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Development Fund for Africa

Implementing for Results: Executive Summaries of Africa Bureau Project and Non-Project Evaluations, 1987-1989



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IMPLEMENTING FOR RESULTS:

Executive Summaries of Africa Bureau Project and Non-project Evaluations, 1987 - 1989

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PREFACE

The importance of regular monitoring and evaluation to A.I.D.'s management of development assistance cannot be understated.

-- A.I.D. is responsible for ensuring that its assistance to Africa is as effective as possible. This involves looking both at the efficiency with which A.I.D. funds are channelled to recipients and at the impact that these funds have on people's lives.

-- The Agency has limited resources with which it can solve problems and it must be constantly searching for the best way to apply those resources.

-- There are lessons to be learned that can only be derived directly from experience. Theories will be refined or disproved and implementation methods will be tested and modified so as to avoid undesirable effects in the future.

Learning and applying lessons of experience, however, is difficult when a massive amount of information is available. This summary of the approximately seventy project and non-project evaluations undertaken by the Bureau during the past three years seeks to minimize this problem by making the evaluation findings much more accessible to the busy managers and designers in the field as well as here in Washington. To facilitate comparisons and the rapid identification of relevant findings and recommendations by the users of this volume, the summaries have been grouped by Strategic Objective as they appear in the Bureau's Action Plan for implementing the Development Fund for Africa. We believe that this summary will prove to be a cost- effective method for facilitating the use of the evaluations already completed by the Africa Bureau and welcome any feedback users may have.

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I. IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES BY REDEFINING THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND INCREASING ITS EFFICIENCY

A. Improving Economic Stability Through Better Fiscal, Monetary and Sectoral Policies

MID-TERM EVALUATION OF MALI'S ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM PROGRAM (688-0240), MAY, 1989

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. During the past two decades, Mali enacted a wide range of regulations to control the private sector. Economists recognized that these regulations were impeding economic growth. Moreover, the public sector had grown so extensively that it represented a major burden for the national economy.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In September 1985, A.I.D authorized the Economic Policy Reform Program (EPRP) for $18 million with a Program Assistance Completion Date of December 1988. EPRP supported the efforts of the Government of the Republic of Mali (GRM) to create a policy environment conducive to private sector development and overall economic growth, and reduce the costs of the public sector to the national economy. In contrast to the past twenty years of a public sector driven approach to development, EPRP represented a major re-direction away from heavy dependence on the government to greater reliance on the private sector as the means for employment generation, export earnings and overall economic development.

The principal grant agreement of $16.7 million was disbursed through five tranches tied to the enactment of fiscal and budgetary reforms. A complementary grant agreement provided $1.3 million for technical assistance, commodities and funding for the Program Coordination Unit (PCU). A limited scope agreement added $962,000 for technical assistance in program management and computerization.

EPRP's fiscal reform measures included: a) rate reductions for business payroll taxes and taxes on business profits; b) increases in administratively determined values for customs valuation of certain imported commodities; c) enactment of a new Commercial Code; d) price decontrol of selected consumer items; and e) general improvements in the administrative efficiency of GRM directorates responsible for tax assessment, enforcement and collection.

EPRP's budgetary reform measures included:
a) computerization of the GRM's payroll; b) adoption of a new classification system for the national budget covering revenues and expenditures; c) implementation of a program to support voluntary early retirement by civil servants; d) reduction of new hiring into the civil service; e) reallocation of expenditures to increase non-personnel spending relative to personnel expenditures; and f) initiation of a plan for privatizing state enterprises.

To implement several of the reform measures and to institutionalize administrative improvements, EPRP supported two project-like activities. One was the computerization of key Ministry of Finance and Commerce (MFC) data collection and management operations (e.g., the payroll, tax records, customs assessments and collections and business registrations). Some equipment, technical assistance and training were provided.

The second activity was the Voluntary Early Retirement (VED) program. EPRP supported the design and implementation of VED. Disbursements were tied to enactment of budgetary reforms to: a) generate local currency used for severance payments; and b) capitalize VED lending activities. The latter included a loan guarantee fund and a study fund for program participants.

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE EVALUATION. This was a midterm evaluation to assess progress toward policy reforms. The evaluation methodology included key informant interviews and document review.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Towards Project Purpose. EPRP's implementation was remarkably smooth and rapid. Considerable progress was made during the first twenty months toward enacting the reform package. Three of the five tranches, amounting to $10,115,000 of the $16,700,000 available for the program, were released on the basis of adequate, and sometimes more than adequate, compliance for disbursement. There was every reason to believe that the GRM would comply with the conditions attached to the two remaining tranches by the Project Assistance Completion Date.

> Recommendation: A.I.D./Washington should provide additional funding for continuing the policy reform process initiated by EPRP. Further reform of the tax and customs systems, particularly those which have the greatest effect on private sector development, should have the highest priority in a follow-on or extension of EPRP.

2. Fiscal Measures: Reduced Internal Tax Rates and Customs Restructuring. The number of tax reforms made by the GRM was impressive. All major reform measures were enacted despite the revenue losses they produced, which demonstrated strong GRM commitment to the program. Progress was made in customs restructuring,

but without a comprehensive study it was impossible to determine results. In accordance with EPRP conditions, the 15 percent payroll tax rate was reduced to 7.5 percent in 1986. In 1987, three tax rates on business profits were reduced: from 50 to 45 percent on corporations, 30 to 25 percent on unincorporated enterprises and 1 percent to 0.75 on companies whose turnover fell below certain levels. In 1986, duties on 53 products were reduced. In 1987, duties on an additional 49 products were reduced.

> Recommendation: The Ministry should publicize EPRP's objectives of encouraging investment and the instruments being employed (i.e., tax rate changes) to achieve this. The EPRP should encourage the Ministry to follow through on further customs restructuring.

3. Fiscal Measures: Regulatory Reform. Under EPRP, business licensing was virtually abolished through the enactment of a new Commercial Code. This was one of the most significant reforms that EPRP supported. The new Commercial Code was enacted in March, 1986 and contained two important improvements: the formal synthesis of all relevant texts in one document and abolition of the requirement to obtain a license for new businesses, an expensive and time-consuming procedure. The president of the Chamber of Commerce said the new code was the best part of the whole EPRP program. Another regulatory reform, the liberalization of price control, was approved in September 1986. It remained to be seen whether price regulation of products considered necessities and which constituted the bulk of business transactions was, in fact, reduced.

> Recommendation: Follow-up studies in both areas are needed. Information on the significance of these reform measures from the owners of businesses directly affected by the reforms is required to evaluate EPRP's broader economic impact and obtain information for future program planning. Basic information on the scale of business activity, changes in operations in response to EPRP reforms, major constraints to current operations and future expansion and necessary additional reform measures should be collected by the study.

4. Budgetary Restructuring: The Voluntary Early Departure (VED) Program and Ceiling on New Hiring. Of the two instruments used to reduce the size of the public sector, the VED and the control over hiring, the latter was by far the most effective. Prior to 1983,

the GRM's policy was to hire all graduates of secondary schools and universities. Beginning in 1983, the number hired was gradually reduced in response to an IMF stand-by agreement that placed a financial ceiling on the annual recruitment budget. EPRP reinforced this limit by establishing a numerical ceiling on hiring. In 1985, the recruitment budget was one billion francs and 1857 new civil servants were hired. For 1988, the same budget items were projected as 350 million francs and 350-500 new hires. By contrast, the VED involved far fewer personnel, and even if the proposed target of 600 were to be reached, its effect on personnel strength would be only 20 percent of that of the hiring ceiling. In addition a cost was attached to the VED for: a) severance pay; b) loans for feasibility studies to support credit requests; and c) a guarantee fund to induce commercial banks to lend to early retirees for business ventures). Thus, the hiring ceiling was more powerful because every year that the workforce was maintained at the 1986 level, the result was 1000 fewer civil servants in the GRM's workforce, compared to 400-600 VED departures annually.

> Recommendation: During the remaining 18 months of EPRP, more attention should be given to a further lowering of the hiring ceiling. To assess the effects of both VED and the hiring ceiling on the workforce, a more concerted effort is needed to improve personnel and payroll data. Increased funding for VED would need to be justified on the basis of its value as an incentive to further reduce hiring. A follow-up study of the first VED participants should be undertaken to determine their success in establishing viable businesses. This would provide useful information for future implementation of the VED.

5. <u>Privatization of State Enterprises</u>. **Despite problems in the initiation of the privatization plan, it was an important policy reform measure in light of the GRM's serious budgetary problems.** In the initial design of EPRP, a privatization plan for state enterprises was added as a program condition. At the time (1985), this reform measure appeared reasonable and likely to be implemented by the GRM. The Minister of State Enterprises had expressed interest in privatizing a few small enterprises and funding attached to this condition -- $880,000 -- was to be used to establish a program comparable to the VED for civil servants who would lose their jobs as a consequence. Equally important, since 1983 the World Bank had been developing a major privatization project. However, since the start of EPRP the situation changed. First, the GRM's support for privatization weakened. Second, the Bank's efforts to reach agreement with the GRM on their privatization program ran aground, due in

large part to union resistance and problems in the design of the project. Given the breakdown of discussions between the World Bank and the GRM, non-compliance by the GRM in the privatization condition could result.

> Recommendation: The privatization condition should remain part of the EPRP reform package. The GRM and the mission should maintain an on-going dialogue on how the condition can be fulfilled. In early 1988, the mission should determine whether the funds tied to privatization should be de-obligated or re-programmed for other uses within the EPRP.

6. Sustainability. **The reform measures could be sustained only if the institutional capability to administer them were to be developed as well.** EPRP's computerization efforts were a significant step in this direction. An expanded capability to manage the volume of fiscal and budgetary data the MFC was responsible for was important for better administration and control of revenue and expenditure systems. Improving the quality of these data and reporting procedures to make them more useful for policymakers would be an obvious follow-on to computerization.

> Recommendation: A.I.D. should include support for improving the information systems of the Ministry in a follow-on or extension of EPRP. The Program Coordination Unit should be considered as a possible vehicle for supporting such improvements.

7. A.I.D. Management. **The mission's management of the program was very sound and effective. However, the program was far more staff intensive than the mission anticipated.** During the course of EPRP, the Program Office had at least one person working almost full-time on implementation (e.g., contract management, commodity procurement, review and negotiation of reform measures, administrative record keeping, Agency reporting requirements etc.). The program economist functioned largely as a full-time project manager. The head of the Program Office and an agricultural economist also gave a significant amount of time to EPRP implementation. Moreover, the time requirements were not due to unfamiliarity with the program. The three staff mentioned above worked on the design of the program and were at post throughout its implementation to date.

> Recommendation: The mission should proceed expeditiously to hire a program manager so the program economist can spend time on the policy

related analyses and supervision of evaluative studies for EPRP. The Africa Bureau should give greater attention to the management demands of future economic policy reform programs to assure that missions have the necessary direct hire and contract staff capability required for implementation.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION OF THE KENYA COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM (CIP), (614-0213), FEBRUARY, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Kenya (GOK) required balance of payments and budget support while it attempted to make structural changes in the economy. Specifically, the GOK required foreign exchange and concessionary assistance to finance balance of payments deficits in its current account. In fiscal year 1984, it was estimated that the GOK required $317 million annual gross external resources.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1984, A.I.D. authorized $28 million for a commodity import program (CIP) as part of USAID/Kenya's Structural Adjustment Program Grant. A.I.D. set funding in the amount of $15 million for 1984 and $13 million for 1985. Final input delivery was in 1988.

The purpose of the program was to provide additional balance of payments and budget support to the GOK while it made the structural changes necessary to address the underlying development problems facing the economy. It was anticipated that the CIP would provide 5 percent of the gross external resources required for that year and 10 percent of the additional financing required for 1986.

The grant also contained a program of shilling generations for mutually agreed upon development activities in the public and private sectors. At the time of the evaluation, none of the counterpart generations from the 1984 grant had been programmed.

The major features of the program were as follows: 1) Eligible importers -- all firms licensed to do business in Kenya; 2) Eligible commodities -- all commodities specified in the A.I.D. Commodity Eligibility Listing; 3) Transaction size -- $5,000 minimum and $1,500,000 maximum; 4) Financing Procedures -- bank Letters of Commitment procedures were used, whereby the cooperating Kenya commercial banks opened letters of credit to the U.S. suppliers through their U.S.correspondents; and 5) Local Currency Deposit -- the cooperating banks in Kenya deposited in the special account of the Central Bank of Kenya, the shilling equivalent of the letter of credit amount within 180 days of the date the letter of credit was drawn. The exchange rate was fixed on the date payment was made to the U.S. supplier.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to: 1) examine the extent to which

the level and rate of disbursement of the CIP contributed to the Structural Adjustment Program's overall purpose of providing balance of payments support; and 2) assess implementation arrangements and their conformance to A.I.D. regulations and guidelines. The evaluation was not intended to address the conditionality included in the Structural Adjustment Program. These issues were addressed in an evaluation undertaken in April 1985.

The methodology involved document review and interviews. The team prepared a questionnaire to interview 10 of the 27 participating firms. The team also prepared questionnaires to interview firms that utilized the Procurement Information Bulletin to advertise in the U.S., Kenyan firms that had not used the CIP and personnel from each of the seven cooperating banks. The questionnaire forms were included as Annex C of the report.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Program Purpose. **The program was not successful in meeting its stated purpose. Disbursements were far too late to ameliorate Kenya's balance of payments situation in 1984 and 1985.** At the end of January 1987, total disbursements and total counterpart deposit equivalent under the CIP were $777,326.69. There were several reasons for slow disbursement. 1) During 1984-85, there was a decline in overall non-governmental imports, as well as a decline in the U.S. share of the market. 2) In 1986, as a result of declining oil prices and increased coffee prices, Kenya ended the year with $400 million in reserves. The relative abundance of foreign exchange moderated demand for the CIP. 3) The GOK's failure to meet conditions precedent in a timely manner led to significant delays in implementation. The slow start was, however, overcome. By the time of the evaluation, applications were being received at an acceptable level and had been running at an average rate of approximately $1,275,000 per month for the previous six months. This translated into an annual rate of $15 million, equal to the value of the 1984 agreement.

> Recommendation: No additional incentives are required to attract clients to the program. Additional steps would have the effect of increasing applications beyond the $15 million per year originally anticipated for the program. However, USAID should continue its promotional activities to ensure continued interest in the program.

2. Program Implementation. **The amount of time required for various program transactions was a matter of concern.** The amount of time required to record a disbursement after the application was submitted to the GOK appeared to be excessive. Since the inception of the program, it took an average of 40 days to receive GOK approval for the import and foreign exchange license. After June 1986, the amount of time fell to 23 days but this was still in excess of the 15 days total specified in the grant agreement. In addition, it took on average 60 days from the date of GOL approval to open a letter of credit, an exceedingly long time. Delays in obtaining credit may, in part, have explained the relatively large number of cancellations: 22 transactions approved by the GOK were cancelled without a letter of credit having been opened. Also of concern was the amount of time required to record a disbursement after the actual disbursement occurred. The total value of letters of credit issued by the eighth month of the program was $810,555.81. As of the twentieth month of the program, disbursements had not reached this level.

> Recommendation: USAID should make inquiries concerning clients' financing arrangements and encourage them to begin negotiations with their banks before the import license is granted.
>
> To obtain a more accurate picture of disbursements, USAID should accrue expenditures based on the value of letters of credit issued which are expired. Accruals, as opposed to disbursements, should be clearly noted. This procedure could be easily accomplished using the Computerized Tracking System.

3. Importer Participation. **Importer participation was largely attributable to the fact that the CIP was an additional source of foreign exchange for which import licenses could be more quickly and easily obtained.** All respondents cited this as the main advantage of the CIP. Other perceived advantages were the 180 day grace period before payment, access to U.S. suppliers through advertising and the hedge against foreign exchange fluctuation. Fifty percent of the importers interviewed cited difficulty in obtaining bank credit. While the problem was not specific to the CIP, it would be useful if A.I.D. were to assist those for whom credit is a constraint.

> Recommendation: USAID should explore the feasibility of using the Credit Guarantee Program, so that credit would be more easily available to potential CIP clients who otherwise could not obtain bank credit. Such clients could be

referred by USAID to the Kenya Commercial Bank for participation in the guarantee fund.

4. Marketing. Although there was widespread awareness of the CIP, respondents, and even some users, did not clearly understand its procedures and benefits. Respondents perceived the brochure as unclear. Newspaper advertising was too general and perhaps not targeted to the appropriate audience. Among the five actively participating banks, there was wide variation in staff ability to explain the CIP to its customers and assist them in following its procedures. The banks played a key role in CIP implementation, yet all cited a lack of understanding of CIP procedures.

Recommendation: USAID should improve marketing of the CIP considering the following measures: 1) USAID should develop a separate piece of educational literature which succinctly states the purpose and explains program operations and benefits. 2) USAID should more selectively target informative notices to the private sector community, perhaps through careful selection of publications such as the Chamber of Commerce Monthly Magazine. 3) USAID should promote and explain the program through the Chamber of Commerce, even if this has already been done. 4) USAID should assist the banks to be more actively involved in marketing the program. Seminars could be held with personnel from each of the banks and banks could be asked to invite selected customers to these seminars.

5. Computerized Tracking System. The CIP computerized tracking system was excellent. A consulting firm, Thunder and Associates, worked closely with the Commodity Management Officer to develop a comprehensive system which tracked each CIP transaction from the time an application was submitted until goods were cleared through customs and local currency was deposited in the special account. The system was designed to provide a series of regular reports summarizing program status. As with all data systems, there is a periodic need to refine the program. Relative fine-tuning could enhance the system's utility and usually is to be anticipated as a new system matures.

Recommendation: USAID should bring in a programmer from Price Waterhouse under their existing contract to work with the Commodity Management Officer to modify the existing system. Annex D3 provides a series of suggestions for modifying the system based on experience with the CIP program in Egypt.

6. Impact. **While the level of CIP resources was too small to have any impact on Kenya's economy, there was evidence of significant impact on individual firms.** Forty percent of the firms in the sample stated that the goods imported under the CIP allowed them to increase employment. Eighty percent of the firms in the sample saw increases in sales or revenue. One hundred percent of the firms in the sample which were engaged in manufacturing stated that productive capacity increased and operating costs decreased.

These favorable findings must be tempered somewhat due to the problem of fungibility. Thirty percent of the firms sampled stated that if CIP financing had been unavailable they would have immediately met their needs another way. Seventy percent stated that they probably would have been able to meet their needs another way, although it probably would have taken longer. No firms thought they would have been unable to proceed with the procurement. These findings might have been different if Kenya had not been in a favorable foreign exchange situation. Since the CIP was, for the most part, financing goods which would have been imported any way, A.I.D was, in effect, providing additional foreign exchange and not additional goods. In this case the question was whether host government policy was conducive to the most productive use of the additional foreign exchange. This question was outside the scope of work for the evaluation.

> Recommendation: Although it is too soon to assess long-term impact of goods imported under the CIP, a more thorough analysis of short-term development impact and end-use could be undertaken in the next six to eight months. Such a study should be finished in time to inform the design of the Fiscal Year 1988 structural adjustment program. It should focus on: 1) direct economic and institutional impact on importers, including impact on production, employment, gross revenues and other firm-level economic measures; 2) indirect impact on users of goods produced or sold by the firms participating in the CIP; and 3) ultimate beneficiaries and end-users of CIP commodities and the effect on their income.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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SEYCHELLES: EVALUATION OF THE COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAMS, 1982-1986, (662-K-601/605), JANUARY, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Republic of Seychelles which became independent in 1976 consists of more than 100 islands, with a total land area of only 164 square miles, scattered over 400,000 square miles of the Indian Ocean. Since 1963, the U.S. has operated a U.S. Air Force satellite Tracking Station in the Seychelles. This facility, the most visible and important of U.S. interests in the Seychelles, provides the U.S. with a strategically located land-based operation. Were it not for this relationship, the U.S. probably would not have initiated a Seychelles aid program: the relatively high per capita income ($2400) is above the range of other countries receiving assistance.

Since the early 1970s, the Seychelles' economy has undergone a striking transformation from one almost exclusively based on agriculture and fishing to a predominantly service economy oriented toward international tourism. Following an all-time high in tourist arrivals in 1979, the country faced a severe recession in tourism in 1981-83 due to a number of conditions: recessionary conditions in Western Europe, rising air fares to Indian Ocean locations and rising costs accelerated by a 15 percent revaluation. Real GDP fell for three years in a row, the current balance of payments deficit, before official transfers, soared to 34 percent of GDP in 1982, and net official reserves fell from two months worth of imports in 1981 to less than one week's worth in 1985.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. The first Commodity Import Program (CIP) agreement with the Republic of Seychelles was signed in March 1982. The rationale for the first CIP, and the four successive amendments that followed, was that balance of payments support was the most appropriate and effective delivery mechanism for U.S. development assistance.

USAID decided to establish a CIP based upon procuring fuel oil from Kenya for the purpose of generating electricity in the Seychelles. This decision was based upon the following considerations. 1) Fuel oil was imported by Seychelles in sufficient quantities to use the levels of annual funding provided by the CIP. 2) A single commodity CIP would minimize procurement actions. 3) Fuel oil would provide the means for producing an intermediate good (electricity) vital to foreign exchange earnings, particularly in the tourist sector and thus the end use of the commodity would complement the balance of payments objectives of the CIP. 4) The end user of the commodity would be a single

solvent utility and this offered good prospects for the generation and deposit of counterpart currencies. 5) The program would not require intensive A.I.D. management time.

The principal organizations participating in the CIP program besides USAID (Regional Economic Development Services Office of East and Southern Africa and Regional Financial Management Center, both in Nairobi) included: U.S.Embassy, Victoria, and, for the Government of Seychelles (GOS) the Department of Planning and External Relations (DPER), the Department of Finance (DOF), and the Seychelles Petroleum Corporation (SEPEC) and a parastatal, the Public Utility Corporation, Electricity Division (PUC-ED).

Between 1982 and 1985 the annual funding level for each CIP was $2,000,000, while in 1986 the annual funding level for the CIP was $1,914,000. Thus total CIP funding between 1982 and 1986 was $9,914,000.

Once the process of procuring the fuel oil had been completed (in 1986 the program used formal competitive procurement procedures, and prior to that, negotiated procedures), the counterpart funds generated by the sale of fuel oil were deposited in a special non-interest bearing account at the Central Bank. When the Department of Finance indicated that the counterpart funds had been deposited, the Department of Planning and External Relations was responsible for programming the local currencies within the agreed categories established during program design.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to: 1) determine the overall impact of the CIP in the Seychelles; 2) track and summarize program inputs and outputs; 3) review specific legislative requirements for the program as set forth in Section 801 of the ISPCA of 1985; and 4) make recommendations to guide future U.S. assistance programs in the Seychelles.

The methodology involved: 1) reviewing program documents and correspondence; 2) collecting quantitative economic data and information on the procurement and utilization of CIP-financed commodities; 3) interviewing A.I.D. and GOS personnel who were involved with the program; and 4) making site visits to local currency-financed projects.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. **Achievement of Program Purpose**. **While the CIP performed well, its impact on the balance of payments**

was marginal, although not altogether insignificant. The CIP financed a total of 44,362 metric tons of medium fuel and 11,235 metric tons of diesel fuel. All the fuel products ordered under the CIP were delivered and paid for, exhausting the remaining foreign exchange available under the CIP Agreement during December 1986. In turn, fuel oils were sold and the counterpart funds totalling SR 67,544,047 were deposited in a special account in the Seychelles Bank. Ninety-six percent of these funds were allocated to fifty development activities, which were, with only one or two exceptions, well selected and very effectively implemented.

In terms of economic impact, the CIP provided foreign exchange which was equal annually to about 2 percent of Seychelles' commodity import bill or 5 percent of its current account deficit before official transfers. Thus, its impact on balance of payments and helping Seychelles maintain a satisfactory foreign reserve level during the lean years was marginal, although not insignificant. The evaluation team analyzed why the GOS did not initiate a different set of economic policies which would have put it on a more satisfactory growth path. They concluded, "to the extent that foreign donor assistance, including that of A.I.D., has enabled the GOS to sustain fiscal and current account deficits without adjusting its policies to stimulate more rapid export production, further development of tourism, efficient import substitution and consequent income and employment generation such activities can create, the assistance can be said to have been counterproductive to achieving the desired pattern of economic growth."

With respect to its impact on the private sector, any possible positive effects attributed to the slightly greater availability of foreign exchange were negated by the adverse effects of pricing (including the foreign exchange rate, wage, employment and fiscal policies).

The use of CIP funds to purchase fuel oil for electric generators did not have any additional impact other than the provision of foreign exchange, since there was no question that without such assistance the fuel required to generate the same amount of electricity would have been purchased anyway. The provision of additional foreign exchange simply allowed the Seychelles to sustain a slightly higher level of imports without incurring additional foreign debt. Thus a problem with continuing a CIP based upon the 1982-86 design is that it would not actively pursue policy adjustments (i.e., modifying the pricing of foreign exchange) that could reduce or eliminate deficits in the future.

Recommendation: USAID should continue to provide its assistance through a CIP. However, USAID should place more emphasis on discussing economic issues with the GOS as part of the design and review process. The eligible commodities under the CIP should continue to be fuel products. However, the source and origin requirements for diesel oil should be expanded to Code 935 countries and the permissible uses should be broadened.

2. Development Impact. The CIP's principal development impact stemmed from the use of counterpart funds for specific capital development projects. Most of these projects involved improving or expanding upon Seychelles' infrastructure. They included: 1) projects related to port and land reclamation activities of the East Coast project; 2) road rehabilitation projects; 3) the Praslin Water Supply project; 4) the Praslin Aerodome project; 5) Outer Islands development projects; and 6) indigenous fishing industry development projects. These projects demonstrated the capacity of the GOS to utilize local currency resources effectively since 75 percent of available counterpart funds were disbursed.

Principal beneficiaries of these projects included: homeowners and businessmen who used reclaimed land for homes and offices; drivers and passengers who benefited from reduced travel time on rehabilitated roads; 3,000 residents of Praslin Island who benefitted from piped, treated water; owners of tourist facilities who would be able to capture larger revenues because of improved airport facilities; residents of outer islands and fishermen who benefited from improved harbor and fishing facilities.

Recommendation: There is an urgent need to establish GOS capital investment priorities, since a major source of balance of payments are directly attributable to GOS budget deficits. To respond to this need, USAID should ensure that projects financed by CIP counterpart funds are directed at those projects which: 1) either earn income (preferably foreign exchange) or directly support income earning activities; 2) generate productive employment; and 3) are sustainable with respect to current resource levels. These factors should be examined at the time of project appraisal and continually monitored in the physical progress report.

3. Management of Local Currency Program. **The management of the local currency program -- specifically, the allocation of financing and the compilation and drafting of physical progress reports -- has been the least impressive aspect of CIP implementation.** The basic problems were as follows. 1) Finalizing the agreed allocation for the uses of counterpart funds between REDSO/ESA and the GOS required prolonged periods of time which delayed counterpart expenditures. 2) Expenditures for eight projects exceeded original GOS and REDSO/ESA budgets. Moreover, there were no subsequent budget modifications (because the Department of Planning and External Relations had not developed an internal control system capable of tracking total project expenditures). 3) Physical progress reports for individual projects were incomplete and irregular.

> Recommendation: The GOS and USAID should redefine and streamline the local currency program. New requirements should include: 1) a change from quarterly to semi-annual physical progress reports for local currency projects; 2) development of an internal Department system for tracking the financial performance of CIP-financed local currency projects; and 3) regular exchange of letters between the Embassy, REDSO/ESA and the Department to approve the allocation, or modification of allocation, of each year's local currency generations.

4. USAID Management. **While the REDSO/ESA CIP management system operated efficiently, there were some areas where more attention was necessary.** The average time required for REDSO/ESA annual management of the CIP was only 37 person days. This represented less than one-half of one percent of the available workdays programmed by REDSO/ESA. And while the management system was generally sound, there was a need to improve the posting and control of earmarks, commitments and disbursements in the mission's accounting records so that up-to-date information could be obtained quickly by clients. Moreover, disbursements made by A.I.D. in some instances exceeded obligations for the CIP. For Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986, vouchers approved by REDSO/ESA resulted in overpayment under the CIP grant of $4,391.96. The GOS subsequently agreed to refund the overpayment.

> Recommendation: USAID should improve the program monitoring system. An effective monitoring system should provide information on: quantities of fuel shipped, corresponding payments, fuel utilization records, allocation of counterpart funds and progress on the local currency projects. All this information was being generated and recorded by

different organizations but was generally inconsistent. A summary sheet where such differences could be reconciled would be an effective monitoring tool, which could speed up transactions and minimize mistakes. When major construction projects are proposed for counterpart financing, a REDSO/ESA engineer should review the plans prior to REDSO/ESA concurrence on funding.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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SOMALIA: EVALUATION OF THE COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAMS (649-K-603, 649-K-604), NOVEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Somalia's options for developing its economy are limited. With a per capita Gross Domestic Product in 1985 of $260, Somalia has been designated by the United Nations as a least developed country. Only 20 percent of Somalia's five million people live in urban areas and an estimated 60 percent can be characterized as nomadic. While government expenditures have not been excessive (usually less than 18 percent of GDP), the tax base is extremely narrow (six percent of GDP) and fiscal deficits have been chronic in recent years. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic (GSDR) has depended heavily on borrowing to make ends meet. In 1981, the GSDR took dramatic steps to liberalize its economy. These reforms, together with substantial reduction in the growth of net credit to the government, produced significant improvements in both the inflation rate and the balance of payments deficit. Still, foreign exchange resources fell far short of requirements and the GSDR continued to require support in pursuing further liberalization and privatization of the economy.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1983, A.I.D. authorized $16 million in grant financing for the Commodity Import Program (CIP) II. The Program Assistance Completion Date was scheduled for July 1987. In 1985, A.I.D. authorized $27 million in grant financing for the Commodity Import Program III. The Program Assistance Completion Date was scheduled for June 1987.

The purpose of both programs was to provide foreign exchange for commodity imports from the U.S. and developing countries in order to assist Somalia with its balance of payments position, as well as to generate local currency for budget support. In addition, the programs included policy reform objectives.

The foreign exchange for the CIP program was allocated by the GSDR to both private and public importers by the CIP Special Committee for commodities in priority areas identified by the GSDR and USAID. The priority commodities included those that would assist in the development of agriculture, agribusinesses, and small, light private sector businesses.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess: 1) the macroeconomic impact of the CIPs; 2) the effects of the foreign

exchange financing on both the private and public sectors; 3) the utilization of local currency generation; and 4) the overall management of the program.

The methodology involved document review; collection of quantitative data on the economy and the procurement and utilization of CIP-financed commodities; and interviews with USAID, GSDR and private sector representatives who had been involved in the management and implementation of the program.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Impact on Balance of Payments Support. While CIP II and CIP III were not particularly successful in providing a rapid infusion of foreign exchange, they provided notable balance of payments assistance and foreign reserve support. Obligated in July 1983, CIP II was delayed by problems related to the transmission of the documents to Washington, locating a lost document between Washington and New York and getting the acceptance of the Central Bank for the Letter of Commitment. Most of the $16 million provided under CIP II was disbursed in 1984. Implementation of CIP III, obligated in February 1985, was delayed eight months because the GSDR ordered an inquiry to determine if the CIP should be used to assist the private sector. Other factors reduced the attractiveness of the CIP causing further delays -- the overvalued dollar in the 1980s, expensive transport costs under the CIP and the unavailability of credit to the private sector in the absence of political connections.

Despite these difficulties, the balance of payments support was not unimportant. The $16 million provided under CIP II funded 5 percent of Somalia's 1984 current account deficit before official transfers. With respect to 1985 and 1986, these figures were six percent and three percent, respectively.

Somalia's dire foreign exchange reserve situation also underscored the importance of CIP assistance. At the end of 1984 and 1985, Somalia had foreign exchange reserves amounting to one week of imports. Reserves amounting to three months of imports are normally considered prudent.

Real growth in Somalia was undoubtedly higher than it would have been without the CIPs. Real growth was 3.5 percent in 1984, 6.4 percent in 1985 and 5.0 percent in 1986.

2. Impact on the Private Sector. CIPs II and III contributed substantially to the strengthening of the private sector in Somalia. Even though the allocation of foreign exchange to the private sector fell far short of its target (48 percent instead of 85 percent of grant financing) the available financing was used well. Significant numbers of businesses in the agricultural and industrial sectors used the CIPs to start up new businesses, expand production and maintain and even expand local employment levels.

New business which used the CIP for start-up included a bonemeal processing plant, a factory for making bags for agricultural products, a cattle feed factory, a vegetable oil processing plant, a tannery, an agro-chemical mixing plant, a fish distributor, and others. These new businesses together utilized over 13 percent of private sector CIP financing.

Interviews indicated that participating firms' production was running approximately 30-50 percent of capacity, rates that would have been lower in the absence of CIP financing. With respect to employment, roughly 230 jobs were created by the new businesses. Financing for spares and machinery saved or created even more jobs. For example, each of the two hundred farm tractors imported under the CIP provided employment for two drivers or 400 jobs. With CIP assistance, the Coca-Cola franchise was maintained and this saved jobs for 150 people. With CIP financing, a public sector sugar producer was able to resume operations and return to work 2,00 permanent staff and 3,000 temporary workers. The Juba Sugar Company registered similar employment gains.

3. Impact of the CIP on Policy Reform. The most significant policy advances were in those areas in which USAID took a "hands-on approach." At the same time, USAID missed opportunities to promote policy reforms beneficial to the private sector. The CIPs encouraged significant policy reforms in the following areas: 1) reduction of government employment;
2) elimination of import licensing; and
3) establishment of private trade organizations.
Modest gains were achieved in encouraging stabilization through support of the IMF agreement, revising the foreign investment code and rationalizing parastatal enterprise. Notable failures were:
1) establishment of civil service incentives;
2) removal of export monopolies on certain products
3) establishment of a private bank.

The success achieved in encouraging the GSDR to reduce the size of the civil service was probably the best example of USAID taking a "hands-on" approach. USAID was out front on a multi-donor supported effort to

rationalize the size of the public sector. A product of this exercise was a Civil Service Report. While the GSDR was unable to implement the salary increases called for, it reduced the number of civil servants by 3,000 each year in 1985 and 1986 and made a number of other policy changes in this regard.

Nevertheless, USAID missed opportunities for pressing for reforms that could have benefitted the private sector. One example was the mission's permitting public sector purchase of petroleum. This purchase stood in stark contrast to the grant agreement which covenanted the GSDR to permit private participation in the market for petroleum products. The mission could have been more insistent on using private marketing arrangements for this transaction. After $17 million in petroleum purchases under the CIPs, GSDR policies with respect to private sector involvement in the petroleum markets had not changed at all.

> Recommendation: Since local currency generated under the CIPs have been used very little for activities related to the private sector, USAID should explore methods of using local currency for this purpose.

4. <u>USAID Management</u>. **Overall, USAID and GSDR management of the CIP programs was very satisfactory.** During interviews with both public and private importers, they expressed a clear understanding of the CIP's implementation process and general satisfaction with the system. Perhaps more telling, however, was the fact that other donors based their CIPs on the system established by USAID. In this case, replication underscored the real value of the CIPs' management system. While importers were generally pleased with program management, they nevertheless made numerous suggestions as to how the program could be improved.

> Recommendation: USAID should look for opportunities to streamline CIP procedures, especially those that relate to payment documents, sourcing requirements and freight shipment.

5. <u>Local Currency for the Public Sector</u>. **CIP-generated local currencies had a significant impact on the public sector projects which received them, but not necessarily a "development impact."** CIP-generated local currencies were used to fund a variety of non-agricultural development projects. This was because of the requirement that PL-480 currency generations could only be used to fund agriculture and health projects.

In many cases, CIP generations were used to fund routine government functions, often those established by previous donor-funded development projects. Thus, funds were used to maintain salaries and operations of one-time development activities that should have become part of the government's recurrent cost budget. In these cases, development "impact" seemed a less appropriate description of these activities than development "maintenance." In other instances, CIP-generated currencies were used to fund capital expenditures (i.e., transportation, water, and electrification projects).

Of the total amount of CIP-generated local currencies, 83 percent was allocated to either USAID operating expenses or jointly programmed development activities. At the time of the evaluation, the remaining 17 percent of CIP generations was unaccounted for.

- Recommendation: USAID must immediately account for the 17 percent of local currency generations that was not allocated.

6. <u>U.S. Exports</u>. **U.S. suppliers were poorly represented in the CIPs.** Only $6.5 million of the $43 million provided by the CIPs originated in the U.S. Of this, $3.7 million was tied to the U.S. shipping of PL-480 products. Several factors contributed to this including the high value of the dollar compared to other currencies during implementation of the CIPs, the high cost of U.S. shipping, and the lack of response of many U. S. suppliers to the requests of local importers.

Recommendation: Once it becomes apparent that U.S. suppliers are not responding to requests to participate in the CIP, USAID should explore options to increase U.S. procurement. Some options might include the following: 1) using a trade mission of U.S. businessmen, familiar with small businesses in the areas of agricultural processing and small-scale manufacturing, to identify products in Somalia which could be supplied from the U.S. market; and 2) expanding the eligibility of items which could be CIP-financed to include areas where the U.S. is more competitive such as food, paper products and raw materials such as cotton.

<u>EVALUATION TEAM</u>.

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William Jeffers	REDSO/ESA
Don Harrison	A.I.D./W (AFR/DP)

INDEPENDENT IMPACT EVALUATION OF USAID/KINSHASA CIP GRANTS (660-0100, 660-0103. 660-0121), FEBRUARY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. During the late 1960s and most of the 1970s, the Government of Zaire's (GOZ) economic policies caused increasing distortions in the economy. Many inefficient enterprises were attracted by excessive tax privileges and tariff protection. Price controls seriously discouraged industrial and agricultural production creating severe shortages of goods and mounting inflation. At the same time, in the face of extreme shortages of foreign exchange and internal credits, productive capacities of local firms became seriously underutilized. Overvalued currency made exports more difficult and shifted the economy toward ever increasing imports, even of basic food stuffs. External and internal imbalances led to an erosion of confidence in the economic future of the country.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1984, A.I.D authorized $10,000 million for the Agricultural Inputs Support I project. In 1985, A.I.D. authorized an additional $10 million for a follow-on project, Agriculture Inputs Support II. And in 1986, A.I.D. authorized $15 million for the Structural Adjustment Support project. The Project Assistance Completion Date for each was 2/88, 2/88 and 5/88, respectively .

Each A.I.D. grant supported a Commodity Import Program (CIP) managed by USAID /Kinshasa but implemented through private agribusiness firms in Zaire. The imported commodities were intended to improve the lot of low resource farmers, consumers and wage earners. Other important objectives included balance of payments support, generation and productive use of local currency for USAID projects and encouragement of the GOZ's economic liberalization policies.

Each of the grants was funded under the Economic Support Fund (ESF). Eligible commodities for import were those that would promote private agro-industries in Zaire. While the 1984 and 1985 CIPs did not include policy reforms, the 1986 program represented a major shift in emphasis. It focused on structural adjustment and policy reform and provided an explicit endorsement of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions, as well as conditionality pertaining to disbursement of its own funds. The specific policy reforms included in the Structural Adjustment program (as well as those which supported World Bank and IMF reforms which had taken place prior to the Structural Adjustment program) are discussed in greater detail below.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine the impact of the CIPs and the GOZ's economic liberalization program on importing firms and their employees and low resource farmers.

The methodology involved review of controller records, CIP files, program documents and analytical papers, as well as interviews with USAID and Embassy personnel, managers of private importing firms, bank and GOZ officials. Because all funds under grants I and II were already disbursed, the evaluation placed most emphasis on the Structural Adjustment Support Grant.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Impact of Policy Reforms. When viewed independently, the impact of the CIPs was marginal. However, when viewed as a complement to World Bank and IMF programs, the impact was considerable. Economic stabilization and reform programs, especially those undertaken since 1983, improved the general incentive structure. They eliminated most of the severe economic distortions, broadened the base of market operations and led to more competitive pricing with signs of improved efficiency. At the beginning of the reforms, capacity utilization in industrial plants was said to have been as low as 30 percent, compared with the current estimate of 50 percent. Even in the absence of updated agricultural data, it was noticeable that severe shortages and extreme price fluctuations of basic food items had disappeared and food importation had diminished.

The addition of $15 million in 1987 generated by the Structural Adjustment grant, while small, was helpful as a complement to the World Bank's and the IMF's far larger inputs. The status and effects of the major policy reforms were as follows.

Exchange Rates. Prior to policy reform, exchange rates overvalued the Zaire as a currency, which discouraged exports and encouraged imports. In 1983, the GOZ devalued the Zaire and established a floating rate. At times there was pressure on GOZ officials to retreat back to the previous fixed rate. This suggested the need for additional training so that Zairian officials could better understand the economic issues which related to policy reforms.

Price Controls. Prior to reform, official price controls existed for both industrial and agricultural commodities. In 1982, all controls were lifted from agricultural prices. The team found that farmers understood the benefit of market prices and some said they were thus receiving better prices for their agricultural commodities and were producing commodities

for the market, whereas previously they produced primarily for home consumption.

Export Taxes. By July 1986, all export taxes had been abolished with the exception of taxes on the export of minerals, crude oil and wood products.

Tariffs. The GOZ complied with the condition precedent which required them to revise their tariff schedule.

Fuel Pricing. While the GOZ generally complied with the covenant requiring the government to permit direct private importation of refined petroleum products and full-cost pricing of fuel, and full-cost pricing was practiced, the GOZ still awarded annual contracts to the oil companies. The result was that if one company was awarded the contract, all other companies had to distribute products imported by that company.

Revenue and Expenditure Measures. The team found little information which indicated trends in revenue since the initiation of policy reforms. Large government investment in industrial projects ceased.

Balance of Payments. The BOP position deteriorated somewhat in 1985, recovered slightly in 1986, but worsened in 1987. 1987 returns to coffee exports were off by approximately $150 million because of depressed prices and lower production.

> Recommendation: In accordance with the conditions as stated in the Structural Adjustment Support Grant, USAID should determine progress being made and sustained on: 1) price controls for industrial and agricultural commodities; 2) control procedures for commodity exports; and 3) the effects of lowered tariffs on formerly protected firms. The fuel pricing covenant should also be carefully monitored.

2. **Impact on Importing Firms and Their Employees. All firms interviewed stated that, without the CIP, already idle capacity in their plants would have increased.** The five representative firms interviewed by the evaluation team provided the following information to support this conclusion. A Zairian-owned factory that produces cartons for transporting farm produce said that their stock was exhausted and their plant had been closed down. CIP funding enabled the firm to import raw materials and start production again. Over 100 jobs were preserved. A soap manufacturer said that the caustic soda provided under the CIP not only helped with employment in the Kinshasa plant but also provided additional employment to palm oil producers, transporters, depot managers and traders. At another factory which received assistance under the CIP,

production of new machines to process nutritious baby food (sold at one-sixth the price of the imported equivalent) created 50 new jobs. Firms visited said demand for their products was high.

Although the team was unable to acquire new data on wages or employment, estimates suggested that wages in the private sector performed better than wages in the public sector under the policy reforms.

> Recommendation: USAID should require all firms that apply for CIP financing to project company-specific impact of imports in terms of production and employment and will thus consider these replies in the selection process.

3. Impact on Small Farmers and Farmgate Prices. CIP commodities had an indirect impact on small farmers, (by way of processed goods or services), rather than a direct impact. In the absence of time series data on production and prices, the evaluation team's economist travelled to areas he had observed for more than a decade. He was convinced that the liberalization of agricultural prices, linked with other changes such as access to markets, had a significant positive effect on small farmers in the zones visited. He noted a greater diversification of crops, the addition of more livestock, newer handtools and more consumer goods than ever noted in the past. The latter included new lamps, corrugated roofs, bicycles, radios and newer clothes.

Data from USAID's 1986 final report of the North Shaba Development project appeared to reflect these trends. The data were gathered in the Shaba Region over the years that the economic liberalization program had been in effect. Repaired roads increased from zero to more than a thousand kilometers. Maize production increased from six thousand to 50 thousand tons. Production of other crops also increased. Some observers asserted that such impact was made possible in part by price liberalization.

Nevertheless, the greater benefit to small farmers was through generation and use of local currency. Had it not been for the significant amounts which derived from the PL-480 and CIP sales, it would have been impossible to maintain a creditable Development Assistance agricultural program in Zaire. Both the country's budgetary crisis and its long habit of agricultural neglect supported this conclusion.

4. Program Implementation. The rate of disbursement of the first two CIPs was slower than expected. However, there was a dramatic reversal in the

disbursement of committed funds under the third CIP. In the early years of the CIP, the high-valued U.S. dollar made U.S. exports non-competitive in world markets. High U.S. prices coupled with the cost in time and money of doing business through A.I.D., as well as the stagnation of the Zairian economy, slowed demand for CIP goods. Three factors contributed to the dramatic reversal of disbursement of funds under the third CIP. 1) There was a concerted effort by the CIP Office in USAID to make the program known to a broader base of importers who were either associated with or in direct support of agricultural production. This office prepared a notice and sent it out to approximately 150 companies. In addition, they made American suppliers aware of business opportunities in Zaire through the A.I.D. Procurement Information Bulletin. 2) The exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against major currencies made U.S. suppliers more competitive in world markets. 3) The chronic shortage of hard currency in Zaire increased the demand for foreign currency to purchase much needed raw materials to support the agricultural sector.

5. <u>USAID Management</u>. **There was a high degree of USAID control over the CIP program.** USAID made staff available to process controls expeditiously. Approvals rarely required more than one day. USAID management required CIP staff to be present in Kinshasa most of the time. This limited the amount of time that CIP staff had to carry out detailed end-use checks in the interior of the country. As reliance on commodity imports grows in overall mission programming, end-use controls will become increasingly important. It appeared that the end-use survey on goods that were sold or shipped to the interior of the country was limited. Items like trucks, tractors, generators and corn grinders should be checked to verify effectiveness of the commodities in use at their final point of destination. Maintaining adequate control will require additional funds and staff to perform program functions requiring travel and absences from Kinshasa.

> Recommendation: End-use checks should be performed by an office other than the CIP office. Accepted accounting principles do not allow the final checking to be performed by the same office that initiates the procurement process. This should become a standard controller function.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION OF COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAMS (613-K-604, 613-K-605 & 605A, 613-K-606), OCTOBER, 1986

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The advent of majority rule in 1980 brought opportunities for social and economic development to the Zimbabwean black majority. Free and compulsory primary education was introduced, clinics and health facilities were extended to people in outlying areas, a minimum wage and other labor legislation were enacted and access to rural credit was improved. Such programs are unsustainable, however, without economic growth. Growth remained strong in 1980-1981, but drought, coupled with a worldwide recession and foreign exchange shortages, put the economy into a downward spiral, beginning in 1982.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. The Commodity Import Program (CIP) served as an integral component of U.S. development assistance from 1982 to 1986, accounting for 42 percent of total U.S. assistance to Zimbabwe. It promoted the fulfillment of the two major long-term goals stated in USAID/Zimbabwe's Fiscal Year 1984 Country Development Strategy Statement:

- the marshalling of foreign exchange and domestic resources into the productive private sector to provide a firm basis for sustainable poverty alleviation, development and growth; and

- the provision of assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) to raise living standards, expand agricultural output, raise rural incomes and increase employment opportunities while narrowing the dualism of the economy.

On April 7, 1982, USAID and the GOZ signed the first $31 million CIP agreement. The purposes of the CIP were to: 1) stimulate the Zimbabwean commercial sector to play a critical role in nation-building and employment creation by making available A.I.D. foreign exchange resources to import U.S. goods; and 2) support GOZ reconstruction and development initiatives by using the local currency countervalue generations to finance a broad range of public sector programs and activities in the areas of education, health and agriculture.

The program included the following salient features: 1) a minimum of 80 percent of the funds had to be channelled through the private sector while the remaining funds were made available to the public sector; 2) both private and public sector users of the funds were required to deposit countervalue in the special account established in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe; 3) all allocations of funds to the private

sector would be handled by the GOZ, using their established allocation procedures; and 4) all commercial and merchant banks operating in Zimbabwe would be authorized to open letters of credit under the program to allow importers to maintain their business relationships with these banks.

Separate CIPs have played a role in USAID's Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector Assistance (ZASA) and Basic Education and Skills Training (BEST) programs. US$31 million and US$29 million of CIP funds were channelled into ZASA and BEST, respectively. The terms of the 1983 CIP for US$37 million and the 1984 amendment, for US$10 million, were virtually identical to those of the 1982 CIP.

In July 1986, U.S. economic assistance to Zimbabwe was suspended. Consequently, no funds were released for the 1986 CIP nor for the CIP component of ZASA.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine the efficacy of the CIP in meeting both the general goals of the United States in Zimbabwe and the specific assistance objectives of the 1987-1990 strategy period. These objectives were to:

- preserve and maintain the productive structure and general infrastructure of the Zimbabwean economy;
- guide Zimbabwe toward a successful post-independence economic model; and
- promote Zimbabwe as a strong economic actor within the Southern Africa region.

The methodology consisted of a survey of firms, banks and local business organizations. The questionnaires used in the survey are included in Annex D of the evaluation report.

The evaluation is concerned only with the foreign currency component of the CIP. Although the ZASA and BEST CIPs may be viewed as elements of separate programs, the foreign exchange element of these sectoral CIPS is included within the scope of this evaluation.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose - Macroeconomic Impact of the CIP. **The CIP had a deep and significant impact on the Zimbabwean economy as a whole and the private sector in particular.** According to the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, at the peak of the CIP's disbursement in 1984, CIP imports

were responsible for 3.8 percent of the Gross Domestic Product and approximately 5 percent of total employment. It then financed 75 percent of U.S. imports in Zimbabwe. Individual firms stated that their production levels would have dropped 30 to 50 percent if they had not received allocations under the CIP.

The loss of the US$10 million 1986 CIP will result in a 0.5 percent reduction in Gross Domestic Product and an additional reduction in productive employment for 8 thousand people. From 1980 to 1985, the U.S. CIP accounted for 20 percent of all commodity import assistance. Therefore the elimination of the U.S. CIP in Zimbabwe will have a deleterious effect on the entire economy but particularly on the private sector, which received the lion's share of the assistance. In some cases, the U.S. was the sole source of certain imports. In other cases, it was the best quality or cheapest source. Many firms will have to reduce their imports or seek alternative suppliers. Without the CIP, U.S. imports to Zimbabwe will decline, but to what extent remains uncertain.

Recommendation: The private sector's absorptive capacity for foreign exchange indicates that a future CIP could be entirely directed to that sector. However, the CIP should not be targeted to specific productive sectors unless evidence exists that the present allocation system is biased against them as a whole. In the absence of such evidence, sectorization would complicate the administration of the CIP and create distortions which may have deleterious effects on the economy by channelling resources to one sub-sector over another.

If A.I.D. and the GOZ agree that, for administrative purposes, the minimum allocation should be US$10 thousand, then A.I.D. should encourage the use of consolidators. Consolidators enable several firms which require less than US$10 thousand to share an allocation. Thus, more private enterprises could benefit from the CIP. Also, it is possible that consolidators could obtain better prices on larger purchasers, as well as reduce shipping costs from the U.S.

2. <u>The GOZ's Foreign Exchange Allocation System.</u> A.I.D. was able to implement the CIP and disburse funds quickly and efficiently using the GOZ's existing allocation system. Established businesses were familiar with the system and thus able to take advantage of the CIP easily. However, the historical basis upon which foreign exchange allocations are awarded does discourage new entrants into the system.

Nevertheless, since the primary objective of the CIP was to facilitate the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economy, the decision to work the program within the GOZ's existing system was well-taken.

> Recommendation: Prior to the commencement of a new CIP, USAID should undertake an evaluation of the GOZ's existing foreign exchange allocation system. Such an evaluation would uncover and analyze inherent strengths, weaknesses and biases within the system. The evaluation should be done in close cooperation with the GOZ for its officials are well-aware of the system's shortcomings. By offering a large CIP, the U.S. may help the GOZ to implement necessary changes in the allocation system.

3. Impact of the CIP on Domestic Production. A cost/benefit study would show that every dollar of foreign exchange provided under the CIP yielded Z$2.00 worth of domestic production. This analysis even includes the adjustment of domestic prices to reflect the overvaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar and the effect of price controls. If all the CIP's foreign exchange went into raw materials used in the production process, then the internal rate of return would be approximately 200 percent. Since much of the CIP's foreign exchange went to the purchase of equipment and spare parts, the actual rate of return ought to be even higher.

4. Effect of the CIP on Employment. Survey results indicated that the CIP had only a small direct impact on employment. Labor legislation enacted after independence seriously discourages firings and layoffs. Consequently, many firms which have curtailed production have a pool of idle and unproductive, employed workers.

5. Effect of the CIP on Policy Dialogue. It is questionable whether the U.S. program has ever been large enough to permit a dialogue on the entire foreign exchange allocation system, the general scope of government control, or other policy issues related to the GOZ allocation system. The mission has used other funds to commission studies on certain issues, but it has not undertaken any formal policy dialogue. The grant agreement for the CIP 613-K-605 included an annex which indicated that the GOZ had independently taken a series of policy steps designed to stimulate the economy, manage demand and promote exports. The annex further indicated that the CIP intended to provide

additional resources to underpin and render more effective those adjustments and stabilization measures.

6. A.I.D. Management. A.I.D. managed and administered the CIP exceptionally well. According to the firms surveyed, A.I.D. kept users well-informed, responded quickly to any questions or concerns and resolved any difficulties arising with U.S. banks and suppliers. CIP-users found the program's rules to be clear and direct and the actual operation of the program to be more efficient than that of any other donor. GOZ officials also stated that, from their viewpoint, the U.S. program had the fewest restrictions and was the simplest to administer.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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B. Reduce Government Involvement in Production and Marketing of Goods and Services

EVALUATION REPORT ON THE REDSO/ESA PARASTATAL STUDIES, RESTRUCTURING AND DIVESTITURE IQC (623-8501-C-00-5006), DECEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Over the last few years, many African leaders have come to recognize the very high economic and social costs of public-sector dominated economies. In varying degrees, this recognition has been precipitated by the steady decline of national economies and concerted educational efforts of donor institutions concerning the fundamental role of private enterprise in economic development and the creation of wealth. While political support for non-market mechanisms of economic management remains firmly entrenched, awareness of the failure of current policies has forced lenders to seek alternative solutions to increased economic productivity and efficiency. Thus, many governments are now interested in implementing measures that rely on market mechanisms, thereby promoting trade, investment and employment. However, even the best informed are at a loss as to what actions should be taken.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. REDSO/ESA initiated the Parastatal Studies, Restructuring and Divestiture Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) to assist: a) bilateral A.I.D. missions to analyze the role of parastatals in their respective countries; and b) host governments in their efforts to make parastatals more responsive to market conditions and assess opportunities for divestiture. The IQC was awarded to Coopers and Lybrand in association with Arthur D. Little, CRS Sirrine, Morgan Grenfell and Technoserve, Inc. in May 1985 and expired on November 30, 1987. The planned life of project cost was $750,000.

Beginning in December 1985, the contractor carried out a total of 14 tasks in nine ESA countries with obligations totalling $465,113. Funding was provided primarily by the requesting bilateral missions and drawn from both project and PD&S sources.

Virtually all of the tasks involved sector strategies, preliminary studies, parastatal sector assessments, scopes of work specifications for technical assistance, development of action plans for strengthening specific public enterprises, divestiture or reorganization and other activities that were representative of the first stages of the privatization process.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of the evaluation were to: a) assess the adequacy of the IQC as a mechanism for addressing private sector

issues, especially privatization in East and Southern Africa; b) review the performance of the contractor in meeting the objectives established for the IQC; and c) make recommendations regarding the restructuring of the contract to address a broad range of private sector development issues, including privatization, in the region.

The methodology included evaluation team visits to USAID/Burundi and USAID/Madagascar to meet with A.I.D. personnel and local officials. In addition, the team reviewed the reports the contractor prepared under each work order. The team also interviewed REDSO/ESA staff to discuss future private sector support activities.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Accomplishments. A.I.D. missions used the Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) successfully to support privatization activities in Burundi, Madagascar, Somalia, Mozambique, Malawi and the Sudan. In Burundi, the IQC study indicated that a parastatal enterprise producing peat fuel was not an attractive target for divestiture but that there were opportunities to increase private sector contracts with the parastatal. These recommendations were subsequently addressed by the on-going project that USAID was implementing with the parastatal. In Madagascar, representatives from USAID and three ministries were pleased with the first phase of the study and were prepared to move to Phase II, which would provide the in-depth analyses required to move forward to the next steps in the divestiture process. In Somalia, as a result of the IQC study, the Government decided to reorganize and privatize the parastatal vegetable mill in Mogadishu. In Mozambique, Phase I and II analyses of divestiture possibilities were completed. Phase III began with a macro-analysis of the construction industry. In Malawi, the IQC study outlined a marketing and management strategy for the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation. The privatization program is now underway. In a few countries no further action was taken. In Somalia and Swaziland, for example, the missions determined that a more supportive political and economic environment for privatization would be required before new activities could be initiated.

> Recommendation: REDSO should continue to provide IQC services for private sector program technical support.

2. Future Mission Needs. The majority of mission staff indicated their need for a broader range of

private sector analytical services and their preference for the IQC over other mechanisms. In interviews, mission staff identified their needs for analytical services that would go beyond privatization studies. Priority areas included: a) designing bilateral private sector programs; b) assisting in defining private sector policy dialogue; c) developing systems to manage the private sector portfolio; and d) assisting in monitoring and evaluation.

> Recommendation: The follow-on IQC should provide technical expertise in a wider range of areas -- a range more closely paralleling bilateral mission needs. Expertise is required in private sector policy reform, privatization, institutional and manpower development, banking and credit, investment and trade and small business development.

3. Contractor Performance. The performance of the lead contractor, Coopers and Lybrand, was entirely adequate in providing the necessary caliber of staff, administrative support and quality reports. Mission staff and local officials reported that the lead contractor fielded well-qualified teams who understood the process of divestiture and produced reports that were useful to the A.I.D. missions and host country government agencies. The contractor fielded the teams on time and the teams, for the most part, completed the reports in a timely manner. They developed clear action plans for restructuring existing enterprises and commencing the divestiture process.

> Recommendation: Given the availability of high quality private sector analytical capabilities and the likely increase in demand in a wide variety of areas for these services, REDSO should consider: a) encouraging consulting firms to form consortia; and b) offering up to three IQCs to ensure increased accessibility to experts and a degree of competition among lead firms.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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C. Improve Equity and Efficiency in Providing Key Public Goods

HEALTH

EVALUATION/STRENGTHENING HEALTH PLANNING CAPACITY PROJECT IN BURKINA FASO (686-0251), JULY, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The proportion of the Burkina Faso national budget allocated to health decreased from 11.8 percent in 1960 to 5.5 percent in 1986, while the budget's real value also declined due to an average inflation rate of 9 percent. Thus the Ministry of Health staff needed to improve their ability to allocate health resources as efficiently, effectively and equitably as possible.

In addition, a new government, which came to power in 1983, was highly committed to popular participation in socio-economic development and placed high priorities on public health. The new Government of Burkina Faso (GOB) launched two health campaigns -- a massive "Vaccination Commando" in 1984 and a nationwide "One Village, One Health Post" effort to bring health workers and midwives to all 7200 villages in Burkina Faso. This was a rapid extension of the 2100 Primary Health Posts that had slowly developed over the years. Both campaigns, while suddenly extending coverage of services, raised questions among Ministry staff concerning the support necessary to make such efforts effective and the recurrent resources necessary to sustain them. The costing-out, programming and feasibility studies required to address such issues are among the responsibilities of the Directorate of Studies and Planning in the Ministry.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. USAID/ Burkina obligated the Strengthening Health Planning Capacity Project in September 1982 at a cost of $4 million, but project implementation did not begin until the five-person technical assistance team from PRAGMA arrived in January 1985. After one year of implementation, a Project Paper Supplement was prepared and an additional $1.75 million was added to the budget for technical assistance, training and commodities. The Project Assistance Completion Date is scheduled for September 1990.

The purpose of the project is to strengthen the capacity of the Department in the Ministry to conduct systematic analyses of health needs and resources, develop health strategies and programs and provide an effective contribution to national planning efforts. This is to be accomplished by the training of Ministry personnel, the provision of technical assistance, the development of a health information system, the establishment of a health documentation center, the construction of a building to house the Department, the purchase of equipment and supplies and the financing of certain local operating costs.

The technical assistance team did not establish a separate office, but was installed in the Department to work collegially with counterparts, transferring skills on the job. The TA team prepared guidance and training materials on health planning and data reporting for provincial and central Ministry staff, undertook various analyses, and assisted in setting up information and reporting systems.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to evaluate progress to date towards achievement of project objectives. The evaluation methodology included a review of project documents, in-depth interviews with Ministry and project staff and site visits to observe the primary health care system in four provinces.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward the Achievement of Project Purpose. During the first half of this project, the Ministry, the Department and the technical assistance teams have been extraordinarily successful in developing a planning capacity in the health sector. Progress in developing policies, procedures, plans, training of personnel and coordination has been extremely rapid as judged either by previous developments in the Burkina health sector, or by comparison with similar activities in other developing countries. The Department has been extremely active in developing a national network of planning/programming/monitoring/evaluation activities through direct and continuous collaboration with all the other Ministry central directorates, the provincial health services teams and the services responsible for organizing and supporting an extensive village health workers program. This unusually high degree of progress has been due, in part, to the priority accorded by the new government to primary health care and to participative, coordinated decision-making from ministries to villages. At high levels the new government has pushed hard for rapid, widespread increases in the provision of cost-effective health services. The Department, with the assistance of the technical assistance team, has produced the following major outputs:

- Guidance materials for the development of health plans and for collecting and using data of the health information system, as well as a series of training seminars on the use of these materials;

- A Five-Year Health Plan and a First Year Annual Health Plan. The Second Year Annual

Health Plan was in preparation at the time of the evaluation;

- Six-monthly meetings of Central and Provincial Directors;
- Two annual Donor Coordination Meetings;
- A new Health Information System, partially computerized;
- Five editions of the Bulletin d'Epidemiologie et d'Information;
- Completion of two operations research studies and the design of three others.

Recommendation: To preserve the Department's capacity for planning, analytic studies and technical analysis, the Department's Director should reduce by 50 percent the number of tasks required of the Department by the Ministry of Health, assign additional clerical staff to assure better utilization of professional staff time on technical tasks and increase efficiency through greater use of computers. The Department should also collaborate with central and provincial directorates to plan for needed training of provincial Ministry personnel in the essential management skills required for implementing plans and programs.

2. Planning. **While planning processes themselves are excellent and are supported by unusually active communication between provincial and central directors of health, financial planning appears weak.** There is scant evidence of an effort to relate available financial and human resources with proposed projects, activities and objectives in the current five-year and annual health plans. While the Five-Year Plan identifies a number of well-chosen health priorities, it does not indicate whether there will be enough resources to carry them out, and, if not, which objectives should be given preference. This plan also indicates the importance of Burkina's progressively relying upon its own resources for its development. The financial analysis capacity of the Department is limited because of: a) the lack of time and research assistance available to the Department economist; and b) the lack of reliable data from the field. The evaluation team heard comments from provincial and central directors about the inability to plan effectively without better costing.

Recommendation: The technical assistance team should give priority to strengthening the financial analysis capability of the Department. The Department should now give priority to delineating the inter-relationships between health status objectives, health service activities, recurrent costs and the availability of resources. With additional support available to the chief Department economist, this should be possible. The Department should work with other ministries to prepare a training program for financial support staff, in order to develop reliable recurrent cost information on health sector expenditures. The Department should also prepare a series of papers which cost out the resources required to achieve various levels of possible results from alternative health activities. For example, if current prenatal care coverage is 22 percent, what additional resources would be necessary to raise coverage the next year to 27 percent, to 32 percent, etc?

3. Health Information System. **Since the Department began rebuilding an all but defunct health information system in 1985, it has made "tremendous progress."** Prior to 1985, annual health statistics did not exist for six years (1979-1984). Before 1985, separate health directorates had to fend for themselves to obtain health data. The outdated system for collecting health data was breaking down largely because of the national administrative change which increased the number of provinces from 10 to 30. The new provincial offices were not well-equipped to handle any kind of reporting, let alone health information requests. To address these problems the Department undertook the following major tasks in 1985, among many others:
a) drafted data collection instruments and systems;
b) visited six provinces to obtain information;
c) enlisted two U.S. Bureau of the Census technicians to assist in preparing questionnaires; d) ordered their first computer; and e) trained personnel.

With the preparation and distribution of a uniform set of health data collection forms, the system was set in motion in 1986. In principle, over 7000 village health posts, along with other health centers, report quarterly to the provincial health directorate. This office compiles the reports and sends them to the Department for processing. Around 70 percent of the provincial quarterly reports arrive at the Department before the end of the following month.

Recommendation: A qualified computer programmer is needed immediately at the Department in order to produce tables from the computerized Provincial Quarterly Reports. These tables are needed to

complete the 1986 Annual Report in a timely fashion. After the production of this report, the health information system should be modified to provide more frequent and timely feedback to all health personnel. This could be done by producing and distributing quarterly reports, or extracting selected data from the provincial reports and including analyses of these data in the Bulletin d'Epidemiologie et d'Information Sanitaire.

4. Operations Research. The Department is performing more operational research studies -- seven -- than the minimum five called for in the project agreement. The studies are all pertinent and adhere to the guidelines set forth in the Project Agreement. Preliminary results on two studies have provided the Ministry with valuable information for planing purposes. For example, one study showed that expenditures for traditional health care were about twice that of modern health care, and that the average expenditures per person (about $4) was far more than the average government expenditure per capita (about $1.50). This information is particularly useful to the Ministry since health expenditures are being used as national indicators to measure progress of the Five-Year Plan.

Recommendation: A Review Committee should be established for the selection and funding of operational research proposals. Since the Department workload is steadily increasing, the Committee should be appropriately placed elsewhere, perhaps in the General Secretariat.

5. Sustainability. The sustainability of the project had not been carefully considered. A plan for the continuation of the project needs to be written by September 1989. Although the GOB is now providing its contribution, it needs to examine where funding will come from for in-service training of personnel, printing costs, funding for conferences and communication costs when the project comes to an end.

Recommendation: The technical assistance economist should begin work on a plan for the Department to cover its recurrent costs. The plan would involve an assessment of all costs and resources available to the Department when the A.I.D. project comes to an end.

EVALUATION TEAM.

NAME:	AFFILIATION:
Vincent Brown	University Research Corporation
Harry Godfrey	"
Ann Levin	"
Melvyn Thorne	"
Janet Malcolm	"

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EVALUATION REPORT OF THE ACSI/CCCD PROJECT IN CAR (698-0421.76), NOVEMBER, 1986

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Problems related to infant and child survival are greater in the Central African Republic (CAR) than in any other low-income sub-Saharan African country. The Government of the Central African Republic (GOCAR) must address a combination of high infant and child mortality rates (138/000 and 27.2/1000, respectively), low vaccine coverage for the under five population and heavy concentration of health facilities around the capital city of Bangui.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1984, A.I.D. authorized a grant of $691,000 for the African Child Survival Initiative/Combatting Childhood Communicable Diseases (CCCD) project. The purpose of the project was to reduce childhood morbidity and mortality through assistance to the GOCAR's programs of vaccination (Expanded Program of Immunization - EPI), control of diarrheal disease and malaria. The project was implemented by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs (MOPHSA) in the eight most densely populated "prefectures" (districts) of the country. Project outputs included increasing national immunization coverage to 55 percent for Bacillus-Carmin-Guerrain vaccine (BCG); 45 percent for measles; 40 percent for Diptheria-Pertussis-Tetanus vaccine (DPT) and polio; 45 percent for tetanus toxoid and increasing the percentage of health facilities using Oral Rehydration Thereapy (ORT) from 5 percent to 70 percent within four years. The Project Assistance Completion Date was May 1989.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess: 1) the effectiveness of the CCCD program with respect to the planning, management and implementation of its activities at the central, regional and peripheral levels; 2) the extent to which CCCD activities were integrated into the GOCAR's existing Primary Health Care/Family Planing structure; 3) CCCD costs, financing and sustainability after termination of donor assistance; and 4) make recommendations to improve the program's effectiveness and sustainability.

The methodology involved document review, interviews and site visits to a representative sample of health care facilities.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **Progress toward the GOCAR goal of establishing a functioning primary health care system was substantial.** The primary health care system involved regional and prefectural level hospitals, health centers, subcenters, health posts, village health committees and village midwives. Trained personnel were available and an indigenous university level medical faculty existed to train doctors and supporting health workers. The Ministry's recently approved multi-year national plans (1986-1990) for EPI, Control of Diarrheal diseases and Control of Malaria were excellent and would provide a solid foundation for operational programs. The Ministry's strategy to execute these activities through decentralization of management, as an integral part of its Maternal Child Health/ Family Planning, and to involve the Chief Medical Officers and their deputies from the five health regions in the final drafting of the three plans was very well-conceived.

Nevertheless, significant problems still needed to be addressed. Only 40 percent of the target population of mothers and children could be reached through existing health facilities and, nationwide, only 18 percent of children under five were fully vaccinated. In view of these problems, as well as the start-up time that was required for the project, it will take a full four operational years from 1986 to achieve CCCD project objectives.

> Recommendation: USAID and GOCAR should consider extending the project (including the Technical Officer) until May 1990 to provide support for the government's multi-year Plans (1986-1990) for the Expanded Program in Immunization (EPI), Combatting Diarrheal Diseases and Malaria.
>
> Since only the EPI plan has a budget, the GOCAR should prepare budgets for the two other national plans so that donor assistance can be sought.

2. Administration and Management. **Administration and management at the central level was very strong while planning and supervision of field operations needed improvement.** The National Coordinator for the CCCD project was a competent manager and this represented a significant plus for the project. The GOCAR's insistence on founding the national programs on vaccine coverage surveys, KAP (Knowledge, Attitude and Practice) studies and data analysis meant that, although there were still many logistic/delivery problems, the CCCD/Primary Health Care programs were based on solid foundations.

At the Regional level, activities were well-coordinated by the Chief Regional Medical officer and his deputies. However, supervision of prefectures and counties was hindered by severe logistical problems -- lack of vehicles, gasoline and per diem. In addition, health centers, subcenters and health posts suffered shortages of professional personnel. Many Maternal and Child Health centers did not have the capacity to carry out vaccinations. The problem was compounded by the GOCAR's agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on limiting the hiring of additional government personnel. Finally, many health facilities were encountering supply problems with medicines, vaccines and antimalarial drugs. Many had ruptures in stock in the last year. Delivery problems were only solved by ad-hoc trips to the regional breakpoint. Petrol supply problems for the refrigerators caused several breakdowns in the cold chain system resulting in loss of vaccines.

Recommendations: Should GOCAR be unable to meet personnel requirements by reassignment of Ministry staff into the field, the project should consider hiring professional contract personnel for the life of the project to meet these needs. Costs of the contract personnel would need to be covered by donors given the GOCAR/World Bank/IMF agreements restricting the hiring of personnel.

To solve the serious logistics problems, the project and GOCAR should prepare detailed annual or quarterly supervisory visit and outreach plans for each region by prefecture indicating the number of health facilities to be visited, frequency and length of field trips. The detailed operational planning in the Expanded Program in Immunization plan can serve as a model for the region. Similar plans should be prepared to address the needs for medical supplies.

3. <u>Expanded Program in Immunization</u>. **Nationwide coverage rates remained quite low.** In 1985, vaccination coverage was as follows: BCG (Bacillus-Carmin-Guerrain Vaccine) -- 53.5 percent; OPV1 (Oral Poliovirus Vaccine) -- 34.5 percent; DPT1 (Diptheria-Pertussis-Tetanus Vaccine) -- 34.5 percent; measles -- 30.5 percent. Complete nationwide coverage was 18 percent. Some of the numerous problems which impeded expanded vaccination coverage included the following.
1) None of the health facilities visited had vaccination activities available all days that the facility was open. Only five of the 18 facilities visited had more than one day per week for vaccination of children and pregnant women.
2) While many health facilities were scheduled to conduct outreach activities, very few of the facilities

were actually conducting them due to lack of transport. 3) All health facilities visited reported numerous "missed opportunities" for giving vaccinations. For example, sometimes children were brought to the clinic but were ill and could not be vaccinated. Other times, only a few children showed up for vaccinations and rather than open an entire vial of vaccine for a few children, which would result in wastage of unused doses, the staff sent the children home and told them to return another time. 4) There was no EPI operational manual available in the field for health workers to refer to in case of questions concerning procedures. 5) There were several problems in the maintenance of the cold chain. Several health facilities encountered difficulties in obtaining kerosene supplies for their kerosene refrigerators from the regional level. 6) Vaccine delivery to the local level was uneven due to fuel shortages.

Recommendation: Health centers should eliminate "missed opportunities" by increasing the number of vaccination days, vaccinating sick children and opening vaccine vials for even one child.

The project should make all efforts to ensure that supervisory visits are conducted as scheduled to guarantee a regular and uninterrupted supply of vaccines and kerosene for alternative energy refrigerators.

The project should consider purchasing ice-lined refrigerators and freezers for those vaccine depots that have a minimum of four to six hours of electricity per day.

4. Control of Diarrheal Diseases. **There was no national program to institutionalize the use of Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS).** Based on findings from other African countries on the dangers of sugar salt solution (SSS) during home preparation, the Ministry decided not to promote SSSs as an option for oral rehydration therapy (ORT) at home but rather to devote all efforts into the increased utilization of ORS packets. Despite this decision, there was no national training course for local level health care delivery personnel on the use of ORT in the management of diarrheal episodes. Field visits indicated that many of the health facilities were routinely prescribing ORS packets for diarrhea. In addition, some health personnel relied indiscriminantly on antibiotics for treatment of diarrhea.

Recommendation: The GOCAR should implement training of all health care professional (including private missionary staff) in the appropriate treatment of diarrhea in children.

They should emphasize: proper preparation and administration of ORS; lack of efficacy of antibiotics in most cases and proper indications for use of intravenous therapy in management of dehydration.

5. Malaria Control Program. Treatment regimens varied in the health facilities and were most often related to the availability of supplies. Health facilities at Regional Headquarters were the only facilities visited that were administering chloroquine preferentially at 25 mg/kg body weight divided over a three day period. Discussions with health facility personnel revealed a preference for IM Quinimax, especially for young children, and for all patients with high fevers and vomiting. Dosages used varied, and all were based on the age of the child rather than on body weight. Similarly, chloroquine dosages varied based on age rather than on body weight.

Recommendation: The GOCAR should implement training of all health care personnel (including private missionary staff) in the appropriate management of presumptive malaria episodes.

6. Financing and Sustainability. While total GOCAR self-sufficiency in the health sector will not be possible, recurrent costs of CCCD activities were not excessive. The minimum recurrent cost of CCCD activities when the project ends in 1990 is estimated at $648,086. This is a minimum cost because it does not include cost of personnel, training or maintenance of facilities which are already the responsibility of GOCAR. Nor does it include replacement of vehicles or equipment. It is likely that UNICEF will continue to cover the cost of vaccines, leaving $423,251 to be covered by the GOCAR. The $349,687 cost of chloroquine and Oral Rehydration Salts packets could easily be recovered through the sale of these drugs rather than providing them free. This would leave $73,568 to be financed out of the Ministry budget. Evidence from facilities where fees are being charged indicates that people are willing to pay for quality care and that user fees can contribute substantially to covering operating costs of health facilities.

Recommendation: The project and the GOCAR should find a way to allow health facilities to keep some of the revenue generated through charges rather than return all receipts to the Treasury.

The project and the GOCAR should expand the cost and health activity information required from health facilities as a first step toward

developing a cost accounting system that would later incorporate revenue accounting as well. This information should be used to design a fee schedule for health services at hospitals and other health facilities. USAID should provide the management training needed to implement this policy.

EVALUATION TEAM.

NAME:	AFFILIATION:
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EVALUATION OF ACSI-CCCD PROJECT IN COTE D'IVOIRE (698-0421.81), JUNE, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Cote D'Ivoire has high rates of infant and childhood mortality and morbidity caused principally by diarrheal disease, malaria, measles, tetanus and polio. The primary health care infrastructure is weak.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. REDSO/WCA initiated the African Child Survival Initiative (ACSI)-Combatting Childhood Communicable Diseases (CCCD) Project in June 1985. The planned life of project cost was $1,691.00. The Project Assistance Completion Date was April 1989.

The purpose of the project was to assist the Government of Cote D'Ivoire (GOCI) in delivering primary health care services to reduce infant and child morbidity, by combatting the most frequent causes of death for which there are safe, efficient, and cost-effective interventions.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of the evaluation were to: a) evaluate ACSI-CCCD activities in Cote D'Ivoire through systematic collection and analysis of data on ACSI-CCCD management and operations at the central, regional and peripheral levels; b) measure the extent to which ACSI-CCCD activities had been integrated into the existing Cote D'Ivoire primary health care structure; c) make recommendations to bring about the expansion and delivery of ACSI-CCCD services and accelerate their integration into the primary health care delivery structure, given resource constraints; and d) advise on the desirability and feasibility of improving project progress by preparation of a second phase that would include redesign of the project and extension of its completion date.

The methodology consisted in briefings by A.I.D./Washington, Center for Disease Control (CDC)/Atlanta, REDSO/WCA and the CCCD Technical Officer in Abidjan, as well as field trips and a review of relevant documentation.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Towards Project Purpose. **Progress was positive but modest.** The project built a solid foundation for future CCCD interventions. While the government's public declarations concerning primary

health care were clear and positive, apart from the successful vaccination campaign, concrete actions with respect to other major child survival/ primary health care interventions were slow. On June 29, 1987, the Acting REDSO Director proposed to the Minister of Public Health and Population (MOPHP) that six specific actions be completed by May 31, 198^. a) adoption of a National Malaria Policy; b) adoption of a National Diarrheal Disease Policy; c) establishment of an Oral Rehydration Therapy Unit; d) completion of two mid-level management courses; e) completion of a practice survey; and f) completion of a statistics course for the Chief Medical Officer.

The status of these activities by the proposed date was as follows: a) appropriate ministries were preparing plans to implement the National Malaria Policy; b) the draft National Diarrheal Disease policy was circulating in the Ministry; c) the Minister of Public Health and Population (MOPHP) agreed to go ahead with the Oral Rehydration Therapy demonstration center; d) the two management courses were postponed; and e) the statistics course was not held or scheduled. Clearly action on the above points was mixed. The national vaccination campaign in 1987 (for which the Ministry provided leadership) required an enormous effort that virtually stopped all other primary health care activities for a period of six months.

There were a range of problems in the design of the original project (the evaluation does not elaborate beyond the following):

- Project designers made incorrect assumptions pertaining to the Ministry's capacity to manage a project of this nature, which led to a series of problems which plagued the project during its first phase;

- Project designers should have ascertained that adequate management capacity for fiscal and non-fiscal matters were already in place in the Ministry prior to the first disbursement of funds;

- All key Ministerial officials should have been involved in the design of the project;

- Project activities should have been integrated into the primary health care system of the Ministry rather than implemented as a parallel operation;

- There should have been more formal and informal contacts between REDSO/WCA and senior Ministry officials during the early phase of the project's implementation.

Recommendation: The project should be redesigned to focus on the Ministry's primary health care priorities and how best to use the CCCD project and Ministry resources to help achieve these priorities. Seven administrative actions should be completed prior to the arrival of the redesign team, the principal one being that the proposal to appoint the Director of the Public Health Directorate as the Technical Coordinator for the CCCD project should be clarified. He/she should then ensure that a responsible officer is named for each of the six principal CCCD interventions.

2. CCCD Component: Expanded Program in Immunization. Impressive vaccination coverage rates were achieved by the national campaign in 1987, but they were not being sustained. After the campaign, only approximately 50 percent of government health centers were equipped to continue vaccination activities. Virtually all of those not so equipped did not have electricity. At the centers that were equipped, vaccination activities usually were limited to one morning per week. Moreover, the number of trained health workers was insufficient.

Recommendation: The project should assist in a post-campaign evaluation of the deficiencies of the existing EPI program and infrastructure. All CCCD EPI-related activities should be closely coordinated with UNICEF.

3. CCCD Component: Oral Rehydration Therapy. Progress in developing and implementing a national Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) program was slow and erratic. Information from a health practices survey in Abidjan suggested that very few episodes of diarrhea were benefiting from ORT. Only 16 percent of the children in the survey having an episode of diarrhea during the preceding two week interval had received any form of ORT. Of equal concern, a CCCD study showed that 30 percent of mothers were making potentially dangerous solutions one day after receiving much more intensive education than is likely to be possible in most health centers. Training of health workers was hampered by the inadequacy of the existing ORT demonstration unit at Treichville.

Recommendation: The ORT coordinator should work with the existing technical advisory committee, CCCD personnel and the redesign team to formulate a coherent ORT policy for formal approval. Construction and staffing of a new ORT demonstration facility should be a high priority

and needs to be expedited. ORT activities need to be re-organized under a single coordinator within the Ministry.

4. CCCD Component: Malaria. Project progress in malaria control was held up by the delay in issuing a formal policy statement concerning appropriate treatment and prevention measures. The need for such a statement was demonstrated by studies undertaken in 1986 that showed that a substantial proportion of children with suspected malaria were receiving inappropriate medication and/or incorrect doses of antimalarials. The policy statement was issued in 1988 and contained appropriate information concerning treatment. Unfortunately, it also indicated that those who wished to give weekly chemoprophylaxis to young children should continue to do so.

Recommendation: A coordinator of malaria activities in the Ministry should be appointed before a redesign team arrives in Abidjan. CCCD should assist the malaria coordinator in the development of a multi-year action plan for the implementation of the malaria control program. The issue of providing chemoprophylaxis to children under five years of age should be reconsidered before its inclusion in technical guidelines for malaria control activities.

5. CCCD Component: Operations Research. Operations research studies conducted under CCCD auspices were uneven in their quality and usefulness in addressing operational problems. The study of the ability of mothers to make Oral Rehydration Therapy solutions (discussed above) was extremely useful. On the other hand, it was unclear how other studies (of children with meningitis, of the characteristics of children hospitalized with diarrhea and of the proportion of infants less than nine months with measles antibodies) would lead to new strategies for decreasing morbidity and mortality from these diseases. At the same time, there was a great need for studies that narrowly focus on definable operational problems.

Recommendation: Limit the operations research component of CCCD to small, simple studies and develop a mechanism for ensuring the quality, scope and appropriateness of future studies.

6. <u>CCCD Component: Health Information System</u>. **The health information system, while improved in some respects since 1985, continued to be problematic.** The system was unwieldy and needlessly complex. The result was that only a fraction of the information collected was ever interpreted or used in decision-making. The hospital-based system of collecting morbidity and mortality data was inoperative. At a broader level, there appeared to be only limited interest within the Ministry in making sweeping changes in the whole approach to gathering and using health data. In 1986, U.S. Bureau of the Census consultants recommended that health officials be given training in how to use health information systems to determine priorities and measure progress in achieving objectives. Many of these recommendations were not implemented and the need for training of this type continues.

> Recommendation: CCCD should assist in designing and implementing a new hospital-based health information system. The CCCD project should support this activity immediately. Recommendations of the 1986 U.S. Bureau of Census consultation should be implemented, particularly those that relate to training, and a follow-up Bureau of the Census consultation should be scheduled immediately after the visit of the redesign team.

7. <u>Sustainability</u>. **The Ministry's primary health care program contained important self-help components.** For example, health cards for mothers and children were sold for 155 CFA francs each. Vaccination cards were 100 CFA francs in Abidjan and 50 CFA francs in the rural areas. While initial doses of chloroquine were provided to mothers at the Health Center, the patient was expected to purchase the remaining tablets. Given the relatively higher per capita income in Cote D'Ivoire, there appeared to be significant potential for the population to help by paying more of the costs of primary health care.

> Recommendation: The redesign team should develop detailed, time-phased cost estimates with the Ministry in terms of the resources required to operate the CCCD project through September 1991. The redesign team should look carefully into how the Ministry might proceed in this sensitive area.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION OF ACSI/CCCD IN LESOTHO (698-0421.32), FEBRUARY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Lesotho has high rates of infant mortality and morbidity caused principally by diarrheal disease, malaria, measles, tetanus and polio. The primary health care infrastructure is weak.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1984, A.I.D. authorized $648,900 for the African Child Survival Initiative -- Combatting Childhood Communicable Diseases (CCCD) in Lesotho project. The purpose of the project was to assist the Government of Lesotho (GOL) Ministry of Health (MOH) to reduce mortality and morbidity in children less than five years old by expanding and upgrading immunization and diarrheal disease control services. The project also aimed to strengthen the ability of the Ministry to deliver routine health services, through health education, training, health information systems and operational research support. Final input delivery occurred in 1988.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to: 1) review progress made on the recommendations of the CCCD External Evaluation in 1986; 2) review progress made to date on activities outlined in the HEALTHCOM Implementation Plan; 3) discuss additional areas of concern, and make recommendations to address these issues, in relation to CCCD-supported interventions; 4) consider a phase-in of additional CCCD project areas, such as a program to combat acute respiratory infection (ARI); 5) make recommendations regarding the recurrent cost implications of CCCD and HEALTHCOM; and 6) determi... whether extensions of CCCD and HEALTHCOM are appropriate and, if so, the potential duration of the extensions.

Key officials of the Ministry, USAID, CCCD and HEALTHCOM prepared draft reports and recommendations for various components of the project. A committee then met December 3-4, 1988 to review and finalize the reports. The committee circulated a summary report in the Ministry and USAID for revisions and final approval in February 1988.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Expanded Program in Immunization (EPI). The project successfully assisted with training, health education, supervision and logistics activities of

Lesotho's EPI. The project encouraged intensified disease surveillance activities and supported efforts to begin urban "immunization weekends" in Maseru, as recommended in 1986. EPI experienced some supply problems with needles, syringes, cold boxes and training manuals. At the time of the evaluation, the Ministry and CCCD already addressed these problems, especially those involving procurement through USAID.

> Recommendation: The project should continue promotion of urban vaccinations and community level services.
>
> The project and GOL should develop a national policy and strategy to vaccinate children on school entry against measles.
>
> The project and GOL should review the inventory system to ensure constant supplies.

2. Control of Diarrheal Diseases (CDD). **The project and HEALTHCOM worked successfully with the Ministry to develop a national policy and implementation workplan for oral rehydration therapy (ORT).** Various ORT Unit activities commenced in 16 of the country's 18 hospitals, strengthened by three national symposia on ORT for 110 health professionals in September. Health Service Areas (HSAs) also drafted plans to open ORT Corners in health centers. However, lack of transportation and funds for supervision, inadequate staff and varying commitments at the district level slowed progress. New vehicles recently supplied by UNICEF should help remedy the transportation problems.

> Recommendation: The project and the GOL should continue strengthening existing ORT Units and develop similar units in Health Centers.
>
> The project and HEALTHCOM should complete remaining ORT Program workplan activities by the target date, including development of distribution schemes for ORT packets and implementation of health education strategies.
>
> The project should hold three separate annual symposia for: 1) officials at the national level; 2) health management teams; and 3) field level health workers.

3. Training. **The CCCD-supported decentralized training program succeeded in laying a strong foundation for continuing Health Service Area (HSA) - level training.** Achievements in EPI coverage and increased knowledge about ORT (not discussed in the

Program Evaluation Summary [PES]) provided evidence of training impact. However, the program was long overdue for an evaluation.

Recommendation: The project should conduct a comprehensive evaluation of CCCD/UNICEF-supported training at the HSA and community levels.

The project should review and upgrade existing CCCD training modules on management skills (especially the one concerning supervision).

4. Health Education/Communication. **HEALTHCOM and the Health Education Unit (HEU) successfully completed qualitative research and a baseline study of knowledge and practices regarding Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) and immunization.** Standard messages on ORT were adopted and disseminated by radio through ten short programs. However, permanent staff related to HEALTHCOM/CCCD interventions had not been identified, slowing progress on planned print and graphics materials.

Recommendation: HEU and HEALTHCOM should create and implement a training plan for new staff scheduled to join the HEU for HEALTHCOM-related activities.

The project should provide a high-volume photocopier and duplicating machine to the HEU to help meet anticipated increased production demands.

5. Health Information System. **Lack of staff prevented processing of inpatient data since 1985 and outpatient data since 1986 -- impeding the development of a timely and responsive health information system.** In response to the 1986 recommendations, the Disease Control Unit created and distributed new outpatient morbidity forms with age-specific information. In addition, the Unit organized a new disease outbreak reporting system. But inadequate staff hindered follow-up on these efforts as well as on monitoring of data collection in the field.

Recommendation: The project should assist the Ministry in the speedy identification and recruitment of adequate staff in the Health Statistics Unit. Critical staff include a full-time health information manager and three to five statistics/data entry clerks. The project should also consider increasing Health Service Area-level training in health information systems.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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RWANDA CCCD END OF PROJECT EVALUATION (698-0421), MAY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Rwanda is a small, landlocked East African country, with one of the highest population densities on the continent (230 per square kilometer). The population growth rate of 3.8 percent is among the highest in the world. About 95 percent of the population lives on small subsistence farms. Per capita income is about $270 per annum. Health levels are low. Life expectancy is 47 years and infant mortality is estimated at 115 to 125 per thousand. Leading causes of death among children are malaria, diarrheal diseases and acute respiratory infections. Malaria incidence has reached alarming proportions in recent years.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. The Rwanda Combatting Childhood Communicable Diseases (CCCD) Project was initiated in July 1984 and began operations in December with the assignment of the Technical Officer (TO). The project provided $1,072,000 in grant funding for commodities and local costs from A.I.D., with an anticipated Government of Rwanda (GOR) contribution of $810,402 for commodities, repair and maintenance. In addition, the Center for Disease Control (CDC)/Atlanta provided funding for the TO, technical assistance and CDC supervision.

Complementing the efforts of WHO, UNICEF and other donors, the project was designed to enhance a major initiative of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MOSHA) in immunization and expand child survival efforts to cover malaria and Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT). The project was intended to strengthen institutional support for these interventions by developing an effective, simplified health information system, strengthening training and health information efforts, reinforcing systems of supervision, supporting operations research and other studies and encouraging the development of self-financing mechanisms. Over the three and one-half years of implementation, the project provided both long and short-term technical assistance in all program areas. The project phased in its coverage of the country by first developing pilot efforts in three provinces, expanding in the second phase to cover four more and, in the final year, to all ten provinces.

The project was administered through an agreement between A.I.D. and CDC. CDC had technical authority for implementing the project as part of the regional CCCD program in 13 African countries. USAID/Kigale was responsible for project administration.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to: a) assess progress in achieving project objectives; b) evaluate the roles of the Ministry, the GOR, USAID, CDC and other donors; c) evaluate the potential for sustainability of project activities; and d) recommend future health activities that could be sponsored by A.I.D. or other donors.

The evaluation methodology involved site visits, interviews with key personnel and document review.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **The project's accomplishments were impressive and many of the institutional objectives were achieved.** By the end of the project, the Ministry had established well-designed national plans for the Expanded Program in Immunization (EPI), ORT and malaria, and had developed a national system to coordinate these interventions. The latter had been integrated into several divisions at the national level. Impact and significant progress were discernible in several areas as discussed below.

> Recommendation: USAID/Kilgale should consider the following options for continuing support in the health sector: a) renewal and redesign of the CCCD project; b) integration of priority CCCD activities into the Family Planning project; c) a primary health care project; or d) an AIDS project.

2. CCCD Component: Expanded Program in Immunization (EPI). **The EPI component was the most effective in reaching the specific objectives of the project.** The project had established the following immunization coverage targets for children 12-23 months: Oral Polio Virus (OPV) Vaccine, 80 percent; Diptheria Pertussis Tetanus (DPT) Vaccine, 80 percent; measles, 80 percent; and Bacillus Carmin Guerrain (BCG) Vaccine, 85 percent. By 1987, actual achievements, which met or exceeded these targets (with the exception of measles) were as follows: OPV-1, 93 percent; OPV-3, 79 percent; DPT-1, 93 percent; DPT-2, 91 percent; measles, 75 percent; and BCG, 90 percent. A second objective was to achieve vaccination coverage of 25 percent of pregnant women with two doses of tetanus toxoid. A 1986 survey found that 24 percent of pregnant women had received the two doses of tetanus toxoid.

> Recommendation: A major challenge will be to ensure that progress made is maintained. The Ministry and UNICEF should continue to support the

current EPI program. USAID should review the EPI program to determine if additional support is necessary.

3. CCCD Component: Control of Diarrheal Diseases (CDD). A national CDD strategy and policy were established. The project target was to establish Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT) as the primary treatment for diarrhea with dehydration in 80 percent of health facilities by the end of 1987. This target was achieved. Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS) packets were available in 100 percent of the health facilities throughout Rwanda. Survey data showed that by 1987, 74 percent of diarrhea cases were treated with ORT, which indicated effective case management of diarrheal episodes. An ORT unit which serves as a training center was established at Kigale and over 20 ORT units were opened nationwide.

Recommendation: The Ministry and UNICEF should continue the current ORT program and place special emphasis on providing all health facilities with demonstration materials for ORS preparation. They should intensify supervision for correct quantity of ORS administered and correct monitoring of weight gained.

4. CCCD Component: Malaria Control. While a national malaria strategy was developed and a national treatment policy was established, for reasons beyond the control of the project, there was an alarming rise in the incidence of malaria. The strategy was comprehensive but problems still existed at the end of the project. In some health centers visited, the standard protocol was not being followed and there was a lack of knowledge among personnel about the efficacy of different malaria medications. In other cases, health workers skipped the sequence for medication established in the protocol because the appropriate medication (Fansidar) was not available at most health centers. Since 1984, reported malaria incidence increased by 96 percent.

Recommendation: The priority area of malaria is the most in need of external support and, unlike EPI and ORT, is without external sources of funding. To cope with the immediate crisis, emergency funding is necessary. All donors should find immediate means of providing the necessary drugs and treatments at least to maintain the supplies necessary for the malaria protocol. Donors should support short-term technical assistance to determine the causes of the dramatic increase in malaria incidence. The Ministry

should use the equipment provided by the CCCD project to establish a national malaria reference laboratory.

5. CCCD Component: Health Information System. While staff reached the target of establishing baseline morbidity and mortality data relevant to CCCD, the health information system needed to be reorganized. The health information system was divided into three parts: 1) the national CCCD information system, which collected coverage and impact data; 2) the supervision information system, which provided status data on health center performance; and 3) the pilot health information system project, which was programmed for expansion to the national level.

Recommendation: The Ministry and other donors should continue efforts to establish a fully integrated national health information system.

6. Supervision. One of the major achievements of this project was the development of an innovative supervisory system which used a carefully designed protocol and checklist for central level supervisors. Central level supervisors were trained in supervisory techniques and developed the checklist using a modification of World Health Organization supervisory guidelines. The central supervisors visited two to five health centers per day when they made a regional supervisory visit. At the end of their review, based on the checklist, they discussed their findings with health center staff. The checklist was used later to enter data in the supervisory information system and a report was prepared which evaluated the performance of all health centers in a region.

Recommendation: It would be useful if this system were extended to the ten regional supervisors so that they could use the checklist in their routine monthly visits. The Ministry should convene a national seminar on supervision with all regional and central officials to discuss the different regional supervisory systems and aim for the integration of regional and national systems.

7. Impact. CCCD activities contributed to impact in one area of the project -- the Expanded Program in Immunization (EPI) -- . However, impact was not yet discernible in the other project areas. There was a 54 percent decrease in measles morbidity, an 85 percent decrease in pertussis morbidity and a 41 percent decrease in polio morbidity from 1984-87, compared to

1980-83. Based on reports from six hospitals, there was no decrease in mortality from diarrheal diseases during 1984-87, compared to 1980-83 and no decrease in the number of diarrheal cases admitted to hospitals during this same period. In these same hospitals, the case fatality rate for diarrheal diseases remained unchanged at 4 percent from 1980 -87. There also was no decrease in the incidence of diarrheal diseases during this period. Based on record reviews from five hospitals, there was a 26 percent increase in mortality due to malaria from 1984-87, compared to 1980-83, and a 57 percent increase in the number of hospital admissions for malaria. The case fatality rate for malaria remained unchanged at 3 percent from 1980-87.

> Recommendation: USAID should provide technical assistance to refine surveillance data on morbidity and mortality in order to provide data required to monitor impact.

8. Financing/Sustainability. Several factors suggested that additional resources would not be available to support child survival activities when the CCCD project came to an end. First, an analysis of USAID, UNICEF and GOR contributions to CCCD recurrent costs suggested that the total recurrent cost burden of the project would be 5.4 percent of the Ministry budget. This would be a significant burden for the Ministry, especially in view of the fact that the Ministry budget had recently been cut by 20 percent. Second, while project expenditures were fairly steady for the first three years, there was a marked acceleration of expenditures in the first quarter of 1988. This pattern of expenditures would make the termination of the project all the more difficult for the Ministry. Expenditure patterns should reflect a declining pattern of USAID contributions and an increasing assumption of project costs by the GOR. Third, while the CCCD cost-recovery study found that 91 percent of households were willing to accept higher fees to ensure the availability of drugs, and made important recommendations concerning the establishment of a revolving drug fund and a feasibility study for prepayment schemes, none of the recommendations had been acted on.

> Recommendation: The Ministry should review self-financing proposals and develop a national plan for self-financing. Donors should provide technical assistance for evaluating alternatives and developing the national plan.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION OF THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH PROJECT (660-0101), July, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. In the late 70s, faculty at the University of Kinshasa (UNIKIN) recognized the need for a unified system to train higher level health professionals. Foreign schools were unable to provide the best preparation for working in the sub-Saharan health environment. In addition, institutions in sub-Saharan Africa capable of providing appropriate training could not train more than one or two students annually from each country. Zaire's projected needs were for approximately 750 master's level health leaders and about 30 MPH graduates per year.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. initiated the School of Public Health (SPH) Project in 1984 through a contract with the Government of Zaire and Tulane University, New Orleans. The project was administered by the University of Kinshasa in cooperation with Tulane's School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine. The project will be funded through June 1994. Planned life of project costs are $8,815,000.

The purposes of the project are to: a) develop a fully independent and accredited School of Public Health (SPH) at the University of Kinshasa to serve Zairian and other central African students; b) develop a series of long and short-term programs for undergraduates and post-graduates; c) establish an applied research program adapted to the health problems of Zaire and other central African countries; d) establish a public health library; e) establish two Field Management Research Centers; f) renovate the nursing/allied health sciences building on the University of Kinshasa campus; and g) establish a public health laboratory.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of this evaluation were to: a) determine whether activities supporting project objectives were on target; b) identify problems impeding project implementation; and c) make recommendations to resolve the problems identified. The evaluation methodology consisted of in-country interviews and document review.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Towards Achievement of Project Purpose. **The School of Public Health (SPH) has been established in the University of Kinshasa's Medical School's Department of Public Health.** It should evolve into an

independent institution in the University system as it grows in faculty and students. The school received its first class of full time students in October 1986. It has provided an academic program at the post-graduate level for 22 students, of which 18 were physician administrators. The curriculum is comparable to a U.S. or European program of study. The school year is divided into four blocks: 1) quantitative measurement; 2) health administration; 3) public health interventions; and 4) research methodology. Field training was performed in each block. The project's technical committee has met several times to give advice on issues ranging from academic to managerial. Several professionals involved with USAID's other health projects expressed the desire to communicate with the advisory committee since their work is related to the school's work in areas such as field training and research.

> Recommendation: USAID should arrange a meeting with service delivery and research project staffs and SPH to develop a procedure to improve communication among these units.

2. Project Implementation. **Project implementation has fallen behind schedule.** The building provided by the University required significant renovations which were delayed due to a lengthy approval process on the part of all involved. The building cost was grossly underestimated by the A.I.D. engineer on the design team and, with the recent rapid rise in Zaire's inflation rate, building costs have skyrocketed several fold. As a result of the delay in construction, neither the library nor the public health laboratories have been completed, although books and equipment have been ordered. The plans for these two elements are sound. A computer laboratory was developed at the temporary site and functions very actively in the teaching and research program.

> Recommendation: USAID and the School of Public Health should revise the project budget for dollars and counterpart funds to reflect the change in the monetary value of the currencies and the elevated cost for the building renovation.

3. Family Planning. **The one-week module on Demographic Techniques is inadequate to the needs of the program.** It is impossible to cover the materials listed in the teaching objectives in 30 hours. In Zaire, where population growth is an issue and where family planning practices can contribute to both reduced fertility and child mortality, students in public health should receive adequate training in

demography and knowledge of demography is basic to understanding all public health measurements.

> Recommendation: The module on Demographic Techniques should be expanded to 60 hours or two weeks. There should be more detailed discussion of mortality and morbidity, the use of demographic data in vital statistics and in the estimation of the local population, contraceptive acceptance, and population policies, including those of the Government of Zaire. There also should be greater use of computer software such as RAPID to develop a better understanding of population issues.

4. Field Training. **Review of field training materials and visits to field training sites suggested the need to rethink how this learning experience can be made more relevant and effective.** The field training objectives seem to focus more on research and data management than on the use of data in managing health systems. The field experience is not focused on learning management skills and applying knowledge gained in the classroom, but rather on observation and description of clinical field operations. Student satisfaction with the field learning experience was very low. The faculty does not appear to have responded to students' comments or to consultants' recommendations that the field training agenda be restructured.

> Recommendation: The School of Public Health should improve the integration of field training with the general curriculum. This may require revising field training philosophy. A committee should be established to determine the topics to be studied in the field. At the end of the year, a large seminar should be held to derive new strategies to improve field training. The time allocated to field training should be augmented and a one-month field session should complete the academic year.

5. The Diploma Program. **The general approach of the teaching program is sound.** A review of the syllabus suggests that the various courses in the curriculum are of the proper breadth and depth, and cover all the essential topics in the fundamental areas of public health, including biostatistics, environmental health, maternal and child health, child survival, epidemiologic investigation, administrative principles, community organization, information, education and communication and Health Information Systems/Management Information Systems. Students' attention is regularly drawn to the causes of preventable illnesses and deaths

known to be most common in Zaire, notably the major diseases of infancy and childhood, malaria, tropical diseases and diarrheal diseases. A.I.D. priorities like child survival and nutrition are emphasized.

> Recommendation: The School of Public Health (SPH) should pay more attention to the kinds of responsibilities a chief of zone will have in Zaire. There should be increased emphasis on reviewing and updating the overall tasks of this post. More extensive use of cases studies, as well as of coordinated field training experience, would clarify the comprehensive responsibility of the new zone chief. SPH should obtain the management case studies and the epidemiology training materials developed by the SHDS project (698-0298) from AFR/TR/HPN.

6. Overseas Training. **It has been impossible to adhere to the detailed plan for overseas training.** A range of factors have affected the overseas training plan including the need to have faculty return to their jobs sooner than originally planned and the International Monetary Fund constraint that no new positions be added in the government sector. It thus became necessary to accelerate the training schedule. Changes that have been made appear to be well thought-out. It would be a mistake to withdraw this program's foreign advisors before students needing supervision have completed their Ph.D. dissertations.

> Recommendation: The School of Public Health should endorse the changes made in the original training schedule and should review the proposed withdrawal of foreign advisors. There should be at least two advisors maintained through the 1991-92 academic year, particularly to provide supervision of Ph.D. candidates.

7. The Library. **Library facilities in Kinshasa are extremely inadequate.** The Medical School has a limited collection of older texts and a spotty array of journals. There is no budget at all for subscriptions. The library is dependent on groups such as the Conference of Medical School Deans for any current material. The general student reading room has about 50 individual desks, but these appear to be used mainly for study of notes. The library owns no texts.

> Recommendation: The School of Public Health (SPH) should continue with the present plans for the library. SPH should explore with the World Health Organization (WHO) the designation of the University of Kinshasa as

the Zaire depository for all WHO publications. Plans for funding maintenance of the collection after the project ends will require special attention. SPH should seek alternative sources for building and maintaining library materials.

8. Sustainability. Modest progress has been made to ensure sustainability but some issues remain unresolved and some foreign students are being highly subsidized by the GOZ. Those foreign students sponsored by bilateral or multilateral agencies pay $4000 per year for tuition, room and board. No effort has been made, however, to seek an equitable fee to cover the costs of public health education. Earnings from short courses will make an unknown contribution to funding other expenses. Tulane University has started a fundraising effort for an endowment, hoping to cover core costs in perpetuity.

Recommendation: Tulane University should continue efforts to ensure project sustainability.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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FAMILY PLANNING

INTERIM EVALUATION OF THE FAMILY PLANNING SUPPORT PROJECT-BURKINA FASO (686-0260), DECEMBER, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Burkina Faso continues to be plagued by high fertility (total fertility rate of 6.16 live births) and infant mortality (139/1000) rates. By the late 70s, nurses and midwives had received numerous requests from multiparous women for assistance in limiting the size of their families, but they were hindered in their efforts to help by their own lack of family planning training and supplies. There were virtually no personnel within the government who had training or were skilled in either Information Education and Communication (IEC) activities or clinical procedures for establishing a family planning program. Moreover, the major professional schools of medicine, nursing and social welfare had not incorporated family planning into their curricula.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. The purpose of the four-year Family Planning Support Project is to strengthen the institutional capacities of the Burkinabe health and social welfare structures to develop and implement improved programs for family planning information and services. This is a Phase I effort to assist the Government of Burkina (GOB) in developing a strong public sector foundation from which to expand, nationwide, the integrated maternal and child health/family planning (MCH/FP) information and services program.

In 1984, A.I.D. approved a $4.4 million population initiative. Due to budgetary and political considerations, the project paper was limited to training of health and social welfare professionals and Information, Education and Communication activities. The project was obligated on June 30, 1986 at a cost of $1,250,000. In June 1987, A.I.D amended the project to add $672,000 and to expand the service delivery component. In addition, the A.I.D./Washington Office of Population provided centrally-funded support in the areas of management systems (FPMT project) and contraceptive logistics (FPIA project). The Project Assistance Completion Date is planned for June 1990.

At the end of the project, outputs will include: a) strengthened management units within the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MOSHA); b) a national training team of 18 program planners and trainers; c) 165 workers trained in clinical services and 120 social agents trained in counselling and communication; d) family planning curricula incorporated into the appropriate national schools; e) a network of clinical services available at 41 centers and contraceptive

users increasing by 10 percent per year; f) eight model maternal and child health centers; and g) an Information, Education and Communication production unit.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to analyze project implementation and management in order to assist USAID and the Ministry to improve project activities and make programming decisions for the future.

The evaluation methodology included document review, interviews with Ministry personnel, including the National Family Planning Training Team, and clinical and social action staff in Ouagadougou and at field sites. The team also observed clinical and Information, Education and Communication participants as they underwent training and spent a week in the field observing service delivery in clinical and social agencies.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **Progress has been exceptionally good.** Project staff have either met or exceeded training goals as discussed in greater detail below. Management is proceeding well, especially at such an early stage of the program, due to the record keeping, logistics and supervisory systems developed with the assistance of the FPMT and FPIA projects. Family planning services are available in 15 provinces at 50-60 clinics compared to the projected 40. Family planning acceptors are increasing faster than the 10 percent per annum projected in the project paper.

> Recommendation: While the team does not urge any change in management style, it suggests that the Ministry and USAID continue the kind of close coordination and attention to detail that have characterized the project to date. When USAID centrally-funded opportunities for long-term management training are available, the team recommends that the project take advantage of these opportunities. Project staff should continue collaboration with the FPMT project, which has had obvious beneficial effects.

2. Institutional Development. **The National Training Team represents the heart of the project's institutional development strategy and brings considerable strength to the training component of this**

project. The National Family Planning Training Team is comprised of 18 members (ten health and eight social action members) representing a variety of the key professions within the medical and social action components of family planning. They have trained 96 health personnel (the project goal is 165) and 83 social action personnel (the project goal is 120). Some trainers have provided secondary family planning training for their staffs at provincial and departmental levels. This team forms the basis of the national capability to achieve self-sufficiency in training. The members have benefited from the technical assistance they have received from INTRAH, JHPIEGO and PCS in curriculum development. They have developed the training and curriculum for the ensuing courses that have trained over 170 workers thus far in various aspects of family planning service and Information, Education and Communication. Trainees have benefited from training and are prepared to use the new skills acquired but they lack information materials and need additional support, including transportation.

> Recommendation: The Ministry should incorporate into its training schedule refresher training in Information, Education and Communication and clinical work for personnel who have had at least a year of experience since initial family planning training.

3. Organizational Structure. With the recent integration of the health and social action agencies into one ministry -- the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs --, the latter is now staffed with experienced professionals who have the appropriate disciplines to carry out effective family planning service delivery. There are still a few appointments which need to be confirmed. A structure will then exist which brings together in the same ministry the functions of family planning service delivery and Information, Education and Communication. There is a need to issue administrative guidelines based on the new organizational structure and to issue new position descriptions that will reflect changes in duties brought about by the restructuring of the family planning components of the Ministry.

> Recommendation: The reorganization should be confirmed in all aspects with appropriate administrative guidelines and new position descriptions. These actions will provide all parties a clearer understanding of their roles and functions in family planning services.

4. Record Keeping. The Directorate for Family Health has developed a good record system with assistance from FPIA and FPMT. Field visit inspection of records indicated that most of the records were complete and kept in good order, although there were some exceptions. Records include individual record cards, a record book of patient visits, a notebook of contraceptive sales, a monthly report summarizing family planning activities and a series of forms designed to track contraceptives, supplies and equipment through the logistics system.

> Recommendation: The record keeping system is already satisfactory but can be improved by further standardization of forms and more supervision to ensure that reports are complete and submitted regularly.

5. Using Service Delivery Personnel Effectively. The effectiveness of the service delivery system is jeopardized by the Ministry's reassignment system. The Ministry's policy is to use existing personnel to deliver family planning services as a component of family health services, particularly Maternal and Child Health services. This is working well to date even though some staff feel overworked. Training in family planning has progressed on schedule so that enough trained staff are available at clinics to meet project goals for family planning acceptors. Unfortunately, several trainees were found to have been reassigned since their training.

> Recommendation: The Directorate of Family Health should monitor trainees to ensure that the Ministry reassigns family planning trainees only to positions where they can still use their family planning training.

6. Information, Education and Communications (IEC) Capability. The project has been successful in establishing a centralized IEC unit which gives the Ministry the capability to produce IEC materials and prepare radio and TV programs for transmission via national facilities. The concept is sound, i.e., to provide a central resource, including reference materials on family planning, which may be used by all units within the family planning network to enrich their IEC activities. PCS has provided effective technical assistance to launch this coordinating unit. However, in only a few local centers was there the close collaboration between IEC and clinic personnel that would lead to more rapid growth in the acceptance of family planning at the village level. It would seem

desirable to reinforce this concept through the in-service training process and through close supervision.

> Recommendation: The Ministry is encouraged to promote coordination between the social action and clinical staffs at all levels. The social action personnel should participate in counseling and promotion activities at clinic sites on a part-time basis.

7. Institutional Capability of the Ministry at the End of the Project. At the end of the project, the Ministry will have demonstrated the capacity to manage a nationwide family planning service. It has already demonstrated its capacity to organize and manage successfully various necessary elements.
Some 50 clinics are scattered throughout 14 of the 30 provinces. The clinical staff training system, a logistics system and the Information, Education and Communication (IEC) system are all in place and will be fully functioning by the end of the project. The experience gained during the four years of this project will enable the Ministry to serve as the in-country training resource for the projected extension of IEC and counseling activities to the entire national network of family planning services. The institutional development strategy -- creation of institutional capability through a carefully planned manpower development effort by training clinical and social action workers at all levels -- was effective.

> Recommendation: The Ministry should develop its plans to expand the present project to provide for increased coverage of family planning, IEC and clinical services by the Project Assistance Completion Date.

8. Impact. The project has increased the number of family planning acceptors far in excess of the ten percent increase projected by the project paper. In 1983, an assessment team found that less than 100 couples were protected by modern clinical family planning methods. The team estimated that the Couple Years of Protection (CYP) provided by the project have increased as follows: 1985, 6,000; 1986, 9,000; 1987, 13,000; and 1988, 20,000.

> Recommendation: The Ministry should ensure that all clinics submit their family planning contraceptive and utilization reports consistently and in a timely fashion. These reports should be analyzed for CYP and cross-checked with the financial reports. In the future, a sample survey of contraceptive users should be conducted.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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MIDTERM EVALUATION: CONTRACEPTIVE SUPPLIES PROJECT (641-0109), APRIL, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The early 1980s witnessed a period of steep economic decline in Ghana and a deterioration in U.S.- Ghanaian relations. In 1983, USAID suspended bilateral development assistance to Ghana and limited its population assistance to contraceptive commodity procurement and participant training through A.I.D. regional and central projects. During the same period, Ghana experienced a mass exodus of physicians and other health personnel. In addition, the country suffered from severe scarcities of supplies, drugs, vehicles and gas, which virtually immobilized the health care system. In view of these developments, Ghana has been unable to bring about significant reductions in the country's high rates of fertility and infant mortality.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. After the U. S. lifted its ban on development assistance to the Government of Ghana (GOG), A.I.D. approved the Contraceptive Supplies Project (CSP) on September 19, 1985, with life-of-project funding at $7.0 million over four years. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, International Economic Relations Division ((MFEP/IERD) signed the Project Agreement for the GOG. It delegated management of the public sector component to the Ministry of Health (MOH), and management of the private sector component to a commercial firm, DANAFCO, under contract to MFEP. The revised Project Assistance Completion Date is June 1990.

The purpose of the project is to increase the voluntary use of safe, effective and appropriate contraceptive methods by Ghanaian couples. This is to be accomplished by making an adequate supply of contraceptives and family planning services available on a continuing basis through the existing service delivery network of the Ministry of Health, and through the development of a Contraceptive Social Marketing Program (CSMP) in the private sector.

To achieve these objectives, the project focuses on the following elements: a) contraceptive inputs into the MOH maternal and child health/family planning (MCH/FP) system; b) improvements in the MOH contraceptive distribution and management systems; c) staff training to improve institutional efficiency; d) information, education and communication efforts for intended beneficiaries; and e) a Contraceptive Social Marketing network.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to review the management and technical aspects of both the public and private sector components of the project and to make recommendations to facilitate achievement of the overall project purpose. The evaluation methodology consisted in a review of project files and interviews with public and private sector personnel involved in the project.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Validity of Project Design. The project design was based on a number of assumptions which proved questionable by the time the Project Agreement was signed in September 1985. When USAID decided to proceed with the project, it used the draft project design that had originally been prepared in 1982. There was little input by Ghanaians or others who had significant experience in Ghana. Some of the design assumptions that later proved faulty were: a) there was a positive policy climate for family planning program development in Ghana; b) the adverse economic climate had led to an increased desire for modern family planning services; c) there was a cadre of personnel trained in family planning, requiring only refresher training; and d) given DANAFCO's involvement in an earlier contraceptive marketing program, it could plan and implement all aspects of the project with limited technical assistance.

By the time the project was signed, these assumptions were questionable. For example, while there was an excellent population policy, there was no strong support for family planning in the MOH or GOG. In addition, research conducted in 1985 showed that knowledge about family planning was low, especially with regard to contraceptive methods. There was practically no family planning in-service training and the curricula of the nurse and midwives school contained only a two hour lecture on family planning. In the private sector, the DANAFCO personnel selected to manage the project were not with the company when it distributed A.I.D. contraceptives in the late 70s. More important, DANAFCO's marketing expertise was quite limited and certainly was less than was assumed in the Project Paper. In fact, there was no administrative analysis of DANAFCO in the Project Paper, only DANAFCO's own statement of corporate capability.

Based on the assumptions of the project design, the principal inputs to the project were contraceptive commodities -- of $7 million total funding, $5.5 million was for contraceptives alone. All other project elements were funded at a low level. For example, project designers budgeted only $80,000 for an Information, Education and Communications (IEC)

component (plus another $20,000 from a centrally funded project).

Recommendation: Given that the follow-on project will be implemented during the time period of the next Country Development Strategy Statement, USAID should conduct a sector analysis and prepare a population/family planning strategy. Ghanaian public and private sector counterparts should be extensively involved in planning future project interventions. Major issues such as institutional capability of public and private sector implementors should be thoroughly investigated prior to the actual design exercise.

2. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **Despite faulty project design assumptions, the project is largely on track and has had major accomplishments.** To compensate for faulty design, the GOG and USAID significantly altered the mix of inputs so that project objectives could be attained. A large number of A.I.D. central and regional projects were tapped to provide resources in addition to those planned in the Project Paper. These supplementary resources were targeted to weak areas to compensate for faulty assumptions. Consequently, there have been some important achievements under the project. It has contributed to significant improvements in Ministry of Health (MOH) logistics management and the supply system, especially in its reporting. The project has also contributed to the development and implementation of a plan of action for improved contraceptive supply management. It has increased supervision of family planning services delivery in the field and training of personnel at all levels in data collection and analysis. A pre-service education curriculum for nurses and midwives has been developed and much in-service training for MOH personnel at all levels has been completed.

While these accomplishments are significant, there are management and technical concerns which need to be addressed if the project is going to achieve its objectives. Early in the project, USAID assumed leadership in project management, which was effective in mobilizing project resources. Since then, USAID has retreated somewhat in project management, but responsibilities in project management and implementation need to be shifted even more from USAID to DANAFCO and MOH.

Recommendation: MOH and USAID should independently and then together take a fresh look at project plans, budgets, achievements and difficulties. They should examine how individual activities might be better coordinated, and they should develop an overall implementation plan and

revised budget. USAID should seek ways to further shift responsibility for project management from the Project Officer and Cooperating Agencies to MOH and DANAFCO.

3. Coordination Between Ministry of Health (MOH) and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP). Coordination between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning is weak. While MFEP is responsible for providing counterpart funds and recurrent budgetary support to the MOH, the MOH has provided no written reports on the progress of the public sector component of the project, nor has it accounted for how the counterpart funds have been spent for the project. For these and other reasons, MFEP has had problems in approving MOH's recent requests for counterpart funds for the project.

Recommendation: MOH should keep MFEP informed about all public sector project activities through periodic reports and meetings and they should meet to clarify what reporting requirements are necessary. MFEP and USAID should meet to review the overall PL 480 agreement and use of counterpart funds for all projects, with the objectives of unblocking funds and streamlining procedures (as is currently being discussed by MFEP and Canada).

4. Contraceptive Logistics Management and Supply. The project has addressed serious problems which existed in 1985 and has made significant progress in meeting its commodity supply and management objectives. A 1985 Price Waterhouse report concluded that the GOG should make major improvements in the contraceptive supply system before A.I.D. provided contraceptive commodities. In addition, a 1985 Center for Disease Control (CDC) report indicated that the MOH contraceptive reporting system had drastically deteriorated. With the assistance of John Snow, Inc. and CDC, the Ministry of Health (MOH) developed a comprehensive workplan to upgrade the contraceptive reporting system. In addition, the MOH conducted special training for 100 regional and district supervisors in the importance and use of the reporting system, cleared MOH shelves of all expired contraceptives and developed a streamlined reporting form to reduce workload at all levels and to provide much greater accountability of revenues raised by the sale of contraceptives.

There are still problems, however, with the remission of sales proceeds (return-to-project funds). Records indicate that most regions are either not reporting the

sales revenues deposited in the Treasury or else are not depositing the proceeds. It is virtually impossible for MOH to access these funds once they are deposited in the Treasury.

> Recommendation: The project should continue to provide technical assistance to MOH to improve the contraceptives supplies system, as it is still fragile. MOH should resolve with MFEP problems surrounding the accountability of return-to-project funds. USAID should review these issues during the upcoming financial management assessment.

5. Contraceptive Social Marketing Program (CSMP). **While DANAFCO has been successful in establishing a CSMP distribution network which reaches all ten regions in Ghana, it is unlikely that the project will be able to develop a self-financing program by September 1989.** DANAFCO's CSMP distribution system now includes approximately 3000 retail pharmacies and chemist shops. In checks in more than 30 shops in three different regions, the evaluation team found only one chemist shop that did not have CSMP products on hand. DANAFCO now uses vans to bring the products to the retailers and this has great potential for diffusing family planning throughout Ghana. The development of a self-financing program by September 1989 is unlikely because program priorities have not been clearly specified. It is unclear whether increasing contraceptive prevalence (which implies lower prices) or establishing a system capable of operating without donor support (which implies higher prices) is the primary objective.

> Recommendation: DANAFCO and MFEP should review the pricing structure for CSMP now and at least once each year as stipulated in the MFEP-DANAFCO contract. An independent firm should assess the financial aspects of CSMP and it should submit recommendations on achieving self-financing.

6. Potential for Impact. **Estimates suggest that the project has the potential to have an impact on contraceptive prevalence.** The Center for Disease Control estimates that the project will lead to a contraceptive prevalence rate of 15 percent by the end of 1989. The distribution of family planning by source is estimated to be 20 percent by the Ministry of Health (MOH), 50 percent by the commercial sector and 30 percent by non-governmental organizations. The share of family planning services delivered by the commercial sector is attributable almost entirely to the project's Contraceptive Social Marketing Program. Continuation of current efforts and expansion of services in the

private sector could conceivably push prevalence rates to as high as 30 percent by 1994.

Recommendation: The MOH and USAID should schedule the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey as late as possible after the Project Assistance Completion Date to allow for the most effective measure of project impact on contraceptive prevalence in Ghana.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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MID-TERM EVALUATION: FAMILY PLANNING TRAINING SUPPORT PROJECT, CENTER FOR AFRICAN FAMILY STUDIES (CAFS) (623-0662-G-00-5022-00), SEPTEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. There is significant demand for training by new and rapidly growing family planning organizations in Africa. With the possible exception of Zimbabwe, no country in sub-Saharan Africa is currently capable of providing adequate training for family planning providers. And trained personnel is the essential element of any family planning program.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In August 1985, A.I.D., International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)-London and the Center for African Family Studies signed the Project Agreement for the Family Planning Training Support project of the Center for African Family Studies (CAFS). The project provided a grant of $2.3 million to CAFS over the life of the project. The Project Assistance Completion Date was set for December 1988.

The purpose of the project was to: a) increase the capacity of CAFS to develop and manage family planning courses and train personnel in family planning; b) increase CAFS' capabilities in training, program development, training methodologies, management and evaluation; c) strengthen family planning delivery systems through the training of operational personnel; and d) improve delivery of family planning information and services in programs where staff have been trained by CAFS. More broadly, the project aimed to establish a viable family planning regional training institution that would assist in developing and strengthening family planning programs throughout Africa. CAFS was originally created by IPPF to assist African affiliates strengthen their management and service delivery capabilities.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess project progress to date and make recommendations that would enhance CAFS' capabilities to achieve the project's objectives.

The methodology involved in-depth interviews, documentation review and observation. The team conducted a field visit to observe a CAFS training course and met with course participants and earlier graduates of the CAFS program. With assistance from CAFS management and some A.I.D. missions, the team distributed a survey questionnaire to former participants. They received a surprisingly high response rate.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. With respect to training, CAFS met or exceeded project goals. However, with respect to providing technical assistance, CAFS failed to meet project objectives. CAFS developed a new course in communications and presented the curriculum (including the communications course) in French, thereby reaching students from different countries. However, because of limited resources and the inclination of teachers to teach, CAFS paid little attention to providing technical assistance. This component had been included in the project to expose instructors to actual situations and thereby strengthen the courses. CAFS, as a result of the evaluation, recognized this shortcoming.

> Recommendation: CAFS should place more emphasis on follow-up and technical assistance with the dual purpose of improving the family planning program of the identified country, as well as enhancing training capabilities. CAFS should move forward aggressively on the design and implementation of in-country, follow-up strategies for participants from the A.I.D.-supported courses. These strategies should address barriers to effectiveness of service delivery.

2. Francophone Training. Training in African francophone countries is more expensive than training in African anglophone countries. For a regional training institution to operate successfully in Africa, it must be able to provide training and technical assistance in both French and English. Although the costs of operating in francophone Africa are higher than in anglophone Africa, family planning training is even more critically needed in the francophone countries, thus justifying the additional costs.

> Recommendation: REDSO/ESA should assist CAFS to obtain technical assistance to determine the most cost-effective and efficient means to implement the French courses.

3. Sustainability. Although little progress was made toward creating a self-sustaining regional institution, three years were insufficient to achieve this objective. CAFS' activities financed by other donors contributed to an enhanced potential for self-reliance and less financial dependence on IPPF. However, a newly developing regional institution requires at least five years or more to mature and achieve partial self-sufficiency.

Recommendation: CAFS should review core costs and the potential for self-financing in relation to IPPF support and continued A.I.D. financing. REDSO should reexamine its assumptions concerning the time required to build a viable regional training institution.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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MIDTERM EVALUATION: SOMALI FAMILY HEALTH SERVICES PROJECT (649-0131), MARCH, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world. The gross national product per capita in 1983 was $250. The population growth rate is over 3 percent, total fertility rate is about 6.5 percent and the infant mortality rate is approximately 147/1000. Forty-four percent of the population is under 15 years of age. Awareness of modern methods of contraception among women of childbearing age is estimated at 2 percent. The desire for many children is widespread and the idea of limiting the number of children is generally considered sinful. The overall literacy rate is 36 percent and written communication dates only from 1972.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. initiated the Somali Family Health Services project with the signing of the Project Agreement in 1984. The planned life of project cost was $10 million and the Project Assistance Completion Date was set for December 1989.

The Grantee was the Government of the Democratic Republic of Somalia (GDSR) represented by the Ministry of National Planning (MONP). The primary executing agencies were: a) the Central Statistical Department (CSD) of MONP; b) the Family Health/Family Planning (FH/FP) Division of the Ministry of Health (MOH); and c) the Somali Family Health Care Association (SFHCA).

The purpose of the project was to strengthen the capabilities of Somali institutions to promote, support, coordinate and sustain family health programs. The four components of the project which were to assist in achieving these objectives included: a) collection and analysis of demographic data; b) development and implementation of information and education activities; c) delivery of clinical services; and d) conduct of operations research.

The project design was unique in three ways. It placed heavy reliance on the ability of four diverse organizations to collaborate in activities designed to achieve the project purpose. It vested responsibility for coordination of these efforts in a non-government group (SFHCA) created expressly for that purpose. Finally, it assigned a major role among project components to information, education and communication.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess progress toward project goals and identify strengths and weaknesses in design and

implementation. The evaluation scope of work called for comments on USAID performance, the quality of technical assistance, effects of Somali policies and procedures on project implementation, probable project outcome based on performance to date and recommendations for improvement.

The evaluation methodology involved document review, site visits and interviews with USAID and government officials, consultants, contractors and project beneficiaries.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Towards Achievement of Project Purpose. **The project substantially strengthened the capabilities of participating organizations to promote, support and coordinate family health programs.** A national census was completed within two weeks of the projected schedule. This was a formidable task, with the enumeration of nomads undertaken by posting enumerators at livestock watering holes. The Information, Education and Communications (IEC) Directors established a Core Trainers Group and, in the first 18 months, 13 Core Trainers received overseas training. A major IEC campaign was underway. A unit devoted to voluntary sterilization and sexually transmitted diseases was established at Benadir Hospital in Mogadishu and two more units were scheduled for 1987. With respect to expansion of service delivery, contraceptives were placed in 40 clinics and 7 hospitals (while the project goal was 60 clinics and 20 hospitals). An ambitious operations research study was conducted in two villages in 1986 and provided important information on social, demographic and health behavior, as well as Knowledge, Attitude and Practice levels on nutrition, child spacing, breastfeeding and female circumcision.

> Recommendation: Given that roles, responsibilities and procedures change over the life of any project, USAID should convene a meeting of participating organizations and all technical assistance counterparts to discuss project implementation and activities. The USAID Deputy Director should issue the invitations and chair the meeting.

2. Data Collection/Policy Component. **While the data collection/census work was proceeding well, a high level, national conference was needed to guide Somalia toward a national policy.** The environment for implementing a population program in Somalia was constrained by many political, religious and tradition-

bound restrictions. The President was said to be generally in favor of child spacing on health grounds, but he and the Revolutionary Council were understandably unwilling to push for family planning services if the people were uninterested in birthspacing. Government strategy was to pursue a quiet policy of active support for family planning and population education. There was no widespread support for the project elsewhere in the government. The effects of the rapid population growth rate of over 3 percent, and consequent stresses on government-supported services, could be more easily communicated if policymakers were brought together at a national conference.

Recommendation: The project should plan and carry out one high level, national population conference. If project funds are unavailable, other donor support should be sought for this priority activity.

3. Information, Education and Communications (IEC) Component - Materials Development. IEC materials development and production was the greatest area of need. The process of developing prototype materials for use in the test campaigns was carefully conceived and carried out and operations research revealed valuable information on the kinds of materials most needed. The IEC advisor, because of his heavy responsibilities, however, could not give the necessary time to this important aspect of the project.

Recommendation: The project should provide technical assistance in materials development and production for a minimum of one year.

Project staff should select an individual who has both creative qualifications and skills in the mechanics of production.

4. Information, Education and Communications (IEC) Component - Education of Leaders. Given the political and religious constraints to family planning in Somalia, mobilizing support for family planning among political and religious leaders was an important aspect of the IEC component. The IEC Directors designated the Somali Family Health Care Association (SFHCA) as the participating organization responsible for developing activities to influence political and religious leaders. This was an appropriate role for a non-governmental organization and one that is carried out by IPPF-affiliates all over the world.

Recommendation: SFHCA should move aggressively to inform and educate religious and political leaders. It should use the results of the recent census to develop IEC activities to educate policymakers. It should also avail itself of the centrally-funded OPTIONS and IMPACT projects which, along with RAPID II, are prepared to assist in developing IEC programs for policymakers.

5. Service Delivery Component. Training for clinical service delivery remained a weak point and there was an unmet need for up-to-date, suitable training materials for all levels of service providers. Since the project began, approximately 16 people received overseas training. Local training, however, had dropped off. In 1985, only 20 people received new training and 90 people received refresher training. Consultant reports consistently mentioned the lack of knowledge with respect to service delivery. Moreover, there did not appear to be any plan to develop adequate training materials for in-service training of nurses. The manual used was cited as outdated and inadequate by several consultants.

Recommendation: The project should give top priority to training, with greater emphasis on in-country and less emphasis on overseas training. The operations research unit should assist the Family Health/Family Planning unit to assess why there is a missing link in training between learning and practice. The project should provide technical assistance immediately to help develop training materials. Emphasis should be on the adaptation of existing materials and they should be in the Somali language as well as English.

6. Operations Research (OR) Component. The OR Unit needed additional staff in order to provide analytical support services to the three other components. OR could greatly assist the other components by undertaking studies and monitoring services which would help personnel evaluate performance and identify activities needing adjustment. To do this, the unit needed a coordinator who would be responsible for management and administration. This would free the Director for more professional tasks.

Recommendation: A coordinator should be hired immediately. The project should inform key personnel from cooperating institutions concerning the valuable monitoring and evaluation functions the OR unit is prepared to undertake or assist in designing.

7. Contraceptive Social Marketing. **Development of a Contraceptive Social Marketing project was premature.** A recent report identified three factors as key elements for success of contraceptive social marketing in Somalia: 1) strong political support; 2) the absence of bureaucratic constraints which otherwise might impede rapid program changes in response to market conditions; and 3) a strong product distribution system. These elements, among others, were lacking in Somalia at the time of the evaluation. In addition, advertising of drugs (including contraceptives) on the radio was against the law. Pricing strategies would suffer from unstructured pricing policies.

> Recommendation: It is preferable to postpone a Contraceptive Social Marketing program until the concept of family health is more widely accepted in Somalia.

8. Private Sector. **Given that the public sector primary health care system was developing very slowly, expansion through the private sector was a very positive move.** There is an active and thriving private sector medical system in Somalia. Even though almost all of Somalia's 450 physicians were assigned to government facilities, physicians' private practice accounted for the majority of family health service delivery. Another active private sector activity was the drugshops, operated at the small town and village level by entrepreneurs, who sold a variety of drugs. A 1985 study indicated that 90.4 percent of the population purchased its drugs from the private sector.

> Recommendation: The project should continue looking into other means of service delivery beyond the Maternal and Child Health clinics and hospitals.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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NUTRITION

FINAL EVALUATION OF ZAIRE AREA NUTRITION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (660-0079), DECEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The developmental setting of Zaire is similar to that of other African developing countries with weaknesses in public and private institutions, shortages of technical, professional and managerial expertise, high urbanization and population growth rates and poor health and nutrition. Endemic diseases and malnutrition are the major causes of morbidity and mortality. Rates are highest among children under five years of age and pregnant women. An imposing array of constraints on food production, consumption, and health services and practices combine to create the conditions for high rates of malnutrition in Zaire.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. initiated the Area Nutrition Improvement Project in 1982 with the signing of the first Project Agreement. The planned life of project cost was $3.3 million and the Project Assistance Completion Date was set for March 1988. The project was designed as a follow-on to the Nutrition Planning Project (660-0055) which created Zaire's National Nutrition Planning Center (CEPLANUT) in 1978.

The purposes of the Area Nutrition Improvement Project, as revised after the midterm evaluation in 1984, were to: 1) promote cost-effective nutrition interventions capable of reducing by 25 percent the prevalence of acute malnutrition among children in the Bandundu region east of Kinshasa by the end of fiscal year 1987; and 2) build the institutional capabilities of CEPLANUT. The principal vehicle for achieving this objective was to be through the creation of a Regional Food and Nutrition Council in Bandundu (CRANB) which would function as a regional planning body in Bandundu and select and monitor the small projects chosen to receive funding. The project purpose was revised after the midterm evaluation because USAID recognized that the original project purpose -- to reduce malnutrition over a very large region -- had been unrealistic and that nutritional impact due to project interventions could not be shown on a regionwide basis.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of the evaluation were to: 1) determine whether the project's objectives as outlined in the project paper and supplement had been met; 2) ascertain whether achievement of these objectives contributed to project purpose and goals; and 3) document the catalysts or impediments to project achievements and record lessons learned.

The methodology consisted in reviewing project documents and interviewing project staff in Kikwit and Kinshasa, the USAID project officer, staff of other USAID projects, members of the project committee and members of the international health community.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. While not all activities envisioned by project planners occurred, the project made a significant contribution to developing the institutional capacity of the National Nutrition Planning Center (CEPLANUT). Other departments in the Government of Zaire increasingly began looking to CEPLANUT for assistance in countrywide feasibility studies and project designs. International organizations were also beginning to look to CEPLANUT as a collaborator in both nutrition research and intervention activities. A 1986 study for USAID's agricultural project found that CEPLANUT could function adequately as a collaborating institution to carry out a baseline consumption survey.

> Recommendation: The project has identified a number of nutrition-related needs in Zaire. These include implementing growth monitoring/promotion activities through health worker training and nutrition education of mothers. If funds remain in the project, USAID should consider funding follow-on activities which support these areas. Possible mechanisms might be through the HEALTHCOM project or through collaboration with the Nutrition Education and Social Marketing project.

2. Regional Food and Nutrition Council (CRANB) Nutrition Interventions. While the project funded many individual nutrition interventions, no evaluations of these activities were ever carried out. This was a very serious shortcoming since evaluation of nutrition interventions was a major purpose of the project. Fifty-one small nutrition intervention projects were funded on a grant basis between 1982 and 1985. Ten additional activities were funded on a loan basis in 1986 and 1987. The 1984 project paper supplement proposed various impact measures to be used at the nutrition intervention sites. In March 1987, a memo of understanding between USAID and the National Nutrition Planning Center (CEPLANUT) noted that a written evaluation and comparison of CRANB activities would be a 1987 priority. In addition, the memo required CRANB to submit a narrative to USAID discussing positive results of the nutrition activities prior to July 1987. No evaluations of these activities were conducted. One reason for this might have been that evaluation was a

USAID priority and no one ever attempted to make this objective a CEPLANUT priority. There were numerous anecdotal success stories.

> Recommendation: Given Zaire's 1986 CDSS goal of undertaking village level development projects supported and managed by rural institutions, USAID should explore ways of integrating successful CRANB activities into the USAID agricultural project, which has just begun to function in the Bandundu region.

3. Nutrition Education. **The nutrition education component made progress but some problems remained.** The component prepared primary school manuals for all six grades. Staff field tested the manuals in ten primary schools and revised and approved them for inclusion in the school curriculum. Because of delays and inflation, there was uncertainty about the total number required to be printed. The original plan was for 800 schools to receive two full sets of manuals. The flip charts to be used to accompany the manuals were ready for printing. However, no funds were available to cover printing costs. Similarly, the project prepared a nurses training manual for training nurses in nutrition assessment and growth monitoring. Again, no funds were available to cover printing costs.

> Recommendation: USAID should allot counterpart funds to fund the printing of the nurses manual and the flipcharts designed to accompany the primary school nutrition manuals.

4. Training. **The project exceeded the goals set for training.** Eight technicians received masters level training in the U.S. in international nutrition, in nutrition planning and nutrition education and business administration. Another eight received short-term training in program planning and design, community health and microcomputers. Forty-five participants attended short-term retraining at local institutions. In addition, all scopes of work for consultancies from Manoff, Tufts and other institutions included specific provisions for training Zairian counterparts. However, to enhance the National Nutrition Planning Center's (CEPLANUT) technical capacity, it might have been better if trainees had concentrated more on statistical analysis rather than on softer subjects. Only one trainee possessed the capabilities in statistics and data analysis required to implement the kinds of surveys that might be required by outside organizations.

Recommendation: USAID should pay more attention to the skills that are needed in-country when long-term trainees select their academic majors. These majors should be agreed to in advance and the project officer should exercise a vigilant veto power over stateside changes that would have an adverse effect on the total skill mix desired at the end of the project.

5. USAID Management. The USAID project manager had to devote excessive management and supervisory attention to this project. The USAID project manager estimated that in the first two years of the project, she spent 60 percent of her time addressing project management issues. The management burden of recruiting and hiring five long-term advisors, dozens of short-term consultants, ordering commodities, plus the day to day handling of administrative and financial issues at two sites (Kinshasa and Kikwit), while dealing with a multitude of project objectives argues convincingly that an institutional contractor might have been a reasonable investment for USAID.

Recommendation: USAID should consider hiring institutional contractors when a project has many elements and much technical assistance, particularly many in-country advisors.

6. Project Objectives and Project Funding. Overall project objectives were not clearly linked with project counterpart funding. While programming of counterpart funds was undertaken by the National Nutrition Planning Center (CEPLANUT), there was no one clearly responsible for assuring that benchmarks for project activities that fulfilled project objectives were set or met.

Recommendation: USAID project design teams should specify in the project paper a detailed budget which identifies benchmarks for local currency funds release based on completion of project objectives. The dollar budget should be as specific as possible.

7. Self-Sufficiency. Even though Government of Zaire support for the project increased steadily, the National Nutrition Planning Center (CEPLANUT) still would need additional resources to support research and intervention activities. Self-financing was not a major goal of the project. Little thought was given to how costly project activities could be financed when the project came to an end. The administrative costs of running CRANB were very high. The cost of one

annual meeting was totally out of proportion to the small amounts of grants extended. Tnere were high per diem and fuel costs for CEPLANUT staff's site investigations, feasibility studies and follow-up visits. Funding and administering micro-level interventions frequently is very costly. In this case, the initial grants of project funds, high administrative costs and generous funding of CRANB executive committee functions, set up funding levels that could not possibly be maintained by available project resources.

> Recommendation: USAID Project Papers should address financial sustainability issues and include a plan for the host government to assume project financing responsibilities gradually.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EDUCATION

BASIC AND NON-FORMAL EDUCATION SYSTEMS (BANFES) PROJECT: 18 MONTH EVALUATION REPORT (632-0222), NOVEMBER, 1986

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. As in many developing countries, Lesotho's educational institutions need strengthening. Specifically, improvements in literacy and basic skills are required to develop the peoples' capabilities to increase their incomes and improve rural life.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. signed the first Project Agreement for the Basic and Non-Formal Education Systems (BANFES) Project in 1984. U. S. assistance is planned for $25,750,000 over the life of the project. The final obligation is expected in 1990.

The purpose of BANFES is to assist the Ministry of Education (MOE) to improve its capacity to provide an effective and relevant education system, through better management of resources and by increasing the effectiveness of the education system both qualitatively and quantitatively. Broadly speaking, this means strengthening educational institutions, incorporating practical skills into the curricula, and providing academic and practical training including in-service training to primary teachers, materials to primary teachers and improved access to basic education to the primary age population.

Agencies participating in the project include the National University of Lesotho (NUL), and the Ministry, as well as the National Teachers Training College, Thaba Tseka Rural Skills Training Center, the National Curriculum Development Center and the Instructional Materials Resource Center.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of the evaluation were to: 1) assess design validity; 2) identify weaknesses in implementation plans or management hindering the achievement of outputs; and 3) propose actions for improving design and implementation as needed.

The evaluation methodology consisted of interviews with all technical assistance consultants, USAID and Government of Lesotho (GOL) staff directly involved with the project, as well as examination of documentation including component workplans (training records, individual technical assistance workplans and reports of the meetings of the workgroup and training committee). All written data were collected, summarized and indexed for reference before the evaluation.

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The team held a meeting each morning to review progress and exchange plans before proceeding to separate tasks. At the end of each day, the team leader met with USAID staff, the GOL BANFES coordinator and the Chief of Party to apprise them of interim findings and to request clarification and direction. Each team member took primary responsibility for one of the four project components. Prior to the team's arrival in Lesotho, USAID/Lesotho and BANFES staff organized and summarized data on project outputs. USAID staff drafted a skeletal report outline to minimize ambiguity concerning the desired end product.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. This ambitious and complex project is off to a good start. Technical assistance personnel of high quality have been brought on board, with only minor delays in recruitment. The contractor has demonstrated strong administrative capability. The GOL, in spite of change in administration and major personnel shifts, remains strongly interested in achieving the project purpose. Covenants and conditions precedent have, for the most part, been met on a timely basis. Component I has a data system in place. Progress is being made towards improving the overall management of the Ministry although no specific output has been completed. Fifty-eight trainees in two subject areas have completed their programs against a project total of 400. Long-term training is in progress although no trainees have returned to date. In-country training has begun for all components.

> Recommendation: To ensure continued smooth project implementation, USAID should hold a top level GOL seminar to examine the project's assumptions and recommend needed changes.

2. Component One: Institutional Strengthening at the Ministry of Education (MOE). Virtually all outputs related to this component are on track. However, the lack of a human resources development unit is impeding institutional strengthening. All major outputs including training, strengthening of the MOE personnel system, establishment of an information system for the planning unit, improvements in the supply distribution system and the teacher service unit are on track. However, the MOE does not have a training and human resources development unit or a full-time position in the professional training area. Thus the training of a training coordinator counterpart and the institutionalization process itself have not proceeded as scheduled.

Recommendation: MOE training plans cannot be implemented without the development of a professional base for training. The project should, with the MOE, seek the establishment of a professional training support unit. In addition, a full-time professional staff position should be allocated to the area of training and human resources development.

3. Component Two: Strengthening the National Teacher Training College (NTTC). **While all outputs related to this component are on track, NTTC is not sufficiently staffed.** The outputs of this component which are on track include training, revising the curriculum (to include agriculture/practical skills),improving the instructional system, and improving the personnel and administrative system. However, NTTC staffing is below projected levels. At least seven administrative vacancies need to be filled. A number of academic posts are also unfilled.

Recommendation: The issue of established posts unfilled by the Ministry is directly linked to institutional development. Project staff and the Ministry should resolve this issue as soon as possible.

4. Component Three: Developing and Disseminating Curriculum and Instructional Materials. **All outputs are on track but lack of consensus on certain issues may impede progress.** The outputs which are on track include revising the primary school curriculum, improving the examination system, strengthening institutional capacity to design and disseminate instructional materials, increasing community support and training staff in designing and evaluating instructional materials. However, there is a lack of consensus on the definition of Basic Education and Practical Skills. These concepts are central to the project purpose, but do not fit easily into the existing organizational structure of the National Curriculum Development Center (NCDC). Some think of practical skills as separate courses, i.e., Agriculture, Home Economics, Health etc. Others define this concept as integrating a practical approach, mostly through improved teaching techniques, into the curricula of all departments. The lack of consensus makes it difficult to find the most effective ways the project can work to improve the curriculum and makes counterpart relationships difficult.

Recommendation: The Ministry should coordinate an effort to arrive at consensus regarding the definition of Basic Education and Practical

Skills. It should also produce a plan specifying how basic education and practical skills can best be introduced into the classrooms.

5. Component Four: Rural Skills Training, Thaba Tseka Skills Training Center (TSTC). Most outputs of this component are on track but there are concerns as to whether TSTC will continue as a viable institution. The outputs that are on track include the number of men and women trained at TSTC, recruitment and outreach, and TSTC staff training. However, a coherent instructional program has not yet been put into place. The TSTC building does not meet accepted standards (too little mortar was used in the construction and the center can now expect expensive maintenance costs). There is a need for a GOL commitment to meet core personnel, operational and maintenance expenses. The staff will need to raise other funds through income generating programs and outside donors to meet program costs. Adequate housing will be needed to attract qualified instructors.

Recommendation: The project should immediately provide technical assistance to the administrative staff to teach them how to fundraise. Training in how to identify donors and write proposals is a priority.

6. Local Employment of TSTC Graduates. TSTC graduates have had a high rate of success in finding local employment. Of 19 bricklaying graduates, 3-5 have been hired by the Rural Water Project and 3-7 are building private dwellings. Of 19 textile graduates, 3 work with the course teacher and 9 are trying to form small cooperatives.

Recommendation: The project should monitor graduates ' success in finding local employment and this information should be used to gauge the continued relevancy of the courses offered.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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BASIC AND NON-FORMAL EDUCATION SYSTEMS (BANFES) PROJECT: INTERIM EVALUATION (632-0222), APRIL, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. A wide range of demographic and governmental factors in Lesotho adversely affect the education sector. The high population growth rate (2.7 percent) provides over 3,000 new primary students each year causing in some areas over a 100:1 student/teacher ratio. Classroom conditions themselves are inadequate, with many lacking basic water and sanitation facilities, blackboards, windows, desks and writing materials. This reflects the exceptionally meager fiscal resources of the Government of Lesotho (GOL) and local communities. The lack of funds means that the GOL is unable to: 1) raise teachers' salaries; 2) maintain schools; and 3) provide basic teaching materials. The lack of personnel results in managerial weaknesses, inability to reduce student/teacher ratios or provide counterparts for project implementation.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. signed the first Project Agreement for the Basic and Non-Formal Education Systems (BANFES) Project in 1984. U. S. assistance is planned for $25,750,000 over the life of the project. The final obligation is expected in 1990. The contractor is the Academy for Educational Development.

The purpose of BANFES is to assist the Ministry of Education (MOE) to improve its capacity to provide an effective and relevant education system, through better management of resources and by increasing the effectiveness of the education system both qualitatively and quantitatively. Broadly speaking, this means strengthening educational institutions, incorporating practical skills into the curricula, providing academic and practical training including in-service training to primary teachers, providing materials to primary teachers and providing improved access to basic education to the primary age population. The project has four major components: 1) institutional strengthening of the Ministry; 2) strengthening the National Teacher Training College (NTTC); 3) developing and disseminating curriculum and instructional materials; and 4) developing a rural skills training center -- Thaba Tseka Skills Training Center (TSTC).

Agencies participating in the project include the National University of Lesotho (NUL), and the Ministry of Education, as well as the National Teachers Training College, Thaba Tseka Rural Skills Training Center, the National Curriculum Development Center and the Instructional Materials Resource Center.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of the evaluation were to: 1) determine the extent to which recommendations from the first evaluation have been acted upon; 2) examine the project's summative and formative evaluation plan; 3) assess progress toward attaining project purposes and sub-purposes; and 4) make recommendations for improving project management by USAID, the contractor and the Ministry.

The evaluation methodology involved: 1) individual and panel interviews with BANFES, the Ministry and USAID principals; 2) on-site observations at project institutions and primary schools; and 3) document review.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **There has been considerable progress toward achieving the project purpose.** Project personnel and Ministry staff have generated an impressive array of instructional materials and training activities and should be commended for their efforts. Of particular note are the National Dissemination Program, Lesotho Radio Language Arts, Sesotho Monthly Reader, Ministry data management systems, overall institutional strengthening of the National Teachers Training College and the project's in-country training programs. However, activities remain too component-based, with insufficient attention paid to overall program objectives. Inadequate cross-component communication has resulted in some duplication of effort and insufficient interchange of ideas.

> Recommendation: Workplans should be structured in such a way that cross-component activities and program objectives are clearly defined. PERT charts should be developed which include information on project progress toward achieving outputs and objectives, schedules for program activities and personnel requirements.

2. Compliance with First Evaluation's Recommendations. **Overall compliance with the recommendations of the first evaluation has been moderately good.** Of the 38 recommendations of the first evaluation, 28 (74 percent) have been or are being implemented. Of the 10 (26 percent) that have not been complied with, however, several are concerned with important policy and personnel matters, e.g., issues concerning unfilled counterpart positions to work with project Technical Advisors and policies needed to govern the Rural Skills Training Center at Thaba Tseka.

Recommendation: USAID, project staff and the Ministry should work together to address the remaining ten recommendations of the first evaluation that have not yet been dealt with.

3. Project Evaluation Plans. The project's formative evaluation plans will enable managers to assess project progress but will not provide satisfactory information on project success or impact. The project's overall evaluation plan calls for regular in-depth evaluations and there are a wide variety of project documents (contractor's implementation plan, annual workplans, financial and commodity procurement plans, project training plans etc.) which enable managers to measure progress toward project objectives. However, it will be much more difficult to measure project success because many of the logical framework's purpose-level, end--of-project status indicators are either unrealistic or no longer relevant. For example, it is unrealistic to assume that the project can measurably reduce dropout, failure and repetition rates while population growth rates continue at 2.7 percent and student/teacher ratios in some areas are 100:1.

Recommendation: USAID, project staff and the Ministry should develop and negotiate new and appropriate indicators to measure project success and include these in project documentation.

4. Component One: Strengthening the Managerial Efficiency of the Ministry of Education (MOE). While many positive activities are taking place, two factors are limiting improvements in management efficiency. Achievements include the following: 1) the return of individuals from long-term training who are now functioning in leadership positions in the Ministry; 2) the conduct of a Policy Clarification Seminar, which resulted in resolution of numerous longstanding issues; 3) establishment of a computerized information system to assist the Planning Unit in using data for long-term planning. However, the lack of trained personnel at the technical support level (e.g., computer operators, system designers and computer technicians) and high turnover in top management levels are impeding improvements in efficiency.

Recommendation: Project Staff and the Ministry should develop a comprehensive plan for continuous training for Ministry personnel. It should include specific training targets, i.e., personnel management as well as word processing and computer operations.

5. Component Two: Strengthening the National Teacher Training College (NTTC). **While BANFES resources have strengthened NTTC, several issues need to be addressed.** The college is focusing on upgrading the academic program in all departments. BANFES Technical Advisors have provided assistance in developing the primary education curriculum and in streamlining basic administrative operations. In spite of NTTC's increased capacity to function efficiently, two issues need to be addressed: 1) unfilled posts to ensure sustainability of successful efforts; and 2) instructional problems such as large classes, multi-age/ability levels, lack of instructional materials and the need for teaching strategies for the local educational setting.

> Recommendation: If the posts at NTTC remain unfilled, the Mission director should discuss this issue with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance. The project should support the revision of the NTTC Primary Teacher's Certification curriculum to emphasize teaching methods and strategies appropriate to the local educational setting. The project should assist in conducting research to determine primary methods that work best in the Lesotho classrooms.

6. Component Three: Developing and Disseminating Curriculum and Instructional Materials. **The BANFES-initiated Lesotho Radio Language Arts (LRLA) program has the potential to have a significant impact on basic education throughout Lesotho.** However, there is inadequate systematic support for teachers' use of LRLA and system-wide use offers the possibility for significant impact.

> Recommendation: The project should assist in developing a more systematic monitoring and feedback system of the program. This information should be used to determine the content of the weekly in-service radio programs.

7. Component Four: Thaba Tseka Rural Skills Training Center (TSTC). **The Center has expanded opportunities for rural training but it has not achieved the objective of the project which was to produce 100 trained craftsworkers each year.** An administrative structure has not been established and there is no direct Ministry supervision of TSTC administration and staff. Student enrollments have declined since the inception of the program. Specific program commitments have not been implemented including: 1) the Student Assistance Fund; 2) the student follow-up program to determine students' success in obtaining employment;

3) establishment of a shop for marketing students' products; and 4) the in-service training program for instructors.

Recommendation: USAID should authorize a financial audit of the Rural Skills Training Center. USAID should use the results of the audit along with this evaluation to determine the sustainability of this component.

8. Sustainability. Due to the lack of counterparts and scarce human and financial resources available to the Ministry, project sustainability is seriously in doubt. On the positive side, there have been several Ministry policy decisions that bode well for sustainability. The Ministry has been meeting and discussing ways to institutionalize the National Dissemination Program. In addition, the materials developed at the National Curriculum Development Center were very much a product of the institution and not of the technical advisors. Another important development (and policy decision by the Ministry) is the restructuring of teachers' salaries. However, it is not apparent that the Ministry will have the human and financial resources to sustain the project when it ends. Just servicing and maintaining all the commodities provided by the project will require significant recurrent cost expenditures. More importantly, the lack of counterparts for the BANFES technical advisors mean that few Ministry staff are receiving the on-the-job training they need in order to take over when the advisors leave.

Recommendation: USAID should bring in an educational economist with extensive experience in recurrent cost financing to provide six to nine months of technical assistance. This person should: 1) examine the cost implications for sustaining the project's interventions, including the prospects for partial cost-recovery of certain initiatives; 2) analyze the Ministry and GOL capacity for financing the recurrent costs of the project's interventions; and 3) apply different levels of GOL financial support to set up a variety of scenarios for sustaining the project.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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TRANSPORTATION

EVALUATION STUDY: STRENGTHENING ROAD MAINTENANCE PROJECT (677-0050), MAY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Chad is a landlocked Central African country with an area of 1,284,000 square kilometers, more than twice the size of France. Its population is estimated at 5.3 million with an annual growth rate of 2.4 percent. The per capita annual income in Chad is approximately $160, making it one of the poorest countries in the world. Development is constrained by: 1) the country's landlocked position, which results in high transportation costs (the closest port is about 2,000 km away from N'Djamena); 2) long distances between population centers, which hinder political, economic and social integration; and 3) climatic variability, which affects agricultural outputs. Roads are the principal mode of transportation. By 1982, following a devastating three-year civil war, most of the improved earth roads had fallen into disrepair and only about 40 km of paved road remained.

U.S. Assistance Response. In 1985, A.I.D. initiated the Strengthening Road Maintenance Project (SRMP). The purpose of the project is to assist in developing a technically competent and financially responsible organization for the maintenance of Chad's road network. To achieve this objective, A.I.D. authorized the expenditure of $27.5 million over a five year period. The Project Assistance Completion Date is planned for September 1990. The Government of Chad (GOC) contribution is $5.0 million.

Expected project outputs include: 1) an organization capable of maintaining 1,600 km of roads annually; 2) an effective Central Workshop maintaining OFNAR's equipment; 3) a trained workforce; and 4) a rehabilitated road, 63 km long.

The GOC has established an agency, Office National des Routes (OFNAR), within the Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Urbanization, whose main purpose is to maintain the national road network. OFNAR's operating funds are derived from tax receipts from petroleum product imports. As the country progresses in the development of an infrastructure, OFNAR revenues are expected to increase, enabling it to augment its capacity and operational level. The GOC is aware that a second project phase will depend on OFNAR success in meeting its recurrent cost targets under the project.

Responsibilities for implementation of the major project activities are as follows. 1) Technical Assistance -- ten expatriate professionals have been furnished by the U.S. consulting firm of Gannet Fleming

Transportation Engineers, Inc. (GFTE), under a contract with USAID. The Senior Advisor has been contracted under a host country personal services contract. 2) Procurement -- heavy equipment for the Training Brigade has been procured by OFNAR, under a host country contract with SHO-Chad, the Caterpillar dealer in N'Djamena. Local procurement is done by OFNAR. 3) Building Rehabilitation -- OFNAR's administrative and workshop facilities have been rehabilitated by a local contractor, under a contract with USAID. 4) Road Rehabilitation -- this will be done by an international contractor, under a host country contract.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of the evaluation were to: 1) determine the progress made toward developing a technically competent and financially responsible road maintenance organization in Chad; 2) determine the effectiveness of the technical assistance provided; 3) determine whether the project's goal, purpose and objectives are still relevant; and 4) recommend actions to be taken to improve project performance and achieve project objectives.

The evaluation methodology involved: 1) document review; 2) interviews with more than 60 individuals, including staff of USAID, OFNAR and technical assistance contractors; and 3) visits to OFNAR's Central Workshop, the Training Brigade site, the N'Djamena Subdivision facilities and the Djermaya-Dandi Road.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **The technical assistance team has introduced certain systems and procedures to strengthen institutional capacity. However, overall progress toward institutional development has been limited and the systems established are fragile.** The technical assistance team has introduced systems and procedures for operation and maintenance of the Central Workshop, inventory control, road maintenance planning and accounting and financial management. They are training a staff of 56 in the Central Workshop, 33 persons in the training Brigade and other managers and employees of OFNAR. However, some systems within OFNAR, like local procurement and financial management, are slow, complicated and unresponsive. They are based upon the norms of a large complex bureaucracy rather than those of a commercially managed organization. For example, procurement of spare parts requires 19 steps. Some units are required to review the procurement request two-four times. The average time for the procurement

process is two months but it may take as long as six months. Even "emergency" procurements require one month and may take three. With respect to financial management, OFNAR's system for payment of expenditures is long and cumbersome. Eighteen steps are required. The system is a significant hurdle for timely execution of OFNAR's and the project's budget and work plans. For example, the Director's signature is required three times in the payment process and then all checks must be approved by the State Control Agency.

> Recommendation: The local procurement system needs to be streamlined. The Procurement Service should be delegated the authority to approve small procurements. This could reduce the time required for procurement by several weeks. The system established under the IDA Road Maintenance Project should be evaluated as a possible model. The system for payment of expenditures should be brought into line with more commercial standards.

2. <u>Effectiveness of Technical Assistance</u>. **Overall, the technical assistance contractor has assigned qualified personnel to the project. However, there has been a high rate of personnel turnover which has hindered institutional development.** The professional qualifications and experience of assigned staff, as compared to the requirements stipulated in the Project Paper, have ranged from very good to marginally satisfactory. On a few occasions, insufficient knowledge of French has created communications difficulties. The operational performance of the contractor has been good, as judged, for example, by the amount of the equipment units rehabilitated, despite difficult working conditions.

The high technical assistance personnel turnover, however, has had a negative effect on work continuity, training of counterpart and other OFNAR personnel and establishment of appropriate systems and procedures for work planning, operations and management. Particularly affected were OFNAR's Central Workshop Administration, the Programming Division and the N'Djamena Subdivision, whose advisors (respectively the Shop Superintendent, the Planning Engineer and the Field Engineer, i.e., the key technical assisstance personnel) were the least available and/or the most frequently changed. Three persons served as Field Engineers, three as Shop Superintendents, and two persons filled each of four other positions. One position is currently vacant. The first two Field Engineers acted as Chief of Party. In the absence of a Field Engineer, the Brigade Foreman and Accountant Advisor acted jointly as Chiefs of Party. Since 1988, the new Planning Engineer has been the Chief of Party but he does not have the capability

in the French language required by the contract and this has resulted in communications difficulties.

Factors that contributed to the high rate of personnel turnover included difficult living and working conditions, inadequate logistics support, failure to staff key positions from the technical assistance contractor's permanent staff and often hasty recruitment decisions.

> Recommendation: USAID should eliminate the positions of Senior Advisor and Planning Engineer and create a position of Chief of Party/Project Manager. Responsibilities of this position should include: management of the technical assistance team, planning budgeting and coordination for project activities and advising OFNAR's senior management on project matters. (In the past, the Chief of Party had responsibility for personnel and administrative matters only.) In the future, the technical assistance contractor should ascertain the willingness of an individual to complete his contract. Financial incentives to do this should be established as much as is practicable.

3. Central Workshop Operations and Management. **Central Workshop operations and management outputs have exceeded expectations but preventive maintenance** remains problematic. Three workshop buildings and one administrative building of OFNAR were rehabilitated under the project. More than 350 items of workshop equipment and tools have been procured by USAID for the Central Workshop. Some 49 units of previously unserviceable heavy equipment and trucks have been rehabilitated at the Central Workshop, a number which exceeds Project Paper targets. These achievement have increased OFNAR's material resources for equipment and road maintenance. The project is providing on-the-job training to 56 personnel, a number which also exceeds Project Paper targets. However, a preventive maintenance program for rehabilitated and new equipment has not been developed (and is not part of the scope of work of the Central Workshop-based technical assistance team). Without a preventive maintenance equipment system, maintenance of new and rehabilitated equipment in good operating condition will be difficult.

> Recommendation: Preventive equipment maintenance procedures should be developed for use by the workshops and field brigades. This could be done by other donors who are providing technical assistance to OFNAR.

4. Road Maintenance Training Brigade. **Current rates of work and training progress appear to be good.** The contractor prepared a training program for the Brigade, covering supervisors and foremen, equipment operators, drivers, field mechanics and administrative personnel. The primary method of instruction is through field demonstration and on-the-job instructions.

A total of 33 persons have received training. Based on a review of completed work, it appears that the quality of work has been satisfactory, particularly considering the lack of compaction equipment. Equipment needed by the Training Brigade only started arriving in mid-1987. Some equipment was deficient and had to be reordered.

> Recommendation: Procurement of equipment to be used for training must begin well before the arrival of the trainers. The guidance provided in A.I.D. Handbook 11, Chapter 3, Section 3.1 on "Procurement Planning" should be followed to avoid delays and waste of technical assistance time.

5. Potential for Sustainability. **OFNAR has honored its commitment to meet an increasing share of project recurrent costs and it ought to be able to continue to do so over the life of the project.** The Project Paper called for OFNAR to pay for an increasing share of the project's recurrent costs, starting at 10 percent in the first year and increasing by 10 percent each year to the level of 50 percent of the project's recurrent costs in the fifth year of the project. Project Implementation Letter No. 8 details how OFNAR is to meet its recurrent cost contributions. Recurrent costs are defined as local currency budget line items for heavy and light equipment operations, shop supplies, per diem paid to training brigades, road maintenance materials, administration, utilities and depreciation of project purchased equipment. OFNAR was required to open one bank account into which it would deposit its share of recurrent costs and another account for depreciation funds. Based upon this formula, the GOC has exceeded its recurrent cost contributions for 1988 and 1987. OFNAR's revenues, principally from fuel taxes are increasing. Thus it appears that OFNAR will have the financial capacity to meet the higher level of recurrent costs implied by the project, as well as other donor projects.

> Recommendation: OFNAR and USAID should closely monitor OFNAR's continued ability to meet its recurrent cost commitments as the rate of project implementation and disbursements steps up.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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FINAL EVALUATION: RURAL RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (645-0224), DECEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Cyclone Domoina hit Swaziland in early 1984. The estimate of the damage to roads and bridge structures was $37 million. The country was not prepared to respond to such an emergency.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. The Rural Reconstruction Project provided the Government of Swaziland (GOS) $1.25 million as part of the U.S. response to the damage caused by Cyclone Domoina. The purpose of the project was to assist the GOS to repair and maintain unpaved roads damaged by the storm and to re-establish GOS capacity to monitor and allocate water resources. The targeted 704 kilometers of unpaved roads (later revised to 600) which were to be reconstructed by the project represented a major part of the country's network of unpaved roads (54 percent) and had been identified by the GOS as its highest priority for assistance. The project also planned to repair 19 of the 33 river flow measuring stations which were destroyed during the cyclone. The original Project Assistance Completion Date was Dec. 31, 1986 but it was extended by USAID twice for a total of 12 months until Dec. 31, 1987. Thus the life of the project covered a period of 40 months since the Project Agreement was signed with the GOS in 1984.

The implementing agencies for the GOS included: 1) Roads Branch, the Central Transport Administration of the Ministry of Works and Communications; 2) the Water Resources Branch of the Ministry of Natural Resources; and 3) Land Utilization and Energy Branch.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the end of project status and the impact of the road rehabilitation project.

The evaluation methodology included document review, interviews and site visits. To review the road work under the project, the Team Leader travelled a representative number of the roads (9) representing 230 kilometers or about 38 percent of the rehabilitated kilometers.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project made significant progress toward restoring Swaziland's infrastructure to pre-cyclone standards.

With the exception of the GOS budget contribution for reconstructing the concrete weirs for the USAID-funded water gauges, all of the anticipated project inputs were delivered in sufficient quantities over the life of the project. In terms of the project's road rehabilitation output, although the original target of 704 was reduced to 600 and an additional 12 months were required to meet the target, the revised target was exceeded by 45 kilometers. This was an impressive and significant achievement. The on-the-job training programs and short courses provided to counterpart engineers and road staff by the project-funded technical assistance were both effective and efficient. In contrast to these achievements, the project failed to meet its target of restoring 80 percent of 33 water gauges destroyed by the cyclone. This was largely due to the inability of the GOS to provide funding for the weir construction. While the shortfall in the water gauging component was disappointing, its importance as an element of the overall goal of the project was marginal in relation to the roads component.

Recommendations: USAID should consider the following options: 1) consider the project completed as of Dec. 31, 1987 and deobligate all remaining funds; or 2) extend the Project Assistance Completion Date by nine months to purchase the commodities for the water component conditional on firm evidence of GOS budget contribution.

2. Maintenance of Reconstructed Roads. **While the volume of reconstructed roads exceeded the revised target, maintenance of the roads was seriously neglected by the GOS.** The Project Paper assumed that maintenance was going to be undertaken by the Maintenance Unit of the Roads Branch, under their regular maintenance program. The project purpose, as stated in the Project Paper, was that the project would assist the GOS to "improve its capability to repair and maintain unpaved roads...". The project did not place any emphasis on maintenance and the GOS did not maintain the roads. As a result, by the time of the evaluation, the reconstructed roads in some locations already required reconstruction rather than regular maintenance. Even though the project had a Steering Committee composed of representatives of the three implementing agencies, regular maintenance of the reconstructed roads was never formally transferred to the Maintenance Units. As late as November 1987, the issue was being discussed by the Steering Committee but was unresolved. There were insufficient resources budgeted in the GOS fiscal year 1987-88 for road maintenance. While there was very little hope for improving maintenance in the short-term, the overall maintenance strategy was expected to improve with the

arrival of the U.N.-funded technical assistance team in 1988.

> Recommendation: USAID should issue a formal communication to the GOS informing them of USAID's serious concern about the lack of repair and maintenance of the roads rehabilitated by the project.

3. Project Innovation -- Use of the Private Sector for Maintenance of Road Equipment. The maintenance program for the road equipment -- which relied in large part on the private sector -- was highly successful and made a major contribution to the project with respect to road rehabilitation. Over the life of the project, the average rate of equipment availability was 75 percent. In January 1985 when the project was initiated, the equipment was only available 40 percent of the time. From September 1986 to September 1987, this figure increased to 81 percent. As noted in the engineering advisors' final report, "without this level of mechanical support, the road rehabilitation would not have been achieved." The project design described a four echelon maintenance strategy which would be used to sustain the high level of equipment availability required to meet the planned road rehabilitation targets. The first and second echelons referred to preventive maintenance by drivers and establishment of mobile repair units. The third and fourth echelons, relating to off-site repair and overhaul of plant and equipment, were implemented through maintenance contracts with the private sector. The third and fourth echelons were by far the most effective tools for maintaining the high availability of road equipment.

The impact of the private sector maintenance contracts was clearly demonstrated in mid-1986. At that time, the GOS modified its decision to use private sector maintenance contracts for project equipment and redirected project repairs to government workshops rather than the private sector contractors. During a three-month period when this policy was in effect, the availability of equipment dropped from 86 percent to 74 percent. While the GOS ultimately reinstated the private contractor policy, it was estimated that 15 kilometers of additional road rehabilitation was lost during this time.

4. Innovation in Project Implementation Strategy. The technical assistance team was very good and devised innovative systems to facilitate project implementation. The initial project design was deficient in analyzing the complexity of the GOS

procurement system. At the start of the project there was no precedent for modifying any of the GOS procurement procedures nor were there any controls in place at the Central Transport Authority (CTA) which would adequately monitor time and materials maintenance contracts. During the initial stages of the project, each procurement request to repair a vehicle in a private garage took up to six weeks regardless of the size of the job. In order to simplify these procedures it was necessary to devise a system that could waive the GOS Tender Board requirements for the procurement of spare parts and equipment assigned to the project. To do this, the project's Equipment Repair Specialist negotiated with the Tender Board to permit sole source contracts with five companies. This system was introduced in 1985. In 1986 additional negotiations with the Tender Board created the opportunity to get waivers from competition in less than 24 hours whereas previously this process required three weeks. These breakthroughs created the momentum for introducing still another modification -- time and materials contracts. These contracts required private firms to quote fixed prices for labor, parts, and services and offered the Central Transport Authority a major benefit in that it was easier to audit invoices against a set of standard unit prices. The ease of administration increased the likelihood that this system would be sustained after the completion of the project.

5. USAID Management. **USAID did not use standard monitoring tools to follow-up on implementation issues.** Issues concerning the interpretation of road standards were raised by the U.S. advisors with the roads branch as early as June 1985 and in the mid-term evaluation of November 1985. It took until June of 1986 for USAID and the GOS to agree on modified standards. This suggests a "lack of involvement" on the part of USAID and the GOS. Similarly, budgetary shortfalls for the reconstruction of concrete weirs, a problem early in the life of the project, was raised as an issue in the mid-term evaluation and yet the team found no written evidence that USAID advised the government of this shortfall in fiscal years 1984 through 1987. The team also found no written evidence that in-house project monitoring tools (i.e., Project Committees, Project Implementation Reports etc.) were used to monitor and follow-up on these issues.

6. Achievement of Project Goal. **The goal of the project was achieved.** The goal of the project, as stated in the Project Paper, was to "rehabilitate the infrastructure of the country to a state comparable to that which existed before Cyclone Domoina." The country's road infrastructure was repaired at an even

higher standard than that prior to the cyclone. Travel times were reduced which lowered transport costs and contributed to economic development. Other donors assisted the GOS in reconstructing the remaining road infrastructure, including bridges and paved roads outside the scope of the project.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION OF THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AND STORAGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (KAFUE-CHIRUNDU ROAD) (690-0209.2), NOVEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Kafue-Chirundu road extends roughly 82 kilometers from Kafue, Zambia to the border crossing with Zimbabwe at Chirundu. It is the principal transport artery between the two countries, with important onward trade links to other countries in Southern Africa. The road fell into disuse for about seven years (1973 through early 1980) due to the war in what was then Southern Rhodesia. The road re-opened after an independent Zimbabwe emerged in 1980. It became a very important point for the movement of key commodities into Zambia. Other transport routes are roughly twice as long and more costly. The lack of use and maintenance and subsequent rapid increase in heavy vehicular traffic contributed to the road's swift deterioration.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1981, A.I.D. designed the Regional Transport and Storage Development Project (RTSD) in response to a request by SADCC states (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) for aid in repairing and strengthening regional transport links. Rehabilitation of this road was given the highest priority by the Transport Commission of SADCC.

The goal of the project was to enhance economic development in Southern Africa through improvements in the region's transport and communication network. The purpose of the project was to advance this goal by facilitating the movement of food grains and commercial goods between Zambia and Zimbabwe. This was to have been achieved by rehabilitating seriously deteriorated sections of the Kafue-Chirundu (Zim-Zam Road), the project's sole output.

For the Zambia portion (the focus of this evaluation), the project was divided into two phases. The first phase focused on urgent resealing of about 33 km which, if conducted immediately, would stave off further deterioration. A.I.D. authorized Phase I as an Economic Support Fund grant of $990,000 in early June 1981. In September 1981, a host country contract was awarded to an American firm, Nello Teer, Co. The work was completed after some delay in May 1982.

Phase II involved the complete reconstruction of 30 km of road. Phase II was authorized in September 1981 using $13.1 million in concessional Economic Support Funds. Zambia was expected to contribute the equivalent of $4.6 million in local currency. The

original Project Assistance Completion Date was December 1984.

In February 1983, a host country contract was awarded to a Zambian-based firm, L.J. Whyle & Co. The firm was slow to mobilize and after numerous false starts and delays, USAID decided to require the contractor to agree to a plan for timely completion of the road and subsequently extended the Project Assistance Completion Date to March 1986. Whlye resisted the new schedule and finally totally suspended road work in August 1985. In May 1986, A.I.D./Washington extended the Project Assistance Completion Date to June 1989. In January 1987, a contract was awarded to another Zambian-based firm, Lendor and Burton. The firm initiated road work in May 1987. The GRZ Roads Department was to supervise project implementation. USAID hired the American firm, TAMS, to assist the GRZ in engineering supervision.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The primary purposes of the evaluation were to: 1) conduct a mid-point review of the project; and 2) determine the adequacy of available funding and contract time to complete construction and engineering services according to specifications in the Project Paper. USAID indicated that the major issue they wanted the team to address was whether the technical assistance contractor could provide construction and engineering services at a level satisfactory to A.I.D. and the Government of Zambia by October 1988 with the funds that were available at that time.

The evaluation methodology involved document review, personal interviews and field site visits.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The road could be completed on or ahead of schedule, assuming the normal December-April rains were not unusually heavy or prolonged. The quality of the work performed by the contractor was good and met the standard GRZ Roads Department specifications. The evaluation team anticipated that the work would be completed under budget by as much as $812,500. The quality of resealing on the Nello Teer sections, and the construction on the Whyle sections, were generally good and stood up well.

> Recommendation: The contractor should submit a program of works to the GRZ for approval soon.

2. Maintenance. **It remained questionable whether the road would be maintained adequately when construction came to an end.** The contract with Lendor and Burton included a one year maintenance program. The GRZ Roads department was provided three dump trucks during the early stages of Phase I to be devoted exclusively to maintaining the Zim-Zam Road. The whereabouts of these trucks was unknown at the time of the evaluation. The weighing scales to deter axle overloading mentioned in the Project Paper had not been installed. The team believed it would be very difficult to avoid overloading by trucks, even if the scales had been installed and kept operational, due to bribery, low fines and the truckers' need to overload to cover their hauling costs.

An important lesson learned during Phase I was how much savings could have been achieved through adequate and timely maintenance of roads. In 1981, GRZ and A.I.D. had the foresight to proceed with resealing a portion of the road built under Phase I. Up to $7 million in additional road reconstruction was saved through the timely resealing effort, which cost $956,000. The resealed sections were quite serviceable at the time of the evaluation.

> Recommendation: USAID should request that the GRZ Department of Roads update the maintenance plan originally submitted to fulfill a condition precedent. This plan should include an analysis of the merits of installing a system of weighing stations along the road to cope with truck overloading. USAID should request from the GRZ information on the disposition of the dump trucks. USAID should obtain information on the status of road maintenance programs supported by other donors. The mission should determine whether the GRZ's maintenance plan should be supported on a multi-donor basis.

3. USAID Management. **Some of the earlier implementation difficulties were attributable to A.I.D.'s failure to exercise timely and prudent oversight.** The Project Paper apparently failed to include a plan and budget for adequate assessments throughout the project's life. No steps had been taken by the GRZ or USAID to rectify this situation until USAID initiated the current evaluation. Had a rigorous formal evaluation been conducted before January 1985 when the contract had lapsed well behind schedule, the team most likely would have concluded that Whyle & Co. was incapable of performing the work required. The financial costs incurred as a result of the aborted contract were roughly $1.57 million (lost mobilization and demobilization expenses including equipment seized by Whyle), plus the cost of extending the supervision

contract ($1.4 million). Many of the management problems were alleviated in March 1986 by USAID's appointing a project officer who could devote adequate time to the project.

> Recommendation: USAID should schedule monthly meetings which include the contractor, TAMS, USAID, and the Department of Roads. The USAID project officer should monitor the project through at least bi-weekly visits to the project site and prepare short memos to the Mission Director summarizing the status of project implementation.

4. Data Collection Plan. The Project Paper did not contain an adequate project monitoring, data collection and evaluation plan. Thus, there were no data collection efforts that focused on issues such as traffic counts, customs documentation, agricultural and/or trade patterns. Unless such a system is prepared, it is very difficult to verify the achievement of project purpose or goal other than through *ex post* anecdotal information.

> Recommendation: USAID should encourage the GRZ to establish a system for gathering key baseline and follow-up data. USAID should also arrange for a transport economist to update the Project Paper's analysis of economic activity along the road.

5. Monitoring and Reporting. TAMS' (the supervisory contractor) monitoring of the progress of the road was good. However, the monthly reports submitted by TAMS could have been strengthened by adding more quantitative data, particularly on the progress of works achieved to date.

> Recommendation: TAMS should be requested to include more quantitative data in their monthly reports and amplify documentation of work accomplished and funds expended.

6. Counterpart Contributions. The GRZ exceeded its counterpart commitments as stated in the Project Paper. The GRZ's commitment at the time of the evaluation totaled K9.6 million, more than double the amount prescribed by the project agreement (K4.14). Despite this considerable financial commitment, project implementation could have been improved had the GRZ Director of Roads' been more directly involved in the project.

Recommendation: USAID should strongly encourage the Director of Roads to chair the monthly project meetings and become more actively involved in the management of this important project.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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Frederick Guymont	REDSO/ESA/ENG
James Harmon	USAID/Zambia

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE BLANTYRE-TETE HARARE ROAD (690-0234.12), SEPTEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Transport linkages among the countries of southern Africa need strengthening. The 700 km road running from Blantyre, Malawi to Tete, Mozambique and on to Harare, Zimbabwe is an important part of the regional transportation network. In early 1984, four to six axle trucks used the road to transport maize from Malawi to drought stricken areas of Zimbabwe. An 80 km length of the road between Blantyre, Mwanza and the Mozambique border with Malawi was identified as a critical section of unpaved road needing maintenance and spot improvement to facilitate the movement of heavy truck traffic.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. To facilitate truck movement on the 80 km section of the road, which could be delayed for numerous days especially during the November-February rainy season, A.I.D. authorized the Improvement of Blantyre-Tete-Harare Road project in July 1984 and provided funding in the amount of $500,000. The Government of Malawi (GOM) contributed, in-kind, the equivalent of U.S. $155,000.

The purpose of the project was to undertake maintenance and rehabilitation on selected sections of roadway in order to reduce travel time and transport costs. The Department of Roads carried out the work. USAID used a force account to pay the GOM based upon units of work completed.

At project inception, the European Development Fund (EDF) had initiated construction on a 60 km road which ran parallel to the project road. This road was part of an effort to construct a high standard, asphalt surface roadway connecting Blantyre with the Mozambique border through the town of Mwanza. A.I.D. understood that construction of this road would be completed in July 1986 and then open to traffic. However, problems developed which delayed completion of the EDF road. As a result, A.I.D. continued the project for another 18 months for a total of 42 months, and provided an additional $200,000 for maintenance and graveling and an additional 16 km of roadway. The additional funding brought the total project cost to $700,000. The Project Assistance Completion Date was extended from June 1986 to December 1987. The GOM provided an additional in-kind contribution of the equivalent of $80,000 to the project.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to develop lessons that would be useful

in subsequent road rehabilitation projects. The evaluation focused particularly on the usefulness of the Fixed Amount Reimbursement (F.A.R.) procedure.

The evaluation methodology involved document review, interviews with USAID and the Roads Department staff and site inspection of the project roadway.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **The purpose of the project was achieved.** The site inspection showed that the project exceeded planned outputs. All work was completed three months prior to the the Project Assistance Completion Date of December 1987 and in a satisfactory manner in accordance with Road Department specifications. The improvements in the road reduced travel time in the rainy season for a four or six axle truck from up to three days with pull assistance to one-half day with no assistance.

> Recommendation: USAID should prepare the final inspection report and notify the GOM, Department of Roads, of the cutoff date for funding activities.

2. Achievement of Project Goal. **The goal of the project was achieved.** The project goal was to improve transportation links among countries of Southern Africa. Empirical data on trade flows in the corridor served by the project road show that the corridor progressively increased its share of total trade traffic from 1983 to 1986. In 1983, total metric tonnage (mt) of exports and imports in the project corridor was 36,293 while in other corridors this figure was 154,459. By 1986, total metric tonnage in the project corridor had increased to 359,223, while this figure for other corridors had increased to only 299,685.

3. Fixed Amount Reimbursement (F.A.R.) Procedure. **Adopting the F.A.R. procedure contributed to effective project management.** At the beginning of the project, work was carried out by the Department of Roads using a force account operation with payment made by A.I.D. to the GOM based upon units of work completed. This basis of payment required extensive records at the job site by the Roads Department concerning labor time, material costs and plant hire costs. The USAID Regional Engineer recognized early on that project payments would be simplified and record keeping by the Department of Roads vastly reduced if the F.A.R.

procedure were used as the basis of payment. The GOM accepted this modification in 1985. This change was an excellent project management action.

> Recommendation: USAID should request the GOM to submit their final request for payment under the F.A.R.

4. Foreign Exchange Component. The foreign exchange component of the project (for direct project use by the implementing government agency) was never used. The Grant Agreement provided $150,000 under a Source Origin Waiver for the direct purchase of fuel and lubricants by the Department of Roads for project use. This procurement was never implemented by the Department of Roads since the GOM Ministry of Finance regulations did not allow the Department of Roads to make direct foreign exchange procurement transactions under force account operations.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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FINAL EVALUATION: TRANSPORT AND STORAGE DEVELOPMENT, MAKUTI-CHIRUNDU ROAD (690-0209.10), OCTOBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Transport linkages among the countries of Southern Africa need strengthening. Specifically, portions of the Zimbabwean part of the Zim-Zam Road, between Makuti and Chirundu, required reconstruction.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. and the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) signed a loan agreement in July 1982 in the amount of $4.2 million to fund the Transport and Storage Development, Makuti-Chirundu Road project. Work on this project was to be done concurrently with work on the Chirundu-Kafue portion of the road in Zambia. The purpose of the project was to facilitate trade and communication between Zimbabwe and Zambia through rehabilitation of the Makuti-Chirundu portion of the Zim-Zam road. The agreement called for the GOZ to contribute the equivalent of $1.25 million. USAID and the GOZ also agreed that the Fixed Amount Reimbursement (F.A.R.) Procedure would be used for funding the road improvements with the work contracted to local Zimbabwean contractors by the GOZ Ministry of Roads and Road Traffic. USAID completed the project in June 1984 with the final disbursement of funds in September 1984. USAID made the final disbursement of residual funds in July 1985.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to officially close out the project by completing the Project Evaluation Summary report. The evaluation methodology involved document review and discussions with GOZ Department of Roads personnel. Since the project terminated in 1985, GOZ and USAID personnel who had been associated with the project were not available.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Achievement of Project Goal. **The project goal, which was to assist in economic development by improving transportation links between Zimbabwe and Zambia, was achieved.** Traffic counts, as prepared by the count station, show that there was an almost two-fold increase in heavy vehicle (commercial) traffic

using the road between 1984 and 1985.

	1984	1985
Passenger Cars	33	66
Light goods Vehicles	25	47
Buses	2	2
Heavy Goods Vehicles (Commercial)		
2 axles	5	8
3 axles	3	4
4 axles	1	-
5 axles	8	7
6 axles	18	29
7 axles	3	12
8 axles	3	8
TOTAL	101	183

What was evident was a greater number of heavy vehicles with an axle configuration of more than five per vehicle.

The road was gradually assuming the status of a regional corridor. About 20 percent of Zambia's copper exports was carried by the road to Harare. Normally the road handled about 7 percent of Zambia's imports (in weight terms) made up mainly of consumer products from Zimbabwe.

2. Project Outputs. **Project outputs exceeded output targets.** Planned outputs involved the reconstruction of 12 km of road and 28 km of shoulder improvement between Makuti and Chirundu. Actual outputs included the completion of 39 km of reconstructed road and paved shoulders and 12 additional km of shoulder reconstruction plus road drainage improvements. Since completion of construction in June 1984, the GOZ maintained the road as built to standards.

3. Fixed Amount Reimbursement Procedure(F.A.R.). **The F.A.R. mechanism provided the GOZ with a "windfall" of Zimbabwean dollars due to the devaluation of the Zimbabwean currency in 1882-84.** At the beginning of the project, A.I.D. and the GOZ agreed that sufficient price data were available to provide reliable cost estimates for the F.A.R. procedure. The contract for the construction work was awarded on March 29, 1983 to W.J. and R.L. Gulliver Ltd. Co. in the amount of Zimbabwe dollars Z$1,792,836. The engineering cost estimate for this work had been Z$2,760,000. The F.A.R. amount had been established based on the engineering cost estimates. USAID felt that the GOZ received a "windfall" due to the large difference between the actual bid price and the F.A.R. agreed payments. This was further exacerbated by the devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar during the life of the construction contract as the F.A.R. payments were in U.S. dollars based upon an exchange rate of U. S. $1.40 = Z$1.00. Contract payments were in Zimbabwean dollars and the F.A.R. payments to the GOZ were in U.S. dollars. Therefore the GOZ realized an appreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar due to the devaluation. As a result, the GOZ amended the contractor's contract to Z$42,760,000. The contractor then made further improvements in the initial 40 km road section.

> Recommendation: USAID should provide for the application of the F.A.R. payment amount to be based on award of contract bid prices. This procedure is now being applied to current A.I.D. projects in Southern Africa. USAID should also provide for the F.A.R. payment amount to be adjusted for both devaluation or revaluation of host country currency.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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II. STRENGTHENING COMPETITIVE MARKETS TO PROVIDE A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT FOR PRIVATE SECTOR-LED GROWTH

A. Liberalizing Commodity/Factor Markets

INTERIM EVALUATION OF TOGO'S CEREALS EXPORT LIBERALIZATION PROGRAM, MAY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Before the initiation of the Cereals Export Liberalization Program ("the Program"), Togo had an official ban on private foodcrop exports. In 1980, the Government of Togo (GOT) had issued a decree which prohibited all cereals exports by the private sector. The GOT issued this regulation because of their concern regarding Togo's food security situation. When the domestic supply situation warranted relaxation of the ban, Togograin, a parastatal agency, had a legal monopoly on exporting food crops. Two events prompted the GOT to consider modifying the ban on food crop exports: 1) two consecutive bumper maize harvests in 1984 and 1985, which produced crops in excess of Togo's consumption needs; and 2) the effects of serious drought in the Sahelian countries -- Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger -- immediately north of Togo. African governments and donors recognized that increasing interregional trade would be a way of helping Africans feed other Africans.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In August 1986, the GOT and A.I.D. signed a Program Grant Agreement authorizing the initiation of the Cereals Export Liberalization Program. Under the Program, A.I.D. would provide a $7 million cash transfer which was to be disbursed in two tranches after the GOT's satisfactory fulfillment of two sets of Conditions Precedents (CPs). The disbursements were originally envisaged to occur over a two year period. The GOT was required to deposit $7 million in local currency (CFAF), of which $2 million was to be set aside for maintenance of rural roads, $1 million was to be set aside for strengthening the Direction des Enquetes et Statistiques Agricoles (DESA) in their gathering and analysis of export-related crop data, and the remaining $4 million was to be placed in a revolving credit fund, which would serve the needs of those involved in marketing, storage and export of Togolese foodcrops.

According to the Program Grant Agreement, the first tranche would be released upon satisfaction of the following Conditions Precedent:

- formation of a Cereals Export Licensing commission authorized to determine the volume of exports and licenses;

- public announcement of the legal status of cereals exports and grantee's commitment to permit exports of cereals subject to preservation of national food security;

- agreement that cereals export licenses would be issued as early as September and no later than November in a given year; and

- in collaboration with A.I.D., definition of responsibilities for the management of the Cereals Export Liberalization program in Togo.

A.I.D. subsequently determined that the GOT had met these conditions and authorized the disbursement of the first tranche in January 1987. In April 1987, the GOT deposited in the designated local account the equivalent amount in CFAF counterpart funds.

The Conditions Precedent for the release of the second tranche were as follows:

- provision of export licenses to private sector traders in two crop years on the basis of an open and fair licensing system, with export volume determined by employing estimates of production, national consumption needs and security stock requirements;

- publication and dissemination of information on crop production and producer and consumer prices from data gathered by DESA;

- satisfactory progress in removing constraints to the grain trade through provision of2 credit to farmer groups and export traders through the National Agricultural Development Bank (CNCA);

- payment for cereals by Togograin at price levels that reflected prevailing market rates and evidence that Togograin purchased cereals only in order to maintain security stocks; and

- existence of an acceptable proposal to A.I.D. for the continued use of the counterpart local currency contribution for the second and third years of the Program.

<u>EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY</u>. The purpose of the evaluation was to assist USAID in determining whether the GOT had satisfied the second set of Conditions Precedent. USAID instructed the evaluation team to pursue its mission broadly while in Togo and thus the team focused especially on whether the reform measures embodied in the Program represented progress toward or away from a more liberal trade regime.

The evaluation methodology consisted in document review and discussions with USAID and GOT representatives.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Condition Precedent (CP) 1: Issuance of Export Licenses. While few export licenses were issued, it may have been unrealistic to expect compliance with this CP given the drop in foodgrain production. This CP called for the issuance of export licenses in two crop years, if crop production estimates warranted, on the basis of an open and fair system. No licenses were issued for the first export season of the Program, September 1986 - April 1987. It would have been somewhat unrealistic to expect the issuance of licenses at that time since the Presidential Decree establishing the administrative procedures for the Program had only been set forth in November 1986. During the 1987-88 export season of the Program, licenses were issued for 97 tons of foodcrop exports. The process established for obtaining these licenses was not particularly open or competitive. The environment for the Program changed from large maize surpluses in 1984-85 to marginal surpluses or even deficits in most major foodcrop categories. From 1986 to 1988, total foodcrop production fell in Togo by about 10 percent, making exports problematical under existing food security policies. Weather-related crop shortfalls clearly influenced the GOT's attitude toward issuing licenses.

Despite the issuance of few export licenses, GOT officials believed their government was in full compliance with the agreement and deserved release of the second tranche. They stated that CP-1 included the contingency of the unavailability of food surpluses for export and that this contingency justified the few export licenses issued to private exporters.

One of the major factors that inhibited the issuance of export licenses was the methodology used by the technical committee to determine the amount of surplus available for exports. DESA estimated that Togolese foodcrop production was growing at a rate of 1.5 percent per annum while the consumer population was growing at a rate of 2.9 percent. If this methodology continued to be used, coupled with the government's "food security" philosophy, the "export window" for Togolese foodcrops would be closed by rising quantity restrictions in the near to medium-term. The real problem was that the methodology omitted consideration as to how the Togolese agricultural sector could produce, export and import according to its comparative advantage and in a way that would maximize national income.

The evaluation team preferred an approach in which licenses would be accorded to all legitimate traders wanting to undertake export operations, provided they obeyed the banking and tax laws of the country. This would eliminate the objectionable aspect of the Program, the underwriting of quantity restrictions in the trade regime.

> Recommendation: Performance to date does not warrant release of the second tranche. The technical assistance team should address further liberalization of the trade regime, and the encouragement of exports generally, rather than formally amending CP 1. The technical assistance team arrived in Togo in April 1988 and will be in-country for two years. The second tranche would be released after a sufficient number of licenses, for an adequate volume of exports, has been issued either to individual traders or for specific export transactions. This will probably occur by the end of the 1988-89 agricultural year.

2. Condition Precedent (CP) 2: Publication and Dissemination of Agricultural Data. **While DESA was gathering and analyzing agricultural data in a competent manner, dissemination of the information to the public could have been improved.** For example, in addition to publication of crop prices at the local markets in the newspaper, radio broadcasts could have been used to a greater extent. On the other hand, the private sector's use of government information channels for information of this kind would probably be quite limited.

> Recommendation: In allocating local currency proceeds, the project should concentrate on allocations to improve fundamentals in the marketing system, instead of large investments in improving information flows, since the latter may already function efficiently in the traditional marketing system.

3. Condition Precedent (CP) 3: Provision of Credit to Farmer Groups and Export Traders Through CNCA and Condition Precedent (CP) 5: Acceptable Proposal for CFAF Local Currency. **While the GOT deposited the CFAF equivalent of the first tranche of the cash transfer in an account in the National Agricultural Development Bank (CNCA), the CNCA had not proposed a program to USAID for use of these funds.** At the time of the evaluation, the CNCA did not represent an adequate implementation mechanism for a rural private sector credit program. Moreover, it did not appear that any other institutional mechanisms existed in Togo that

could have handled the large amounts of CFAF that were generated under the program. The CNCA and other Togolese banks were structurally incapable of assessing a rural sector client's risk and potential. Although some sort of guarantee fund might change this, experience has generally shown that such funds only encourage unwise lending.

> Recommendation: The mission should consider the following two options for the management of Tranche 2 local currency proceeds. The first option would be a cash transfer, emphasizing policy reforms in the trade regime, but without programming of local currency. The second option would be a cash transfer with policy reforms and local currency programming, but with the latter restricted to rural roads and agricultural statistics. The evaluation team prefers option one.

4. Condition Precedent (CP) 4: Cereals Purchases by Togograin Must be at Market Prices. Togograin fully complied with this condition. Since 1986, Togograin had not intervened in the marketplace except in late March 1988 when Togo's Council of Ministers asked that it place a limited quantity of cereals on the rural markets of southern Togo. These areas had experienced high crop losses from the drought and were faced with high local market prices and severe food shortages. As the agreement with the World Bank permitted the selling of food security stocks under such conditions, this intervention by Togograin was considered acceptable, as it did not have any disincentive effect on production or marketing.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION REPORT: BOTSWANA SMALL ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (633-0228), AUGUST, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Small-scale entrepreneurs in Botswana need credit to expand their business operations, as well as training in business methods, in order to increase their incomes and enhance their standard of living.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. USAID/Botswana and Partnership for Productivity Botswana (PFB/B) signed an agreement in 1982 authorizing the Small Enterprise Development Project. USAID provided $452,000 for this activity through an Operational Program Grant. PFP/B, a not-for-profit subsidiary company of the Botswana Development corporation (BDC), had worked in Botswana since 1977. The company was originally a subsidiary of Partnership for Productivity International which was a Washington D.C.-based Private Voluntary Organization (PVO). The Project Assistance Completion Date, originally scheduled for September 30, 1985, was extended to September 30, 1986 because of slow expenditure of funds in the early stages of the project.

The purpose of the project was to: 1) initiate new small-scale economic activities among rural and urban poor (this was a NORAD component); 2) strengthen the impact on beneficiaries of small enterprise development programs; and 3) expand the development of permanent Botswana staff capacity to address small enterprise development problems.

PFP's first project in Botswana (Phase I) was conducted in conjunction with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and was aimed at assisting small-scale enterprises through business skills training. The project under review, (Phase II), was intended to use the training resources set up during Phase I, as well as resources available from the Government of Botswana (GOB), to increase productive activities among economically disenfranchised rural and urban beneficiaries. The project focused on the areas of Old Naledi and the Communal First Development Area (CFDA).

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess project accomplishments and identify areas of strength and weakness to consider in future project design.

The evaluation methodology involved document review, interviews with PFP/B clients and USAID, NORAD, GOB and

PFP/B staff, and review of USAID's resource materials on small enterprise development.

The interviews with PFP clients were conducted using a questionnaire (included as Appendix III of the evaluation report). Each interview took approximately 45 minutes.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project did not achieve its purpose. There was a low level of achievement with respect to most project outputs. For example, the project assisted in establishing only 20 new businesses when the target (revised downward from 150-250 at the time of the mid-term evaluation) was 30-50. The project provided assistance to only 65 clients while the target (revised from 200-300) was 75-100. The project design also envisaged that eight trained staff would be in place by the Project Assistance Completion Date. While there were times that this many staff had been in place, by the Project Assistance Completion Date, only three staff were in place. And while the project did improve the business skills of the 65 clients it assisted, this was achieved at a high cost -- $6,954.00 per current and graduated client.

Limitations in the original project design contributed to ineffective project implementation. The major problem was that project design was based on weak analysis -- no study of the area had been done until after the project design was completed. Consequently, the original design did not clearly identify and analyze the target group and, as a result, assumptions concerning the needs of the target group were inaccurate. The project thus began implementation in an area that was geographically too small to provide sufficient suitable clients and where there was insufficient demand for the project's services. This then required enlarging the project area and changing the emphasis of the project -- by developing a credit scheme for small businesses. The provision of credit had not been anticipated in the original project design. Even with these changes the project reached a very small portion of the population in the project area at high cost.

> Recommendation: USAID should undertake socioeconomic studies of the project area as a part of project design. This will enable project designers to identify target clients and their actual needs on the basis of adequate data.

2. Use of Lessons Learned in Project Design. **Errors in project design could have been avoided had designers studied the lessons learned from other small enterprise projects.** The evaluation team's review of resource materials available at the USAID mission suggested that many of the problems in design and implementation could have been avoided if the project incorporated the many valuable lessons from the literature on small-scale enterprises. As one example, the team noted that clients who needed financial assistance were, for the most part, incapable of understanding the material that was presented to them. Even the informal one-on-one sessions were frequently pitched at too high a level for the client to understand. Clients' participation in this aspect of the project was solely to satisfy certain requirements so that they could receive financial assistance. These issues had been addressed in A.I.D. Special Evaluation Study Number 27, Private Voluntary Organizations and the Promotion of Small Scale Enterprise. The author of this paper observed, "Programs for informal sector entrepreneurs that require the completion of formal training courses, often as a prerequisite for approval, are regarded as probable failures. Trainees tend to offer only perfunctory responses to course material."

> Recommendation: USAID should ensure that project designers make adequate use of resource materials containing lessons learned.

3. Micro-Credit Scheme. **The micro-credit scheme was the most successful aspect of the project but the benefits of credit were unlikely to be sustained.** The micro-credit scheme was the most successful element of the project because this was what was really needed in the project area. During project implementation, when it became apparent that: 1) the clients were of such a low level of literacy that they were incapable of understanding the business extension services (especially record keeping); and 2) the clients' needs were for capital to start their businesses and many of them were ineligible for available credit because of poor creditworthiness, PFF/B secured P10,000 from Barclays Bank, which was to be used for the provision of credit to small enterprise clients. Interviews with clients suggested that the most important service provided by the project was credit.

Nevertheless, there was a fair chance that the benefits provided by the micro-credit scheme would not endure. The author of the document referred to above reached the following conclusion. " The impact of credit on firm profitability are more likely to endure when the loans meet the following criteria: 1) they are for longer rather than shorter terms; 2) they are for fixed rather than working capital; and 3) they are made to

firms that are larger than micro-sector enterprises." Considering that the loans granted under the micro-credit scheme were mostly for periods of up to six months, were primarily for working capital and were all made to one-man businesses, there were doubts whether the benefits would be sustained.

4. Sustainability. There was considerable doubt concerning Partnership For Productivity/Botswana's (PFP/B) future. When USAID indicated that it was unwilling to fund a Phase III, the company was unable to secure funding to continue operations. At the time of the evaluation, it was thirteen months after the Project Assistance Completion Date and the issue had not been resolved. The only available funding was P80,000 from the Botswana Development Corporation, which was not even sufficient to cover PFP/B's fixed overhead. PFP/B's operations had declined and staffing had been reduced to skeleton levels. If a support institution like PFP/B fails to achieve sustainability, it raises questions about its ability to assist clients to achieve this goal.

> Recommendation: Project designs should incorporate plans for securing funding for subsequent phases as an integral part of the project plan. When institution building is a goal of the project, USAID should ensure that the project is designed to run over longer periods. The project life should be at least five years, but preferably seven to ten years in duration. Extending the funding period will give the institutions a better chance of becoming established and achieving sustainability.

EVALUATION TEAM.

NAME:	AFFILIATION:
D. A. de la Harpe	Price Waterhouse, Botswana

MIDTERM EVALUATION OF THE RURAL ENTERPRISE PROGRAM OF THE RURAL PRIVATE ENTERPRISE PROJECT (615-0220), NOVEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Kenya's economic setting is generally healthy and suited to accommodating growth in small enterprise development. However, private investment declined sharply in real terms from 1980-84, but increased by 30 percent in 1985 and another 5 percent in 1986. The level of private investment was, however, considerably below the levels achieved in the early eighties. The private investment trends are of great concern to the government, as manifested by the establishment of the Committee on Investment Policy in October 1986 to look into ways of improving private investment and facilitating implementation of investment policies.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In mid-1984, A.I.D. signed a cooperative agreement with World Education, Inc. (WEI) to launch the Rural Enterprise Program (REP) throughout Kenya. The purpose of the program was to promote small enterprise development through institutional development of local organizations, credit and technical assistance. REP was part of the larger Rural Private Enterprise (RPE) project that provided $24 million in loan funds to the Government of Kenya (GOK) to be channeled through commercial banks to support the growth of rural small businesses. REP was under the direction of a Kenyan Board of Directors and was run by an American General Manager and Kenyan staff.

The agreement, as amended, provided $7.059 million in grant funds, including $4.2 million for Non-Governmental-Organization (NGO) subproject activities. The final input delivery was scheduled for 1989. USAID has proposed additional funding for REP through 1994.

The Project Paper indicated that the following would be key REP activities:

- approximately 1,350 individuals or group clients would receive loans averaging $1,200;
- approximately 21,500 individuals would benefit either directly or in groups from the project;
- approximately 1,000 new jobs would result from the credit program;
- a large proportion of NGO clients would be women; and

- a large proportion of beneficiaries would be group members.

REP's role, according to the Project Paper, was to serve as an administrative and financial intermediary between A.I.D. and NGOs; a source for upgrading NGO capabilities; a provider of technical assistance to both NGOs and client enterprises; a provider of credit to NGOs; and a monitoring and evaluation organization.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of the evaluation were to: 1) assess REP progress and lessons to date; 2) establish parameters for on-going project monitoring and final evaluation; and 3) demonstrate links with worldwide small enterprise activities.

The methodology involved site visits to 10 REP subprojects in 11 very different geographic settings in rural Kenya and interviews with the REP BOARD, project beneficiaries, and USAID, REP and NGO staffs.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **REP had made very good progress.** REP was now one of the most widely-recognized institutions in the country promoting economic development. At the time of the evaluation, REP had funded fourteen subprojects, and was directly serving over 4,500 entrepreneurs of whom roughly half were women. In many instances, outputs exceeded expectations as shown below.

Planned Output	Actual Output
- benefit 21,500 individuals	- benefitted 24,000
- create 1,000 new jobs	- created 2,000 new jobs
- loans average $1,200 each	- loans averaged $1,277

Recommendation: USAID should consider providing additional assistance to REP thorough appropriate funding mechanisms.

2. REP Technical Support to Subprojects. **REP developed very good tools and procedures for assessing business feasibility and monitoring business progress.** REP carried out intensive surveys to determine whether the proposed business would be viable. This survey

became a part of the proposal to the Board for subproject selection. This survey work was critical for successful subproject implementation. For example, when REP realized there were limitations in the management capabilities of an appropriate technology group, it deobligated a grant to them of $220,860. In addition, after a proposal had been approved, the sub-grantee was provided with "REP monitoring forms." These forms included the Grantee Client Information Intake form; the Grantee Client Monitoring Form; the Grantee Aggregate Monitoring form filled out by headquarters or regional offices twice a year; and the REP Monitoring of Grantee Performance, which REP filled out every six months for each subproject.

> Recommendation: Possibly some of the information on these forms may not be necessary, especially at the client intake stage. REP indicated that as more experience is gained, these forms will be modified as appropriate.

3. <u>Need for Continued Emphasis on Innovation</u>. **REP launched a number of novel approaches for generating income and creating jobs in the small business sector.** It assisted Samburu warriors in Isiolo in forming goat-trading associations for the first time. It helped a women's group in Wondonyi learn how to account for and share proceeds from a mill the project helped them build. The project was also helping graduates of polytechnical schools form group enterprises. The risk of exploring these innovative schemes seemed worth taking. However, some will certainly fail.

> Recommendation: USAID should measure the success of REP in terms of both impact and innovation. A reasonable balance between the two should be struck. If too much emphasis is given to the need for a high percentage of successful subprojects, many high-risk but innovative opportunities will have to be passed up to satisfy the donor.

4. <u>Monitoring Job and Income Generation to Determine Impact</u>. **Given that many subprojects had just begun, REP had made little progress in gathering data at regular intervals to monitor progress and impact.** By and large, data were not being collected by subproject staff on indicators such as job generation and related costs, percentages of male and female clients etc. However, if this type of data base were to be developed, the final evaluation should yield a wealth of information on impact. The evaluation team thus believed that one of the most useful functions it could perform was to set up indicators for monitoring progress and assessing impact. The evaluation team

suggested a total of 17 indicators. Three of these indicators were as follows.

- Create new jobs at a total cost of $1,000 per job. (Data should be disaggregated by male/female entrepreneur. The lower cost per job, the greater the impact of REP and the greater chance of sustainability.)

- Generate additional annual income for the small entrepreneur at a rate of Ksh 1.50 for each Ksh. 1.00 expended to create that new income. (REP should track the added income of an entrepreneur supported by the program and the total costs to all parties of creating that new income. Before and after figures should be collected.)

- Recover loans to entrepreneurs at a rate of 80 percent.

Recommendation: REP and subproject staff should use these indicators not only to facilitate future evaluations, but also to guide their enterprise development work. Data collected on the suggested indicators will permit comparisons and inform changes in REP development strategies. As subproject staff become more familiar with their programs, they should develop other indicators to guide their monitoring and evaluation efforts. REP should ensure that careful monitoring of job and income generation is carried out so that the impact of each subproject can be assessed.

5. Innovative Elements of REP Strategy. Two important and innovative elements of REP strategy were: 1) product market analysis as part of subproject design; and 2) provision of financial training and bookkeeping to entrepreneurs and Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGOs) before making available loan funds. Many projects in other countries do not undertake adequate product market analysis before designing subprojects, resulting in failed enterprises. REP put heavy, up-front effort into doing market surveys and into training NGO staff to do market analyses on their own. REP also emphasized with NGOs the importance of giving businessmen and women training in financial accountability before giving them credit. REP also documented these procedures in manuals for training and field use.

Recommendation: Small scale enterprise specialists and project designers should take advantage of the REP experience in Kenya and its

materials on market analysis for small firms and training for credit.

6. Linkage. As an innovative project, REP could provide assistance to and benefit from linkages with other small scale enterprise projects. Three projects which could both teach and learn from REP include: 1) Indonesia's Central Java Enterprise project; 2) Senegal's Enterprise Development project; and 3) ADEMI's group lending project in the Dominican Republic.

Recommendation: REP should use project resources to link the growing number of enterprise development projects through exchange visits, electronic networking and shared technical assistance to third countries.

7. Sustainability. REP will require several additional years to approach sustainability, but not all elements will ever become fully self-subsidizing. REP will need the assistance of donors and Kenyan resources to hope for success in this area. Credit programs, revolving loan funds and loan guarantee components should become self-funding once NGOs and financial institutions establish effective relationships. But training and technical assistance elements seldom cover costs from fees for service. Drawing on experience from other projects, it seems unlikely that all components of REP will become fully self-subsidizing.

Recommendation: REP and USAID should work together to explore innovative ways to offset costs with revenues. Business advisory services, marketing analysis, technical assistance on small business development are all capable of generating income and could be provided by REP beyond the project. REP has no real competition in the field of small business promotion in Kenya and it has marketable skills that could generate income to offset development costs.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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MIDTERM EVALUATION OF THE COMMUNITY AND ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN SENEGAL (685-0260), JUNE, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. A joint 1979 evaluation by A.I.D. and the Government of Senegal (GOS) of USAID/Dakar's program concluded that GOS-provided agricultural services were not fully meeting farmers' needs for goods and services. In addition, A.I.D. and the GOS recognized that small-scale entrepreneurs required credit and training in order to contribute to rural and urban enterprise development.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1983, A.I.D. designed the Community and Enterprise Development (C&ED) project as a pilot effort to determine if Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) were a more effective alternative to traditional government services in meeting small farmer needs. The C&ED project, with life-of-project funding set at $9 million, had two distinct purposes, to: 1) strengthen the capacity of village organizations (VOs), through PVOs, to carry out development projects that benefit both the VOs and the region; and 2) assist small-scale enterprises (SSEs) to carry out increased and self-sustaining business activities.

- The PVO component had grant funding to strengthen the PVOs and a $750,000 revolving credit fund to funnel through the PVOs to VOs for financially viable group activities. The PVOs were expected to train the VOs in credit management so that they would eventually be able to receive bank funding directly. The Project Paper anticipated working through 21-30 PVOs to provide assistance to 210 VO projects by the Project Assistance Completion Date.

- The SSE component consisted of a revolving credit fund of $450,000 and aimed at providing the services of a rural bank, operating according to strict business criteria. Its lending criteria aimed at both financial benefits for the entrepreneurs and developmental benefits, including increased economic activity and employment. The Project Paper anticipated that this component would provide training and credit services to 675 small scale enterprises. At the end of the project, 70 percent of the participating SSE's were expected to have reimbursed their loans and 50 percent were expected to have the capacity to move into the formal banking and credit sector to receive additional loans.

The project began in 1985 but it was not until August 1986 that the project made the first loans to small-scale enterprises. The Project Assistance Completion Date was planned for 1989.

USAID awarded contracts to two organizations to assist in project implementation. One organization, New Transcentury Fund (NTF) had a broad scope of activities. The other, Management Sciences International (MSI) had a narrower scope -- small business development and management systems.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess project progress to date, help replan, if necessary, and recommend activities which would help the project institutionalize its two components by the end of 1990.

The evaluation methodology consisted in document review, personal interviews and direct observation of project activities. For the PVO component, interviews with non-participating PVOs gave the team insights into why these organizations had declined the opportunity to receive technical assistance and funding to support their activities. The team visited with village organizations and farmer groups to determine the early impact of the PVO side of the project. For the small-scale enterprise side, the team interviewed small-scale entrepreneurs funded by the project to determine the impact of their first project loans. The team also participated in the May monthly credit committee meeting, at which the business advisors presented and defended entrepreneurs' applications for credit. This provided the opportunity to observe the credit screening process in action. Finally, the team interviewed the staff of eight banks, to ascertain what actions the project would have to take during its final three years to create a clientele sufficiently attractive for a bank to assume part of its portfolio. The interview forms that the team used to conduct interviews for the SSE and PVO components were included in the appendices of the evaluation report.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose: Small Scale Enterprise (SSE) Component. The SSE component was a success. The SSE component made 95 loans by the time of the evaluation, totaling over $400,000 with no defaults and only four late payments. The loan portfolio was growing every month. The project was charging 24 percent interest, 10.5 percentage points above the formal lending rate. Despite this real rate of unsubsidized interest, the businesses

receiving credit had been visibly strengthened. Businesses were reinvesting earnings and the volume of business was increasing. The component's success was due to the use of sound business principles by the SSE specialist. However, the SSE component was not yet financially viable. The target group of the SSE component did not constitute a large enough market for the Small Business Advisory Unit (SBAU) to achieve profitability. The average loan size and the number of loans per advisor were too small for the SBAU to break even. This was in large part a function of the restrictive loan criteria and definition of the target group employed by SBAU. The target group in the project paper was limited to firms involved in agricultural production.

There was a large demand for loans at 24 percent in all zones from firms with viable projects that did not have access to formal credit. If the project were to ease its restrictions on fundable projects and increase the ceiling on loans, it would increase it effectiveness in reaching the target group. Increasing the number of overall loans and raising the average loan size would provide the economies of scale to become profitable. With these larger, more profitable loans, the SBAU would be able to afford to make loans to the target group. Thus, extending loans to non-target enterprises would subsidize the smaller, less economic loans to the target group.

> Recommendation: The SSE component should entertain loan requests from firms that do not fall directly within the target group or that may not meet the enterprise development criteria being imposed by the project. These loans should always come in second priority to loans to firms in the target group or other firms meeting the other loan criteria (particularly reinvestment in the firm). It should also transfer 104 million CFA from the PVO grant subcomponent to the SSE component to ensure enough capital funds to attain profitability.

2. <u>Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose: Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Component</u>. **The PVO component was plagued with administrative delays.** The project had provided grants to only four PVOs and only one of these (CARITAS/Mbour) had begun implementing activities with (four) Voluntary Organizations (VOs). The other three PVOs (PADEC, AFRICARE, and OEF/MFR) planned to begin activities with 38 VOs shortly. PVO participation had been much lower than anticipated. Of the twenty-nine PVOs that had had contact with project staff, 19 decided not to participate for the following reasons: lack of expertise in agricultural production and credit; lack

of PVO role in project decisionmaking and subproject development; and requirements for certain PVO internal management systems prior to receiving funding. Six PVOs were awaiting approval of their proposals. There had been serious delays in the approval process because some proposals had been poorly conceived. In some instances PVO accountability systems needed strengthening.

> Recommendation: The project should restrict the number of participating PVOs to six-eight as a result of the limited time remaining until the Project Assistance Completion Date. The project should reduce the total number of VOs to be served during the project -- possibly to 70-100 -- to reflect the actual capacities of the PVOs. USAID and project staff should review project proposal procedures for PVOs to make them simpler to follow and faster to process.

3. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) as Viable Alternatives to Government Services. PVOs, GOS technical offices and USAID's agricultural office were unable to provide data on the cost of delivery of services. Without data to analyze the comparative costs of services, the team could not judge whether PVOs were more efficient or more expensive with respect to service delivery, compared to GOS government agencies. The team noted that all four Voluntary Organizations (VOs) appeared to be achieving their objectives and that the services that CARITAS/Mbour were providing to the VOs (well equipment delivery, installation of irrigation lines, agricultural advice, pesticide use and control and pump maintenance crews) appeared to be beyond the means of the skeletal government services in the project area.

> Recommendation: The project's management unit should undertake a baseline study of the comparative costs of the delivery of services. By mid-1987, the project should have six-eight PVO participants and should be able to track their performance.

4. Use of Rapid Reconnaissance Surveys to Strengthen Project Design. The Small Scale Enterprise (SSE) component used rapid reconnaissance surveys to strengthen the original design of the project and to gain an understanding of the needs of the target group. The Project Paper called for the Small Business Advisory Unit (SBAU) to work closely with individual enterprise owners to design and administer a business improvement plan based upon the entrepreneur's aspirations. The level of assistance was to be based

on the entrepreneur's ability to absorb it and was to include everything from credit to functional literacy and numeracy, as deemed necessary. When the project began implementation, the SSE advisor initiated a series of rapid reconnaissance surveys including: 1) a month-long survey of small-scale enterprises to identify characteristics and critical needs; 2) a week-long survey on aspects of SSE credit use and access; and 3) an in-depth survey of 500 SSEs to serve as baseline data and for strategy re-elaboration, if necessary. The surveys revealed that credit was the single greatest constraint to development and strengthening of SSEs. Therefore, project staff selected the credit fund as the foundation of the strategy and the principal tool of the SBAU in their work with entrepreneurs. The major change in project strategy, then, was to concentrate on the lending and repayment of loans, and deemphasize the design and administration of a business improvement plan.

> Recommendation: The project should involve the financial management advisor in the review of SSE strategy changes. He has a strong banking background and should be involved to ensure that changes in credit and interest strategy are properly thought through and that their real impacts are assessed.

5. Impact. **The Small Scale Enterprise (SSE) component had already demonstrated positive impact.** The SSE component demonstrated positive impact based upon case studies of entrepreneurs who had fully paid off their loans.

- A metalworker borrowed 500,000 CFA to increase his working capital to allow him to make and sell more electric millet grinders. He repaid the loan in two months, clearing more than 600,00 CFA in profits. He reinvested the profits in the electric grinder operation and returned for a second loan of 1.5 million CFA to begin manufacturing a diesel powered grinder for use in rural areas.

- An agricultural produce merchant paid off his loan and used the return from his investment to open the first local dealership for plow parts, on which he then had an exclusive license.

- A civil servent with a livestock-fattening operation earned 225,000 CFA, for a 20 percent return on his loan, which he reinvested in the infrastructure of his farm.

Recommendation: To enhance impact, the project should raise the loan ceiling from 3 million CFA to 6 million CFA. This will allow the size of the average loan to grow to about 1.8 million CFA. The SSE component should continue the Small Business Advisory Unit's (SBAU) current loan analyis policies. They work well and defaults must be kept below 5 percent for the project to become self-sustaining.

6. Sustainability. The Small Scale Enterprise (SSE) component could become profitable and self-sustaining in the future. However, it needed to refine its strategy to achieve these two objectives by the Project Assistance Completion Date. It needed to attract a parent banking organization and ensure the project's institutionalization within this organization. This would require an intensive effort on the part of the SSE specialist and his advisor, focused on these objectives alone.

Recommendation: The project staff should establish communications with likely parent banks for future adoption of the Small Business Advisory Unit (SBAU).

EVALUATION TEAM.

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Credit

FINAL EVALUATION OF LESOTHO CREDIT UNION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (632-0214), MARCH, 1986

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Lesotho (GOL) believed that credit unions could positively affect the lives and welfare of Lesotho's people, especially in rural areas, and required assistance in strengthening the Lesotho Cooperative Credit Union League, the largest, strongest and most active cooperative organization in the country.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. signed the first Project Agreement to assist the Lesotho Cooperative Credit Union League (LCCUL) in 1980. A 1983 evaluation of the project recommended continued support. Accordingly, A.I.D. approved an additional $989,241 grant for the two year period from March 1, 1984 to February 28, 1986.

During the two year extension, LCCUL was to redirect its credit union development efforts into a carefully managed strategy. The latter was designed to strengthen those credit unions which demonstrated interest, capability and potential to serve as vehicles for providing agricultural credit to the small farmer.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY. The evaluation methodology involved inspection of operational procedures at five credit unions, interviews with credit union members, boards of directors and staffs and review of LCCUL files and reports.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. At least two-thirds of the quantitative and qualitative outputs were achieved. Member savings reached M1.74 million; member loans, M1.3 million. Productive loans increased to 48 percent of total member loan funds. 776 farmers learned improved agricultural practices and received adequate credit. 212 board and 302 committee members developed increased managerial skills. Measurement of yields indicated from 20 to 30 percent increases, compared with those outside the program. On the negative side, loan delinquency continued at 28 percent. LCCUL earnings, while meeting the target, were primarily made from dues and fixed deposits, while earnings from interest on loans fell short of the target. Important operational systems, such as the LCCUL personnel policies and employee evaluation system, were not yet implemented. LCCUL efforts to

collect loan principle and interest owed were considered inadequate.

2. Institutional Capacity - Credit Unions. **While credit unions as a group made overall improvements, persistent problems existed among the non-participating credit unions.** LCCUL provided support services designed to promote the development of the institutional and operating structure of the credit unions. Nevertheless, problems remained which included: high delinquency loan rates; uncollected loan interest; failure to maintain acceptable bookkeeping; failure to hold regular meetings and failure to report.

> Recommendation: LCCUL should develop an action plan which calls for a more concerted effort to solve the more critical problems. The plan should include the following steps: 1) identification of the credit union and its specific problems; 2) meeting with field officers to get their input; 3) visits to the credit union to discuss solutions; 4) follow-up visits to evaluate status of problems; and 5) field officer reports on problem credit unions.

3. Loan Collection Procedures. **The loan collection procedure was spread over too long a time period to be effective.** Moreover, these procedures were not being followed by LCCUL management. LCCUL's loan collection as well as dues and capitalization collection from its member credit unions could best be described as passive.

> Recommendation: The time schedule in the loan collection procedure in the LCCUL credit policy should be shortened. There should be shorter intervals between collection notices and other follow-up steps.

4. Delinquent Credit Union Loans. **Although the established goal of 24 percent loan delinquency was not achieved, many of the individual credit unions far surpassed this goal.** Strong supervisory efforts along with training programs directed toward improved credit administration and loan collection resulted in more than 30 credit unions adopting improved loan collection policies and procedures. At least 30 credit unions hired one or more loan collectors.

> Recommendation: Credit unions which have adopted these policies should be strongly urged to put them into place as soon as possible. LCCUL field

officers should be required to monitor the efforts of the collectors and follow-up with credit union Boards of Directors to determine the results of these efforts and member reaction to the new policies and procedures.

5. Less Restrictive Loan Policies. While less restrictive policies for crop production loans were put into effect by the LCCUL, on an overall basis demand for these loans was very weak. Members were allowed to have loans up to the amount of their input need if they had an ongoing viable cropping program and the capacity to repay the loans. Dry weather at planting time, however, reduced the demand for credit for crop production and the actual amount of loans disbursed did not significantly increase. Beyond this specific problem and on an overall basis, the demand for agricultural production loans was very weak.

Recommendation: To improve member participation and loan demand, demonstration projects using improved farming or animal husbandry practices should be set up with qualified, willing and respected members in each credit union community. The progress of these projects should be monitored to provide technical assistance and counselling if needed or requested by the participants.

EVALUATION TEAM.

NAME:

George LaChapelle

Larry Wisniewski

MIDTERM EVALUATION OF ACCOSCA (698-0413.13), JUNE, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The formal African credit union movement began in the 1960s, although a few individual credit unions were initiated in the 1940s and 1950s. The movement forms a band across Africa south of the Sahara, from the islands of the Seychelles and Mauritius to Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Twenty-four national organizations constitute the African credit union movement which is affiliated with the Africa Confederation of Cooperative Savings and Credit Associations (ACCOSCA), the apex organization. At the time of ACCOSCA's founding in 1968, a number of European countries as well as the United States began to fund various components of the ACCOSCA operation. The large amount of support to a young organization led to difficulties. Rapid growth was not accompanied by sufficient attention to financial management and many donors withdrew support. In the early 80s the organization was in peril of dissolution.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. recognized the difficulties of supporting a pan-African organization, particularly at a time of slow economic growth in the region, but believed that the organization merited continued support. A.I.D. carried out the first grant-funded project from 1980 to 1985. In 1895, A.I.D. authorized $1.7 million for the follow-on project, Support to Regional Organizations - African Cooperative Savings and Credit Association II Subproject (ACCOSCA II). The purpose of the project was to improve ACCOSCA's organizational effectiveness and assist affiliates with their organizational requirements. The project provided operational support, support for one long-term training advisor and short-term technical assistance, particularly to assist ACCOSCA in achieving institutional self-sufficiency.

The grantee was the Credit Union National Association (CUNA) while the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) served as the conduit for funds and provided technical assistance and administrative support. WOCCU was responsible for administering the A.I.D. grant and for financial reporting.

In a document attached to the project agreement, A.I.D. outlined five major objectives for the project:

- Financial Management and Income Generation: ACCOSCA would prepare a long-range plan to maximize income generation and control expenses;

- Organization and Administration: ACCOSCA would form five new affiliates;

- Services and Outreach: ACCOSCA would increase use of affiliate leaders to provide services to Francophone countries;

- Project Monitoring and Management: ACCOSCA would establish and use project advisory and donor committees; and

- A.I.D. Grant Administration: A.I.D. would continue its arrangements with CUNA and WOCCU.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to: 1) develop information to be used by project personnel to increase operational efficiency and facilitate mid-course corrections; and 2) assess whether ACCOSCA's management and organizational procedures were sufficiently effective to warrant continued donor support.

The methodology involved site visits to nine countries: Ivory Coast, Togo, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Swaziland and Uganda. In-country visits permitted interviews with credit union officials, staff and members as well as representatives of government, banking and donor agencies. The team interviewed 65 individuals directly and 175 indirectly through group interviews. The team also reviewed project documents at ACCOSCA headquarters in Nairobi.

MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **ACCOSCA made a major effort to respond to donor criticism.** ACCOSCA became a mature organization. Under the guidance of a revitalized Board of Directors, it was more stable and fully staffed at all levels. Its Executive Secretary had been recognized both within the African credit union movement and African and international organizations as an able leader.

2. Training. **The training component was fully and effectively implemented.** The training strategy was effective and exceeded its targets. While the target number of training programs was five, ACCOSCA conducted 15. While the target number of person days of training was 500, ACCOSCA conducted 1,300. And while the target number of training manuals to be produced was 25, ACCOSCA produced 201 manuals, modules and lesson plans.

Recommendation: The functions of the project's Training Advisor should be fully integrated into

ACCOSCA's Department of Training, prior to her departure.

3. Promotion. The project's promotion component suffered from errors in design. As stated in the organization's charter, ACCOSCA's raison d'etre was to "promote and organize national cooperative savings and credit organizations in liaison with African governments and interested parties." A major purpose of the project was for ACCOSCA to form five new affiliates, thereby increasing the total number of affiliates to 29. Despite the fact that the project agreement clearly identified targets in the area of promotion, the project budget had no line item for promotion. At the time of the evaluation, ACCOSCA had three new affiliates on stand-by acceptance for May 1987. In addition, the Department of Promotion was young, and had not yet defined its strategy or priorities.

Recommendation: The project should eliminate the goal of adding five new affiliates. ACCOSCA should accord priority to strengthening the institutional base of current affiliates.

4. Risk Management. The income from risk management could not be considered a significant source of income either at the time of the evaluation or in the foreseeable future. Risk management is coverage against loss of savings and loans for credit union members. First introduced in 1973, this insurance program was designed to: 1) contribute to the ultimate self-sufficiency of ACCOSCA (to be at 20 percent by the end of the project) by generating funds from insurance commissions; and 2) render ACCOSCA better able to deliver a vital insurance service to its members. By 1983, ACCOSCA had extended risk management coverage to nine of its 24 affiliates.

A 1986 consultant's report, "Long-Range Self-Sufficiency Strategies for ACCOSCA" calculated annual risk management commission income at $25,000-$37,000 per year. The evaluation team considered this projection highly optimistic. The Risk Management chief at the time of the evaluation estimated project commission earnings at $6000 and $7500 for FY87 and FY88 respectively. These figures were consistent with those contained in the Project Paper.

ACCOSCA's earned income from 1983-85 averaged 20-24 percent of total income. In 1986, earned income dropped to nine percent due to the withdrawal of Kenya from the risk management program. More than 80 percent of ACCOSCA's earned income from insurance commissions

was derived from the Kenya program. In the prior three-year period, the largest income earner for ACCOSCA was the risk management program, typically contributing 60-70 percent of all earned income. At the time of the evaluation, the program would do little more than pay for itself. Significant income from risk management would be possible only when all affiliates (24 at a minimum) operate insurance programs.

Recommendation: ACCOSCA should continue to consider risk management a priority activity, but should not view it as a significant source of increased income.

5. Financial Viability. **The project would not achieve the 20 percent self-sufficiency target by the Project Assistance Completion Date.** The major sources of income were to have been derived from: 1) insurance premiums; 2) dues payments by affiliates; and 3) one new income generating activity which was to have been tested during the first year of the project. As of December 1986, 18 months into the project, revenue from all three sources was below target. The problems with the risk management program were discussed above. Dues payments were below targeted levels. From 1980-86, ACCOSCA collected approximately one-third of affiliates' assessed dues. Finally, the project's income generating activity only began in the first quarter of 1987 and, at the time of the evaluation, had not yet generated any income.

Recommendation: For the foreseeable future, ACCOSCA should consider increased income generation as the project goal rather than self-sufficiency.

6. Data Collection and Analysis. **The project made progress in establishing an information-gathering and analysis capability in ACCOSCA.** Technical assistance provided by a qualified accountant for one year contributed to improved reporting of in-house and affiliate accounts. The Board took actions to develop an improved information system. However, the volume of data generated at ACCOSCA required computer capacity and ACCOSCA had virtually no resources for instituting a permanent data collection and analysis capability.

Recommendation: ACCOSCA must adopt improved methods of data collection, create a central information system at both central and affiliate levels and improve statisical and financial data of credit union societies. The project should undertake a needs assessment for microcomputers

and software for ACCOSCA. Possibly REDSO/ESA can assist ACCOSCA in this endeavor.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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FINAL EVALUATION REPORT: DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOGO NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ASSOCIATION (693-0224), AUGUST, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. In Togo, lack of access to credit at a reasonable rate is a major constraint for low- and middle-income households. Togolese have traditionally countered the ever-present usurer by relying on "tontines" (informal savings and credit groups usually of friends or neighbors) and the practice of "adakavi" (whereby an entrepreneur manages members savings during the year and returns the funds at year-end with token interest).

In 1967, the first credit union in Togo was established. By 1983, the credit union movement had grown to the point that members felt the need to create a national credit union association. Thus, representatives of 68 credit unions established FUCEC-TOGO, the National Credit Union Federation of Togo. Members of this organization recognized the need for technical assistance and training to promote further the credit union movement in Togo.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1983, A.I.D. authorized the Togo National Credit Union Association project for $2,149,745. The purpose of the project was to develop a technically and financially self-sufficient national federation. Other partners in the project included the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU, the recipient of the A.I.D. grant), the International Center of Mutual Credit of france (CICM), the African Confederation of Cooperative Savings and Credit Associations (ACCOSCA) and Bread for the World. A.I.D. provided approximately 55 percent of total project funds. The Project Assistance Completion Date was set for December 1988.

The principal objectives of the project were: 1) improvement of the central administration of FUCEC-TOGO; 2) strengthening of the Central Liquidity Facility; 3) improvement of league financial management; 4) development of national association planning systems; 5) risk management (life savings and loan protection service); 6) inspection/auditing of credit unions and regular follow-up; and 7) attainment of a financial self-sufficiency rate of 50 percent.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess progress toward achievement of project objectives.

The evaluation methodology included a six-week self-evaluation conducted by the WOCCU technical assistance

team and the staff and management of FUCEC-TOGO, prior to the arrival of the external evaluation team. The self-evaluation involved the assembly and analysis of documentary information on the attainment of project objectives and targets. The evaluation team included considerable information on these topics in the appendices of the evaluation report.

The methodology used by the external evaluators involved document review, interviews with credit union staff and leadership, site visits to 16 industrial and rural credit unions and review of the analyses conducted during the self-evaluation.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. FUCEC-TOGO accomplished much during the five years of external support under the project. FUCEC-TOGO, with the help of the technical assistance team, successfully implemented many valuable activities and put into place systems that should help in the management and development of the credit union movement. By the time of the self-evaluation (March 1988), FUCEC-TOGO had achieved or was close to achieving many of the major project targets, such as those identified below.

Target	Actual Achievement
No. of credit unions affiliated 119	111
Total credit union savings $2,143,000.	$2,137,340
Total credit union membership 14,375	12,197
Total loans outstanding $1,286,00	$1,604,960
Dues collection rate 75%	93%

While the project established a foundation for credit union growth, FUCEC-TOGO still manifested weaknesses in certain areas such as leadership, management, oversight, auditing, loan servicing and the functioning of internal financial, operational and computer systems.

> Recommendation: FUCEC-TOGO should not initiate highly expansionary, new programs. The organization should concentrate during the next two years on consolidating and strengthening general management and the mastery of systems and

technology already in place. Expansion should be reserved for a subsequent phase.

2. Improvement of Central Administration. FUCEC-TOGO improved administrative policies and procedures yet certain weaknesses needed to be addressed. FUCEC-TOGO computerized a wide variety of tasks, developed and implemented a modern accounting system, a dues collection system and a document filing system and prepared numerous administrative and functional manuals. However, FUCEC-TOGO's staff had not yet shown that they were fully capable of implementing all of the new procedures at the time of the evaluation. This was especially true of many computer operations including information management and statistical analysis. Most disturbing was the failure of the internal control committee to monitor credit activities, financial operations and adherence to internal policies.

Recommendation: The Internal Control committee should initiate quarterly follow-up of: 1) the main decisions of the last meeting; 2) the proper functioning of program and departments by spot-checks; and 3) credit unions' adherence to the organization's by-laws. FUCEC-TOGO should monitor technical self-sufficiency by initiating a program of systematic monitoring of staff's technical progress.

3. Development of a Central Liquidity Facility (CLF). Even though the CLF did not meet all expectations, by August 1988 it represented FUCEC-TOGO's main financial system and principal source of income. The purpose of the CLF was to pool the surplus liquidity of the nation's credit unions and to redistribute these funds via loans to well-managed credit unions. By the end of 1987, 55 percent of the credit union networks's total liquidity was pooled in the CLF, compared to a target of 75 percent anticipated during project design. FUCEC-TOGO used the CLF successfully to some extent to channel urban savings to rural credit unions: rural credit unions deposited only 29 million CFAF while they received loans amounting to 40 million CFAF. The total net worth of the CLF was twenty times the amount of seriously late (more than one year) loans. By August 1988, the CLF was solvent, but not yet profitable.

Given the CLF's financial contribution to FUCEC-TOGO's operations, the evaluation team found it surprising that management did not allocate technical, operational and control resources to the CLF that were at least the equivalent of CLF's financial contributions. The absence of systematic internal control, external audits and follow-up on delinquent loans raised questions

concerning management's understanding of the importance of the CLF mechanism.

Recommendation: To improve internal administration of the CLF, FUCEC-TOGO should establish regular standards for internal controls and systematic follow-up of delinquent loans (including implementation of the penalty interest rate on late loans). In order to ensure the CLF's contribution to financial self-sufficiency, FUCEC-TOGO should promote the CLF's financial services for affiliated credit unions.

4. Financial Planning/Self-Sufficiency. **The federation's earned income increased significantly each year of the project but expenses increased faster than income.** In 1987, financial self-sufficency reached 14 percent but fell to 11 percent during the first four months of 1988. In addition to problems with increased expenses, this suggested deficiencies in periodic controls and follow-up. Thus FUCEC-TOGO developed a new financial plan which raised the interest rate on loans by the CLF to rural credit unions from 12 to 15 percent per year. The federation anticipated in five years a 70 percent level of sufficiency for core operations.

The principal reasons for lack of achievement of the 50 percent self-sufficiency target were as follows:

- General operating expenses, particularly those other than salaries and benefits, were nearly double those foreseen in project design;

- Less than accepatable levels of dues collection, particularly from the largest credit unions;

- Non-startup of the Risk Management Program; and

- Late startup of the CLF capitalization program, compounded by the steady decline of interest rates in financial markets and a less-than-anticipated loan volume, all of which contributed to a reduced interest rate margin.

Recommendation: FUCEC-TOGO should regularly track the self-sufficiency target on a monthly basis by investigating each significant variation (more than 5 percent) of income and expense line items. This presupposes that management insists that the accountant provide monthly budget reports and balance sheets within the first ten days of each

month. FUCEC-TOGO should periodically revise interest rates on CLF loans and this should become a regular agenda item for board meetings. Each proposed change should clearly show the impact on the CLF's and affiliated credit unions' financial situations.

5. National Association Planning System. FUCEC-TOGO's accomplishments in developing planning, evaluation and monitoring systems were impressive. The internal review claimed that this project was among the best documented and monitored in Africa and the documentary materials available on the project attested to the validity of this claim. Principal accomplishments included a computerized management information system, annual workplans with verifiable objectives for each staff member, preparation of quarterly progress reports, design and implementation of various studies and a survey of member credit unions to determine needs at the grass roots level. However, the management information system was too complicated to be used effectively. The annual workplan for 1988 included 150 separate objectives. Some staff members had between 40 and 100 objectives for which they were responsible and the director's list included almost all 150. There was no clear indication of priorities that could assist FUCEC-TOGO in implementing their program. Moreover, management made too little use of the monitoring data to resolve problems. There was a low achievement rate of scheduled objectives which suggested unrealistic planning. There appeared to be a lack of follow-up by the board regarding the low rate of target objective achievement.

Recommendation: FUCEC-TOGO should simplify workplans and monitoring procedures and should clearly identify priority activities. Management should improve the functional use of monitoring instruments and use regular staff meetings to identify and correct problems.

6. Risk Management Program. FUCEC-TOGO did not initiate the Risk Management Program. Due to FUCEC-TOGO's uncertain legal status during the first half of the project, the risk management program could not be initiated. Then, during the second phase, it was delayed again by numerous technical and legal requirements by government authorities. At the time of the evaluation, two major financial requirements (setting up of a "fond d'etablissment" and a security deposit equal to 50 percent of the "fond d'etablissement") still had to be negotiated.

Recommendation: FUCEC-TOGO should send a high level delegation to the Ministry of Finance to ensure waiver from the remaining financial requirements and obtain final authorization to begin implementing the Risk Management Program.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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III. DEVELOPING THE POTENTIAL FOR LONG TERM INCREASES IN PRODUCTIVITY

A. Natural Resources

FINAL EVALUATION OF NIGER FORESTRY AND LAND USE PLANNING PROJECT (683-0230), DECEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Niger requires assistance to arrest and reverse the current deterioration of her soil and vegetative resources. Ultimately such efforts will help Niger attain food self-sufficiency and sustained economic growth in rural areas.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D authorized the Forestry and Land Use Planning (FLUP) Project on December 31, 1979. A 1983 evaluation of the project found that there were " major flaws in the dimensions of the activities and in the underlying assumptions on which the project design was based." Despite these problems, the evaluation recommended that with "better definition of its tasks, strengthened personnel and additional time and funding, the project should be continued." Accordingly, USAID prepared a revised Implementation Plan and a fourth Project Amendment, approved on April 30, 1984, which redefined project objectives. Project funding totaled $4,319,000. A.I.D. provided a grant of $4,089,000. Peace Corps provided $131,000 and the Government of Niger (GON) provided $99,000. The revised Project Assistance Completion Date was December 31, 1987.

The mode of implementation included: 1) a project agreement between USAID/Niger and the GON, Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment, Directorate of Forests and Fauna, under the authority of the Ministry of Rural Development; and 2) A.I.D.-financed local contract awards.

The purpose of the FLUP project -- as stated in the original Project Paper -- was to establish a functional planning and managerial capability within Niger's Forest and Water Service (now the Direction de Foret et la Faune -- DFF). In addition, the project was to produce a long-term plan for the protection of Niger's soil and vegetative resources. With the Revised Implementation Plan, project orientation shifted from the development of an overall resources planning unit and preparation of a comprehensive plan to developing the planning capability required to meet the short and medium term needs of the DFF. The purpose of the revised project was, therefore, to improve and strengthen the planning process within the DFF and to institutionalize that process by developing an effective planning unit within the DFF, thereby improving its ability to identify problems, opportunities and solutions and program human, financial and operational resources.

The specific objectives of the revised project were to: 1) create a planning unit within the DFF; 2) develop cost-effective methodologies for data collection; 3) develop and demonstrate technologies needed to respond to natural resource problems; and 4) prepare increasingly more detailed plans to facilitate decision-making in the DFF.

Planned project outputs included: 1) three managed model sites; 2) five fuelwood inventories; 3) a documentation center; 4) a strategic planning service; 5) eight trained foresters; and 6) a technical planning unit.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to: 1) assess progress toward attainment of the project purpose and goal; 2) evaluate project performance in completing planned outputs; 3) identify the impact the project had on the GOM approach to natural resources management; and 4) recommend specific policies and activities which could be pursued in the near and medium-term to attain subsector goals.

The evaluation methodology included interviews of USAID and project personnel, document review and visits to five project sites.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. While the FLUP project, especially the model site component, was a technical success, the planning unit -- Service de la Planification et de Documentation (SPD) -- was not functional. The model sites were quite successful in addressing some extremely complex issues and demonstrating useful technologies (the model sites are discussed in greater detail below). However, the SPD was not effective. The project established the SPD one year behind schedule in October 1986. The purpose of the SPD was, with technical assistance from the project, to foster development of a natural resource planning capability within the Forest Service. It was intended to have a major role in assembling, analyzing, generating and disseminating relevant information to be used to establish land use priorities and strategies. Since the SPD was created, however, collaboration with the FLUP project was almost non-existent. The SPD was located in the Forest Service offices, physically apart from the project office. The majority of planning activities had not begun because: 1) the SPD was not adequately staffed; 2) there was no counterpart relationship between the SPD and the project; and 3) the Technical Advisor was assigned administrative functions. Although the SPD existed on

paper, it had little to do with the project. A major flaw was that the counterparts to the technical assistants were not attached to the SPD. Thus, the transfer of technology, as intended by the project, was not taking place. The technical assistants should have been working on a daily basis with counterparts from the SPD, not just any counterparts. At best, the methodologies and analytical techniques developed by the technical assistants were passed to the SPD in the form of reports and studies.

> Recommendation: The SPD was supposed to have been the centerpiece of the FLUP project. It was created probably in response to pressure by A.I.D. to satisfy a condition precedent. If the FLUP project is to be extended, it is essential that all remaining project activities be focused on the SPD. While present project counterparts should be attached to the SPD, they should not be placed in any decision-making roles because of their relatively low levels of education. If the project is extended, USAID should obtain technical assistance for the project through an institutional contractor, not through individual contracting arrangements.

2. Model Sites/Technical Achievements. **The Model Sites were a technical success but much remained to be achieved with respect to manpower and institutional development before this component could have a long-term impact in Niger.** At the Guesselbodi Model Site Forest, wood cutting had been under a management plan on all 5,00 hectares since 1983. Grazing and haycutting were under a management plan on about 2,000 hectares, with 500 additional hectares planned to come under management each year. Initial studies showed that the average production of wood under management would be between 0.8 and 1.1 stere/yr./ha. over a ten year rotation once the forest was protected. The protected state of the forest would increase productivity and the team estimated an additional 25 percent increase in production would result from management. Restoration was initiated in 1984 and included enrichment planting and soil and conservation work. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence suggested that the soil and water conservation work at this site significantly increased biomass of vegetative yields and improved the species composition.

The project established additional Model Sites at Boyanga and Gorou Bassounga and progress was made in restoring and protecting forests at these sites.

> Recommendation: The project should bring farmers and agriculturalists to these sites to see the effects of improved microsite technology, most of

which is sustainable in the context of smallholders. The project should monitor the production rates of the trees established on these microsites. This information would be extremely useful to foresters, agriculturalists and livestock specialists throughout the semi-arid region of Africa where little is known about the production rates of these useful and adaptable species. The project should test the hypothesis concerning the projected 25 percent increase in wood production.

3. Model Sites/Sustainability. **The most significant lesson learned came from the model site experiments -- that recurrent costs of natural forest management could be covered under sustained field management through the local participation/cooperative approach.** The evaluation team's analysis, based upon conservative inventory data from the Geusselbodi site, showed that all costs would be covered by the seventh year and the site would produce a net profit of 412,916 FCFA. The analysis showed that revenues (derived mostly from the sale of hay) would cover the recurring and operating costs associated with sustained yield management; and 2) much of the revenue came from products other than fuelwood.

Recommendation: The profit could be spent on: 1) intensified management of the same forest; or 2) restoration of other areas which are currently degraded. If the latter option were to be chosen, additional hectares would eventually be brought under management. If so, more wood would be harvested and sold which would lead to additional surpluses. In turn, these surpluses could then be used to restore yet additional hectares of land. The whole process could be designed so that the restoration of degraded lands could be financed by portions of the proceeds from the management of present resources, based on the Guesselbodi formula.

4. Contractual Collaboration Model. **The formation of Land-Use Cooperatives and of contractual agreements between these cooperatives and the GON were essential for successful land-use planning.** The Guesselbodi contractual agreement was an agreement between farmers and the GON. It described in detail both the conditions under which the trees and grasses were to be managed and to whom the benefits of this stewardship would accrue. As a result, the farmers in the cooperatives were working hand-in-hand with government personnel in managing the Model Site for sustained yields of wood and forage and for soil and water

conservation. The farmers appeared to accept the arrangement whereby a certain portion of the revenues from cutting were put into the Cooperative to cover recurring costs of protecting the Model Site area. This contractual collaboration model demonstrated clearly that productivity could be increased and that few, if any, public funds would be required for recurring costs. It appeared that the GON was acting in good faith according to the terms of the agreement and that the Water and Forest Service was becoming a service agency in the best sense of the word (by providing technical assistance to farmers) rather than a policing agency which sees farmers as adversaries.

> Recommendation: The GON should establish the following positions to ensure continuation of the work at the Model Sites: 1) a university-trained GON forester as operations manager; 2) a senior forestry specialist to serve as technical advisor to the Model Sites Chief; 3) Forestry Managers for each site; and 4) GON Clusa agents for cooperative development.

5. Documentation Center. **The Documentation Center was close to the point of having an impact.** The evaluators observed substantial progress on three fronts: 1) organization -- the center had increased researchers' accessibility to documents by instituting a new classification system; 2) training -- a newly trained library scientist recently began working at the center; 3) information dissemination -- a first copy of a professional bulletin was in final draft form and, if distributed on a regular basis, would be a means for professional foresters to record publicly their findings and experiences. However, if the newly trained library scientist were to leave to serve one year in the "service civique", as scheduled, and the technical assistance contracts were to come to an end and were not renewed, the Documentation Center's effectiveness would be greatly diminished.

> Recommendation: USAID, with the concurrence of the Water and Forest Service, should extend the contracts of the two technical assistants to the Documentation Center until December 1987. The Service should request that the library scientist be permanently assigned to the Documentation Center.

6. Management. **Neither the technical assistance team nor USAID exercised adequate financial discipline.** While certain controls were built into the use of counterpart funds, they were not adequate. All expenditures made appeared to have been approved. Few

expenditures made appeared to have been approved. Few disallowances had been made. For example, all gasoline expenditures appeared to have been automatically approved despite the fact that the log books for each vehicle were rarely filled out. No expatriate team member was assigned the task of verifying that all expenditures were legitimate and fell within the project's scope of work and budgetary line items.

> Recommendation: The team leader should assume the responsibility of reviewing and advising on expenditures.

7. Impact. **The major impact of the FLUP project was to foster, through the model sites, a more pragmatic approach to land-use planning that recognized that local participation was essential.** Niger, like most countries in the Sahel region, went through a generation of donor-financed projects which emphasized a top-down approach which did not include villagers and herders. After this lengthy learning period, a viable model was beginning to emerge.

> Recommendation: The project should be extended. With additional time, A.I.D. stands to reap substantial returns on its investment in FLUP in terms of lessons learned and directions for future natural resources management.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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FINAL EVALUATION OF THE GITUZA FORESTRY PROJECT (698-0502.96), AUGUST, 1988

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. initiated the Gituza Forestry project in 1985 with $2,500,000 in grant funding to CARE. The final input delivery was planned for 1989.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to develop lessons learned for the second phase of the project, scheduled to begin in October 1989 and be financed by the Royal Dutch Government.

The evaluation methodology involved document review, interviews with project managers and staff and a survey of 40 farm families. The evaluation team recruited Rwandan students to assist with the interviews.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The two project components -- reforestation and agroforestry -- were successful in achieving planting targets and farmer acceptance of the techniques advocated by the project. About 2,500 hectares of trees were growing where bald hills loomed only three years previously. The project established a central nursery and upgraded eight existing nurseries under the agroforestry component by improving management and adding demonstration plots. The plots were guarded, well-maintained and organized with clearly marked plant species. The commune residents showed real pride in the trees and nurseries. The project's achievements merited and required further inputs and new instruments to achieve sustainability.

> Recommendation: Project staff should prepare a detailed proposal for the second phase beginning in October 1989 and secure the necessary funding. The project's focus should be oriented toward improved information and communication, expanded agroforesty inputs and closer cooperation with authorities and development partners. It should also address the high fire risk of the plantations.

2. Energy Conservation Component. The Energy Conservation Component was one of the best examples of flexible stove development in West Africa. The

original objective of the Energy Conservation Component was to improve household energy management. However, at an early stage of implementation, project staff learned that improved cookstoves would reduce household energy consumption and thus reduce per capita demand for fuel. Since then, the project was formally targeted toward energy conservation through improved stoves, rather than improved household energy management. The project succeeded in selling over two thousand charcoal stoves in over a year and some 800 improved woodstoves. It installed approximately 500 improved woodstoves. The rural cookstoves component was successful in introducing improved household energy management to hundreds of housewives in Gituza and surrounding communes. Monitoring and follow-up of improved stoves was satisfactory.

In terms of cookstove marketing, it was much easier to penetrate the urban, as opposed to the rural market.

> Recommendation: The project should clearly define rural, as opposed to urban, stove strategies and finance a survey of cookstove sales and marketing in urban areas prior to undertaking additional work on privatization. The project should also delay the relocation of the CARE Gituza stove production facility until a thorough survey of the market for improved stoves has been conducted. Finally, the project should ensure that there is no duplication of effort in the field of improved charcoal stoves, especially by the UNDP/World Bank project.

3. Constraints to Adoption. Although the project showed remarkable success in reaching its targets in the agroforestry and reforestation components, rates of agroforestry adoption varied significantly, from 20 percent in one area to 60 percent in another. The evaluation team identified the following constraints to adoption:

- the location of some nurseries was too far from farmers' homes and transportation of seedlings was a problem;
- the increase in the price of plants resulting from the nursery commercialization strategy made them too expensive for some farmers to purchase;
- the farmers prefered not to plant trees in fields;
- the attitude of some local farmer leaders was not cooperative. They wanted to be paid and were jealous of extension agents who received

higher salaries. They had the potential to negatively influence farmers.

Recommendation: To secure a long-term positive impact, the project should be carefully managed, according to varied and complex local socio-ecological conditions. Project staff should consider a more varied design of the plantations. This might broaden opportunities to draw useful lessons for the future and increase the chance of finding silvacultural solutions to match the needs.

4. Beneficiaries. **The short-term benefits for the residents of Gituza Commune were substantial.** The Project Agreement between CARE and the government of Rwanda explicitly specified the importance of creating local, salaried job opportunities in the Gituza commune. The project expended approximately $450,000 for local manual labor over four years, which benefited approximately 35,000 people. The result was an improved quality of life for Gituza residents.

5. Sustainability. **The financial analysis showed that the plantations would not attain a positive cash flow until year 16.** Until that time, the Gituza Commune would be unable to finance tending, harvesting and replanting costs using solely locally-generated revenues. The analyis emphasized that the plantations would not be able to meet recurrent costs without external financial assistance until midway through the first 30 year rotation. Potential revenue from the sale of seeds from the commercialized nurseries would not significantly defray these costs.

Recommendation: The project should assist the Rwandan government in developing a sound forestry management plan and financial strategy in order to maximize the benefits from the 2,391 hectares which have been planted to date.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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CDA FORESTRY PHASE I, REFUGEE AREAS REPORT (649-0122) APRIL, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Desertification has been occurring throughout Somalia, due to overgrazing and deforestation. The presence of large concentrations of people in refugee camps caused the complete denuding of surrounding areas. The refugees collected firewood and building materials from as far as 10 km from the camps. This additional pressure on the brush and tree ecology has been devastating. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic (GSDR) and others realized that action was needed to provide other sources of fuelwood and to redress the damage.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1982, A.I.D. authorized $6,000,000 for the CDA (Cooperation in Development in Africa) Forestry project. The Project Assistance Completion Date was set for July 1988.

The purposes of the project were to: 1) strengthen the institutional capability of the National Range Agency (NRA) at headquarters and in the field; 2) establish decentralized tree seedling supply services together with some outplanting in refugee camp regions which could be replicated throughout the country; 3) test the benefits of a much wider use of agroforestry; 4) undertake larger-scale tree planting and fuelwood production plantations, beginning on lands neighboring the refugee camps; 5) test the feasibility of wider diffusion of fuel conserving wood stoves; 6) provide the GDSR with a source of revenues from fuelwood plantations which could cover recurring costs and capital establishment costs of additional plantations; and 7) provide refugees who did not have access to agricultural plots with an opportunity to earn additional income.

The Project Paper called for four Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) and the National Range Agency to assume responsibility for implementing project activities. The PVOs involved in the project included CARE/Somalia, Africare, Save the Children and the Overseas Education Fund.

The GSDR provided $1,908,000 to the project. PVOs were expected to make contributions to their own subprojects.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the validity of project design and effectiveness of project implementation.

The methodology included document review, site visits and interviews with beneficiaries, project participants and USAID and government staff.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. While the project had some successes, the centerpiece of the project, the fuelwood production component (representing 66 percent of total project funding), was a failure. Some of the project successes included: 1) the woodstove component -- the project designed and distributed 6,328 woodstoves that required 20 percent less fuel; 2) training of refugees as extension workers -- the Overseas Education Fund trained 35 refugees, most of whom were women and the National Range Agency trained two women; 3) all PVOs and the National Range Agency were successful in assisting farmers in planting groves of papaya; and 4) the shade tree plantys were successful in demonstrating to refugees the advantages of trees in their compounds. Actual achievements as compared to targets were as follows:

	Target	Achievement
Fuelwood Lots	5	18
Fuelwood Lots Planted	250 ha.	2774 ha. survival poor
Fuelwood Plantations	1.7 million	3.2 million trees planted, survival poor
Shelterbelts	225 to 300 ha.	180 ha.
Amenity Plantings	.5 million trees	886,000 trees
Woodstoves Distributed	10,000	6,328

While the fuelwood component met its target, fuelwood lot survival rates were so low that the lots were not producing useable amounts of wood. There were two major reasons for the failure of the fuelwood component. First, several assumptions made during project design were flawed. The Project Paper made incorrect assumptions concerning the availability of good quality land, underestimated the harshness of the environment and lack of rainfall, failed to take into account the desiccating effects of winds which blow strongly 10 months per year and consequently overestimated the growth rate of trees and recommended inappropriate species.

A second reason for the failure of the fuelwood component was that the implementing Private Voluntary Organizations failed to critically examine the Project Paper assumptions. A cursory survey of the project sites would have caused most persons to question seriously the objective of producing 10 to 15 cubed meters per hectare of wood, per year, after year four, without irrigation. The average rainfall in these areas was barely adequate to grow any woody perennials.

> Recommendation: Future design efforts should examine existing conditions more carefully and thoroughly to maximize benefits. In the future, A.I.D. should require Private Voluntary Organizations who are being considered as possible implementing agencies to make site inspections to determine whether the proposed work can be accomplished with the available resources. One would hope that this would lead to the Private Voluntary Organizations' raising questions as to the feasibility of the projects as proposed, or alternatively, stating what the true cost of project implementation would be. For this project, the true cost would have included the cost of providing irrigation on a long-term basis.

2. <u>Comparison of Implementation by Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) vs. the National Range Agency (NRA)</u>. **While PVO staff were committed and hardworking, their lack of professional forestry expertise, as compared to the NRA, hindered effective project implementation.** PVOs implemented all subproject activities specified in the Cooperative Agreements. The woodlots they established were generally free of animals and fences were intact suggesting that PVOs had consulted with community leaders and had gained community concurrence on use of community land. Most PVOs had in-country experience working with refugees. However, their experience with forestry projects was limited. Delays in staff recruitment, frequent staff changes, employment of young, relatively inexperienced personnel (most had little experience in arid zone forestry) were all handicaps. This lack of professionalism manifested itself in: 1) an uncritical acceptance of the Project Paper; 2) slow start-up of project activities; and 3) choice of poor techniques and inappropriate fast growing species. By contrast, the NRA subproject was managed by an experienced NRA counterpart (a B.S. with ten years experience as a senior forestry officer). The NRA subproject was successful because the NRA officers: 1) conducted species trials to determine what would grow; 2) identified the species most in demand by private farmers; 3) developed a large nursery that was able to meet farmer demand for seedlings and seeds; and 4) had timely input support (pumps, fuel and transport,

fencing, etc.) supplied in large part by a Private Voluntary Organizatiuon engaged in refugee relief operations, Inter Church Response.

Recommendation. As provided in Cooperative Agreements, A.I.D. has the right to approve project staff. A.I.D. should ask Private Voluntary Organizations to submit the names and resumes of their proposed project staff at the time they submit their project proposals. This would allow A.I.D. to make a more informed decision concerning the quality of the technical services which are being proposed.

3. Institution Building. **While there was an increased awareness of the need for forestry activities in the GSDR, institution building was minimal and the turnover of the National Range Agency (NRA) counterpart staff left the NRA's management capabilities little improved.** The three expatriate personnel who provided technical assistance to the NRA performed well, but were overwhelmed with administrative tasks, which limited time allowed for site visits and technical assistance. On-the-job training (and study tours) organized by Private Voluntary Organizations for junior and middle level staff was in the main successful. Despite the support provided by the project, the number of professional officers in the NRA declined. While in 1983 there were three graduate Somali foresters, by 1988 none had remained in government service.

Recommendation: A future forestry project should work with the GSDR to initiate pay reform and career structures in the NRA. Future forestry project planners must accept the severe shortage of senior and middle level management staff and then design projects accordingly. A new project should emphasize training Somali staff at the B.Sc. level in Forestry/Range management.

4. Fuelwood Conservation. **The project designed and marketed fuel efficient charcoal and wood stoves effectively.** However, the history of such projects in other Third World countries points to difficulties in long-term selling of such stoves owing to the relatively greater increase in price over traditional models. Those involved in this aspect of the project noted similar constraints.

Recommendation: Future projects should give consideration to subsidizing the selling price of improved stoves to make them directly competitive with well-established models. They should gradually reduce subsidies as the stoves become

popular and local craftsmen develop skills in their construction.

5. USAID Management. USAID monitoring and technical overview during the entire project could have been improved. The expatriate advisors assigned to the NRA found themselves mired in administrative management problems and were not able to devote the necessary time to monitoring. REDSO/ESA helped out during the first half of the project, but support seriously diminished during the second half. Moreover, USAID management was lax in not following through on the Project Paper requirement that each subproject keep records. Formats, included in Annex XX of the Project Paper for species trial coordination and cost accounting systems for both nursery and out-planting activities, were not utilized. While these formats were distributed to the Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), CARE and the Overseas Education Fund (OEF) were the only PVOs which reported any cost on fuelwood lots and nurseries.

REDSO/ESA's interest in the project probably waned because the forester who had been involved with design was re-assigned and USAID's Fiscal Year 1986 Country Development Strategy Statement indicated that forestry projects were not going to be continued. All of this resulted in insufficient technical backup for the project.

Recommendation: An in-house forester at USAID or an additional advisor to the NRA would have assisted in improving USAID management.

6. Impact. The project appeared to have given encouragement to the implementation of other forestry projects. At the time the project was being planned, there were only a few small forestry projects implemented in the refugee camps. This project, and more particularly the project steering committee meetings, appeared to have encouraged forestry projects. By June 1984, there were 19 forestry projects in Somalia. Unfortunately, the steering committee ceased meeting in late 1984 with the departure of the funded technical advisor.

Recommendation: USAID should work to revive the steering committee meetings as a forum for sharing ideas and coordinating projects.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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Rod Bowen	Forester, British Forestry Project
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EVALUATION: COMPREHENSIVE GROUNDWATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, (649-0104), MARCH, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. In arid Somalia, the scarcity of dependable water supplies for the rural population and their livestock is a serious constraint to bringing into production potentially productive land and making efficient use of livestock resources. The livestock sector is Somalia's principal source for foreign exchange. Further, Somalia has low, erratic precipitation and high evapo-transpiration. There are only two relatively small rivers crossing the southern portion of the country, while the remainder is deprived of perennial surface water. Therefore, groundwater is the only dependable water source in Somalia.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. authorized $18.5 million for the Comprehensive Groundwater Development (CGDP) Project in 1979. The purpose of the project was to strengthen the Government of Somalia's (GOS) Water Development Agency (WDA) and provide assistance to it in its efforts to establish an on-going water development program which provides potable and livestock water in rural areas. A.I.D. scheduled the final input delivery for 1987.

The project had the following components:
1) Preliminary Hydrogeologic Data Collection -- this component was designed to define the availability of groundwater both nationally and regionally to permit efficient utilization of the resource; 2) Institutional support for the Agency and the Ministry of Minerals and Water Resources (MMWR) -- this component was designed to strengthen the institutional structures of the Agency and the Ministry by developing needed skills and systems so that activities and procedures initiated under the project would continue when it was completed; 3) the Exploitation Program -- this component consisted of the drilling program, dug wells and surface water development.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to: 1) evaluate progress toward attainment of project objectives; 2) identify problem areas which might have inhibited attainment of objectives; 3) assess how such information might be used to help overcome problems in this or other projects; and 4) evaluate the development impact of the project.

The methodology involved structured interviews with key management staff of the project, the GOS and USAID,

review of project and related documents and field visits to seven villages and two additional sites.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project was modestly successful in terms of achieving its objectives. The project completed a number of producing wells and more than 100,000 rural dwellers and their livestock benefitted. The contractors (not identified in the evaluation report) carried out their terms of reference in a sound and professional manner. Actual as compared to planned outputs were as follows:

Planned	Actual
- 92-100 rural borehole water production systems	- 61 systems
- two private firms involved	- one involved
- WDA continuously updating data	- only monthly progress reports
- impact studies produced	- none produced
- Water Data Center est. at MMWR	- work well underway
- WDA capable of drilling 50 boreholes per year	- possibly obtainable

The major shortcomings in project effectiveness were immediately traceable to the invalidity of numerous assumptions developed during project design and several inappropriate management and procurement decisions made by former Agency management. Some of the major assumptions which proved to be invalid were: 1) the objectives of the Agency were the same as those of the project -- it appeared project designers did not give significant consideration to the fact that the Agency might have other objectives, i.e., acquisition of equipment and materials to lease subsequently for hard currency; 2) rehabilitation of the Agency's existing equipment (as opposed to the provision of new

equipment) would not be cost effective -- project designers did not investigate comparative costs; 3) the Agency's preferred technology for drilling wells was appropriate -- the contractor and both evaluations questioned this assumption; 4) a major share of water needs in the target regions could be met through the development of groundwater -- the contractor's final report showed this assumption to be invalid; 5) the Agency would have in place a maintenance system for the wells that were installed and an efficient system for collection of water user fees.

> Recommendation: USAID should ensure that in the future, long-term A.I.D. staff who are familiar with specific conditions in Somalia, are more intensively involved in project design and used to support short-term consultants. The designers of future groundwater projects should compare alternative approaches to well drilling in terms of project objectives, type of equipment best suited to each approach, the impact of each approach on settlement patterns and future maintenance needs and organizational structure.

2. Inappropriate Technology. **The choice of TH-60 rigs as prime equipment for the drilling operations proved to be a serious mistake.** Five cable tool rigs could have been purchased for the price of one TH-60, and even operating at their normal slower rate, the project would have had 10-15 cable tool rigs, which require very little material support, and less manpower and maintenance than the TH-60s. Each cable tool rig is capable of drilling one well in approximately two months, which would have resulted in 980 wells per year or more than 360 wells for the four years the project would have had the equipment.

> Recommendation: The Agency should give serious consideration to providing continued support for maintenance of the new TH-60 rigs and support vehicles and rehabilitating the Agency's operating rigs.

3. Local Community Participation. **The Community Assessment and Participation Program (CAPP) did not make an effective contribution to the project.** Initially, the project's social component was relatively small and devoted largely to preparing social profiles of water user communities. Later in the project, staff developed a more elaborate social component called the Community Assessment and Participation Program (CAPP). It involved rural residents in a collaborative effort to work with the Agency in the selection, construction, operation and

maintenance of the project's wells. The lack of staff and the lack of support from the Agency caused the CAPP to be reduced in scope. The Monitoring and Evaluation System (MES) was designed as part of the CAPP process but was far to complex for the Agency to use.

> Recommendation: The CAPP appears too complex and should be simplified in terms of the information sought.

4. Beneficiaries. The project provided benefits for more than 100,000 rural dwellers and their livestock. The project obtained detailed data on end-user characteristics and usage rate from one community. However, project staff did not obtain quantified information on usage rates, end-user characteristics, willingness to pay, local health conditions and livestock production rates for the project as a whole. Nevertheless, the project provided real benefits which included: improved access to year-round high-quality water; increased quality of water at existing wells; reliable water supplies in times of drought; more human resources available for productive economic activities (i.e., women may spend up to eight hours per day in the dry season obtaining water); reduced livestock losses; and stabilization of agro-pastoral and sedentary populations -- which meant more production of food crops.

5. Transfer of Skills to the Water Development Agency. Project staff were not integrated into the Agency. The project had its separate management structure and staff within the Agency and was rather isolated from the reminder of Agency staff. Thus skills were transferred to a small number of counterparts. The majority of Agency staff may have been jealous of the skills obtained by the Agency staff assigned to the project. Moreover, project staff spent little or no effort analyzing the institutional processes of the Agency, how the various elements of the Agency interacted and how the Agency related to rural communities.

> Recommendation: USAID should collaborate with the Agency's new managers to develop a modest program of support to the Agency Planning Unit.

6. Privatization While a project-funded study recommended that donors stimulate growth of the private sector in water resources development in Somalia, its conclusions were overly optimistic and inconsistent with the interest shown by the Somali government on this topic. There was no incentive for the Agency to

give up the cash-flows that direct well-drilling and the operation of existing wells provided. It was likely that a program of privatization would be slowgoing (even though the Agency had begun contracting out a few wells) and would be resisted by various groups within the Somali government.

> Recommendation: USAID should modify the proposed technical assistance program for the private sector so that it is consistent with what the new managers of the Agency perceive to be its real needs.

7. Unplanned Effects. **The practice of constructing relatively large wells had a significant effect on settlement patterns.** The evaluation team estimated that the population of communities where wells were located increased by 5-21 percent within 12-24 months after the wells were completed. In some instances, new villages were established. Thus there was a relatively high risk of severe dislocation if a well were to fail for any reason. Moreover, the areas around some of the completed wells suffered significant environmental degradation. In some cases, areas around the wells became almost completely denuded.

> Recommendation: To address the risk of dislocation if a well were to fail, future projects should consider drilling a larger number of wells with lower production rates. Most of these wells would require hand pumps. Future project design efforts should include studies of potential settlement patterns and alternative water point systems, such as clusters of low production wells, widely spaced within each cluster.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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INTERIM EVALUATION OF SOMALIA CENTRAL RANGELANDS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, (649-0108), JUNE, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Livestock production is the most important industry in Somalia. Over two-thirds of the population is engaged in grazing. Livestock production contributes about 75-80 percent of total foreign exchange earnings through export of live animals and animal products. The livestock industry is based on natural rangelands which constitute 45 percent of the total land area and is suitable only for extensive livestock production. Since rainfall is erratic, most of Somalia is classified as arid to semi-arid. On average, droughts occur once every five years. Despite the lack of rain, the traditional Somali grazing system functioned remarkably well. However, with advances in human and veterinary medicine, and the resulting increase in the human and animal population, pastoralists are now compelled to compete with one another for forage and water. They have wide experience in the utilization of grasslands, but need additional technical knowledge to take best advantage of the biomass supported by available soil and water resources.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. The Central Rangeland Development Project (CRDP) was a large multidonor range and livestock development project designed to benefit nomadic pastoralists of Central Somalia. The World Bank developed the overall project concept and presented it to donors in April 1979. During discussions, the CRDP emerged as a set of individually funded and directed component projects, each directed by a specific participating agency. Donors assigned responsibilities as follows: GTZ -- veterinary services and forestry; IDA and IFAD -- infrastructure and non-formal education; WFP -- food for work program in support of other components; USAID -- range management, soil and water conservation; and Government of Somalia (GOS) -- Somali staffing of the National Range Agency (NRA).

The purpose of the USAID component was to: 1) improve rangeland and livestock productivity through the introduction of improved range management practices and livestock water supplies; and 2) improve the Agency's ability to implement range development by training Agency staff. USAID authorized $14.4 million for the project in 1979 and in 1981 awarded a contract to Louis Berger to begin implementation. The Project Assistance Completion Date was scheduled for September 1989.

At the time of contract signature, both USAID and Louis Berger noted weaknesses in project design. Louis Berger attempted to address these problems by preparing

an implementation plan designed to eliminate the shortcomings in design. This plan was never accepted by USAID.

Nevertheless, Louis Berger began work on the basis of this plan. By 1986 it had become evident that USAID was using the Project Paper as the standard for implementation and Louis Berger was following their own plan. USAID, therefore, prepared a Project Paper amendment to reconcile the differences between the 1979 Project Paper and Louis Berger's 1982 implementation plan. This effort was only partially successful as differences in project emphasis still existed at the time of the 1987 evaluation. The amended Project Paper emphasized technological interventions while Louis Berger's plan emphasized evaluation of prospective technology.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to measure progress, examine implementation strategies and make recommendations for improved implementation during the remainder of the project.

The methodology involved document review, interviews with project, World Bank, USAID, Louis Berger and Faculty of Agriculture staff, and site visits to Bulo Berte, Ceel Dhere and Hobyo, which gave the team a chance to view field activities and interview pastoralists, district officials and project field staff. The team also flew over central Somalia in a light aircraft to observe general land characteristics and use patterns.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project was completing many planned outputs roughly on schedule and the quality of work was high, but progress was impeded by lack of fuel and it was unlikely that the primary purpose of the project -- to improve productivity -- would be achieved. Physical outputs such as wells, dugouts and shelterbelts were technically sound and functioning as intended. However, developments requiring heavy construction equipment or trucks, well rehabilitation, or access tracks were behind schedule largely due to lack of fuel. Range inventories for three priority districts were on schedule and were scientifically sound. Training of Somali students at Somalia National University and in the U.S. had been excellent and their job performance following graduation was good. The numbers of graduated students were consistent with the project's training goals. Some of the major completed

outputs (as of 1986) compared to targets were as follows:

	Target	Achievement
Resource Inventory	2	1
Fenced Sites	10	4
Access Tracks (km)	250	50
Associations (RLAs)	18	6
Mgt. Plans	10	8
Boreholes	13	7
Dugouts	77	17
LT-Training (yrs.)	20	20
ST-Training (no.)	100	25

Nevertheless, it was not known whether completion of outputs would contribute to achievement of project purpose. There were a number of critical, yet questionable, assumptions implicit in achieving the linkage between outputs and purpose. These were that: 1) appropriate range management practices which would improve both range and livestock production in Central Somalia were known to specialists; 2) potentially useful technologies would be socially acceptable to Somali pastoralists; 3) water development would improve range and livestock productivity; and 4) people trained by the project would be available to the Agency.

With respect to these assumptions, the evaluation team noted that they were not aware of any range grazing management practices which could be reliably applied to increase range plant or animal production without control of the number of livestock using the range. Since grazing systems requiring control of livestock numbers were assumed to be socially unacceptable to Somali pastoralists, all proposed grazing management interventions should have been viewed as experimental until successful implementation in the field. The grazing interventions had not been in place long enough for evaluation and validation to have occurred.

With respect to the assumption concerning water development, the team noted that water development would not be likely to increase range plant production. It may increase animal production to the extent that it relieves water stress in livestock and opens up underutilized range areas for grazing. However, water development which does not consider sociological,

ecological and economic factors may promote destruction of rangelands through overgrazing, human conflict over grazing and water rights and a decrease in economic well-being. Moreover, the project lacked adequate data concerning pre-project range or animal production to quantify increases if they did occur.

Finally, while most students trained by the project had been employed by the Agency, given the relatively low pay provided by the Agency to its employees and lack of reward systems, it was questionable whether well-trained, motivated individuals would remain at the Agency once USAID support ends. Thus, while project purpose two would most likely be achieved by the end of the project, the abilities of the Agency could be expected to deteriorate if employee pay/benefits were not increased by the GOS.

> Recommendation: Project staff should begin to gather data to determine both the technical success and impacts on surrounding areas of all physical range improvement practices and proposed grazing management practices. USAID should seek to have the GOS increase the priority of the project for fuel allocation purposes. If a sufficiently reliable supply of petrol and diesel fuel cannot be obtained through the GOS, fuel should be purchased directly by USAID to meet the needs of the project.

2. <u>Donor Coordination</u>. **Donor coordination was ineffective.** Coordination of all components of the project was, in theory, undertaken by a full-time Project Director and a project Donor Advisory Board which met twice a year. In practice, this mechanism was ineffective. Individual donors largely ran their projects as distinct enterprises divorced from the activities of other components. The advisory board served more as a mechanism to receive reports than as a decision-making body. The USAID range management component was highly dependent on the World Bank non-formal education (NFE) component to provide extension services to support the work of the range management staff. While relations between the two components had been cordial, the evaluation team was concerned that the proposed reorientation of the NFE component in Phase II, combined with the general lack of coordination of components, would result in reduced extension services to support future range management work.

3. <u>Water Development</u>. **Respondents indicated that water development was the major benefit provided by**

the project. The Project Paper called for drilling 32 boreholes. However, a low success rate (seven useable wells out of 19 drilled) together with range overuse associated with permanent water sources led project staff to deemphasize boreholes in favor of limited duration surface water sources such as dugouts. The evaluation team supported this decision because permanent water attracts people and their livestock and may devastate rangeland within several kilometers of the water source. Small dugouts by contrast, provide intermittent seasonal water so that areas may be grazed for limited periods. It appeared that range ecologists were rarely consulted during water development efforts.

> Recommendation: The project should give more attention to range management/ecological concerns when undertaking water development and it should only be undertken as a portion of a formal, overall managment plan for an area.

4. Institutionalization of Training and Research Components. **The training/research component was only just beginning to yield trained students and participant lecturers and research results.** Expatriate professor/researchers began their research projects in 1983-85 and their work was yielding publishable results. The research appeared to be very good. Five Somali long-term training participants would soon complete long-term training and return to teach in Somalia and fill the positions of the expatriates. However, if the Somali trainees did not overlap with the expatriates, they would have difficulties continuing the current level of range teaching activity as expatriates depart.

> Recommendation: The project should extend the expatriate professors for another two years. This would provide a phase-in period for the participants and a phase-out period of the expatriates that would contribute to institutionalizing the training component. Also, the project should explore developing a relationship with a U.S. "sister" university as a way of securing continuing support for the Department of Botany and Range Managemnt at the University.

5. Range Livestock Associations (RLAs). **While the RLAs supported water development activities, their support for grazing reserve plans seemed unenthusiatic.** Benefits from grazing reserve plans in terms of increased forage and animal production were not obvious. Pastoralists could not be expected to accept

grazing reserve plans unless clear benefits could be demonstrated.

Recommendation: The project should hire a resource economist to analyze data on benefits of project interventions in range improvements.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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JUBA DEVELOPMENT ANALYTICAL STUDIES/MIDTERM EVALUATION (649-0134), APRIL, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Construction of the Baardheere Dam in the Upper Juba Valley, and development of the Valley itself, are among the highest priorities of the Government of Somalia (GOS). While the World Bank considered the preparation of a Master Plan for Juba Valley Development essential, the GOS required assistance in its preparation.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. A.I.D. authorized $8.5 million for the Juba Valley Analytical Studies project in September 1983. The Project Assistance Completion Date was set for September 30, 1988.

The goal of the project was to contribute to the "creation of a Master Plan which will optimize the resources used in the Juba River Valley." The Master Plan itself was to be developed by the Ministry of Juba Valley Development (MJVD) with assistance provided by a German advisory team. The purpose of the project was to "provide the necessary information on soils/land use, social and environmental effects for incorporation into the Master Plan." In addition, the project was to "provide support for the MJVD (help build MJVD's planning and monitoring capabilities)." USAID was not to participate in the planning process itself. The project would have achieved its purpose if the required information was delivered to the Ministry.

USAID implemented the project through three separate contractual arrangements:

- A Participating Agency Service Arrangement (PASA) with the Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation (BUREC), for the execution of reconnaissance water and land and resource studies;
- A Cooperative Agreement with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to provide advisory support to the project; and
- A contract with Associates in Rural Development (ARD) for the execution of the environmental and sociological assessment.

The four project outputs were: 1) classification of soils and land use; 2) identification of environmental and socioeconomic constraints; 3) development of the Ministry as an effective planning body; and 4) incorporation of the environmental assessment in the planning stages.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess project progress to date and make recommendations to enhance project progress.

The methodology involved document review, site visits and interviews with project participants from the Ministry, USAID and technical assistance teams.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. It appeared that the project would deliver the required information to the Ministry. However, the development of some types of information, as called for in the contract, was neglected. At the time of the evaluation, the Bureau of Reclamation had completed 90 percent of Output One. With respect to Output Two, the information developed only stressed the constraints and omitted analysis of the environmental and socioeconomic benefits of dam construction. In the planning process, both types of information would be needed. Output Four was scheduled to be undertaken after the evaluation.

The evaluation team was concerned that the Associates in Rural Development (ARD) team missed opportunities to develop the type of information that could effectively guide their work. Phase one of ARD activities was to involve a compilation of existing data and a review of the literature about the Juba Valley. Conceptually very important to the project, this phase was not undertaken adequately. The Phase One report devoted one page to all activities of the phase and the remainder of the report outlined a plan of work for phase Two, without the benefit of a well-directed technical effort in Phase One. The Phase One report did not fulfill ARD's obligation to produce a report on existing data, conditions and development activities in the Valley. The Phase One effort did produce a bibliography, however.

Phase II of ARD's work was to have involved the collection of field data and a report on anticipated impacts of various development scenarios. Many of the studies being undertaken for this phase appeared to have been going well. However, the design for the methodology for data collection during Phase II was too have come out of a rapid reconnaissance study of the Valley called a "sondeo." The sondeo was to have been used to establish the distinctive features of social structure, livestock, land use patterns, health and land tenure issues, as well as generate a set of hypotheses to be tested during the quantitative data gathering of Phase II. The sondeo itself was undertaken, but could not be completed until the project was already into Phase II. Therefore it played no part in the Phase II research design. Moreover, ARD

never produced a report on the sondeo or its results even though the work represented several months of ARD's research time. Finally, ARD had not prepared a clear timetable for its research which outlined individual tasks and deliverables expected from each.

> Recommendation: USAID should have insisted that ARD prepare a synthesis of information concerning field conditions in the Juba Valley, either through a Phase One report or a report on the results of the sondeo. USAID should now insist on on-going and timely reports on the present state of data collection in the project. Synthesis and analysis of data must be an on-going part of ARD's work.
>
> ARD should prepare a project timetable to supplement the workplan. The timetable should establish target dates for important elements of work and show how each will contribute to the deliverables. ARD needs to devote attention to keeping better records and memoranda concerning crucial decisions that affect project progress -- particularly decisions involving choices of research alternatives or agreements to change the work plan. ARD should revise the bibliography to include annotations and categorize studies by subject to improve its usefulness.

2. Institutional Development. A.I.D. did not give adequate consideration to counterpart training during project development. The Project Agreement with the Ministry specified certain counterpart assignments. However, the contracts with Associates in Rural Development (ARD) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BUREC) did not specify that counterparts would be assigned with the exception of lab technicians for BUREC. Under the ARD contract, no Ministry counterparts were assigned, even though ARD had a mandate for training. As a result, ARD had to hire and train a large number of Somali staff on its own, which had no institutional development benefits to the Ministry. BUREC was, in fact, assigned a number of qualified counterparts, but they had no mandate for training.

Eight Ministry staff had been sent to the U.S. or Kenya for academic (long and short-term) training and fifteen more were proposed. However, it was unclear whether training all of the proposed candidates was warranted or more should be proposed. It was left to the USAID project manager to make these decisions through default rather than through any documented mandate. Moreover, the requirements for training were only defined in qualitative terms and limited by available funds. No specific numbers of students or years of study were identified. A written training strategy for the

or more should be proposed. It was left to the USAID project manager to make these decisions through default rather than through any documented mandate. Moreover, the requirements for training were only defined in qualitative terms and limited by available funds. No specific numbers of students or years of study were identified. A written training strategy for the project would be worthwhile so that resources could be used in a rational and organized manner.

> Recommendation: USAId should develop an out-of-country training program that: 1) identifies the type of trained personnel needed by the Ministry to strengthen its planning capabilities; and 2) defines an approach to getting them trained to meet that objective. Since ARD has contractual obligations to train counterparts, USAID should encourage in-country training by facilitating the transfer of BUREC counterparts to ARD. USAID should extend the Project Assistance Completion Date to 5/30/90 to conclude long-term training programs important to Ministry institution-building.

3. <u>Juba Valley / National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Advisory Panel</u>. **While the NAS advisory board was a good idea given the wide scope of subjects the project was to investigate in a limited period of time, and was largely successful, NAS's ability to provide on-going research advice was somewhat limited.** The immediate objective of the advisory panel was to provide USAID and other parties with an independent, source of objective advice on the scope, conduct and outcome of the environmental/sociological study. To carry out its contract, the NAS appointed the Juba Valley Advisory Panel (JVAP). They selected many distinguished members with experience in river basin development and analysis of social and environmental consequences of dam construction. The most important JVAP activity was a series of workshops to review problems encountered during the project. The workshop recommendations were quite good, but it was difficult for panel members to find the time to monitor the project to see that their recommendations had been carried out. For example, JVAP recommendations included comments on the lack of a Phase One report, the lack of information on sondeo results and lack of clear allocation of work effort among activities in the Phase Two work plan. Neither ARD nor JVAP followed-up on any of these problems, although these comments had been made one year ago.

One of the most important factors in lack of JVAP follow-up related to the eminence and experience of the JVAP itself. Each was a well-known member of the academic development community with extensive responsibilities at their own universities. Most

importantly, since JVAP members were not paid, outside of workshop per diem and occasional trips, work for the JVAP seemed to have been done on an ad hoc basis.

> Recommendation: The JVAP panel should include members who are more oriented toward project implementation rather than academic research. The NAS should use the remaining $15,000 in the NAS Cooperative Agreement to pay for critiques of project studies rather than conducting advisory panel workshops.

4. <u>ARD Socioeconomic Baseline Survey (SEBS)</u>. **ARD's large-scale socioeconomic baseline survey might not have been the best way to collect data to help make planning decisions for development.** This survey was designed to generate a large data base for the Juba Valley and to collect demographic data called for in the contract. In part due to its complexity, the conduct of the survey was running behind schedule in the workplan. After its completion, only four months were left for analysis and reporting of research results. The survey sample consisted of one thousand households. The questionnaire's length was excessive, having over 290 questions. Each interview took between forty-five minutes and three hours per household, an excessive amount of time to ask of subsistence farmers. There were questions concerning its statistical validity. Nomadic groups, for example, cannot be adequately studied using point specific survey techniques. Since 25 percent of the SEBS sample was nomadic, one would question the statistical validity of the results.

> Recommendation: While highly accurate and all-inclusive research is desirable, development-oriented research needs to be pragmatic. The degree of confidence required need only match the level of planning decisions which have to be made. ARD researchers must therefore spend more time with the German planners who are assisting the Ministry to determine the degree of accuracy necessary for the tasks at hand. Once a massive survey has begun, it is difficult to call it off, but it could be trimmed (using smaller samples) or modified (by changing or shortening the questions) once research objectives have been agreed upon. Since ARD and the German technical assistance team have not yet agreed on research objectives, it is difficult for the evaluation team to recommend alternative research methodologies.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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B. New Technologies

INTERIM EVALUATION OF THE AGRICULTURE RESEARCH COORDINATION PROJECT, SACCAR, (690-0225), SEPTEMBER, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. After the 1980 Lusaka summit, nine states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) declared their commitment to "pursue policies aimed at economic liberation and integrated development of national economies." To achieve this objective, they established the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Given the recurrent regional problems of low crop and animal productivity, inefficient use of land resources, economic shortfalls and erosion of the natural resource base, SADCC subsequently selected agricultural research as one of the areas in which there could be productive cooperation among member states. It requested the Government of Botswana (GOB) to coordinate this activity and subsequently urged that a separate institution be set up which could serve as a focal point for agricultural research in the Southern Africa region.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. This institution, the Southern African Center for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR), was established in 1984 through the joint efforts of the GOB, the nine SADDCC member states, and Canada, Norway, Sweden and the United States. The first Project Agreement for the A.I.D. portion of overall support for this project, the Regional Agricultural Research Coordination Project, was signed September 27, 1984. The Project Assistance Completion Date will be April 1, 1990. A.I.D. grant funding for this project is $1.5 million.

The purpose of the project is to establish an institution which serves as a focal point for cooperation in the region and coordination of activities in agricultural research among SADCC members. Project outputs will include: improved agricultural research practices, reductions in redundant research efforts, improved relevance of research, better utilization of resources for research and improved crop, agroforestry and livestock production throughout the SADCC countries.

Project activities include construction of offices and residences; promotion of coordination in agricultural research; workshops, training and networking; documentation and publications; grants and special studies; and graduate level manpower development.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to: 1) review the effectiveness of policies, systems, procedures and long-term strategies established thus far and recommend mid-course corrections; 2) assess the adequacy of staff in relation to workload, annual workplans, service requests and the manner of their execution; and 3) consider the amount and extent of direct and indirect financial contributions of SADCC member states to the general operating costs of SACCAR in terms of institutionalization and sustainability. This was the first interim evaluation (conducted in September, 1988). The project had been fully functional for about 18 months at the time of the evaluation.

The methodology included interviews in Zimbabwe and Botswana with staff of the research institutions, universities, and donors, as well as with recipients of SACCAR study and travel grants. Site visits were made to sub-projects and formal meetings were held with the GOB, SADCC and other collaborators.

MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project has been well-implemented and its activities are contributing to strengthening national agricultural research and training institutions. Considerable progress has been made in the six principal areas of project activities. With respect to construction, an office block has been constructed at Sebele Research Station, as well as four SACCAR staff houses. Concerning coordination in agriculture research, seven regional sub-projects covering a wide range of agricultural activities are now in operation, which represent donor commitments in excess of $60 million. Concerning workshops, training and networking, the project has sponsored ten workshops and five new regional projects have resulted from these events. With respect to information and publications, SACCAR is actively involved in the production of newsletters, workshop proceedings and special papers. Twenty-three travel grants and 28 research grants have been awarded. Finally, programs in Agricultural Research and Manpower Training are now in place and these together with SADCC regional research programs will train over 100 degree students during the life of

and budgeting, as well as for implementing and monitoring.

2. Extension. **The adaption and application of** technologies developed by agricultural research systems is a critical but weak link in the SADCC region. The SACCAR mandate relates almost exclusively to various aspects of research. There is no specific reference among SACCAR objectives to a role in disseminating or applying research. While this might have been an appropriate approach during the early stages of SACCAR's development, there is little doubt that without effective extension linkages, the improvement of agricultural production in the region will be seriously delayed. SACCAR, however, should not be faulted for failing to assume a responsibility that was not included in its original objectives.

Recommendation: SACCAR should be authorized to expand its mandate to include promotion and coordination of extension services in the region. The mandate should include responsibility for extension subject matter specialists and extension linkage mechanisms.

3. Management. **There is considerable uncertainty concerning the operation and management of SACCAR's regional agricultural research projects.** SACCAR has initiated eight regional agricultural research projects -- in areas such as water research management and sorghum and millet improvement, among others. Management problems stem principally from the fact that Memoranda of Understanding (MOU -- the contract with the executing agency of the subproject) for these projects do not specify the work that is to be done in operational terms. For example, for many projects, the actual research is not defined, the project budget does not appear to be an integral part of the agreement, the contributions to be made by cooperating partners are not specified, management requirements are not identified and, most importantly, the MOU between SACCAR and the agency responsible for implementing the project has not been signed.

Recommendation: SACCAR should improve the management of regional agricultural research projects by developing a standard format for the MOU and no project activities should begin until the MOU is signed. The format should require specification of the purpose of the project, the executing agency and source of funding, management arrangements, responsibilities of the executing agency, a long-term work plan and work planning and approval arrangements.

4. USAID Management. While USAID/Botswana was well-versed with respect to SACCAR's progress, the project would benefit from increased guidance from and management by USAID staff. USAID should review and approve SACCAR annual workplans. The evaluation team observed that "this management element seemed to be badly missing in the life of the project." The changes in SACCAR's mandate which have already occurred would seem to have required full donor consultation and formal approval, yet the team was unable to identify such a process or the resulting documentation.

> Recommendation: USAID should facilitate the annual donors' meeting. The purpose of the meeting should be to review SACCAR annual operational workplans and budgets and provide joint approval for fiscal year disbursements.

5. Sustainability. Whether SACCAR can become self-sufficient through SADCC assessments remains doubtful. Proposed estimates for SADCC members for Fiscal Years 1989/90 will be about $81,000.00 or about 20 percent of originally projected operating expenses of $321,000.00. During the next fiscal year, donor contributions to program costs will be approximately $788,300. While all member states but one have met their assessed quotas for the 1988 fiscal year, the magnitude of program costs makes it doubtful that they can assume this responsibility in the near future.

> Recommendation: To enhance sustainability, SACCAR should develop a plan whereby member states increasingly assume a larger portion of SACCAR operational costs. Also, SACCAR should search for ways to have some of their other activities financed by the national agricultural research systems and the university community.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION: ON-FARM GRAIN STORAGE PROJECT (615-0190), MARCH, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Kenya is only marginally self-sufficient in food grains. The population growth rate remains very high -- approximately 4.1 percent per year. Agricultural production growth has averaged less than three percent per year since 1972 with the exception of the last two years which had very favorable weather conditions. Periodic poor crop years have led to large scale food imports and increased foreign exchange shortages. Agriculture contributes one-third of the gross domestic product and maize is the most important product.

Approximately ninety percent of the maize is grown by smallholders -- farmers with less than 20 hectares. Grain losses appear to be high throughout the country. Preliminary post maturity loss estimates for maize suggest that losses could be reduced by eleven percent -- the equivalent of a thirteen percent production increase with existing technology.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1981, A.I.D. authorized a $7.8 million loan for the On-Farm Grain Storage project. Final input delivery is expected in 1990.

The purpose of the project is to increase the use of more effective on-farm grain drying and storage practices in Kenya. A.I.D. initiated a host country contract with Development Planning and Research Associates, Inc. (DPRA) to provide all technical assistance, training functions and a major portion of the procurement. Work under that contract began in 1983. The A.I.D. contribution consists of $3.6 million for technical assistance, $$0.9 million for training, $0.5 million for construction, $1.1 million for commodities and $1.7 million for contingencies and inflation.

Project outputs include: 1) creation within the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) of the capacity to stimulate interest and participation of smallholders in identifying grain drying and storage problems; 2) improved Ministry capacity to facilitate adoption of appropriate on-farm grain drying and technological storage packages by small holders; 3) increased capability of agriculture educational institutions to provide training in on-farm grain drying and storage technology; 4) creation of a unit to monitor and evaluate stored grain losses; and 5) written reports regarding the need for financial assistance to smallholders to support grain drying and storage activities as the most effective delivery systems.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of the evaluation were to: 1) measure impact of the project to date on reducing grain loss and future benefits likely to accrue as a result of the project; 2) determine progress toward objectives; 3) determine validity of existing project objectives in light of implementation revisions reducing the project from four to three years with a proportional reduction in technical assistance and training; and 4) explore the feasibility of developing an expanded project.

The methodology involved document review, interviews with key personnel and site visits.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project is having a significant positive impact on grain storage practices in western Kenya. The project "has created an awareness of post-maturity losses in maize and demonstrated methods to reduce those losses. The increased awareness is very evident among extension staff and farmers." The project has already trained 600 extension agents (vs. 900 planned) and has completed training of 6,000 farmers (vs. 9,000 planned). Over 300 farm demonstration sites have been selected for assistance. Trials have been conducted on 63 farms and at six Ministry of Agriculture facilities. The project has demonstrated that improved management packages are acceptable and effective at the farm level. By using these technologies, grain storage losses can be reduced by about 10 percent. In Ikolomani, over 300 farmers adopted improved storage techniques and management practices after observing 24 farm trials. Six participants are pursuing long-term training and most have indicated their intention to return to their positions in the Ministry. A well-equipped unit has been established to evaluate grain losses.

> Recommendation: The project should be continued for a fourth year as originally planned. The original plan for the project recommended that the laboratory be used as a regional grain monitoring unit. Converting the laboratory to a regional (western Kenya) extensive investigation center would be a better option. Its role should include providing investigation/extension facilities for extension specialists, providing technical support such as soil tests, insect and disease identification and undertaking testing of research results appropriate for extension in the region.

2. Project Implementation. **Implementation changes were drastic and usually as a result of delays or non-approvals, not the outcome of comprehensive planning.** During implementation, many deviations from the original plan made the project less effective. Some of these changes included the following.

- The project cancelled twenty-six percent of the planned person months of long-term consultants. This eliminated the Farm Management/Economist activities and substantially reduced the time for other positions. These reductions caused cancellations of critical project activities.

- The project used only eight percent of the planned person months of short-term technical assistance.

- After three years of the original four year project, the project expended only 42 percent of the contract funds.

- The project plan was for grain, but the project only considered maize (the most important crop, but not the grain with the highest estimated losses).

- The project was consistently behind schedule in identifying in-country staff. In some instances, the delays reduced or eliminated the planned counterpart experience -- which was essential for institution-building.

- USAID approved the third year contract one month after the previous contract had expired. This decreased the lead time for extension/demonstration efforts prior to the harvest.

- At the time of the evaluation, the project had not ordered any of the bicycles (700 planned) or motorcycles (50 planned). The project plan included these to enhance the mobility of extension personnel. Transportation was consistently identified as one of the most serious constraints for the program.

Recommendation: The project contractor must have the flexibility to fill essential project positions. If adequately qualified Kenyans are not available, the project should consider hiring short and long-term consultants. More local program control is needed. The project should give as much authority and responsibility to the Provincial Directors of Agriculture (PDAs) as

possible and local people should be involved in program planning. The project manager should be answerable to the PDAs of the involved provinces.

3. Adoption Rate/Potential Economic Impact. Project activities resulted in an estimated overall adoption rate of 6 percent in the first year. The adoption rates for farmers constructing their own cribs for grain drying was estimated at 0.4-0.6 percent. This low percentage was due to the fact that the extension phase of the project only began in mid-1986 and partly because the costs of recommended cribs were not within the financial capability of some farmers. The adoption rates of shelling and insecticide treatment were estimated at 10 percent, thus resulting in a 6 percent overall adoption rate. Assuming current levels of investment in training and testing, the adoption rate may progressively increase to 25 percent by year 2001. Based on a 6-25 percent adoption rate between 1987 and 2001, the value of reduced losses range from approximately $583,363 in 1987 to $2.8 million in 2001, while the total saving in the period is estimated at $26.9 million. The benefit to cost ratio with a 15 percent discount rate for the region is 1.16 while the break even adoption rate is 10 percent.

Recommendation: Until the adoption rates justify an expanded project, the current extension efforts should be continued and intensified. To the extent possible, the program should involve other organizations such as: 1) the churches, which have several development activities in the area; 2) Non-Governmental-Organizations such as Action Aid which works with small farmers; 3) Lake Basin Development Authority (LBDA) which has initiated several self-help projects in the area; and 4) International Center for Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE) whose research capability on insects would be of paramount importance.

4. Adoption Constraints: Capital Costs and Social Factors. Capital costs for constructing a crib or a raised basket for grain drying were clearly an adoption constraint. When farmers used purchased materials and hired labor, costs ranged (depending upon the type of structure for drying that was constructed) from KShs 500. to KShs 1,638.75. However, if the farmer used materials obtained in his/her immediate neighborhood, the cost ranged between KShs 240-500 per structure. With respect to social factors, frequently grain production and handling is the women's role and thus women's groups are valuable contacts.

Recommendation: Materials for construction, to the extent possible, should be of local origin. The Farm Management/Economist position should be filled so that he/she can develop data on economic benefits of improved post-harvest grain management and provide this information to farmers. The project should increase its contacts with women's groups. It should also work with banks and other credit lenders to assist in obtaining credit for capital improvements.

5. Extension. Inadequate resource support (transportation, operating budgets, teaching materials, salaries and other incentives) seriously limits extension staff productivity. Given that this information must have been available to project designers, it was surprising that half the project budget was allocated to long-term consultants.

Recommendation: The primary focus of the project should be on continued intensive extension. The project must address the transportation problems experienced by extension staff. Ordering the bicycles and motorcycles should not be delayed any longer -- these items were needed last year.

6. Institution Building. The project's organizational structure is a constraint to institution building. The Project Coordinator was located at the laboratory. This was logical because he also had technical responsibilities at that location. But this decision had several negative results. The laboratory was a component, not the central focus nor the administrative center (which probably was the office of the Provincial Directors for Agriculture). This structure separated project management and activity from the provincial personnel who, if involved, could have given more enthusiastic support for the project.

Recommendation: The counterpart of the Project Coordinator should answer to the Provincial Directors of Agriculture (PDAs). People should identify with the program being developed rather than the project. Therefore, the project should have administrative offices close to the PDAs' offices and, if possible, share common stationery, telephone numbers and addresses. When project termination approaches, project personnel should shift from their enthusiastic, highly visible role to one that is much more invisible by working with counterparts.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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FINAL EVALUATION: TOGO ANIMAL TRACTION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (693-0218, AUGUST, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Following a period of unsuccessful attempts to introduce tractors as a means of promoting agricultural production, the Government of Togo (GOT) reassessed its strategy and, subsequently, began to stress animal traction as a technology appropriate to the development of existing production systems.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. The purpose of the Togo Animal Traction Development project was to assist the GOT in improving, coordinating and expanding on its activities in support of the promotion of animal traction among small holder farmers in Togo.

A.I.D. funding financed the services of a U.S. technical assistance team to assist the principal GOT implementing agencies (PROPTA and the Directions Regionales du Developpement Rural [DRDR] of Kara and Savanes regions) in their mandate to coordinate and expand animal traction activities in Togo. A.I.D. funding also assisted in the construction of technical and administrative facilities and in the procurement of essential commodities and vehicles. GOT financing covered local personnel costs as well as those associated with the establishment of a revolving credit fund to assist farmer-adopters to acquire the animals and implements necessary for converting from traditional farming methods to animal traction.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of this end-of-project evaluation was to: 1) assess project impact; 2) identify areas of successful design and implementation; and 3) recommend possible areas of future USAID assistance.

The methodology involved document review and interviews with USAID and GOT officials and project staff and recipients, as well as site visits.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. Based upon logframe targets and indicators, the project was an unqualified success. The project met most of the major project outputs as outlined below.

TARGET	ACHIEVEMENT
- PROPTA M&E unit set up	- M&E data base established
- 39 projects using PROPTA services	- 100%, performance varies
- Credit system established, 800+recipients	- 56%
- Farmers trained, no target	- 1,761 farmers trained
- 16 resources centers established	- 100%
- Farmer adopters use new technology, no target	- 806 farmers
- Land under anim. tract. cutiv. incr. 30 %	- average increases of 30%
- Crop prod. incr. 20% aft. 5 yrs.	- No measure avail.

The project benefitted tangibly from the evolution of a Togolese policy that was increasingly farming-systems oriented and harmonious with the project's original approach. The GOT officially announced a new policy in March 1985, " La Nouvelle Strategie du Devellopement Rural," which explicitly endorsed animal traction technology as a primary goal of rural development activities. During the following year, the GOT initiated a national examination of rural development agents and the dismissal of poorly qualified personnel.

Recommendation: USAID should employ undisbursed project funds in a number of key technical areas: participant training, extension of technical assistance for training programs and equipment diagnostics.

2. Economic Analysis. The internal rate of return (IRR) did not appear to be high enough to explain the strong demand for animal traction in the project area, but the projected IRR depended upon the assumptions employed in the analysis. On the basis of crop costs and returns alone, animal traction produced net income per hectare that was about 39 percent greater than manual cultivation in both financial and economic terms. The return per manday was about 680 FCFA with animal traction as compared to 490 FCFA for the

traditional system. When all costs were included, however, the differences were less dramatic, with a financial internal rate of return of 13 percent without credit and 15 percent with it. Although acceptable, these rates were marginal in relation to a farmer's other alternatives and were not high enough to explain the strong demand for animal traction.

Examining certain assumptions might help explain the divergence between apparent financial returns and farmer behavior. For example, a 30 percent increase in area cultivated as opposed to the 19 percent used in the budget, farmer perceptions that they need to repay only 75 percent of their loan and reducing care of animals to one-half hour per day all increase the IRR substantially. If farmers attach no cost to the time spent caring for animals, because having animals is an element of prestige, then returns rise to nearly 25 percent with credit. If certain of the assumptions are combined, then returns rise to almost 30 percent with credit.

3. Credit. The credit program was critical to the success of the project. Relatively few farmers could have afforded the large investment required if they had to pay cash. Farm level interest rates (50-75 percent) were simply too high to make any but the highest return investments profitable for a farmer who had to borrow at village level interest rates. By providing credit at rates that reflected modern sector interest rates, the project was trying to promote a more efficient allocation of modern sector investment resources. In the process, it was making animal traction technology profitable for many farmers than would otherwise have been the case.

Financing for the program came from the GOT and was managed through an account at the National Agricultural Bank. A consultant provided by REDSO under a regionally funded Indefinite Quantity Contract put in place and is monitoring the system for accounting for credit program resources. Repayment rates improved from 24 percent for the pilot project to around 90 percent in 1987. The accounting side of the program appeared to be strong but management could be further strengthened.

> Recommendation: The project should more clearly define a system for monitoring the results of the program on a monthly basis and reporting these results to the director. The system should establish documentation of reasons for late payments and clearly define the conditions which warrant leniency with respect to deficient loan repayments.

4. USAID Management. **The impact of the project was limited due to USAID delays in the disbursement of project funds.** USAID did not make any advances against PROPTA expenditures and operations between August 1983 -- the start-up date of the project -- and January 1985. To sustain its operations during this period, PROPTA had to borrow from existing revolving funds which had been earmarked for other purposes. Delays in the disbursement of funds to the project resulted from a variety of factors including:

- An overly complex circuit of approvals encompassing USAID/Lome, the GOT and REDSO/Abidjan;
- Requests by A.I.D. for line-item justifications which sometimes delayed the entire tranche of funding;
- Misunderstandings about administrative and fiscal procedures which sometimes resulted in inappropriate requests at the project level.

The delays and shortfalls in project funding resulted in net deficits in project accounts during critical periods of program implementation.

Recommendation: USAID should conduct an internal review of project management procedures to identify systematic problems that block resource availability to projects. USAID, GOT and REDSO should work together to simplify procedures for cash advances and disbursements to ensure that administrative complexity is not an impediment to project success. USAID should institute annual or semi-annual administrative workshops for technical assistance and counterpart project administrators. Excellent curricula for such workshops have already been developed by the Sahel regional Financial Management Project.

5. Participant Training. **While participant training was included as a critical element in project design, the lack of a training needs assessment resulted in a lower than planned level of participant training.** The project provided a total of $40,000 for participant training, but only $7,882 was disbursed by the end of 1987. The principal impediment to the use of participant training resources was the failure of the technical assistance team and USAID project management to implement a training needs assessment and training schedule in a timely manner. In mid-1987, these offices developed a PROPTA needs assessment and training program, but long-term training was precluded

by the imminent end of the project. The lack of training will affect the sustainability of project activities. There may be no competent human resources to replace the technical assistance team once the project ends. The ability of the PROPTA monitoring and evaluation unit to function in the absence of a sufficiently qualified specialist is doubtful, in spite of commendable in-house training efforts by the technical assistant assigned to that unit. The absence of any animal traction technology specialists at the DRDR is almost certain to have a detrimental effect on host country follow-up to project activities.

> Recommendation: USAID should require projects to draw up participant training schedules during the first year of implementation. This would allow adequate time for the identification of appropriate institutions, training, and re-insertion of host country personnel during the life of projects. Undisbursed participant training funds should be disbursed under the newly-extended Project Assistance Completion Date for training in: monitoring and evaluation; credit program management; and animal traction technology.

6. Animal Health Services. **While the project recognized the importance of animal health and successfully implemented a range of remedial activities, the limited availability of animal health services was an impediment to increased and sustained adoption of animal traction technology.** The project emphasized year-round animal nutrition, preventive care and treatment. However, the number of Animal Health Service agents serving farmers is extremely limited. For example, in the Kara region, there were nine agents, which meant 7,444 cattle per agent. Resources to support the agents in their work were extremely limited. Allowances due to veterinary agents for operation and maintenance of their vehicles were subject to chronic delays. Not all agents were provided with official means of transportation and thus agents had to supplement their income by charging for treatment and travel costs.

> Recommendation: USAID should explore and support a program for policy reforms in the animal health area. USAID should also encourage training for village-level para-veterinarians who could operate on a cash or barter basis, requiring no salaries or subsidies.

7. Impact of USAID Withdrawal. In the final year of the project, A.I.D was still providing a major share of PROPTA's recurrent and capital costs. Alternative resources had not been identified. In the final year of the project, with respect to the total PROPTA budget, A.I.D. was providing 69 percent for operational costs, 64 percent for contingency costs, 64 percent for construction and 52 percent for equipmert.

8. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). While the M&E unit had many accomplishments, it neglected to gather information that project directors and the GOT needed to maximize the effectiveness of project activities. Much extremely useful information could have been gathered regularly by field staff without an expensive training program or elaborate effort on indicators such as: supply of spare parts, condition of the animals, suitability of the equipment and effectiveness of the demonstration plots.

Recommendation: PROPTA should establish a simple M&E system that provides information on indicators that are useful for decision-making.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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MIDTERM EVALUATION: SAAR-CIMMYT II FARMING SYSTEMS RESEARCH II (698-0435-03), MARCH, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Governments in East and Southern Africa are aiming to achieve food security and self-sufficiency over the long-term. In 1976, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) introduced in this region the idea of off-station agricultural research with a focus on production constraints of small-scale farmers and came to play a major role in assisting A.I.D. teams and host-country agencies in using on-farm research (OFR) methodologies. As a result, many of the national research institutions recently initiated OFR programs, with linkages to commodity research teams and extension programs. While there were many important achievements, much remained to be done to institutionalize OFR as a vital part of Ministry programs.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1985, A.I.D. authorized $5 million for the SAAR-Farming Systems Research Phase II project. The project was a follow-on to the CIMMYT I On-Farm Research with a Farming Systems Perspective project which was initiated in 1981 and completed in 1985. The purpose of CIMMYT II was to provide participating countries with training, direct assistance in on-farm research with a farming systems perspective, networking among cooperating national programs and contracting agencies, and help with institutionalizing the on-farm research process. The Project Assistance Completion Date is planned for May 20, 1990. The mode of implementation is a direct contract between A.I.D. and the grantee, CIMMYT.

Projects outputs are to include: 1) more effective USAID-funded in-country programs in on-farm research with a farming systems perspective (FSP);
2) national professionals trained in OFR/FSP in cooperating countries in Eastern and Southern Africa;
3) improved OFR/FSP methodologies through exchange and networking interaction among country programs; and
4) institutional changes in some national research organizations to accommodate OFR/FSP.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of the evaluation were to: 1) assess project progress; 2) examine the extent of national participation in project activities; and 3) assess REDSO/ESA and CIMMYT project management.

The methodology involved visits to four of the 16 countries served by CIMMYT: Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe

and Zambia. In these countries, the team made site visits, interviewed researchers, extensionists, farmers, national research directors and reviewed secondary data in country publications and research and extension studies.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. Project assistance was contributing to strengthening the FSR methodology at regional and national levels within research, extension and university systems. CIMMYT II has been a major factor in the restructuring of national research programs presently espousing OFR/FSP as an approach to understand and better serve their client farmers. Research is taking place on farmers' land based upon farmer-identified production constraints. For many countries, this is the first time that farmers have been taken into account as rational users of their limited resources and the best persons to explain to the research community why they use their resources as they do.

CIMMYT training programs have received very positive reactions from national programs. Participants trained in-country and graduates of the regional workshops spoke highly of their training experiences. The regional workshops were mentioned many times as outstanding examples of project achievements. Most OFR practitioners in the region received their initial OFR training in these regional workshops. Another of CIMMYT's more significant achievements has been their efforts to institutionalize OFR in the university community. The project has developed strong programs in Tanzania and Zambia that include FSR instruction in crop sciences, economics and rural development courses.

2. Use of Farming Systems Research (FSR) in National Programs. The use of FSR in national programs varied from country to country. The quality and use of FSR in the four countries the team visited were as follows.

- Kenya. The areas where on-farm research was going on and the number of experiments were not extensive. The work had not evolved substantially since the last in-country training. Farmer participation in experimental management was minimal but was included in evaluation of technology.

- Tanzania. Only two zones use FSR and CIMMYT's activities in Tanzania were limited by the Brooke amendment. The Tanzanian researchers demonstrated substantial progress

in using the FSR process. Their experimentation involved farmers and was not solely researcher managed. Economic analysis had not been used sufficiently.

- Zimbabwe. Development and integration of FSR into the system was been limited. This seemed to be due primarily to the conservative nature of the Zimbabwe research system and lack of support for the process at higher levels. There was a Farming Systems Research Unit (FSRU) based at headquarters with no spread to other research stations. It appeared their work was researcher managed and not necessarily conceived with a diagnostic survey as background. There was little emphasis on involving the farmer.

- Zambia. Many donors were involved and supported FSR in Zambia. Therefore, assessment of CIMMYT's influence was difficult.

Recommendation: The project should increase the amount of time devoted to direct collaboration between CIMMYT and host-country staff. Joint visits by agronomists/economists are encouraged. The project should identify specific areas for longer term consultancies (e.g., special studies).

3. Institutionalization of Farming Systems Research (FSR) at the National Level. The ideas and concepts of FSR have gained considerable respect in national research programs. The degree of institutionalization of FSR at the national level in each country program was as follows.

- Kenya. Under the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), there were eight regional research centers with responsibility for adaptive research and 16 national research centers with commodity and/or disciplinary focus. Each of the regional research centers was to have a farming systems section, but the staffing breakdown (number of agronomists vs. economists) was not clear. At the national level, there was a position established for an adaptive research coordinator but the position was vacant. The idea of a farmer focus to research seemed to be generally accepted.

- Tanzania. Farming systems research team were established at two out of six zonal research centers, with plans for a third, and perhaps more depending on donor funding. The teams

included both biological and social scientists. There was a national coordinator of farming systems research with two assistants, all based in Dar es Salaam.

- Zimbabwe. The Farming Systems Research Unit (FSRU) was a separate unit of the Department of Research and Specialist Services (RSS), reporting directly to the director of RSS. It was composed of two animal scientists, two crop scientists, one economist and ten technicians. The future of the FSRU was being debated. It was not clear that it would remain as a separate entity.

- Zambia. On-farm research in Zambia was carried out by adaptive research teams in each province. The teams, based at provincial research stations, consist of an agronomist, social scientist and research-extension officer. The teams had a national coordinator.

There was still a great deal of work to be done before results could be expected on a regular basis. Problems stemmed from several factors:

1) there was confusion over what a "systems approach" actually entailed;

2) the research was carried out by relatively junior level staff with poor support; and

3) the mechanisms for planning and priority setting in national research programs were inadequate. Probably the single most effective way of establishing a farmer-focus to research at this time is to achieve results and document them. There was no documentation on either the institutionalization process or on the adoption of new technologies as a result of the FSR process.

Recommendation: One of the most important ways of achieving results is through better documentation of planning and analysis in national programs. The 1985 baseline data summary giving the status of on-farm research in 14 countries should be updated. It should be used as a means of assessing progress in the institutionalization of on-farm research and as a basis for discussing strategies and workplans in particular countries. The project should also emphasize developing a way to document farmer adoption as well as the role of FSR in the adoption process.

4. Social Dimensions of Farming Systems Research (FSR). **The project encouraged research oriented towards the needs of small-scale farmers.** In both Kenya and Tanzania, for example, researchers made sure that female farmers were well-represented as on-farm experiment collaborators. Research on issues of inter-cropping in Kenya and Tanzania, seasonal food shortages in Tanzania and drought risk in Zimbabwe were all examples of a re-orientation towards the priorities of small-scale producers.

> Recommendation: The project should continue its emphasis on the social dimensions of agricultural research, both in its training and networking activities.

5. CIMMYT Management. **The absence of a designated person responsible for project management and coordination was a major shortcoming in project management.** Project coordination was being done on an ad-hoc basis by a Nairobi-based staff person. This arrangement did not provide the level of authority required to address key planning and project implementation matters as required under the Grant Agreement (e.g, financial and program planning, procurement, coordinating technical resources etc.).

In addition, the Grant Agreement required that annual workplans be prepared and submitted to USAID for review and approval. While the first workplan (for Calendar Year 1986) was prepared and approved, subsequent workplans for 1987 and 1988 were not submitted.

Finally, budgeting and financial planning activities were weak. Current budget information was not available in the field offices visited. The illustrative budgets of the grant agreements were the only budget documents available. Also, the practice of an officer approving his/her own expense voucher lacked oversight and control.

> Recommendation: CIMMYT, in consultation with REDSO/ESA, should review options that would provide for regional coordination and management under the project.
>
> The project should prepare the 1988 workplan and submit it to USAID within 60 days. Future workplans should be submitted no later than the 4th quarter of the preceding year.
>
> The project should prepare a financial statement that indicates total expenditures to date and sources of funding. It should also prepare, as part of the annual workplan, a detailed budget

which identifies all funding sources and application by line item.

Individual expense vouchers should be approved by a second signatory.

6. USAID Management. A more thorough review of project implementation and management should have been undertaken by A.I.D. when reviewing the CIMMYT proposal. These issues were not adequately addressed by A.I.D. and have resulted in misunderstandings.

Recommendation: REDSO/ESA should prepare a handbook that provides information to project field staff on matters related to project implementation and standard regulations covering use of project funds.

USAID should consider withholding funding if the grantee does not comply with provisions of the grant agreement such as timely submission of annual workplans.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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MIDTERM EVALUATION: CIP/PRAPAC POTATO RESEARCH NETWORK PROJECT (698-0435.04), APRIL, 1989

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Potatoes are an important crop in the highlands of Burundi, Rwanda, Eastern Zaire and Western Uganda. Introduced by European missionaries and colonists in the late 19th century, potatoes are now widely grown by small farmers, both for home consumption and as a high-value crop for sale in national markets. Yields in farmers' fields average from four to seven tons per hectare (t/ha), well below averages achieved in other developing countries such as Mexico (13t/ha) or Bangladesh (12t/ha). Nevertheless, Central African farmers can obtain more nutritious food and cash income from their small plots of potatoes than from any alternative crop, and in a shorter growing season. High yields have been limited by disease, a lack of appropriate varieties and clean, high quality seed.

In response to farmers' needs, the International Potato Center (CIP) in Nairobi helped to organize national potato programs in the early 1980s in Rwanda and Burundi. By 1982, the leaders of these programs recognized that their countries did not have enough trained scientists or other resources to organize national agricultural research programs in isolation and that problems of potato production were broadly similar throughout the zone. Consequently, they formed an agricultural research network, PRAPAC ("Programme Regionale d'Ameloriation de la Culture de la Pomme de Terre"). Uganda was added to the network in 1987. The objectives of PRAPAC are collaboration between the potato programs of member countries, exchange of technologies and ideas, training and stimulation of better research.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. The organizers of PRAPAC envisioned that external funding would be required for about ten years to develop and institutionalize an effective regional potato research network. As a first phase, the International Potato Center (CIP) applied for and received in February 1986, from REDSO/ESA, a five-year $1.557 million grant to expand the potato improvement research network, which encompassed Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. In addition, the USAID/Rwanda Farming Systems Research project provided a $251,000 buy-in for activities in Rwanda and USAID/Burundi provided $377,000 in foreign exchange and $313,000 equivalent in P.L. 480 local currency generations. The Project Assistance Completion Date is scheduled for 2/13/91.

The purpose of the project (CIP/PRAPAC Potato Research Network Project) is to provide support to the CIP

program for continuing and expanding a potato improvement research network encompassing Zaire, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. A secondary purpose is to develop and disseminate improved potato varieties and cultural practices specifically adapted to the region.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to: a) review CIP's multicountry networking concept and its validity as a research coordinating unit; b) assess PRAPAC's immediate operational needs and future programming requirements; and c) examine the adequacy of grant management arrangements in order to guide project management during the remaining life of the project.

The evaluation methodology consisted of interviews conducted by the full team in Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire with CIP personnel, the PRAPAC coordinator, national research directors, potato researchers and farmers participating in on-farm trials.

MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. In spite of PRAPAC's youth and relatively modest size, it is making progress toward the achievement of the project purpose and has made "impressive strides in delivering technologies appropriate for small farmers". Progress has been made in such ares as: development and dissemination of improved varieties; rapid multiplication techniques; production of clean seed; diffused light stores for seed; ware potato storage; integrated pest management; and use of repellant plants in stores and dormancy breaking. As just one example of progress, the project has promoted the use of Lantana leaves to control tuber moth damage. The team noted, "this simple biocontrol method is exactly the kind of environmentally-benign technology that is needed in farming areas...(especially) for farmers who cannot afford pesticides."

> Recommendation: REDSO and USAIDs should assess the availability of funding for Phase II of PRAPAC support. They should assess alternative ways of funding Central African potato research, studies and training.

2. Uneven Development of National Potato Research Programs. A critical challenge facing PRAPAC is the linkage of national potato research programs of uneven strength and maturity. Rwanda has the largest and strongest potato research program in the region with

six scientists and ten technicians, but is somewhat short of working space and facilities. In Burundi, one national scientist, on the job for less than a year, is working with five technicians and two expatriates. The potato program in Zaire has good facilities which are underutilized. Currently two scientists, an extension specialist and seven technicians run a skeleton research program with very modest assistance from PRAPAC's coordination budget.

3. Inadequate Extension Systems. While PRAPAC appears to be a cost-effective way to stimulate potato research within the region, inadequate extension services in each participating country are hindering greater progress toward dissemination of potato technologies. The PRAPAC countries lack adequate and established infrastructure for the transfer of technologies to farmers. In Burundi, for example, there is only one extension agent posted in each of the country's fifteen provinces. (Burundi's Structural Adjustment Program has a mandate to strengthen the extension system.) Rwanda's system is more extensive but agents have no means of transportation and therefore can only reach a handful of farmers. Problems in Zaire are similar.

> Recommendation: PRAPAC should work with the broader agricultural sector in each member country. In this way they would improve the linkages between potato research and the agencies responsible for clean seed production, seed bulking, seed distribution and extension.

4. Need for Socio-Economic Data and Monitoring. While the International Potato Center's Social Science Department has succeeded in producing valuable socio-economic studies of the potato food system in member countries, it has proved more difficult to institutionalize a regular role for socio-economic monitoring in PRAPAC and in the member national programs. Reliable data about the role, market and nutritional importance of potatoes would strengthen the position of potato researchers as they argue for more personnel and funds. Some socio-economic research that has been initiated has not been completed or used due to lack of adequate support. The reasons for this were not spelled out in the evaluation report.

> Recommendation: PRAPAC and the International Potato Center need to direct more attention to gathering and analyzing socio-economic data. They should consider recruiting a social scientist experienced in biological aspects of potato research to replace the Coordinator at the

conclusion of his term. Data collected should be disaggregated by gender, since the needs of male and female farmers may differ.

5. Management by REDSO/ESA and USAIDs. Increased collaborative monitoring by REDSO/ESA and USAIDs would set the stage for making future decisions regarding greater mission support for potato research and PRAPAC. USAID officers were not well-informed about project progress, the status of PRAPAC activities or the relative importance of potato cultivation and marketing in their countries. To assess whether USAIDs should increase their support for potato research in the future, missions will require market, nutritional and socio-economic studies on potato production and consumption in their countries.

Recommendation: REDSO and USAIDs should improve their mechanisms for consultation and joint planning. Each USAID's budget for agriculture research should include support for potato research. The biennial Agriculture Development Officers' Conference should be used to plan mission financial contributions.

6. Training. While PRAPAC has done a good job of organizing workshops and providing in-country training, the lack of B.S. and M.S. degree level researchers will constrain project progress. Through PRAPAC initiative and funding, an excellent training facility has been established in Rwanda and numerous in-country workshops and seminars have been held. However, the lack of college and graduate-level scientists is critical. Only Rwanda has a Ph.D.-trained scientist. Zaire and Burundi each have only one M.S.-trained scientist.

Recommendation: The Ministries of Agriculture of member countries should assess long-term undergraduate and graduate-level training needs for potato research. They should propose candidates for training to appropriate donors, including USAIDs, and give greater attention to recruiting women researchers for training.

7. PRAPAC Management. PRAPAC management of research programs needs strengthening. During the first three years of the project, much of the Coordinator's time was spent managing the construction of the project-funded training center in Rwanda and his adjacent residence. As a result, the Coordinator has been unable to offer sufficient technical assistance to national potato research programs in the network. With

respect to his travel time, only one week was available to the Uganda program which entered PRAPAC in 1987, while this program and that of Zaire are most in need of technical assistance.

> Recommendation: The Director's Committee should develop a more explicit written job description for the Coordinator's position. The written job description should specify the percentage of time to be spent on travel status and the minimum amount of technical assistance to be provided to each country. A plan and schedule for moving a national scientist into this position should be prepared.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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C. Improvement of Job-Related Skills

INTERIM EVALUATION: BOTSWANA WORKFORCE AND SKILLS TRAINING PROJECT, PHASE II, (633-0241), DECEMBER, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Since independence in 1966, Botswana has experienced rapid overall economic growth. The per capita gross domestic product indicator, however, is misleading. Unemployment stands in excess of 25 percent and the labor force is growing rapidly. (The annual birth rate is between 3.4 and 3.7, among the highest in the world). At the same time, numerous vacancies exist at the managerial and technical skill level.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1986, A.I.D. approved Phase II of the Botswana Workforce and Skills Training Project (BWAST II), as a US$27 million, five year effort. Four A.I.D.-supported human resource development projects had preceded BWAST II. The Project Assistance Completion Date is scheduled for May 1994.

The purpose of the project is to increase the number of trained Batswana in both the public and private sectors in skill areas which foster employment generation, and to bridge, temporarily, some of the most critical gaps with expatriates.

Key project outputs are: (1) Batswana trained through in-country training programs in fields associated with employment creation and labor productivity; (2) Batswana trained in the U.S. or third countries in disciplines directly linked to the employment generation effort; (3) technical assistance provided to ministries and the private sector in fields related to job formation; and (4) institutionalization of a management training system that will strengthen the capacity of the public and private sector to plan and manage their own manpower development.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to review activities undertaken during the first two years of the project, determine if these activities were meeting project goals and recommend whether USAID and the Government of Botswana (GOB) should consider any shift in emphasis during the remaining life of the project. The evaluation scope of work required that five broad areas be emphasized: (1) various ordering mechanisms under the project; (2) performance of the contractor, the Academy for Educational Development; (3) the impact of BWAST II on GOB training systems, particularly on the process by which individuals were targeted for training; (4) the

role of returned trainees; and (5) all private sector components.

The team employed a rapid reconnaissance methodology. Information and data were obtained in the following ways: (1) review of documents; (2) purposive sampling of key informants; (3) focus group discussions in Botswana with returned trainees; and (4) interviews in Washington and Botswana.

The evaluation report includes three data collection instruments: the participant training follow-up questionnaire, the OPEX (this term refers to the "operational experts" employed as expatriate technical assistants to various ministries under the project) probe questionnaire and the USAID letter to former trainees. The report also includes some of the actual data gathered: focus group meeting notes and responses to evaluation questions.

MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **The project is a flexible and innovative use of a conventional public sector participant training program.** It has been reoriented to facilitate bilateral policy dialogue and alleviate critical constraints to the growth of the private sector. In concert with GOB officials, USAID has made creative use of BWAST II funding to study policy and procedural areas inhibiting market forces in Botswana's mixed economy and has provided technical assistance and training in areas with high potential to positively influence employment generation.

Despite progress, there is a need for a broader approach to private sector development in Botswana beyond participant training activities. A new initiative is required which would have a more focused and broader approach to private sector development: focused in the sense that services must be coordinated and linked; broader, because small employers require a variety of services including management and marketing assistance, credit, help in securing raw materials and product design assistance (among others).

> Recommendation: Ideally, a separate project should be initiated to undertake broader private sector development objectives. Although training individuals who have a role in formulating policies which affect private sector development and providing technical assistance to foster employment generation are key elements of the project's strategy, training per se is largely a subordinate function. Training is only effective to the extent that other essential services are

available to the target group. USAID should extend BWAST II by one year while plans for new projects are developed.

2. Private Sector Training. Although BWAST II is accomplishing its private sector training objectives, further fine-tuning of this component would enhance project effectiveness. The implementation of Botswana's development plans requires a large pool of mid-level talent which does not currently exist. The project currently emphasizes two- or three-year degree programs. Instead, emphasis should be on shorter, mid-level training. Moreover, the selection process emphasizes choosing individuals from the larger firms which already have the resources for training rather than from smaller employers who may have the greatest training needs (but lack resources to support an individual in training). Finally, emphasis also seems to be given to individuals who have obtained the support of particular employers, not necessarily the actual importance of the skill.

Recommendation: With respect to private sector training, the project should concentrate on short-term external and in-country technical skills training, rather than on long-term, external degree programs. The project also needs to open competition to those with the appropriate backgrounds but who are not yet employed, ensure equal access for women, include training for those in areas outside Gabarone, include training for those in the informal sector to the extent possible and develop linkages with a community-centered training and business assistance organization. USAID should initiate a private sector "needs assessment" to identify additional critical skill areas -- both technical and entrepreneurial -- for which training can be provided.

3. Broadening Private Sector Training Opportunities. The focus of the key organization (BOCCIM -- Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower) designated to coordinate private sector training opportunities is too restricted to represent the private sector adequately for purposes of BWAST II training. "Non-traditional" enterprises (such as cooperatives), as well as rural enterprises located outside of Gabarone, all play a vital role in development and should be given consideration when allocating training opportunities to stimulate employment generation.

Recommendation: USAID should support the development of BOCCIM as a "lead organization" to mobilize and coordinate indigenous services to private sector firms. This center might provide access to a range of services that could include: locating training in management and technical skills; assisting with credit and financial services; assisting employers with marketing and distribution; and providing information of technology.

4. Third-Country Training. The project has encountered problems in attempting to meet the mission objective which aims to place 15 percent of all trainees in third-country institutions. USAID established this objective in response to a 1987 audit of BWAST II which stated: "The project has not used cost-effective third-country training of students. Even though opportunities existed in other African countries for undergraduate and other training at greatly reduced costs, no students had been placed in those countries." The evaluation team, however, identified numerous constraints (related to quality, costs and access) to use of third-country training institutions in Africa. For example, many African students recognize the lack of international standards at these institutions and desire overseas training. Some high quality institutions, like those in Zimbabwe, emphasize admission to local, rather than foreign, students. With respect to institutions in Africa offering curricula geared to private sector expansion, "the situation is bleak." The American University in Cairo has private enterprise programs, but the environment would not be culturally appropriate for students from Southern Africa.

Recommendation: USAID and the project staff should explore the possibility of placing students in non-African, third-country institutions, to address the problems identified with third-country training in African institutions. If the 15 percent target cannot be waived, other training institutions outside of Africa should be considered. These might include, for example, the ILO training center in Turin, Italy and other training institutions in Asia.

5. Enhancing Employment Generation. There is a need to link employment needs to training plans. Due to population pressure, by the year 2000 there will be an accumulated shortage of 59,000 jobs in Botswana, in spite of efforts to create jobs in all sectors of the economy. What is required is a "linkage model" similar to that of some American community colleges.

These colleges frequently have small business development units which provide on-the-job apprenticeships for both public and private sector needs -- for example, training in repairing Boeing 747's and assembling Caterpillar tractors. Local institutions could be adapted to perform some of the functions which American community colleges perform such as: technical training, hands-on learning and linkages with commerce and industry.

Recommendation: USAID and other donors should give serious consideration to developing a model whereby existing (or, if necessary, new) Botswana institutions could be adapted to fill the functions performed in America by some community colleges. Current BWAST II trainees are using American community colleges for technical training, as well as remediation in math, science and other areas. An American community college model could be utilized to link training to the private sector.

6. Data for Monitoring Project Progress. **Data on key indicators of project progress and other analyses were not readily available.** This kind of information had to be laboriously extracted from various sources on a case-by-case basis. The evaluation team was unable to obtain some key summary information.

Recommendation: USAID and project staff should revise the project data system so that it provides, at a minimum, totals of trainees selected, or sent, and of trainees concluding training successfully. A more ambitious effort would be to develop status indicators for the expected outputs of BWAST II, and to develop programs for tracking these indicators.

7. The Role of Operational Experts. **OPEXers have provided valuable assistance by filling important operational roles. However, cost-benefit could be increased by emphasizing recruitment of OPEXers with strengths related to policy reform and training.** The OPEXers who appeared to have the greatest impact were those involved with policy activities. They described how they prepared analyses which had persuaded Botswana policymakers to explore business opportunities and remove constraints to the private sector.

Recommendation: Project staff should recruit more OPEXers and consultants who have policy development expertise or who are qualified as trainers of trainers. They also should ensure

provision of adequate support equipment (e.g., calculators, lap-top computers) to OPEXers.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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AGRICULTURE MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING PROJECT, EVALUATION REPORT (631-0008), MARCH, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of the Republic of Cameroon (GRC) required assistance in developing agricultural management and planning capabilities.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1979, A.I.D authorized the Agricultural Management and Planning (AMP) Project. Since the inception of the project, A.I.D. invested approximately $9 million, while the GRC invested an equal amount. The purpose of the project was to "institutionalize a sector planning and statistical capacity within the Ministry of Agriculture's (MINAGRI) Directorate of Studies and Projects (DEP)." A.I.D.'s investment concentrated mainly on building capacity to generate agricultural statistics and, to a lesser extent, on sector analysis and planning capacities. Final input delivery was planned for Fiscal Year 1988.

A.I.D. provided technical assistance to the project through the signing of a Participating Agency Service Agreement (PASA) with the Office of International Cooperation and Development (OICD) at U.S. Department of Agriculture. Under the terms of the agreement, OICD was to provide a Senior Agricultural Economist, a Senior Statistician, a Survey Statistician/Agricultural Economist, a Data Processing Specialist and an Agricultural Extension and Training Specialist.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the continuing relevance of the project, determine whether project amendments brought about desired results, suggest modifications for achieving project goals and make recommendations regarding a second phase.

The evaluation methodology involved document review, interviews with the Directorate, USAID, FAO and other agency officials and site-visits.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. While progress in the statistics component was very significant, progress in the economics component was more limited. The Statistics Service completed and tabulated the 1984 Agricultural Census -- a major accomplishment -- and published preliminary copies in both English and French. They conducted annual surveys in 1985, 1986 and those for 1987 were underway. The

hands on experience of having completed these activities was extremely important for staff development. With respect to the economics component, the Division of Studies (DE) conducted studies in collaboration with other donors and prepared terms of reference. However, very little in-house analysis was carried out. To some degree, the more limited accomplishments reflected the lack of priority in DE with respect to actually conducting studies and analysis.

Also, the Chief of Party was consumed with administrative duties which limited his capability to assist with economic analysis.

> Recommendation: USAID should extend the current project to 1988 to allow for continued assistance to statistical activities and amplification of in-house economic analysis and planning functions. If USAID decides to extend support beyond 1988, a new project should be designed to assure greater emphasis on economic analysis than the current project provides.

2. Technical Assistance. **Technical assistance provided to the Division of Statistics (DS) was effective in transferring desired technologies. However, delays in filling some key positions had a negative effect on implementation.** Technical assistance provided to DS possibly was more effective because that unit had clear priorities reflected in the division's management plans. As a result, workplans for the technical assistants were very clear. Timely staffing for the Senior Economist, Survey Statistician/Economist and Extension Specialist provided overall continuity to the project. However, the data processing position was vacant for almost a year and a half and the position of senior statistician was vacant for nearly two years. In the absence of appropriate technical assistance, the data base system for the census and annual surveys was delayed and the Survey Statistician had to undertake more statistical duties, which limited the time he could devote to economic analysis and interacting with the senior economist.

> Recommendation: The Office of International Cooperation and Development (OICD) should have more direct involvement in the project in order to provide better support to project activities and the technicians. The project should make more use of short-term specialists to aid in sector analysis, planning, short courses and training efforts.

3. Project Management. **Management issues emerged in almost all elements of the project.** First, the management tools used to guide implementation planning were inadequate. Technical assistance workplans, quarterly reports from the technical assistance team and annual project budgets did not state project objectives in an operational context. They neither adequately specified resource needs nor directed resources where they were needed. They did not specify priorities for the project. Second, the project did not have a management system which tracked development of division-specific capabilities or even monitored project accomplishments or outputs. Third, project management did not adequately perform problem-solving responsibilities. This was true in terms of both: a) resolving internal problems (e.g., data processing management problems); and b) redefining project outputs to enhance achievement of project purpose. Fourth, the roles and responsibilities of the Director of the Directorate of Studies and Projects (DEP) (who was also the Project Director), USDA Chief of Party and USAID Project Officer were never clearly specified. Both USAID and DEP looked to the Chief of Party to provide a large part of the project management, but given his technical functions as agricultural economist, he did not have the time to properly execute management and administrative responsibilities.

> Recommendation: USAID, DEP and the USDA team should establish a project implementation committee. (There was a similar recommendation in the 1984 evaluation which was not acted upon.) The committee should hold meetings monthly or quarterly and establish a specific agenda. In recognition of the importance of developing management skills, as well as technical skills, the evaluation team recommends that ten percent of project resources be devoted to improving project management skills at the directorate and divisional levels of DEP. This could take the form of technical assistance, long- or short-term training or provision of materials on management.

4. Computer Maintenance. **Computer maintenance and maintenance service was a problem.** Most of the project computers were located in a room with heavy dust infiltration and in which the air conditioning did not always operate. This contributed to operational problems. Local service had been available for the North Star computers but no service was available for the IBM computers. Preliminary discussions with possible service contractors indicated that annual costs for service would approach the cost of new equipment.

Recommendation: USAID should consider alternative solutions such as limited service contracts, project purchase of parts and maintenance by project staff or service by outside contractors. USAID should undertake a study of these and other alternatives.

5. Project Backstopping. Project backstopping should have provided access to high level statistical specialists. The Office of International Cooperation and Development at the Department of Agriculture (OICD/USDA) was the backstop agency for the project. Unfortunately, the USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Services was not involved in backstopping the project. This precluded access to high level, experienced statistical specialists who could have provided valuable assistance to the project.

Recommendation: Future project designs should include access to an institution which can provide state-of-the-art backstopping in both statistical methods and data processing. This would be especially important when one or more positions are unfilled for a period of time.

USDA should participate in the annual review of workplans to enhance its backstopping functions in providing technical services.

6. Inconsistent Priorities. There appeared to be inconsistencies between USAID and the Directorate of Studies annd Projects (DEP) concerning project priorities. USAID consistently stressed the importance of the sector analysis and planning functions of DEP, with statistics as a means to those ends. DEP gave greater priority to statistics functions, without the same explicit tie-in to analysis. While these were far from being mutually exclusive objectives, none of the project management mechanisms allowed for an honest give and take with respect to institutional and project priorities.

Recommendation: USAID, DEP and the Chief of Party should jointly establish priorities for the project and should jointly develop overall project workplans.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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FINAL EVALUATION OF THE MALAWI RURAL DEVELOPMENT LINKAGES PROGRAM (612-0220), SEPTEMBER, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The rural areas of Malawi manifest all the characteristics of extreme underdevelopment -- lack of infrastructure, low income, high rates of illiteracy and infant mortality, among others. While Malawi has numerous organizations and government extension services operating in rural areas to respond to these conditions, there are problems related to the vertical and horizontal integration of these services.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. To respond to the need to link these services, USAID/Malawi, Save the Children Federation (SCF) and the Government of Malawi (GOM) initiated the Malawi Rural Development Linkages Program (MRDLP), to be implemented between 1983 and 1988. The five-year USAID budget was US$1,250,000, with the SCF and GOM contributions at US$256,000 and US$206,000, respectively.

The project was implemented in two isolated areas: the first area was Mbalachanda in northwestern Malawi and the second area was Mkhota in central western Malawi. There were approximately 37,0000 people in the first catchment area and 31,000 in the second. At the time of the evaluation, the project had worked five years in Mbalachanda and two years in Mkhota.

The purposes of the project were to: (1) strengthen community capacity to identify problems and design and manage projects; (2) provide infrastructure and services; (3) establish linkages with existing services; and (4) provide a development model for the GOM.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the final evaluation was to analyze Save the Children Federation (SCF) success in implementing the original proposal and the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation. Themes throughout the evaluation were the sustainability and replicability of project accomplishments. The SCF/Malawi Field Office urged the team to concentrate on the actual and potential role of a new community development organization created through the project, the Area Development Committee (ADC).

The evaluation methodology consisted of one site visit (three person days) to Mkhota to develop the interview guides; a site visit to Mbalachanda (16 person days) to collect data and information; and a site visit back to

Mkhota (eight person days) to collect data and information. The team interviewed beneficiaries, project staff and sector-specific village committees. The interview guides the team developed for preparing profiles of specific development activities and the Area Development Committees are included in the evaluation report.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project demonstrated a significant achievement in the creation of eleven credible local structures, the Area Development Committees (ADCs), capable of addressing the development priorities of their communities. The ADCs have become true "peoples committees", elected by the whole community. Although not yet financially self-sufficient, they made significant strides in: acceptance and credibility, working relationships, representation of communities and self-management and formation of linkages. The ADCs were created only five years ago in Mbalachanda and two years ago in Mkhota, yet they have become an accepted and credible part of the institutional framework in both areas. The ADCs were increasingly independent of Save the Children Federation (SCF): they held meetings and formed subcommittees without informing SCF and all ADCs reported planning and carrying out some projects without SCF assistance. With respect to management, the ADCs were able to implement technically sound project plans with help from SCF and sustain high attendance levels at designated meetings. However, they were unable to prepare long-range development plans. With respect to program development, they were able to identify development needs and link-up with local extension services. Nevertheless, they were unable to reach out to extension services not already present in the catchment area. With respect to fundraising, they successfully raised funds and in-kind contributions from the communities. They were, however, unable to operate to any significant degree of effectiveness without financial assistance from SCF.

> Recommendation: The ADCs should undertake long-term planning and strengthen upward linkages to District Development Committees (DDCs). The ADCs should undertake planning extending over five years so they become the repository for area planning. Strengthening the ADCs' linkage with the DCCs would enhance their self-sufficiency, since the DCCs are the repositories of non-SCF funds.

2. Sustainability of Project Activities. The project initiated over 150 specific development activities in Mbalachanda and Mkhota. A substantial number of these activities appeared to be sustainable beyond Save the Children (SCF) intervention. There was evidence of sustainability in the following areas, in addition to others. Primary Education - Seven "junior" primary schools graduated to full status through the construction of school blocks and teachers' houses. "Graduation" allows the schools to receive teachers and materials from the Ministry of Education. Functional Literacy - The project trained more than 100 literacy teachers. Having a trained instructor qualifies a community for the national functional literacy program, in which the GOM pays for the instructor and supplies. Revolving Drug Funds - At Mkhota, eight revolving drug funds were established, three of which generated enough money to pay the health volunteer, as well as sustain the drug supply. Community Mobilization - The amounts of resources mobilized suggested that communities would be willing to contribute to development projects. In Mbalachanda, the community contributed US$242,000 worth of resources for 137 projects. Human Resources - As a result of project training, there was a cadre of 14 Community Development Assistants (CDAs) in Mbalachanda and 12 at Mkhota who had the necessary community development skills.

3. Project Activities That Were Not Sustainable. There were two types of project activities that did not appear to be sustainable: water supply projects and the businessmen's revolving loan fund. While the number of wells increased from 74 to 152, maintenance was dependent on Save the Children Federation (SCF) and there was no revolving fund for materials or spare parts. Water committee members reacted with horror to the idea of charging water users. The loan fund was not working due to debt default by a maize grinding project.

> Recommendation: Since the lack of sustainable, community-based well pump maintenance is a major problem throughout Malawi, the project should try to contribute a model for solving the problem. SCF's worldwide experience with water supply projects should be helpful in this regard. Also, the policy of providing water without charge needs to be examined. With respect to the other type of project that could not be sustained, the revolving loan fund, SCF might consider providing technical assistance in income generation and business methods to the Mbalachanda Businessmen's Society.

4. Replicabilty. While the project was a catalyst with respect to many types of development activities, the project, due to its cost, was not replicable. The GOM could not invest the amount per capita throughout Malawi that USAID and Save the Children Federation (SCF) invested in Mbalachanda and Mkhota. However, some of the project's specific activities clearly could be replicated elsewhere in Malawi.

> Recommendation: SCF should work with the GOM to institutionalize the ADC (Area Development Committee) concept and to initiate many of the activities that are replicable. SCF might conduct a workshop on the complementary roles of the ADCs, the VDCs (Village Development Committees), the AAGs (Area Action Groups) and the Ministries. At the same time, they should seek the AAGs' approval and cooperation in institutionalizing the ADCs. SCF should work with the GOM to identify the activities that are replicable, such as the functional literacy training, the revolving drug funds and the school upgrading activities. The evaluation report provides a table listing the activities the team believes are replicable throughout Malawi.

5. Infrastructure vs. Economic Activities. Mkhota appeared to have avoided the heavy emphasis on infrastructure activities that occurred at Mbalachanda, and invested instead in economic activities. The Mkhota example should be followed. There may be a tendency to choose infrastructure projects because: infrastructure gives prestige to villages, USAID gives Save the Children Federation (SCF) a time limit to spend money and infrastructure projects are a way to show quick results.

> Recommendation: For similar projects in the future, greater emphasis should be given to economic and income generating activities than infrastructure activities.

6. Institutionalization of the Project in Malawi. While the project proposal envisioned phaseover of project activities to Malawian institutions in the project's fifth year, little "phase-over" activity had taken place. There was a lack of clarity concerning Save the Children Federation's (SCF) long-term role in the catchment areas, and many GOM officials expressed surprise and disappointment when the subject of phaseover was brought up.

> Recommendation: SCF should develop a phaseover plan describing how it will devolve its

responsibilities to a combination of GOM and local community resources. Since Malawian field staff's jobs will be in jeopardy as a result of any phaseover plan, (primarily the community Development Assistants [CDAs] whose salaries are paid by SCF, rather than by the GOM), SCF and the Ministry of Community Services should immediately take steps to give all Malawian project field staff job security.

Since the Ministry of Community Services is embarking on a massive functional literacy effort, they should consider integrating the project's Malawian staff into this program. Perhaps project staff might work as trainers of CDAs, curriculum developers or CDA supervisors. Perhaps Mbalachanda and Mkhota could become training camps for new CDAs.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAM GRANT TO CARE-COMOROS (602-0001), APRIL, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Major areas of the Comoros need to make the transition from traditional export crop production to non-traditional export crops or subsistence food cultivation to adapt to the recent decline of the international spice market. (Indonesia is now self-sufficient in the production of clove cigarettes for its domestic market, for example). Moreover, traditional technologies are unable to address declining soil fertility. In addition, land tenure problems interfere with farmers' receptivity to improved on-farm technologies, since only 30 percent of the land is officially titled at present. Of the remainder, 40 percent is farmed on a usufruct basis and the rest is occupied by forests and villages. Institutional capacity to generate and implement agricultural policy is weak. The Ministry of Production's Federal Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CEFADER) needs to develop the skills of its agricultural extension agents, as well as its analytical capacities in agriculture policy analysis and project development.

U.S. Assistance Response. The A.I.D. bilateral program in the Comoros began in May 1984 with a five-year, $3.5 million dollar project, Operational Program Grant to Care-Comoros. The Project Assistance Completion Date was scheduled for May 1989.

The purpose of the project was to increase GOC capability to implement erosion control and soil fertility enhancement on the island of Anjouan. The project had two components: 1) strengthening of extension capability by training extension agents, establishing nurseries and demonstration fields, providing tree cuttings and multiplying grasses for dissemination of agroforestry technologies and the stabilization of steep slopes; and
2) institutionalizing capacity for maintenance and repair of extension service vehicles on Grande Comoro and Anjouan islands.

To implement the project, CARE staff worked with Ministry regional agricultural extension service units known as CADERs in two regions on Anjouan.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation (undertaken in year four of project implementation) was to assess progress towards project objectives, generate recommendations for implementation by the Project Assistance Completion Date, and define

overall strategy for A.I.D./CARE collaboration for Fiscal Year 1989 and beyond.

The evaluation methodology involved 10 days in Comoros on site visits to project activities, interviews with project staff, GOC and American Embassy officials, farmers and other donors, and review of project documentation.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **The Land and Soil component demonstrated modest progress.** Until recently, this component scattered its efforts equally over the entire two CADERS, focusing on farmers who showed interest. Unfortunately, response was uneven and few farmers demonstrated interest. Demonstration fields were centralized in the CADER stations and thus the impact of research and demonstration was dissipated by the distances between interested farmers and the demonstration plots. Research activities absorbed far too much time given personnel constraints.

While the project met or exceeded planned outputs for this component, in many cases these targets were not good measures of progress toward the project's purpose. For example:

- While all 29 villages were contacted (the target), the quality of contact was exceedingly difficult to assess and was a poor measure of project achievement.

- While the target was to extend soil conservation measures to 300 families cultivating an average of 38 hectares each, the project treated only 38 hectares with erosion control measures. Moreover, this indicator did not provide adequate information on progress since more information was needed on participation and tree survival rates (good signs of farmer comprehension and participation).

- The number of seedlings produced met the original project target. However, the evaluation team raised questions whether: 1) nurseries and seedling production was the best approach to use for plant material propagation; 2) the present mix of plant material would attract farmer participation; and 3) this approach would foster financial sustainability (transporting grasses and seedlings from nurseries to farmers was absorbing considerable amounts of project

resources and would not be sustainable when donor support ends).

- Although the project trained 18 extensionists per CADER, there was no comprehensive long-term curriculum.

- Although farmers were trained, project staff did not monitor which farmers attended training or received on-farm consultations.

In short, the project was output driven and relied on activity targets of questionable value as measures of success.

Recommendation: CARE should continue to consolidate and intensify extension activities in well-defined geographic areas to maximize impact. CARE should consider, as an alternative to nurseries, multiplication of plant material on farmers' fields within these intensification zones. Rather than raising seedlings on these sites, the project should establish parent trees and grasses from which cuttings could be harvested and sold to interested farmers. The choice of plant material should conform to clients' needs for fodder, fuel and cash crops to attract paying 2customers. Under this scenario, the project could reduce transport costs and establish a commercial basis for farmers' sale of plant material, thus enhancing prospects for long-term sustainability.

A.I.D. should strengthen monitoring by providing for annual project assessments by REDSO.

2. Training. Lack of a well-organized training program and monitoring of training accomplishments was one of the project's greatest shortcomings. The project provided about three weeks of training for each extension agent but it was not clear how much training it provided to farmers. CARE records did not specify time spent on each topic or gender of trainees. All extension training, supervision and facilities development was left to expatriates, with very little assistance from overburdened CADER Directors.

Recommendation: CARE's resident Extension Advisor should prepare a comprehensive training plan, based on project experience and CARE's Agroforestry Sourcebook (soon to be completed). The training plan should emphasize basic agronomy, applied communication skills, monitoring and evaluation. CARE's Regional Technical Advisor should review and approve the training plan.

3. GOC Local Currency Inputs. **The GOC's financial contribution to the Land and Soil Component was less than 10 percent of levels committed in the Grant Agreement.** The Grant Agreement committed the GOC to incrementally assume responsibility for paying extension workers' salaries. GOC contributions to salaries were planned to have been 30 percent in 1987, 60 percent in 1988 and 90 percent by the Project Assistance Completion Date. At the time of the evaluation, the GOC had not provided any funds for payment of salaries. The GOC contributed only the small share of local currencies which paid CARE's rental of office space and staff housing. The lack of GOC commitment raised serious questions about the sustainability of the agricultural extension system after donor support ends.

> Recommendation: CARE should more actively pursue GOC counterpart contributions, as outlined in the Grant Agreement. USAID should require the GOC to open a special escrow account and deposit the unpaid extension workers' salaries for disbursement by the Ministry and CARE.

4. Short-Term Technical Assistance. **The Land and Soil Component received very little short-term technical assistance.** The Land and Soil Component received very little technical assistance from consultants, CARE Regional Technical Advisors in Nairobi and REDSO/Technical staff. Short-term consultants provided a total of 12 days of assistance to Anjouan and 16 days of assistance to Moroni.

> Recommendation: In the future, the project should program short-term consultancies more frequently and they should be timed to contribute to government and multi-donor discussions and complement informal inputs provided by CARE's resident technicians.

5. Survey Data. **CARE collected excellent needs assessment survey data.** Project staff had intended that the surveys' results were to be used as baseline for monitoring and evaluation. However, completion of analysis was delayed by the large sample size, a multitude of details in the survey forms and staff constraints.

> Recommendation: CARE should assign a high priority to analysis of baseline survey data. They should discuss results with extension agents as soon as possible. They should ask CARE's Resident Technical Advisor for Agroforestry to

assist with development of a monitoring methodology to track farmer participation.

5. The Ministry's Garage Component. The Grande Comore garage had the potential to become financially self-sufficient under Comorian administration. If trends noted at the time of the evaluation continued, the garage should have been ready for handover to Comorian management by December 1989 (seven months after the Project Assistance Completion Date). This component's progress was attributable, in part, to the technical assistance provided by the CARE Regional Technical Advisor for Small Enterprise Development, who prepared pricing policy guidelines for the garage. In addition, CARE Comoros advisors conducted considerable research, using suppliers' catalogues, to determine which mail order source could supply a given part at the cheapest price. The garage can become financially self-sufficient if the Ministry pays for maintenance and repair of its fleet of 110 vehicles on a timely basis and if the garage can generate additional income by servicing 40-50 Ministry-related vehicles supported by other international donors.

Recommendation: Ministry and CARE staff should develop a strategy for handover of the garages to the Ministry, or alternatively, for their privatization. If the Ministry prefers privatization, REDSO should provide Project Development & Support funds to support an analysis of privatization alternatives. To reach the objective of 80 percent Ministry fleet availability by the Project Assistance Completion Date, the project should institute one-day workshops for CEFADER drivers to teach preventive maintenance practices.

6. World Food Program Commodities. CARE repeatedly expressed concern about use of World Food Program (WFP) commodities to pay farmers for on-farm erosion control. CARE was concerned that this practice inhibited acceptance of technical packages for their inherent value. Though only approximately 10 percent of Comorian rice needs were supplied by domestic production, CARE was concerned that the proposed shift from maize to rice in WFP rations would reduce local rice production.

Recommendation: USAID should carefully consider the use of WFP commodities during design of a new multi-year grant for CARE.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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SUPPORT TO REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ESAMI SUBPROJECT EVALUATION REPORT (698-0413.09), MAY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Eastern and Southern Africa Management Institute (ESAMI) is located in Arusha, Tanzania. ESAMI evolved from an earlier organization known as the East Africa Management Institute, which was founded in 1974 to serve the three member states of the East African Community (EAC). Following dissolution of the community, the EAC Council of Ministers recommended that the Institute expand its membership and be formally recognized as a regional management training center for Eastern and Southern Africa. ESAMI was officially established in February 1980 and required assistance in strengthening its capabilities as a regional management training center. ESAMI currently has a membership of 18 countries.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1982, A.I.D. authorized $500 thousand for the Support to Regional Organizations ESAMI Subproject. The purpose of the project was to "support certain initiatives of ESAMI so as to strengthen this regional institution in providing a range of better services to its client or member countries, develop links with other institutions in Africa, Asia and the United States, and to place ESAMI in a better position to attract and use follow-on and related outside financial assistance."

The three major subproject components were: 1) assessment of perceived training requirements for 15 new member countries; 2) development of an African case study teaching capacity within ESAMI and an African case study library and 3) development of professional and institutional linkages between ESAMI and institutions in Africa, Asia and the United States. In addition, ESAMI was to "use its best efforts to plan and develop activities for private sector management training." The Project Assistance Completion Date was August 1988.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of this final evaluation were to: 1) determine whether the activities funded under the project were implemented correctly and efficiently and whether they were effective in achieving the project objectives; 2) identify lessons learned and develop recommendations for improving the design and implementation of similar projects; and 3) provide input for planning potential future A.I.D. assistance to ESAMI.

The evaluation methodology included a review of project documents at REDSO/ESA and at ESAMI, interviews with

project managers and ESAMI officials and attendance at management courses offered at ESAMI.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. In spite of its institutional management problems, ESAMI has the potential to become a significant regional training institution. ESAMI is capable of supplying viable training services for mission supported management training in a number of different fields. Financial management, project implementation and planning and appraisal courses are among the offerings. Training in these areas can be applied to a number of different subject areas, i.e., banking, agribusiness, manufacturing, public health and transportation. Between 1981 and 1985, ESAMI increased its regular course offerings from 31 to 44 per annum. It also increased participants in these courses from 643 to 835. Indicators of achievement of project purpose included the following.

- The regional training needs assessment, conducted early in the life of the project, was successful in assisting ESAMI mangers to identify training needs.

- The agricultural management courses probably made a much greater contribution to the understanding of agricultural management than was anticipated due to its focus on ideas and concepts not traditionally used in agriculture management training in Africa. However, it was unlikely these courses would be continued in the absence of additional outside support due to staff limitations.

- ESAMI strengthened its relations with a number of professional client organizations (i.e., with a number of branches of the Indian Institute of Management) which provided a source of additional business.

- While there were no activities in the area of private sector management, ESAMI developed several management courses for public sector employees, including "Senior Managers' Development Programs," "Success Factors in Public Enterprise" and "Performance Evaluation for Public Enterprise." Based on course evaluations conducted by ESAMI, these courses received high ratings from participants.

- ESAMI developed eight case studies under partial A.I.D. funding. However, the project

suspended this activity soon after its initiation, along with other project activities, pending resolution of financial irregularities in another A.I.D.-funded ESAMI project. ESAMI staff later completed the planned case studies using non-A.I.D. resources.

- The project conducted several financial management strengthening activities at ESAMI. However, as of September, little progress had been made in the implementation of recommendations included in Coopers and Lybrand's April 1987 report on ESAMI's accounting procedures.

Recommendation: REDSO/ESA and A.I.D./Washington should review the final Coopers and Lybrand assessment of ESAMI's accounting procedures and financial management information system and evaluate the results of the Price Waterhouse non-federal audit to determine if further support is necessary.

2. Evaluation Follow-up. **ESAMI and REDSO/ESA failed to follow-up on major recommendations of the 1985 evaluation report concerning management issues.** These recommendations were as follows: 1) ESAMI should allocate an increasing amount of staff time to project/grant management; 2)REDSO/EASA should monitor project implementation more closely (including a visit to ESAMI at least every three-four months); and 3) ESAMI should submit quarterly progress and financial reports within 30 days following the end of the quarter. No quarterly narrative or financial reports were available at REDSO or ESAMI. ESAMI managers indicated that they had never been informed that such reports were required. Progress against other 1985 evaluation recommendations was satisfactory.

3. Project Design. **Project designers made two incorrect or overly optimistic assumptions.** These assumptions were: 1) ESAMI would be able to implement the project with very limited REDSO/ESA monitoring; and 2) project outputs could be accomplished within two years. Project designers did not adequately assess ESAMI's priorities.

Recommendation: During future design efforts for similar projects, designers must consider critical factors such as: 1) the institution's own development strategy; 2) the quality of

institutional leadership; and 3) the willingness of A.I.D. to make a sustained commitment for institutional support.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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SOMALIA MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT: FIRST INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT (649-0119), JULY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Somalia (GOS) required assistance in strengthening the management skills of both public and private sector managers.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1985, A.I.D. authorized $18.5 million for the Somalia Management Training and Development (SOMTAD) project. The purposes of the project are to: 1) improve the ability to plan and manage development in both the public and private sector; and 2) strengthen institutions that can supply training in management to both sectors. The project has three major components: 1) provision of long-term advisors assigned to work closely with high-level staff in key ministries; 2) development of a Masters in Business Administration/Masters in Public Administration program at the Somali Institute of Development Administration and Management (SIDAM) to train 210 mid-level managers in both the public and private sectors; and 3) development of a Worksite Management Training Unit to provide short-term training to address immediate organizational problems in both the public and private sectors. The Project Assistance Completion Date is planned for 1991.

In November 1986, A.I.D. awarded a contract for project implementation to the Academy for Educational Development (AED). The three sub-contractors were: the State University of New York at Albany (SUNY/A); Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL); and Creative Associates (CA). Other participants included SIDAM, The United States Information Service/Somalia (USIS) and seven key GOS ministries -- Ministry of Labor, Sports and Social Affairs; Ministry of National PLanning; Ministry of the Interior; Ministry of Finance and Revenue; and Ministry of Industry and Commerce. The first members of the field staff, including the Chief of Party, arrived in-country in March 1987. The GOS 1988 budget for secretarial and administrative support for the project was not disbursed until mid-March 1988, approximately one week before the evaluation team's arrival.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to examine: 1) how SOMTAD's purpose and goals address Somali development needs; 2) how the SOMTAD project has been operating to date; 3) what it has accomplished; 4) what problems it has encountered; and 5) how it has been affected by political and economic developments in Somalia.

The methodology involved a case study approach based on document review, interviews and observation. The team members observed classes at SIDAM and attended project staff and Project Coordination Committee meetings.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. While the project is an unwieldy effort, it has the potential to provide crucial assistance to Somali managers and administrators in appropriate ways. With some modifications, it can contribute to enhancing management development in Somalia. Progress achieved in each of the components varied.

- The Long-Term Advisors (LTAs) were generally well placed in their ministries and remarkably effective. They had conducted useful feasibility studies, analyzed government reports, provided recommendations that enabled a government enterprise to begin to make a profit, provided training to ministry staff in budget preparation and conducted a workshop on manpower planning. All except one produced training needs assessments for use by Worksite Management Training Unit. However, because of the GOS' financial problems, the LTAs have not received adequate logistics support (i.e., offices, travel support, computers) to accomplish their work effectively.

- The start-up of the English language training program was a significant accomplishment of the project. Twelve classes of 20 students each began in August 1987. Textbooks and video equipment were available in a timely manner. Attendance has been high and drop out rates low. USIS is exceeding its objective of preparing 210 candidates in three cohorts with the TOEFL scores necessary to enter the MBA program at SIDAM.

- The Basic Management Training (BMT) component (for which SUNY/A was responsible) was supposed to have been a prepatory course to prepare students for the formal Masters in Business Administration (MBA) program. At the time of the evaluation, there was little to suggest that the BMT program existed. There was no syllabus which described the contents of the BMT or requirements for student performance. There was minimal communication between the staff of this component and USIS and lack of a student focus, most visible in the lack of

information to students on the MBA program and lack of an effort to discuss student concerns and special needs.

- Progress in the MBA program has been limited. With respect to three major activities -- student selection procedures, start-up of the BMT program and curriculum planning -- communication between the sub-contractor (SUNY/A) and SIDAM has been limited. Most importantly, curriculum development for the MBA program was weak. Two two-person curriculum development teams without significant overseas experience came to Somalia for three-week periods. This was insufficient. The sub-contractor needs to place its curriculum plan on Somali-based needs assessment and intensive collaboration with Somali faculty and others familiar with the Somali administrative and business context. To do this, a curriculum planning team needs to spend several months in Somalia.

- In assessing the Worksite Management Training Unit, the evaluators noted they were dealing with "a plan, not an activity." Creative Associates, responsible for this component, noted that the unit had the potential to reach large numbers of Somalis, an estimated 800 per year during the life of the project. Moreover, it has the potential to become self-sustaining after the end of the project, by charging fees for the short courses it provides. However, the project budget did not allocate sufficient resources to this component, $429,000, plus $200,000 for equipment and 12 person-months per year of technical assistance, far too little for the thirty to forty workshops it is expected to conduct each year.

Recommendation: The project should: 1) provide additional funds for an "English for Specific Purposes" course (i.e., training in English in specific disciplines) which is necessary to supplement general English training by USIS; 2) provide a transportation allotment for Long Term Advisors and battery operated laptop computers, so that they can work when brownouts and power surges occur; 3) encourage SUNY/A to work collaboratively with Somali faculty, preferrably in Mogadishu and develop an approach to focus on student needs; and 4) establish a Training Advisor and Somali counterpart positions for the Worksite Management Training Unit and increase the number of person months available to it.

2. Project Design and Implemntation Problems. **Three types of implementation problems were due to faulty project design.** 1) The design required extensive coordination. Coordination between the main contractor, Academy for Educational Development (AED - a consulting firm), and one sub-contractor SUNY/A (a university), was difficult. Coordination with USIS, awarded the English language teaching contract, was "particularly indirect." 2) The project design called for USAID to be directly responsible for procurement. This meant that REDSO, USAID/Somalia and AED all had to collaborate on developing specifications for equipment purposes. It took REDSO so long to approve specifications that they became outdated. 3) The project budget failed to define adequately the resources required to achieve project goals. One of the project goals is to assist students to become computer literate. Yet the Project Paper provided only eleven computers, which allowed each student one and one-half hours per week of computer time, hardly enough to attain computer literacy. In addition, the Project Paper stated that a library would be established for the Masters in Business Administration program, yet the budget provided for only 5,000 books (25,000 additional books are needed for an adequate library -- the latest edition of the Book of Knowledge in the existing collection is dated 1953) and allocated no funds for shipping or cataloging of books.

> Recommendation: In the future, project designers should build into complex projects mechanisms that will promote coordination among component parts. Project Papers should authorize adequate staff and budget to achieve project objectives to preclude time-consuming stop-gap measures compelled by unexpected needs for additional resources. USAID and REDSO should streamline the procurement process. This is a vital consideration that goes beyond the scope of this project.

3. Project Design Assumptions. **Due to changes in the economic and political climate during the past three years, and within USAID itself, many assumptions underlying project design proved questionable at the time of the evaluation.** These assumptions included the following.

1) "Allocations of US and GOS funds will be adequate and timely" (Project Paper, p. 80). Problems with the USAID budget were discussed above. Prior to actual project implementation, the GOS restored an unrealistically high rate of exchange. Thus, U.S. dollars yielded fewer shillings than anticipated. Moreover, the GOS was in dire financial straits and unable to honor its commitment fully by releasing the

amount of shillings for the project previously agreed to.

2) "SIDAM staff will be retained and other programs funded adequately" (Project Paper, p. 80). Due to a 15 percent cut in budget, USIS pulled out of the other English language program it had offered at SIDAM, leaving only the project English program.

3) "Civil service reform will be implemented" (Project Paper, p.80). While some important reforms were instituted in the mid-80s, the GOS could not raise the civil service salary scale during the fiscal crisis. This directly affects the project because it cannot assume that its Masters in Business Administration graduates will find immediate rewards for their training in the civil service.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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Dr. William Darnell	"
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REFUGEE SELF-RELIANCE PROJECT FINAL EVALUATION REPORT (649-0123), APRIL, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. By mid-1981 refugee relief activities in Somalia were ending. These activities had begun in 1977 with the arrival of ethnic Somalis. By December 1981, a UNHCR task force recommended attention be given to development programs. In response, a Government of Somalia (GOS) policy shift in 1981 permitted refugee farmers to cultivate family plots. The character of the crisis had changed and therefore donor response was reoriented from relief to development.

A joint State Department/A.I.D. mission to Somalia in 1982 established basic policies and guidelines for future U.S. support to the refugee program, since the immediate crisis of feeding and sheltering the large influx of refugees had passed. Priorities included: 1) reducing refugees' dependence on external assistance; 2) improving the government's capabilities to manage refugee assistance programs; 3) restoring refugee-caused environmental damage; and 4) reducing the cost of refugees' care and maintenance.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1983, A.I.D. authorized $6 million for the Refugee Self-Reliance (RSR) project. The purpose of this experimental project was to test strategies and interventions that would assist refugees in becoming more productive and self-reliant. The project goal was to "increase the capacity of refugees in Somalia to become more productive and self-reliant, thereby improving their economic status, while reducing their dependence on the Somali government and donor countries." The Project Paper did not anticipate full-self reliance during the project life and recognized that only a limited number of refugees would benefit. Sub-project activities began in April 1983 and were completed in September 1986. USAID extended the Project Assistance Completion Date to March 1988 in order to provide technical assistance to the National Refugee Commission.

The GOS contributed $2.3 million in equivalent local currency contributions and Private and Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) contributed $2.8 million for total project funding at $11.2 million.

The project components were: 1) institutional support to the National Refugee Commission (NRC); 2) support for socio-economic and technical studies on refugees; 3) direct assistance to refugees through PVO subprojects; and 4) monitoring and management assistance to the project.

The bulk of project financing ($9.8 million) was devoted to supporting specific refugee self-reliance interventions implemented by the following PVOs: 1) Save the Children Foundation (SCF); 2) Partnership for Productivity (PfP); 3) New Transcentury Foundation (NTF); and 4) The Experiment in International Living (EIL).

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. This was a final evaluation to assess project success in achieving stated objectives, the degree of impact on the target population and the replicability of the project in other countries or in other situations.

The methodology involved review of USAID and National Refugee Commission documents, interviews and site visits.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. Refugees benefitted from the short-term project activities but the institution-building aspects of the project were less successful. While the project did not meet many of the quantitative targets, the extent to which it benefited refugees can be seen by comparing planned outputs and actual achievements.

Planned Output	Actual Achievement
7,000 refugees growing food	4,265 families farming
2,000 ha. cultivated	1,555 ha. cultivated
3,000 refugee farmers trained	4,400 trained
2,500 refugees trnd. in voc. skills	734 trained
5 Somali mgrs. trained	6 mgrs/2 mos. trng.
Rds., 25 km constr., 50 km. impr.	15 km.improved
850,000 person days employment	597,471 person days
Environmental improvements	3,410 mtrs. drainage systems cleaned
8 test holes drilled,	4 struck water, 2 had potable water

Recommendation: To enhance effectiveness, future designs of refugee assistance projects should:

1) include procedures to evaluate frequently socioeconomic, technical and policy issues affecting the project; and 2) not depend on provision of resources by agencies outside the management control of the project itself.

2. Institutional Support to National Refugee Commission (NRC). The effort to improve the organizational effectiveness of the Planning Unit in the National Refugee Commission was moderately successful. Training and skills upgrading activities were undertaken successfully. Staff learned to submit written reports of site visits and in some cases the skills upgrading acted as a normative influence on other staff. However, impact was diluted by reassignment of staff to other ministries.

The first two technical assistants produced impressive substantive recommendations and research in compliance with their scopes of work. This component made advances toward output targets. The technical assistants helped in the preparation of a standardized system for evaluation of camp activities and the design of internal and external information systems. The systems were not implemented because they were too complicated and were not translated into Somali. The project provided for technical assistance and commodities over a two-year period valued at $700,000. Clearly this was too short a time to have created significant institutional changes.

Recommendation: In the future, projects designed to address relatively short-term (i.e., urgent) problems should not attempt simultaneously to address longer-term institutional needs as well.

3. Socioeconomic and Technical Studies. While this component did not provide a continuous flow of objective data for use in planning, as anticipated in project design, it produced three useful studies. These studies provided information that guided the design of the USAID-funded Refugee Settlement project. The evaluation did not discuss the reasons for the relative lack of success of this component.

4. Experiment in International Living (EIL) Subprojects. This component was relatively successful in providing management training. EIL conducted 37 seminars, a five month course in office skills for National Refugee Commission secretaries, 16 field seminars for 250 participants from 25 government and voluntary agencies, established an EIL information

system at the National Refugee Commission, trained six trainers, conducted needs assessments at four agencies, produced a management manual in Somali and English and prepared three course units and two tapes, among other activities. A major result was that the field seminars induced field level communication between government agencies and non-governmental organizations. The majority of respondents cited this as the most important accomplishment.

While this component provided training in Western management skills, the training could have been more effective if the trainers had had more knowledge of the culture and non-Western management systems. In Somalia, the peoples' strong oral preferences make western management techniques less applicable. For example, the management manual EIL produced failed to take advantage of the Somali oral tradition by suggesting alliterative memory aids.

> Recommendation: In the future, project design should include access to consultants who have knowledge of systems and skills used in other African or Arab countries.

5. Partnership for Productivity (PfP) Subprojects. PfP was highly successful in creating a model for future skills training programs. PfP's internal evaluation showed that the training led to increased income. PfP was the only Private Voluntary Organization under the project to gather data and keep records throughout the life of the subproject on progress and impact. Moreover, PfP carefully adapted their program to the reality of the local environment by conducting small surveys and assessments prior to offering consulting services and business advice. PfP broke new ground by employing three women as business advisors to the Somali business community.

> Recommendation: Future designs of projects in Somalia should take into consideration that there is a seemingly large market for business advice services and accounting in rural Somalia. Programs in which local businessmen train refugees in an apprentice arrangement is an effective training approach.

6. New Transcentury Foundation (NTF) Subprojects. NTF was successful in carrying out a wide variety of agricultural and infrastructure projects. They were especially successful in using labor intensive methods (although local official were opposed to this approach as "too expensive" and "not modern") and a predominantly national staff. NTF performed road

upgrading using refugee and local laborers (159 km of roads were constructed or renovated vs. the target of 240), assisted over 325 families in cultivating 335 ha. (exceeding their target by 50), and constructed numerous dams, reservoirs and wells. However, the roads deteriorated after the first rains and then reverted to close to their original condition. While this caused intense criticism of NTF, they should not be blamed. The GOS had agreed to carry out periodic maintenance of the roads, but did not adhere to their agreement.

> Recommendation: Future designs of refugee assistance projects should take into consideration that refugees respond to opportunities to earn income and that many refugees are able farmers who adapt well to new farming techniques.

7. Save the Children Foundation (SCF) Subprojects. While there were some accomplishments, SCF did not achieve the subproject goals of construction of a fully working irrigation system and training refugees in irrigated agriculture. SCF assisted farmers in clearing 900 ha. of rainfed farmland. Land was assigned to 3,200 refugees (against a target of 1,600) but was not farmed because of uncertainty caused by announcement of possible land reassignment. It was unclear how many farmers were provided with irrigation. The irrigation system was completed but could only irrigate 80 percent of the design area because of lack of essential land leveling. Siltation of the canal will probably prevent its full use because beneficiary farmers were not willing to clean and maintain the canal. SCF did provide training in farming and improved practices but did not provide training in operating a complex and expensive irrigation system. SCF did not have any production records or accounts of observations on increased production by farmers using new methods.

Implementation was hampered by lack of continuity in SCF leadership. During the project, there were three country directors and one acting director. Within six months of project start-up, it became apparent that the design and engineering performed by a local firm were seriously defective. SCF never had the design work reviewed by independent consultants or knowledgeable in-house staff before the work began. Moreover, SCF's failure to staff the project properly hampered its completion. The irrigation engineer position was vacant for 14 months until it was filled by a civil engineer who lacked experience in third world irrigation projects. From the beginning, SCF failed to appreciate the technical needs of the project and failed to evaluate, monitor and manage its activities.

Recommendation: In the future, USAID should more closely review a Private Voluntary Organization's corporate and technical experience prior to the signing of Cooperative Agreements.

EVALUATION TEAM: USAID/Mogadishu

MIDTERM EVALUATION OF THE SWAZILAND TEACHER TRAINING PROJECT (645-0214), JULY, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Swaziland (GOS) required assistance in improving its capacity to produce better-qualified, more highly motivated primary school teachers. In the early 80s, Swaziland's three Teacher Training Colleges operated independently, with no coordination or common planning of programs. There were no Bachelor of Education or diploma programs in primary education at the University and there was little structured in-service education for primary teachers. Teachers required training in the use of more appropriate curriculum materials and teaching methodologies.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1984, A.I.D. authorized $6,195,000 for the Swaziland Teacher Training project. The purpose of the project is to expand the capacity of Swaziland's teacher training system to train and support new teachers at the primary level. A.I.D. implemented the technical assistance and training components through a contract with Ohio University. The GOS provided the equivalent of $2,345,000. The Project Assistance Completion Date is planned for August 31, 1991.

The project provides long- and short-term technical assistance, participant training, commodities and other support. It has five major components:
1) improving primary teacher education; 2) training new teacher educators and up-grading in-service teachers and teacher educators; 3) establishing in-service training and support services; 4) establishing library resource centers; and 5) improving coordination and management of the educational system.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the appropriateness and quality of inputs by the contractor and host government, review project outputs and quantify progress in achieving output targets and assess the extent to which inputs and outputs are leading to the achievement of project purpose.

The methodology involved document review, communications with Ohio University College of Education staff, site vists to three teacher training colleges and interviews with Ministry of Education staff, Ohio University technical assistance team members and USAID personnel.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **The project has progressed well toward achieving its principal goals and end-of-project (EOPS) status.** The in-service teacher education workshops have, quantitatively, far exceeded projected numbers and approximately 3,000 teachers will have benefitted by the end of the project. This was the most important contribution of the project to date. A plan for upgrading the educational qualifications of Teacher Training College (TCC) lecturers is being implemented. A three-year diploma program has been initiated at the TCCs, and a Bachelors in Education program and a two-year part-time program have begun at the University of Swaziland for upgrading of Teacher Training College staff. However, it is unlikely that the Teacher Training Colleges will produce 300 new teachers per year (EOPS#1) because the Ministry of Education reduced the acceptance rate at the colleges by roughly 50 percent.

The project achieved some notable successes. First, it helped establish a Department of Teacher Education and Curriculum Development within the Ministry of Education. It also helped create a master calendar to facilitate planning and coordination of in-service and workshop activities in the Ministry of Education. Finally, it helped establish a recurrent budget allocation for the project's in-service program.

> Recommendation: USAID should continue assistance to the education sector in ways that build upon the present project. Future projects should emphasize direct interventions in improving the educational delivery system, especially at the primary level, (such as making additional instructional materials available) rather than further efforts to upgrade the credentials of teachers. Research on the determinants of student achievements in developing countries consistently shows that the availability of textbooks and other instructional materials has stronger effects on achievement than other interventions, including teacher training and "relevant" curricula. Investments in instructional materials, including textbooks (perhaps with an emphasis on local production); curriculum kits (which received inadequate attention in the present project); and workshop equipment for schools are likely to yield higher returns than other possible investments in the Swazi education system.

2. Practical Arts. **Progress in the area of practical arts was limited.** All project documents and the National Education Review Commission report (February

1985) stress the need for practical arts education at the primary level. This is an important area because of problems of unemployment among school leavers. About 40 percent of primary-age children drop out before they finish the seventh grade and, of those who reach the seventh grade, over one-quarter do not continue on to secondary education. Thus primary education is terminal for about two-thirds of the children. This suggests that practical arts -- agricultural skills, handicrafts, and elementary technologies -- will be useful to primary school children and should merit priority in the curriculum.

The National Curriculum Center had not issued curriculum materials in these areas. The three teacher training colleges' emphasis on practical arts was limited. It was unclear where qualified teachers in the practical arts will come from.

> Recommendation: The project staff should emphasize practical arts during the remainder of the project. They should encourage the University of Swaziland to consider a cooperative Bachelors in Education for Teacher Training College lecturers in practical arts (agriculture or home economics) in the Faculty of Education and the Faculty of Agriculture. They should also encourage the National Curriculum Center to complete practical arts materials.

3. <u>Materials Production</u>. **The procedures for materials production should be revised.** The procedures were acceptable as an interim solution but now they should be reconsidered. The procedures involved National Curriculum Center (NCC) testing of pilot materials in schools, final editing and illustrations in the U.K. and printing in Hong Kong. Problems arose with illustrations done by U.K. artists who were not familiar with Swazi culture (e.g., chiefs on thrones rather than standing on the ground; walnuts, unknown in Swaziland, used in science experiments). In addition, the process is time-consuming and sometimes takes well over a year before materials arrive in Swaziland.

> Recommendation: The project should employ a consultant to study the possibility of designing and printing NCC materials in Swaziland.

4. <u>Project Administration</u>. **The project is extremely well-managed but serious problems relating to centralization of control remain.** The Chief of Party is a gifted administrator and Ohio University put together an exceptionally strong team in Swaziland. However, there are problems of over-centralization and

failure to delegate program and administrative responsibility to local counterparts in several spheres of project activity. For example, the master calendar in the Ministry of Educations was maintained in the office of the Chief of Party and the Ministry of Education budget for in-service activities was maintained in a bank account under his control. This was a quite extraordinary delegation from the Ministry to a technical advisor. While it represented a strong vote of confidence, it called into question the ultimate viability of the administrative accomplishments of the project. In addition, large elements of the in-service program continue to be planned and managed almost entirely by the Ohio University team.

> Recommendation: The Ohio University team should develop and implement a plan for handing over administrative and program responsibility for all project activities to Swazi counterparts, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and other concerned officials.

5. Enhancing Administration of the Educational System. **The project made little progress in the area of upgrading the quality of administration in the educational system of Swaziland.** One of the objectives of the project is to up-grade the quality of administration, both within the Ministry of Education and at the individual school level. Project planners anticipated that short-term consultants in educational administration would be recruited to provide consultant services to the Ministry, to assess the local need for administrative training and advise on the development and implementation of a plan to provide such training. It appeared that nothing had been done along these lines.

> Recommendation: USAID, the Ministry of Education and the Ohio University team should agree on the priority to be accorded to administrative training in the remaining two years of the project.

6. Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) Program at University of Swaziland. **The development of a full-scale B.Ed. program at the University of Swaziland is hard to justify.** The current state of the market for new teachers combined with the GOS's recurrent budget problems, suggest that the development of a full-scale Bachelor of Education program may be a poor investment of U. S. and Swazi resources. Some 1985 graduates of teacher training colleges remain without jobs and none of the 1986 graduates will be placed until all 1985 graduates are employed. Moreover, virtually all of the

Ministry of Education's resources are allocated to the payment of salaries (99.8 percent of all expenditures in primary education, for example). The Ministry can no longer afford to construct new schools and has delegated this responsibility to local communities. Thus demand for new, highly qualified teachers may be quite limited.

> Recommendation: Future USAID projects should emphasize strengthening the University's educational research capability.

7. <u>USAID Management</u>. **Budgetary control data on this project were completely inadequate.** Budgetary data available at USAID /Swaziland were outdated and provided little information concerning the allocation of project resources among project functions. Data in USAID's computer system, for example, were complete only through 1984, the first year of the project, and showed no disbursements for subsequent years. Reports from the Chief of Party showed allocations and expenditures only for gross budget categories and were mutually inconsistent in recent periods.

This was particularly important for two reasons. 1) There were significant shifts of resources among budget categories. Most notably, the quantity of resources devoted to the Diploma and Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) degrees at the University of Swaziland had been increased by a factor of at least ten from original project agreement estimates (from $35,000 to $301,000) and these resources must have been shifted from some other budget category. The allocation of project resources to the distribution of curriculum kits was reduced to near zero. 2) USAID and the University of Swaziland reached a series of agreements with respect to division of responsibility for the costs of degree programs and payment of one year of replacement salary for students in the B.Ed. program. These agreements were reached outside of the contract with Ohio University, yet contract resources were committed, which presumably necessitated shifts of resources between budget categories.

> Recommendation: USAID should update its records on disbursements for this project. The Ohio University team should make more current and detailed information on project budgets and expenditures to USAID/Swaziland in the future.
>
> USAID should amend the contract with Ohio University to reflect agreements with University of Swaziland to pay 50 percent of the cost of degree programs and one year of salary replacement, and resources should be added to the contract to cover these costs.

EVALUATION TEAM.

NAME:	AFFILIATION:
Seth Spaulding, Ph.D.	Creative Associates
Karl Massanari, Ed.D.	"
David Plank, Ph.D.	"

PROJECT EVALUATION: UGANDA MANPOWER FOR DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL PROJECT (617-0103), NOVEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Uganda is highly dependent upon its agricultural sector which accounts for about 60 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Over 90 percent of the population of approximately 14 million lives in rural areas with most of the working age population directly engaged in agriculture. Up to the mid-70s, progress was made in agriculture manpower training and Uganda developed a reasonable number of well trained staff for agricultural research. However, due to the departure of many senior staff persons because of the unstable political conditions and general lack of financial support, Uganda has had difficulty maintaining the standards in agricultural research that it had in the early 70s. Thus, lack of trained manpower has become a major constraint in planning, organization and execution of priority research programs.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In August 1983, A.I.D. authorized $7.5 million for the Manpower for Agricultural Development project. In 1986, A.I.D. amended the project and set the funding level at $9.9 million. The purpose of the project was to assist the Government of Uganda (GOU) to rehabilitate, retrain and redirect its agricultural manpower and institutional capability in food crop research. Project outputs were planned to include: retrained staff at the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) and Makerere University Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry (MU/FAF); rehabilitated and reequipped research facilities at Kabanyolo Farm and the Kawanda and Serere Research Stations (the latter depending upon the security situation); rehabilitated and reequipped teaching and office facilities; development of a food crop research strategy and implementation plan; and a research system with established linkages to extension activities. The Project Assistance Completion Date was planned for September 1988.

The Prime Contractor was the Ohio State University Research Foundation. Subcontractors included: the University of Minnesota (UM); Experience, Incorporated (EI); and the International Agricultural Development Service (IADS) which later became Winrock International (WI). The prime contractor was responsible for all components of the project except equipment and supplies. USAID gave the main procurement responsibility to a Procurement Services Agency (PSA) in the United States. The GOU provided approximately $7.7 million in host country counterpart funds for the project.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the project was to provide information to USAID to be used in project redesign. The mission intended to redesign and extend the project for five years to 1993.

The methodology involved document review and interviews with policymakers, scientists, administrators, trainees, technical assistance personnel and faculty members. The evaluation team drew on their extensive experience with similar projects to assess project performance.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. While it was impossible to achieve the level of accomplishment expected at the beginning of the project due to unstable political conditions, achievements were less than what was possible or what should have been accomplished. The unstable conditions in Uganda and the interruption of the project for about 10 months due to civil war hindered progress. Nevertheless, some progress was made. The prime contractor carried out the training satisfactorily in accordance with the terms of reference. The technical assistance team undertook considerable work with regard to the research program including data analysis of projects for local currency funding, arranging for appropriate consultancies for commodity research and extension planning and organizing for annual and subsequent reports. The rehabilitation work was proceeding well despite serious labor problems. However, the contractor failed to make progress in a number of key areas specified in their contract. The project was to have assisted in the development of a national agricultural research plan, an activity of the highest priority, yet the project had taken no steps to assist in the preparation of such a plan. Nor had the technical assistance team undertaken any activities concerning other contractual obligations such as: selecting and training of "extension specialists" at the Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry; holding conferences, seminars or workshops; providing "additional assistance" to the university on curricula or staff development plans; or strengthening linkages between research and extension.

Performance was weak for two reasons. First, the technical assistance Team Leader, although a highly competent individual in his professional field, was not an appropriate choice to represent the contractor in the field and provide leadership for the project. Thus, the technical assistance "team" did not work as a team and the project was not widely known either inside or outside the implementing agencies. Second, backstopping was weak. The contractor should be

faulted for being relatively uninformed concerning the Team Leader's performance in the field and failing to take corrective action. Also, it appeared that the contractor did not monitor to determine whether all aspects of the project were being implemented.

> Recommendation: To assure adequate monitoring of project progress, problems, corrective action needed and goal achievement, there should be annual joint reviews of the project by the Technical Assistance Team, representatives from the implementing agencies, USAID and the contractor (represented by its project coordinator from headquarters).
>
> The contractor and the implementing agencies should give attention to the development of a national food crops research plan.

2. Procurement Process. The Procurement Services Agency (PSA) arrangement was not working satisfactorily. Long delays were evident in purchasing and delivery of supplies and commodities. These delays resulted in a negative impact on project implementation since chemicals and supplies urgently needed by the implementing agencies had not arrived.

> Recommendation: In the future, USAID should consider giving the procurement responsibility to the prime contractor who has a direct interest in timely purchases and delivery.

3. Sustainability. Project sustainability was in question. The GOU fulfilled all covenants related to the project. However, there were questions whether there would be sufficient support forthcoming from the GOU to maintain the equipment and facilities which were provided under the project. There was also a question whether salary levels could be raised for all staff to permit them to devote full time to their work rather than having to find additional outside work in order to live.

> Recommendation: In the future, project funds should not be used to establish a program that is larger than what the host country can continue to support after the project is completed or to provide salary supplements to individuals which cannot be continued.

4. Training. Based purely on the number trained, the project carried out the training program very well.

Sixty-seven participants from the Ministry or the Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry received short-term training of three weeks to four months. However, while participants considered the international contact extremely valuable, whatever knowledge and experience they gained from the training had little immediate use, since meaningful application was negated by lack of adequate facilities at the home institutions of the returning scientists.

> Recommendation: Given the large number of first degree holders in the research system, future training, with the exception of technicians, should be concentrated at the post graduate level to address the staff needs of the research program. Whenever possible, the Master of Science degree should be taken at the Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry.

EVALUATION TEAM.

The evaluation report did not identify evaluation team members.

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE AGRICULTURE POLICY AND PLANNING PROJECT (660-0119), APRIL, 1989

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Zaire (GOZ) required assistance to improve their institutional capacity to develop agricultural policies and investment plans.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1986, A.I.D authorized $14.5 million for the Agriculture Policy and Planning Project. The purpose of the project is to increase the institutional capacity of the GOZ to develop and implement coordinated agricultural policies and investment plans. This is A.I.D.'s fourth project to support the development of the Office of Studies and Planning (the Office) in the Department of Agriculture. Funds provided by the project are used to: 1) train Zairian technicians; 2) institutionalize annual conferences on agricultural policy; 3) publish sound regional and commodity reports; 4) prepare subject papers on specific policies and programs; 5) conduct project evaluations; 6) establish a viable system of data collection; 7) improve and expand the Agricultural Statistics Data Bank; and 8) promote regular consultation between the Office of Studies and Planning and other GOZ agencies concerning plans, policies and investments affecting agriculture. USAID contracted with Chemonics, an American consulting firm, to provide technical assistance to implement the project. The Project Assistance Completion Date is scheduled for April, 1996.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of this start-up evaluation was to identify areas for improvement in the project. The evaluation methodology consisted of interviews with GOZ, USAID and Chemonics officials and a review of relevant publications and documents.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The priorities of the GOZ since project design have shifted from commodity and regional studies to macroeconomic issues related to the agricultural sector. As a result, the rigidly quantified annual outputs demanded by the Chemonics contract have become increasinly less relevant in the eyes of the GOZ. The technical assistance team and USAID have recognized this issue and have tried to address it by broadening the team's annual workplans but the results, thus far,

have not satisfied the GOZ. For the project to have a major influence on GOZ agricultural policies would require that the GOZ perceive the team as a useful resource. The GOZ did not appear to have this perception of the team at the time of the evaluation. Due to continuing friction within the team over leadership and GOZ priorities, no commodity or regional reports had been completed.

> Recommendation: USAID and the GOZ should review the Project Paper, the Project Agreement and the Chemonics contract to ensure that they reflect the real needs of the GOZ. The new documents should: 1) reduce the quantitative emphasis on commodity and regional reports; 2) reduce the emphasis on national policy conferences by replacing them with low-key technical seminars and workshops; 3) permit the technical assistance team to serve as a more integrated staff resource; and 4) increase the importance of the quarterly and annual workplans to organize and evaluate the performance of the technical assistance team.

2. Project Implementation. **The integration of the technical assistance team into the Office of Studies and Planning was not smooth.** Some of the factors that contributed to this situation included: 1) arrival of team members over a period of eight months; 2) uneasiness on the part of the Office due to problems with per diem; 3) uncertainty on the part of the Office and the technical assistance team concerning the role of the latter in preparation of reports; and 4) frustration experienced by the technical assistance team due to a perceived lack of professional freedom.

> Recommendation: At the end of the current contract, USAID should reduce the technical assistance team from seven to four or five members who would work in the proposed new policy unit in the Office and who would provide assistance in developing new investment projects and improving evaluation, design and overall data collection.

3. Data Collection. **While some progress was made, due to the lack of computer hardware and software and absence of a Data Collection Advisor, the project is having only a marginal impact on the work of the Statistical Division.** Fifteen months after project start-up, no computer hardware or software had been delivered. Efforts to develop cooperative work between the two divisions in the Office that were responsible for data collection and processing were only partially successful due to the lack of a project data collection advisor. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now

clear that purchasing five to six standard computers before finalizing the overall computer plan would have significantly increased the opportunity for progress.

> Recommendation: If delays in the recruitment of the Data Collection Advisor continue, USAID should address the immediate need for data collection skills through short-term contracts.

4. Project Coordination. While the Project Paper envisioned a project committee consisting of the Director of the Office, the Chief of Party of the technical assistance team and the USAID project officer, the record did not show that regular meetings had been held. Such meetings would appear to be essential to review progress, issues and the work ahead. The need for such coordination applies also to relations with the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization and Belgian Cooperation. While the parties have informal contacts, they are not true partners in the building of the Office as an institution.

> Recommendation: The Office, USAID and the Chief of Party should set up a schedule of regular meetings. The Director of the Office should set up quarterly meetings with all donors.

5. Sustainability. No one in the GOZ or USAID was able to project a time frame for project sustainability. Presumably, the GOZ would want to maintain this "elite service" that was created with USAID assistance given its reliance on the Office for an increasingly broad range of economic studies. However, even with maximum efforts, the GOZ would in all likelihood be able to retain only a small professional nucleus. Sustainability may also be hindered by the fact that it appeared that GOZ statutes would not permit the Office to contract with outside entities and retain income. Such funds would have to be deposited with the Treasury.

> Recommendation: When project support phases out, USAID should initiate a study to determine whether the Office could be converted to a legal entity permitting institutional contracting.

EVALUATION TEAM.

NAME:	AFFILIATION:
James Bucknall	Team Leader, Agricultural Policy Specialist, International Science and Technology Institute (ISTI)
Harvey Gutman	Institutional Development Specialist (ISTI)

IV. IMPROVING FOOD SECURITY

A. Food Aid

AN EVALUATION OF UNITED STATES FOOD AID IN GUINEA
AUGUST, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Republic of Guinea gained independence on October 2, 1958 after being part of the French colonial empire for more than fifty years. Under the leadership of the new President, Ahmed Sekou Toure, the government and sole political party sought to establish an African form of socialism. Over time, however, expectations for Guinea's success as a model of African political and economic development faded and Guinea remained plagued by economic and political difficulties when Sekou Toure died in 1984. On April 3, 1984, one week after Sekou Toure's death, a group of army colonels overthrew the last remnants of the Toure regime and began to systematically dismantle the economic ad political structure of the First Republic. Under new leadership, the Government of Guinea (GOG) undertook sweeping economic reforms which included: an accelerated retreat from collectivization and abolishment of agricultural marketing agencies, abolishment of compulsory sales of agricultural products through state agencies, establishment of a private commercial banking sector, devaluation of the currency, abolition of fixed prices for most commodities, increases in previously subsidized consumer prices for rice, gasoline and electricity and privatization of selected state-owned enterprises. On December 27, 1985, USAID/Conakry sent a cable to Washington requesting a strong show of USG support for the GOG reforms.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. On September 15, 1986, USAID and the Government of Guineau (GOG) signed a three-year Food for Progress agreement. Under this agreement, the USG was to provide, on a grant basis, 30,000 Metric Tons of rice in Fiscal Years 1986/87, 40,000 Metric Tons in Fiscal Year 1988, and 30,000 Metric Tons in Fiscal Year 1989. In return, the GOG agreed during the first year of the program, to:

- Privatize rice imports without restriction or unfair advantage to government importing agencies;
- Not reintroduce food rations;
- Not reintroduce food subsidies;
- Gradually remove officially established prices for imported rice;
- Prepare a plan for privatizing the import and sale of agricultural inputs; and

- Undertake measures to improve the security of the Port of Conakry.

Continuation of the program after the first year of the program was conditional. The agreement stated, "performance on the six factors will be evaluated before approving commodities for the second year under this agreement."

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to examine: GOG performance on the six policy reform measures specified in the original Food for Progress agreement, GOG progress on the overall economic reform; and the effects of continued rice imports on the national economy. The team was then to formulate both short and long-term recommendations for A.I.D.

Given that statistical information in Guinea was scarce and the abrupt change in government philosophy in 1985 rendered much prior economic analysis irrelevant, the team employed the following methodology. They examined all existing material concerning agricultural production, consumption and population levels, as well as recent World Bank and International Monetary Fund reports. When data conflicted, the team compared high and low scenarios. They supplemented this information with interviews of mission staff, importers, wholesalers, government officials, shipping agents and farmers.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. GOG Compliance with Food for Progress Agreement. The GOG complied, both in letter and in spirit, with the six factors included in the original Food for Progress Agreement. Evidence of compliance was as follows.

- Factor 1: Percentage of rice imported privately should increase.
  Government statistics showed a dramatic shift from government imports toward private imports. In 1985, 82 percent of total rice imports was undertaken by government monopolies and 18 percent was undertaken by diverse private importers. In 1986, 10 percent to rice imports was undertaken by government monopolies and 90 percent was undertaken by diverse private importers.

- Factor 2: Food rations should not be reintroduced.
  The GOG noted that their "decision to end food rations (was) irreversible" and the team found no evidence to the contrary.

- Factor 3: Food subsidies should not be reintroduced.
  Data from a commercial rice importer supported the GOG's contention that the retail selling price of all rice on the market was not subsidized.

- Factor 4: Officially established prices for privately imported rice should be gradually removed. Compliance with this measure was weakest. However, while officially established prices for imported rice continued, there were no real controls on the market pricing of rice and the actual price was allowed to rise substantially above that price, reflecting market value at the retail level. Margins varied, usually well above those calculate in the official price. Because free market pricing was in fact the representative price for imported rice, the GOG met with the spirit of the reform.

- Factor 5: A schedule for privatizing agriculture inputs should be prepared.
  The GOG prepared a schedule for privatizing agriculture inputs and the GOG's commitment to divest the parastatals through which these inputs were sold remained firm. However, the GOG was encountering resistance to divestiture by the Agricultural Ministry. The GOG was in compliance with the agreement, but the team was concerned that resistance to this measure and continuation of parastatal agriculture input supply agencies would increase risks for those wishing to enter the agriculture input supply business, as government stocking of inputs could cause a rapid deterioration in the market position of private traders.

- Factor 6: Measures to improve the security of the Port of Conakry should be undertaken.
  On August 12, the Deputy Port Director announced plans to control and limit access to the port by partitioning it into two separate areas. This measure was included in Phase II of the GOG's port expansion project, already tendered for bid. The Port Authority reported that it wanted to implement this measure immediately and could complete it within a few months.

Recommendation: Insofar as the GOG met the terms of the original agreement, the USG should immediately commence negotiations for the second tranche. The shipments should arrive sufficiently after the local harvest to avoid disrupting local markets but to ensure the availability of rice during the Moslem holiday season.

2. General Reform Measures. While achievements were not as great as anticipated, the GOG continued to make progress in the general area of economic reform. The GOG made little progress toward reducing public sector employment in 1986. To accelerate the pace of reform, the government subsequently adopted a series of measures and indications were that by August 1987, over 3,000 civil employees voluntarily departed from the government. The GOG goal was to reduce government rolls by an additional 10,000. With respect to restructuring public enterprises, progress was slower. While the GOG intended to liquidate or privatize 21 commercial and 49 industrial enterprises, none of the commercial enterprises had been liquidated and only four of the planned 16 industrial enterprises had been liquidated. The costs of slippage were minor in comparison to the benefits of the steps already taken. The GOG was committed to complete the disengagement of the government by June 1988.

3. Effects of Food Aid. In the medium and long-term, food aid was detrimental to the development of the agriculture sector in Guinea. The agricultural sector has the natural resources necessary to provide food self-sufficiency for Guinea. The sector already responded to the more encouraging economic climate and showed both the desire and the ability to continue increasing levels of agricultural production. The lack of an adequate internal transportation network was the most important bottleneck to expanded production and marketing. Neither the current truck fleet nor the available roads could support major increases in local agricultural production. At the time of the evaluation, it was at times cheaper to transport rice from Thailand to Conakry, than to move rice from the producing areas within Guinea to Conakry. Evidence then available suggested that commercial imports would continue to increase as long as imported rice remained cheaper than domestic rice in Conakry. If this is the case, Guinea will "graduate," in the terms of the agreement, from PL 480 Title I. Since PL 480 loans must be repaid, this would have the added advantage to the GOG of reducing total borrowing.

Imported food has a negative effect on domestic agricultural production by lowering domestic

agricultural prices. A decline in Title I imports would stimulate domestic agricultural production by limiting an important source of competition -- the government. Private importers would be much more likely to make the investments necessary to bring local grain to the capital if abundant government stocks were not available.

Recommendation: USAID should continue close monitoring of rice imports and domestic production to ensure domestic production is not hindered by imports. USAID should delay signing any Title I agreement until comparatively late in the fiscal year (June or July). Delaying of the final agreement would allow time for assessment of the current crop and levels of commercial imports. In this manner, a short-term contingency -- a crop shortfall, or unanticipated withdrawal of the commercial sector before domestic production and infrastructure is adequate -- can be taken into account. Further, the USG should not substitute wheat for rice, due to the possible long-term effects of changing consumption patterns away from grains that could be locally produced.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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SENEGAL PL 480 TITLE III FOOD FOR DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS LEARNED, FEBRUARY, 1987

PROBLFM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Senegal (GOS) required assistance in enhancing the accessibility of the rural poor to a secure supply of food.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In May 1980, the United States and the GOS (Ministry of Finance) signed a $21 million PL 480 Sales Agreement for the purchase of surplus medium grain American rice. The USG sold the rice to the GOS on concessionary terms (ten year grace period, 20-year repayment schedule at 2-3 percent annual interest). Under the terms of the Title III Agreement, the GOS was eligible to offset its debt repayment obligation by using the FCFA equivalent of $21 million for approved development purposes. Any portion of the FCFA equivalent of the $21 million not spent for approved purposes would remain a GOS debt to be repaid according to the specified repayment schedule. In accordance with the Title III Agreement, the GOS opened a special local currency account in October 1980. FCFA proceeds from the sale of the PL 480 imported rice were to be deposited in the account. All such deposits would automatically be earmarked for financing specific development projects. In 1984, the USG and the GOS amended the agreement bringing the total amount of commodities (rice and sorghum) sold over the course of the program to the equivalent of $28 million. The final disbursement was planned for December 1987.

The program goal was to enhance the accessibility of the rural poor to a secure supply of food. The purpose was to strengthen the GOS's development policies and reform initiatives. Specifically, the program was designed to reinforce the role of rural development agencies, strengthen rural cooperatives, revise agricultural pricing and marketing policies and manage and conserve the country's natural resource base.

The program financed 25 specific projects in the following areas: agricultural research, natural resource conservation, dune fixation, infrastructure development, crop production and policy studies.

Following the agreement, the GOS and USAID formed a Title III Management Committee (MC). The MC received and approved project proposals emanating from the Ministry of Plan, various technical ministries and Non-Governmental-Organizations. It also allocated annual project budgets. A Title III Permanent Secretariat (PS) was also formed to administer the program and verify that project funds were expended for approved purposes. If the Management Committee approved a

proposal, it instructed the Permanent Secretariate to prepare letters of transfer from the Title III Special Account to the individual project accounts. Project directors drew on their accounts for project related purchases of goods and services. Each project accountant justified project expenditures by submitting monthly receipts to the Secretariat and quarterly reports to USAID. Once the Secretariat verified that at least 80 percent of a project's advance had been spent for approved purposes, that project would be eligible for the next advance from the Special Account.

A third administrative unit, the Food for Peace Local Currency Unit (FFP/LCU), was responsible for coordinating technical assistance to Title III funded projects, preparing Currency Use Offset reports and acting as a liaison between USAID management and the Title III administrative structure.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to examine the impact of the Title III administrative structure on program accomplishments in order to improve implementation of future Title III programs. The evaluation emphasized assessing the management system rather than analyzing the outcome of the 25 projects financed under the program.

The methodology involved interviews with program participants, USAID representatives, GOS officials, staff of other donor agencies and project contractors, as well as site visits.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Goal. While the program financed over 25 discrete development projects, programming, management and monitoring difficulties hindered achievement of project objectives. The program contributed to the implementation of policy reforms elaborated in the GOS's New Agricultural Policy (1984) which concerned protection and rejuvenation of the natural resource base, strengthening parastatal regional development agencies, enlargement of the role played by agricultural cooperatives and improvement of the agriculture economics knowledge base.

However, a range of problems impeded efficient administration of the overall program. The GOS experienced great difficulty selling the rice. It did not correspond to Senegalese tastes and preferences. High world market prices and a steep appreciation of the dollar obliged the GOS to sell the rice at a significant loss, incurring a shortfall of

approximately $7 million. This amount was reimbursed by the GOS Treasury so that the GOS could qualify for full debt forgiveness. In addition, the GOS paid out approximately $4.5 million to cover shipping, handling and storage costs. Thus, the GOS in effect paid $11.5 million for rice valued on the world market at $28 million. This represented a substantial sum of money for the GOS.

Slow rice sales, coupled with delays in the deposit of sales proceeds in the special account, set back implementation of the six original projects eighteen months to two years. These projects received, on average, only 48 percent of their planned budgets over the first two years of the project. Some projects had to forgo vehicle purchases. Projects containing construction components ground to a halt as project directors did not have sufficient funds to pay local contractors. Project directors were unable to program quarterly budget expenditures because they did not know how much would be deposited into the Special Account. In 1984, the GOS again lowered the price of rice and required wholesalers to buy it. From that point on, there were sufficient funds to finance planned project activities.

Project implementation difficulties were compounded by the unstable dollar/FCFA exchange rate, which fluctuated approximately 70 percent during the six years of the program. This fact, compounded with unreliable financing, clearly injected an avoidable element of instability into the programming process.

> Recommendation: In future Title III programs, the sale of commodities should precede the implementation of individual projects. The Title III Special Account should contain at least the equivalent of first year budget requirements before individual project implementation begins.
>
> In future Title III programs, the life of project budgets should be denominated in the local currency, using a three to five year exchange rate average. Budgets denominated in U. S. dollars inhibit effective long-term planning.

2. <u>The Local Currency Unit</u>. The Local Currency Unit's monitoring role was never specified. The evaluation team found no document emanating from A.I.D./ Washington which clarified the LCU's (meaning USAID mission staff's) role in the overall Title III program. The absence of well-understood official guidelines contributed to two areas of confusion regarding USAID's role: 1) the extent to which it should have been involved in the programming process; and 2) the scope of its obligations to monitor Title III funds. The

Regional Inspector General's Office (RIG) and the Regional Controller (RCON) had widely differing interpretations concerning the extent of USAID's monitoring responsibilities. RIG maintained that the LCU's monitoring responsibilities extended down to the project level. RCON maintained that the LCU's monitoring responsibilities ended when funds were transferred from the Special Account to the individual project accounts. This confusion forced the LCU to operate in a very uncertain institutional setting. To its credit, the LCU proposed three separate financial monitoring systems, none of which were adopted by the Permanent Secretariate (PS). It also prepared a comprehensive description of the roles and tasks of members of the PS, but this personnel management plan was never enacted. It created a system to monitor the progress of individual projects, but it did not receive a sufficient number of project implementation reports from project managers to implement the system.

> Recommendation: In future programs, because decisions regarding the role of the Mission in Title III must be made on a country-by-country basis, the Mission Director, in conjunction with the program, legal and local currency officers, should develop Title III implementation guidelines and define responsibilities of the local currency officer with respect to program management and project selection.

3. The Management Committee (MC). The MC was unable to exert effective control over the Permanent Secretariate and did not always avail itself of the technical and economic expertise necessary to evaluate project proposals rigorously. The Title III agreement defined the role of the MC in only the vaguest of terms ("The program will be implemented by the GOS under the overall coordination of a Senegal Management Commission"). The vagueness of this definition had a decidedly negative effect on the administration of the Title III program, the most important one being the unwillingness or inability of the MC to exercise effective authority over the Permanent Secretariate. The head of the latter, the Permanent Secretary, sat on the MC and was thus able to exercise near total control of the Title III program, in the absence of official documents delineating the responsibilities of these two entities. As long as the Permanent Secretariate had operating funds, it had enormous autonomy. It was free to allocate its quarterly budget as it saw fit. In 1983, the Permanent Secretary arbitrarily and unnecessarily doubled the size of his staff and rented new office space without prior consultation with the MC. The MC could not manage the program unless the Permanent Secretariate functioned, not as an independent entity, but as an implementor of MC

decisions. This finally occurred when the GOS replaced the Permanent Secretary in 1985.

In addition, there were major weaknesses in the MC project approval process. There was no standardized format for project proposals or established economic criteria or cost-effectiveness measures.

> Recommendation: In future Title III programs, USAID should ensure that the bilateral entity responsible for overall management of the program, exercises effective control over the bureaucratic structure charged with program administration. This can only be accomplished by establishing regulations outlining the duties and prerogatives of the administrative arm of the Title III program.
>
> USAID should develop a standard project proposal format and set of economic and technical criteria to be used in the evaluation of Title III proposals.

4. <u>The Permanent Secretariat</u>. **All members of the Management Committee acknowledged that the Permanent Secretariat was not competent to perform its role.** The head accountant had falsified his accounting diploma. It was unknown if he had any training as an accountant. It was also unknown whether the five other accountants hired by the former Permanent Secretary had any formal accounting instruction, but, in any event, they proved incapable of keeping valid records themselves and thus were unable to advise individual projects on improvements in their own financial management systems. The six full-time accountants were each responsible for fewer than four projects. The staff economist had never held an economist's position prior to his work at the Secretariat.

Each of the four annual evaluations of the Title III program recommended that a comprehensive personnel management plan, outlining the respective duties and responsibilities of the Secretariat staff, be adopted to improve the efficiency of the unit. This was never fully done.

In addition, although three separate financial monitoring systems were proposed by USAID, no financial monitoring system was adopted by the Secretariat. Once the money was obligated from the Special Account to the project accounts, there was no way of assuring that budgeted line items were respected. Line items that appeared in the approved budget proposal did not necessarily correspond to those in the project's quarterly financial disbursement reports.

Clearly there was an over concentration of power within the Secretariat. One must ask how accountants without certifiable backgrounds came to manage the FCFA equivalent of $28 million. They were hired by the Permanent Secretary without the prior approval of the Management Committee. The arrival of the new Permanent Secretary in 1985 signaled a substantial improvement in program implementation.

> Recommendation: In future Title III programs, USAID should develop, in conjunction with the host country administration, a financial management system before project implementation begins. Also, it should sponsor training in financial management before project start-up.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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B. Increasing Agricultural Production and Utilization

PROJECT ASSISTANCE COMPLETION REPORT: RURAL SECTOR GRANT PROJECT (633-0077), APRIL, 1989

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Botswana (GOB) required assistance in developing programs to stimulate rural development and productive employment opportunities.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In May 1980, A.I.D. authorized the Rural Sector Grant (RSG) project. For Phase I and II (which began in 1983), A.I.D. authorized a total of $9,349,000, of which $5,610,000 (approximately 40 percent) was eventually deobligated due to slow project implementation. A six-year drought, which began in 1982, was, in part, responsible for significant administrative, sociological and implementation constraints. In commenting on implementation difficulties the GOB coordinator of the Rural Development Unit noted, " The focus of government ministries became survival, rather than production or employment."

The goal of both phases of the project was to "stimulate rural development and a more equitable distribution of income in Botswana." The purpose of Phase II was to "provide the rural population with increased access to productive employment opportunities." To accomplish this, Phase II was to fund subprojects that had a direct impact on production and income at the district/village level or that addressed broader constraints that had to be overcome before production improvement interventions could be implemented. These subprojects and the responsible implementing agency were as follows:

- Rural Industries Officer (RIO)/Productive Enterprises Development Fund (PEDF), Ministry of Commerce and Industry -- the purpose of this subproject was to train rural industrial officers, while the PEDF subproject's aim was to provide funds from the National Development Bank to be used in the implementation of the Financial Assistance Policy;

- Horticultural Estates, Ministry of Agriculture -- the purpose of this subproject was to establish several operational horticultural estates to provide employment and income to members of the estate association;

- Agriculture - Small Projects, Ministry of Agriculture -- the purpose of this

subproject was to assist organized farm groups to undertake small-scale infrastructure and production activities such as vegetable plots, poultry production, construction of storage facilities, etc.;

- District Institutional Government (initiated in Phase II), Ministry of Local Government and Lands -- the purpose of this subproject was to increase the District Officers' capacity to plan and administer rural development programs, particularly those aimed at job creation and income generation; and

- Special Technical Assistance, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning -- under this subproject, the Rural Development Unit of the Ministry of Finance would continue to receive technical assistance to address special problems and needs identified during implementation.

The Project Assistance Completion Date was in 1988.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. This was a project completion report to close out the project.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. While numerous factors hindered implementation, the project still achieved some notable successes. External factors which affected the project, in addition to the drought, included a devaluation of Botswana's currency and the imposition of GOB budget ceilings on individual ministries. Internal factors included personnel changes at both USAID and the ministries. For example, in the five years of Phase II, three different USAID officers administered the project.

Observers cited the Rural Industrial Officers subproject as the most successful in the entire project. Ministries viewed the training (in developing non-agricultural income generation opportunities) provided to these officers very enthusiastically. In addition, the training provided to District Officers under the District Institutional Development subproject appeared to have improved job performance and the "graduates" were generally regarded as outstanding officers.

2. Project Design and Project Implementation. **Weak project design hindered implementation of some subjects.** In addition to the external and internal factors cited above, weak project design hindered implementation of the Horticultural Estates and Productive Enterprises Development Fund subprojects. Horticultural Estates was one of the least successful of the subprojects. The complexity of the project (e.g., construction, agricultural extension, dam building, irrigation, transport and marketing) made the achievement of objectives difficult. In addition, it appeared that the subproject did not avail itself of adequate technical expertise. The 1986 evaluation noted, in referring to this subproject, "a danger in attempting to implement a project without appropriate technical expertise or follow-through."

The Productive Enterprises Development Fund subproject, designed to provide funds from the National Development Bank (NDB) to be used in the implementation of the Financial Assistance Policy, was only minimally successful. It appeared that project design underestimated the institutional capacity of the NDB.

Overall, the project design underestimated the managerial and technical assistance requirements of the project. This was clearly demonstrated by the slowdown of project implementation after the departure of the Communal Area Coordinator, even after six years of project implementation.

> Recommendation: In the future, project designers should more carefully estimate managerial and technical requirements. One of the most important lessons learned is that project design should be preceded by complete baseline studies and economic analyses. In this project, it appeared that detailed implementation plans were drawn up before the necessary analyses were even considered. This appears to be especially true with regard to the Productive Enterprises Development Fund, the National Development Bank and the Horticultural Estates subprojects.

EVALUATION TEAM.

> USAID staff who prepared the project completion report were not identified.

MIDTERM EVALUATION: CHAD PVO DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES PROJECT (677-0051), MAY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. In the mid-80s, the development climate of Chad was unusually difficult. It was one of the poorest countries in the world and had been confronted with 15 years of recurrent war and drought. While increased food production was clearly the principal development priority, the Government of Chad (GOC) was incapable of reaching the hardest hit populations in the Sahelian region.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. USAID/Chad had had two years of positive experience with U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in its relief and rehabilitation activities and had found them to be efficient vehicles for assistance in both rural development and private sector promotion. Accordingly, on June 7, 1985, A.I.D. authorized $12.725 million for the Chad/PVO Development Initiatives project. The Project Assistance Completion Date was planned for September 30, 1989.

The purpose of the project was to assist small farmer production and supportive private sector activities having demonstration and institutional development (primarily local cooperation) effects. Major project objectives were to: 1) make a significant contribution to the welfare of Chadians hitherto subject to famine and the recipients of food aid, including settled displaced persons; and 2) demonstrate approaches to developing small farmer and private sector production systems which successor, longer-term projects could adopt or otherwise support.

USAID approved the following four PVO subproject proposals for this project:

- CARE Irrigated Agricultural Development, budgeted at $3.98 million;
- ORT Lake Chad Agricultural Development and Farmer Training, budgeted at $2.593 million;
- VITA Private Enterprise Promotion in Chad, budgeted at $1.2 million; and
- Africare Ouaddai Rural Development, budgeted at $2.84 million.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess progress toward achievement of

project purpose and make recommendations to improve project implementation.
The methodology consisted of interviews, document review and site visits.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project made considerable progress toward achievement of its overall purpose. The quality of technical assistance was generally very good and, in most respects, implementation proceeded smoothly. By midpoint, the project had already developed a range of sustainable and replicable interventions such as: improved canal layouts; clay canal linings; furrow planting techniques; crop spacing arrangements; improved plant population densities; improved use of manure; confined aquifer taping to improve well recharge; and the dalou water lifting system.

> Recommendation: The Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) should focus on extending sustainable and replicable interventions immediately. They should shift their focus from an emphasis on "experimentation" to a more results oriented process of technology identification, adaptation, and extension, with the specific goal of maximizing agricultural production in their specific areas of influence. The PVOs should concentrate on activities which will not require the continued presence of GOC or donor inputs after the Project Assistance Completion Date.
>
> All PVOs should quantify and document their agronomic, environmental and other impacts, both successful and unsuccessful. They should keep permanent records on these interventions and submit these records annually to USAID. A suggested model for a "PVO Impact Report" was attached to the evaluation report as Annex J.

2. CARE Subproject. CARE fielded an extremely strong long-term technical assistance team and generally did an outstanding job of implementation. Inputs were of high quality and provided on a timely basis. Approximately 75 percent of all long-term technical assistance provisions were met. With respect to water management, CARE's major success was with refinement of irrigation plots and canal lining techniques to maximize the efficiency of water use. CARE did an excellent job of developing an appropriate technical package for small-scale, commercial irrigated agriculture. With respect to agricultural production, CARE concentrated its agronomic activities in the Bahr-

el-Ghazel, where it set up an experimental farm for varietal trials and initiated training of extension agents and farmers. CARE initiated thorough data collection activities which will likely yield well-conceived and adaptable improvements in cropping techniques. In addition, CARE made a serious effort to collect and analyze data on the impact and economic sustainability of the subproject. This included an analysis of the economic environment, monthly surveys on the price, quantity and transport costs of agricultural goods and handicrafts, a weekly survey of revenues and expenditures of 30 farm families in the Kanem region, as well as anthropological and sociological baseline studies on the Nokou and Cheddra regions and in the irrigated perimeters. The latter studies were very well done and generated good data on all aspects of sociopolitical organization and the cultural life of the targeted population. They also provided excellent data on the sexual division of labor, household consumption and expenditure patterns and ethnic differences, among other topics.

The major problem was over-extension of subproject activities across three zones which were 750 km apart and which posed considerably different technical problems.

> Recommendation: CARE should reduce the subproject's scope by eliminating areas and activities which show the least promise of replicability and sustainability and least benefit for the cost.

3. Africare Subproject. While there were only six months of actual subproject implementation, progress was satisfactory. Inputs were of good quality and substantial progress was made in achieving outputs. In this short period of time, Africare developed two promising technologies: 1) construction of water catchments across wadi beds to catch and retain seasonal flows (these had good potential but at their current scale would have required more capital investment and GOC supervision than would have been sustainable at the village level); and 2) the dalou animal traction water lifting system, which seemed to be both affordable and replicable at the farmer level. The water catchment structures contributed to agricultural production. During the 1987/88 season at the Mattar catchment, farmers grew tomatoes, peanuts, millet and sesame. Limited yield data indicated that about 2.26 tons/ha. of dried tomatoes were obtained. Africare's data gathering activities were limited.

> Recommendation: Africare should design data gathering methodologies so that appropriate data on the upcoming growing cycle can be analyzed.

4. <u>ORT Subproject</u>. **ORT undertook experiments on farmers' fields with promising results.** The ORT agronomist successfully demonstrated the advantages of a number of techniques. For example, the use of furrows, as opposed to growing crops on square plots, resulted in much higher yields (exact amount not specified in the report). Farmers appeared to be receptive to the small but significant new technologies that were introduced. The pump program, on the other hand, experienced serious difficulties and pump technology was not adopted by farmers. In addition, the scheduled training of ten SODELAC (the rural development agency) agents, had not taken place due to ORT's difficult relationship with this organization and problems involved in identifying candidates.

> Recommendation: ORT should work out an agreement with SODELAC as soon as posible. The subproject's success is in part dependent on the participation of SODELAC agents in all subproject activities.

4. <u>VITA Subproject</u>. **Progress toward attaining desired outputs was mixed.** VITA created a credit organization with a well-trained, motivated staff. Business and technical advice provided to clients was excellent. However, the reduced demand for loans for small/medium enterprises (SME) and the low repayment rates raised questions as to the ultimate sustainability of any SME credit program in Chad. Moreover, VITA's overhead costs to loan volume were 3.9:1. These problems were in large part due to Chad's general economic stagnation.

In contrast to the credit program, the VITA initiative to develop export markets for Chadian fruits and vegetables appeared promising. A trial shipment to Paris demonstrated the potential acceptability of the produce on the French market. VITA proposed the creation of a "VITA Export Association" to take advantage of this opportunity. Under this new proposal, VITA would provide local farmers needed inputs, technical advice and a guaranteed price and market for their crops.

> Recommendation: USAID should extend the project to assess whether an improvement in economic conditions results in higher loan applications and repayment rates. VITA should pursue the "Export Project" as rapidly as possible, as a concrete effort to find new markets for local farmers. USAID, VITA and the GOC need to consider how this activity can be financed and how VITA can act as a commercial intermediary.
>
> VITA should enhance its interest rate and fee structure with a goal of enhancing revenues.

VITA should enhance its interest rate and fee structure with a goal of enhancing revenues. Options could include charging fees for loan administration and advisory services, and charging different interst rates for different borrowers and different types of activities.

6. Role of Women. Women seemed to perform all of the hard physical labor required for construction and extension of the water catchment structures. It was unclear whether women in the Ouaddai region normally undertook the heaviest labor in the fields, were working for the perceived future benefits of these structures or were engaged in this activity for FFW rations.

Recommendation: Africare should assess the economic and social impact of catchment construction on gender roles in the region. The study should examine the cash value of the women's FFW ration and how it compares to men's rations. It should also examine whether women are receiving plot allocations commensuate with the physical labor they have contributed to catchment construction.

7. USAID Management. USAID Management was very good. USAID gave thorough technical and administrative scrutiny to the Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) proposals submitted for funding under this project and provided excellent backstopping to the PVOs. However, the Project Officer was only able to devote half her time to this activity because of other duties.

Recommendation: USAID should recruit a full-time contract Project Manger to ensure closer technical monitoring of the PVOs. To assure high quality responses to advertisements for this position, A.I.D. should go beyond its usual advertising in the Commerce Business Daily and advertise in the Economist, the New York Times, the Washington Post or the Los Angeles Times.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH COAST AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN GUINEA-BISSAU (657-0010), DECEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Guinea-Bissau (GOGB) required assistance in rehabilitating its mango swamps for rice production.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1983, A.I.D. authorized $5.5 million for the South Coast Agricultural Development (SCAD) project. The project supports the Department of Hydraulics and Soils (DHAS), the agricultural engineering arm of the Ministry of Rural Development and Fisheries of the GOGB, in its efforts to rehabilitate mango swamps for rice production. The purpose of the project is to strengthen the institutional capacity of the DHAS to promote and facilitate the extension of south coast rice production areas through improved water control structures and water management practices. The revised Project Assistance Completion Date is September 30, 1990.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to review project design, measure progress to date and recommend specificactions. In addition, the evaluation team examined the agricultural, engineering, economic, social and other assumptions on which the project is based. The main concern of the evaluation was the feasibility of salt water intrusion dams -- the primary infrastructure innovation being used by the Department to rehabilitate the mango groves.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. "Nothing has been done" to obtain the technical assistance needed to achieve three major project objectives. With respect to three major project objectives -- improving water control structures, improving water management practices and training mechanics to establish a regional maintenance capacity -- the project failed to obtain the requisite technical assistance. Construction of a maintenance facility (the Cation Center) was completed and equipped and tools and spare parts were on order. But technical assistance and a training program for mechanics was needed to make the center operational.

Recommendation: The Project Assistance Completion Date should be extended to September 30, 1990 to

The project should develop a training plan for the staff of the Cation Center.

2. Environmental Impact. The positive effects of the large barrier dikes constructed by the project appeared to exceed the negative effects. The traditional method of building low dikes along the estuary banks barely affects the environment. The new method of building large barrier dikes radically changes the environment, principally by limiting spawning area and impeding the flow of nutrients to the sea. On the positive side, the large barrier dikes are more effective in rehabilitating land for rice production. Since the project affects only a small percentage of the total area, the evaluation concluded that positive effects outweighed negative effects and that there was no reason not to continue construction of the large barrier dikes.

Recommendation: The project should initiate monitoring of the impact of the large barrier dikes on the environment.

3. Social Issues. A range of social issues may affect project achievements. These include labor constraints, land distribution, ethnic differences, women's role in rice production and farmer participation.

Recommendation: The project should initiate studies of these issues. The project should also takes steps to ensure that farmers participate in all phases of dam construction from selection through maintenance.

EVALUATION TEAM .

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PROJECT EVALUATION: GUINEA-BISSAU FOOD CROP PROTECTION III (657-0012), FEBRUARY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Guinea-Bissau's (GOGB) goal is to create food self-sufficiency with production of surpluses for export. However, plant disease and pests are increasingly difficult to control and are impeding achievement of this objective. The GOGB required assistance in its efforts to improve food crop protection.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In August 1985, A.I.D. authorized $1,250,000 for the Guinea-Bissau Food Crop Protection III project. The purpose of the project is to strengthen the National Crop Protection Service's capacity to develop and direct a crop protection program and continue to implement the on-going program in crop protection. The Project Assistance Completion Date is planned for September 30, 1990.

The GOGB's contribution to the project is $870,000 for salaries and benefits for the employees of the Crop Protection Service, the fuel for field transportation and office space and utilities.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the National Food Crop Protection Service's capability to carry out a food crop protection program in order to determine whether present and proposed activities under the Food Crop Protection III project are appropriate or need to be modified.

The evaluation methodology involved document review, field visits to three zones to observe crop protection activities and needs in rural zones and interviews.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project has made many beneficial contributions to institution building. It has contributed both to the physical construction of the headquarters and the development of the senior technical and administrative staff of the Crop Protection Service by providing training, technical assistance, vehicles, commodities and construction materials. However, the project has not strongly emphasized rural farmer crop protection needs. As a result, the crop Protection Service is a relatively well-equipped, centralized government

regions of the country in order to achieve the national goal of food self-sufficiency. The Crop Protection Service is in dire need of decentralized pesticide storage facilities, office and training space, transportation, communication equipment and appropriate pesticides at the village/farmer and regional levels.

Moreover, the principal crop protection strategy of the project has been the teaching of integrated pest management and biological control, rather than the practical use of pesticides. As a result, while some exemplary biocontrol projects have been initiated, the national need for more food has caused pesticides to be used as a primary tool by farmers, agencies and projects as the first line of defense against crop pests. They produce the desired results while integrated pest managment and biocontrol do not despite their environmentally compatible approach.

The pesticide use problems that have developed in Guinea-Bissau need to be addressed expeditiously. These problems include: improper containers that are later used for food consumption; improper and inadequate labels, frequently in inappropriate languages; lack of proper storage facilities; pesticide misuse (e.g., pesticides intended for grasshopper nymph control applied as a grain protectant on peanuts) and improper container disposal, among numerous other problems. In the absence of additional assistance, it is likely that the problems encountered will continue until toxic chemical poisoning becomes commonplace and there are detrimental side effects such as ground water pollution and fish kills.

> Recommendation: USAID should provide an additional $750,000 to address the pesticide problems that have developed in Guinea-Bissau.

2. Pesticide Regulation. There is no uniform pesticide regulation in Guinea-Bissau. The team surveyed many toxic pesticides in storage places that belonged to projects and government agencies other than the Crop Protection Service. The latter had neither control nor authority over the storage, safety and use of these pesticides. In one case, thirteen large drums of toxic pesticides were stored outside without protection and uphill from an open well and about four hectares of fresh vegetable gardens tended by barefoot women.

> Recommendation: USAID should make continued support of crop protection contingent on the enactment of pesticide regulation to control use of these toxic chemicals.

3. Extension Training. **The National Crop Protection Service extension training work appears to be progressing satisfactorily.** There is an established system of extension in place and information is getting down to the farmers in spite of the numerous language difficulties (the official language is Portuguese, the lingua franca is crioule and there are about 18 tribal dialects). The extension organization published crop protection calendars (paid for by the project), conducted monthly radio programs and participated in carnivals on the theme of "good bugs" and "bad bugs" before large audiences. It also conducts an annual training program for supervisors who then train field agents and farmers.

> Recommendation: The Crop Protection Service should use more illustrative and diagrammatic training publication aids because of the high illiteracy rates of the rural population. The existing training emphasis on integrated pest management and biological control needs to be adjusted in consideration of the growing use of pesticides to increase food crop production. Recommended pesticide training subjects include storage, toxicity, labels, environmental side effects, crop residues, mixing, application, first aid, record-keeping and disposal.

4. Communication. **Communication facilities to meet the occasionally urgent needs of the Crop Protection Service were inadequate.** The telephone system was not sufficiently dependable to meet the sometimes critical needs of the Crop Protection Service to mobilize its resources, manpower, pesticides and sprayers quickly enough to combat crop insect and disease attacks. This was particularly the case during the rainy season when rural roads were impassable because of deep standing water and electric telephone systems were shorted out.

> Recommendation: The project should provide six short-wave radios (at an approximate cost of $11,495) not only to improve the logistical operations of the Crop Protection Service, but also to provide dependable communication to call for medical help or evacuation in case of toxic pesticide accidents and poisonings.

5. Sustainability. **The present system of providing services to farmers did not contribute to project sustainability.** The GOGB cannot continue to provide Crop Protection Services for free.

> Recommendation: The Crop Protection Service should consider introducing a low charge for

pesticides and crop protection services. Small farmers would not be charged but larger farmers who benefit the most would be required to pay a fee. Perhaps 1 percent of the crop value could be levied for the pest or disease diagnosis and prescription. Another 10 percent of the crop value (5 percent for the pesticide, 5 percent for its application) could be charged to provide funds for the Crop Protection Service budget.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION OF THE RICE PRODUCTION PROJECT IN GUINEA-BISSAU (657-0009, 657-0004), JUNE, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Guinea-Bissau's (GOGB) goal is to achieve food self-sufficiency with surpluses for export. During the late 1970s, agricultural production declined approximately 60 percent, largely due to drought conditions.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. On August 28, 1980, A.I.D. authorized $4.5 million for the Rice Production project in Guinea-Bissau. The purpose of the project was to increase food production and farm income of about 1,200 farm families in the Geba River Basin area of Guinea-Bissau and to develop institutional experience and information bases which would enable the farming systems developed in the project to be replicated elsewhere.

USAID signed a contract for technical assistance with Aurora Associates, Inc. on April 15, 1982 to provide technical assistance (long and short-term) to the GOGB.

Planned projects outputs included: 1) the successful introduction of improved water management techniques and improved agronomic practices; 2) improved management capacity of the Department of Agricultural Research and Experimentation (DEPA); 3) experimental farmer associations operating and supervised by DEPA technical personnel; and 4) development of a Geba River Valley Plan.

A 1983 REDSO/WCA evaluation of the project recommended redirection of the project to attend to farmers needs with technology they could implement themselves. The evaluation noted that project implementation had been allowed to stray off course. The technical assistance team had been pursuing mechanized land development and planning major earthworks, neither of which was sustainable nor compatible with increased village participation. The evaluation emphasized that significant increases in yields could be expected with the successful introduction of simple water control structures and improved agronomic practices.

In early 1985, USAID approved a Project Paper Supplement which outlined a course of action to be pursued through the end of the project in 1987. The supplement stated, "The project must address the agronomic issues of rice production through improved water management practices and intensive community development efforts. The bas-fonds (lowland) development should be accomplished without machinery and should be initiated on a scale that does not place an unrealistic burden on village labor...".

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to review the status of project outputs and to make recommendations to assist in achieving the project purpose.

The evaluation methodology involved interviews, document review and site visits. The evaluation team conducted a series of interviews with 45 villagers in the bolanhas (crop producing areas) of Demba Luri and Medina Sare. Those interviewed included village leaders, Bolanha Rice Committee members, old and young men and women farmers.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project provided 1,115 farm families with agricultural inputs but progress with respect to each output was limited. The project provided farm families with seeds, fertilizer, and hand implements and provided training in water management techniques. Progress with respect each output is discussed in greater detail below.

> Recommendation: USAID should pursue a bridge activity that would have Aurora Associates, Inc. continue for approximately 12 months to help consolidate the modest institutional gains to date. The evaluation presents a set of lessons learned that should guide the development of any follow-on activity.

2. Output 1: Improved Water Management Techniques and Agronomic Practices. Data were unavailable to determine whether the major project intervention in water management -- contour dikes -- was sustainable and replicable from an economic and sociological perspective. Traditionally, there has been no method for holding water on the 125,000 of land in the bas-fonds which was suitable for rice production. A major output of the project was to have been the identification and testing of water management structures which could contribute to increased rice production. Although the supplement anticipated that animal traction and/or manual labor would be used to construct contour dikes, this approach was abandoned almost immediately in favor of using a tractor for this activity. The rationale for this decision was that a tractor could construct 10 meters of dikes in nine seconds while it would take one person an entire day to complete the same task. By 1987, the project had 416 hectares under partial or completed contour dikes. During the last two years, there was a total rejection of manual work for construction of new contour dikes.

No reliable cost data on the construction of dikes and drainage structures were available. This, coupled with the lack of yield data on the effects of partially constructed dikes, made the assessment of costs and returns for tractor use impossible. Other management techniques such as animal traction to create contour dikes, labor-intensive contour diking, construction of catchments and use of low-lift pumps were not sufficiently tested. Therefore, the implications of using these techniques could not be determined.

The evaluation team raised questions concerning the sustainability of tractors for contour diking. Sustainability of the tractors would depend on: 1) the ability of the Department to maintain the tractors; and 2) availability of spare parts.

The project did not develop a written recommended package of technology for distribution by extension agents to farmers and the evaluation team observed little agronomic research at the unit responsible for this activity, the Contuboel Center. The team noted that a 27-month period was too short a period to develop and test a technological package for bas-fond rice production.

> Lesson Learned: The lack of monitoring by either USAID or REDSO/WCA, which played the major role in the evaluation and redesign of the project, resulted in the Aurora team drifting from the technical guidelines outlined by the Project Paper Supplement.
>
> The project did not test various water management techniques long enough to prove their acceptability, sustainability and replicability.
>
> A project which attempts to improve production capability must have baseline data and gather cost-effectiveness data in a systematic way.

3. <u>Output 2: Institution-Building at the Department</u>. Institution-building achievements were modest. The technical assistance team developed training programs and helped to establish clear roles and responsibilities at three Department units. Progress at these units was as follows.

- Credit Unit. The necessary human resou[illegible] base for a credit program did not exist [illegible] Contuboel. There were no trained indigen[illegible] people to staff the Credit Unit, the Department had little interest in the program when it was initiated and there were some questions whether the farmers needed the credit in the first place. Most

significantly, since no satisfactory package of technology was available to give the farmers, the possibility of loan repayment was questionable. The Credit Advisor attempted to build a credit program from scratch under these difficult conditions but the institutional gains were slim. There was serious doubt about the sustainability of the Credit Unit with the departure of the techncial assistance team.

- Hydrology Unit. The Hydrology Unit was well-established, particularly given the presence of the recently returned A.I.D. participant trainee. If adequate financial support were to be forthcoming from the GOGB, this unit could continue to function after the departure of the technical assistance team. The topography teams were sufficiently proficient to implement the engineering dimensions of tractor-contour diking in the bas-fonds.

- Extension Unit. Progress was made in creating an institutional capacity to deliver services to rice farmers in the project area. The Aurora Extension Advisor developed numerous training courses for extension staff. However, more effort should have been made to transfer responsibility of training sessions to qualified Department personnel. Moreover, the extension system as a whole was not working. Wages were very low and the Department had serious difficulty paying the wages of extension agents. In 1986 and 1987, the project, rather than the Department, paid the salaries of 20 extension and credit agents. Extension agents' bicycles were in disrepair since the Department could not provide for vehicle maintenance and spare parts as agreed. Sustainability was in question since the GOGB did not have funds to continue supporting the agents supported by the project.

The GOGB technicians at the project site made a concerted effort to make the project work. However, there was a very serious lack of management skills that influenced every aspect of the operation. The staff could not be faulted as they had not received training in management principles.

Lesson Learned: The lack of management skills must be addressed before the Department will be able to provide sustainable services to farmers. The highest priority is to provide basic

management training for technicians in management positions. When qualified extension agents cannot be paid adequately, recruitment and training should be directed to the most sustainable extensionists, those who are adapted to village conditions and the most effective diffusers of ideas -- the farmers. Farmers might be given plots and high yielding seeds and fertilizer as incentives to induce participation.

3. Experimental Farmer Associations. The project worked through existing village structures -- Bolanha Rice Committees -- **and did not establish experimental farmer associations.** The Department asserted it preferred to work through existing structures rather than create new ones. The committees, however, had two flaws: 1) they appeared to represent the villages' traditional male political hierarchy rather than the interests of bas-fonds rice farmers who were women; 2) they appeared in some instances to be biased toward the central villages and wealthier farmers. Women farmers reported that men had priority in the use of credit materials such as donkey carts, animal traction and large hoes and only when men had finished using these items were they transferred to the bas-fonds bolonhas for which they were originally intended.

4. Development of Geba River Valley Plan. **The technical assistance team did not draft a Geba River Valley plan.** The evaluation team believed that, given the limited time available for technology generation, the technical assistance team was justified in its decision not to attempt to develop this plan. Moreover, USAID gave no guidance to the technical assistance team concerning the requirements of such a plan.

5. USAID Management. **Project monitoring by USAID was unsatisfactory.** Its files for the project were sparse and the technical assistance team had the only complete documentation available. Additional problems included: 1) the lack of a workable implementation plan; 2) lack of designation of responsibility for the project in USAID; 3) lack of systematic reporting or field visits; 4) lack of commodity procurement and participant training plans; and 5) the preparation of only two Project Implementation Letters to provide guidance to the GOGB. With respect to procurement, the technical assistance team identified all equipment and supplies needed and made a global procurement request to USAID in 1985. Due to the absence of timely action, all commodities arrived in 1987.

Lesson Learned: No planning or monitoring of this project by USAID was in evidence. USAID was unable to handle the complexities of procurement. This activity would be more appropriately handled through the contractor.

6. Impact on Women. The project invested considerable effort in the provision of equipment that did not increase the productivity of labor in rice production. Rice is traditionally cultivated in the bas-fond by women and their daughters. Men play no role in this activity although with the introduction of water control structures they were expected to be responsible for dike construction and maintenance. Data on gender role differentiation and agronomic practices indicate that men are more likely to use machetes in their work and women and men use rakes about equally. In 1985, the project sold 1088 machetes in project and non-project areas and 237 rakes. Overall, greater numbers of hand tools that would be used by men were sold. Similarly, the project sold 150 donkey carts in 1985. Animal traction is the purview of men. The utility of donkey carts in improving the productivity of rural labor was not in question. The critical question was whether project resources should have been used to subsidize the purchase of inputs that did not directly increase the productivity of women's labor in rice production. Many types of mechanized agricultural equipment for rice producers exist, but the project did not offer these for sale.

Lesson Learned: Resources from the project's input supply system could have been used to support local production of agricultural equipment for rice producers.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION OF THE LESOTHO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT PROJECT (632-0221), MAY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. In 1980, the Government of Lesotho (GOL) identified two major goals in agricultural development: increasing agricultural production and employment. In formulating its Fourth Five Year Plan (1987-1991), the GOL recognized that: the need for creation of domestic jobs was urgent and becoming more serious with time; food production was not keeping pace with population growth; and viable marketing institutions, food distribution networks and agro-industrial production bases had not been developed. The GOL expects the agricultural sector to play an increasing role in providing increases in income and employment as the labor force continues to expand and job opportunities outside the country continue to decline.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. On March 5, 1985, A.I.D. authorized $26.1 million for the Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support (LAPIS) project. The Project Assistance Completion Date is August 31, 1991.

The purpose of the project is to provide direct production and marketing assistance to small farmers and to strengthen GOL institutional capabilities in agricultural research and extension for contributing to small farmer production, in order to increase incomes and employment of the rural population of Lesotho. End of project conditions are as follows:

- Farming households are involved in intensive horticulture, cash crops and livestock production activities, which have measurably contributed to increased employment and income;

- A coordinating structure is operating within the Ministry of Agriculture to support smallholder production projects;

- The Ministry Research division is capable of addressing the constraints to smallholder agriculture, testing and developing improved packages and assisting in the dissemination of these packages to small farmers;

- Training institutions are capable of training Ministry extension and technical staff, farmers and public and private sector personnel involved in smallholder agriculture; and

- Basotho are trained to support and maintain the objectives of this project.

A.I.D. signed the prime contract for the project with American Agriculture International in March 1986 and contract personnel began to arrive in-country in June 1986. The project also includes two Cooperative Agreements, one with CARE ($629,200) and the other with Credit Unions of North America/World Council of Credit Unions (CUNA/WCCU) ($1,898,700).

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to identify project areas which may require further attention and possibly redesign.

The evaluation methodology involved document review, interviews and site visits.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. Despite the fact that the project was in an early stage, it achieved significant progress in a number of areas. Nevertheless, there were questions concerning institutionalization and the degree of Ministry of Agriculture support. Progress was in evidence in all components, as discussed in greater detail below. For example, the eight project participants during the first year of the project earned estimated annual returns from M173 to M2,896 as a result of project activities. After one and one-half years, there were 39 individual farmers and two farmer associations (with 70 total members) in production, compared to planned outputs of 20 individual farmers in production and no farmer associations.

While the project was accomplishing quantified outputs, it was not being successfully incorporated into Ministry operations, nor was the Ministry providing adequate personnel support to the project, particularly in the field. Unless the Ministry considerably increases its participation during the life of the project, much of what has been achieved in terms of institutional knowledge and organization will be lost. More specifically, unless the Ministry creates an internal institutional structure, such as the Production Coordination Unit, conceived of in project design as the central organizational entity to coordinate and stimulate support for smallholdings, it is unlikely such support will continue past project completion. While the GOL notified USAID in April, 1987 that they had established the Production Coordination Unit in compliance with a condition precedent in the project agreement, neither the

Ministry, USAID nor the contractor had taken steps to make this unit operational.

The level of Ministry support was affected by the large number of their personnel (38) on long-term training under the project. (That the project was able to identify and send off this large number of participant trainees was impressive.) However, provision of field personnel, i.e., those below the degree level, should not be affected by the long-term training program.

> Recommendation: Although it is too early to recommend an extension, one solution to the problem of attempting institutional strengthening and long-term training simultaneously is to use a longer life of project time frame, spread out trainee departures and plan for expatriate technical assistance presence before trainee departure, during their absence and after their return. Otherwise, to try to accomplish all LAPIS project objectives during a five or six year period is unrealistic. Any extension should consider this alternative design.
>
> The project must establish a functioning Production Coordination Unit in order to attain the coordination necessary for successful project implementation.

2. Component 1: Production Initiative Component (PIC)
Progress on the irrigated crop production phase of the component generally exceeded planned outputs. The project demonstrated the feasibility of irrigated horticultural production as well as the willingness of farmers to undertake a new and risky activity and successfully apply the new technology. However, the project gave insufficient attention to the marketing issue. As supply of horticultural products increases (also as a result of other projects) marketing is likely to become more of a constraint.

Even more important, recent policy statements by some members of the GOL indicated skepticism concerning the viability of projects which focus on smallholder production for attaining GOL objectives. These statements indicated the GOL's preference for the capital intensive consolidated irrigated production approach. These pronouncements raised questions as to the likelihood of adequate government support during the life of LAPIS, also with respect to the continuation of the program after project completion. In addition, the Ministry had not provided adequate personnel for this component. In mid-February, the Ministry took steps to rectify the long-standing shortage of technical personnel assigned to the project, but unless the Ministry makes available a

sufficient number of extension agents, in particular for on-the-job-training to continue the program beyond the pilot stage, which is all that can be attained under the present project, there is no justification for continuation of this component.

> Recommendation: If USAID is unable to obtain firm assurance of adequate Ministry support for the Production Initiative Component, the component should be terminated. In view of the pivotal position of the Production Initiative Component in the project, its termination would require re-evaluation of inputs into the other two components.

3. Component 2: Agricultural Education. **The educational component was successful.** The education component made considerable progress in upgrading the academic standards at the Lesotho Agricultural College (LAC). Long-term training of LAC faculty and the marked increase in the amount of practical hands-on training addressed some of the basic weaknesses of the program prior to LAPIS intervention. An examination of past and current LAC catalogues demonstrated improvements in courses. LAC faculty and students praised the quality of the technical assistance.

The student enterprise projects, intended to demonstrate the profitability of agricultural production and a major contribution to the practical aspects of student training, worked out very well. The LAC Credit Union provided loans for these projects at a 12 percent interest rate. Of the five projects undertaken, all returned a profit to the students.

> Recommendation: LAC should consider adding additional courses related to commercial agriculture, such as agricultural marketing, agribusiness and crop reporting.

4. Component 4: Agricultural Research. **The intended emphasis in Farming Systems Research was not pursued under this component.** The purpose of this component, as stated in the Project Paper, was to "assist the research division to strengthen its Farming Systems Research (FSR) Program to produce and deliver a continuing flow of improved technologies for increasing the productivity of Lesotho's farmers." The technical assistance team argued that a working FSR program did not exist in the Research Division when the LAPIS project was initiated and that LAPIS should not be a farming systems project. The evaluation team believed there is an important role for FSR in the LAPIS project, in particular because the project is a direct

intervention in the existing farming system and knowledge about those systems and the effects of the interventions are essential if the interventions are to be self-sustaining and of positive benefit to farmers. Neither the Ministry nor USAID wholly shared the evaluation team's views.

> Recommendation: The project should hold a workshop, as already planned by project management, to assess the direction of and ways to strengthen the research program. The project should seek external assistance for carrying out the workshop, including one individual who is a specialist in carrying out FSR methodology.

5. <u>USAID Management</u>. There was room for improvement in USAID monitoring of the project. Under A.I.D./Washington instructions, the project was designed to minimize, to the extent possible, the direct oversight roles of direct-hire USAID personnel. While this approach might have been appropriate earlier, given the problems which developed, it was no longer appropriate. Increased field trips to project sites outside of Maseru were required of USAID project managers to enable them to assess project activities on-site and hold in-depth conversations with field personnel at the same time. The team was able to review evidence of 1986 site visits only. Records relating to 1987 site visits could not be located. Quarterly Project Monitoring Reports did not include information on progress toward meeting project objectives or expenditure/procurement information.

Both USAID and the technical assistance team raised the issue of "flexibility." Both appeared to believe that the LAPIS project must be exempt from documentation procedures (used to document revisions in project design) in order to achieve flexibility in project implementation. They stated that management determined that formal project revisions would not be required in the project as long as the purpose and goal remain unchanged.

A final management issue was the question of the appropriate reference document. There were four major project documents -- the Project Paper, the Grant Agreement, the AAI contract, and the Benchmark Report -- and these might have been in conflict on any one point. There was never a comprehensive review of these documents to determine in what ways they differed. Of particular concern was the statement in the Benchmark Report, "USAID considers the technical substance of these documents to supercede that of the Project Paper." This statement was not supported by proper documentation to indicate formal revision of the Project Paper had occurred when necessary.

Recommendation: As proposed by USAID, the project should hold a team-building exercise. Included as one purpose should be resolution of project documentation issues, i.e., how the various design documents relate to one another and when formal documentation is necessary in the case of project modifications.

The USAID project manager should conduct regular field visits, at least on a quarterly basis, in addition to representational visits.

The project should strengthen management by holding regular Project Management Committee meetings.

The Quarterly Project Monitoring Reports should include expenditure status, commodity status, major problems and recommended actions and expected progress toward meeting objective for the next quarter.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION OF THE USE AND SOCIOECONOMIC PROFITABILITY OF IMPORTED COMMODITIES UNDER THE MADAGASCAR AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION AND SUPPORT PROJECT (687-0101), DECEMBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Throughout 1980-1986, there were substantial annual reductions in the volume of imports due to the scarcity of foreign exchange. Imports in 1986 were limited to about US$ 330 million, a drop of over 50 percent in real terms from their 1980 level (US$ 764 million). The balance of payments situation remained weak as a result of poor export performance and debt service payment obligations. It was extremely difficult for importers to obtain access to foreign exchange to permit importation of equipment and spare parts required in the rehabilitation effort.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In April 1985, A.I.D. authorized $4,460,000 for the Madagascar Rehabilitation and Support project. The purpose of the project was to support the rehabilitation and recovery of the Malagasy agricultural sector through increased foreign exchange allocations for imports of key agricultural and rural transportation products. Project funding was intended to finance the importation of farm tractors, spare parts for road building tractors, graders and a low-bridge superstructure. The project strategy centered on using private sector firms to import and distribute the commodities.

Between 1985 and 1987, A.I.D. amended the project four times to bring total project funding to $14,235,000. The Project Assistance Completion Date was September 1989.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to document the developmental results and impact of the program, and, in particular, the extent to which it directly or indirectly benefitted small farmers. The evaluation did not examine the impact of counterpart fund-supported self-help measures.

The methodology involved interviews with import firms to select a sample of direct beneficiaries. Based on these interviews, the evaluation team developed a sample of indirect beneficiaries whom they interviewed concerning the end use of the commodities. Because there is one rainy season per year, the evaluation team determined they would focus on the beneficiaries of commodities imported prior to October 1986.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **The utilization of commodities under the project supported the government's policy goal of improving food self-sufficiency.** The program encouraged farmers to save by facilitating access to essential equipment and encouraged semi-mechanization and farm produce collection using Ford tractors and light trucks. As of November 1987, 69 Ford tractors, 100 Ford light trucks, a low bridge superstructure and a supply of Caterpillar spare parts for road-building equipment had been imported into Madagascar under the program. The equipment was sold quickly after its arrival in-country.

After their import, two out of every three tractors were purchased by the private sector. Almost all private farmers used their tractors in direct agricultural production, while the parastatal companies used their tractors primarily for the collection of cash crops and the transportation of sugar cane. Tractor use proved economically beneficial to the owners as the associated expansion in cultivated area and improvement in yields increased production value, despite the 1987 fall in producer prices. The majority of project beneficiaries acknowledged an increase in their production and income.

Two major problems were: 1) the tractors' high cost; and 2) the problems of maintenance for farms situated long distances from after-sales service centers.

> Recommendation: Since there was a very strong demand for the project's commodities, the project should be maintained and, if possible, intensified.
>
> Because low producer prices threatened the ability of some farmers to pay off loans taken out to purchase the vehicles, action programs should be initiated to stabilize crop prices as an economically viable level.
>
> Since maintenance was a problem, the mission should undertake a follow-up questionnaire to establish a list of the most frequently needed spare parts. Based on this list, a standard set of parts should accompany future vehicle sales.
>
> The project should explore modifications to bank credit systems to improve access to credit for young people and women.

2. Caterpillar Spare Parts. The private sector was by far the largest user of spare parts. Roadworks benefitted the most, followed by agro-industry, mines and industrial fishing. The direct beneficiaries were the 15 purchasing companies themselves, many of which would have closed operations had it not been for their access to Caterpillar parts. The indirect beneficiaries were the 3,200 workers employed by these companies. A third category of beneficiaries was the local population who benefitted by the completion of roads and dams and through improved access to processed goods such as sugar.

3. Light Trucks. The purchasers of the light trucks were all in the private sector and the vast majority were involved in service industries. Most of the trucks were used for commercial transportation of inputs, farm produce, and consumer goods to and from the rural areas.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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FIRST EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION SUPPORT PROJECT (683-0234), JANUARY, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Prior to 1975, the research, extension and credit system in Nigeria serviced cash crops, a continuation of agricultural activities from colonial days. The drought of the early 1970s brought a change in orientation toward food crops. In addition, the Government of Nigeria (GON) began to elaborate an agricultural strategy that gave priority to: 1) achieving food self-sufficiency; 2) transforming the parastatal agriculture input supply system into one run by cooperatives and the private sector; and 3) developing cooperatives and cooperative credit programs. The GON required assistance in all of the above areas.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1982, A.I.D. authorized $19.9 million for the Agriculture Production Support project. The purpose of the project was to strengthen supporting services needed to achieve sustainable increases in agricultural production. The Project Assistance Completion Date was June 1989.

The project was initially designed in 1980 but because of various design changes the six project components began implementation at different times:

- Input Supply	March 1985
- Cooperative Training and Credit	July 1985
- Extension Support	March 1986
- Seed Multiplication	Aug. 1982
- Fertilizer Use and Extension	March 1987
- Coordination and Management Unit	Aug. 1982

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGy. The purposes of the first external evaluation were to: 1) measure project progress to date; and 2) recommend modifications in project strategies and components to ensure success by the Project Assistance Completion Date and for their possible inclusion in follow-on activities. The methodology included document review, interviews and site visits.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **Project purpose achievement was mixed.** Delayed start-up of three components (input supply, cooperative training and extension support), non-adherence to its primary purpose by the seed multiplication component, and the failure of the GON to provide the human resources to create the necessary government-project bridging at the top accounted for modest performance. The result was a project which was not completely coherent and lacked the desired cross-fertilization of components, attributable in part to failure of the project to adhere to its original organizational design.

The size of the project (its physical, financial and human resources) made it appear a competitor (and a threat) to the very national-level institutions it was designed to strengthen. From the project's standpoint it was often easier and more effective to bypass the weak national service and go directly to the field or set up its own operating infrastructure. The result, however, was failure to collaborate and cooperate at the national level. And, for the longer term, the national services were not prepared, either with the experienced personnel or financially, to sustain the field-level human resources that had been developed or maintain the additional infrastructure that had been created. As discussed in greater detail below, the six project components made varying degrees of progress toward strengthening or creating infrastructure which, in turn, could strengthen national support services.

> Recommendation: In the future, project designers should critically analyze the advantages and disadvantages of creating a project with several discrete components, each implemented by a separate agency . They should consider alternatives ways to reach objectives such as spinning off one or more components into a separate project.

2. Component 1: Input Supply. **The project made some progress in providing an institutional framework to allow the Central d'Approvisionnement (CA, the input supply center) to be managed and owned as a business.** The project made progress in institutionalizing inventory, accounting and financial management systems at CA headquarters. The CA was formally transferred to the cooperative movement and there was some CA-cooperative movement interaction with respect to training. However, while cooperative directors were responsible for collecting payments and managing inventory at the field level, members had not been trained to undertake these tasks. Moreover, the CA did not operate according to sound business principles. Therefore it did not have a positive financial track record to attract business buy-ins. The CA's operating costs had not declined and warehouse rental and vehicle maintenance represented a significant impediment to reduction of operating costs.

> Recommendation: To become financially independent, the CA should be allowed to control pricing policy and move toward reducing its burdensome inventories. It must also have sufficient independence to eliminate unprofitable operations and liquidate buildings and property.
>
> The project should seek donor and GON agreement to allow the CA to utilize the proceeds of fertilizer sales as a revolving fund, or financing should be provided through a loan on a concessional basis. This assistance should take place on a fixed timetable which aims at CA self-sufficiency at the end of the designated period.

3. Component 2: Cooperative Training. **The cooperative training component, including its credit subcomponent, made substantial progress in a short time toward achieving its purpose of "contributing to the growth of a viable cooperative movement in Niger."** With project assistance, cooperatives were undertaking viable economic activities and were starting to achieve their social and economic objectives. These achievements were attributable to the component's training model, which helped cooperatives identify, design and carry out economic activities. So successful was the training model that six other organizations sought out the component for assistance with their own cooperative training needs. Several asked component staff to help them design a training unit based on the component's model.

There were 114 pilot cooperatives under the project. This was more than one-half of the final goal of 210 cooperatives. Expansion was occurring on average at the pace of twenty new cooperatives per quarter. The main reasons that CLUSA's cooperatives were succeeding in their movement toward capitalization and self-management where others failed were that: 1) the CLUSA assistants were willing to be based in the villages; 2) many income-generating activities were successful; 3) the training model was village-based needs driven and pragmatic; and 4) the intervention was centered on training and not credit.

Recommendation: The project should develop a comprehensive and standardized training plan.

4. Component 3: Extension Support. **Despite the GON's failure to provide adequate counterpart extension staff, and the project's failure to strengthen national extension staff, training of field extension staff was proceeding well.** The project by-passed the national agency office in the Ministry of Agriculture and provided support directly to field agents, in part because the GON failed to provide counterpart personnel and support staff at the national level. The training programs were well-received by field personnel and were timely and appropriate.

Recommendation: The GON should provide the minimum numbers of professional cadre and support staff. This will help ensure the sustainability of the Extension Support Center after project financing ends.

5. Component 4: Seed Multiplication. **After five years of operation, the seed component had not achieved its primary purpose, that of producing high quality seed.** The component produced large quantities of low-value seed. Very little seed had been sold to local farmers and there was no monitoring of the performance of this component since the activity began in the 1970s. The quality of the seed had been called into question by a number of observers and had been listed as the principal reason that farmer demand for project seed was so low. The seed technologist's work was criticized as superficial.

Recommendation: The next phase of the component must solve the quality control problems if any of the previous investments are to pay off. Additional training in seed technology, soil conservation and quality control is necessary for the staff. Farmers' use of the seed must be monitored to allow the component to give feedback to the research unit.

6. Component 5: Fertilizer Use and Extension. Given the failure of the 1987 fertilizer trials, there was no progress toward purpose achievement, which was to eliminate constraints to fertilizer utilization. The failure of the fertilizer trials could be traced to several problems: the drought and the late start-up of the rains; the late arrival -- after farmers had planted their crops -- of the fertilizers and insecticide; and the failure of the component, after five years of research, to design a protocol that included the recommended rate of phosphate application. In addition, it appeared the project used a traditional top-down extension methodology that did not include input from farmers.

Recommendation: The trial and demonstration program should be redesigned prior to the 1988 planting season. The protocol should be based on previous research on phosphate fertilizers in Nigeria. Feedback from farmers who participated in the 1987 trials should be evaluated and included in the new protocol design.

7. Component 6: Program Coordination and Management Unit (PCMU). The PCMU's organization bore little resemblance to that which was proposed in the Project Agreement. This affected the degree to which it was able to provide coordination and management. In the Project Agreement, the PCMU was to include support and accounting staff, a management specialist, research and extension liaison, evaluation officers and three staff assistants. The PCMU was to have had "primarily oversight and problem-solving responsibilities." It was to have been overseen by an Inter-Ministerial Executive Committee (IMEC), which was created to set broad guidelines for the project.

The IMEC met only once. Thus, the forum for discussion of common problems was eliminated. In place of the original design, the project coordinator worked with a management specialist, his counterpart, and the research/extension liaison and evaluation officer. Collaboration with project components was uneven. Other than the production of a draft policy paper on seeds and a recent evaluation of the seed component, which contained policy recommendations, the PCMU had little activity in the other component areas.

> Recommendation: The PCMU should develop methodologies that will help the several components and the project as a whole measure the attainment of outputs. This could be done by the PCMU itself or in collaboration with the Agricultural Statistics Department. This information should then serve as the basis for formulating agricultural policy objectives, especially concerning input supply, extension and credit.

8. <u>Replicability</u>. **While the project as a whole should not be replicated, some components and sub-components merit replication.** The cooperative training component and its credit subcomponent were replicable. Certain elements of other components were replicable including the seed multiplication component's contract growers' program, the extension support component's in-service training activity aimed at low and middle-level extension personnel and the financial management assistance package for the input supply component.

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COMPREHENSIVE REPORT AND EVALUATION: CEREALS PRODUCTION II PROJECT EXTENSION (685-0235), AUGUST, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Senegal has become increasingly concerned about the deterioration of the agricultural resource base of the Groundnut Basin (GNB). This two million hectare area of mixed grain and peanut farms, located in West Central Senegal, has traditionally supplied Senegal's primary export of peanut oil. However, as trees under cultivation expanded, other trees and crop residues have been increasingly exploited for fuel and fodder. The resulting degradation of soils and vegetative cover has been exacerbated by a number of low rainfall years and drought conditions. Since the onset of the drought in 1968, this problem has been called "desertification."

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1985, A.I.D. reprogrammed $2.1 million of the funds remaining in the Senegal Cereals Production project for a pilot program in agroforestry and soil conservation. This activity came to be known as the "Projet de l'Agroforesterie et du Conservation des Sols et des Eaux" or "PACFOCSE." The purpose of the project was to extend and monitor agroforestry plantings at the village level, as well as conduct adaptive research and support training in agroforestry. PACFOCSE aimed to carry out: 1) soil conservation and agroforestry in 60 villages; 2) adaptive research on agroforestry techniques; and 3) studies of environmental degradation, interagency coordination, village reactions and the technical and economic feasibility of various interventions.

In addition to USAID, the following institutions were involved in implementing the project: Societe de Developpement et Vulgarisation Agricole (SOVEDA), which provided extension and extension education; the Ministry for the Protection of Nature, which collaborated on tree planting; Institute Senegalais de Recherches Agricoles (ISRA), which planned to carry out the research; Centre d'Etude et de Researche sur les Energies Renouvables (CERER), which provided stove-building techniques; the U.S. Peace Corps, which supplied village-level volunteer extension workers; and the International Science and Technology Institute (ISTI) which provided a long-term forestry advisor and short-term consultancies through a direct contract with A.I.D. The Project Assistance Completion Date was planned for Dec. 31, 1987.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to measure progress toward achieving project objectives and project impact.

The methodology involved site visits, document review and interviews. Because this was a final evaluation, the team presented a series of lessons to be taken into consideration in the design of future agroforesty projects, rather than recommendations.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **While some objectives were met, PACFOCSE, an experimental project, tended to emphasize extending innovations and technologies rather than testing them.** The extension aspect was reinforced by project design which provided more detail on the extension work to be done than on the experimental or research work. Other weaknesses in the experimental aspect of the project included: 1) vagueness about the overall program and purpose of the research; 2) no follow-up on the research plan which was developed in the first year; 3) lack of a village level survey that would yield answers to technical questions such as adoption of different species to different sites; 4) lack of study results on the acceptance by the villagers of the project; 5) lack of information that would account for good survival rates in some villages and total failure in others; and 6) little or no data on rainfall or land-use characteristics or facts other than those pertaining to tree planting. As discussed below, the project generally met its objectives with respect to production, training and extension.

> Lesson Learned: Data collection and analysis are crucial to developing projects based on village-level trials.

2. Production. **Tree-planting was relatively successful.** The project planted a wide variety of trees, both native and exotic, in 63 villages and raised more than one hundred thousand trees per year, comprising more than fifteen species, in numerous nurseries (including 21 village nurseries). However, an assessment of accomplishments in agroforestry can only be partial. The oldest tress had only three years of growth by the time the project ended. Their survival was still in question and would continue to be until the fifth year at the earliest. Survival rates in 1986 were as follows: woodlots -- 58%; community orchards -- 44%; double line windbreaks -- 34%; single line plantings -- 62%; single trees -- 40%;

A.albida plantings -- 46%; and A. albida regeneration -- 89%.

Lesson Learned: The value of trees cannot be demonstrated only by planting them. If the value of trees is not already known and accepted, they will probably not survive due to lack of protection. Future projects should emphasize: site visits by village leaders to well-established plantings; improved educational work; and compensatory measures for extraordinary costs incurred in tree protection.

3. Training. **While many short-term training activities were conducted for project staff, extension agents and villagers, the majority of these events took place in the last year of the project.** The participants did have an excellent chance to learn and be exposed to different approaches. However, the short time left for project implementation lessened the potential benefits of the training.

Lesson Learned: Training of development cadres and villagers should take place as early as possible in the project life so that learning can be reapplied to the project.

4. Extension. **The project was successful in reaching out to and working in a number of villages, but the extension approach used was not suited to untested interventions.** The villages were major beneficiaries of the project's extension and tree planting activities. Included in these activities were the planting of woodlots, orchards, windbreaks, windrows, and live fencing. However, the extension approach used by the project was more suited to proven technologies that generate beneficial results for farmers. Some of the project's technologies were unproven in their application to village conditions or were of uncertain and very delayed benefit. For example, a windbreak's effectiveness cannot be demonstrated merely by planting a double line of trees because effects will not be seen by villagers until the windbreak is four meters tall and, prior to that, the trees may even depress the growth of nearby crops as they compete for water and nutrients. Also, the extension approach was poorly suited to field trials that seek both technical and socioeconomic adaptation of research results. In sum, classes and talks by extension agents are not adequate for such large-scale, community-wide resource management changes.

Lesson Learned: A more effective alternative to traditional extension methods would be to arrange visits by villagers to villages or sites where windbreaks are full grown and their benefits are being enjoyed and to let other villagers testify to their effectiveness and benefits.

5. Project Design. **Accomplishments were determined and limited by the project's design.** The design was limited by lack of detailed consideration of key aspects such as research, management of coordination among participating agencies and project administration by USAID. Two key items that should have been included as project outputs were: 1) identification of qualitatively improved agroforestry interventions; and 2) a coordinated research program.

On the other hand, some project activities that were ultimately quite successful were not included during design. For instance, wood-burning stoves were considered but dropped during project design. However, during implementation this element was included with great success. 100 women were trained in stovemaking and they built a total of 1,121 stoves, an innovation which spread to other villages. Fruit trees also were not a design output but were a felt need of villagers and engendered great interest in the project.

Finally, the distinction between the need to conserve existing soils and the need to regenerate degraded ones was not made during project design. Thus, the tree planting exercise seems to have assumed that the soils were viable and merely needed to be conserved. While the project generated very good studies on the degraded nature of the soils, the soil studies would have been more useful during the design stage when their results could have been taken into account in planning the various interventions, research and trials in the villages. This would have resulted in a better mix of tree-planting and soil-restoring actions.

Lesson Learned: Future agroforestry projects should place greater emphasis on the usefulness of related interventions for drawing villagers into active participation in the project.

When developing projects that focus on interventions aimed at reversing land degradation or conserving soils, data on the soils should precede project design.

6. Societe de Developpement et Vulgarisation Agricole (SODEVA) Management. **SODEVA used a top-down approach that inhibited the project's experimental emphasis.**

The project employed a top-down approach by insisting on a certain tree-planting formula in every village. In addition, SODEVA's decision to give bonuses to extension agents based on performance contributed to the project's focus on outputs, as opposed to awareness-raising and technical advice to village management committees. This top-down, performance-oriented mode did not allow the flexibility needed by such a pilot project to discover -- through an open dialogue with villagers -- the constraints of soil and water conservation and to respond with appropriate trials and interventions.

> Recommendation: Community dynamics and community-level common property resource management must be considered to avoid a top-down approach to project implementation.

> Local ingenuity is a source of innovations that projects should take advantage of by analyzing and improving on existing low-cost techniques developed by villagers.

7. Management Structure. **The project's management structure did not enhance project implementation.** The project's technical and financial management was distributed among USAID, the technical assistance forestry advisor and the SODEVA PACFOCSE director. The SODEVA PACFOCSE director was responsible for providing leadership for planning and coordinating the project's yearly activities, including research, while the technical assistance forester was largely responsible for technical coordination of forestry inputs and village operations. The SODEVA PACFOCSE director was based in Dakar, while the technical assistance forester was based in one of the project areas (Thies). This physical distance resulted in a loss of valuable time in project implementation and delays in project decision-making and communication.

> Lesson Learned: Innovative projects require field-based management and streamlined administrative structures.

> Pilot projects require unique coordinating mechanisms.

8. USAID Management. **USAID's financial and contractual management of inputs resulted in a number of key delays in project implementation.** Both contractual and financial matters tended to be subject to the management priorities of USAID's overall program and larger projects, not necessarily the priorities of PACFOCSE. The inevitable consequence was delays in the

signing of contracts and the disbursement of funds. These delays hindered seasonal work such as nursery activities and research with trees and crops.

> Lesson Learned: USAID's financial and contractual administrative procedures are best suited to large projects. They are often too complicated to fulfill the demands of innovative projects requiring coordination of authority and small, timely cash disbursements. USAID should not use the direct-purchase method for needed inputs for such projects, but should consider hiring a contractor for input administration.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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MIDTERM EVALUATION OF THE ZIO RIVER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (693-0226), MARCH, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Located in Southern Togo, the Zio River region is a relatively well-endowed area. Rainfall is sufficient to have two growing seasons. The Ewe, the main ethnic group of the region, are a resourceful, hard-working people with aspirations for upward mobility and an appreciation for education. An unusual feature of the area is a technically sound, irrigated perimeter capable of watering up to 600 hectares built by Chinese and Taiwanese aid in the 1960s and 1970s.

Despite these endowments, rural poverty is widespread in the Zio region. In 1983, rural family income was $72. For the most part, resources are not well-utilized or managed. For example, the water of the canals of the Zio Irrigated Perimeter was covered with weeds and used by only a small number of producers who were not organized or trained to practice modern agricultural techniques, much less maintain perimeter infrastructure. The productivity of rainfed agriculture was very low.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1984, A.I.D. authorized $3.5 million for the Zio River Economic Development Project. The purpose of the project was to enable the inhabitants of the region to attain higher levels of economic, human and institutional development by increasing productivity through better utilization and management of resources. The Project Assistance Completion Date was planned for September 1989.

The project had four major components: 1) strengthening farmer producer organizations to make production more efficient and provide producers with input acquisition, marketing and management skills; 2) strengthening local institutions that enable Zio producers to make better use of their resources; 3) institutionalizing credit and providing management education, business development training and adult problem solving education; and 4) improving the productivity of the Zio River Irrigated Perimeter.

To implement the project, A.I.D. signed a Cooperative Agreement with Partnership for Productivity International and its local affiliate, the Association pour la Productivite (APP) au Togo. APP implemented the project until December 1986 when USAID turned project management over to CARE, International.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The midterm evaluation had four learning objectives. They were to: 1) make improvements in the design and execution of the Zio River project; 2) create an appreciation among project staff of the policy significance of project activities with respect to African rural economic development; 3) increase understanding among donor institutions as to what productivity technology is; and 4) measure progress toward rural productivity.

The evaluation methodology consisted of: 1) four studies; and 2) two evaluation workshops. Project staff prepared the following studies during October-December 1986: a critique of the field program; a socio-economic impact survey among clients and other producers in the region; a financial audit and a study about APP businesses that could support Zio producers and generate program revenue. The findings of these studies were presented at two evaluation workshops. The first, on November 21-22, was for APP staff and USAID representatives. The second workshop, on December 9-10, was attended by representatives of eight rural development institutions to discuss rural productivity technologies and how agencies could collaborate to improve it.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The Zio River Project deserves serious consideration as a model for transferring the benefits of modern technology -- both production and management -- to traditional producers. The Association pour la Productivite's (APP) intensive approach to farmer training, credit and management training resulted in real gains in yields, income and skills among participating producers and has begun changing traditional ways of economic behavior. What was significant about the project was that APP integrated applied agronomic research, extension, credit training and a small business development program in ways that made it possible for small farmers to adopt modern practices and behavior. This combination of services is a rarity among rural development institutions in Africa where these four components almost never function together successfully. The most impressive aspect of APP's integrated approach is that in two years' time it established the possibility for more profitable small farmer agriculture in the region. People now know that they can raise multiple crops, produce food crops of higher value and use modern inputs, practices, credit and training institutions effectively. Not just production is changing, but a whole series of habits and thinking about management of an economic activity to increase its profitability.

Just a few of the many accomplishments compared to one APP objective include the following.

Objective: Increase quantity/quality of agriculture related activities

Accomplishments:

- APP farmer income double 1984 income
- APP farmer yields 2-4 times above regional averages
- 93% of beneficiaries farming 2 or more crops intensively
- APP farmers' ag revenue 62% greater than other local producers

While the project achieved notable successes, questions were raised concerning the cost-effectiveness of service delivery, i.e., how APP's training and credit could be delivered at a more affordable cost. APP assisted 422 small-scale economic projects over two years of project implementation. The investment costs of ten field agents and 21 total program staff were initially very high in relation to services delivered.

> Recommendation: The project should develop a service delivery approach that continues to be effective but is more cost-effective and reaches larger numbers of producers. The project should consider charging for credit education and production and management training. In addition to whatever revenues might be generated, it will make both producers and agents more conscious of managing their time effectively.

2. Component One: Strengthening Farmer Producer Organizations. **APP successfully used a group formation approach to deliver technological packages and provide farmer training and support services.** While during year one, project staff worked mainly with individuals, by the second year of the project, APP was organizing three types of groups: agricultural production groups; associations of farmers organized around a "model client"; and water user groups. APP provided technological packages (for corn, cowpeas, peanuts and irrigated rice) to farmers in these groups through a farmer training system. The packages resulted in yield increases of two to four times over traditional yields. For example, while the average yield of peanuts in the Maritime region was 400 kg/ha, the 1986 average peanut yield among APP producers was 1100 kg/ha. Similarly, while the average yield for irrigated rice was 1500

kg/ha, in 1986, the average irrigated rice yield for APP producers was 3700kg/ha.

> Recommendation: The project should take elements of the present approach that have worked and increasingly apply them to group mechanisms. The project should set quotas and monitor the extent to which APP's systems are being transformed from an individual to a group approach. The project should reorient APP personnel to be trainers of trainers.

3. Component Two: Collaboration with Local Institutions. **APP successfully collaborated with public sector institutions and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs)** . APP successfully worked with ten local institutions and PVOs. Three examples include the following. 1) APP worked with the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, which supplied APP with plant varieties and prototypes of labor saving machines to test, as well as technical assistance in adapting these for local use. 2) APP's closest field level collaborator was the Centre Rizicole du Zio which assisted APP in drawing up an irrigated perimeter development strategy based on water user groups. 3) APP contracted with the Agricultural Statistics Service (DESA) to provide monthly price data and measure crop yields. However, the idea of APP field agents working hand in hand with public sector extensionists had not proven realistic. The approaches to increasing rural productivity of APP and public sector agencies were too different, as were levels of training, motivation and support. Meshing approaches and resources is technically and organizationally complex.

> Recommendation: For 1987-89, the project should define areas of potential collaboration with other rural development agencies. The project should consider having periodic exchanges of views, trainers and methods. APP and other agencies should test different approaches and compare results.

4. Component Three: Credit Education and Small Enterprise Development Training System. **APP established a successful credit education and small enterprise development training program.** APP developed a six-stage system for the provision of credit which included assisting clients in the design and execution of feasible, small-scale economic projects, monitoring of borrowers to ensure they use their loan for the purposes intended, and training in recordkeeping and profitability. By the end of

October 1986, APP had lent 22,823,185 CFA among 422 clients. Very few of these borrowers had had prior experience with productive credit, nor had many ever dealt with a formal credit institution. Of the amount lent, only five percent had to be written off and 10 percent was delinquent.

Recommendation: The project should undertake more comparative analysis concerning the project's problems and approaches for solving them. It should define a feasible reimbursement and correction strategy for troubled loans.

5. Component Four: Improving Productivity of the Irrigated Perimeter. Under this component, the project developed a technical package for irrigated rice production and formed the only water users' group in the perimeter. The technical package for irrigated rice production resulted in yields between three and four tons per hectare for farmers who used it correctly, compared to the traditional yield of less than two tons per hectare. Through the water users' group, the project provided intensive training in production and management techniques, and conferred maximum responsibility on farmers for the upkeep and management of their section, something no other development plan in the area attempted to do.

Recommendation: Based on experience with water user groups to date, the project should now develop a comprehensive, realistic plan for water management in the Zio Irrigated Perimeter.

6. Monitoring and Evaluation. A USAID/Togo management audit recognized the Zio river project as one of two projects in the mission's portfolio that had the means to monitor outputs and impact. APP developed a monitoring and evaluation system that measured the economic performance and socio-economic benefit of client projects and a management information system that tracked several major indicators of project performance such as volume of service delivery, credit fund activity and revenue generating capacity. APP added a new dimension to public policy analysis in Togo by collecting and analyzing evidence about performance and benefits. Two other local institutions approached APP to request information about the APP monitoring and evaluation system.

Recommendation: There is one expensive top-notch program for socio-economic analysis that has been adapted for use by IBM micro computers called SPSS/PC+. Given that APP does not have IBM computers in the Zio project, but USAID/REDSO in

Abidjan does, APP should use REDSO computer resources to analyze its data and shape its management and project analysis systems.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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FOOD PRODUCTION SUPPORT PROJECT: EVALUATION/DESIGN REPORT (617-0102), OCTOBER, 1987

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Agriculture is the most important sector of Uganda's economy. In the past, it accounted for approximately 97 percent of the country's export earnings, 56 percent of the gross domestic product and provided a livelihood for 90 percent of Uganda's population of 14 million. Total agricultural output declined during the period of Amin's rule (1971-1979). The 1979 liberation war and severe drought from 1978 to early 1981 caused a further decline in output of both cash and food crops. Total volume of export crops fell from 350,000 metric tons per year in the late 1960s to less than 120,000 in 1980. Subsistence agriculture declined by 16.3 percent per year between 1978-80. Rehabilitation of the agricultural sector is a priority in the Government of Uganda's (GOU) current economic recovery program. A major production constraint was the lack of agricultural inputs (tillage equipment, seeds, fertilizer, and spray pumps, among many other items).

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1981, A.I.D. authorized $5 million for the Food Production Support project (FPSP). Between 1982 and 1986, A.I.D. amended the project several times (without altering project purpose or goal). These amendments increased project funding to $11.9 million. The Project Assistance Completion Date was extended from 1984 to September 30, 1988.

The purposes of the project were to: 1) increase agricultural production, especially food production, by supplying Uganda's small farmers with farm implements and other inputs; and 2) rehabilitate the cooperative movement so that it could resume essential services in support of farmers. The project was designed to supply steel and limited equipment to UGMA Steel and Engineering Corporation so that it could produce hoes for small farmers; to import inputs; and to utilize the cooperative movement to distribute hoes, seeds, gunny sacks for marketing, bicycles, tires and related spare parts for transportation. The project was also to provide training and technical assistance to strengthen the distribution channels for the Ugandan cooperative sector.

A.I.D. signed a contract with Agricultural Cooperation Development International (ACDI) to provide technical assistance and training.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purposes of the evaluation were to: 1) assess the impact of the project; and 2) specify a clear direction for the cooperative movement in Uganda, with special attention to assistance in the areas of input distribution, marketing, farm credit and development of agribusiness to help sustain a viable small farmer cooperative system in the immediate years ahead.

The methodology involved extensive interviews, document review and limited direct observation.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. The project, although not without its difficulties, made significant progress toward achieving project goals and objectives. The hoes, bicycles, seeds and other commodities brought into Uganda under the project were of substantial value despite many problems with delays and profiteering. The input distribution program boosted farmer morale, improved agricultural production and enhanced the image of the cooperative movement. Equally important, the project helped A.I.D., the Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing (MCM), and leading institutions in the cooperative movement to identify the basic policy and institutional issues that needed to be resolved before Uganda's cooperative movement could effectively serve agricultural development objectives.

A comparison of seven major (out of a total of sixteen) planned vs. actual outputs is as follows.

- A planning unit is installed in MCM. The planning unit was established but was substantially under-staffed. Personnel required additional training and technical assistance.

- A long-term cooperative development plan is prepared. While there were plans in existence, comprehensive long and short-term plans were very weak.

- A report is prepared on improving procurement, storage and distribution procedures. Completed.

- 500 junior MCM officers complete a one-week seminar. As of 12/84, 700 were trained.

- 50 cooperative officers complete a four-week seminar. Approximately 100 trained.

- 10 participants complete short courses out-of-country. Approximately 100 personnel received training abroad.
- A report containing recommendations for improving cooperative banking procedures prepared. Inputs and outputs on credit greatly exceeded originally planned levels. Credit was moved to the top of the list of priorities in terms of technical assistance.

Recommendation: The current project should be brought to an orderly close and efforts should begin immediately to design a follow-on project addressing the key constraints that have been revealed through experiences with the project. The new project should include: agribusiness support, policy and planning, supply and distribution of production inputs and marketing and processing of agricultural products and cooperative education and training.

2. Implementation Problems: Commodity Program. The impact of the commodity program was weakened by several factors. First, the implementing agency and A.I.D. itself, played too large a role in input pricing; administrative judgments were substituted for market pricing and this hindered efficient distribution and use of the inputs. Second, many commodities (e.g., four-wheel vehicles, bicycles, motorcycles) went for the use of implementing agency officers and senior cooperative officials at the expense of the cooperative membership generally. Too much money was spent on motor vehicles (pickups, jeeps and motorcycles) at the expense of production inputs (hoes, seed, fertilizer) and bicycles that could have been of more value to the farming population. Procurement of commodities was unduly slow. Finally, the project did little (apart from training) to strengthen primary societies (not defined in the report) directly. With the benefit of hindsight, this might have been attributable to a flaw in project design, since a continued lack of basic equipment and facilities (scales, record-keeping materials, storage) seriously undermined the ability of primary societies to provide effective input supplies and marketing services.

Recommendation: A.I.D. assistance should be provided primarily to the cooperative movement itself (unions and societies) and only secondarily to the implementing agency -- and then only in support of necessary policy and regulatory functions.

A.I.D. assistance should give greater weight to material assistance of direct value to farmers

(production inputs and cooperative marketing and processing facilities) and relatively less weight to technical assistance and vehicles.

3. Technical Assistance. While the contractor, by many measures, did a superior job of project implementation, the technical assistance provided through the project was not as productive as might have been expected. A handful of activities appeared to have had real impact or hold special promise for future impact. First, the training and education programs improved morale and performance of cooperative members and managers at all levels. This kind of training was essential for development of the cooperative movement. Second, the 1984 project cooperative sector review helped crystallize a large number of key policy issues and placed them before Ugandan decision-makers in a persuasive form. The Bank of Uganda's Agricultural Secretariat, the Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing, the Uganda Cooperative Alliance and A.I.D. were following through on recommendations contained in that report. Third, the project took the first steps toward setting up a management information system in the implementing agency.

Three factors, however, limited the effectiveness of the technical assistance. First, there was a diffusion of effort across a broad range of well-intended activities, some of which might be judged to have been of minor importance. Second, circumstances required the Team Leader to spend an inordinate amount of time on minor logistical problems. Third, mounting civil and economic disorder, culminating in two coups, and the evacuation of expatriate staff, had a disruptive effect on the efforts of the technical assistance advisors. All in all, Uganda's farmers might have been better served had more money been spent on production inputs and less on technical assistance and if the technical assistance had been concentrated on solving operational problems of cooperatives and less on the new credit institution. The project provided little technical assistance in addressing critical marketing issues.

Recommendation: A.I.D. assistance should focus on a select-number of high priority policy and institutional concerns to avoid diffusion of effort and impact.

4. Uganda Agricultural Finance Agency (UAFA). The project devoted an excessive amount of effort to establishing UAFA at the expense of other objectives, such as assisting the Department of Planning in the Ministry of Cooperatives and Marketing and the district

unions. In the best of times, launching a new credit institution is slow, costly and risky. Launching a new credit institution to serve very small borrowers seemed particularly ill-advised, at a time of 200 percent inflation with major shortages of production goods to finance, major problems in pricing and pricing policy and continuing overall national economic uncertainty. Even if repayment were not to become a problem and administrative costs could be kept within manageable levels, the capital fund would almost inevitably be rapidly depreciated by inflation. Finally, interviews at farm shops suggested that most farmers had sufficient funds to buy the limited inputs available. A major problem was that there was little in the way of production inputs to finance, if financing had been available. Reports indicated that USAID was in the forefront in the recent concentration of technical assistance on the new credit institution.

> Recommendation: If a new credit program is to be launched, it probably would be best to view it as pilot program effort to test new methods, develop staff and prepare the basis for a large program when the need is clear and economic conditions are more favorable. At the end of three-four years, the experience should be evaluated and a decision should be made as to whether a new institution should be established or the credit activity terminated permanently.

<u>EVALUATION TEAM</u>.

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START-UP EVALUATION: CENTRAL SHABA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (660-0105), DECEMBER, 1988

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. One of the principal priorities of the 1986 Government of Zaire (GOZ) Five Year Development Plan was the achievement of national self-sufficiency in food crops by 1990. Agriculturalists generally believe that Zaire possesses considerable unrealized potential for increased agricultural production, due in part to the wide variations in agroclimatic conditions, abundant rainfall and plentiful surface water resources. Despite these advantages, only 4 percent of the land suitable for agricultural production is actually cultivated. In addition, World Bank estimates indicated that in 1986 there was a shortfall in corn (a principal staple food crop) production of approximately 152,000. Shortfalls are expected to decrease somewhat through 1998 but still remain considerable.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1986, A.I.D. authorized $33.9 for the Central Shaba Agricultural Development Project. The purpose of the project was to increase the production of corn in Shaba, relying to the extent practicable on private sector interests, mobilized to induce and support small cultivator productivity. The Project Assistance Completion Date was planned for September 30, 1993.

Total project funding was set at $59,113. Other funding sources included the GOZ (local currency equivalent of $24.4 million, including $16.4 million in counterpart funds) and Peace Corps ($0.8 million).

Project activities were organized into three discrete components: 1) agriculture (extension, storage activities and the information office); 2) seed production and distribution; and 3) roads rehabilitation and maintenance. The agriculture activities were administered directly by project personnel (the contractor was not identified in the report), while the roads component was implemented by the GOZ Roads Bureau. The seed activities were managed by a private sector seed company. Coordination of these three activities was the responsibility of the Project Coordination Committee, composed of senior GOZ and USAID officials. Daily operational guidance was performed by a GOZ/USAID Project Activities Coordination Team, which served as the informal Chief of Party for the overall project.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the "start-up evaluation" was to assess: 1) the continuing validity of project design assumptions; 2) the effectiveness of project management systems and personnel; 3) progress in achieving project objectives; and 4) constraints to timely and effective project implementation.

The methodology consisted of interviews, document review and site visits. The evaluation team spent two and one-half weeks in the project area (central and southern Shaba).

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. **Progress in the three components was mixed.** The agricultural component was considerably ahead of schedule while the seeds and roads components were behind schedule due to a range of implementation problems. Progress in each component is discussed in greater detail below.

Uncertainty arose concerning the crop focus of the project. The Project Paper stated that the goal of the project was to "assist the GOZ achieve self-sufficiency in staple food crops" while the purpose statement emphasized the production of corn. Questions arose as to whether the project was to focus only on corn or primarily on corn.

> Recommendation: USAID should clarify the crop focus of the project. If crops other than corn are to be included, USAID and the GOZ should specify the percentage of project resources to be allocated to these crops.

2. Agricultural Component. **Extension activities were over one year ahead of the project paper implementation schedule.** The extension methodology developed by the Service de Vulgarisation Agricole (SVA) was an innovative form of the Training and Visit system. One of the goals that SVA set for itself was to limit the number of extension agents and rely largely on local contact farmers, both men and women, chosen from village communities. At the time of the evaluation, there were 25 extension agents, including two women. The extension agents were working with 250 villages (the Project Paper goal for year three of the project was 210) and 869 contact farmers including 142 women (the Project Paper goal for year three was 420). The contact farmers set up 259 demonstration fields. Extension agents organized 399 field days attended by 2,236 farmers.

One factor which helped to explain the level of achievement was that SVA was able to build on the experience of a prior project, Projet Nord Shaba (PNS). PNS extension was based on the Standard Training and Visit system. It relied on a large staff of 80 extensionists to cover an area of about one-third the size of the current project area. This approach was very costly, difficult to manage and appeared to have broken down when funding ended. From PNS experience, SVA also learned to address the needs of women in the mainstream of the extension program.

> Recommendation: To improve the outreach of the SVA message, the project should investigate the possibility of installing a radio transmitter which would cover the Shaba region in collaboration with the national Zairian radio. Information on agricultural topics and marketing could be relayed through this channel.
>
> A.I.D./Washington should prepare a special case study on the agricultural component of the current project as its achievements could constitute a source of inspiration for other agricultural extension efforts in Africa.

3. The Seed Component. While the strategy of using a private sector company to implement the corn seed production and marketing activities was an innovative aspect of project design, the company's experience in seed production and marketing was quite limited. The company, Trabeza Mbeko Shaba (TMS), had no experience in servicing large numbers of widely dispersed small farmers. No budgets or action plans were available. Although the technical assistance contractor, Zimbabwe Seed Cooperative, could clearly provide excellent seed production support to Trabeza, it was doubtful that ZSC could provide the management and marketing assistance which would be necessary. Despite the 11 month delay in signing of the contracts with both companies, the first year target for seed sales to the project areas had been exceeded. Trabeza's interest in continuing to serve the project area will depend on its ability to provide a unique/high value product and to increase diversification of their product line.

> Recommendation: Trabeza should submit an action plan detailing its 1989 strategy for developing a sales and distribution network in the project area. Trabeza and ZSC should prepare a joint technical assistance plan outlining Trabeza's exact needs and ZSC's ability and willingness to meet those needs. Finally, Trabeza should establish a market feedback system to identify

farmers' needs -- real market potential -- in collaboration with the extension service.

4. Roads Component. Delays in the road component were having a negative impact on agricultural outputs. The roads component was over one year behind schedule and the rehabilitation and maintenance activities had virtually stopped. There was some question as to whether the 1989 corn production and seed distribution schedules would be met if the road infrastructure was not in place. Several of the key assumptions of the Project Paper were no longer valid. Most notably, the Roads Bureau was no longer able to cover its operating costs for project activities. In addition. the Project Paper stipulated that the roads rehabilitated under the project were to be maintained temporarily by the equipment used in rehabilitating the road, until a labor intensive maintenance program could be implemented for permanent road maintenance. However, two years after project start-up there was no such program even in the planning stage. A major constraint to effective road rehabilitation was frequent delays in the acquisition of spare parts, for which lead times in excess of one year were reported. The two obstacles to more expeditious procurement were the Roads Office, SGMPT, in Lubumbashi and the A.I.D. Commodity Management Office in Kinshasa.

Recommendation: USAID should make immediate provision to provide operational funding for the Roads Bureau project activities and should consider employing performance-based salary supplements. All current road rehabilitation should be stopped and available equipment utilized to implement an emergency road repair system. USAID should investigate the possibility of using the river transport system in the eastern part of the project area. A labor intensive road maintenance program should be designed and implemented immediately.

5. Agricultural Component Management Structure. The agricultural component's management structure appeared to be an extremely effective mechanism for maintaining high-level GOZ and USAID support for the operational coordination and management of the overall project. The agricultural component was managed by a two person unit, the office for the coordination of Project Activities (Coordination des Activites du Projet, CAP). CAP members included the Department of Agriculture (DOA) Coordinator of the Project Coordinating Committee and USAID's field project officer for the agricultural component, a personal services contractor. In addition to its primary responsibilities of management of the

agricultural component, CAP also functioned as the operational Chief of Party for the overall project. The guidance which CAP provided was extensive -- it had to approve all personnel decisions, virtually all financial expenditures and all major operational decisions, including those pertaining to equipment and vehicle use. The motives for the establishment of such a tightly-controlled and centralized system were several, namely to: 1) relieve the project area officers of administrative and public relations responsibilities, so that they could concentrate on their technical work; 2) avoid the mistakes of the Nord Shaba project in which shared and decentralized authority resulted in a highly bloated bureaucracy and considerable misallocation of funds; and 3) relieve project area officers of the relatively frequent requests and pressures for use of project equipment, vehicles and funds. The system functioned smoothly, in part due to a fairly reliable and quick communications system between the project area and the Lubumbashi field office.

The financial management, accounting and inventory control system for the agricultural component appeared to have been meticulously designed by Coopers and Lybrand, which also conducted a training session in the use of the system. While financial management was tightly controlled, officers saw the system as supportive rather than restrictive.

> Recommendation: As the project matures, project staff should consider increasing the delegation of management authority to help ensure sustainability after the departure of the present management team.

6. Information Office. The Information Office was not operational. According to the Project Paper, the Information Office was to carry out various data collection and analysis activities required for monitoring and evaluation of project impact. The strategy was to conduct a variety of focused, small-scale studies rather broad, comprehensive surveys. As of December 1988, the Research Specialist had not been recruited and no Zairians had been hired or singled out to work with the office. Therefore, no system was in place to monitor crop production, marketing, transport or farmer incomes. The difficulty encountered by the present evaluation in assessing the initial impact of project activities was an indication of the serious problems created by the lack of these activities.

> Recommendation: Given the progress of the agricultural extension component of the project, the project should give priority to the immediate

gathering of agriculture production and marketing data.

7. Women. The Service de Vulgarisation Agricole (SVA) made a laudable effort to improve project outreach to women. In February 1988, a USAID-sponsored study (Russell, 1988) on the integration of women as farmer leaders in the project recommended the recruitment of women to work in community development and as extension agents. It also recommended including in the extension training program information on how to reach women farmers. As a result, more women contact farmers were hired, two women extension agents were hired, and SVA was seeking a female Zairian sociologist to staff the Women in Development Office in Niembo. Her job would be to advise SVA on how to work with women as well as to identify women's groups with which the project could collaborate.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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EVALUATION REPORT: SMALL FARMER PRODUCTION PROGRAM WESTERN PROVINCE, ZAMBIA (611-0205), SEPTEMBER, 1986

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. Zambia's economic objectives are to: increase investments in the productive sectors of the economy; diversify the economy away from dependence on mining and increase the emphasis of agriculture and domestic manufacturing; reduce the disparity between urban and rural living standards; achieve self-sufficiency in food production and provide more job opportunities through the development of small-scale industries and labor intensive technologies.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1983, A.I.D. authorized a $483,000 grant to Africare to fund the Western Province Small Farmer Production project. The purpose of the project was to support the development of village-based production, processing and marketing of honey and beeswax in Zambia's western and central provinces.

Through this project, Africare assisted the Forestry Department's Beekeeping Division to achieve its objectives which were: 1) to improve incomes of rural honey producers -- through honey and beeswax production -- while 2) simultaneously strengthening conservation of Zambia's dwindling forests, essentially through extension and training activities.

The project provided up to K90,000 to the Forestry Department to establish a revolving fund to purchase honey and beeswax and recover recurrent expenditures until the program became self-sustaining.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY. The purpose of the evaluation was to address project effectiveness: economic, financial, social, institutional and technical.

The methodology involved document review, site visits and interviews.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. Despite being behind schedule, the project was basically a well-managed endeavor which had made good progress toward achieving the project purpose. There were several delays during the outset of the project that impeded implementation: problems in assigning a permanent resident manager to the project and in completing the honey processing factory and staff

housing. At the time of the evaluation, these were no longer restrictions on implementation. The manager had been in residence since May 1985 and the project had made great strides since then. He recruited 356 new beekeepers with a projection of 500 by the end of 1986 (total project goal was 950). The project appeared to be very well-received by villagers. It appeared to fill a genuine need by providing a method of moving the honey and wax from the villages to the towns.

Recommendation: The project should be extended for an additional two years.

2. Institutional Capacity. **Only a few key persons in the Forestry Department's Beekeeping division had received appropriate training in beekeeping.** The Forestry Department had approximately 30 officers in its beekeeping division and these were the personnel who were required to provide the extension training to the beekeepers. All of the officers had completed a two-year certificate program at the forestry school in Mwekera, but that program included only an introduction to beekeeping. There were only five officers who had received any relevant beekeeping training and none of the officers in the Africare project fell within this category. The extension work of the Africare personnel seemed to be appropriate based on the needs of the village beekeepers.

Recommendation: As a short-term solution, the project should provide a short-term, intensive training program for the Forest Department's beekeeping officers. As a permanent solution, the project should develop a more formal, long-term training program for current and new beekeeping officers.

3. Extension. **Extension workers were relying on an expensive mode of transportation.** Project staff relied heavily on project trucks and land cruisers to reach the villages. This mode of transportation is extremely expensive in terms of fuel and vehicle depreciation. A review of the project's monthly reports shows that in many months the project's revolving fund was expending as much or more money for transportation as it was for the purchase of honey and wax.

Recommendation: Project staff should keep travel using the trucks or land cruiser to a minimum. Whenever possible, project staff should use the project bicycles for extension work.

Project staff should give consideration to involving non-project personnel in the

transportation needs of the project. The project might consider contracting with a firm to buy a large share of the wax production. The contractual agreement might include pickup of the wax in Kaoma and delivery of the bottled honey to a drop off point in Lusaka.

4. Beeswax. Although the project was based on honey production, beeswax had an excellent potential as an income source for the beekeepers in the project. The beeswax produced in the project area was of excellent quality. Because of minor chemical differences, the wax produced by the project was of higher quality than U.S. wax. The type of wax produced is an essential ingredient in the production of cosmetic products using beeswax as a base. A purchasing agent for Continental Products (Zambia, Ltd.) stated that his company had purchased four and one-half tons of Zambian wax in 1885. His company used three tons for product development and the rest was shipped to other plants in Southern Africa.

Recommendation: The project should purchase the processed wax produced by the beekeepers. There is an excellent market for such a wax and it requires no additional processing by project personnel. It sells for as much as 50 percent mark-up under present market conditions and would contribute greatly to the project's revolving fund.

The project should undertake a thorough market survey as a step toward sustainability. The project should survey, target and penetrate all possible markets and advertise. The project should also conduct a cost analysis of plant operations in Kaoma.

5. Impact on Farmer Income. The project was increasing subsistence farmer income. Information on income was limited due in part to the difficulties in estimating income prior to the full development of the project and the diversity and dispersion of beneficiaries. Hives per beekeeper had increased by approximately 85 percent over the original number. The average number of hives per beekeeper was between 85 and 100 at the time of the evaluation. Comparisons of income data for the 22 beekeeping groups showed considerable variation. The estimated real income increases per farmer ranged from 10 to 89 percent. The average increase was approximately 41 percent.

Recommendation: Project staff should re-examine quantitative and qualitative aspects after one full year of operation.

Evaluation Team.

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CHAMA RICE EVALUATION: (611-0204), AUGUST, 1986

PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW. The Government of Zambia (GOZ) wanted to increase the nation's supply of staple grains, thereby reducing the need for imports and foreign exchange expenditures. The GOZ wished also to increase the income and living levels of the inhabitants of Chama District -- a remote and impoverished area of the country that is vulnerable to famine.

U.S. ASSISTANCE RESPONSE. In 1981, in response to a request by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development (MAWD) of the GOZ, A.I.D. authorized a grant of $1,166,224 to Africare for the Chama Area Development project. The purpose of the project was to increase rice production and farmer income in three areas of Chama district -- Kapilingizya, Simulemba and Chifunda. Project designers anticipated that mechanization would increase the amount of rice land and the number of rice farmers as well as productivity per farmer and per hectare. The project was to last three and one-half years.

Specific features of the project included: 1) a technical package consisting of tractor preparation of rice land, nursery plots, transplanting of nursery shoots in rows and seed multiplication and purification; 2) a management package which included a District Rice Management Group (DRMG) and a Farm Management Group (FMG); 3) a personnel package consisting of an agricultural engineer to serve as Africare Agricultural Technician (AAT) and a Ministry District Rice Coordinator (DRC); and 4) an infrastructure package to include housing for project personnel and improved roads and bridges. The latter was to be carried out by the GOZ with funds provided by Africare.

In 1984, the Africare Agricultural Technician's annual report indicated that the GOZ had failed to make use of the funds provided for house and road construction or provide an effective District Rice Management Group. In addition, the report noted that extension workers were ineffective because, as outsiders, they were distrusted, much of their time (eight to fifteen days per month) was taken up collecting their salaries, and they were not adequately trained. The report also stated that scheme members did not follow advice for better cultivation and that the Japanese manufactured planters and weeders provided by Africare were not suitable.

Based on this report, Africare submitted to USAID a request for a two-year extension. Modified goals were

to: 1) develop the Farm Management Groups into self-sustaining entities able to maintain their tractors: 2) complete rice trials; and 3) perform a feasibility study related to ploughing and transplanting. Due to the failure of the GOZ to adequately use its share of project funds, the extension could be funded at very little additional cost to USAID (specific amount not stated). In November 1984, USAID extended the project through two additional growing seasons.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY. The methodology involved observation, interviews and analysis of project documents. At times the evaluator used participant observation methods which involved participating in purchasing items in local stores and the Chama market, joining village groups in shelling corn or groundnuts and sharing a meal with village members. The evaluator also held interviews with individual farmers and with groups. For farmer interviews, the evaluator relied upon a random sample of male and female farmers. The evaluation report includes a representative sample of case studies selected from the farmer interviews (Annex I).

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose. Production statistics showed progress in two of the three project areas. The third project area (Simulemba) had been making progress, but the area was virtually destroyed by a flood in 1985-86. The following table shows the progress made over the years.

		Chifunda	Simulemba	Kapilingizya
1982	No./Farmers	17	45	85
	Harvest	Poor	Good	Poor
	Hectarage	16	21	25.5
1985	No./Farmers	187	61	155
	Harvest	Excellent	V. poor	Good/Exc.
1984	Hectarage	61.5	18.6	42.5

The project addressed many of the earlier problems. All staff housing was in place and the houses neglected by the GOZ had been built by project participants through self-help. All three tractors were in perfect shape. The GOZ deposited extension salaries in

Barclay's Bank in Lundazi, cutting time for salary collection from one-half of each month to one day. Since the GOZ raised the price of rice in 1985 to K55/bag, farmers were satisfied with their yield and the project.

Farmers were practicing more careful husbandry of rice in response to extension agents' instruction. They accepted advice to plant earlier, weed earlier and more often and harvest when indicated.

> Recommendation: The scope of project activities should be narrowed until the remaining implementation problems can be resolved. The project should concentrate on Kapilingiza because it is doing fairly well, has the most land available for expansion, is the most accessible and its Farmer Management Group is the most stable.

2. **Farmer Profits. Each of the three project areas reported a profit.** Kapilingiza reported a profit of K8,990 for the years 1981-4, and a further profit of K4,472 in 1985. This resulted in an average farmer income of just under K112. Chifunda's 1981-85 profits totaled K18,170. Farmer incomes in this area approximately doubled the income of farmers in the other project areas. Although a flood nearly destroyed Simulemba, farmers in this area still realized a total of K6,690 profits for the years 1981-85 and an average income of approximately K117.

> Recommendation: The project should encourage farmers to take out crop loss insurance which is offered by many insurance companies in Zambia.
>
> The project should establish coops in each project area with the aim of providing credit to members so that the necessary inputs can be purchased when needed.
>
> Since participation in project activities is highly valued, the project should require a commitment from farmers, as a condition of participation. Such commitment might include: cooperation in rice trials and seed multiplication; adherence to good cultivation practices; agreement to assist other members, especially during harvest time, when asked; and to pay all bills on time.
>
> The project should make available to project participants a mechanical rice polisher so that they could sell polished rice, which receives a much higher price than unpolished rice.

3. Farmer Management Groups (FMGs). **After many difficulties, the FMGs were beginning to function.** Although it seemed that the establishment of the FMG management system was not worth the time and effort required, it did appear to be functioning at the time of the evaluation. Nevertheless, the FMGs did not hold regular meetings nor were their meetings well-attended. The FMGs were probably sustainable as a management system if the traditional leaders -- chiefs and headmen -- were utilized, not only in the collection of tractor-hire fees and organizing self-help schemes, but also in practicing their traditional roles in calling meetings and aiding in decisionmaking. It was questionable whether the FMGs' bookkeeping officers were capable of carrying on unassisted. If bookkeepers continue to be selected by popular vote, with no requirements as to necessary skills, this aspect of the FMGs probably will not be sustained. The cooperative should be sufficiently profitable to hire a bookkeeper for the few short periods needed.

> Recommendation: The FMGs should make greater efforts to integrate the traditional leaders -- chiefs and headmen. The project should provide training to bookkeepers in record and bookkeeping and should consider hiring temporary bookkeepers as project activities expand.

4. Non-Sustainability of Tractor Land Preparation. **Tractor land preparation was not sustainable.** In theory, the tractors should have assisted in the process of land preparation. In actuality, the tractors frequently failed in this role for a variety of reasons: breakdown, lack of fuel, difficulty of obtaining spare parts and lack of funds to purchase necessary inputs. The Africare technician, who had skills in managing tractors and a four-wheel drive vehicle to fetch tractor necessities and access to ready cash, including foreign exchange when necessary, was not able to keep the tractors functioning despite spending a major share of his time on the effort. In view of this, it is difficult to believe that farmers, lacking the project's resources and left with increasingly older machines, will have more success.

One extension agent, in commenting on another donor's mechanized rice project commented, "We are better off knowing there will be no tractor. The tractors really were an excuse for laziness. People did not prepare their fields early, waiting for the tractor. When it broke down before everybody got its services, it was too late to prepare the fields before the rains and the harvest suffered. Now people know there will be no tractor and they start to prepare the field early."

Recommendation: The project should shift its emphasis on tractor use and maintenance to improved husbandry, including cultivation of early maturing strains for non-consumption purposes. Any new project director should be prepared to spend a major effort on cultivation practices.

EVALUATION TEAM.

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