EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID'S HAITI HILLSIDE STRATEGY:

AN ASSESSMENT OF AN APPROACH

VOLUME I OF II

Submitted to:

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A. Purpose, Scope and Procedure

1. Purpose

The purpose of the assessment was to examine the effectiveness of USAID/Haiti's agriculture portfolio, in light of the Hillside Strategy, in enhancing small farmer income while promoting soil-conserving farming practices. In particular, the Evaluation Team was to:

- Review the history of the USAID agriculture and rural development program in Haiti since 1971, especially the Hillside Strategy. Analyze the USAID Agriculture and Rural Development portfolio by the resource flow to hillside agriculture, to plains agriculture and to natural resources. Review the functional and geographic efforts of other donors to agriculture in Haiti;

- Relate the current ADO projects to the Hillside Strategy. Evaluate the Targeted Watershed Management Project and review pertinent aspects of the Local Resources Development I, Local Resources Development II, Agroforestry Outreach and the new Agroforestry II projects;

- Estimate relations of costs to benefits (inputs compared to: hectares of land stabilized or actually improved; change in vegetative cover resulting from the interventions; change in attitudes as a direct result of the interventions; increase in farmer income; etc.);

- Review cross linkages between projects as to research, extension, motivational strategies, seed and seedling multiplication, etc. Assess the effectiveness of the accumulated balance between research and extension;

- Assess suitability and/or modifications to the Hillside Strategy as a continuing agricultural strategy for USAID for the period 1990-95. Based upon a comparison of the agroclimatic, demographic, cultural and economic factors when the Hillside Strategy was developed with those of today and the next five years, determine whether the strategy is still valid. Briefly compare, from a sociological and economic perspective, the comparative advantages and disadvantages of a hillside versus an alternative agricultural strategy. Within the parameters of hillside agriculture and funding constraints, assess the range of options for a focus for a continuing hillside strategy; and

- Advise of any further studies that may be needed to adequately compare strategies for hillside agriculture development and plains agriculture.

2. Scope

In general terms, the evaluation was to "test the underlying assumption of the Mission's agricultural hillside program that farmers can be convinced to adopt improved soil-conservation practices by means of economic incentives. This analysis was also to measure program impacts on beneficiary incomes and soil conditions, and look at the efficiency and effectiveness of programs and institutions." [1] In specific terms, the objective was to assess the Targeted Watershed Management project which embodies all the elements of the general objectives in one action oriented-activity.

Eight projects were under direct review in the evaluation. They included:

- **Targeted Watershed Management (TWM)**: $15 million, authorized 9/03/86, PACD 9/30/91. TWM works in the Les Anglais, Port-a-Piment, L'Acul, Grande Ravine du Sud and Cavaillon watersheds. This project has utilized a U.S. consulting firm (Associates in Rural Development - ARD) and local NGOs for implementation;

- **Local Resource Development I (LORD I)**: $1 million, authorized 7/85, PACD 7/31/90, LORD I addresses the Upper Artibonite watershed around Maissade; and **Local Resource Development II (LORD II)**: $1 million, authorized 7/02/86; PACD 6/30/90. LORD II works at the summit of the Archaie watershed. These two projects use foreign PVOs operating in Haiti in discrete watersheds as their implementation mechanism. They utilize more of an integrated rural development approach;

- **Agroforestry II**: $30 million, authorized 1990. This project has a nationwide focus. The team also reviewed the Agroforestry Outreach Project, or **Agroforestry I**: $27 million, authorized 1981; PACD 1990. These projects used a U.S.-based PVO initially specializing in one item - tree delivery - and is now more agroforestry oriented;

- **Title III, PL 480**: USAID and the GOH jointly approve what is to be done;

- **Secretariat Technique a l'Amenagement des Bassens-versants, (STABV)** designed to improve the Ministry of Agriculture's capability to manage programs;

- **Swine Eradication and the Interim Swine Repopulation Project** executed by a non-Haitian government agency;

- **L'Acul Watershed-Interventions** and irrigation projects on the plains; and

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[1] USAID/Haiti, Action Plan 1990/91, Port-au-Prince, 1990, p. 128

- o Coffee Revitalization Project.

While the TWM project was to receive an in-depth evaluation, the others were to receive "summary" investigations that would address:

- o Whether the assumptions, design logic and Objectively Verifiable Indicators of these projects are reasonable and quantifiable measurable;
- o What inputs are required by the actual interventions (technical assistance, labor, capital, vehicles, equipment and supplies, and other material support);
- o Numerical targets of organizations involved in the Hillside Strategy compared with their actual accomplishments; for example, significant progressive increase in farmer demand for technologies introduced by the projects; soil conservation and enhancement of fertility and moisture;
- o Effectiveness of extension methods, installation and administration of demonstration and experimental sites. Is there an objectively measurable difference in the effectiveness of an individual approach vs. a group approach?;
- o Effectiveness of project administrative structures, management, communications and monitoring systems. To what extent has a secondary benefit of the Hillside Strategy been to strengthen rural institutions?;
- o Technical, managerial and administrative capacities of the NGOs; sustainability without AID funding or capability to effectively utilize local currency or other AID funds post-project;
- o Input supply structures;
- o Profitability, suitability to the region and adoption of the introduced techniques (including forestry, fuelwood and fruit trees);
- o Soil conservation and fertility augmentation on project sites (clearly stating what are the benefits of soil conservation, based on the types of interventions, their popularity and apparent cost);
- o Appropriateness and levels of project incentives to farmers;
- o Sustainability of farmer level interventions and NGOs without the projects; and
- o Adequacy of data on land tenure, agricultural production and practices, and socio-economic status.

3. Procedures

The evaluation/assessment was conducted in Haiti in May and June, 1990 by a four person team comprised of an social scientist/institutional specialist, an agricultural economist, an tropical agronomist, and a local technician. Two of the team members were Americans, one was Canadian and one was Haitian. The team wrote its draft report in June, 1990. The Team Leader revisited Haiti for three weeks in late July/early August to (a) make extensive field visits to agroforestry sites for the purpose of confirming tree survival rates, (b) discuss the draft report with the Mission and project implementing agencies and (c) solicit reactions/comments from interested parties. The Final Report was completed in the Fall, 1990.

The Scope of Work (SOW) for the Assessment provided a draft program and itinerary. This was adjusted in small ways on occasion to suit changing study needs and logistical requirements. The team reviewed available documentation, visited numerous project sites and conducted interviews with USAID/Haiti and GOH officials, project managers, coordinators responsible for implementing the various projects, beneficiaries, community leaders and other donors. The team quickly developed the following rules of thumb:

- Always have at least two team members (out of four) visiting the same site simultaneously. The sub-teams visiting sites were composed as relevant (not always the same two individuals); the Team Leader tried to see all sites and all projects;

- Agree on and use a consistent set of field evaluation assessment techniques;

- Respect the Terms of Reference requirement for a professional synthesis on major evalution items; that is, avoid as possible, a section on agronomy, or a section treated and written by only the economist;

- Try to see as many relevant areas and people outside of the accompanying representatives of the agencies concerned with the project;

- Search out supplementary documentation not provided in the first instance by the USAID or others;

- Try for immediate discussion and synthesis by the entire team after a visit or meeting; and

- Continuously develop investigation priorities within the time available.

Extensive field trips were made during the evaluation. These included hillside areas near Port-au-Prince (Kensckoff and environs) and the plains and farms near the capital; LORD I sites around Maissade and Hinche; LORD II sites in and around Leger; and agroforestry sites in numerous places including the

Bassin Bleu and Passe Cat-a-Bois area in the Northwest (CARE Zones 3 and 4). The area of the TWM project was visited thoroughly, with visits to work locations of ARD, all four implementing NGOs, the University of Florida at Pic Macaya (Formon), and Title III work sites (MARNDR). Les Cayes plains and some irrigation were also examined. PADF sites were examined in Les Cayes, the North East and the Central Plateau. Typically, when two or three team members were visiting project sites, the other(s) were holding meetings, examining documentation, and the like.

B. Background to the Evaluation

USAID re-established a development program in Haiti in 1971. Its strategy for rural development has pursued goals through increased agricultural productivity, maintaining and enhancing the incomes of the rural poor majority and enhancing the natural resource base through promotion of sustainable agricultural development strategies. USAID/Haiti has attempted to resolve constraints within the small farm, multi-crop, peasant production systems that engage most of the rural population.

In 1985, USAID/Haiti outlined its development strategy for the next five years as a systematic attack on the basic causes of Haiti's accelerating economic decline. The strategy in agricultural and rural development defined an orientation to Haiti's hillsides where it was seen that all solutions to natural resource degradation and related decline in agricultural production must start. The "hillside strategy" presumed that hillside erosion was holding hostage the most productive area in Haiti--plains where irrigation systems depended on stabilizing hillside capacity to catch and hold rainwater.

Furthermore, it noted that most of the food in Haiti is produced on small hillside plots. Decreasing food production on hillsides would aggravate already serious food gap problems and inevitably force migration to urban areas such as Port-au-Prince, which is already stretched past its carrying capacity. Finally, over two-thirds of the Haitian population live in rural areas. They are largely dependent on agricultural lands, 80% of which are hilly or mountainous, and less than 8% of which are environmentally stable under current land use practices.

By means of the Hillside Strategy, USAID/Haiti took on the long-term task of assisting this poor majority to improve their livelihood in a sustainable fashion. The plan for the period 1985-89 was to orient new programs to reforestation, hill cropping systems and soil conservation, specifically targeted to hillside areas. The focus was to address environmental and production problems by watershed.

Particular zones having major watersheds were selected for their relatively high production potential: Les Cayes/Cavaillon, Upper Artibonite, Arcahaie and Trois Rivieres. By the year 2000, hillside production systems were to have changed on 290,000 hectares to decrease soil erosion significantly. The Mission was to have worked closely with other donors to promote such an approach by watershed, for example with the Interamerican Development Bank which was designing such a program for the watershed of the Artibonite River. Existing projects were to be reoriented to provide

agricultural stabilizing inputs to hillside populations, while the existing agriculture program would be maintained to protect previous investments in the plains by rehabilitating irrigations systems and establishing water users associations. [2]

In response to the situation described above, the Agricultural Development Office (ADO) of USAID/Haiti arranged its program of activities into the eight projects on page 2. The Targeted Watershed Management (TWM) project was to be the focus of the Hillside Strategy program. These projects and the overall Hillside Strategy were the subjects of this evaluation. USAID's Hillside Strategy and the various projects it included were designed to secure the following:

- Improved income and productivity for rural farmers (about 80% of the people);
- Enhanced soil and water conservation and protection measures;
- Protection of achievements already completed in the plains;
- Sustainable agricultural development strategies; and
- Availability and utilization more indigenous food producing capacity.

Most of these projects (if not all) have been previously evaluated. Some received the highest of marks. The reality, however, is that the USAID/ADO does not have a clear picture of how they have been doing in relation to the above goals because the above goals have never been the primary foci of an evaluation.

The Strategy has been implemented during a period when USAID had largely abandoned any meaningful relationship with the Government of Haiti. The portfolio of projects being implemented has changed. Having given money based on promises and not performance, USAID was often "caught holding the short end of the stick." An aborted election attempt caused Congress to formalize what was an already de facto situation -- no formal dealings with the Government. Thus, USAID/Haiti formalized the policy of trying to get projects implemented in Haiti through U.S. consulting firms, Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) base in the U.S., U.S. universities, and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In all instances, these projects were largely staffed and run by expatriate personnel. Thus, almost all the organizations had foreigners in the key management and technical positions of any consequence. Two notable exceptions were DCCH and IRD which were headed by Haitian priests. However, these two organizations are not yet free to run at full speed in that their development objectives have not been fully synchronized with those perceived by the USAID Mission as being relevant and profitable.

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[2] Based almost entirely on Article I-Title: Hillside Strategy Assessment, No. 521-000.1 incorporated in Evaluation Team's Terms of Reference.

Many supporting projects ended in 1988, others in 1989. [3] Other projects are in the "pipeline", such as a coffee revitalization project. Title III funds have also been channelled extensively into activities supporting the overall Hillside Strategy. These include two Local Resources Development (LORD) Projects, the Technical Secretariat for Watershed Management (STABV), the projected Strengthening of Coffee Co-ops and Coffee Revitalization Projects, and the Irrigation System Rehabilitation Project. Title III funds channeled to the Ministries have also included the construction of soil reclamation and erosion control works.

The Evaluation Team concluded that the Hillside Strategy, as developed by USAID, lacked a number of elements critical to its successful implementation. The Strategy has failed to recognize that:

- Most of the food will ultimately have to be grown on the plains which requires an intensification of lowland agriculture;
- Small kitchen gardens producing calorie, protein and vitamin-based crops are a requisite even for hillsides;
- Appropriate erosion control measures subsumed to existing agricultural patterns have to be devised. To first devise erosion control measures and then "add" agriculture will not work; and,
- Hillside agriculture, whenever it is practiced successfully, is a combination of forest and woodlands, permanent pasture on which grazing is controlled, intercropping with permanent tree crops, cocoa, coffee, pimento, teak plantations, etc. and more intensive agriculture. In none of the projects observed was it clear how these features were handled and integrated into project activities.

In addition to these key elements of success, three other components are desirable: (1) Achieving a gradual decline in hillside population; (2) Increasing reliance on off-farm and non-agricultural employment; and (3) Structuring markets for permanent crop and livestock products and perishables. These components are not the responsibility of anyone at this time.

The team was also concerned with the lack of goal specificity in project activities. Present approaches seem somewhat disconnected from the Haitian situation including the harsh realities all peasants face of no margin for risk, no effective cash flow, disinvestment to meet cash needs, and constant decision-making at the margin to barely stay alive. Hillside farming lacks needed investments. It appears that little thought has been given to categorizing the kinds of investments that are needed or to identifying the

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[3] Historical review of portfolio conducted with USAID/Haiti's Action Plans for different periods and Development Strategy Statements. The most recent of the former is for FY 1990/91 and of the latter 1989/90.

means to secure them, especially the promotion of desirable private investment. These investments could include:

- o Agroindustry and agribusiness;
- o Permanent crop and livestock production;
- o Productive infrastructure;
- o Land tenure security;
- o Technology generation for mixed tree cropping, small farmer livestock, and annual crop systems; and
- o Conservation in priority mini watersheds designed on agronomic grounds with an impact on production rather than as a structure piece.

In rethinking the Hillside Strategy, a number of important considerations should be paramount:

- o Local experts, both traditional and "emergent", can often adapt new methods to local conditions better than outsiders. It can be disruptive, as well as costly, to circumvent such people in favor of direct introduction of outside expertise and technology designs;
- o Local control of change may matter more than rapid transformation. The process is as important as the initial result if change is to be sustainable. People may need time and a series of small successful changes in order to develop the will and the capability for further change;
- o It is usually preferable to build upon and branch from existing technologies rater than to introduce entirely new technologies. New technologies should be "graftable" onto existing knowledge and practice through a variety of local information and action networks.
- o Joint participation between outsiders and rural communities implies dialogue to establish trust and shared goals and to translate and pool knowledge. Facile compromises to meet conflicting or unrelated objectives may simply result in two jobs poorly done;
- o Dialogue must take place <u>within</u> communities as well as <u>between</u> the community members and outside "catalysts". In some cases, people's responses to outsiders' questions and their decisions on community and individual actions will change considerably after separate discussion among themselves; and

- External constraints can block local initiatives. These need to be eliminated as much as possible.

Despite these shortcomings, there is no doubt that the Haitian peasant with an annual income of $50 U.S., is in need of the services that are offered or could be offered by the projects involved. However, it is critical that the redesign and reformulation of the Hillside Strategy projects take place now so that the benefits of the overall program can be realized in this decade. Achieving sustainable, tangible results in Haiti is not an easy affair. The ADO staff should be complimented for having vision of what is possible and for trying to achieve that vision given the most difficult of circumstances.

In the design of many Hillside Strategy projects, the very essence of the nature of the peasant household, folkways, and mores has often been ignored. As such, the programs have not always reached the intended beneficiaries. The peasant in Haiti is at a "zero-elasticity", existing below subsistence levels where he is forced to sell what he produces, sometimes even before it is ready, for whatever he can get. In the Northwest, the Central Plateau, and Haitian Hillsides, the prospect of even a four week lateness in rainfall can result in widespread starvation. Women's lives are particularly harsh. In addition to fetching wood and water, women also work in the fields, produce children, and bear responsibility for feeding their families, trudging to market, etc.

Nowhere in the Haitian hillside is the use of fertilizer, soil conservation devices, or any of the techniques and intervention package modules noted having a significant impact on the quality of life and well-being of farmers and their families. Instead, the standard of living is barely holding steady and, in most instances, is moving downwards and backwards. In the words of one statistician, there were only negative or marginally-correlated inter-relationships between project input and expected outputs. It was not even necessary to ask the peasant if he were better off. If he were, by whose values?

The peasant faces many demands for and few returns from the resources available. There is a lack of health and educational opportunities; social requisites (deaths, marriages, birth festivals, etc.) place inescapable demands on limited income; basic needs--water, fuel, food, clothes and shelter--must be met. Thus, for many peasants, investment in factors of production becomes a low priority. Moreover, the peasant is caught in an incredibly diminishing return from his factors of production. Weather, pests, crop diseases, rodents, and other insecurity-causing factors were most dominant in our conversations about conservation. To make one additional effort may not only have been above the peasants capabilities, it may also have been above his agricultural will. Many peasants know better than all outsiders that their soil and the living it allows has nothing in it which they or anyone else would find worthy of conservation. Even if they wanted to, the micro techniques and micro surgeries which are needed to save themselves and their hillsides have not yet been invented.

Despite these difficulties, an effort must be made to promote a more equitable, productive, and sustainable agricultural base in Haiti. Though USAID/Haiti and PVO/NGO staff may come and go, the intractable problems Haiti faces will remain. Political stability is closely tied to economic security and prosperity. It behooves all parties involved in the Hillside Strategy to take a serious look at the cumulative impact of their efforts over the last decade. There is potential for change and possibilities exist for improving the quality of life of the Haitian farmer and his family.

The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Hillside Strategy summarized here are a good place to begin the process of improving the development impact of USAID's efforts in the agricultural sector. Volume II of this Report provides considerable detail and analysis of all the projects reviewed as well as an assessment of the Strategy itself. The two volumes together provide a basis for policy makers, program designers and implementors to initiate a process to target resources more effectively and develop a more indigenous institutional base.

C. Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

1. HILLSIDE STRATEGY

FINDINGS

1. Neither the GOH nor USAID had a clear strategy for the agriculture sector. Moveover, USAID did not consciously devise a Hillside Strategy. Rather the strategy evolved from a series of activities. While some attempts were made to address problems on the hillsides, there was no serious consideration given to the possibility of hillsides.

2. Hillside Strategy projects do not focus on the key ingredients vital to the Haitian development context: increased food supply, employment creation, income generation. Decision-makers generally fail to view agricultural development from a peasant or individual farm perspective. As such, peasants have other priorities not in the Hillside Strategy package.

   The Hillside Strategy has also failed to focus on what to do with the rural landless population. They have no "safety net" and have consistently interfered with efforts to reclaim the hillsides for farmers in an effort to make a living for themselves.

CONCLUSIONS

The absence of a clear agricultural development strategy has made it difficult to place Hillside Strategy projects in a conceptual framework. Because the "Strategy" evolved, it because centered only on hillsides and their conservation. The bigger picture was overlooked.

The Hillside projects have resulted in very little improvement in the quality of life of the rural poor in the project areas as a result of the Hillside projects. Without a parallel strategy to generate non-farm income for the rural landless population, efforts to develop agriculture for those who do have access to land will not be wholly successful.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Develop an overall agricultural strategy that includes programs and projects that relate to the total improvement of hillsides. Such an approach would address the following questions:

- Who needs help the most?
- What is needed to intensify agriculture?
- How can project build on the endemic strengths of the agricultural sector?
- What institutional reforms are needed to assist the farming community?
- What is needed to build up community agricultural capability?
- How long will such a strategy take to succeed?
- What activities will make for quickest success? and,
- What are the dynamics of the agricultural resources base?

Maximize the availability of food, jobs, and income in future Hillside Strategy project activities. The Hillside Strategy must concentrate on the improvement of agriculture and on removing the bottlenecks now hindering productivity increases. It must also support the introduction of light manufacturing and agribusiness to generate additional employment opportunities.

1. HILLSIDE STRATEGY (continued)

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
3. There is little evidence that the four key requirements for successful project implementation have been met in the Hillside Strategy. These include a detailed awareness of the farmers productions systems and of the farm families economic financial system; a clear understanding of the relationship between a particular intervention and the Hillside Strategy objectives; and a firm understanding of how farm-level interventions lead to overall protection of a hillside or sub-watershed.	The lack of awareness or understanding of local farming systems and of the impact of particular interventions has led to the project's inability to deliver results.	Redesign Hillside Strategy projects and reorient them to include a stronger focus on farming systems in Haiti.
4. Hillside Strategy projects lacked discipline and accountability. No one in USAID accepted responsibility to see that projects delivered outputs and the End-of-Project Status intended. There was no efficacious, internal project monitoring and evaluation plan for the Hillside Strategy. USAID staff had no consistent means of monitoring Objectively Verifiable Indicators to assess whether project outputs were being achieved. This situation was further complicated by the close personal relationships between USAID staff and project implementation staff. In some circumstances, these relationships led to too much flexibility in accounting for project deliverables. NGOs and PVOs were able to develop their own performance data, much of which was incorrect.	Lack of accountability for project performance allowed projects to drift in their own direction. Absence of an effective M&E system resulted in an unacceptable level of flexibility by contractors in managing projects.	Require accountability for the expenditure of project resources. Develop and implement a monitoring and evaluation system to be used by USAID project officers and program implementors. Insist that targets either be met on schedule or revised to account for changing conditions. Train USAID staff in project management, program planning, and monitoring and evaluation.

1. HILLSIDE STRATEGY (continued)

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
5. The Hillside Strategy was designed to enhance the productivity of hillside resources. Interventions were to prevent or retard soil erosion, hold more rainwater and increase percolation; and improve the hydrological regime, including the reduction of sediment in the water column and the reduction of flood peaks. No measurement systems were put in place to record any of these physical changers pre-, during, and post-project.	The physical impact of the projects on the hillside resources they were supposed to enhance and protect is not yet clear.	Establish appropriate measurements on a nation-wide basis by working with the Ministry of Agriculture. Sedimentation plots and stream gauges would be a starting point.
6. Projects comprising the Hillside Strategy generally concerned the planting of trees and development of hedgerows on farmed land. While perhaps laudable in some respects, these efforts lacked concentration on specific hillsides.	The division of effort over bits and pieces of non-continuous farm plots meant that no effective resource protection occurred on hillsides as whole.	Focus tree-planting and hedgerow development on smaller and tighter areas. The objective is to achieve resource stabilization and improvement on 100% of a selected hillside.
7. Hillside Strategy projects were not designed to incorporate or integrate the lowland/plains areas nor the higher-level river valley populations and economies. The development of such ares was essential to the medium and longer-term welfare of hillside populations. Such zonal development can provide employment and reduce the seasonal movement of the unemployed and landless to the hillsides to farm on abandoned or desiccated land, thus worsening the erosion problem.	Soil conservation and resource stabilization projects must be planned in the context of both agricultural and regional development; they cannot sit in isolation.	Developing a regional orientation, starting in Les Cayes
8. There has been little cross-fertilization between projects and few inter-project linkages. As a result, there are duplications of effort, for example, in terms of research. Often-times important findings or discoveries that could improve the implementation and performance of a number of projects are not shared. This results, in part, from professional "jealousies" and also from the absence of a "mechanism" for collecting and disseminating these insights and pieces of information.	The projects in the Hillside Strategy do not benefit from each other. Valuable resources (time, money, and human energies) are frequently invested, but mistakes are being repeated.	Set up a central information clearing house to identify information and collect, analyze, and disseminate, as appropriate, individual project information to other projects that might benefit. Seminars should discuss the projects and disseminate useful information regarding successful approaches.

1. HILLSIDE STRATEGY (continued)

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
9. Haiti's development programs are overwhelmingly staffed by foreigners. In the Agroforestry project, for instance, all the top level posts to two levels down in the hierarchy (and sometimes three) are occupied by foreigners.	The presence of this expatriate group is stifling the emergence of an indigenous Haitian group of technician specialists.	Develop policies and plans to promote indigenous management of USAID-funded development projects with the purpose of forming the nucleus of a professional, managerial and technical middle class.
10. The GOH is not an integral part of the Hillside Strategy or the flagship project, TWM. Nor is the GOH taking the lead in planning and organizing the plethora of uncoordinated development activities underway.	Government structures need to be refocused. Without more active participation by the GOH, activities will continue to go uncoordinated and can become counter-productive.	Draw on the STABV experience to strengthen the Ministry of Agriculture. Other relevant entities should also be strengthened, especially in those areas of agriculture in which USAID has an interest. Coordination of external funds and technical assistance is required.
11. The GOH has not effectively used development funds at its disposal. Funds have been given by USAID and others on GOH promises, not performance.	The grant arrangements and terms between USAID and the GOH were not conducive to financial accountability or achievement of project goals.	Barring dramatic changes in the organization and management of GOH agencies, establish a private, non-profit Haitian development foundation for agricultural activities nationwide.
12. As a result of the Hillside Strategy projects, a number of good things have resulted, such as the strengthening of local institutional capabilities, increasing PVO/NGO cooperation, and opening "paths to development".	While the strengthening of local institutions may have long-term positive implications, the immediate needs of rural poor are not being met.	Reorient project inputs away from PVO/NGO superstructure and bring these to the farm level, e.g. the animateur/farmer relationship. Focus activity here to meet farmer needs in the context of resource enhancement.
13. PVOs and NGOs have become dependent on USAID funds and do not appear to have taken the necessary steps to become self-sufficient and able to sustain their activities once "outside" funding is terminated. Moreover, they have not acquired a "bottom line" business approach to their projects.	Unless there is a dramatic change in the financial and administrative management of PVOs and NGOs, there is very little potential for sustainability of the Hillside projects.	Assist PVOs and NGOs to become more efficient and cost effective. Their staff (including the director, administrators, evaluators, agronomes, and extension personnel) should be given courses in small business management, financial accountability, fund-raising, marketing, etc.

1. HILLSIDE STRATEGY (continued)

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
14. There is no clear cut USAID or GOH policy regarding food production for domestic consumption. There is also no policy for cash or export crop production although one of the objectives for all Hillside Strategy projects is the improvement of farm income and standards of living. Few attempts have been made to make small farmer Haitian agriculture more efficient and export oriented.	Food and cash crop production have not received prominence in the Hillside Strategy and as a result, the intended project output of increased income has not materialized.	Concentrate on food and cash crop production activities, including crops for export such as flowers, winter fruits and vegetables.
15. Farm credit activities are not an integral part of the Hillside Strategy project activities.	Without adequate credit, the farmer cannot acquire the basic inputs or tools needed to improve his agricultural base for food or cash crop production.	Develop a credit delivery system that makes needed capital available to farmers. Use the lessons of earlier unsuccessful credit efforts. Essentially, credit in kind, small-scale and local, without huge bureaucracies, is most appropriate.
16. The Hillside Strategy program has not made enough of a distinction between soil conservation and land reclamation. Very often it was clear that soil conservation devices were being destroyed because gullies were not being treated. Once gully erosion begins, a hedgerow cannot retain it.	Certain areas need land reclamation, not soil conservation activities. The current projects do not include these in a meaningful way.	Promote indigenous leadership which knows and uses indigenous techniques such as planting in holes and a good mix of soil conservation and land reclamation activities. Also consider increased use of tropical biomass such as bamboo, sugar cane, and bananas which are very efficient in assisting the plugging of gullies.
17. Hillside protection through the use of permanent crops has been neglected. There is, moreover, no real understanding by developers as to why the hillsides are bare.	Until there is a clear understanding on behalf of the GOH, donors, the PVO's, and the peasants of the causal factors contributing to "bare" hillsides, remedial action will only continue to flounder.	Organize and conduct a seminar for all parties concerned with the hillsides to discuss the reasons why hillsides are bare and to develop a consensus for action.
18. The primary agricultural problem in Haiti is land tenure. Nothing sustainable in agriculture can be achieved for the long run if land is not securely in the hands of the persons who utilize it.	Abuse of land and insecurity of tenure are directly correlated.	Assist the government of Haiti to set up a Land Certification, Planning and Utilization Commission directly charged with seeing that all idle land is optimally utilized and that all land is securely in the hands of the users. Land consolidation should also be effected where possible.

1. HILLSIDE STRATEGY (continued)

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
19. The second most serious problem facing farmers is lack of irrigation water. Water is sorely needed for domestic, bio-intensive and nutritionally balanced gardens and both cash and subsistence crop culture during the dry period. Cisterns in the uplands and small scale irrigation systems in the inter mountain plateaus are natural extensions of the Hillside Strategy.	In the inter mountain plateaus, irrigation could make a significant difference. For example, cisterns could relieve women of their work as drawers of water and permit seed beds and nurseries.	Integrate cisterns and small scale irrigation systems as possible into all intervention packages on the hillsides.
20. A strong livestock program could make a significant difference in peasant income. While linkages could be made in the present Hillside program between biomass for both soil conservation & forage for livestock. Such an effort has just begun.	An opportunity to utilize local resources for multiple purposes including livestock feeding has been missed.	Begin a major support program for the livestock activity which is site and farm-specific. Lessons and prospects should be documented and appropriate since hedgerow material can feed significant livestock numbers.

2. AGROFORESTRY I & II

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
21. The agroforestry project has had a number of accomplishments to date including the involvement of peasants, training of animateurs, strengthening of local institutions and development of a good to excellent tree production system, among others.	These accomplishments provide a strong base for developing other activities to achieve project goals.	Continue to support a range of "farmer driven" activities and strengthen local capacity to do so.
22. Trees planted by the Agroforestry I project, according to project distribution rates are appearing on the ground, after six months or more, in the following percentages: 2% on hillsides 10-15% nationally 35% in the best of conditions. This is in direct contrast to recent claims made by PADF and CARE of 50% survival rate and previously professed claims of over 80%.	Figures for tree survival rates have been exaggerated by CARE and PADF.	Conduct an audit of the tree survival rates to determine why hillsides have only a 2% survival rate. USAID should also make an assessment of the responsibility for these low numbers and develop a plan to improve the survival rate and assure more accountability in the future.
23. Eighty percent of the funds intended for the tree planting program has been spent on expatriate salaries and overhead. Despite the fact that $30 million has been spent by USAID for tree plantings in the past ten years, the total value of all the trees currently growing does not exceed $300,000, or one percent of the investment.	The administration model being used for the Agroforestry I project, which places emphasis on tree production by expatriates in nurseries is not valid nor is it cost effective.	Examine the expensive institutional super-structure and attempt to reorient a larger percentage of funds to farmer-level tree planting activities. Support Haitian management development.
24. The goals of raising farmers incomes are not yet attained. For example, the projects have not really looked at trees from the perspective of forest products production. Tree species have not been planned for uses such as furniture and carving, which would provide more income generating opportunities for peasants. There are apparently few persons in USAID or the PVOs who have this experience.	Gearing the species more to the economics of tree and forest products would provide greater incentives to farmers to plant trees.	Hire a hands-on technical specialist with extensive experience in the production and export of forest products. Alternately, USAID should use the agroforestry research team to investigate and implement possible practical recommendations.

2. AGROFORESTRY I & II (continued)

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
25. With the exception of one NGO, the projects have de-emphasized fruit tree production. However, fruit trees are very desirable, not only for shade and, in sufficient quantities, for their soil conservation impact, but also for the fruits they can provide year round to improve rural food supply and income.	Trees can fill both manifest and latent economic needs and thus help Haiti to be covered by trees and stay covered. More fruit trees must be encouraged, especially those whose fruit is not yet a glut on domestic markets.	Place more emphasis on the production of fruit trees, for their potential to increase farmer's food supply and income. Markets and fruit marketing should also be examined to assist the promotion of sales.
26. After 10 years of operation the program is still in need of seed sources. Peasants are just now being allowed to grow their own seedlings.	The program has not placed sufficient emphasis on the development of a seed source capable of meeting genetic and biodiversity needs.	Develop seed sources and stress seedling survival.
27. The Agroforestry II project has not been structured to overcome the limitations of Agroforestry I, particularly the lack of attention to the "agro".	Without the agro in forestry, e.g. species based on perceived need integrated into farming patterns and micro-climatic conditions, only (as is happening), marginal success rates will result. Whereas the USAID/ADO in Haiti had some clear ideas as to how they wished new features to be incorporated into Agroforestry II program, activities have not been sufficiently differentiated to demonstrate this.	Reexamine and redefine the agroforestry objectives and adjust activities to add emphasis to agriculture, tree species for new uses, and integration of forestry into farm planning.
28. SECID has researched and published 18 reports and papers on forestry in Haiti: The results of these studies have not been applied in the field.	Research efforts to date may not be sufficiently focused on practical farm-level applications and thus may not meet the operational needs of the peasants.	Re-target and redesign agroforestry research efforts toward farm-level issues and problems, both technical and financial.
29. Though drought conditions persist in Haiti, especially in the Northwest, drought-resistant varieties that could be cultivated have not been utilized and the expertise to the develop these varieties does not exist in the country.	A shift needs to be made in Haitian farming systems to a more drought resistant agriculture. Perennial crops like teff grown in Ethiopia, or amaranth, grown in the tropical Americas, would be ideal crops to produce since they are both nutritious and drought tolerant. Perennial grain polycultures for marginal lands should also be secured.	Support the development of drought-resistent varieties to improve the environmental conditions in Haiti. Once again, it is necessary to know more about existing farming systems.

3. TARGETED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT

FINDINGS

30. The Targeted Watershed Management project has failed to achieve its objectives. There are several reasons for this: 1) Insensitive, high-level announcements by US officials of $15 million for the region and 20,000 jobs which really never materialized bred hostility and resentment and discouraged participation in the project; 2) Lack of technical capability and an absence of focus on project management and goals by some A.R.D. staff; 3) Basic weaknesses of the implementation model and mechanisms utilized which were borrowed from other projects; and 4) The umbrella agency (A.R.D.) consumed an inordinate share of the project funds as did its management of the four NGOs.

Despite the expenditure of $15 million on the Targeted Watershed Management activities, the actual, current on-ground value of accomplishments for conservation measures (e.g. hedgerows, contour canals) is no more than $150,000, a one per cent return on investment.

Despite these failings, the TWM project has provided some significant "lessons learned" for the redesign of the project. These include:

- o The NGOs are able to cooperate and manage the project without an outside "super umbrella" contractor. However without some local implementing agency "umbrella," accountability and coordinated effectiveness will be difficult to establish.
- o There is a need for more farm level analyses.
- o Additional work is needed on agricultural improvements and technology.

CONCLUSIONS

The majority of project funds have been absorbed by a top-heavy administrative structure. Resources need to be rechanneled and projects redesigned so inputs can reach the farm level. The administration structure is far too complicated and heavy, as well as expensive, for achieving the desired results. The failure of A.R.D. to complete studies on acceptable technical interventions and on farm systems has handicapped the project further.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Redesign the TWM project to have more of a focus on the farmer and Haitian farming systems on the hillsides. Consider the termination of the ARD component of the TWM project. Reprogram the remaining funds to continue conservation measures utilizing Haitian organizations.Assist the four NGOs to develop a local management agency in concert with the USAID Project Coordinator.

3. TARGETED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT (continued)

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
31. TWM projects have complicated targets and work plans, organizational structures which are cumbersome and top heavy, and administrative and financial requirements which are complex. These have distracted attention and effort from achieving project objectives.	The administrative constraints often block the goods and services from reaching the ultimate beneficiaries -- the people.	Restructure and streamline project management to achieve more effective implementation by removing administrative constraints.
32. TWM project designs do not allow for a phasing in period, a focus on farming systems, a fusing of technological approaches, a farmer's perspective, or consideration at the aggregate level constraints in the technology adoption process.	The project can not have a favorable impact on soil conservation, farm family income, etc. within the life of the project as presently structure.	Reevaluate technical approaches to focus more on farm needs.
33. There is no comprehensive and integrated plan for watershed development.	Even if natural resource enhancement takes place on individual farms, it's continuity cannot be assured since some other neglected, but important component in the watershed, such as the need for food, could serve to negate it.	Concentrate on total mini-watersheds to begin with and allow these to accumulate into a larger watershed protection arrangement.
34. Remedies for difficult agricultural areas, e.g. in drought prone or high altitude areas, are generally not being geared to meet these site-specific features.	Without the appropriate diagnosis of site-specific problems, generalized remedies for land conservation, reclamation and agricultural production will fail.	Identify and diagnose site-specific agricultural problems and apply remedies appropriate to a specific circumstance.
35. The technical interventions do not provide incentives to farmers. There is no tangible incentive system for the farmers to carry out soil enhancement and conservation activities. There are no incentives for agricultural productivity either.	A meaningful incentive system needs to be developed for farmers if conservation and agricultural activities are to be effective.	Develop appropriate incentive schemes and popularize and implement these incentive schemes with the farmers. These will require a more rigorous examination of farm production systems.
36. Agribusiness and small-scale enterprise are not part of the TWM project despite a chronic need for income generating activities for the landless and land poor.	The absence of alternative employment opportunities in agro-industry and other small-scale enterprises has continued to put intense pressure on an increasingly fragile land base. This is one of the most important features leading in project operations.	Develop a plan to integrate agribusiness and small-scale enterprises such as cottage industries into the Hillside Strategy and TWM project to create employment and generate income.

3. TARGETED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT (continued)

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
37. The farmer/animateur relationship has not reached its potential in terms of providing needed extension services to the farmer.	The farmer/animateur relationship and the resources necessary to strengthen the animateur's work with the farmer have been given low priority.	Reallocate funds to promote animateur development and strengthen the role of the animateur vis-a-vis the farmer. Provide the animateur with extension methodology, the latest conservation techniques, a few site specific farming interventions for cash and subsistence crops and a biomass production orientation geared to livestock rearing.
38. Organic manures have been used to address soil abuse and the extended use that has caused soil deterioration. However, attempts to use only organic manures, while commendable, are not providing the "quick starts" necessary for generating a significant difference in agriculture.	Fertilizers have a place in Haitian agriculture, particularly in rice and vegetable cultivation, and can be adapted to the Hillside Strategy.	Use a judicious combination of fertilizers with organic manures and good agricultural husbandry to achieve agricultural fixes for peasant attention span. Based on past experience, it is short and likely to get smaller. Integrate fertilizers into farm plans on a site-specific bases so the farmer can profit from its use.