

PD-ABB-828
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ASSESSMENT
of the
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT
(306-0204)

RONCO Consulting Corporation
in association with
Devres, Inc.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On April 1, 1987. A.I.D. authorized the Agricultural Sector Support Project, with a two-fold purpose:

1. To provide resources to support increased agricultural productivity in selected areas of Afghanistan (from a base in Peshawar, Pakistan); and
2. To support the growth of institutional mechanisms to use the resources provided under the project.

The purpose of this evaluation was to do an assessment of the ongoing project and its technical assistance (provided by Volunteers in Technical Assistance, VITA) with the objective of identifying possible improvements/modifications leading to a redesign to meet the changing needs inside Afghanistan.

The assessment was conducted over about a three-week period, mostly in Peshawar, Pakistan, by a contract team of five technical specialists (team leader, senior agriculturist, agronomist, civil engineer, anthropologist) with experience in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The team reviewed files and background documents for the project; discussed with VITA staff the project's history, problems encountered, accomplishments, and issues; discussed with representatives of other organizations which have interfaced with the project their relationships, problems, and benefits from the project; and briefed the Office of the A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan (in the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad) on the findings and conclusions. (Following the assessment, the contract team assisted with redesign of the project and drafting of an Amended Activity Approval Memorandum).

Findings and Conclusions

The project has made remarkable achievements in a short time. It is the only significant cross-border program in agriculture and rural development. It has a strong Afghan character. Institutions and systems have been developed to rehabilitate small-scale irrigation systems and farm-to-market roads. The implementing contractor has given advice to private voluntary organizations (PVO) and has collaborated in the field with some of them. A small but highly successful experimental activity has been developed to distribute agricultural equipment through the private sector.

The project has been somewhat less successful in developing an organized agricultural assistance program than it has in implementing rural works types of rehabilitation activities. To a large extent, this is because about one year was lost, through no fault of the project designers and managers, in attempting without success to work through the Agricultural Council of the seven-party Alliance. Once the Council mechanism proved

unworkable, the project began to do agricultural work through a new vehicle--the field-structure of the Rural Works Division's Area Development Schemes. Only then was much accomplished in agriculture, per se. The exception to this was the experimental activity in distributing selected items of farm equipment through the private sector, which was started simultaneously with the attempt to work through the Council.

Definition of, and planning for, agricultural field testing operations was hampered in that VITA has limited technical depth in its U.S.-based office on which the field office can call for assistance. Home-office problems with financial and administrative management have slowed field activities.

Principal Recommendations

Follow-on activities should build on the considerable and solid record of successes already achieved:

1. The cross-border rural development and agriculture component should be continued and, as conditions permit, the number of teams should be increased from the existing 12 to about 15, or perhaps more if the situation inside Afghanistan permits.
2. As security conditions permit, the locations of some of the teams should shift somewhat to the most agriculturally productive areas, to areas in which shuras or other local community organizations exist or are likely to become functional, and to areas which will place teams in representative territories of the main ethnic groups of Afghanistan.
3. The name of this set of activities should be changed from Area Development Schemes to the Agricultural Rehabilitation Schemes (ARS), to portray more accurately the purpose and functions of the component.
4. The main objective of the ARS teams should be to solve problems that have arisen due to events of the war, namely:
 - Damage to community-owned, small-scale irrigation schemes;
 - Damage to rural roads and bridges;
 - Loss of draft power due to approximately half of the pre-war numbers of oxen having been killed;
 - Growth of grass, weeds and shrubs on land that has been left untilled for several years, making it very difficult to till with traditional tools and methods; and

- Deterioration of seed varieties and vegetative planting materials.
5. Enough flexibility should be included in this component so that in special cases, whether they be additional problems or potentially high pay-off opportunities, other activities can be carried out with approval of project managers and O/AID/Rep.
 6. To focus on those problems, each ARS team should be structured, under leadership of a team director, into two groups:
 - One for infrastructure rehabilitation (irrigation systems, roads, and bridges); and
 - One for the testing and demonstration of agricultural production technology.
 7. VITA should add a deputy to the Director of the Rural Works Division; add up to four more senior Afghans, at least one of whom should be very strong in agriculture, to the VITA/Peshawar staff; and strengthen sufficiently the agricultural field staff in the ARSs to perform the functions of testing and demonstration of agricultural production technology.
 8. The commercial channels subcomponent should be re-defined as the Private Sector Agribusiness (PSA) component, and should function as the mechanism for getting a substantially increased volume of critical agricultural inputs and supplies into Afghanistan from Pakistan. This activity should be conducted to the extent possible through private-sector traders, dealers and businesses, although non-market channels might be used in special situations.
 9. A Monitoring and Analysis component should be created with the objective of strengthening the functions of planning, monitoring, evaluation and analysis of project activities.
 10. Because of the enlarged scope of the commercial channels or PSA component, and the specialized nature of this and the monitoring and analysis activities, a new contractor(s) with experience and competence in commodity import procedures, in private-sector agribusiness management, and in monitoring, evaluation, and analysis should be selected to implement these two components.

Project Identification Data Sheet

1. Country: Afghanistan
2. Project Title: Agricultural Sector Support Project
3. Project Number: 306-0204
4. Project Dates:
 - a. Project Authorized: April 1, 1987
 - b. First Project Agreement: Not applicable
 - c. Final Obligation Date: FY ___ (planned/actual)
 - d. Most recent PACD: March 31, 1990
5. Project Funding

A.I.D. Bilateral Funding (grant) US\$ 6.0 million
6. Mode of Implementation: A.I.D. direct contract

Contractor: Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA)
Subcontractor: Department of Geography,
University of Nebraska, Omaha
7. Project Designers:
 - a. O/AID/Rep
 - b. VITA
8. Responsible Mission Officials
 - a. A.I.D. Representative: Larry Crandall
 - b. Project Officers: A. J. Nehoda, 4/1/87 to 7/31/88
Gary Lewis, 8/1/88 to present
9. Previous Evaluations: None

I. THE SETTING

The Agricultural Sector Support Project (ASSP) was initiated in April, 1987 to help rehabilitate agriculture in Afghanistan. The agricultural economy had suffered from nearly a decade of war, which included systematic destruction of animals and crops. According to a comprehensive agricultural survey undertaken as of 1987, food production had dropped to 45 percent of 1978 levels, 30 percent of the land had been left uncultivated, the number of cattle had decreased by 55 percent, the number of sheep and goats by 66 percent, and the number of horses by 45 percent.(1) Rural infrastructure, such as irrigation systems and farm-to-market roads, had been damaged. In addition, the farm labor supply had been reduced drastically through deaths (estimated at between 1 and 2.5 million) and injuries associated with the war, by virtue of refugees (estimated at about 5 million persons) who had crossed over into Pakistan and Iran, and through internal movement within Afghanistan of large numbers of people (estimated at an additional 2 to 3 million people) to get away from areas of active military conflict.

While some areas inside Afghanistan have become liberated since the project was initiated, conditions in most of the country have remained quite unsettled, at best, and much of the country has been actively at war. Such is the setting in which cross-border activities in agriculture and rural development have been carried out.

II. THE PROJECT

A. Purpose

The project purpose is two-fold:

1. to provide resources to support increased agricultural productivity in selected areas of Afghanistan, and
2. to support the growth of institutional mechanisms to use the resources provided under the project.

B. Overview of the Project

The original project concept included two "tracks" for implementing field activities inside Afghanistan. Track I was to have been an agricultural development program implemented by the Afghanistan Agricultural Project (AAP), which was to have been formed by the seven-party Alliance and operated under the policy guidance of the Alliance's Agricultural Council. Track II was to be a program for involving commercial channels in the sale inside Afghanistan of selected items of farm machinery and related inputs. It was also to be the mechanism for assisting private voluntary organizations (PVO) to become involved in agricultural activities. Track II operated about as had originally been envisioned. Track I did not, primarily because the Agricultural Council and the AAP did not become functional. Meanwhile, VITA's planning staff in Peshawar conceived a program to assist with reconstructing selected items of infrastructure which were deemed to be crucial to the rehabilitation of agricultural production: namely, traditional irrigation systems and rural roads in selected areas. This rural works program was designated Track III. The project and VITA's contract were amended in August, 1987 to incorporate the rural works activities, and VITA established a Rural Works Division to implement the program.

C. Project Components

The Agricultural Sector Support Project (ASSP) has four sub-components (one in planning and three in field activities):

(1) First Report on the Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan, implemented by Dr. Azam Gul, Director of Survey, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (Peshawar, May 1988)

1. Planning

The Planning sub-component, which is at the apex of the project, has the functions of formulation and promulgation of project implementation policy (within the general policy guidelines provided by the Office of the A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan (AID/Rep), planning the use of project resources, monitoring and evaluating project activities, and overall management of the project.

2. Field Activities

Field activities are divided into three sub-components, or "tracks." The chronology of the development of the programs under the three tracks is shown schematically in Figure 1. The original project had only two tracks. It was envisioned under Track I that an Afghan organization would be created as the primary vehicle for implementing the project. This entity--the Afghan Agricultural Project (AAP)--was to have been composed of Afghan technocrats, nominated by Afghan political parties from the seven-party Alliance. The AAP was to function under the direction of an Agricultural Council, which was to have been a policy-making body comprised of one representative from each of the seven parties. For a number of reasons, the AAP never became functional.

Track II was intended to run parallel to Track I. Under the policy guidance of a Steering Committee composed of representatives of the Office of AID/Rep and the Government of Pakistan (GOP), VITA could channel financial resources and technical assistance to the AAP or, alternatively, as circumstances dictated, channel resources to private-sector groups and organizations which have the ability to work in the agricultural sector of Afghanistan. Because the AAP did not become functional, Track II was implemented under the alternate mode; it provides resources through the private sector and PVOs.

Because Track I did not show promise, VITA staff began looking for other ways to achieve the agricultural objectives of the project and, with the assistance of the pre-war Director of Afghanistan's Rural Works Department, conceived a rural works program to be implemented in a manner similar to that of the former Department. On a trial basis, an "area development scheme" was included as a part of the rural works concept.

Nominally, the scheme was to include agricultural as well as rural works activities. In August 1987, the Activity Approval Memorandum (AAM) for the project was amended to add the third component, or track, to constitute a rural works program to complement the other two tracks in support of the agricultural sector. Rural Works was defined to include karez cleaning and other minor irrigation improvements, road and track construction and improvement, and area development schemes. Within the context of an Area Development Scheme (ADS), it was envisioned that the project would provide fertilizer, seeds, oxen, and perhaps flour mills in addition to works in minor irrigation and roads. Track III would also implement rural works activities outside of specific ADS areas. In fact, until recently, most of the activities under Track III were in irrigation and road rehabilitation outside the confines of an ADS.

One pilot ADS was initiated in August-September, 1987. Based on the experience, several additional ones were added in the summer of 1988, as indicated in Figure 1.

VITA became convinced in mid-1988 that the ADS concept could serve as an institutional mechanism for delivering goods and services to facilitate agricultural rehabilitation and, in that sense, could help fill the "institutional" void left by the defunct AAP. Consequently, VITA shifted the ADS program from Track III to Track I, as indicated in Figure 1. Rural works outside the ADS areas continue to be in Track III, while rural works within ADS areas were considered to be an integral part of the newly-defined Track I.

As of November 1988, there were twelve Area Development Schemes in eight provinces where the project was sending tractors, threshers, reapers, bullocks, and improved seed. VITA's Rural Works Division (RWD) was cleaning karezes (traditional irrigation systems) and canals, constructing or rehabilitating rural roads, and building bridges in 16 provinces. RWD had day-to-day operational responsibility for supervising the Area Development Schemes. The Planning Office in Peshawar was working with private sector Afghan businessmen to

encourage the delivery of appropriate agricultural machinery and equipment to rural areas of Afghanistan, and had collaborative programs with four or five PVOs, including both U.S. and third-country organizations.

Figure 1.

Schematic of Programs under Tracks I, II and III
Agricultural Sector Support Project

	Track I	Track II	Track III
Apr/87	AAP	Commercial/PVOs	
May	!	!	
Jun		!	
Jul	!	!	
Aug		!	Rural Works
Sep	!	!	! 1 ADS
Oct		!	! 1 ADS
Nov	!	!	! 1 ADS
Dec		!	! 1 ADS
Jan/88	!	!	! 1 ADS
Feb		!	! 1 ADS
Mar	!	!	! 1 ADS
Apr		!	! 1 ADS
May		!	! 1 ADS
Jun		!	! 1 ADS
Jul		!	! 8 ADS
Aug		!	!10 ADS
Sep	10 ADS	←-----	
Oct	12 ADS	!	!
Nov	12 ADS	!	!
Dec	12 ADS	!	!

III. ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Agricultural Sector Support Project (ASSP) was authorized on April 1, 1987. In the short time since, the project has made remarkable achievements. It is the only significant cross-border program in agriculture and rural development. It has a strong Afghan character. Institutions and systems have been developed to rehabilitate small-scale irrigation systems and farm-to-market roads. The implementing contractor, VITA, has given guidance to private voluntary organizations (PVO) and has collaborated in the field with some of them. A small but highly successful experimental activity has been developed to distribute agricultural equipment through the private sector.

The ASSP has been somewhat less successful in developing a specific agricultural assistance program than it has in implementing agriculturally related (irrigation and roads) rural works types of rehabilitation activities. To a large extent, this is because about one year was lost, through no fault of the project managers, in attempting without success to work through the Agricultural Council of the seven party Alliance. Once the Council collapsed, the project began to do agricultural work through a new vehicle--the field-structure of the Rural Works Division's Area Development Schemes. Only then was much accomplished in agriculture, per se. The exception to this was the experimental activity in distributing selected items of agricultural equipment through the private sector, which was started simultaneously with the attempt to work through the Alliance's Agricultural Council.

Definition of, and planning for, agricultural field operations was somewhat hampered in that VITA has limited technical depth in its U.S.-based office on which the field office can call for assistance. Home-office problems with financial and administrative management have at times slowed field activities.

Three offices have been established by VITA/Peshawar: one for administration and planning; one for rural works and area development schemes; and one for financial control/operations.

Three programs have been established to deliver goods and services across the border, in addition to the planning and administration functions carried out in Peshawar. The remainder of this section is organized around the sub-components: (a) planning; (b) agriculture; (c) commercial and PVO operations; and (d) rural works activities.

A. Planning

In the original project concept, planning was to be one of the important functions operating in parallel with, and acting as the guiding mechanism for, the field activities. Planning as visualized included the following elements:

1. Traditional project planning which was fairly heavily oriented to the short-range, since it had to undertake work in a war-torn climate in the midst of potential, if not real, day-to-day risks of military operations, with associated personal risks and loss to equipment and infrastructure. The overriding situation precluded normal, on-site planning and monitoring.
2. A concept of in-process, rolling redesign intended to permit maximum flexibility to respond to changing conditions, to experiment with alternative approaches, and to concentrate on those activities which proved most technically and manageably feasible and acceptable to potential participants and beneficiaries in Afghanistan at particular times.
3. Substantial work with support of and guidance from the Agricultural Council composed of representatives of six of the seven political parties.

Although it was not explicitly articulated, it can be assumed that if the Council had functioned even moderately well it would have been the recipient of considerable direct aid to strengthen its own information gathering, analytical and planning capacity. However, in large part because of conflicting interests, including turf competition among the parties, it never functioned effectively and the idea was ultimately abandoned, after more than a year of attempting to work with it. Whether it could have been made effective by different approaches to its involvement, support and use is problematical, but the failure may be a harbinger of potential problems in dealing with different groups as the general political situation shifts in the future.

Within the concept of rolling design (or redesign), the project ultimately placed primary emphasis on the Area Development Scheme and Rural Development programs, plus an experimental program of equipment supplied through commercial channels. This latter program, thus far, has been fairly small, in part due to the need for results of field tests of tractors and other machinery with

respect to suitability and the potential for sharing among farmers.

Planning has been very informal. VITA's senior staff (Wakil, Garner and, later, Sediq) personally identified opportunities and selected priorities based fairly heavily on first-hand information. That mode of planning can work well at a small scale of operation and with simple activities. Initially, the activities were small in number and simple -- a few karezes and small amounts of farm machinery for testing. However, such a system can break down as numbers, size and complexity of activities grow, and as macro-level issues need to be addressed.

VITA, as the principal implementing entity, has been authorized to work with and support PVOs and NGOs from the United States and other countries, as well as work directly with people inside Afghanistan. VITA's attention to the PVO community has created a major load on the project's (VITA's) planning, implementation and monitoring activities.

Lack of hard information on the situation inside Afghanistan has been an obstacle to efficient planning, monitoring and definition of problems the project is expected to address. The problem of inadequate information needs to be addressed for better definition and monitoring of future activities. A related planning issue is one of defining the magnitude of the problems the project is expected to address. The project, as conceived and as operated to date, requires site specific, micro data for efficient implementation. Ideally, this would include detailed data on individual small-community, largely farm, group needs; individual farms' needs; and problems with small irrigation system components. Up to now, there has been little effort to collect such information in advance of decisions to work in a particular area and on a particular reconstruction job. In the pressure to get activities underway and to learn from the experience, this has not been a serious handicap. However, for future planning, a more formalized data collection and information management system needs to be put in place.

The recently commissioned University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) subcontract for LANDSAT imagery in two pilot areas is expected to demonstrate the utility of this technology for obtaining useful micro and macro data. Based on the results, and before additional remote sensing work is commissioned, a better definition of data requirements and specifications is needed as well as a system for

ground truthing (micro, site specific information collection) inside Afghanistan and an efficient means of communication between the Nebraska center and VITA/Peshawar.

For future planning, there is a need to define the magnitude of the problems the project is expected to address. For example, is the project expected to produce an impact measurable in terms of: (a) growth of GNP in agriculture; (b) a significant percentage increase in total food production; (c) self-sufficiency in food within three years; or (d) an increase in food supply sufficient to feed all refugees returning from Pakistan in the next three years. Once the magnitude of the problem is defined, conceptually sound measures and approaches can be defined, and more adequate and relevant information-gathering systems can be developed. Planning could then proceed within the framework of total human, material and financial resources available.

An evaluation and monitoring system for project activities is in place and has recently been strengthened with the addition to VITA's staff of Dr. Riffat Sardar, who is responsible for formal monitoring. Project monitoring is built into individual project activities, such as karez reconstruction. This provides the basis for payment and for future activity planning. For the farm machinery distribution activity, monitoring is expected to provide the basis for choices in future machinery activities.

Operating within the concepts of testing, monitoring, evaluation, and rolling design, the project has been quite successful in implementing small-scale activities. Teams responsible for planning at this level also take on an information gathering role for appraisal, planning and implementation of small projects. Planning at this level functions very well under the prevailing circumstances.

The main weakness lies in definition of the magnitude of the problem to be addressed and the systematic collection of data upon which optimizing choices can be made and overall plans can be developed to ameliorate the problem.

B. Agriculture

The project is designed to assist the agricultural sector of Afghanistan, within selected geographic areas, to return to normalcy, by providing resources for increased agricultural productivity and to support the growth of

institutional mechanisms to use the resources effectively. As noted earlier, the original concept of using the Agricultural Council and the AAP as an implementing mechanism did not work out. Subsequently, the Area Development Schemes were used as an institutional mechanism for agricultural activities as well as for rehabilitating infrastructure, such as irrigation systems and roads.

Historically, Afghan farmers have resisted government interventions and are skeptical of outsiders telling them how to farm. They are much more receptive to the opportunity to have access to a piece of equipment or to one-time community services, such as cleaning or rehabilitating karezes, which have little threat of continued government involvement. Partly for these reasons, the agriculture portion of ADS activities has been less impressive than have the rural works activities.

Even so, there have been accomplishments. Informal surveys within the Area Development Schemes have identified the types of inputs considered by farmers to be essential to rehabilitate agricultural production. Equipment and draft animals provided by the project have demonstrated and introduced improved technologies, and helped communities to resume more productive activities. The experience has helped project managers and implementors to define possible future activities better. For example, certain types of threshers which were introduced on a small scale turned out to be inappropriate, while others worked quite well and demand for them is now being filled through the commercial channels sub-component.

Table 1 shows the kinds and numbers of machinery and oxen which have been directly provided through the Area Development Scheme subcomponent of the project.

Table 1: Inputs Provided through the ADS Subcomponent

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>
Tractors	15
Ploughs	14
Scraper blades	14
Tillers	14
Reapers	8
Small threshers	21
Large threshers	1
Motorcycles	20
Poinjar drills	14
Bullocks	496

Some 30 tractor drivers and thresher operators were trained (by the equipment suppliers) to accompany the equipment. The equipment has been rented to farmers in villages selected by shuras (local councils). The money earned from rental is used first to defray the cost of fuel and repairs and, if excess funds are generated through rental, the shuras are asked to make recommendations concerning use of these funds.

The demonstrational value derived through introducing improved technology in this manner is quite positive. Involvement of the shuras in the process is also a very important and positive development; among other functions, they often serve as a check on the local military commanders.

In summation, accomplishments to date under the agriculture sub-component have been satisfactory, given the short time-frame (approximately 16 months) in which it has been operating, and especially so since the Agricultural Council under auspices of the Alliance was not forthcoming.

C. Commercial and PVO Operations

1. Commercial Operations

VITA's Planning Office has been working with private-sector Afghan businessmen to encourage the sale of selected items of agricultural machinery inside Afghanistan. As of mid-October, 1988, the following items had been sent to Afghanistan for sale through commercial channels with a total value of approximately \$1.5 million:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Wheat threshers	308
Pumps	1,581
with engines	1,164
without engines	417
Rice husking machines	152
Spare parts (\$226,600)	

Since the Agricultural Council did not become functional, the project has relied increasingly on commercial channels to provide inputs and services to help rehabilitate agriculture.

Lack of information on the condition of fixed productive resources, and of the supply and appropriateness of alternative production inputs and services, has been a constraint on sound design and implementation of this and other agricultural activities. To alleviate this constraint, project personnel have devised a two-staged approach. The first stage involves introduction and testing of alternative types of production goods and services to determine their suitability and acceptability under conditions prevailing in different areas. While losses of some types of production resources have been heavy--e.g., livestock--considerable though not precisely known amounts of other production goods and services are currently available in many but probably not all farming communities, supplied by private initiative, and by the Kabul Government's and Soviet's efforts. This commercial, private-sector oriented activity can particularly address shortages created by the war which has destroyed large numbers of draft animals and tillage implements, reduced labor supplies, resulted in deterioration in the quantities and qualities of high yielding seed, and resulted in land going untilled and hence becoming difficult to farm. Failure to till crop land has resulted in growth of annual and perennial weeds and shrubs. This makes it difficult to plow crop land with hand labor and light animal tillage tools. The shortage of labor for tillage and harvesting exacerbates this situation, particularly during land preparation and grain harvest, when labor requirements normally peak. The supply of animal and/or tractor mechanization appeared essential to replace lost draft animals and, in the case of associated tillage equipment, to compensate for the decline in the labor force available to carry out labor-intensive

operations, especially harvesting and threshing as it was done in the past.

The situation with respect to grain seeds (mainly wheat), other planting materials (including fruit trees), fertilizer, pesticides and pesticide application equipment was less clear, but generally believed to be a less serious problem. It is generally accepted that the long period since introduction and replacement of wheat seed inevitably has resulted in a substantial decline in grain seed quality. This deterioration probably has been accelerated by lack of care in monitoring of fields from which farmers saved seed, from mixing of seed and losses of seed supplies due to military operations. Many orchards have deteriorated due to lack of regular maintenance, and the inability to replace older and diseased trees on a normal schedule. Some orchards have been destroyed by Soviet or regime troupes, and some have died because of the destruction of irrigation systems.

Urea fertilizer has continued to be produced at the Mazar-i-Sharif plant at a rate of about 120,000 MT/year, which is considerably in excess of original-design capacity. The local production of fertilizer has been supplemented by imports, mainly from Eastern Europe, of additional fertilizer, including phosphates. Some pesticides also have been imported and distributed. However, the extent of distribution and the availability in the main war-affected areas is not known by ASSP project managers.

Tractors and sprayers have been imported mainly from Eastern Europe and sold to farmers in Afghanistan. Numbers, quality and purchasers are not known by project personnel, but both quality and quantity are generally believed to be far short of needs. Estimates have been made on losses and current supply of oxen and other animals, though the degree of accuracy of these estimates is not known. Clearly, the situation on animal losses is serious. In 1978, before the war began, there were an estimated 3.5 million cattle, a million other large domestic animals (donkeys, camels, horses, etc.), and 20 million domestic sheep and goats. Out of the 3.5 million cattle, approximately 2 million (1 million pair) were used for draft. They provided by far the major source of draft power for tilling the approximately 3.8 million hectares of crop land. (In 1978, an estimated 3.3 million hectares were

planted in grain crops.) Tractor numbers were very small and other large domestic animals (donkeys, camels and horses) were used mainly for transport. Available data indicate that approximately half of the two million oxen used for draft power were destroyed. Sometimes this has been a deliberate economic war policy of the Soviets and the Kabul regime, and by contact with land mines. Large numbers of sheep and goats also were lost due to military action directly, including mines and interruption of normal grazing and other animal husbandry operations. Sheep and goat losses, while representing a major economic cost, present a less serious problem for agricultural recovery than loss of draft oxen, especially for crop farmers. The logical remedy would be large scale replacement of draft oxen and equipment, but this is very expensive and it is logistically difficult to obtain sufficient numbers of suitable types of draft animals, and to transport and distribute the large numbers needed. Increased tractor mechanization is being tried under the project as a partial alternative. One tractor with suitable implements can replace 20 to 30 pairs of oxen. Gasoline and diesel fuel apparently have been available in adequate quantities in Afghanistan. However, the economic and technical feasibility and acceptability to farmers of this tractor mechanization approach was not known. There has been considerable uncertainty also about the feasibility and suitability of alternative supply and distribution arrangements for tractors, oxen, and other tools and implements.

To avoid major mistakes, a program of supplying production inputs and services was initiated first on a pilot basis under the Area Development Schemes; the project supplies and operates the mechanical equipment and maintains title. The project's program which subsidizes private-sector commercial channels for supply and distribution of equipment has run in parallel with the ADS testing of equipment. The commercial channels sub-component works with established businessmen who own or have linkages with existing distribution networks in Afghanistan.

The pilot program, generally operated in selected communities under the guidance of local shuras, has included:

- Tractors: 15 model 240 Massey Ferguson

tractors (each equipped with a mouldboard plow, nine-tined cultivator, and scraper blade) have been distributed for trial under guidance of the shuras. The project has supplied trained drivers and mechanics with each.

- Threshers: One large thresher, powered by tractor, and 21 small threshers powered by an accompanying small engine, have been supplied to communities on a pilot basis for trial.
- Oxen: 496 head of oxen have been supplied under the pilot Area Development Scheme. The conclusion was reached that necessary oxen implements could be located or produced locally mainly from wood and small amounts of steel. Hence, implements were not provided with oxen.

Most of the oxen were distributed gratis through the mechanism of the shuras. Approximately 50 head were auctioned off in an experiment to test the feasibility of this distribution mechanism. Based on initial reports, it appears that auctioning is a serviceable mechanism and future distribution should generally move in this direction.

Services of the tractors and threshers were to be shared by farmers on a community basis. That is, services were made available on a custom-hire basis to individual farmers, with costs of operation assessed and collected from users.

Much less uncertainty has been associated with the supply of annual production inputs such as seed and fertilizer. Thus, the introduction and testing on a pilot basis under ADS was not considered a prerequisite. Some improved seed packages composed of 7 kg of improved wheat seed and fertilizer have been prepared for distribution to individual farmers on a grant basis.

The results of trials with tractors and threshers were sufficiently encouraging to justify and provide direction for a larger commercial operation, functioning mainly through the private sector. The pilot operation indicated that farmers were willing to pay for custom services of tractors and threshers. The tractor and associated implements were found to be technically suitable and acceptable to farmers. Alternative implements, e.g., a disc harrow instead of a nine-tined cultivator, might

have been provided but choices were limited by types available in Pakistan. Of the various types of threshers provided, the very small thresher equipped with small motors proved unsatisfactory. (This was based on models of larger threshers, which were scaled down and redesigned under the project. This design proved to be unsatisfactory and must be improved substantially or discontinued.) Larger tractor-powered thresher models, which were already being widely used in Pakistan, were accepted. Reapers introduced to reduce labor in cutting wheat have had mixed results. Some farmers complain that they cut grain too high and waste bhooza (chopped straw used for livestock feed) and were not suited to small narrow plots often encountered in Afghanistan.

The program has moved ahead with the Model 240 Massey Ferguson tractor and the associated package of implements, and the large tractor-powered thresher being distributed through private dealers. Private sector supply and distribution of oxen has not yet developed. although the mechanism of the auction appears to be a step in this direction. The private sector is expected to supply and distribute other production inputs and equipment--improved wheat seed, fertilizer, pesticides, sprayers, and small water pumps. Simple tools and oxen drawn implements (plows, harrows, spades, hoes, etc.) can be made by craftsmen already in Afghanistan. However, some assistance with machine tools and raw materials may be needed, especially by returning refugees who wish to go into the business of manufacture and repair of such equipment and tools. Some assistance may also be needed in providing spare parts.

Private sector supply of production equipment and supplies currently follows two separate sets of procedures. Tractors, for which the existing Government in Kabul maintains a monopoly and hence for which private involvement is illegal, are in effect smuggled into Afghanistan by private dealers. Other Equipment, for which no such monopoly and hence no Kabul Government prohibition exists, is usually imported following prescribed Kabul Government procedures. Import requests with required documents are formally submitted and authorization is obtained from Kabul. Documents are presented at the existing Government border posts. Duties are paid as required. (The post at Torkham has been allowed to operate in the midst of

a Mujahideen controlled area for the convenience of all parties concerned). The legally sanctioned goods are distributed to rural areas through legally established and Government recognized private dealer networks. Most of the agricultural machinery legally imported is sold in the Kabul market, which is essentially the only established central marketplace for such machinery at this time. However, it does not pass through Government hands in Kabul and pays no taxes beyond initial import duties. This procedure provides these goods with the advantage of fully recognized legitimacy and hence some protection from seizure. Tractors and related equipment which cannot be legally imported are smuggled in and distributed to areas that are under secure control of the Mujahideen.

Results to date indicate that tractors and related implements and other equipment are readily accepted, and that substantial numbers of farmers have the financial resources and/or banking contacts to finance importation of even large scale equipment such as tractor and implement packages. Also, many are able to arrange payment in Pakistani rupees, even at the current unofficial rate for the Afghani, which is about one-third the official value.

Many Afghan farmers with access to resources to buy tractors and equipment are deterred by the bureaucratic requirements, uncertainties and difficulties in coming to showrooms of Pakistani distributors to buy, and arrange shipment and export from Pakistan of the equipment. One solution would be establishment of warehouses, near the two border crossing points in NWFP and Baluchistan, where Afghan farmers could buy and pick up equipment with minimal bureaucratic requirements, e.g., the equipment would already have cleared all Pakistani requirements and be available for immediate shipment or on-site pick-up by Afghan farmers.

The amount of equipment and supplies provided under this and other components of the project has not yet been sufficient to make a substantial impact on total production. However, it has been sufficient to accomplish three very important intermediate objectives:

1. Lists of equipment and supplies which are acceptable to Afghan farmers and farm groups have been identified, tested and proven.

2. The feasibility of use of private channels for distribution of essential production goods and services has been tested and proven. The proven willingness of private owners of tractors and other large equipment to provide custom hire services for other farmers in the community and willingness of farmers to hire and pay for such services are very important considerations in decisions on future expansion of this approach.
3. Finally, some contacts and business relationships have been developed and project assistance has been accepted by private sector Afghan businessmen.

These accomplishments will be critically important in future expansion of this activity. The experience also appears to have proved that with minimal logistical and technical assistance support, the private sector can successfully implement a major part of an agricultural development program and play a key role in the supply of equipment and services essential for resettlement of large numbers of refugees. This approach, if properly designed and supported, would be low-profile and require little direct U.S. management.

2. Private Voluntary Organizations

The AAM indicates that VITA will work with PVOs; details were not specified. During the summer of 1987, VITA began working with two PVOs which were then working in Afghanistan: the Swedish Committee and British-sponsored Afghanaid. Subsequently, they began working with the Austrian Relief Committee, the Dutch Committee, CARE/International, the American branch of Save-the-Children and, to a lesser extent, the Norwegian Committee. Page 33 presents a discussion of the types of interaction that have been involved in these relationships.

D. Rural Works

The Rural Works Division became operational in the summer of 1987 under the leadership of Engineer Mir Mohammad Sediq, with a small nucleus staff. As of mid-November 1988, the staff had increased to about 200, of which about one-fourth were in Peshawar. Twelve teams were working cross-border in 16 provinces of Afghanistan. Among the organizations operating out of Peshawar, this

is by far the largest such effort, being several times more than the total of the others combined.

Up to now, rural works activities have been centered in areas freed from Soviet and Central Government control and generally within the two most easterly tiers of provinces, from where most of the refugees in Pakistan come. These areas have received emphasis for two reasons: security and ease of access from Pakistan.

Rural works activities under the project have been limited essentially to rehabilitating village roads and small-scale irrigation systems, mostly karezes.

No attempt is made under the project to address other types of public works activities, such as restoration of homes, farm buildings, schools and public buildings or electrification. Project implementors felt that village access roads and provision of irrigation water were the imperatives to rehabilitating agricultural production. The assessment team agrees with that conclusion.

In assessing the project's rural works sub-component, a comparison with USAID-assisted pre-war rural development activities is useful. The Rural Works Department was organized by the Government of Afghanistan in the 1960s to carry out small-scale engineering works. USAID became involved in supporting the program in 1972. Outputs scheduled for the first two years of Phase I (1975-77) included 80 water control structures irrigating an average of 375 acres each, 26 stone and concrete bridges with an average cost of \$14,000, and 100 kms of farm-to-market gravel roads. Later, the output goals for the project were reduced. In March, 1976, scheduled outputs and the results achieved were:

	<u>Goals</u>	<u>Completed</u>
Water Control Structures	14	8
Bridges	8	3
Roads (km)	15	0

These figures are well below the range of accomplishments during the first year under the ASSP project. As of mid-November, 1988, about 200 km of roads were improved or rehabilitated and about 500 karezes were rehabilitated.

E. Other Activities

1. Data Collection and Analysis

Information has been very scarce on destruction and loss of use of infrastructure (surface and karez irrigation, roads, bridges, public buildings, industry) and of forest and crop land due to military operations, and deterioration from lack of maintenance and disuse. Uncertainty about conditions of irrigation infrastructure and current use of land (e.g., amount cropped) is a particularly serious handicap in planning and implementing agricultural activities. Several measures have been taken to provide more reliable and up-to-date information with adequate area of coverage for rehabilitation planning and implementation. These include:

1. Field teams of the rural works and agricultural rehabilitation activities assemble information about ongoing and proposed activities from on-site field observations and discussions with local residents and area commanders. These observations are very limited in area and subject to personal bias.
2. A special survey conducted under the auspices of the Swedish Committee (funded principally by A.I.D.) attempted to collect data on losses, including damage to infrastructure and fixed and other agricultural resources, and on status of agricultural production for major parts of the country. The Swedish Committee assembled and analyzed a large volume of data which is invaluable, especially at a macro level, in appraising damage, current productivity and likely costs of reconstruction. A principal

problem is that the data collection techniques employed do not provide the kinds or levels of data required for location specific farm and community level rehabilitation planning and implementation. The data also lack detail and area specificity to provide ground truthing for interpretation of satellite imagery.

3. VITA, with Mission approval, subcontracted with the University of Nebraska to carry out a pilot study on the potential for use of LANDSAT (satellite) imagery to identify and assess damage to infrastructure, including irrigation systems (surface systems and karezes, etc.), roads, bridges, and buildings, and to estimate the extent of use of agricultural land especially for crop production.

The assessment team met in Washington, D.C. with Dr. John Shroder of the University of Nebraska, the principal investigator, who has several years of earlier experience in survey and mapping work in Afghanistan. Dr. Shroder briefed the team in detail on results of his work under the VITA subcontract. This included a presentation and review of imagery on the two pilot areas included in the study. Several conclusions emerged. Despite collection of LANDSAT imagery in August--a period not ideally suited to interpretation--a large amount of information can be obtained on damage to infrastructure and current land use by comparison with pre-1978 imagery covering the same areas. For example, careful interpretation and comparison with earlier imagery would permit identification of many (not all) karezes and other irrigation systems not functioning or functioning at reduced levels compared with earlier periods. In some cases, it also permits identification of inoperative drainage systems and other damage due to military action or lack of maintenance. It also permits identification of some impaired bridges and other infrastructure. Better timing of imagery collection would permit much more accurate interpretation of the current situation especially with respect to cropping and other land use. Illustratively, imagery collected at normal maximum wheat crop growth (just prior to turning color) and again at full maturity would permit a high level of accuracy in estimation of areas planted to grain and ready for harvest. It would permit differentiation with respect to areas in range, forage and waterlogged areas not in cultivation. Comparison with earlier imagery would

permit identification and measurement of changes in patterns of land use. This in turn would permit assessment of damage to irrigation systems and changes in land used for crop production, community by community. Subsequent collection and interpretation of imagery could be used as a reliable, non-biased, check on results of reconstruction activities, e.g., karezes put back into operation for those which had been totally out of order (it could not detect, for instance, a 20 percent increase in flow of water due to cleaning or rehabilitation).

Close coordination between work done at the University of Nebraska and field operations, particularly collection of ground truth by field teams in Afghanistan, is necessary to reap the results potentially available. In mid-November, 1988, O/AID/Rep arranged for Dr. Shroder to come to Pakistan to meet with project personnel and the evaluation/redesign team to discuss potential use of satellite information, and work out details on steps to achieve maximum possible results from the current pilot operation.

Ideally, a commitment should be made by February, 1989 and arrangements made to initiate a program by April 1, 1989 to cover the target areas for the ASSP's rehabilitation teams. This should include arrangements to obtain multispectral coverage of the enlarged area twice during the May-July period (after wheat has changed color, but before harvest). This program should provide for close working relationships and frequent visits by the University of Nebraska team to Peshawar and periodic visits by involved Afghan professionals to the University of Nebraska. The interpretation work should be concentrated at the University of Nebraska.

The results of such interpretation efforts could be valuable to parties involved in resettlement and rehabilitation. The information should be shared with other donors to assist them in planning and implementation of activities they will support, and to improve donor coordination. This might include assistance to the IFAD-funded team undertaking study and development of reconstruction and resettlement programs for Afghan refugees from Iran.

The following information from Dr. Shroder covering a section of the Helmand Valley is indicative of the potential of LANDSAT.

"The changes between pre-war and now are as follows:

- The Marja area has greatly deficient agriculture. Much of it seems to be out of cultivation, perhaps through salinization and waterlogging.
- Nad-i-Ali seems to be intensively cropped and shows few problems, except at the south end.
- The area of Kareze Saydi between Nad-i-Ali and Marja is in new production.
- The area between the Shalaman Canal and Lashkargah, and between the confluence of the Helmand and Arghandab Rivers looks healthy.
- South of Lashkargah things do not look so good, except around Hazaras, as you can see.
- South from the Marja drain by the Helmand there is virtually nothing, even though I see a lot of villages on the map. The imagery shows abandoned fields."

2. VOA Broadcasts Concerning Agriculture

VOA radio broadcasts produced by VITA are aimed at farmers within Afghanistan and deal with general problems encountered by farmers there. While no specific listener surveys have been conducted, the programs appear to be well received by farmers. Presently, the amount of time VOA offers these programs is limited to approximately eight minutes about once a month. This seems inadequate.

3. Horticultural Nurseries

Before the war, Afghanistan was known for its superior fruits. Both local consumption and exports were high. Direct events of the war and neglect have damaged at least 10 to 15 percent of the orchards and vineyards. In some areas, the damage is near 100 percent.

Widespread reestablishment of orchards and vineyards will be a long-term undertaking and, as such, should not receive a major emphasis in this project. However, the selection, testing and production of root-stock and planting materials, and introducing

these in selected areas of Afghanistan will accelerate the rehabilitation of fruit production. Thus, it is appropriate to devote a small amount of resources to nurseries, and to testing and demonstration in selected areas of Afghanistan in which fruit is important.

Two small nurseries have been started in Pakistan (Peshawar and Swat) under the project for root-stock production, varietal introduction and for eventual budding. It is planned that materials will be moved to Afghanistan at an appropriate stage of development of the stock. This approach is endorsed by the assessment team.

IV. ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Team

1. Is the technical assistance team effective?

In most respects, the technical assistance team that VITA has assembled is quite effective. The team leader provides strengths by virtue of having a keen sense of the political realities in rural Afghanistan, from having had considerable experience in rural development in other developing countries as well as in Afghanistan, and from being a savvy and articulate planner and leader. The team started out with the benefit of having on the permanent staff a former senior Afghanistan government official (Minister of Agriculture and other high-level positions) who provides a policy-level dimension to project planning and implementation. Subsequently, VITA was able to attract to its staff the pre-war President of Afghanistan's Rural Works Department, a person who is an extremely effective director and implementor of programs. The total team has grown rapidly, especially in more-recent months, and is generally effective. The least effective aspect of the team is in strategizing and implementing purely agricultural programs. With respect to infrastructure activities, implementation appears to be strong but, to date, emphasis has been mostly on karez repair. The approach lacks a clearly articulated strategy, or framework, for rehabilitating irrigation systems and rural roads.

2. Are there sufficient numbers of personnel with appropriate backgrounds to meet project objectives?

Senior staff on the VITA/Peshawar team include:

Expatriate:

Executive Director	1
Chief Financial Officer	1
Program Officer (consultant)	1

Pakistani:

Monitoring/Evaluation Officer	1
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Afghan:

Chief Technical Advisor	1
Director, Rural Development	1

Total	6
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The Program Officer (consultant) is assisting on a short-term basis with designing and defining agricultural assistance activities. This should be made a full-time, permanent position. In addition, a qualified deputy to the Director, Rural Development Division, should be added.

Except for a deputy, there are ample numbers of Afghan staff available to VITA's Rural Works Division, both technical and professional, although the level of skills for most of the staff is less than fully adequate. Between 20 September and 23 October, 1988, the staff increased by 20, or 17 percent. While there are several engineers on the staff, few of them have had extensive training and background in irrigation engineering. Such training is not necessarily needed for work on karezes, but it will be for work on surface-irrigation systems.

The number of field staff in agriculture is adequate, although some shift in specialties and qualifications is needed. At least one agricultural specialist at a senior level is needed on each team to supervise testing and demonstrations, to work with key farmers on seed multiplication, and in general to assure that the scope of activities laid out by the Peshawar planning team is carried out.

3. Should there be changes in the numbers and mix of skills?

VITA added an expatriate agricultural consultant on a short-term contract in mid-1988 in an effort to add depth in conceptualizing activities and strategizing in agriculture. There remains a deficiency in the ability to implement agricultural, as opposed to area development, activities in the field.

4. Is the team organized in the most effective manner to implement the project's field activities?

The field teams have gone through a recent reorganization. While not all ADSs are fully staffed, the staffing pattern calls for fourteen persons on each team, including an area development officer, seven who are associated with rural works, and six agriculturists, agricultural equipment operators and mechanics (generally, two

agriculturists and four equipment-related persons.) The organizational structure may need to be adjusted in order for the teams to implement the more sharply focused scope of work that is being recommended, especially for the agriculture portion of the teams. As a minimum, a more-senior agricultural person needs to be appointed on each team.

Overall staffing for agricultural programs reflects the dearth of professional Afghan agriculturists available. Few agricultural professionals have been located or have come forward seeking employment. The pool from which to select is small. This was true in Afghanistan even prior to the conflict. Many of the more senior experienced persons who left Afghanistan have sought and accepted employment in other areas of the world. Many of those who remain in Afghanistan are junior personnel with limited technical training and experience. Personnel constraints in agriculture will remain. The recommended solution, for the ASSP project, is to mount an in-service training program for the agriculture field staff so that they can carry out the specific objectives of the project as defined in the amended ASSP. The field staff is currently weighted toward the operation of equipment, i.e., tractor drivers and thresher operators.

5. Should Tracks I, II and III continue to be in the same project and/or implemented by the same contractor?

A great deal of potential complementarity exists between agricultural and rural works activities in the Area Development Schemes. This augurs well for field activities of Tracks I and III to be implemented as an integral set of activities by one contractor. The Track II commercial-channels program needs to be expanded substantially and implemented in a full-fledged private-sector oriented manner, involving Pakistani agribusinesses, and Afghan traders and merchants on a large scale. VITA is not equipped to manage this kind of an effort in addition to the area development schemes. Therefore, a new contractor with the requisite personnel and experience should be sought. Close coordination between this program and the field activities will be important. The proposed structure for implementing an expanded private-sector commercial channels program should be discussed in the amended ASSP.

B. Systems

1. Are VITA's accountability and record keeping systems adequate?

Because the VITA field office in Peshawar operates a trans-border assistance program, VITA's contract allows for special accounting provisions. The field office follows normal accounting procedures; it documents the end-use receipts for all goods and services within Pakistan. By special contract provision, VITA is exempt from normal accounting procedures for end-use of items within Afghanistan and costs incurred there. The procedures and staff in place appear adequate for tracking costs and materials up to the border. Tracking the use of the resources beyond this point is the function of the monitoring program (see section H).

The VITA/Virginia home office is responsible for releasing funds to the field office by a Federal Reserve letter of credit. Through the period of the contract, there have been problems with the timely transfer of funds to the field office, which have created temporary cash flow problems and, at times, slowed activities. VITA/Virginia has recently reorganized its accounting office in an effort to correct these difficulties. The team recommends a shift of at least part of the program's funds to be disbursed directly by A.I.D. if immediate improvement is not accomplished.

C. Operating Functions

1. If field activities take on operating functions which are normally those of a government agency, how will this affect relationships with VITA and A.I.D.?

VITA's responsibility for cross-border rural works and agricultural rehabilitation within Afghanistan forces it to take on functions that would normally be filled by a host government agency. It accepts requests for work, decides on where in Afghanistan rural works and agricultural development schemes should be located, employs Afghan staff for planning and implementation, and helps to create village and regional level organizations to decide on appropriate distribution of goods and priority

of work within project areas.

The fact that VITA has taken on, quite effectively, some functions normally carried out by government agencies need not in any way affect VITA's relationship with A.I.D. As a contractor to A.I.D., VITA should continue to get its policy guidance and technical direction from AID/Rep.

2. Should the (ADS) operating arm be spun off, say as an independent foundation which could accept assistance from a variety of sources?

The Rural Works Division, which implements the ADS program, has the potential to become autonomous. It employs a large Afghan staff and has become an institution with important potential for the post-war reconstruction effort. As an organization with an Afghan character, it has attracted the attention of many agencies ranging from foreign PVOs, whose planning abilities are rudimentary, to the United Nations, which will need to rely more heavily on Afghans as it begins working within the country. Allowing Rural Works to assume a more international role in meeting its program goals, with funding from a variety of sources, could accomplish more than the budget currently permits. It would also mean that if there were a reduction in the level of U.S. funding, program commitments could still be met.

While developing such autonomy is seen as desirable, the structure of a foundation may not be the best way to proceed. A foundation would take time to set up and approve, and the structure it takes in planning may eventually be rendered inappropriate by changing events within Afghanistan. Nor is it clear what the goals of such a foundation would be, beyond acting as a conduit of funds to the Rural Works Division, whose engineering functions would likely be prescribed by a national government under normal conditions. Finally, the case would need to be made that a new foundation structure with an untested staff would improve the effectiveness of the current program more than could be obtained by readjusting its current relationship as an AID/Rep contractor.

Planning for the future of the Rural Works Division should consider the need to integrate efforts with those of other international agencies that will also be involved with Afghanistan's resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

There appear to be three alternatives to a foundation, within which a Rural Works program could proceed.

- (a) Rural Works could remain part of the VITA organization but expand its base by taking funds from other agencies and planning cooperative ventures with them. This would also allow A.I.D. to participate in multilateral programs with an organization it had set up and which meets its standards for accountability and accomplishment. While organizations perceived as bilateral may fall on hard times as relationships between their respective governments change, multinational programs may be less vulnerable. As a contractor to AID/Rep, VITA's Rural Works activities could remain primarily, or at least partly, funded by A.I.D.
- (b) The Rural Works program could be incorporated as a unit within a larger United Nations program. As the UN takes a greater role in organizing rehabilitation and reconstruction within Afghanistan, it may be more feasible for Rural Works to be part of a multilateral program if it wishes to expand its role by taking on larger engineering projects.
- (c) The Rural Works program could become part of a ministry within a new Afghan government. As the political situation changes and a new government emerges in Kabul it will likely seek out Afghan-staffed programs like Rural Works with ties to the resistance as a way to begin its own national program of redevelopment. If this occurs, the Rural Works program will disappear as a donor-supported program but its staff and duties would continue and perhaps expand as a governmental agency.

The team feels that it is premature to make a recommendation from among the alternatives. Rather, this situation should remain under review.

3. Are relationships between VITA, and the Afghan and Pakistani organizations satisfactory? Are changes needed?

Relationships between VITA and GOP agencies appear to be very good, with coordination and lines of communication satisfactory. In dealing with the Afghan party organizations, VITA has recruited people with an eye to maintaining a balance between factions without tying itself formally to any single party or to the vagaries of the seven-party Alliance leadership. Inside Afghanistan, VITA has helped create local level shuras, or councils, that represent the range of leadership within the community or district. Under the assumption that the political situation in Afghanistan could become increasingly fluid over the coming months, VITA has positioned itself well to operate in an uncertain environment with the variety of parties or other leaders that may emerge.

D. Role of PVOs

1. Is the nature of VITA's role in this project such that a PVO (VITA or any other) faces institutional and attitudinal constraints in carrying out its contractual responsibilities effectively?

VITA's Afghan projects and the number of employees (nearly 200 as of mid-November 1988) have grown considerably over the past 18 months. A strength of the organization lies in the quality of its senior planning staff in Peshawar, including two former senior Afghan officials who have facilitated the creation and growth of the organization. In the process, VITA has taken on some operating functions normally associated with those of a government agency.

Largely because of the flexibility that was purposely built into the project, and partly because of VITA'S management style (sometimes taking the character of a PVO, though they are a contractor in this project) VITA has tended to be "experimental"

at times. It is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that they were able by using this "style" to accomplish as much as they have in a relatively short time. At this stage of the project, though, with the foothold that has been made in establishing cross-border operations, the operating mode needs to take on more of the character of a contract. This may be easier for the overseas staff than for VITA as an institution. (Files of correspondence from the home office to the field, in describing the collaboration with PVOs, often refer to the latter as "other PVOs.")

2. Should this project be implemented by a private consulting firm or organization rather than by a PVO?

PVOs by their nature are mission oriented, carrying out humanitarian projects that meet the goals of their organization. With this mission orientation, they have taken the lead in many aspects of refugee relief in Pakistan and war relief inside Afghanistan. However, when a PVO moves from accepting grants for carrying out a project which it has proposed and developed, to accepting contracts for work which some other agency has defined and will evaluate, different criteria come into play. In a grant situation, PVOs are able to mobilize energy and enthusiasm that make them quite effective in dealing with specific problems, because they are meeting their own goals as well as the donor's, with the help of other people's money. In a contract situation with a multiplicity of goals, some of which have political and economic purposes outside the scope of a PVO's charter, strong moral commitment is less important than a strong base of administrative skills and a proven track record of project accomplishment.

Having said that, the VITA field office at this stage of project implementation has a comparative advantage, especially in implementation of the Area Development Schemes, that needs to be exploited. Implementation by a private consulting firm of that portion, in particular, is not recommended at this time.

3. Should VITA continue to be the contractor?

There is no reason to terminate prematurely an effective contract implementation mechanism. VITA

should continue to be the contractor for the Area Development Schemes (renamed Agricultural Rehabilitation Schemes in the amended ASSP) and for rural works activities outside ADS', at least until their current contract expires in March, 1990. At the end of 1989, their performance should be reviewed again and alternatives weighed against the option of continuing VITA's contract. Effective coordination with other elements of the revised ASSP Project should be a major criterion.

4. Does VITA have the institutional capability to implement the project as it may be changed and/or expanded?

VITA's strengths are in the existence of the beginnings of a strong staff and organizational structure in Peshawar, and a viable structure for carrying out cross-border activities. In this sense, it appears that VITA will be able to develop the institutional capability to implement the redesigned agricultural rehabilitation schemes. VITA does not have the capability in Peshawar to implement a substantially expanded private-sector agricultural input sales operation. More to the point, VITA/Virginia has virtually no institutional capability to backstop or implement such an expanded program. In fact, it has difficulty backstopping even the current contract.

E. Organizations

1. What progress has been made in creating effective Afghan organizations to provide assistance to the agriculture sector?

Considerable time (about 12 months) and effort were expended during the design and initial implementation phases of the project to enlist participation of the Agriculture Council of the seven party Alliance in planning and implementing the Area Development Schemes. That effort was finally abandoned. However, two other organizational developments occurred later in the project life which may prove to be more significant than the Agricultural Council: (a) the constitution of the Rural Works Division, which has the potential to become an Afghan entity at some point, and (b) assistance in the formation of shuras (local councils). Project activities have the potential

for giving the shuras a reason for being, e.g., to represent community interests in the process of allocating resources and in programming rehabilitation efforts, and as a check on commanders.

2. What role, if any, might a resuscitated council have in future project activities?

While the potential usefulness of an agricultural council should not be dismissed out of hand, it is not at all clear at this juncture what role such a council might fruitfully play for the ASSP project. New mechanisms undoubtedly will be generated by the Afghans themselves as a new, post-PDPA government evolves.

3. What progress has been made in strengthening existing agricultural services in project areas? Which of these can and should the project try to develop or strengthen?

Virtually no agricultural services exist, except the state-run fertilizer and machinery operations which effectively serve only a small proportion of farmers. The project has helped to maintain, or strengthen, private sector capability to deliver selected items of agricultural inputs, most notably farm machinery. In fact, strengthening this kind of service--the capacity to distribute and sell to farmers the agricultural inputs necessary to restore productivity of farms--should be a primary emphasis of the project.

F. Training

1. Is satisfactory progress being made in training agricultural technicians and para-engineers under VITA auspices? Does the training program need to be broadened or expanded to meet needs for trained personnel?

A training program is carried out within the Rural Works Division. Completed, ongoing and presently planned training programs are indicated in Table 2. There is a definite need for additional in-service training of field staff, especially with the recent expansion in staff. To arrange training at Pakistani institutions, which is recommended by the

assessment team, will be time consuming. Training programs which really fit project needs may not exist and will have to be developed. For example, to suit the needs of the Agricultural Rehabilitation Schemes, training may have to be tailor-made. VITA will likely need a full-time training officer to manage these functions.

Program focus has been largely oriented toward skill development at functional levels, such as tractor driving and thresher operation. To supplement this, more attention needs to be given to short-term training programs for agricultural personnel who are, or will be, responsible for data collection, analysis, program formulation, and implementation within an area. Also, technical specialists need to be hired for the Peshawar staff, and one of their duties should be to design training plans based on an assessment of training needs.

G. Monitoring

1. Is the monitoring and evaluation unit appropriately organized and staffed?

Monitoring projects inside Afghanistan is the responsibility of ten field-staff observers who report on project progress and provide more general information about socio-economic conditions in Afghanistan. Of the seven monitors who review the commercial channels sub-component (Track II subsidy program), five live permanently in Afghanistan and provide reports. The other two travel from Pakistan as couriers and observers. For security reasons, the identity of all monitors is restricted to top members of VITA's staff, so that no VITA project team is aware of who is evaluating their work.

The evaluations take different forms. For the Area Development Schemes and Rural Works activities, technicians administering the projects are expected to provide detailed work summaries on the progress of projects. VITA staff indicate that the field activities in three project areas were inspected by an ad hoc team consisting of one engineer and three technicians, in a trip lasting three months. The Chief of Party plans to add more monitors in the near future. The team applauds this innovation, since VITA heretofore has relied on its implementing engineers for self-monitoring.

Monitoring of the commercial channels program involves checking the reliability of the end-use data supplied by Afghan merchants. These data consist of government documents showing the delivery of specified equipment into Afghanistan and the end-use sale including name of buyer, address, date of sale, and price. Monitors check a sample of these individuals to determine if they actually received the specified goods at the recorded price.


In addition to the field monitoring, VITA has recently established an analysis unit in Peshawar consisting of a social scientist and two assistants. Their job is to collate the specific data from observer teams and, by extensive debriefing, to produce situation reports for each project area. This information is to be made available in Quarterly Monitoring Reports that itemize the information available for each project. Monitoring and evaluation file reports have been produced for most of the ADS project areas.

2. Is the system providing reliable information and analysis about quality and adequacy of inputs, and how they are distributed and used?

Given the constraints inherent in supervising a cross-border operation, VITA has now set up an adequate monitoring program which should improve its reliability over time through the use of cross-checking reports. VITA expects to upgrade the quality and reliability of the reports in the future by implementing a training workshop for current monitors to produce more standardized reports and to encourage them to collect more detailed information about local conditions. There is also a proposal to involve expatriate monitors already in Afghanistan observing projects run by PVOs to take a look at neighboring VITA programs.

No attempt has yet been made to monitor the impact of inputs delivered or facilities reconstructed. The planning, monitoring, and evaluation section of the amended ASSP describes a plan for such monitoring.

Map Showing Locations of Existing ADS
and Proposed Eventual Locations of ARSs



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H. General Project Activities

1. Are VOA radio broadcasts about agriculture effective, and should they continue under VITA or other auspices?

VOA radio broadcasts in Persian and Pashto about Afghan agriculture are produced by VITA and directed at farmers within Afghanistan. The topics covered are intended to be useful to a wide variety of farmers and include a considerable amount of useful technical information. While no specific listener surveys have been conducted, occasional reports to VITA's Peshawar office indicate that the programs have been well received. However, the amount of time VOA has made available for such programming is limited; broadcasts have been reduced to only about eight minutes per month. The assessment team was not able to examine the written scripts provided to VOA by the VITA/Virginia staff. It may be that the quality of these is such that VOA has questioned their usefulness. This point needs to be checked.

With the changing political situation, consideration should be given to broadening the broadcast base by producing programs for mujahideen radio stations, particularly if large broadcasting facilities become available within Afghanistan. This would allow an expansion in the amount of program time that can be devoted to agricultural issues in specific parts of the country. The programs could also be improved with the aid of a radio producer to make them less technical and more appealing to the average farmer. VITA has acquired some old agricultural broadcasting scripts formerly used by Radio Kabul which may have some useful ideas. It seems reasonable that VITA should continue to have responsibility for these broadcasts.

2. Nurseries and Research: Has satisfactory progress been made in establishing and operating seed nurseries, and agricultural research? Should these two activities continue under VITA or other auspices?

VITA has established two relatively small nurseries, primarily for fruit-tree seedlings. It is planned that the seedlings will be transferred to a nursery, and eventually to farms, in Afghanistan when they reach an optimum stage for transfer. This is not

a major activity, but could be very worthwhile in rehabilitating fruit orchards, which in the past were an important source of exports.

Pakistan's Minister of Agriculture told the assessment team that the Pakistan Forest Service would supply large quantities of seedlings to Afghanistan for rebuilding the capacity to produce building materials and fuel wood. This will be an important and valuable resource and should be taken advantage of at the appropriate time.

The ASSP has not established agricultural research, nor should it attempt to at this stage. Through the Area Development Schemes, some very useful field testing of farm machinery and tillage techniques has been carried out. These activities should be continued and broadened somewhat, as described in the amended ASSP.

Pakistan's Minister of Agriculture also suggested that "in three to five years, when the situation inside Afghanistan normalizes, Pakistan will offer to share its research facilities and programs with Afghanistan, and help to strengthen their research establishment." This approach could be quite useful.

3. Rural Works: Does the Rural Works Division have the right kind of equipment and supplies to carry out its tasks?

For the sorts of projects presently being undertaken by the Rural Works Division, only hand tools are necessary for the most part. Project staff has these in adequate supply, along with means for storing and securing them. Occasionally, on road projects, they have obtained the use of a farm tractor and trailer to haul stones for metaling the roads. In the future, some larger tools and equipment may be needed. However, a proper review should be made prior to any project funds being committed. The possibility should be kept in mind using the Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit (ACLU) to supply trucks and other equipment for Rural Works activities.

4. Concentration: Is the Rural Works Division spread out over too large an area to have significant impact?

Initially, the Rural Works Division operated generally in "areas of opportunity," defined to a large extent on the basis of security. As additional areas have become secure, the number of ADSs has been increased, with a geographic distribution that includes a spread within Afghanistan from north to south, including two ADSs north of the Hindu Kush. This spread offers the advantages of serving areas with different farming patterns and agricultural potential, and different ethnic groups. The results obtained from this spread are useful in planning future activities, and the spread is generally considered to be appropriate. When feasible, it would be better to move more teams into the north, where the bulk of the agricultural potential exists.

5. Is VITA effectively assisting PVOs in their rural assistance activities?

The AAM indicates that VITA will work with PVOs; details are not specified. Under direction of the Steering Committee, project staff have spent considerable time with several PVOs, both individually and collectively. VITA has worked on a one-to-one basis, for instance, with the Swedish Committee, Afghanaid, and the Austrian Relief Committee, to explain details of karez cleaning techniques and costs, or fertilizer requirements for various crops. VITA has also extended program development assistance to PVOs new to the area, who are interested in beginning cross-border work. This has included the Dutch Committee, CARE/International and the American branch of Save-the-Children. VITA helped CARE to prepare a proposal for possible USAID funding to establish more area development schemes to be implemented by CARE. VITA has helped Save-the-Children to start an area development scheme in one of the south-eastern provinces. They helped the Dutch Committee structure a program for training para-veterinarians, and nominated candidates for training under the program. It is planned that successful candidates of this program will be assigned to three of VITA's area development schemes, with technical support being provided by the Dutch Committee. VITA has helped Afghanaid to develop various strategy options for deploying resources inside. VITA also provided an engineer for an extended PVO needs assessment survey for the Panjshir, conducted jointly with the Swedish Committee and Afghanaid.

VITA has also participated in many group meetings with PVOs. Dr. Wakil, in particular, has spent considerable time in these fora, providing council from a policy perspective. More recently, these meetings have centered around the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR). VITA's assistance to PVOs can be useful in meeting the objective of both this project and of the Rural Assistance Project (306-0208) which has funded the activities of Save-the-Children and Afghanaid mentioned above. However, this type of assistance must be kept within limits, so as not to impede implementation of VITA's own activities.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The proposed follow-on agricultural activities supported by the U.S. would build on the considerable and solid record of success achieved in a very short time under the current project. Major successful elements and approaches would be continued. The present project in the short time it has operated has developed very successful cross-border Rural Works and Area Development Scheme programs. These activities have achieved notable progress in rehabilitation of infrastructure, especially karezes and roads, and successfully tested a number of different kinds of farm equipment. They have achieved ready acceptance and gained stature for the program among Afghan communities, and developed a well organized and managed staff with a nucleus of trained people in 12 areas of Afghanistan. This has begun to strengthen indigenous local institutions and is addressing some real needs, albeit on a small scale.

A companion activity to the rural works and area development schemes is a small but highly successful experimental activity--called, commercial channels--that was developed to distribute agricultural equipment inside Afghanistan through the private sector.

Following is a summary of specific recommendations for the future:

1. The cross-border rural development and agricultural component should be continued and, as conditions permit, the number of teams should be increased from the existing 12 to about 15, or perhaps more if the situation inside Afghanistan permits (Figure 2).
2. As security conditions permit, the locations of some of the teams should shift somewhat, as prescribed by the following criteria:
 - Productivity: The most agriculturally productive areas should receive priority so that both infrastructure rehabilitation and testing, and demonstration of agri-cultural production technologies will help those areas to produce surplus agricultural commodities for deficit areas;
 - Community Organizations: Those areas in which shuras or other local community organizations exist, or are likely to become functional, will be the most suitable locations for teams;
 - National Balance: Program managers should seek to

Table 2.
Training Inventors

	<u>Type</u>	<u>By Whom</u>	<u>Where</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Underway</u>	<u>Planned Next 6 Mos</u>
1.	Course for tractor operators 40 people	Millat Tractor Supplier	Lahore	May 1988		
2.	Workshop	Rural Works Works Div. (RWD)	Peshawar	May 1988		Planned for Nov. 88
3.	Training course for Agriculture	"	Peshawar			Dec. 15-Feb. 28, 1988
4.	Training course for Technicians	"	Peshawar		For RWD Technicians	Dec. 30-End Feb. 89
5.	Training	"	Peshawar	Jan. 1988	For RWD Technicians	
6.	On-the-job training	"	P/Field	Jan. 1988	In headquarters and in the field	
7.	Tractor Operator 20 People	Millat Tractor Supplier	Lahore			3 Mos. duration starting Dec. 1988
8.	Area Dev. Officers (10)	RWD	Peshawar			Nov. 27-Dec. 1, 1988
	Deputies (10)	"	Location to Be Determined			Dec. 15-Feb. 15, 1989
9.	Agriculture Extension (20)	"	Location to Be Determined			Dec. 31-Feb. 28, 1989
10.	Rural Works Div. Tech. (20)	"	Location to Be Determined.			Dec. 31-Feb. 28, 1989

place teams in representative areas in territories of the main ethnic groups of Afghanistan; and

- Poppy Areas: Teams should not be located in areas in which it is known that poppies are grown, unless:
 - the local community government (shuras and/or commanders) actively seeks assistance in reducing poppy production; and
 - a reasonably attractive economic alternative is available.
3. The name of this set of activities should be changed from Area Development Schemes to the Agricultural Rehabilitation Schemes (ARS) component to portray more accurately the purpose and functions of the component.
 4. The main objective of the ARS teams should be to solve problems that have arisen due to events of the war, namely:
 - Damage to community-owned, small-scale irrigation schemes;
 - Damage to rural roads and bridges;
 - Loss of draft power due to approximately half of the pre-war numbers of oxen having been killed;
 - Growth of grass, weeds and shrubs on land that has been left untilled for several years, making it very difficult to till with traditional tools and methods; and
 - Deterioration of seed varieties and vegetative planting materials.
 5. Enough flexibility should be included in this component so that in special cases, whether they be additional problems or potentially high pay-off opportunities, other activities can be carried out, with approval of project managers and O/AID/Rep.
 6. To focus on those problems, each ARS team should be structured, under leadership of a team director, into two groups:
 - One for infrastructure rehabilitation (irrigation systems, roads and bridges); and

- One for the testing and demonstration of agricultural production technology.
7. VITA should add a deputy to the Director of the Rural Works Division; add up to four more senior Afghans to the VITA/Peshawar staff; and strengthen sufficiently the agricultural field staff in the ARSs to perform the functions of testing and demonstration of agricultural production technology.
 8. The commercial channels subcomponent should be re-defined as the Agricultural Input Sales (AIS) component, and should function as the mechanism for getting a substantially increased volume of critical agricultural inputs and supplies into Afghanistan from Pakistan. This activity should be conducted to the extent possible through private-sector traders, dealers and businesses, although non-market channels might be used in special situations.
 9. A Monitoring and Analysis component should be created with the objective of strengthening the functions of planning, monitoring, evaluation, and analysis of project activities.
 10. Because of the enlarged scope of the commercial channels, or AIS, component, and the specialized nature of this and the monitoring and analysis activities, a new contractor(s) with experience and competence in commodity import procedures, in private sector agribusiness management and in monitoring, evaluation and analysis should be selected to implement these two components.

ATTACHMENT 1

SCOPE OF WORK

IV. Scope of Work: The contractor team will be required to undertake a dual-purpose assignment -- an assessment of the ongoing project and its technical assistance (in this case the grantee VITA) with the objective of identifying possible improvements/modifications leading to a redesign necessary to meet the changing needs inside Afghanistan. The information gathering stage will not be limited to information needed to assess VITA's operations and the Project's redesign, but will include information about the needs of the agriculture sector which presently are outside the scope of the Project, e.g., credit and fertilizer needs, training for para-veterinarians, etc. This will allow the team to make recommendations requested in the previous paragraph.

1. Rapid Assessment of Current Project: The purpose of this 12-15 day exercise will be to give the AID/Rep a document which assesses the appropriateness of A.I.D. assistance, including its mode of implementation, and recommend specific, practical improvements which can be implemented in light of the evolving security and donor environment. The assessment will address, but not be limited to, the following questions:

A. Team: Is the technical assistance team effective - are there sufficient numbers of expatriate, Pakistani and Afghan personnel with appropriate backgrounds to meet project objectives? Should there be changes in the numbers and mix of skills? Is the field team organized in the most effective manner to implement Tracks II and III? Should Tracks II and III continue to be in the same project and/or implemented by the same contractor?

B. Systems: Are VITA's accountability and record keeping systems adequate?

C. Operating Functions: If field activities take on operating functions which are normally those of a government agency, how will this affect relationships with VITA and A.I.D.? Should the operating arm be spun off, say as an independent foundation which could accept assistance from a variety of sources? Are relationships between VITA and the Afghan and Pakistani organizations satisfactory? Are changes needed?

D. Role of PVO: Is the nature of VITA's role in this project such that a PVO (VITA or any other) faces institutional and attitudinal constraints in carrying out its contractual responsibilities effectively? Should this project be implemented by a private consulting firm or organization rather than by a PVO? Assuming a PVO is appropriate and capable of implementing this project, should VITA continue to be the contractor? If so, does VITA have the institutional capability to implement the project as it may be changed and/or expanded?

E. Organizations: What progress has been made in creating effective Afghan organizations to provide assistance to the agriculture sector? What role, if any, might a resuscitated council have in future project activities? What progress has been made in strengthening existing agricultural services in project areas? Which of these can and should the project try to develop or strengthen? Which, if any, should be split off as new projects?

F. Inputs: Are priorities established for inputs consistent with the evolving environment? What changes, if any, are recommended? Is satisfactory progress being made in providing inputs through existing mechanisms? Are any changes recommended in the procurement system? What are the problems of allocation and distribution of inputs? What lessons have been learned? Are project inputs being delivered at acceptable costs compared to alternative approaches to obtain the same objectives? Are subsidies effective and/or necessary to make distribution of inputs to farmers?

G. Training: Is satisfactory progress being made in training agricultural technicians and para-engineers under VITA auspices? Does the training program need to be broadened or expanded to meet needs for trained personnel?

H. Monitoring: Is the monitoring and evaluation unit appropriately organized and staffed? Is the system providing reliable information and analysis about quality and adequacy of inputs and how they are distributed and used?

I. General Project Activities:

-Radio - is the VOA radio broadcast activity effective and should this continue under VITA or other auspices?;

-Nurseries and research - has satisfactory progress been made in establishing and operating seed nurseries and agricultural research? Should these two activities continue under VITA or other auspices?;

-Rural works - does RWD have the right kind of equipment and supplies to carry out its tasks?;

-Concentration: is the RWD spread out over too large an area to have significant impact?;

-PVOs - is VITA effectively assisting PVOs in their rural assistance activities?

2. Redesign of Current Project: After completing the draft of the assessment in the third week, the team shall brief the AID/Rep on its findings, conclusions and recommendations with respect to the current project and its redesign/modification. This briefing will provide the basis upon which the team will proceed to undertake the remainder of its assignment. Once agreement on an outline is reached (the draft outline should be available at the same time as the assessment is discussed), the team shall prepare a revised Activity Approval Memorandum (AAM), the Afghan program equivalent of a project paper which incorporates agreed to changes derived from the assessment. (N.B.: this document does not require the standard project analyses required of an A.I.D. PP.) The effort will result in an AAM acceptable to the AID/Rep with the required sections on, inter alia, background, purpose or objective of revised project; activities that should be supported by the revised project; magnitude of inputs that should be provided (including detailed cost analysis for any construction requirements); implementation methods for delivery of resources; new life of project budget estimates and completion date; and need for waiver or continuation of existing waivers. Also, and to the extent possible, the revised AAM should include a discussion on the relationship of the (revised) Project to the (to be approved) AID/Rep transition strategy for resettlement and recovery. (The AID/Rep will provide guidance to the contract team in this area.) The revised AAM must provide flexibility to allow an appropriate response to evolving political, military, and economic conditions and changing relationships with the Government of Pakistan, the Alliance, other Afghan institutions and other PVOs. The AAM should include but not be limited to:

A) Discussion which addresses problems identified in the assessment and reflects the broad policies and directions of AID regarding the Afghan agriculture sector. The redesign should include the maximum feasible implementation flexibility to permit adequate response to rapidly changing conditions. The team will take account of what may be provided for the agriculture sector under other AID/Rep programs (e.g., other PVO projects) and by other donors in projecting what can and should be done under this project, for how long, and at what cost.

B) Careful examination of the relationship of VITA (or any other implementing contractor) to other organizations providing assistance to the agriculture sector; for example, should VITA provide in-house TA to PVOs involved in agriculture and rural works projects? Should VITA provide in-house TA as well as grant funding to other PVOs for implementation of activities in the project? Should VITA have only a coordinating role with other PVOs? Or should VITA have no role vis-à-vis other PVOs?

C) Relationship to the AID/Rep transition strategy whereby project objectives and activities are consistent with those approved in the strategy.

D) Discussion of possible separate or new activities. The team will identify (i) activities now being carried out by VITA (or others) which might be spun off as separate, new projects; (ii) activities not in the current Project but which should be started as new projects when sufficient information is known to provide design instructions; and (iii) subjects for which surveys, pre-feasibility, feasibility or other type studies should be made which might lead to new projects financed by AID or other donors.

Following identification of other activities and concurrence by the AID/Rep as to the acceptability of these activities, the team will identify the levels of effort required to undertake the necessary designs/studies and the types of technicians required to undertake the job. (Note of clarification: the team is, in effect, being requested to write draft scopes of work for the design/study of these other activities. They will not undertake the design/study themselves.)

Possible new agricultural activities to be examined by the team (the team is free to consider others) include:

1. Activities to reduce the growing of poppy in Afghanistan (e.g., education and promotion of alternate crops)
2. Activities that the animal holding facility in Peshawar (presently being operated by the contractor for the Commodity Export Program) should carry out in the future. Should this facility be managed under the Agriculture Project contractor or another contractor? Should or could this facility be redesigned to support the transfer of other animals, e.g., bullocks?
3. Program of veterinary and/or a para-veterinary operations in Afghanistan or along the Pakistani border.
4. Activities by A.I.D. or other donors to meet Afghan fertilizer needs. Should the Project and its implementing contractor provide fertilizer? Should the Commodity Export Program logistics contractor procure and distribute fertilizer? Is the pre-war A.I.D.-assisted Afghan fertilizer corporation still a suitable mechanism for fertilizer supply and distribution? If so, what assistance could AID or other donors provide?
5. What would be an appropriate mechanism for AID or another donor to contribute to a credit program (e.g., a separate project, monetized Food for Work, or another approach)? Could the Afghan Development Bank of Kabul (ADB) eventually become a suitable mechanism to receive donor funds for a credit program? Would VITA or some other contractor be the most appropriate conduit?

6. If there exists a need for a centralized management information system (MIS) to collect and analyze agricultural data about Afghanistan, what purpose should the MIS serve? Where should it be located? How should it be managed? Who should be its clients? What should its relationship be to the Swedish Committee's "Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan"?

7. Activities to enable the forestry sector to provide building materials and fuelwood. Are the forests large enough to meet the greatly expanding needs of returning Afghans for materials to rebuild their homes and for fuelwood (heating and cooking)? Should reforestation efforts be a high priority for donor assistance? If so, in what form should his assistance take?

The team must be realistic in its assumptions of future funding levels required for any expanded and/or new activity. The fiscal constraints in achieving all the projected goals may not be possible to eliminate. Therefore, the AAM will be drafted "accordion" style, i.e., given funds available certain activities/geographic areas may have to be eliminated if insufficient funds exist. Likewise, if sufficient funds become available, other elements/geographic areas can be added.

ATTACHMENT 2

COMPOSITION OF ASSESSMENT TEAM

The assessment team consisted of five persons, two of whom were provided by the prime contractor--RONCO Consulting Corporation--and three of whom were provided through a subcontract to Devres, Inc.:

Name	Designation	Source
Leon F. Hesser	Team Leader	RONCO
Richard Newberg	Senior Agriculturist	RONCO
Blair Allen	Agronomist	Devres
Tom Barfield	Anthropologist	Devres
Herbert Springer	Civil Engineer	Devres