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Report to

Science and Technology Bureau/Office of Nutrition/Agency for International Development

On

**An Evaluation
of the
Tripartite Nutrition in Agriculture Project**

By

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edc

Education Development Center, Inc.

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INTRODUCTION

This evaluation was conducted at the request of the Office of Nutrition, Bureau for Science and Technology, of the United States Agency for International Development, by the Education Development Center, Newton, Mass. (EDC), under an IQC contract. The EDC evaluation team consisted of Anthony Dawson (formerly Director of Evaluation and Planning in the U.N. World Food Program, Rome) and Eileen Kennedy (on detail from the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.). The work was carried out under the supervision of Ronald Israel, Vice-President, International Programs, EDC, and Nicolaas Luykx, Deputy Director, Office of Nutrition. It was accomplished during the period 16 June-14 September 1987. Anthony Dawson, at EDC in Boston, served as team leader and report editor and undertook the travel involved, over a period of 55 working days, while Eileen Kennedy in Washington, over a period of 30 working days, gave particular attention to the quality of the scientific and technical work, as reflected in the documents on the basis of the studies conducted under the project and in discussions with their authors. Visits were made to the Office of Nutrition and to certain Regional Bureau and Country Mission officials of A.I.D.

who could be reached in Washington, D.C., and to the officials of the Nutrition Economics Group of the Office of International Cooperation and Development of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, to Tufts University, Boston, to Iowa State University, Ames, and the University of Arizona, Tucson, and to the Country Missions, Host Country authorities and other donor missions and experts in Honduras and Mali.

EDC and the evaluation team members wish to express their gratitude and appreciation for the excellent cooperation and guidance that they received throughout their work from the institutions and persons contacted. It is hoped that the practical value of this report in terms of enlightenment and of better orientation of future activities will duly recompense for the thoughtful help given.

The many published documents read by the team are listed in Annex A. Persons contacted by the team are listed in Annex B and numbered. Where a statement in the report should be attributed to a particular person as a source of information or opinion, a reference to them is given by number: e.g. B.1.

The three projects managed as one, which this report is all about, are referred to simply as "the tripartite project". The original short-term studies conducted under this tripartite project were frequently referred to as CEAP - the Consumption Effects of Agricultural Policies. We have, however, eschewed

using this substantively satisfactory shorthand expression for the overall tripartite project and the sort of activities to which it relates. This is because "CEAP" may be habitually associated in the mind of a number of readers with its narrower context. We want to give more weight in this report to the longer-term, deeper studies and to the important if so far more limited technical assistance and training activities under the tripartite project. Moreover, we should emphasize that the project is concerned to an increasing extent with the consumption effects of agricultural projects as well as of policies. A number of project reports have given specific attention to subsidies, but we regard these as particular policy instruments which affect consumption (and also production), and not as substantively separate in any major sense.

Whether it be in regard to policies or projects, the "tripartite project" as we will call it is concerned with data-gathering and analysis of their consumption effects, and with technical assistance and training relating to doing research and to taking remedial action in the light of the findings and implications. The present tripartite project, or "Phase I", is distinguished from the proposed new follow-on project by calling the latter "Phase II".

An Executive Summary follows which gives our recommendations and serves as an index to the contents of the report, but cannot serve at all completely as a substitute to a reading of the whole

of this document due to the complexity of the subject-matter and the nuances required in dealing with certain topics.

Chapter I, concerning our Scope and Approach, quotes from the Office of Nutrition's "scope of work" the objectives of the evaluation and the stages of work to be accomplished and indicates where these are covered in our report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Headings in this summary correspond to chapters in the report. Under the final heading, however, we have listed briefly all our recommendations, and referred back to relevant paragraphs in the summary, which are all numbered.

I. Scope and Approach

1. At the beginning of Chapter I on our scope and approach the objectives of the evaluation and our work agenda are quoted from the "scope of work" and related to the structure of this report. Answers to the basic questions for the evaluation in the "scope of work" are given in Chapter X on Overall Evaluation (which should be read in conjunction with this summary). We have given particularly close attention to the technical quality and relevance of the studies (Chapter IV), to host country involvement and institutionalisation (Chapter VII) and to the follow-on project (Chapter XI).

2. The tripartite project, bearing as it does on the consumption effects of agricultural policies and projects has, as an integral part of its final objective, in our interpretation, the aim of "institutionalisation". This means the extent to which all project activities bring about a change in the state of mind of developing country officials, experts and project managers; the higher priority they attach to the study of consumption and nutrition situations as they are affected by the supply side in agriculture; the skills they acquire through the project for conducting this study and analysis; the procedures they set up and the resources they receive and obtain for carrying on the work set in motion by A.I.D. under the project; and the strengthening of their will and capacity to change agricultural policies and projects that will, according to its inputs of research documents, technical assistance and training, lead to improvements in food consumption and human nutrition. The bottom line for this evaluation is that these improvements should ultimately occur.

3. A complementary objective of the project should be the construction of a unified edifice of synthesizable, mutually compatible, widely applicable knowledge and practice. This knowledge and practice should be conducive to a process of economic development in which food needs are translated into effective demand as income levels rise and as agricultural policy contributes to this process by instruments and measures affecting

both demand for, and the supply of food, and helping to match them.

II. Objectives and Programs

4. A.I.D. indicates in its policy paper "Nutrition" that its objective is "to maximise the nutritional impact of A.I.D.'s economic assistance". Subsequent text in the paper suggests that the economic assistance mainly addressed is in the agricultural sector; the other economic sectors, and the level of employment, come much less into the picture. Our visit to Honduras underlined how the tripartite project can be "especially appropriate in formulating country development strategies."

5. In its policy paper on "Food and Agricultural Development" A.I.D. says it will concentrate its assistance on countries that show they are committed to similar objectives to those adopted by A.I.D. in this sphere. They should be given preference when country selection is made for action under Phase II of the tripartite project.

6. The Action Plan of the Office of Nutrition provides in 1987 \$675,000 for the impact of food and agriculture policies on nutrition, out of a total program for the year of \$5,375,000.

III. Studies, Technical Assistance and Training

7. Research and studies rightly predominated in Phase I of the project at the beginning; they were necessary to give substance and assurance of validity to much of the technical assistance and training activities. The latter need eventually to be supplemented by public relations and dissemination through the written word, and by networking and an internationalised worldwide campaign, if an impact is one day to be made on a majority of the world's hundreds of millions of malnourished people.

8. There is still a need to recognise that research and longer-term action in a foreign aid program are an inescapable basis for the more difficult and ambitious objectives, since the development of the Third World is inherently a complex, long-term process.

9. The tripartite project takes about the right proportion of the Office's total program budget at present, but may merit much higher allocations if and when the developments described two paragraphs back occur.

10. Technical assistance provided has been pertinent and of good quality, but can risk being too sophisticated and costly to follow if care is not taken to assess absorptive capacity realistically.

11. Training has been the cinderella under Phase I but methods are evolving in the right direction and it is now a quantum leap that it is called for.

12. Technical assistance and training are activities in which, if they work out as intended, the A.I.D. share of the total cost is smaller, and the host country's larger, than in the case of studies. Hence the impact per A.I.D. dollar is greater. However, that can only work out as intended, if prefaced and underpinned by valid research. Some technical assistance and training are normally imparted as an integral part of the process of research and studies.

13. We have made some detailed comments on specific training activities.

IV. Technical Quality and Relevance of Studies

14. The series of studies funded under the tripartite project till now vary tremendously in approach and quality. Because of the diverse methods used to conduct the studies, comparative analyses of issues across the series of studies is not possible. For the follow-on project, we recommend that studies be more methodologically vigorous and susceptible to supporting integrative work and synthesis. In order to achieve this, N.E.G. should take a more assertive, directive role in coordinating the second wave of studies.

15. It is most important to develop a detailed conceptual framework to guide the new studies. We have indicated how this might look (Figure 1, Chapter IV) both for future use and to show how the studies till now have neglected certain major linkages between production and consumption. Project proposals for Phase II need to be more specific about the objectives, data collection methods, the plan of analysis and sources of data for the proposed research.

16. Before proceeding to the Phase II studies, N.E.G. should make a concerted effort to pull together the "lessons learned" from the Phase I activities. The new activities can then build on this base.

V. Synthesis and Integration

17. This chapter is separate from the preceding one because the comparative analysis applicable to research is also applicable to technical assistance and training, and integration of the study work gives a more balanced, digestible and error-free corpus of knowledge to be transmitted to the target groups through these other two types of project activity.

18. Following upon what has been said on this subject in the preceding chapter, we recommend that N.E.G staff construct a handbook of techniques to be used in surveys, distinguishing between national versus household-generated data, extant versus

primary data collection and making a comparison between different types of survey instruments. It would be extremely valuable to select one data set and illustrate how the choice of survey instruments can alter the interpretation of data. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each and how do data differ in the story they tell, across the two methods? The relevance of the handbook would be increased if, in addition to providing critiques of methods, there were to be a section on how each of the methods can be administered.

19. A similar exercise for methods of analysis would be helpful. For example, it would be valuable for N.E.G. to select two or three of the better data sets and apply AIDS, LES and OLS to determine how results are altered by the analytical approach adopted.

20. We have also indicated other types of standardization that are needed.

21. Further studies might reanalyse some data sets using other nutrient indicators than calories.

22. An integrative analysis should be undertaken on the issues of price policy and consumer subsidies, along the lines we indicate.

VI. Selection of Countries for Implementation

23. Till now, availability of data, and the existing country experience and contacts of cooperating university personnel, have played a large part in the selection of countries for implementation.

24. If, as recommended above, the selection process is used to serve the aim of increasing chances of impact of the tripartite project on the host country, then our analysis suggests that preference should be given to the poorest countries with serious and relatively widespread malnutrition where export opportunities and capacities are limited, and the agricultural sector will probably have to remain the predominant one in the economy. While these characteristics are typified in the two countries we visited - Honduras and Mali - we recognise that in their cases one also has the advantage of considerable donor leverage for getting the tripartite project fully implemented. Large heavily populated poor countries with a well-educated elite are also propitious for host country involvement, as we have seen in the case of Indonesia.

VII. Host Country Involvement and Institutionalisation

25. The impact of the tripartite project on the countries where its activities have been conducted is in principle the center of focus of this evaluation, insofar as all other aspects seem pointless without this impact. In practice we had difficulty and

lacked time and resources to get a satisfying amount of information on the subject. We strongly recommend that monitoring and evaluation of this crucial aspect of CEAP be strengthened and made a regular feature of the N.E.G's work and of its reporting to the Office of Nutrition.

26. We have made some specific comments on factors affecting institutionalisation in particular host countries: Indonesia, Jamaica, Mali, Honduras, the Dominican Republic.

27. We were pleased to hear from universities that their oversight by the Office of Nutrition is in particular watchful of how well they are trying to making an impact on the host country.

28. A.I.D. reporting standards and requirements may, we think, differ from those host countries might choose if they were evaluating the tripartite (or other A.I.D.) projects. Also, these standards and requirements reflect a shorter time frame and reporting cycle than that within which the universities undertaking the project studies have to operate.

29. The susceptibility of countries to institutionalise project findings and advice should figure prominently among the criteria for selection of countries in which to act under the project.

30. Techniques of promoting institutionalisation should rely heavily on the use of host country personnel to persuade host

country personnel. A.I.D. should not hesitate to foot the bill for small but essential items involved in making an impact, such as translation, publication, publicity, cost of meetings etc.

31. We have sketched a scenario for how to promote institutionalisation, which can be used as a preface to self-evaluation by N.E.G. We have referred to a good N.E.G. paper called "CEAP Studies and the Host Countries: What Next? Institutionalisation and other Matters", presented at the Mid-Term Workshop in 1983. The latter workshop was itself an instrument for increasing impact, since host country personnel participated. This formula bears repeating.

VIII. Contractors

32. Institutions signing cooperative agreements under the tripartite project are more autonomous and operate under a more open-ended agreement than contractors in the normal, narrower sense (who are closely supervised and have fixed terms of reference and deadlines). A.I.D. gains considerably from using the services of some Cooperators, especially the universities. In regard to the tripartite project, the universities have a lot to offer compared with other types of consultant groups and services. They bring to the job a wealth of intellectual capital and knowledge of countries they assist, they have personnel who remain in the picture and who continue follow-up, even sometimes after USAID has ceased to be the sponsor of the action. They are

strong-minded, however, and may not always do exactly what they are asked if they have a different idea of what is required or what is important or "interesting".

33. Among the American specialists in relevant areas of economic theory and its application - theory of demand etc - those whose services have been obtained for the project are leaders in their field. They are assisted by more junior staff, graduate students etc., who are good, but it is necessary for N.E.G. to remain vigilant to ensure that the cooperators' principals are on hand in the assisted countries as frequently as they are required to ensure proper supervision of the ongoing work, and above all to provide the stature, comprehension and eloquence called for when the moment of policy dialog is reached and to promote good follow-up and impact on the host country.

34. There is a risk of going too far in relying upon econometric techniques to compensate for inadequacies of data. At the macro-level it may be inescapably necessary to spend rather heavily on data-gathering and supplementation. At the micro-level, regarding consumption effects of agricultural project management, this problem of dependance on econometrics does not arise, and data-gathering can be much more economical.

35. We have made some specific comments, largely positive, on the contributions made to the tripartite project by particular universities we visited and contacted. We would recommend that

these universities continue to be used in Phase II. The tripartite project work done in Honduras is a good example of how, after overcoming certain deficiencies in the earlier stages, research and studies were undertaken on what appeared to us an appropriate and satisfactory basis.

36. In Phase II it will be necessary to give further consideration to how the poorest host countries can manage with techniques and methodologies that require sophisticated and costly hardware, software and personnel. This is one instance of many foreign aid projects, during implementation in such countries, where a common need comes to be felt that computer resources donated by foreign aid might be centralised for their physical protection and better maintenance, and to be fully and economically used by all projects, aid missions and host country staff that need them.

37. It is sometimes necessary for the N.E.G. to be watchful when selecting and overseeing the work of high-level consultants to ensure that they have sufficient realism in the matter of what advice and facilities host countries can afford to follow and to use.

IX. Project Management.

38. A.I.D. as a centralised aid agency is well placed to promote coordination between the tripartite and other American aid projects, notably those concerned with agriculture and policy dialog. The project has to make its impact largely through agricultural policy dialog, but A.I.D. is not as well suited as, say, an international organisation to conduct policy dialog because host countries do not always regard it as an equal and apolitical partner.

39. A.I.D. has large means, but the tripartite project has nevertheless suffered from financial constraints, and from a pressure to produce concrete results quickly and to maximise the "spread" of each dollar.

40. We believe it is more important to spend each dollar cost effectively by doing the job well than politically effectively by spreading it over a maximum number of projects and beneficiary countries.

41. There has been over-reliance, till more recently, on short-term, quick turnaround, studies using second-hand data.

42. Some small economies achieved at the expense of steps very necessary to assure an impact on the host country can put at risk the benefit of all the other expenditure.

43. Heavy reliance on buy-ins by country missions may impair the homogeneity and proper targetting of the project.

44. Project managerial staff and project monitoring and evaluation might with advantage be strengthened. Evaluation need not be frequent and costly, but in adequate depth about every three years.

45. The division of labor between the Office of Nutrition and its sub-manager for the project, the Nutrition Economics Group of USDA, should be less ambiguous and variable, to guard against duplication and doubts concerning the locus of responsibilities. It should be drawn more horizontally so as to keep the Office in a proper oversight role and out of details. The Office is a place for reflection and policy guidance, the N.E.G. for administration of the project.

46. Several Country Missions have demonstrated how much they can help support the tripartite project and a few have shown how it can suffer from their benign neglect. These differences occur in time as well as space and are unduly dependant on the goodwill of individuals, due to a need to strengthen further the systems and procedures for maintaining institutional memory and ensuring proper coordination and follow-up.

47. The Nutrition Economics Group has done good work, and has selected well the cooperators and contractors and collaborated

constructively with them. But it could benefit from some reinforcement. Better teamwork should be promoted and the chief should concentrate more on the oversight of other group members and less on working alongside them at their level. The chief should do more to promote integrative activity and a proper shift in the balance between studies, technical assistance and training, gradually accentuating the latter two to a greater degree. More coordinative editing and quality control in respect of reports on studies should be achieved by the group.

X. Overall Evaluation

48. The important work started under the tripartite project certainly merits being carried on and strengthened and it is implied that aspects not questioned in this report appear to us satisfactory and should remain pillars of strength in the new project. The project has been designed, and to an appreciable extent has been implemented and managed so as to promote the stated objectives as indicated in the project documents. Further attention to reinforcing its impact on the host country and on institutionalisation will be required in the follow-on project. A.I.D.'s approach, of focusing on the food consumption and nutrition aspects of agricultural programs, policies and projects is indeed the most effective way for A.I.D. to influence agriculture sector activities to serve the Agency's nutritional objectives at the same time as production goals.

49. The broad underlying aim is of the greatest importance. Availability of food is the factor transcending all others in the cause and solution of malnutrition problems. Agricultural production must be managed and guided with due regard for consumption needs as well as for effective demand for food. Otherwise the bifurcation into a large traditional and a small modern sector will remain, with poverty not much alleviated. The tripartite project gives pertinent answers to this dilemma.

50. It is good that the cooperators include a university where agricultural economics is a part of the faculty of economics rather than that of agriculture, for highly significant reasons we give.

51. The good choice of cooperators has been one of the major achievements of the tripartite project. The project managers have done some good work (and we suggest how it might be strengthened) but they have suffered from constraints and discouragements which it is within the power of A.I.D. to correct, on the principle "physician heal thyself!"

XI. Follow-on Project

52. The project proposal drafted by the Office of Nutrition, which we saw at the outset of our work, is well conceived and expressed and might simply be modified and amplified in the light of acceptable elements of this report and of this chapter.

53. Using corporate language as an analogy, the Office of Nutrition (which is at present an over-worked and under-staffed unit) should serve as the project's chairman of the board, the role of the board members being performed jointly by the interdivisional committee referred to in the draft proposal and by a technical advisory or peer review group meeting once or at most twice a year whose establishment we propose.

54. The N.E.G, which should continue in the USDA with appropriate support by the latter vis-a-vis the impact of the tripartite project on the world of agriculture, should be the president; the Office would provide intellectual oversight and policy guidance and the N.E.G. the administration of the project.

55. To get the correct mutually respectful relationship between the two, the right choice of a new long-term chief of N.E.G. needs to be made and the chief's role and responsibilities unambiguously and trustfully defined. This, the most senior public official giving full-time attention to the tripartite project, should be a key, respected figure, able to lead, coordinate and integrate the work of the project and to motivate well the Group by belief in and enthusiasm for its work which is manifested in digesting and assembling its output in a uniform edifice rather than in getting lost "out in the brickyard helping to make the bricks".

56. N.E.G. should benefit from, and contribute fully to, a period of say six months for reappraisal and reflection during which the details of Phase II could be worked out, the foundations for it laid and the changes of course achieved to shift from the approach and methods of the first Phase to those of the second as we have outlined them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. As soon as possible, during a transition phase of about six months prior to the full-fledged implementation of Phase II of the tripartite project, a basic reappraisal of the project's objectives, experience and achievements till now should be undertaken, to serve the following purposes:

(i) to work out a conceptual framework for the subject-matter addressed by the project and a re-statement or confirmation of the project's objectives, and to decide how the project may be properly named and "packaged" so as to secure maximum understanding and acceptance of it, and support for its implementation, on the part of A.I.D. (especially the Country Missions), the agricultural economists and other professional people in the United States concerned, and the people in the host

countries who can help to bring about the desired changes and developments.

(ii) to review this report and take decisions on its findings and recommendations and on the issues it raises.

(iii) to execute the preparation and then incorporate the main conclusions of the integrative documents recommended below.

(iv) to finalise the design of Phase II and draft the main project documents relating to it.

2. Ideally, the basic reappraisal should be led by the individual who will assume the full-time management of the project in future, such as the chief of the N.E.G. If the appointment of a permanent chief of the N.E.G. will be long delayed, or if the future of the N.E.G. itself and the question of its possible replacement by another body, are to be among the questions raised and answered during the basic reappraisal, then an outside consultant should be appointed to fulfill this role of "director of the reappraisal". This should preferably be someone well versed in the field of the project and could be a candidate for the post of "project manager" (either as prospective head of the N.E.G. or as a consultant attached to the institution which is envisaged as a replacement for the N.E.G.)

3. In order to have some consistency across studies, the "director of the reappraisal" should supervise the formulation of a conceptual framework that will serve as the basis for the

selection and design of Phase II studies. New studies should not be initiated until this is completed.

4. Before proceeding to new studies, a summary of "lessons learned" from Phase I research should be written. This will be a useful policy document and will also serve to identify gaps in our current knowledge.

5. A handbook of data collection methodologies based on Phase I experience should be developed. This should be helpful in the implementation of Phase II studies.

6. An external Technical Advisory Group with a multi-disciplinary representation should be formed to advise the Office of Nutrition and the project manager on technical aspects of the research and studies program carried forward under the tripartite project.

7. This Group, together with an interdepartmental committee in A.I.D. established to assist the Office of Nutrition in coordinating the implementation of Phase II, should provide to the Director of the Office of Nutrition the elements normally expected in policy formulation and oversight by the chairperson of the board of a corporation. The Director of the Office of Nutrition would be the chairperson and would supervise the "project manager" in a relationship similar to the corporate chairperson/president relationship.

8. The Office of Nutrition should provide intellectual and technical guidance to the project management as well as overall administrative and financial control and should not duplicate detailed managerial functions in Phase II. If certain project funds are to be kept separate for allocation and disbursement by the Office of Nutrition, the rationale of this separation and the kinds of purposes these funds are to serve, differentiated from the purposes served by the remainder of the funds, should be spelled out in the follow-on project proposal.

9. The project manager (chief of N.E.G. or other) should not work partly at the same level as the rest of the management team on detailed supervision of and participation in specific project activities, but should exercise overall supervision, providing motivation of the team and the contractors, ensuring quality control and high-standard editing of documents, and should prepare integrative documents and in other ways promote synthesis within the project. He or she should also give personal attention to, and participate in, self-evaluation exercises and actions to ensure follow-up and host country impact (see 12 and 13 below).

10. A formal mechanism for soliciting input from developing country governments and A.I.D missions on high priority areas for training, technical assistance and research should be developed. This would help ensure that Phase II work is responsive to the in-country needs.

11. The Nutrition Economics Group needs to be more involved in decisions regarding the actual conduct of projects to ensure a tighter quality control of work.

12. Thorough procedures to ensure follow-up of the tripartite project in the host countries, and especially action to be taken in response to the implications of study findings, should be established (cf. the scenario we sketch out in pages 100-103).

13. Regular procedures should be established for project monitoring and evaluation. Host country personnel (from the government or other implementing institution directly concerned) might be allowed to participate in the evaluations if the host country desires this.

14. Greater weight should be given to technical assistance and training, as compared with research and studies, in Phase II, through the relative financial allocations and through the planning and scheduling of project implementation.

15. Another workshop should be held, similar to that convened in Reston, Virginia to conduct a mid-term project review. This next time it might serve several functions: training of A.I.D. and host country personnel; preparation of integrative documents as a basis for discussions contributing to synthesis; a contribution to evaluation of certain achievements, either posing questions ex

ante to be answered in an evaluation that is planned or reviewing findings ex post of an evaluation already conducted. This workshop might be an element in the basic reappraisal recommended above, but this should not be considered unless the workshop can be prepared and completed well within the six months' time limit envisaged for the basic reappraisal.

16. Consideration should be given to the most effective methods of inspiring interest in and support for the tripartite project on the part of Country Missions. To quite an extent this can be achieved during the basic reappraisal's examination of appropriate project packaging (see recommendation 1 (i)). However, other steps are required, such as briefing on the project for agricultural and nutrition officers and, more abbreviated, for A.I.D. mission directors in Washington prior to their taking up appointments with Country Missions.

17. An examination should be undertaken of how the cost of policy-level studies can be validly reduced in various ways, including rapid appraisal techniques, and of the extent to which the overall purposes of the project can be well and cost-effectively served by stepping up the relative effort devoted to agricultural project management-level study and intervention.

CHAPTER I

SCOPE AND APPROACH

Objectives

The "scope of work", in the "Statement of Work" prepared for the Contractor by the Office of Nutrition, sets two objectives for this evaluation, to which we address ourselves in this report (see references to relevant chapters in parentheses in the text which follows):

"1. the evaluation will assess the following:

"(a) compliance with the objectives of each project (931-1171, 931-1274 and 931-1275);

"(b) Tangible and intangible final results achieved, including reductions in the problems addressed by each project, and observable impacts on A.I.D. field missions and on host country institutions and programs, and on the problems addressed by each project;

((a) and (b) are summed up in Chapter X).

"(c) Managerial and technical effectiveness of the entities involved in providing oversight and guidance, technical assistance, research, training, state-of-the-art development, analysis and reporting, and other undertakings under the terms of the projects. The analysis will focus and report on, in turn:

-- technical assistance (in policy formulation, policy analysis, household and consumer survey design and analysis, data handling, project design and monitoring, and other topics as provided for in the project documents); (see Chapter III);

-- research (including relevance of problem identification to the overall A.I.D. Strategy, and the USAID and host country bilateral strategy; the rigor and relevance of the design and methodology development; the extent of collaboration with host country experts; and reporting); (see Chapters III,IV);

-- training (including curriculum and materials development, testing, and dissemination, participant selection, involvement and follow-up); (see Chapter III);

-- state-of-the-art development, analysis and reporting (of methodological and other advancements derived from these projects and the relevant work of others); (see Chapter IV);

"-- other undertakings of the projects (noted in their objectives and procedures, plus ad hoc services and consultancies in response to requests); (see Chapter V, Annex E);

"-- management (including effectiveness and efficiency of staffing, funding, internal controls, networking and communications); (see Chapter IX); and

"-- major external constraints (affecting resources, timing, geographical scope, access to A.I.D. and host country information and influence)." (see Chapters III, VI, VII, IX, X).

"In summary, the basic questions which the evaluation should answer are:

"--has this three-part project been designed, implemented and managed effectively by S & T/N and USDA/OICD to achieve the stated objectives as indicated in relevant project documents? and

"--is this approach, focusing on the food consumption and nutrition aspects of agricultural programs, policies and projects the most effective way for AID/W to influence agriculture sector activities for the simultaneous achievement of the Agency's nutrition objectives?"

(These basic questions are answered in Chapter X).

"2. To prepare recommendations for inclusion in the design of a follow-on project attuned to current needs for equivalent services to deal with persistent or emergent problems relevant to the attack on malnutrition through agriculture sector undertakings." (see Chapter XI).

Work Agenda

The "scope of work" requests the evaluator, as a first step, "to prepare a detailed draft evaluation protocol for review and approval by A.I.D." This Protocol, as amended following discussion and approval of it by A.I.D, has been submitted to the Office of Nutrition at the outset. It served to express in the evaluators' own language, and to verify our proper understanding of, the purpose and scope of the project to be evaluated, as indicated in the "Statement of Work"; the first draft of the Phase II project proposal by the Office of Nutrition; our initial briefing; and other basic documents we received at the outset (notably those quoted in our next chapter).

Some of the words used in these documents have a particular meaning in A.I.D. which it was important to clarify.

For example, one key word is "institutionalisation". This, in A.I.D. parlance, refers to what the team has taken to be an integral part of the final objective of the tripartite project. It means the extent to which all project activities bring about a

change in the state of mind of developing country officials and experts; the higher priority they attach to the study of consumption and nutrition situations as they are affected by the supply side in agriculture; the skills they acquire through the project for conducting this study and analysis; the procedures they set up and the resources they receive and obtain for carrying on the work set in motion by A.I.D. under the tripartite project; and the strengthening of their will and capacity to change agricultural policies and projects in ways that will, according to the tripartite project and its inputs of research documents, technical assistance and training, lead to improvements in food consumption and human nutrition.

In the last analysis it should be possible at least to perceive, if not to measure, these improvements to which the tripartite project has led through "institutionalization". If they do not appear to have occurred, or cannot reasonably be expected to occur in the not-too-distant future, then the project would have failed in its main purpose and would have been a waste of time and money. This would be true even if the project has contributed to enlightenment and advancement of the state-of-the-art in the academic world, since the funds have been provided by an Office of Nutrition, whose purpose is to promote nutrition, rather than by a body such as the National Academy of Sciences which serves to promote scientific knowledge for the general benefit. The enlightenment provided constitutes a potentiality for improving nutrition, but the bottom line for this evaluation

is that the improvement should actually occur, at least in the end. If it does not, then an Office of Nutrition will be faced with the question whether to concentrate more of its funds on more direct methods of impacting the nutrition situation in developing countries. We have therefore considered it relevant to take a brief look at the balance of the different components in S & T/N's activities so as to judge the type of instrument provided by the tripartite project in due perspective.

The subject of institutionalisation is dealt with specifically in Chapter VII "Host Country Involvement and Institutionalisation", but it also receives frequent attention at relevant points throughout our report and in Annexes C and D.

A complementary objective to the basic one, which the tripartite project also appears to have, and which it should reach in order to be applicable throughout the Third World, is the construction of a unified edifice of synthesizable, mutually compatible, widely applicable knowledge and practice. This knowledge should be conducive to a process of economic development in which food needs are translated into effective demand as income levels rise and as agricultural policy contributes to this process by instruments and measures affecting both the demand for and supply of food and helping to match them. The tripartite project was envisaged at the outset to be more than a heterogeneous agglomeration of individual actions at the level of one country useful and relevant only to that country. It

is reported that there was even talk at the beginning, later no longer heard, of developing "The Method" so that, after some trial runs and comparative analysis of results in a number of selected developing countries, a manual could emerge for the edification and guidance of the other developing countries, and of the aid officials and experts who help them in this sphere of improving food consumption and human nutrition. This did not happen, but the evaluation should judge the extent to which an objective of capacity for integration of the sum total of tripartite project activities has been approached. This level of evaluation is required when it is a matter of measuring complete success. Limited success can be accorded to efforts which have been of value only to one country and are not replicable (at least without a major exercise of translation). We have heard of one instance where an activity did not even help the country in which it was conducted, but redeemed itself by being of scientific and analytical interest to the company of scholars and practitioners who carry the tripartite project forward.

We have given close attention to this objective of making the tripartite project an integrated project whose outputs are susceptible to synthesis. This is to be seen, for example, in our chapters (IV) on the technical quality and relevance of studies, (V) on synthesis and integration, (X) on overall evaluation and (XI) on the follow-on project.

The second in the general sequence of activities mentioned in the "scope of work" is to review project documentation. We give in Annex A the published documents we reviewed. The Office of Nutrition, the Nutrition Economics Group (USDA) and the Country Missions and Universities we visited are aware of the internal documentation they enabled us to see. This review inspired at least as much of our report as the oral transmission of information to us did. It is particularly reflected in our chapters (IV) on the technical quality and relevance of studies; (III) on studies, technical assistance and training; (V) on synthesis and integration; and (II) on objectives and programs.

The third step requested of us was to conduct interviews with relevant staff in S & T/N, USDA/OICD, and other contractor, cooperator and grantee organizations in the United States that have been involved in the tripartite projects. This we did by several visits to Washington of the team leader; by many discussions which the other team member, resident in Washington, had there; by visits to the University of Arizona, Iowa State University and Tufts University; and by long telephone conversations with Washington, Ottawa, Medford, Ames, Tucson and Albuquerque. The results reveal themselves in many parts of our report, including notably the chapters (IX) on project management, (VIII) on the contractors, (III) on studies, technical assistance and training, and (VII) on host country involvement and institutionalisation.

The fourth step in the scope of work was to undertake an overseas field trip to review documentation and conduct interviews with representative program cooperators and participants (A.I.D. staff, host government agencies, scientific organisations) in one or more of some specified countries, as concurred in by A.I.D. units. We made, but later cancelled, arrangements to visit Indonesia, due to absence from there at the time of key expatriate and Indonesian personnel. The expatriates we were able to contact in North America. Following discussion and agreement with A.I.D. units concerned, and after being obliged to cancel a planned visit to Haiti due to the unrest there, we visited Mali and Honduras, in that order. In Mali we saw a study and training in progress and in Honduras we saw the situation regarding host country involvement following completion of a study and of technical assistance. These visits are described, respectively in Annexes C and D, and are reflected in the body of this report.

Annex B lists persons contacted both in North America and in Mali and Honduras, under steps three and four.

The fifth step was to prepare recommendations for planning cost-effective, feasible approaches to implementing A.I.D.'s nutrition objectives through agriculture sector undertakings in a follow-on project. These we have presented in Chapter XI on the Follow-on Project, on the basis of the conclusions drawn, and revealed in the preceding chapters.

The sixth step in the "scope of work" was to prepare this evaluation report which, as required, has been delivered in twenty copies to the Office of Nutrition.

The seventh step was to discuss the evaluation findings and recommendations with the Office of Nutrition and the USDA/OICD RSSA management office, which took place at a meeting in Washington on 10 September 1987.

The Evaluation Protocol already submitted to A.I.D. gives a description of the tripartite project and an account of its origins, which need not be repeated here. We have had a limited amount of time in which to cover a vast field of activity. Records and memories of certain past activities, particularly for technical assistance and training, are not all readily available. Some of the staff concerned can no longer be found in Washington. We had neither time nor funds to visit them elsewhere or, a fortiori, to visit more than two of the thirty or more countries reached at some time by the tripartite project. Were we as outsiders and newcomers to presume to make detailed assertions about the project's history, and especially about parts of the history whose success was debatable, thus bringing either well-informed or vulnerable people flying to the defence, we could

risk getting involved in debates about red herrings of sheer detail, without serving any useful purpose. Rather than conduct a post mortem, we have preferred to adopt a more positive, forward-looking technique in this report: we have focussed on the best way, in our opinion, of organizing and conducting the tripartite project and carrying it forward in Phase II under the new project. Many project participants will acclaim that they have already been doing some or all of these things. We know this, though we cannot know all that was either achieved or neglected. What we seek to do in our assertions is to point to factors making for success, and to imply, by emphasis on certain areas and aspects, in what respects not nearly enough has been done in the past and what was actually done wrongly.

To avoid dispute over painful but petty details, we have scrutinized as objectively as possible the different parties to tripartite project action: A.I.D./W, Country Missions, Regional Bureaux, Technical offices, cooperating ministries (government departments), cooperators, contractors, project administrators and implementers: analyzed their characteristics, strengths, weaknesses, complementary and conflicting interests, against a background of comparison with similar structures and endogenous systems in other donor countries and international organisations. A job conceived bears the mark of its conceptor; it will be executed according to the character, personality and interests of the executors. Looking at these qualities and deducing their interactions, we do not need to cite examples of arguments over

turf or of people working at cross-purposes which will be disputed; we can simply identify why risks of lack of cooperation and coordination and complementarity arise and how they may be consciously combatted. We have not given space in this report to describing a number of broader problems in A.I.D. which we uncovered in our inquiries. They reduce significantly the effectiveness of the tripartite project, but also affect the management of most other projects too. They have been noted before, are hard to change and may well be addressed again by higher-level reviews in future.

An evaluation of any human activity will uncover weaknesses and failures, and indeed also strengths and remarkable successes, attributable to the personal qualities of particular individuals. These we cannot systematically consider, or recommend how they can be found or avoided, as appropriate. We can only address ourselves to more tangible factors: to the characteristics of prevailing systems and procedures, to the features which have been consciously built-in to the project design to serve explicit purposes and external constraints or positive catalysts that can be described and assessed generically. We can, and have sought, however, to draw attention to possibilities and ways for implementation and follow-up of the tripartite project to be less dependant on personal memories and abilities, and more dependant on systems, for assuring project continuity and cumulative progress. We have also made a passing reference to personnel

policies and factors which affect project performance through their impact on morale.

All of this report is intended to serve as a basis for stimulating debate leading to improvement. The participants will be able to add to the sum of knowledge and assessment of realities we have reached within the time and the limits of evidence available to us.

CHAPTER II

OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS

A.I.D. estimates "that six hundred million people in less developed countries (LDCs) are in danger of not getting enough to eat". The objective of its nutrition policy "is to maximise the nutritional impact of AID's economic assistance." It "places high priority on alleviating under-nutrition - inadequate food consumption and biological utilization of nutrients" and its policy is "to improve nutrition through sectoral programs in agriculture, health, food aid, population and education as well as through direct-nutrition programs." This can be effected through:

"A. identifying projects based upon analysis of nutrition and food consumption problems; this is especially appropriate in formulating country development strategies."

"B. including nutrition as a factor in project design:

"1. in agriculture, through maximising consumption effects of crop and technology selection, research and extension, and appropriate national policies.

.....

"C. targetting sectoral projects to individuals or households at-risk of developing nutrition problems;

"D. monitoring and evaluating nutrition impacts of projects that are likely affect nutrition, food consumption, or food production.

"E. complementing sectoral programs with nutrition projects to enhance nutrition impacts;

"F. utilizing the private sector, especially the food industry, in food programs whenever feasible;

"G. encouraging appropriate national agriculture, health and nutrition policies to address nutrition and food consumption problems;

"H. coordinating with LDC governments and other donors to achieve nutrition goals." (A.I.D Policy Paper: Nutrition, May 1982, page i).

It should be noticed that, although AID's objective is rightly to maximise the nutritional impact of its economic assistance it does not, in the more specific policy statements which follow in the above quotations, refer to its economic assistance in economic sectors other than agriculture. It refers to action through the health, population and education sectors, which are important and relevant, but different. It is through the economic sectors that the most direct and sizeable impact can

be made on employment and incomes of the malnourished and population at risk. Many, but not all, of these people are in agriculture and it is necessary to reach the rest of them either through expansion of agriculture or through development of other economic sectors. Action in the agricultural sector alone does not offer sufficient potentiality to increase employment, productivity and incomes to the extent required to enable the 600 million mentioned to be able to produce for themselves, or to afford to buy, the amount of food they require. Most, but fortunately not all, of the project studies refer only to linkages with the agricultural sector; some do look at linkages between the consumption/nutrition situation and other economic factors that might be taken up in a policy dialog.

Our visit to Honduras revealed that, as is said by A.I.D., projects such as the tripartite project are "especially appropriate in formulating country development strategies". Just before our visit an agricultural sector strategy was formulated. One of the experts working on this had worked on the tripartite project and took the opportunity to incorporate the project's Honduras final report findings into this strategy: a welcome instance of the project's impact.

The objectives of USAID food and agricultural assistance "are to enable countries to become self-reliant in food, assure food security to their populations and contribute to broadly based economic growth." Two sub-objectives are:

"Increased food availability through

- increased agricultural production, with an emphasis on increasing and sustaining productivity, incomes and market participation of small farmers, with special attention to food production;

- greater economic efficiency in the marketing and distribution of agricultural and food production, exports and imports; and

""Improved food consumption in rural and urban areas through:

- expanded productive employment and incomes of men and women who at present lack the purchasing power to obtain adequate food;

- increased awareness and incorporation of sound nutritional principles in the design and implementation of production, marketing, health and education policies and programs, including improved access to, and utilization of, food for those at nutritional risk;

- effective direct distribution of food from domestic or external sources to those facing severe malnutrition and temporary food shortages."

A.I.D. avowed to concentrate its assistance for food and agricultural development in countries "that share these objectives and are committed" to certain elements of policy, including the improvement of "country policies to remove constraints to food and agricultural production, marketing and consumption". (A.I.D. Policy Paper Food and Agricultural Development, May 1982, pp.1-2).

We did not obtain a list, if there is one, of the countries that did so commit themselves, but certainly they should be among those to be preferred in the selection of countries for tripartite project action.

The Action Plan of the Office of Nutrition for FY 1986, 87 and 88 says that "the S & T Nutrition Program has two goals, (i) reducing morbidity and mortality in young children and (ii) reducing hunger by improving food consumption by the poor. These goals flow from the following two of the five key development problems identified in the USAID "Agency Strategic Plan":

- health deficiencies, especially infant and child mortality, and

- hunger."

The Action Plan provides that reduction of infant and child morbidity and mortality will be achieved principally through the health sector activities (which receive \$2,945,000 of the funds in 1987), while reducing hunger will be achieved principally through activities in the food and agriculture sector (which receive \$1,285,000.) Under the latter heading, activities concerning the impact of food and agriculture policies receive \$675,000, the remainder going to food technology action. The tripartite project is thus not the largest project under the Office of Nutrition. The balance of allocations may be compared with the following analysis in Nutrition Sector Strategy USAID 30 January 1984 of malnutrition models:

1. Inadequate availability of food, attributable to low production, post harvest food loss, rapid population growth and inability to import.

2. Adequate availability of food but people unable to procure it, attributable to inequitable geographical distribution due to poor marketing system, transport, storage; inequitable economic distribution, due to people lacking purchasing power.

3. Adequate availability of food, adequate distribution, and people have purchasing power, but do not consume proper diets, attributable to nutritionally inappropriate beliefs and food habits.

4. Adequate availability of food, people with power to purchase, distribution equitable, and nutritionally sound beliefs and habits, but nutrient loss in body after ingestion, attributable to poor environmental sanitation, poor water supply, poor waste disposal and prevalence of disease.

In any country some or all of these scenarios can be found in different areas. The plan of action in this document of January 1984 includes food consumption and nutrition surveys, nutritionally-relevant activities to be implemented through the agricultural (and other) sectors, policy dialog with ldc's, training, strengthening institutional capacity, applied research, evaluation inter-country networks and coordination with other donors.

These then are some of the main policy objectives and program ends and means to be seen as a backdrop to this evaluation of the tripartite project.

CHAPTER III

STUDIES, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING

To bring about a state of mind in agricultural planners, policy makers and project managers in which they take adequately into account the needs, requirements, situation and behavior of food consumers in their own country, the Office of Nutrition has rightly chosen to use under the tripartite project three instruments: research, technical assistance and training. In this chapter we examine the relative efficacy of each, their complementarity and their due proportion in the project budget, past, present and future.

Logically, research comes first, since you need data to look at and to analyze, before reports can be written. Then you need study of the report by the target readers to hit your target. Technical assistance and training can both be used to complement research, report writing and studies, since for the sake of host country acceptance and institutionalization and minimizing long-term dependence on foreign aid, host country officials' capability to participate in and eventually take charge of the research normally has to be strengthened. Technical assistance and training depend for their quality and substance, especially in a pioneering activity such as the tripartite project, on a feedback from research and studies. So, in that natural order of

things, it is sensible to expect that the accent (and relative budget shares) would gradually shift from research to technical assistance (which is closely related to collaboration on research), and from technical assistance to training. However, in practice it is not surprising to find that these three are generally intertwined and that, though one activity predominates as intended, the line separating it from the other two is sometimes not easy to see.

In the end a fourth arm might be added to the tripartite project: public relations. The shift to more and more technical assistance and training, and then to this arm of public relations, is called for by the following consideration. The aim is to help the malnourished, who number a major part of one billion people in the Third World. All foreign aid, including food aid, cannot directly provide for better feeding of so many people. This betterment can only come from the Third World's own efforts to understand the problem and increase the amount of food produced and delivered in edible condition to its population. This means a change in the state of mind of Third World authorities, for which you need technical assistance and training (largely oral communication) and public relations (feasibly reaching a large number of people through publications about experience gained under the project and the guidance flowing from it). As we have stated elsewhere it is particularly necessary in the case of intervention at the agricultural project management level to impart to the managers, through training and other,

wider, methods of dissemination, ideas about and techniques for reinforcing linkages between the projects and food consumption. In this case, studies can reach only very few managers.

Unfortunately the Office of Nutrition feels obliged not to put research at the beginning of the list, and rather to use the perhaps more practical-sounding word "studies", because A.I.D., anxious for quick results and conscious that the poor and hungry are being kept waiting, shies away from the time-consuming inquiry and reflection implied. This is understandable, but not realistic since, with more haste and less speed, foreign aid the world over has never got many quick results. This is an unfortunate attitude toward the tripartite project, or any inherently difficult and complex activity, because it is even harder to do difficult than simple things well in a hurry. It is unfortunate for a body like S & T, which is seeking to give intellectual leadership to foreign aid to a Third World still to be fully discovered. No university can give intellectual leadership without research, and it is difficult to imagine that any other institution can do so.

There is no need to add much here on the subject of studies since the whole of Chapter IV Technical Quality and Relevance of Studies is on that subject and Chapter VIII Contractors and Chapter VI Selection of Countries for Implementation also have a close bearing on it. However, so long as the tripartite project continues to use research and studies as the main arm of its

action, one remark is called for regarding the inclusion of the tripartite project in the overall program of the Office of Nutrition (as portrayed in "Action Plan: Office of Nutrition, FY 1986,87 and 88"). Out of a total budget for that program in 1987 of \$5,375,000, Impact of Food and Agriculture Policies (covering the tripartite project) costs \$675,000 and is just over half of the sub-budget of \$1,285,000 dealing with hunger, the remainder of which deals with food technology. The amount spent on tackling nutritional problems through the health sector amounts to \$2,945,000, quite a high proportion, while the remainder, \$1,145,000, is devoted to program innovation and quality support and does not seem too much, especially since it may to some extent complement the actions under the other sub-budgets. Considering the tripartite project's relative importance and potentiality for impact on nutrition, it does not seem to us that it claims an overly large share of the total program. However, insofar as it relies heavily on studies, and also bearing in mind the preconditions for success in using research as an instrument and the factors taken into account in Chapter VI on selection of countries for implementation, it seems to us important to keep a major share of the overall program resources for making a more direct intervention in the nutritional situation. In the long run, if the tripartite project can develop a solid basis for a worldwide public relations program, then its greater potential for impact would suggest that it should receive very solid financial support.

It seems that much of the technical assistance provided has been in conjunction with the execution of research and studies. It can also lead to, and help to prepare for, the undertaking of studies of consumption by developing sensitivity to the need for them in association with agricultural policy formation and in agricultural project management. In all types of project activity, research, technical assistance and training, it is important to focus on both the policy level impact and the project management level impact.

Insofar as technical assistance has been provided by the American universities on which we comment in Chapter VIII, it has probably been of good quality and value to the recipients.

From what we could learn of technical assistance to Honduras (see Annex D), there is an observation we should make which conceivably could be applicable to technical assistance generally under the tripartite project. American faculty people are accustomed to well equipped, modern universities, normally with large, powerful and advanced computer centers. In this environment they have no inhibition in developing theories whose testing and application requires the use of extensive and sophisticated computer hardware, software and operating and maintenance personnel. When visiting developing countries as short term experts they are liable to recommend improvements in the conduct of tripartite project studies indicated by the state of the art which are not applicable without access to the kind of

advanced facilities, just mentioned, which they take for granted at home. They no doubt have in mind how much can be achieved with the quite small computers now on the market, which can and are being supplied by A.I.D.

For example, the Institute in Honduras which conducted the tripartite project study has received six or seven of these. But the model of the Honduran economy developed under the tripartite project could not, up to this day, be tried out with the computer capacity (taking account also of software and personnel requirements) available there. Moreover, a start had been made with a linear programming technology, which seemed at the start to be appropriate in the state of knowledge then and taking account of the Honduran economic situation and circumstances. Later, a technical assistance expert suggested a shift to another methodology, but this advice was not followed in view of the time and money already invested in the earlier technology.

The Almost Ideal Demand System (A.I.D.S.) recommended by Iowa State University makes heavy demands for its application on computer capacity. Tufts decided to eschew this in Mali for the less demanding double-log equation approach; even so, computer capacity in Mali is strained and it is envisaged that an important part of the calculations and analysis must be done on the Tufts main frame computer in the United States. Another, similar aspect of this matter is that A.I.D.S. is a very difficult methodology to understand fully; it requires the

ability of an econometrician with a good Ph.D degree. The personnel that can master it is very scarce in developing countries.

To a greater extent than technical assistance, the training arm of the tripartite project has been the Cinderella victimised by budgetary limitations. There appear to have been two periods in N.E.G's training activities. During the first, developed by an N.E.G. staff member who left some years ago and whom we were not able to reach, but about whose work we heard, three training sessions were organized near Washington (Easton and Marriottsville, Maryland, and Berkeley Springs, West Virginia) and one in Ecuador. All four were of one week's duration. Those near Washington were for A.I.D. personnel only whereas the one in Ecuador was open to A.I.D. and other US officials and to Ecuadorians. (It was explained to us that there are two budgets for training which can be used: one under the tripartite project for training host country people and another for the training of USAID officials, with a little flexibility for interchange when one is more exiguous than the other).. The chief characteristic of this first period was that the trainers were not people experienced with tripartite project work. In fact the audience got an assortment of speakers, each speaking about his special field as seen traditionally - agricultural economics, household expenditure and food consumption surveys, nutrition etc. It was thus up to the members of the audience to piece together as best they could these separate parts in their own patchwork quilt and

to figure out in their own way the linkages between them. This problem was greatest in the final course, since in the earlier ones N.E.G. and Office of Nutrition personnel had participated and had helped with the discernment of linkages. The first period was brought to an end by shortage of funds, by the fact that the quality diminished over the four sessions as N.E.G. participation lessened; and because the organizing N.E.G. staff member responsible for this training left, among other reasons.

The second period was developed by the N.E.G. staff member (see B.13) who replaced the one who left. It seems to have been an improvement on the first period in the sense that the content of the delivery was a proper package - the linkages between food production, consumption and nutrition which the tripartite project is all about were clearly brought out. This was helped by the identification and specification of linkages in the studies on farm management systems (see B.9). The training material we saw looked clear and sensible, but does not go beyond what might be called proselytization for the tripartite project. The impact must be rather limited so far. The session was held in Nigeria and only lasted for two and a half days, which is really too short. Another session is being prepared and an effort is being made to apply the lessons so far learnt. The sessions in Ecuador in the first period and Nigeria in the second have the advantage of reaching host country personnel. It was unfortunate that the course in Ecuador, which is recalled as having been quite lively and effective despite the difficulties mentioned, could not also

be open to the participation of neighbouring countries as originally planned, due to lack of funds.

Also worth mentioning as being in a similar context is the "Mid-Project Workshop" from 7 to 10 November 1983 in Reston, Virginia. This brought together the tripartite project implementers, beneficiaries and other A.I.D. officials and outside experts, and, in addition to being a contribution to integration of the project as discussed in Chapter V, was also a contribution to training in the form of cross-fertilization plus stimulation by speakers on the four central topics:

(i) A critique of the policy focus, design and implementation of the Phase I studies by Robert Evenson of the Yale Growth Center;

(ii) A critique of the quality, uses and analysis of available consumption data in the developing countries by Stanley Johnson - then of the University of Missouri;

(iii) A review of farm household models (those which treat farmers as producers as well as consumers) and their relevance for consumption impact analyses by Terry Roe of the University of Minnesota; and

(iv) A review of the CEAP studies and their actual and

potential influence on host countries by Gary Smith of the Nutrition Economics Group.

This workshop seems a worthwhile exercise from several aspects. Perhaps the opportunity could be taken to broaden the forthcoming workshop in the Caribbean so as to provide training and integration in the same manner as at Reston and to discuss there as appropriate the findings and recommendations in this report. All possible sources of ideas should be prospected for the basic reflection required when entering Phase II of the tripartite project.

To complete the picture on training, mention should be made of the simple but very useful training of host country officials that participate in the carrying out of the studies. In other words, in addition to the higher level technical assistance to more advanced and senior host country people concerned with methodology etc., the implementers have provided straightforward training in the use of computers, the coding of data, the conduct of household and market surveys etc. We saw the value of this, for example, in Mali. We also saw in Honduras, at the Ateneo de Agro-Industria, how its staff - whose first work was the tripartite project - gained much similar experience.

CHAPTER IV

TECHNICAL QUALITY AND RELEVANCE OF STUDIES

INTRODUCTION

The series of studies funded under the auspices of the tripartite project have accomplished a lot, not least of which is the fact that, as a whole, they have given visibility to the importance of consumption issues in planning agricultural strategies. The purpose of this chapter is not to critique each individual study but rather to examine what has been learned as a result of the tripartite project studies from 1978 to present and to identify current gaps in our knowledge. This information can then be used for developing and refining a new generation of projects.

The chapter is divided into three sections: conceptualization, methodological issues, and phase II studies.

CONCEPTUALIZATION


The studies vary in purpose, methods, quality and funding. Although there is the general theme of assessing the consumption effects of various agricultural policies and programs, the approaches vary tremendously. Part of this diversity is due to the absence of a specific conceptual framework to guide each of the studies. What are the presumed linkages between the

particular policies and programs and food consumption? Most of the studies seemed to have highlighted just income and prices. Clearly income and prices are two of the key determinants of food consumption, but they are not the only ones nor, in some cases, the most important ones.

Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework illustrating the range of factors through which agricultural policies and programs can affect consumption. The conceptual framework is not all inclusive but it does demonstrate the complexity of the agricultural policies/consumption linkages. This conceptual framework was developed based heavily on background information provided by the Office of Nutrition, U.S. Agency for International Development; the Nutrition Economics Group, U.S. Department of Agriculture; the mid-project review workshop; and the Draft Project Paper for the Phase II projects (931-5110).

Several points are worth highlighting from this conceptual framework. First, there are a series of agricultural policies and programs which can affect consumption. The original set of studies concentrated primarily on producer price policy and subsidies. These two areas are policy instruments used by many developing countries and are, therefore, of great interest to governments and AID. However, other policies which may have equal or greater impact on the urban and rural poor have not been addressed but could be in future studies. It would be useful to have a more formalized mechanism for identifying the high priority areas for research and technical assistance. This means providing ways of getting input from:

Figure 1—Some potential linkages between agricultural policies and progress and food consumption and nutritional status



- o developing country policymakers,
- o AID missions, and
- o AID bureaus in Washington.

One vehicle for doing this is to develop a very specific and detailed conceptual framework and scope of work for Phase II and circulate this not only to AID missions but to a cadre of policymakers and researchers in developing countries throughout the world. It is important to ascertain that the next wave of projects is responsive not only to AID but is policy-relevant to developing country governments as well.

Many of the studies that have been conducted concentrated on a small part of a complex picture. As already mentioned, the studies to date have focused on a limited number of factors--mainly income and, to a lesser extent, prices--linking agricultural policies and programs to consumption. However, even if incomes are increased as a direct result of a particular policy, there may be only modest effect on food consumption. Income may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ensuring adequate food consumption. Factors such as a household's propensity to spend on food versus nonfood items, control of income, form of income (cash versus agricultural production), etc., may all influence the ability of a project to improve food intake. Not all of these factors will be equally important in a given sociocultural environment. However, Alderman (1986), in a review of multiple projects, found that food expenditures tend to increase more than caloric intake in response to increments in income.

There is currently a debate in the literature about how much of a food consumption impact one can expect from income-generating projects. Some researchers believe that these effects have been overstated (see, for example, Behrman and Deolalikar, 1987). Simply knowing the impact of a particular project on household income may not be adequate to predict the food consumption effects.

The previous discussion is not meant to trivialize the importance of income-generating projects. Elimination of poverty is the obvious step toward reducing malnutrition. However, the conceptual framework in Figure 1 is meant to illustrate the fact that agricultural policies and programs may have substantial impacts on consumption through pathways that are mediated through something other than incomes and prices.

Some AID-funded work suggests that the effects of policies and programs on the internal dynamics within the household may be critical in understanding the food consumption effects of agricultural strategies (see Rogers, 1983). The issue of intrafamilial resource allocation, particularly allocation of time, is not addressed in the studies. These issues may become even more important in understanding the factors that encourage the adoption/nonadoption of new agricultural technologies.

While there may be gaps in our information about how policies and programs influence households, there is a virtual void in our knowledge of how individuals within the household are affected. We raise this issue because the draft project paper

for Phase II work quotes the AID Strategic Plan objective to:

"reduce the percentage of children under age five suffering from chronic and severe undernourishment to less than 20 percent of the age group."

Virtually none of the studies¹ have examined the linkages between households and individual members. The basic assumption running throughout the reports is that a positive effect on household food consumption translates into an improvement in the food consumption of each household member. An even more tenuous assumption is that an improvement in individual food intake results in an improvement in nutritional status. This scenario is not always correct. Malnourished children are sometimes found in households with adequate food supplies. Why? There are a variety of reasons. What is very unclear is whether various agricultural policies and programs will exacerbate or alleviate these conditions.

It may be that no one study can adequately explore each of the potential linkages shown in Figure 1. However, a framework like the one laid out in Figure 1 is useful in that it defines the range of issues that might be explored. If a given question is not even raised, it is unlikely that research will provide the answer.

¹ The one exception is the Sri Lanka Kandy study that examined the determinants of preschool malnutrition.

The conceptual framework for the initial set of studies may have been implicit. However, as the number of studies funded under the tripartite project increased, it became important to have an explicit framework specified in order to provide some continuity across projects. If there is no agreement on the presumed set of linkages between agricultural policies and consumption, each project may be examining a different set of variables and this is, in part, what happened. This makes an integrative analysis across issues almost impossible given the current set of studies (this will be discussed again in the section on methodological issues).

The original set of CEAP studies are often referred to as exploratory. We get the impression from talking to researchers involved with the projects and from reading projects documents, that in 1978 so little was known about the actual consumption effects of various policies and programs that any information was seen as valuable. Thus, a common methodological approach was not seen as essential; it is unlikely given the diverse nature of the data available that standardization of the research protocol for each study would have been possible.

However, the laissez-faire approach to the studies was taken too far. The original scope of work for many of the projects was very thinly laid out in the proposals and, as a result, it is not clear exactly what was being proposed other than trying to link policies--usually price policies and subsidies--to some consumption information. Emphasis was placed on

the use of extant data. The use of existing data was consistent with the original objective of policy-relevant research in a short period of time. However, even with the diversity of data sources used, it would have been possible to have more consistency across studies that is now there.

We believe it is important before embarking on a new series of studies to step back and devote some time to a better conceptualization of the problem. This conceptual framework will provide the theoretical underpinnings to guide each of the new studies.

Recommendation:

The Director of the Nutrition Economics Group should supervise the development of a conceptual framework that will serve as the basis for development in Phase II of the research and studies under the tripartite project. This conceptual framework will help guide the research design and protocol for the next set of projects. New studies should not be funded until this is completed.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The series of studies funded under Phase I varied in scope and methods reflecting a diversity in objectives. As already mentioned, the projects are often referred to as "exploratory" in nature. However, exploratory should not be

² Some projects did extensive primary data collection as in the Egypt subsidy project and Sri Lanka work.

accepted as synonymous with sloppy. We were surprised in many of the reports how little detail was given on research methods.

This section examines the studies in the aggregate from the point of view of ability to achieve objectives, research design and sampling, data collection methods, and analytical approaches.

Study Objectives

The AID Office of Nutrition and the Nutrition Economics Group had a series of objectives for the tripartite project, including technical assistance, training, policy-relevant research, and "state-of-the-art" methodological development. It is unlikely that any one project would have addressed each of these objectives equally well; nor should they be expected to do so. It is almost contradictory to expect a "rapid" turn around time for research and a strong training/institution building component in the same project. This is a common theme that emerged when we talked to researchers. If in-country institution building is a high priority objective, it almost, by definition, means that a research project will take longer.

We found it perplexing that ex-post, projects were expected to achieve objectives for which they were never intended. For example, the Sierra Leone project was singled out by several previous reviewers as an example of a project that contributed a lot to methods of analysis, but was criticized as not being policy relevant. Yet when we went back to the original scope of work and talked to key researchers involved, it became

clear that the methodological development, not policy research, was the original focus of the study.

Phase II needs to be clear about the expectations of individual studies. To repeat, it is unlikely that any one study would achieve the wide range of objectives identified in the draft project paper developed by AID. We believe there should be several categories of projects focusing on different objectives. These will be discussed under the section on Phase II studies.

For this report, we began by evaluating each of the projects in relation to their original stated objectives. However, it was difficult in some cases to identify the specific objective(s) of the project. In almost all cases, some reference was given to trying to link food consumption data to a particular policy. But many of the studies were sufficiently vague about the objectives of the specific study. The main reason given for the vagueness of what was proposed is that researchers were often uncertain about the quality and types of data that would be found in-country.

Given this, it would have made more sense to have projects with at least two phases of activity. Phase I would involve development of a research protocol based on identification of appropriate data. In some cases, the project might end here. If data of minimum acceptability were not available, it would not make sense to proceed. This did not seem to happen at all in the Phase I studies. Rather, even when extant data were less than what had been promised or assured, studies proceeded. Because of this, there were studies in the early 1980s based on

consumption data that were 13 to 15 years old because data that were promised from the late 1970s did not materialize. Clearly, this was not the preferred approach of the researchers. Given the often unrealistically stringent time constraints of the projects, studies had to proceed with incomplete or inappropriate data sources. Having the actual analysis based on this Phase I feasibility study would improve the quality of work that follows. This two-staged approach to project development should be considered for Phase II studies.

Research Design and Sampling

Many of the studies in Phase I were based on national level data. We assume that these data are based on a sampling frame that is representative of the country. However, it would have been useful both in the development of the project proposal and in final reports to discuss the sampling approach used. This is another area where little information is supplied. The Sierra Leone project is one of the few where the sampling strategy is discussed. This adds greatly to understanding other parts of the report.

Similarly, for many reports, there is little information provided on the research design. A cross-sectional research design is used in several studies with little indication of the problems inherent in such an approach. We know now from an accumulating body of evidence that adopters/nonadopters of a particular technology or recipients/non-recipients of a specific intervention are often systematically different in ways that preclude drawing strong inferences from study results (see, for example, Pinstrup-Andersen, 1984).

Clearly, the heavy reliance on cross-sectional approaches in the studies was driven by cost and time constraints. However, there is a series of questions related to the consumption and nutritional effects of agricultural strategies that can most appropriately be answered using a longitudinal design. The mid-project review in 1983 made a strong recommenda-

³Dominican Republic, Egypt and Sri Lanka studies also have some discussion of sampling.

tion that a longitudinal or semilongitudinal component be integrated into one of the studies. This was not done. We will make this plea again. The use of a longitudinal design, at least in a few projects, will add tremendously to policy relevance of the study results.

Data Collection and Analysis Techniques

The methods for data collection and analysis varied across studies. At first glance, this may seem surprising given that many of the projects concentrated on price policy and, to a lesser extent, on subsidy issues. Much of the variance was due to use of extant data. The utilization of these existing data implied accepting the method of data collection that had been used. This meant that certain key pieces of information, most noticeably food prices, often were not in the data set. This diversity in data collection procedures makes it difficult to conduct a comparative analysis of issues across the series of studies.

However, there are some advantages to the heterogeneity of data collection instruments used. For example, food consumption information has been collected using a variety of techniques--food expenditures (fixed and varying periods of recall), 24-hour recall (household and child), food disappearance data, etc. NEG should capitalize on what has been learned about the advantages and limitations of different approaches. Before a new wave of studies begins, NEG should supervise the preparation of a handbook of data collection methodologies highlighting

preferred approaches to given topics. Unacceptable methods should be clearly identified. For example, it is not very useful to estimate caloric consumption by summing production plus imports minus exports if one is interested in consumption of low-income groups. This type of information would be valuable for new field initiatives.

This exercise could also identify areas where current methodologies are inadequate and, therefore, preclude beginning research on these topics until further methodological development occurs. Several instances came to mind. Currently, structural adjustment is a high visibility topic. If one is interested in examining the nutritional consequences of macroeconomic adjustment policies, methods for linking macro- and microlevel data must be developed. Rushing into the field with poorly conceived and untested methods is costly and nonproductive.

One of the early objectives for the CEAP projects was development of "state-of-the-art" methods. Surprisingly, there was a good deal of consensus among researchers and NEG staff that much of what was done in the way of data collection and analysis would not be classified as "state of the art." One researcher pointed out that studies tended to use "tried and true" methods. Here again, this was due primarily to the extremely short time period in which the studies had to be completed.

The analytical methods that were employed were driven partly by the data collection methods and therefore are diverse. However, with more direction from NEG staff who had an overview of the range of studies, more consistency across projects would

have been possible. One obvious flaw in many of the project reports is the limited amount of descriptive information presented. This is curious. A thorough descriptive analysis of data often provides information that can be generated quickly (and thus be used as the basis of interim reports) and can be useful to policymakers. Countries in which limited analyses have been done find this type of information invaluable. A well-done descriptive analysis also provides a useful context for the later multivariate analyses. The Honduras report (Garcia et al., 1987) is an example of where descriptive analyses have been blended into a larger report.

In planning the Phase I studies, there was discussion of an integrative analysis once the individual studies were finished. Many of the comparative analyses across issues that were originally anticipated will not be possible because of the manner in which the studies were conducted. However, the data from the studies can be used for a different type of comparative analyses that offers potentially high payoff. A variety of analytical techniques have been used in the studies. In our review, we became concerned about several aspects of the analysis:

- o Two separate reports based on the same data arriving at diametrically opposed conclusion;
 - o A reanalysis of consumption data using 186 rather than 23 food items coming to different conclusions.
- In addition, as part of the mid-project review, at

least one reviewer (Johnson, 1983) argued for different methods of analysis--the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS).

The studies under the tripartite project have generated a tremendous amount of information. We believe more guidance is needed on analytical methods before proceeding to Phase II. One way to achieve this is to select two or three projects and reanalyze data using a variety of different techniques. We would be concerned if an AIDS analysis produced different conclusions than an OLS approach. This comparison of analytical techniques could be done in a relatively short period of time and provide guidance for analytical approaches in Phase II.

Another type of integration of studies is to pull together "lessons learned" from the various studies. After approximately 20 studies, it would be useful to summarize what is known about food consumption effects of the policies evaluated. This also would identify gaps in our knowledge that might be addressed in Phase II projects. This type of synthesis document does not currently exist.

PHASE II STUDIES

We have learned a lot as a result of the Phase I studies. This knowledge needs to be built upon in order that the Phase II studies more effectively reach their objectives.

The first area that must be reassessed before embarking on new initiatives is the role of NEG. If NEG is to continue managing and coordinating Phase II projects, the staff must be

more assertive. If this does not happen, we believe projects funded under Phase II will continue to be of mixed quality.

In the first phase, there was an insufficient interaction between NEG and the researchers during the actual conduct of the study. Final project reports were circulated by NEG for comment. However, the reality is that once a final report has been drafted, there rarely are extensive revisions. Changes that are made are usually more in the nature of fine tuning.

Some of the problems with individual studies could only be resolved by modifications of the study during the data collection or analysis portion of the work. NEG staff need to take a more active role in this process.

A more active role of NEG staff will not necessarily be popular with all researchers. Some researchers do convey the attitude that they are the "experts" and therefore should be allowed a free hand in the execution of the work. However, NEG staff have a broader perspective on the project studies and their input would be useful in ensuring that individual projects are responsive to the overall goals of Phase II.

As part of this more active involvement, NEG staff need to be more demanding of project proposals. At a minimum, project requests need to be specific about objectives of the study, how the project fits into the larger conceptual framework, specifically what data will be used or collected and a tentative analysis plan. Without these basic elements of a proposal, it is not possible to evaluate the viability of a proposed project. If the researchers cannot provide this level

of specificity, then a two-staged project with the first phase being exploratory might be considered. Funding for the second stage would be based on the results of Phase I.

Knowledge about agricultural programs/consumption linkages has grown and, therefore, the approach to Phase II studies will be expected to be at a higher level of sophistication than the Phase I studies. The nature of the topics and approaches taken dictate a multidisciplinary focus. The NEG staff is small. One way to broaden the size and technical expertise of the staff is to establish an advisory group that meets periodically to discuss issues and review progress reports.

This need not be an expensive component to add. The advisory group could meet semiannually for a one- or two-day period. If advisory members were sent material beforehand, the actual meetings could accomplish a lot.

We envision that panel members would be selected to provide an expertise in either anthropology, economics, nutrition, food policy analysis, or statistics. We strongly advise that panel members be selected from outside AID and USDA. NEG and the Office of Nutrition have other mechanisms for soliciting the comments from in-house experts. The purpose of this advisory panel would be to contribute a fresh and possibly varied perspective to projects.

The range of topics addressed in the Phase II work will change as a result of information from Phase I. For example, as a result of the subsidy studies in Phase I, many of the questions related to effects of consumer subsidies have been

answered. Further work on consumer subsidy does not appear to be a high payoff area. There now must be a mechanism for identifying future areas of research.

The conceptual framework that should be developed will partly guide the selection of new topics. The proposed advisory panel with a multidisciplinary focus should also be helpful in defining the range of issues that are policy relevant. However, as discussed in an earlier section, the selection of new topics should be based on a broader discussion outside Washington with policymakers and researchers in developing countries and with AID Mission staff. It is presumptuous to think that a group of six or so can identify the policy-relevant issues for the rest of the world. This definition of problems and issues to be considered need to be done in a systematic fashion.

Some new research areas are suggested as a result of the review of prior studies. Much more needs to be done in modeling behavior for those rural households who are producing as well as consuming households. New analytical approaches for examining the linkages between production and consumption decisions should be explored.

Agricultural policies and programs are potentially important instruments for improving the health and welfare of the rural poor. We already mentioned that we know relatively little about the impact of policies on individual family members. In addition, we know little about how particular agricultural policies and programs affect the overall health/sanitation environment. Will income-generating projects be sufficient to

alleviate malnutrition without simultaneously improving access to health care and sanitary condition (water, etc.)? In most countries, agricultural and health planning are entirely separate. Would a coordinated agricultural/health project be a more effective approach to dealing with food consumption and nutrition problems of the rural poor? This is a researchable issue.

Many countries have adopted a package of macroeconomic adjustment policies. What are the consumption and nutrition consequences? Much of the work to date on the agricultural policies and programs relates to the broader issue of structural adjustment.

This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of topics but simply illustrative of the types of issues that follow from some of the earlier studies.

Much of this Chapter has concentrated on research studies. However, as we talked about in other parts of the report, technical assistance and training are equally important parts of the tripartite project. In the past, funds have been limited and we assume this will continue. This creates a conflict in how much will be spent on studies versus technical assistance and training. As stated earlier, we do not believe any one project can serve all three functions simultaneously.

Well-designed and well-executed studies are expensive relative to most technical assistance and training efforts. One of the major errors made in Phase I was underfunding of studies, which was imposed on the N.E.G. notwithstanding the judgment of its own staff. We have been told that a calculated risk was taken, trying to see what results might be obtained with little outlay. With the wisdom of hindsight, we can say - as was recognised to some extent in the mid-term project review at Reston -that this almost inevitably resulted in poor quality work. It was a false economy.

NEG and the Office of Nutrition must decide whether studies will be included as part of Phase II work. If they are, they must be allocated sufficient funding and adequate time to complete projects. It was interesting to note in the draft project paper for Phase II that the two studies (Egypt and Sri

Lanka) which were examples of stellar research were also the projects that were most adequately funded.

If there is one lesson that comes across loud and clear from the Phase I studies, it is that inadequately funded research produces unsatisfactory products. NEG and the Office of Nutrition would be better funding fewer studies but of higher quality.

There needs to be more discrimination in what will be funded. Part of this exercise should entail decisions about the time frame for studies. Clearly, every policymaker would like research completed in as short a time frame possible. However, not every study can be a "rapid" appraisal. Not every issue can be satisfactorily evaluated in a six-month study. NEG needs to be clear about which issues can be addressed quickly and which require a longer period. Here again, the external advisory panel can provide some guidance.

The review of previous studies suggests that the Phase II projects as a whole must be more methodologically rigorous than prior work. Adequate funding and a realistic time frame for the execution of the study are two preconditions needed to achieve this.

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CHAPTER V

SYNTHESIS AND INTEGRATION

The previous chapter touched briefly on the issue of synthesis and integration of study results. In this chapter these issues are discussed in slightly more detail. Also, in talking about synthesis we would like to extend the discussion beyond simply the studies and examine what type of synthesis work can be done on the technical assistance and training components of the project.

Research under Phase I of the tripartite project has provided the largest cadre of studies on the consumption effects of agricultural policies and programs. The studies used a variety of different data sources and varied data collection protocols. Rather than reinvent the wheel in the Phase II projects, these early studies can provide some guidance on preferred methodological approaches. We are not suggesting a laundry list of types of instruments that for example can be used to collect consumption data. In order to be useful this exercise has to be much more critical. Based on the experience of the projects, NEG staff could construct a handbook of techniques to be used in surveys. There would need to be a differentiation between uses of national

vs. household-generated data, extant vs. primary data collection and a comparison of different types of survey instruments. It would be extremely valuable to select one data set and illustrate how the choice of survey instruments can alter the interpretation of data.

For example, the Egypt subsidy study used calories derived from expenditures as well as a 24-hour recall of consumption to compute calories. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each and how do data differ across the two methods? Other examples also come to mind from the projects completed.

The relevance of the handbook would be increased if in addition to providing critiques of methods, there was a section on how each of the methods can be administered. For food expenditures, it is best to collect information for the previous week? month? or a flexible period of recall? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each and what are the implications? What are some model protocols that can be used? This would provide useful background information to researchers embarking on the Phase II studies. In addition, this would be a form of technical assistance that can be very useful for individuals in developing countries who may be conducting research.

This type of exercise need not be costly and could easily be carried out as part of a current cooperative agreement. Of course, other contractual mechanisms could also be used.

A similar exercise for methods of analysis would be helpful. Before this can be done, NEG will need to do some additional work on analytical approaches. As already suggested, it would be valuable to select two or three of the better data sets and apply AIDS, LES and OLS to determine how results are altered by the analytical approach adopted.

Other types of standardization are also needed. Many of the studies computed calories on a per capita basis. However, if there are differences across types of households or differences across income groups in the age and sex composition of households, the per capita calculation will overestimate the degree of caloric deficits for some and underestimate it for others. The use of an adult equivalent basis for estimating calories circumvents this problem. However, this assumes that the data contain information on the age and sex of household members. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each type of approach? How do results change when calories are changed from a per capita to an adult equivalent basis?

Most of the consumption analyses limited themselves to calories as the nutrient of interest. Are calories a good proxy for the other nutrients? Here again, a more detailed reanalysis of one or two of the data sets would provide some useful guidance on approaches to analysis of consumption data.

Handbooks on methods of data collection and data analysis could be updated as newer information became available.

Many of the general reports that were developed during Phase I were useful. (For example, T.Frankenberger: "Food Consumption and Farming Systems Research: A Summary", February 1987, and N.E.G. "Intra-Household Food Distribution - Review of the Literature and Policy Issues"). It would be valuable to expand this effort by conducting a comparative analysis of certain policy issues from Phase I work.

An integrative analysis should also be done on the issues of price policy and consumer studies. The generalizable findings from the series of studies should be summarized. In addition, results that seem to be country specific should also be highlighted. This comparative type of analysis is very useful to policy-makers who might not be interested in the methodological issues of each study but are anxious to understand the policy implications of various programs. This document should be concise.

We tend not to put the topics of training and technical assistance into categories that lend themselves to a comparative analysis. This is incorrect. Here again, the cadre of studies provide a large volume of information on factors that must be considered in providing technical assistance and training.

Summarizing the "lessons learned" would be a useful building block for the Phase II studies.

CHAPTER VI

SELECTION OF COUNTRIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

There are two opposite extremes to which one might go in launching quite a number of A.I.D. projects, including the tripartite project, which could be abbreviated as "from the top down..." and "from the bottom up". In fact, most of them, including the tripartite project, have been launched more or less completely "from the top down". Despite the attractions in principle of launching "from the bottom up", it presents difficulties and drawbacks. Some of them may be found in the case of an agricultural policy project being implemented for USAID by the consultancy agency ABT, which is one of the few instances of launching "from the bottom up".

As an illustration of how a project activity might be launched from the bottom up, one could envisage a general message going out from S & T to all Country Missions somewhat along the following lines: "The US Government is deeply concerned about the serious malnutrition in the third world, and anxious to assist in improving the situation of food supply from domestic production as one of the most important among several factors which can alleviate this problem. In particular, malnutrition is present in quite a number of developing countries from which food and other agricultural commodities are exported on a significant scale and

also in other countries where farmers could produce more for local consumption if induced to do so and if the productivity of the agricultural sector could be increased. Policies to reduce dependance on food imports (including food aid) should in our view be designed to take much better into account domestic food consumption requirements and be based on studies of the actual and potential demand for food under forward-looking plans for more egalitarian economic development. Kindly discuss with authorities concerned (ministries of planning, agriculture, food, health, social welfare) whether USAID can assist them in tackling this question and, if so, what forms of assistance would be most pertinent: e.g. studies, technical assistance, training of officials etc." This might then open a rather broad field for a great variety of proposals that might come in. USAID would have to select those which take good account of major problems described by the respondents in this area and which show a capacity or willingness to grasp the appropriate ways in which to tackle them, and would hope that the outcome - as seen in terms of an integrated project with a stated purpose such as the tripartite project - would not be too heterogeneous a mass of activities. There would be by this method the assurance that one started out with what the host countries really wanted.

Many Country Missions might conceivably respond that the idea is too vague and that it would not bring forth any concrete or purposeful proposals from the host country. Or, without an opinion from the Mission, which simply passes the idea on, the

actual response might bear out this expectation. We shall probably never know what really might happen were such an approach attempted.

How the launching of the tripartite project, country by country, has actually come about has been largely from the top downward. Admittedly general telexes have been circulated to Missions about the tripartite project; for example, to evince interest in a second phase of the project and expressions of Mission willingness to cooperate, which have indeed come in. But these depend on spreading knowledge of the specific things the tripartite project has already done, and so have a basis for greater specificity in interpreting the question and formulating the answer.

It would seem that the launching of tripartite project has been done progressively on an implementer by implementer, country by country, and country mission by country mission basis. Regarding implementers, word went out through the appropriate trade journals and networks that USAID has money for work in this area. Universities doing, or wanting to do, work in this area, get in touch with USAID (let us use this phrase loosely to cover the Office of Nutrition and the N.E.G.) and a discussion begins. The parties to this discussion focus on whether what USAID wants is what the universities want to do or is reasonably complementary, on what each knows about countries where data already exists that could be used - developed, cleansed, processed,

supplemented analysed - and about the susceptibility of these countries to getting interested in taking action with US help. A fair amount gets onto paper in Washington before a country is even visited or the country mission is consulted. This is because AID/W wants to start out on a path that will not prove too expensive and which corresponds sufficiently closely with AID/W's conception of the problem and the right action to take about it under the tripartite project.

Then the field of choice gets narrowed somewhat as Missions are consulted, since not all respond positively. Compensatively, it is eventually broadened again as the tripartite project expands and gets better known through dissemination of its results. Contractor/A.I.D. visitors then discuss and negotiate with host country governments and in a majority of cases agreement is reached on an activity and the activity gets under way. Normally the Mission is fully in agreement and in many cases the Mission has made a major buy-in to help with financing. However, we have heard of at least one instance where AID/W has worked the whole thing out and the Mission has been told at a pretty late stage prior to actual launching to go along with what has been planned without its participation. We have heard of another case where a Mission gave absolutely minimal support to the action launched because the implementer selected had poor relations with the host government (due to a previous piece of non-project history in which the implementer had shown unwillingness to share decisions with the government to the latter's satisfaction). This

slowed down, but did not wreck the action and there was a painful process of recovery of the confidence of the host government in the work of the implementer.

What does this process mean in terms of criteria which actually operate in the selection of countries for action? First, the countries strongly preferred are those with data thought to be usable (though in some cases it has been seriously out of date or otherwise inadequate). Secondly, the countries are ones where someone in the host government and/or the Mission are already open minded and ready to be involved with the tripartite project's approach. Thirdly, the countries include those with which implementer personnel already have contacts and prior knowledge and/or where the problems and policies relate to research interests the University implementers wished to pursue in advance of seeking to serve the tripartite project. Fourthly, a small minority of the countries are more like "bottom up" cases because they or the Missions in them took the initiative to approach AID/W for help.

Operating under these criteria, a wide variety of countries has been selected. They range in GNP per capita from well under \$200 to over \$1000, in population from 1.7 million to a hundred times that amount, in the share of the agricultural sector in GDP from 7 per cent to over 50 per cent.

What, speaking in very rough and general terms, are the countries which are, or ought to be, most interested in doing something about nutrition concerns in agriculture? Will they not be those which have a serious malnutrition problem, affecting a politically significant fraction of their population, which contributes to their instability? Will they not be those with few potentialities for affording major food imports, i.e. few potentialities for export earnings? Will these not be countries whose economic sectors, apart from agriculture are small and bound to remain small for lack of natural resources and/or capital? Will they not have to grow at home most of the food they need, or continue to be heavily dependant on food aid? (There will be marginal cases, such as Cape Verde Island, which cannot survive without eternal food aid). Will they not be countries with small populations, largely primary sector economies, and little strategic significance, so that their government's agenda will have little on it but the problem of feeding their people and little hope of dodging major economic issues by exploiting great power rivalry to their advantage? Will they, though having many of these qualities, exclude totalitarian countries like Ethiopia whose governments have shown their readiness to ignore or conceal problems of hunger, or countries like Haiti or Lebanon, whose central authorities have so disintegrated that no serious problem can any longer be tackled?

There is at least one major criterion which points in quite a different direction from several of the criteria on this list

above: this is the sophistication of the government and the capacity of its personnel to grasp the technical issues which consumption and demand concerns in agriculture raise and to understand the methods of inquiry and analysis by which they may be tackled. Countries which have (or had, such as Haiti) a long tradition of a foreign-educated politically dominant elite educated abroad are largely fairly populous countries, such as Egypt, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, which, despite their poverty in per capita terms, can afford government ministries and research and planning institutes with high-level manpower that can quickly grasp the significance of the tripartite project and of its findings. The countries named are also, except India, badly in need of the project and which have (except Pakistan) in fact accepted and benefitted from it.

The bottom line to the discussion in this chapter is that, so long as the tripartite project has to be run with a low budget, countries selected will be those with data already gathered or countries which will use the micro-economic form of consumption concerns in agriculture not requiring costly data-gathering, namely the agricultural project and farm management systems level of intervention. We explain in Chapter IV the adverse consequences of using ageing data gathered for purposes other than those they are expected to serve under the tripartite project.

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CHAPTER VII

HOST COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT AND INSTITUTIONALISATION

The impact of the tripartite project on the countries where its activities have been conducted is in principle the center of focus of this evaluation, insofar as all other aspects seem pointless without this impact. Even the activities of training USAID officials and of informing the academic and research community of the findings of studies is only of practical value, in the last analysis, if, through the medium of these other people, an impact is eventually made on developing countries of a kind that can lead to improvements in nutrition.

We say "in principle" this is our focus because in practice we have not been able to find out nearly as much as we would have liked on this subject. First and foremost, we could only visit two of the many countries reached by the tripartite project, and only one in which the project's work had been completed. Even there the end of the story had not quite been reached because the final report had not been distributed in Spanish and read, marked, learned and inwardly digested by those in a position to act on its implications. Secondly, there does not seem to have been any systematic reporting procedure by A.I.D., N.E.G. or the Country Missions on follow-up to the tripartite project and an assessment of its impact on the host countries. An N.E.G. staff

member (see B.14) accompanied us to Honduras and participated imaginatively in our efforts to discover the project's impact there but it seems that a visit with such a purpose is quite unusual for the N.E.G. Admittedly, N.E.G. staff do participate in the round-up meetings or workshops where the findings of studies are discussed with host country officials and they have the opportunity then to observe the reactions of the host country people. But what happens after that may well be almost a closed book to them.

We asked the cooperating and contracted universities what impact they thought they were making on the host countries. Iowa State University stated that one concrete result of their efforts in Indonesia was to help bring about the policy decision to progressively reduce the subsidy on fertilizer used in rice production. They also hinted at other, unspecified, impacts. Also, thanks to financial and other support by another A.I.D. project designed to assist in the strengthening of agricultural policy in Indonesia, there had been meetings organised with agricultural planning officials to discuss the Iowa State University findings. Under the strong leadership of the chief agricultural officer of the Mission a good effort was under way in Indonesia to coordinate the efforts of all the USAID projects bearing on agricultural policy; his interest in the tripartite project gave good hope that the Iowa work would not end up on a shelf.

Though a difficult beginning was made in Zambia, Iowa achieved a worthwhile outcome insofar as recent evidence indicates that that host country is using the model developed under the tripartite project.

In Jamaica the Iowa State University work has not received proper consideration in official circles due to the lack of financial provision to hold a briefing meeting for interested ministries.

There is an understandable reluctance by A.I.D. and other donor governments to provide money for meetings, when they find they are able to meet in their own capitals without any additional expense. It should be recognised that in developing countries meeting rooms of any size are scarce; it may well be necessary to hire a room, which will be available only in a hotel of quality. Such hotels may provide rooms on reasonable terms if they are also ordered to provide refreshments or a meal. It is a good idea to do this to promote attendance. Here again, a free meal is more needed and appreciated than in the capital of a developed country. It is simply realistic to have this inducement to attend when there are so many meetings to which important officials are invited. A meeting in a major hotel is likely to attract the attention of the media, which is also an inducement for important people to attend and show they are doing something about an important subject. Publicity for consumption concerns in agricul-

ture is always welcome; it may generate popular pressure to get something done.

There may be a similar attitude in A.I.D. to other small expenses involved in the dissemination of reports (such as the translation expense in Honduras). "After doing all that work for them, it ought to be worth their while to spend a little of their own money using our gift?" This would be an understandable cry, if heard. In fact, putting your money where your mouth is may not be a serious test of host country commitment. Many host countries that are helped, especially those needing help most, are so broke that bills of all kinds for many causes go unpaid. If extravagance and corruption can still be seen in their government circles, this is not an indication of capacity to pay; it is just an indication of one more reason why most bills go unpaid.

In Mali circumstances were propitious due to the existence of a powerful multi-donor committee that dialogs with the government on the restructuring of cereals markets and which is kept informed, and will discuss with the government, the findings of the Tufts study as soon as they are finalised. A major roundup meeting is envisaged for May 1988. In the case of the Dominican Republic, Tufts regretted that the final roundup meeting proved to be premature. It was scheduled before delays in the completion of work could be properly foreseen and assessed. USAID wanted to stick to the original date, nevertheless, because it is under

constant pressure to produce results and it is thus impatient for output.

A point which struck us favorably was the response we received when asking universities what sort of guidance and supervision they got from the Office of Nutrition. They said that the Office was "anxious to ascertain that we were getting out something in a form that would make our work assimilable by the host country." There was more interest in practical results and in impact on the host country than on making sure the universities were working on sound technical lines. On the latter they were expected to know their job and do it well without having their decisions taken for them by A.I.D.

It may not be entirely obvious and should perhaps be said that A.I.D., and indeed the aid agencies of other donor countries, are likely to ensure that their performance conforms to the expectations of their own parliaments or governments rather than to the requirements and evaluations of the host countries they assist. In their own capital frequent progress reports are required, structured according to policies and criteria formulated in their capital. The cooperators and contractors, more detached from the paymaster government and closer to the needs and situation of the assisted countries, organise their work and adjust their performance more to the latter. It is on this basis that they see the time required and the way to follow to do the job properly. A.I.D., with its reporting obligations, comes to them frequently.

To speak metaphorically, it takes the pack of cards from their hands and sorts through it to pick out what will best go under the particular headings of the A.I.D. report or memo. currently required; sometimes the aces, sometimes the three of clubs. Those producing and holding the pack of cards may not have made a three of clubs yet (it is still in the mail from the Dominican Republic), and so they have to insert a joker or wild card instead. Later, when the three of clubs and indeed all the cards are available, you have the makings of an excellent comprehensive report, but then the timing may be wrong or the subject may be insufficiently topical to find readers and supporters at that particular point in the cycle of government reporting, evaluation and programming procedures and the rate of turnover of official thinking. There may even be a new and entirely different administration.

The degree to which the host country is susceptible to being involved in consumption concerns in agriculture depends to a major extent on factors discussed in Chapter VI, many of them outside the control of either USAID or the host country. That chapter, on the selection of countries for implementation of the tripartite project, should be read in close conjunction with this one.

Without losing sight of those factors, we have noticed a number of others which affect the extent to which an impact is

made by the tripartite project on the host countries and which we summarise in the balance of this chapter.

The implementers of the tripartite project have on the whole understood and applied the principle that it must be carried out and followed-up through host country personnel to the maximum extent possible. It must respond to, or else be preceded by enlightenment of, their own conception of their food production, supply and consumption problems. The ideal, achieved for example by previous contact of the implementer (say a university professor) with a key host country figure in this picture - he may have seen a tripartite project report from another country - is for a start to be made by the host country coming to talk with the A.I.D. Country Mission about related problems. The Mission may then be fortunate in having an official who understands his point and his point of view and knows about the tripartite project and (with the backing of his Mission superiors) gets in touch with the Office of Nutrition. The latter then, if we are still being fortunate, responds enthusiastically to the interest shown by the Mission and gives the country the same priority as it would to another country in which the Office itself took the first initiative. N.E.G, receiving first word of the matter from the Office, feels free with this blessing to act with all the stops out. It finds, we hope, a university or other implementer that can be relied upon to stick within the bounds of both what the tripartite project tries to do and what the host country thinks, or can be persuaded to think, it needs. Then N.E.G., having got

the blessing of the Office and the Country Mission for this choice and initiative, sends the implementer's emissary with one of its own people to the host country to prepare the ground. Obviously this is a crucial selling and planning stage which, according to the way it is done, can make or break whatever follows. The N.E.G. fellow traveller on this mission, who for consistency and follow-up should be the one who continues to be responsible for whatever follows, will we hope have read and kept in mind the N.E.G. document "CEAP Studies and the Host Countries: What Next? Institutionalization and other Matters" by Gary Smith (November 1983). Ideally, if the project as then discussed and agreed upon goes forward, the implementer will put in place resident staff for whom the Mission will be "home", a host country institution will be "the office". Also, most important, there will be a host country authority dealing with agricultural or at least general planning who will regard the implementers as well within that authority's collegiate ambit. From start to finish, the design and coordination of the project will relate to policy issues and to identified gaps in knowledge and technology that are, or at least in the light of the project's output will be, considered relevant and important by that authority within the "collegiate ambit". The output, when fully available and having passed muster under the close scrutiny of N.E.G and the Office, will be made well available (say a thousand copies and a sensible distribution list) in the official language in the form of two documents. The first will be a technical report, with annexes showing all of the "workings" and methods used. The

second will be a less technical document, understandable to policy makers and inter-disciplinary groups, which garnishes the findings with a surround of good historical and descriptive analysis of the problems and of the implications of the findings for policy and/or agricultural project design and management. Both these documents, after an adequate interval for their dissemination and absorption, will be discussed at two separate, different and consecutive meetings to which those able to understand them and do something appropriate about them will be invited. The convenors of both meetings should be host country officials, or institutions, of significance and relevance and they should include among the invitees other donors and international organisations that might also be induced to put their shoulder to the nutrition in agriculture wheel. The implementers will then check at "home", in the Country Mission, before departure, that all is well in hand for follow-up of the tripartite project activity (say a study, though much of what is said here might apply also to technical assistance or training) and that other A.I.D. projects, contemporaneous and consecutive, that can be supportive, are going to help. A year or two later - the timing depending on the specific circumstances and the calendar of expectations - N.E.G should make a visit to the host country, hopefully post-natal rather than post-mortem, to evaluate host country impact and the progress of institutionalization and to seek lessons to be learned and applied to future activities.

Here, as elsewhere, the evaluation of what the Office and N.E.G and the implementers have done can be self-evaluation. If they have acted along the lines of what we have just suggested, we believe that there is a good chance of a host country impact. If there has been an impact though less was done or more was done in a different way, then either they have been lucky or we have been wrong.

CHAPTER VIII

CONTRACTORS

Contractors with A.I.D are directly supervised by it, whereas those signing a Cooperative Agreement with A.I.D. have a broader assignment, open-ended for the addition of specific tasks serving the stated purpose of the Agreement. N.E.G. (and S & T/N) can thus "farm out" to cooperators some of the management of the tripartite project, whereas contractors require their close attention and supervision in the execution of clearly defined tasks to be completed within a stated time period. Among the pros and cons of these alternatives, there is a predilection for an N.E.G. staff member to opt for a cooperative agreement because this permits the ear-marking of a substantial sum of money for his or her activities before it has been pre-empted by another colleague.

Obviously confidence has to be established in the leadership and managerial capacity of the co-signer, such as a university, before a Cooperative Agreement can be made. All the expenses of a contractor incurred in performing the task are covered, whereas the Cooperator is expected to make a financial contribution as well as A.I.D. In return for this the Cooperator expects to gain something from the deal as well as it being of help to beneficiaries in the third world. Cooperators tend to estimate handsome-

ly the value of their own contribution. However, without just counting the nuts and bolts, it has to be recognised that USAID gains considerably from using the services of some Cooperators, especially the universities.

When comparing the relative advantages of different contractors and cooperators to which A.I.D. might turn, the universities have a lot to offer. If properly chosen, as they generally have been in the case of the tripartite project, they bring to the job a wealth of intellectual capital and experience relating to the discipline and (usually) to the countries which they are called upon to assist. They involve personnel in the work who are much more likely (than in the case of say consultancy companies) to have been "in the picture" long before this particular job and to remain in it after the job is finished. In fact they may well, because of their professional interest, have a greater commitment to the work and to its follow-up than A.I.D. itself. If A.I.D. money stops flowing, they are adept at finding other backers to keep their cause moving forward. Unfortunately, it cannot be so confidently claimed that they are cheaper than other consultants simply on the ground that university personnel tend to get lower salaries than commercial consultant staff: universities have enormous overall expenses and many "non-self-liquidating" staff to carry and they need the good "profit" they make on A.I.D. assignments, under which the allowance for overheads seems to be a sufficient incentive for them to give higher priority to A.I.D. work than they do to a number of their traditional activities.

The A.I.D. work enables them to build up considerably their understanding of the adaptation of their disciplines to conditions of the third world, which is important for building up the foreign-aid-giving expertise of a country such as the United States, having conditions that are so different.

There is a risk with the use of universities as cooperators and contractors which one does not run with consultant groups, and which the tripartite project may have proved vulnerable to, and that is of "the tail wagging the dog". That is to say, universities are naturally peopled with individuals having keen research interests and strongly held views precisely in the fields in which their expertise is sought. Not infrequently they have ongoing work on particular subjects or themes, for which they are in need of further funding to continue and complete the task. They will gravitate toward any funding source having ideas in a similar technical area, or needs which could be served in a complementary way while they continue to meet their own. The risk then is that an agreement is reached with the paymaster couched in language which permits a marriage of convenience between what the paymaster seeks and what the university wishes to do. Sometimes the result can be that the work accomplished does not turn out to be exactly what was expected and asked for, but is also not so different as to be rejectable. This could be among the several factors which have brought about a rather fragmented, ad hoc and not entirely coherent and synthesizable corpus of work under the tripartite project.

There is another risk with universities (shared in this case with other sources of consultancy), to which the tripartite project has been less subject thanks to the necessary vigilance on the part of S & T/N, N.E.G. and the Country Mission officials relating with the project. This is that too large a share of the actual work to be done is carried forward by much less qualified and experienced people than the principals, under less close supervision by the latter than there should be. This risk underlines the importance of adequate budgetary provision for travel by USAID and contractor and cooperator personnel to the countries assisted. Moreover, when the time for follow-up and policy dialog comes, it is essential for the principals to have the knowledge, eloquence and stature to be listened to with respect by the interlocutors in the host country. All this amounts to having adequate participation by the most senior partners whenever their presence and full attention is required.

We can affirm that, among the American specialists in relevant areas of economic theory and its application - theory of demand etc - those whose services have been obtained for the tripartite project are leaders in their field.

More specific comments may be made on the universities cooperating with the tripartite project where we made visits and had direct contacts.

The Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at the Iowa State University, which works on the tripartite project in collaboration with the University of Missouri, is under the direction of a prominent figure in the field of consumption and demand studies and the interaction of domestic and international food commodity markets, both in developed and developing countries, exemplifies some of the best work being done on the tripartite project which is heavily biased toward the use of econometrics. The staff, and especially the two most senior staff, in CARD in addition to being formidable theorists, have the edge over many other academics in the field insofar as they are very experienced as witnesses before U.S. congressional committees, as advisers to the Canadian, Indonesian and other governments, and as public speakers, explaining the practical implications for policy and public welfare of their technical work and research. It is extremely important in the tripartite project to have people who understand fully all the technical aspects of the project and who can speak in non-technical language to politicians and policy-makers and convince them of the need for change.

The CARD professors are among the best practitioners of the econometric approach, and the most confident believers in it. Nevertheless, they are not without their critics. There are those who object that econometric models are more sensitive to changes in the assumptions on which they are based than to

changes in the data fed into them and that the findings emerging from them are unconvincing to policy-makers because these models are static (a "snapshot" rather than a dynamic "movie" of the real world), more sensitive to the assumptions on which they depend than upon changes in the data which may be fed into them. There are some who consider that what are sometimes called "intuitive" studies can produce more convincing findings and guidelines for agricultural policy makers. This "intuitive approach" seems to mean absorbing into a human brain over a period of years an intimate and detailed knowledge of the behaviour, reactions and requirements of producers and consumers in the food market, seen in a dynamic, real-life context, and coming out with advice on the direction and roughly (it has to be "roughly" by this approach) the magnitude of the changes and consequences to be expected as a result of a policy change or a change in a policy instrument (such as those affecting cost and price levels). There has been a case (not under the jurisdiction of CARD but a part of the tripartite project) where two different authorities using econometric methods came out with diametrically opposed advice on an envisaged policy change, each feeding similar data into different models and getting contradictory outputs.

The CARD people view this criticism as failing to take sufficiently into account the recent advances in econometric methodology to which they have contributed and they rate more highly than some of their critics their success in convincing

policy-makers. In Indonesia for example, they feel that they now have more of the answers than have hitherto been provided and will be listened to more carefully now that the agenda is broadening to take account of the position of both food producers and consumers considered together. It is welcome that the head of the Mission's agricultural office (B.3), a highly competent judge of the technical as well as other substantive and practical aspects of the tripartite project and of this issue of the validity of the econometric approach, considers it valuable to keep a debate going in Indonesia. The Indonesian officials concerned are quite sophisticated and can judge for themselves what they should take and what they should leave, as the different facts and viewpoints are laid before them by the expatriates. Another welcome consideration to us is that one of the technically highly competent experts in the Indonesian picture (B.4) considers the work of the CARD people valid and backed up by networking and experience-gathering with specialists and practitioners in many countries.

There is, it may be said, a trade-off to be perceived through this discussion. The tripartite project, when seeking to find an economical way to get a clear and reliable understanding of the situation of food consumers, has been led to eschew major and costly new sample surveys of various kinds, to make the best of existing data previously gathered for other purposes, and to compensate for deficiencies and gaps in the data by subjecting them to appropriate econometric processing. The more one economi-

zes on the data gathering and seeks to bolster the results with econometrics, the greater the risk that the latter will not be able to guarantee reliability of findings.

This trade off relates particularly to a macro-economic level of analysis: the consumption effects of agricultural policies. At the micro-level, when studying the consumption effects of agricultural projects, presents a possible way out of the difficult choice between costly data-gathering and overstraining the powers of econometrics. At the macro-level, one is concerned with vast numbers of consumers, often, as in the case of big countries like Indonesia, living in a widely differing variety of geographical regions and even, in some cases, being in different food markets not fully linked with each other. On the supply side, one is concerned with instruments of policy which will have a different effect between regions as they go into application. The picture is a complex one to analyse. At the micro-level, where one deals with an agricultural project confined to a more limited area and concerning a relatively much smaller number of producers and consumers, surveying of the latter and reaching to minds of the former is a much more limited and less costly operation, and the situation is inherently one in which there can be prompt and continual feedback between the viewpoints and interests of consumers and producers.

This consideration lends great interest to the approach fostered by the Office of Arid Lands of the University of

Arizona, Tucson, in cooperation with the University of Kentucky, under the tripartite project. The Cooperative Agreement with these universities is a model of its kind. It is a very early stage at which to evaluate the work starting up under this agreement. However, we were impressed with the dedication of the staff involved (and soon to be involved), by the good interdisciplinary cooperation, by the clarity of thought and writing of the principals and their readiness to see that the relative "pinpricks" of intervention at the micro-level can only gain broader significance at a more global third world level if their activities are considered to be experimental and demonstrative and if, as experience cumulates, a growing portion of their time goes into dissemination activity. Ways have to be found to reach many project managers in many countries and convey to them the common sense message that they, like any other producers, have to plan their production on the basis of studies of their markets. This is obvious when the market a producer faces is already entirely commercial and the demand they serve is entirely effective demand. What the food producers have to face (beyond a small "enclave" of existing effective demand) is a significant degree of unsatisfied ineffective demand for their products which may, with a little of the right economic progress to which their own project can - if it will - contribute, eventually blossom into effective demand. This is the message of the high income elasticity of demand for food among the numerous poor, though we admit, as stated in Chapter VIII, that the income and other factors affecting demand for food and intake of calories are

complex and require further analysis. The leader of the Arizona/Kentucky team (B.9) sees rightly that his task is to work himself out of a job. That is to say, he has pre-eminently to launch a movement to persuade more and more, and eventually most, agricultural project managers to be fully concerned with their actual and potential markets, to realise, as those reached already have, that due preoccupation with the consumer is the normal way to design and manage any project.

A strength the Arizona group shares with the Iowa State University group is a capacity to produce good information material and to carry out public relations, dissemination and training effectively.

Tufts University School of Nutrition has ably conducted studies in the Dominican Republic and Mali, enabled by budget adequacy to maintain, as already noted, a residential presence in the aided countries, to follow the work closely and keep it on the right track by close supervision on the part of the Principal Investigator (B.10). The School itself provides an interdisciplinary backing to the work, including the guidance and technical assistance of an econometrician.

The contribution of an economist formerly associated with the University of New Mexico (B.11) to the excellently broad, well-structured and cohesive tripartite project work in Honduras

demonstrates the advantage to be gained from the long-term intervention of personnel knowing the country well, keeping up to date with developments there and sharing in other A.I.D. work of relevance to the project. A number of other university consultants have also helped to round out and strengthen the methodology of the Honduras work.

CHAPTER IX

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

A.I.D.

A.I.D. is well placed to promote coordination between the tripartite project and other American aid projects.

An important end result of the project is to influence the course of policy dialog, especially regarding food and agriculture policies. A.I.D. can help considerably in this connection, though it cannot enter the dialog with the same neutrality as, say, an international organisation. In the case of the countries we visited, Mali is desperately dependant on US and other food aid in the frequently recurrent droughts, and Honduras is in the midst of a strategic and political situation where it is similarly subject to a powerful external forces. For these reasons it is to be preferred that the major implementers under the tripartite project are universities, which can be regarded by the host countries as more politically neutral, intellectually fair and guided mainly by the dictates of logic, than A.I.D. itself. It also helps that A.I.D. appears to be willing to leave it to the host country officials and institutions to take control of the process of "institutionalization", to train them sufficiently so

that they can themselves do the job of "selling" to their countrymen the implications of the tripartite project studies, findings and guidance and of analysing and re-formulating agricultural policies and agricultural project designs. It is necessary for the political "comfort" of both the US and the host country governments to have independent universities or institutes or semi-autonomous planning groups convene the workshops at which agricultural policies are discussed, since when these policies take further account of consumer welfare they are even more likely than before to impinge on vested interests and on such touchy issues as the distribution of land ownership and the organisation of production.

An American aid program (as distinct from the aid programs of much poorer donor countries) should have the considerable advantages of a wealthy backer: capacity to pay sufficiently for the best talent available; capacity to plan and commit resources over an adequate time period to finish long-term as well as short-term jobs and to make a lasting impact; capacity to follow-up completed aid with other relevant action in logical sequence to a completed project; capacity to network with many other aid programs and donor countries and to share in the leadership of a concerted attack on major problems such as nutrition throughout the Third World.

In fact, at present, A.I.D. seems to be rather adversely affected in its work by budgetary problems, procedures and

constraints. Overshadowing all is the national budgetary deficit and pressure for economies. Though the total budget for A.I.D. is still impressive in absolute terms among all the programs assisting the Third World, it is under pressure to produce concrete results quickly and to maximise the "spread" of each dollar. As a result we see in the tripartite project the undertaking of a number of studies and other actions which are possibly too many in the sense that resources are spread too thinly to get each job done properly and to ensure follow through, up to decisive and lasting impact.

One example of "the ship being spoilt for a ha'porth of tar" is in Honduras, where the N.E.G did not have the \$2000 or so required to translate the final report into Spanish. Admittedly the Country Mission said they could find the money for translation, but this was only thanks to their goodwill and because the problem had been brought to their attention (by us) eight months after the report had appeared in English. On the host country side, a summary had been prepared in Spanish at their expense. Perhaps more could be expected of the host country. But developing countries get a lot of reports and other foreign aid of varying quality and relevance. It is only reasonable to expect them to put their precious resources on the line once the required steps have been taken by the donor to convince them that here they have a winner. In any event the main action expected of them is on a big scale: to change their agricultural policies once they have been given the full story in their own language.

The former chief of the N.E.G. (B.2) told us that from the outset she had wanted to undertake the longer-term, deeper studies which were called for in the mid-term project review at a participants' workshop in Reston, Virginia, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the "mid-term review"). It was not surprising that the participants had found much of the preceding work subject to the defects of doing things cheaply: for example, using data already gathered for other purposes, relevant to but not tailored to serve the consumption study objectives of the tripartite project; limiting objectives to what might be achieved in a maximum of six months; under-estimating numerous factors which cause delay and waste of time and money in developing countries; depending on country mission "buy-ins" or other sources of conjoint funding with some consequent diversification of purposes served and objectives pursued; making existing relevant intellectual capital and acquired experience a predominant factor in the choice of contractors and cooperators (even though they might be unsuitable in other important ways, such as having lost the confidence of the host country during previous work there). The latter two considerations have a lot to be said in their favor, but it has to be recognized that you get one kind of house if you build it with the parts of a demolished house and another if you build it with new parts selected for their suitability to the house you have designed.

There seems to be a feeling that central funds should serve as seed money and be spread as widely (and hence thinly) as possible over all developing countries, with the Country Missions buying in the lion's share of the burden of implementing the project. This ensures that you have Mission members' commitment to a project they genuinely believe in. It also means, however, that you have a row of projects worldwide that differ considerably in conception and execution according to the viewpoints of the Missions. If the latter are doing their job well, they reflect the needs of the host countries as they are seen by those countries themselves. This is not entirely satisfactory because the tripartite project is a kind of project which is particularly needed by host countries which have a rather wrong-headed view of how best to serve their people's basic needs.

The philosophy of why there should be central funds controlled by a body like S & T to bring about technical advances under foreign aid is too large and difficult a subject to enter frontally here. However it might be admitted that (i) such funds should serve to help the assisted countries to discover or realise what the Country Missions are too parochial to think of; (ii) they should not just be spread thinly according to a "me too" strategy of strengthening existing arms moving in directions the Missions have already chosen, but rather be concentrated on a solid and convincing demonstration of new ideas and approaches in a few countries which their money can cover, with enough money left over to pay for teaching A.I.D. officials

in the other Missions the lessons learned from these experiments.

The Office of Nutrition is seriously understaffed. This may be due partly to misfortune (such as the sickness of the director) but the number of vacancies and the deficiency of staff to carry the workload should be controllable under sound management practices. The RSSA with USDA to obtain the services of the N.E.G. was a solution found long ago to this problem (though there are admittedly other reasons too for using USDA). It hardly seems an open or openable question, when considering how Phase II might be managed, to examine other options for S & T/N project management reinforcement than a RSSA with a government technical department like USDA. This is because only such bodies have sufficient working capital at their disposal to keep operations going all year round however many months late A.I.D. may be in paying for these services. Hardly any university and no consultancy company would be able to provide so much credit throughout part of each financial year, except at interest rates to which the government would presumably object.

Even if this problem has been exaggerated or wrongly analysed by those who portrayed it to us, the alternatives to an RSSA with a governmental group - i.e. contracting outside the government - appear to have other snags. These might include inequality of emphasis on studies, technical assistance and training, according to the "slant" of the cooperating institution chosen; incompatibility of control procedures; the risk of shifting the centre of gravity perhaps far from Washington and

the Office of Nutrition. The constraints surrounding use of a group such as N.E.G. mean that it is far from an ideal option, but possibly better than anything else. Perhaps some of the constraints surrounding N.E.G. can be alleviated?

Looking now at the sub-project level of management (affecting individual elements in the tripartite project), it seems exceptional to pay for the full-time residential presence of a contractor or cooperator staff member in the host country to watch over day by day the on-going work under a study. It is not implied that host country people cannot carry out studies, but that without this expatriate presence they will do it their own way whereas the name of the game is to use a university to transmit particular know-how which is non-existent, dormant or unemployed in the host country. It is also, under existing budgets, quite easy for the activity to expire, and start to be forgotten, as soon as the final report on the completed study has been delivered to Washington in enough copies to round out the files into which it should go. There is not, as a matter of general practice, financial provision for translation (if necessary) and for publication in a sufficient number of copies of both the original technical text and of a practical manual spelling out, minus buzz words, its methods and findings and its implications for policy. Equally there is no provision for a workshop at which the readers can exchange views on these publications and choose among the best options for changing and implementing new policies; and inadequate provision for monitoring and evaluation to ensure that money already spent is

leading to institutionalization and, eventually, to improvements in nutrition.

We would raise some questions regarding the problem of satisfactory implementation and follow-up depending, as we have seen in the case of the tripartite project, too much on the goodwill and memory of individuals. Is there adequate evaluation and monitoring? Adequate evaluation would be, say, a thorough enquiry not more frequently than every three years, as distinct from more frequent, ad hoc and superficial assessments. It also means: are there effective procedures for ensuring that the same work is not going to be done more than once? - for retrieving the results of valid previous work and building upon it or revising it as required? - for discovering the reasons why good work in the past made no impact, so as to redesign the approach appropriately if a second attack is to be made on the same objective, this time with better hope of reaching it? Do these procedures only depend on the memories of individuals or are there (for example through the monitoring system) progress reports and records in the institutional memory of Country Missions and AID/W which bring newcomers into the picture and ensure proper follow-up?

For example, the Mission official in Honduras who promised, as mentioned above, to get the report translated into Spanish, was due to leave government service entirely a few days later. Is there a mechanism to ensure that his promise will be remembered

and kept? Does the system give his successor some sense of obligation to keep the promise?

Evaluations and reviews can differ considerably, yet remain valuable and pertinent. The present evaluation brings an independent viewpoint; the mid-term review mentioned above had a different but considerable value in bringing together participants that know where the shoe pinches and how to get a better fit, and in promoting some integration between widely dispersed project activities subject to strong centrifugal and diversifying forces.

The managers of the Office of Nutrition and of N.E.G. cannot be held fully responsible for either the achievements or the failures of the tripartite project: they are heavily dependent on the cooperation and understanding of a complex range of other A.I.D. instrumentalities. There are several major questions about the management of the project which relate to the whole organisation of A.I.D. and which apply also to the management of the Agency's other projects. These can only be addressed in a higher-level evaluation.

While accepting the general rule of major delegation of authority and resources to the Country Missions, is there not, in the case of the tripartite project and other instances where the proper role of S & T is to pioneer new technical approaches, to innovate and to promote actions and policies that the Missions are not likely to think of, or to be easily persuaded to accept

until new facts enlighten them, - is there not a need for S & T (in this case S & T/N), to be free to apply substantial resources in selected countries and to be given the amount of time required to complete the job of developing something along sound lines? Is this not a quintessential role for which S & T ought to exist and to have separate funds and technical staff? Should it not be exempt in such circumstances from claims that it should stop duplicating a bilateral program? Should it continue to be obliged to rely heavily on buy-ins if this runs the risk of fragmenting its approach and reducing the compatibility and comparability - and increasing the susceptibility to integration - of project data and findings in the different countries?

We appreciate the cogency of the arguments for "buy-ins" and the practical realities surrounding the phenomenon. Our foregoing paragraph contains simply questions, not assertions, to stimulate a debate and to offer defensive arguments for an S & T unit which may be unduly inhibited about spending sizeable sums of its own money on a pioneering type of activity strongly needed in a developing country even though that need is not yet sufficiently felt there, at least by the Country Mission.

The Nutrition Office

As noted above, this Office has insufficient staff to manage the tripartite project directly in its entirety and for this among other reasons created the N.E.G. in the Technical Assis-

tance Division of the Office of International Cooperation of the US Department of Agriculture. Judging from the draft we saw of Phase II, the S & T/N - perhaps as a reflection of S & T's self-conception generally - sees itself as an intellectual power house that can give technical guidance and backstopping to the tripartite project. If it is to have this role, which seems quite appropriate and legitimate, then it should in principle be free of responsibility for day-to-day management of details. Experience in the official international organisations has shown that when, initially, research departments took on the added responsibility of managing technical assistance and foreign aid operations, they ceased to do either research or aid management at all well. The one was supposed to stimulate the other, but in fact the one distracted and disrupted the other. It is better for both to be managed by technical staff, but operating in separate departments.

At present the Office of Nutrition appears to be seriously over-extended, not only for lack of staff but also because a lot of its time (which should be devoted to keeping itself and others abreast of technical developments and the state of the art) is used up on administrative chores. Moreover, there appears to be an ad hoc and frequently changing division of labour between it and N.E.G. which runs down more or less vertically between management activities at the same level rather than horizontally between higher and lower levels of supervision and of detail in substantive matters. Some dissatisfaction of the Office with

N.E.G. has manifested itself (and vice versa) which can be discussed below in connection with N.E.G. This dissatisfaction should simply be mentioned here as a possible explanation of the fact that the Office of Nutrition has got itself directly involved in detailed questions which one would have expected N.E.G. to handle. In the case of the project in Mali, we found that at the beginning Tufts University was carrying on a triangular and duplicative, even contradictory, correspondence with N.E.G. and the Office about the same matters. This was solved by changing the two Washington addresses to one; a little surprisingly, it was the Office of Nutrition which remained in the picture and N.E.G. which was excluded.

The role of the Office of Nutrition in the implementation of Phase II needs to be looked at carefully and afresh. When conclusions are reached, the size and composition of the Office staff should then be brought into line with the conclusions (or, if this cannot be, then the conclusions will have to be revised). The aspects of this role which we might suggest for consideration are given in Chapter XI.

It is now well recognised that human nutrition depends on a wide range of parameters which only an interdisciplinary team can grasp and handle together. It is comparable in a number of ways to the employment problem, which cannot be solved either by human resources experts or even by economists alone. Nutrition involves availability of food, ability to buy or acquire it and under-

standing of what is good for you to eat. Employment similarly involves availability of resources to work with, facilities for people to be where the job has to be done and knowledge on their part of how to do the job well. Without employment, people usually cannot afford to eat enough and without sufficient food over their life span people are diminished in physical and mental capacity and have such low productivity that they are not worth employing except for very low incomes. An Office which has to obtain the cooperation of other elements and disciplines in A.I.D., notably the technical officers in the Country Missions, needs people on its staff who can speak the language of these different counterparts, or at least such staff in N.E.G. to speak for it. This being said, its complement should include - especially in the upper echelons - adequate representation of nutritionists of the kind who accept that they cannot be of much practical value in their field unless they use inter-disciplinary teams. The tripartite project particularly needs nutritionists of this kind and people who can converse with agronomists and agricultural economists. N.E.G. fortunately includes on its staff individuals with combined training in nutrition and agricultural economics.

To say that there is no need for an Office of Nutrition, but simply of nutritionists putting in their oar in other technical departments, is rather like saying that there is no need for employment policy specialists and manpower planners - you can just leave it to economists and economic planners to produce the

prosperity which creates the jobs. Economists are more likely to raise national incomes than to eradicate unemployment, which like hunger exists side by side with prosperity in many parts of the world. Similarly, agricultural economists can lead the way to a prosperous farming sector (based, for example, on burgeoning exports to towns and to other countries) and leave many people in the country, even in the farming sector, seriously malnourished. In both cases there has to be an entity holding the brief for full-time social concern for the satisfaction of basic human needs, notwithstanding the current distribution of income. An argument which economists can understand, and which presents perhaps the strongest case in a nutshell for a preoccupation with linkages between agriculture and consumption, is that it is not generally all that easy to make agriculture prosper exclusively by serving urban and foreign markets, where the competition is stiff. The main hope is to expand the domestic rural market by enabling the poor there to purchase the food they need by virtue of a more egalitarian process of economic development (such as you get by pursuing employment objectives in economic planning). It then becomes an operation of raising yourself by your bootstraps.

Before leaving A.I.D. a word should be said about the role of the Country Missions in helping to manage the tripartite project and its follow-up. We have seen only one at work (in Mali) since in Honduras the work was completed. We did however have the

benefit of thorough discussions with a few key figures (B.3, B.4) in the Indonesia Mission and with former mission staff in the Dominican Republic (B.3) and Haiti (B.4). We also got an indirect reflection from the impressions of contractors and cooperators, notably at Tufts, Iowa State and Arizona universities. On the Mission in Mali, reference may be made to Annex C. It is exemplary of the best that could be expected: first class intellectual leadership given (especially by the agricultural economist (B.7)) to the young and inexperienced but capable and talented Tufts resident project director (B.8), good logistical support for the project staff's professional and personal needs, and, last but far from least, Mission participation in highly relevant government machinery (the P.R.M.C.) that stands ready to help institutionalize the findings of the project once they are fully available.

Mali also exemplifies, nonetheless, a feature which we fear is to be found (either present or conspicuously and damagingly absent) in most Country Missions: heavy dependence on the understanding and goodwill of particular individuals for assurance of the powerful support which a Mission can give to consumption concerns in agriculture if it chooses to do so. In Mali the supportive officer had formerly served on the staff of N.E.G. in its early days and understood and believed wholeheartedly in the tripartite project. She was due to leave the Mali mission a few days after our visit and one wondered whether and hoped that her

successor would continue to give the project the same support during its most crucial culminating phase and follow-up.

In Indonesia the tripartite project was very well supported by the Mission, especially thanks to the chief of the Agricultural Office (B.3), and to a cooperating expert in a relevant US project in Indonesia (Winrock: agricultural policy analysis: see B.4). The health and nutrition people there seemed to take less interest in it. In contrast, in Honduras - while the agricultural staff were interested and supportive, the new nutrition officer seemed best placed, through his contacts with relevant government machinery, to ensure a good follow-up to the tripartite project, and was very understanding and supportive of the project as soon as he learned about it from us.

In regard to another country, we heard that it might be hard to find traces of tripartite project activities (even though recently completed there) because there had been a turnover in practically the whole of the A.I.D. mission staff. We heard this during a discussion about the selection of a second country to visit, which we strongly preferred to be a country where work had been completed and where we could thus have an opportunity to evaluate the tripartite project's ultimate impact. We were disturbed by the apparent difficulty of the project's managers to be able to think of many places where this could be seen. We could not help wondering whether, due to such factors as personnel transfers (most frequent in the "hardship stations" where

serious malnutrition makes the project particularly relevant), there are a disappointingly small number of traces to be found of durable and tangible ultimate impact.

This dependance on the goodwill and understanding of individuals implies a fault in the managerial system. It may be attributable to slippages of Country Mission managers in their role both as coordinators and as enforcers of established policy; and to a need for strengthening the information and retrieval, monitoring and evaluation systems to facilitate the forging of better linkages between A.I.D. projects and to follow-up those completed. For example, in the Honduras Mission there seems to have been delay in bringing the nutrition officer properly into the picture. Two copies of the project's final report were sent to the Mission. One properly reached the agricultural office. The other had not been seen or heard of by the nutritional officer (we gave him one of our copies), which is strange when one remembers that it is a product of the nutritional wing of A.I.D.

We hope that when the issue discussed earlier in this chapter of whether, ideally, Country Mission money ("buy-ins") should cover a major or a minor part of the cost of tripartite project actions at beneficiary country level is settled, there will be much less ambiguity than at present about the respective roles of the Missions and of S & T/N in the implementation of the tripartite project. Even if the Missions carry only a minor part

of the cost, their full moral support for the work is essential, especially in achieving the proper follow-up. There must be other methods of testing the sincerity of their support than getting them to commit a lot of their own money. A well-managed and ambitious Mission might logically be expected to value highly the opportunity of strengthening its arm and enlarging its total field of action with an important project for which much of the money can come from Washington. Since the project is an ongoing activity for many years, its purpose and character should be effectively brought home to each mission official concerned (directors and officials the agriculture and nutrition sectors) when he or she is briefed in Washington prior to taking up a new field assignment. This would ensure that the assignee on arrival will seek in the Mission's files for any completed project work and check for adequacy of follow-up and will, if nothing has been done yet in the country, examine carefully whether action relating to linkages between agriculture and consumption would be relevant and propitious and, if so, request it from Washington.

We realise that one attraction of buy-ins is that they avoid the delays associated with A.I.D. procedures for new project preparation and approval. We would not want to see these procedures speeded up if that would make them more superficial, since we believe that priorities need sharpening and that there should be fewer projects, better chosen and more adequately financed. What might get round the difficulty is to have more delegation of authority to project managers. If Phase II of the project is well

conceived and prepared and approved with full confidence, then the manager of it (say the strong figure we envisage as head of the N.E.G.) should be given considerable discretion to decide (in consultation with the Office of Nutrition which has to exercise financial control) how the funds for the tripartite project will be deployed by country and by type and element of action.

N.E.G.

This unit has well qualified and capable staff, is very comfortably housed by government standards and is well-equipped. It has had, generally speaking, good leadership; the first chief (B.2), serving till very recently, was respected for her technical qualifications and appreciated for her commitment to and belief in the importance and validity of the unit's work and for her consequent ability to motivate the staff and the contractors and cooperators. However, N.E.G. is at present suffering from the fact that when this first leader left only a short while before the present evaluation, no provision had been made for her immediate replacement with a new permanent chief expected to stay for at least as long as she had. The present temporary "caretaker arrangement" for supervision; the fact that the current staff (like any other government staff below the chief's grade) cannot expect to be eligible for promotion to leadership of the N.E.G. (unless the temporary restrictions presently in force are lifted); current lack of funds for operations; ambiguity

regarding the present and future division of labor between N.E.G. and the Office of Nutrition; occasional rifts between USDA and A.I.D. about who is getting the credit for achievements and whose policies and standards are to govern the work done; and uncertainty about the future of the project are all causing the unit to lose momentum and esprit de corps.

Due to factors partly within and partly beyond the control of N.E.G. staff members and the leadership, there is insufficient team work. This is not to be attributed simply to the rather logical current division of labor. One team member concentrates on training, a second on agricultural policies and consumption and the third on agricultural projects and consumption. It is for the unit chief to promote team work, which may be done more easily when he or she concentrates on synthesis.

The first unit leader did not simply monitor, evaluate, supervise, edit and reinforce the work of the other three but also shared directly in it at the same level of detail. This was thought by her to be necessary to get certain jobs done properly which were beyond the range of qualifications that had been recruited to the staff. She may well have been right in her reasons for doing this, but it involved her neglect of other important leadership roles which we make clear in our recommendations for Phase II in Chapter XI.

At least two staff members left N.E.G. (and at least one left the Office of Nutrition, and is not yet replaced) who seem to us to have been major losses to the cause of the tripartite project. All three had pragmatic abilities and were conscious of the need never to lose sight of the goal of institutionalisation. They are cited even though this evaluation does not profess to deal with the role of individual personalities simply because they are among the examples of the type of person to seek in future recruitment, and to seek to retain by the right managerial and personnel policies and practices.

It is perhaps a lot to expect that staff of the calibre and experience whom N.E.G. can expect to recruit, with its degree of attractiveness and prestige as an employer, will be able to supervise and exercise sufficient quality control over the outputs of the contractors and cooperators, a majority of whom are academic personalities of distinction and of wide experience. They do not appear in practice always to have done as much as was necessary to improve substantively drafts of certain documents received from contractors that were inadequate for publication. What might have been easier, but was perhaps not done for lack of time, for lack of direction and for lack of integratable data and findings, was to devote more time to synthesis, cohesion and cumulation in the project than one saw in such outputs as the final report on the Reston workshop. Some documents of an integrative character have been produced and are among the relevant and notable achievements of the tripartite project.

It is necessary for the criteria for performance evaluation applied to N.E.G. staff to emphasize adequately efficacy in technical work as well as in administrative tasks. Similarly this emphasis should be reflected in the organisation of work. It is appreciated that there are important administrative and financial oversight tasks that have to be shouldered somewhere in the government to ensure that contractors are keeping in line, but it is hoped that this can be done by specialists in these bureaucratic areas, who will consult (but not pass the buck to) those with primarily substantive responsibilities whenever there is need for their guidance to ensure that administrative and financial arrangements and actions facilitate and do not obstruct the smooth course of the actual work to be done.

When evaluating the relative worth of different studies and other project activities, whether conducted by N.E.G. or the Office of Nutrition, it is very necessary to take fully into account the amount of time and money devoted to each relative to the level of resources required to do the job properly. Some things have been severely scrimped, others less so.

It is difficult to clarify to what extent N.E.G. faced factors beyond its control with regard to decisions affecting the relative effort that was put into studies, into technical assistance and into training. There seemed to be a predilection for the first of these, and N.E.G. staff have to some extent been

open to the charge of pursuing their academic interests; not of course a dishonorable activity. It seems to us that this the kind of major question which it is the responsibility of the Office of Nutrition to watch over.

It has been very difficult for us to evaluate effectively the extent and relevance of the contribution made by the tripartite project to technical assistance and to training, because the evidence is not so readily available in terms of documents and should, but could not be, gathered from the persons reached by it in the different developing countries and within A.I.D. itself. As implied by our recommendations for the future in Chapter XI the balance was unduly weighted in the past in favor of research and studies. A valuable degree of technical assistance was automatically delivered through this process to the study participants and beneficiaries, as was some training. It is probable that the most understated of the activities, relatively speaking, was training - at least in terms of our conception of the desirable. However, to concentrate on studies at the beginning is to err in the right direction; valid technical assistance and training depends on a basis of good research and proper understanding of the issues in the context of the developing countries.

An important aspect of good management is cost effectiveness. Stress has already been laid in this chapter on the pressure within A.I.D. to "spread the butter thin". A literal-

minded and superficial auditor might be well pleased with all the evidence that A.I.D. has applied the philosophy expressed in the old English phrase "take care of the pennies and the pounds will take care of themselves". Spreading the butter thin; regarding so much of the money as seed money; and trying out a maximum number of soils and reaching as large a number of developing countries as possible is political effectiveness rather than cost effectiveness. You keep as many people as possible happy by giving a little money to a lot of causes. We would suggest that more emphasis might have been placed on establishing priorities and on spending enough money on the better planned and selected projects, to ensure a major impact.

The study conducted by Tufts in Mali has been described as "generously budgeted". We do not agree with the implication of this choice of language that money was spent extravagantly on it. We saw no sign of any kind of wastage; nor, on the contrary, any sign of under-spending which is wasteful because ineffective. In the case of Honduras, as noted in Annex D, it seems that there may have been too much money spent on too many consultants. To judge this properly one has to assess how much each added to the input of technical assistance and how much each was simply duplicating or - happier phrase - re-confirming the findings of his predecessors. Rather we would point to this plethora of consultants as a possible illustration of what we sense to be feelings of insecurity and lack of self-confidence among the project implementers in Washington, feelings induced by the

attacks to which they have been subject and the too frequent calling in question of the justification for the tripartite project or of their right to exist.

The Office of Nutrition has not been entirely satisfied with N.E.G, though it has - in the unfinished draft of Phase II we saw - envisaged continuing it as the main managerial instrument in the new project. This dissatisfaction might, perhaps not too crudely, be summarised as "it would be best if the whole N.E.G. staff could be added to that of the Office of Nutrition, so as to be completely under its control." There is apparently a fundamental procedural impediment to such an incorporation taking place, even if it were desirable. We have suggested that it is better for the Office of Nutrition not to have its conceptual and intellectual role disrupted by too many detailed managerial responsibilities.

Some staff members in N.E.G. believe that their unit could operate more effectively if they were even less closely controlled by the Office of Nutrition, or at least if the control could be more systematized and based on a clearer notion of the division of labor. They illustrate the kind of change they envisage by saying that N.E.G. should be a PASA rather than a RSSA creation. It would then, like a project, have more specific and clearly defined objectives and responsibilities and greater autonomy in the execution of them. We do not find ourselves sufficiently informed on the ins and outs of the matter to decide

on this issue but have recommended that it be examined and settled. We have in Chapter XI below described substantively what the future course of the tripartite project should be, and leave it to the experts in management within government, and in the intricacies and constraints of using government money, to figure out the details of the most suitable structure.

In any event, it should be borne in mind that the tripartite project is only one of several projects the Office of Nutrition is concerned with and, at least at present, it seems that there is no senior official there who can be spared to give full-time attention to the project. It is therefore necessary to find a chief of N.E.G. who has the stature to take a major part of the responsibility in running the project, because this will be the most senior government official able to give full-time attention to the leadership of this complex and diverse project. In corporate terms, the chief of N.E.G. would be the "president" and the Director of the Office of Nutrition the "chairman of the board". The board itself could be the interdivisional committee in A.I.D. which has been planned to guide and promote the coordination of and full support for it from other elements in the A.I.D. structure, but which needs to come to life. The technical advisory committee we have recommended could contribute to the work of this board.

An achievement of N.E.G., for which the credit should no doubt be shared to some extent with the Office of Nutrition, is

the sound selection of, and good working relationships achieved with, most of the contractors and cooperators. (Whatever has been said in this chapter about the latter, and the handling of the latter, which is largely positive, has for balance to be read in conjunction with Chapter VIII).

CHAPTER X

OVERALL EVALUATION

An evaluation can give a misleading impression of being negatively critical if it is confined to specifics, as in the other chapters of this report. We are at a turning point. One of the main practical applications of the report is to produce a new project for Phase II which will avoid the defects of the old, and so these have to be identified. The work started certainly merits being carried on and strengthened and it is implied that aspects not questioned appear to us satisfactory and should remain pillars of strength in the new project. For certain purposes, however, it may be useful to the readership of this report to have an abbreviated, balanced overall statement of the value of the project to ensure that our judgment of what is past is seen in proper perspective and to leave no doubt that we consider this kind of activity merits a high priority in A.I.D.'s total program.

Moreover, it is important to give a complete answer to the basic questions posed in the "scope of work" quote in Chapter I, in addition to the partial answers which emerge from the foregoing discussions of particular aspects of the tripartite project.

First, we can affirm that the tripartite project has been designed, and to an appreciable extent has been implemented and managed, so as to promote the stated project objectives as indicated in the project documents. These project objectives should not remain exclusively in the official program and budgetary documentation and other official documents, but should be embodied and expressed in a consistent way in the project's conceptual framework which we recommend be prepared at the beginning of Phase II and in other general and integrative project documents prepared by or under the supervision of the N.E.G. Regarding implementation and management, our generally positive evaluation is to be tempered by the detailed remarks in the preceding chapters. In particular, and above all, further attention to reinforcing the project's impact on the host country and on institutionalisation will be required in the follow-on project.

Secondly, A.I.D.'s approach, of focusing on the food consumption and nutrition aspects of agricultural programs, policies and projects is indeed the most effective way for A.I.D. to influence agriculture sector activities to serve the Agency's nutritional objectives at the same time as production goals.

The tripartite project's broad underlying objective is of the greatest importance: the reduction of malnutrition in all the developing countries where it is a widespread and grievous problem. The instrument, this project, relates to the availabil-

ity of food produced within these countries, a factor in malnutrition which transcends all other causes. If it is not addressed effectively, the other solutions will remain hopelessly partial and inadequate. Nutrition education is, for example, very necessary, but it is almost cruel to teach people what they really need to eat if such food is not available, or only at prices they cannot afford to pay.

Agricultural production should not be managed on the simple principle of "the more the merrier". Even if the output is a good earner of foreign exchange, the currencies may go to paying off debts, purchasing armaments or luxuries, rather than buying staple foods the poor people at home need. The use of land and water for agricultural production, either of which may be scarce in relation to population, has to be carefully managed in the light of the basic food needs and preferences of consumers and their capacity to pay. Food produced has to be stored and distributed so that it reaches people where they are and when they want it. Agricultural policy instruments must therefore include pricing systems and other devices which ensure an effective food distribution system in time and space.

Even in advanced countries such as the US, agricultural economics is generally part of the faculty of agriculture rather than of economics, with the result that it is set in a wider community of academics concerned only with production, not consumption, and only with one economic sector. The agricultural

economists as a rule have no environmental prod to include in their purview the analysis of demand and consumption or the relations between agriculture and other sectors in the economy. It is not surprising that Iowa State University, one of the major implementers of the project, is one of the leaders among the minority of agricultural economists who study demand, consumption and nutrition, since it offers one of the few instances of incorporating its agricultural economists in its economics faculty.

In the developing countries, it is all the easier for agricultural economists to forget the consumer. Many consumers are of negligible commercial importance, due to their poverty and to the major fraction who are subsistence farmers. Many of these countries are former colonies, forced to produce agricultural exports to the metropolitan territory. Now, the servicing of their debts presses them to export commodities and neglect production for the local market. At all times the highly unequal distribution of land in many of these countries leads to lower production of staple foods, to extensive or plantation agriculture, pasturing and cash cropping.

The tripartite project is the direct and pertinent answer to this situation. It has been well conceived and designed by its instigators. It is, if carried out so as to have an impact on the situation, more likely than food aid to alleviate malnutrition and is potentially capable of tackling it on the scale required.

On that scale, food aid is dwarfed to insignificance. On a time scale, concern for consumption in agriculture has a cumulative effect, whereas food aid seems to have difficulty working itself out of a job as time goes by. Without this concern for consumption in agriculture and with the population explosion, dependence on food aid grows; it does not diminish.

On this solid basis, there are grounds for both continuing and expanding the tripartite project. A major achievement at the beginning was to see the need for it. A major achievement throughout has been the use of first class cooperators and contractors.

A defect has been to hobble the latter with time and resource constraints and the use of second-hand data and other corner-cutting, false economies. In the face of these constraints it is not fair to blame either the implementers or the NEG and the Nutrition Office for the fact that the corpus of output and experience so far in hand is too heterogeneous: a basket of non-additive pears, plums, apples and bananas. Or to blame them for the uncertainty this far of a lasting impact in more than a few of the developing countries reached.

There certainly is a lasting impact in terms of the consciousness and arousal of the American academic community regarding this former gap in our conception of problems and knowledge about their solution. The seeds are now too well sown for the

subject to die away, even if A.I.D. were to drop it. Nevertheless, American universities today are too strapped for cash and burdened with expenses and obligations to keep this ball rolling in the third world without the continued support of USAID.

The personnel of N.E.G. and of the Nutrition Office have also done their best within their limits and those imposed on them, and deserve a little more credit for the tripartite project's achievements than the remainder of A.I.D., including the Country Missions; many parts of this vast and multifarious body have been supportive and effective, but some others have been negligent, critical and sceptical, or disabled by procedural deficiencies which inhibit coordination, continuity, the power of recall and the habit of follow-up. All the personnel seems overly subject to turnover, unexpected in a permanent civil service, and the system fails to counteract completely the discontinuities and lapses this turnover occasions. Insofar as foreign aid is regarded as too temporary an activity to entrust to permanent civil servants, this seems a questionable attitude, because many of the problems with which it deals will take the whole career of one or more generations to reach a solution.

With goodwill it should not be difficult to translate the great potentialities of the tripartite project into reality. Continued and developed along the right lines the project deserves all the support that A.I.D. can give it. In view of the immensity and universality of the problems it addresses, and the

sensitivities of developing countries regarding certain political and other aspects, it would be well worthwhile to seek alliances with other donor countries and with international organisations to achieve greater solidarity in the promotion of this good and necessary cause.

CHAPTER XI
FOLLOW-ON PROJECT

We find the unfinished draft project proposal we received from the Office of Nutrition on this subject well conceived and expressed and would suggest simply that the following points be considered when finalising it.

It does seem to us, because of financial factors mentioned above and of the ease of working with and controlling properly another government department as distinct from an outside agency, that the best formula for absolving the Office of Nutrition ("the Office") from day-to-day management chores distracting it from its primary role of intellectual and technical guidance and oversight is to continue the N.E.G. ("the Group") as the manager of the tripartite project.

A key to the whole problem of turn around of this project and setting it on a new course following the right lines is to find and appoint a chief of the Group who has the requisite qualifications to carry out the assignment as we outline it below and who can have the full confidence and trust of the Office and be left to get on with the job. Apart from the importance of avoiding divided leadership between the Office and the Group and ambiguity concerning the division of labor between them, the Office par-

particularly needs relief of workload so long as it remains in its present under-staffed and under-financed situation.

Continuing to place the group in the Department of Agriculture seems logical, as long as the Department sees that the substantive contribution required of it, and for which it can take credit if well done, is to get the world of agriculture - especially the planners, policy analysts and project managers - to understand and back-up the thrust of the tripartite project whenever and wherever it reaches the stage of targetting its findings on these agriculturalists. This it can do mainly through its influence over the agriculturalists in the US foreign service. It could also help, however, vis-a-vis the international organisations that might be persuaded to put their shoulder to the wheel, particularly the FAO and the World Bank. For example, the new departmental officer in the US permanent delegation to the FAO in Rome is the former chief of N.E.G.(see B.2). Properly instructed by her department, she would be in an excellent position to sell the approach of the tripartite project to the FAO, which in turn could take a more neutral role than A.I.D. in the policy dialog on this subject it is desired to promote in the developing countries. She would be quickly understood and supported by the FAO officials concerned, including the deputy director in the Commodities Division who formerly served with the International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington. Another useful role of the Department is vetting tripartite

project reports to ensure that they use language and arguments to which the world's agriculturalists will listen with respect.

Before taking up the future role of the new Chief of the Group, it is necessary to consider our next recommendation. This is that an adequate period - say the first six months - in the life of the new project should be devoted to a fundamental reappraisal of the design and directions of the project. It may well be unacceptable to leave too many questions open in the draft of the new project proposal. Therefore, there could be an interim transitional phase for reflection, of say six months, with an appropriate budget, during which the second definitive phase could be carefully shaped. Whatever happens, the right Chief for N.E.G. should be appointed as a matter of urgency, and given the added incentive that he or she will take a key role in leading the fundamental reappraisal as well as the assurance that A.I.D. is already decided in principle to continue the tripartite project on a long-term basis, accepting so far as possible and in due course the findings of the reappraisal and period of reflection and that therefore the Department would be secure in appointing as chief a tenured official.

The reappraisal could take this report as a starting point, deciding to what extent its points and recommendations are well taken. We would hope that Figure I in Chapter IV would serve to inspire the Office and the Group to come up with an appropriate and comprehensive conceptual framework to guide in the selection,

design and implementation of the future studies and other activities to be undertaken. The project documentation already in hand should be carefully reviewed, to see to what extent it can be synthesized and which studies lend themselves best to this process and to serve as source material for the production of integrative reports and generalised guidance to policy makers. A way to do this would be for the new Chief of the Group, with the assistance of all its staff, to prepare a report, covering all the documentation, similar to the report covering only the four documents submitted to the Mid-Term Workshop prepared by the former Chief of the Group. The provision for a similar workshop in the Caribbean might be amended to enable that meeting to serve as a sounding board and critical review forum for papers, including a more advanced draft of the proposal for Phase II of the tripartite project, that emerge from the reappraisal.

As an alternative, if this is considered to be too large and unwieldy a device, or in any event as a supplement, the Office might set up a standing expert advisory body, including some of the most eminent of the implementers of the tripartite project till now. Its first task would be to examine and make recommendations to the Office on the results of the reappraisal and reflection conducted under the leadership of the chief of the Group. Its continuing role would be to meet once or at most twice a year, and to serve as a correspondance committee between meetings, to watch over and help to steer the implementation of the new project.

This might at first be seen as a duplication of the role of the interdivisional committee to guide the project foreseen in the present incomplete draft of the new project proposal. However, we see a difference between our proposed advisory body, which would deal mainly with technical and methodological and, generally, substantive aspects of the project, and the interdivisional committee, whose main role would be to maximise the project's impact on the host countries by promoting coordination and cooperation between all the A.I.D. and other government services that should give assistance in this regard. The technical advisory body might also be criticized as a duplication of the role of the Office. In fact, we see the Office as chairing this body, and using it, through the correct selection of its membership, to maintain contact with the leaders in the state of the art which it will seek to ensure that the Group and the project serves and applies.

The papers emerging from the reappraisal and reflection should include an indication of gaps and deficiencies in the existing corpus of the tripartite project work which could serve as a basis for drawing up a research program designed progressively to fill these gaps and overcome these deficiencies. One criterion in the selection of countries would be to take those in the best position to help with this task of completion of the project's reconnaissance.

The papers emerging might also deal with other aspects of the criteria for selection of countries, taking into account what has been suggested in Chapter VI of this report.

The reappraisal should also gather together evidence, additional to what is given here, concerning the project's impact on host countries to date and, in the process, design a system for monitoring and evaluating this fundamental indicator of project success. Recommendations, building on those given in this report, should be prepared on the optimum methods of achieving impact and institutionalization in the host country, to be used henceforward. There should be a feedback from the monitoring and evaluation of impact to the guidance in methods for promoting it.

We realise that the present report has been awaited with a feeling that no further time should be lost. We would stress that the proposed reappraisal should not be regarded as simply a further delaying factor, or that we are like a committee simply deciding to set up another committee. Done correctly, under the leadership of a well-chosen chief of the Group, the reappraisal could actually give new dynamism to the project and speed up its rate of achievement when measured over the next four or five years following the reflection. In a project of such complexity and longevity it takes more than the two months' work we have done to put everything straight and build new and adequate foundations and infrastructure for the ongoing work. It will

require the insight of insiders as well as the detachment and objectivity of outsiders to complete the design of Phase II.

We would recommend that in future the chief of the group should not devote any time to doing similar work at the same level as the group's other members. He or she should, in addition to supervision of the Group, which has been insufficient in the past to ensure proper editing and coordination of the outputs received from contractors and cooperators, continue the task started during the reappraisal of preparing and organising integrative studies, monitoring the contribution of other studies to the assembly of the central edifice of knowledge and practice, and ensuring proper follow-up and promotion of institutionalization. The latter would include participation in round-up meetings in the countries assisted and the subsequent visits a year or two later, proposed in a preceding chapter, to evaluate impact. Another major responsibility of the chief would be the innovative development of the more diminutive arms in the project - technical assistance, training and - eventually - the public relations or widespread dissemination program. The latter should include, especially in the case of implementers of micro-level or project-level action, meetings of peer groups in the United States to encourage the adoption of the consumption and agriculture approach by other foreign aid donors, well beyond what can be done with USAID resources.

The present draft of Phase II envisages that a part of the project budget should be ear-marked for use by the Office directly rather than through the Group. It will be necessary in the final draft to specify clearly why this should be kept separate, even if the Group is headed and works in such a way as to have the full confidence of the Office. Certainly the technical advisory group we recommend should support to the Office, not the Group, and the funds for it and for any exploration of new approaches outside the Group's terms of reference should be allocated directly and monitored by the Office. As has been said above, the chief of the Group is, in corporate terms, the president, while the Office director is the chairman of its board. The role of the "members of the board" would be performed jointly by the members of the technical advisory group and the interdivisional committee in USAID, discussed above.

Finally, when drafting the Phase II proposal, account should be taken of the points mentioned in the Executive Summary which were not repeated in this chapter.

ANNEX A

PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE FROM THE NUTRITION ECONOMICS GROUP

Abeyratne, S.; T. Poleman
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July 1983

AID
A.I.D - Nutrition Sector Strategy (General)
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A.I.D Policy Paper: Food and Agricultural Development (General)
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May 1982

Alderman, H.
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October 1984

Alderman, H.; J. von Braun; S. A. Sakr
Egyptian Public Food Program Study Report on Task 1 - Egypt's Food Subsidy and
Rationing System: a Description (Egypt)
November 1982

Alderman, H.; von Braun, J.;
Egyptian Public Food Program Study Report on Task 2 & 3 - The Effects of
the Egyptian Food Ration and Subsidy System on Income Distribution and
Consumption (Egypt)
July, 1984

Ariza-Nino, E.; R. Rice
Analytical Methods and Field Survey Techniques Used in Cameroon and Senegal
Studies (Cameroon)
August 1983

Ariza-Nino, E.; Goheen-Fjellman, M.; Matt, L.; Rice, R.
Consumption Effects of Agricultural Policies: Cameroon Case Study (Cameroon)
August 1983

Ariza-Nino, E.;
(PICNIC) Price and Income Changes: Nutritional Impact Upon Consumers
(Five Volumes) (General)
Volume 1 PICNIC: A Program to Compute Nutritional Impact of Food Pricing and
Income Policies on Consumers, February, 1987
Volume 2 PICNIC: PICNIC Technical Annex: Modeling Diet Adjustments and
Nutrient Intake, February, 1987
Volume 3 PICNIC: PICNIC Case Study: Nutritional Effectiveness of Alternative
Food Subsidies in Brazil, February, 1987
Volume 4 PICNIC: PICNIC Case Study: Food Consumption Effects of PL-480 Rice
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Volume 5 PICNIC: PICNIC: Users' Guide, March, 1987

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 Report #1 (Jamaica)
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 Summary Results from the 1975, 1976, 1977 Consumer Expenditure Surveys for
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 October, 1985
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 Research, Rural Roads, Rural Electrification, and Water Project (General)
- Conroy, M.E.
 Notes for the Baseline Study and Evaluation: USAID/Guatemala Small Farmer
 Diversification Project, with Special Reference to the Food Consumption
 Effects (Guatemala)
 July 1983
- DeWalt, K.
 Case Studies in Nutrition in Agriculture (General)
 April, 1987
- Edirisinghe, N.; T. Poleman
 Behavioral Thresholds as Indicators of Perceived Dietary Adequacy (General)
 July 1983
- Edirisinghe, N.
 Preliminary Report on the Food Stamp Scheme in Sri Lanka: Distribution of
 Benefits and Impact on Nutrition (Sri Lanka)
 February 1985
- Evenson, R.
 Food Consumption, Nutrient Intake and Agricultural Production in India
 October, 1986 (India)
- Evenson, R.
 A Review of the Consumption Effects of Agricultural Policies Project
 Findings: Data, Methods, Models and Conclusions (General)
 October 1983

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
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Food Consumption and Farming Systems Research: A Summary (General)
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(Mauritania)
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Franklin, D.
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Hiemstra, S.; Savadogo, K.
Urban Food Consumption Patterns and National Food Policy in Liberia
Report 2 Part 1 - Results of Household Survey (Liberia)
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Immink, M.D.C.
Food and Health Expenditure Patterns in Urban and Rural Ecuador: Analysis
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Johnson, Stanley
A Review of the Consumption Effects of Agricultural Policies: Uses and Analyses
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Consumption Effects of Agricultural Policies: Senegal Case Study (Senegal)
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January 1983

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Intra-Family Food Distribution: Review of the Literature and Policy
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NEG
Nutrition Economic Group Annual Report Fiscal Year 1986 10/1/85 - 9/30/86
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African Countries (General)
April, 1984

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Consumer Expenditure Elasticities in Honduras (Honduras)
August, 1983
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Expenditure Patterns and Food Consumption in Honduran Households (Honduras)
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Centralamerica
Food Consumption and Nutrient Intake for Socioeconomic Groups in Honduras
(Honduras)
September, 1983
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Centralamerica
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Study of the Effects of Agricultural Development Policies on Food Consumption
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July, 1984
- Pinstrup-Anderson, P.; J. von Braun; T. Uy; W. Floro
Impact of Changes in Incomes and Food Prices on Food Consumption by
Low-Income Households in Urban Khartoum, Sudan with Emphasis on the
Effect of Changes in Wheat Bread Prices (Sudan)
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- Renkow, M.; J. Leonard; D. Franklin
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Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka)
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June, 1985
- Schmidt, C.; Pines, J.M.
Jamaica's Food Stamp Program: A Technical Review (Jamaica)
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- van Haeften, R.
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Tanzania Case Study - Consumption Effects of Agricultural Policies (Tanzania)
- von Braun, J; H. de Haen
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- Youngblood, C.; M. Harrell; M. Demousis; D. Franklin
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April 1983

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(Sudan)
April 1983
- Zalla, T.
Toward Rapid Appraisal of Consumption and Expenditure Patterns (General)
March, 1987

- (General) - Indicates that a publication is filed in NEG files in a
non country specific file
- (Country) - Indicates that a publication is filed in NEG files in a
country specific file

ANNEX B

PERSONS CONTACTED

I. Persons mentioned in the Report

1. Nicolaas Luykx, Acting Director, Office of Nutrition, Department of Science and Technology, A.I.D.
2. Roberta Van Haeften, former Chief, Nutrition Economics Group, USDA; presently USDA member of the US Delegation to the UN FAO.
3. Richard Cobb, Chief, Agriculture Office, A.I.D, Indonesia.
4. Thomas Hedley, Economist, Winrock International Project, Indonesia.
5. Roberto Castro, A.I.D/W., formerly Chief, Agriculture Office, A.I.D., Dominican Republic.
6. James Walker, A.I.D/W., formerly Chief, Agriculture Office, A.I.D., Haiti.
7. Emmy Simmons, A.I.D/W., formerly Agricultural Officer, A.I.D., Mali.
8. Melanie Lowdermilk, Tufts University/CEAP Project Director, Mali.
9. Tim Frankenberger, Professor and Farming Systems Research Specialist, Office of Arid Lands Development, University of Arizona.
10. Beatrice Lorge Rogers, Associate Professor, School of Nutrition, Tufts University, Principal Investigator, Tufts University/CEAP projects in Dominican Republic and Mali.
11. Roger Norton, former Professor, University of Albuquerque, A.I.D. consultant for CEAP and other projects in Honduras.
12. Maura Mack, former official of the Office of Nutrition, S & T, A.I.D.
13. William Whelan, official, N.E.G.
14. Patricia B'Brien-Place, official, N.E.G.

II. Other Persons Contacted

15. John Hyslop, Chief, N.E.G.
16. Shirley Pryor, official, N.E.G.
17. Peter Timmer, Professor, Harvard Institute of International Development.
18. Harold Alderman, Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
19. Neville Edirisinghe, Research Fellow, IFPRI.
20. Per Pinstруп-Andersen, Director, Cornell University Nutritional Surveillance Program
21. David Franklin, President, Sigma One Corporation, Raleigh, North Carolina.
22. Stanley Johnson, Professor and Director of the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa.
23. Dennis Starleaf, Chairman, Department of Economics, Iowa State University.
24. Willi Meyers, Professor and Deputy Director, CARD.
25. Helen Jensen, Professor, CARD.
26. Tesfaye Teklu, CARD.
27. Kamal Banskota, Iowa State University.
28. Group of CARD graduate students.
29. Kenneth E. Foster, Director, Office of Arid Lands Studies (OALS) and Director, Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Arizona, Tucson.
30. Gail Harrison, Professor, Department of Family and Community Medicine, University of Arizona, and Co-Principal Investigator (with Professor Tim Frankenburger: see #9 above) under Cooperative Agreement with CEAP.
31. Anthony Vuturo, Head of the Department of Family and Community Medicine, University of Arizona.
32. Priscilla Stone, Department of Anthropology, University of Arizona.

33. Monika Escher, International Relations Department, University of Arizona.

34. Michael Norvelle, Director, AGRES II Mauritania Project, University of Arizona.

35. Margaret Norem, Agronomist, Environmental Research Laboratory, University of Arizona, and future researcher under CEAP.

III. Persons Contacted in Mali

Project

Ms Melanee Lowdermilk, Project Director, Tufts University study of demand for food (and some project staff members).

Mr Mohamed Diallo, Deputy National Director, National Directorate for Statistics and Information (DNSI)

Mr Jacques Sissoko, Chief of Division (DNSI).

USAID MISSION

Mr Eugene Chiavaroli, Director.

Ms Emmy Simmons, Agricultural Economist, representative on the Technical Committee, Program for Restructuring the Market for Cereals (PRMC).

Mr Tracy Atwood, designate Chief, (ADO)

Mr Philip Steffen, (ADO) designate representative on PRMC

Mr S.K.Reddy (ADO)

Mr Josue Dione (ADO) MSU/CESA Food Security Project

Mr Roger Simmons, Chief, Program Office in Africa

Mr James Elliot, Program: Economic policy reform expert

Mr Jeremy Oppenheim, Program: Private sector consultant.

Ms Sherry Suggs, GDO: Human resources expert

Canadian Aid

Mr Gerard Gagnon, Economist, representative on the Technical Committee of the PRMC.

European Economic Community

Mr Serge Coelo, Adviser to the Minister for Public Enterprises, representing the Ministry on the PRMC (till now financed by World Bank but shortly transferring to EEC).

World Food Program

Mr Francis Valere-Gilles, Deputy Representative in Mali, WFP.

World Bank

Mr Mama Tapo, Deputy Director, World Bank Representation in Mali.

Ministry of Planning

Mr Lassana Traore, Director, Bureau of Public Enterprises.

Office of Stabilisation and Regulation of Prices

Mr Birama Diallo, Deputy Director-General (Acting Director-General).

IV. Persons Contacted in Honduras

A.I.D Mission: Joe Kwiatkowski, Chief Agricultural Officer
Guillermo Alvarado, Agriculture Office: food aid.
Juan Castillo, Nutrition Officer, Human Resource
Development Office

ADAI: J. Mario Ponce Cambar, Director
Magdalena Garcia, Econometrician
All other ADAI staff.

FAO: Carlos Andres Zelaya Elvir (formerly with Ministry
of Natural Resources and familiar with whole
history of project recipient of final report).

Secplan: Idelfonso Paredes, Director, Agricultural Planning
Carlos Cordero, Officer for Nutrition and Food Aid
David Caballero R., Officer for coordination of
agricultural policies and programs.

Private Sector: Karl Henry Holst, President, Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, landowner, farmer, industrialist
and meat exporter, San Pedro Sula.

Bafotigui Sako, Adviser.

ANNEX C

USAID (S&T/N)

Nutrition in Agriculture Project Evaluation, July August 1987.

Report on a Visit to Mali by Anthony Dawson, USAID Consultant,
13-20 July 1987.

1. The purpose of my visit to Mali was to discuss the implementation and impact of a study of demand for food being conducted by USAID contractor Tufts University, as one example of studies in numerous developing countries being financed by a tripartite USAID project, Nutrition in Agriculture. The visit was part of an evaluation during July-August 1987 of the whole tripartite project by the Education Development Centre of Newton, Mass. under the team leadership of this consultant. I arrived in the evening of 13 July and left in the evening of 20 July and so had six working days: Tuesday, 14 July to Saturday 18 July and Monday 20 July.

2. The persons contacted during the visit are listed in Annex I. It would possibly have been useful to contact a number of others who were absent during this holiday period, but those reached included all who were most directly concerned with the study, namely, Ms Melanee Lowdermilk, Tufts resident director of the project, and her counterparts: Ms Emmy Simmons, Acting Chief of Agriculture, USAID Mission; M. Mohamed Diallo, Deputy Director, National Institute of Statistics and Information (DNSI); M. Jacques Sissoko, Chief of Division (DNSI). Ms E. Washington of the USAID mission, also directly concerned, was absent in Washington, D.C., but I expected to be able to meet her in that city immediately on leaving Mali.

3. Documents received from or quoted by the persons contacted are listed in Annex II.

4. Rather than offer here a repetitive summary account of each separate meeting with the parties contacted, during which similar ground was covered, and in order to increase the information and guidance which could be obtained from the visit (since this report was discussed in draft with the Director of the USAID Mission, his colleagues, and the project study director before

departure), it has been deemed preferable to present the consultant's views on this particular study and on the whole tripartite project of which it forms a part, as they had been developed up to the time of my last day in Mali. It is thus much more dominated by what had been heard and seen during the visit than our final report will be once all the other information, visits and contacts in Haiti, Washington and American universities are in hand and the views and analysis of my other team member (Ms Eileen Kennedy of IFPRI), notably in regard to the quality of scientific and technical work done under the project, are available and can be integrated. She will join the team immediately after the Mali visit and can include this report among the sources of ideas to be tested out during her inquiries and reflections.

5. The study took as a starting point data gathered from a household expenditure survey financed by the World Bank and conducted by DNSI for purposes of establishing a cost of living index. This survey lacked the benefit of unit prices based on standardised quantities. Clarifying data were gathered under the study to rectify this gap. Some preliminary results of the study from the first round of data gathering, conducted in the dry season, are available and have been summarised by Ms Emmy Simmons (see Annex III). The second round was in progress during the rainy season in which this consultant's visit took place. A third round is envisaged, if financing is confirmed, to further strengthen the precision of the data as a basis for reliable analysis.

6. The context of economic and related changes over the period in which the data were collected and the Tufts' more precise insight into standard quantities and unit prices has so far been conducted should be mentioned. There have been major changes in the food supply (and consumer income) since the start of data collection (including that financed by the World Bank). The years 1982-4 witnessed the worst drought Mali has ever recorded - worse and longer drawn out than that of 1971-73 - while the rains were excellent in 1985 and 1986. These rains, together with strong policy encouragements to producers, led to a doubling of cereals output from the pitiful level of the last drought and to an overwhelming accumulation of both public and private stocks. (The surplus production of "little millet" - mil-sorgho - in 1987 is 117,000 tons). Cereal imports, kept very cheap by low world prices, by food aid and by over-valuation of the Malian CFA franc, are abundant. (This is true for rice also, for even though rice imports were halted on 11 March 1987 by the Malian Government - to protect its own rice industry under the Office du Niger - prices have only begun recently to rise slightly as and when local stocks were fully used up to cover the shortfall of local production to consumption (26,000 tons for the whole of 1987). In sum, during the whole period of World Bank and Tufts data collection there have been enormous swings in cereal supply,

changes in price levels beyond what the official price regulation mechanism can control, and substantial changes in the income of cereal consumers. Urban consumers, covered by the survey, have had a real income increase because of lower food prices. A salary increase discussed and promised in October/November 1985 to be given to civil servants sometime in 1986, to quieten their protests at the IMF standby agreement which included an official rice price increase, proved unnecessary when food prices fell, and was easily foregone and forgotten. Rural consumers, not covered by the survey, have had an income increase because of lower prices plus, if they are food producers, a gain from their larger saleable output (to market and to stocks). But this gain has been mitigated by the lower prices received and the cost of carrying stocks of their surplus output.

7. As stated, two rounds of verification and precision of quantity measures in the market were undertaken in the dry and rainy seasons corresponding to the period of the year in which the original data were collected. A third round of verification, corresponding to the time of the year in which the third round of original data collection occurred, would improve the reliability of analysis by obtaining precision in three sets of prices rather than two as a basis for the calculation of absolute and relative price and income elasticities which were influenced by the aforementioned range of varying economic events over a period of time. The surveyors have taken considerable pains to establish the range of sizes and the mean size used, in respect of each category of measuring device (cup, basket etc), and the vagueness still associated with this factor is probably eclipsed by the bigger economic changes just noted.

8. I encountered other indications of the thoroughness of Tufts in carrying out this survey. Visits of the senior supervisor (Principal Investigator) from Massachusetts to Bamako have been frequent enough to keep the whole project well on the rails and to give good technical and morale support to the project director and her staff. The project director is resident in Mali - a feature which is necessary yet not followed in the conduct of studies in other countries under the tripartite project (where circumstances may admittedly be less difficult). The project director combines technical capacity with qualities of character and personality highly suitable to her task of supervising data collection over a vast, sparsely populated, rugged country with poor communications and a people not yet adapted to conditions and requirements of modern life (but willing if paid and quick to learn), and analysing data with computers which are too small for rapid, labor-saving analysis (such as can be achieved on the main-frame A Tufts and victimised by voltage surcharges, power reductions and outages, and delayed servicing and repair at long range. It is not to be assumed that all graduate students with her intellectual qualities will also have her patience, tact, pertinacity, leadership and motivational ability, or even to

achieve quickly facility with the foreign language in which the work must be done. Neither may they all accept as well as she has the hardship conditions involved in staying in the field for the proportion of time necessary to ensure that things are done the right way, without waste of time or materials and without theft. One of the seven provincial cities included in the survey is Tombouctou, which at any time can only be reached across a roadless desert by four-wheel traction and heavy fuel and water supplies. Travel to Kayes calls for rail travel, equally subject to delay or worse.

9. Soon after my arrival the Tufts project director Melanee Lowdermilk gave me a memorandum which she had prepared specially for my visit and purpose. I agree with all of it and found that it contained a number of points I had already raised with her during the first days. It is also confirmed by my fairly recent experience of working for two years in a similar African country. I therefore attach it as Annex IV. A graphic example may be given of just one of the many factors in Africa which can cause delay in work of this kind. The present report, which represents one man-day of work, can be saved in its entirety onto a floppy disk within a matter of a few seconds. It takes ten whole minutes to save a full load of project data on the personal computer used. If the electricity happens to be cut off during the process of loading onto memory - quite a possibility since the computer works continuously through two shifts sixteen hours a day and there are very frequent power cuts - all that has already been saved on that memory is lost in addition to the loss of the new work in what is being copied on to the obliterated memory as a replacement.

10. The quality of the technical and analytical work undertaken by Tufts seems sound but is subject to comment by my team member Ms Eileen Kennedy. Elasticities are to be measured by log.log equations. The remarks of Professor Stanley Johnson on this methodology in his paper surveying similar studies undertaken in Indonesia has to be taken into account (though not necessarily accepted) when judging the work in Mali (or anywhere else that such methods are applied under the tripartite project).

11. The conduct of the study by Tufts is considered by the Mission to be in accordance with the objectives expressed in the Cooperative Agreement. It also responds well to USAID/Mali's objectives expressed in the PIO/T (necessarily consistent with those in the Cooperative Agreement), which are: (a) providing an empirical basis for predicting the effects of changes in consumer price policy in Mali; (b) assisting the Government of the Republic of Mali (GRM) and the PRMC to anticipate the consequences of changing absolute and relative prices of major foods; and (c) thus aiding in the development of policies which are both economically sound and politically feasible.

12. Subject to its successful completion, preferably with a third round, it can thus be concluded that the study will serve its immediate purpose of providing precise and detailed information, for the first time, on the demand for food in Mali. All foods will be covered, and for a representative sample of urban families account can be taken of their size, age and sex composition and their expenditure as these change over time and as they affect the effective demand of those who buy food for the family.

13. Such information will have great value to students of the social situation in the country. It will have heuristic value to those concerned with health and with nutritional status. A more complete picture of the latter will require insertion of the factors mentioned in the next paragraph.

14. The study findings will be of considerable value for those concerned with demand projections and with analysis of factors affecting demand. However, not included in the definition of family income nor in the family food supplies is free food aid. This has an impact on effective demand for food in the market. It does not perhaps have a major effect on the demand of urban consumers covered in the survey since its impact is localised in time and place: it enters largely into the picture mainly in times of deficit in the places most vulnerable to the shortage, such as the northern cities of Kayes, Gao and Tombouctou. The rural population is also beyond the scope of the survey and so will not give those concerned with agricultural pricing policy a picture of total demand for food over the country. However, the urban population does account for the majority of demand for marketed food. It would be well to extend the enquiry to this half of the population later, and to take account of the effect on prices of households which are both consumers and producers of food at the same time. It may be noted that one of the major enlightenments provided by the tripartite study to agricultural policy makers is understanding of the reactions to policy and food market situations of families which are simultaneously producers and consumers of food.

15. The big question in evaluating the tripartite study as a whole is whether results of this or any other studies - as distinct from different kinds of influences, fears or enticements - will have enough impact on agricultural policy makers to bring about changes in food production and availability which will lead, *ceteris paribus*, to improvements in nutritional status of the population, especially the population at risk. Though it is certainly a major highway, it is a roundabout route to the nutritional goal. (It must be repeated that this consideration does not put in question the intrinsic value of such studies or their applicability or impactability in spheres which they can reach by less roundabout routes.) The answer depends on the circumstances of each developing country in which USAID will

undertake them, and suggests that it would be appropriate in any new project to establish and apply criteria for the choice of countries in which the assumptions which the project requires for its success are most likely to be valid.

16. For example, compare Mali and Indonesia in this respect. Indonesia has, the project contractors claim, government officials and ministers capable of judging good and bad analysis in this field and quickly understanding the reliability and implications of the findings. They feel the need for such data and analysis because they will use them in analysing and formulating their policies. This is true not only of the central planners but, they say, has also more recently become true of the agricultural planners and policy makers, whose level of sophistication has now risen sufficiently. I cannot speak about this, not having visited Indonesia sufficiently recently, but I know that it is probably true of Indonesia and other countries, such as India, Pakistan, and Egypt, which have a highly-educated elite class. (It may not be so true of Haiti where the members of the elite, due to persecution, nearly all chose voluntary exile). It is highly unlikely to be true of Mali and other African countries whose educated elite is so thin on the ground (and also partly exiled by persecution or brain drain). In any event, Mali and other African countries have politics dominated by the class interests of the civil servants and army officers, who are inclined to choose agricultural policies that appear in practice to yield them the best and cheapest food supplies and who would be influenced only by studies of their own demand for food. Unfortunately, there are policies giving them a privileged food intake position, policies frequently adopted, which reduce food availability for the rest of the population.

17. The Government of Mali has, nevertheless, in its five-year plan for 1981-85, adopted as an overall strategy an amelioration of the food situation of the country, in terms of adequacy and security of food supplies (for all, not just the civil servants) and, in principle, self-sufficiency in food. One has to say "in principle", because a country over-populated and over-grazed in relation to its aridity and uncertainty of rainfall must always be dependant on imports and on food aid (contingency insurance projects) in times of deficit which are acts of God. This emphasis continues in the new five-year plan starting in 1987. A major problem is to lower costs of production and increase yields and productivity in domestic agriculture, not excluding the more modern but still high cost official irrigated cereal production sectors, such as the Office de Niger (rice). Also, to reduce under-cutting by competition of foreign food imports with local production (and this applies to many foods, not just cereals), the over-valuation of the currency should be stopped. (This latter may affect other UMOA member countries similarly and could be tackled by common agreement among them on a new ratio with the French franc.)

18. A major instrument of government policy affecting food consumption and production in Mali is price regulation and intervention. Better understanding of its effects on production and supplies to market and to storage are coming from the wide variety of experience, boom and slump, in recent years. (E.g. see document #1 in Annex II, as corrected by document #2). There is little or no information on price and income elasticities of demand and cross-elasticities in response to changes in relative prices of food commodities. Government officials contacted, particularly those in the Office for Stabilisation and Regulation of Prices, confirm that they are therefore deeply interested in the results of the Tufts study. It will be particularly useful for them in making demand projections for rice and other foods and for guiding them in formulating price and other policies intended to promote diversification in food production and consumption. The preliminary results have already awakened considerable interest in the technical committee of the multilateral donor/Mali mechanism known as the Program for Restructuring the Market for Cereals (PRMC), which coordinates food aid and deploys substantial counterpart funds generated by food aid and carries on a donor/Mali policy dialog, with a view to stabilising cereals markets, and improving food security and production. It may be expected that this interest will be shared with the Malian Government when the final study results are available and when the full-fledged coordinating committee of the PRMC, including full government participation, actually gets down to meeting, as the government has promised it will (at the National Seminar on Cereals Policy in Mali, Bamako, 15-18 June 1987).

19. It may be invalid to assume that countries like Mali, still heavily dependant on food aid yet hesitant to follow agricultural policies that will reduce that dependance if they seem adverse to the interests of privileged groups such as civil servants, can nevertheless have "their arm twisted" by the food aid donors to adopt these policies. Findings of studies such as that conducted by Tufts in Mali may well not directly outweigh the influence of the civil service and the army (it is a military regime) on agricultural and food policy. But if the weight of donor influence is also behind the study, this may tip the balance in a way that leaves the government acting with a better will because the study demonstrates the positive impact which the proposed policies can have through the demand system on the nourishment of poor people and those at risk of malnutrition. The existence of a body such as the PRMC makes Mali a much more promising candidate than it would otherwise be for hosting a nutrition in agriculture study such as Tufts is undertaking.

20. Another factor rendering Mali at least as ready as Indonesia, if not more so, to be influenced in its agricultural policies by a study of food consumption is the simplified structure of its

economy. About half of the gross national product and more than three quarters of the total employment of the population is obtained from the agricultural sector. Export earnings potentiality based on either this sector or the rest of the weak economy is very low. The capacity to import food other than aid commodities is thus limited. Hence the government has to be very preoccupied with agricultural policy, for lack of other options to increase prosperity. It can give more undivided attention to agriculture, and factors which do or should affect it, than can governments ruling more complex economies better endowed with natural and other resources.

21. Indonesia has a huge population and area, an economy in which agriculture provides a fifth or so of the gross national product, and has other major sectors requiring careful attention, so that the government's attention span must be broader and more detached from food and agriculture concerns. The country has oil and other resources to provide foreign exchange. The government has many factors other than food consumers' and farmers' needs to take into account politically. One cannot be certain that findings from any study of food consumption and requirements will weigh heavily among the numerous and varied factors affecting the priorities, support policies and resources benefiting local food production.

Recommendations.

22. There is a need for further reflection in this evaluation of the criteria to be used for selection of countries in which nutrition in agriculture studies are most likely to have major practical impact on agricultural policy and the nutritional situation. Mali may well have, compared with a number of the other countries selected, a goodly share of the required characteristics.

23. There should be understanding and support of the USAID Mission for the proposed project activity - whether study, technical assistance or training - from the beginning to the end. It is even seen to be an advantage if some mission and host country officials happen to be sold on this type of approach even before the official proposal reaches them from AID/W or a visiting university (potential contractor). Here again this is borne out in the case of Mali by the considerable and valuable support of the Mission (especially its Agriculture office) to the project.

24. The approach to budgeting of individual elements in the tripartite project should be to seek economies by cutting back the number of elements rather than cutting the budget for each element. In other words an element such as a study should be adequately provided for; not cut back to the point where its efficacy can be harmed. This also seems to be more favorable in

the case of Mali than of studies in other countries, for the contractor Tufts succeeded in its efforts in upgrading at the beginning the initial proposed budgetary allocation. It was thus able, unlike other contractors, to support resident project directors in the field, which seems essential. Also needed for similar reasons is adequate and sustained attention by the contractor's senior staff to the proper conduct of the study, and above all to the high-level responsibility for helping the Mission to disseminate the study's findings and win over the authorities concerned to better agricultural policies suggested by the findings. It is not suggested that Tufts has or will be remiss in this respect. Simply I wish to state that in general, on other countries as well as the United States, university professors contracted on the basis of their reputations to undertake a task requiring their adequate personal commitment for proper and effective execution, sometimes succumb to the temptation to take on too many commitments, and to leave too much to graduate students under their diluted supervision.

25. Budgets should also allow more adequately for all the steps that are necessary to effectively disseminate the findings of studies and ensure that they capture the understanding and acceptance of principals in the government and local authorities who are in a position to influence food and agriculture policy and production in any way. This includes one or more seminars or workshops at the end to present the study and its results and implications, a follow through by the Mission to ensure that these enter into the policy dialog with the Government, and the publication of practical manuals enabling the host country to carry on the enquiries, analyse the results and apply them in policy analysis and formulation.

26. I have already endorsed the points and recommendations made by Ms Melanee Lowdermilk in her memorandum (see Annex 4). I would stress the value of the training the project has given under her supervision to collaborating and hired local staff, which should always be an element in such projects. This is an immediate gain even if there may be no other, in the most unfortunate cases.

27. The policy of USAID (and many other aid programs) of providing for capital but not recurrent costs should be reviewed. in cases of highly sophisticated and costly equipment. Computers and other costly equipment simply cannot be properly maintained by least developed countries. It would be more realistic to ask them to buy the computers rather than keep them running for a normal life-time. As items break down, instead of being repaired they are replaced by capital gifts of replacement items from one donor or another. Consideration might be given to setting up in the capitals of least developed countries computer and communications complexes for the joint use of collaborating multilateral and bilateral donors, their experts and contractors and of approved government authorities and local institutions. In

the modern buildings of these complexes costly and advanced equipment can be protected with air conditioning and purification, stability and reliability of electricity supply, staff, services and other facilities way above the standard that could be afforded or approved in any public institution of a host country.

28. When studies are designed under the tripartite project in consultation with the Mission and the host country, care should be taken to ensure that the agricultural situation and problems of the country and of its relevant policies are fully taken into account. This is to ensure that the findings expected to emerge from the study are only those which can have a practical bearing on agricultural policy and, in particular, on aspects of current policy considered to be possibly harmful to, or at least a constraint upon, the aim of improving food consumption and nutritional status of the local population.

29. Other projects being implemented by the mission should, so far as this is relevant, be kept informed of the data and its implications provided by nutrition in agriculture studies so that the project staff can help in promoting application of the policy changes or orientation of agricultural extension staff and farmers so far as the studies indicate this may be desirable. In Mali, the Mission Director has shown his close interest in the Tufts study and may be expected to ensure this coordination and collaboration among all the projects under his supervision that may be concerned.

A. Dawson,
Bamako, 19 July 1987

Postscript

After the completion of this report I met my team member Dr Eileen Kennedy in Washington, who I had asked to read the documentation on the Mali study. She had the following comment to add to this report:

"The Mali study has addressed some of the concerns raised about earlier studies. For example, the study examines effects of price policy on households that are both producers and consumers. This, therefore, addresses an earlier recommendation made at the Mid-Term Project Review.

"The Mali Project also has very detailed price data allowing estimations of price elasticities which were not possible in many earlier studies. Overall the study is an improvement over many of the earlier projects.

List of Documents

1. "La Fin d'Une Utopie: pour un systeme realiste de stabilisation des revenus des producteurs cerealiers au Sahel", by Gerard Gagnon, May 1987, CIDA (Canadian Aid).
2. "Analyse critique du document intitule "La Fin d'une utopie", G.Fontaine (EEC), Note au Dossier PRMC, GF/ 08/06/87. (N.B. It is expected that Ahlers, Senior Economist for Mali at World Bank, Washington, will also write some comments on the Gagnon paper, which we had not obtained before finalising our report).
3. "Maternal and Infant Nutrition Reviews: Mali", International Nutrition Communication Service, March 1983, Education Development Center Inc., 55 Chapel St, Newton, MA 02160.
4. Seminaire National sur la Politique Cerealiere au Mali Bamako 15-18 June 1987):
 - a. "Expose du 15 juin" Ministere de l'Agriculture.
 - b. "Contribution au Seminaire National sur La Politique Cerealiere au Mali", Ministere de l'Agriculture.
 - c. "Proposition d'Appui des Donateurs au Programme de Restructuration du Marche Cerealier pour une prolongation de trois ans."
 - d. "Synthese de.." et "Contribution du Ministere des Finances et du Commerce".
 - e. "Expose du 15 juin", Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Mali".
 - f. "Contribution", Chambre de Commerce.
 - g. "Prix au Producteur, Volume Transiges et Destination des Cereales, Certains Marches du Mali, Campagne 86/87."
 - h. "Liste des participants," (et "Errata").
 - i. "Bilan des Travaux des Groupes de Travail de la Statregie Alimentaire", Novembre 1986.
 - j. "Resolutions du Seminaire National sur la 'restructuration de l'OPAM et du Marche Cerealier, (Dec.1980-January 1981'".
 - k. Contribution; Evolution de la Politique Cerealiere", Ministere de Tutelle des Societes et Entreprises d'Etat".

1. "Repartition des Participants" (by Ministry, Organisation etc).
- m. "Programme du Travail Provisoire".
- n. "Politique de Stockage", Office des Produits Agricoles de Mali.
- o. "Les Problemes de Transport", Ministere des Transports et des Travaux Publiques.
5. Collecte de Donnees: Manuel de Formation, Univ.Tufts./DNSI.
6. Manuel de Saisie, Univ.Tufts./DNSI
7. Manuel des Codes, Univ.Tufts./DNSI
8. Memo: Bea Rogers (Tufts) to Gene Chiavaroli, Mission Director, June 7, 1987
9. Memo: Bea Rogers to Nick Luykx, S&T/Nutrition, 7 June 1987.
10. "Comparison of Planned and Actual Schedule", as of 5 June 1987.
11. "Note de Service", Melanee Lowdermilk (Tufts) to Mohamed Diallo (DNSI).
12. Memo: M.Lowdermilk to Emmy Simmons, ADO, USAID.
13. "Enquete sur les Depenses des Menages Urbains 1985-86", DNSI.
14. "Politique Economiques et Performances Agricoles; Le Cas du Mali 1960-83," Jacques Lecaillon and Christian Morrison, OECD, Paris, 1986.
15. "Analysis of Supply Responsiveness in Traditional Agriculture: Millet, Sorghum and Rice Farmers in Mali," Working Paper #36, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, June 1981.

ANNEX D

USAID

Evaluation of Nutrition in Agriculture Projects.

Report on a Visit to Honduras by Anthony Dawson,
Education Development Center, Newton, MA (Evaluator)
(5-8 August 1987)

1. I was accompanied by Mrs Patricia O'Brien-Place, agricultural economist with the Nutrition Economics Group (N.E.G.) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The N.E.G. is entirely funded by the Nutrition Office of USAID's Department of Science and Technology, under a RSSA to assist the Office of Nutrition to implement three combined projects (the tripartite project) which, since 1978, have focussed and supported efforts to promote consideration for consumption and nutrition in the agricultural policies of developing countries. I was thus enabled to discuss at length with Mrs O'Brien the work of the N.E.G as well as to benefit from the documentation she supplied from N.E.G files on the work of the projects in Honduras and the valuable contribution she made to the work there.
2. The documentation is listed in Annex I. There is no need to repeat any of it here because it is available to the readers of this report. I would only say that a quick reading of it, together with a re-reading of the remarks on the Honduras work in the papers of Roe, Evenson and Johnson submitted to the N.E.G workshop in Reston, confirmed my impression that this project has been conducted - up to the present point of completion in English of the final report - successfully due to the high quality inputs of N.E.G. and of leading Honduran project personnel and to the appropriateness of project design and scope, as responsively adapted to criticisms and suggestions made during evaluations and reviews. I would refer particularly to the assessment in the overview of Roger Norton in 1984 which appears quite objective in its arguments and supporting data, though Norton himself has been one of the main contributors to the project's success. I would also refer to the laudatory comments of Gary Smith, one of the project's launchers, in his memo. of 20 April 1984 to Roberta Van Haeften, who displayed there, as in much of his other writing his healthy and relevant concern for "institutionalization" and impact on the host country. This present report continues in the latter spirit since the crucial point has now been reached where all the good efforts since 1981 can be lost if the right action is not taken - as suggested below

- to disseminate the findings and instigate action in the light of them.

3. The contacts we made are indicated in Annex II. The list is small, but select for these are the people most directly concerned with agricultural planning in the context of overall economic planning and coordination with consumption and nutrition objectives. One exception is Mr Karl Holst. Being President of the Chamber of Commerce of San Pedro Sula (Honduras' major economic centre), a major landowner and cattle raiser and major investor in a meat-packing and exporting concern, he was able to provide an interesting viewpoint on the economic, political and agricultural situation in Honduras from a fairly conservative position. (It should perhaps be explained that our work was slowed and reduced by the illness we both suffered during the course of our short visit.)

4. The work under the tripartite project was launched under the auspices of the Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty of Economic Integration of Centralamerica. Originally envisaged to be conducted on a region-wide scale, it was subsequently agreed that it should start with Honduras as a case study, conducted in such a manner as to be replicable in other Central American countries. On the Honduran side the work has, since 1981, been conducted under the tripartite project by Dr J.Mario Ponce Cambar (a graduate in agricultural and general economics of the University of Wisconsin and the London School of Economics and former director of agrarian reform in Honduras) and Dr.Magdalena Garcia (a graduate in mathematics of the University of Monterey, Mexico, and in economics of the combined faculties of Honduras and Miami).

5. The project agreement was signed in August, 1980, with the following general objectives: (i) to modify and refine the agricultural planning methods that have been developed or are in process of being developed in Central America for the purpose of analyzing the impact of agricultural policies on the pattern of food consumption for different socio-economic groups of the population and (ii) to demonstrate, in one of the national planning systems in Central America, the usefulness of such methods for policy analysis. The different stages in the progress of the work are summarised in a document of ADAI excerpted in Annex III. The major modelling activities included the construction of a sequence of farm, regional and national models using linear programming methodology, while at the same time using the national household expenditure survey to estimate a system of household level demand functions. The strategy was to construct a farm level model that typified a reasonable classification of farm types. The types of farms were to be based on their location, endowments and agronomic practices employed. The farm models were then used as building blocks in constructing the regional and national model.

6. The first project review suggested that the demand analysis should proceed independantly of the farm and regional levels, in part to keep the level of complexity within manageable bounds. Upon completion of the demand analysis, direct and cross-price elasticity estimates would become parameters in the farm and national level model. The objective function of the farm model was to include a farm level income-aggregate calorie relationship. Of the most numerous problems reviewers found in this approach, the most serious was that the relationship between calories and income would not reflect the effect of relative market prices or internal household prices of goods and time. Unless individual income elasticities of demand were known, the aggregate calorie-income relationship could not be disaggregated to reflect individual income effects on household produced and purchased foods, or between preferred foods. The May, 1983 evaluation revealed that the aggregate income/expenditures to calorie function would be dropped and replaced with relationships estimated between income/ expenditure levels and levels of food consumed by the household. The evaluation also recommended that work continue toward the construction of a national model suitable for analysing the consumption impacts of the government's price, trade and food policies.

7. The macro-modelling work of the project ran into the constraint of lack of facilities for computerisation in Honduras. The Ministry of Natural Resources, which encompasses the role of a ministry of agriculture, lacked either the hardware or the personnel capacity to operate such a model. The project findings have been issued in a series of documents listed in Annex IV, some of which are summarised in Annex V).

8. The two leading Honduran project staff members were in 1984 entrusted with the establishment of ADAI, financed largely by USAID, an institution which Mario Ponce still serves as Director and Ms Garcia serves as econometrician. They and their current staff were of considerable assistance to the visiting team producing the present report.

9. ADAI stands for "Ateneo de la Agro-Industria", a non-political, non-profit private firm with legal status that has been created "by a group of Honduran technicians to offer their services to the socio-economic development efforts of Honduras, Central America and the Caribbean Basin." A summary of the documents produced by ADAI for the tripartite project are given in the document reproduced as Annex V.

10. It would appear that the linear programming methodology used by Dr Garcia in carrying out the project (probably recommended by Gary Smith of N.E.G.) was the most suitable and up-to-date that could be chosen at that time. Visiting experts such as Grant

Scobie, Terry Roe, Thorbecke, David Franklin and Stanley Johnson suggested changes that could have improved it; some were adopted (especially those recommended by Grant Scobie) and others could not be because they were put forward too late to be applicable, or were inapplicable for lack of the required software. In general they approved of the way the work was being done and the studies which emerged have been well respected. In fact their most immediate impact took the form of their being quoted and incorporated in succeeding studies and reports on various related subjects. Professor Stanley Johnson said in his paper to the Reston N.E.G. workshop that "the complexity of the production possibilities faced by farmers, lack of farm level prices and other information tends to favor the use of the linear programming technology."

11. Professor Evenson said in his paper to the N.E.G workshop in Reston that "this study is presumably destined to be the flagship study of Phase II. The idea is to integrate a CEAP component into the planning and policy system in place...A.I.D seems to have sent plenty of consultants, advisers and reviewers, all with their bits of advice creating a situation where 'too many cooks spoil the broth'...USAID should not go forward with this major Phase II effort until the staffing arrangements are made consistent with the project. This effort requires highly qualified economists committed to the project for an extended period." This criticism seems unfair and misplaced since USAID not only sent in the distinguished economists mentioned above but also engaged from the beginning the long-term commitment to the project of Professor Roger Norton. His sustained follow-through has made a great success of the project, at least in terms of the intrinsic value and intellectual and scientific quality of the project outputs. Above all, he authored, with Magdalena Garcia, Mario Ponce and Roberta Van Haeften (then head of the N.E.G.) the final report: "Agricultural Development Policies in Honduras: A Consumption Perspective", January 1987 (referred to hereinafter as "the final report").

12. This study builds on the extensive work carried out during the earlier multi-year Study of the Effects of Agricultural Development Policies on Food Consumption in Central America, which produced a number of basic reports and succeeded in cleaning and processing the data tapes from the 1978-79 Household Survey of the Ministry of Economy and Trade. The year of research undertaken to prepare the final report permitted a consolidation of the earlier work and an extension of it in some respects, particularly as regards policy implications.

13. The first two chapters of the report are introductory, first at the economy-wide level and then at the sectoral level. They provide the basic information required to establish the framework for later analysis. They also illustrate the effort of the authors to produce a text which can be readily understood by

officials of other governments, in Central America and beyond, who it is hoped will wish to learn from this experience and adapt and apply the approach to their own circumstances. In chapter 2, there are discussions of the history of the agrarian reform movement and of the public institutions in the sector, as well as a review of the main trends in production and trade. Chapter 3 describes the structure of rural incomes, by farm size group and by agricultural product, so that the incidence can be measured for policies that affect particular products. Some implications of the analysis for land use policies are developed. Chapter 4 develops a considerable amount of information about food availabilities and their time trends and distribution. It is in this chapter that new estimates of calorie and protein availabilities are presented, and the chapter also provides some estimates of demand functions for nutrients and for major foods. Chapter 5 deals with marketing issues, particularly focussing on the role of governmental marketing policies and programs at the consumer level. Chapter 6 analyzes the evolution of agricultural prices and their relation to other prices in the economy, and it discusses issues such as the role of wheat pricing in determining levels of PL 480 imports of wheat. Chapter 7 offers an analysis of the distributional effects of food pricing policy. And Chapter 8 presents a summary of the main findings and recommendations that are developed throughout the report.

14. The scope of the report responds well to a criticism made of the project by Professor Stanley Johnson at the N.E.G workshop in Reston: "The most serious problem facing this project must surely be the lack of a vision as to what the economic problem is; nowhere in the documents is there a mention of the 'political economy of the Honduran food problem.' As a consequence, the analytical effort lacks direction, focus...Without a problem-oriented focus, difficulties are likely to be encountered in 'institutionalizing' this analytical capacity into the planning process where high social payoffs might be realized from its use...The design of economic models should be influenced by the administrative infrastructure of the planning process if this capacity is to play an effective role in influencing policy decisions." It might well be asked whether these remarks are applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to other studies carried out under the tripartite project and whether, when they are applicable, the work could be salvaged by the kind of consolidation and broadening achieved under the expert guidance of Dr Roger Norton.

15. It is the drawing out of the policy implications which makes the report of general interest to our evaluation of the tripartite project worldwide. Some governments may have officials sophisticated enough to draw policy implications for agriculture simply from a reading of a technical study of food consumption and related factors, but for many least developed countries, it

seems essential to have the assistance of a highly experienced economist who knows the country well (such as Norton in the case of Honduras) in drawing out the policy implications. Also, it is the least developed countries, such as Honduras, which appear to merit high priority for this type of assistance because of the gravity of malnutrition within their borders and the heavy dependance of their economy on the agriculture sector. Generally speaking, their agriculture faces stiff competition when exporting to the international market, and can best hope for stimulation by an egalitarian progress of the domestic economy which translates into a substantial increase in effective demand for food by the poorest and least nourished people as their incomes increase.

16. At the time of our visit the official position regarding this report was that it was a draft awaiting publication by USDA. This is normally a long wait because of the exacting editorial process involved. It was also awaiting - a quicker process planned to be completed in September at a meeting between two of the authors, Roger Norton and Roberta Van Haeften - some cleaning up of typographical errors and certain corrections in the statistical and mathematical substance. It would then require translation into Spanish, as requested in a letter from the Director of ADAI to USAID to N.E.G. dated 23 February 1987 (a letter which also mentioned Roberta's idea of a seminar to discuss the report, which Ponce thought could take place during Norton's visit later in 1987 for the evaluation of PL480). This translation could have proceeded in advance of the finalisation of a few details by the two authors mentioned, and be finalised to incorporate their corrections.

17. Since the time seemed to be ripe for getting the report out and its message known, the Director of ADAI himself translated the final summary chapter into Spanish. He then distributed copies of the English text, with this Spanish summary, about ten days before our visit. Among the recipients were the Ministries of Planning, Finance, and Natural Resources, some of the embassies, UNDP, FAO and the University of Honduras.

18. A copy also went to the USAID mission, where we found it with Mr Joe Kwiatkowski. I said to him that it could make practically no impact if it was not available in Spanish and that, when it was, it would be desirable to organize a workshop at which the readers, including agricultural planners and policy-makers, could discuss it. Mrs O'Brien told him that USAID had no budget for translation into Spanish and that ADAI could not find the \$2000 required. He replied that his mission would be able to translate it if AID/W sent a telex saying that they had no funds for the purpose. He would also be prepared to organize a workshop once the report was out.

19. Though the final report was received by Joe Kwiatkowski, it had not been seen by Dr Juan Castillo, the chief of the Nutrition Office in the Division of Human Resources of the Mission. Mrs O'Brien-Place promptly gave Dr Castillo her own copy. This generous gesture was putting it in the right hands, because Dr Castillo is closely in touch with two highly relevant Honduran Government efforts which the Agriculture Office of the Mission did not mention. About three months ago, a donor coordinating committee including USAID (Dr Castillo), West Germany, EEC, CRS, CARE and WFP started periodic meetings (every two months) to oversee levels of food imports and different types of food aid projects. This committee has appealed to Honduran government agencies to participate. On the government side, technicians in an interministerial working group (representing those concerned with planning and with both food production and consumption) are attempting to produce a national strategy regarding food security. This group wishes to include the donors in its work and to achieve coordination with them. It was formed 18 months ago in response to a ROCAP-INCAP initiative at regional level, encouraging each country in the region to formulate a food security strategy. Honduras is to present a document to INCAP in November on this subject. Going further back still, in December 1983 the Contadora Group of countries, with financial support from the EEC, set up CADESCA - an action committee for economic and social development of Central America. Starting in mid-1984, this committee called for country food security schemes addressing the following aspects:

- (a) diagnosis of the food supply situation; surveillance of harvest results;
- (b) system of food production;
- (c) marketing basic food products;
- (d) agricultural credit;
- (e) investigation and transfer of technology.

This approach, which has led to the setting up of a Honduran counterpart body, has more of a policy orientation than the first Honduran working group mentioned, which concentrates on increasing managerial capacity to tackle the problems identified in the food security field.

20. I asked Dr Castillo about Consuplane and the Agricultural Policy Commission (set up in 1977 and mentioned on page 2-9 of the final report). He said Consuplane was now called Secplan and the other body he had not heard of and doubted that it was active. (It is composed of the Ministers whose officials are now in the present working groups).

21. We had meetings with the officials of Secplan most directly concerned with agricultural planning and with the formulation of the food security strategy (Sr. Idelfonso Paredes, Director of Agricultural Planning, and his deputies responsible for agriculture and nutrition respectively: Sr David Caballero R. and Sr Carlos Cordero). Sr Paredes thought that the National Food Security Committee should organise the workshop for discussion by the readers of the final report of the project. He also believed that the subject of the report was highly topical and he wished USAID to keep them informed of progress with translation and distribution of the final report so that they could prepare well for the workshop without having to do it at short notice. In the absence of Dr Castillo, who had planned to be at the meeting but was unable to come, and of Mrs O'Brien, who fell sick, they asked me when I thought the workshop could be held. I said that if the translation could begin almost immediately it should be possible to get the report issued in Spanish by ADAI in early October. A month for reading it would then be required, so it might be discussed in November; however, I explained that all this was up to USAID and the Mission would keep Secplan informed. Sr Paredes also hoped that USAID could finance the workshop.

22. In a telephone conversation with Dr Norton before we reached Honduras, he mentioned two concrete instances of impact of the final report of which even the Mission itself might not be fully aware. First, in his evaluation of the PL 480 Title I program in Honduras (see "An Evaluation of the PL 480 Title I Programs in Honduras", Roger D. Norton and Carlos A. Benito, for USAID, Winrock International, May 1987, he had applied as appropriate the findings of the final report.

23. Secondly, in the three weeks immediately preceding our visit he and USAID officials (Weingert, Scott Brown) from Washington had hammered out a basis for Mission policy dialogue with the Government in which the findings of the final report are also fully reflected. (See their document Honduras: Agricultural Sector Strategy. One example of the concordance of this document with the final report is in Section C: Conceptual Agricultural Growth Models: including a natural resources based model, a science based model, an export growth model, an import substitution model, and a self-sufficiency model: "while, as in many LDC economies, there and must be a mixture of these growth models... (the first four face difficulties, while the fifth)..., "self-sufficiency model focussing on the indigenous market complemented by science and productivity is promising. With low nutritional levels and high income elasticities for food, a sustained effort of employment generation with rising real incomes is an important source of agricultural growth."

24. It was difficult for us to get a clear indication of the what the reception and impact of the final report would be when

talking to people who had only just received it and who had not yet had time to do more than just glance through it. Some, knowing only Spanish, had to confine themselves to the summary chapter. We focussed on what would be the readiness to accept and use a report with this subject-matter and what would be the best way to diffuse and institutionalize it once it was plentifully available in Spanish. Naturally also opinions differ according to people's varying assessments of the current political situation. A key relevant factor in this concerns the landowners. It would seem that since the take-over in Nicaragua they have been hardened rather than softened in their conservatism; any shift in favor of the interests of the poor is now proven by the Nicaraguan experience to be a slippery and dangerous road to embark upon - one enters a slide that cannot be stopped. However, their political influence is considered to have diminished. A strong opposition candidate for the election of a new President in two years' time, Rafaelo Callejas, might conceivably draw ammunition from the final report if and when it comes to his attention. Mario Ponce thought that the final report recommendations could be accepted. Obviously the proposal for a land tax would run into the stiffest opposition, especially among members of parliament who are landowners. The military remain powerful, but only a few top military people are major landowners. There is a free press. Even the landowners might eventually be impressed and won over by hard evidence about changes that raise productivity per hectare in agriculture, stimulate agricultural growth and raise the value of land. The conservatives would also welcome a shift from using government agencies to market and fiscal-monetary mechanisms to achieve the desired changes.

Recommendations

It should be stressed that since there were only three working days for our visits, and this report had to be prepared on the fourth day, saturday (when entry to the Mission was not permissible to outsiders for security reasons) prior to our departure early Sunday morning, there was no time for this report to be read and agreed to for its facts and opinions by the Mission. This applies equally to the recommendations made below:

1. The example of the Honduras final report might be followed in other countries where, taking account of the level of sophistication of government officials receiving project reports, it seems necessary for the policy implications of the findings to be fully drawn out and set clearly in the context of the agricultural and overall economy (see para.14 above).

2. Since Mr Kwiatkowski is leaving the Mission in Honduras (and US government service) before the end of the month, action is needed to ensure that his promise of translation of the final report and organization of a workshop for readers to discuss it will be met (see para.17 above).

3. The proposal of the Secplan agriculture and nutrition planning officials (see para.20 above) that the final report be discussed in a workshop of its readers financed by USAID and organised by the National Food Security Committee should be accepted. It is preferable for the promotion of the report's recommendations to be done by Hondurans within this committee and within the ministries represented on it, rather than pushed for by outsiders in a meeting organised directly by them. It will maximise the possibilities of institutionalisation.

4. Quite an impressive number of top-rank economists as well as other evaluators and reviewers have visited and participated in the ongoing work at the expense of USAID. This has been very valuable (i) in correcting and reinforcing the work of the project, including provision of technical assistance and training to local personnel, and (ii) helping to carry the benefit of its experience to similar projects in other countries with which these visitors have also been associated on behalf of USAID. It seems that in this and other ways a special effort has been made by S&T/N and N.E.G to make this what was appropriately called a flagship project. But the cost should also be analyzed. Was there a lack of self-confidence in the manner in which the project was managed using all these visits? Could there be a lesson drawn that from the outset a sufficient sum of money should be allocated to ensure that a very few top-flight international and local personnel have a long-term commitment to serve the project as their primary occupation, and leave the outside peer checks to periodic comments on the project output visible on paper? Evaluation is essential to ensure objectivity, but might be done thoroughly on a broad basis no more than once in three years. It is recommended that these questions be examined in regard to all the undertakings in the worldwide tripartite project.

5. The Honduran project demonstrates the value of setting up an independent body such as ADAI, to give the local key project workers the detachment and long-term commitment necessary to see the project through without distraction, and to use and protect donated equipment (such as computer hard and software) under decent house-keeping conditions. It is recommended that this be considered as a lesson for generalisation and that it be remembered that, at the end, it increases the need for specific and adequate provisions to re-internalize in government institutions the project results. (The pattern of donations should be reviewed for balance: ADAI has six or seven good microcomputers and excellent printers, yet no photocopy machine at all!)

6. Another general lesson to be drawn from Honduran - and probably from much other ldc experience with the project - is that any approach which depends on developing complex mathematical models and analysing masses of data calls for computer capacity which is not, except rarely, available. A recommendation has already been made as an outcome of the Mali visit that bilateral and multilateral donors might coordinate their efforts to provide developing countries with independent non-profit computing centres in which adequate operating conditions can be guaranteed and capacity can be properly shared and fully utilised at all times by donor missions and the host country. Apparently the UNDP has already considered taking such initiatives: at least in Africa.

Anthony Dawson,
Tegucigalpa,
8 August 1987.

Postscript

Following the preparation of this report I was able to meet my team member Dr Eileen Kennedy in Washington, who I had asked to read the Honduras study documentation. She had the following comment to add:

"The Honduras study relies exclusively on extant data with all the limitations discussed (in Chapter IV above). Given these data limitations, the researchers do about the best that can be done to address policy issues. The detailed descriptive analyses contained in the report are useful in providing a context for the study and in interpreting some of the later multivariate analyses."

Documentation

Memorandum: Gary Smith to Roberta Van Haeften on Fletcher's CEAP/Honduras report, April 20, 1984

Memo: Van Haeften to files: Hondruas trip report, August 4, 1986

Contract of 22 January 1986 with Roger Norton

Letter: Ponce to Van Haeften, August 16, 1984

Request to A.I.D to finance new ADAI, August 1984

Note: Van Haeften to N.Luykx: list of non-project work done by ADAI, 1984-1986, 14 August 1986.

Letter: Whelan to D.Franklin concerning latter's visit to Honduras, 11 April 1985.

Contract for Franklin, 23 July 1984.

Letter: AID Mission Director to Ponce about new ADAI

Letter: Van Haeften to Peters, ARDO, AID Mission, transmitting two copies of final report

Revision to original list of project tasks

Letter: Ponce to Van Haeften about disseminating final report 23 February 1987

Memo: Forman to Duane Acker about Honduras, 6 August 1986

Project review by Roger Norton, July 1984, SIECA/ECID doc.# 50/84

Norton draft outline of final report

Memo: Smith to files about Carlos Benito's work to publicise and popularize the Honduras work, 25 August