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CORE Subproject Phase II Agricultural Development Support Project Evaluation Report

**Contract No. 279-0052-C-00-0009-00
Final Report, April 1990**

Submitted to

USAID/Yemen, Yemen Arab Republic

by

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CORE SUBPROJECT PHASE II
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT PROJECT
EVALUATION REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID/Yemen

CORE Subproject Phase II (279-0052)

Project Evaluation

April 16, 1990

1. Purpose of the CORE Subproject Phase II (CORE II)

The purpose of the CORE II is to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) of the Yemen Arab Republic Government (YARG) to plan and monitor a national agricultural development program supportive of private sector production and marketing. Successful achievement of the purpose of CORE II will be demonstrated by an improved functioning MAF providing leadership and support to private sector farmers and other elements of the agricultural sector.

2. Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the progress and performance of CORE II in accomplishing the project purpose.

The evaluation is based on reviews of project documents, annual work plans, reports and publications supplied by the United States Agency for International Development/Yemen (USAID/Yemen), the Consortium for International Development/Colorado State University (CID/CSU), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries/Yemen Arab Republic Government (MAF/YARG); site visits to project activities and offices; and interviews with CID/CSU, USAID/Yemen, and MAF officials, advisors, and staff, as well as with other individuals related to the project. Document reviews, interviews, and report writing were conducted by the evaluation team in Yemen during February 26-March 25, 1990.

3. Findings and conclusions

The overall progress and performance of CORE II, from 1985 until very recently, has been unsatisfactory.

MAF remains understaffed and undertrained for the tasks it faces in planning and monitoring national agricultural development programs supportive of private sector production and marketing. MAF's internal planning processes are generally informal and unstructured, with little monitoring or accountability. MAF budgets remain inadequate to maintain staff or supplies for normal operations. MAF staff is still in need of extensive technical agricultural economics, statistics, and managerial training.

The project has lacked a narrow, consistent focus of activities. The contractor has failed to provide long-term advisory staffing continuity. Many long-term advisors have played an almost exclusively operational role. Selection of short- and long-term trainees has not generally been based on an assessment of MAF requirements, nor have most long-term trainees been MAF employees with a budgeted position to return to. The project has not pursued one of its major objectives of creating an effective, sustainable manpower development and training unit within MAF. The purchase of equipment has seldom considered the ability of MAF to cover recurrent costs. The project has purchased many expendable office

supplies and furniture. The project has not enlisted TDY expertise in institution building or development management to assist it in accomplishing its objectives.

The only previous evaluation of CORE was of CORE I, in 1984, and that was as only a small element in a broader evaluation of the ADSP as a whole. CORE was redesigned without benefit of a complete evaluation. Following CORE's redesign, it took almost three years to recontract the project and obtain new project management. USAID monitoring of CORE was minimal until the later stages of CORE II, and then it consisted principally of budgeting and financial monitoring rather than programmatic monitoring.

The progress and performance of the most recent period of less than one year is judged to be satisfactory. In fact, the current leadership in CORE, with assistance from the USAID/ADO and current MAF leadership, has succeeded in substantially changing the direction of the project. The gradual shifting of priorities over several years has recently focused on some areas that are central to improving MAF capability to plan and monitor agricultural sector programs supportive of private sector production and marketing: planning and policy analysis, agricultural economics and marketing, and statistics and data collection. MAF has begun to be involved in the design of annual work plans. The CORE Team Leader has instituted numerous monitoring and record keeping systems. The training program has improved in focus and administration (over the entire CSU contract period). The CORE sponsored Documentation and Learning Resource Center has taken positive steps towards sustainability.

However, this recent progress and reorientation of approach is less than a year old, and much effort will be required to sustain it in order to achieve the technology transfer and institution building objectives of CORE II by the end of the current contract period.

4. Recommendations for CORE II

CORE should immediately enlist TDY experts in institution building and development management to assist the staff and MAF in developing a concrete plan for building MAF capacities for planning and monitoring agricultural development programs.

CORE should develop an institution building plan, with benchmarks against which to measure progress.

CORE should sharply curtail activities peripheral to its central focus on strengthening MAF capabilities in planning and policy analysis; project monitoring and evaluation; agricultural economics and marketing; and statistics and computer training. In particular, it should eliminate funding for activities in the following areas: finance and administration, agricultural affairs, extension, weather stations, and water use management.

CORE should curtail the purchase of commodities and focus its resources on human resource development and institution building activities in support of strengthening MAF capabilities in planning and monitoring an agricultural development program supportive of private sector initiatives.

MAF commitment of budget and resources to expanding the trained staff in its key departments is crucial to the success of the program.

CORE and MAF should develop a concrete plan, including YARG budgetary support, for the reintroduction of returning long-term participant trainees.

No further participant training should be initiated until CORE and MAF are able to assess MAF needs and requirements so training can be targeted to future manpower requirements rather than individual department level needs.

The establishment of an effective manpower development and training unit within MAF, as specified in the CORE Subproject Paper Amendment (1985), the CSU contract (1988), and the YARG Third Five Year Plan (1987), remains a high priority if MAF is to be able to assess manpower and training needs, to design and implement training programs to meet these needs, and to continue institutional strengthening efforts when the project ends.

Every non-Arabic speaking CORE Advisor should be provided with a bilingual adjunct advisor.

Any operational role taken by CORE Advisors should be sharply curtailed and more emphasis put on teaching and training activities.

CORE advisors, in coordination with their MAF counterparts, should increase efforts to provide more formalized training in their respective areas of specialization (e.g., agricultural economics, marketing, statistical survey and data analysis, data collection, computers, etc.) for the staffs of the Departments with which they interact.

Training activities should be supplemented by short-courses, seminars, and workshops provided by Arabic speaking short-term trainers.

A concrete plan for shifting full financial, technical, and administrative responsibility for the DLRC from the project to MAF between now and the end of the project should be developed and implemented.

If contractor long-term staffing problems persist or if MAF commitment of resources to building its key departments is not forthcoming, then USAID should consider terminating the project, or drastically reducing the program to key areas in which staffing has had some continuity or MAF is especially supportive.

If substantial progress can be made during the remainder of the contract period, then USAID should consider designing a follow-on project to further build the capacity of the MAF in policy formulation and planning, project implementation and monitoring, agricultural economics and marketing, and statistics and data collection.

5. Lessons Learned

The design of an institution building project requires the incorporation of several elements, including narrowly focused activities in a limited set of institutional entities, establishment of a system for monitoring the achievements of the institution building activities, sensitivity to the socio-cultural-political environment at work inside and outside the targeted institutions, establishment of a system of budgeting and financial control that limits spending on unsustainable activities, and requirements for the selection of a contractor experienced in institution building activities which can assure at least some bilingual capabilities, continuity of staffing, and adequate backstopping.

BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. Country: Yemen Arab Republic
2. Project Title: CORE Subproject Phase II,
Agricultural Development Support Project
3. Project Number: 279-0052
4. Project Dates:
 - a. First Grant Agreement: June 14, 1979
 - b. Second Grant Amendment (First CORE Subproject Paper): December 20, 1979
 - c. Third Grant Amendment (First CORE Subcontract): Cost Reimbursement Contract with an Educational Institution, AID/NE-C-1698: July, 10, 1980
 - d. Project Implementation Letter 33 (Extension to May, 31, 1986): March, 13, 1985
 - e. Sixth Project Amendment (CORE Subproject Paper Amendment; CORE Subproject Phase II): April 24, 1985
 - f. Twenty-third Grant Amendment (Extension of ADSP to April 30, 1996): May 14, 1985
 - g. Project Implementation Letter 40 (Extension to September 30, 1987): November 13, 1985
 - h. Project Implementation Letter 52 (Extension to September 30, 1990): March 18, 1987
 - i. Project Implementation Letter 59 (Extension to December 31, 1992): December 11, 1987
 - j. First CORE Subcontract Phase II (8010): January 15, 1988
 - k. Final Obligation (8010): FY 1993 FQ, Planned
 - l. Administrative Project Assistance Completion Date (8010)(APACD): December 31, 1992
 - m. Project Assistance Completion Date (ALSP) (PACD): April 30, 1996

5. Project Funding:

CORE Subproject Phase I (FY78 - FY88)

a. AID Bilateral Funding Grant, 1698 Contract:	\$ 27,495,000
b. Other Major Donors: None	
c. Host Government Contribution:	\$ 7,000,000

Subtotal CORE Subproject Phase I \$ 34,495,000

CORE Subproject Phase II (FY88 - March 31, 1990)

a. AID Bilateral Funding Grant, 8010 Contract:	\$ 13,890,853
Miscellaneous USAID Direct:	\$ 172,477
(AMIDEAST) Third Country Training:	\$ 356,082
b. Other Major Donors: None	
c. Host Government Contribution:	\$ 5,200,000

Subtotal CORE Subproject Phase II \$ 19,619,412

Total CORE Subproject Phase I and Phase II \$ 54,114,412

6. Mode of Implementation: ADSP, collaborative assistance under agreement between USAID/Yemen and the Consortium for International Development (CID). CORE II, USAID direct contract with CID with Colorado State University as lead university.
7. Project Design: The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries of the Yemen Arab Republic Government, USAID/Yemen, and the Consortium for International Development. Redesignated under CORE Subproject Paper Amendment, April 24, 1985.
8. Responsible Mission Officials:
 - a. Mission Director: Kenneth Sherper
 - b. Project Officer: Abdoullah Bin Yahya
9. Previous Evaluation: ADSP (overall) January, 1984
CORE Subproject Phase I (none)
CORE Subproject Phase II (none)
10. Cost of Present Evaluation:

	Person Days	Dollar Costs
a. Direct Hire AID/W TDY:	8	---
b. Contract:	79	\$ 53,423
Total:	<u>87</u>	<u>\$ 53,423</u>

Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	ii
Basic Project Identification Data	v
ACRONYMS	viii
1. Preface	1
1.1 Evaluation Methods	1
1.2 Evaluation Team Composition	2
1.3 Acknowledgements	2
2. Description of Country Context	2
3. Description of USAID Initiatives in the Yemen Arab Republic	3
4. Description of CORE II	3
4.1 Overview of CORE II	3
4.2 Goals, Purpose, Outputs, and Inputs	4
4.3 Strategy	5
4.4 History	5
5. Issues Addressed	6
5.1 Overall Progress and Performance of the CORE Subproject	7
5.2 Statistics	13
5.3 Agricultural Economics and Planning	20
5.4 Documentation and Learning Resource Center	29
5.5 Computer Applications	33
5.6 Finance and Administration	39
5.7 Marketing	44
5.8 Training	51
5.9 Other Areas	56
5.10 Cross-Cutting Issues	60
5.11 Global Issues	63
6. Lessons Learned	68
7. Appendices	70
A. CORE Evaluation Team Scope of Work	A-1
B. Letters of Clarification of Scope of Work	B-1
C. Original Logical Framework Matrix for the CORE Subproject Phase II	C-1
D. Updated Logical Framework Matrix for the CORE Subproject Phase II	D-1
E. List of Documents Consulted	E-1
F. List of Individuals Consulted	F-1
G. Itinerary for CORE Evaluation Team	G-1
H. Organizational Chart of the MAF	H-1
I. CID Proposal for Development Related Training of Yemeni Women Currently Residing in the United States	I-1
J. CORE Subproject Evaluation Component of the ADSP Evaluation, January 18, 1984	J-1
K. Recent Staffing History of CORE	K-1

ACRONYMS

ADSP	Agricultural Development Support Project
ADO	Agricultural Development Office
AID/W	Agency for International Development, Washington
ANE	Asia, Near East, and Europe Bureau
APACD	Administrative Project Assistance Completion Date
ARD	Agriculture and Rural Development Office
BS	Bachelor of Science
CALPOLY	California State Polytechnic University
CID	Consortium for International Development
CPO	Central Planning Organization
CSU	Colorado State University
DLRC	Documentation and Learning Resource Center
EHRD	Education and Human Resource Development
EOPS	End of Project Status
FFYP	Fourth Five Year Plan
FOA	Faculty of Agriculture
FQ	First Quarter
FSN	Foreign Service National
FY	Fiscal Year
GD	General Director
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HITS	Horticulture Improvement and Training Subproject
IBM	International Business Machines
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
MAF	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
MS	Master of Science
OSU	Oregon State University
PACD	Project Assistance Completion Date
PC	Personal Computer
PH.D.	Doctor of Philosophy
TDY	Temporary Duty
TFYP	Third Five Year Plan
TOEFL	Test of English as a Foreign Language
TR	Technical Resources Division
SOW	Scope of Work
SMY	Support Module, Yemen
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
WID	Women in Development
YALI	Yemen American Language Institute
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic
YARG	Yemen Arab Republic Government

1. PREFACE

This report evaluates the progress and performance of the programmatic elements of the CORE Subproject Phase II (CORE II), a USAID/Yemen sponsored technical assistance and training project designed to improve the capacity of the Yemen Arab Republic Government (YARG) to plan and monitor a national agriculture development program supportive of private sector production and marketing. CORE II is a redesigned and ultimately recontracted CORE Subproject Phase I (CORE I), a subproject established in July 1980 under the Agricultural Development Support Project (ADSP), a collaborative assistance project under agreement between USAID/Yemen and the Consortium for International Development (CID) extending from June 1979 to April 1996. Oregon State University (OSU) was the lead university under the CID contract for CORE I. Following CORE's redesign in a CORE Subproject Paper Amendment in April 1985, OSU began implementing CORE II with the development of its first annual work plans for the period beginning October 1, 1985. OSU continued to implement CORE II until almost three years after the redesign, when CORE II was recontracted in January 1988 for five years under a USAID/Yemen direct contract with CID with Colorado State University (CSU) as the lead university. This evaluation focuses on the programmatic elements of CORE II under the CSU contract, but will also examine the progress and performance of the subproject since its redesign in 1985.

1.1 Evaluation Methods

The evaluation is based on reviews of project documents, annual work plans, reports and publications supplied by USAID/Yemen, CID/CSU, and MAF/YARG; site visits to project activities and offices; and interviews with CID, CSU, USAID/Yemen, and MAF officials, advisors, and staff, as well as with other individuals related to the project. It will evaluate the progress that project activities have achieved toward accomplishing the project purpose as stated in the contract. Document reviews, interviews, and report writing were conducted by the evaluation team in Yemen during February 26-March 25, 1990.

1.2 Evaluation Team Composition

The evaluation team was composed of the following individuals: John T. Rowntree, Team Leader, Agricultural Economist; Charles Rogers, Agricultural Statistician; Ahmad A. Ahmadi, Management and Institutional Development Specialist; and Paul F. Novick, ANE/TR/ARD, AID/W. Paul F. Novick was not to participate full-time in the evaluation process, but he made substantial contributions, reviewed the first draft, and concurs fully with the recommendations of the report.

1.3 Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to thank Abdulmalik Al-Thawr, General Director, Directorate of Planning and Statistics, MAF; John Swanson, ADO, Chief, USAID/Yemen; and Dana Thomas, Team Leader, CID/CSU; and their respective staffs for their kind cooperation in every aspect of conducting this evaluation. Dana Thomas was particularly helpful in providing requested information and in discussing openly every aspect of the project.

This report completes Contract No. 279-0052-C-00-0009-00 between RII and USAID/Yemen, Yemen Arab Republic.

2. DESCRIPTION OF COUNTRY CONTEXT

The Yemen Arab Republic began modernization in the 1970's, following a revolution in 1962 and ten years of civil war, gaining political stability only in the late 1970's. Its government institutions, including MAF, are new and evolving. Almost 60 percent of its rapidly growing population of more than 9 million (1.5 million of whom are living abroad) lives in rural areas where agriculture contributes less than 30 percent to a per capita GDP of \$540 (1987).

Agriculture is characterized by natural resource constraints and extraordinarily high costs of inputs to production. Agriculture is largely rainfed, with less than one quarter of arable land being irrigated, and land holdings are small and fragmented, particularly those on terraced slopes, and do not lend themselves to mechanization. Labor scarcity has been driven by a million

Yemeni workers living abroad in nearby oil producing countries. Fertilizer use, limited in part due to import controls, is among the lowest in the world.

Yemen has a small, relatively open economy, characterized by a relatively high degree of equity in its distribution of income and decentralized decision-making, particularly in the agricultural sector. Since most of the decisions affecting agriculture are made by farmers themselves, the role of the MAF is largely limited to planning and supporting systems for providing services to and facilitating the development of private sector agricultural operations.

With a life expectancy of 47.7 years in 1988, adult literacy rates of 27 percent for men and 3 percent for women in 1985, and secondary school enrollment of only 17 percent for men and 3 percent for women in 1986, Yemen faces severe constraints in human resource development. The consequence for MAF is that there are severe shortages of trained personnel to join in planning and monitoring agricultural development programs.

3. DESCRIPTION OF USAID INITIATIVES IN THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

USAID/Yemen's strategic goal for the next five years is to promote sustainable increases in production and productivity within the framework of an increasingly open economy and society. Objectives supporting the pursuit of that goal include effective policy formulation, expanded private sector participation, effective institutional and human resource development, sustainable increases in agricultural production, and effective delivery of social services. CORE directly supports the achievement of all but the last of these objectives by focusing on improving the capacity of the MAF to formulate and implement effective policies and programs to obtain sustainable increases in private sector agricultural production and productivity.

4. DESCRIPTION OF CORE II

4.1 Overview of CORE II

CORE II is a technical assistance project whose purpose is to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), Yemen Arab Republic

Government (YARG), to plan and monitor a national agricultural development program supportive of private sector production and marketing. CORE I was a much broader project, serving as the "core" ADSP subproject designed to provide overall sector support to the MAF in research, teaching, and extension, to provide the mechanism for the design of other subprojects, and to provide all administrative, logistical, and technical support for all other subprojects. While much more focused than CORE I, CORE II continued to provide administrative, logistical, and technical support for other ADSP subprojects under a "support module." This support module was recently evaluated separately.

4.2 Goals, Purpose, Outputs, and Inputs

The goal of CORE II is increased income and improved quality of life for rural inhabitants in the context of broad-based and equitable social and economic development. The sub-goal is to improve the capacity of the YARG and Yemeni agricultural producers to develop and sustain an agricultural sector which effectively uses Yemeni natural resources, is integrated into the economy, and is supportive of broad-based and equitable social and economic development.

The project purpose is to improve the capacity of the YARG to plan and monitor a national agricultural development program supportive of private sector production and marketing. The successful achievement of the purpose of the CORE II project will be demonstrated by an improved functioning MAF providing leadership and support to private sector farmers and other elements of the agricultural sector.

The outputs contributing to the achievement of the project purpose include the following: (1) A training unit established in the MAF capable of, and actually, carrying out in-service training, recruiting and processing participants for overseas training; (1a) Technical/administrative in-service training; (1b) Undergraduate and graduate university educations in agricultural sciences; (1c) English language training; (1d) Short-term overseas training; (2) An Agricultural Documentation and Learning Resource Center completed and fully operated by Yemeni;

(3) Studies, assessments and analyses of the agricultural sector and the component parts completed; (4) A firmly established system for assuring the continuing operation of an integrated program of assistance to the MAF; and (5) Ongoing technical and administrative/logistic/financial support to the program and all subprojects.

The USAID inputs devoted to generating these outputs include long-term advisors, long-term support staff, short-term consultants, U.S. support, participant training, limited construction, and commodities. The YARG inputs devoted to generating these outputs include counterparts, participant travel, and facilities.

4.3 Strategy

A major constraint to accelerating and sustaining agricultural production and distribution was identified as the lack of functioning institutions which have the human resources and knowledge necessary to provide services which increase production and marketing. Actions required if this constraint on future production is to be eased were identified as institution building efforts to improve MAF capacity for planning, managing and evaluating an effective national program supportive of increased production and marketing. The strategy is to provide MAF advisory services and staff training to improve its capacity to plan, evaluate, and manage agricultural development programs in order to ease this major constraint on accelerating and sustaining agricultural production and marketing.

4.4 History

After five years of CORE I, the project was redesigned in the CORE Subproject Paper Amendment in early 1985. Dissatisfied with the performance of CID and OSU, USAID/Yemen decided to recontract CORE II, but it took almost three years before the redesign was materialized into a new direct contract for five years with CID with CSU as the lead university in January 1988. A number of administrative and project implementation changes were initiated in 1985, but the project continued with the development of the DLRC, its long-term participant training program, and

the maintenance of several long-term advisors to MAF. Spending levels declined, reaching a low of about \$3.7 million in FY87, much of which went to maintaining the participant trainees in the U.S. and to providing support services for other ADSP projects. CSU took over from OSU the CID offices in Sana'a and the administration of an ongoing technical assistance program and a participant training program with 33 persons in U.S. institutions.

OSU in five years of CORE I and three of CORE II spent approximately \$27.5 million, and CSU has spent approximately \$14.4 million over two years and three months. (Making adjustments for that portion of the "support module" costs that should be attributed to other ADSP projects and for other contract costs not under CSU control, CSU has spent for CORE II programs about \$12 million.)

5. ISSUES ADDRESSED

This section addresses each of the issues and associated questions raised in the evaluation Scope of Work. However, the evaluation team felt that it was appropriate to deal with the broader question concerning overall progress and performance of the project in achieving the project purpose (Section 5.1) before dealing with each of the detailed questions (beginning in Section 5.2). This first section is a summary evaluation, drawing on discussions throughout the remainder of the report, but repetition of the major issues, findings, conclusions, and recommendations, we feel, is warranted.

Our conclusion is that the overall performance of CORE to date has been unsatisfactory. The evaluation team does not simply want to criticize. It is our hope that we can make constructive suggestions that will contribute to redesigning and refocusing this project so that it can improve its performance. The progress of the project has been slow and difficult to document. The project has not worked as planned and scheduled. We have sought to find out why it has not worked, and have made some initial recommendations for improvement. We hope our findings, conclusions, and recommendations will be supportive of USAID/Yemen in improving this and follow-on projects.

A major qualification to the overall evaluation of CORE II (Section 5.1.1.4) is that progress during the past year has been satisfactory. It is only because of the recent reorientation of the project that we recommend continuing the project. Each of the individuals involved, in USAID, in CORE, and in MAF, have been fully cooperative with the evaluation team in our endeavor, are concerned that the project has made such slow progress, and, we think, will be receptive to constructive suggestions.

5.1 Overall Progress and Performance of the CORE Subproject

5.1.1 Question: What has been the overall progress and performance of the project in improving the capability of the MAF to plan and monitor a national agricultural program supportive of private sector production and marketing?

5.1.1.1 Findings

The MAF remains understaffed and undertrained for the tasks they face in planning and monitoring national agricultural development projects. Few of the key MAF units, other than those in which the project is investing heavily in survey work, have larger total BS level staffs than they did five years ago. Efforts by the project to help the MAF with a manpower development plan were discontinued because of their ineffectiveness. MAF's internal planning processes are generally informal and unstructured, with little monitoring or accountability. MAF budgets remain inadequate to maintain staff or supplies, including such things as furniture or stationery, for normal operations. MAF Directorate budgets are not known by project counterparts, so little is actually known concerning MAF contributions to CORE activities, except for some specific survey work.

The project has supplied the MAF with a large number of computers, many of which are used for word processing and some of which are used for data entry and tabulation; however, some are unused and many are under utilized due to lack of training for MAF staff.

CORE long-term advisors maintain separate offices where they do most of their work in the afternoon. Most long-term advisors do not speak Arabic and have not had bilingual adjunct advisors to facilitate their technical interactions with MAF

staff, even though English language capability of MAF staff, except for counterpart Directors of departments, is minimal. In general the project advisors are not well informed about the internal operations of the MAF, and most have not seen their counterpart Department's "terms of reference." Many operational tasks, such as writing or evaluating proposals, planning or monitoring activities, designing surveys or conducting analyses, and evaluating policy options, are still done by CORE, USAID, UNDP, or other donor sponsored expatriates and short-term consultants.

In the past CORE annual work plans were often developed without input from MAF counterparts. MAF involvement in work plan development began only with the design of the 1988-89 work plans and became significant only with the design of the 1989-90 work plans.

Few long-term participant trainees have returned to the MAF, and there is limited follow-up on those who have received short- or long-term training. Since most of those selected in the early years for long-term training were not MAF employees, and were not promised a specific position within MAF to return to, the extent to which this training will strengthen the MAF is questionable.

Work on developing an effective manpower development and training unit within MAF has not been pursued.

The initial project design was extremely broad. The focus changed many times. Increasingly the focus has turned to agricultural economics policy with continuing support from statistics and data analysis, and a continuing support for the DLRC. CORE has been seen as both an institution building activity and as an "umbrella" project to support many diverse activities. Continuity of long-term advisory staffing has been a continuing problem for the contractor, again with the exception of the advisors in statistics and the DLRC.

USAID monitoring of the project was minimal during the early stages of CORE I. Although some restructuring was initiated under the old contract, USAID was slow to recontract CORE II after its redesign. Recently, USAID increased its monitoring of the activities, but too much emphasis has been put on budgetary

accountability. A new "matrix" work plan and budgetary system which links costs to inputs to activities to outputs to achievement of project purpose is a useful budgeting and monitoring device, but the causal links between the inputs and actual sustainable institution building outputs have not been explored in much detail. The project has not utilized any institution building or development management expertise to assist it in carrying out its mandate.

5.1.1.2 Conclusions

To date there has been little sustainable technology transfer or institution building. This should not be surprising in view of the absence of conditions for ensuring sustainability, technology transfer, or institution building. The failure of the project to have a narrow, consistent focus of activities; the lack of continuity of staffing of advisor positions; the failure to develop a MAF manpower development plan; the operational role often played by long-term advisors; the absence of careful selection of long-term participant trainees on the basis of ability and MAF requirements in the early years; the failure to establish an adequate trainee monitoring system until recently; the purchase of vehicles, computers, and equipment without a fully consistent inventory system, and without concern for MAF ability to cover recurrent costs; all of these things and more all have contributed to the absence of documentable progress that is anywhere near commensurate with the scale of the project. It is doubtful the contribution of the project to improving planning and program monitoring capability of MAF would have been much reduced had the project spent well only a fraction of what was spent.

Two shortcomings of project implementation, the failure to establish an effective manpower and training unit within MAF and the failure to develop a formal institution building plan, are particularly serious. Establishing a manpower development and training unit is a key project output identified in the Logical Framework Matrix, is proposed in the TFYP, and is specified as a key objective in the CSU contract. The creation of such a unit is essential if MAF is to be able to assess manpower and training needs, to design and implement training programs to

meet these needs, and to continue institutional strengthening efforts when the project ends. Too, without an institution building plan, with a timetable and benchmarks against which to measure achievement, efforts to improve the capacity of MAF to plan and monitor agricultural development programs remain, at best, intuitive and unsystematic.

5.1.1.3 Recommendations

CORE should sharply curtail activities peripheral to its central focus on strengthening MAF capabilities in planning and policy analysis; agricultural economics, marketing, and monitoring and evaluation; and statistics, computer training, and documentation. In particular, it should eliminate funding for activities in the following areas: finance and administration, agricultural affairs, extension, weather stations, and water use management.

CORE should curtail the purchase of commodities and focus its resources on human resource development and institution building activities.

MAF commitment of budget and resources to expanding the trained staff in its key departments is crucial to the success of the program.

CORE and MAF should develop a concrete plan, including budgetary support, for the reintroduction of returning long-term participant trainees.

No further participant training should be initiated until CORE and MAF are able to assess MAF needs and requirements so training can be targeted to future manpower requirements rather than individual department level needs.

The development of an effective manpower development and training unit within MAF remains a high priority if the project is to leave behind a sustainable human resource development unit within MAF.

Every non-Arabic speaking CORE Advisor should be provided with a bilingual adjunct advisor.

Any operational role taken by CORE Advisors should be sharply curtailed and more emphasis put on teaching and training activities. CORE advisors, in coordination with their MAF counterparts, should immediately institute more formal

training in their respective areas of specialization (e.g., agricultural economics, marketing, statistical survey and data analysis, data collection, hands-on-computer training, etc.) for the entire staffs of the Departments with which they interact.

Training activities should be supplemented by short-courses, seminars, and workshops provided by Arabic speaking short-term trainers recruited from Egypt, Jordan, or other Middle East countries.

A concrete plan for shifting full financial, technical, and administrative responsibility for the DLRC from the project to MAF between now and the end of the project should be developed and implemented.

If contractor long-term staffing problems persist or if MAF commitment of resources to building its key departments is not forthcoming, then USAID should consider terminating the project, or drastically reducing the program to key areas in which staffing has had some continuity or MAF is especially supportive. If substantial progress can be made during the remainder of the contract period, then USAID should consider designing a follow-on project to further build the capacity of the MAF in policy formulation and planning, project implementation and monitoring, agricultural economics and marketing, and statistics and data collection.

If such positive developments are not obtained, USAID should discontinue the funding of programs in this area.

5.1.1.4 Qualification to the Overall Assessment of the Progress and Performance of CORE II

A major qualification to the above overall assessment is that recent developments in the project have been positive. Despite a difficult beginning, CORE II under CSU has been strengthened considerably in the recent nine months, and many positive steps have been taken to correct past mistakes. The USAID/ADO has also taken a positive role in trying to get the project on target. Communication problems between USAID and CORE appear to have been resolved. The MAF began significant involvement in project work plan development when the 1989-90 work

plans were designed. The Team Leader has provided positive leadership and instituted numerous monitoring and record keeping systems. The current advisors are making significant efforts to avoid taking principally an operational role. The current training program selection and monitoring system has improved in focus and administration. The DLRC has taken some positive steps towards sustainability. The statistics program has benefited from advisory continuity. The agricultural economics and marketing program is well in place and there are positive plans to add two more agricultural economists before the end of 1990. After a difficult year and a half, CORE II is becoming better managed and more focused in its objectives. But it faces difficult challenges in the remaining two years and nine months of the contract.

We feel that the overall assessment, however, is justified because the recent progress is tenuous. It is highly dependent on some specific individuals, namely, a Minister of Agriculture and MAF leadership that is more supportive, a CORE Team Leader and CORE advisory staff who are working harder to overcome project difficulties, and a USAID/ADO more involved and concerned with the project than in earlier periods. It is revealing of the failure of the institution building aspect of the project that current success is so dependent on individuals rather than on institutional capabilities. We highlight the past problems because nothing is more difficult for an institution building project to overcome than a history of failure. For recent progress to be sustained, all concerned parties need to become aware of the source of past difficulties and to take positive steps to do things different in the future.

Furthermore, long-term advisory staffing difficulties and discontinuities, which have plagued the project throughout, extend into the present period. (See Section 5.11.2 for a more detailed discussion of the staffing issue and Appendix K for an overview of CORE II staffing history.) Overcoming this staffing problem is crucial to CORE's ability to sustain and build on recent progress.

5.2 Statistics

5.2.1 Question: To what extent have the project activities been successful in improving MAF's ability to collect and disseminate relevant agricultural data?

5.2.1.1 Findings

The goal of this module is to assist MAF in collecting, using, and disseminating relevant agricultural data and statistics. The main counterpart agency is the Department of Statistics which is in the General Directorate of Planning and Statistics.

The project has provided improved sampling frames, training, vehicles and per diem for data collection. Computers and computer training were provided for data tabulation. A bilingual Yearbook of Yemen Agriculture has been published annually and a summary pamphlet will be published for 1989.

5.2.1.2 Conclusions

These project activities upgrade the quality of crop and livestock data series which have been characterized as too weak and incomplete to support analysis and of marginal utility for planning purposes. They also provide more timely data in a form which can be disseminated to interested users.

5.2.1.3 Recommendations

The project should continue to move toward improved sampling frames and probability samples.

The staff should be provided with continuing training in all phases of sampling and survey work including the measurement of sampling errors and the minimization of nonsampling errors.

5.2.2 Question: What are the strengths and weaknesses of MAF's statistics gathering efforts?

5.2.2.1 Findings

The Statistics Advisor position has been filled continuously since 1986, except for a short period in 1989-90 between the time when the advisor was appointed Team Leader and a new advisor was recruited. The advisor during 1986-88

returned for a second tour of duty in February 1990. The MAF counterpart, the Director of the department, has not changed during this period.

A sample frame and sample based on villages was prepared for the General Survey of Agriculture started in February 1989 and is now nearing completion.

Crop and livestock estimates are based on updating prior year estimates by a ratio. This updating has continued each year, using the most recent Census of Agriculture as a base. The Census was conducted in 1978-83 using a one percent sample of holders in three provinces, and a two percent sample in the remaining eight provinces. Data collected for the updating ratios are based on subjective evaluations of the direction of change from the previous year by farmers or officials in the local area.

The data collection effort is centralized in Sana'a. Numerators receive per diem for all data collection and are provided vehicles for transportation.

5.2.2.2 Conclusions

The continuity of the Statistics Advisor and his counterpart has contributed to a strong working relationship and the development of a strong program.

Crop and livestock estimates based on subjective updating of the 1978-83 Census are weak and unreliable (although improving over time). The General Survey of Agriculture is based on a probability sample and should sharply improve the quality of the estimates.

The data collection activity is very expensive (see Section 5.2.5).

5.2.2.3 Recommendations

Encourage the continuity of advisory staffing found in this component.

Continue efforts to improve the quality of sampling and estimates.

5.2.3 Question: What changes have taken place that are attributable to the project?

5.2.3.1 Findings

The General Survey of Agriculture will be used to supply estimates for the 1989 Yearbook of Agriculture and for the Statistical Yearbook published by the CPO.

In large part due to project support, the General Agricultural Survey data were collected in about one year and tabulations will be completed soon after data collection.

The Department of Statistics now has some staff members trained, and others in training, in statistical methodology, computers, data collection, and data entry and tabulation.

3.2.3.2 Conclusions

Crop and livestock estimates for 1989 will be much improved in quality over the estimates for recent years and can serve as a base for future years (until an annual survey can be completed). The data are also presented in an improved format with charts and graphs and in both Arabic and English.

Estimates from the survey are for one year for all provinces, in sharp contrast to the previous survey which required about five years to complete, covering the period 1978-83.

The Department is now capable, with some guidance, of preparing and implementing sampling frames, samples, and surveys to provide improved and timely estimates. The project should take credit for many of the improvements.

5.2.3.3 Recommendations

The Statistics Department should continue to move toward probability surveys and provide estimates annually when feasible.

CORE should continue training the staff in all areas of statistics, sampling, and computer data analysis.

5.2.4 Question: Is MAF budgeting for the activity sufficient?

5.2.4.1 Findings

The Department of Statistics budget for this activity is not available to CORE staff, although cost estimates are provided for specific surveys. As a result, only general approximations of the full extent of MAF contributions to this activity are available. MAF is providing the salary for approximately 22 people in the Statistics Department and purchasing about half of the expendable supplies. It

is estimated that MAF is contributing about 25 percent of direct data collection, tabulation, and publishing costs. MAF has agreed in the current work plan to provide additional personnel for constructing an area sample frame in Dhamar Province and for two data collection branch offices. They will also provide office space, vehicles, and furniture for the branch offices.

5.2.4.2 Conclusions

The evaluation team did not have sufficient financial information to make an exact determination regarding MAF funding, however, it appears MAF is providing a reasonable share of direct costs of survey activities at this stage in the project.

5.2.4.3 Recommendations

The MAF should provide budget information to CORE staff and USAID so that everyone can assess the likelihood of the activity being sustained. For MAF to sustain this activity without CORE or other donor support, it must absorb an increasing share of the ongoing data collection, tabulation and publication costs in the remaining years of the project.

5.2.5 Question: What specific steps can be taken to ensure that the project makes the maximum contribution possible to creating long-term sustainability in MAF's data collection activities and methods?

5.2.5.1 Findings

The General Agricultural Survey, conducted in 1989-90, is using a sampling frame with villages, combinations of villages, or subsamples of villages as final sampling units. A feasibility study has been conducted and a pilot study is planned for a land area sampling frame in Dhamar Province.

The data collection staff has been provided with vehicles for survey travel. Final sample units are currently large, and two to four people travel and work together.

The enumerators receive approximately \$19 per day in salary and \$40 per diem. A team driver receives approximately \$12 per day in salary and \$25 in per diem. All data collection is conducted from Sana'a and enumerators are on per diem full

time while working in the field. CORE staff estimated direct data collection and data entry costs at \$9.50 per completed interview.

5.2.5.2 Conclusions

The General Agricultural Survey frame can be used for a long period without major redesign or modification. The final sampling units will require periodic re-listing and subsampling when applicable.

The use of the present vehicles may be efficient only when several enumerators can travel and work together. A data collection system based entirely on crews traveling together is probably not sustainable. Vehicle costs combined with per diem make data collection very expensive. If MAF is to sustain this activity, these costs must be reduced.

5.2.5.3 Recommendations

Long range minimum maintenance sampling frames should be put in place with documented methodology for updating and maintenance.

The precision of data based on the planned pilot area sampling frame should be compared with precision of data from samples based on the village frame. This will require that sampling errors be calculated for samples from both frames in Dhamar Province. These comparisons, along with costs of data collection and frame maintenance costs will allow for a logical decision on the future direction for sampling frames and sampling.

If a new area frame is constructed, the resulting final sampling units will probably be smaller than those in the village frame. Collection of data for other purposes may be less concentrated than the general survey.

All means should be considered to reduce data collection costs. For example, if individuals are to travel alone for data collection work, the use of motorcycles should be further explored; in some countries motorcycles have been sold to enumerators with no down payment and with small deductions from pay. Per diem costs might be reduced by hiring enumerators to work in their home areas, by using additional extension staff, or by implementing a system of directly sharing per

diem costs by the project and MAF. The proposed branch data collection centers may provide marginal reductions in costs.

5.2.6 Question: What gaps in data collection still remain and what concrete steps can be taken within the limits of project resources to fill them?

5.2.6.1 Findings

The current data series cover information about holdings, crop areas and yields, livestock numbers, machinery, energy, transportation, and labor. The General Agricultural Survey being completed this year will update all series except crop yields. No animal production series except for chicken meat are currently available.

Little is known regarding data collection errors, including coverage of holders, memory bias, recording errors, unit of measure errors, and bias from interview techniques.

The Department is also collecting rural market price information in coordination with the Marketing Directorate and will be publishing these data in 1990.

5.2.6.2 Conclusions

Most basic economic data except for animal production series are included in current publications. Crop yield estimates are based on a weak data collection process and the quality of the estimates is not known. Potential data collection errors can reduce the quality of estimates, primarily through bias.

5.2.6.3 Recommendations

Priorities for additional data collection efforts should be established. Data collection for milk, eggs, meat, other animal products, and especially crop yields, should be begun when feasible. Provide for adequate study and pre-testing before data collection begins. The evaluation team recommends that different methodologies for the collection of crop yield information be tested. The planned objective yield method should proceed, at least on a limited basis as a feasibility study, but the objective yield work should not interfere with the area frame

sampling. Interview methods using area and production or direct yield questions should be tested for appropriateness for various farming conditions.

Provide for study of the data collection process through re-interview or other techniques. This type of study may begin to detect weaknesses even when conducted on a very limited scale.

5.2.7 Question: To what extent is the data collected being properly used, analyzed and disseminated?

5.2.7.1 Findings

Data collected by the Department of Statistics are converted to common units of measure and edited, using range limits, at the point of data entry.

Data analysis in the Department of Statistics has been limited to the preparation of different methods of presentation.

The Department is printing 500 copies of the 1989 Yearbook of Agriculture and 500 copies of a summary pamphlet. These are distributed to YARG agencies, authorities, etc., and by request to other users. This does not completely fill demand, especially for multiple copies. Users with a specific need for a few tables are supplied with photocopies.

Data from the Yearbook of Agriculture are also published in the Statistical Yearbook by the Central Planning Organization.

5.2.7.2 Conclusions

The different units of measure reported to enumerators can present a problem in data accuracy if they are not well specified at the time of data collection. In the 1983 Census publication, two pages are devoted to presenting tables for each province to define the conversion of reported measures to square meters.

Printing of the Yearbook of Agriculture is relatively expensive (estimated at \$13 - \$15 per copy) and must be balanced against the demand for copies.

5.2.7.3 Recommendations

Data analysis should continue to be limited to methods of improving presentation at this time.

The current number of copies of the Yearbook of Agriculture being printed meets most demand and should be continued. Additional demand may be met by the pamphlet and photocopies.

5.2.8 Question: What can be done to strengthen this element of the project?

5.2.8.1 Findings

The project has trained the Director of Statistics, and is now training his assistant at the U.S. Census Bureau, in sampling and survey methodology. This is an intensive, one year, non-degree program. Other short-term training was provided on statistical methodology, computers, data collection and data entry.

5.2.8.2 Conclusions

The training has increased the capability of the Director of Statistics and his staff to provide more timely and accurate information for users.

5.2.8.3 Recommendations

Additional training, advanced degree training if possible, for the Director would increase and update his capability in statistics, allow him to further train staff, and enhance his capacity to sustain the activity.

Training for Department staff, especially in statistics and survey methodology, should be continued. The assistant director should be capable of assisting with this type of training when he returns from training in the U.S.

5.3 Agricultural Economics and Planning

5.3.1 Question: What has been the impact of project activities on MAF's ability to plan and analyze agricultural programs and formulate agricultural policies?

5.3.1.1 Findings

A CORE Advisor has been assigned, irregularly and often part-time, first to the Department of Planning and more recently to the Department of Agricultural Economics. These advisors have provided advice and support with position papers on policy issues, writing and evaluating project proposals, and conducting economic research and analyses to the often inexperienced and understaffed economics units. A UNDP advisor and some UN volunteers also provide assistance in reviewing project

proposals and monitoring approximately 35 donor assisted projects (or subprojects), about 19 of which are with MAF itself and the rest are with Regional Development Authorities or related institutions.

5.3.1.2 Conclusions

MAF policy and planning activities are largely donor designed and supported. The operational assistance of the CORE Agricultural Economics Advisor has improved the planning and policy process in the MAF, but the advisor's activities often include normal staff functions which cannot be done due to the shortage of staff and experience. With few exceptions, these activities neither transfer technology to MAF staff nor strengthen MAF as an institution on a sustainable basis.

5.3.1.3 Recommendations

CORE and MAF should immediately begin to plan for sustainable improvements in MAF's own capabilities in the areas of planning and policy formulation and analysis. Such improvements would include providing on-the-job training in planning, project evaluation, and policy analysis to existing staff and increasing the numbers of trained staff in key units of the General Directorate of Planning and Statistics.

5.3.2 Question: To what extent has MAF been able to develop its own ability to plan and analyze policies and programs?

5.3.2.1 Findings

The number of staff with BS or higher degrees in planning, agricultural economics, and monitoring and evaluation is about the same as it was in 1985.

There are few indications that the planning and policy units have been strengthened, although the General Director is personally engaged in policy discussion with the advisor. Based on data collected in 1988, a wheat production cost and return study has been prepared. The General Director has been involved in the policy debate, and one of the better trained staff members did the data tabulation once the direction was set by the advisor.

There is concern by the General Director that improved information for decision making be obtained, and an initial survey is now underway which will provide the basis for developing costs and returns information on about 16 basic agricultural commodities on an annual basis.

Annual department work plans are submitted to the Minister, although they are not binding or standardized in form or content, nor are they usually shared with staff or the CORE Advisor. Annual department plans of action are based on, and project proposal reviews (largely done by the UNDP advisor and UN volunteers) are judged by, reference to the Third Five Year Plan.

5.3.2.2 Conclusions

The small staffs of the project and policy analysis units are still in need of assistance and training. The MAF has not yet made the budgetary commitment to expanding trained staff, although recently MAF did specify that several returning participants are planned to be placed in these areas.

With advice and guidance by the CORE Advisor, the analytical capabilities and confidence of some individual staff members of the agricultural economics units are increasing.

While research questions and priorities are often shaped by donor agencies and expatriate interests, including those of CORE Advisors, the MAF is taking more initiative in setting policy priorities and defining its own research needs.

The MAF policy planning, project review, and work plan processes are only beginning to be formalized and institutionalized.

5.3.2.3 Recommendations

The CORE Advisor should give increasing attention to engaging MAF staff in collaborative research and providing training to counterparts, and to helping MAF staff clarify their own policy and research priorities.

CORE should provide training to MAF leadership in the management of studies to guide policy.

MAF needs to make a commitment to increasing the staffs of its planning and policy analysis units.

5.3.3 Question: To what extent has the project been able to support areas of interest to MAF, including development of the agricultural section of the most recent Five Year Plan?

5.3.3.1 Findings

During CORE I the Planning Advisor worked closely with an ADSP-funded bilingual consultant in the preparation of the agricultural section of the Third Five Year Plan, at the request of the Director General of Planning and Statistics.

MAF requests for advisors from CORE has been largely influenced by the changes in the levels of operational assistance offered to the MAF by other donors. CORE has been requested to fill the gaps. When an IBRD project ended in 1983, CORE began supplying its first planning advisor; when UNDP provided a planner in 1987, MAF requested a marketing advisor. Now that the UNDP advisor is departing, MAF is requesting a CORE planning economist and an agricultural economist. This represents a response to needs for operational assistance.

MAF requested a production cost and return study of wheat and a production costs and returns survey for a wide range of agricultural crops to provide data to be published on an annual basis.

5.3.3.2 Conclusions

CORE has been able to support areas of need in the MAF, particularly in the provision of operational assistance. But CORE staffing of the advisory position in planning and policy analysis has been discontinuous.

It is generally thought that until recently the MAF was hesitant to discuss policy issues, but this is certainly not the case today. The growing MAF interest in policy discussion is due to growing concerns about the constraints to the development of the agricultural sector in Yemen and has been influenced by donor-assisted studies, but it is difficult to assess CORE's specific contributions to this increasing policy awareness.

5.3.3.3 Recommendations

CORE's response to MAF needs in the areas of policy analysis should emphasize MAF staff development, and CORE staff should be sensitive to the fact that, while policy analysis is a set of techniques for clarifying the effects of alternative policies, policy formulation itself is a YARG concern.

5.3.4 Question: What activities related to agricultural economics and planning have been the most successful?

5.3.4.1 Findings

USAID-ADSP and CORE involvement in drafting the agricultural component of the Third Five Year Plan was instrumental in formulating MAF ideas, plans, and policies. The process was interactive, resulting in a plan which continues to guide annual action plans within Directorates and Departments within MAF.

Policy dialogue between the CORE Advisor and MAF counterparts is occurring in new ways. As an example, an ongoing discussion concerns how to present data regarding returns to wheat production. MAF wishes to present costs showing only the social profitability, while the CORE Advisor is recommending showing both the social and private profitability. This has led to a policy dialogue around a technical issue of data presentation.

Two recent USAID/MAF-sponsored TDY policy studies have heightened policy debate at MAF. One on "Prices and Incentives" lends analytical support to those advocating the removal of the ban on fresh fruit imports, while one on "Fertilizer Use and Distribution" lends analytical support to those desiring to increase the availability of fertilizers by removing the current system of import licensing and exchange controls on fertilizer imports.

5.3.4.2 Conclusions

CORE participation in the development of the Third Five Year Plan for Agriculture helped the MAF define the status, development potentials, constraints, and policies and plans required for continued development of the agricultural sector.

Productive exchanges between the few bilingual MAF counterparts concerning technical and policy issues are occurring.

Special studies can bring a breadth and depth to policy analysis not possible with present limited CORE staff. However, the CORE Advisor is playing a role in making some of the analytical complexities more accessible to MAF staff. The fact that USAID and other donor agencies see the need to provide such TDY studies is a sign that MAF analytical capabilities are limited and not yet sustainable.

5.3.4.3 Recommendations

USAID through CORE should offer to assist the MAF in the development of the agricultural section of the Fourth Five Year Plan, since this plan is the only significant guidance for setting policy research priorities within MAF.

Collaboration in the policy analysis and in the preparation of analytical studies should be fostered.

TDY policy analytic studies should continue to supplement the role of the long-term agricultural economics advisor. The analyses and the results of these studies should continue to be carried out with MAF counterparts and made more accessible through Arabic translations, departure seminars, and follow-up workshops conducted by the long-term advisor.

5.3.5 Question: What activities related to agricultural economics and planning have been least successful?

5.3.5.1 Findings

The CORE Agricultural Economics Advisor's role has largely been an operational one, consisting of designing surveys, conducting economic analyses, writing reports, and preparing project papers and feasibility studies.

The lack of bilingual capabilities on the part of U.S. and Yemeni counterparts has limited collaboration in these activities. A bilingual adjunct advisor was supplied to an earlier advisor, but none is currently supplied.

The position of the Agricultural Economics Advisor is currently being filled by using 25 percent of the time of the Marketing Advisor. By the time a full time

advisor is scheduled to arrive, the position will have been filled by a total of 10 person months over a period of about 3-1/2 years.

5.3.5.2 Conclusions

An operational role for the Agricultural Economics Advisor remains because of the shortage of trained staff in MAF, but this role has tended to dominate the advisor's time to the exclusion of collaborative activities and on-the-job training for the MAF staff (although the current advisor is making a strong effort to limit the operational role).

The effectiveness of the advisory role is dependent on the advisor having Arabic language capability or of having a bilingual adjunct advisor to assist advisor in communication with the entire staffs of related departments.

The failure of CORE to supply a full-time economics advisor since April 1987 has disrupted what otherwise could have been a more positive contribution to a MAF policy analysis-strengthening process.

5.3.5.3 Recommendations

CORE and MAF should work together to limit the operational role of the advisor, allowing more policy analytic training of staff to take place.

A bilingual adjunct advisor should be appointed to assist the CORE Agricultural Economics Advisor.

Assuring continuity in the provision of a full-time Agricultural Economics Advisor is essential if any sustainable contribution to strengthening the analytic capabilities of MAF staff is to take place.

5.3.6 Question: What mix of activities (long-term technical assistance, short-term technical assistance, training, computers, other equipment, etc.) offer the greatest opportunity for success?

5.3.6.1 Findings

The Directors of the Departments of Planning, of Agricultural Economics, and of Monitoring and Evaluation (all within the Planning and Statistics Directorate) are all three currently in six months English and technical training programs in the U.S.

Two agricultural economists, one to serve as a Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor and the other as a Planning Advisor, are being recruited and are scheduled to arrive in May 1990 and October 1990, respectively.

Nineteen of the 51 CORE participant trainees currently in the U.S. are studying agricultural economics/business, but it is uncertain that any of these persons will be incorporated into the relevant departments upon returning to Yemen. During the past 27 months only one of 17 CORE (and 24 ADSP total) short-term training programs has been in agricultural economics.

5.3.6.2 Conclusions

Providing short-term English and technical training to the Directors of the crucial agricultural planning, policy analysis, and monitoring and evaluation departments was well-conceived and promises to strengthen the management and policy analysis and formulation capabilities of the MAF.

While agricultural economics is the largest single component of CORE long-term participant training, assuring the returnees jobs in the appropriate departments of MAF is crucial to the institution building component of the project.

Having three agricultural economists advise the Directorate of Planning and Statistics during the final two years and nine months of CORE could strengthen the relevant departments, especially if these advisors share their time between operational roles and collaborative research and training activities.

5.3.6.3 Recommendations

In the remaining project life CORE should design and implement additional short-term technical assistance activities in planning, policy analysis, and project monitoring to absorb some of the operational responsibilities of the long-term advisors.

USAID, CORE, and MAF should cooperate to insure that a substantial number of the returning long-term participant trainees in agricultural economics return to relevant departments.

The contractor must insure advisory staffing continuity in the remaining years of the project.

5.3.7 Question: To what extent can this success be sustained?

5.3.7.1 Findings

The MAF planning and policy analysis units remain undertrained and understaffed, despite sizeable inputs of training and assistance by CORE.

Planned CORE inputs to the planning and policy analysis process have become more focused during the last year (e.g., training for department directors, the recruiting of two new advisors in this area, and the placement of returning participant trainees in the relevant departments), but it must be emphasized that it is still in the beginning phase.

MAF officials and CORE Advisors are participating in a new Policy, Planning, and Statistics Sub-Group of the Donor Coordination Group.

5.3.7.2 Conclusions

Much remains to be done to strengthen the MAF's policy analysis and formulation capabilities. Success in this area will require increasing focus on providing training and assistance to strengthen these capabilities, and follow through on current plans for training, new advisors, and placement of returned trainees is crucial. The efforts to date have not put any sustainable institutions in place. The creation of the Donor Coordination Policy, Planning and Statistics Sub-Group is a welcome development. This group offers the possibility of a forum for policy discussion among MAF staff and between them and the donor community.

5.3.7.3 Recommendations

In the remaining life of the project CORE should make the increasing focus on and continuity of staffing in the planning, policy analysis, and monitoring and evaluation components among its highest priorities.

CORE and MAF should follow through on current plans to intensify inputs to this area.

USAID, CORE, and MAF should continue participation in the policy and planning forum created by the Donor Coordination Policy, Planning and Statistics Sub-Group.

5.4 Documentation and Learning Resource Center

5.4.1 Question: What has been the overall effectiveness of the documentation center in fulfilling its mandate to maintain and make available a complete set of literature relating to agricultural development in Yemen?

5.4.1.1 Findings

The DLRC was one of the earliest CORE activities. The main goal of this component is to develop and sustain a resource center which contains all agricultural literature relevant to Yemen and establishes long-term links with other Yemeni libraries and regional and international information systems. The DLRC is established and is now regarded as the best source of technical information on agriculture in Yemen. CORE is providing training, computer equipment and long-term technical assistance.

The funding for the DLRC building, completed in 1984, and its furniture was provided by CORE. To date about 25,000 copies of documents, reports, monographs, maps, and video cassettes have been collected by the DLRC. It is estimated that the total number of separate items is about 10,000 of which only about 5,000 have been cataloged according to the international standard in Arabic and English. About 75 percent of the documents are in English and 25 percent are in Arabic.

The DLRC Director reports to the Director of Information and Documentation of MAF who received an MS degree in library science with CORE funding. In addition to the CORE Advisor, the DLRC has six staff, two of whom are CORE employees. The reference librarian upon completing English language training will be sent to the U.S. for an MS degree in library science.

The DLRC is equipped with an HP 3000, an IBM PS/2, a Wang, and a two photocopying machines. The MINISIS system has been installed on the HP 3000 and presently a TDY is in the process of assisting in the first stage of its operation and reviewing the data base.

During the past year MAF began to pay the electric and phone bills and the salaries of two Yemeni additional employees at the DLRC.

5.4.1.2 Conclusions

The access to the DLRC has facilitated the performance of the MAF in planning and decision making. Moreover the easy access to various studies and feasibility reports has reduced duplication of studies on the same subject.

The DLRC throughout its development has taken on new activities and changed technologies and cataloging systems. This accounts for the fact that only about half of its items are cataloged.

The DLRC is not yet sustainable, at least with its current capabilities, in the absence of CORE. While the process of shifting responsibility of the DLRC to MAF has begun, CORE remains primarily responsible for its support.

5.4.1.3 Recommendations

The DLRC should not purchase new equipment or develop new systems until after the MINISIS system installation and the cataloging of the backlogged items are completed.

CORE should maintain a DLRC advisor for at least another two years. However, the CORE Advisor should steadily shift his operational responsibilities to Yemeni counterparts.

CORE and MAF should develop an orderly plan for shifting the financial, technical, and administrative responsibility for the DLRC to MAF during the remainder of the project in order to insure sustainability of the DLRC after the end of the project.

The DLRC should charge for photocopying documents.

5.4.2 Question: To what extent does the center meet the needs of MAF?

5.4.2.1 Findings

In 1989 the DLRC photocopied about 70,000 pages of various documents, mostly responses to requests by MAF. The DLRC has been able to assist MAF in providing various agencies and businesses with requested documents and information. Various

directorates of MAF refer to the DLRC for statistical data and reports on various subjects pertaining to Yemen agriculture. The DLRC has also been able to provide MAF with certain information from abroad.

5.4.2.2 Conclusions

The DLRC has been able to meet most of the MAF demands. However, until it complete the cataloging of items it cannot fully meet all of MAF demands.

5.4.2.3 Recommendations

The work on cataloging the backlog should be completed as soon as the conversion to the new system is made. There is a need for constant follow up on the scope of work of the advisor so that the work will be completed as scheduled.

5.4.3 Question: To what extent does it meet the needs of a legitimate broader constituency (other ministries, other donors, interested Yemenis, etc.)?

5.4.3.1 Findings

During 1989 an average of 400 people a month visited the DLRC. A good portion of these people have been from other ministries, donors, university students, businessmen, and other interested Yemenis. Over 3,000 requests were received and more than 4,000 documents were used.

5.4.3.2 Conclusions

The DLRC is playing a useful role in disseminating reliable information to interested parties.

5.4.3.3 Recommendations

The DLRC hours should be extended to provide greater public access.

5.4.4 Question: To what extent have these agencies defined their needs?

5.4.4.1 Findings

In general most of the requests received have been in the area of statistical data, economics, surveys, feasibility reports, water resources, land use, soils, field crops, horticulture, poultry and bee keeping. But the DLRC has not specifically assessed the needs of particular agencies.

5.4.4.2 Conclusions

There is no knowledge of the specific needs by various agencies. But the DLRC does have the most complete collection available on Yemeni agriculture, including current donor agency TDY reports and similar documents.

5.4.4.3 Recommendations

The DLRC should survey the needs of various agencies when they send them their bibliography lists. This would also provide an opportunity for user agencies to comment on ways services of the DLRC could be made more effective.

5.4.5 Question: Would greater definition help the center direct its future work?

5.4.5.1 Findings

As in any line of activity, greater understanding of the needs of the clientele would enable the supplier of services to improve performance.

5.4.5.2 Conclusions

The DLRC can be more effective in collection and dissemination of information once the needs of users are better defined.

5.4.5.3 Recommendations

The MAF, with assistance from the DLRC, should assess its own needs and those of other users once yearly.

5.4.6 Question: What specific measures could be undertaken to enhance the center's effectiveness in gathering and disseminating information on agricultural development in Yemen?

5.4.6.1 Findings

To date the accession list of cataloged items has been compiled and forwarded to Ministries, the University of Sana'a, Faculty of Agriculture, various donors and international agencies, and private enterprise. As soon as the National Bibliography of Yemen Agriculture is published, it will be disseminated along with the list of newly cataloged items. The DLRC will disseminate a list of newly cataloged items on a quarterly or semi-annual basis. A number of theses written by Yemeni scholars are being collected, and a search is being made to identify books which have been written abroad about Yemen. The MAF, CPO, Faculty of Agriculture,

and some of the donors are sending their publications to the DLRC. In spite of the fact that the DLRC has requested the international agencies to forward a copy of their publications directly to the DLRC, some are still being sent to the MAF and then are sometimes misplaced or not forwarded to the DLRC.

5.4.6.2 Conclusions

The DLRC has taken effective measures to collect documents about Yemeni agriculture and disseminate the information regarding the collected documents to interested parties. Moreover the quick and easy access to a set of reliable documents has facilitated the work of managers, donors, and government officials in decision making.

5.4.6.3 Recommendations

MAF should itself request international agencies to forward a copy of their publications to the DLRC.

MAF should obtain a copy of missing volumes of the USDA Agricultural Yearbook and obtain the current volume each year.

The DLRC should subscribe to the American Biological Abstract and similar abstracts published in other countries.

A small budget should be provided to the DLRC by MAF for purchasing of technical books and subscriptions to the most useful agricultural journals.

5.5 Computer Applications

5.5.1 Question: What has been the effectiveness of computer applications introduced throughout the entire range of CORE activities?

5.5.1.1 Findings

Computer applications are part of CORE activities and also extend to parts of MAF not otherwise assisted by CORE.

The first computers were purchased in 1987 for the Department of Statistics. Computers are now available throughout the range of CORE activities. The DLRC has been a major user of computers for cataloging and retrieval of documents. The use of computers for word processing is now widespread. Staff knowledge regarding

computers and computer applications varies from very basic to advanced, with some hardware capability.

CORE was unable to supply the evaluation team with documentation concerning the location of all of the computers.

5.5.1.2 Conclusions

The availability of computers has enhanced the capability of the Department of Statistics to perform data tabulations and prepare data for publication in a timely manner.

The HP 3000 in the DLRC will provide for retrieval of documents, by subject, at several levels to assist researchers in covering a particular subject. These searches can be conducted in both Arabic and English.

The widespread training of staff will provide for increasing use of hardware and systems.

The evaluation team observed many computers on location.

5.5.1.3 Recommendations

Promote the use of computers by providing opportunities for interested persons. Move computers and/or personnel to provide access and encourage use.

CORE should improve its inventory system to indicate the location of each computer.

5.5.2 Question: What specific computer applications have been effectively adopted by each counterpart entity within MAF?

5.5.2.1 Findings

The Department of Statistics is using the Wang and IBM PC computers primarily for data entry and tabulation but also with SPSS and Lotus, and for graphs, charts and Yearbook of Agriculture formatting.

The DLRC has used the Wang computer for cataloging and retrieval. These activities are now being converted to the HP 3000 with the MINISIS system.

The Information and Documentation Department is operating the Wang VS 15 with ten terminals primarily for word processing but also for testing of payroll and

personnel systems. The PS/2's are used for the development of systems and programs.

Extension and Training is using the Apple II primarily for desktop publishing.

Several users throughout the Ministry have IBM PS/2's purchased by CORE (nine in total).

5.5.2.2 Conclusions

The Wang computers in the Department of Statistics are being used effectively.

The DLRC is using the Wang terminals and the IBM's, and will use the HP 3000 effectively.

The Information Section is using and providing Wang terminals to other users with mixed effectiveness.

Extension and Training is effectively using the Apple II.

Three of the nine IBM PS/2's are well used. Use of the remaining six varies from none to about one-half time.

5.5.2.3 Recommendations

CORE should monitor use of the IBM computers and attempt to place them where use will be maximized when this is feasible.

Additional training should be provided to maximize computer usage.

5.5.3 Question: To what extent are these applications actually used in day-to-day operations?

5.5.3.1 Findings

The Department of Statistics is entering data from the General Agricultural Survey and preparing tabulations for the 1989 Yearbook of Agriculture.

The DLRC is cataloging documents and preparing to move all cataloging to the HP 3000.

The Information Section regularly prepares programs using two IBM's. The Wang is regularly used for word processing and is expected to soon be on line for

payroll. Six more Wang terminals are awaiting Arabic keyboards.

5.5.3.2 Conclusions

The major computer systems in MAF are used extensively in day to day operations. Some of the IBM PS/2's are not yet fully utilized.

5.5.3.3 Recommendations

Add the six remaining Wang terminals and the IBM PC's as planned. Move the IBM's to ensure use and/or to provide additional training to persons who currently have access to the computers.

5.5.4 Question: To what extent is the computer capacity being developed sustainable after USAID involvement ends?

5.5.4.1 Findings

The staff in each counterpart entity of MAF where computers are available has been trained in their use. This training varies widely by entity. Some departments are capable of full use of the equipment while others are not using the machines for lack of training. Motivation also varies widely, possibly related to training.

The 1989-90 work plan shows three computer science majors now in degree training programs in the U.S., and others in related fields. Before returning to Yemen, each of the three computer science majors will receive specific training on one of the three computer systems in use at MAF (Wang, IBM, or HP).

Maintenance and repair services are available locally for the Wang, IBM and Apple equipment, although availability of spare parts remains problematic.

MAF has generally supported increasing hardware capacity, training and use of the computers.

5.5.4.2 Conclusions

There is widespread and continuously developing capability in MAF for the use of computers. This capability is being further enhanced by present and planned training. Some training in hardware service and maintenance has been offered and more is planned.

There is adequate local support (except for the HP) to maintain and service equipment.

The specific equipment training for the computer science students now in the U.S. and expected to return in 1991 will provide increased capacity for use, service, and maintenance of equipment.

MAF should plan ahead now and must commit itself to providing resources once donor support ends.

5.5.4.3 Recommendations

Continue to provide training in computer use and in hardware service and maintenance using local suppliers and other sources.

MAF should be increasingly involved in all phases of computer use, service, and maintenance, and should be committed to sustaining use without donor support.

MAF should be committed to the identification of quality positions for the returning computer science graduates and to payment of salaries sufficient to retain them.

Move toward standardization (fewer suppliers) as equipment is purchased or equipment can be moved to other users.

5.5.5 Question: What gaps remain and how can project resources be best used to fill them?

5.5.5.1 Findings

In discussions with MAF officials, no one expressed an immediate, urgent need for more computer capacity. Some areas, Finance and Administration, for example will need more terminals as additional systems are developed.

Moving Department of Statistics computers to the planned branch offices and purchasing new equipment from a different supplier for the Sana'a office is being considered.

Several users, including the Directorates of Marketing, Agricultural Affairs, and Finance and Administration expressed a need for additional training.

The Computer Advisor departed Yemen with a shortened tour of duty during the evaluation team visit. The position is being advertised in the U.S.

5.5.5.2 Conclusions

There are few, if any, immediate gaps in hardware. The six Wang terminals awaiting keyboards and the fourteen IBM PS/2's due to arrive soon should be sufficient for near-term requirements.

Any move toward standardization can increase the possibility that MAF will be able to sustain the activity.

Training focused on immediate needs may increase use of the computer equipment.

It is necessary that a long-term Computer Advisor be available during this crucial period of introducing much new equipment and of enormous computer training requirements.

5.5.5.3 Recommendations

Limit the purchase of hardware to immediate and compelling needs until training and use more fully utilize existing capacity.

Move toward standardization of hardware when exchanges or purchases are made.

Locate two to four of the new IBM computers in a special computer room available to all trained MAF staff.

Continue to develop and budget for service and maintenance capability within MAF, and to monitor equipment being maintained and serviced by others.

Focus training in those areas where the computers are not being used due to lack of training (e.g., in marketing, agricultural affairs, etc.)

CORE should expedite the recruitment of a new Computer Advisor.

5.6 Finance and Administration

5.6.1 Question: To what extent has the project been able to address issues relating to finance and administration within MAF?

5.6.1.1 Findings

Although representing only a small part of project activities, a number of training and technical assistance programs have been developed which aim to improve the management and administrative capabilities of the General Directorate of Finance and Administration. This directorate is instrumental in controlling financial matters for MAF and is responsible for payroll, inventory, and other administrative matters. Activities outlined in the 1989-90 work plan are well behind schedule. Efforts are underway to computerize payroll and personnel records, but it has not been completed. About 12 persons have been trained in general computer use, but only two are using their training.

No technical assistance has been supplied in management development.

The evaluation team was informed that the World Bank is initiating a project to assist the Finance and Administration Directorate.

5.6.1.2 Conclusions

With needs so vast that it is doubtful that the small amount of assistance provided by CORE can successfully strengthen the institution, especially in view of a new World Bank assistance program.

5.6.1.3 Recommendations

CORE resources are best not directed to this Directorate, except for computer training to accelerate existing computer use.

5.6.2 Question: To what extent have MAF needs and requirements in this area been defined?

5.6.2.1 Findings

The required management assistance has not been well-defined by CORE. Computerization of inadequate financial control systems has been the main target of activities, although MAF apparently does not have a comprehensive manual inventory system. Finance and Administration has enormous needs. Last year the General

Director requested that CORE provide long-term advisors in general management and in payroll and personnel, TDY's in inventory control, budgeting, and personnel, computer advisors, two vehicles, two computers, photocopiers, and more.

5.6.2.2 Conclusions

Although the assistance to be provided to Finance and Administration in the 1989-90 work plan was substantially reduced below original requests, the project has been able to fulfill only a small part of it.

It is not clear that the computerization of payroll, personnel records, and inventory systems was well thought out.

5.6.2.3 Recommendations

MAF should assess the requirements of the General Directorate of Finance and Administration for improving methods of inventory control, budgeting, auditing, and purchasing, in light of new assistance from the World Bank, and develop a proposal for additional assistance from USAID only if it is required.

5.6.3 Question: What activities have been undertaken that directly relate to institution building at MAF?

5.6.3.1 Findings

Since much of what belongs in this section has already been addressed in Section 5.1, this section will deal briefly with the general issue of institution building and then address some specific issues.

In the broadest sense, CORE is an institution building project. The first element in the End-of-Project Status (EOPS) in the CORE Subproject Phase II Project Paper Amendment (1985) is: "Improved capacity of selected MAF Directorates and Divisions to undertake such activities as planning, analysis, project identification and preparation, evaluation and implementation." Yet, today, after five years and slightly more than two years of the CSU contract, a statement in ANNEX E/1 of the CORE Subproject Phase II Project Paper Amendment would appear to be as true today as it was when it was written in 1985: "The ability of the MAF to develop and implement agricultural development programs at this time is problematic

to say the least. There is a chronic shortage of personnel and several of the key directorates are badly understaffed, while some MAF sections have no assigned personnel at all. Budget resources for operations and planning are in short supply." While there has been some progress, staff numbers and budgets are still inadequate. Trying to assess progress has been difficult.

While data are sketchy and not well-documented, at least 18 ADSP long-term U.S. participant trainees returned with degrees after 1985, not counting an undetermined number who returned in 1987. At least six CORE sponsored degree holders from Egypt and four from the U.S. returned since the beginning of 1988. A total of about 30 degree holders have returned to Yemen since 1985. Yet, the crucial General Directorate of Planning and Statistics, which had 16 persons with BS or higher degrees in 1985, had only 17 persons with BS or higher degrees in March 1990. The Statistics and Agricultural Economics Departments each actually had one fewer staff members with a BS or higher degree in 1990 than in 1985. The overall picture is clear: the MAF has not made a commitment to increasing its ability to attract and retain trained personnel in its key planning and statistics departments. This leads the evaluation team to question how much institution building has indeed taken place.

The operational role often taken by long-term advisors has been mentioned several times in this report. The development of CORE annual work plans incorporated little MAF input before 1988, and MAF input was not significant until the development of the 1989-90 work plan.

In the past there were significant numbers of CORE employees working at the MAF. Even though the evaluation team was informed that this practice is being phased out, it is worth noting that, as of March 1990, CORE employs a total of 13 persons working in MAF facilities. Even the relative successes of the statistics and DLRC components appear to be influenced by unsustainable CORE funded technicians and per diem rates.

The project has throughout taken a capital-intensive approach in its activities, with associated limitations in institution building. The MAF inventory system is incomplete; project identification stickers have not been put on CORE purchased equipment and there remain inconsistencies between the inventory lists that are available. The CORE Team Leader has been attempting, unsuccessfully to date, to get CID or CSU to send TDY support to correct these inventory discrepancies. Throughout the CORE budgets there are line items for office furniture and office supplies, suggesting that the MAF "budget resources for operations and planning are in short supply," still in 1990.

CORE still does not have an institution building plan, with benchmarks against which to measure progress.

5.6.3.2 Conclusions

It is difficult to measure the institution building progress of CORE over its ten year history and about \$42 million investment, or even more recently during the CORE II subcontract with CSU with an annual investment of about \$5.35 million a year. The increasing involvement of MAF in the development of CORE work plans and the explicit specification of MAF contributions to each set of activities are both promising steps recently taken under CORE II. However, most progress appears to have been in the recent past, suggesting that CORE has not succeeded in fulfilling its mandate to build capacities in the MAF at a pace commensurate with such a large investment of time and money. The final years of this project are crucial ones.

There is not adequate space in this report to review the elements of institution building. However, it is worth noting that two earlier studies, Smith et al. (1985) and Snodgrass (1985), raised all of the important issues and tasks facing CORE and MAF in institutionalizing improved MAF capabilities in planning and monitoring agricultural development programs. CORE leadership would do well to review these studies and take steps to develop, in coordination with MAF officials, an institution building plan to guide efforts during the remaining years of the project.

Despite the sincerity of the current CORE staff, without an institution building plan, and without professional help in developing one, it is difficult to see how CORE II will succeed any better than CORE I in this crucial objective in the time remaining in the project.

5.6.3.3 Recommendations

CORE should immediately enlist TDY experts in institution building and development management to assist the staff and MAF in developing a concrete plan for building MAF capacities for planning and monitoring agricultural development programs.

MAF should continue to increase their involvement in CORE's annual work plan development and to increase material contributions to the implementation of activities during the remaining years of the project.

MAF should make a commitment to increase its budget for trained staff in its key departments.

CORE funding for Yemeni staff working in MAF should be discontinued. USAID, CORE, and MAF should explore the best way to support bilingual adjunct advisors.

5.6.4 Question: What are the strengths and weaknesses of each?

5.6.4.1 Findings

There are few strengths in the institution building activities. Little appears sustainable should USAID assistance end today. The strengths of the long-term advisors largely depends on individual temperament, although pressures from MAF counterparts for one to take an operational role may be great. Short-term advisors typically prepare reports. Not enough long-term participant trainees have returned to be assured that institutions are in place to incorporate the returnees within the relevant department of the MAF.

5.6.4.2 Conclusions

Revising the selection process for long-term advisors, to favor individuals more suited to the institution building advisory role, is an important issue for the contractor. CORE and the MAF need to reconsider how to best benefit from

short-term advisors, exploring ways to institute more workshops and training courses for MAF staff. Careful planning for incorporation of returning participant trainees will be required to assure that their newly acquired capabilities are utilized by the MAF.

5.6.4.3 Recommendations

The institution building aspect of the project and the trainer role of the advisors should be of highest consideration in the long-term advisor selection process. Individuals should be selected who have more of a training than a research focus.

More short-term advisors should be employed to conduct explicit training programs rather than to produce studies.

USAID, CORE, and the MAF should cooperate to develop a careful plan for the reintegration of returning participant trainees into the relevant departments of MAF.

5.7 Marketing

5.7.1 Question: What has been the overall effectiveness of USAID assistance to the MAF Marketing Directorate?

5.7.1.1 Findings

The CORE Marketing Advisor interacts and has good communication principally with the General Director and the Department of Research and Studies, which has three professionals, including one with an MS and one with a BS degree, and several data collectors.

The CORE Marketing Advisor has provided training and assistance in completing or initiating several agricultural marketing studies in areas of importance to developing MAF marketing policies. CORE support for the data collection efforts were essential to the conduct of these surveys. TDY studies, to which the General Director and the CORE Marketing Advisor made substantial inputs, have generated a healthy policy debate concerning the proposal for the MAF to establish several central markets.

5.7.1.2 Conclusions

The assistance has been effective in helping develop the Directorate and in initiating required studies, but the leadership of the Directorate suggests that the scale of operations would be sustainable at only 10 to 25 percent of current levels without continued CORE support.

A new World Bank National Agricultural Sector Management program is expected to do some work in marketing.

5.7.1.3 Recommendations

CORE should continue support for the General Directorate of Marketing and Storage in order to sustainably strengthen MAF marketing policy analytic capabilities.

Future marketing activities should be coordinated with the new World Bank initiatives in this area.

5.7.2 Question: Is this assistance offered appropriate for the newly established Marketing and Storage Directorate?

5.7.2.1 Findings

CORE began providing assistance to the newly created Directorate of Agricultural Marketing and Storage in accordance with the work plans for 1988-89 at the request of the MAF. In addition to supplying furniture, two vehicles, a microcomputer, and supplies to the new directorate, the assistance has consisted principally of the CORE Marketing Advisor providing training and advisory assistance in conducting several agricultural marketing surveys to develop baseline data for conducting policy analysis.

The CORE Marketing Advisor (who has been in Yemen for only about 9 months) currently devotes 75 percent time to marketing and another 25 percent time to Agricultural Economics in another Directorate.

The great demands for the advisor to play an operational role conflicts with his ability to contribute to satisfying the substantial training requirements of the staff. The microcomputer is not currently being used because of the lack of

staff training, and partly because the microcomputer is located in the Director's office which is not always accessible to staff.

5.7.2.2 Conclusions

Supplying furniture and office supplies is not an appropriate CORE function.

The CORE Marketing Advisor cannot be as effective as required in the marketing area because of divided responsibilities between two directorates. This should be corrected when the newly recruited agricultural economists arrive in Yemen.

Staff training requirements in data collection, marketing economics, policy analysis, and computer use are immense.

5.7.2.3 Recommendations

MAF should take responsibility for supplying furniture and other office supplies to the directorates.

CORE should follow through on its plans to obtain an agricultural economist so that the marketing advisor can devote full time to marketing.

CORE and USAID should assess immediate study and training requirements of the Directorate and supply the needed TDY advisors to conduct these studies and training programs.

5.7.3 Question: How has USAID assistance influenced the program at the Directorate?

5.7.3.1 Findings

Under the guidance of the CORE Marketing Advisor numerous basic surveys and studies are underway to establish baseline data required of any marketing division in a ministry of agriculture. MAF has not approved the appointment of a bilingual adjunct advisor in marketing.

The General Director and the CORE advisor agree that the staff has not been able to accomplish planned activities as rapidly as desirable or expected because they expect to be paid overtime incentive pay to do the work. Incentive pay (in one form or another: salary supplements, overtime, etc.) was paid in some parts of

the ADSP until about a year ago, and other donors often pay incentives. The staff is eager to do survey work because of the high per diem rates. Data entry and report preparation on already collected data is slow. The work day is short (four to five hours) and much socializing occurs during regular working hours.

5.7.3.2 Conclusions

The research agenda, set under the guidance of the CORE Marketing Advisor, appears appropriate for a new directorate, but the advisor needs a bilingual adjunct advisor to improve effectiveness.

It may be necessary for USAID and CORE to reaffirm their policy of not paying any salary supplements, incentives, or overtime to MAF employees.

5.7.3.3 Recommendations

The direction of the current research program is appropriate and should be continued.

CORE should appoint a bilingual adjunct advisor, with at least BS level agricultural economics training, for the CORE Marketing Advisor.

USAID and CORE should investigate to see if any form of incentive pay remains in any part of the USAID assistance program in Yemen and eliminate it.

5.7.4 Question: To what extent have Directorate needs been defined?

5.7.4.1 Findings

The creation of the Directorate is based on MAF needs to improve the efficiency of the agricultural marketing system, one of the strategic elements in the TFYP. The Directorate prepares extensive annual work plans consistent with its MAF defined "terms of reference." The leadership in the Directorate and the Department of Research and Studies is cognizant of its responsibilities, articulates the Directorate's requirements, and works closely with the CORE Marketing Advisor in planning research activities.

The Directorate is focused on developing baseline data for analyzing the efficiency of the wholesale agricultural output marketing system and for examining various policy options, with some attention devoted to export market potential and

post-harvest losses. As yet, however, there is little interest in studying input markets or retail markets.

5.7.4.2 Conclusions

While recognizing the need for developing a data base for analyzing marketing efficiency and policy options, the research focus, principally on wholesale supply markets, requires broadening as soon as initial efforts are completed. Additional training in basic marketing economics would broaden the staff's understanding of their mandate.

5.7.4.3 Recommendations

CORE should institute a regular staff training program, including formal classes during working hours and a series of workshops in basic marketing economics, to supplement the informal economics education being provided by the long-term advisor in daily interaction with MAF counterparts.

CORE and MAF studies should expand into the areas of input and retail markets as soon as initial studies are completed.

5.7.5 Question: What activities have been completed or are underway that involve USAID assistance?

5.7.5.1 Findings

CORE has assisted in designing and conducting a survey of all major agricultural markets (the report for which is in the final editing stages), a survey of cold storage facilities, and the country's first surveys of marketing margins for selected horticultural crops.

CORE also provided a TDY to analyze household food consumption, expenditure, and price data for 21 agricultural products, based upon the 1987 CPO Household Consumption Survey data.

CORE also supported a workshop on marketing extension. USAID-ADSP has supplemented the marketing activities by providing TDY assessments of the agricultural marketing system, of the establishment of marketing cooperatives, of the economic feasibility of creating fruit and vegetable marketing facilities, and

of the financial feasibility of creating central wholesale markets.

5.7.5.2 Conclusions

The studies conducted under the guidance of the CORE Marketing Advisor are generating an initial data base required to evaluate the efficiency of agricultural marketing in the country and to conduct policy analyses which will aid in the identification of policy options influencing the marketing of agricultural commodities. Some of the surveys underway are not as sophisticated or methodologically sound as is desirable in the long run. However, in view of the importance of generating some initial baseline data and of completing some studies in a timely way, it appears to be a correct strategy to expedite some simple studies to generate a successful base on which to build.

The TDY feasibility studies, to which the CORE Advisor and the General Director made inputs, have served as inputs to immediate policy questions, but, again, such studies are not creating conditions for sustainability of the institutional capacity. But this division of labor between the long-term advisor and the TDY's is appropriate.

The marketing workshop produced a high level of enthusiasm among the staff of the Directorate.

Since the TDY assessment of the development of agricultural marketing cooperatives was produced by Arabic speaking consultants and the TDY exit presentation was in Arabic, the study was more accessible to the staff than the studies done in English.

5.7.5.3 Recommendations

Efforts should continue to expedite the generation of initial agricultural marketing data. More sophisticated surveys can be initiated later. Additional surveys should be undertaken only after data entry, analyses, and report preparation based on earlier surveys have been completed.

The use of more TDY advisors, especially Arabic speaking ones, is highly desirable. More activities, such as workshops and training programs, conducted in Arabic would prove to be quite productive.

5.7.6 Question: What impact have these activities had in supporting the mandate of the Marketing Directorate?

5.7.6.1 Findings

The General Director and the Director of Research and Studies completed a short term visit to U.S. markets to evaluate alternatives to meet the wholesale market needs in Yemen concerning physical facilities, storage, grading, packing, sales, and location. The Director of Research and Studies recently completed a study tour of several Middle East country markets. The General Director has received English language training, and a four to six month intensive English and targeted technical training program for him is being planned.

TDY studies on the feasibility of establishing central wholesale markets have generated policy discussion among the leadership in this Directorate. Several issues concern whether there are positive rates of return to creating these markets, whether farmers or wholesalers can capture these returns, whether these markets will automatically lead to improved grading, sorting, and packaging, and what the effect of government construction of these markets will have on private sector initiatives.

5.7.6.2 Conclusions

Further training for the leadership in the Marketing Directorate will deepen its understanding of its mandate and how best to serve it. Careful technical studies of proposed policies indeed leads to policy discussion and improved policy formation. However, these activities in themselves are not creating a sustainable institution.

5.7.6.3 Recommendations

The intensive training program in the U.S. for the General Director of Marketing and Storage should be encouraged, since it would improve his English language, technical, and, hopefully, managerial capabilities.

TDY studies should be encouraged when they can contribute to policy dialogue and reevaluation of how best to implement the Directorate's mandate.

5.8. Training

5.8.1 Question: What has been effectiveness of training activities conducted under all elements of the project, particularly long-term training?

5.8.1.1 Findings

Information regarding the status of persons who have completed training is not well-documented, difficult to find, and sketchy. Neither USAID, nor CORE, nor MAF has been able to follow up on persons once their training has ended. Answers to where long-term participant trainee returnees are today are anecdotal. The Education Office at USAID has had a tracking system for trainees while in training, but no substantial follow up after training ends. The USAID ADO is now performing the tracking function and is attempting to follow up on those completing training, but with little success.

Concerning long-term non-degree training, the Director of Statistics, his assistant, and the General Director of Irrigation have trained in the one year program of sampling and survey methods at the U.S. Census Bureau.

Concerning long-term academic training, since January 1988, two MS graduates and one BS graduate (who also has a business degree) have returned from the U.S. The two MS graduates are working at the MAF, however, the first BS graduate is not working for MAF but has actually been hired in the health section of USAID/Yemen. Of the six BS graduates who have returned from Egypt since the beginning of 1988, one is employed by MAF and four are employed by Regional Development Authorities.

Large numbers of people have received in-country English language, computer, secretarial, word processing and other types of training. Four data collection

staff persons from the Department of Statistics received a four-week training program at CAL POLY in 1989. During 1988-89, 73 individuals received one or more short-term computer training courses, all but five of which were in-country.

5.8.1.2 Conclusions

The insufficient follow-up documentation on trainees made it impossible for the evaluation team to be precise in its evaluation of the effectiveness of the training in supporting CORE institution building objectives. Expatriate institutions are not well equipped to monitor returning Yemeni students; it appears to the evaluation team that this is a function more appropriate for MAF.

It would appear to be setting a bad example for the next group of returning long-term U.S. participant trainees that the first BS returnee under CORE II has not gone to work for the MAF, but was hired by USAID/Yemen.

The training for the Director of Statistics at the U.S. Census Bureau has had a positive effect on department operations and staff. The effect of the short term training at CAL POLY is considered positive in the data collection effort. The evaluation team spoke with some people who are using their training in word processing and data entry. The in-country training may have the most immediate impact since so many people are involved, however, the evaluation team did not have time to follow up on most of those trained.

5.8.1.3 Recommendations

MAF should take the lead with assistance from USAID and CORE in developing a system of follow-up to document the status of returning graduates. MAF should enforce its agreement with participant trainees that they will return to MAF employment.

USAID should establish a policy of not hiring returning long-term participant trainees.

Continue short-term training (especially that presented in Arabic) and selective long-term advanced degree training.

Continue computer training, especially that focused on immediate needs of particular MAF entities.

5.8.2 Question: What training programs have been supported and completed under CORE so far?

5.8.2.1 Findings

During the period 1981-86, CORE supported 39 long-term academic participant trainees, 20 to the U.S. and 19 to third countries. During this same period CORE supported 84 persons for short-term technical training, 36 to the U.S. and 48 to third countries. Data for this period do not separate CORE from other ADSP returnees; however, 7 of 94 ADSP trainees returned without finishing training and 18 of the 94 completed training.

Since January 1988, 23 new departures and pick-ups (of persons already studying in the U.S.) have entered CORE academic training and four CORE academic trainees have returned from U.S. training, three of whom are employed by MAF.

Long-term participant trainees in the U.S. have taken much longer to complete their studies than anticipated. For example, it is taking an average of about six years for a student to complete a BS degree, and about four years to complete an MS degree.

Programs for English language, word processing, secretarial, and computer training have been continuous.

Several specialized training programs in the U.S. for MAF department Directors and assistants have been mentioned elsewhere in this report. Since January 1988, six trainees have returned from Egypt with a BS degrees in Agriculture.

Since January 1988, fourteen persons have departed for short term training in the U.S., and 11 have returned.

The University of Sana'a is now graduating students with a BS in agriculture. As a result, the program for CORE support of any new BS level training in the U.S. has ended.

5.9.2.2 Conclusions

Short-term and in-country training has been widespread and anecdotally effective. Long-term participant trainees have taken much longer to complete their studies than anticipated.

5.8.2.3 Recommendations

Continue in-country training and short-term (preferably Arabic speaking) training.

Continue advanced degree training on a selective basis, only when well qualified candidates are available.

The project should not be "picking-up" students already in the U.S. unless they are uniquely qualified and can be expected to return to MAF for employment.

5.8.3 Question: To what extent is the present mix of training related to the needs of MAF?

5.8.3.1 Findings

The CORE project now has 51 trainees in degree programs in the U.S., 43 BS, 7 MS and one PhD. Of the 51, 19 are in Agricultural Economics/Business, 4 are in Computer Science/Systems, 18 are in some type of Engineering, and the remaining 6 are in a variety of programs.

Of the 13 trainees expected to complete training and return from the U.S. in 1990, six are in Agricultural Economics/ Business, four are in Engineering, two are in Horticulture, and the program of one is unknown. The General Director of Planning and Statistics, in response to a request by the CORE Team Leader, recently identified positions in MAF to which these participant trainees will return. The positions identified include one to Marketing, one to Planning, two to Monitoring and Evaluation, and the remainder to areas not a principal focus of CORE, such as four to Agricultural Affairs, two to loans, and three to Regional Development Authorities. It will be important that MAF follow up on these assignments of the returnees to MAF departments in the coming year.

In-country training has been heavily oriented toward computers and computer usage.

5.8.3.2 Conclusions

The students now in academic training were apparently not selected based on MAF needs, so any relationship of training to MAF needs may be coincidental.

The mix of graduates returning in 1990, by area of study, is roughly the same as the total of students in training and is not unreasonable for the needs of MAF.

Continued in-country computer use training will be required to insure the success of the computerization program.

5.8.3.3 Recommendations

MAF should follow through on budgetary commitment to support returning participant trainees in the assigned departments.

5.8.4 Question: To what extent is it consistent with the targeted approach recently adopted by CORE?

5.8.4.1 Findings

The program under which most current trainees were selected did not seriously consider the needs of the MAF or CORE objectives. The selection was based on availability, language, personal relationships, etc. The trainees were largely BS candidates and this program has been discontinued.

The targeted approach recently adopted by CORE identifies needs and select candidates to fulfill these needs. The needs and candidates are identified by MAF General Directorates and Departments acting jointly with CORE Advisors. There is no manpower development plan, and efforts to create an effective manpower development and training unit within MAF have not been pursued.

5.8.4.2 Conclusions

The concepts used in the selection of earlier candidates was not consistent with the targeted approach. This new approach is even more important since only advanced degree candidates will be selected in the future. The total approach of CORE to the academic training process in the U.S. appears to be much improved and

improving. The selection program, follow-up during training, and the recent conference in the U.S. for participant trainees (at which 47 of the 51 attended) to inform them of MAF interest in their studies are all very positive developments. However, the current targeted approach is a poor substitute for a selection process based on a comprehensive manpower development plan.

5.8.4.3 Recommendations

Continue the targeted approach to selection of trainees, the follow-up during training, and the participant trainee conferences in the U.S. to encourage trainees to return to MAF at the end of their training.

CORE should work with MAF in the development of a comprehensive manpower development plan to guide future training decisions.

CORE should reactivate efforts to create an effective, sustainable manpower development and training unit within MAF

5.9 Other Areas

5.9.1 Question: What has been the effectiveness of the range of other activities undertaken so far under CORE and comment on their utility and weaknesses (these include manpower development, establishment of weather stations, support for extension, water use management, support for Agricultural Affairs Directorate, etc.)?

5.9.1.1 Findings

As the "umbrella" project for activities that don't fit naturally anywhere else within the ADSP project, CORE has also supported a myriad of activities: manpower development, the establishment of twelve weather stations, special studies on irrigation and dams, maintaining a print shop for the Directorate of Extension and Training, and limited support for the Directorate of Agricultural Affairs.

Of all these activities, only manpower development seems to pertain to the mission of CORE. An advisor performed a useful MAF manpower assessment in 1985 (under CORE I), but MAF was not receptive to work and planning in this area. An FSN Training Officer was employed under CORE I and retained under CORE II until mid-1989, but this position was terminated apparently because of the

ineffectiveness of the position. The need to develop MAF manpower and training capabilities remains.

The evaluation team did not evaluate the effectiveness of the weather stations or studies on irrigation and dams. We were informed that fifteen weather stations are functional and that data from them are current through December 1989. Irrigation was given three vehicles, but then came asking the project for transportation to visit the weather stations. There was no explanation as to why the vehicles were unavailable for data collection. Neither USAID nor CORE personnel appeared well-informed about the irrigation and dam activities.

The assistance provided to the General Directorate of Extension and Training is essentially subsidy and assistance in setting up a print shop and attempting to make it operational.

Most of the activities directed to the General Directorate of Agricultural Affairs are technical assistance (e.g., a TDY in weed control, and several TDY's in water-use management) or simply unsustainable direct support (e.g., providing a the director with a bilingual secretary, an assistant, and miscellaneous office supplies). The project did provide a long-term advisor to Agricultural Affairs for almost six years, well into CORE II, up until June 1989, the last year being an extension at MAF's request.

5.9.1.2 Conclusions

It is difficult to judge the effectiveness or utility of these activities, since little information on them is available from USAID or CORE. The most important one in terms of CORE's current work plans--manpower development--is thought to have been ineffective.

Purchasing vehicles and weather stations for the Department of Irrigation is not a sustainable institution building activity consistent with CORE's more focused objectives.

The assistance to the General Directorate for Agricultural Affairs does not appear appropriate in the context of CORE's more focused objectives.

Despite the impressive activities undertaken by the General Directorate of Extension and Training, particularly with the recent assistance provided by a third country TDY, CORE's support is principally devoted to keeping a print shop operating. It is likely that it would be much more cost effective, and sustainable, to have MAF printing done commercially than to cover the costs of maintaining this operation through CORE.

5.9.1.3 Recommendations

Cease funding the small "other" activities, including the support for irrigation, water-use management, Agricultural Affairs, and Extension and Training.

CORE should explore further the development of a manpower plan for MAF. Such work would complement the institution building activities of the project.

5.9.2 Question: Is this a good use of project resources?

5.9.2.1 Findings

The evaluation team obtained financial data that shows that the five areas under "other" activities used or will use about 7.5 percent of total CORE expended funds during its first two years and nine months, FY88 - FY90, if the budget is followed during the next six months. Assuming these activities absorbed their proportionate share of overheads and support costs, on the average these activities are costing the project about \$436,000 per year.

5.9.2.2 Conclusions

It is difficult to say whether project resources for these activities is "useful," since little information was obtained on them, despite how "important" each may be in its own right.

It is true that the broad design of CORE II, growing as it did out of the collaborative assistance mode of CORE I, permitted some activities in these areas. There can be little follow-up or monitoring of activities in areas without a long-term advisor.

5.9.2.3 Recommendations

If any of the "other" activities are continued, they should be more carefully monitored.

5.9.3 Question: How have these activities contributed to an achievement of project goals?

5.9.3.1 Findings

As suggested in the answers in Sections 5.9.1 and 5.9.2, the evaluators do not feel that these "other" activities, except for manpower development, contribute to the achievement of the project objectives.

5.9.3.2 Conclusions

The obvious conclusion is to eliminate these activities from future work plans. It was suggested in materials supplied by the project administration that assistance to Agricultural Affairs and to Extension and Training are to be phased out. But it is worth noting that assistance to Agricultural Affairs was once before phased out of CORE, i.e., not included as a "module," in the CORE II subcontract. This should be done as soon as possible.

The assistance to Agricultural Affairs would earlier have fit better under the Horticulture Improvement and Training Subproject of ADSP, and today, under the Farming Practices for Productivity Project, than under CORE.

5.9.3.3 Recommendations

Eliminate these "other" activities from future work plans.

5.9.4 Question: Have activities in these other areas impacted adversely on CORE as far as the project reaching its main objectives is concerned?

5.9.4.1 Findings

These "other" activities are relatively unmonitored. The Team Leader has oversight responsibility, but given the demands on his time, that means principally seeing to it that paperwork is processed correctly.

5.9.4.2 Conclusions

Unmonitored activities create a lax atmosphere. Only in this general sense does the evaluation team want to suggest an "adverse" impact on project

achievements due to support of the "other" activities. The project does not seem to have been constrained in its choice of activities by a shortage of funds, so perhaps it could afford to use \$436,000 per year on peripheral activities. However, it doesn't appear to be an efficient use of USAID funds in an era of financial stringency.

When CORE is trying to model good management and planning, and the linking of costs to inputs to activities to outputs to project purpose achievement, it certainly sets a bad example to be carrying activities which do not contribute to the achievement of project objectives.

5.9.4.3 Recommendations

CORE and USAID should work with the MAF to develop a plan for reinstituting manpower development planning, since this is the one area that fits with current project objectives.

5.10 Cross-Cutting Issues

5.10.1 Question: To what extent have project activities been used to benefit women?

5.10.1.1 Findings

Women's share in the project's activities have been small. One woman is working in the Department of Statistics. A few have been trained in word processing, data entry, or programming. Only one of the 51 long-term CORE sponsored participant trainees currently enrolled in U.S. universities was a woman. Out of the FY 90 CORE budget of \$6.6 million, only \$28,250 was explicitly budgeted for "women in development" activities. This was for a proposal submitted to USAID/Yemen concerning development related training of 15 of the 25 wives of the current CORE sponsored Yemeni male participant trainees in the U.S. (see Appendix I.). The few trained women visited were very enthusiastic about their work and were performing their task with pride.

5.10.1.2 Conclusions

Women have responded well to the training received and have proved capable of accomplishing assigned tasks. Little project activity has been devoted to women.

5.10.1.3 Recommendations

A special effort should be made to give women preference for training in activities which are culturally acceptable, e.g., word processing and data entry.

The project should seek ways to cooperate with the Women's Department in MAF.

USAID should consider providing a number of long-term scholarships for women.

5.10.2 Question: To what extent are the full range of activities financed under CORE sustainable once USAID involvement ends?

5.10.2.1 Findings

Sustainability issues have been addressed generally in the Global Issues section and specifically at various points throughout this evaluation report.

Here, many of the observations will be summarized.

In general the advisors are too much involved in day-to-day operations of the activities, and there has not been sufficient emphasis on advisor-provided training. The projects have tended to purchase many commodities, with an emphasis on vehicles, equipment, furniture, and expendable supplies and materials for MAF. Per diem for domestic travel is unrealistically high. MAF per diem rates for data collectors appear to be influenced by donor activities, since daily per diem for a data collector is about 10 percent of the average monthly salary, and greater than USAID per diem rates for expatriates in areas outside the five major cities. In this regard there are numerous activities that do not appear sustainable.

Overtime pay for MAF staff is often paid currently (and salary supplements to selected MAF staff were paid in the past) for conducting regular duties in the afternoon after MAF working hours. Thirteen persons at the MAF are employed and paid directly by CORE.

5.10.2.2 Conclusions

At the present time it is doubtful that many of the project activities could be sustained without donor support.

5.10.2.3 Recommendations

The MAF should bear an increasing portion of the costs of activities as the project approaches the end.

The MAF should be encouraged to set aside the appropriate funds for maintenance and depreciation of equipment and vehicles.

For maintenance of the computers and other equipment the necessary MAF staff should be fully trained by the project.

The present rate of per diem for MAF employees for internal travel should be reviewed and reduced to a rate sustainable by the MAF.

CORE advisors should reduce their operational roles and increase their training roles.

5.10.3 Question: What "lessons learned" from the design and implementation of CORE could be applied to the development of future activities in Yemen or similar projects elsewhere?

5.10.3.1 Findings

The original design of CORE did not limit project activities to a few MAF units, and even the redesign in 1985 set forth at least eight areas of assistance priorities. With the failure to prioritize areas of focus and the lack of long-term advisor continuity, the project has shifted directions repeatedly depending on individual advisor priorities. Only recently has the project begun to narrow its focus to a coherent set of activities with a small number of MAF units.

While USAID monitoring and evaluation of the project has increased recently, the project was not well-monitored in its early phases. Despite contractually scheduled evaluations, until now CORE has not been evaluated, except as a component part of an ADSP evaluation, over a period of ten years. However, there is strong evidence that USAID is monitoring the project more carefully now.

5.10.3.2 Conclusions

The project has not been as effective as it could have been had it been better designed to begin with, had appropriate evaluations been conducted, had the contractors been able to perform well in providing staffing continuity, and had USAID monitored the project more carefully during its earlier implementation. An institution building project requires design features as described in Section 5.6.3.

5.10.3.3 Recommendations

When a project is having problems, it is necessary to immediately evaluate the project and find the necessary measures for removing the constraints and improving the performance.

CORE should continue to narrow its focus on specific areas in specific MAF departments, and concentrate on specific objectives.

5.11 Global Issues

5.11.1 Question: What has been the success of CORE in the "global" context of the ADSP project and the goals and purposes of the USAID program in Yemen?

5.11.1.1 Findings

The development of the agricultural sector to increase the income and improve the quality of life for rural inhabitants in the context of a freer society and of broad-based and equitable social and economic development is the overriding goal of CORE, ADSP, and the USAID program in Yemen. Success is dependent on improving the capability of the MAF to formulate, analyze, implement, and monitor agricultural policies, programs, and projects. Improved productivity requires good policy based on sound policy analysis. Despite difficulties, natural resource constraints, and extraordinarily high costs of inputs to production, Yemen's agricultural sector is continuing to develop. MAF and YARG have avoided many of the pitfalls of development, such as implementing policies which squelch private initiative. CORE, ADSP, and USAID studies have contributed to this policy environment.

5.11.1.2 Conclusions

Despite enormous expense and, at times, extraordinary difficulties, CORE has been part of the interactive planning and policy process in Yemen's agricultural sector. Its technical assistance contributions to the MAF and agricultural sector development, while difficult to quantify, have been in some areas qualitatively positive in the sense that YARG agricultural policies are continuing, in the main, to avoid interfering with individual private sector farmer decision making. CORE advisors interactive role with MAF counterparts is at least engaging in the right debate. But the question of sustainability has yet to be addressed.

5.11.1.3 Recommendations

CORE should intensify its focus on improving the capacity of MAF to formulate and analyze policies and plan and implement a national agricultural programs.

USAID should consider further support to the MAF after CORE II in the areas of formulating and analyzing policies and in planning and implementing agricultural programs and projects only if MAF, in the remaining years of CORE, makes substantial commitments of its own resources to its own capacity building.

5.11.2 Question: To what extent has the contractor been successful in meeting the goals of the contract?

5.11.2.1 Findings

Progress during CORE I of achieving the programmatic purpose of CORE-- improving the capabilities of MAF to plan and monitor agricultural development programs in support of the private sector--fell short of expectations. Little strengthening of MAF staff and institutional capability took place, and many of CORE II's difficulties stem from this past poor performance. However, the data collection efforts, the actual MAF use of the DLRC, the increased interest in policy discussion by MAF staff which has in part been generated by the interactions with long-term and TDY advisors are all positive steps in the right direction.

Staffing difficulties have remained a problem for CORE II right up to the present time. For example, following the early departure of the first CSU Team

Leader after only 14 months in Yemen, the project was managed by two TDY's and an Acting Team Leader, before the then Statistics Advisor became the new Team Leader only seven months ago. During the twenty seven months of the CSU contract, two successive agricultural economists have filled the advisory position for a total of only about 17 months. The Computer Advisor departed with a shortened tour of duty during the time of the evaluation team visit. The only continuity in long-term advisory staffing over the past five years has been in the DLRC and statistics components of the project.

5.11.2.2 Conclusions

It should be clear from all that has been said earlier in this report that the evaluation team feels that contractor performance overall has been poor, but that there has been definite improvement during the recent period. The status of CORE II in achieving the goals of the contract appears to these evaluators to be better than at any time in the past. But CORE II still needs more focus in its activities and substantial inputs of development management and institution building expertise. The overall success by the end of the contract is highly dependent on the contractor being able to provide continuity of the staffing of the long-term advisors.

5.11.2.3 Recommendations

CORE should focus its activities in the remaining contract period on agricultural planning and policy analysis and related support activities in statistics, computers and documentation.

CORE should put the highest priority on maintaining continuity of long-term advisory staffing.

CORE should obtain several TDY's--in institution building, in development management, and in management of its analytical agenda--to help the CORE team develop a sustainable capacity in MAF during the remaining years of the project.

5.11.3 Question: Given constraints of time and resources, how can the CORE activity be best "consolidated" to represent a concentrated, focused cluster of activities and goals that can be achieved in the time remaining under the project?

5.11.3.1 Findings

Currently CORE II focuses principally on providing technical assistance to the General Directorate of Planning and Statistics and the General Directorate of Marketing, and on providing short- and long-term training. There remain several other "modules" or components in the work plans, but the support is limited and no long-term advisors are currently in place or planned for in the components involving the General Directorates of Agricultural Affairs, Finance and Administration, Extension and Training, or in water-use management and irrigation.

5.11.3.2 Conclusions

The recent trends in focusing CORE activities are positive. Assistance, including TDY support, tends to be ineffective in unmonitored activities.

The remaining project period is too short to begin any but the most selective new long-term training.

Development management and management of analytical studies skills remain limited in the MAF departments and directorates.

5.11.3.3 Recommendations

In the time remaining in the project CORE II should narrow its focus to concentrate its activities in the General Directorate of Planning and Statistics and the General Directorate of Marketing, in the areas of planning, agricultural economics, monitoring and evaluation, marketing, statistics, computers, and training.

CORE should be highly selective in beginning any new long-term training program during the remainder of the project. Efforts in this area should focus on monitoring and follow-up on those currently in training.

TDY activities should be focused on the areas with long-term advisors.

CORE should supply TDY support in the area of development management and management of studies to guide policy.

5.11.4 Question: Has USAID provided appropriate guidance to the project?

5.11.4.1 Findings

Failing to have an interim evaluation over a ten year period of a troubled project leaves the project management and contractor without the benefit of outside advice. Even today, neither CORE, nor MAF, nor USAID is adequately monitoring returned participant trainees, and moreover, nothing has been done to assure that the project and MAF resolve discrepancies in inventory lists.

However, USAID's involvement in and guidance to CORE increased during the latter stages of CORE I, under the collaborative assistance mode, and has continued to increase during the first two years of the CSU contract. During CORE II this involvement has been principally in the context of advising on and approving the annual work plans which have become increasingly detailed in a "matrix" format under which costs, inputs, and activities and programmatic "modules" are structured in detailed form and, in principle, linked to project outputs and the achievement of the project purpose.

Communication between USAID and the contractor has improved over the past year. But USAID has continued to "add on" numerous activities to CORE even after the work plans have been agreed to by USAID, CORE, and the MAF.

5.11.4.2 Conclusions

Project performance could have been improved had USAID monitored this project more closely and held an outside evaluation of CORE itself earlier in its history.

In principle, the matrix accounting and work plan development system appears to be a useful device, and a good example for the MAF of linking costs and inputs to the ultimate objectives of the project. MAF involvement in the detailed planning process is especially valuable. However, there is the danger that involving USAID in the approval of the finer details of the inputs in the matrix can lead to "micro-management" or interference with project implementation by the

contractor. Too, the "causal" links between inputs and the achievement of project purpose are often weak, so the "matrix" planning system may induce financial accountability with only an illusion of good planning.

Despite improved communication between USAID and the contractor, more efforts to facilitate mutual understanding are needed.

The USAID practice of "adding on" small elements to the CORE activities, especially in view of the detailed work plan development, is taxing to the administration of CORE.

5.11.4.3 Recommendations

The "matrix" accounting and planning device should be continued, but USAID should avoid using budgetary control as a mechanism of becoming involved in detailed programmatic planning.

Continue and strengthen the quarterly in-depth "content" meetings of all concerned USAID staff and all CORE advisors to share information on USAID and CORE initiatives, activities, and concerns.

MAF, CORE, and USAID should avoid "adding-on" activities to the CORE contract or annual work plans.

6. LESSONS LEARNED

There are perhaps many lessons to be learned from any technical assistance project's experience. However, CORE II highlights a particular lesson to be learned about institution building projects. The design of an institution building project requires the incorporation of several elements, including narrowly focused activities in a limited set of institutional entities, establishment of a system for monitoring the achievements of the institution building activities, sensitivity to the socio-cultural-political environment at work inside and outside the targeted institutions, establishment of a system of budgeting and financial control that limits spending on unsustainable activities, and requirements for the selection of a contractor experienced in institution building activities who can assure at least some bilingual capabilities, continuity, and monitoring of staff and adequate

backstopping. Unfortunately, CORE II was not carefully designed and USAID and the contractor have had to gradually learn the hard way, from experience, how to redirect the project.

VII. Appendices

Appendix A. CORE Evaluation Team Scope of Work

SECTION C:
STATEMENT OF WORK (CORE)

I. Activity to be Evaluated

USAID/Yemen requests an interim evaluation of the CORE component of the Agricultural Development Support Project (ADSP).

II. Purpose of Evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of the CORE subproject in making progress toward its main goal--to improve the ability of the YARG to plan and monitor a national agricultural development program supportive of private sector production and marketing.

Evaluation recommendations will be used to make needed adjustments and sharpen the focus for the remaining years of the project (the perceived need to sharpen the focus of the project and consolidate project activities so that the activity more directly addresses project goals is a major reason for conducting the evaluation at this time). All recommendations should be directly linked to ensuring continued CORE support for major USAID-supported initiatives in agriculture in the 1990s.

III. Background

The \$60 million CORE activity is the largest component of the \$135 million ADSP project, the "centerpiece" of USAID/Yemen support for agricultural development in Yemen during the 1980s. Other sub-projects within ADSP support expansion of the fruit and poultry sectors, and improvements in agricultural education at the secondary and university level.

CORE commenced in 1980 and is expected to run through 1992. Implementation is through the Consortium for International Development (CID), with Colorado State University taking the leading role. CORE itself has yet to be evaluated.

Over the course of ADSP implementation, CORE has become an "umbrella" for a range of diverse activities centered within the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF):

1. Statistics. The goal of this module is to assist MAF in collecting, using, and disseminating relevant agricultural data and statistics. The main counterpart agency is the General Directorate of Planning and Statistics, responsible for planning as well as data collection within MAF.

2. Agricultural Economics and Planning: The goal of this module is to improve MAF's ability to analyze the agricultural sector and improve overall planning. Special studies aimed at improving the policy environment for agriculture are also supported. The main counterpart agency is again the

General Directorate of Planning and Statistics within MAF. At the present time a planning advisor as such is not being provided to MAF. The project is providing an agricultural economist who provides some assistance to the Planning Directorate.

3. Documentation and Learning Resource Center (DLRC). One of the earliest CORE activities, this center is now well established and regarded as the best source of technical information on agriculture in Yemen. USAID is providing training, computer equipment and long-term technical assistance. It also funded construction of the center next to the main MAF offices in Sana'a. The main module goal continues to be to develop and sustain a resource center which contains all agricultural literature relevant to Yemen and establishes long-term links with other Yemen libraries and regional information systems.

4. Computer Applications: This activity recurs throughout the project; computerization activities are part of all CORE subproject modules and also extend to the parts of the Ministry not assisted by other CORE modules.

5. Finance and Administration: Although representing only a small part of project activities, a number of training and technical assistance programs have been developed aimed at improving the management and administrative capabilities of selected directorates within MAF.

6. Marketing: CORE recently began providing assistance to the Directorate of Agricultural Marketing and Storage within MAF. The effectiveness of USAID assistance in this area needs to be assessed.

7. Other Areas: As the "umbrella" project for activities that don't fit naturally anywhere else within the ADSP project, CORE has also supported a myriad of other activities ranging from extensive training to support for agricultural extension to establishment of twelve weather stations to special studies on irrigation and fertilizer. CORE's role in providing such support needs to be highlighted and assessed in the evaluation document.

IV. Scope of Work

The main body of the evaluation report shall be divided into the sections described below. The report itself shall provide empirical data to answer the questions raised; conclusions (interpretations and judgments) based on the findings; and recommendations based on an assessment of the results of the evaluation exercise:

1. Statistics. Assess the extent to which project activities have been successful in improving MAF's ability to collect and disseminate relevant agricultural data: What are the strengths and weaknesses of MAF's statistics gathering efforts? What changes have taken place that are attributable to the project? Is MAF budgeting for the activity sufficient? What specific steps can be taken to ensure that the project makes the maximum contribution possible to creating long-term sustainability in MAF's data collection activities and methods? What gaps in data collection still remain and what

concrete steps can be taken within the limits of project resources to fill them? To what extent is the data collected being properly used, analyzed and disseminated? What can be done to strengthen this element of the project?

2. Agricultural Economics and Planning. Evaluate the impact of project activities on MAF's ability to plan and analyze agricultural programs and formulate agricultural policies: To what extent has MAF been able to develop its own ability to plan and analyze policies and programs? To what extent has the project been able to support areas of interest to MAF, including development of the agricultural section of the most recent Five Year Plan? What activities related to agricultural economics and planning have been most successful? Least successful? What mix of activities (long-term technical assistance, short-term technical assistance, training, computers, other equipment, etc.) offer the greatest opportunity for success? To what extent can this success be sustained?

3. Documentation Center. Assess the effectiveness of the documentation center in fulfilling its mandate to maintain and make available a complete set of literature relating to agricultural development in Yemen: To what extent does the center meet the needs of MAF? To what extent does it meet the needs of a legitimate broader constituency (other ministries, other donors, interested Yemenis, etc.)? To what extent have these agencies defined their needs? Would greater definition help the center direct its future work? What specific measures could be undertaken to enhance the center's effectiveness in gathering and disseminating information on agricultural development in Yemen?

4. Computer Applications. Review the effectiveness of computer applications introduced throughout the entire range of CORE activities: Which specific computer applications have been effectively adopted by each counterpart entity within MAF? To what extent are these applications actually used in day-to-day operations? To what extent is the computer capacity being developed sustainable after USAID involvement ends? What gaps remain and how can project resources be best used to fill them?

5. Finance and Administration. Assess the extent to which the project has been able to address issues relating to finance and administration within MAF: To what extent have MAF needs and requirements in this area been defined? What activities have been undertaken that directly relate to institution building at MAF? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each?

6. Marketing. Assess the effectiveness of USAID assistance to the MAF Marketing Directorate: Is this assistance offered appropriate for the newly established Marketing and Storage Directorate? How has USAID assistance influenced the program at the Directorate? To what extent have Directorate needs been defined? What activities have been completed or are underway that involve USAID assistance? What impact have these activities had in supporting the mandate of the Marketing Directorate?

7. Training: Briefly discuss the effectiveness of training activities conducted under all elements of the project, particularly long-term training: What training programs have been supported and completed under CORE so far?

To what extent is the present mix of training related to the needs of MAF? To what extent is it consistent with the targeted approach recently adopted by CORE?

8. Other Areas. Briefly assess the effectiveness of the range of other activities undertaken so far under CORE and comment on their utility and weaknesses (these include manpower development, establishment of weather stations, support for extension, water use management, support for Agricultural Affairs Directorate, etc.). Is this a good use of project resources? How have these activities contributed to an achievement of project goals? Have activities in these other areas impacted adversely on CORE as far as the project reaching its main objectives is concerned?

9. Cross-Cutting Issues. Comment briefly on cross-cutting issues applicable to all USAID evaluations. To what extent have project activities been used to benefit women? To what extent are the full range of activities financed under CORE sustainable once USAID involvement ends? What "lessons learned" from the design and implementation of CORE could be applied to the development of future activities in Yemen or similar projects elsewhere?

10. "Global" Issues. In view of the issues discussed above, discuss CORE in the "global" context of the ADSP project and the goals and purposes of the USAID program in Yemen. To what extent has the contractor been successful in meeting the goals of the contract? Given constraints of time and resources, how can the CORE activity be best "consolidated" to represent a concentrated, focused cluster of activities and goals that can be achieved in the time remaining under the project? Has USAID provided appropriate guidance to the project?

V. Methods and Procedures

The final report shall be based on a review of all existing literature (Project Paper, project files, contractor reports, government documents, etc.) and interviews with relevant individuals concerned, including government officials, USAID staff, and contractors.

The four-week evaluation exercise shall be developed around the following illustrative schedule:

A. Week One: Orientation in Sana'a; orientation and team planning meeting (TPM) organized by USAID staff; review of project documentation; preliminary meetings with individuals familiar with the projects.

B. Week Two: Detailed discussions with counterpart agencies within MAF; detailed interviews with project staff and YARG officials; visits to documentation center and all government departments concerned; report writing.

C. Week Three: Report writing, with follow-up interviews as needed.

D. Week Four: Presentation to Mission, contractors, and YARG and finalization of the report in Sana'a.

Team members shall coordinate arrival and departure times to ensure that the team remains intact throughout the course of the evaluation. Formal meetings shall include at a minimum an initial orientation and team planning meeting with USAID staff in Sana'a; an interim progress report; and a final close-out report to concerned Mission staff. Additional meetings with USAID staff, government officials, or other individuals may be called as appropriate.

The evaluation team shall leave with the Mission a near-final draft of the report. Any additional Mission comments shall be telexed or faxed to the Contractor within two weeks after the team departs from post. Two final copies shall be sent by courier to the Mission and an additional twenty copies shall be pouched to the Mission by the Contractor not less than five weeks after departure from post.

VI. Team Composition

The team shall consist of three individuals with the specialties described below. One of the three shall be designated as team leader, with full responsibility for completing and presenting the final report in Yemen. At least one member of the team shall also have extensive experience in computer applications.

Agricultural Statistician: PhD in relevant field; at least five years experience in data collection project in a third world country; prior experience in evaluating activities similar to the statistics component of CORE.

Agricultural Economist: PhD in relevant field; at least five years experience in policy-oriented agricultural planning and analysis involving the private sector in a third world setting; at least three years prior experience in management of agricultural economics and planning activities similar to the economics and planning component of CORE.

Management/Institutional Development Specialist: PhD or MBA in relevant field; at least five years prior experience in managing institution development activities (some of which shall have related to computerization programs, finance and administration assistance, and development of documentation centers) similar to those sponsored under CORE.

Arabic language ability and/or previous work in the Middle East are highly desirable. Although prior work experience in Yemen is a plus, evaluation team members shall not have previously been involved in any aspect relating to CORE or the work of the Consortium for International Development (CID).

USAID/Sana'a may independently arrange for other individuals (e.g. a representative from the YARG and/or someone from CDIE, the AID/W documentation center) to participate in the evaluation exercise. Although these individuals, if selected, will contribute to the evaluation, the three-member team provided for under this contract is responsible for all aspects of the

evaluation, including collection of data and drafting and presentation of the final report.

VII. Reporting Requirements

The final report shall include the following sections:

A. Executive Summary of not more than five pages summarizing the main findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The executive summary shall also state the development objectives of CORE, the purpose of the evaluation, and methods and procedures used.

B. Completed A.I.D. Project Evaluation Summary form, based on a sample provided by the Mission.

C. Table of Contents.

D. Main Body of Report, not to exceed sixty double-spaced pages of text. This main section of the report shall include a section on team composition and study methods; a brief description of the country context in which the project was developed and is being implemented; information on the individual issues raised in the SOW, arranged according to findings, conclusions, and recommendations; and specific lessons learned from implementation of the activity thus far.

E. Annexes, to include at a minimum a copy of the evaluation SOW; an updated logical framework; and a list of documents and individuals consulted, along with institutional affiliations. Additional annexes that report and amplify on the evaluation findings may also be provided as appropriate.

VIII. Other Provisions

A. Duty post in Yemen is Sana'a. English is required, Arabic highly desirable. Access to classified information will not be required. USAID's Office of Agriculture will provide basic logistic support, including hotel reservations, transportation and typing services during regular working hours. Consultants are advised to bring their own computers. Six day work weeks are authorized for the evaluation.

B. The period of performance is for the four week period beginning on or about February 20, 1990.

C. This contract is predicated on the contractor's consultant nominees Rowntree (Ag. Economist), Rogers (Ag. Statistician), and Ahmadi (Institutional Development Specialist).

END OF STATEMENT OF WORK

Appendix B. Letters of Clarification of Scope of Work

February 28, 1990

MEMORANDUM

TO: John Swanson, AGR, Chief
FROM: John Rountree, CORE Evaluation Team Leader
SUBJECT: Amendments to the CORE Evaluation Scope of Work

Following a detailed review of the Scope of Work (SOW) for the CORE Subproject evaluation, our Evaluation Team was left with numerous questions. Many of these questions were answered during three meetings on February 27, 1990, a meeting with John Swanson, the Team Planning Meeting, and a meeting with John Schamper, Abdullah Bin Yahya, and John Addleton. In light of the more important clarifications of the SOW received during these meetings and to assure that the CORE Evaluation Team and AID/Yemen share the same expectations regarding the evaluation, we would like to request that the SOW be formally amended to incorporate the following:

1. Section I. Activity to be Evaluated should be amended to say the following:

USAID/Yemen requests an interim evaluation of the CORE Subproject Phase II (described in the CORE Subproject Paper Amendment of April, 1985) component of the Agricultural Development Support Project (ADSP). Throughout this Scope of Work the CORE Subproject Phase II will be referred to as CORE.

2. Section II. Purpose of Evaluation should be amended as follows:

The word "purpose" should replace the word "goal" in paragraph 1, line 3, and the words "the project purpose" should replace the words "project goals" in paragraph 2, line 5.

The following sentence should be added between the first and second sentences of paragraph 2: "The evaluation will focus on the programmatic rather than the financial aspects of CORE, except in so far as alternative allocations of project resources among various components bear on the effectiveness of achieving the project purpose."

3. Section IV. Scope of Work, Subsection 8 Other Areas should be amended as follows:

The following sentence should be added between the first and second sentences: "In view of the wide range of other activities undertaken under CORE, the team will devote little time to seeking

out information specifically related to these activities, but will deal with the questions raised on the basis of information gathered from interviews and document reviews principally focused on the other nine issues raised in this section."

cc: John Schamper, AGR (CORE) Charles Rogers, Team Member
Aboullah Bin Yahya, AGR (CORE) Ahmad Ahmadi, Team Member
Jonathan Addleton, PRM Paul Novick, AID/W, Team Member



AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES AID MISSION TO YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بعثة وكالة التنمية الدولية إلى الجمهورية العربية اليمنية

U. S. A. Address:

USAID/SANAA
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
20520-6330

International Address:

USAID
P. O. Box 1139
Sana'a, Yemen Arab Republic
ص. ب. : ١١٣٩ - صنعاء
الجمهورية العربية اليمنية

MEMORANDUM

March 11, 1990

TO: John Rowntree, Team Leader, Core Evaluation

FROM: John Schamper, ADO *John Schamper*

THROUGH: John B. Swanson, S/ADO *John B. Swanson*
Leonard Kata, ACO *LK*

SUBJECT: Clarifications to Contract for Core Evaluation

REF: Memo, Rowntree to Swanson dated 2/28/90

The ADO and the ACO have reviewed the ref. memo and view the proposed changes to the scope of work for the Core Evaluation as "clarifications", as opposed to "amendments" that would require a change in the contract.

Appendix C. Original Logical Framework Matrix
for the CORE Subproject Phase II

ANNEX B

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
Agricultural Development Support Program (279-0052)—Core Subproject

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>GOAL: Increased income and improved quality of life for rural inhabitants in the context of broad-based and equitable social and economic development.</p>	<p>GOAL: 1. Increased farm production. 2. Increased farm income. 3. Increased farm services.</p>	<p>GOAL: 1. YAR Government statistics. 2. Subproject statistical and socio-economic analysis.</p>	<p>GOAL: 1. Income generating opportunities within agriculture will be competitive with "outside" activities. 2. Services provided by the MAF will be perceived as worthy of use or adoption by farmers.</p>
<p>SUBGOAL: Improved capability of the MAF and Yemeni agriculture producers to develop and sustain an agriculture sector which effectively and efficiently uses Yemen's natural resources, is integrated into the economy, and is supportive of a broad-based and equitable social and economic development.</p>	<p>SUBGOAL: 1. Improved performance of MAF in planning and implementing an agriculture program. 2. Improved capacity of the MAF to gather and process information and use it to analyze agriculture development needs. 3. Improved capacity of the MAF to provide technical services to farmers. 4. Increased agricultural yields.</p>	<p>SUBGOAL: 1. YAR Government statistics including MAF sample surveys. 2. Subproject statistical and socio-economic analyses. 3. Review of the functioning of agriculture service units. 4. Review of Ministry planning documents and project implementation progress.</p>	<p>SUBGOAL: 1. No new sets of values will emerge which would be counter to economic development. 2. Agricultural development will continue as a high priority. 3. Remittances will continue to provide adequate resources for capital formation. 4. Market forces will continue to be the central force behind farmers' decision making.</p>
<p>PROJECT PURPOSE: 1. To improve the capacity of the MAF to plan and implement a national agriculture development program supportive of private sector production and marketing.</p>	<p>PURPOSE (END OF PROJECT STATUS): 1. Improved capacity of selected MAF Directorates and Divisions to undertake such activities as planning, analysis, project identification and preparation, evaluation and implementation. 2. A Documentation and Learning Resource Center established and operating without external assistance in the MAF making available library materials, reports, and training materials to Government and the public. 3. MAF staff and financial resources largely allocated to servicing the private sector in the public interest.</p>	<p>PURPOSE: 1. Government records and reports. 2. Program reviews and evaluations. 3. Core records. 4. Surveys of the agriculturally related private sector.</p>	<p>PURPOSE: 1. Government policy permits the MAF to continue to function as a planning and monitoring organization rather than engaging in production schemes. 2. Government policy will continue favorable to private sector development.</p>

ANNEX B

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
Agricultural Development Support Program (279-0052)—Core Subproject

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>GOAL: Increased income and improved quality of life for rural inhabitants in the context of broad-based and equitable social and economic development.</p>	<p>GOAL: 1. Increased farm production. 2. Increased farm income. 3. Increased farm services.</p>	<p>GOAL: 1. YAR Government statistics. 2. Subproject statistical and socio-economic analysis.</p>	<p>GOAL: 1. Income generating opportunities within agriculture will be competitive with "outside" activities. 2. Services provided by the MAF will be perceived as worthy of use or adoption by farmers.</p>
<p>SUBGOAL: Improved capability of the MAF and Yemeni agriculture producers to develop and sustain an agriculture sector which effectively and efficiently uses Yemen's natural resources, is integrated into the economy, and is supportive of a broad-based and equitable social and economic development.</p>	<p>SUBGOAL: 1. Improved performance of MAF in planning and implementing an agriculture program. 2. Improved capacity of the MAF to gather and process information and use it to analyze agriculture development needs. 3. Improved capacity of the MAF to provide technical services to farmers. 4. Increased agricultural yields.</p>	<p>SUBGOAL: 1. YAR Government statistics including MAF sample surveys. 2. Subproject statistical and socio-economic analyses. 3. Review of the functioning of agriculture service units. 4. Review of Ministry planning documents and project implementation progress.</p>	<p>SUBGOAL: 1. No new sets of values will emerge which would be counter to economic development. 2. Agricultural development will continue as a high priority. 3. Remittances will continue to provide adequate resources for capital formation. 4. Market forces will continue to be the central force behind farmers' decision making.</p>
<p>PROJECT PURPOSE: 1. To improve the capacity of the MAF to plan and implement a national agriculture development program supportive of private sector production and marketing.</p>	<p>PURPOSE (END OF PROJECT STATUS) 1. Improved capacity of selected MAF Directorates and Divisions to undertake such activities as planning, analysis, project identification and preparation, evaluation and implementation. 2. A Documentation and Learning Resource Center established and operating without external assistance in the MAF making available library materials, reports, and training materials to Government and the public. 3. MAF staff and financial resources largely allocated to servicing the private sector in the public interest.</p>	<p>PURPOSE: 1. Government records and reports. 2. Program reviews and evaluations. 3. Core records. 4. Surveys of the agriculturally related private sector.</p>	<p>PURPOSE: 1. Government policy permits the MAF to continue to function as a planning and monitoring organization rather than engaging in production schemes. 2. Government policy will continue favorable to private sector development.</p>

Appendix D. Updated Logical Framework Matrix
for the CORE Subproject Phase II

Updated Logical Framework Matrix
for the CORE Subproject Phase II
(CORE II--CSU Contract Period)

Items below include only NARRATIVE SUMMARY and OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS for the PROJECT PURPOSE, OUTPUTS, and INPUTS, since those are the only elements in the Logical Framework Matrix which have been changed from the original.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PROJECT PURPOSE

1. To improve the capacity of the MAF to plan and implement a national agricultural development program supportive of private sector production and marketing.

OUTPUTS

1. A manpower development and training unit established in MAF capable of assessing manpower requirements, designing training programs, and actually carrying out in-service training and recruitment and processing participants for overseas training.
 - a. Manpower assessments.
 - b. Technical/administrative in-service training.
 - c. Undergraduate and graduate university educations in agricultural and policy sciences.
 - d. English language training.
 - e. Short-term overseas training.
2. Agricultural Documentation and Learning Resource Center completed and successfully operated by MAF.
3. Planning and policy analysis units in MAF capable of agricultural assessments, planning, and analyses, designing and conducting agricultural economics and marketing policy studies, and project monitoring and evaluation for agricultural sector.
4. Statistics and data collection unit in MAF capable of creating sampling frames, sampling, data collection, and data processing and dissemination to support planning and policy analysis units in MAF.
5. Ongoing administrative/logistic/financial support to the program.

INPUTS

USAID:

1. Long-term advisors.
2. Long-term support staff.
3. Short-term advisors.
4. US Support.
5. Participant training.

YARG:

1. Counterparts.
2. Participant travel.
3. Facilities.

OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS

PURPOSE (END OF PROJECT STATUS):

1. Improved capacity of selected MAF Directorates and Divisions to undertake such activities as planning, analysis, project identification and preparation, evaluation, and presentation.
2. A Documentation and Learning Resource Center established and operating without external assistance in the MAF making available library materials to Government and the public.
3. MAF staff and financial resources largely allocated to servicing the private sector in the public interest.

MAGNITUDE OF OUTPUTS:

1. Unit staffed and operating on MAF funding.
 - a. MAF manpower assessments completed and updated.
 - b. In-service training courses given to 10% of MAF staff annually.
 - c. BS--26 completed (and employed by MAF), 21 still in progress.
MS--3 completed (and employed by MAF), 8 still in progress.
Ph.D.--3 still in progress.
 - d. 100 completed YALI.
 - e. 75 trained.
2. Operates fully on MAF funding; at least 90 % of items catalogued; open daily working hours; has 10 or more visitors and 25 or more requests per day; acquiring new items.
3. MAF and contractor jointly produce FFYP; identifiable MAF economics and marketing surveys and studies; annual MAF evaluation document for each project.
4. Updated long-life sampling frame; annual economic survey; published data for major series.
5. Adequate support for programmatic success.

MAGNITUDES OF INPUTS/ANNUM:

USAID:

1. 6 US, 2 third country nationals.
2. 2 US, 8 local hire.
3. 120 months.
4. 4 FTE.
5. Average 52 years of study.
6. Average \$350,000.

YARG:

1. 8
2. 178
3. Office space, materials and equipment.

Appendix E. List of Documents Consulted

List of Documents Consulted

Agricultural Development Support Project CORE Subproject Paper Amendment. Sana'a, April, 1985.

Agriculture Development Support Project (279-0052) Evaluation. Sana'a, December 1981.

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First Annual Work Plan for CID/CORE Subproject, May 1, 1981 to April 30, 1982, AID Project No. 279-0052, Title XII Agricultural Development Support Program, Yemen Arab Republic. Consortium for International Development in Collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, Yemen Arab Republic, USAID Mission. Sana'a, March 1981.

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Appendix F. List of Individuals Consulted

List of Individuals Consulted

CORE Subproject, Agricultural Development Support Project

Tom Clevenger	Marketing and Agricultural Economics Advisor
David Faulkenberry	Statistics Advisor
Ann Oyer	Training Coordinator, Colorado State University
Ali Rammal	Computer Advisor
Jeffrey Sole	CORE Support Module Yemen
Ahmed Taleb	Documentation and Learning Resource Center Advisor
Dana Thomas	CORE Team Leader

Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Yemen Arab Republic

Nasr Monsour Abdel	Researcher, Department of Agricultural Economics, General Directorate of Planning and Statistics
Mohamed al-Alimi	Director of Documentation and Learning Resource Center
Abdul Malik al-Arashi	General Director of Agriculture Marketing and Storage
Nasser al-Aulaqi	Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries
Hassan Faya	General Director of Finance and Administration
Abdul Hafiz Karhash	General Director of Agricultural Affairs
Mohamed al-Nowairah	Director of the Department of Statistics, General Directorate of Planning and Statistics
Mohamed Lutf Obad	General Director of Extension and Training
Mohamed Taleb	Director of Department of Information and Documentation, General Directorate of Planning and Statistics
Abdul Malik al-Thawr	General Director of Planning and Statistics
Mohamed al-Wadan	Director of Research and Studies, General Directorate of Marketing and Storage

United States Agency for International Development, Yemen

Jonathan Addleton	Deputy Program Officer
Abdoullah Bin Yahya	Project Officer
Ben Hawley	Program Officer
Mike Lukomski	Deputy Director
Abdel Moustafa	Deputy Supervisory Agricultural Development Officer
John Schamper	Agricultural Development Officer
Robert Schmeding	Education and Human Resource Development Officer
Abdul Ali al-Shami	Program Specialist
Ken Sherper	Director
Kamal Siddik	Agriculture Specialist
John Swanson	Agricultural Development Officer (Chief)

Others

Charles Basham
Stanley Miller
Ibrahim Moharum
Nurieddin Taqieddin

TDY, HITS Project
Faculty of Agriculture Project Team Leader
TDY, Extension Media Specialist
Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP/World Bank Project
for Institutional Support to MAF
Secretary/Treasurer, Consortium for
International Development

Eric Vimmerstedt

Appendix G. Itinerary for CORE Evaluation Team

Itinerary for CORE Evaluation Team

Sat, Feb 24

4:00 PM Rowntree, Rogers, and Novick departed for airport.
7:00 PM Rowntree, Rogers, and Novick departed U.S.

Sun, Feb 25

Rowntree, Rogers, and Novick in transit.

Mon, Feb 26

12:35 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Novick arrived in Sana'a, Yemen.
2:00 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Novick arrived at Taj Sheba Hotel.
11:30 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Novick visit USAID office. Met several USAID personnel, received tour of offices, given draft schedule of visits, set up Evaluation Team office.
4:30 PM Returned to hotel.
6:30 PM Met for 3-1/2 hours with team members, discussing evaluation and reviewing Scope of Work.

Tues, Feb 27

7:30 AM Travel to USAID office.
8:30 AM Briefed by John Swanson on USAID expectations for evaluation.
9:00 AM Joined in Team Planning Meeting. Attendees: Ken Sherper, Director; Ben Hawley, PRM; Jonathan Addleton, PRM; Aboul Ali, PRM; John Swanson, AGR (ADO Chief); John Schamper, AGR (CORE); Abdoullah Bin Yahya, AGR (CORE); Nasr Al-Ghoorary, AGR (HITS); Kemal Siddik, AGR; Paul Novick, AID/W (CORE Evaluation Team Member); John Rowntree, CORE Evaluation Team Member; Charles Rogers, CORE Evaluation Team Member; Bruno Quebedeaux, HITS Evaluation Team; Member; Calvin Arnold, HITS Evaluation Team Member; Bishay Bishay, HITS Evaluation Team Member. Chair, John Addleton. Briefed by Ken Sherper, Jonathan Addleton, John Swanson, Abdoullah Bin Yahya, and AGR staff. AID staff and Evaluation Team Members shared expectations and concerns.
12:30 PM Met with CORE Evaluation Team Members, John Addleton, John Schamper, and Abdoullah Bin Yahya. Discussed revision of draft schedule and concerns about Scope of Work. Received clarification on several issues concerning Scope of Work.
2:00 PM Drafted revised schedule.
2:30 PM Visited USAID library.
3:30 PM Drafted memo on Scope of Work amendment. Reviewed documents.
4:30 PM Returned to hotel.
8:00 PM Reviewed documents.
4:00 PM Ahmadi departed for airport.
7:00 PM Ahmadi departed U.S.

Wed, Feb 28

Ahmadi in transit.

7:30 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Novick traveled to USAID office.
8:00 AM Met with Jeff Sole, SMY. Others present included: John Schamper, Abdoullah Bin Yahya, A. Moustafa, and Kamal Siddik.
9:00 AM Met with Dana Thomas, CORE Team Leader, and Ann Oyer, CSU Training Coordinator.
10:00 AM Traveled to attend Planning, Statistics and Policy workshop at the MAF which was unfortunately cancelled. Regrouped and decided to meet with CORE staff at CID offices, particularly to discuss training since Ann Oyer was TDY in Yemen and was leaving for the U.S. that evening. Others present in discussions of training with Ann Oyer included Dana Thomas, David Faulkenberry, Tom Clevenger, Stan Miller, Kamal Siddik, and Ahmad Taleb.
3:00 PM Returned to USAID office to gather materials in order to work at the hotel over the weekend.
4:30 PM Returned to hotel. Drafted outline of evaluation report.

Thurs, Mar 1

12:35 AM Ahmadi arrived in Sana'a, Yemen.
2:00 AM Ahmadi arrived at Taj Sheba Hotel.
9:00 AM Rowntree and Rogers met all day with Ahmadi to review activities of previous three days, to review documents, to review status of evaluation, to make team assignments, and to plan future interviews.

Fri, Mar 2

Weekend

Sat, Mar 3

7:30 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi traveled to CID office.
8:00 AM Met with David Faulkenberry, CORE Statistics Advisor, and Dana Thomas at CID office. Discussed history of his involvement with statistics module.
9:45 AM Joined by Novick and Kamal Siddik to meet with Abdulmalik Al-Thawr, General Director of the Planning and Statistics Directorate, to discuss evaluation issues.
12:00 AM Met with Mohamed Al-Nowairah, Director of Statistics, under the Directorate of Planning and Statistics to discuss evaluation issues.
2:00 PM Met with Tom Clevenger, CORE Marketing and Economics Advisor, at CID office.
4:30 PM Returned to hotel.

Sun, Mar 4

7:30 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi traveled to USAID office. Novick took field trip.
8:00 AM Met with John Schamper. Joined by Kamal Siddik.

10:00 AM Met with M. Taleb, Director of Information and Documentation, and Ali Rammal, CORE Computer Advisor, toured DLRC, observed operations, computer use, etc.
1:30 PM Rowntree met with CORE Marketing Advisor, Tom Clevenger, and Nasr Monsour Abdel and Hamood, researchers in the Research and Studies Directorate of the General Directorate of Planning and Statistics.
2:00 PM Rogers and Ahmadi met with CORE Computer Advisor at CID office.
3:00 PM Rowntree joined Rogers, Ahmadi, and Siddik with CORE Computer Advisor.
5:00 PM Returned to hotel.

Mon, Mar 5

7:30 AM Rowntree and Ahmadi traveled to USAID office; organized materials. Rogers traveled to CID to meet with CORE Statistics Advisor.
9:00 AM Rowntree, Ahmadi, and Siddik met with Eng. Abdul-Hafeez Karhash, General Director, Agricultural Affairs Directorate.
11:00 AM Rowntree, Rogers, Ahmadi, and Siddik were joined by Schamper in a meeting with Mike Lukomski, Deputy Director, USAID/Sana'a, to discuss history of CORE and ADSP.
2:00 PM Rowntree, Rogers, Ahmadi, and Siddik met with Ahmed Taleb, CORE Advisor for the DLRC.
4:00 PM Rowntree left meeting with CORE Advisor to meet briefly with the CORE Marketing Advisor.
4:30 PM Rowntree met with Eric Vimmerstedt, CID Secretary/Treasurer.
5:30 PM Returned to hotel.

Tues, Mar 6

8:30 AM Rogers met with Mohamed Al-Nowairah, Director of Statistics at the MAF.
9:00 AM Rowntree met with Abdulmalik Al-Thawr and Dana Thomas. Ahmadi visited DLRC.
10:00 AM Rowntree and Thomas met with Nurieddin A. Taqieddin, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP/World Bank Project for Institutional Support to MAF.
10:00 AM Rogers and Ahmadi visited DLRC and met with DLRC Director and staff.
12:30 PM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi met for the remainder of the day with Dana Thomas to discuss all aspects of CORE.
6:00 PM Novick returned from field trip.

Wed, Mar 7

7:30 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Novick traveled to USAID office. Ahmadi traveled to MAF.
8:00 AM Rowntree and Rogers organized office papers. Ahmadi met with Nurieddin A. Taqieddin, CTA, UNDP/World Bank Project for Institutional Support to MAF.
9:00 AM Evaluation Team attended Donor Coordination Planning, Statistics, and Policy Subgroup Workshop at the MAF.

12:00 AM Rogers and Ahmadi left meeting to meet with Hassan Faya, General Director of Finance and Administration at MAF.
1:00 PM Rowntree returned to USAID office.
2:00 PM Rogers and Ahmadi left MAF and traveled to CID office to meet with Charles Basham. Rowntree met with John Schamper and Abdoullah Bin Yahya to review contracting history of CORE in process of designing the Basic Project Identification Data sheet.
3:00 PM Rogers and Ahmadi returned to USAID office and were joined by Rowntree to review documents and to share information gathered at various meetings.
4:30 PM Returned to hotel.

Thurs, Mar 8

8:00 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi reviewed status of evaluation, shared information, planned writing schedule, and reviewed documents. A planned field trip was cancelled due to an opportunity to meet with the Minister of Agriculture.
12:00 Meeting with the Minister of Agriculture, H.E. Dr. Nasser Al-Aulaqi, was cancelled because he had more urgent business.
1:00 PM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi returned to hotel and spent the remainder of the day continuing document review and planning session.
7:00 PM Attended a reception for Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Stains, the future head of the Agricultural Development Office of USAID/Yemen, at the home of Dr. and Mrs. John B. Swanson.

Fri, Mar 9

8:00 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi took a field trip to Dhamar with Dana Thomas.
1:00 PM Returned to hotel for remainder of weekend.

Sat, Mar 10

7:30 AM Ahmadi and Novick traveled to USAID office.
8:00 AM Ahmadi worked at USAID office.
8:30 AM Rowntree and Rogers traveled to CID office.
8:45 AM Rowntree met with Tom Clevenger. Rogers worked in CID conference room and met with David Faulkenberry.
11:30 AM Ahmadi traveled to CID office.
12:00 AM Evaluation Team was scheduled to meet at CID office with Abdulmalik Al-Thavr and Mohamed Nowairah, but they were unable to come to the meeting, so extensive discussions were held with Dana Thomas.
3:00 PM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi returned to hotel and reviewed documents and began drafting sections of the evaluation report for the remainder of the day.

Sun, Mar 11

7:30 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi traveled to USAID office.
8:00 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi met with John Swanson.
9:00 AM Traveled to MAF.

9:30 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi were joined by Abdoullah Bin Yahya in a meeting with Abdul Malik Al-Arashi, General Director of the Directorate of Marketing and Storage, The CORE Marketing Advisor and the staff of the Marketing Directorate were present.
11:30 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi were joined by Abdoullah Bin Yahya in a meeting with Mohamed Loft Obad, General Director of Extension and Training, and Ibrahim Moharum.
1:30 PM Return to USAID office.
2:00 PM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi briefed John Swanson, Abdoullah Bin Yahya, John Schamper, and A. Moustafa on evaluation status.

Mon, Mar 12

7:30 AM Rowntree, Rogers, and Ahmadi travelled to USAID office.
8:00 AM Tended to administrative details and visited USAID library.
9:00 AM Met with John Swanson, John Schamper, and Abdoullah Bin Yahya to interview them on questions in scope of work.
12:00 AM Rowntree met with Tom Clevenger to discuss economic issues. Rogers met with USAID EHRD Officer, Robert Schmeding. Ahmadi reviewed documents.
3:30 PM Rowntree returned to hotel; reviewed documents.
4:00 PM Rogers and Ahmadi returned to hotel.

Tues, Mar 13

Drafted Report.

Wed, Mar 14

Drafted Report. Met briefly with Dana Thomas at the hotel in the late afternoon.

Thurs, Mar 15

Rowntree drafted report.

7:30 AM Rogers and Ahmadi took field trip to Haja with Abdoullah Bin Yahya.
3:30 PM Rogers and Ahmadi returned from field trip.

Fri, Mar 16

Weekend

6:00 PM Met with Paul Novick before his departure.

Sat, Mar 17

3:30 AM Paul Novick departed Sana'a.

Drafted Report. Met briefly with Dana Thomas at the hotel in the late afternoon.

Sun, Mar 18

Drafted Report.

Mon, Mar 19

8:00 AM Prepared First Draft of Report.
12:00 AM Traveled to USAID office.
12:30 PM Briefed John Swanson on thrust of First Draft of Report and submitted a copy. Arranged for meeting with USAID and CORE staff.
3:00 PM Returned to hotel.
3:30 PM Worked on Report.

Tues, Mar 20

8:00 AM Worked on Report details.
2:00 PM Traveled to CID office.
2:30 PM Briefed USAID and CID staffs on First Draft of Report. Held productive exchange concerning aspects of the Report. Those present included: John Swanson, John Scamper, Jonathan Addleton, Abdoullah Bin Yahya, Kamal Siddik, A. Moustafa, Dana Thomas, David Faulkenberry, Tom Clevenger, Ahmed Taleb, and others. Received written commentaries on draft from Thomas, Clevenger, Faulkenberry, Taleb, and Swanson, with additional input from several others.
6:00 PM Returned to hotel.

Wed, Mar 21

Revised First Draft of Report.

Thurs, Mar 22

8:00 AM Revised First Draft of Report.
9:45 AM Traveled to MAF offices.
10:00 AM Met with Abdulmalik Al-Thawr to discuss Report.
12:00 AM Returned to hotel.
12:30 PM Finalized preparation of Semi-Final Draft Report.

Fri, Mar 23

Weekend

Sat, Mar 24

Duplicated copies of Semi-Final Draft Report. Updated LogFrame.
Drafted Project Evaluation Summary Form.

Submitted copies of Semi-Final Draft Report to USAID, CORE, and
MAF.

Returned documents to USAID office.

Sun, Mar 25

7:30 AM Traveled to CID office.
8:15 AM Duplicated copies of Draft Final Report.
11:00 AM Final close out briefing with Minister of Agriculture, H.E. Dr.
Nasser Al-Aulaqi and the key MAF directors and staff members.
John Swanson, John Schamper, and other USAID staff members were
present, along with CORE Statistics Advisor, David Faulkenberry.
1:00 PM Traveled to USAID office.
2:00 PM Final close out briefing with USAID/Yemen Director Kenneth
Sherper, ADO Chief John Swanson, and key USAID staff members.
3:30 PM Formally submitted Draft Final Report of Evaluation Team to ADO
Chief and Deputy Program Officer and discussed follow up details.
4:00 PM Returned to hotel.


Mon, Mar 26

4:45 AM Traveled to airport.
7:00 AM Departed Sana'a.
3:00 PM Arrived in Frankfurt. Layover in Frankfurt.


Tues, Mar 27

2:00 PM Departed Frankfurt.
4:30 PM Arrived at Washington Dulles Airport.
6:00 PM Arrived home.

Appendix H. Organizational Chart of the MAF



Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Organizational Chart



Appendix I. CID Proposal for Development Related Training
of Yemeni Women Currently Residing in the United States

DEVELOPMENT RELATED TRAINING
OF YEMENI WOMEN CURRENTLY RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES

An Unsolicited Proposal
Submitted to USAID/YEMEN

by

The Consortium for International Development
Tucson, Arizona

September 10, 1989

Development Related Training of Yemeni Women Currently Residing in the United States

Background

The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) has modernized its society and particularly its relationship with other countries in the past twenty-five years. In some areas, however, it retains a rather traditional approach. Women are not yet participating up to potential in the work force, particularly in skilled and administrative areas.

Inadequate availability of well trained Yemenis to direct and support new programs and activities is a key constraint to rapid development of the country. Training is thus a high priority in any development support program. While some Yemeni women are beginning to attend Sana'a University, the overall total number of women receiving any form of higher education is still far below desirable levels.

USAID provides important training opportunities in the U.S. and in third countries for Yemenis, but only a small percentage of those trained are women. There are many constraints to sending a women abroad for training from Yemen.

At this time, however, through a CID contract for the Agricultural Development Support Program, USAID is providing academic training to Yemenis in the United States, including twenty-five who are accompanied by their wives. Of the twenty five wives, fifteen have responded, with support of their husbands, to indicate they would like to pursue some type of additional education while in the U.S. One of these has a bachelors degree and could pursue a graduate program. Others have started programs at Sana'a University but abandoned them to accompany husbands to the U.S. Many of these women, unless specifically encouraged and assisted, will be relatively isolated while in the U.S. and will spend up to three years in the U.S. on the edge of a university with no opportunity to enhance personal capacity or to prepare to contribute to the development of Yemen.

The Proposal

It is proposed that USAID Sana'a request PPC/WID to create, by grant or co-operative agreement to the Consortium for International Development, a program to support U.S. educational opportunities for Yemeni wives of ADSP participant trainees. To create this program, it is proposed that USAID provide a total of \$ 28,250 as a 25% matching contribution, requesting that PPC/WID funds of \$ 84,750 or 75% of the total, be allocated to the program defined below.

Program Objectives

Expand the number of trained women available to contribute to Yemen's development through U.S. education of wives of participant trainees attending U.S. universities.

Plan of Action

Upon agreement with AID to implement the proposed program, CID will provide each trainee wife with information on the program, solicit further information on wives background, prior education, interests and status of English and children's requirements. (Preliminary information on wives is attached as Appendix 1).

Subsequently, CID will arrange with each institution to evaluate wives capabilities and provide counseling regarding educational opportunities.

Wives who appear, based on the evaluation and counseling sessions, to be prepared to take advantage of educational opportunities will be immediately enrolled in English programs. During English training, placement decisions and arrangements will be made. Wives are expected to be placed in one of the following types of programs:-

- Regular graduate degree programs
- Undergraduate Bachelors level degree programs
- Associate degree programs
- Non-degree, certificate programs, which provide a specific skill development

Enrollment may be in the same university as husband trainees, but is likely to be in nearby junior or community colleges as well.

These wives, as non-project related trainees, should be provided considerable latitude in selection of areas in which to concentrate their studies. The principal criteria to be followed in approving programs of study are:-

- Program related to long term development needs of Yemen.
- Reasonable expectation of opportunity to utilize the education/skills upon return to Yemen.

Thus it is expected that a wide range of areas may be included. Certain areas are seen to be of immediate interest, even to the ADSP project and the same institutions to which the husbands are committed to return. As an example, women trained in Library Science would be useful at MAF/DLRC and at the Sana'a University. Women trained in computer operations including English language wordprocessing are in short supply and AID is currently training women for these positions, both in-country and in third countries. As Yemen currently employs a large number of expatriates in public school instruction, any area of public school education should be valuable.

CID will provide from the grant/co-operative agreement on behalf of chosen wife/trainees the following support/benefits.

- Cost of English training
- Tuition payments for regular courses
- Books allowance
- Application and testing fees as required
- Reimbursement for child care required during hours spent in class
- Opportunity for limited on the job training/internship where appropriate.

WID trainees will be expected to make regular progress on a plan of study designed to complete the desired degree or certificate within the span allotted in the husband's existing PIO/P. They may however take less than the load required of most AID participant trainees who are required to be enrolled full time.

CID will monitor wife/trainee progress and report such to USAID three times per year. As these wife/trainees are provided for under a WID program, and are not regular AID participants, they will not be entered in or tracked in normal AID participant documents, but reported as part of USAID, Sana'a WID programming.

Expected Outcome

It is anticipated that at least ten wives will complete a degree or certificate program during a three year period and return to Yemen prepared to contribute to national development. Further, it is expected that all wives participating in this program will return to Yemen with substantially greater English skills than is common for returning participant wives and that they will all likewise return with greater understanding of, and appreciation for, U.S. society and its pluralistic values. It is also expected that wives engaged in this program will be better prepared to understand, support, and assist their spouses in their academic and professional efforts.

Budget

For the period of January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1992 (The following is an estimate of budget required and is subject to final negotiation at the time of award).

Tuition for 10 programs/3 years	\$ 60,000
Book Allowances	\$ 12,000
Child Care	\$ 15,000
Admission, Testing and Other Fees	\$ 3,000
Program Administration	\$ 18,000
CID G and A	\$ 5,000
	<u>\$113,000</u>
Estimated USAID contributions	\$28,250
Estimated PPC/WID Contributions	\$84,750

ANNEX (1)

Summary of Preliminary Information on ADSP Trainee Wives
Interested in Pursuing Some Education in the United States

<u>NAME</u>	<u>(HUSBANDS NAME)</u>	<u>INTEREST STATED</u>
Hoda Abdulrahman Kasim	(Abdullah Al-Alimi)	English and Computers
Nagla Najini Badia	(Amin Al-Halali)	English
Amina Ahmed Al-Akwa	(Ahmed Al-Akwa'a)	BS in Home Economics
Fatin Ali Al-Eryani	(Abdulkafi Al-Eryani)	M.A. History
Anessa A. Ali	(Jamal Diffalah)	Computers
Gamelh Saleh A.	(Mansour Al-Howshabi)	Home Econ/Computers
Amal A. Shafer	(Tarela Aghabri)	Accounting/Computers
Zeinab Mohammed Abdulhalim	(Shakib Abdulbari)	Womens Vocational Training
Nival Ahmed Mokassm	(Saleh Biddoho)	Associate Degree (No field specified)
Hanan Taher Ismaeel	(Nadeem Zeywar)	Accounting/Statistics
Fathiah Abdullah Beshar	(Abduljalil Saleb)	To complete program started at Community College
Latifa Al-Shibani	(Abdullah Al-Sarory)	Cosmetology
Amatel Rahman Sharmahi	(Abdulrahman Nasser)	Positive response, no field indicated
Raja Saeed	(Nageb Al-Zoreky)	English
Ezzia Mohammed	(Hamood Al Makhlafi)	English

Appendix J. CORE Subproject Evaluation Component
of the ADSP Evaluation, January 18, 1984

Source:

External Evaluation Project, PDC/1406-1-09-1141, Agricultural Development
Support Program (ADSP), Yemen Arab Republic. The Pragma Corporation, Falls
Church, April 1984.

CORE SUBPROJECT

A. SUMMARY

Subproject Status

By December 1983, Core had been in operation for 42 months. Its accomplishments to date were:

- a fully developed local administrative and logistical support office in Sanaa,
- a fully developed staff at OSU to back-stop Core/Yemen three resident advisors working with the MOA, plus an engineer and a technician working on subproject implementation,
- Two subprojects approved and de facto being implemented and two others under preparation,
- The DLRC under construction,
- 37 participants sent abroad for degree and non-degree training,
- English language training for MOA staff,
- Studies related to advisory functions.

Progress in Relation to Design

The outputs projected in the PP will be achieved in the main by the end of the first phase, in mid-1985. In one key activity, training, the subproject is well ahead of PP targets. In terms of progress as outlined by the work plans, implementation had been slow on nearly all activities in the first two years, partly because the work plans were too optimistic and partly because it took some time for the institutions involved to work out operating modes. Currently, the main delay is in the timely recruitment of approved long-term advisors.

Major Problems

Given the cultural differences between the Yemen, and U.S. institutions, the history of AID's involvement in Yemeni agriculture and the totally untried nature of this particular Title XII collaborative mode of operation for all parties concerned, it is not surprising that the major problems were in developing a modus operandi in the

first two-three years of this subproject. It seems that this exploratory phase is now over. However, some basic assumptions of the PP have not been fully confirmed in practice, particularly those relating to YARG's ability to recruit and assign necessary staff to the subproject and the CID institutions' actual ability to deploy the required inputs in time from their own resources.

B. BACKGROUND

The Core subproject is the basic mechanism for the overall implementation of the Agricultural Development Support Program (ADSP). It will exist for the life of the program, serving the following functions:

- a. support the YARG in expanding the capacities of its agricultural and agriculture-related institutions.
- b. design, administer and coordinate all the subprojects, including the Core, so they operate as one program.
- c. develop CID's linkages to Yemen and its institutional capacity to support a long term program there.

The Core PP was written in December 1979 by CID and USAID. This PP detailed the activities for the first five year phase (the subject of this evaluation). The Core subproject actually began in June 1980 under a pre-implementation funding of \$500,000 provided through the on-going Ibb subproject. This enabled CID to initiate activities prior to signing of Amendment 3 of the 0052 project, which occurred on August 31, 1980, formally establishing the Core subproject and authorizing its direct funding. During this period when Core was being funded through the Ibb subproject, CID carried out a number of baseline studies to determine the range and scope of the YARG's agricultural needs that could be supported by USAID, and thereby constitute the ADSP. These studies were financed under a separate contract, No. 1613, and were completed in September 1980.

Core activities began in July 1980, when the program director was hired and leadership changed from the University of Arizona to OSU. In September 1980, a Chief of Party was recruited and sent on a TDY to Yemen. In November/December 1980, a draft interim work plan was worked out and approved by CID, USAID and YARG. The plan covered the period July 10, 1980 to March 31, 1981, with a continuing resolution through July 31, 1981. In early 1981, the MAF assigned a full-time co-manager to the Core.

The annual work plan is the basis of operation of this subproject, since it and not the project paper establishes the annual budget, inputs and outputs of each subproject activity. Expenditures are authorized through the annual work plan which are approved by each of the collaborating parties. The project paper establishes the goal and purpose of each subproject, but through the work plan mechanism, the collaborative parties have considerable flexibility to determine and adjust the implementation schedule and level of effort required to accomplish the goals and purpose.

The Interim Work Plan, developed by CID/Y and USAID, with YARG concurrence, set out an extremely ambitious program of work for the coming year, given the fact that the contractor had only the COP in field, with no previous experience in setting up projects abroad, let alone in a country like Yemen. The projections for the year were:

- 1) establishment of Core University support program,
- 2) establishment of Core team in Yemen, consisting of 7 resident experts.
- 3) development of relationship with YARG and USAID/Sanaá,
- 4) design and implementation of Wadi Jawf Water Impoundment Project,
- 5) design On Farm Water Use Project to follow Wadi Jawf Water Impoundment Project,
- 6) design Sanaá Area Demonstration, Extension and Farmer Training Farm and implement preliminary engineering and construction activities,

- 7) in collaboration with MAF, select six MAF staff members for participant training in the US in Organization and Management,
- 8) design and begin implementation of a poultry outreach program at the village level,
- 9) preliminary design of a Horticultural Program with emphasis on citrus fruit production,
- 10) preliminary design of a water resources program with emphasis on water use policy and legislation, and,
- 11) preliminary design and initial implementation of a documentation center to be established in the Ministry of Agriculture.

None of these targets were achieved, and some were not even started. The planning, by CID and USAID, was not based on a realistic assessment of what could and could not be done in Yemen and on campus in the time frame, and within the management and cultural context of the institutions involved. During this period though, local offices and housing were rented, the Jarouba station was taken over (from Tuskegee and University of Arizona), contacts with MAF developed and priority areas identified (Poultry, Horticulture, Water Management and a Documentation and Learning Resource Center). Project design on the Poultry and FOA subproject was also initiated. All parties were under pressure to get the program going, before the key issues, such as policies and procedures of program formulation and implementation, between CID and USAID, and within the CID system, had been clearly identified and gone through the process of resolution.

The First Annual Work Plan, covering the period May 1, 1981 to April 30, 1982 was approved in June 1981. The outputs proposed were:

- 1) Establish a cost accounting system in Yemen and U.S., which identifies and tracks subproject costs,
- 2) Complete Core commodity procurement,
- 3) Recruit expatriate personnel on time,

- 4) Establish a Documentation and Learning Resource Center,
- 5) Complete the Agricultural Sector Assessment,
- 6) Coordinate subproject activities with overall program development activities and planning.

This work plan was also rather ambitious, and several of the key outputs were not achieved. The expatriate staff recruitment was slow; of the twelve resident expatriates expected to be in Yemen for 10-12 months by the end of the work plan, only four were on post for six months or more, three of whom had arrived only on the last month of the plan year. The Agricultural Sector Assessment was incomplete, and the Poultry subproject PID approval was withheld by AID. An Integrated Crop and Water Management PID team came, but lack of a suitable site eventually precluded any project that AID could consider. Finally, the DLRC activity was delayed, as AID/W held onto a concept of a DLRC being just a library in the MAF, while USAID, CID/Y and YARG envisaged a center with its own building.

In August 1981, a year after it had started, Core had four different TDY teams in the field; FOA, Agricultural Sector Analysis, Poultry and the Integrated Crop and Water Management Subprojects. However, at the same time, the incumbent COP was abruptly recalled to the U.S., and his replacement came to Sanaá in September 1981 on a TDY, prior to taking up residence in January 1982. The removal of the first COP was a unilateral action by OSU, and resented by other parties in the way it was done. Intra-faculty personality clashes overrode the wider interests of the program and other partners, undermining the foundations to Core's management, besides creating a vacuum in Sanaa at the most crucial time. The first COP stayed only ten months, his administrative support staff were all TDYs, and there was no resident administrative officer until late 1982. In fact the new chief of party, and the Agricultural Advisor, who first arrived in Sanaá in September 1981, were the first senior Core persons who managed to stay their full terms.

In December 1981, an in-house evaluation was carried out by CID, dwelling mainly on the problems of implementation details. These basically involved lack of efficient communication between CID/Y and AID/W, particularly in the flow of documents reporting program

operations, expenditures, work plans and future plans. Recommendations were made on establishing procedures to improve communications, most of which are in place, although the semi-annual reporting on program implementation has not been accomplished. Comments were also made on the apparent inability of the Corvallis office to recruit personnel to support Core/Yemen, with the suggestion (page 20) that "...if OSU/Core office is not providing or cannot provide support, other alternatives should be pursued...".

The evaluation concluded that the Core's main weaknesses were due to the inadequate management of resources it deployed in 1980/1982 in setting up the Sanaá office, and in the preparation of subproject PIDS and the ASA.

The Second Annual Work plan was prepared with input from the evaluation team in December 1981/January 1982, to cover the period May 1, 1982 to April 30, 1983. However approvals were late in coming; CID's in September 1982 and MAF's not till May 1983. The plan period was in any case extended to 30th September 1983, to both accommodate these delayed approvals and to mesh with AID's financial year. The activities programmed were:

1. Continuation of ongoing administrative and logistic support and advisory functions
2. Add 6 new long-term advisors
3. Design and implement the HITS subproject
4. Design and implement the PETS subproject
5. Develop a PID and a PP for the FOA
6. Limited pre-PID activities in water use and management.
7. Erect a DLRC building, staff and run it.

The HITS and PETS subprojects were approved during the plan period; the former in September 1982 and the latter in December 1982. AID approval of the six new advisors was delayed pending the results of the Agricultural Sector Assessment, which was carried out in October/November 1982 and reviewed by AID/W in

February 1983. Subsequently, in August 1983 the scopes of work of four advisory posts were approved but none had been selected by December 1983. The DLRC was also delayed, as AID did not formally accept the YARG/CID/USAID concept of the DLRC (it favored a simple library) until mid-1983. Consequently, construction could not begin until the next (83-84) work plan and the advisors could not be in place until the building is ready. The FOA PID was prepared and approved in the work plan period, but the proposed water studies were put off to the next plan period.

Up to the end of this work plan period, one of the weakest elements of the Core subproject was the management of the local currency budget. To save money AID did not allow the posting of a seasoned resident administrative officer to accompany the first COP when he came in 1980 and, in fact, not until late 1982 was there such a person in Yemen full time; the position, as mentioned earlier, had been filled by three different TDYs between October 1980 and October 1982. It was implicitly assumed that the USAID controller's office would have the necessary backstopping but, for various reasons, including lack of resources and established procedures, this was not so. The subsequent local budget management problems were such that USAID called for an audit, which was carried out in late 1982 by the regional Inspector General's office and published in January 1983 (Audit Report No. 5-2-79-83-4).

The audit questioned and suspended 24.5% of the \$1.8 million applied against the contractor's advance. Much of this applied to the first six months' operations when no accounting procedures existed. Internal control problems were found in managing cash, accounting for advances, reimbursing for salaries and travel, and using project equipment. The audit also found controls over the shipping and receiving of commodities procured for Core to be inadequate for AID, that insufficient information was flowing between OSU and the Core subproject to know what was being ordered, shipped, or received. The audit also noted that project work plans required by the project agreement had either not been prepared or their approval had been delayed to the extent that their usefulness was questioned. It stated that the contractor personnel were having difficulty preparing work plans acceptable to AID; although USAID officials set the work plan

format and helped in the preparation, it was AID/W that later rejected them for lack of sufficient content and unacceptable format. CID admitted that some of the problems were of its own doing, but it is clear that the major cause of problems was the lack of proper communication between AID/Y and AID/W.

The audit also noted YARG's noncompliance with certain terms and conditions of the AID grant, particularly provision of houses for Core long-term advisors. Apparently AID/Y's view was that these grant conditions should not have been written, and the grant agreement be adjusted accordingly.

The audit made eight recommendations relating to management of funds, procurement and production of pertinent work plans. These recommendations are now in progress, after appointment of qualified staff, at Core/Yemen, CID/Tucson and OSU. It is felt that all plant, management and accounting procedures, and output of work plans, will be in order by mid-1984. However, the auditor-general still wants CID/Y and AID/Y to resolve the undocumented expenditures of the first six months, which would require considerable accounting resources to do.

A major step in work plan formulation and implementation was the Joint Annual Field Review which took place in June 1983. This brought together senior decision makers from AID, CID, and OSU to work with AID/Y, CID/Y and the YARG to pass the next or Third Annual Work Plan. In this way, delays and misunderstandings inherent in the usual system (of consequent reviews in Yemen and Washington) could be by-passed, and in this respect the exercise was extremely efficient. The PP had actually proposed that this technique be employed from the first annual work plan (originally March 1981), but it took two years before most, though not all, players could be brought together in one place at one time.

The current work plan, the Third Annual Work plan, covering the period October 1, 1983 to September 30, 1984, received its final signature in November 1983. The outputs projected are:

- Completion of the DLRC and its staffing.
- Implementation of the HITS and PETS subprojects.
- Finalizing project papers for extending the Core and Ibb subprojects.
- FOA SPP completed and mobilization for the FOA Demonstration/Teaching Fair.
- Participant training.
- Water Use and Management PID completed.
- Recruit four additional Core advisors.

The DLRC is under construction and should be ready by March 1984; the approved advisor and referenced librarian are currently being recruited by the University of Arizona. The HITS and PETS subprojects have hit a legal constraint in that the contract amendment has not been signed by AID due to circumstances beyond AID's control (discussed on page III-5), although all parties approved the subproject and its financing in late 1982. The lack of signature has not slowed the implementation of PETS.

The Core and Ibb subproject extension papers will be written up subsequent to this evaluation. The FOA subproject activity is on schedule, and the Water Use and Management PID team visited Yemen in September/October 1983. The third Core advisor, on training, arrived on post in late 1982, but the four additional advisors, originally proposed in 1982 and approved in August 1983, have still to be identified by OSU.

At the time of this evaluation, in December, 1983, Core had been in operation for 42 months. Its accomplishments to date were:

- a. A large local administrative and logistical support office in Sanaá, with a staff of 27; the COP and four others under the dollar budget and 25 under the local currency budget. In addition there is the warehouse with 15 employees and 16 drivers, for a total staff of 58.
- b. A State-side on-campus staff of 6.5 full-time personnel, split 7.5 FTE at OSU, including the Program Director, and 1.0 FTE at the University of Arizona backstopping the DLRC. In addition, there is the CID/Tucson involvement, where the Yemen program accounts for 40% of all activity, about 3 FTE. The university staff are directly billed to Core, while the CID personnel are paid under CID's G&A income from the subproject.

- c. Three resident advisors working with the MAF, plus one engineer and one technician.
- d. Two subprojects (HITS and PETS) approved and de facto implemented. As the HITS and PETS subprojects are legally at the pre implementation stage, awaiting contract signature, the resident HITS and PETS experts two advisors/team leaders, three technicians are part of Core for budgetary purposes. The HITS Jarouba station manager/horticulture specialist ended his tour in mid-October 1983 and his replacement is still to be recruited.
- e. The DLRC under construction.
- f. The FOA PP and a Water Use and Management PID under preparation.
- g. 37 participants sent to the U.S. and Egypt for degree and non-degree training.
- h. English language training established at the MAF and YALI for all MAF personnel who want to learn English at individual levels of proficiency and effort.
- i. Studies related to the Agricultural Sector Assessment, life of programs and subprojects, program strategy statement, program procedures and policies, and sewage effluent treatment.

C. EXTERNAL FACTORS

The key external factors impacting on the subproject involve the explicit and implicit assumptions underlying the PP and in the planning of the work plans. Following is a list of assumptions that could have been examined more carefully.

1. The timeliness of the collaborative mode of operation in YAR.

YARG ministries and agencies, as modern organizations, are only 10 years old, and still at an embryonic stage of development. Furthermore, unlike any other country where AID is engaged in institutional building, YARG institutions have very little experience in dealing with US organizations. In particular, there is no cadre of Yemen officials at management levels who have been educated in the U.S. Given this setting, and the cultural environment, it takes some time for relationships and mutual confidences to build up, and this stage has yet to be reached in some agencies e.g. the MOE. However, the collaborative approach assumes a roughly equal tri-partite modus operandi, implying a considerable history of experience and mutual interaction between the three partners. This is not so, and as a result, decision making takes a lot longer, in turn creating more problems e.g. slowness in recruiting and approving experts and signing of work plans, adherence to agreements regarding sites and other inputs, unilaterally changing a previously agreed course of action for a subproject, etc. Such AID "communications problems" or "cultural variances" are not unique to Yemen, but seem to be more acute there. The point is that in this context, the collaborative approach may not have been the most efficient way for AID to operate in Yemen.

2. The capabilities of the CID institutions to actually implement the ADSP without undue delays.

Although CID is the contractor for the ADSP, it does not manage the resources deployed, since they are the responsibility of the lead universities. Working together, and sharing responsibility, for a complex program in a foreign country is a unique experience for the otherwise competing

institutions. In the PP, it was assumed that the universities and CID would quickly work out the management guidelines and establish policies and procedures for program implementation. It takes however a lot of time for a group of universities to mutually agree and then adhere to a common set of policies. At present, there is no hierarchy nor a defined channel of communications, and a great fear that individual universities have too much blocking power in the CID Board of Trustees, and that too much decision making remains in the hands of the trustees. Thus there is too much diffusion of responsibility, and more chances of confusion and delay, i.e. universities have their "communication or cultural" problems too.

For example, CID/Y and USAID/Y interpret subproject approval as definite grounds for lead universities to spend the agreed sums. However, CSPUP is loath to put its full effort into recruitment without a signed contract, fearing legal consequences if its auditors question any expenditure without a signed contract. Or where one university feels it has done its recruitment duty when it submits curriculum vitae to OSU, although CID/Y might think the recruitment process is not complete until these curriculum vitae have been scrutinized in Sana'a. The proper chain might involve eight equal parties e.g. CSPUP - OSU - CID/Y - CID/Y - Subproject team leader - USAID - COP - MAF and back. Slip-ups and delays can and do occur at each of these stages, and the party most involved is easily aggrieved at all the others. Diffusion of authority is such that important decisions are made between USAID and the lead university, without involving CID in the process from the beginning, although ultimately CID is the contractor.

3. That CID universities had the management and technical resources to assign to Yemen.

The universities did not, and still do not, have the right long-term expertise to assign to Yemen in a timely manner. The actual pool of faculty available for foreign assignments is actually very small; in fact, every university has had to go outside its own staff and the CID system to recruit the needed individuals. The potential pool is further narrowed by the attitudes of some of the departments, where a foreign assignment is a career impediment except to someone close to

retirement. Consequently the universities' approach to recruitment for Yemen is not very rigorous; in the U.S., if they had a \$6 or \$8 million project in a new environment, it is certain that they would assign one or two very senior members of the faculty to manage the project in the field. However, the same size project in Yemen, a vastly more difficult environment demanding high level management and people-oriented skills as well as technical competence, is paradoxically thought to be a job suitable for retirees, even if they have just tenuous links to the university concerned. The universities have also not been able to provide the necessary short-term technical expertise at times, as experience with PID and PP design has shown.

4. That the AID system understood its responsibilities and the complexities of implementing: a) a program in Yemen, and b) within the collaborative mode with CID.

Since USAID has been intimately involved with CID from the beginning in the work plan formulation, including establishing outputs and the number of experts to be assigned, it shares with CID in the successes and shortcomings of the Core subproject. USAID could have been more cautious in approving outputs in the earliest work plan, which were overly optimistic, and should have insisted on more resident management and administrative resources to accompany the first COP to help with program mobilization. As already mentioned, the first COP, helped only by a string of assistants on TDYs, was expected to have an office organized and the program going within one year, working in a totally foreign environment and without knowing any Arabic. Such a task requires two to three full-time professionals, with previous experience in this activity, knowledge of pertinent local customs, as well as command of the language. Also, in planning the strength of the Agricultural Sector assessment team, only two TDYs were approved by AID for this job, although experience over the years indicates that a lot more people are required: AID fielded 10 men to do the task in October-November 1982. Finally, there seems to have been communication problems between AID/W and USAID in the early days of the Core. For example,

PIDs developed by CID and approved by USAID were subsequently turned down by AID/W (the first water subproject, the DLRC and the Poultry subproject).

Other external factors that came to bear on the subproject after implementation were:

1. The decision by UNDP and World Bank to terminate at the end of 1982 their TA project which had funded seven expatriate advisors and operational executives in the MAF for 5-8 years. These experts had build up the MAF from its earliest stages, so their departure was keenly felt, and greatly enhanced Core's advisory role in the MAF. Aside from the one UNDP/WB advisor still in the Ministry, the three Core advisors are the only other senior experts working directly with the MAF's general directors
2. Unlike governments in other developing countries, the YARG maintains an agricultural policy that permits farmers to receive the highest possible prices for their products. These incentives were further enhanced by bans on the import of vegetables (1981) and fruit (1983). The latter put a great deal of pressure on the Core-HITS subproject. The demand for fruit seedling and budwood shot up, and MAF, reacting to this demand, wanted the CID to immediately switch emphasis from training to production, and to expand the projected output for planting material. These pressures were keenly felt, especially for a subproject which had been delayed through slowness in recruitment.

D. INPUTS

The inputs detailed in the PP for the first phase were:

1. Training: Funding/identification of candidates for a) B.S., M.S., and PhD degrees for 24 staff members of the central MAF and MOE.

To date, 10 participants are studying at CID and 6 at Egyptian universities. Fifteen participants are to be sent to the US, and four to Egypt. This activity is well ahead of schedule, although the participant pool is very small for the following reasons:

- (i) The MOE has not contributed any participants through Core; it has sent participants to CID and Egyptian universities only under the Ibb funding.
- (ii) The MAF participants are expected to make a lifetime career in the ministry. This is a constraint, since potentially a large number of candidates who want to study agriculture have no desire to work for the MAF (a common syndrome in developing countries, where MAF have low status and pay).
- (iii) USAID, and some of the universities insist on participants achieving a score of 475 in the Teaching of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) test in Sana'a before they proceed to the U.S. This level is very difficult to achieve in Yemen, partly because English instruction is new in the local school curriculum and taught adequately in very few secondary schools.

- b. Specialized academic and non-academic training for 40 staff members.

To date, twelve staff members have participated in this training, 6 more are being processed, and four slots await MAF nominations. Core can send more, but the bottleneck seems to be the MOA's inability to find the candidates within its cadres, plus reluctance to nominate deserving people outside the ministry.

- c. English language training for 200 MAF staff members.

Core runs classes at the MAF and places students at YALI. In the former, there is currently a regular attendance by 8-10 functionaries, and others would attend more frequently if their schedules (work load in Sana'a and regular out-of-town assignments) would permit. At YALI, Core has arranged to place 20 participants per term, four terms per year, and these are fully taken up. It is expected that by the end of the first phase, over 200 MOA staff members would have received some English training.

2. Funding and Resources.

The PP set out the following inputs for the first phase:

- 34 person years long-term T.A.
- 45 person years, short-term T.A.
- 15 person years, U.S. support
- 40 person years, Participant training
- \$1.5 million worth of commodities

The total cost was projected at \$21.5 million AID grant, and \$1.8 million plus unspecified indirect contributions, from the YARG. The actual rate at which inputs would be provided would be adjusted in accordance with the work plans submitted by CID and AID/Y, and approved by AID/W.

Changes have been made in the relative deployment of these inputs, while still holding onto the original budgeted financial totals. Over the first phase, the long-term T.A. is expected to increase, and the short-term T.A. reduced. U.S. support is expected to increase to 20 person years, while the amount budgeted for commodities is likely to rise to \$2.0 million, to account for AID's approval to fund the DRLC, plus other minor purchases.

E. OUTPUTS

The Core subproject evaluation SOW specifically asks for evaluations of fourteen objectives (pp 8-9). These are discussed below.

Advisor-Related Objectives

1. Improved YARG capacity for agricultural planning, sector analysis and project design, evaluation and implementation.

This objective is really the ADSP's overall purpose, and its attainment in any significant form is a long-term exercise, implicit in the 10 to 15 year commitment that AID has made. The MAF is only ten years old, and extremely short of trained and experienced cadres at all levels. Until the end of 1982, much of its senior experienced management complement consisted of seven operational executives provided by a

World Bank/UNDP grant. Currently, it has only one of these advisors, plus three from Core. Of these three, one has been in the country for two years, and two have just arrived: one to take up a new post, another to replace the Agricultural Advisor finishing his two-year tour. These advisors are making their contribution, but for Core to have real impact, more time and advisors are needed. Although Core received approval in August 1983 to recruit four more advisors, OSU has yet to nominate them; it tried the CID system first, which failed to produce suitable candidates, so now it is advertising nationally. The MAF can definitely do with more agricultural economists as well as advisors in agricultural engineering, soil conservation, livestock, forestry and extension in addition to the approved Extension/Communication post. Building up a viable extension service is a vast task for MAF, needing several advisors.

2. An Agricultural Sector Assessment, up-dated periodically, used as a basis for determining development objectives and identifying technical assistance needs.

Core was to have carried out the ASA in late 1981, but was permitted only 2 TDYs for this task. This proved to be inadequate, and AID/W therefore fielded its own ASA in late 1983. CID followed in early 1983 with a Program Strategy Statement, and these two documents adequately outline the future development objectives and technical assistance need for the ADSP. Up-dating of the ASA receives close attention from the Agricultural Planner as and when he and others generate new data and analysis.

3. Documentation and Learning Resource Center established and making materials available.

The Center is now under construction and will be completed in March 1984. If the University of Arizona recruits the DLRC advisor and the reference librarian, by then the Center should be fully operational by the end of the current work plan (September 1984).

4. Design of projects for implementation by other donors or the YARG.

Given that there is only one Core Agricultural Planner in the Ministry and that other donors have their own very definite project ideas, this is rather an unrealistic objective during this phase.

Nevertheless, it is a very large task and a high-priority objective for the YARG, with support from the World Bank and the Arab funds, among others. Consequently, it is recommended that more long-term advisors, supported by TDYs, be approved in the next work plan, as already suggested under Objective No. 1 above.

5. Coordination of the ADSP activities with the Ministries and donors participating in agricultural development in Yemen.

This coordination is taking place, formally and informally. The Core and other ADSP subprojects do link-in with other related agricultural projects.

6. Training

Training output is defined as participants coming back from degree and non-degree courses abroad. Currently, only 12 participants have returned from training (non-degree) in the U.S. All the others have still to complete their degrees.

7. Institutional development/training plan completed for each directorate of the MAF where long-term advisors exist or where positions have been approved.

Where advisors are at post, planning is in process. Given the current state of development of the MAF as an institution and the advisors' workload, instituting a comprehensive planning exercise in each directorate is a task that takes time, and may not be fully implemented until the end of this next five-year phase.

Management-Related Objectives

1. Design of other subprojects for implementation by Project 279-0052.

To date, Core has designed four subprojects, Poultry, Horticulture, FOA and Water Use and Management. Core's involvement with the Poultry subproject began under the interim work plan, and four poultry houses were constructed in 1981 at Al-Hasaba. Design activity by OSU began in February 1981, and the design team visited Yemen in August-September 1981. The PETS subproject was approved a year later, in September 1982.

Core's involvement in horticulture began in October 1981, when it took over the Jarouba station, and its three experts, formerly with Tuskegee and the University of Arizona. Design activity took a year and the HITS subproject was approved in December 1982.

FOA involvement began in July 1981, and in March 1982, a team came to design the demonstration farm. AID intends to fund only the technical assistance and the farm components of the FOA; it assumes that the building costs, some \$20 millions, would be provided by Arab donors. Although YARG is confident that it will get the building, there has been no firm commitment yet, and this has slowed the design process. In any case, AID has approved the PID, and an PP team, which visited Yemen in late 1983, and is expected to formally submit its report in early 1984.

CID's involvement in designing a water project predates Core. In 1980, under a separate contract, a CID Water Team visited Yemen to identify a water project. Its report was published in early 1981, and in August 1981, a CID team came to Yemen to design a subproject for a specific 22-ha. site. However, just after the team's arrival, it turned out that the MAF didn't really own the site, and it was "collaboratively" decided that the team, instead of returning home empty-handed, would do a PID for the development of Wadi Sahiya in Kwolan. When this report was submitted to Washington in early 1982, AID/W rejected it on the grounds that it was an investment, not a technical assistance project.

Another effort at a water activity was not attempted until September 1983, when another team came to Yemen. This team has developed a concept paper for potential CID involvement in water management in Yemen. It will be studied by AID before any PID is decided upon.

There are two basic problems in these subproject design activities:

- (1) lack of clear assignment of design responsibility, and
- (2) communication problems between the parties involved.

Project design, which is more an intellectual process rather than just a technical skill, is an important capability for a contractor to have a priori, but it seems that none of the CID institutions had it. The first water project, submitted directly by OSU to AID/W, was rejected because of this reason. Subsequent PIDs apparently were submitted through USAID, but were still rejected by AID/W as inadequate. All this created very lengthy delays, to the frustration of all. In 1982, CID/T brought in an experienced design officer on secondment from AID/W; it still needs a full-time design officer on staff.

2. Mobilization assistance to subprojects before they are added to the CID contract.
3. Technical, logistical and administrative support being provided to other subprojects.

These activities seem to be well in hand. A minor problem seems to be the perennial jealousy between universities--in this case, between OSU and other universities. Up to now, OSU has nominated the Program Director, who also heads Core subproject. The other universities are not happy with this dual function, and the CID trustees have decided to make the Program Directorship a CID post, based in Tucson, effective early 1984. This change in structure is highly recommended, as it not only removes the source of friction between the universities, but also gives CID, the contractor, real ability to carry out its fundamental program coordinating function. Once the post is filled,

it is recommended that all formal communications between Sanaá and the universities pass through the Program Director in Tucson. See Recommendations.

4. Long-term links established between YARG and Oregon State University, the Core subproject lead university.

OSU is the major participant, and beneficiary of the CID/Yemen program, since it has the lead for both the Core and the Faculty of Agriculture and PETS subprojects. The main responsibility of OSU is the timely recruitment and posting of qualified experts for approved long-term assignments. This OSU has not been able to do, and has been criticized by other parties, including the in-house evaluation. Basically, OSU lacks the commitment to efficiently serve its Yemen obligation, as its faculty network is not geared to achieve this yet. It shares this shortcoming with other universities, who can send someone abroad only by specifically recruiting him or her, and only after a very lengthy and procedure-laden process established by state and federal statutes. As a result, it takes up to a year to fill an assignment, even though such a post might have been approved much earlier. Universities, as contractors for AID projects, just do not have the needed resources or flexibility that the collaborative mode presumes, but which are available amongst private or other non-profit AID contractors.

It is hoped that once the FOA subproject is under way, OSU will be able to give a stronger support to its Yemen activities. Unless it does, these long-term links with YARG will be limited to its Yemeni alumni coming under USAID auspices.

5. Leadership provided to coordinate the efforts of all subprojects into a single program.

Core is doing well in this role, and would enhance the program orientation as it begins to concentrate its resources on the FOA and the advisory functions; the less subprojects and

universities involved, the better the coordination of goal objectives.

6. Establishment and application of criteria for determining priorities among subproject activities.

With just five subprojects implemented or under design, and all selected by the PP in 1979, there is no need to develop such a priority list.

7. Establishment of common standard systems, procedures, and policies for all subprojects covering personnel, recruitment, accounting, procurement, reporting, etc.

General management systems in Yemen and the U.S. are being adequately developed, as manuals, guidelines and computer capacities are being put in place. A problem seems to be the tendency for the individual universities to interpret some procedures to fit their own convenience.

This has created problems in certain recruitment cases and equipment purchases. This is inevitable since universities are fiercely independent and subject to different state laws. Perhaps a more formal structure, where Core program responsibilities are vested in CID/Tucson, as proposed, would improve cooperation between the lead institutions.

G. PURPOSE/GOALS

The purpose of Core is to improve YARG's capacity for agricultural planning, sector analysis and project design, evaluation and implementation. This is being done by the advisory cadre in the MAF, the design of the FOA and the Water Use and Management subprojects, and the training of Yemeni cadres. Given the resources budgeted for these purposes, and the institutional environment that prevails, the current program of Core is adequate.

"The goal of the Core subproject is increased income and improved quality of life for rural inhabitants in the context of broad-based and equitable social and economic development. (PP p.20.). Core's subgoal, the PP states, is "... to improve the capacity of the YARG and Yemeni agricultural producers to develop and sustain an agricultural sector which effectively and efficiently uses Yemeni natural resources, is integrated into the economy and is supportive of a broad-based and equitable social and economic development." (p.20.).

Core is addressing these goals/subgoals by enhancing the professional capacities of the MAF cadres it is training, and by giving appropriate professional advice to the MAF and the University, which are key YARG institutions serving this predominantly agricultural nation.

H. BENEFICIARIES

The major direct beneficiary of Core's activities in Yemen has been the MAF, since it receives the bulk of Core's resources that are transferred to YARG. The University of Sana'a is the next beneficiary. Both these institutions have received resources in terms of participant training, advice and some commodities. Indirectly, through Core's coordinating role, other beneficiaries have included the MOE, through CID support to the Ibb School, some poultry producers through PETS and some fruit growers through HITS. The poultry and fruit beneficiaries include a range of farmers, from the smallest to the largest, including public sector establishments.

The small farmer, labor intensity and urban-rural inequality issues do not apply to Yemen on the same scale as in the other developing countries. The YAR is unique in that there are no macro or micro-policies that adversely affect the rural sector. In fact, the reverse is the case. The major source of economic activity, remittance income, accrues directly to the rural sector, particularly the poorest families that otherwise would have surplus labor. Emigration to generate this income has created a general labor shortage. Furthermore, Yemenis have an inherent preference for local products and are prepared to pay

substantial premiums for local, over imported (even better quality) produce. Government does not attempt to suppress prices of rural products; in fact, the opposite is true, as import laws on fruit, vegetables and qat certify.

A major thrust for Core should be to encourage maintenance of the status quo regarding agricultural price policies, while seeking ways to increase yields and reduce unit costs of production, by transferring technology to the farms and encouraging efficient rural mechanization through an enhanced MAF capability.

I. UNPLANNED EFFECTS

The termination of the UNDP/World Bank technical assistance project to the MAF considerably enhanced Core's importance to the Ministry. With the departure of the UNDP/WB personnel, MAF had to rely heavily on Core advisors. Conversely, the MOE's unwillingness to accept American advisors prevented the planned Core involvement in that Ministry. An agricultural/ education advisor did in fact come in 1981 on a long term assignment, but after two months the MOE cancelled the arrangement, and the post was abolished.

J. LESSONS LEARNED

The Core has been in existence for just over three years, in the initial stage of a 10-15 year involvement in Yemen. Obviously, a lot of learning has been acquired, whether on the general level as to how the various institutions are working out their inter and intra relationships, and at the personal level, of individuals learning how best to perform in their professional and social environment. Yemen is also a society undergoing rapid changes, which affect the ADSP and the Core subproject, regarding initial assumptions and expectations, and future alternative.

The PP outputs envisaged for this phase were classified as follows:

- a. Training of Yemenis, either by CID advisors in country or at universities in the U.S., and to a minor extent, in Egypt.
- b. Sector and sub-sector studies.

- c. Agricultural Documentation and Learning Center (DLRC)
- d. Subproject Design and Implementation - Some seven were envisaged by the SPP.
- e. Support services.
- f. CID/YARG linkages.

The critical outputs are the training, the studies, the DLRC and the subprojects design. The training outputs have been attained beyond original expectations, the DLRC will be built, but the studies and subproject design outputs are bottlenecks.

One main lesson of these bottlenecks is the lack of YARG resources, particularly of middle and upper level cadres. These are so short that sending a number of them to universities abroad creates a big gap at the senior level in the Ministry. This shortage particularly affects design and implementation of ongoing, let alone new subprojects.

Another lesson is the difficulties the CID universities are having in recruiting personnel to staff the long-term posts. The universities do not have the available staff resources, as perhaps assumed when the collaborative mode approach was decided for Yemen. This constraint can be partially overcome by insisting on all recruitment being done nationwide from the beginning, rather than the present system of exhausting first the lead universities, then the CID system and finally going nationwide: the process is too lengthy, and severely hurts the implementation of the ADSP. The CID institutions defend their monopolization of staffing as part of the CID/YARG linkage development. It would be better at this stage if the universities concentrated on meeting their obligations to CID, YARG and USAID by prompt recruitment; the linkages grow out of this process, as well as from having Yemeni students attend their campuses. In this respect, it is interesting to compare NMSU's record with that of OSU or CSPUP. To meet its Ibb School obligations, NMSU immediately went international to recruit the necessary staff. In the process, it assembled about the best team in the region and admirably managed its subproject. In contrast, OSU has been very lethargic, such that after four years it still has not changed its attitude or style to long-term recruitment, claiming that it is

difficult to find people to go to Yemen. A more determined and less parochial recruiting effort will generate a number of qualified U.S. citizens quite prepared to go to Yemen.

K. SPECIAL COMMENTS

1. Actions taken on prior evaluation recommendations.

Almost all the recommendations have been resolved (see page_III-9). The main issue still needing attention is the slowness in recruitment by OSU.

2. Revisions to log frame as necessary.

The PP log frame still holds, except that no more subprojects be undertaken (output No.7), but that the resources be shifted to expanding sector and subproject assessments, studies and analyses (output No.5). Basically this means a much greater concentration on the advisory role in the next phase of this subproject. This is more fully discussed below in Recommendations.

L. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Core activity with the most positive impact on YARG has been its advisory services. It is evident that the MAF greatly appreciates the work of the three advisors assigned to work with its general director, and that more would be welcome. The need is obvious, given that the ministry is only ten years old, and aside from the three Core and one UNDP/WB advisor, has no other resident expert. So acute is the shortage of senior staff that the ministry still sends people at the director general level for post-graduate training; a sign of its embryonic stage of development.

It is clear that the highest priority should be given to expanding the Core cadre of long-term advisors in the MAF, in addition to the four new posts already approved. The MAF could definitely do with more agricultural economists, plus advisors in livestock, soil conservation, range, management, forestry, agricultural engineering and extension, i.e. an expert cadre strength similar to that existing in other

countries in the region with same level of population. Not all these have to be provided through AID, but certainly USAID can increase the number of advisors it currently has through CID. Every functioning ministry of agriculture has to have this expertise, and even if MAF cannot find the required counterpart for each and every advisor, the necessary work can still go on until the trained Yemeni cadre is built up in 5-10 years. In addition, relations have to be developed with the MOE, so that one or two advisors can be placed there, as originally envisaged in the PP book in 1979.

The alternative to expanding the Core advisory role is, as per the PP, to develop more subprojects. Given the experience to date, this is far less efficient than adding more Core advisors. With the FOA almost at the PP stage, to embark on any other subproject would involve another year spent on design, on TDYs rather than resident advisors. Once the subproject is approved, it is certain that MAF will have the greatest difficulty in allocating its share of funds and counterparts. In addition, another subproject means extra on-campus staff, and its overheads, at the lead university. Expanding the Core advisory group by-passes all these problems, because all the incremental resources could be devoted to putting expertise into the MAF, rather than have them spread all over, as has been CID's experience to date with subproject design and implementation. Enhancing the advisory role presumes that OSU will improve its recruiting capabilities markedly in the future.

It is therefore recommended that the Core subproject concentrate on expanding its highly effective advisory activity, and that no more new subprojects be entertained. If this recommendation is accepted, then the Core would become a normal technical assistance activity. With a large advisory team in the country, logically its team leader must be the COP, who is the CID Associate Program Director, not the Core team leader, who represents basically OSU.

Even without an expanded advisory team, the COP must be the Associate Program Director, since CID is the contractor, and must have, as a fundamental management rule, its man in charge in the field. Furthermore, such a person is responsible only to CID, whose commitment to Yemen is far greater than any university, where Yemen is but a small and peripheral activity.

In this evolution then the Core advisory activity gives the ADSP a distinct manifestation, and the logical next step is to split Core into two, with the advisors under the CID COP, and the administrative and logistical functions under the Core team leader who would be an administrative officer. By concentrating on the advisory role, there would not be the need for a large on-campus staff at OSU; the current 7.5 FTE could be cut to the Core subproject director, an assistant and an accountant/expeditor. In Sanaá, there would not be the need for a staff of 58 people.

Appendix K. Recent Staffing History of CORE

Recent Core Staffing

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Team Leader						▼ Badiel		▼ Shaner	▼ Riley ▼ Fulcher ▼ Boone ▼ Collom	▼ Thomas
Agricultural Advisor		▼ LaQuey		▼ Badiel						
Research Advisor							▼ Badiel			
Agricultural Planning Advisor		▼ Snodgrass								
Agricultural Economics Advisor					▼ Amann		▼ Araji			
Marketing Advisor									▼ Clewenger	
Statistics & Data Mgt. Advisor						▼ Faulkenberry		▼ Thomas		▼ Faulkenberry
DLRC Advisor				▼ Siddiqui		Dibble			▼ Taleb	
Computer Systems Advisor								▼ Rammal		
Training Advisor			▼ Law					▼ Al-Huthi		
Extension & Comm. Advisor				▼ Kuhnle						
Water Use & Mgt. Advisor				▼ Griffin						
Beekeeping Specialist					▼ Karpowitz					