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A REVIEW OF THE CRS EMERGENCY PROGRAMME IN TANZANIA
DRAFT

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METHODOLOGY : A SPECIAL NOTE

Due to circumstances beyond our control, it was not possible to carry out the full review of CRS Tanzania's Emergency Programme as had originally been intended. The reasons for this are as follows:-

i) The refusal of the Prime Ministers Office to issue the necessary documentation to enable us to travel outside the capital to visit areas where the Emergency Programme had been run or was still underway. This refusal stemmed from the preoccupation of many Regional and District officials with the Presidential Elections scheduled for 27th October, some three weeks after our arrival.

ii) Our inability to meet Ministry offficials. This situation was due in part to (i) but apparently also to the nature of the relationship between a senior CRS staff member and officials in the Prime Ministers Office.

iii) The extremely poor state of the filing system in the CRS office which meant that considerable amounts of time were spent searching for key documents, some of which were never found.

iv) Our inability to interview the former Director and Assistant Director who had played such a key role in the Emergency Programme due to their having been transferred to other positions in Africa.

v) The contraction of malaria by one of the consultants.

Though some idea of the actual implementation of the Programme was gained from discussions with church officials and CRS field staff (some of whom very kindly travelled to Dar es Salaam to meet with us), inevitably what follows is less comprehensive and less well researched than the reviews of either Ghana or Lesotho. Nevertheless the study has been written-up using the limited material available, because we feel that several key issues are raised by CRS's experiences during the Tanzanian Emergency Programme, which did not arise in either of the other two countries. In view of the above, we would be particularly grateful to learn of any factual errors or ommissions on our part.

TANZANIA : COUNTRY PROFILE

Tanzania is a large country being equivalent in area to Nigeria or alternatively over half as large again as France or Kenya. Around 90% of its present population of approximately 20 million live in the rural areas. As can be seen from Figure 1 (to be drawn) the population is spread unevenly across the country. The population consists of more than 130 ethnic groups, only one of which (the Sukuma who live in the Shinyanga area) numbers more than 1 million. Approximately one third of the population are Muslim, one third Christian and one third Animist. Despite the potential for a divided society, Tanzania has enjoyed internal peace since Independence in 1961. Though a common language (Swahili) is a strong unifying force, the "people oriented" social policies pursued since Independence have contributed significantly.

The country is divided into 25 administrative regions, of which 20 are on the mainland (see Map) and 5 on the islands of Zannzibar and Pemba. As part of the decentralisation strategy, considerable powers are vested in the Regional and District Authorities (Regional Commisioners are members of the National Assembly). Chama cha Mapinduzi is the only political party, and its structure mirrors that of the Government. Grassroots representation is provided through the election of "Ten Cell Leaders" by every group of ten households in the country. Executive power rests with the President who is chosen by the party and presented to the electorate in a straight yes/no poll. The National Assembly has 203 members, 101 of whom are elected and 92 appointed.

Following President Nyrere's Arusha Declaration in 1967, Tanzania has pursued a policy of socialism and self-reliance coupled with a non-aligned foreign policy. Government control over the economy grew rapidly (there are at present approximately 400 parastatals organisations) and through the Ujamaa villagisation schemes upto 11 million rural people were settled in approximately 800 communal villages. The objective of the villagisation schemes were to alter the settlement patterns so as to make it feasible to provide the rural people with basic services. In some respects the policy has been very successful and Tanzania now boasts the highest adult literacy rates in sub-Saharan Africa as well as the fourth highest life expectancy rates at birth , 52 years according to the World Bank (World Bank 1981). In other respects however the policy has contributed to the poor performance of the Agricultural sector by making farmers live further away from their land.

During the 1970's the economy as a whole grew rapidly, but so limited was base inherited at Independence in 1961 that Tanzania remained within the poorest 25 counties in the world. However this slowed towards the end of the 1970's as a result of the combined effects of the oil price shocks (oil imports cost around 60% of foriegn exchange earnings in 1981) and the beginning of the world recession, the cost of the war to oust the Amin regime

in1979, and increasing economic mismanagement as witnessed by the worsening performance of the parastatals and agriculture. By 1981 GDP was declining and the country was experiencing a severe shortage of foreign exchange (Gross Official Reserves fell to the equivalent of just 2 weeks of imports in 1982). The level of corruption increased and even basic consumer goods were unobtainable. With a chronic shortage of raw materials and spare parts industrial output fell to just 40% of capacity. GDP fell 3.3% in real terms in 1982 and 1.2% in 1983. In 1982 the world Bank halted all its projects following Tanzania's failure to repay outstanding loans and USAID began run down its Development Assistance Programme as a result of Tanzania falling under the Brooke Amendment.

1983 (ie. the year before CRS's Emergency Programme commenced) probably represented the peak of the crisis. In the January a plot to overthrow the Government was uncovered, primarily involving members of the armed forces. In the same month serious divisions emerged over the future of the union between the mainland and Zanzibar. Mainland troops were sent to Zanzibar and several prominent people were detained. In March a campaign was launched aginst "economic saboteurs" to try and reduce corruption and the growth of parallel markets. Police roadblocks increased and movement of goods within the country became increasingly difficult. Though there were hundreds of convictions by the specially created tribunals the campaign was criticised for passing heavy sentences on small offenders whilst having missed the "big fish".

The severity of the economic situation and the political threat it posed, resulted in a fierce debate within the CCM as to whether the answer lay in a stricter adherence to the principles of the Arusha Declaration or in a more liberalised economy. For several years Tanzania had been noisily resisting the IMF's conditions for a US$ 300 million loan but the sweeping changes in the June 1984 budget were clearly directed at bringing the IMF back to the negotiating table and represented a victory for the "liberals" within the party. The measures included a 26% devauation of the shilling to the present rate of Tsh.17 = US$1, increased agricultural producer prices and the removal of subsidies on maize meal and fertiliser). Two months before the budget Edward Sokoine, the popular Prime Minister and ally of President Nyrere was tragically killed in a car crash. The extent to which this event and the worsening food shortages in the north of the country had on the content of the budget can only be guessed at.

In early 1985 President Nyrere announced he would retire following elections to be held in October. His successor is Ali Hassan Mwinyi.

THE CRS/TANZANIA COUNTRY PROGRAMME

CRS has an unusually long involvement in Tanzania, having begun it's operations there in 1964. The scale of CRS's operations in Tanzania has always been modest in comparison with it's operations in other countries in Africa. Thus the tonnages of food distributed under the Regular Programme has apparently never exceeded 7000 metric tons. Though the recent raising of funds for development activities in Africa which do not involve the distribution of PL 480 Title II foods will increasingly render tonnage levels a poor indicator of programme size, it is felt that at least until 1984 tonnages are a relatively fair indicator.

Significantly even these relatively small amounts have in the past been spread between several types of feeding programmes (MCH, Day Care Centres, Community Development / Food for Work and some Institutional Feeding) which were implemented in most regions of the country. Given the large size of the country and the difficulty of travelling between regions, it was inevitable that the Programme would experience problems of monitoring (eg. in 1978 end-use inspections were carried out at only 250 of the total numbers of 931 centres, according to the 1980 AID Audit), and thus of control. The poor control of such a "thinly spread" Programme must have limited its effectiveness so severely as to make it's impact negligible.

In 1980 an AID Audit Report severely criticised the Programe having found that during 1978 and 1979 over US$ 1 milion of Title II commodities which had been received at the ports "could not be accounted for as having arrived at the intended destinations", and threatened to recommend "either a reduction in programme size or a change in the volag administering the programme, unless we are convinced of marked CRS/T management improvement within the next several months." (AID 1980) CRS's eventual response to such criticisms came in 1982 when the scale and coverage of the Programme was drastically reduced to make it more manageable. Under a new Programme Director the following changes were made:-

i) Assisstance to the category of Small-Scale Self-Reliance Projects was terminated and the projects were either closed down or turned over to the project leaders. The three CRS field staff responsible for this category temporarily became end-use checkers working within the Food and Nutrition Section.

ii) The MCH Programme was reduced from 134 centres operating in 16 of the 20 mainland regions to just 37 operated by the Government and missions in the following 8 regions :- Shinyanga, Tabora, Singida, Dodoma, Iringa, Tanga, Morogoro and Dar es Salaam. These 37 centres (which represented only a small proportion of the total number of clinics in these regions) were selected as being "within manageable distances while still being within areas of need" (Annual Narrative Report 1982).

iii) The number of Day Care Centres was reduced from nearly 200 to 59 most of which were located in Dar es Salaam and Tanga Regions. Supervision of the Day Care Centres programme (which curiously had been the responsibility of the Shipping Section) was transferred to the Food and Nutrition Section.

iv) The number of ports used by CRS was reduced from three (Mtwara, Tanga and Dar es Salaam) to just one (Dar es Salaam).

Taken together the above changes represented a major reduction in CRS's Programme. The approved tonnage level was virtually halved from the earlier levels of around 6700 metric tons to just 3500, though during 1983 but in particular 1982 actual distributions fell far short of even this figure. The manner in which the cut-back was carried out caused deep resentment in the areas where the assisstance was ended and for a period (probably lasting at least until the beginning of the Emergency Programme) soured relations between the Catholic Church and CRS. Apparently there was insufficient consultation over the changes and some centres complained of receiving no warning that their food deliveries were going to be stopped.

Nevertheless, from mid-1982 onwards the strategy of "contract and consolidate" gradually began to yield dividends. Under a new Director with an auditing backround the monitoring, control and accountability of the Programme was improved. A Manual of Operations was developed and introduced, and formed the basis of seminars run for all centre operators. A combination of clearer guidelines and the threat of the halting of assisstance if the implementaion and reporting procedures were not followed, resulted in considerable improvements. Deliveries to centres gradually became more regular and the actual amounts of food distributed per beneficiary began to approach the size of the approved ration levels.

Once control of the Programme had been improved, attention was focussed on ways of utilising the development potential offered by the MCH programme in line with the new "Associated Development Activities" (ADA's) initiative. On the reckoning that the existing MCH clinics were not a suitable vehicle for ADA's because; i) their catchment areas were large and they were some distance from many of the villages they served, and ii) in accordance with the Ministry of Health guidelines only underweight children received rations (contrary to CRS's strong prefence that rations should be given to all children in a community), it was decided to test a new scheme known as "Village Based MCH Centres". At these centres all households with children under five years would be included in the Programme and receive rations. The funds collected from the recipients contributions would be used to fund the ADA projects. (Until 1984 the level of the contributions had been fixed at Tsh. 40 per ration. In January 1984 this was increased to Tsh. 80 and then in October to Tsh. 110 following the June 1984 devaluation.)

Approved by ADD?

[illegible]

In conjunction with local government and church officials and following some nutritional suveys 8 villages in Same District (Kilimanjaro Region) and 6 (later increased to 8) in Dodoma Rural (Dodoma Region) were selected for the pilot scheme which was intended to run for two years before being evaluated. Iringa. Apparently Dodoma became involved by default. The normal MCH programme had been temporarily suspended in 1982 following the refusal of the Catholic missions to adhere to the guidelines in the new Manual of Operations. On the understanding that an agreement had been reached, deliveries were resumed in January 1983 whereupon the Dodoma Dioscese said it was "no longer interested" in distributing food through the mission clinics. Anxious to use the food and continue an MCH programme in Dodoma Region where CRS had a long involvement and the need for a continued programme were felt to be great, CRS turned to the Anglican Dioscese of Central Tanganyika to help set up and oversee a new village based scheme.2

Following the selection and training of centre supervisors drawn from their own villages, the new scheme was begun in the first half of 1983. Monthly rations are distributed to all mothers and children in the villages and the weights of the children are recorded. Though the new centres are physically separate from the village dispensaries, close links have apparently been formed with them. Children requiring medical treatment or immunization are refered to the dispensaries or the nearest clinic.

The intention has always been that the funds raised by the recipient contributions would, after paying the wages of the centre supervisors, be used to fund the Associated Development Activities devised in consultation with the mothers. However, due largely to the demands placed upon CRS staff by the Emergency Programme from April 1984 onwards, no ADA projects have been implemented to date as far as we are aware. With the rapid increases in the level of recipient contributions during 1984 (from Tsh 40 to Tsh 80 in the January and from Tsh 80 to Tsh 110 in the October), substantial funds have been built up and we understand that several villages are demanding to see progress on the use of the funds.

2 or 3 very small projects ✓ which have been implemented but not many.

Two further changes which proved of some significance during the implementaion of the Emergency Programme were made during 1983 and 1984. Firstly, in order to provide closer and continous supervision of it's programmes, particularly of the new village based scheme, CRS relocated a Nutrition Supervisor and a Community Development Officer in Dodoma and Same. This policy of "decentralisation" as it is called, is now a central feature of the CRS structure. Secondly, the increased level of recipient contributions, though primarily aimed at reducing CRS's operating defecits in Tanzania, enabled a switch during 1984 from a distribution system which relied heavily on the railways, to one based entirely on the costlier, though significantly more efficient, road transport. The direct delivery of food to the programme centres reduced losses, improved management and was primarily responsible for the increased level of distributions

achieved during the first two quarters of 1984 (see Figure 12).

In summary therefore the Programme had undergone major changes during the years leading upto the 1984/5 Emergency Programme. In order to improve control and accoutability the size and coverage of the Programme had been severely reduced during 1982. This contraction was to remove CRS's operational presence from some of those regions where the Emergency Programme was to be implemented just two years later. Efforts to consolidate the new, smaller Programme during 1983 and early 1984 were resulting in significant improvements in the management and effectiveness of the Programme. However, the process was far from complete when the Emergency Programme began and the Programme was effectively quadrupled in size. Thus many of the new features and methods were less than two years old when they were required to cope with considerable stress. Some, such as the direct delivery of food to centres by trucks had been in operattion only a few months. Inevitably, this was to tell during the implementation of the Emergency Programme.

THE NATURE OF THE EMERGENCY

The food emergency in northern and central parts of Tanzania in 1984/5 was the product of the following factors:-

i) a long term failure of food production to keep pace with population increases,

ii) deficiencies in the 1983/4 rains,

iii) the inability of the internal marketing system to move food from surplus to deficit areas of the country.

Due to the costraints on our work outlined at the beginning of this report, together with the poor quality of the available data, it was not possible for us to fully analyse the relative importance of the above factors in producing the emergency.

The Complexity of the Tanzanian Agricultural System

At the outset, it is important to understand the complexity of the agricultural system in Tanzania, not only to help in trying to understand what actually happened in 1983, but also to assist with later discussions on early warning systems in relation to CRS.

Tanzania has a variety of agroclimates and agroecological zones ranging from semi-arid infertile areas to high rainfall areas with deep and very fertile volcanic soils. Such variety is a product of its location just south of the Equator (which gives some areas a bimodal rainfall distribution and a tendency towards bimodality across the rest of the country), as well as its size and differences in altitude and soil types. Figure 3. is a simplified map of the major agroclimates in Tanzania (from Gommes, 1985).

In the areas of less reliable rainfall farmers adapt to the uncertainty in a variety of ways. Thus in the area occupied by members of the Sukuma tribe (roughly corresponding with Shinyanga Region), farmers frequently phase the planting of their crops over several months prefering to spread the risk instead of aiming at maximum yields. Figure XX shows for each crop the percentage of the total area sown by month. Such phased planting also has the advantage of spreading the highly seasonal demand for labour and enabling the extension of consumption periods.

As a result of all these factors the picture of the state of the different crops across the country is extremely complex. Thus Figure 4. shows that even for one crop - maize - parts of the country can be engaged in planting whilst others are just completing the harvest.

The FAO Early Warning Project

Despite such complexities, Tanzania possesses a well developed early warning system which is probably the most sophisticated in Black Africa. The system is the result of an FAO project (the

Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Systems Project which was begun in 1976. The system uses a network of over 400 "Rainfall and Crop Reporters" (based on meterological stations, agricultural extension staff and volunteers, notably school teachers) that submit weekly reports on rainfall, crop condition and prices of staples in the local markets. Data analysis is carried out on computers in Dar es Salaam where the information is combined with known information on soil moisture capacities in the different areas and crop yields under different moisture conditions. The results are then combined with estimates of the area planted for each crop as supplied by the District Agricultural Officers. Beginning in March production estimates are made for each District of the country, until the major report on the National Staple Food Supply Projections is published in July at the end of the cropping season.

The great failing of this system is that the crucial information is not made directly available to the donor community. Instead, it is treated as confidential information within the Goverment Ministries. Though we were unable to compare the projections sent to the Ministries for the 1984 harvest with the information provided to the donors by the Prime Minister's Office, it is apparently felt amongst the donor community that that they bore little relation to each other and that the Goverment requested more than was justified by the aggregate production data. In part the Governments sensitivity over the information provided by the FAO project stems from an episode some years ago when the former Project Leader felt the Goverment was not acting on a warning issued by the project and gave details to Western journalists. Apparently the FAO are confident that the Government will gradually become willing to share the data more freely.

Declining Food Production

Prior to the severe droughts of 1973/4 and 1974/5, food crop production was more or less in balance with demand, seasonal variations either permitted exports or necessitated limited imports. Since then production has failed to keep pace with the population growth. The World Bank estimate that over the period 1969-71 to 1977-79 food production declined in per capita terms at the average annual rate of 1.5% (World Bank 1981). The likely causes of this are several:-

i) The real prices paid to producers by the National Milling Corporation have been allowed to decline since 1970.

ii) Government expenditure on the agricultural sector was stagnant in real terms between 1976 and 1982 (though between 1982-4 the proportion of the Development Budget directed to agriculture was doubled from 12% to 24%). According to the World Bank (1984) only 10% of expenditure over this period was directed towards raising agricultural production, the remainder going to parastatals to expand their capacity, replace equipment and develop new activities.

iii) The shortage of foreign exchange and the reduced capacity

of domestic industry reduced the availability of even basic consumer goods in the country and thereby one of the main incentives for peasant farmers to produce a surplus.

In response to factors i) and ii) an increasing (though unknown) proportion of grain producton in Tanzania has been smuggled across to Kenya, Zaire and Zambia to enable the purchase and smuggling back of consumer goods.

The National Food Strategy which was published in 1982 found that though in overall terms sufficient food was produced in normal years to provide the daily calorific requirements of 2420 Kcals, there were wide disparities in avaialbility and types of food between regions. Thus Dodoma, Mwanza, Tabora and Dar es Salaam were found to have large calorie deficits, whilst Iringa, Mbeya and Rukwa had large surplusses

The Grain Marketing System

Until recently all the official purchasing, processing and distribution of the staple grains (maize, rice and wheat) and minor food crops (sorghum, millet, cassava and beans etc) are handled by a single crop parastatal, the National Milling Corporation (NMC). The NMC became a very large corporate entity in Tanzanian terms during the 1970's when, in addition to the above, it became responsible for the importation and distribution of imported grains, the long term strategic storage of food crops as well as a few other food related activities. The wide scope and geographical spread of these operations was not matched by the planning and financial management by the NMC and, squeezed between the conflicting Government policies of trying to maintain producer incentives whilst at the same time holding down the retail prices, the NMC ran up massive defecits. By the end of 1980 its cumulative overdraft facility drawn on the Tanzanian National Bank of Commerce (another parastatal) amounted to T.Shs 2.8 billion - equivalent to five times the producer price of all NMC purchases from peasants in that year (Ellis 1982).

Inevitably, its efficiency declined and together with the unattractive producer prices this resulted in a decline in the amount of food grains marketed through the NMC. Thus whearas the average amount of maize sold to the NMC in 1978 and 1979 was 217,000 mt., the average for 1982 and 1983 was 88,000 mt.. Despite official restrictions the amount of grain traded in informal markets increased, possibly to as much as 75% of the total amount being traded. Often grain entering the market through informal channels found its way across the borders. With urban demand for food grains increasing at 11% per year the Government was becoming increasingly dependent on food aid imports to satisfy the urban requirements.

The 1983/4 Rains

Figure 6. shows the deviation of the actual rainfall from the 30 year average for recording stations in Shinyanga, Mwanza, Kilimanjaro and Dodoma Regions. Unfortunately we only obtained data for one station covering 1984/5. The deficiency of the 1983/4 rains can be seen clearly for all staions except Mpwapwa in Dodoma Region where the average was actually exceeded as the result of very heavy precipitation in May 1984. Given the reports that Maswa was at the centre of the worst affected area of Shinyanga Region, it seems suprising that the 1983/4 rains were only 17% down on the average. However, we were informed by the AgroMeteorologist of the Early Warning Project that this understate the severity of the situation, because the spacing of the rains within each month was particularly poor. The excellent rains of the 1984/5 season in Maswa (especially during November and December 1984 when the first CRS Emergency Programme distributions were made) are also clearly shown in Figure 6..

Figures 7. and 8. show the conditions of maize at the end of March 1984 and 1985 according to the Early Warning Project. As far as we are aware, these maps only became available outside of the government Ministries in late 1985 when a paper explaining the operation of the project was prepared. Gommes 1985. They show the large areas of northern Tanzania in March 1984 where the maize crop condition was classified as either "poor" or "failure". The worst affected areas were large parts of Shinyanga, Mara, Mwanza, Tabora, Kilimanjaro and Arusha Regions together with parts of Singida, Dodoma and Tanga Regions.

According to the March 1985 map in all the above areas except parts of Kilimanjaro and Tanga Regions the maize condition was either "fair" or "good". Even in Kilimanjaro the situation was not unusual, for according to the narrative (Gommes 1985) the very poor crop in the lowlands of Kilimanjaro (an area corresponding roughly with Same District) is very common and should strictly speaking have been shown as an average crop "since the crops dry up, ie. fail, during most years." Of course the fact that the crop condition was good in 1985 does not necessarily mean that production was above average, for this depends on the area planted. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain regional production data over a number of years to establish with any measure of accuracy how "poor" the 1984 harvest was or how "good" the 1985 harvest was.

The Prime Ministers Commission on Drought

Alarmed at the worsening food shortages being reported from the northern Regions, in April 1984 the Prime Minister appointed a Commission to assess the severity of the situation and recommend the measures needed to alleviate it. The Commission submitted its report towards the end of May and during June it was made available to donors on an informal basis. The Commission's estimates of the food defecits in each Region are apparently

regarded as being more accurate than the reports submitted by the District and Regional Agricultural officials. The reason for this is that each year the Agricultural Officials have to plan target production levels for each crop and their reports during the growing season have a tendency to support the "correctness" of their targets rather than expose targets that were "wrongly" fixed.

The Commission estimated the size of the deficit in six of the eight regions as follows:-

	Food Deficit (mt.)	
Mwanza	23,181	
Shinyanga	140,920	
Arusha	49,149	(134,064)
Kilimanjaro	46,274	
Tanga	66,099	
Dodoma	14,261	
TOTAL	339,884	(424,799)

At the time the Commission visited Arusha the rains had not ended and the estimate in brackets was made in case the remainder of the rains were inadequate. According to an AID/Tanzania telex it turned out the rains were poor and that the higher figure "may be more accurate."

As for the situation in the two other Regions the Commission estimated that for Tabora Region there was an approximate balance between the production estimates and the requirements. For Mara Region the Commission estimated that there was a surplus of around 160,000 mt. "provided that no food is traded across the border _into Kenya¿ which is currently rampant."

Though the Commission's report can be criticised for relying too heavily on the food balance sheet approach (thereby ignoring the inequalities of food production and distribution within the districts and regions), stronger criticism can be levelled at the manner in which it was used by the Government as the basis of requests to donors for food aid. Despite the Commission recommending that "in order to arrive at a more realistic national food balance, it is necessary to assess the agricultural performance of the other regions not visited," the Government chose to try and ignore the reports that a good crop was expected from the traditional surplus producing areas in the south west of the country. As can be seen from Figure 8. the condition of the maize crop in most of Rukwa and Mbeya Regions was either "good" or "excellent".

Unfortunately we were unable to obtain accurate information on the size of the surplus, so it is unclear whether it would have been sufficient to cover the deficits in the north. One UN official told us that his agency held the view that the surplus had been sufficient and that "there was no emergency." Though this may have been theoretically correct from a national

aggregate perspective, it ignored the stress that clearly occurred in many parts of the north.

The reasons why the Government appeared to try and play down the size of the surpluses in the south are unclear. It is possible that initially the size of the surplus was not known and the Government tried to "play safe" by requesting food aid. Once the size of the surplus became known it may then have been considered too embarrassing to admit to it. Perhaps the main reason however, concerned the logistical difficulties and high cost of transporting large tonnages from the south to the north. Diesel fuel was chronically in short supply during during 1984 and 1985. The capacity of the NMC to handle such amounts was questionable. Several observers informed us that the costs of transporting a ton of maize from parts of the south were actually higher than the costs of purchasing a ton on the world market and transporting it to Shinyanga. Though, we were unable to verify the accuracy of such assertions, it is interesting to note that the Government did purchase 83,900 mt. of maize from Thailand during 1984.

Even if the state felt itself incapable of transporting the food to the affected areas, many observers agree that, had they been allowed, private traders could have helped move food to the deficit areas where the market prices were between two and three times the price in the surplus areas. Restrictions on the transport of grain between districts were eased to enable the movement of upto 500 kgs. per vehicle, but we heard several reports that some roadblocks refused to implement the new ruling. We understand that at least two other donors were prepared to support the CRS/AID scheme to purchase food in the south and transport it to the affected areas using monetization funds to cover the costs (described in Section 3.), but the Government was reluctant to approve the scheme.

THE SEVERITY OF THE EMERGENCY

Whatever the amount of food available in the south, it is clear to us that for people in many areas of the north, the emergency was very real and it was only right that efforts should have been made to relieve them. Several indicators support this. Cattle sales rose dramatically in Shinyanga during the 1983/4 marketing year. At the Shinyanga District Cattle Auction in 1982/3 some 41,000 cattle were sold, wheras in 1983/4 this rose to 196,000 - an increase of 370% (AID/Tanzania Field Trip Report 9:84). We also heard several reports that large numbers of cattle were moved out of the Shinyanga area during 1984 in search of better grazing and returned in early 1985 following the heavy rains during the November and December of 1984.

Figure 9. shows the average price movements for the main staples in the markets in Mwanza Region monitored by the Crop Monitoring

and Early Warning Project. Apart form the curious trend for cassava (which may have something to do with the fact that reporting only began in September 1984), prices of beans, millet and maize rose significantly from July 1984 until the end of the year. All three peaked between October 1984 and January 1985. The average price of beans increased by about 90% over a period of six months, bulrush millet by some 60% and maize by around 80%. Presumably some markets recorded lower increases than these and some higher.

Unfortunately, information on the change in nutritional status of the population over the period is very poor. As noted earlier the CRS/MCH Programme operated through the Ministry of Health clinics is highly selective, with only those children who are underweight being admitted. Thus our analysis of the Master charts for the MCH centres in Shinyanga reveal no discernable trends. As far as we know, the only continuous data available for an unbiased sample is that produced by the CRS Village Based MCH Centres in Kilimanjaro and Dodoma Regions. UNICEF have recently begun a community based nutritional surveillance programme (which does not involve the distribution of food aid), but this only covers Iringa Region in the south of the country.¿

The graphed line in Figures 10. and 11. show the proportion of children attending two of the CRS village based centres in Dodoma Region who were below 80% of their correct weight-for-age. The histograms show the numbers actually attending each month in order that any sharp fluctuations (possibly because of variations in the availability of food) can be taken into account when interpreting trends in the malnutrition rates. As the centres only began operation in 1983 it took some months for the recording system and thus the data to settle down. The graphed lines show a marked seasonality in malnutrition rates (though this is less clear in 1985 for Handazi) with the peaks occurring between February and June in both villages. In Handazi the peak in 1984 was 62% and in Ngahaleze it was 53%. In Handazi the rates in 1984 were significantly higher than in 1985, though in Ngahaleze the difference is slight. Thus, unfortunately the two villages give a confused picture of how exceptional the conditions during 1984 actually were. Though rates of moderate malnutrition of 50 to 60% are distressingly high, they are not unusual for Tanzania. Indeed, on the basis of all the community surveys carried out in Tanzania since 1964 (see Table 1.), UNICEF estimate that on average the frequency of moderate Protein Energy Malnutrition is 40 - 60% and that for severe PEM is 4 - 6% (UNICEF 1985).

Of course, it should be remembered that though Dodoma was included in the CRS Emergency Programme it is a considerable distance from Shinyanga, which is generally regarded to have been at the centre of the affected area. Under the CRS Nutrition Intervention Programme (NIP), surveys of the nutritional status (weight-for-age) of all children under five years of age were carried out in a number of villages in early 1985. However in the absence of any baseline data on the nutritional status of the

children in these villages from before the food emergency, such "one-off" surveys are of little value, for they are only able to show actual status rather than the much more valuable changes in status. The importance of this distinction was made clearly with the results of the NIP surveys in Shinyanga. In all but one village the proportion of those falling below 80% (weight-for-age) was less than 44%, a figure which CRS/Tanzania was using as a cut-off point for continued NIP food distributions. Though this was less than results from the vilage Based Centres and NIPs in Dodoma, it is possible that the situation in Shinyanga in early 1985 could still have been considerably worse than the pre-emergency situation. Indeed the Tanzanian Food and Nutrition Commission suspect that Shinyanga may well have lower than average rates of malnutrition as a result of the high cattle population and a more varied diet. (Director of Medical Nutrition, personal communication)

A SUMMARY OF CRS'S RESPONSE

Before giving a description of the Programme from a chronological perspective, it would be useful to give some summary statistics of the Programme.

Additional food for emergency distributions was requested from USAID in the third week of May 1984 and, according to the text of the Plan of Operations, was to cover the period from July 1984 until March 1985. Actual distributions commenced in November 1984 and look set to continue (though at a slightly reduced level) until at least December 1985. The "late" start and numerous postponements of the Programme's termination are significant features that will be dealt with at length later.

Emergency distributions have been made in as many as 500 villages (though not necessarily on a continuous and regular basis) in part of, or all of the following eight Regions:- Mwanza, Mara, Shinyanga, Tabora, Arusha, Dodoma, Kilimanjaro and Tanga, (see map in Fig. 2.)

At it's peak which (according to the available records which only go as for as June 1985), seems to have been during January 1985, the Programme was distributing emergency rations to around 110,000 recipients. Of these approximately 40,000 were receiving rations through the expanded MCH Programme and around 70,000 through the General Assisstance Programme. Beginning in February there was an attempt to alter the Programme's emphasis from General Assistance to Nutrition Intervention, which caused deep divisions between CRS and USAID and within CRS itself. For various reasons the altered emphasis was only achieved in a few areas.

The Emergency Programme was almost entirely dependent on resources provided by the US Government through three seperate projects, two of which were Title II food requests (both of which included significant monetization components), and an Emergency Grant from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assisstance (OFDA).

A total of 20,386 mteric tons of Title II food for free distribution was approved and shipped as a result of the two requests, though at least 1600 mt of this amount has been utilised in the Regular Programme. The first request (for 10,386 mt. for free distribution) was submitted in the third week of May 1984 and the first shipment docked at Dar es Salaam in early October (though as can be seen from Figure 13, the first sizeable shipment did not arrive until early November). The second request (for 10,000 mt.) was submitted to USAID in the last week of December 1984 and the entire amount arrived aboard two vessels which docked in the second week of July and the third week of August 1985 (see Fig. 13). As will be shown in a subsequent section the late arrival of these two shipments, or alternatively the fact that a portion of them were not cancelled, is the main reason for the continuation of the Programme beyond it's originally intended completion date.

Each of these two requests also included amounts of vegetable oil which were to be "monetized", ie. sold in Tanzania to raise local currency to cover the additional transport and administrative costs (including the hiring of extra staff) incurred by CRS in distributing the additional tonnages. Under the first request 2000 mt. of crude de-gummed vegetable oil was shipped to Dar es Salaam and monetized. The arrangement raised a total of Tsh 83 million of which Tsh 64 million (equivalent to US$ 3.76 million) was released to CRS. Under the second request 1200 mt. of refined vegetable oil (which was scheduled to arrive during the first week of November 1985), was expected to raise around Tsh 100 million of which CRS had requested some Tsh 70 million (equivalent to US$ 4.1 million). In both instances the arrangements were worked out between USAID and the Government of Tanzania, with little direct involvement of CRS.

The OFDA Request was submitted and approved during September 1984. It provided US$ 1 million which was used to make hard currency purchases of vehicles, spare parts,tyres and fuel. In addition a small, though intelligent and by all accounts successful, injection of funds was made by CRS New York to enable the purchase and transportation of 147 mt. sorghum seeds from Malawi to northern Tanzania during September and October 1984. The seeds were distributed to General Assisstance Programme recipients in Shinyanga and Tabora Regions in time for the start of the "short rains", to help their recovery from the food crisis.

Having given a broad outline of the Programme, it can now be described in more detail. As far as is possible, this will be done from a chronological perspective.

A CHRONOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF CRS'S RESPONSE

According to CRS Tanzania's 1984 Annual Narrative Report, the office in Dar es Salaam began receiving reports of "potentially severe food shortages in the central and northern regions" during January and February. Presumably these were verbal reports because we were unable to find any written reports on the files.[2] In the third week of March CRS sent telegrams to the diocese in the affected areas requesting their "observations of the food situation" in their diocese. During the same week a request for food assisstance in Shinyanga Region was received from the Prime Minister's Office. The letter requested 12,710 mt. of food for emergency distributions to 463,000 people affected in Shinyanga during the period March to June 1984. Ignoring the patent impossibility of being able to procure food to cover this period, CRS used this request and the responses from the various Diocese to warn USAID that,

> "we have received confirmed statements from very reliable sources of the famine situation in a number of affected areas such as the following regions:

Region	Population Affected
Shinyanga	463,000
Tabora	80,000
Same	36,800
Dodoma	40,000

> "Now that we have received an official request from the Government for emergency assistance, we feel that it is our obligation to try and assist them." (CRS files 21:3:84)

A week later CRS also warned the New York office that an Emergency Programme was being prepared.

The Preliminary Assessments

At the beginning of April CRS sent Community Development Officers (CDOs) to the areas that appeared to be the worst affected, to carry out their own assessments of the situation and to gain a clearer idea of the extent of the affected areas and thereby a rough idea of the numbers of people involved. A document prepared by CRS/New York a month earlier (as a means of standardising the information being received from drought affected countries in Africa), was used as the basis for compiling the assessments. The procedure followed in these "preliminary assessments" as they became known, was essentially to start at the top of the Government and Church hierarchies and work down to the District and occassionally divisional and parish levels. At each step the two viewpoints were assessed and where there was a significant difference between them a judgement was made by the CDOs based on their own impressions and experience. On average each assessement of a region took between one and two weeks to carry out.

Obtaining information on food production and deficits was often difficult even though the Prime Minister's Office had requested Regional Authorities to prepare such information in preparation for the visit of the Prime Minister's Commission on Drought. In Shinyanga officials were unwilling to release the data until after the Prime Minister's Commission had made their visit. In other Regions the production estimates were widely regarded as underestimating the severity of the situation in order not to show up the wishful thinking of earlier reports that the areas production targets would be met.

However, on the matter of which areas were experiencing the most problems there was usually general agreement between the church representatives and the government officials. In Shinyanga for instance there was general agreement that the situation was severe in Bariadi, Maswa and Shinyanga Rural Districts. However in Dodoma Region there were significant differences between the Catholic Diocese and the Government over the location of the worst affected areas. Apparently the Diocese said that large parts of Mpwapwa District were severely affected whereas the Government felt that the situation was serious in only one particular Division. In contrast the Government felt that several areas of Kondoa District were badly affected, whereas the Diocese felt that the situation was not abnormal there. On investigating such differences further the CDOs felt that in most cases inadequate information was the cause and that general agreement could be reached if all parties had access to the same information. Nevertheless allowance did have to be made for the inevitable human bias in the information presented to the CDOs, eg. the fact that the Bishop of Dodoma had his Parish in Mpwapwa. However, the most significant difference of opinion was never resolved, and that was in Singida Region where, despite the Diocese feeling that the situation was severe in some parts, the Regional Commisioner refused to acknowledge that there was any need for relief distributions. Apparently at one meeting he spoke of "teaching the peasants a lesson" for not following the extension advice given by the Government. As a result, CRS made no emergency distributions in Singida despite it being featured in much of the initial correspondence and indeed in the first request submitted in May 1984.

The First Request

During the second week of May a three day field trip was made to Shinyanga and Tabora Regions by the CRS and AID Directors accompanied by the regional Food for Peace Officer (FFPO) responsible for Tanzania. Convinced of the need to respond by their own experiences and the assessments prepared by the CDOs, the week following their return saw the final preparation of CRS's request and its submission to AID/Washington. Unlike the procedure normally followed, the request was in the form of a classified telex from AID/Tanzania. CRS did prepare a Plan of Operations and a partially completed AER which were sent to CRS/New York, but the latter was not signed by the AID Director. We assume that this approach resulted from the desire to save

time and from the FFPO's knowledge of how to obtain the rapid approval of requests. If this was the case the technique worked - approval was given just one month after the sending of the telex.

Exactly what happened during the week following the short field trip is not clear. Apparently CRS were wanting to submit a request for a total of 13,386 mt. (10,386 mt. for free distribution and 3,000 mt. of the unrefined vegetable oil for monetization) but the monetization component was reduced to 2,000 mt., possibly as a result of more detailed calculations of the likely costs of the Programme relative to the amount to be raised through the monetization. Futhermore, the 10,386 mt. was divided into two "Tranches" of which 4,761 mt was to be approved and shipped "immediately" for distribution during "the worst lean period, July/August thru (sic) December/January" (AID telex 11:5:84) and the remaining 5,625 mt. to be approved later.

Though in the case of the Tanzania Programme the status of a Tranche seems little different from that of the more commonn Call Forwards, it appears that each Tranche occupies a status mid- way between that of a separate request (which has to go through the whole approval process) and the Call Forward whose approval is virtually certain. We understand that USAID's increasing use of Tranches rather than Call Forwards in Emergency Programmes is intended to retain some degree of barganing power with the agencies actually distributing the food (and thus a greater degree of control), even though the full amount may have received initial approval and been budgetted for. Thus, the telex request from AID/Tanzania to AID/Washington noted CRS's "dissapointment" with the recommendation that immediate approval be given only to the first Tranche of 4,761 mt., but went on:-

> "We believe, however, that at this time, and taking into consideration CRS management and logistics capacities, it is prudent to support only about half of their request initially"
>
> AID/Tanzania 11:5:84

For their part CRS seemed to have accepted this reasoning so fully that their Plan of Operations submitted two weeks later only requested the 4,761 mt. (as well as the 2000 mt. of unrefined vegetable oil) which was referred to as "an initial allocation" of the "proposed emergency request". When CRS did eventually request the balance of 5,625 mt. for distribution between January and May (the request being submitted at the beginning of October in the form of an ordinary letter), "approval" by Washington was unproblematic taking just three weeks.

Expanding the MCH Programme

According to the Plan of Operations submitted by CRS, it was proposed to expand the MCH Programme (both at the village-based centres as well as at the government and mission run clinics) in

the regions of Shinyanga, Tabora and Dodoma and in the district of Same. This was to be achieved through an increase of both the ration size and the numbers of recipients.

Under the Regular Programme each mother admitted to the MCH Programme received a 5 kgs. ration (2 kgs. bulgur, 2 kgs. milk powder and 1 kg. vegetable oil) for herself and a further 5 kgs. ration for upto two children under the age of five. (Those families with more than two children under five were simply treated as if they had two children). Thus each family was receiving either a 10 kgs. or a 15 kgs. ration depending on whether they had one or two children under the age of five. It was proposed to increase this to a "Family Ration" of 27 kgs. (18 kgs. bulgur, 6 kgs. milk powder and 3 kgs. vegetable oil). As will be seen, by the time the Relief Programme got underway it had been decided to distribute a slightly larger ration at all the village-based centres whilst retaining the Family Ration only at the clinic based MCH centres. The larger ration which came to be known as the "Nutrition Intervention Programme ration" (or NIP ration), was a much easier package to handle and distribute, being composed of one sack (22.6 kgs.) of bulgur, 4 kgs. of milk powder and one tin (3.5 kgs.) of vegetable oil.

The Regular MCH Programme in the above areas distributed the smaller non-drought ration to a total of 26,600 recipients. Of these 24,000 were supplied through the village-based centres operating in 8 villages in Dodoma Rural District and 8 villages in Same District. The four clinic-based MCH centres operating in the whole of Shinyanga in early 1984 (a fifth that had previously been supplied but halted distributions for staffing reasons reinstated it's MCH programme at the start of the Relief Programme), supplied only 1,400 recipients. (The population of Shinyanga Region was 1.3 million in 1978). Similarly, the two clinic-based MCH centres in Tabora (increased to three just before the start of the Relief Programme) supplied only 1,200 recipients.

According to the Plan of Operations it was proposed to "double/triple the recipient levels at these centers based on their requests and the capacity to administer such increases". Later it states "CRS/Tanzania proposes to increase its Food and Nutrition program food ration..... for 53,000 recipients". It then set out the proposed increases in recipient levels for each of the four Regions/Districts (Shinyanga, Tabora, Dodoma and Same). It noted that as the 16 village-based centres in Dodoma and Same were "presently operating at their maximum capacity of recipients" (ie. every household with a child under five was already receiving a ration under the Regular Programme), these centres would only benefit from the increase in ration size provided by the "Family Ration". At the four MCH centres in Shinyanga however it was proposed to dramatically increase the recipients from 1,400 to 16,200, together with a further 6,000 recipients at the centre that was just reinstating it's MCH Programme. The largest increase proposed was at Kayusayu which was expected to leap from 500 to 9,000 recipients. Similarly in

the two MCH centres in Tabora an increase from the existing 1,200 recipients to 6,000 was proposed, together with an envisaged 1,200 at the third newly opened centre. In each case the increase was to come from a relaxation of the selection criteria which had been strictly enforced in these centres, together with increased enrolments from the "many mothers of malnourished children who are requesting to enroll in the Food and Nutrition Programme" (Plan of Operations, May 1984).

Significantly, even with the dramatic expansion of the recipient levels in Shinyanga and Tabora the numbers proposed for the expanded MCH Programme totalled 37,470 - a long way short of the 53,000 stated. No indication was given as to how the difference might be accounted for. As it turned out even the figure of 37,470 turned out to be a considerable overestimate. Far from expanding to an envisaged 22,600 recipients the MCH Programme in Shinyanga appears not to have exceeded 9,500. The dramatic increase from 500 to 9,000 recipients at Sayusayu never materialised - the numbers hardly exceeded 1,500. As will be shown later, the (mistaken) impression that the expanded MCH programme was playing a significant role in the Relief Programme was to contribute directly to the later fiasco over the "switch" from the GAP to the NIP.

General Assistance and Food for Work

From the outset it seems to have been clearly recognised by CRS that a substantial part of it's response would have to take place outside it's existing MCH framework, simply because the framework was so thin on the ground in most of the affected areas. By the time of the preparartion of the Plan of Operations it was envisaged that the tonnages distributed through the proposed Food-for-Work and General Assistance Programmes would be almost identical to those to be distributed through the MCH Programme. As it turned out the General Assistance Programme was to form by far the largest component of the whole Programme and Food-for-Work (FFW) was hardly to even feature.

The Plan of Operations requested food for a "limited Food for Work / General Assistance Programme for 26,000 families". No indication was given as to how this figure had been arrived at or how it was to be divded between the affected areas. In the text the proposed ration was to consist of half a sack of maize (11.3 kgs), half a sack of Soy-Fortified-Sorghum-Grits (SFSG) and one tin of vegetable oil (3.5 kgs.). Three pages later in the text however the breakdown of the tonnages required under the first Tranche (ie. for approximately a four month period) for the FFW/GAP was as follows:-

Bulgur wheat	1,716 mt.
SFSG	300 mt.
Vegetable oil	315 mt.

No explanation was given as to why maize had been dropped and bulgur appeared, nor as to how these apparently unrelated figures had been arrived at. As an AER was never submitted and as the AID telex does not go into the detail of the size of rations and precise numbers of beneficiaries, it is not possible to shed any light on this from other sources.

As to what the FFW activities might be, the Plan of Operations states:-

> "Preliminary discussions with church and government representatives .... have indicated a willingness to program and administer food for work activities. ..... Since priority must be given to rehabilitation of the food supply, CRS will encourage projects which increases water availability, which improves local storage capabilities and which promote the cultivation of drought resistant varieties".

"General assistance," the text continues "will be used to provide relief to those unable to work and to areas where food for work activities are impossible to administer."

PREPARING FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE FOOD

Once the requests had been sent off (the AID telex to Washington and the Plan of Operations to CRS New York), work began on preparing for the arrival of the food. At that point it was thought that the first distributions under the Emergency Programme would be made in August (though several church representatives in the affected areas claim to have been told that they would begin in July). As it was the estimates of the length of time it would take to ship the food proved naively optimistic and because of "unanticipated delays" distributions did not begin in earnest until the November. In some respects this was fortunate because had the food arrived as early as July it is extremely doubtful that CRS could have coped with it.

Preparations for the expansion of the MCH programme took the form of visits to the centres by Food and Nutrition Section supervisors (whose numbers had been increased from two to four at the beginning of the year), and the running of short seminars for the centre staff.

Preparations for the setting up of the FFW/GAP programme were much more involved and time consuming, for it meant setting up organisational structures to administer the distributions and to select the recipients of the food, virtually from scratch. As during the Preliminary Assessments, the CDO's visited church representatives and government officials at the regional level and worked down. This time the purpose of the discussions were several:-

i) to explain the Emergency Programme that CRS was intending to implement,

ii) to outline how the church and government could assist in the implementation of the Programme,

iii) to agree on exactly which villages should receive food,

and iv) to discuss procedures for the selection of those households most in need of assistance.

Initially, the main efforts of the CDOs were concentrated on the three affected districts of Shinyanga and the adjacent Igunga district in Tabora. This was partly because these were felt to be the most seriously affected areas and partly because the coverage of the few MCH centres in these areas was so scanty. Because it was the first area where all the potential implementation problems of the FFW/GA Programme had to be addressed, the document that resulted from the process "The Shinyanga and Tabora Distribution Plan" (September 1984) immediately became the model to be followed by CDOs working in other areas.

The methodology used to identify the worst affected areas and within these areas the particular villages to be supplied, built on that used in the Preliminary Assessments, ie. of working down the church and government hierarchies, reducing the area of investigation at each stage and continually using each of the two sources to check the validity of the other. This time as many of the affected villages as possible were vsited to make a direct assessment. As well as meeting with local parish priests and village leaders, a few farming households were visited by the CDOs to inspect their grain stores and their fields and to discuss with them how they were coping with the situation. In a few instances the 'poorest' or the 'worst affected' households were sought out so as to gain some idea of how serious the situation was. Apparently on occasion the CDOs would also visit villages which had not been judged to be badly affected, in order cross-check the judgement of the officials. In this way a total of 264 villages were selected in Shinyanga and Tabora to receive food distributions under FFW/GAP. Of these apparently 126 were visited by CRS staff.

Having identified the villages to receive food, the Programme was explained to the village leaders and when possible to parish priests. They were asked to draw up lists of "needy people" (in fact the Swahili term generally used was "Wasiojiweza" which literally translated means "those without means"). The need to be strict in selecting the recipients was continually stressed, because the CDO's had by June been given ceilings for the maximum number of recipients that could be admitted to the General Assistance Programme in each region. These ceilings were simply a breakdown of the figure of 26,000 which had been approved in June, ie. Shinyanga 10,000, Dodoma 6,000, Tabora 8,000 and Same 2,000.

Where both the church and the village authorities had drawn up separate lists, they were compared and where there were differences the justification for the inclusion or exclusion of a particular household was discussed. This process was a valuable check on the tendency for those drawing the lists to show favour to certain individuals or groups in an area. Though it would be wrong to generalise about the relative strictness of the two groups's interpretation of the term "Wasiojiweza", it is interesting to note that in Dodoma the initial lists prepared by the church were apparently longer and thus "more generous" than those prepared by the local government and Party officials.

Significantly, when the selection processs was eventually completed in those regions that had been given a ceiling, it appears that in every case the numbers selected considerably exceeded the ceiling. Thus in Dodoma where the Government had originally requested assistance for 30,000 families and CRS had stipulated a ceiling of 6,000, the final figure was 12,000. In Shinyanga where the ceiling was set at 10,000 the Distribution Plan produced in October provided for 21,240. At what point in the process it became clear that the ceilings would be dramatically exceeded is not clear, though the CDOs had been well aware of the difficulty of keeping the numbers down since they first began explaining how to select "needy" households to the village and church leaders. As early as August, it appears that some of the villages that had alredy made their selection began requesting to be allowed to increase the list because of the worsening situation and the fact that the food that had been promised to arrive in August (or as early as July in some cases), was not now due until October or November. Apparently the CDOs reffered such requests to the relevant district or regional committee. As for the overall regional figures exceeding the ceilings, the CDOs passed the problem onto the office in Dar es Salaam and to a certain extent seem to have supported the view of the local officials that the best way to deal with the problem was simply to request additional food shipments. How the office regarded this major problem or when approval of the larger numbers was given is not clear, for we were unable to find any correspondece on the files dealing with this issue. What is clear however is that by the end of October the numbers had been tacitly accepted, for the distribution plans were being used by the Shipping Section to begin forwarding the newly arrived emergency food.

Upward pressure on the approved levels of 26,000 GAP households was not only coming from within those areas that had initially been thought to be the "worst affected". From arond May, when the first request was submitted, until the end of the year requests for assistance were received from Mwanza, Mara, Arusha and Tanga Regions. In each case CRS responded positively by sending teams to carry out assessments and in certain cases nutritional surveys. Implicit within this approach was the thinking that if the assessments showed there to be a genuine need then CRS would include the area in the Emergency Programme. Though there were clear signs by October that a second request

for food was needed, it was not until the last week of December that this was submitted.

The idea that the able-bodied would be relieved through food for work projects appears to have been quietly dropped from the Programme at an early stage, as the virtual impossibility of setting up such projects and providing adequate supervision over such a wide area was realised. Indeed one CDO said that the idea had been dropped even before they began explaining the Programme to the regional officials. Apart from some projects in Tanga Region which were only just commencing at the time of our visit (October 1985), food for work projects were apparently only undertaken in one parish in Shinyanga, which earlier in the year had been cited as the the most seriously affected area in the region.

Here road improvement work was begun in September when the priest (by all accounts a rather forceful individual) learnt that the food that was supposed to arrive in July/August would not be available until October or even November. The thinking behind beginning work when there was no food to pay the labourers was that the workers could accumulate food "credits" that would be repaid when the food eventually arrived. In November therefore some workers were "paid" three months rations. Inevitably this original solution to the problem of the late arrival of the food was found unacceptable by CRS, and their relations with this particular priest deteriorated to such an extent that in early 1985 deliveries to the parish were temporarily suspended following a dispute over stock control and his forcible ejection of a CRS staff member from the parish food store.

THE OFDA REQUEST

When in September 1984 the US Congress voted an additional US$ 16 million to OFDA for use in providing logistical support to relief operations in Africa, CRS Tanzania quickly prepared a request for US$ 1 million, which was submitted by the end of September and the agreement signed by the middle of October. The hard currency funds were intended to be used to purchase 8 11-ton lorries for assisting in the movement of food, 5 four-wheel drive light vehicles for use by CRS staff monitoring and supervising the Programme, the importation of tyres and spare parts (which were in desperately short supply in the country) to be sold to the contractors transporting CRS food as an "incentive", and the importation of 400 mt. of diesel and petrol for use in CRS vehicles.

As will be seen later the vehicles have proven extremely valuable, though the tryes, spare parts and fuel were considerably delayed.

THE SEED PURCHASE

During the early stages of the planning of the Emergency Programme some thought had been given to rehabilitation requirements. Over the next few months attention became focussed on the provision of sorghum seeds to farmers in the affected areas in time for planting during the first rains due in October/November. After enquiries showed that procurement of the seeds within Tanzania would be extremely difficult, enquiries were made in neighbouring Malawi with the help of the World Vision office and the National Seed Company was identified as a willing supplier. In September CRS/T received US$ 102,000 from the Africa Drought Fund set up by CRS/NY. The Assisstant Director visited Malawi to finalise arrangements and make the first payments for 142 mt. of white sorghum seeds at the end of September. The trucking operation via Mbeya began in the second week of October.

The bulk of the purchase (101 mt.) was distributed in Shinyanga through the Diocese distribution network. Actual distribution of the seeds had to await the first food distributions in November to ensure that they were not eaten. Each household was given 4kgs. for which they were expected to make a small contribution. By all accounts the seeds were welcomed by the farmers and the particular variety grew well in the good rains that began in November. Though some thought was given to another purchase to be distributed in time for the second half of the rainy season (beginning in February) this never materialised. Three separate purchases were made in Malawi between June and October 1985 of 82 mt. sorghum and 47 mt. of beans, with the intention being to distribute the seeds in time for the start of the November rains. However at the time of our visit in October each of the purchases was still awaiting approval for distribution by the Ministry of Agriculture.

FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS COMMENCE

The first shipments of emergency food arrived at Dar es Salaam during the second week of October when CRS's Regular Programme stocks had reached a very low level (see Figure 12). The first two shipments were of vegetable oil and SFSG and both were less than 300 mt., so it was not until after the arrival of a shipment of 1,600 mt. of bulgur during the second week of November (see Figure 3.) that the trucking of food to the affected areas could begin in earnest. Over the next three month period distributions exceeded the average quarterly distributions for the previous year by some 900% (see Figure 12), though this did include an unrecorded amount of "transfers" to some of the newly opened depots rather than distributions direct to beneficiaries. To achieve this the number of transport companies used by CRS rose from four to 13. Though it was not possible for us to carry out a full objective assessment of the efficiency of the logistics aspects of the Programme, several observers informed us of how they had been impressed by the speed with which the food was

moved through Dar es Salaam and out into the affected areas.

Nevertheless, numerous problems were experienced particularly during the first couple of months. In Shinyanga the first deliveries were consigned directly to the 7 parish distribution centres, but after several trucks had shown up unexpectedly and been unloaded without records being taken, this was quickly altered to a system where the trucks had to report first to the Dioscese in Shinyanga town. In Dodoma the Government rather than the Church was taking the lead role in organising the Relief Programme and had decided that responsibilty should be decentralised to district level officials. The first deliveries of food to Dodoma Rural were consigned directly to the villages without the District Executive Director being informed in advance. Due to a mistake in the Shipping Section food was supplied to 10 villages in one Division rather than the 6 selected and included in the Distribution Plan. The District Executive Director's concern at being responsible for the distributions but not having any control over the consigning of the food, was exacerbated by complaints that the Anglican priests were taking all the credit for getting the food to the district, and may even have been issuing it only to members of the Anglican Church. It was therefore decided that all food should be consigned to a depot in Dodoma town administered jointly by CRS and the Government and that deliveries to the villages from the depot would then be made by trucks hired by the Government. Though the depot initially provided by the government was considered unsuitable by CRS, another consignment of food arrived and was put in the warehouse where it got wet and just over 6 mt. bulgur had to be written off and no more deliveries were made to Dodoma until January when another depot was provided. Even then, deliveries to the villages were held up by a lack of transport which the District officials were having difficulty in hiring. Apparently on more than one occassion the Shipping Section mistakenly sent too much food to Dodoma.

To place CRS's experience in Dodoma Rural in some kind of perspective, it should be mentioned that relations became strained not only over logistics issues, but also over such matters as the forms to be used for keeping the stock records and the setting of the level of the recipient contributions (to be dealt with below). To a certain extent these issues were symptons of the basic difference between CRS and the District officials over who was ultimately in charge of the Programme. however it also appears that personality differences accounted for a good part of the problems in Dodoma Rural, for in the other two Districts of Dodoma Region (Kondoa and Mpwapwa) relations between CRS and the District officials were good.

RECIPIENT CONTRIBUTIONS

During the planning of the Emergency Programme discussions with the Prime Minister's Office had shown the Governments preference

for a nominal fee to be charged for the food in order to discourage recipients from thinking it was purely a hand out. The fee was set at Tsh. 30 for each household's monthly ration with the rider that those households who had no means of paying would be exempted. The funds would be used to pay any of the locally incurred costs such as the hire of ration clerks or the payment of casual labourers to offload the delivery trucks. Any funds remaining would be set aside for use in development activities (though the term "rehabilitaion" was occassionally used in the correspondence) in those villages where the funds were collected.

Though most areas adhered to the Tsh. 30 fee, the District Executive Director in Dodoma Rural unilaterally set the rate at Tsh. 100 per ration and later when the Nutrition Intervention Programme was initiated with its additional 4 kgs. of powdered milk the fee was increased to Tsh. 130. In neighbouring Mpwapwa the rate was initially set at Tsh. 30 but later reduced to Tsh. 25. In Same district the rate was set at Tsh. for the GAP ration and Tsh. 60 for the NIP ration.

The way in which the funds were collected, held and used varied widely. In areas where the Church was managing the distributions, the funds appear to have been held initially at the parish centres and then later in bank accounts of the Diocese. Whilst in Shinyanga the accounting of the funds appears (from what little we heard) to have been satisfactory, in Arusha the funds were used (without authorisation being given by CRS) by the Diocese to purchase a total of six tractors, two milling machines, an oil press and apparently a second hand lorry. Because the funds were not being used "for development activities" and because of reports that the funds were not being properly accounted for, CRS suspended deliveries of food to the Diocese in October 1985, pending an audit of the funds. In Same the funds were held by the District Council who undertook to use them for funding development activities in the villages, though the status of these activities was not known.

Apparently it was not until towards the end of 1984 when the USAID Food Monitor began touring the feeding centres that AID learnt that recipients were being asked to pay a fee on the relief food. They felt that this was quite contrary to the terms under which AID had approved the food "for distribution free of charge". They were also concerned that the contributions were being used to pay for some transport and other costs which in theory were already covered by the Monetization Agreement. The fact that CRS would be able to fund some of it's future development activities from funds raised through the "sale" of relief food irritated them. Though the issue was discussed on several occassions with CRS it has not been resolved to date. However, so as to ensure the safety of the funds in early 1985 CRS requested that all the funds be sent to Dar es Salaam where they would be held in a CRS account. By the end of September 1985 the account only held Tsh. 865,000, which is only a small fraction of the Tsh. 25 million that CRS had expected to

raise through the contributions.

THE SECOND REQUEST

At the beginning of December the CRS Director left for one months leave (which included a stopover in New York to brief Head Office staff on the progress of the Emergency Programme and other matters). Even though he had discussed the need to submit a second request for food as much as two months before, no attempt had apparently been made to draw up such a request before he left. Whether the Assistant Director was instructed to prepare and submit a second request during his absence is not clear but that is what happened. What is clear is that events during December were to have major repercussions during 1985.

Following the first General Assistance distributions during November in parts of Shinyanga, Tabora, Arusha and Mwanza Regions, the pressure to lengthen the lists of those selected increased as those not on the lists saw that here was a way of getting food. Apparently the Assistant Director approved these requests as they came in during December, together with others that had been awaitng approval for some weeks. Presumably this was done in the knowledge that a second request was about to be submitted.

In mid-December it was discovered that the the Second Quarter Call Forward for the Regular Programme (FY 1985) which should have been submitted in early October had not been submitted. This meant that supplies for the Regular Programme would not be available between February, March and April 1985 and approximately 1,100 mt. of commodities would have to be "borrowed" from the Emergency Programme at a time it seemed increasingly likely that the Emergency Programme supplies themselves would be running low. Though the Assistant Director promptly submitted both the Second and Third Quarter Call Forwards, the next Regular Programme shipment did not arrive until the last day of April (see Figure 3).

The second request was prepared hurriedly and submitted, with some sections written by hand, to USAID at the end of December. It requested a total of 11,000 mt for free distribution and a large monetization of 3,000 mt. of unrefined salad oil the sale of which was expected to raise around Tsh. 132 million (approx. US$ 7.8 million) of which around Tsh. 75 was to be used to purchase some 5,000mt. of food from the "surplus southern regions" of Tanzania for distribution in the north.

The primary justification for this second request was that the initial request had been calculated on the basis of monthly distributions of "approximately 1,150 mts per month to four regions which had been identified as the most seiously affected". However, "approximately 2,500 mts/month are now required for the maintenance of existing distributions in six regions", together with another 2,759 mt/month required to approve additional

requests for assistance. Despite the almost incredible expansion envisaged, very little explanation was given as to why the pre-December expansion which was now being presented as a 'fait accomplit' had been allowed by CRS in the first place, nor why it was so necessary to expand the Programme still further to the scale envisaged.

The "existing distributions" were summarised as follows:

Region	Families	MTs/Month
Shinyanga	29,000	754
Tabora	23,400	608
Dodoma	20,300	527
Arusha	9,050	235
Kilimanjaro	8,350	217
Mwanza	6,000	156
Total	96,100	2,497

The proposed "expanded coverage" to an additional 106,150 recipients was outlined in a similar table.

Region	Families	MTs/Month
Shinyanga	29,000	754
Mara	25,200	655
Singida	15,000	390
Mwanza	14,000	364
Kilimanjaro	13,000	338
Dodoma	5,000	130
Arusha	4,950	128
Total	106,150	2,759

An extraordinary feature of the request and one that was to cause consternation in the CRS/Nairobi, was that the the entire request was aimed at expanding only the GAP/FFW component of the Programme, (despite the fact that hardly any FFW projects were being implemented). Thus all the calculations of the tonnages required assumed the 26 kg. GAP/FFW ration size. No mention was made of any proposals to direct at least some of the expansion towards the MCH component of the Programme.

As for the timing of the distributions, the Plan of Operations envisaged a continuation of the Programme until June in all Regions except Shinyanga and Mwanza where it was intended to halt distributions at the end of April where harvests were "expected" in March. It was assumed that the "expanded coverage" would commence in February. (Presumably the reasoning employed here was that the Programme had been approved to cover a 9 month period and so taking its commencement to be in October it should end in June.) Thus, the total amount of food required from January through until the end of June was estimated to be 22,224 mt. The Plan of Operations saw this amount being met from a variety of

sources according to a complex and extremely tight schedule. According to this schedule all the stocks held in Dar es Salaam would be moved out to the centres and village stores during December to ensure that distributions continued throughout January. During January CRS and USAID would "attempt to purchase 5,000 mts from the surplus southern regions" which would "be used to meet total distribution needs for the month of February". During February it was thought the entire balance from the first request (ie. the second Tranche) would arrive in sufficient time to enable full distributions during March. The 11,000 mt. being requested would "be used for distribution during April, May and June".

It is difficult not to conclude that because the Plan of Operations was making such staggering assumptions that it was no more than an exercise in wishful thinking. It assumed for instance that the innovative and untried purchase of large amounts of food in the south could be arranged and transportation begin within 2-3 weeks. This was a virtual impossibility, for even if the monetization were approved immediately (the first monetization was approved four weeks after submission) it was bound to be several more weeks before any financial loan arrangements between USAID and CRS were likely to be approved. Even though it had taken 19 weeks from the submission of the first request to the arrival of the first shipment (23 weeks to the arrival of the first sizeable shipment) the second request assumed it would take less than twelve weeks. To base what was becoming a sizeable and costly Emergency Programme on a tight schedule that made no allowance for delays in any of a series of complex operations was at the very least unrealistic and arguably reckless.

Before USAID submitted the request to AID/Washington, the monetization component was reduced to 2,000 mt. unrefined salad oil and the food component to 11,000 mt. The reasons for this are unclear, but presumably it resulted from a reappraisal of the costs of the in-country food purchase.

Events proved most of the assumptions made in the Plan of Operations schedule to be mistaken. The proposed in-country purchase eventually fell through in February. AID/Washington was predictably (though mistakenly) reluctant to approve the funding of food purchases in a country experiencing a drought and receiving emergency food aid. However it was the Tanzanian Government's apparent unwillingness to admit that there was actually a food surplus in the south of the country that finally killed the proposal, even though CRS and AID had tentatively identified willing suppliers in Rukwa. Nevertheless, to quickly transport 5,000 tons of commodities from Rukwa to the affected areas by road and rail could quite possibly have proved too much for CRS's stretched administrative capacity to bare. Apparently maize and beans were the commodities available in sufficient quantities. It is worth noting that without the gallon (3.5 kg.) of vegetable oil, the locally purchased ration package would have to have been significaltly larger than the AID supplied package

to provide a ration of equivalent calorific value.

Without the need to cover the costs of the in-country purchase, the tonnage of oil to be monetized was reduced to 1,[illegible] mt. In addition the commodity was altered by AID/Washington from the initial unrefined salad oil to the ordinary vegetable oil that could be marketed without any furter refining. This made the arrangements for the monetization simpler (the shipment was consigned directly to a local Consumer Society), and increased the unit value of the oil. Nevertheless it was not until May that Washington gave approval to the arrangement. As will be seen this delay not only caused uncertainty over the funding of the Emergency Programme, but also significantly affected decision-making over the question of when to phase-out the Programme.

Though the first shipment of the Second Tranche did arrive in February, delivery of the full 5,625 mt. was not completed until the last week of May (see Figure 13).

As for the main part of the request, the 10,000 mt. was divided into two Tranches as before and each approved seperately. The first Tranche was approved in the first week of February (5 weeks after submission) and the second in mid-March. Apparently two factors were acting against faster approval. The first was that the telexed request arrived in Washington in the middle of the Christmas holiday period. Even when most of the staff had retuned by the second week of January they were onliged to concentrate almost all of their activities on the needs of the Ethiopian Relief Operation. Inevitably the request from Tanzania suffered.

So what was the effect of all these events on the Programme itself ? Figure 14. shows the total number of recipients through both the GAP/FFW component and the Nutrition Intervention Programme which was introduced during February (to be described later). The number of recipients under the MCH component (both clinic and village based) are not included as we did not gather these figures on a monthly basis. The records of the number of recipients were only available upto June at the time of our visit (in October). It should be noted that the records may not be entirely accurate for we discoverd that some 4,000 recipients were recorded as having received NIP rations during March in Kilimanjaro even though the Nutrition Supervisor for the area stated that the first NIP distributions did not commence until the July.

As can be seen from the graph, the number of recipients during December was 36,000 even though the Plan of Operations had claimed that "distribution levels.... as of 20 December" were 96,000. The number of recipients peaked during January at a level of just under 73,000. Far from increasing from February onwards to the level of the 202,000 proposed in the Plan of Operations, the numbers dropped below 59,000 in February and then plummeted to just 15,000 in March. The effects of the failure of

the in-country food purchase were felt most severely during March when all stocks were exhausted and only the arrival of the first shipments of the Second Tranche enabled distributions to a handful of villages (see Figure 13). As the balance of the Second Tranche arrival together with the Regular Programme second quarter shipments that CRS/T had "forgotten" to call forward on time, so limited distributions were made, but because this was the only supply of food available the numbers reached were only 28,000 in April and 17,000 in May. During June, the month before the first shipment of the second request arrived, the number of recipients dropped to just 4,000. Though such a low figure would be quite understandable given the numerous delays in the arrival of the second request and the likely exhaustion of the available stocks, it is odd to note that the Commodity Status Report for the end of the second calender quarter (ie. 30th June) shows aproximately 1,900 mt. in store in Dar es Salaam (see Figure 12).

So what did all this mean to the recipients in the affected areas? Obviously, the "expanded coverage" never occurred. Though it is extremely unlikely that all 106,150 of them had actually had their names entered on lists and were expecting to begin receiving rations in the February, it is only reasonble to conclude that a large number of people were very badly let down. Whether any of them were experiencing such severe hardship that CRS's failure to relieve them resulted in their death is impossible to say. It would be reasonable to expect however, that the most severely affected cases had already been included in the Programme before January.

As for those who had already been fortunate enough to receive rations during the "food plentiful" months of November, December and January, the lack of supplies from March until June meant that few of them received any more rations until July when the Programme picked up again. (Unfortunatlely, we are unable to describe or comment upon the Programme after June because of the absence of data.)

In an attempt to show which areas suffered most the number of General Assistance Programme recipients was plotted for each region on a monthly basis. (NIP recipients will be dealt with separately in the next Section). Though it is recognised that distributions in some areas straddled the end of a month so that a single round of distributions is split between two months, some extraordinary fluctuations in the numbers of recipients are revealed (see Figure 15). Thus during the November/December distributions there were some 22,000 recipients in Shinyanga which increased to 36,000 in January and 47,000 in February. Though there were a handful of GAP recipients during April, May and June, the General Asistance Programme was effectively halted at the end of February. Similarly there appear to have only been three distributions in Tabora where the Programme ended at the end of January. In Mwanza, recipient numbers were around 2,500 in November, 7,000 in December and 8,000 in January. Though no distributions were made in either March, May or June, approximately 15,000 households received a ration in April. Even

If we make the generous assumption that there was a "core" group of recipients who always received their rations first, at best it seems that the lucky ones received a CRS GAP ration on only three or maybe four occassions over the 9 month period that was originally to have been covered by the Programme. For the unlucky ones not in the "core" of recipients, most probably only received a ration once or maybe twice over this period.

THE NIP AND GAP CONTROVERSY

As noted earlier, the staff in the Regional Office in Nairobi were taken aback when they received a copy of the second request (a week after the request had been telexed to Washington by AID/T) by the proposed scale of the GAP/FFW component of the Programme. Until then they had believed that the division of the Emergency Programme recipients between the MCH and the GAP/FFW was roughly of the order of 53,000 and 26,000 as had been stated in the first request. Now they were being told that the GAP/FFW numbers were already 96,000 and it was proposed to increase this to 202,000, whereas no mention was being made of the status or requirements of the MCH Programme. With most of their available staff resources focussed on the rapidly expanding Emergency Programme in Ethiopia, their response was to "hire-in" the services of a CRS employee who had previously worked in the CRS/T Programme and was shortly to move from the New York office to the Public Health/Emergencies post in the nascent regional office in Dakar. Her Terms of Reference were to i) determine the magnitude of the food defecits in the affected area, ii) assess the present and planned Emergency Programme interventions for their appropriateness, and iii) assess the programming and management effectiveness of the present emergency activities. She visited Tanzania for a three week period beginning in mid-January and submitted her report to Nairobi at the beginning of March.

Whether she had been briefed to start the process of altering the Programme's emphasis from GAP to NIP, or whether she had been given permission to begin implementing her findings before reporting back to Nairobi is not known. Nevertheless, within just a few days of arriving in the country she was touring the affected areas accompanied by the Head of the Nutrition Section and the Office Manager (apparently taken along because of her good contacts amongst senior Regional Officials), and was apparently informing Church and Government officials that CRS would shortly begin replacing its General Assistance distributions with Nutrition Intervention distributions.

In her report she recommended the need to prioritise and introduce NIPs as soon as possible. She criticised the GAP focuss of the Programme as being ineffective because:-

i) it was not producing any nutritional data that could validate the severity of the situation in a given area or particular village,

ii) it had become spread over too wide an area with the

result that those communities with the greatest needs were receiving insufficient resources,

iii) it had proved difficult to control because of the lack of clearly defined responsibilities of those in charge of the distributions and through the failure to introduce ration cards.

It was apparent to us that there was considerable confusion at the time as to exactly what is meant by a Nutrition Intervention Programme. To some it takes place at an MCH centre serving villages within its catchement area, to others it takes place in each village. Again, to some it is a long term intervention within a village indistinguishable from a village-based MCH, to others it lasts only as long as the Emergency Programme, whilst to others it is simply a means of carrying out a one-off nutritional survey of a community. Nevertheless, for present purposes the essential difference between GAP and NIP can be described as follows:- GAP gives a food package to a household which has been selected using subjective assessments of "need" and irrespective of whether the household has children in the vulnerable age group of 0-5 years. NIP on the other hand gives the same food package together with 4 kgs of milk powder to all households in a village with children in the 0-5 age group, whilst at the same time monitoring the nutritional status of the children.

On returning to Dar es Salaam a meeting was held with AID/T officials (including the Mission Director) to explain the change in the Programme. It was explained that those households who did not have children in the 0-5 age group but who were considered to be in great need would continue to receive a GAP ration. It was further explained that the changeover would, according to AID's understanding, "go into effect immediately on receipt of the next emergency shipments expected at the end of February". (AID letter to CRS/T dated 13:2: 85). This same letter continued:-

> "We have serious reservations about immediate implementation of NIP in Shinyanga and Igunga where a system of distribution has been set up using missions and existing village organizations. We are concerned that a structure does not exist within these areas to handle NIP. You mentioned only four MCH centres, as contrasted to the present thirteen distribution centres serving 264 villages in Shinyanga and Igunga.
>
> "We are further concerned that implementation of NIP will deplete emergency food supplies faster than planned, which woukd mean that the 10,000 mts. we asked for in December might not be sufficient.

The letter requested details of CRS's plans to implement NIP in Shinyanga and Igunga, and in order to estimate the food requirements of the NIP figures on proposed NIP recipient levels and period covered by the programme were also requested. It ended:-

"It is important that we have this information prior to your beginning implementation of the NIP so as to properly assess your proposed changes in the emergency assistance programme" (AID/T 13:2:85)

This position was reaffirmed two weeks later when the Regional Food for Peace officer visited Tanzania. CRS/T never replied to the AID letter.

In March the AID Food Monitor (who had been hired in December 1984 specifically to monitor the use of the Title II donations to the Emergency Programme) discovered on a field trip that the NIP had begun in Bodami and in Shinyanga where the Diocesean Famine Relief Coordinator had written to all parishes at the end of February explaining that "CRS is moving from GAP to the more permanent NIP".

At the beginning of April a meeting was held in Nairobi to resolve the issue. It was attended by the regional Food for Peace official and the relevant senior staff from AID/T, CRS/T and CRS/Nairobi. By all accounts the meeting was heated. CRS/Nairobi's position could be summarised along the following lines:-

i) that it was a central tenet of CRS' philosophy that food should be targetted to children in the 0-5 age group because of their greater vulnerability,
ii) that the Programme had originally intended to only allocate approximately one third of the emergency food supplies to the GAP/FFW component with the rest going to the child targetted MCH component,
iii) that AID was becoming too involved in decisions that were CRS's responsibility

In contrast USAID and Food for Peace's position was more or less as follows:-

i) that it had taken several months to set up the GAP and that it was unwise and possibly disruptive to make such a major programme change in the middle of its implementation,
ii) that the requirements of the NIP (in terms of staff, food supplies and organisational structures) had not been adequately thought through,
iii) that giving rations to all households in a village with children in the 0-5 age group was "untargetted" and therefore wasteful of scarce food resources,
iv) that as USAID were providing CRS with virtually all the food and financial resources being used in the Programme, they were justified in involving themselves in major programming issues.

The meeting resolved little apart from agreeing that the CRS regional nutritionist should visit Tanzania "to assess the current situation and advise on the most appropriate form of the emergency programme". Though the nutritionist spent almost two

weeks in the country before the end of April, she did not address the GAP/NIP issue "because the Programme was drawing to an end and there seemed little point in continuing the argument if whatever I recommended couldn't be implemented" (personal communication). She therefore worked on issues of the Regular Programme and identifying projects for the Associated Development Activities in Dodoma. Due to a late change in travel arrangements she failed to attend a pre-arranged meeting with AID officials to discuss the GAP/NIP issue.

So what actually happened on the ground with the NIP? Using records of NIP recipient numbers Figure 16. has been drawn showing recipient numbers by region and month. It shows that until June NIP had effectively only been introduced in Shinyanga and Dodoma, though there were apparently 2,500 NIP recipients in Arusha during March. In none of the months did the total number of recipients exceed 10,000. In Shinyanga (were the GAP had reached a maximum of 214 villages) we understand that NIP distributions only took place in a total of 36 villages. The villages were selected on the basis of advice from church and Government officials that these were the villages worst affected by the food emergency, ie. using exactly the same "subjective" criteria that was used a few months earlier to select villages for the GAP distributions. Of these 36, one village received distributions on three consecutive months, eight villages received distributions on two consecutive months. The remaining 27 villages received only one distribution. The reason for not continuing the distributions was that the results of the weight-for-age surveys of the children showed the prevalence of malnutrition in all but one of the villages to be equivalent to, or less than, the national "norm". Even though the "norm" is judged by UNICEF and the Tanzanian Food and Nutrition Commission to be in the 40 - 60% range, CRS used a figure of 44% (of children less than 80% of their correct weight-for-age) as their cut-off. Where this figure appeared from is unclear. Strangely, even though the situation in Shinyanga had improved sufficiently to justify the non-continuation of the NIP, GAP distributions were resumed on a large scale in July, following the arrival of the first shipment of the second request#

In Dodoma Region the NIP has been a more meaningful and consistent programme. In large measure this has been due to the additional experience and personnel resources in the area as a result of the village based MCH centres that had been operating since 1983 in Dodma Rural and late 1984 in Mpwapwa Districts. CRS Nutritional staff were able to use the Centre Operators from the village-based centres to assist in the running of NIP distributions and in particular to supervise the weighing of children. Apparently the prevalence of malnutrition shown by the suveys has been sufficiently high to justify the continuation of the NIP.

In Kilimanjaro Region which also has the benefit of the village-based centres in Same District, the Nutrition Supervisor organised nutritional surveys of all children under-5 years in 23

villages in March, 18 in April, 16 in May and 23 in June. Interestingly this was all done without distributing any food, simply because there was none available. It was only in July that rations were distributed during the surveys.

Clearly, the "switch from GAP to NIP" did not materialise to the extent intended by the Public Health Specialist in February 1985. Indeed it seems to have had suprisingly little impact considering the strength of feelings the issue raised amongst those involved. Why was this so?

The fact that the NIP surveys used weight-for-age measures rather than weight-for-height goes a long way to explaining this. In the absence of baseline information on the pre-emergency nutritional status of the areas, weight-for-age data did not enable the accurate assessment of the degree of nutritional stress being experienced by the communities. The use of the 44% cut-off, was an extremely crude method for differentiating areas of relative need, because it made no allowance for the possibility of regional variations in malnutrition. Thus, the reason why the surveys in Shinyanga showed relatively low prevalence rates could well be attributed to pre-emergency rates substantially lower than the national average. This is a not an unrealistic proposition because of the greater role of livestock products in the diet of the area than elsewhere in the country.

Even though CRS/T Food and Nutrition Section had increased its capacity to oversee the setting-up and implementation of the NIP with the addition of the three new Supervisors (hired using the monetization funds), it was still not sufficient to carry out the task in so many villages over such a large area.

Perhaps more importantly was the apparent lack of support for the idea of a "switch from GAP to NIP" within CRS/T itself. Apart from staff working in the Food and Nutrition Section itself, it seemed that no-one agreed with the proposed change. Perhaps this is best seen in the absurd course of events in Shinyanga, where GAP was continued even though the NIP surveys had "indicated" that there was no justification in continuing food distributions. The staff of the Community Development Section had invested considerable time and effort into selecting the GAP villages and setting-up the distribution system. Inevitably, they resented the sudden appearance of NIP with the clear implication that they had been wrong to place so much effort into the GAP. Though we can only guess at the Director's feelings, he must have felt belittled witnessing the argument between AID and CRS/Nairobi. Though this may be too Machiavelian, it occurred to us that the NIP may have provided the Food and Nutrition Section, whose role in the Emergency Programme had been eclipsed by the rapid growth of the GAP, with a golden opportunity to re-assert its position within the office.

Value Maximization

ENDING THE EMERGENCY PROGRAMME

On returning to Nairobi from Tanzania at the beginning of May 1985 the regional nutritionist recommended that the Nairobi office provide some assistance to Tanzania in planning the gradual end or "phase out" of the Programme, which according to the second request was to happen during June. The newly arrived Regional Resources Manager visited Tanzania and produced her report in mid May. Her assessment of the food situation in the areas where the CRS Programme had been operating and her recommendations on when the Programme should be ended were based on nutritional data from CRS's own records and from the Tanzanian Food and Nutrition Centre, on field reports from CRS staff and information from the FAO Crop Monitoring and Early Warning project. Essentially her recommendatons were that the Programme should continue at a reduced level until September in most areas, though in two districts in Mwanza the Programme should be stopped in May. In the following Districts where the harvest situation was either poor or unclear, or where the prevalence of malnutrition was above the national average, she recommended that the Programme continue until September and that the situation be closely monitored so that if necessary the Programme be continued beyond September:- Dodoma Rural and Kondoa Districts in Dodoma Region, Kwimba District in Mwanza Region, and in Same and Mwanga Districts in Kilimanjaro Region. Due to the poor harvests expected in parts of Tanga region and the high rates of malnutrition recorded by a CRS survey in Lushoto District, she recommended that a FFW programme be provided for around 2,000 households in this area.

On the basis of these recommendations and using estimates of the number of recipients in both the MCH and GAP/NIP components she estimated the monthly food reqirements of the Emergency Programme from May until September. (Given the tremendous fluctuations in the recipient numbers and the fact that the Emergency Programme was operating at a much reduced level at the time of her visit the source of the GAP recipient levels is far from clear.) The calculation of how much additional food was needed simply added the monthly requirements together and then subtracted the existing stocks, which yielded a requirement of 4,909 mt. grains, 1,276 mt. powdered milk and 651 mt. vegetable oil. Such a method of course assumed that the additional requirement would be immediately available. At the time of her visit the first shipment of the second request was apparently due in June and the second shortly after. As it turned out the first shipment didn't arrive until mid-July and the second until mid-August (see Figure 13). Due to the size of the two shipments both of which were more than twice the size of any previous shipment they took considerably longer to unload and necessitated the recall to Dar es Salaam of the OFDA funded trucks. This was to render her schedule for the phase out redundant, or at best move it back by over two months.

Shortly before the Regional Resource Manager's visit, CRS/T had submitted the Regular Programme's Fourth Quarter Call Forward for

approximatley 1,600 mt. to AID/T for their concurrence, which usually is given automatically. On this occassion however AID/T refused to support the Call Forward on the grounds that with the second request due in June, CRS was in danger of receiving more food than it required until the end of the year and that the 1,600 mt. could be drawn from the second request. The reason that it was the Regular Programme's supplies that were being cut and not a portion of the second request, was apparently that the second monetization had by then still not been approved and it was feared that if part of the second request was cancelled it might threaten the approval of the monetization. The FFP raised the point that this method might create problems for CRS in the future when its failure to fully utilise its FY 1985 Regular Programme approved tonnages might be used by AID/T to hold down the size of the Programme. Nevertheless, it was agreed that apart from the powdered milk component of the Call Forward which was required by the NIP, the rest of the Call Forward could be cancelled.

Thus when the Resource Manager's estimate of the additional requirements of the Emergency Programme became known, CRS made the following caculation:-

	9,801	Emergency Programme requirement May to September
minus	2,383	Current inventories

	6,818	
plus	1,600	Transfer from Emergency to Regular Programme

	8,418	

Thus of the 10,000 mt. approved under the second request only 8,418 mt. would be required. CRS therefore requested AID/T to cancel 1,582 mt.

AID/T's initial response was that rather than cancel a portion of the second request CRS should not submit the next Regular Programme Call Forward ie. for the first quarter of FY 1986. CRS agreed and at the end of July (ie. after the arrival of the first shipment of the second request) wrote to CRS/NY explaining that the First Quarter Call Forward would not be submitted "due to the large inventory of emergency relief supplies which can be used for the Regular Programme centers". Accordingly CRS/T submitted the Second Quarter Call Forward (for 1,112 mt.) in the second week of September, just before the Director left to take up a new post in West Africa. At this point AID/T appeared to change their tune and persuaded the newly arrived Director that "it was better to play safe" and make the Call Forward the First rather than the Second. If necessary AID argued, a later Call Forward could be cancelled instead. Thus, by the time of our visit the 1,582 mt. had not in fact been cancelled.

Though the final stock analysis and distribution figures for the the quarter until the ending in September were not availble at the time of our visit, the Shipping Section estimated that as of

30th September the total food stocks were approximately 7,000 mt. (see Figure 12). Thus six months after the Emergency Programme was supposed to have finished according to the text of the first request, or three months after the Programme was supposed to have finished according to the second request, and on the day that the Programme was to have finished according to the recommendation of the Regional Resource Manager, CRS had more than twice the amount of food in stock than it had ever had at any point during the previous five years#

Due to the lack of an upto date distribution plan (see below) and the fact that the recipient status reports were not available after June, it proved impossible to get a clear and comprehensive picture of how the food from the second request was being used, what numbers were receiving rations and, following on from this, how long emergency distributions would continue. For Shinyanga we were able to ascertain that starting in October the Shipping Section was supplying food (590 mt. per month) for 20,060 GAP recipients, which was only slightly below the numbers supplied between November 1984 and January 1985. (It was not clear how many recipients had been supplied during August and September.) Interestingly the document which gave this number envisaged that the 20,060 would continue receiving rations until March 1986.

Beginning in July the AID Food Monitor began pressing CRS to prepare a distribution plan to replace the one prepared by the Regional Resources Manager which was now considered to be inapproriate. Since beginning the job in the previous December the Food Monitor had warned both of the effect of the drought in accentuating "pockets of poverty" in many areas and had tended to be cautious over the extent to which the situation had recovered following the good rains earlier in the year. It is probably fair to say that his analysis of the situation tended to carry more wieght than was justified by the seniority of his position, as a result of his extensive knowledge of Tanzania, fluency in Swahili and the amount of time he was spending travelling in the areas where the Programme was being implemented.

His point in pressing for a revised distribution plan, was that the late arrival of the second shipment called not just for its distribution to begin and end a couple of months later than planned, but for a complete reappraisal of how it could be most effectively used. In his opinion the reappraisal would have to take account of the continuing need for assistance in some areas and the approach of the "hungry season" lasting from November through to March. To simply begin the plan prepared by the Regional Resources Manager in August would mean ending emergency distributions at the end of November just after the start of the "hungry season".

CRS were slow to respond. The Director was very busy, for in June, he had heard that he was to be transferred to West Africa probably during August (later postponed to the end of September), and the Assistant Director who had been transferred in April had still not been replaced. In mid-August (just before the arrival

of the second half of the second shipment) the Food Monitor met with the CRS Nutritionist and an experienced CD and assisted them in the production of a distribution plan that would cover the period from September 1985 until the end of March 1986. The average monthly distribution in this revised plan was [illegible] mt. i.e. approximately 60% of the monthly distributions envisaged by the Regional Resource Manager's plan.

The revised plan never received approval from the Director, who besides being preoccupied with his impending transfer also resented the role of the Food Monitor in the preparation of the plan. Initially AID were told that the plan would be discussed at a meeting of all the field staff to be held in mid-September. After the meeting and just before the Director left, the plan was given to other staff in the office to rework it. At the time of our visit the plan could not be found. Clearly it was not being used, for the Shipping Section was supplying the GAP in Shinyanga with 590 mt. a month compared to the combined GAP/MCH levels of the revised plan of 163 mt.. Neither was the Regional Resource Manager's plan being used, for that had recommended a GAP/MCH level of 416 mt. per month.

Though we had no reason to suspect that the food distributions were not being properly accounted for, in the absence of a distribution plan it is hard not to conclude that at the time of our visit the food distributions were virtually out of control.** With no accurate information on the actual number of recipients, nobody could tell us when the emergency distributions would end, though most CRS staff seemed to think it would be sometime around Christmas. When pressed on the matter the head of the Shipping Section was forced to concede that the Emergency Programme would end "when the food is finished".

THE USE OF RECIPIENT CONTRIBUTIONS

As noted earlier significant (though unknown) amounts of money had been raised through the collection of contributions from recipients of the emergency rations. At the time of our visit the issue of how the remaining funds would be used was emerging as an area of major concern. Approximately Tsh. 15 million had already been raised and before the end of the Programme this is likely to reach Tsh. 25 million. Taking account of the increase in the level of the rate in several areas but especially in Dodoma, as well as the (very) approximate levels of local expenditures on transport and labour costs, it seems likely that around Tsh. 20 million (just over US$ 1.1 million) remains. With

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** Admittedly we were there before the new Director had had sufficient time to grasp exactly what was going on, and more than likely a new distribution plan has since been prepared.

less than Tsh. 1 million held in the CRS account in Dar es Salaam, almost all the funds must remain either in accounts held by Government or Church (depending on the area) at the regional level, in safe boxes at parish centres or even in safe boxes held by village or party officials. Though we do not wish to be unecessarily alarmist, the difficulty in accounting for the amounts actually raised (arising from the variable rates used, the easily altered records of "those unable to pay") and the insecure way in which some of the funds are now held, it would be hardly be suprising if CRS were unable to recover every last Shilling raised during the Emergency Programme.¿

Clearly it is most unlikely that every village that received at least one distribution was informed that the money collected would be used to fund development activities within the village. Nevertheless all the Church and Government officials were given this impression, and inevitably this message will have reached a large number of the 500 or so of the villages involved in the Programme. Before the emergency CRS had deliberatly reduced it's Regular Programme to around 120 MCH and Day Care Centres in 9 Regions. Within this Programme, much of the developmental energies of CRS (ie. the Community Development Section) were focussed on the 20 or so village based MCH centres situated in two areas of Dodoma Region and one area of Kilimanjaro Region. Even if CRS/T retains the additional staff hired to help with the Emergency Programme, the chances of it being able to provide adequate support to development activities in even a quarter of the Emergency Programme villages, must be very slight. If CRS is not to repeat history and allow itself to become hopelessely overextended (as before 1982) it will have to either extricate itself from responsibility for the use of the funds in most of the villages, or retract on it's perceived commitment to the villages and request that all the funds be sent to Dar es Salaam for use on well planned projects in a small number of villages.

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE MONETIZATIONS AND THE OPDA GRANT

The Two Monetizations

As already noted, CRS's was not involved in the handling of the two shipments of oil that were monetized. From the outset USAID had decided that it was much better placed to be responsible for the monetization arrangements, as a result of its previous experience in PL480 Title I shipments. (Due to the Brooke Amendment, the last Title I shipment arrived in 1983). Thus once the amounts to be requested had been agreed between CRS and USAID, all details of the monetization Agreements were worked out between AID and the Ministry of Finance, usually at the forum provided by the PL 480 Committee within the Ministry of Agriculture. The committee which had been formed to agree upon and then monitor the use of Title I funds, was revived especially to arrange the Title II monetizations and then be responsible for approving the disbursement of the funds. CRS attended the committee's meetings when necessary.

With both shipments the pre-agreed sums were paid into a special account controlled by the PL 480 Committee. In the case of the first shipment the entire Tsh. 83 million had to be paid into the account by the consignee (Rajani Industries) on receipt of the vessel's Bill of Lading, whereaswith the second shipment half of the Tsh. 100 million had to be paid by the consignee (Biashara Consumers Society) on receipt of the Transfer Authorization and half within 21 days of receipt of the Bill of Lading.

In order to obtain release of the funds CRS had to submit details of its expenditures to the Committee. Under the first Agreement the uses to which the funds could be put was defined in very broad terms. They "wil be used to pay for i) transport and other costs associated with CRS/Tanzania's emergency food relief program and ii) other drought relief and rehabilitation activities as may be mutually agreed upon in writing by USAID and the Government of Tanzania" (Transfer Authorization, September 1984).

In September 1984 the Committee apparently loaned CRS Tsh, 10 million from some of the unspent Title I funds in its control, in order for CRS to begin hiring staff. Thereafter CRS submitted two seperate budgets supposedly tied to the distribution costs of the two Tranches. The budgets justified expenditures of Tsh. 64 million. Though the Committee had not received the full Tsh. 100 million from the Cooperative Society by the time of our visit, CRS had already submitted two budgets showing expenditures of Tsh. 25 million. Despite submitting the budgets in arears of the "expenditures" claimed, there is theoretically no reason why CRS should encounter any liquidity problems, for it too operates in arears to a large extent (paying transporters after proof of dlivery has been received), and if cash flow problems are perceived then the budgets can be submitted at more regular intervals. An accounting malpractice which presumably had gone

undetected by the Committee and the previous Director was discovered during our visit. Travel advances had repeatedly been given without the retirement of the previous advance. Thus money which may have remained unspent after a field trip and which should have been returned had been counted as an expenditure. The amount of money involved is not known.

In all CRS hired an additional 23 staff using the monetization funds. For the most part the additional staff were drivers (for the vehicles purchased with the OFDA funds) and warehouse clerks. However, there were also three Nutrition supervisors, two Community Development Officers, a Project Coordinator (working in a senior capacity based in the Dar es Salaam office), and a "Drought Information Officer" whose exact function seemed unclear. Whilst most of the additional staff were hired before the end of 1984 (two of the Nutrition Supervisors were hired in mid-August 1984) some were still being hired in July 1985. With the considerable uncertainty at the time of our visit over when the Emergency Programme would end, it was not clear when the additional staff would either be laid-off. The new Progamme Representative was hoping that some of the better staff could be retained after the ending of the Emergency Programme to assist with the implementation of the projects proposed under the new Family Food Security Strategy. The apparent postponemnet in October of the projects by CRS/NY until 1986 and possibly 1987, meant that probably all those hired during the Emergency Programme would have to be laid-off.

The OFDA Grant

The OFDA request was prepared hurriedly in September 1984 following the anouncement of Congress's approval of US$ 16 million for logistical support to relief programmes in Africa. Had these additional funds not become availabe it is doubtful whether CRS/T would have drawn-up and submitted such a request to any alternative funding sources. Whether a figure of around US$ 1 million was suggested to CRS/T by CRS/NY is not clear, but we did hear from a CRS staff member that during the preparation of the request there was some effort "to get it upto a million". The request was based on that submitted to OFDA by CRS/Ghana in 1983. One of the Nutritionists/Emergency Programmers from CRS/Nairobi visited Tanzania specially to assist with the preparation of the request.

The breakdown of the US$ 1 million in the request was as follows:-

500 heavy duty tyres	130,000
Spare parts	330,000
Fuel importation	200,000
Eight 11 ton lorries	280,000
Five 4WD supervision vehicles	60,000
Total	US$ 1,000,000

The request was approved with impressive speed. It was submitted by Telex to CRS/NY in mid-September and thence to AID/Washington along with requests from other CRS Country Programs. Approval was given to CRS/T's request before the end of the month, and the Grant Agreement signed in mid-October.

Shortly after the agreement was signed, CRS/T decided to swap the allocations for spare parts and tyres so that the funds available for spare parts were reduced to US$ 330,000 and that for tyres increased to US$ 330,000. The decision was based on:-
i) the greater availability of spare parts in Tanzania towards the end of the year (as a result of the changes made in foreign exchange regulations in the Government's June Budget) and
ii) the dramatic increase in the number of transporters used by CRS during the November following the arrival of the first large emergency shipment. This made both the purchase of appropriate spare parts for all the vehicles and their equitable distribution between the transporters extremely difficult. It was therefore decided to use the funds solely for the purchase of spare parts for the lorries and supervision vehicles to be provide through the OFDA Grant.

Vehicles
Quotations for the eight lorries (Bedford 11 tonners with steel bodies) and the five four-wheel drive vehicles (Isuzu Troopers) were obtained from suppliers in Kenya with the help of CRS/Nairobi, shortly after the Grant was approved. The Troopers were delivered in November and transferred to the field during December. Delivery of the Bedfords was delayed following a mix-up with the bank in New York over account numbers. The lorries finally arrived in February and began transporting food from regional centres out to the villages and parish centres the following month. Two lorries each were placed under the control of the Church/Government Regional Coordinating Committees in Dodoma, Tabora, Shinyanga and Same/Kilimanjaro.

Tyres
The tyres were intended to be a form of incentive for the transporters working for CRS who had great difficulty in procuring tyres in Tanzania and who often used the excuse of frequent punctures as the reason for delays in deliveries. The tryes were to be sold at cost price using the official exchange rate. This effectively made them several times cheaper than they were on the open market and because they were to be imported would be of better quality than those produced in Tanzania. The amount each transporter could purchase was limited according to a formula of the number of loads carried for CRS. Payment was to be made by deducting the sum from the transporter's outstanding invoices.

In advance of the OFDA Grant 100 tyres were purchased locally and distributed during October 1984 using the monetization funds. Immediately after the approval of the OFDA Grant 125 tyres were ordered in Kenya and were deliverd in February. An order was

then placed with a Brazilian firm to supply [illegible],200 tyres. Although the initial delivery date was to have been June, the shipment had not arrived by October. Due to the method of payment it seems likely that for a substantial period after their eventual delivery payments to transporters will be in the form of tyres rather than from the monetization funds.

Spare Parts

The major order for spare parts was not made until February when all the OFDA vehicles had arrived. It was not clear whether this order had arrived by October, but according to a progress report prepared for OFDA, they had not arrived by the end of June.

Fuel

An order for 300 mt. diesel and 100 mt. petrol was placed with Caltex Tanzania in January 1985 and delivery was made to Dar es Salaam in July. The agreement reached with Caltex was that the fuel could be drawn by CRS vehicles at specified fuel staions in the areas where the Programme was being implemented.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Of the three Emergency Programmes we have reviewed, the Tanzanian Programme of 1984/5 was undoubtedly the one that experienced the most problems. It was implemented by a smallish Country Programme with only partial geographical coverage of a large and complex country. Significantly it had barely re-established itself after a major reorganisation. The centre of the affected area lay outside the areas where the Regular Programme had anything approaching a good coverage. This made it difficult to interpret the confusing reports from the affected areas and meant that CRS had to set up a beneficiary selection and food distribution system virtually from scratch. In doing so it was forced to rely heavily on the Church and local Government structures. The initial division of the proposed Emergency Programme into NIP and GAP was sound, but the estimate of the numbers that could be reached through the existing clinic structure was hopelessely optimistic.

With its subjective selection criteria, the GAP came under tremendous pressure (usually expressed through the Church and local Government) to exceed the recipient ceilings that had been designed in the light of the likely tonnages that would be supplied by AID. With little regard to the limited capacity of the Programme, CRS/T gave in to the pressure and the GAP recipient numbers grew almost uncontrollably. Belatedly a second request for food was submitted, but predictably it arrived too late to sustain continuous supplies to the numbers that CRS had intended to assisst. As a result the Programme almost came to a halt between March and July. Because of a complicated sequence of events the shipment of the second request was allowed to proceed even though it could have been predicted that its late arrival would require the continuation of the Programme for several months longer than had originally been intended, or was apparently recuired by the situation.

Just ten weeks after implementation of the Programme had begun, an attempt was made to begin replacing the GAP with the NIP with its more objective basis. Even though the GAP was severely overstretching the Progamme and an effort to regain control was required, such a major change to a Programme that had taken so much effort to set up was a mistake. It ignored the greater demands it would place on the limited staff capacity and created unnecessary ill-feeling between the Community Development and Food and Nutrition Sections of the office. One of its objectives of providing information on the relative severity of the situation between regions and villages was negated by the use of the weight-for-age rather than the weight-for-height measure. This, combined with the lack of base-line nutritional data and the use of a crude cut-off, has tended to draw the Programme into areas with high levels of chronic malnutrition, but which were less seriously affected by the food emergency. Inevitably this is creating problems of how to stop the Emergency Programme even in areas where the rains have been satisfactory.

Further problems for the transition from the Emergency back to the former Regular Programme have been created by CRS's acceptance of both the Governments desire for the Emergency Programme recipients to make finanacial contributions and the undertaking that the funds would be used to carry out development activities in the areas covered by the Emergency Programme

Immediately prior to the emergency, CRS staff in Tanzania, Nairobi and New York had the impression that the reorganisation had overcome the severe structural problems that the Tanzanian Country Programme had experienced upto 1982. In our opinion the underlying problems remain and these were highlighted by the Emergency Programme. With its limited geographical coverage and its reliance on the Church and Government for its operational support, CRS/T risks a repetition of the cycle that had just been completed before 1984, ie. the Programme becoming overextended with the resulting reduction in effectiveness and accountability, followed by a "contract and consolidate" type of reorganisation. Clearly, the pressures to become overextended are far greater during an Emergency. In our opinion CRS/T is in danger of becoming overextended once again as a result of its mistaken use of the NIP 44% cut-off criteria and the undertakings over the use of the Emergency Programme recipient contributions.

Clearly, if CRS is to retain control of any future Emergency Programmes in Tanzania that are implemented outside its Regular Programme areas, it must be clearer in its objectives and more realistic in its assessment of its own capacity. In order to be able to say "no" to expansion pressures it feels unable to handle, it must begin from a more objective basis. Whether weight-for-height preliminary surveys are the most effective method of providing this basis remains to be seen. The personnel implications of being able to rapidly mount such surveys, as well as the implications for the training of Food and Nutrition Supervisors are significant and will have to be discussed within CRS.

TABLE 1.

PROTEIN-ENERGY MALNUTRITION (WEIGHT-FOR-AGE)
AMONG UNDER-FIVES IN COMMUNITY SURVEYS IN TANZANIA

SOURCE: UNICEF 1985

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		Arusha	[illegible]	[illegible]	not reported
[illegible]	[illegible]		Mara	[illegible]	[illegible]	not reported
[illegible]	[illegible]	January	Lushoto	[illegible]	[illegible]	9
[illegible]	[illegible]	April	Mtwara	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	December	Coast	[illegible]	[illegible]	7
[illegible]	[illegible]	May	Dar es Salaam	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	June	Tanga	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	December	Dodoma	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	May	Iringa	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	June	Morogoro	[illegible]	[illegible]	7
[illegible]	[illegible]	June	Mwanza	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	June	Ruvuma	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	June	Lindi	[illegible]	[illegible]	7
[illegible] (TFC)	[illegible]	January	Mtwara	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	September	Kyela	[illegible]	[illegible]	not reported
[illegible] (TFC)	[illegible]	October	Tarime	[illegible]	[illegible]	not reported
[illegible] (TFC)	[illegible]		Tarime	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] (TFC)	[illegible]	August	Kyela	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	June	Iringa	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	October	Iringa	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	October	Iringa	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	January	Rufiji	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	December	Rufiji	[illegible]	[illegible]	not reported
[illegible]	[illegible]	June	Rufiji	[illegible]	[illegible]	not reported
[illegible]	[illegible]	October	Rufiji	[illegible]	[illegible]	not reported
[illegible] (TFC)	[illegible]	December	Lindi	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] (TFC)	[illegible]	January	Mtwara	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] (TFC)	[illegible]	June	Iringa	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	August	Iringa	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	March-June	Iringa	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	September	10 Districts	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Iringa	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Iringa		[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	October-[illegible]	Iringa	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

FIGURE 1. MAP OF TANZANIA - POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

KEY: ■ OVER 100,000 PERSONS
• 50,000 — 100,000
• LESS THAN 50,000



FIGURE 2. MAP OF TANZANIA - ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS



Fig.3 : A simplified map of the major agroclimates in Tanzania. B: two rainy seasons (Nov./Jan. and March/June), the first of which is very unreliable; W climate is similar to B but significantly wetter due to the influence of lake Victoria; the rainfall distribution of the U-type is also bimodal but out of phase with the other types; C climates have unimodal (Dec/March or April) but very unreliable precipitations; climates of the S type are unimodal and much less variable due to aspect and higher elevations; T climates are intermediate between the B and C types. (after Gommes and Roussiau, 1982).Maize is grown throughout the country while millets, sorghum and sweet potatoes are mostly confined to the T and C climates. Cassava is abundant in the northern T climate and in the southern regions of the country, and bananas in the north (W climate) and KL and MB regions.

PHASED PLANTING IN SUKUMULAND (SHINYANGA)



HISTOGRAMS SHOW PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AREA USED FOR EACH CROP SOWN IN DIFFERENT MONTHS.

SOURCE: VON ROTENHAM 1968 CITED IN ROTHENBERG 1976.

Fig. 5 : Phenology of maize at the end of March 1985. N: no crop in the fields; A: planting; B: vegetative; C: flowering; D: "ready for harvest" or complete maturity; E: harvest ongoing. From March 1985 Farming Weather Bulletin. (FAO CROP MONITORING AND EARLY WARNING PROJECT)



FIG. 6. MONTHLY RAINFALL: AVERAGE COMPARED TO ACTUAL (MPWA SHINYANGA REGION)

SOURCE: CROP MONITORING AND EARLY WARNING PROJECT

ACTUAL — AVERAGE



MPWAPWA VETERINARY - DODOMA REGION



FIGURE 6 (CONTINUED)

NGUGU - ANANZA REGION 1983/4



-26%



-32%

FIGURE 7.

CONDITION OF MAIZE AT THE END OF MARCH 1984



SOURCE: FAO CROP MONITORING AND EARLY WARNING PROJECT

FIGURE 8. CONDITION OF MAIZE AT END OF MARCH 1985

FIGURE 9.

PRICE MOVEMENTS OF BEANS, BULRUSH MILLET, MAIZE AND CASSAVA BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 1983 AND EARLY 1985 IN MWANZA REGION.

SOURCE : FAO CMEWP.

The data are averages from weekly reports to the FAO Project.



FIGURE 10. MALNUTRITION RATES AND ATTENDANCES:

NGAHALEZE VILLAGE BASED MCH CENTRE – DODOMA REGION



FIGURE 11. MALNUTRITION RATES AND ATTENDANCES:
HANDAZI VILLAGE BASED MCH CENTRE – DODOMA REGION



FIG. 12. TONNAGES DISTRIBUTED AND IN STOCK BY CALENDAR QUARTER 1980 – 1985

(SOURCE CRS/T. COMMODITY STATION RETURNS)



FIGURE 13.

SIZE AND SPACING OF SHIPMENTS

(SOURCE CRS/TARZ. SHIPPING LEDGER)




F M A M J J A S O N D J F M
1984

FIGURE 14.

TOTAL NUMBERS OF GAP AND NIP RECIPIENTS BY MONTH

SOURCE CRS/T RECORDS.



FIG 15 GAP - NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS BY REGION



FIG. 16 NIP—NUMBERS OF RECIPIENTS BY REGION



CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES
EMERGENCY PROGRAM PHASE OUT
JANUARY - MAY 1986

Recipient Levels, Food Tonnages Programmed
by Region

DODOMA -	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	TOTAL RATIONS
Recipients					
GAP		2,608	6,831	4,669	14,108
MCH	13,675	13,675	13,675	13,675	54,700
	13,675	16,283	20,506	18,344	68,808
TONS					
GAP		74.3	206.3	141	424.6
MCH	60.4	60.4	60.4	60.4	241.6
TOTAL	60.4	137.7	266.7	201.4	666.2
SHINYANGA					
Recipient Levels					
GAP	5,810	5,710	5,300	5,300	18,020
MCH	10,305	10,305	10,305	10,305	41,220
	16,015	16,015	13,605	13,605	59,240
TONS					
GAP	150	150	86.4	86.4	472.8
MCH	53	53	53	53	212
	203	203	139.4	139.4	684.8

N.B : MCH - Dodoma & Shinyanga. All MCH recipients are receiving the larger emergency ration of 6 kg. of cereal per recipient rather than 2 kg/1 recipient. This additional 4 kg. per recipient plus the full ration of 6 kg cereal, 2 kgs. milk and 1kg for 3155 extra recipients registered only during the emergency is included here as emergency assistance.

MCH - Other Regions. While emergency rations have not continued, the extra recipients served in this program during the emergency will continue to recieve assistance through April. The ration of 2:2:1 is included here as emergency assistance. for the 13431 extra recipients.

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
MARA					
Recipients					
GAP		6565	6565	6565	19767
TONS		173	173	173	519
TANGA					
Recipients					
GAP/FFW		4044	9656	9656	23356
MCH	7455	7455	7455	7455	29820
	7455	11499	17111	17111	53176
TONS					
GAP/FFW		122	290.4	290.4	702.8
MCH	21	21	21.	21	84
	21	143	311.44	311.4	786.8
KILIMANJARO					
Recipients					
GAP		6173	9673		16,046
MCH	3040	3040	3040	3040	12,160
	3040	9213	12913	12913	28206
TONS					
GAP		187	323		510
MCH	15.2	15.2	15.2	15.2	60.8
Total	15.2	202.2	338.2	15.2	570.6

	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	TOTAL
GRAIN					
CAB		9,200	9,200	9,200	27,600
TONS		276	276	276	828
TAROA-Recipients					
MCH	3,840	3,840	3,840	3840	15,360
TONS	19	19	19	19	76
SINGIDA Recipients					
MCH	1926	1926	1926	1926	7704
TONS	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.65	38.4
TOTAL Recipients					
CAP	5710	34324	45449	33414	118897
MCH	40241	40241,	40241	40241	160964
	45951	74565	85690	73655	279861
TONS					
CAP	150	987.3	1357.1	968.8	3463.2
MCH	178.2	178.2	178.2	178.2	712.8
	328.2	1165.5	1535.3	1147.0	4176.0

Total Emergency Tonnage Programmed - 4176 MT

TRANSPORTATION COSTS

A. TRANSPORTATION FROM DAR ES SALAAM TO REGIONS

	MT	EST.RATE/M		T.SHS
DODOMA =	491.6	@ 2,000/MT	=	983,200
SHINYANGA =	491.3	@ 5,000/MT	=	2,456,500
TANGA -	386	@ 1,800/MT	=	694,800
KILIMANJARO -	518.2	@ 2,185/MT	=	1,132,267
ARUSHA -	736	@2,500/MT	=	1,840,000
SINGIDA	38.4	@ 2,800/MT	=	107,600
TOTAL	2,661.6	[illegible]		7,214,567

B. TRANSPORT BETWEEN REGIONS

MARA TO SHINYANGA	24 MT	@ 1,000/MT	24,000
		TOTAL	7,238,567

C. REGIONAL STORES TO DISTRIBUTION POINTS

4174 @ Aug rate T.shs. 2,000/MT — 8,348,000

D.	Warehousing	373,540
E.	Tanga Forwarding Agent	130,555
F.	Rebagging	246,500
G.	Contingency 10%	165,000
	Total T.shs	16,546,909.50

SCOPE OF WORK

CRS/TANZANIA INTERNAL FINANCE AND COMMODITY MANAGEMENT AUDIT

1 BACKGROUND

During 1984-1985, Catholic Relief Services (CRS/T) programming in Tanzania focused primarily on emergency food distribution. From September 1984 - December 1985, approximately 20,168 metric tons of food was distributed for both the regular and emergency programs, throughout 12 regions in Tanzania. Regular programming continued for Day Care, Institutional and Welfare centers. Emergency rations were given to all Maternal-Child Health centers (MCH). Food for Work (FFW), general assistance (GAP) and nutrition intervention programs (NIP) were initiated during the emergency.

As of January 1, 1986 recipient levels were as follows: MCH - 76,636; Day Care - 5,575; Institutions - 2,737; Welfare - 222; GAP/NIP/FFW - 36,538.

Prior to the emergency, approximately 24 national and 2 expatriate staff supported the management of CRS/T's programs. With the onset of the emergency and subsequent additional funding provided by a US government Monetization grant, CRS/T increased its staff by 35.

With a good harvest anticipated in June and July, it is anticipated that emergency programming will be terminated by the end of May. CRS/T will then resume its regular food and nutrition program, based on 1986 approved recipient levels of 74,800 and approximately 4,534 metric tons.

During this emergency program, several problems have developed with regard to financial and commodity management. CRS/T would now like to conduct a review of the program accountability and the management control systems currently in place, to assess the accuracy of past reporting and to evaluate the adequacy of the current systems.

II. CONSULTANCY OBJECTIVES

The broad objectives of this consultancy are as follows:

A. Commodity Management and Accountability

1. To conduct an audit of commodity accountability and management control systems.

2. To re-design the commodity accounting and control systems so that an auditor can readily trace each commodity movement transaction from shipping department reports, through available records and back to source documents, so that all commodities received, distributed or lost (due to damage, infestation, etc.) can be accounted for.

   This system should also enable CRS/T to produce the required monthly and quarterly reports.

3. To train CRS/T staff and assist with the initial implementation of the new system.

B. Financial Management and Accountability

1. To conduct an audit of the financial accountability and management control systems.

2. To re-design the financial accounting and control systems to ensure that an auditor can readily trace all financial transactions from accounting reports, through available records and back to source documents, so that all funds received and disbursed can be accounted for.

   The system designed must be one that will provide the information required to complete monthly financial reports.

3. To train CRS/T staff and assist with the initial implementation of the system.

III. SCOPE OF WORK

A. Statement of Work

The specific activities to be undertaken within the limits of this budget and time frame include: (the period to be covered will be from the onset of emergency programming - September 1, 1984 - up to date of the onset of this consultancy, for both regular and emergency programming).

1. Commodity Management Audit and Systems Analysis -

a. Conduct a general audit of the CRS/T commodity accountability system. The auditor should ensure that the following are included as part of the audit:

(i) Audit all shipping ledgers.

(ii) Trace all ledger entries against supporting documentation.

(iii) Reconcile distributions from Dar-es-Salaam against receipts by up-country warehouses or by centers, as well as distributions from up-country warehouses against receipts by centers (ensure the consistency of units and corresponding unit weights in ledger entries).

(iv) Verify the accuracy of all Commodity Status/Recipient Status reports for the 3rd quarter FY 1984, the 1st through 4th quarters, FY 1985 and the 1st quarter, FY 1986.

Analyze and report on commodity distributions, itemizing the commodities distributed by region, commodity type and quantity (number of units and tonnages), for both the regular and emergency programming.

c. Audit inventory control and reporting procedures for Dar es Salaam and up-country warehouses. Prepare a reconciliation between book and physical inventories. If necessary, send CRS/T staff up-country to verify book against physical inventories.

d. Audit all accounted for and unaccounted for losses and subsequent claims. Prepare a list of all claims outstanding prior to September 1, 1984 plus all claims incurred from September 1, 1984 to date. Itemize who the claim is against, the amount of the claim, amounts collected, amounts outstanding, payments made to and due USAID, payments made to and due CRS/T.

e. Review the current commodity management system, report on the adequacies and inadequacies of the existing system and make recommendations that will ensure that the necessary internal controls are established.

Recommendations should include (but not be limited to):

(i) Specification of the procedures to be followed in accounting for the receipt and distribution of commodities.

(ii) Delineation of the specific responsibilities of each CRS/T shipping department employee in implementing the procedures in (i) above.

(iii) Establishing the appropriate ledger formats and posting procedures.

(iv) Establishing a system that will ensure accessibility to accurate and complete supporting documentation.

(v) Developing a monthly inventory reporting system; establishing an accounting and inventory control system for petrol, spare parts, etc. in Dar-es-Salaam and the field; developing a plan which stipulates the time and CRS/T staffing required to periodically check book versus physical inventories at the center level and in up-country warehouses.

(vi) Developing a system that will ensure timely access to accurate information required for monthly and quarterly reporting.

f. Train CRS/T staff in the initial implementation of the system developed in e, above.

2. Finance Audit and Systems Analysis
(for all local currency and US dollar expenditures).

a) Conduct a general audit of Fund 566, Fund 533, Fund 593, Fund 630.

b) Review the terms of the OFDA and Monetization grants; report on CRS/T's compliance and non-compliance with the grant terms. This review should include (but not be limited to) the following analyses:

i. Review of transport costs

- determine and delineate the amounts paid by centers (from emergency or regular program recipient contributions) or from the monetization grant, for the transport of emergency and regular program commodities (include Title II, clothing, seeds, medicines) etc.

- If data is unavailable in the CRS/T office in Dar-es-Salaam, prepare a plan indicating the action to be taken as well as CRS/T staffing and time required to obtain the information required.

ii. Review of emergency versus regular program costs -

- Analyze reported versus allowable costs incurred, by line item, for the regular and emergency programs. (Refer to the grant terms to determine which costs are chargeable to the monetization grant).

iii. Audit OFDA transport invoices to determine the actual cost deducted from the transportation invoice as reimbursement for spare parts, fuel, etc. This analysis should indicate whether actual cost versus local purchase price + taxes were deducted.

c. Prepare a reconciliation of all field advances and report on outstanding amounts due by individual, diocese, etc.

d. Review emergency and regular program recipient contributions.

i. For each center, determine the contribution requested per recipient and the total amount to be collected during the emergency period (breakdown into regular and emergency portion when applicable).

ii. Using the monthly center reports, report on amounts collected, actual expenses (per line item), amounts remitted to CRS/T, amounts transferred to other agents - e.g. district officials, dioceses, or kept at the center; report on the amounts received, spent and the outstanding balances of funds transferred to other agents. In this analysis, a distinction should be made between regular and emergency program recipient contributions.

iii. Compare reported versus actual balances at centers. (Some verification has already been conducted by the Projects Department).

iv. If information is not available in Dar-es-Salaam, prepare a work plan detailing the actions to be taken to obtain the information, and include the CRS/T staffing and time required to do so.

e. Conduct a review of the current accounting system, report on the adequacies and inadequacies of the existing system, and make recommendations that will ensure that the necessary internal controls are established.

Recommendations should include, but not be limited to:

i. Establishing a system of field financial reporting (non-center reporting).

ii. Developing a system to ensure coordination between the shipping and accounting departments for invoicing centers; establishing a systematic means of accounting for amounts due, amounts received, and outstanding balances due from each center and for issuing collection notices.

iii. Developing a reporting system to account for the eventual use of emergency recipient contributions already collected, for planning and implementing development projects.

iv. Developing a system that will stipulate the time required and CRS/T staffing needed to perform periodic checks of book versus report balances at the center level.

f. Train CRS/T staff in the initial implementation of the system developed in e above.

IV. PERSONNEL

This consultancy is to be completed by 2 consultants, one each for the financial and commodity management audits, with support provided by the CRS/T Country Representative and the assistant to the Country Representative for Resource Management.

V. CONSULTANCY SUPPORT

CRS will cover the following costs:

1. Consultancy fees

2. Travel Expenses - to include hotel room/laundry, perdiem, in-country travel and travel to Dar es Salaam.

3. Administrative Costs + Contingency - A fixed rate to cover costs related to report preparation (expenses such as secretarial services, photo copying, miscellaneous office supplies).

CRS will also provide support in arranging for hotel accommodation and travel.

VI. Time Frame

It is anticipated that the 2 audits will commence at the latest on April 1. The estimated time frame is as follows:

A. Commodity Management Audit

1. 30 days - Conduct audit and systems analysis
2. 15 days - Train CRS/T staff
3. 15 days - Report write-up

B. Finance Audit

1. 30 days - Conduct audit and systems analysis
2. 15 days - Train CRS/T staff
3. 15 days - Report write-up

VII. END PRODUCTS

Each consultant will prepare a written report containing the following:

1. Audit results and recommendations. (To include both strengths and weaknesses).

2. Systems analysis and recommendations for systems modification. (To include both strengths and weaknesses).

3. Details of the training assistance provided to CRS/T staff.