was approved August 12, 1987. The initial obligation of funds took place with the signature on September 20 of a Grant Agreement by the President of Honduras and the U.S. Ambassador. One of the components of this project was to provide support to the National Elections Tribunal (TNE) and its affiliate the National Registry of Persons (RNP).

According to the terms of the Grant Agreement, there were to be evaluations of the project, including a mid-course evaluation. On August 27, 1990, AID signed a contract with Development Associates Inc. (DA) to undertake the mid-course evaluation. See Annex A for the scope of the work for the evaluation. DA fielded a five-person team to carry out the evaluation (* = principal evaluators for the TNE/RNP component):

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| * James L. Roush | Team Leader--Economist, Evaluation Specialist |
| * Mitchell Seligson | Political Scientist, Latin American Specialist |
| James Rowles | Specialist in Comparative Law and Latin American Law and Legal Systems |
| * Joseph Alessandro | Educator, Training Specialist |
| * Carlos Ferro | Commodity Procurement Specialist |

Mr. Roush visited Honduras August 28-31 to obtain preliminary briefings from USAID, to prepare a work plan for the work of the team, and to make arrangements for the team's visit. The team (except for Mr. Ferro) met in Washington D.C. September 5-7 to study the scope of work for the evaluation, review documentation, and meet with officials of AID and the prime contractor (Georgetown University -- GU).

The team arrived in Tegucigalpa Sunday September 9. The team met with the TNE Tribunal September 10. Drs. Seligson, Alessandro, and Rowles visited Costa Rica September 12-15, contacting officials of CAPEL and the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. In Honduras, the team interviewed officials from USAID, TNE/RNP, the Honduran office of Georgetown University (GU/H), and GU sub-contractors (see Annex B for a list of people contacted). The TNE arranged a special visit to, and briefing on the work of the RNP. The team reviewed documentation in TNE, USAID, and GU/H files (see Annex C for a list of the published documents reviewed). Dr. Seligson arranged for and coordinated a survey of attitudes regarding the integrity of the November 1989 election (see Annex E for methodology and other details).

In conformance with the objective of the evaluation, the team reviewed the progress made against targets established in USAID's

Project Paper and the Grant Agreement, analyzed policy issues and implementation problems, reviewed the basic design for the project component, and made recommendations regarding future assistance to this component. A draft report was submitted to USAID on October 2, 1990. GU provided comments on the draft report on October 16; USAID's comments were received December 7 and 14. These comments are relected in this final report.

II. PROJECT AND COMPONENT OBJECTIVES

The project purpose, as stated in the Logical Framework of USAID's Project Paper (see Annex D) and the Grant Agreement, is to:

"improve the capability of key democratic institutions (the Judiciary, the Congress, and the National Elections Tribunal/National Registry of Persons), develop local leadership and increase the knowledge and participation of the Honduran populace in the democratic process."

To implement the project, separate Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) were signed with the three agencies. The MOU was signed with the TNE on September 21, 1987. The objective was stated therein as:

"to assist in the improvement and professionalization of the TNE and the RNP, enhancing their capacity to manage an effective registration process and guaranteeing universal suffrage."

The MOU proposes two major activities:

- (1) Up-dating, microfilming and computerization of the Civil Registration Lists. This was to be broken into two stages:
 - (a) Up-date, verify, and microfilm, within 18 months of the signature of the MOU, all documents from 1880 to 1987 required by the Civil Registration process.
 - (b) Support the institutionalization of an improved and effective civilian registration process at all levels of the Republic. Based on an analysis of needs that would be funded under the project, the following actions would be undertaken:
 - Initiation of the Civil Registry Career system at all levels of the RNP;
 - Formulation of a recruitment and promotion system based on ability;
 - Drafting, production and distribution of procedural manuals for use at all levels of the RNP; and
 - Institutionalization of planning and budgetary processes.

- (2) Provide support to the 1989 national election:
- (a) Finance in-service training of administrative personnel and of election workers who will be manning the individual polling tables;
 - (b) Provide technical, administrative, training and commodity support to facilitate the implementation of the general elections scheduled for November 1989, and to strengthen the permanent institutional base for future elections; and
 - (c) Fund the procurement of consumable items and other costs necessary for the successful implementation of the general elections scheduled for November 1989.

III. PROJECT PROGRESS

A. Findings

1. Up-date, Verify and Microfilm the Civil Registration Lists

USAID contracted with Dual and Associates in January 1988 to carry out this function by May 31, 1989 so that the TNE would be able to prepare a more complete and more accurate voter list for use in the November 1989 elections. The work was estimated to involve an estimated 20 million records.

It has been estimated that some 200,000 records were microfilmed by the end of the Dual contract. Officials of the TNE told the evaluation team that even those microfilmed were not usable because they were not properly classified. There seems general agreement that no use will be made of those films.

All action was suspended in May 1989 to permit TNE to work with the records to prepare voter lists for the November election; the Dual contract was allowed to expire on June 30, 1989.

The RNP has resumed this activity on a reduced scale using its own personnel. It has recently requested (September 1990) that USAID provide it with funds to permit it to hire additional personnel so it can expand operations in the next year. A decision on the request was pending at the time of the evaluation.

2. Support the Institutionalization of the RNP

This activity was planned as a follow-on activity to 1., to be undertaken after the election. It involved assessing the needs of the municipal level registry offices and their ability to effectively carry out the registration process as directed by the National Registry office. Further, there would be an assessment related to the restructuring, equipping and operation of the municipal registries, modernizing procedures, preparation of procedural manuals, study of existing and future physical spatial needs, and up-dating of various functions.

Based on the results of these initial studies, the following actions were to be undertaken during the remaining life of the project:

- Initiation of the Civil Registry Career system at all levels of the RNP;
- Formulation of a recruitment and promotion system based on ability;
- Drafting, production and distribution of procedural manuals for use at all levels of the RNP; and
- Institutionalization of planning and budgetary processes.

It was assumed that action could take place after the election because the following Conditions Precedent of the MOU were to have been fulfilled before June 1, 1989: (1) a career law for the RNP and guidelines for its implementation would have been submitted to the Congress; (2) all new personnel would be being hired under this system; and (3) 75 percent of the staff would have been employed under the career personnel system.

A career law for the RNP was introduced into the last Congress, and the law has been referred to the TNE for comment. The evaluation team was also told that TNE was working on its own draft legislation. The team was told different things by different TNE members. In any case, there has been no compliance with the Conditions Precedent of the MOU. Therefore, the actions cited above have not been planned, let alone implemented.

3. Support to the 1989 National Election

a. Training of Election Workers

The affiliate of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights for electoral advisory assistance

(CAPEL), a GU subcontractor, contracted with Gerentes y Empresarios Asociados de Honduras (GEMAH) to provide a training program for election workers. The objective was to train members of departmental tribunals, local tribunals, and members of voting tables (those who ran the voting places).

The scope of the program was to train 41 supervisors, who in turn would train 295 instructors. The latter were to train some 64,000 election workers to manage the voting places. The actual results were 41 supervisors, 295 instructors, and 58,841 election workers.

In addition, GEMAH and TNE produced, with CAPEL advice, several documents: 1) a general manual; 2) a small manual related to the organization of the voting place; and 3) a description of the electoral process. The process was well documented so that there are good materials that can be used for the next election.

TNE has spoken highly of the training, and USAID and TNE believe that the voting places were better managed than in the 1985 election. The evaluation team concurs in this assessment, but believes that follow-up surveys, both among the election workers and the general public, should have been undertaken to verify this conclusion and to obtain information that could be used to strengthen the training program for the next election.

b. Planning for the Electoral Process

GEMAH conducted three seminars for TNE and RNP, one in June 1989 and two in August, to help them devise plans and procedures for carrying out the election. The seminars were considered helpful, but the potential benefits were not fully realized because of changes in electoral procedures voted by the Congress and internal conflicts within the governing TNE Tribunal.

c. Mass Media Campaign in Support of the Election

The Futures Group, a GU subcontractor, contracted with a local nonprofit organization, El Ateneo de la Agro-Industria (ADAI), to conduct a survey of voter attitudes. The information gathered served to guide the public education campaign orchestrated by The Futures Group and carried out by Modernoble-Calderon, a local advertising agency. The three campaigns carried out covered voter registration, the work of the TNE, and the electoral process.

All components of the project were carried out successfully, and USAID and TNE felt that the campaign made a significant contribution to the electoral process of 1989. Based on the information available to it (discussed further in Annex F), the evaluation team concurs. The team feels that a follow-up survey should have been carried out to determine more precisely the impact of the activities and to obtain information that would be helpful for future public education campaigns of this type.

The Futures Group also worked with TNE in an effort to arrange a televised presidential debate. Considerable effort was devoted to the activity, but in the end it came to naught. While there were other complicating factors, it appears that the main reason the debate did not occur was because one of the candidates wished to avoid participating in it.

d. Observational Visits

Nine observational visits were arranged for members of the TNE. Most were to the U.S. in relation to the U.S. elections in 1988; others were to El Salvador, Puerto Rico and Costa Rica.

The participants generally found the visits useful. Some were able to use the knowledge gained directly in their work at TNE. Others used their knowledge to make suggestions for TNE operations and had them turned down.

[NOTE: For a fuller treatment of the training activities, the media campaign and the observational visits, see Annex F.]

e. Technical Assistance to TNE/RNP

Dual & Associates was contracted to organize and carry out certain activities described above, but it was also to provide some technical assistance and training to TNE/RNP. Members of the TNE tribunal, as well as TNE and RNP employees, expressed dissatisfaction with both the TA and the training.

GU subcontractor Clapp & Mayne also sent technical experts to work with the TNE. TNE officials expressed dissatisfaction with some of them also, citing haughty attitudes and attempts to insist on a Puerto Rican solution to Honduran problems. While some of the experts apparently provided useful services, it is clear that the TNE is very dubious about the utility of accepting more foreign technical assistance.

Because of the foregoing difficulties, USAID hired GEMAH to help TNE coordinate the logistics of the election--in addition to the assistance provided by GEMAH to the training of voting table workers through its contract with CAPEL.

f. Commodity Support for the Election

About \$1.5 million of commodities and services were programmed for supporting the election, about one-third of it being purchased in Honduras and the balance in the U.S. or Puerto Rico. This included paper for ballots, printing of the ballots, indelible ink, transparent plastic bags for transporting ballots, fax machines, ball point pens, paper towels, etc.

The offshore procurement was handled by Clapp & Mayne following good commercial practices in line with U.S. government procurement regulations. Except for the FAX procurement which is covered below, GU/H administered local procurement. This was done well. The only questionable procurement involved a contract for printing services. In this case, TNE insisted that the award be given to a government parastatal, now defunct, even though the documentation suggests that a lower bidder met all of the specifications.

Clapp and Mayne managed the in-country procurement of the FAX machines, and the preparation for their use in reporting election results after the polls closed. Statements by some local vendors and TNE staff suggested that normal procurement practices had not been followed in the FAX purchase. The Clapp & Mayne expert has explained orally and in writing the procurement process used, but the team was unable to locate at GU/H the documentation cited by him which would have put the concerns to rest.

The vote reporting system, which involved using the FAX network for reporting and computer activity in the Informatica office in TNE for collating the vote, broke down the night of the election. It is reported to have been working after a six-hour down period, but the TNE discontinued the system --ostensibly because a local radio had been announcing preliminary results all along and more quickly than TNE.

The evaluation team heard and read a number of conflicting stories on what happened on election night and whose fault it was, e.g., the FAX machines failed, polling people failed to report,

there was a problem with a computer program, Hondutel did not have maintenance people on duty, etc. USAID says in its comments on the draft evaluation report that the evaluation team should have addressed the issue more fully and gave advice regarding future use of the system.

The evaluation team did not have the time and resources to determine what really happened, and thus be in a position to make a judgment whether the system should be tried again. The team believes that USAID and TNE should have arranged for the contractor or a jointly selected team to fully research and document what happened and provide recommendations for the future.

In that connection, the contractor, in its work plan for the first half of 1990, proposed: "a major examination of the organizational structure and operations of the GOH institutions which are involved in the elections process, with a view to recommending necessary changes, additional measures to be adopted, and technical assistance and training that might be required to establish a capability within the GOH to carry out fair and free elections in the future in a competent and organized manner, without the need for outside assistance." This proposal was not pursued by USAID and TNE.

Unrelated to SDI project activity, the election preparations were complicated by last minute changes in procedures passed by the Congress (e.g., where people were to vote and what identification would be accepted) and by political in-fighting within the TNE Tribunal. Also, three of the five members of the Tribunal were new in their jobs. There were also problems in getting commodities delivered to polls; some polls opened late.

B. Conclusions

1. Virtually no progress has been made in up-dating, verifying, and microfilming the civil registration lists.
2. No progress has been made in the institutionalization of the RNP as called for in the MOU, and it is not clear that any can be expected in the near future.
3. Although there were temporary crises in the delivery of some of the project-funded activities and TNE dissatisfaction with some of the USAID-funded technical assistance experts, project support to the TNE for carrying out the election generally was effective and was appreciated by TNE. The election took place on

schedule in a relatively orderly and peaceful fashion with a high level of voter participation and a very low level of complaints at the time of the scrutiny.

IV. ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND CONSTRAINTS

A. Up-dating and Verification of Civil Registry Rolls

1. Findings

- a. The up-dating and verification of the civil registry rolls as a preliminary step to establishing a more reliable electoral list encountered difficult and frustrating implementation issues. There appears to be a number of reasons contributing to the minimal accomplishment in this activity, particularly in relation to that projected:
 - (1) USAID took on faith that what was proposed by TNE/RNP would achieve the desired results and could be accomplished in less than 18 months.
 - (2) USAID underestimated the amount of time needed for the contracting process and for the contractor to mobilize. The Project Paper did not include an implementation plan for the up-dating; this may have contributed to the optimism regarding this activity.
 - (3) The contractor presumably also underestimated the magnitude of the job--and possibly over-rated its own capabilities; otherwise, it presumably would not have accepted a fixed price contract.
 - (4) TNE at times held up operations of the contractor. At one point, the issue was the hiring of personnel by the contractor to carry out the work (a political issue within TNE). At another point, the TNE was not convinced of the wisdom (justifiably so) of the contractor's implementation plan.
 - (5) Implementation issues were not sufficiently worked out in advance because of the time pressure that every one was under. The time pressure was also the reason why USAID used a short-cut method to contract with Dual & Associates, thereby restricting its chances of obtaining a contractor that might have had prior experience in this or a comparable activity.

- b. Not only was there not a detailed implementation plan for carrying out the up-dating and verification of the RNP rolls, there was and is no feasibility study that demonstrates conclusively that the procedures proposed by TNE/RNP will actually provide a more accurate electoral roll. This issue was raised by E. Andrews in his report of May 1989 and the evaluation team confirmed with TNE that the test proposed by Andrews still had not been run.
- c. The Project Paper states on page 52: "The Civil Registry is the basis for obtaining a reliable and acceptable election process." It seems quite clear that assistance to up-dating the Civil Registry was included in the project because the Registry data were being used as a basis for establishing the electoral rolls. Thus, continued assistance to RNP under the project seems justified only if it is clear that such assistance will result in more reliable elector rolls within a reasonable time period.
- d. The TNE has asked USAID to fund an RNP effort, using its own personnel resources, to continue the up-dating and verification activities. RNP is working on the oldest records (i.e., starting with 1880) rather than starting with the more recent records and working backwards. The latter procedure would seem to provide more useful data more rapidly, both for serving Hondurans in general and for increasing the perceived reliability of the electoral rolls.

For a fuller discussion of the issues involved in improving the electoral rolls, see Annex E.

2. Conclusions

- a. Further assistance under the project for up-dating the RNP rolls is not justified until USAID has in hand a feasibility study which has explored alternative procedures for the up-dating process and prepared a detailed implementation plan and budget for the most feasible process. Funding of such a study with project funds would be appropriate.
- b. Given the minimal accomplishments to date in up-dating the RNP rolls, it is likely that it will take a number of years, if it is feasible at all, to clean up the RNP rolls to the extent that the reliability of the electoral rolls would be significantly enhanced. Thus, it seems appropriate

to consider whether an alternative process might be established for electoral registration.

- c. Because of the influence of the political parties on the hiring of RNP employees and the running of the TNE, the political parties need to be included in any discussions involving future USAID support to TNE/RNP for improving the general Civil Registry rolls or the electoral rolls.

B. Institutionalization of the National Registry of Persons

1. Findings

- a. Legislation has not been passed to establish a career service for the National Registry of Persons, and it is not clear that the political parties would support such legislation.
- b. The study called for in the MOU to analyze the needs to improve the RNP civilian registration process at all levels of the Republic has not been carried out.

2. Conclusions

- a. A high level discussion with GOH authorities is needed to confirm whether or not the political will exists to seek a career law for RNP and TNE and to adopt revised structures and procedures which could increase the integrity of the electoral rolls.
- b. The study proposed in the MOU could provide the kind of information that is likely to be needed to build a consensus in favor of reform of RNP personnel policies and operating procedures if the GOH wishes to push ahead in this area.

C. Support to National Elections - a Policy Issue

1. Findings

- a. USAID and its contractors have been deeply immersed in the myriad day-to-day activities involved in organizing and administering the election, e.g., the Dual & Associates effort to up-date the Civil Registry rolls which would impact on who votes, the procurement effort of GU and its subcontractors to equip the voting tables and supply FAXes to report the voting results; the CAPEL-coordinated training of the local managers of the election process.
- b. There were many articles in the press criticizing the U.S. involvement in the Honduran electoral process, particularly with regard to the Dual & Associates effort.

- c. Based on a survey coordinated by the evaluation team, it appears that there is a significant level of skepticism about the honesty of the 1989 election (see Annex E and the tables attached thereto).
- d. In both the 1985 and the 1989 election, USAID was asked to handle offshore (and some local) procurement to support the election. There appears to have been no effort made to develop a local capability or process for handling the offshore procurement--or for fostering, as feasible, more local production of imported items.

2. Conclusions

- a. A decision is needed now on what, if any, assistance USAID should provide to the 1993 election.
- b. While USAID support for developing procedures and preparing detailed implementation plans for the 1993 election could be helpful to TNE, the evaluation team believes that the Hondurans can, and should, carry out the 1993 election without direct assistance from USAID. Hondurans have carried out elections in the past without U.S. support; an objective of project assistance should be to put them in a position to do so in the future.
- c. USAID and TNE should have implemented the contractor's proposal in its January-June 1990 Work Plan (see III.A.3.f. above) or at least arranged for surveys and studies to evaluate what was done and developed improved plans for the next election.

D. Impact on Women

The potential impact of the project on women was not discussed in the Project Paper or the MOU, and the team found no indication that it had been considered during the implementation of the project up to mid-1990. In the evaluation scope of work, however, USAID asked the team to suggest mechanisms that could be incorporated into the project to measure the impact on women. Such suggestions are provided in the Recommendations section (VI.) below.

V. PROJECT DESIGN VALIDITY

The team's conclusions regarding the validity of the design of this component as set forth in the Project Paper are as follows:

1. If the RNP rolls were up to date, the result would permit the preparation of a more accurate electoral roll. However, it is not clear that the process attempted by Dual & Associates and currently being carried out by RNP will really result in an up to date and accurate civil register.
2. With regard to a career law for the RNP, the Project Paper states that the Director of the RNP and the governing board of the TNE recognize that policy changes are necessary. The assumption by the drafters of the Project Paper that there would be multi-partisan support for this reform appears not to have been valid--at least up to now.
3. The Project Paper proposes (page 55) support to facilitate the implementation of the 1989 election and to strengthen the permanent institutional base for future elections. However, no inputs are designated for achieving the latter objective. The training provided for the 1989 election can be helpful for carrying out future elections--if the same people are around. Assistance to promote a capability to handle the procurement of essential commodities is not addressed.
4. The institutional analysis of the TNE and the RNP in the Project Paper remains valid.
5. The recurrent cost analysis in the Project Paper projects a reduction of personnel by 200 over the four-year life of the project as a result of the professionalization process. This should result, according to the Project Paper, in a reduction in recurring costs of about US\$1 million annually, which would more than cover the projected increase of US\$100,000 expected from increased training, public information, and equipment maintenance activities. The evaluation team feels that the personnel reduction figure is optimistic. Nevertheless, the general thesis that the additional recurrent costs should be manageable seems reasonable.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Mid-Course Adjustments

1. USAID should not provide additional assistance for up-dating the Civil Registry rolls at this time, but it should indicate its willingness to fund: (a) a study of the feasibility of up-dating the rolls; and, if found feasible, (b) the preparation of a detailed implementation plan and budget for carrying out the task.

The team to carry out such a feasibility survey should include an expert on Central American historical demography and an expert from the Costa Rican Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones.

Depending upon the outcome of the study, USAID could consider whether it would provide assistance to the effort to up-date the Registry rolls. If so, the evaluation team suggests that a separate project be established just for assistance to the RNP--without any time pressures related to the next election.

2. USAID should discuss with senior GOH officials the various problems related to the electoral rolls and indicate USAID willingness to finance a study to review the problems of the current system and analyze the pros and cons of other options for the electoral registration process.

Depending upon the outcome of the study, if approved, and whether USAID assistance was needed, USAID should try to ensure that any USAID follow-on role was limited to funding observational visits and assistance by recognized international organizations or experts in the planning and coordination of training that might be needed to implement the effort.

B. Institutionalization of the National Registry of Persons

1. USAID should discuss with senior GOH officials whether or not the GOH is interested in seeking a career law for RNP and TNE (or otherwise providing for greater personnel continuity) and adopting revised structures and procedures which could provide greater assurance of fair and complete coverage in the registration process.
2. If the GOH response to 1. is favorable, USAID should indicate its willingness to finance the study called for in the MOU to analyze the requirements to improve the RNP registration process at all levels of the Republic.

This study should focus on personnel needs (quantity and quality), equipment needs, and processes and procedures. Based on the results of the study, and GOH action on building consensus for a career law, USAID could determine what type, if any, of assistance it could provide to meet the needs that were identified in the study.

C. Support for the Next Election

1. USAID should inform the GOH and TNE that USAID is prepared to assist TNE now in preparing for the 1993 election, but it does not intend to provide any assistance once the official electoral campaign has begun.

The type of assistance that could be furnished now would be studies/surveys and technical assistance in planning. The types of studies/surveys the evaluation team has in mind are the following:

- (1) obtaining feedback on the operations of the last election -- training provided to poll workers, the delivery of commodities to polling places, and the voter education messages used;
- (2) determining what would be necessary for TNE, or a local agent, to handle all of the procurement (including offshore) for the next election; and
- (3) ascertaining the public's attitudes toward the 1989 election and the election process.

The team does not believe that it is too late to carry out studies (1) and (3).

With the results of the various studies and surveys, it would be appropriate to have a workshop/retreat to integrate the findings into the thinking of political party officials, and perhaps municipal leaders, as well as representatives of the organizations involved in direct administration of the election (e.g., TNE, the military, contractors). Hopefully, a consensus could be reached on a certain number of actions that could be expected to increase the confidence of the electorate in the next election.

D. Impact on Women

There are two issues related to women that should be of concern to USAID. One relates to the access of women to participation in the electoral process (registration and voting); the other relates to whether women will have equal access to employment

possibilities in the career systems that are to be established with project assistance.

1. USAID should fund a study to ascertain the degree to which current electoral procedures and practices openly or indirectly discriminate against women becoming included on the electoral rolls and/or being able to cast their vote.
2. USAID should monitor the hiring policies established for the career service of the TNE/RNP.

E. Priority of Recommendations

A complete ranking of all recommendations (e.g., 1,2,3, etc.) does not make sense because some are contingent on other recommendations or actions, the timing of which the team cannot determine, and some could be taken care of, at least initially, in a single meeting. Therefore Category I recommendations would be A.1. and A.2., B.1. and C.1., all of which could be discussed in a single meeting with GOH and TNE officials. Category II priority would be B.2., Impact on Women recommendations, and any follow-up activity which resulted from the proposed high level meeting.

VII. LESSONS LEARNED

A. Scope of the Project

The SDI project was essentially an umbrella project composed of three separately identified components: one to work with the Judiciary, one to work with the Congress, and one to work with the Elections Tribunal and the National Registry of Persons.

Each of the three components of the project were supposed to be self-contained, and problems in one were not supposed to cause delays in the others. It is doubtful that this can ever be guaranteed, but a minimum condition to achieve such a situation would be the provision of separate USAID project officers for each component. Having separate contractors for each component would further increase the insulation.

Even if it were not possible to have separate project officers for each component, it seems clear that support for the election should have been separately administered. The election component had less to do with the other two components, and it had a deadline by which a large amount of project action had to culminate. Thus, it had to have overriding priority for USAID and contractor action for nearly a year; as a result, the other components suffered. If the other components had continued normally with the

existing management structure, the elections component would have suffered.

Aside from wanting to insulate the different components from problems in the others, having a separate contractor for the individual components makes sense on other grounds. The three components have very little in common, and most potential U.S. contractors will not have expertise in all three activities. While this can be dealt with by forming a consortium or through sub-contractual relations, these arrangements diffuse authority and responsibility, complicate control of personnel, and are usually more expensive -- e.g., by adding overhead on to overheads.

In sum, these three components are really three different projects. It is questionable whether the umbrella concept reduced project management workload in relation to what it might have been with two or three projects. In any case, the cost in implementation difficulties and delays does not seem worth maintaining the umbrella concept.

B. Information Sharing

The evaluation team found that neither USAID nor contractor personnel were well informed about similar activities being carried out by AID in other Central American countries. There appears to be a need for more systematic sharing of information about programs and actions being taken to deal with fairly common problems.

Either the AID/Washington LAC/DI project or the Central American regional project should take responsibility for developing a system for sharing information, including periodic regional meetings of USAID project officers, contractor personnel, and host country counterparts.

USAIDs should require that contractors have a process for ensuring that their experts are current on relevant activities in other countries in the regions. Contract experts should join host country personnel when they go on observation tours to other countries. The expert can help ensure that the participants receive maximum benefit from the visit. This process should also result in improved communications in subsequent project implementation.

C. Marking of Election Commodities

USAID had to process a number of waivers to AID marking requirements for items that were going to be used in the election. It was not thought to be in the interest of either the U.S. or Honduran Government for the commodities that were to be used in the polling places to have the AID symbol on them.

Assuming that this would generally be the position, USAIDs could include a marking waiver in the initial project authorization. Further, AID/W should consider the possibility of issuing a worldwide waiver on AID marking of commodities to be used directly in elections.

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EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

OBJECTIVE

To provide a team which shall evaluate the progress made to date under the project and to provide guidance for any midcourse adjustments that may be necessary. This objective will be achieved in a four-part process:

For each of the four project components:

1. A comparison of accomplishments to date against the planned outputs;
2. An analysis of problems and constraints that have impeded project implementation and achievement of planned inputs;
3. An analysis of the continuing validity of the original project logical framework and assumptions;
4. Recommendations for midcourse adjustments, if any.

STATEMENT OF WORK

The contractor shall conduct an evaluation which addresses the following areas:

A. Overall Project Progress

For each of the project components, the evaluation will provide answers to the following questions:

1. What are the project accomplishments to date?
2. How do these accomplishments compare to planned project outputs?
3. For planned outputs not yet realized, what are the prospects of achieving the outputs by PACD?
4. What achievements or accomplishments occurred that are beneficial toward achieving project objectives but that were not envisioned in the original design?
5. The cost effectiveness of supporting each component should be reviewed and compared against results and planned outputs.

6. What mechanisms should be incorporated into the project to measure the impact on women?

B. Analysis of Problems and Constraints

The evaluation will answer the following questions:

1. What have been the principal constraints to achieving the planned outputs in a timely and cost effective manner?
2. What factors, if any, have constrained the ability of contractors and subcontractors to achieve the targets established for their work.
3. Is the balance between contractor responsibilities and Mission Project backstopping appropriate for timely and cost effective implementation? If not, why not?
4. Is the overall project management appropriate for effective project implementation? If not, why not?

C. Project Design Validity

The evaluation will answer the following questions:

1. To what degree are the logical framework and Project Paper analytical assumptions still valid?
2. Is the institutional analysis contained in the Project Paper still valid for each component? If not, why not?
3. Where assumptions and analyses are no longer valid, will there be a negative effect on achieving planned outputs? If so, in what way?
4. Is the recurrent cost analysis contained in the Project Paper still valid? If not, how will this impact the project?

D. Midcourse Adjustments

Based on the analyses in Sections A, B, and C above, the evaluation will describe what, if any, midcourse adjustments are necessary to achieve the project outputs by the Project Assistance Completion Date.

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LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
(522-0296)

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<u>Goal</u>			
To strengthen Honduran democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - continuing open elections - public's confidence in the system - increased access and participation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analysis of elections - Central Bank Statistics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regional political stability - stabilized economy - Continued political will to consolidate the democratic process
<u>Purpose</u>			
To improve the capability of key democratic institutions (the Judiciary, the Congress and the National Elections Tribunal/National Registry) improve local political leadership, and increase the knowledge and participation of the Honduran populace in the democratic process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - universal suffrage - increased number of bills initiated in Congress - reduction in time for court case processing - separation of power enhanced in according with the constitution - relative increase in the number of participants in the system and awareness of the democratic process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - project reports - surveys - evaluations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - political acceptance of targeted institutions to change - maintenance of internal political stability

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<u>Outputs</u>			
<p>1. Administration of Justice</p> <p>-- to strengthen the court system making it more efficient and responsive to the Honduran populace in matters concerning civil and criminal justice and better able to mediate intra-governmental conflicts</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - judicial career implemented - 40 law school graduates participating in experimental justice of the peace; public defender system consolidated - strengthened administrative system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- improved planning, programming and budgetary capability -- organizational and procedural manuals written -- financial, management and personnel system functioning -- procurement capability established -- information system strengthened and utilized - 400 judges trained - 20 administrative staff trained - public information program initiated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - project reports - surveys - site visits - evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - enhanced elite political commitment to rejuvenated judicial process - appropriate human resources available - increase in allocation of national budget to Jt for the judiciary by 1990.
<p>2. Legislative Enhancement</p> <p>-- to improve the effectiveness of the Honduran Congress in formulating and passing laws which govern the country and to increase contact with the [SIC]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish a National Center for Legislative support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- permanent staff -- reference service functioning -- policy research service functioning -- career service established for congressional administrative staff and employees of the National Legislative Support Center 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project Reports - Surveys - Evaluations 	

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Creation of the Congressional administrative office<ul style="list-style-type: none">-- improved planning, programming, budgeting-- organizational and procedural manuals written-- financial, management and personnel systems functioning-- improved information systems- legislative process streamlined<ul style="list-style-type: none">-- calendar established-- debates scheduled-- deadlines maintained-- tracking system developed- committee system strengthened and utilized- 134 legislators trained in orientation session- 120 trained in committee procedures- 150 administrative staff trained- 23 congressmen partake of observational trips- public information program functioning		

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
<p>3. Voter Registration/ Elections improvement - to assist in the improvement and professionalization of the TNE and the RNP; enhancing their ability to manage an effective registration process and guaranteeing the Honduran people universal suffrage and fraud free elections.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Registries from 1880 - 1983 updated, verified and microfilmed - 45,000 registries including 20,000,000 documents and over 2,000,000 identity cards - establishment of a career service for the RNP - an improved administrative structure for the RNP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- financial, management and personnel systems functioning -- improved programming, planning and budgeting -- organizational and procedural manuals written -- information system improved - department and municipal register activities enhanced and linked better with the National Registry - 30 administrative support officers trained - 620 National Registry employees trained - 1000 local registry employees trained - improved conduct elections - strengthened administrative office 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project reports - Site visits - Evaluations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multi-partisan support - human resource availability

Narrative Summary	Objectives Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- 80 administrative support officers trained- 52,000 election workers trained- 1989 Presidential elections carried out- public information program functioning.		

ELECTORAL ROLLS AND VOTER CONFIDENCE

The strategy of the project was quite clear and, at least at first blush, sensible. The design called for what was essentially a two phased effort. The first phase was to improve the quality of the voting rolls, and the second was to assist in the conduct of the election itself.^{1/} We deal in this section with the first component.

The Quality of the Voting Rolls

As is the case in most countries, voters in Honduras must be registered prior to the elections. Unlike many other Latin American countries, however, until very recently there was no national civil registry. Rather, births were inscribed at the local level (the municipio). Prior to the current constitution of 1982, election registration was done on an ad hoc basis. Approximately six months prior to each election, municipalities issued voting cards for those inscribed in their birth records.

This system had numerous defects. Most important, in terms of disenfranchisement, was that for individuals who had moved from their municipality of birth, it proved very difficult if not impossible to register to vote. The other side of the coin was that in many cases it was easy for individuals to register in more than one municipality and hence, vote more than once because there was no reliable way in which individuals who did not possess birth certificates could prove their right to register. As a result, many persons were granted voting rights in more than one municipio. Added to this the inevitable problem of corruption, whereby municipal officials who wished to increase the vote total for their party would grant voting rights to non-citizens (mainly immigrants from El Salvador and Guatemala) and under-age voters in exchange for their vote.

In order to provide a national system of voter registration to complement the new democratic system that arose after twenty years of military rule, a National Registry of Persons (Registro Nacional de las Personas) was created by law No. 150 on November 17, 1982 as a dependency of the newly established Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones (hereafter TNE). The Registro was charged with the responsibility of maintaining accurate records of all births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and changes of citizenship status (i.e., naturalization proceedings). In addition, the Registro was given the responsibility of issuing an identification card (cédula o tarjeta de identidad). Finally, the Registro was responsible for preparing a national voter registration list (Censo Nacional Electoral). Continuous updating of this list became a permanent function of the Registro.

^{1/}Each of these phases (or components) had a number of subcomponents to be discussed below.

For the 1985 elections, information was collected and a process of providing permanent identification cards begun. When the 1985 elections were completed there was a strong belief within the TNE that there were many cases of individuals who were not citizens but who had nonetheless obtained ID cards.

The problem of false identification arises in Honduras from two major sources. First, individuals may take the voting cards of deceased persons and vote in their stead. Second, a large proportion of births occur at home rather than in hospitals, especially in rural Honduras. For these infants, it is left up to the parents to register the births with the local officials. Not all births are registered, however, and adults find themselves without a birth certificate or any official record of their births. Without this record, one could never prove one's citizenship unless there were some mechanism to do so.

The law provides for these cases via a process of juridical birth, or "reposicion." Individuals present information to the Registro that helps to establish that they are native born. Most of this information consists of testimony of others (two witnesses are required), the veracity of which is not always beyond suspicion. Foreign born individuals who attempt to prove that they are Honduran citizens in order to obtain an identification card (to allow them to cash checks at banks and carry out a variety of other procedures as well as vote) can go to a local municipality and find the death certificate of an individual who would have been of about the same age as the foreign born person. They then assume that person's name and obtain false testimony from the required number of witnesses to prove their native Honduran birth.

For the 1989 election, 319,460 citizens had been given the right to vote via the reposicion method put in place with the creation of the TNE in 1982. Countless others had received that right prior to 1982 using procedures established in the late 1970s by the military government. A large number of these cases were concentrated in departments that have international borders, such as Choluteca (55,634 reposiciones) and therefore suspicions are aroused that these are actually foreigners registering as Hondurans.

The TNE became very sensitive to this problem after the 1985 elections and began making plans to correct it. By their estimation, there are some 300,000 cases of inconsistencies in their records that they wish to check out.^{2/} According to newspaper

^{2/}Interviews with the TNE produced a figure of 300,000, but the Andrews report gives a figure of 400,000 reposiciones. See Edmund Andrews, "Assessment of the Options for the National Tribunal Electorate of Honduras to Complete the Microfilming, Verification and Computerization of the Honduran Vital Registry," May 19, 1989, p. 8.

accounts on the eve of the 1989 elections, one report alleged that 91,000 foreigners had managed to obtain documentation to allow them to pass as Hondurans, whereas another report suggests 533,000 cases of fraudulent registration, an enormous number in a voting population of some 2.3 million registered voters.^{3/} If only a small proportion of those cases proved to be fraudulent, the results of local and even national elections could be swung one way or the other.

On the face of it, the method of establishing a citizen's right to vote is simple; what one needs is positive identification of individuals who achieved their voting status via the "reposicion" method. Two methods were devised for this but apparently neither one has worked. The first is to utilize the full set of finger prints that are taken for all registrants. While finger prints are a useful identification device, and may help to intimidate those contemplating fraud, the TNE says that it has no electronic method of reading the prints. Thus, it cannot use them to detect fraud. In the view of the TNE, the prints being taken for registration purposes are currently serving no useful function.

But more to the point, the prints are of no value in dealing with cases of "reposicion" unless they also have the prints of the deceased individuals whose identity has been stolen. In cases where the identity of infants or children have been taken, probably the most common cases of fraud, no such prints could possibly be available. It should be noted that the TNE places a high value on obtaining a computerized finger print recognition system, but as far as the team can tell, doing so would serve no useful purpose because of the problems outlined.

The second method to detect fraud in registration is more straight forward. This method involves comparing the information given by the registrant with the information in the municipal registries and in the Migration Department to search for inconsistencies. For example, if an individual claims to be a native born Honduran but a record appears that shows the individual migrated from El Salvador, the fraud will be detected. For the 1985 elections the Registro gathered and computerized some information from the local registries, but did not include in this process the names of each individual's parents.^{4/} The TNE believes that if it had access to the full information from the municipal and migration records it would be able to check virtually all of the inconsistencies of the records and thereby reduce the level of fraud.

^{3/}El Heraldo, November 4, and November 7, 1989. It should be noted that the newspaper clipping file from which these and other figures are drawn is the one contained within the GU filing system. Unfortunately, in many cases the name of the newspaper and/or the page on which the article appeared is not contained in the file.

^{4/}It should be noted that there is considerable confusion as to what information was obtained and when.

The RNP has set for itself the admirable goal of making up for the absence of a centralized system. It is not merely content to start with all new information being sent to it from the date of its founding in 1982. A major reason for its need to obtain vital data for the period prior to its creation is its central role in the preparation of the voter registration lists. After all, the RNP is a subdivision of the TNE, and its *raison d'être* is the preparation of data to enable the creation of clean voter registration lists. Yet, questions need to be raised about the ultimate efficacy of the effort.

To eliminate the problem of "the voting dead," one needs death certificates that could be compared to the voting roles. There are no studies that the team could find that indicate what proportion of deaths occur outside of hospitals in Honduras and are not registered with the local authorities. If most deaths are indeed registered, then this would be a good way of preventing this type of fraud. Without good estimates of the volume of unreported deaths, one cannot know how efficacious a technique it actually is.

To reduce the problem of illegal voting due to false "reposiciones," one would once again need to have accurate death records. In many instances, infant deaths are not reported and therefore no death certificate will be found.

Thus, there remains considerable uncertainty as to the efficacy of this enterprise. In the May 1989 Andrews report cited above, the consultant states (p. 14), "the problems of the current RNP birth list are not quantified or fully understood." Rafael Villegas of the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones of Costa Rica, who has come to Honduras to study its system, suggested to a team member that the Honduran problem of retrospectively cleaning up the voting rolls may be an impossible task unless additional evidence is used.

His view is that in Honduras almost all parents register their children in order to be able to guarantee them the gift of citizenship; those without birth certificates should be considered foreign born nationals. On the other hand, deaths may easily go unreported, especially of infants in a country where it is not at all unusual for mothers to lose one or more children before they reach their first birthday. Villegas argues that church records should be utilized to help clarify individual cases, since the local priest may maintain better records than the local municipality. However, access to those records is another matter, and their quality would have to be reviewed by historians. In any event, there is no study of the quality and accessibility of these records.

A discussion between the team and some TNE members revolved around the possibility of dealing with the problem by declaring an amnesty and agreeing to give citizenship to all foreign born

nationals after an appropriate period of residence had been established. In essence, something like the Simpson-Rodino bill was being discussed. Such a procedure would, in one simple step, obviate the need to reconstruct records from 1880 to 1983. Moreover, it would accept the reality that large numbers of Salvadoran and Nicaraguan citizens have now integrated into Honduran society and to legalize their situation. It would give these aliens a sense of belonging and loyalty to the system that could only redound to the good of the Honduran democratic stability.

The response of the TNE was strongly negative based on two grounds. First, the migration flows into Honduras have been largely of undesirable individuals and it would weaken Honduran society to accept them. Second, since most of those who migrated entered Honduras illegally, it would be wrong to allow these people to benefit from their initial illegal act. Even though this proposal was greeted so negatively, it is possible that over time it might receive a warmer reception.

Whatever the efficacy and ultimate feasibility of the process, there are certain to be errors. Consultant Andrews (1989, p. 16) warns that USAID should not be involved in the cleansing of the electoral lists because of "the potential of holding USAID liable if problems arise because of problems with the cleansing of the Electoral Lists or because of major data processing errors which might have compromised the quality of the Electoral Lists." This consultant's advice is well taken; it would be very unfortunate to have Hondurans blaming the government of the U.S. for their inability to vote, or for the ability of others to vote fraudulently.

Leaving aside the rationale behind the effort to improve the working of the RNP and the reliability of its records, we come to the results of the process itself. On this score there seems to be widespread agreement on two facts. First, the 1989 election benefited from a somewhat more accurate list of voters than the 1985 election. Second, the USAID-funded efforts made to improve the lists had little or no positive benefit. Within and outside of the TNE considerable skepticism remains as to the integrity of the voting rolls.

No hard data are available to support these conclusions, because no audit of the quality of the voting lists has been conducted. However, several sources have come to the same conclusion. Our interviews with the TNE members confirmed this view. One member of the Tribunal put it flatly: "The only product was the microfilms, and since they were not indexed, they are unusable." An oral report made by the TNE to the Congreso on November 7, 1989 confirms that the absence of data from the Direccion de Poblacion y Politica Migratoria for any

year other than 1986, along with the absence of other key documentary information, made it impossible to fully clean the registration lists.^{5/} A report of a bipartisan international observer delegation prepared by the National Republican Institute for International Affairs states that, "The voter registration process was one of the most troublesome aspects of the election administration."^{6/} In addition, a flood of newspaper accounts in the month leading up to the election contain numerous charges of fraud in the registration process.^{7/}

Career Service for the RNP

The MOU (section b), states that for the TNE and RNP, "the crucial change revolves around the establishment of a group of Registerial Career personnel within the RNP, through legislation reforming the personnel system." Indeed, a condition precedent of the MOU with the Congress (g.2) stipulates that for the disbursements to proceed beyond December 31, 1988, evidence was to have been produced that "enabling legislation has been passed to permit the career service for the National Registry of Persons" [emphasis added]. A similar CP is present in the MOU signed with the TNE, but this one further requires that 75% of the staff of the RNP be employed under this new career service.

Despite the centrality of the formation of a career service in the RNP, and the project requirement that it be done, no such service has been created to date. It should be noted that legislation designed to create such a service with the RNP was proposed in Congress in late 1989, but it has not yet been considered, let alone passed, by the Congress.

^{5/}See Tiempo Nacional, November 87, 1989, p. 2.

^{6/}National Republican Institute for International Affairs, The November 26, 1989 Honduran Elections, p. 15. The Democratic Party did not prepare a separate report, but Democrats participated in the observer team. CAPEL completed a study as well, but the final report has yet to be issued and the team was not given access to the draft version during its visit to San José, Costa Rica.

^{7/}There were several reported instances of local TNE offices being broken into and identification cards being stolen. The team feels strongly, however, that it is inappropriate to link these events to the evaluation of the USAID role in the electoral process because there is nothing that USAID did to provoke these robberies and nothing it could (or should) have done to prevent them.

Once again, the Honduran context must be considered. Political parties, as was noted in the concept papers prepared for the PP, survive on contributions made by public employees who have received their jobs through the party system. Deductions are taken from the employees' paychecks. Politicians who support the creation of a career service in any branch of government would damage their party's immediate interest of financing its activities. Moreover, the very structure of the TNE guarantees the politicization of the election process. The members of the TNE are appointed by the legally inscribed political parties, except for one member, who is appointed by the Supreme Court.^{8/} The TNE is a partisan structure designed, by its balance of parties, to be a fair arbiter of the elections. Only in this context can one appreciate the highly partisan comments made by sitting members of the TNE. One example will suffice: El Tiempo of May 3, 1990, reported the following comment by Juan Manuel Lagos Ortiz, sitting member of the TNE:

"Licenciado Callejas [President of Honduras] has not fulfilled the promises he made to the people during his election campaign. In general terms, the President has deceived the Honduran people."

A comment such as this from a member of the Costa Rican Supreme Elections Tribunal, the homologous organization to the TNE, is simply inconceivable, but it reflects the political facts of life in Honduras.

The evaluation team believes that it is unrealistic to expect to improve elections by reducing the partisan nature of the RNP. Given Honduras's history, the effort will not likely succeed. Furthermore, world-wide, nations that are extremely poor are ones that are extremely politicized and partisan. The reason for this is obvious; in a poor country one of the very few means to obtain wealth is via the political route. Political patronage is one relatively abundant resource in a resource scarce system. Honduras is one of the poorest countries in mainland Latin America, and a country whose GNP in per capita terms has remained little changed for most of the 20th century.^{9/} As Honduras develops, intensive partisan

^{8/}In instances where the number of legally inscribed parties is odd so that with the addition of the Supreme Court nominee the total becomes even, to assure that the TNE will always have an odd number of members (to avoid ties in decisions) the President of the country via the Supreme Court, designates an additional member.

^{9/}Nicaragua probably has a lower GNP per capita today, but historically it has been wealthier. For reconstructed GNP data from 1920-1979, see Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Political Economy of Central America since 1920, 1987, Cambridge University Press.

politics should slowly recede as other opportunity structures develop.

Perceived Legitimacy of the Electoral Process

The issue, then, is not how to create a less partisan RNP, but rather how to deepen the legitimization of the electoral process--given the partisan nature of Honduran electoral structure. While the designers of the project did not put it in these terms, political scientists consider that democratic stability rests firmly on the legitimacy of the system. To measure project success, the PP set up as the only criterion for determining this legitimization the use of surveys.^{10/}

What do Hondurans believe about the legitimacy of their elections? We do have some information on this question as a result of a survey conducted for the Futures Group, a subcontractor on this project^{11/} by the local Honduran firm, ADAI.^{12/} The survey was of 800 Honduran adults, concentrated in Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula and three quasi-rural areas.^{13/} The study found that for the sample as a whole, 54.1% of those questioned thought that the elections of 1985 were very honest, whereas 50.0% of those in San Pedro Sula and 47.3% of those in Tegucigalpa believed this way. As the sample is not weighted and does not represent the entire country, it is possible that the sample is a somewhat biased estimate of the national result, but it probably gives a fairly good idea of the degree to which

^{10/}The PP calls for the use of project reports, evaluations and surveys. The first two of these focus on the process of the project, not on the impact on legitimization of the system.

^{11/}See their report, "Strengthening of Democratic Institutions Public Information Campaign, Trip Report, April 30-May 13, 1989, p. 8-9.

^{12/}El Ateneo de la Agro-Industria (ADAI), Informe final: Fase de investigacion por encuesta sobre el proceso politico en Honduras, September, 1989, mimeo.

^{13/}The report refers to these areas as rural, but most of the area covered were in or around the major urbanized areas. This comment is not meant as a criticism of the survey, since it appears to be excellently done, but merely as a clarification. It is not possible from this sample to generalize to the entire population of Honduras. Some inferences can be made to the population of the two major cities, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, but the sample although stratified quite carefully, is not weighted. We assume that the distribution of the sample (half male, half female; half between the ages of 18-24 and half between the ages of 25-55) reflects the population distribution thereby obviating the need to weight the sample.

Hondurans felt the 1985 elections produced a legitimate result. Put in other terms, nearly half of the population of the sample, and over half of those in Tegucigalpa, the nation's capital city, had some doubts about the honesty of the 1985 elections.^{14/} When asked why they thought that the elections were not completely honest, 54% responded that there was fraud in the voting process, while the remainder produced diverse responses.^{15/}

In 1985, then, the first national election for president after the retreat of the military, only half the population of the country was fully satisfied that the system of selection was honest. These public opinion results provide a strong justification for an effort to improve the image of the TNE and confirm the wisdom of the design of the project in focusing on the elections as a key institution that needed strengthening.

One would have thought that soon after the 1989 election a follow-up survey would have been conducted to measure popular reaction to that election so as to compare with the earlier one. In fact, the ADAI study, whose central purpose was to develop information for the mass media campaign, is explicitly designed as a pre-election study, to be followed by a post-election re-study.^{16/} The proposal by the contractor for such a study was turned down by USAID.

^{14/}The other response categories were: "somewhat honest," "not honest" and "don't know." It is difficult to interpret the meaning of these responses, especially the "don't know" category. What is clear is that only 54.1% of the population expressed no doubts about the election's honesty.

^{15/}These reasons included: disorganization, false identification cards, and most important of all, the "union de votos," presumably referring the methods of organizing the ballot.

^{16/}See p. 3 of the ADAI report. Note, however, that the follow-up was likely to be cross-sectional rather than of a panel-study nature. That is, it does not appear that the plan was to interview the same respondents twice (before and after the election), the preferable method in order to reduce variation created by differences in the two samples. It should also be noted that the main purpose of the ADAI study was to develop information to be used in orienting the publicity campaign that the Futures Group was developing for the upcoming election. If a follow-up survey had been done, no doubt questions would have been asked to help determine the impact of that campaign.

The absence of survey data increased the difficulty of assessing the impact of this component of the project in terms of its goal of strengthening democracy in the minds of the mass public. To facilitate the assessment, the team arranged for and coordinated a small scale survey of public opinion in Tegucigalpa. The team used as a baseline the ADAI survey of 1989, and attempted to replicate the design as closely as possible.^{17/} In the ADAI study, 300 respondents were interviewed in Tegucigalpa, whereas the evaluation team, given time and resource constraints, was able to plan a sample of 200.^{18/}

The findings of the team's study indicate that the average citizen in Tegucigalpa perceived the honesty of the 1989 election as about the same as the 1985 election. An almost identical proportion of Tegucigalpa residents was fully confident of the results of the 1989 election as they were of the 1985 election. Specifically, 47.3% of the respondents questioned in 1989 believed that the 1985 elections were "very honest," compared with 48.6% of the 1990 respondents who believed that the 1989 elections were "very honest."^{19/}

^{17/}As described above, the ADAI survey included Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and three quasi-rural areas. Our time and resources only allowed us to survey Tegucigalpa. Our sample was structured identically to the ADAI sample. The city was divided into quadrants and within each quadrant ADAI made a selection of colonias and barrios. We divided our sample in the same fashion and selected two colonias or barrios from each quadrant identical to the ones sampled by ADAI. The ADAI sample was further stratified by sex and age, with half of the sample consisting of males and half of females, and within each sex, half of the sample divided into young respondents (18-24 years of age) and the other half divided into older respondents (25-55). We produced, therefore, what is known as a "quota sample," with our quota for each sample stratum matching the ADAI survey. The result of this process is to produce a sample that closely replicates the design utilized by ADAI, recognizing that neither sample is weighted or of probability in design.

^{18/}We used a team of four interviewers, all of whom had worked for the past four years conducting interviews in both rural and urban Honduras. The supervisor of the team had worked for one of the Development Associates consultants on several previous occasions.

^{19/}The proportion of "don't know" dropped in the 1990 survey to 11.5% from 19.3% in 1989, no doubt because the 1989 survey was conducted 4 years after the election and therefore some respondents were either too young in 1985 or were unable to recall clearly the events of that year.

More disquieting than these overall results is the breakdown of the results by party preference.^{20/} One would anticipate that for those whose party lost the election, there would be a relatively high proportion of disgruntled respondents, especially in the 1989 elections in which the losing candidate never officially conceded his loss despite the landslide results. In fact, this was the case. Among those respondents in our survey who voted for the losing Liberal Party, 45% felt that the elections were "very honest," whereas in comparison 60% of those who voted for the winning National Party completely trusted the outcome. What was disquieting about these findings is not that they conform to expectations, but that even among those who voted for the winning party, forty percent of the respondents were not fully convinced of the honesty of the elections.

We are not surprised by these results, especially given the dialogue in the local press prior to the election including accusations by some members of the Tribunal, and the problems encountered by voters on election day (e.g., delayed opening of the polls, limited or missing supplies of ink, and numerous voters whose names were not to be found on the registration lists). Nevertheless, they suggest that much still remains to be done to strengthen the credibility of elections in Honduras.

While expecting partisanship to play a role in people's perception of elections, the team also explored other factors that might influence the voters' views. Our analysis first examines three of the basic demographic and socio-economic characteristics: sex, age and education.

An analysis of the impact of gender on the evaluation of elections shows that although females are slightly more likely than males to believe that the elections are very honest (53.8% vs 45.8%), the differences are not statistically significant. It is also to be noted that a somewhat higher percentage of females did not give an opinion about the honesty of the 1989 election.

Age also seemed to have little or no effect on the evaluation of the elections. While those in the 25 to 39-year-old category were somewhat less likely to view the elections as completely honest, both younger and older voters had more positive evaluations, indicating no linear relationship between age and evaluation. The differences are not statistically significant.

Finally, as shown in the last table in this series, education has no clear cut relationship to the evaluation of the elections. The most negative evaluations come

^{20/}The ADAI survey does not provide breakdowns by party or vote.

from those with the lowest and highest level of education. Those with secondary education or some university education provide the most positive evaluations of the 1989 election. But again, the differences are not statistically significant.

The team concludes from this examination of demographic and socio-economic factors and their relationship to the evaluation of the elections that irrespective of gender, age and education, only about one half of Tegucigalpa residents expressed no doubts about the election of 1989. It appears, therefore, that the concerns about the election are not confined to one group of citizens but are widespread.

The team sought to determine why respondents thought the 1989 election was not fully honest. The responses from the sub-set of respondents who stated that the elections were less than very honest are present in an accompanying table. As can be seen, it appears that the disorganization of the election was by far the greatest factor causing concern. The responses "lack of organization" and "not allowed to vote" together account for 50.5% of all the answers. Outright fraud and falsification of the cédulas as an explanation was given by another 36.9% of the respondents. Hence, many Honduran voters believe that the honesty of the elections is affected by factors related to its administration.

The tables on which the foregoing is based, as well as a copy of the questionnaire used, are appended.

In its comments on the evaluation team's draft report, USAID cited a number of factors explaining why it believes that the Honduran electorate had much greater confidence in the election in 1989 than it did in the 1985 election--e.g., there was a smaller number of challenges of the results in 1989 than in 1985. The USAID also questioned the validity of the survey which the team organized and suggested that the team should have interviewed more candidates and leaders of political parties.

The team's response is as follows. We do not consider that the number of challenges is so significant in 1989 because the results were not close and candidates would not have felt they could be successful in challenges. More important, we believe that the objective of the Strengthening Democratic Initiatives project is not only to help the Hondurans carry out a more honest election, but to ensure that it is also perceived as being honest. We interpret that to include the perceptions of voters in general as well as those of candidates and political leaders.

Our concern is not how 1989 compares with 1985; rather, it is the perceptions about the 1989 election. Even though our survey was a limited one, the results should give pause to TNE and USAID. Furthermore, we would not have felt the need to undertake the survey if one had already been done--and we believe strongly that it should have been.

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Annex :Survey Sample Results

Sample zone		
North east		
%.....		24.8%
(N).....		(50)
South east		
%.....		24.8%
(N).....		(50)
North west		
%.....		25.7%
(N).....		(52)
South west		
%.....		24.8%
(N).....		(50)
TOTAL		
%.....		100.0%
(N).....		(202)

Honesty of eleccions?		
Very honest		
%.....		50.0%
(N).....		(101)
Somewhat honest		
%.....		33.2%
(N).....		(67)
Not honest		
%.....		13.9%
(N).....		(28)
Don't know		
%.....		3.0%
(N).....		(6)
TOTAL		
%.....		100.0%
(N).....		(202)

For which party did you vote?

	Nacional (Callejas)		Liberal (Flores)		Other		Don't know/din't vote	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Honesty of elections?								
Very honest.....	60.9%	(67)	46.3%	(25)	20.0%	(3)	26.1%	(6)
Somewhat honest.....	31.8%	(35)	33.3%	(18)	53.3%	(8)	26.1%	(6)
Not honest.....	7.3%	(8)	20.4%	(11)	20.0%	(3)	26.1%	(6)
Don't know.....	.0%	(0)	.0%	(0)	6.7%	(1)	21.7%	(5)
TOTAL.....	100.0%	(110)	100.0%	(54)	100.0%	(15)	100.0%	(23)

Evaluation of Elections by Sex, Age and Education

	Sex of respondent			
	Male		Female	
	%	(N)	%	(N)
Honesty of elections?				
Very honest.....	45.8%	(44)	53.8%	(57)
Somewhat honest.....	39.6%	(38)	27.4%	(29)
Not honest.....	13.5%	(13)	14.2%	(15)
Don't know.....	1.0%	(1)	4.7%	(5)
TOTAL.....	100.0%	(96)	100.0%	(106)

	Age							
	18-24		25-39		40-55		No answer	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Honesty of elections?								
Very honest.....	54.5%	(54)	43.9%	(29)	50.0%	(18)	.0%	(0)
Somewhat honest.....	27.3%	(27)	40.9%	(27)	33.3%	(12)	100.0%	(1)
Not honest.....	13.1%	(13)	15.2%	(10)	13.9%	(5)	.0%	(0)
Don't know.....	5.1%	(5)	.0%	(0)	2.8%	(1)	.0%	(0)
TOTAL.....	100.0%	(99)	100.0%	(66)	100.0%	(36)	100.0%	(1)

	Level of education							
	Primary incomplete		Primary complete		Secondary incomplete		Secondary complete	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Honesty of elections?								
Very honest.....	46.4%	(26)	45.3%	(24)	57.1%	(12)	57.8%	(26)
Somewhat honest.....	39.3%	(22)	37.7%	(20)	28.6%	(6)	26.7%	(12)
Not honest.....	8.9%	(5)	13.2%	(7)	14.3%	(3)	15.6%	(7)
Don't know.....	5.4%	(3)	3.8%	(2)	.0%	(0)	.0%	(0)
TOTAL.....	100.0%	(56)	100.0%	(53)	100.0%	(21)	100.0%	(45)

(continued)

	Level of education					
	University incomplete		University complete		Don't know	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Honesty of elections?						
Very honest.....	57.1%	(8)	45.5%	(5)	.0%	(0)
Somewhat honest.....	14.3%	(2)	45.5%	(5)	.0%	(0)
Not honest.....	28.6%	(4)	9.1%	(1)	50.0%	(1)
Don't know.....	.0%	(0)	.0%	(0)	50.0%	(1)
TOTAL.....	100.0%	(14)	100.0%	(11)	100.0%	(2)

Reason election not considered honest	
Lack of organization	
%.....	28.4%
(N).....	(27)
Fraud	
%.....	21.1%
(N).....	(20)
Not allowed to vote	
%.....	22.1%
(N).....	(21)
False ID cards	
%.....	15.8%
(N).....	(15)
Promises not fulfilled	
%.....	6.3%
(N).....	(6)
Other	
%.....	5.3%
(N).....	(5)
Don't know/not appl.	
%.....	1.1%
(N).....	(1)
TOTAL	
%.....	100.0%
(N).....	(95)

Did you vote in elections of 1989	
Yes	
%.....	91.6%
(N).....	(185)
No	
%.....	5.9%
(N).....	(12)
Too young	
%.....	2.0%
(N).....	(4)
Don't know	
%.....	.5%
(N).....	(1)
TOTAL	
%.....	100.0%
(N).....	(202)

For which party did you vote?	
Nacional (Callejas)	
%.....	54.5%
(N).....	(110)
Liberal (Flores)	
%.....	26.7%
(N).....	(54)
Other	
%.....	7.4%
(N).....	(15)
Don't know/won't say	
%.....	11.4%
(N).....	(23)
TOTAL	
%.....	100.0%
(N).....	(202)

Why didn't you vote?	
Not applicable	
%.....	92.1%
(N).....	(186)
Too young	
%.....	1.5%
(N).....	(3)
No ID card	
%.....	3.5%
(N).....	(7)
Living outside of Honduras	
%.....	1.0%
(N).....	(2)
Not allowed to vote	
%.....	1.5%
(N).....	(3)
Had to work	
%.....	.5%
(N).....	(1)
TOTAL	
%.....	100.0%
(N).....	(202)

Level of education		
Primary incomplete		
%.....		27.7%
(N).....		(56)
Primary complete		
%.....		26.2%
(N).....		(53)
Secondary incomplete		
%.....		10.4%
(N).....		(21)
Secondary complete		
%.....		22.3%
(N).....		(45)
university incomplete		
%.....		6.9%
(N).....		(14)
University complete		
%.....		5.4%
(N).....		(11)
No reponse		
%.....		1.0%
(N).....		(2)
TOTAL		
%.....		100.0%
(N).....		(202)

age		
(Valid N).....		(201)
Mean.....		28.8

Vote and Sex, Age and Education

	For which party did you vote?							
	Nacional (Callejas)		Liberal (Flores)		Other		Don't know/din't vote	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Sex of respondent								
Male.....	47.3%	(52)	51.9%	(28)	46.7%	(7)	39.1%	(9)
Female.....	52.7%	(58)	48.1%	(26)	53.3%	(8)	60.9%	(14)
TOTAL.....	100.0%	(110)	100.0%	(54)	100.0%	(15)	100.0%	(23)

	For which party did you vote?							
	Nacional (Callejas)		Liberal (Flores)		Other		Don't know/din't vote	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
age								
18-24.....	50.9%	(56)	37.0%	(20)	46.7%	(7)	69.6%	(16)
25-39.....	30.9%	(34)	42.6%	(23)	33.3%	(5)	17.4%	(4)
40-55.....	17.3%	(19)	20.4%	(11)	20.0%	(3)	13.0%	(3)
No response.....	.9%	(1)	.0%	(0)	.0%	(0)	.0%	(0)
TOTAL.....	100.0%	(110)	100.0%	(54)	100.0%	(15)	100.0%	(23)

	For which party did you vote?							
	Nacional (Callejas)		Liberal (Flores)		Other		Don't know/din't vote	
	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)	%	(N)
Level of education								
Primary incomplete.....	33.6%	(37)	16.7%	(9)	26.7%	(4)	26.1%	(6)
Primary complete.....	25.5%	(28)	33.3%	(18)	26.7%	(4)	13.0%	(3)
Secondary incomplete....	8.2%	(9)	13.0%	(7)	6.7%	(1)	17.4%	(4)
Secondary complete.....	20.9%	(23)	24.1%	(13)	20.0%	(3)	26.1%	(6)
University incomplete...	5.5%	(6)	7.4%	(4)	13.3%	(2)	8.7%	(2)
University complete.....	6.4%	(7)	5.6%	(3)	6.7%	(1)	.0%	(0)
Don't know.....	.0%	(0)	.0%	(0)	.0%	(0)	8.7%	(2)
TOTAL.....	100.0%	(110)	100.0%	(54)	100.0%	(15)	100.0%	(23)

TRAINING ACTIVITIES AND MEDIA CAMPAIGNS

A. Evolution and Current Status of Training

1. Training Activities

As planned in the Project Paper, the Inter-American Center of Assistance and Electoral Promotion (CAPEL), an affiliate of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, was sub-contracted by Georgetown University to help the National Elections Tribunal (TNE) prepare for the 1989 elections. CAPEL contracted with Gerentes y Empresarios Asociados de Honduras (GEMAH), a Honduran management consulting firm, to plan and implement a training program for election workers.

Objectives

The objectives of the program were:

- o To train members of Departmental Tribunals
- o Local Tribunals, and
- o Members of voting tables.

Planning and Implementation Unit

The general planning and implementation unit consisted of one liaison person from the Tribunal and one from GEMAH. CAPEL had a coordinator to work closely with the TNE and with Georgetown.

The scope of the training program was to train 41 supervisors. Once trained, these supervisors would train 295 instructors who would in turn train 64,000 table election workers managing voting tables. The supervisor also had the responsibility for training Departmental Tribunals members and the instructor members of local tribunals.

Training Strategy

The planning and implementation unit formulated specific duties and responsibilities of supervisors, instructors and election table workers. These performance criteria were passed on to the political parties to assure the best selection possible of personnel to be trained for this essential task.

To assist and support the content portion of the training, GEMAH and TNE produced, with CAPEL advice, the following documents:

- o a general manual;
- o a small manual relative to the organization of the voting table; and
- o a description of the electoral process.

Similar visual documents were prepared for the training of Departmental Tribunal members as well as local Tribunals. All were developed by the National Elections Tribunal and CAPEL.

In addition, three flip charts were developed around the same text and drawings of the electoral process pamphlet. Flip charts were also made containing a summary of course content received in the training program for table workers, Departmental and Local Tribunal members.

The training program was seen as a great success by the National Elections Tribunal, CAPEL, the Congress and voters as well. Voters seemed to feel comfortable with explicit directions for voting and the management of their problems by election table election workers. The political parties, who at first were indifferent to training, recognized the excellent work of the election workers and their great contribution to a successful election.

The accomplishments of the training program were as follows:

- o training of 41 supervisors;
- o 295 instructors; and
- o 58,841 election table workers

The National Elections Tribunal felt that the training was effective but that it might have been even more effective if negotiations between GEMAH and CAPEL could have been completed sooner. It was felt that too much time was lost in this transaction.

Revisions in the election laws (and thus the procedures) were occurring up to two days prior to the election, related for example to where people were to vote and what identification would be accepted. It was difficult, therefore, to finalize the training program

and the training. To avoid a repeat of this situation, legislation has been proposed which would prohibit the consideration of legislation affecting a forthcoming election for 12 months prior to the election.

There were some delays in obtaining from the political parties the names of voting table workers and supervisors who were to participate in the training. Supposedly, the parties were reluctant because they wanted to prevent rival parties from influencing their representatives. TNE officials told the team they did not do a good job of keeping the political parties fully informed about training plans; they intended to do better next time to encourage more cooperation.

There were suggestions by table workers that more time should be allotted for training. Two weeks for the training of supervisors, two weeks for supervisors to train the teachers, and two weeks for teachers to train voting table workers would be desirable if funding is available. This way, the content could be imparted at a slower pace, it could be reviewed, and time could be allowed for each group to practice their teaching content in small groups as well as to local members. This would allow time for supervisors to assist the teachers with their methodology of presentation. The longer training time would increase the likelihood that the message delivered would be accurate, clear and precise.

The National Elections Tribunal felt that the work of GEMAH was extraordinary, timely, and appropriate. It was felt that assistance to this kind of training endeavor should be provided only by a Honduran-based entity.

It was felt by GEMAH, the National Elections Tribunal and CAPEL that some kind of evaluation scheme should have been built into the training design. Although it was felt that the training contributed to the success of the elections, there is no empirical evidence.

One of the highlights of the training program was the documentation process which was initiated from the very beginning to the end. The documentation was a step by step sequential account of start up to finish which can be utilized in the follow-on election.

The National Elections Tribunal made intensive efforts to prevent political interference in the elections. There were only minor infractions noted. In the training some instructors gathered their own party members for instruction. This was spotted and nipped in the bud.

One of the unique aspects of the training was the provision and training of supervisors who imparted training to instructors and then supervised election table workers on election day. This tight design enhanced the efficient work of election table workers on election day. The table workers felt the need for this type of support.

2. Planning For the Electoral Process

GEMAH conducted a seminar for 3 days (June 9-11, 1989), for the National Elections Tribunal and the National Registry. The purpose was to devise an orderly plan and procedure to conduct an efficient and honest election. At this meeting, discussions were held, responsibilities were defined and the planning process started. Two subsequent seminars (August 22 and 29), dealt specifically with an analysis, needed alterations and approval of plans that had been drawn up by the technical unit of the Tribunal. GEMAH provided the technical assistance using the system of management by objectives approach. A total of about 15 individuals attended one or several of the seminars. According to participants, this planning exercise, with the assistance of GEMAH, contributed significantly to the success of the elections.

3. Mass Media Campaigns

May 15-November 11/89

The Futures Group, a GU subcontractor, was responsible for conducting three major public education information campaigns relative to voter registration, promoting the work of the National Elections Tribunal and information on the electoral process. They successfully completed all components of their project, and the activity was given high marks by USAID and TNE. Unfortunately, their proposal for a follow-up survey to ascertain which components were most successful was turned down by USAID.

Purpose of the Project

The campaign was designed to bring about more confidence, awareness and participation by Hondurans in the electoral process.

Objectives

The objectives of the campaign were:

- o The transmission of planned conceptual and informative events of the electoral process;

- o to assist in the planning of a presidential debate with the cooperation of the National Elections Tribunal;
- o to formulate appropriate themes to motivate people to vote;
- o to arrange discussion sessions to test, redesign and select a strategy for the final campaign; and
- o to transmit through the media a voter motivational campaign prior to the election.

Strategy

A first phase was designed to render information relative to important dates to remember (for voting) and requirements for participation in the election in addition to encouragement and instructions for new voters on how to vote.

A second phase was more conceptual in nature designed to assist the public's understanding of democracy and to appeal to their own feelings of democracy. In addition, the National Elections Tribunal's role as well as functions were to be emphasized as the institution in charge of the electoral process. A final phase provided motivation for participation by voters in the electoral process.

The information oriented campaign for those under 18 was transmitted from May 15-29. The over 18, May 15-October 26. The "confirmation of dates" campaign July 26-August 27. The conceptual oriented campaign was transmitted July 18-November 11/89.

The Futures Group sent a consultant during the month of October to put a final touch on the motivation to vote campaign. The purpose of this visit was to get a consensus on one of the three story boards:

- o "Your vote has the power to give or stop the power";
- o "Your vote is the arm of peace"; and
- o "When you vote we all win"

Of the three story boards a consensus was reached on the third, "When you vote we all win". It was transmitted from November 15-25/89.

The Futures also developed a ten minute documentary on voting procedures. In addition, a television brief was designed to present the new technology and security for the November elections.

There were some delays in the distribution of voter's lists and ID cards. Therefore, two additional radio spots were developed to assist affected citizens to check the lists and to urge them to pick up their identification cards.

4. Presidential Debate

The Futures Group made an effort to assist the National Elections Tribunal stage a presidential debate. A representative came to Honduras on two occasions to lay the ground work. The consultant was able to assess the capacity of the various media entities to cover the debate. However, there was insufficient interest to commit to plans for such an event at that time.

A second trip by the consultant resulted in a discussion with members of the National Elections Tribunal where a proposal for the debate was presented, including objectives and criteria for the implementation of such an event.

The consultant also met with representatives of party candidates who agreed to a tentative date in late October. Since timing was crucial, the consultant developed a time frame for the implementation of proposed activities.

Neither the National Elections Tribunal nor a student group from the law school, which also tried to arrange a presidential debate, was able to convince the parties to move forward on the notion of a debate; therefore, it did not materialize.

5. Observational Visits

November 23-27/87

Two members of the National Elections Tribunal traveled to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, to attend the second conference of Electoral Organizations of Central America. The duration of the conference was five days. Speakers from Central and South America were featured during the day and evenings.

The themes and topics of the Conference centered around the electoral process. In addition there were excursions and field trips to broaden views on ways to carry out an election.

The participants found the conference to be of particular interest since there were upcoming elections in Honduras in two years. The participants indicated they have incorporated experiences gained in many of their frequent invitational lectures in Central America.

Dec. 11-16/88

Invitational travel was extended to a member of the National Electoral Tribunal to observe the development of identification cards in Costa Rica. The participant spent a great deal of time in the printing establishment observing each step of the process. The participant also spent considerable time studying operational procedures of the various machines used in the development of these cards.

The National Elections Tribunal had requested that this participant select and do a cost estimate for similar equipment for use in Honduras. The participant completed the study and it is hoped that the National Elections Tribunal will modernize its production of identification cards.

The participant felt that this experience was invaluable. He was especially impressed with the methodological process employed to develop a simple identification card.

March 21-29/88

One member of the TNE was afforded the opportunity to visit San Salvador, Los Angeles and Puerto Rico to study the work of electoral tribunals.

The participant indicated that the trip served to assist him in making suggestions for the improvement of the Tribunal in Honduras.

September/88

Two members of the National Elections Tribunal visited San Jose, Costa Rica for one week for the purpose of studying participation in the democratic process. Some of the topics discussed were:

- o the electoral process;
- o role of independent candidates in an election;
- o the financing of political parties; and
- o proportional representation.

The participants indicated that their schedule was rigorous but the program offered a great deal of learning. The participants agreed that learning took place outside the classroom when opportunities were afforded to dialogue with other Central American experts.

One of the participants was the Vice President of the Tribunal and he had to begin planning for the 1989 electoral process. This experience assisted greatly in the planning stages of this event.

November/88

Three members of the National Elections Tribunal were provided the opportunity to observe the U.S. electoral process. The trip was for 5 days. The group met in Washington D.C., then journeyed to Virginia and Maryland.

In large part, the group was given a complete orientation of the electoral process. The tabulation and reporting of election results were emphasized.

Before returning to Honduras the group visited Georgetown University. A briefing of work plans was given in addition to a tour of the university.

November/88

Two additional persons from the National Elections Tribunal were invited to observe U.S. elections. This group spent three days in Washington D.C. Upon termination of the electoral process the group spent a short time in New York City.

The main topics and themes discussed with this group were:

- o census taking and reporting, by representatives of the U.S. Census Bureau; and
- o the electoral process in the U.S.

November/88

An invitation was extended to three additional people from the National Elections Tribunal to observe the U.S. elections.

The group spent 10 days visiting Washington, D.C. and North Carolina.

Among some of the interesting activities provided for this group were:

- o Visits to political party headquarters;
- o briefings by representatives of each political party;

- o listening to several campaign speeches;
- o a lecture by Secretary of State Schultz on "Peace in the World";
- o observation of the electoral process; and
- o the process of tabulating and reporting elections results.

December/88

The National Elections Tribunal sent two members to Puerto Rico to observe the coordination of the electoral process. The visit was for four days. The two participants were given the opportunity to discuss coordination problems with experienced personnel. They were shown how computers can assist the coordination process.

The two participants were afforded the opportunity to review logistical procedures with an expert in this field. Of special interest was the use of modern technology in the computation of election results.

The participants returned and presented some possible applications of what was learned on the trip, but their suggestions were not accepted.

October/89

One member of the National Electoral Tribunal visited Costa Rica for 4 days to observe Costa Rican elections. During this time the participant was given an orientation on the Costa Rican Tribunal's needs.

B. Conclusions

1. There were no significant implementation problems in the training and mass media programs.
2. GEMAH was the appropriate agency to provide assistance in the formulation and implementation of training for election workers. They made a diagnostic study of the National Elections Tribunal's capacity for management and knew the training strategy needed.
3. The design for the training of election table workers was sound. The supervisors delivered the message to instructors and instructors passed on the same message effectively to election table workers. Evidence of effective teaching was the excellent election day performance by the huge contingent of election table workers. The scheme was effective and should be employed again in future elections.

4. The design used by the Futures Group was equally sound. Their work was preceded by field research to determine the most effective kinds of advertising and the capacity of the various entities to do it. With this knowledge, a good strategy was employed and the campaign was a success.
5. The observational visits were timely, relevant and appropriate. The knowledge gained from these visits enabled the participants to lend their assistance to the planning and implementation of the electoral process.
6. There appeared to be no need to involve the principal contractor, CAPEL and GEMAH in the training program for supervisors, instructors and election table workers. It could have been done directly with GEMAH.
7. The design of the training program for election workers should have provided for an evaluation.
8. The training activity of election workers was extremely well documented and will serve as an invaluable source in planning for training in the next elections.
9. No effort was made to evaluate the performance of table workers on election day or to assess the impact of the training on the election. This still could be attempted, at least on a sample basis.
10. The initial field work by The Futures Group and its strategy to test and select from various advertising features contributed to its successful campaign. The failure to include a follow-up evaluation of the design made it difficult to assess the contribution this activity made on the success of the election and to provide guidance for subsequent campaigns.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The National Elections Tribunal should solicit inputs and observations on the training program from election workers and from representatives of the political parties and include these comments in the documentation records.
2. TNE should study the documentation materials to determine deficiencies and replan for the oncoming election.
3. The project should fund one or two sample surveys to review the impact of the mass media campaigns for the last election and the performance and contribution of the table workers.

4. TNE should maintain an active list of supervisors, instructors and workers participating in the 1989 elections for possible utilization in the next election.

ANNEX-F.ET:3755y:10Jan91

**COMPONENT III
VOTER REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS IMPROVEMENT**

Training Proposed

- Two long-term scholarships of two years at the master's level to career senior professional staff of the R.N.P. Training for candidates of RNP Director, and Sub-Director.
- Training for Registry Personnel.
 - a) On-the-job training shall be offered for 30 technical staff members in TNE headquarters.
 - b) In-service workshops for 620 employees who staff RNP headquarters.
 - c) Training shall be provided for 900 local registrars working around the country.
- Assistance by GEMAH to assist in the planning and implementation of the electoral process.
- Training for 67,000 election workers for TNE, October and November 1989. All 67,000 workers shall receive an intensive one-day training course and a clear easy to use, step by step, self instruction manual on how to carry out their responsibilities. a) Training for supervisors, instructors, departmental and local elections tribunal members and voting table workers. b) Training of two weeks in seminars of 80 TNE administrative staff members.
- Observational visits--none planned.

Training Completed

- None to date
- On-the-job training for 1,045 employees of the National Registry of Persons.
- Three seminars by GEMAH to assist in the planning and implementation of the electoral process.
- Training for 58,841 election workers for TNE in October and November 1989. Training for supervisors, instructors, departmental and local elections tribunal members and voting table workers.
- International visits: a) Invitational travel - Registry and identification factories. b) Trip to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

ANNEX F

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to attend Central American conference. c) Visit to Puerto Rico. d) Trip to San José, Costa Rica. e) U.S. Election study tour. f) U.S. Election study tour. g) Invitational Travel. h) U.S. Election Observational Tour. i) Travel to Central America.

- In cooperation with TNE Public Affairs Office, three major public education information campaigns regarding registration, the TNE and the electoral process. a) First shall be a general education campaign to raise awareness of public relative to advantages of democratic system (3 months). b) Second shall permit registration (one month). c) Third, information on finding correct voting places and actually voting and to present key issues of principal candidates positions through a public debate.

- In cooperation with TNE Public Affairs Office, three major public education/information campaigns regarding registration, the TNE and the electoral process National Registry of Persons.