PD-ABC-785
72071

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART I

1. BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM, READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS.
2. USE LETTER QUALITY TYPE, NOT "DOT MATRIX" TYPE.

IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Reporting A.I.D. Unit:

Mission or AID/W Office USAID/TUNISIA
(ES# 664-90-ES-002)

B. Was Evaluation Scheduled In Current FY Annual Evaluation Plan?

Yes [X] Slipped [ ] Ad Hoc [ ]

Evaluation Plan Submission Date: FY ___ Q ___

C. Evaluation Timing

Interim [X] Final [ ] Ex Post [ ] Other [ ]

D. Activity or Activities Evaluated (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated; if not applicable, list title and date of the evaluation report.)

Project No.	Project /Program Title	First PROAG or Equivalent (FY)	Most Recent PACD (Mo/Yr)	Planned LOP Cost (000)	Amount Obligated to Date (000)
664-0343	Agricultural Policy Implementation Project (APIP)	FY87	4/30/91	5,240	5,238

ACTIONS

E. Action Decisions Approved By Mission or AID/W Office Director

Action(s) Required	Name of Officer Responsible for Action	Date Action to be Completed
1. Constitue a steering and standing committee to manage project and implement recommendations	S. Pryor/ S. Makhlouf/ M. Gharbi	March 90
2. Discuss and resolve priorities for remaining studies.	S. Pryor/ S. Makhlouf/ M. Gharbi	March 90
3. Update computer management.	S. Pryor/ S. Makhlouf/ M. Gharbi	Nov. 90
4. Institute a systematic information and dissemination effort.	S. Pryor/ S. Makhlouf/ M. Gharbi	Nov. 90

(Attach extra sheet if necessary)

APPROVALS

F. Date Of Mission Or AID/W Office Review Of Evaluation: (Month) (Day) (Year)

G. Approvals of Evaluation Summary And Action Decisions:

	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission or AID/W Office Director
Name (Typed)	Shirley Pryor	Mohamed Gharbi	Nancy Hooff	Lewis Lucke
Signature				
Date				10/29/90

ABSTRACT

H. Evaluation Abstract (Do not exceed the space provided)

This mid-term evaluation was done after two years of project implementation in order to provide the Ministry of Agriculture and USAID with an assessment of project performance to date and develop guidance for future project direction.

The Project's foremost objective is to support policy analysis essential to the Government of Tunisia's (GOT) ongoing Agricultural Structural Adjustment Program (ASAP), which entails's GOT commitment to a series of economic liberalization measures being undertaking by the GOT as part of its seventh Economic and Social Development Plan 1987-91.

Project documents were reviewed and project personnel were interviewed at all levels. The major findings and conclusions are that the Project has:

- Largely achieved its primary objectives and enhanced the GOT's capacity to enact and implement structural adjustment policy in the agricultural and food sector.

- Created an atmosphere of awareness of free market issues and confidence in analytical techniques.

- Delivered a series of analytical studies of acceptable to high professional quality that have helped the GOT to assess the probable outcomes of structural adjustment policy decisions and to make choices among alternative measures.

The evaluators noted the following lessons:

- The policies engendered with the support of APIP so far have been successful but it is difficult to document policy level impact and pinpoint specific instances where decisions taken could be directly related to project outputs.

- AID should and can avoid even giving the impression that it is departing from a fundamental "non-intervention" stance. USAID should limit itself to supporting GOT policy decisions with analyses designed to support decision makers to assess probable outcomes.

- It is essential that projects supporting policy and decision-making have flexibility built into project design and agenda setting.

COSTS

I. Evaluation Costs

1. Evaluation Team Name		Affiliation	Contract Number OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (U.S. $)	Source of Funds
- Eric Shearer	Ag. Economist	Devres Inc.	42	87,680	Project
- Theodore Black	Design/Eval.	Devres Inc.	39		664-0343
- Maxime Lesage	Food Prod.Posthar	Devres Inc.	39		
- D. Wood	Institutional Specialist	Devres Inc.	2		

2. Mission/Office Professional Staff Person-Days (Estimate) _____

3. Borrower/Grantee Professional Staff Person-Days (Estimate) _____

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART II

SUMMARY

J. Summary of Evaluation Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (Try not to exceed the three (3) pages provided)
Address the following items:

- **Purpose of evaluation and methodology used**
- **Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated**
- **Findings and conclusions (relate to questions)**
- **Principal recommendations**
- **Lessons learned**

Mission or Office:	Date This Summary Prepared:	Title And Date Of Full Evaluation Report:
USAID/TUNISIA	September 10, 1990	Mid-Term Evaluation of the Tunisia Agricultural Policy Implementation Project

USAID/Tunisia's Agricultural Policy Implementation Project (APIP) was approved in March 1987 for a period of forty months and funding of about five million dollars. The Project's foremost objective is to support policy analysis essential to the Government of Tunisia's (GOT) ongoing Agricultural Structural Adjustment Program (ASAP). The ASAP includes specific, time-phased commitments to the World Bank through the end of 1990 under the terms of a second Agricultural Structural Adjustment Loan (ASAL) for $84 million approved in 1988. A secondary objective of APIP is to enhance, through training activities, the capability of GOT cadres to undertake adjustment policy analysis. The prime implementation contract and three subcontracts were signed in November 1987.

The project has delivered a series of analytical studies of acceptable-to-high professional quality that have helped the GOT to assess the probable outcomes of structural adjustment policy decisions and to make choices among alternative measures.

The purpose of the evaluation was to review the identifiable Project outputs; determine the less tangible manifestations of policy level impact; identify implementation problems that could impinge on the successful completion of the Project; and, make appropriate recommendations to A.I.D. and to the GOT.

The Project has in most respects performed well and is making positive impact on current policy choices as well as in less tangible ways--such as the attitudes of managers and staff regarding free market policies. The improved policy milieu indicates the cadre's desire to understand and learn to apply the laws of supply and demand to guide agricultural adjustment policies and measures.

The Project's impact to date can be measured only in terms of tangible outputs (e.g., the series of studies led or undertaken by the principal contractor and institutional subcontractor). Effects of the Project on policy are not objectively measurable. APIP provides the tools of analysis and enhances personnel's capability to use them. Whether GOT effectively implements the best choices identified by the analysis is a political matter beyond the scope of A.I.D. and of the Project.

The major findings, issues, recommendations and lessons learned are summarized below:

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A new management structure should be developed to enhance GOT Project management coordination. The structure should facilitate communication and define and delegate authority to the appropriate levels. High level authorities should be allowed to focus their efforts on guidance and solving crucial problems. Specific recommendations are to:

- Constitute a steering committee composed of the two ministerial Secretaries of State most concerned (Agriculture and Economy) and the Ministry of Planning and Finance's (MINPLAN's) GD of Planning, and including the Director, USAID/Tunisia by invitation, to meet only ad hoc for making policy decisions;

- Create a standing executive committee of the relevant directors general or directors of those ministries and the USAID Project Officer, as well as the prime contractor's Resident Representative as adviser, to meet regularly to deal with routine problems and prepare decision options for the policy committee;

- Discuss and resolve priorities for the remaining studies within the proposed management structure at the earliest possible moment, in accordance with the GOT's plans for continued structural adjustment for the near future; and

- Institute, within the DG/PDIA, more participatory management and greater delegation of authority, while referring key decisions to the State Secretary.

2. Revise the use and location of the computers in the DG/PDIA and develop a new communications system with the assistance of an appropriate public institution (e.g., the Higher Institute of Management (ISG), the Regional Institute for Scientific and Technological Research (IRSIT), the National Computer Center (CNI). The new system should make use of interoffice electronic mail and all personnel should be trained to use the hardware and the software for communication and work processing.

3. Institute a systematic information and dissemination effort, under the guidance of the executive committee, to ensure appropriate channeling of feedback and appropriate distribution of Project results. An experienced writer should be contracted to undertake this task. To promote and institutionalize the dissemination of Project results and feedback the Project should:

   - Sponsor public debate, along the pattern of the general seminar held in May 1989, on each study after its final,approved version has been widely distributed.

   - Issue regular operational bulletins within the DG/PDIA and to cooperating institutions. The bulletins should contain information on noteworthy activities or products of the DG/PDIA and APIP and on the arrival of consultants. Circulate copies of important background and statistical documentation to other MOA units and interested Ministries.

4. Give the training component of the Project greater emphasis. Training is an important link to the creation of a MOA cadre capable of sustainable, independent policy analysis. Specifically, the Project should:

   - Make the short and long-term outputs implemented by separate contractors more synergistic and lengthen the visits by the University of Wisconsin advisers;

   - Provide incentives for contractors of short-term outputs (such as studies) to devote part of their time to transferring their methodological know-how to GOT collaborators; and

- DG/PDIA management should make specified staff members available full-time for designated APIP activities.

Issues for the Future and Lessons Learned

Several issues merit the attention of the GOT and all donors beyond the completion date of this project. These issues also have implications for AID in considering similar projects elsewhere.

1. Unfinished agenda

The following measures should be undertaken beyond the scope and life of APIP:

- Contract, for a DG/PDIA management study, a prestigious national institution (e.g., ISG) to study the detailed management needs of the DG/PDIA, including links to other Ministry of Agriculture units, key public agencies and to the private sector.

- Contract an assessment of individual training needs in the DG/PDIA with the assistance of a public educational institution. The assessment should lead to the development of a long-range training program that can be submitted to multilateral and bilateral donors for funding.

- Take action on the long-standing proposal to upgrade the statistics sub-direction to a full direction. Also, the unit's links with the MOA and other GOT data processing centers, as well as with less organized data bases in related ministries and public agencies, must be strengthened and created (where they do not exist).

-Generic lessons learned

- Maintenance of a low profile by AID in the policy making process is important. This approach implies measurement of overall project impact rather than attempting to pinpoint "success" or establish conventional monitoring indicators.

- Flexibility is key to the successful implementation of a policy support project given fast changing circumstances and the critical importance of timing input delivery. One corollary of this concept is the need to avoid the tangle of AID and host country regulations which often compete with projects' objectives.