

AN EVALUATION OF THE SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE PROGRAM
OF THE BUREAU FOR PROGRAM AND POLICY COORDINATION
OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation was prepared for the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC) of the United States Agency for International Development. It is part of a broader effort to evaluate the effectiveness and utility of the experimental Social and Institutional Profile (SIP) program. The evaluation includes three parts. An INTRODUCTION describes the rationale for the SIP program, the countries in which it has been initiated, and the evaluation procedures. The EVALUATION section consists of twelve essays that review the SIP's submitted for analysis. The final FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS section presents suggestions for formalization of the SIP program.

A major finding is that the experimental SIP's are remarkably successful documents that can be of considerable assistance to AID in the formulation of development strategy and project design and implementation. A major recommendation is that AID contemplate transforming the SIP program from an experimental to an operational one.

SIP SUCCESS

The evaluation reviewed the Kenya, Niger, Somalia, Uganda, Eastern Caribbean, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Oman, Yemen and Philippines SIP's. Each SIP was considered in terms of its conformity to its scope of work (SOW), its comprehensiveness, its descriptive and analytic qualities, its coherence, and its relevance to development programming.

Conformity of a SIP to its SOW: The evaluation developed two measures (called Csow and TCsow) of SIP to SOW conformity. Both measures compared the number of sections included in a SIP with those requested by its SOW. If 60% or more of a SIP's sections were those requested by its SOW, it was judged to have been in conformity with its SOW. All SIP's had successful Csow and TCsow rates.

Comprehensiveness: Two assessments were made concerning the comprehensiveness of SIP's. First, they were evaluated in terms of whether they discussed "many" social, institutional and geographic aspects of a country. "Many" meant that both the bulk of a nation's geography was discussed. It equally meant that more than its central ministries and formal economic institutions were analyzed. Second, SIP's were judged in terms of whether they were "comprehensive enough". This was defined to mean that they included all the socio-economic institutions and geographic regions about which a planner had to possess knowledge to develop interventions. All SIP's were judged to have analyzed "many" socio-economic institutions. However, only 45% were rated as "comprehensive enough".

Descriptive and Analytic Quality: A single assessment each was made of the descriptive and analytic quality. Description denotes the presentation of the properties of things and their relations to other things. Analysis refers to the arguments, and the appropriateness of the arguments, by which the properties of things and their relations are established. "Good" description in this evaluation involved complete and accurate presentation of the topics in each section of a SIP. "Good" analysis was evaluated on the basis of the quality of a SIP's arguments. Arguments were judged according to the prevailing standards of empirical social research. Fully 82% of the SIP's were judged successful in their description. However, only 27% were successful in their analysis.

Coherence: Each SIP was evaluated in terms of its coherence. This meant its understandability. Incoherence arose from stylistic problems in the presentation of an argument, including bizarre grammar, gibberish sentences, misleading headings, byzantine organization, etc. Fully 63% of the SIP's were coherent.

Relevance to Development Programming: The development relevance of a SIP was not judged in terms of its actual impact upon Mission programming, but in terms of its potential for such impact. Each SIP was evaluated in terms of the number of interventions it proposed and of the importance of those interventions. If a SIP presented one or more interventions, it was judged to be successful in the number of interventions it proposed. Interventions were considered important if analysis revealed that they seized a development opportunity or relaxed a constraint, that they were feasible, and that they had a potentially high benefit incidence. All the SIP's presented a satisfactory number of interventions. However, only 36% convinced the reviewer of the importance of their interventions.

Overall Success Rate: The SIP's as a whole were judged to have been successful in 74% of the activities in which they were evaluated. This is a rather remarkable achievement.

FACTORS INFLUENCING SIP SUCCESS

Six factors contribute to more successful and six factors to less successful SIP's. These factors are:

<u>MORE SUCCESSFUL SIP's</u>	<u>LESS SUCCESSFUL SIP's</u>
1. Sufficient time	Insufficient time
2. SIP team includes senior social scientists/development practitioners with considerable in-country experience	SIP team lacks such persons
3. SIP team has good mix of development anthropologists and development economists	SIP team lacks both development anthropologists and economists
4. Adequate funding	Inadequate funding
5. SIP team asked to perform only SIP-related activities	SIP team asked to include non-SIP-related activities
6. SIP team and document created by an institution with a proven record in complex social development research	SIP team and document created by an institution with no such experience

ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE SIP PROGRAM

The following issues might be considered when planning the institutionalization of the SIP program.

Time Frame: SIP teams must be allowed sufficient time to perform their activities.

Team Experience: SIP teams should include experienced social scientists/development practitioners with very considerable in-country experience and language capability, as well as team management skills.

Team Composition: SIP teams should include a core of social analysts, including development anthropologists.

Funding: SIP teams should have funding commensurate with their personnel and time requirements. This suggests increased funding.

SIP Activities: SIP teams should largely perform SIP activities. However, team members should be encouraged to participate in the development of Mission interventions. Conversely Mission personnel should be encouraged to contribute

to SIP teams. This may contribute to the development value of the SIP as well as its impact.

Institutional Affiliation of SIP's: SIP teams should be fielded by institutions with proven track records in applied social development.

SIP Substance, Social Development Analysis and SIP Power: The more successful SIP's tended towards a form of analysis termed social development analysis (SDA). This analysis provides a way of making successful decisions concerning development strategy and project design and implementation. It is thus potentially powerful in that it places Missions in a better position to formulate strategy and to translate this into larger, more efficient project portfolios. AID may wish to exploit SDA more thoroughly.

The following possible actions may facilitate addressing the preceding issues:

1. Enlargement of the SIP Working Group: This group has the dual function of maintaining and improving the quality of the SIP program while at the same time promoting its activities. The working group might well consider adding one or two outside members. The rationale for doing so would be similar to that used by trustees of major agencies when they secure outside membership. The working group might well select such individuals on the basis of their possession of a skill which it feels it needs. For example, outside members might be persons with considerable familiarity with social development research.

2. Creation of a SIP Publication Series: A number of the SIP's are of such quality that they are publishable in the private sector. They contribute in important and at times unique ways to understanding the development process. It is thus recommended that AID establish a fund to publish and distribute its most meritorious SIP's. Publication of SIP's will enhance USAID's visibility and development credibility in ways that will facilitate its actions. SIP's might be selected for publication by the SIP working group with the approval of the AID Missions in the countries whose SIP's have been selected. Strong candidates for publication would be the Kenya, Niger and Somalia SIP's.

3. Creation of a Mission SIP Officer: This direct hire officer, in addition to other duties, would have responsibility for SIP activities within his or her mission. Specifically, the person would manage the creation of the SIP, and manage its utilization when created. The officer would have responsibility for assuring a compatibility between the SIP and the mission's CDSS's, PID's and PP's. The officer would be available to assist contract personnel in the utilization of the document during their performance of their missions. The officer would also be available to assist mission and contract personnel involved in implementation activities to utilize the document in these domains. Finally, this officer would be responsible for locating lacunae in the SIP and recommending to the SIP Center means of removing such information gaps. SIP officers might well be Program Design or Rural Development personnel.

4. Creation of a Core SIP Substance and Methodology: SIP's should continue to be allowed considerable substantive flexibility. However, it is time that more explicit procedures be formulated specifying a core substance and methodology. Two general types of SIP's might be considered. The first might be a more descriptive document that contains information concerning a nation's target populations, its development-related institutions, and its developing sectors. The second might be a more analytic document that performs a full-scale social development analysis and from this analysis derives development strategy and tactics.

5. Institutionalization of SIP Program Management: At present, the SIP working group provides:

- assistance in the selection of SIP teams;
- assistance in the management of SIP teams;
- assistance in the preparation of SIP documents;
- assistance to missions in the use of SIP's in program and project design and implementation.

Further, two additional functions may be imposed. Those of:

- management of the SIP Publication Series;
- management of the creation and updating of documents which specify and teach SIP core substance and methodology.

When the preceding occurs, management of the SIP program will become more onerous. Two options, and a compromise, are suggested to cope with the increased managerial load.

A more centralized approach would be to place all management functions of the program in the hands of a single unit with expertise in applied social analysis. This unit would be a SIP Center, and like Wisconsin's Land Tenure Center, be located at some institution of higher learning. It would not perform all SIP's itself, but would select the teams that created them and perform all other management responsibilities associated with the program. A more decentralized approach would be to delegate all SIP managerial functions to the Regional Bureaus and the individual USAIDs. A potential strength of the first approach is that it might result in greater "academic" expertise in the formulation of SIP's. However, this strength is also its weakness. Overly "academic" exercises rarely address the practical world of development. The greatest value of SIP's comes only if AID learns how to perform them and use them in strategy formulation and in project design and implementation. Thus, one counsels the greatest possible AID participation in the formulation of SIP's. One way of increasing AID participation while retaining social science expertise in the program would be to devolve the major functions of implementing SIP's to the Regional Bureaus and USAID's. The task of creating and updating core substance and methodology could be given to an applied social development analysis group. Finally, the SIP working group would continue as a coordinating committee overseeing the entire program.

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INTRODUCTION

This evaluation was prepared for the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination (PPC) of the United States Agency for International Development/Washington. It is part of a broader effort to evaluate the effectiveness and utility of the experimental Social and Institutional Profile (SIP) program. The present evaluation consists of three parts. The INTRODUCTION recounts the rationale for the pilot SIP program, describes the countries in which it has been initiated, and explains the evaluation procedures. The EVALUATION section consists of twelve essays that judge the twelve SIP's which have been submitted for analysis. A final section presents FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. A major finding of the present evaluation exercise is that the experimental SIP's are remarkably successful documents and that they can be of considerable assistance to AID/Washington and AID Missions in both the formulation of development strategy and the hurly-burly world of project implementation. Its major recommendations, thus, are those designed to transform the SIP program from an experimental to an operational one.

BACKGROUND

The SIP program appears to have been catalyzed by the conjunction of three needs which AID officials perceived required attention if development assistance programs were to be made more effective. These needs arose in response to Mission problems in implementing projects, and equally in response to their frustrations generated by the analytic requirements imposed upon

them by AID/W when social soundness analysis (SSA) and the Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) were made mandatory.

The years between 1970 and 1980, especially in response to the Sahelian Drought in Africa, involved the rapid build-up and maintenance of Mission project portfolios. During this time, direct-hire personnel levels remained more or less constant. This meant that many direct-hire officers with implementation responsibilities found themselves with more and grander projects to manage. Such officers found themselves wrestling with a bewildering array of governmental and non-governmental institutions in their daily attempts to get and keep projects moving. Months would go by before calls would be returned; crucial papers would go unsigned or be lost; institutions designated in Project Agreements as the appropriate agencies with which to deal would swear that this was an impossibility; commodities would go unpurchased; commodities purchased would go undistributed; etc., etc. Dealing with host-country institutions was a prime determinant of project officer angst. And it was from sentiments like these that the need for a SIP-like document began to be perceived, because such a document would explain, like a "user friendly" computer program, how a host-country's institutions operated.

In 1975 the USAID began to require social soundness analyses as part of the project design process. These were supposed to increase project effectiveness by designing projects which conformed to local-level social, political, and economic institutional requirements. Grizzled Mission officers with considerable implementation experience knew that the world price of peanuts affected the behavior of parastatal peanut monopsonies, which affected the income of families who grew peanuts, which affected their health, their

attitudes toward innovation, etc. In short, these officers knew that local institutions affected each other and were in turn affected by national and even international institutions. What they did not know, however, was how the different institutions affected each other. It is answers to this type of question which social soundness analysis gives.

Social soundness analysis ran into certain problems following 1977, when steps were taken to shorten project design. One unintended consequence of these steps was to restrict social soundness analysis to the last phase of design -- the project paper. The authors of the Kenya SIP reported:

This led to difficulties because, although formal commitments to projects or project elements are not allowed prior to the signing of the project paper, any number of informal understandings are in fact reached much earlier in the project development process.

...obviously there are many instances where the social analysis can not contribute to the project design because the design is nearly finalized (Kenya SIP).

A response to these difficulties and a recognition of the usefulness of social soundness analysis was a tendency to explore ways of performing social soundness analysis before it was too late, and again, according to the Kenya SIP:

It was with this experience in mind that AID social analysts in Washington and in the field began, in 1980, to explore seriously the possibility of institutionalizing the use of social analytic skills at an earlier point in the project development cycle... (and) attention soon centered on the notion of a country-level, Socio-Economic or Socio-Institutional Profile. It was thought that such profiles would... provide a framework of criteria that could be used to assess the social soundness of program or project ideas at a very early stage... (Kenya SIP:ii).

At the same time that Missions were seeking proper ways to utilize social soundness analysis, they were confronted with the CDSS. In 1978, AID/W required

that Missions annually provide a CDSS. This was a most difficult document for Missions to generate in part because of its contradictory requirements. On the one hand, the document was to be short -- about 60 pages (double-spaced). On the other, it was to contain a statement of and a rationale for the Mission's development strategy which was supposed to further AID's "New Directions" policy of targeting the rural poor while capitalizing on the opportunities and minimizing the constraints present in a nation's development trends. Further, it was made quite clear that the CDSS was to influence profoundly the dollar flow to Mission programs. The CDSS, thus, required that Missions prepare a major analysis of the dynamics of their host-country's socio-economic system in a document with the length of a decent undergraduate term paper. Obviously, what was needed was another document, one which performed the analysis required by the CDSS.

It was against this background in 1981 that PPC initiated a pilot SIP program. Missions, as part of this program, would undertake to produce SIP's. These were to have considerable flexibility as to the topics included. There was some sense, however, that SIP's would combine sectoral (especially agricultural sector), institutional, and social analyses. But each SIP was to meet the needs of the Mission for which it was formulated, and was to be drafted by a team of social scientists working in collaboration with Mission personnel. The SIP's were seen as largely analytic documents that utilized existing data sources. PPC sought to catalyze this fledgling program in two ways: first, by subsidizing the funding of SIP's; and second, by providing the "know-how" to help Mission's formulate SIP's tailored to their requirements. Twelve SIP's from this pilot program were ready for review by the

SIP's were produced for Africa (Kenya, Niger, Somalia and Uganda), the Caribbean and Latin America (Eastern Caribbean, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras and Hamaica); the Middle East (Oman and Yemen), and Southeast Asia (Philippines). There are no South Asia SIP's. These are generally trying times for the nations for which SIP's have been drafted. There are problems in the agricultural sector; deteriorating terms of trade; balance of payment difficulties; high, often increasing, rural poverty; and political instability.

EVALUATION PROCEDURES

SIP success was evaluated on the basis of performance in nine areas in five categories. These were:

Conformity to Their Scopes of Work (SOW)

1. SOW Conformity Rate
2. Total Conformity Rate

Comprehensiveness

3. SIP Comprehensiveness
4. Comprehensive "Enough"

Descriptive and Analytic Quality

5. Descriptive Quality
6. Analytic Quality

Coherence

7. SIP Coherence

Relevance to Development Programming

8. Number of Interventions

9. Importance of Interventions

A "Success of SIP" Score summarized the overall performance of the document. This score was the percentage of the total criteria in which the SIP was judged to have performed successfully.

The procedure for evaluating a SIP was as follows. First, the reviewer read all the SIP's. Then individual SIP's were judged. This involved assessing the degree to which it satisfied the criteria used to indicate success. During this phase, the reviewer "haunted" the SIP in question. It was read and reread. Relevant literature and experts were consulted. The result was an essay seeking to detail the strengths and weaknesses of the document. A critical tone in an essay evaluating a SIP does not mean that it was considered unsuccessful. The SIP's were remarkable documents. They provoke reflection and debate. The reviewers' essays seek to capture these qualities and communicate them to their readers. Generally, the longer and testier an evaluative essay, the more its reviewers found it worthy of comment. The following paragraphs present the criteria that were used to evaluate whether a SIP had successfully performed in a particular area and category.

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

Each SOW contained a section variously entitled "Scope and Content" or "Report's Contents" which explicitly requested the different substantive topics

which were to appear as sections in the SIP. SIP to SOW conformity is concerned with the degree to which the sections in the SIP's actually were those requested by the SOW's. Two indicators of this conformance were developed -- one called the SOW Conformity Rate (Csow) and the other, the Total Conformity Rate (TCsow). The former measures the degree to which the SIP sections conformed to what was requested by the SOW, but not the degree to which the total SIP documents reflected what the SOW had requested. This latter type of conformance is measured by TCsow. The SOW Conformity Rate is:

$$Csow = \frac{Nsow}{Tsow} (100)$$

Nsow = the number of SOW-requested sections in the SIP

Tsow = the total number of SOW-requested sections.

The Total Conformity Rate is:

$$TCsow = \frac{Nsow}{Tnon-sow + Tsow} (100)$$

Tnon-sow = the total number of non-SOW requested sections that are included in the SIP.

The procedure for establishing the two conformity rates was to enumerate the number of sections requested by the SOW on the relevant section in which it prescribed the SIP's contents, and then to compare what the SIP contained with what the SOW prescribed. "Conformity" tables were constructed for each SIP. Column 1 of the table contained the data bearing upon SIP to SOW conformity. This column was divided into two parts. The top part included a list of the different sections requested by the SOW. The total number of sections listed in the top part of the column were thus Tsow. A plus at the end of each section indicated that it was included in the SIP. A minus

indicated the reverse. The total number of sections with pluses beside them were Nsow.

Beneath the last SOW requested section a line was drawn, and there followed in the column a list of sections which the SIP contractor had included that were not explicitly requested by the SOW. The number of these sections was Tnon-sow. At the bottom of this first column, the two conformity rates were presented based upon the information contained in the column.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

The evaluator made two assessments concerning the comprehensiveness of the SIP. First, to what extent did the SOW authorize the SIP to discuss "many" social, institutional, and geographic aspects of the country under examination; and to what degree did the SIP conform to the SOW's prescriptions. Second was the resulting SIP comprehensive "enough" in the sense that a reader would know enough about the country to formulate sensible development decisions. If a SOW prescribed that a SIP analyze "many" socio-economic institutions in addition to many geographic regions, then it was classified as comprehensive. "Many", in the former case, meant more than central ministries and modern sector, formal, economic institutions. "Many", in the latter case, meant the bulk of the nation's geography. Finally, a SIP was evaluated as "comprehensive enough" if it did not leave out those socio-economic institutions and geographic regions about which a planner had to possess knowledge to develop interventions.

DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTIC QUALITY

Each section that was included in the SIP was evaluated in terms of its descriptive and analytic properties. Description denotes the presentation of the properties of things and of their relationships with other things. Analysis refers to the arguments, and the appropriateness of the arguments, by which the properties of things and their interrelationships are established. "Good" description in the context of the present evaluation involved the complete and accurate presentation of the topics discussed in each section. It also involved the clear presentation of the relationships between topics where this was relevant. Successful analysis was evaluated on the basis of the quality of a SIP's arguments. Arguments were judged according to the prevailing canons of empirical social research. Two criteria proved to be most pertinent: first, whether or not assertions were substantiated by valid and reliable evidence; and second, whether plausible alternative interpretations of this evidence were considered.

COHERENCE

Each SIP was evaluated in terms of its coherence. Coherence refers to the understandability of a document. Incoherence arose from problems in the style used to present an argument. These included faulty grammar, gibberish sentences, misleading headings, confusing organization of sections, etc.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

The development relevance of a SIP was not judged in terms of its actual impact upon Mission programming, but in terms of its potential for such impact.

Each SIP was evaluated in terms of the number of interventions it proposed of relevance to Mission project and program design and implementation, and in terms of the potential importance of those interventions. Interventions were "important" if some rationale was presented showing that they relaxed a development constraint or seized an opportunity; that they were economically and culturally feasible; and that they had a potentially high benefit incidence. If a SIP presented one or more interventions, then it was judged to be successful in the number of interventions it proposed.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

The disciplinary mix of the team which wrote each SIP was examined. The concern was to discover whether the document was written from a particular perspective such as anthropology/sociology, political science, development administration, economics, etc. Care was taken to ascertain whether the contributions of different disciplines were adequately integrated in the SIP.

OVERALL SIP ASSESSMENT

An assessment of the overall quality of each SIP was made by calculating the percentage of the total number of categories in which the SIP was evaluated that were judged to have been successfully completed. A table was constructed which presents the results of this assessment. The table consists of 10 columns (see Table 3:2). The first column lists the different SIP's. Columns two and three present SIP to SOW conformity; columns four and five report comprehensiveness; columns six and seven give descriptive and analytic data quality; column eight presents the SIP's coherence; columns nine and ten evaluate

programmatic relevance; column 11 presents the percentage of categories judged to have been successfully performed in the SIP. The following judgments are reported for each column:

Column 2: + successful SOW Conformity Rate, defined as a rate of 60% or more
- unsuccessful Total Conformity Rate, defined as a rate of less than 60%

Column 3: + successful Total Conformity Rate, defined as a rate of 50% or more
- unsuccessful Total Conformity Rate, defined as a rate of less than 50%

Column 4: + successful SIP comprehensiveness, defined as a document which examines "many" of a nation's socio-economic institutions and geographic regions
- unsuccessful SIP comprehensiveness, defined as a document which does not examine "many" of a nation's socio-economic institutions and geographic regions

Column 5: + successful in examining "enough" institutions and regions to formulate action programs
- unsuccessful in examining "enough" institutions to formulate action programs

Column 6: + successful description, defined as clear presentation of topics discussed
- unsuccessful description, defined as unclear presentation of topics discussed

Column 7: + successful analysis, defined as arguments conforming to the canons of contemporary social research
- unsuccessful analysis, defined as arguments that do not subscribe to the canons of contemporary social research

Column 8: + successful coherence, defined as a document whose style of presentation is lucid
- unsuccessful coherence, defined as a document whose style of presentation is baffling

Column 9: + successful number of interventions, defined as at least one intervention
- unsuccessful number of interventions, defined as less than one intervention

Column 10: + successful in suggesting "important" interventions, defined as proposing at least one intervention of importance
- unsuccessful in suggesting "important" interventions, defined as proposing no significant interventions

Column 11: percentage of categories in which the SIP is judged to be successful. This percentage is defined as:

$$\text{Success of SIP} = \frac{\text{the number of columns judged successful}}{\text{the total number of columns}} (100)$$

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EVALUATION

KENYA SIP

The purpose of the Kenya SIP, according to its SOW, was to:

(1) Review the current social, institutional, and economic and policy framework in Kenya as it defines the development potential of the country; (2) given that framework, to draw out implications for AID intervention in several key areas (among them food production, employment generation and stimulation of the private sector...); and (3) provide background analysis and identify information gaps for the identification of approaches most likely to contribute to broad-based, self-sustaining development within the country (Kenya SOW:1).

Its goal was to improve "USAID's programming and project identification capability" (Kenya SOW:1). The document was to result from a review of existing Kenyan development literature. It was to "be prepared by scientists familiar with AID as well as with Kenya" (Kenya SOW:1).

The resulting SIP is a fine document. If it were submitted to a publisher it is quite likely that it would be accepted for publication with only slight modifications. It is the product of the collaboration of two development anthropologists -- P. Fleuret and N. Greely (both with very considerable AID and Kenya experience) -- with seven specialists in different aspects of Kenyan economy and society. The latter group prepared background papers which the senior authors synthesized into a commendable SIP.

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

The SOW requested that nine sections be included in the SIP. These were all part of the resulting document so that its Csow was 100%. Further, the SIP team included two excellent -- but unrequested -- sections on education and nutrition, so that its TCsow was 82%. The SIP thus provided all the sections

required of it and then some. The SOW had requested that the SIP explore "broad-based, self-sustaining development" strategies. Such strategies cannot be formulated in the absence of data concerning education and nutrition. Thus, the SIP analyzed topics whose necessity was implied by the SOW though not explicitly stated.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

The SIP consists of 10 chapters. The first chapter functions much as an executive summary, reviewing major analytic findings and presenting the development implications of these findings. Chapter II analyzes smallholders, pastoralists, the landless, the urban and women in order to identify potential target populations for Kenyan development. Chapters III through IX analyze different phenomena which could affect the development of these groups. Chapter III discusses the institutions which "are officially responsible for implementing development" (Kenya SIP:6). Chapter IV analyzes dryland and irrigation farming as well as the livestock sector in terms of the ways production and employment can be increased. Chapter V explores "how may government and donor agencies stimulate off-farm employment in a way that generates further agricultural growth?" (Kenya SIP:112). Emphasis is upon the stimulation of small, rural industries. Chapter VI looks at energy. It suggests that Kenya faces a "dual energy crisis" in the conventional and fuelwood sectors (Kenya SIP:125) and suggests that agro-industry "holds the key" to solving at least one of these crises. Chapter VII examines fertility, seeking to explain why fertility appears to be rising, and what might be elements of an effective population control strategy. Chapters VIII and IX explore health, education, and nutrition.

Chapter X, the final chapter, reviews the findings of its analyses and proposes a number of inter-sectorial development interventions. It concludes by presenting a set of criteria for deciding whether or not to invest in specific development interventions. As the preceding has indicated, the SIP is a comprehensive document that covers every geographic region and institution relevant to planning Kenya's future.

DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

Both the description and the analysis in the SIP were excellent. However, comments concerning what the SIP identified to be the most important development "facts" concerning Kenya, about its institutional analysis, and its handling of nutrition, may prove instructive.

A. "The Most Important Fact..."

The SIP was convinced, as it announced in its opening sentence, that "The most important fact about Kenya is that population is growing at 4% per year" (Kenya SIP:1) (emphasis added). Their analysis in Chapter 7 suggested that population growth was caused by high fertility. This finding means that "high and increasing fertility rates...constitute Kenya's most fundamental -- and perhaps most intractable -- development problem" (Kenya SIP:230). Such an interpretation motivates planners to concentrate their attentions upon the "natives" reproductive proclivities and away from other evidence provided by the SIP that suggested other transformations of equal significance.

In rural areas, there is rapidly increasing differential access to arable land. Two groups appear to be major actors in this process. On the one hand,

there are low-income smallholders who do not have access to enough land for their households' subsistence. These are people who, according to the SIP, should be considered a "rural proletariat" (Kenya SIP:16). On the other, there is a "bureaucratic-managerial" elite -- the phrase is the SIP's -- who are highly educated. Well educated persons find jobs in the government and private bureaucracies from which they derive handsome salaries. A portion of these salaries are invested in land, which is acquired at the expense of the low-income smallholder.

Table 2:1 shows the trends in land distribution for two provinces in the years between 1961 and 1974.

Table 2:1. Distribution of Land in Central and Nyanza Provinces: Changes to 1974

	Percent of Population	Percent of Acreage 1961	Percent of Acreage 1974	Percent Change in Share
Central Province				-30.3
Smaller Landholders	40	26.3	18.3	-6.2
Middle Landholders	30	29.7	27.9	+22.3
Larger Landholders	30	44.0	53.8	
	100	100.0	100.0	
Nyanza Province				
Smaller Landholders	40	15.6	12.9	-16.3
Middle Landholders	30	29.5	28.0	-5.1
Larger Landholders	30	54.9	59.1	+8.7
	100	100.0	100.0	

Source: Kenya SIP:11.

The table shows that large-holder percentage of the total acreage increased by an average of 16% during the 13 years, while small-holders' percentage of the total acreage decreased by nearly one fourth during the same period! On the larger farms, "herd sizes and cultivated areas have been shrinking", though "expenditures on fencing has grown by 747% from 1972 to 1980" (Kenya SIP:4).

It is not clear how quickly Kenya's rural proletariat is growing. Approximately 72% of the nation's 15,322,000 people are small-holders (Kenya SIP:11). About 44%, or 4,874,234 of these, are classified as low-income small-holders (Kenya SIP:16). One study suggests that the landless squatter population increases by 15,000 per year (Kenya SIP:25). If this figure is accurate, then .001% of the total population is completely squeezed off the land each year. Further, the low-income-small-holder category includes, in addition to the landless, those people with some land but not enough to survive upon. It is quite likely that a substantial number of individuals find themselves sinking into this state each year. With 600,000 plus births a year, and half the population under age 15, the problem is not so much contemporary farmers being "squeezed off" land, as the new generation not being able to find good land.

Further, there is evidence showing a correlation between "size of landholding and material wealth", and, on the basis of this correlation, the SIP concludes that low-income small-holders "are being increasingly immiserated..." (Kenya SIP:20). The term "immiserated" means that they are growing poorer and are increasingly experiencing the physical and emotional pain associated with deepening poverty.

Kenyan society, then, seems to be polarizing into a relatively few bureaucratic managers who increasingly acquire land from a large and growing rural

proletariat whose experience of this process is immiseration. One consequence of this will be "growing conflict", because "the land issue like no other in Kenya has the power to stir emotion to the point of violence" (Kenya SIP:5). Indeed, high fertility means that there will be more Kenyans, but the nation's transformation into a society dominated by a bureaucratic gentry fencing out a land-starved, rural poor means that most of these new Kenyans will be desperately poor. Such a situation will be comforting to white South Africans. It is hardly what one would call development.

There is also evidence which suggests the possibility that rising fertility may be a consequence of the increasingly restricted access to land. The SIP finds that the nation's high fertility "is fueled by the extremely high and growing value placed upon children in Kenya" (Kenya SIP:152). This finding raises the question: why the extreme pro-natal attitudes? The SIP makes a number of suggestions. At one point, it asserts that pro-natalism is "linked to modernization" (Kenya SIP:152), but it neither demonstrates the mechanisms that link modernization to values, nor those that link values to fertility.¹

¹One way, according to the SIP, in which modernization is supposed to affect fertility is that it "has...caused changes in family relationships; husbands' and wives' social domains have become more nearly alike, with one possible result a higher frequency of intercourse which generates higher fertility..." (Kenya SIP:155). I am not convinced that just because husband and wife do similar things they will race off to bed more frequently. However, even if they do, the problem with this sort of analysis is that modernization - the more nearly identical social domains - is affecting fertility through changes in coital rates and not in value systems. The other way in which modernization is supposed to affect values and fertility is that it is supposed to have led to a decline in attitudes favoring polygyny, long periods of post-partum abstinence, and long periods of breast feeding (Kenya SIP:152, 156). The problem with this type of reasoning is that "modernization" is a vast concept much like "economic", so that saying that modernization leads to s, y or z is a bit like saying the economy is in the last instance the ultimate determinant of x, y and z. The planner needs to know what it is in modernization that affects values.

They review with approval a now rather passé literature which attributes pronatalism to "traditions" (Kenya SIP:152) and "specific cultural norms (Kenya SIP:155).² A problem with this view is that it never explains why there are "specific cultural norms." The reader is left with two suggestions as to the reasons for high fertility -- perhaps modernization, or conceivably the "iron hand" of tradition.

The Kenya SIP's emphasis upon modernization and tradition as determinants of high fertility reflects a similar emphasis in the East Africa literature. This is in contrast to some of the West African population studies, which relate high fertility to agricultural labor demands. One implication of these researches is that low income small-holders may experience increased child labor demands as their access to land diminishes, and increased child labor demands may intensify already high pro-natal attitudes. The SIP makes observations that suggest the applicability of such a view to Kenya. They note:

Children contribute much in support of farm families in Kenya, providing farm labor (especially during seasons of peak demand), and performing household tasks such as fetching firewood and water. They also care for each other and assist in food preparation, and are especially called upon for family support when men are away. Their contribution may be most important in women-headed households, or in households where women spend time in cash-earning activities.... All these circumstances increase people's need and desire for children (Kenya SIP:153).

²Levine, S., Mothers and Wives: Gusii Women of East Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

³A guide to some of this West African literature can be found in R. H. Faulkingham, West Africa Fertility: Levels, Trends and Determinants. Abidjan: REDSO:WA, 1980, pp. 57-60.

This quotation states that Kenyan children under normal farming conditions "contribute much...labor" which increases the "people's need and desire for children." Consider the situation when a farm family loses access to the amount of land it needs for subsistence. Usually this results in one or more of its adult males absenting themselves from the farm to seek employment elsewhere. These men may, and frequently do, send remittances back to their families. This income, however, as the SIP notes, is "very small" (Kenya SIP:16), and thus is not enough to permit the hiring of labor to replace the absent males. This obliges children to perform some of the migrant males' agricultural chores. Under such conditions, children would be performing their normal workload (lc) plus some of that of adult males (la). This suggests that in households with sufficient amounts of land:

$$\text{child labor} = lc;$$

but that in those whose access to land has fallen below subsistence levels:

$$\text{child labor} = lc + la.$$

If, under normal conditions, children "contribute much...labor" which increases "desire for children", then under those just presented, where children contribute even more labor, is it not plausible that the "desire for children" should further increase?

If the preceding re-analysis of the SIP's data is substantially correct, then an alternative to its "most important fact about Kenya" is in order. Population growth in this view is important -- but only as a catalyst of the "most important fact." This is the rapid increase in the number of farmers lacking access to sufficient quantities of land off which to survive. For this fact means that an enormous and growing segment of the national population -- already

32% of the total -- is experiencing immiseration. Development for them means things are getting worse. This fact, by increasing child labor demands and stimulating fertility, may trigger population growth, which can contribute to further immiseration.

B. Institutional Analysis

The Kenya SIP's institutional analysis was the most ambitious attempted by the SIP's. It sought to look at the relationship between three variables -- motivational structure, participation, and institutional performance. The analysis first distinguished five types of Kenyan institutions (government, private, mixed public/profit-making, PVO and self-help) on the basis of differences in motivational structure (Kenya SIP:38). It then classified these five development institutions in terms of whether they were more or less participatory (Kenya SIP:46). This procedure suggests to the reader that different levels of institutional performance will result from different reward structures and types of participation. However, the analysis of institutions with varying types of reward structures and participation -- which occurs between pages 46 and 77 -- reveals no clear patterns concerning the relationship between the three variables.

There are three possible reasons why this was the case. The first is that the SIP team never developed institutional performance measures -- and you cannot measure performance when you do not know what you are measuring! The "impact" of a project seems to have served the team as a rough and ready measure of its performance. There is unfortunately no consideration given as to just what constitutes the "impact" of an institution (cf. Kenya SIP:49, 51 and 54

for the analyses respectively of the MIDP, IADP and KSC projects). The second reason no clear relationships emerged may be that when institutions were analyzed, the analysis did not extend to showing the reader how reward structure and participation might influence performance. The MIDP and IADP projects were susceptible to such an analysis. Both projects had different types of participation, the same type of (governmental) reward structure, and both appear to have had limited "impact" (Kenya SIP:49, 51). The fact that both institutions exhibit weak performance, different types of participation, and the same type of reward structure suggests that it is this latter factor which impairs performance. However, no such case is made.

A third reason why no clear pattern of relationship between the variables emerged may be that they are not related. For, as the authors themselves observe, "programs involving large numbers of responsible institutions are prone to failure than those involving few" (Kenya SIP:81). This finding suggests that the number and complexity of inter-institutional linkages may be a more powerful influence upon institutional performance than either motivational structure or participation. Thus, the fundamental problem with the SIP's institutional analysis is that it does not help the reader to know what determines institutional performance.

C. Nutrition

This SIP's discussion of nutrition is useful because it dampens the enthusiasm for overly simplistic views. The first of these is that infant and child nutritional problems are the result of defective mothers. This is a view quite widespread, that mothers in developing nations, caught between their

traditions and the dazzling opportunities offered by modernization, do not really know how to care for their infants' nutrition. This has often been felt to be the case with regard to breast-feeding and weaning where bottles and formulas are said to have lured mothers into early weaning and the replacement of mothers' milk with fowl substitutes. The SIP shows that "sustained chronic protein-energy malnutritions (PEM) among children under five is caused by underlying economic and institutional processes" and not by "problems with breast-feeding and weaning..." (Kenya SIP:8). Reduced PEM will not result from enlightened workers instructing ignorant mothers about the bosom's proper usage. Rather, if you get more food to mothers, they will get it to their children -- doing this, however, is no easy matter because it involves changing "underlying economic and social processes."

The view that if you can only get subsistence farmers into commercial agriculture you will get agriculture moving and improve everybody's well-being is another over-simplification. Kenya is a nation which has a considerable number of its farmers engaged in cash-cropping, and the SIP noted, "In no zone does cash cropping appear to contribute greatly to nutritional status" (Kenya SIP:223). Further, it shows that some types of commercial agriculture have a "deleterious effect" upon child nutrition (Kenya SIP:222). If nutritional levels are valid indicators of well-being, then the Kenyan data appear to indicate the commercial agriculture does not help and, indeed, may hurt some segments of the population's well-being.

The SIP's description and analysis were excellent -- with the exception of the overly ambitious institutional analysis. However, even fine performances, like a Fellini film, are open to interpretation. The SIP's own analyses

graphically portray increasing and deepening rural poverty. This, I believe, is a "most important fact" about contemporary Kenya.

COHERENCE

The SIP's analysis proceeded in a crisp and coherent fashion. Its grammar was excellent; its nonsensical sentences were at a minimum; intra-chapter headings were intelligible; and section and chapter organization made sense.

The SIP possessed an intra-chapter and SIP-wide method of procedure. Within each chapter, the analysis generally went as follows. First, the substantive analysis was made. This analysis sought to identify issues that were relevant to development interventions. Second, the analysis' results were presented as findings. Findings were specific issues which had to be addressed if interventions were to be successful. Third, different interventions were presented to resolve the issues raised by the findings. For example, the analysis in the chapter on fertility shows that Kenya's fertility is high and apparently rising. This raises the issue of what to do about high fertility, which is resolved by the suggestion of a number of population control strategies.

The over-all organization of the SIP involved a four-part analysis: first it sought to identify, given macro-socio-economic trends, target populations for development assistance (Chapter II); then it analyzed the institutions doing the assisting (Chapter III); next it explored the agricultural and industrial sectors that needed to be developed if the target populations are to be assisted (Chapters IV and V); and finally, it addressed energy, demographic, educational, health and nutritional factors which affected the capacity of the productive sectors to provide benefits for the target populations (Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX).

Neither the intra-chapter nor the inter-chapter methods of procedure were explained to the SIP's readers. The document might have been made even more coherent had these procedures been made clear to readers in the first chapter.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

The SIP recommended a number of important interventions. Their basic strategy was to target middle, small-holders (Kenya SIP:18) as the recipients of agricultural assistance (Kenya SIP:86-91), while assisting "small" industries to generate off-farm employment for the growing rural proletariat who can no longer be supported upon the land. This "small" (farmer and industry) approach may have the same type of problems that have been associated with the World Bank's small farmer initiatives.¹ One concern is that development resources will end up in the hands of the bureaucratic-managerial elite, who would use these to acquire land even more rapidly than is presently the case, thereby increasing the size of the rural proletariat.

The SIP also suggested interventions in the following areas:

Institutions: It suggested that programs and projects which involve fewer rather than more institutions are more likely to be successful. It further recommended a heavier emphasis upon private institutions to remove the "deadening effect of government involvement" (Kenya SIP:77).

Agriculture: It stressed that increased agricultural employment should be as important a goal of agrarian development as increased output. It stressed that

¹Cheryl Payer, "The World Bank and the Small Farmer." Journal of Peace Research, 4,XVI:293-312, 1979.

"private initiatives" should be given every consideration when implementing interventions (Kenya SIP:111).

Energy: It recommended that Kenya have "public works" tree-planting programs; agroforestry programs that brought the necessary resources "through non-governmental institutions" (Kenya SIP:149); as well as plantations for urban, industrial users.

Fertility: It recommended population control based upon "increased employment, productivity and modernization" (Kenya SIP:170), as well as a dramatic increase "in access to and availability of" family planning services (Kenya SIP:170).

Education: It suggested that primary education should be universal and free, and that secondary education should develop along similar lines.

Health: It proposed an expanded role for the private sector, major malaria control programs in rural areas, and increased educational services in poor areas, especially to help reduce infant and child mortality.

It should be clear that the SIP was successful in suggesting a considerable number of interventions. These interventions were important in that they relaxed a development constraint (e.g., with malaria eradication) or seized a development opportunity (e.g., by targeting the enterprising middle farmer). There may, however, be raised eyebrows concerning the feasibility of targeting middle farmers and small businesses. The bureaucratic-managerial elite is adroit at enlarging its interests.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

The Kenya SIP was the product of two development anthropologists working in collaboration with seven other social scientists. All those who had a hand in the SIP benefited from considerable AID and Kenya experience.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

There is a major debate in the contemporary development community between those who might label "entomologists" and their "socio-economic" rivals. The former believe that development can be achieved if only a few technical "bugs" in the system are worked out. "Bugs" are often environmental or demographic in nature poor soils, high fertility, etc. The latter observe that development involves transformations of entire socio-economic systems, and concludes from this observation that you cannot plan change until you understand how the entire system is evolving. It may "bug" some that the SIP takes an essentially entomological position when its analyses suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, the SIP performed successfully in all the categories in which it was evaluated.

NIGER SIP

The Niger SIP was prepared by the Institute for Development Anthropology (IDA). Its SOW specified that it was to be: "a descriptive and analytic document" that was "intended to expand the base of information from which the (Niger) Mission can make sound judgments about strategy, program direction, and project design and implementation" (Niger SOW:1). It was to focus upon the "analysis of the rural production sectors of Niger in the context of the Mission's development

concerns" (Niger SOW:1). The SIP team's activities were to be restricted to the analysis of existing documents and to discussions with experts. Its activities were to be finished in "3.5 months" (Niger SOW:2). Such a short time-period was perhaps too brief. Luckily, in selecting IDA to create the Niger SIP, AID acquired the services of some of the world's most experience Nigerian authorities, and the resulting document was a veritable 570-page encyclopedia of all things Nigerian.

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

The SOW requested that 10 sections be included in the SIP. The resulting document included these and thus achieved a 100% C_{sow}. Further, the SIP team included four additional sections on religion, education, health/nutrition and an annotated bibliography which were not requested by the SOW, for a TC_{sow} of about 71%. The Niger SIP provided all the information requested of it -- and then a good deal more. However, as will be documented below in the sections on analysis and coherence, information was presented in a fashion that makes it difficult to utilize.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

The Niger SIP consists of four sections. There is an introduction in the first three chapters to ecology, ethnicity, demography and religion in Niger. The second section (Chapters Four through Six) focuses attention upon the local and national institutions with roles in the country's development. The third section (Chapters Seven through Nine) analyzes rural food-production systems. The final section (Chapters Ten through Eleven) analyzes the nation's

health and education sectors. In the course of its discussions the SIP presents all of Niger's geographic regions. It should be quite clear that the SIP analyzed "many" institutions. Further, it was "comprehensive enough" in that it did not leave out any region or institution about which planners would have to be informed. There is probably no published or unpublished work in any language quite like the SIP. Put simply, it is the most exhaustive, currently available overview of Niger's economy and society.

DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTIC QUALITY

The level of description in the SIP is excellent. Complicated socio-economic institutions, demographic trends, and ecological situations are presented in a clear manner that is for the most part accessible to non-specialists. The analysis is full of insightful micro-analyses of particular development sectors that are of considerable significance to development not only in Niger, but throughout the Third World. It equally includes some dubious arguments that need re-working. First, the good news.

Analysis in demography, health and pastoralism is insightful:

A. Demography

The chapter on population shows Niger's population to be growing at an alarming rate, c. 3% per annum (Niger SIP II:13). Mortality appears to "have declined from higher levels", while fertility is at one of the world's "highest" levels and still "appears to be rising very slowly" (Niger SIP II:5). Further, the analysis suggests that the fertility-led population expansion is not due to an irrational Nigerian pre-occupation with pro-natal norms and values, but with the realities of food-production under Nigerian conditions,

which make the bearing of children the only way that most farmers can improve or maintain their economic situation (Niger SIP II:13). This finding has implications for population programs. Nigerian farmers will treat family planning schemes much as they will any other threat to their economic livelihood. This means that fertility reduction will be dependent upon changes in the productive sector of the rural economy. Because Niger's rural economy is not that different from ^{that of} many other impoverished countries, and because family planning programs have not effectively reduced rural fertility levels in other countries, the preceding findings of Niger's SIP have implications for other population programs. The Third World population problem may well be a production problem. Creation of farming systems with inexpensive factor mixes that do not require considerable labor inputs to significantly raise real incomes, which at the same time raise the costs of children, may lessen rural demands for child labor.

B. Pastoral Economics

Professor M. Horowitz, the senior author of the SIP, is a pioneer in analyzing the relevance of herders' pastoral production strategies to different livestock development strategies.¹ He summarizes some of his work, as well as that of others, in Chapter Eight. Analysis begins with the observation that the notion of "overgrazing" dominates the livestock development literature, much as that of "sex" dominated the psychoanalytic literature. Range management experts have been preoccupied with the notion that there is a fixed

¹Interested readers might wish to consult M. M. Horowitz, Sociology of Pastoralism and African Livestock Projects. USAID Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination. AID Discussion Paper #6, Washington, DC, 1979.

carrying capacity over and above which "overgrazing" occurs, and when this occurs, other nasty consequences, ranging from erosion to increased herd mortality, inevitably result. Horowitz cites evidence from Mali which shows a linear relationship between forage production and rainfall.² This means that grassland productivity, and consequently carrying capacity, vary with precipitation. The existence of varying carrying capacities means that there are varying stocking rates over and above which overgrazing occurs.

Horowitz then cites a discussion by S. Sanford concerning different ways in which herders might go about stocking their pastures. According to Sanford, a "conservative" strategy is one:

...which maintains a population of grazing animals through good and bad years alike. A conservative strategy implies that during good years livestock numbers are not allowed to increase to utilize all the additional forage available (Sanford 1982:62, cited in Niger SIP VIII:6).³

Whereas an "opportunistic" one:

...varies the number of livestock in accordance with the current availability of forage. Such a strategy enables the extra forage available in good years to be converted directly into economic output (milk, meat) or into productive capital in the form of a bigger breeding herd (Ibid).

Herders in the Sahel tend to follow the latter strategy, while range-management specialists have insisted upon the former one in order to avoid "overgrazing."

Horowitz, then, observes, with regard to conservative strategies:

²L. Diarra and H. Bremen, "Influence of Rainfall on the Productivity of Grass-Land." In Evaluation and Mapping of Tropical Rangeland. Addis Abba: ILCA.

³Stephen Sanford, "Pastoral Production Strategies and Desertification: Opportunities and Conservation in Drylands." In B. Spooner and H. S. Mann (eds.), Dryland Ecology in Social Perspective. New York: Academic Press, 1982.

Since the amount of forage is as unpredictable as the amount of rainfall, and in some years will be reduced to near zero, the selection of a conservative figure for carrying capacity will inevitably mean that in most years the range could sustain far more animals than use it (Niger SIP VIII:8).

This observation leads one to pose the question: Which strategy is economically sounder -- one with stocking rates that adjust to annual variations in carrying capacity, or one with fixed stocking rates that must habitually understock?

The response would tend to favor the former alternative -- which is what herders appear to do. The implication of such an analysis is that the herders' pasture management strategy is rather more "rational" under present conditions than that enshrined as the range-management component of many livestock development projects. This goes a long way to account for why most livestock development projects have failed.

C. Rural Health

Using Nigerian data, Horowitz has, since the mid-1970's, advocated the utilization of indigenous health delivery systems. His analysis seeks to show that so-called "traditional" health systems can be medically sound, cost-efficient in extending health services to rural peoples who would otherwise be denied these services. The case is again made in Chapter Ten.¹

Perhaps the IDA team was just being modest, but this reviewer believes that the results of their demographic, pastoral and health analyses have an importance beyond Niger. The SIP would have been stronger had IDA been less modest and documented this importance. So much for the good news; now for the bad. The

¹The interested reader should consult the section on health (pages 148-186) in David Brokensha, Michael Horowitz and Thayer Scudder, The Anthropology of Sahelian Rural Development. Binghamton, New York: Institute for Development Anthropology. 1977.

analysis of dryland agricultural institutions and intersectorial interconnections needs work. Consider the following:

A. Dryland Agriculture

The analysis of dryland agriculture is extensive but flawed for two reasons. First, it does not distinguish what is truly significant for the development of Niger's pluvial farming from what is fussily academic. The discussion drones on for about one-fourth of the total analysis about the most appropriate way to classify Niger's farms (Niger SIP VII:23-35). The debate over whether typologies based upon labor allocation versus those based on the "gandu" approach may be charged with significance for agricultural technicians, but the average reader may think that all this talk of "gandu's" has to do with hobbits and other related fantasies. The SIP does not make clear what, if any, development significance there is in the debate over the classification of farm units.

Lost in the typological wars are certain findings with considerable direct development relevance. The SIP reports, "It is important to note that a market for hired labor exists in Niger" (Niger SIP VII:33); that "the segment of the population whose subsistence production is insufficient often must sell its labor power to raise cash" (Niger SIP VII:34); and that "wage labor is linked to rural differentiation and inequality with direct consequences for agricultural productivity" (Niger SIP VII:34). Then, having acquainted the reader with the fact that somehow the growth of an agricultural labor market is related both to inequality and productivity, the SIP immediately returns to its consuming passion, the "defining of appropriate units for data collection and analysis" (Niger SIP VII:34), without analyzing what are, indeed, the relationships between labor markets, differentiation, and productivity.

A second concern is the assertion: "The lack of (agricultural) capital is a result of taxation, marketing policies and consumption habits..." (Niger SIP VII:25). This assertion may, indeed, be valid, but the analysis is not sufficiently advanced to make any such judgment. The problem is that the lack of capital may in large measure also result from the low productive capacity and productivity of farming systems. However, the SIP's presentation of production data is limited to a single table (Niger SIP VII:26) whose data are of unknown reliability, from an unknown sample that represents an unknown portion of the farms. The development issue at stake is not trivial. If rural capital's absence is due to taxation, etc., and if capital is essential to agricultural modernization, then the application of liberal marketing and taxation policies combined with reduced consumption (on a population whose daily per capita caloric intake is already 10% less than that needed for adequate nutrition (Niger SIP X:23)) may lead to a flowering of Niger's agriculture. However, if there is very little capital because there is very little output, then a pre-occupation with marketing and taxes may ignore the fundamental problem -- that Niger's farming systems presently operate in manners that increase soil erosion, thereby decreasing the productive capacity of already rather anemic production systems. Diddling with marketing may be fiddling while the fields blow away.

B. Development Institutions

The analysis of Niger's development-related institutions needs work in the following areas. First, Niger's development institutions are arranged in a structure that is supposed to catalyze rural productive capacity and productivity. There are a number of governmental and parastatal organizations (e.g., UNCC, CNCA, OPVN, etc.) which are vertically integrated from national to local

levels that are supposed to provide goods or services to organizations composed of rural producers (e.g., cooperatives and village youth organizations). Neither the rationale nor the structuring of the overall organization of rural development is clearly analyzed. Second, Nigerian development institutions have not been effective. This information is communicated by the SIP -- albeit in an unsystematic fashion. For example, though there is no section which explicitly analyzes cooperatives, the reader is informed on page VI:6 that they have been regarded by the Nigerian government to be "Unworkable." However, the SIP lacks a conceptual framework for analyzing the performance of development institutions, so that the reader does not really know how or why Niger's development institutions have been ineffective performers. A final distressing aspect of the SIP's discussion of development institutions is that the most crucial institution, that of the cooperatives, is simply not analyzed.

C. Inter-Sectorial Connections

Each topic analyzed tends to be treated in isolation. Thus, for example, it is known that nutritional and health conditions affect agricultural production. Yet, neither the chapter on health and nutrition, nor the chapters on food production discuss the connections in the context of Niger. Similarly, it is known that there is a relationship between education, social differentiation and agricultural production. Connections between these three topics are explored in the Kenya SIP (Kenya SIP:173-203). They go unmentioned in that of Niger, which is ironic because the Niger SIP insisted that it intended that educational systems should be analyzed "in a broader political-economic context" (Niger SIP XI:1).

The analysis in the Niger SIP was uneven. There were some fine discussions of demographic, pastoral and health issues. These were diminished by an analysis of development institutions that was innocent of any analytic framework for institutional analysis; a discussion of dryland agriculture which had trouble distinguishing the important from the mundane; and a reluctance to strive for the "big picture" by extending the analysis to sectorial interconnections. The preceding suggests that Niger SIP's description was fine, that its analysis, though successful, required refinement.

COHERENCE

This reviewer found the Niger SIP to be a cumbersome document. There were ten problem areas which comprised coherence. These included:

A. Absence of an Introduction

The document begins in medias res with a description of government and administration. There is no statement of the document's purpose, its methods of analysis, its procedures for reporting interventions, or its organization. The reader, thus, is kept in the dark about what the SIP is about, about what will occur in it, or when to expect what will occur.

B. Occurrence of "Chekov's Dogs"

A dog wanders across the stage in the middle of one of Chekov's plays and the audience immediately anticipates its further involvement so that its meaning in the play will be revealed. No dog re-appears. It was an irrelevancy. Chekov was toying with his audience. Such an irrelevancy enlivens the SIP in Chapter Three on "Islam and Customary Law". This is a fine expository chapter if one is interested in Islam in Niger. It is, however, a "Chekov's

dog" in that it has nothing to do with the SIP's purpose of analyzing "the rural production sectors of Niger in the context of the Mission's development concerns" (Niger SOW:1). Had the SIP shown how Islam affected Niger's development, that would have been a different matter; but as the document presently stands, the chapter on Islam simply parades religion across the SIP's stage like an irrelevant dog.

C. "Cart before the Horse" Internal Organization of Chapters

It would seem appropriate that the internal organization of chapters be such that the analysis precedes findings which should in turn precede action recommendations. This is not always the case. Consider, for example, the chapter concerning pastoralism. This has three major sections. The last one, "Nigerian Pastoralism", includes much of the analysis of pastoral economics. However, pastoral interventions had been suggested earlier in the second section (on pages 8 through 14). This reviewer finds that being told what to do about herders before discovering what their situation is puts the cart before the horse.

D. Lack of Integration between Chapters

Each chapter stands as an island with no apparent relationship to other chapters. Clearly inter-chapter relationships exist and should be made explicit. For example, Chapters Five and Six analyze Niger's rural development institutions. Chapter Five describes the public and parastatal institutions which seek to provide production inputs and services to rural producers. Chapter Six describes the institutions to which rural producers are supposed to belong and which receive inputs and services. However, the relationship between the institutions described in Chapter Five and those presented in Chapter Six is never made clear.

E. Misleading Chapter Titles

Certain chapters have deceptive titles. For example, Chapter Four, "The Macro-Economic Dimensions of Nigerian Development", is overwhelmingly concerned with the rural economy and with suggesting areas of possible rural intervention. It might have been more convincingly entitled "An Introduction to Planning Issues in Niger's Rural Economy."

F. Scattering of Recommendations

This reader found that discussions of topics that were analytically connected were often scattered about in no systematic fashion. This was most noticeable in the presentation of development interventions. Different proposals for interventions are scattered about in the SIP's 570 pages in no discernably systematic way. For example, the major presentation of agricultural interventions comes in Chapter Four, which, as mentioned earlier, is supposed to be a macro-economic analysis of Niger. This presentation of agricultural recommendations comes two chapters before the analysis of agriculture, which comes in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine.

G. Reluctance to Separate the Wheat from the Chaff

The SIP contains some fine analysis, findings and recommendations. Equally, it includes other analyses, findings and recommendations which are humdrum. The reader is not provided any guidance as to what is important and what is not. This throws uninitiated readers back on their own ways of judging importance, which often equates length of presentation with significance. This could induce certain readers to believe that the two-page list of Muslim Holy Days (Niger SIP III:14-16) is more important than the single sentence: "High fertility,

particularly in the rural agricultural areas, seems to be based on the heavy demands of agricultural labor, high infant and child mortality and relatively low cost/benefit ratio for child labor" (Niger SIP II:13). Nothing could be further from the truth. The former is nice to know, but no more. The latter has implications for population growth and control throughout the developing world, and further suggests that American population policy has squandered considerable sums on unimplementable population programs.

H. Occasional Non-Translation of Important Quotations

The SIP kept certain quotations in foreign languages. This hampers for most readers the quick digestion of arguments.

I. Absence of Summary

There is neither an executive summary nor a concluding chapter, so the reader does not really know what the SIP did, what was significant about what it did, or what remains to be done. The absence of a summing up might be less noticeable in a shorter document, but remember that the Niger SIP is 570 pages.

J. No Systematic Relationship between Analysis, Findings and Recommendations

The above nine lapses, considered as a whole, suggest that there was no systematic framework in the SIP which related analysis to findings and findings to recommendations.

The Niger SIP contains some important analytic insights with development implications beyond Niger. However, as the document stands, it is like a Thomas Wolfe novel prior to its editing. Wolfe's novels, prior to their editorial ministrations, rambled along for thousands of pages in a Brownian

motion of brilliant and absurd utterances. Following editing, they were thousands of pages briefer and brilliant. The Niger SIP needs Wolfe's editor urgently.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

The Niger SIP made six suggestions for development interventions in a number of sectors. These included the following:

A. Data Base and Sahelian Development Efforts

Relatively large quantities of money are currently being invested in a wide variety of sahelian development interventions. Relevant to these investments is the Niger SIP's conclusion that:

...hard data about sahelian environment and the contiguous saharan and sudanic zones are far too scarce to justify commitment of large sums of money and the elaboration of extensive development efforts (Niger SIP X:10) (emphasis added).

B. Population Policy and Population Growth

Population policies designed to curb population growth have stressed family planning programs. For reasons discussed earlier, the SIP believes such programs are "Not likely to garner much support" (Niger SIP II:14). Rather, on the basis of their analysis, they suggest development dollars would be more prudently spent in Niger to upgrade the quality of demographic data, to support efforts to upgrade maternal health, to support efforts to reduce infant and child mortality, and to support programs to reduce the gap between rural and urban incomes (Niger SIP II:15).

C. Rainfed Agriculture: Agricultural Subsidies and Food Self-Sufficiency

A major goal of Nigerian agricultural policy since the 1972-74 drought has been food self-sufficiency. The SIP notes that "rainfed agriculture has expanded, in part because the government provides heavily subsidized agricultural inputs" (Niger SIP IV:10). These inputs are thus a drain upon the national budget. Further, when they do result in agricultural intensification, they have led, as in other sahelian nations, to the replacement of food crops "by high value (often non-food) crops..." (Niger SIP IV:10). Thus, the SIP queries whether Niger's use of agricultural subsidies is creating "too great a tax...on the national budget" for no real contribution to the goal of food self-sufficiency" (Niger SIP IV:10).

D. Irrigation Agriculture: Costs, Non-Farm Income Opportunities and Food Self-Sufficiency

Niger has also committed itself to a rapid extension of its irrigation agriculture as a way of achieving food self-sufficiency. However, the costs of large-scale, capital-intensive irrigation schemes in the African Sahel are enormous (\$20,000/hectare). Further, individual farmers find both the labor requirements and the input costs to be exorbitant on large-scale schemes. This increases their enthusiasm for alternative non-farm income opportunities. The preceding raises two questions: are large-scale, capital-intensive irrigation schemes economically feasible; and, even if they are feasible, will there be anybody to work them? Such considerations lead the SIP to conclude that small-scale irrigation schemes may be "an attractive development strategy" (Niger SIP IV:11).

E. "Packaging"-Pastoralism

The SIP sounds a cautionary note with regard to pastoralism. It reminds planners that:

It has become slowly but persuasively clear that apart from veterinary and animal nutritional interventions, and apart from opening up remote pastures through well digging, which itself has perhaps caused more problems than it has solved, a "technical package" designed to improve the productivity of semi-arid rangelands does not yet exist (Niger SIP VIII:14).

This means that pastoral planners should seek to provide "...adequate time, personnel and resources for the understanding of the social economics and ecology of the pastoral production systems" as well as "genuinely involving the herding peoples in the definition of an action program" (Niger SIP VIII:10). The message of the SIP comes through loud and clear: avoid glib pastoral packages that do not understand sahelian ecology or how herders exploit that ecology.

F. Indigenous Health Delivery Systems

The SIP recommends health strategies consistent with AID's 1980 Health Sector Policy Paper which supports indigenous health delivery systems. Specifically, it recommends:

...a manual to guide...(health practitioners)...to anticipate the relevance of the traditional practice and delivery systems to programs of the extension of modern medicine to rural areas...(Niger SIP IX:32).

It further suggests the utilization of the Niger Rural Health Improvement Project:

...to test the relative advantages of working with the indigenous system or creating a parallel, competitive one (Niger SIP IX:33).

The SIP reported a number of findings which suggested the need for interventions, about which it itself took no positions. These included:

A. Official Grain Prices and Parastatals

The SIP observes:

There are adequate data to suggest that the official grain prices are well below the actual farm-gate prices, and that inefficiencies in parastatal grain marketing tax the national budget with minimal benefit to the producers (Niger SIP IV:9).

Though the preceding suggests that the SIP has a position, it takes in print no position about either prices or parastatals.

B. Livestock Marketing Policy

The SIP reports that the Government of Niger's limitation of livestock exports "actually reduces herder income and compels traders to seek illegal means for export" (Niger SIP IV:9). Once again, however, the SIP is silent about possible interventions.

C. Development Institutions

A considerable amount of space was devoted to describing and analyzing local and national development institutions. These are shown to be characterized by poor performances. The SIP, however, appears to have no idea about what might be done about this situation.

D. Educational Institutions

An entire chapter is devoted to Niger's education system. The system is shown to be an innovative one in that it consciously strives to extend the benefits of education to rural peoples. The SIP has no idea how planners might assist this system.

In sum, the Niger SIP may be judged to be relevant to development programming in that it proposes a number of interventions which are of importance. However, it does not propose interventions in a number of areas in which its own analysis suggests that there might be a need.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

The Niger SIP was the work of a senior development anthropologist who was assisted by 11 other economists, sociologists, and development anthropologists. These were all senior Niger experts. IDA's capacity to know who were the best social scientists for the team, and then its ability to convince them to participate on it, assured the SIP's success.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Niger SIP is a remarkable document. It is potentially the most comprehensive overview of Niger in any language. It successfully performed 89% of the tasks upon which it was evaluated. However, its analysis needs work, and it needs extensive editing to strengthen its coherence.

SOMALIA SIP

The Somalia SIP's purpose was "to expand the mission's base of information upon which to make judgments regarding strategy, programming and project identification, design and implementation" (Somalia SOW:1). It was to do this by analyzing the "social and institutional dimensions relevant to expanding income and self-sufficiency of the population through increased agricultural productivity and expansion of rural enterprise and industry" (Somalia SOW:1). The SIP was prepared by a team from the African Studies Center of Boston University between May 1982 and April 1983. The Boston University group performed the following activities in the process of preparing the SIP:

In May of 1982 the team reviewed the English, Italian and French language literature on Somalia and available USAID and World Bank program documents in Boston (see References Consulted). During June and July members of the team spent up to five weeks in Somalia where they reviewed additional documents and conducted extensive interviews with government officials, employees of donor agencies, local social scientists, merchants, and farmers. One member of the team visited Hargeisa to learn more about livestock production and marketing and the World Bank's Northwest Agricultural Project. Two members made a field trip to the Bay region to learn more about the Bay Region Agricultural Development Project. Two members traveled to Brava in order to learn more about marketing and irrigation systems along the Shebelle. The team presented its preliminary findings to the USAID mission before departing from Somalia. This report was written in Boston (Somalia SIP, Preface).

The resulting monograph is an excellent development document whose values lies in its demonstration of the "fragility" of Somalia's conventional, inward-looking development strategy.

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

Both the SIP's C_{sow} and TC_{sow} rates are 100%. However, the reviewer would have been happier if the discussion of local institutions had been more extensive.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

The Somalia SIP included an Executive Summary, six chapters and four appendices. The first chapter formally introduced the analytical framework of the Boston University team, reviewed findings and described the document's organization. The second chapter described the agro-ecological situation of the country and the history of the country as it pertained to development. The

third chapter dealt with "Economic Issues in Somalia". It chronicled six topics: the recent performance of the economy (especially the relationship between the official and parallel economies), agricultural marketing and internal trade, labor markets, poverty, institutional capacity for economic analysis and economic policy issues. The fourth chapter analyzed Somali pastoral development. After explaining the nature of Somali pastoral systems, the chapter explored the natures of certain "crises" purportedly bedeviling the livestock sector. The analysis closed with a critique of an existing rangeland development project and a number of suggestions for pastoral interventions. The fifth chapter explored the development of dryland agriculture concentrating its attention on the inter-riveraine region between the Shebelle and Juba rivers. The sixth chapter is a "Summary of Recommendations". The four appendices describe the SIP team, list the persons contacted, review education, profile poverty, and describe the studies which the SIP recommends. The poverty profile, which includes a critique of different techniques for analyzing poverty, is especially noteworthy.

The SIP contains little discussion of development institutions, irrigation agriculture, demography and the contemporary political scene. It notes that there is a "fragility of information about the institutions of Somalia's economy..." (Somalia SIP, Appendix 4:10). However, though there may not have been enough information to evaluate the performance of Somalia's development institutions, there was probably enough to list what they are, how they are organized, and how they are supposed to function. Somalia has "traditional" forms of irrigation agriculture located near artificial ponds (uars) or flood plains (desheks). Further, capital intensive irrigation dates back to the

efforts of the Duke of Abruzzi in the 1920's. Neither of these farming systems is analyzed. Demographic, especially fertility, issues are important in constructing development strategies in other Third World nations, so that it seems cavalier to ignore them completely in the Somalia SIP. The rule of Somalia's President Siad Barre is autocratic, and the Horn of Africa, where Somalia is located, is of strategic value. These observations are of significance in developing Somalia, and their significance is neither noted nor analyzed. Somalia is an important producer and exporter of frankincense and myrrh. However, there is no analysis of their role in the Somali economy. And while the SIP may be forgiven for overlooking myrrh, it should have addressed the other topics. Thus, it is not comprehensive enough.

DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

The description and analysis in the SIP involve sustained criticism of conventional development wisdom concerning Somalia. This wisdom sees Somalia as a "hopeless" case (Somalia SIP Executive Summary:3).

Development strategies enunciated both by the Government of Somalia and by the international donors have relied heavily on transition from nomadic pastoralism to settled agriculture and fishing accompanied by regulation and intensification of range-management. In order to accomplish these ends radical changes in the institutional framework governing control of land and water have been called for, accompanied by introduction and dissemination of improved livestock and crop technology. The "fragile" human resource base has been repeatedly identified as a major obstacle to such transformation (Somalia SIP Executive Summary:3).

Thus, most donors view the "fragile" or, to phrase the matter less euphemistically, "dumb" Somali people and their institutions as the problem.

The approach of the SIP was:

...to focus on the strategies by which differing types of individuals, households, and other resource management units earn incomes, avoid risk, save, and invest; and on the ways these strategies affect and are affected by the wider economic and policy environment. It is an approach that views people's income-generating behavior as the product of choice and not tradition. It anticipates that many of them may have mixed income strategies, that their degree of participation in a given sector -- for example, in agriculture -- is likely to be affected by the return they anticipate from activities in other sectors. It anticipates that people's income strategies are likely to be dynamic, adaptive, and flexible and that persistent patterns of apparently "irrational" economic behavior may, in fact, be quite sensible when understood in context (Somalia SIP I:1).

This approach reveals that:

Rather than being an obstacle to development, as suggested by many "expert" reports describing the "fragile" human resource base, Somali extended-family groups are adaptable, skilled, resourceful, and have developed sophisticated methods of managing common resources through delegation of responsibility to decentralized family units scattered widely over space (Somalia SIP I:3).

Perhaps the most important conclusion of this approach is to reverse who is and who is not "fragile". The SIP concludes, concerning the conventional development strategy that has been imposed upon Somalia:

In sum, it appears to us that an inward-looking development strategy that focuses almost exclusively on raising agricultural production through the introduction of "modern range management" and technology presumed to be readily available is neither efficient nor effective. Furthermore, we believe that the premature expansion of government extension services in the absence of an effective package may, in the Somali social and institutional context, merely exacerbate existing bureaucratic tendencies towards over-centralization in planning and decision making, further inflate the public sector payroll, inhibit growth in the indigenous private sector, reinforce mutually antagonistic attitudes between extension agents and producers, and create a bureaucratic constituency that will make it

politically difficult for the government to adopt new and more liberal economic policies in the future (Somalia SIP 1:5-6).

The critique of the "inward-looking" strategy extends from macro-economic problems to the food-production sectors. The critique is reviewed below.

The World Bank, IMF and the Franco Valuta System

By 1980 Somalia's economic straits appeared perilous. There was stagnation in growth, desperate lack of foreign reserves, and grave arrears in external payments. In exchange for IMF financial support, the Government of Somalia "implemented a very standard IMF package" (Somalia SIP III:3), which included restrained fiscal and monetary policies and increases of producer prices on a number of agricultural products..." (Somalia SIP III:1). A casualty of the IMF package was the franco valuta system. This was a legal, parallel market in foreign exchange under which imports were allowed to come into the country if the importer had access to foreign exchange. The sources of this foreign exchange were the substantial earnings of the very numerous Somali workers abroad. The SIP notes that the franco valuta system stimulated productive investment as well as consumption within Somalia:

The franco valuta system developed as a mechanism for channeling a substantial portion of these earnings back to family members in which goods were allowed to enter Somalia outside of the official foreign-exchange allocation system if financed by foreign exchange held by individual Somali importers. The goods flowed back into extended family units not only to increase consumption, but also to generate productive investment in transportation, construction, pumps and water tanks (birkets) in pastoral areas. The benefits were widely spread through rural as well as urban areas of the country (Somalia SIP I:3).

With the effective abolition of the system at the end of 1981:

...the flow of imported goods available for use within Somalia was curtailed. In 1981, some \$60 million of goods were financed by franco valuta amounting to almost 25 percent of total imports; the foreign exchange to purchase such goods has since been denied to the economy as workers abroad have chosen to hold back on remittances until a suitable mechanism is again found. The result is that applications for foreign exchange vastly exceeds the quantities available and administrative allocations are made to selected importers for particular goods. While food and fuel imports have been maintained, such producer goods as cement and reinforcing bars, vehicles and particularly vehicle spares, as well as spare parts and intermediate goods for existing industrial and agricultural enterprises have become scarce. By assuming that remittances would continue despite prohibition of franco valuta, and believing that the demand for imports expressed by families did not reflect appropriate priorities, a functioning market system has been supplanted by a cumbersome administrative system for allocating foreign exchange in large blocks in response to politicians' and technocrats' judgement of priorities. It has been accomplished at high cost to Somali families and to investment (Somalia SIP I:3).

In short, the IMF package "must be judged a failure..." (Somalia SIP III:4).

En passant, it might be observed that the IMF package had been formulated "in the absence of adequate data..." (Somalia SIP III:3).

Many "experts" believe the difference between the developed and the developing world is that in the former world decision-making is rational and in the latter, it is traditional. "Rational" decision-making involves the analysis of data to decide upon the best action. "Traditional" choice involves the rote selection of conventionally prescribed action -- no analysis of best alternatives occurs. The World Bank acknowledged that "the statistical system in Somalia is too deficient to generate any meaningful data" (Memorandum on the Economy of Somalia, World Bank, March 1981:6; cited in the Somalia SIP III:3). Thus, in the absence of analysis of the Somalian economy, the IMF

imposed its standard package. Standard here means the one that it conventionally applies to any Third World nation in any area experiencing grave arrears in external payments. If this is rational analysis of development alternatives, then the Mad Hatter might well serve at the IMF.

Crisis in Somali Livestock Production

Conventional development planners "have seen the system of livestock production as in...crisis..." (Somalia SIP IV:1). The SIP analyses the three pastoral production systems in the nation (Somalia SIP IV:3-17). It then evaluates what have been termed "crises" in pastoralism, and it concludes:

As shown in earlier sections of this chapter, developers have attacked a "crisis" in health, then a "crisis" of overstocking, then a "crisis" in range degradation. Through it all, as an FAO team remarked in 1979, Somalia has been able to stand up against actual developments which seemed to prove these assessments erroneous ever again" (FAO/AOAD 1979:43). Indeed, projects have come and gone without leaving much tangible effect, dire predictions have faded away, and in 1979 a national herd twice the size of what...experts had called the maximum carrying capacity of the "overgrazed" rangelands, can be thriving and still expand in Somalia (FAO/AOAD 1979:43) (Somalia SIP IV:25-26).

This means that:

...the pastoral system itself is thriving: with minimal interference, it supports the subsistence of between 60 and 80 percent of the population; it provides fresh milk and other dairy products daily to the burgeoning urban populations of Somalia; it provides over 80 percent of the foreign trade earnings of Somalia; it supplies 38 percent of the preferred live-slaughtered meat for the whole Arabian Peninsula and holds first rank there as the source of livestock imports; and while providing 1.5 million animals to the export trade and nearly another half million to domestic municipal slaughter, the system has proven resilient enough to recover from the 1974-75 drought, to utilize pastures in the Ethiopian Ogaden despite continuing warfare between the two countries, and to provide steadily improving prices to producers (Somalia SIP IV:1).

Flexible Farmers and Inexpert Experts

The SIP shows that Somali farm families have evolved complex, but highly flexible, income strategies which permit them to avoid "risks" and to make "efficient use of resources..." (Somalia SIP V:6) under conditions of extreme climatological difficulty when "most of the high quality land along the rivers... has been appropriated, in most cases without direct compensation, by the modern sector, public or private, large-scale controlled irrigation schemes" (Somalia SIP V:2). The SIP also explored the different components of Somalia's agricultural intensification and extensification programs and showed that "most of the current recommendations simply do not suit the circumstances" of the nation (Somalia SIP V:21). This implies inexpert experts.

Taken as a whole, the description and analysis of the Somalia SIP reveal certain myths of current development practice in the country and beyond. This expose suggests that it is inappropriate to label Somali people and their institutions as "fragile". If anybody has been "fragile", it is the experts.

COHERENCE

The Somalia SIP is a coherent document. Faulty grammar, gibberish sentences, misleading headings, confused section organization are at a minimum. The SIP announces in the first chapter what its approach will be, and then systematically follows it throughout the remainder of the monograph. The document, however, is not a perfect work. First, it is difficult to read. This is not the result of poor writing as much as the couching of arguments at fairly abstract levels. This is especially the case with the analysis of the franco valuta system. Second, there is a tendency toward some redundancy.

The Executive Summary, which is longer than the first two chapters and hardly seems to justify the label "summary", recounts the SIP's findings and recommendations. This is repeated again in the first chapter and then again in the final chapter. Such reiteration reduces the readers' attentiveness, thereby obscuring clarity. Finally, the SIP never really gives the reader a clear idea of what all the Somali do. We are told the "3/5's" of the population subsists through livestock production (Somalia SIP IV:17) and that a further "14%" are in dryland farming (Somalia SIP V:1). We are never told what the remaining 26% of the population does. However, the preceding three difficulties notwithstanding, the Boston University monograph should be judged as one of the more coherent SIP's.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

Somalia has followed an "inward-looking" development strategy. Such a strategy emphasizes increasing the gross domestic product (the production of income taking place within the territorial boundaries of a nation) rather than the gross national product (the production of income accruing to a country's nationals regardless of their territorial location). The major means by which such a strategy is implemented is through intensified utilization of livestock and agricultural resources. The SIP's analysis shows that herders and farmers make efficient use of available resources. It further demonstrates that planners lack either pastoral or agricultural intensification packages with the capacity to improve substantially upon current food-production resource use. This analysis suggests that there is currently no way in which an

"inward-looking strategy can rapidly raise the gross domestic product. The SIP further suggests:

The "inward-looking" development strategy currently supported by major donors fails to recognize Somalia's real potential which is based on its two main resources -- a resourceful, skilled, and highly adaptable population and a strategic location (SIP Executive Summary:3).

The improbability of the inward-looking strategy leads the Boston University team to suggest an outward-looking one that requires:

...taking maximum advantage of opportunities for labor export to the Gulf. Agreements should be sought with Gulf states to make this source of income more dependable and secure. Policies must be designed to facilitate channeling these earnings in ways that will be most beneficial to Somali families in providing access to higher and more reliable incomes. At the same time, adjustments in the fiscal system will be required to insure that appropriate functions of government can be financed and that earnings abroad will bear a fair share of the tax burden.

In the long run it is quite possible that Somalia can develop an efficient export-oriented manufacturing and service sector that will maximize returns to human resources and location through exploiting the markets on the Gulf. An outward-looking strategy must be seen as a complement, rather than an alternative, to a strategy that continues to seek increases in agricultural and livestock production (Somalia SIP Executive Summary:13).

In order to implement the outward-looking strategy, the SIP suggested a number of interventions in the realm of policy, studies, institutional strengthening, and projects. (These are presented in their most succinct form in the Executive Summary between pages 14-18.)

The Somalia SIP is of relevance to AID and other donors. If its analyses are correct, it shows that present programming rests upon an implausible strategy. It offers an outward-looking alternative, and it spells out the steps in which to move to implement this option.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

The Boston University team consisted of two development anthropologists, one development economist, one agricultural economist and one sociolinguist. All shared a "commitment to using multidisciplinary social science research and area studies to understand the relationship between micro- and macro-processes in development" (Somalia SIP:Preface). The Boston University African Studies Center is the second oldest such center in the United States. It provided senior persons to work on the SIP. These persons had enjoyed very considerable experience with AID.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Boston University team was asked to evaluate Somali development strategy. They showed that the prospect for success of the current, inward-looking strategies was limited. They argued in favor of an outward-looking alternative that stresses private initiative. They suggested policy, program and project interventions to implement such a strategy. Donors that ignore the Boston University SIP do so at the expense of their credibility. The SIP received a 89% success rating.

UGANDA SIP

The Uganda SIP was prepared by a team of five persons working under the auspices of the Experiment in International Living. Its Sow-defined objective was provision of "socio-economic information and analysis of the dynamics of rural economy and the functioning of the development-related institutions..."

(Uganda SOW:2). Specifically, the SIP was "to begin to disaggregate the roughly 90% of Uganda's population that is rural and agriculturally productive so that USAID/Uganda's assistance program can be better targeted" (Uganda SOW: 3). It was to do this by "examining rural productive strategies...and the institutions through which they operate, looking at institutional linkages at the local, regional and national levels" (Uganda SOW:2). This was to be accomplished by treating household survival strategies -- "the economic, political and social relations by which households provide for their members" (Uganda SOW:3) -- as if they were dependent variables. Then "local-to-regional-to-national" (Uganda SOW:3) institutions were to be treated as if they were independent variables. Thus the goal of the analysis became the discovery of how the latter institutions diachronically influenced household survival strategies. The SOW requested that the team perform three activities to accomplish its goals: a literature review, fieldwork, and analysis of data collected in the first two activity phases.

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

The SOW requested 18 different sections. In the judgment of this reviewer, 17 were included in the SIP, for a 95% C_{sow}. As the contractor added no sections on its own initiative, the TC_{sow} was the same as the C_{sow}.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

The Uganda SOW requested a very comprehensive SIP that required holistic analysis of major institutions affecting the dynamics of the rural economy. The literature review, which was entirely professional, was a bit narrow for this

task as it "concentrated mainly on agriculture" (Uganda SIP:23) -- and a largely technical agricultural literature at that. Further, the SOW requested that the Experiment team survey five agro-ecological zones. Only four were done. These were restricted to the southern part of the country (Uganda SIP: 26, 199). Interviewing took place in only three villages in each of the four zones surveyed. A problem with this southern emphasis is that the least known and most disadvantaged areas of Uganda are in the central and northern areas of the nation. Further, it appears the USAID/Uganda may target central Uganda as a center for its development activities (1983 CDSS:53). In sum, the Uganda SIP examined a large number of local, regional and national institutions bearing upon land tenure, marketing, capital and credit, agricultural services, and government administration. It went so far as to describe the role of churches and political parties. This all conformed to its SOW's request for a comprehensive document. However, this reviewer believes that because much of the central and northern parts of Uganda were not analyzed, and that because it would be imprudent to write these areas off during the development of Uganda, that the SIP was not comprehensive enough.

DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTIC QUALITY

Description was judged to be successful in most of the sections. This was not true of the analysis which was judged to need work. The reviewer was concerned that analysis needed work in the following areas:

A. Institutional Coping

The SOW requested that the SIP describe "Characteristics of Institutions that Are Functioning Well and Assisting Household Survival." The Experiment

team never addressed this topic. An implication of this is that perhaps the team believed that all major institutions were malfunctioning in the recent past. If this was the team's attitude, it might have been made explicit. Further, if it was indeed their attitude, it was a curious one, because many households did survive, and their very survival is evidence that some institutions — perhaps the household itself — did function to facilitate this end.

B. Description of Survey Instruments

The questionnaires administered by the SIP team are presented in Appendix 3 (Uganda SIP:238-266). However, there is no description of sampling procedures pre-testing, and training of interviewers. Nor is the reader ever informed of the total sample size. The questionnaire was elaborate and posed sensitive questions concerning household finances and possession of other economic resources. Responses to such questions must be taken with a grain of salt. Thus, the reader does not know of what the sample is typical, nor whether its data are reliable.

C. Annotated Bibliography

The documentary analysis is not especially well integrated into the text. For example, Joan Vincent's Teso in Transformation (1982), a classic analysis of rural dynamics, might have helped the SIP team analyze the effects of community, regional and national forces upon the transformation of household survival strategies. Vincent is cited in the annotated bibliography, but her work never figures in the textual analysis.

D. Analysis of "Local-to-Regional-to-National" Interactions with Households

Chapter Four of the SIP reveals a cornucopia of development-related institutions that do indeed range from the local to the national levels. Chapter

Five includes a discussion of "community-level interactions" (Uganda SIP:182-185). But the analysis never extends to showing that such-and-such an institution affected household survival strategies in such-and-such a manner for such-and-such reasons. Thus, the analysis of "local-to-regional-to-national" interactions with households is never explicitly made.

E. Disaggregation of Rural Poverty

The reader is fed "shreds and patches" of the rural poverty situation. For example, one is informed "all are poorer than in the past" (Uganda SIP:167). Then, seemingly in contradiction to the previous observation, one discovers that there is a flourishing "affluent minority" (Uganda SIP:178-182). Further, one discovers that a fair number of persons have made money off shady dealings known as "magnento". One is not told, however, what characterizes the "affluent minority" or those enriched from "magnento". The reader is also informed that household size, land holding size, forms of tenure and other factors affect poverty levels (Uganda SIP:167-181). But the analysis does not extend to disaggregating different poverty levels on the basis of differences in the above variables. So the "shreds and pieces" of the rural poverty situation are never put together into a coherent picture of the different varieties of rural poverty.

F. Analysis of Household Survival Strategies

The SIP reported that access to different amounts of land, labor and other agricultural production inputs can characterize different household survival strategies. However, the analysis never formulated just what combination of different resources characterized different survival strategies. The closest it came to such a formulation was when it stated that the "two key variables of

survival strategy" are "the ownership of land and the means to utilize it effectively..." (Uganda SIP:182). The most appropriate next step in analysis might have been to distinguish different household survival strategies in terms of their variations in the possession of land and other production inputs. For example, a number of studies in West Africa have suggested that land-abundant households tend to survive on the basis of cash cropping and the hire of other household's labor; while land-scarce households tend toward subsistence production and the sale of their labor.¹ Was this equally the case for Uganda?

The Uganda SIP's analytic chore, as specified in the SOW, was to model rural dynamics diachronically in terms of inter-relationships between household survival strategies, poverty, and "local-to-regional-to-national" institutions. The absence of an analysis of household survival strategies in conjunction with both a lack of association of these with different poverty types and the operation of different institutions meant that the SIP needed more analytic work.

COHERENCE

The Uganda SIP, with the exception of a few sentences here and there, is coherent. The organization of chapters might have been improved by reversing the order of Chapters Four and Five. Chapter Three presents data for the household survey. Chapter Five analyzes this information. It might have helped to have the household analysis directly following the household description. Readers

¹James Smith's Economy and Demography in a Mossi Village (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1977) and P. Fleuret and N. Greeley's The Kenya Social and Institutional Profile (USAID/Kenya, Nairobi, 1982) suggest for Bourkina and Kenya respectively that there are "rich" household survival strategies based on cash-cropping and the hire of labor and "pcor" household strategies based upon subsistence production and the sale of labor.

unfamiliar with Uganda might have been helped by a description of population and ethnic-group distribution by geographic region. This is significant because we know that the north was not described, but we do not know what ethnic groups and what percentage of the total population was excluded. Otherwise, the Uganda SIP was stylistically successful.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

The Uganda SIP section concerning "Policy Implications and Recommendations" is useful. Constraints to and opportunities for development are identified in the "Key Issues" section (Uganda SIP:187-189). Twenty-one short- and long-term interventions are presented (Uganda SIP:189-193). A number of these are obviously important, though their presentation does not address their rationale, their feasibility, nor their benefit incidence. This tends to diminish the importance of the recommended intervention to the reader. For example, the 1985 Uganda CDSS was bullish on Uganda's cooperatives saying that they provide "vital services" (Uganda CDSS 1985:48). In its section on interventions, the Uganda SIP recommends that the Uganda central government's role in cooperatives be redirected toward being more "facilitative" (Uganda SIP:191) -- but it does not explain why! The recommendation might have been more convincing if it had referred back to its earlier discussion of cooperatives which suggested that excessive government control over cooperatives smothered their ability to provide services (Uganda SIP:1-4-145). Thus, the SIP may be evaluated as successful in the number of interventions it proposed, but unsuccessful in convincing its readers of their importance.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

The Uganda SIP team included five persons: two economists, two sociologists, and a development anthropologist.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Uganda SIP was successful in 70% of the categories in which it was evaluated. Its weaknesses were threefold. It was not as comprehensive as might be desired. It did not successfully analyze diachronically the relationships between household survival strategies and different institutions. It did not elaborate upon the importance of its interventions. Nevertheless, the Uganda SIP is a considerable achievement judged in light of the magnitude of the task imposed upon it by the SOW, the short time in which it had to complete this task, and the general pandemonium in Uganda.

EASTERN CARIBBEAN SIP

(St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts-Nevis)

The Eastern Caribbean SIP was produced under the auspices of Devres, Inc. Its SOW required social and institutional profiles prepared on a country-by-country basis and detailed in the specifics according to four broad analytic objectives -- to wit: 1) social systems and cultural patterns of developmental relevance; 2) "effects and relationships of socio-cultural trends on economic development"; 3) identification and analysis of key public and private developmental institutions; and 4) identification and analysis of available human and financial resources for the institutions described in the course of

developing item 3 above. The SOW was admirably clear in detailing the necessary information expected to be included within the Eastern Caribbean SIP. The social profile for each country was to include highly specific population analyses, structural description at all levels (i.e., social, political and economic), reference to the question of gender roles and the impact thereof upon development issues, and analysis of extra-institutional concerns with a high degree of analytic rigor and depth. The country institutional profiles were, according to the SOW, to be detailed descriptions of "major development-related institutions and their objectives." Selection criteria were not wholly left to the contracting team. In addition to description, the selected institutions were to be analyzed according to: a) the "institutional support network" serving the public and private sectors; b) institutional effectiveness; and c) the appropriateness of their stated objectives.

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

The SOW required a document which, for each of four eastern Caribbean countries, addressed four social profile issues and three specific institutional profiling issues (discussed in detail above). The terms of the SOW required a very comprehensive, one might say exhaustive, documentation of socio-political-economic issues, trends, factors of development significance. The Eastern Caribbean SIP is a thorough-going exercise which addresses all SOW-stipulated areas of investigation, and thus scores a C_{sow} of 100%. There was nothing included in the Eastern Caribbean SIP that was not anticipated by the SOW. Thus the T_{Csow} equals the C_{sow}: 100%.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

Both in terms of geographical and socio-cultural/institutional scope, the Eastern Caribbean SIP was intended to touch on as many developmentally significant areas as possible, given the constraints of time and data availability. The Eastern Caribbean SIP notes in its statement of procedure that time constraints were indeed pressing -- especially with regard to interviewing in the field. Problems of an insufficiency of available documentary information (statistical and demographic in particular) are noted in the SIP's Annex 2. Nonetheless, considering the extent of the assigned task and the limited time available for its completion, as well as the, in many cases, paucity of published data available, the research team managed to produce a remarkably rich and comprehensive document. It is "comprehensive enough", in the convention adopted in this evaluative document, because it does manage to address the major problems, trends and institutional structures relevant to productive and pertinent planning efforts.

DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTIC QUALITY

The Eastern Caribbean SIP is, on the level of description, a highly successful document. In both editorial and stylistic terms, it is eminently accessible to the reader, even one who is only cursorily informed as to the region, its history, and its problems. Unfortunately, there are certain difficulties in the area of analysis, which are generated by a combination of the report's format and its integration of the various elements (social, institutional, regional and historical) of the document as a whole. The key areas of this analytical "short-fall" can be identified as follows:

1. The Eastern Caribbean SIP makes the assertion that "the conventional descriptions of the groups that made up these societies -- small elites controlling most of the resources and a large population of underpaid and exploited workers -- is no longer true or adequate" (Eastern Caribbean SIP:9). Yet on the same page the authors explicitly state that information on what currently might be "true or adequate" is non-existent, and indeed, assert that increasing stratification along income levels and life styles is occurring. Additionally, in the individual countries studied, data are presented which directly contradict this assertion (see pages 65-66 and Annex 4:2 for Santa Lucia, suggesting an ongoing concentration of land and educational opportunities; pages 178-179 for Antigua-Barbuda, suggesting a concentration of access to political/economic/educational resources; Annex 4, page 6, on Dominica, where "the patois-speaking peoples have been in an inherently unequal position for over 150 years" and the pattern is reported as still extant; and Annex 4, page 8, for St. Kitts where it is reported that "those individuals and families which traditionally have dominated certain sectors...remain dominant"). The conclusions of analysis and the description of the evidential data are in direct contradiction. One cannot have it both ways. However, given the non-articulation between the analytical and descriptive portions of the document, and the fact that the general (regional) summary precedes the detailed description of the individual countries, these contradictions are somewhat obscured.

2. The Eastern Caribbean SIP views outmigration of labor in terms of its "safety-valve" function for the unemployed. Analysis of the probable effects of the loss of outmigration as a strategy for addressing unemployment is sound,

but the more important questions of who migrates, why, and under what circumstances are on the whole inadequately addressed. This can be attributed to the research team's tendency to rely on macro-level statistics (percent of adult population migrating, percent of total population unemployed, etc.) to the exclusion of social-sectorial or community-based data. Without the inclusion of such data, and without analysis that speaks to the above questions, specific planning to offset the projected disequilibrating effects of the loss of the outmigration option cannot be adequately informed.

To state the analytical weakness of the Eastern Caribbean SIP at its most general level, one would identify the central problem as being the tendency of the researchers to treat each island's population as a more or less homogeneous unity. This unity is belied at the descriptive level, suggesting that the analytical model(s) used were overly simplistic.

COHERENCE

The Eastern Caribbean SIP is, for the most part, a laudably coherent document. Where this characterization is not wholly applicable is coincident with the format and integrational problems referred to above. Specifically, the problems can be identified in two areas:

1. The decision to present the regional evaluation prior to the country-by-country evaluation creates difficulties for the reader. This is due, in part, to the fact that much of what is presented in this regionally-oriented section consists of conclusions based on more specific descriptive data not yet presented. It is presumably intended to be a background document, and those portions of it which treat historical issues is indeed useful. However,

the intermingling of such information with generalizations regarding the contemporary conditions within the region presupposes familiarity on the part of the reader with information that is not provided until much later in the report.

2. The lack of articulation between/among the various sections (social and institutional) of the report makes it difficult to relate findings regarding the human needs, trends and issues with suggestions for interventions in established institutions. The two aspects of socio/political/economic organization (the populations to be assisted and the institutional vehicles for such assistance) are not analytically linked in any informative way.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

The Eastern Caribbean SIP includes (pages 31-49) 42 specific recommendations regarding interventions in the region, presenting these in a country-by-country format and linking the recommendations to institutional problems disclosed in the document. In terms of institution-building/strengthening recommendations, the suggested interventions are accompanied by admirably specific detailing of how such interventions might best be approached. However, in the area of suggestions for strengthening social welfare and service institutions (health care, education), such detail is often lacking. This may be in part attributable to the organizational problems of the report noted above, particularly the fact that social issues and institutional descriptions are not adequately linked in the analytical portion of the document. As a result, it is difficult to coordinate the findings regarding institutional inadequacies (internal) with those which derive from analysis of the problems

borne by the client populations of those institutions. Thus, for example, the recommendation for improving of educational programs in Antigua speaks of the need for "strengthening", but does not offer specific suggestions as to how that might most efficaciously be accomplished beyond the provision of economic assistance. In this example, it would be useful to have some idea as to what populations might be in need of specific recruitment into the educational system, what sorts of incentives might assist in accomplishing such recruitment, which particular institutions already existing might best be involved in the "strengthening" process, etc.

On the whole, however, the Eastern Caribbean SIP does succeed in positively contributing to the establishment of potentially relevant development program planning.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

The specific disciplinary credentials of the Eastern Caribbean SIP research team are not given in the document. However, it is apparent that the input of knowledgeable persons in the fields of economics, business and social planning was actively sought in the process of SIP development and preparation.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Eastern Caribbean SIP, on the whole, is a successful document in achieving the ultimate goals of the exercise as outlined in the Eastern Caribbean SOW. It might be kept in mind that the work was intended to inform specific planning strategies and to approach those strategies from an institutionally-oriented direction. However, as is often, an easily, the case in more "develop-

ment from above" approaches, the report is less successful in linking its suggestions to the needs, perceptions, and problems of the ultimate target population -- the disadvantaged and under-advantaged of the region. Thus, although the Eastern Caribbean SIP effectively addressed two aspects of the SOW's requested analysis (of the institutions' effectiveness and of the institutional support networks), it could not, on the social level, address the question of appropriateness, for to do so requires the ability to compare the objectives and methods adopted by institutions with the needs and perceptions of their client populations.

ECUADOR SIP

The Ecuador SIP focused on the examination of relationships between government and private business associations, with an eye to developing "program initiatives involving the private sector and those which would be supportive of decentralized development strategies" (Ecuador SIP:2). The emphasis was to be placed upon potentials and needs of the private sector, with a geographic focus centering upon secondary cities and small towns. It does not appear to have more than a generalized approach and set of specifications motivating it (the SOW appears to have refrained from detailed specifications).

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

The specific requirements of the Ecuador SOW are not presented. Rather, there is given a summation of the salient points of focus to which the Ecuador

SIP was intended to address itself. Therefore, the C_{sow} and TC_{sow} figures are more or less discretionary. Given the generally stated emphases noted above, the Ecuador SIP addresses its attention to the appropriate areas of Ecuadoran society, politics and economy and thus would receive "full marks" on the C_{sow} rate (100%), as well as the TC_{sow}. However, it must be emphasized that in the face of so generalized a conceptualization of the appropriate SOW, these ratings have less utility than has been the case in the evaluation of other SIP's.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

The Ecuador SIP was intended to restrict its primary emphasis to the private sector and to smaller towns and cities, so that it was not designed to be a maximally comprehensive document (in part because the Ecuador SIP program as a whole was conceived of as an ongoing, rather than a single-document, exercise). The document in question does attempt to situate its special-focus description and analysis into a more comprehensive framework, through the inclusion of a background chapter (Chapter Two), which presents information on a variety of socio-economic-political factors contributing to the development context. Further, since it is only one of several SIP-like documents, it should perhaps be judged as part of a series rather than on its own merit. As it is, the assessment of this report's comprehensiveness must be something of a split decision: it is comprehensive in terms of discussing the range of institutions and relations to which it is intended to address itself; but in and of itself, the document is not comprehensive enough.

COHERENCE

In terms of coherence, both editorially and stylistically, the Ecuador SIP has a great many problems. Frankly, it reads like a preliminary to a first draft. Paragraph-long sentences that wander into relative-clausal depths of obscurantism (a most notable example occurring in Part I, pages 48-49) are commonplace. The authors commonly mistake redundancy for clarification (e.g., the phrase "imported imports" that keeps cropping up -- what other kinds are there?), or content themselves with unhelpfully, over-generalized descriptive characterizations of groups and institutions. This latter observation is particularly borne out in the report's description of labor unions, which are inadequately differentiated. The convoluted writing style adopted, in combination with a less than fully integrated format of the individual report sections, makes it very difficult for the reader to make use of the document as a consistent and coherent whole.

The fact that the Background and Introduction section is presented as Part II of the SIP (logic would suggest that this precede the more specific presentations of Part I), and that the compilers of the document managed to include pages 97 through 135 twice, indicate a somewhat slapdash approach to the production of this SIP.

DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTIC QUALITY

The Ecuador SIP has serious difficulties on both the descriptive and analytic levels. Descriptively, the document swings from being far too up-in-the-air (i.e., overly generalized and abstracted), to being so particularistic

as to offer no real insight-generating value (e.g., the repeated reference to Raul Paiz' experiences in Part II, the meaning of which still escapes this reader after four re-readings). Part of the problem is the assumption on the research team's part that its readership shares the same practical and theoretical background as it enjoys -- the document assumes that it is writing for a fully-experienced AID mission population, in contradiction to the prescribed, general-accessibility expectation of the SIP program as a whole. Even in the areas most directly salient to the SIP effort, local and regional development entities, it appears to have been assumed that depth of analysis in this document was neither necessary nor expected ("The regional development entities were only superficially reviewed for this study..." (Ecuador SIP II: 59), an assumption this reviewer finds somewhat inexplicable.

To be fair, it appears that this SIP -- with the support and agreement of the enabling AID mission -- is really only intended to be a partial document -- one of a set of several special-focus documents, and neither can, nor should, be judged in terms of the other SIP's dealt with in this general evaluative report. Perhaps the specific data omitted in the Ecuador SIP under discussion are presented elsewhere in the archival resources of the Ecuadoran AID mission, and perhaps the authors of this SIP assume that their work will be read only as a part of that larger package. If that is the case, then the companion documents should also be made available to the reviewer (the assumption that this is possibly the case is based on footnote 2, page 2, Part I, which states: "...it was considered that several SIP documents had already been done by the Mission including several on poverty and on women").

Because the document had a number of purely descriptive "holes" in it, taken as a self-sufficient unit, it is not surprising that the analytic portion of the document is singularly unsatisfying as well. The study adopts a "systems theory" approach, but only presents a small range of the socio-political-institutional factors contributing to the whole of the "Ecuadoran system". The reviewer wishes to be fair in assessing the analytical value of the SIP submitted, as well as to the (somewhat unique) approach to the SIP process in general that appears to have been adopted in Ecuador, and so only reluctantly accepts this document "on face value". But in the absence of supplementary reports, there is no other course available. Therefore, as a descriptive and as an analytic document, the Ecuador SIP receives negative ratings.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

The Ecuador SIP identifies municipal development as the most important single area for planning emphasis. The bulk of its specific recommendations, therefore, are geared to the improvement of the capacity of these municipalities to address the needs of their populations, specifically through introducing fiscal rationality and self-sufficiency. However, these recommendations are couched in the most general terms. For example, it is suggested that attention be paid to improving municipal/community relations and education, but the specific means by which this might be done are not outlined. This lack of specificity is true of all suggested interventions, which are presented in flow-chart form (Ecuador SIP II:72). Since a part of the judgement of the SIP's relevance to development programming is based on the degree to which

particular interventions are justified and effectively detailed, the Ecuador SIP's success in this area is subject once again to a "split decision". It does indeed suggest interventions (and receives a positive score for so doing), but it does not include as a part of its suggestions specific and detailed suggestions as to how these interventions might most efficaciously be carried out (and therefore earns a negative score regarding "importance").

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Ecuador SIP is not, as it stands, a successful document. It is not detailed enough, comprehensive enough, nor particularly coherently put together. Part of its problem may simply be attributable to the fact that it seems not to have been intended to stand alone, but rather to comprise but one documentary contribution to a larger body of social/institutional research documentation. Even taking this into account, however, does not overcome the more basic problems of the report's presentation: its lack of clarity, poor organization, and the overall lack of professionalism in its preparation.

HAITI SIP

The Haiti SIP is a pre-feasibility study for a development project. Thus, to evaluate it as a SIP is to judge it according to what it is not. However, analysis of the document will reveal that had a real SIP been available for Haiti, the present document might have been stronger.

The Haiti SIP is a description of and a rationale for a "coordinated

regional approach" to development in the L'Acul River Basin. However, the proposed project is in fact a rather conventional IRD project emphasizing increased commercialization of agriculture in conjunction with increased soil conservation. (The project is described on page 168 and following.) This reviewer found the following problems with the rationale supporting the project:

A. Weak Data Collection Methods

The SIP describes its market price and land tenure data collection procedures. Its technique for arriving at accurate market prices was as follows:

Market prices for commodities were collected by two Caucasians.... It was made clear to the vendors that the information was required for a study; there was no intention of purchase. In this way the true market price rather than the "prix blanc" was obtained (Haiti SIP:68).

It was paternalistic, and perhaps a bit racist, of the SIP team to believe that because their questions were posed by two whites and because the natives were told that their answers were for a study, that the responses would then be accurate.

Data for the land-tenure survey were collected as follows:

After informal conversation of 10 to 15 minutes, the formal questionnaire was introduced. The survey was done within a two-week time frame...(Haiti SIP:88).

Formal questionnaires applied after 15-minute "warm-ups" yield ludicrous informant responses. Readers of the Haiti SIP, in this reviewer's judgment, have every reason to be skeptical of the quality of its data.

B. No Analysis of Development Trends

The SIP is largely concerned with describing the L'Acul River System. Chapters One and Two provided a background to the "coordinated regional"

approach. (This is done with considerable intellectual pomposity.) Chapter Three describes the habitat of the river basin, and sounds like a chapter from an introductory soils text. Chapters Four and Five describe marketing and farming, largely from a synchronic and technical perspective that leaves the target population out of the analysis. Chapter Six describes the river basin's institutions and Chapters Seven and Eight describe the proposed project. There is no analysis of the development trends either within Haiti or within the project area. Thus, one simply does not know what has been happening in Haiti or the L'Acul River Basin.

C. Limited Analysis of the Target Population

The SIP makes some rather sweeping statements concerning Haitian peasant families. For example, they assert: "While this self-sufficient structure maximizes the farm unit's ability to survive under present conditions, it must result in a decreased level of economic efficiency and output" (Haiti SIP:5). I searched the document high and low for an analysis of farm family economic choice. There is none. This means that statements concerning maximization and efficiency are not made on the basis of evidence. In fact, there are almost no data concerning peasant institutions, culture or economy.

D. Limited Analysis of Development Strategy Alternatives

The SIP assumes that a program of agricultural intensification and extension is the appropriate development strategy for Haiti. There is no analysis, however, which attempts to show why this might be the case.

There are reasons to believe that considerations of alternative strategies would be beneficial to the Haiti Mission. First, the SIP notes: "The regime of micro-property is the dominant pattern, and the majority of farmers are not

not capable of making a living on their own lands..." (Haiti SIP:103). This situation resembles that of the Kenyan "low-income farmers." Such farmers, the Kenyan SIP argued, would never be able to participate in agricultural innovation (Kenya SIP:1-195). If such is the case in Kenya, then perhaps it is so in Haiti. If this is indeed the case, and there is considerable evidence from other countries which supports that of Kenya, then the SIP strategy depends for success on a farmer target population that is reluctant to change.

E. Limited Analysis of the Economic and Cultural Feasibility of the Proposed Agricultural and Soil Conservation Packages

The SIP asserts that the agricultural interventions which it proposes are culturally acceptable and economically feasible. No data, however, are provided to substantiate these assertions.

F. Little Analysis of Institutional Performance

The SIP says that it will discuss "the strengths and weaknesses" of development institutions (Haiti SIP:110), but it provides no clue as to what it means by institutional performance, nor of how to measure such performance. It then races on to discuss 34 different types of institutions in 49 pages (Haiti SIP:111-149). This means that each institution is disposed of in slightly less than two pages. Under such conditions, discussion of the institutions was understandably superficial. One simply could not tell how institutions worked, and whether they would "cut the mustard".

The Haiti SIP asks the AID Mission to formulate major decisions in the absence of information concerning:

1. development trends;
2. alternative development strategies;

3. the nature of proposed target populations;
4. the feasibility of proposed interventions; and
5. the performance of proposed implementing institutions.

Lacking such information, AID/Haiti does not know either if the proposed project is appropriate or feasible. A proper SIP would have helped to provide such information to the Haiti Mission.¹

HONDURAS SIP

The Honduran SOW called for a SIP document which would provide an understanding of the "growing intensity and number of pressures from internal and external sources" confronting Honduran society in order that AID's activities there may be made more "coherent, appropriate, and adaptive in a time of flux." The resulting report was expected to be national in scope, and to generate insights beyond the level of purely economic considerations. In other words, emphasis initially was to be given to socio-cultural, political, and institutional forces bearing upon the whole spectrum of current Honduran affairs. Because of an intention to avoid unduly biasing the focus of the SIP at the outset, the SOW was couched in terms of a high degree of generality, specifying only that the core research issue was to be "how are contemporary macro-social and macro-economic dynamics affecting Honduran social structure and political culture, and what does this mean for the AID program?" Refinements of focus were expected to evolve from the SIP exercise itself, which was intended to contribute to a "continuing, open, and flexible dialogue among a variety of direct and indirect participants." In the process of developing

¹It appears that the Mission has formulated such a SIP.

the document, the SIP team was expected to rely upon a literature review, surveys, and interviews with "key individuals" in Honduran society.

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

The very general nature of the original scope of work called for identifying primary issues in Honduran society and for the identification of important socio-cultural, political and economic forces, as well as for the provision of predictions and development planning alternatives to be derived from such analysis. The Honduras SIP endeavors to fulfill these expectations, and thus earns a C_{sow} rate of 100%. In addition, the team includes a (non-requested) historical overview of the colonial heritage of Honduras on the premise that the colonial experience contributed to the development of contemporary Honduran culture and social organization. The inclusion of this additional section generates a TC_{sow} rate of 83%.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

The Honduras SIP team undertook an impressively large task: to provide description and analysis not only in terms of national geographical and institutional scope, but also in terms of historical depth. The institutional analysis, given the primarily agrarian nature of Honduran society, quite logically focused on agricultural structures and issues, but not to the total exclusion of industry and commerce. Unfortunately, however, the disjunction between intent and performance in this report is quite large -- data are indeed included from all regions and very many social/political and economic levels of Honduran society, they they are often presented in too general terms,

so that for a newcomer to the contemporary Honduran scene, developing a sense of "what is happening where" is more difficult than it need be.

The biggest problem in terms of comprehensiveness is the team's difficulty analyzing contemporary external forces affecting Honduran society. Specifically, one gets the sense from this document that external influences on Honduras are largely a thing of the past. The impact of colonial (read "Spanish") influence is elaborated upon in great length, yet given Honduras' geographic location, its strategic role and importance to U.S. Central American policy, and the general political situation existing in Central America at present, one is surprised, to say the least, that discussion of these undeniably important factors in Honduran life is excluded. Indeed, given the sensitivity of the Central American region, both politically and militarily, and the position Honduras occupies vis-a-vis U.S. policy and practices on the one hand (see CDSS, 1986, p. 6), and particularly the El Salvadoran and Nicaraguan situations on the other, one finds it inexplicable to find no treatment of these issues and their significance in Honduran social and political life, especially in a document intended to assist in guiding AID mission planning.

The Honduras SIP earns a positive general comprehensiveness rating, for it does indeed attempt an extremely broad social/institutional/historical survey of Honduras. However, the omission of reference to sensitive and (particularly for AID purposes) highly significant external forces and factors in contemporary life renders the Honduras SIP hardly comprehensive enough.

DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTIC QUALITY

The Honduras SIP is characterized by a high degree of stylistic and editorial clarity in its presentation. It is an exceptionally readable document. For the most part, its presentation of description and the elaboration of argument follows a well defined and logically coherent format. Unfortunately, many of the illustrative or summary charts and tables are poorly reproduced, often to the point of illegibility. Also, there is a tendency to acronymic reference to many groups, often without sufficient "translation" of the acronyms. This could have been easily remedied by the inclusion of an appendix listing the important acronyms and abbreviations used in the report, and so need not be counted as a terribly serious shortcoming.

One cannot be quite so positive in the assessment of the Honduras SIP's analytic quality. Two key difficulties are encountered in this regard. They occur in two different dimensions of the SIP exercise. First, as mentioned earlier, the team made the decision (for whatever reasons) to exclude or ignore current conditions of (and therefore local responses to) externally generated influences and stresses. The impact of this decision upon analysis is particularly apparent in the team's effort to explain negative local perceptions of AID in terms of the persistence of the Spanish colonial influence on the native psyche. The implication of this explanation is that, short of proposing national psychoanalysis, the situation cannot be improved. If, on the other hand, there are more direct and immediate factors contributing to these perceptions, a detailed presentation of such would provide information that could help alleviate and/or overcome these problems.

Second, related to the selection of significant data is the problem of

the selection of informants. The interview portion of the Honduras SIP relies entirely upon a universe of persons which the team itself allows as being "elites" (Honduras SIP:4). The argument given for this is that the individuals in question are "experts" with regard to their particular institutions, political movements, or the bureaucracy in which they participate. Thus it is assumed that they are likely to be able to speak most cogently and analytically of Honduran problems and issues. In defense of their selection of informants, the team suggests that the only alternative would be to interview exclusively the "disadvantaged" in the society. This is silly. While it is true that the socially, economically and educationally advantaged may be more articulate spokespersons with regard to their perceptions of important development issues, the fact remains that one's perceptions are influenced by one's social and economic position. And the contention that the selection of interviewees involves an "either-or" choice between the advantaged and the disadvantaged makes no sense at all. Indeed, in a document such as the SIP, information on the perceptions of the broad range of population segments (including both the "movers-and-shakers" and the non-powerful/non-privileged), is required.

These two issues lead to a further major analytical difficulty of the Honduras SIP: the presentation of Honduran society as "speaking with one voice." There is a misleading tendency to attribute to all Hondurans the views and opinions expressed by particular individuals or by representatives of a single stratum of Honduran society. This tendency evolves directly out of the rationale used by the Honduras SIP team to delimit its field of informants. One is given the impression, at the analytical level, of a homogeneous group,

while in terms of the descriptive data presented, the picture is quite otherwise.

Overall, then, the Honduras SIP receives a positive assessment for descriptive quality, but a negative scoring in terms of analysis.

COHERENCE

As noted earlier, in terms of descriptive quality, the Honduras SIP is an eminently readable document. The analytical difficulties do not affect the document's coherence (in the sense of it hanging together logically) so much as they affect its utility and reliability as a specific tool for the generation of development-oriented insights into Honduran society. The historical chapter (Chapter Three) is a bit difficult to follow -- a predictable outcome of any attempt to collapse more than 350 years into less than 70 pages.

Finally, there are two somewhat minor criticisms. First, the recurrent use of the term "organism" is needlessly jargonistic and unnecessarily obfuscating. Second, the use of the "gumsa-gumlao" analogy to Honduras' purported political alternation between reliance on democratic process and reliance on force is both inappropriate and a misrepresentation of Leach's position regarding the Kachin, for which the model was originally developed.

Taken all in all, the Honduras SIP must be given a positive coherence rating, but with reservation.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

The Honduras SIP does succeed in identifying and describing a number of institutions of potential importance to the development process, but the

weakness of the document severely undercuts its ability to contribute with significant utility to the process of developing planning strategies. The SIP's suggestions for intervention can be summed up as follows:

- a) increase focus on the development of small and medium level enterprises because of their superior cost-efficiency vis-à-vis their capacity to generate employment;
- b) increase focus on marketing constraints, particularly for agricultural commodities;
- c) upgrade educational resources, particularly emphasizing the training of management-level skills; and
- d) increase support for farm planning and health programs.

The suggested interventions are couched in exceedingly tentative terms, and do not specify the means by which they might best be accomplished. On both the criteria for success in this portion of the Honduras SIP assessment, then, the document receives a negative rating.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

The Honduras SIP team consisted of a (full-time) North American development anthropologist, and a (full-time) Honduran social psychologist specializing in the agrarian sector. In addition, there was a (part-time) Honduran sociologist who specialized in urban research.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Honduran document contained a number of serious flaws, most glaring of which was the team's reluctance to deal directly with contemporary external

relations and forces impacting on Honduran affairs. Additionally, the document does not sufficiently integrate its findings on the social level with its presentation of institutions. On the other hand, the Honduras SIP's team's decision to include, as an integral part of the description of Honduran society, an historical dimension was most welcome to this reviewer.

JAMAICA SIP

The Jamaica SIP was produced by Miranda Associates in compliance to a SOW which established as the principal research questions: 1) "What are the economic and social development dynamics of Jamaica's private sector institutions, and the public sector institutions directly affecting the private sector" with regard to development; 2) what recommendations are appropriate for strengthening selected institutions; and 3) how can AID improve its operations to take maximum development advantage of this Jamaican institutional dynamic? The SIP was to be generated through documentary research, field reconnaissance, and interviews.

In terms of the SOW specifications, the research team was constrained for the most part to emphasize formal public and private sector institutions in place in Jamaica, and the most detailed description and analysis is focused in this area. While a general social overview is attempted, the bulk of the document consists of a set of institutional descriptions of "representative" public and private sector organizations from an "organizational behavior" analytical perspective.

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

The Jamaican SOW ordered an identification and description of existing, formally constituted institutions with particular focus on the private sector. The selection criteria for the specific institutions to be included were left more or less to the discretion of the research team, with the provision that the institutions be either those in the private sector specifically involved in productive activities, or PVO's (and others) directly involved in addressing the socio-economic welfare needs of the Jamaican population, and public sector institutions having direct impact and "significant effects" on the private sector. In addition to institutional analysis, the SOW calls for an executive summary, a section dealing with "principal issues" (left undefined), recommendations, and supplementary annexes. In purely formal terms, the Jamaica SIP includes all requested sections except for the provision of "supplementary annexes", and thus earns a Csow rate of 80%. Recognizing that the omitted section of the report was undefined in terms of expected content, its exclusion is understandable. Since the final document does not substantially exceed the basic SOW specifications, the TCsow rate equals the Csow: 80%.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

Implicit in the wording of the Jamaica SOW, the core of the Jamaica SIP was intended to consist of institutional analyses that were to be representative rather than comprehensive in nature, although the specific institutional analyses were expected to be fitted into the broader Jamaican socio-political and economic context. The Jamaica SIP presents as the first of its five chapters

an introduction to Jamaican society in terms of economics, employment, demography, income distribution, government, and the "socio-political" context. However, these segments are excessively brief (the Jamaican government is dispatched in three sentences, and demographic information is handled in equally abbreviated terms). An even cursory awareness of Jamaican current social and political affairs suggests that such brevity is inappropriate, to say the least.

A word must be said regarding the selection criteria employed in the decisions as to which institutions were to be included for analysis. The Jamaica SOW established extremely general guidelines as to the sorts of institutions which were of interest to the Jamaican AID mission, leaving final selection to the research team. The team elected to set up a "cross-section" of public and private sector institutions "based largely on accessibility" (Jamaica SIP:22), and presented these organizations in a case-study format. However, "accessibility" can in no way be said to be the equivalent of "representativeness", and thus caution must be exercised in any attempt to generalize from the case studies. Further, the particular analytical approach adopted in the Jamaica SIP (a more or less straightforward "organizational behavior" approach) focuses primarily upon management strategies, and therefore requires a contextualization in equally specifically understood social relations before it might be truly useful in planning for Jamaican society as a whole. Given that the social, political, and economic background is so scantily presented, this is not accomplished. Thus in assessing the comprehensiveness of the Jamaica SIP, we must consider the question from two angles. In terms of strict formal compliance to the SOW-ordered expectations, the SIP technically can be

considered comprehensive. However, if the question is whether or not this SIP is comprehensive enough to generate useful insights regarding Jamaica's development-related problems and strengths, then the brevity of background presentation and the questionable representativeness of its institutional analysis requires that the answer be "no".

DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTICAL QUALITY

The descriptive quality of the Jamaica SIP is variable in the extreme. Basically, the point of divergence of quality is at the split between description of particular institutions on the one hand, and socio-cultural description on the other. The case studies are clear, accessible even to those readers lacking a background in management, and presented in a logically organized manner. However, these descriptions are presented in something of an informational vacuum. That is to say, the institutional description is not accompanied by an equally rigorous description of the larger social context. The result is that, even on the purely descriptive level, a false picture of homogeneity is implied for Jamaican society. Description of the Jamaican context never presents rural or urban poor. Rigorous analysis on the local level might have countered this descriptive shortcoming. Reference is made in the "socio-political context" portion of the SIP to the poor, but it rarely gets down to specifics. The problem with excessive brevity in the description of the socio-political-economic background section has already been mentioned. Much greater attention is paid to the elaboration of social science theories that have been developed with regard to Jamaica (those of M. G. Smith and Carl

describing the phenomena to which that theory is intended to apply. The theoretical approaches presented sketchily in the Jamaica SIP conflict with one another in important ways, but the Jamaica SIP, by providing little specific data, does not equip its readership adequately for the intelligent evaluation of the theoretical insights these models might generate.

On the level of theory (both in the presentation of established social science models and in the team's own analytical attempts), the Jamaica SIP is also problematic. In the case of the former, the Jamaica SIP team appears to have satisfied itself with appropriating the most general formulations of the models -- M. G. Smith's "plural society" is effectively boiled down to a statement of an "us against them" attitude on the part of Jamaica's poor, which is an excessively simplistic presentation of a far more complexly worked out analysis. What is lost is the recognition that, historically, Jamaica has consisted of a multiplicity of participatory levels defined by factors of racial heritage, economic position, as well as educational levels and prospects, gender and occupation. All these factors are linked through historical process and must be comprehended to fully understand, for example, why particular motivational strategies might be successful in some areas or institutions and less so in others.

A further problem with the Jamaica SIP analysis is the tendency to speak of "Jamaican thought" as if there were some monolithic cultural-ideological perspective relevant to all sections of Jamaican society. While this is a commonly encountered phenomenon in some social science research, and at times can be justified as useful in simplifying the characterization of an overwhelming volume of data, it has no place in a document like the SIP,

which is intended to be specifically capable of informing development planning.

Finally, the approach taken, to analyze specific institutions, is informed by assumptions which, while not necessarily invalid, are insufficient for the use to which the Jamaica SIP is intended. It is indeed possible to approach institutional analysis in terms of internal dynamics (management-labor relations, production efficiency, marketing strategies, etc.), but this tells the reader nothing of the articulation of the institutions with the larger social whole. Particularly in the discussion of the PVO's, it is equally important to discuss in detail the linkages between the institutions themselves and their client populations, an area the Jamaica SIP does not adequately address.

Overall, then, the Jamaica SIP must be accorded a negative assessment in both the areas of descriptive and analytical success.

COHERENCE

The organizational format of the Jamaica SIP is clear and, as noted earlier, accessible to the reader. Presentation is accomplished according to a well defined sequence. The principal shortcoming in terms of coherence is the lack of coordination between the social profile and the institutional case studies. That is to say, the two sections are not explicitly linked to one another. On the whole, however, in terms of editorial and stylistic coherence, the Jamaica SIP earns a positive rating.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

Because of the analytical approach taken by the SIP team, the document's conclusions and recommendations were constrained along two dimensions. First, since the institutional profiles were not linked to a detailed socio-political-economic general profile, specific recommendations were able to be generated solely with reference to modifying each institution's internal structure and/or dynamics -- not with reference to improving their relationships, impact on, and relevance to Jamaican social-economic development as a whole. This is a significant shortcoming, particularly in the way in which intervention suggestions are constrained with regard to the PVO's, where the suggestions are neither specific enough to be useful (it is suggested, for example, that the CVSS be brought more directly into the operation of the new Voluntary Sector Development Office as a "learning experience", which by the definition and charter as presented in the Jamaica SIP, would occur anyway), nor realistic (suggesting that the CVSS Executive Committee consider recruiting "charismatic leadership" seems singularly unhelpful).

A further result of the analytical approach taken by the Jamaica SIP team is that it requires a top-down orientation in which the ultimate target population of development interventions (the poor) is insufficiently represented. Thus, the report is prevented by its approach from being able to provide suggestions of specific interventions that might assist in improving the conditions of this population. The fact that the Jamaica SIP's only recommendation in this area consists of the suggestion that AID undertake a study of just that population is, in effect, an acknowledgement that, as it stands, the Jamaica SIP itself is inadequate to inform directly specific AID intervention strategies.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

The Jamaica SOW called for a team of three to four individuals possessing skills in a broad range of disciplines from business administration to political science to the social sciences. While the disciplinary credentials of the actual team are not specified in the SIP, it is quite apparent, both from the report's tone and its focus, that the SIP relied heavily upon member expertise in the field of business management. Its strengths derive largely from the description and analysis of internal institutional dynamics. It has been the contention, throughout this evaluation of the Jamaica SIP, however, that a more balanced mix of management analysis principles and those deriving from the social sciences might have gone a long way to overcome the problems and shortcomings of this report as a planning tool.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Jamaica SIP, while earning an overall successful rating, gains that rating only by a very slim margin. Ultimately, its utility is restricted to its usefulness in providing specific case-study data about the internal operations of its selected institutions. The questionable representativeness of the selected case studies makes generalization from the specific findings advisable only with the exercise of great caution. Most importantly, what is lacking is a sense of the linkages between the institutions analyzed and the larger, heterogeneous Jamaican society -- between the institutions selected for analysis and the various populations (and other institutions) participating in or affected by them.

OMAN SIP

The Oman SOW specified that the purpose of the SIP would be "to provide the Oman Development Council and Omani-American Joint Commission for Economic and Technological Cooperation" with "basic information on social and institutional factors...which affect development" (Oman SOW:1). The SIP was to "reflect the objectives and strategy" of Oman's second Five Year Plan (1981-86). It was to focus on "rural" areas' "water, agriculture, fisheries,... commerce and quality of life." In order to accomplish its purpose, the SOW directed the SIP team to perform five activities. These included a literature survey, a compilation and analysis of in-country survey data, a statistical analysis of the Directorate General of Fisheries data, interviews with key Omani informants, and the collection of agricultural and commercial data in rural areas. The four field-based activities never occurred, so that the document under review was compiled solely as a result of the literature search. This SIP was prepared during 1982 by an Institute for Development Anthropology (IDA) team of three persons. It is, however, an interesting document -- for reasons discussed below -- of potential interest to those with development responsibilities in other desert regions.

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

The SOW requested that 14 different sections be included in the SIP. The resulting document presented nine. Thus the Csow was 64%. The missing sections are lacking because the document under review was not the completed SIP. The SOW requested an executive summary, conclusions concerning development

priorities, lists of in-country persons contacted, and sectoral quantitative data. However, as the four in-country activities were never performed, it is understandable that these sections are absent.

The Oman SIP had a TCsow equal to that of the Csow. The SIP team included seven sections in their document that were not explicitly requested by the SOW. These included discussion of village and tribal social structure as they related to rural economy, land tenure, labor migration, religion, women, education, and health. These topics were presented in a way that was and thus were implicitly requested by the SOW. relevant to institutional aspects of rural development. The IDA team, in the judgement of this reviewer, added to the strength of the document by including these topics.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

There is disjunction between the "Purpose" and "Scope and Content" versus the "Reporting Requirements" sections of the Omani SOW (SOW:1). The two former sections call for an analysis of all social and institutional factors influencing rural development -- implying a comprehensive SIP. The latter section, however, asks rather little. For example, the section does require that the SIP include a section on agriculture-- but it does not specify exactly what about agriculture it is interested in. This allowed the SIP team to have considerable leeway, which the IDA contractors utilized to construct a comprehensive document which emphasized irrigation and water management systems and rural social structure. The Oman SIP may be characterized as comprehensive in that it discussed national governmental as well as local political, economic, religious institutions. It was comprehensive enough in the sense that it

presents all the major socio-economic institutions and regions which the planner needs in order to construct action programs.

DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTIC QUALITY

The document's description was evaluated as satisfactory. However, its analysis was judged to need work. There are three apparent reasons for the less than total analytic success.

A. Did Not Perform Certain Sections

The SIP did not attempt four sections. These were sections, however, which could only be written if the team had visited Oman, and remember that it did not.

B. Did Not Explicitly Analyze How Socio-Economic Institutions Influenced Rural Dynamics

The team reviewed a considerable volume of secondary material, much of which would be puzzling and arcane to "Westerners." This included various forms of aflag irrigation systems; diacritical religious notions of different religious sects, such as that of mushrikeen; land tenure categories, such as mulk versus bayt al mal; and pivotal tribal notions of organization such as 'asabiya. These must all be understood if planners are to avoid blundering into different development obstacles. The team did a good job of describing these for non-specialists.

However, the analysis of how socio-economic institutional factors influence rural development dynamics is not entirely successful. The reader is given pieces of information. For example, one is informed that in irrigation there have been "major shifts in patterns of trade, consumption and investment" which

are widening the gap between "rich and poor" (Oman SIP:13); that the amount of irrigated land was found to be down in one study 38% from previous estimates (Oman SIP:144); that there is a trend towards individual investment (Oman SIP: 151); that there have been "revolutionary" changes in fishing (Oman SIP:51); that 28% of the Omani domestic work force was "employed abroad" in 1975 (Oman SIP:137). These pieces of information suggest that Oman is experiencing sweeping and rather dramatic change. These bits of description can all be seen, then, as pieces in a puzzle showing how socio-economic institutional factors are influencing Omani rural dynamics. But there is never an exercise which puts the pieces together. The puzzle never resolves itself into a clear picture of exactly how and why Oman is changing. It was especially in the sections on irrigation, fisheries, village social structure, land tenure, or migration that such analysis was appropriate -- and it never occurred.

C. Did Not Explicitly Analyze the Implications of Various Socio-Economic Institutional Factors for Development Interventions

The village social structure, land tenure, labor migration, religion, women, education, and health sections contain fine descriptions. There is no analysis, however, which suggests how these topics are relevant to sound program planning, project selection, and effective project design and implementation. The SOW called for two sections concerning discussion of development priorities: one in the conclusion to the sectorial review, and the other at the conclusion of the document. These sections were never completed, with the exception of a discussion of what planners might consider when undertaking oasis development.

The preceding suggests that the Oman SIP description was fine, but that its analysis needed considerable work. However, it must be remembered that the

SIP was a "background" document functioning to brief the full SIP team (Oman SIP:Preface).

COHERENCE

The Oman SIP, with some exceptions noted below, was generally a coherent document. Certain of the incoherencies were:

A. Editorial Problems

There are a number of sections in the document which would be better re-named. For example, the section entitled "Diachronic and Causal Explanations of Omani Irrigation" (Oman SIP:10) sounds like a gangbuster, abstract analysis of the dynamics of irrigation systems. However, it turns out to be merely a précis of two documents concerning Omani irrigation, and might have been better entitled "An Introduction to the Oman Irrigation Literature." The SIP also contains some egregious description. For example, one half of the section on fishing consists of line drawings of fishing boats and the terms fishermen use when fishing. This is all great fun, especially if you happen to be possessed of a passion for fishing. It would have been nice to know how many people fish how much they catch, what have been recent production trends, etc. This information, however, is not included.

B. Substantive Problems

The bulk of the document's description of productive activities concerns irrigation agriculture and fisheries. The amount of space devoted to these activities implies that they are the predominant production sectors. However, no data are presented bearing upon this implication. The reader knows neither

what percentage of the GNP these activities constitute, nor what percentage of the national population engages in them. Thus, the reader simply does not know why so much coverage is given to irrigation and fishing. In point of fact, agriculture -- and all Omani agriculture is irrigated -- and fisheries employ the majority of the Omani labor force. Further, agriculture is in decline and fisheries appear to have considerable potential for increased production in a protein-starved area of the world. Thus, the SIP presumably focused upon irrigation and fisheries because improvements in these two sectors might relax major development constraints while having wide benefit incidences. However, the uninitiated reader never is told this.

In sum, the Oman SIP is coherent with the exception of the above observations.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

The Oman SIP included discussions of agriculture, fisheries, education and health -- all of which are areas in which planners might suggest development interventions. However, the document discusses development interventions in only two places. The first occurs in the fisheries section. Here, en passant, it severely criticizes capital-intensive approaches to fishing. This may be appropriate. However, it never suggests an alternative. It helps to know what not to do. It helps more to know what to do. The other area where the document discusses development interventions is in the final section, where it takes up the possibility of oasis development (Oman SIP:225-229). The suggestions concerning what issues to be sensitive toward when undertaking oasis

development are important. However, they are presented tentatively. They are not supported by any analysis suggesting their rationale or what development constraints they might remove, or their likely benefit incidence and distribution. Oasis development, if successful, can be useful in reversing agricultural decline in arid regions throughout the Middle East and North Africa. However, while the SIP identifies what would be an important intervention, it does not go very far in informing planners as to how they might go about doing it.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

The team which prepared the Oman SIP appears to have consisted of three development anthropologists.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Oman SIP was judged successful in seven of the categories in which it was evaluated. It was comprehensive, of satisfactory descriptive quality, and generally coherent. However, it was weak in not attempting an analysis of rural dynamics or of the implications of these dynamics for different interventions. The Oman SIP reader knows a considerable amount about what is happening in Oman, but not how it all fits together, or what it all means for development. The present document's ability to achieve a 78% success rate is remarkable when it is recalled that it was only a "background" document for an uncompleted SIP exercise. AID might consider continuing this exercise, for then the Oman SIP might become what it has the potential of being -- a model for the development of irrigation and fishing in certain desert regions.

YEMEN SIP

The purpose of the Yemen SIP was to "expand USAID/Yemen's base of information upon which to make sound judgments regarding strategy, programming and project identification" (Yemen SOW:1).¹ This was to be done by describing "the significant social and institutional factors which shape development opportunities and constraints for the rural population" (Yemen SOW:1). Research upon which to base the SIP was to include a literature survey and interviews with knowledgeable persons in Yemen. The SIP was to complete its work in three months.

The American Institute of Yemeni Studies (AIYS) prepared the document. Work on it began in October, 1982 when AIYS's president requested background papers about Yemen from "about two dozen researchers" (Yemen SIP:iii). Eleven papers actually resulted from this request. These were synthesized into the final SIP in a week by the principal author, Dr. Daniel Varisco. The resulting document was an interesting overview of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen).

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

The SOW asked for 13 sections -- 12 of these were included. Thus, C_{sow} was 92%. The SIP team included no unrequested sections, so that T_{C_{sow}} = C_{sow}. The missing section was an annex that was supposed to contain quantitative data. Such information is limited for Yemen, and it is likely that the quantitative information which was available was integrated with the SIP's text.

¹ It should be observed that the copy of the Yemen SIP evaluated was a draft.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

The SIP consisted of an Executive Summary, seven substantive chapters, one "mystery" missing chapter, and four annexes including an annotated bibliography and an interesting guide to using and updating the SIP. The first chapter describes the entire nation's ecology. The second profiles the rural population. It discusses religion, traditional social groups, gender and age roles, health, nutrition, reproduction and education. It further presents recent socio-cultural trends and their implications for planners. The fourth chapter presents rural Yemen's institutions. These include formal public and traditional institutions, including tribal structures. The fifth chapter describes existing rural road, educational and health infrastructures. The sixth chapter discusses access to land and water resources. The seventh chapter analyzes rural productivity, presenting discussions of agriculture, livestock, crafts and services, trade, remittances and the non-narcotic stimulant gat, which has recently emerged as the leading cash crop. The eighth chapter -- the "Rural Development Experience" -- appears never to have been written and is thus the "mystery" chapter. It was conceived as a discussion of two AID projects to "draw attention to concrete problems" with project implementation in the country (Yemen SIP:150).¹ The ninth chapter presents the constraints and potentialities of Yemeni development. It suggests certain courses of AID action. The SIP is both comprehensive and comprehensive enough.

¹This chapter does exist in the draft version of the SIP.

DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTIC QUALITY

The description occasionally contained certain phrases such as: "The Yemeni is proud of his country..." (Yemen SIP:177, emphasis added). Aside from being rather banal, the sentence is sexist. Equally, there are sentences that are ambiguous. Consider, for example: "There are only a few qanats (underground infiltration galleries) in Yemen, but these are not important for irrigation" (Yemen SIP:119). The semantic unclarity in this sentence has to do with the word "but". Do the authors mean that because there are few qanats, that they are not important for irrigation? If this is the case, the sentence would have been clearer with "so" replacing "but". However, if the authors mean that the qanats are unproductive water sources as compared to other sources of water for irrigation in Yemen, then the word "but" might be appropriate.

Certain of the farming systems currently employed in Yemen are described in an unclear fashion. This is especially true with what the document first describes as "runoff harvesting" (Yemen SIP:119), and then simply as "runoff" (Yemen SIP:120). The problem is that the reader is introduced to this form of farming as if it were a single aspect of a farming cycle when in fact it appears to be an entire labor-intensive farming system (Yemen SIP:119-120). These types of gaffes notwithstanding, the SIP is generally successful in its description.

There are problems with the analysis of the rural majority, development institutions, and rural productivity:

A. Rural Majority

The SIP says that Yemeni society is "mosaic" (Yemen SIP:21).¹ Then it poses the question: "How are the pieces (of the mosaic) organized?" -- to which it responds: "A number of approaches could be taken..., but no single criterion is sufficient" (Yemen SIP:22). What the authors appear to be really saying in this sentence is that they do not know, and hence do not intend to analyze, how Yemeni rural society is structured. The SIP then proceeds to describe serendipitously Yemeni religion, tribes, merchants, pariahs, etc. The problem with all this is that it turns out to be a "shreds and patches" description of Yemeni society and culture. There is no disaggregation of the rural population into different groups that perform different economic functions and that might be differentially affected by, and targets for, development. I asked myself, as I read the pariah section, if the SIP convinced me that it makes any difference, in terms of either development trends within the country or donor development strategies, whether I know about Yemeni pariahs? The answer was no.

The reader might note that the SIP proclaims a number of superficial findings. For example, it announces "the main cause of malnutrition...is bottlefeeding..." (Yemen SIP:45). However, this assertion is made in the absence of any information within the SIP which demonstrates that such is the case. Rather, the authors appear to be reporting this finding because it is a current, "pop" explanation of Third World malnutrition. The reader is directed

¹The analysis of Middle Eastern society in terms of "mosaics" has been influential in the past. However, such an approach is perhaps past its prime in Middle Eastern ethnology. The Oman SIP explicitly rejects a "mosaic" approach (Oman SIP).

to the Kenya analysis of the same topic (Kenya SIP:223-226). Here data are provided and here the data suggest that underlying economic conditions, rather than bottlefeeding, induce malnutrition.

A problem with parroting "pop" truisms is that it makes the task of development more difficult by obscuring real problems. For example, on the basis of the SIP's analysis of Yemeni malnutrition, it would appear that a cause of infant malnutrition is ignorant mothers -- i.e., who don't bother to wash bottles, over-dilute the formula, etc. (Yemen SIP:45). This makes it seem as if a fine way to attack nutrition problems is through the education of mothers. This might provide the rationale for a nutrition education project whose goal would be to teach Yemeni women the proper ways to use their breasts and bottles. However, the SIP never explored whether malnutrition resulted from problems in the food production and distribution systems, as appears to be typically the case in Third World nations. If this is indeed the case, a "mothers' nutrition-education" project will greatly elevate women's sensitivity to bottles while having little effect upon malnutrition.

A further disturbing aspect of the treatment of the rural majority is that it does not disaggregate the population into groups who are differentially affected by and benefitting from development trends, and who thus might serve as appropriate target populations. The entire rural population is presented as one confusing "mosaic", and the development planner does not know whether to help the "middle" farmer (as suggested by the Kenya SIP) or the traders, who appear to be flourishing (Yemen SIP:87-96), and whose assistance would strengthen private initiative.

B. Institutions

There is no institutional analysis. There is only institutional description, and this description is scattered throughout the SIP in Chapter Three, in parts of Chapters 4 (especially pages 101-110) and Five (especially pages 125-128). Lacking is any notion as to what constitutes institutional performance, or what are the determinants of this performance. Hence the SIP is innocent of an analytic framework for evaluating Yemen's institutions.

C. Rural Productivity

The chapter on rural productivity is not about productivity. The chapter presents no productivity measures, and does not show any relationship between the topics it presents and agricultural productivity.

COHERENCE

The Yemen SIP is like an American teenager prior to a serious prom: at a distance, well groomed and together; closely observed, highly creative, but a complete and utter anarchy. The SIP seems to move from analysis of rural folk to rural institutions, and on and on without a firm command of what is happening in rural Yemen, and how what is happening is relevant to various development options -- and that is the problem: it is all a facade.

The reader is informed on the first page of the document that "the single most important aspect of present-day Yemen is the remittance factor" (Yemen SIP:1), only to discover that remittances only receive a three-page treatment (Yemen SIP:142-145), which is not especially instructive. (The reader is directed to the Somali SIP for a more successful treatment of the significance of remittances.)

Most of the SIP's discussions ultimately lead back to the agricultural system which is treated in a confusing fashion. This is true because it is analyzed from three different perspectives in three different places. First, agriculture is described as part of the tribal system (Yemen SIP:74-80); later, it is treated in the context of land use and tenure patterns (Yemen SIP: 116-125); and finally, it is considered as part of the analysis of rural productivity (132-136). These three different treatments tend toward redundancy.

Further, the analysis of agriculture is inchoate. For example, during the analysis of tribal agriculture, the SIP speaks of the "demise of the traditional economy..." (Yemen SIP:79). I read this proposition to mean that the rural economy, and with it agriculture, has suffered a "demise" -- i.e., is gone. However, in the section that discusses rural productivity, the reader is told that the agricultural system is "in a state of decline" (Yemen SIP:135). Well, the reader asks, which is it -- is traditional agriculture declining or has it met its demise? While one is on the topic of "traditional" agriculture, what is so "traditional" about "traditional" farming? The reader is never told because the category "traditional" is never defined. Thus the reader is in a position of not knowing what "traditional" agriculture is, as well as not knowing whether in fact it is or is not in decline. The reader may be puzzled to discover that even though agriculture is in a "decline" that "profit margins for the farmer are extraordinarily high" (Yemen SIP:140), and that cash-cropping -- which may or may not be "traditional" -- appears to be booming (Yemen SIP:135). Is this decline -- which may or may not be

occurring -- due to the impact of roads, as stated at one point (Yemen SIP:90), or the result of political unrest, as is stated at another point (Yemen SIP: 135)? And how does the remittance factor fit in? We are never told. The Yemen SIP tried to dazzle, like the young Mozart. I found it murky, like the mediocre Salieri.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

At one point, roughly one-fourth of the way through the monograph, the authors announce: "Dozens of implications for program planning and for project design and implementation emerge from the discussion in the preceding pages of this section" (Yemen SIP:53a). Actually, in the section of the document which formally presents the SIP's proposed development intervention, seven suggestions are offered (Yemen SIP:180-185). These included project retrenchment, national level institutional building, the backing up of Yemeni development initiatives, the performance of projects that produce "immediate and at least visible" results (Yemen SIP:183), the design of projects that make expanded use of the media, as well as other projects involving other educational activities, and finally, the design of projects which stimulate appropriate technology.

Technically, the SIP was successful in recommending enough interventions. However, with the exception of the underdescribed initiatives in education and appropriate technology, the SIP's development strategy for Yemen recommends that AID stop doing what it is doing and do what the Yemenis want with "visible" -- i.e., cosmetic -- projects that exploit the media. With regard to the

exploitation of the media, the SIP insists that "talk-shows" are out and "docu-dramas" are in (Yemen SIP:184). The logic of such an intervention strategy means that even though the SIP found standards of rural health to be "very low" (Yemen SIP:1), no AID projects should be contemplated because, for the Yemen government, "Health is a relatively low priority..." (Yemen SIP:103). The Yemen SIP is distinguished in its formulation of the first "showbiz" development strategy. However, the SIP failed to convince this reviewer of the seriousness of such a strategy — but you never know; maybe "docu-dramas" are the way to go.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

It is difficult to tell exactly who performed what function in the cast of Yemeni SIP.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

In the Preface, it is announced that "The actual writing of this report took place...between January 9 and January 16." Dr. Varisco is a perceptive and serious scholar. He was given an impossible task. No person can synthesize a serious monograph in a week. The Yemen SIP is not a serious document. However, it was judged to have successfully performed in 67% of the categories in which it was evaluated.

PHILIPPINES SIP

The Philippines SIP was prepared by a team from the Integrated Research Center (IRC) of Philippines' De La Salle University. It was the sole SIP to be entirely the product of people from the nation the SIP analyzes. Its SOW stated:

The primary purposes of the SIP are to study the trends of development changes taking place in the Eastern Visayas (e.g., the island of Leyte) and to identify the most significant social and institutional factors involved, with a view to analyzing the potential for further development in the region. Within this context emphasis will be placed on the effect of these changes on three categories of rural poor -- the landless, the rainfed farmers, and the artisanal fisherman (Philippines SOW:3).

In order to accomplish this analysis, the team was asked to perform both documentary research and fieldwork. The SOW characterized the fieldwork as "minimal" (Philippines SOW:1). Its scope was specified as follows:

The major emphasis will be on market towns, where those who provide goods and services to the farm and fishing communities are aware of the changes taking place in the surrounding market area, and where local leaders are aware of the patterns of social change. The market towns in effect are links between the macro-regional and micro-village levels of development. In analyzing the trends of change, the interviewers will refer to the range of significant factors identified in the documentary phase of research to understand some of the reasons for changes and their impacts upon the poor (Philippines SOW:3).

This SOW directed the IRC team to collect primary data on rural change throughout Leyte, which was a far from "minimal" undertaking. Social scientists familiar with conditions in the Philippines and the research program imposed by the SOW suggested that data collection and preliminary data analysis, but

not a final write-up, would probably exceed two years if executed correctly. The IRC was given a year to do the job (Philippines SOW:1). Further, its "main report" was not to exceed "35 double-typed pages" (Philippines SOW:3). The SOW asked the IRC to perform the rather vast analysis of social change in Leyte in a brief period and to report on it in a document that was to be shorter than the most decent undergraduate term papers. Thus, IRC's agreement to perform the Philippines SIP may be likened to their fitting into a Victorian corset. They were obliged to cram hurriedly a considerable bulk within a tiny space.

SIP TO SOW CONFORMITY

The SOW requested a SIP with only three extremely general, monolithic sections (e.g., "Overview of the Eastern Visayas," "Development Trends," and "Potential Trends") (Philippines SOW:3). Thus, it did not specify what it wanted as clearly as might have been hoped for. However, it did, in a discursive fashion, suggest what topics it wanted covered in the three sections (Philippines SOW:4-12). From the perspective of the IRC team, a problem in organizing their SIP must have been that they were supposed to cover all topics in only 35 pages. This problem they resolved by presenting their survey information on farmers and fishermen in appendix form (Philippines SIP: 64-112). This meant that information which the SOW wished included in the body of the SIP is relegated to appendices. Nevertheless, the SOW requested 11 sections and the SIP complied with 10, for a Csow of 91%. As the contractor added no sections on its own initiative, TCsow equaled the Csow.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

The Philippines is the world's fifteenth most populous nation, with a population estimated at over 50 million in the early 1980's. The Philippines SOW requested that the IRC team restrict its analysis to Leyte, which had a population of roughly 1.6 million, or 3.2% of the total population. The SOW requested that the IRC analyze numerous institutions across a number of development sectors. The IRC team performed as requested. Thus, it may be evaluated as comprehensive in that it discussed "many" institutions. However, this reviewer has reservations as to whether it is comprehensive enough. This is for two reasons. First, the Philippines has a severe population problem. In the 1950's, its population was about 20 million. In the early 1980's, it was up to about 50 million, and at the then prevailing rates of increase, it was projected to exceed 90 million by the turn of the century. These increases have led to high population densities in fertile areas which have exacerbated "landlord-tenant relations" and have not unsurprisingly been associated with "peasant unrest."¹ The SIP does not address the population problem. Second, the SIP neither discusses the two major population centers in the Philippines the islands of Luzon and Mindanao; nor does it describe how Leyte resembles these. Thus, the SIP ignores the most populous parts of the nation and a major development constraint.

DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTIC QUALITY

The Philippines SIP's description is successful. There are, however, problems with its analysis. It believed it had identified certain development

¹David Steinberg, The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982, page 12.

trends. Specifically, its thesis was:

Leyte presents a classic example of a province which has the capacity to provide substantial wealth alongside phenomenal poverty. Its aggressive industrialization drive, instead of narrowing the gap between the relatively well-off urban centers and the poverty stricken rural areas, seems to further strengthen such disparity (Philippines SIP:49).

Analysis that supported this view had two jobs to perform: first, it had to identify what made the rural poor poor; and then it had to show how "aggressive industrialization" widened the gap between rural poor and urban wealthy. With regard to the former analytic requirement, the SIP hypothesized that rural poverty resulted from the absence of all but the most rudimentary production inputs which, in conjunction with adverse terms of trade to rural producers and the absence of education, health or nutritional services, meant that agricultural output and incomes stayed low. With regard to the second analytic requirement, the study hypothesized that because of the capital-intensive industrial development program on Leyte agriculture has been "given less attention and assistance by the government" (Philippines SIP:28). While this reviewer believes that the position argued by the SIP is probably correct, he does not feel that either the SIP's own study or other documentary data presented in the course of the analysis provide substantial support for its position.

The problems with the analysis include the following:

A. Utility of the Survey

The survey performed by the SIP was a major source of data used to support its hypotheses. The following bear on the usefulness of this information:

1. Training of Interviewers: Interviewers were given three days of training (Philippines SIP:119). This was described as "inadequate by the IRC team (Philippines SIP:124).
2. Questionnaires: The IRC team considered the questionnaires it used to be a "major problem" for reasons that it did not elaborate upon (Philippines SIP:124).
3. Sample: One hundred and seventy informants constituted the study's sample. The study does not describe what measures were taken to ensure representativeness. Rather, the description provided of the selection process suggests the reverse. Readers are told that informants were chosen through "official channels" or through their kinship with interviewers (Philippines SIP:119).

There are thus reasons for concern about the quality and the representativeness of the survey data. These methodological problems were not of the IRC's making. Rather, the SOW's demand that the SIP be completed in a year meant that IRC could only allot "a three-month period" for its field survey (Philippines SIP:Forward i).

B. Reliance upon Insufficient Data

The SIP tends to support its hypotheses on the basis of weakly substantiated assertions. Consider the following:

1. Concerning the Determinants of Rural Poverty: The reader is told that rural populations are characterized by:

...landlessness, utilization of traditional technology,...lack of capital and lack of access to credit facilities, dependence upon middlemen for crop/product disposal, and poor access to roads... (Philippines SIP:31).

COHERENCE

This reviewer was concerned about the Philippines SIP's coherence. There were the following problems:

A. Lack of Definition of Terms

The word barangay is used throughout the SIP. It is never defined.

B. Contradictory Assertions

The SIP first announces that "traditional fishing grounds are experiencing a decrease in resources" (Philippines SIP:24) and then goes on to announce that the fishing grounds are "rich" and of a "vast potential for investment" (Philippines SIP:29). It may well be that both assertions are correct, but as expressed in the SIP, the reader does not understand why -- and is perplexed.

C. "Awkward" Characterizations

Fishermen are characterized as permitting illegal gambling to run "rampant" while enjoying "drinking" as a "favorite" pastime (Philippines SIP:107). Upland rainfall farmers are reported to be "superstitious" but "devoted" to work (Philippines SIP:92). Lowland rainfall farmers "were friendly" and "peace-loving" (Philippines SIP:77). Such characterizations seem inapt. For example, one group's superstitions are another's religion; while in different contexts, all peoples can be characterized as friendly, or hard-working, or peace-loving.

D. Confusing Organization

Information which concerns the three groups under analysis is presented in Annex A. The only data other than generalities presented prior to a discussion of findings is a nine-page overview of Leyte's infrastructure, public

services and industry (Philippines SIP:17-26) that does not assess the impact of these upon farmers and fishermen. Thus, most information that forms the basis of analytical judgments is tucked away in the annex. This asks the reader to accept findings concerning farmers and fishermen before he or she has seen the data upon which the findings are based.

E. Devotes Too Much Time to Preliminaries

The Philippines SIP is 173 pages long. Eleven pages are devoted to an overview of the study (pages 1-12). Eighteen pages are a "general profile" of Leyte (pages 12-30). Four pages are bibliography (pages 54-63). Sixty-one pages describe field procedures, survey instruments and staff (pages 112-173). This means that only 73 pages, or 42% of the document, include data analysis and description. This situation reminds one of a suitor who is superb at setting up the preliminaries, but can't get the job done. The Philippines SIP is not especially coherent for the above five reasons.

RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING

The Philippine SIP argued that the emphasis upon developing capital-intensive, urban-based industries on Leyte neglected the development needs of the rural sector, which included the majority of the population. Accordingly, it recommended an integrated rural development program designed to benefit rural producers. The program included six major interventions: irrigation systems; credit facilities; roads; baseline data collection; revitalized population, health, nutrition and education services; environmental protection measures; and certain structural and policy reforms (Philippines SIP:vi).

Although the SIP's effectiveness is diluted by analytic and coherence problems, it nevertheless convinces the reader in the section which presents its development program (Philippines SIP:53-58) that its package of interventions, if successfully implemented, would remove production input scarcities for many farmers and fishermen while at the same time improving the health and habitat of these people. Thus, the SIP was evaluated as successful in both the number and the importance of its interventions.

DISCIPLINARY MIX

The IRC study involved a rather labor-intensive team of 27, including five senior staff, three research assistants, eight interviewers, five typists and three consultants. The SIP does not describe the professional affiliation or academic background of the senior staff. The tone of the document suggests that they included sociologists/anthropologists and economists with the former predominating. My guess is that IRC's Cecile B. DeMille-like approach to the size of its SIP team was a response to the SOW demands that it do a great deal in a short time. A research project of the magnitude specified by the SOW could have legitimately used a team of 27 in an effort that would have required six months of preliminary data analysis, four months of survey design and pre-testing as well as interviewer training, eight months to survey the Island of Leyte, six months to analyze and write up the findings in a preliminary fashion, and two months for unexpected delays. There is a moral to be drawn from this. Even a supporting cast of thousands cannot perform a chore in a short time that cannot be performed in a short time.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Philippines SIP is a promising document. It was successful in 70% of the areas it was evaluated. Its analysis was not successful. It needed considerable work on its coherence. The Philippines are currently experiencing a "serious crisis" (CDSS FY 1986; Annex I:1). AID is "rethinking" its development objectives, programs, and projects in the country. Continued SIP activity in the Philippines could contribute to the design of a more effective AID presence.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

First, the findings of the previous section are reviewed; then, on the basis of these, a number of options are advanced for a stronger SIP program. Four types of findings are discussed: those concerning the nature of the SIP; those describing the SIP's success; those discussing the factors which controlled their success, and those bearing upon the substance of SIP's, and of the power that this substance may potentially confer upon USAID.

FINDINGS

The SIP's evaluated are a unique, successful, and potentially powerful set of documents. The evidence supporting this assertion is presented below.

NATURE OF THE SIP

The SIP's evaluated were complex documents. They were of wide scope and involved three types of analysis. The term scope refers to the breadth of information considered in an analysis. SIP's generally analyzed local, national, and occasionally international-level developments over extended time periods. There is no other document currently in the repertoire of the donor agencies with the SIP's scope. Further, SIP's based their strategy and implementation proposals upon sectoral, institutional and social analyses. No other development agency currently has a document which includes all three of these analyses in the same document. All three types of analysis, as suggested in the introduction to the SIP, are useful for effective development planning. Thus, SIP's

are useful planning and implementation documents. They are unique to the USAID, and give AID missions an ability to control their destiny which other donor missions lack.

SIP SUCCESS RATINGS

Table 3:1 summarizes the success of the individual SIP's. The following points are relevant to the overall success of the evaluated documents:

A. SIP to SOW Conformity

All SIP's were judged to have successful C_{sow} and TC_{sow} rates. SIP contractors, thus, conformed to a satisfactory degree to the scopes of work of their contracts.

B. Comprehensiveness

All SIP's were judged as comprehensive in that they discussed "many" socio-economic institutions. Only 50% of the SIP's, however, were seen to be "comprehensive enough".

C. Descriptive and Analytic Quality

Eighty-two percent of the SIP's were rated as descriptively successful. This was not the case with analysis, where only about 27% of the SIP's were successful.

D. Coherence

Sixty-three percent of the SIP's were coherent.

E. Relevance to Development Programming

All the SIP's were evaluated as having recommended a successful number of interventions. However, only about 36% convinced the evaluator of the importance of their proposed interventions.

Table 3:1. Assessment of SIP Quality

Name of SIP	SIP to SOW CONFORMITY		Comprehensiveness		Description & Analysis		Coherence	Program Relevance		Percentage of SIP's. Categories Judged Successful
	SOW Conformity Rate	Total Conformity Rate	SIP Comprehensiveness	Comprehensive Enough	Descriptive Quality	Analytic Quality		# of Inter-ventions	Importance of Inter-ventions	
AFRICA										
Kenya	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	100%
Niger	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	89%
Somalia	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	89%
Uganda	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	67%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	50%	100%	75%	75%	100%	75%	86%
CARIBBEAN & LATIN AMERICA										
E. Caribbean	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	89%
Ecuador	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	44%
Honduras	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	67%
Jamaica	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	55%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	25%	50%	0%	75%	100%	25%	64%
MIDDLE EAST										
Oman	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	78%
Yemen	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	67%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%		0%	50%	100%	0%	73%
OTHER										
Philippines	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	67%
Haiti	Cannot be evaluated as a SIP because the document is a project planning paper.									
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	45%	82%	27%	-	100%	36%	74%

F. Geography Distribution of Success

The African SIP's were rated as successful in 86% of the criteria upon which they were reviewed. The three most successful SIP's were those of Kenya, Niger and Somalia. Only they, among all SIP's, were rated as being both of some analytic distinction and able to convince their readers of the importance of their interventions.

G. Overall Success Rate

The SIP's as a whole were judged to have been successful in 74% of the activities upon which they were evaluated. Judged in their entirety, the SIP's are a remarkably successful set of development documents.

FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS

SIP success may be thought of as controlled by the factors of SIP production. The more of these factors a SIP controlled, and the more effectively they were utilized, the greater its success. The factors of SIP production are "land" -- in the form of the raw amounts of information available about a country; "capital" -- in the form of scientific and development expertise concerning a particular nation that members of a SIP team possessed; and "labor" -- in the form of the amount of time a team had to perform its chores. The following six factors affected the amount and effectiveness of a SIP team's capital and labor:

1. Time: The contracts which the SIP teams signed generally allowed them far too little time in which to perform their responsibilities. There was far too little start-up time, and almost no analysis time. This meant that literature could not be surveyed adequately prior to the team's departure for the field,

and that information collected while in the field could not thoroughly be analyzed. Professional field research cannot be performed in the Third World in less than 18 months. Most SIP's did not, and should not, require fieldwork. Rather they largely involve analysis of published and unpublished secondary sources. A highly skilled SIP team may perform such analysis in about nine months.

2. Team Quality: The best SIP's had the best teams. Each nation for which a SIP was drafted has a pool of experienced analysts with both scientific and development experience. The Africa SIP's were generally able to tap this pool. Such experts exist in the other areas covered in the SIP's, but AID did not tap them. There are more American and Latin American senior social scientists/development experts than is the case for Africa, so it is disappointing and puzzling that not a single such individual was brought into the Latin American and Caribbean SIP's. The quality of SIP teams can save time. Teams with AID, country, and social development literature experience do not have to spend time learning about AID operations, the country they are in, or the literature they are to analyze.

3. Disciplinary Mix: The disciplinary affiliation of a team was probably less important than the quality of the personnel. However, certain types of experts seemed to be less effective. These included persons with primarily psychology or organizational behavior orientations. The most successful teams all included a core of development anthropologists.

4. Funding: The SIP's were underfunded. The major effect of the underfunding was to reduce the quality of the team members and the time they could

work. At least two SIP teams worked beyond the financial resources they were allotted in their contracts.

5. Mission Use of Teams: The quality of certain SIP's was affected by the way the Mission for which the SIP was being created used the SIP team. For example, the Haiti SIP team drafted a perfectly adequate document. It is not, however, by any stretch of the imagination a SIP. Rather, it is a pre-project design document which establishes the rationale for and feasibility of a single project. Thus, the Mission used the SIP team in project design rather than SIP preparation. Missions have perfectly legitimate project design and implementation needs. However, SIP teams cannot do project work and SIP preparation activities at the same time. It is just too much work.

6. Institutions Forming the SIP Teams: Two of the SIP's were performed by teams from more "academic" institutions (e.g., Boston University and the Institute for Development Anthropology). These institutions appear to have known who were the senior development experts for their areas, and were able to recruit them. Some of the less successful SIP's were created by teams put together by institutions with fine track records in project design, evaluation and implementation, but not in the production of analytically complex documents like the SIP.

Thus, it appears that six factors contribute to more successful, and six factors to less successful, SIP's. These factors are:

MORE SUCCESSFUL SIP'S

1. Sufficient time
2. SIP team includes senior social scientists/development practitioners with considerable in-country experience
3. SIP team has good mix of development anthropologists and development economists
4. Adequate funding
5. SIP team asked to perform only SIP-related activities
6. SIP team and document created by an institution with a proven record in complex social development research

LESS SUCCESSFUL SIP'S

- Insufficient time
- SIP team lacks such persons
- SIP team lacks both development anthropologists and economists
- Inadequate funding
- SIP team asked to include non-SIP related activities
- SIP team and document created by an institution with no such experience

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following issues should be considered when planning further institutionalization of the SIP Program.

1. Time Frame

SIP teams must be allowed sufficient time to perform their activities. In general the less that is known about a nation, the more complex the nation and the greater the USAID's perceived need to formulate its strategy and program, the more time that should be spent upon the SIP.

2. Team Experience

SIP teams should include experienced social scientists/development practitioners who possess very considerable in-country experience and language

capabilities. Experienced scientists are ones who, by virtue of their publication records and their employment experience, are recognized by their peers to be authorities on the countries in which they are asked to create SIP's. Experienced scientists should also possess research team management skills.

3. Team Composition

SIP teams should include a core of social analysts, including development anthropologists. This core would constitute the team's most experienced personnel. Other experts may be added at the discretion of the core's assessment of the personnel requirements needed to create a SIP in the nation of their responsibility. These persons would be specialists in an area that demands analysis in a particular country (e.g., population in Kenya; livestock in Niger, etc.).

4. Funding

SIP teams should have increased funding. Table 3:2 estimates a SIP budget for a team of five over a nine-month period.

Table 3:2. SIP NINE-MONTH BUDGET

Total Personnel		\$95,000
social scientist	\$25,000	
social scientist	25,000	
social scientist	15,000	
social scientist	15,000	
social scientist	15,000	
Travel (including international and in-country)		7,500
Per Diem		7,500
Secretarial Services		1,000
Overhead (40% of total direct costs)		44,000
TOTAL		\$154,000

The estimated \$154,000 cost of a SIP is modest. It assumes that senior and junior personnel will be remunerated at middle-level academic rather than private consulting rates. It further assumes an overhead of only 40% of total direct costs. Such an overhead may be unacceptable to many institutions.

5. SIP Activities

SIP team activities should largely be restricted to SIP activities. This means that while working at a particular mission, they will not undertake lengthy design, evaluation, or implementation responsibilities. However, the quality of a SIP may well increase if SIP team members participate in the Mission's process of formulating development interventions. Conversely, Mission personnel may better appreciate the value of a SIP through participation in its creation. Thus, when a SIP team is at a Mission, its members and Mission personnel may fruitfully participate in each other's activities to the degree that such participation enhances the quality and impact of the SIP.

6. Institutional Affiliation of Teams

SIP teams should be fielded by institutions with proven track records in applied social development. This does not mean that each and every SIP must be the product of a major social development institution. It does mean that those responsible for fielding such teams are reasonably confident that they have fielded the best team that can be secured.

7. SIP Substance, Social Development Analysis and SIP Power

The more successful SIP's tended to have the following substance. They:

- a. Presented models, supported by available evidence, which analyzed the directions in which the entire society was moving. These models, thus, were ones which sought to explore social, as opposed to more

narrowly conceived economic, development.

- b. Tended to conceptualize social development in terms of the institutions that were actors in the change process. These were the institutions whose activities actually implemented social development. Such conceptualization involved the analysis of their performance. Institutional performance involved consideration of how often and how efficiently institutions performed manifest and latent functions.
- d. Tended to conceptualize social development in terms of the groups that were differentially affected by the change process (e.g., that were target populations such as farmers or fisherfolk). Here the analysis sought to establish how, and how much, different changes altered different target populations' consumption levels.
- e. Sought to include in the analysis the full variety of institutions that were change agents, as well as the full variety of target populations that were the change recipients. The full variety of institutions included informal as well as formal economic, political, kin and religious institutions. The full variety of target populations involved disaggregating various target populations into groups that were differentially affected by the change process (i.e., breaking farmers down into different categories defined in terms of the amounts of resources they possessed).
- f. Sought to establish in the analysis two sorts of linkages. First, it sought to demonstrate linkages between the institutions which were actors in the process of change. This meant it sought to show how

the performance of one institution influenced the behavior of another institution or institutions. For example, in many areas applied agricultural research stations pass their findings on to National Ministries of Agriculture, which pass these on to local agricultural services, which in turn pass them on to extension agents. Analysis of the first sort of linkage seeks to establish how the different institutions' performances mutually, and often dynamically, affect the other institutions' performances. Such institutional linkage analysis would show how the activities of the research station acted upon the National Ministry's activities, and how these affected the local agricultural services, etc.

The second sort of analysis sought to demonstrate the linkages between the institutions influencing development and the target populations influenced by it. Here concern is with the farmers who would be using the innovations introduced by extension agents. Here the analysis seeks to show how, and how much, the performance of linked institutions (research station/National Ministry/local agricultural service/extension agents) alter the consumption levels of the target population (the farmers).

The result of such analyses of development are two sorts of understandings:

- a. Understandings of the linkages between target populations and institutions, where the former are being "hurt" by institutional action. "Hurt" is defined to mean a secular decline in a target population's consumption levels. Such understanding depends upon knowledge of how

the performance of linked institutions influences a target population's "hurt".

- b. Understanding of the linkages between the target populations and institutions where the former are being "helped" by institutional actions. "Helped" is defined to mean a secular rise in a target population's consumption levels. Such understanding depends upon knowledge of how the performance of linked institutions influences a target population's "help".

It should be clear that none of the present SIP's completely analyzed the preceding six substantive domains, though the better SIP's sought to work in more of them. It should equally be clear that this type of analysis differs in three major ways from conventional economic analysis of development. First, it makes linked institutions, not individuals, the major unit of analysis. Second, it explicitly demonstrates relationships between change agents (linked institutions) and the recipients of change (target populations). Third, it is broader in scope, looking at all relevant institutional linkages between change agents, not just the formal economic institutions that might be presumed to influence rational choice. Thus, it is appropriate to identify analyses operating in the preceding six substantive areas with a distinct label. This might be social development analysis (SDA).

The type of understandings SDA provides gives development planners a tool for deciding between alternative development strategies and tactics. Development strategy is concerned about what to do to whom. Development tactics are about how to do it to them. This is to say strategy is concerned with formulating decisions about upon whom (i.e., what target populations) to concentrate

interventions. It is equally concerned with decisions about the appropriate mix of actions and resources to utilize as interventions. Tactics are concerned with the hurley-burley of project design and implementation. Here decisions concern how to introduce interventions. Social development is concerned with improving the lot of a society's different target populations. This means that in SDA, a better development strategy is one which improves the welfare of more people in more target populations than alternative strategies.

The understanding provided by SDA tells the planner who is being "hurt" by how much, and who is being "helped" by how much. This information allows the planner to select a combination of target populations that are being "hurt" a great deal and "helped" a great deal. This permits the planner to resolve the strategic question of whom to help. Further, the understanding provided by SDA can tell the planner why institutions that are linked to each other perform to "help" or "hurt" target populations. This means that two types of interventions should be attempted. First, for target populations that are being "helped" by institutional activity, the interventions should be to do more of whatever is helping. In this case, what you do is what is working, only more of it. Second, for target populations that are being "hurt" by institutional activity, the interventions should stop whatever is "hurting", and replace it with institutional activities which can help. In this case, what you do is less of what isn't working.

SDA analyzes how linked institutions perform, which includes how they marshal, transmit and utilize different resources required to help target populations. This means that the planner knows what institutions can do what

jobs in the tactical world of project design and implementation. Development tactics in this situation become the selection of the best institution or institutions for the intervention at hand, as well as the improvement of that institution's ability to provide the resources used in intervention.

Thus, SIP's which perform SDA can tell the planner whom to help, what to help with, and how to do it. A Mission with this sort of information is in a better position to formulate strategy and to translate this into a larger, more effective portfolio of projects. It is the SIPs' ability to do SDA which gives them their potential power. SIP teams should be allowed considerable flexibility concerning their document's substance, but in the future, there should be a common substantive and methodological core. However, the more SDA is utilized, the more powerful the SIP.

The following possible actions may facilitate addressing the preceding seven issues.

1. Enlargement of the SIP Working Group: This group has the dual function of maintaining and improving the quality of the SIP program while at the same time promoting its activities. The working group might well consider adding one or two outside members. The rationale for doing so would be similar to that used by trustees of major agencies when they secure outside membership. The working group might well select such individuals on the basis of their possession of a skill which it feels it needs. For example, outside members might be persons with considerable familiarity with social development research.

2. Creation of a SIP Publication Series: A number of the SIP's are of such quality that they are publishable in the private sector. They contribute

in important and at times unique ways to understanding the development process. It is thus recommended that AID establish a fund to publish and distribute its most meritorious SIP's. Publication of SIP's will enhance USAID's visibility and development credibility in ways that will facilitate its actions. SIP's might be selected for publication by the SIP working group with the approval of the AID Missions in the countries whose SIP's have been selected. Strong candidates for publication would be the Kenya, Niger and Somalia SIP's.

3. Creation of a Mission SIP Officer: This direct-hire officer, in addition to other duties, would have responsibility for SIP activities within his or her mission. Specifically, the person would manage the creation of the SIP, and manage its utilization when created. The officer would have responsibility for assuring a compatibility between the SIP and the Mission's CDSS's, PID's and PP's. The officer would be available to assist contract personnel in the utilization of the document during their performance of their missions. The officer would also be available to assist mission and contract personnel involved in implementation activities to utilize the document in these domains. Finally, this officer would be responsible for locating lacunae in the SIP and recommending to the SIP Center means of removing such information gaps. SIP officers might well be program design or rural development personnel.

4. Creation of a Core SIP Substance and Methodology: SIP's should continue to be allowed considerable substantive flexibility. However, it is time that more explicit procedures be formulated specifying a core substance and methodology. Two general types of SIP's might be considered. The first might be a more descriptive document that contains information concerning a

nation's target populations, its development-related institutions, and its developing sectors. The second might be a more analytic document that performs a full-scale social development analysis, and from this analysis derives development strategy and tactics.

5. Institutionalization of SIP Program Management: At present, the SIP working group provides:

- assistance in the selection of SIP teams;
- assistance in the management of SIP teams;
- assistance in the preparation of SIP documents;
- assistance to missions in the use of SIP's in program and project design and implementation.

Further, two additional functions may be imposed. Those of:

- management of the SIP Publication Series;
- management of the creation and updating of documents which specify and teach SIP core substance and methodology.

When the preceding occurs, management of the SIP program will become more onerous. Two options and a compromise are suggested to cope with the increased managerial load.

A more centralized approach would be to place all management functions of the program in the hands of a single unit with expertise in applied social analysis. This unit would be a SIP Center, and like Wisconsin's Land and Tenure Center, be located at some institution of higher learning. It, itself, would not perform all SIP's, but would select the teams that created them and perform all other managerial responsibilities associated with the program. A

more decentralized approach would be to delegate all SIP managerial functions to the Regional Bureau and the individual USAID's. A potential strength of the first approach is that it might result in greater "academic" expertise in the formulation of SIP's. However, this strength is also its weakness. Overly academic exercises rarely address the practical world of development. The greatest value of SIP's comes only if AID learns how to perform them and use them in strategy formulation and in project design and implementation. Thus, one counsels the greatest possible AID participation in the formulation of SIP's. One way of increasing AID participation while retaining social science expertise in the program would be to devolve the major functions of implementing SIP's to the Regional Bureaus and USAID's. The task of creating and updating core substance and methodology could be given to an applied social development analysis group. Finally, the SIP working group would continue as a coordinating committee overseeing the entire program.