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CLASSIFICATION
PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I

Report Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE P.L. 480 Title II Emergency Food Distribution Program for Western Kingston (Jamaica) <u>5329800531501</u>	2. PROJECT NUMBER N.A.	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE USAID/JAMAICA
	4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) <u>79-4</u>	
<input type="checkbox"/> REGULAR EVALUATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL EVALUATION		

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING		7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION	
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY <u>78</u>	B. Final Obligation Expected FY <u>79</u>	C. Final Input Delivery FY <u>79</u>	A. Total	\$ <u>770,000*</u>	From (month/yr.)	<u>October 1978</u>
			B. U.S.	\$ <u>700,000</u>	To (month/yr.)	<u>March 1979</u>
					Date of Evaluation Review	<u>March 1979</u>

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., algram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
Preparation of final loss reports.	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)	June 1
Letter to GOJ transmitting USAID evaluation of project	J.Hulehan, GDO	April 30
All records kept by Jamaican counterpart organization to be turned over to CRS	CADEC/CRS	May 1
USAID follow-up action on rice losses reported by Ms. Fox	USAID/Jamaica/ J.Hulehan, GDO	May 1

*Includes GOJ contribution for local costs, but does not include volunteer effort of 131 churches involved in program, donation of GOJ warehouse space, and other voluntary contribution.

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS			10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT		
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) <u>None</u>	A.	<input type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change	
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____	B.	<input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or	
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C			<input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P		C.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project as planned	

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles) Nancy Fox, AID/W FFP Jerome Hulehan, USAID General Development Officer Henry Johnson, USAID Program Officer Philip R. Schwab, Assistant Director Donor M. Lion, USAID Mission Director	12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval	
	Signature	<u>Donor M. Lion</u>
	Typed Name	Donor M. Lion
	Date	

AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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For each address check one ACTION | INFO | DATE REC'D.

TO: AID/W To AID A- ~~125~~

~~5329800531501~~

PASS: TO LAC/DP/PPE

532 PLC2

DATE SENT
4/25/79

FROM: KINGSTON

SUBJECT: P.L. 480 TITLE II EMERGENCY FOOD
DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM FOR WESTERN KINGSTON

REFERENCE: (a) TOAID A-91 (b) Kingston 2663

y
DISTRIBUTION ACTION
LA
INFO
2-8-9
PDC
PPC
DS/PO
DIU
FFP
DRC

AGRIC

Attached is an evaluation report prepared for USAID/Jamaica by an AID/W Food for Peace Officer, Ms. Nancy Fox, on the six-month P.L. 480 Title II Emergency Food Distribution Program for Western Kingston. The USAID is in agreement with the conclusions of the report. Although no evaluation was required, due to the possibility of developing a follow-on Title II program and the unique use of Title II to assist a population recovering from years of political warfare, rapidly rising food prices, and worsening economic conditions, ^{special} this evaluation was undertaken.

LAWRENCE

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

DRAFTED BY PROG: Smedley:pw	OFFICE PROGRAM	PHONE NO. 92-94850	DATE 4/19/79	APPROVED BY: <i>Director, Donor Liaison</i>
AID AND OTHER CLEARANCES PROG: HJohnson <i>my</i> GDO: JEalehan <i>JH</i>				

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TITLE II EMERGENCY PROGRAM

JAMAICA

OCTOBER 1978 - MARCH 1979

Description of Program

After several years of political warfare, the gangs that ruled western Kingston declared a truce. Members of the Peace Committee made a direct, personal appeal to American Ambassador Irving for food assistance in the truce areas for children, mothers and the elderly - those who had been most severely affected by the high unemployment rate, inflation and the lack of resources. In response to this request, USAID, with the cooperation of the Office of Food for Peace, AID/Washington, designed a six-month emergency program directed primarily at undernourished preschool children, pregnant and lactating mothers and aged adults in western Kingston. The end of project recipient target was 60,000. Objectives of the program were to provide short-term emergency food relief, to consolidate the peace momentum, and to develop a community infrastructure and dialogue between heretofore warring factions.

The feeding program was to be implemented by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) (the cooperating sponsor), who would be responsible for the importation and delivery of the food to the warehouse; Christian Action for Development in the Caribbean (CADEC) (the counterpart agency), who would be responsible for the warehousing and distribution of the food; USAID, who would be responsible for provision of commodities and monitoring of the program; and the

Government of Jamaica (GOJ), who would fund the administrative costs of the program. Original commodity shipment amounted to 1,426 MT valued at \$608,362 plus freight. This amount was later supplemented by a request for an additional 233 MT necessitated largely by early attainment of the end-of-project target of 60,000. At the end of December, 131 churches and community centres were distributing 61,900 rations.

II Implementation of the Program

A. Inputs

1. Adequacy

Because of delays in the inauguration of the program and extensive recruitment efforts by the counterpart, CADEC was able to enroll more than the originally projected 20,000 start-up recipients for the first month's distribution. To provide adequate rations for the full six months, either the recipient level would have had to be reduced or the commodity volume increased. It was decided the best alternative would be to increase commodities to a level sufficient to feed 60,000 recipients for the last four months of the program and an amended commodity request and program plan were submitted to AID/W and approved.

2. Acceptability

Realizing that Corn-Soy-Milk (CSM) although highly

nutritious, was unfamiliar to the population in western Kingston, USAID printed instruction/recipe booklets to accompany the CSM distributions. They also suggested that cooking demonstrations be held to familiarize recipients with its use. Due to the short term of the program and the complexity of the distribution system, these efforts were not very successful and CSM was never widely accepted. In some cases, where ministers insisted recipients accept the commodity, it was later thrown away. Arrangements are being made to donate any excess CSM to the Ministry of Health.

B. Distribution Network

The Committee of Concerned Ministers was the group who has had most of the responsibility for organizing and managing the distributions. At the end of December, 131 churches and community centers were enrolled in the program and were reaching 61,900 beneficiaries. These centers are responsible for transporting the commodities from the warehouse, rebagging and actual distribution.

The greatest benefit of the program, outside the humanitarian relief aspect, is the communication and cooperation developed among the various churches and community centers participating. This sort of cooperation was extremely limited before the program began. Ministers and other community leaders now meet regularly to discuss the program and other community problems.

A feeding program of this magnitude was totally outside the experience of any of these groups and overall they have managed heroically. They have had to cope with crowd control, theft, and accountability/selection requirements which, in some cases, were beyond their understanding and sometimes capability to implement. Nevertheless, using only volunteers and financing transportation out of their own pockets, they have managed approximately 60,000 distributions a month and in the majority of cases, this has been accomplished in an orderly fashion. Distribution and loss reports have been submitted regularly to CADEC. However, in many cases they have not distributed all the food to only registered recipients or have reduced or increased rations to fit a perceived need. In this type of a program that is not a surprising occurrence; and within the latitude of an emergency distribution program.

C. Management

CADEC was unprepared for the magnitude of the task they had agreed to accept - in fact, Rev. Cadogan had some serious misgivings about CADEC's involvement. The program director they hired, Clyde Shaw, was inexperienced in food management. Moreover, other demands were made on his time. This had led to a breakdown in supervision and reporting. He has not communicated with USAID on a regular basis and at the end of January had failed to file any

distribution or loss reports or to reconcile stock positions.

Despite CRS's prior experience with Title II feeding programs, Fr. Grenier was not able to cope adequately with all the problems related to the program. A further complication seemed to be the lack of rapport between CADEC and CRS. Fr. Grenier seemed to feel he had to keep his distance from the day-to-day management of the program and could only "advise" if asked. This is unfortunate as he is directly responsible for the food and filing claims. At the end of January he had not submitted any report or disposition of unfit commodities or claim reports.

The warehouse situation during the first delivery was chaotic. The second delivery has proceeded much more smoothly and losses should be reduced. Fr. Grenier felt he could not interfere in the warehouse management or issue orders to the two CADEC employees. They, in turn, seem to have some difficulty managing the government employed warehouse workers. In the last week the situation has changed somewhat. Fr. Grenier has begun to supervise the warehouse management and to make "strong" suggestions on operations. Pilfering from the warehouse has been constant. (It is claimed that warehouse employees have filched over 10 tons of commodities since the beginning of the program. Efforts to reduce this pilferage have not been very successful. Some minor losses have occurred at distribution points, one church has sustained recurring thefts and commodities

have been recovered from the market where they were on sale.

III Conclusions

This program is almost unique in the Title II experience and, therefore, the "lessons learned" and how successfully the objectives were attained should be carefully examined for their applicability for future programs.

Emergency Title II assistance has been used mainly in the past to meet relief requirements resulting from natural disasters or to feed refugee populations. This request to assist a population attempting to recover from years of political strife exacerbated by the declining economic conditions of the country presented a new challenge. The request was a personal request from the truce committee to the ranking U.S. official in country.

Response was rapid and efficiently organized by the Mission and the Office of Food for Peace who asked Catholic Relief Services to serve as cooperating sponsor because it had an existing agreement with the Government of Jamaica and had participated in feeding programs in the past. CADEC was asked to act as a counterpart agency because their Disaster Emergency Relief and Welfare organization was already distributing food supplied by Church World Service and because of their ties to the Jamaica Council of Churches and the Committee of Concerned Ministers.

There was a delay in the initial implementation due to some opposition from the Jamaica Council of Churches which was finally resolved.

The commodity requirement was forwarded to Washington, with a request for expeditious procurement and a split shipment. Because diversion was necessary to meet the time requirement, commodities had to be scheduled to arrive at one time.

At the beginning of the program TDY assistance was requested from the Office of Food for Peace and subsequently a one month contract for a food monitor was arranged.

Lessons Learned

The weakest area of the program has been the management. Areas of responsibility never were clearly understood, and this has resulted in commodity loss at the warehouse. A presumption was made that because of CRS's prior experience with feeding programs, Title II requirements were understood and would be met. Consequently, USAID monitoring responsibilities were not sufficiently stressed. Delivery of commodities at one time created a chaotic situation beyond the capability to manage of either the CADEC program manager, who was unfamiliar with feeding programs, or CRS, who had never managed a program of this size. The original TDY by the Office of Food for Peace was ill-timed, well before arrival of the first shipment and ending just as commodities began to arrive. The food monitor worked strenuously with the program implementors, devised forms for reporting and made suggestions for the smooth running of the remaining months of the program. Unfortunately, she appears to have been ineffective as her suggestions, in the main, were not followed.

This failure in management led to the one serious aberration in the program - stock discrepancies in the warehouse, particularly in

rice.

1. Any future programs should be cautious in presuming ability of cooperating sponsors, particularly if the new program is of a greatly increased magnitude.
2. Even if less efficient, deliveries should be scheduled to arrive in manageable allotments.
3. Areas of responsibility must be clearly defined and stress placed on the importance of meeting requirements of reporting and monitoring.

Attainment of Objectives

Despite the management failure the program was highly successful in meeting the program's objectives.

Over 60,000 recipients in the truce area have been reached with a monthly supplement of food averaging 695.6 calories and 29.5 grams of protein daily. Distributing the food meant organizing a community infrastructure of 131 churches and community centers who have used their own resources and volunteers to register recipients, pick up the food and repackage and distribute it. This has been a massive undertaking in an area not noted for its community communication and cooperation. From all reports this undertaking has succeeded beyond any expectations. Losses and thefts have been minimal and discipline and crowd control for the most part has been maintained.

The churches were asked to assume this task and have been fully supported by the truce committees. This has enabled the feeding to go on without any political or religious bias. The ministers have been able to circulate in their parishes more fully than in the past

and to familiarize themselves with the individuals living in the area and their needs. A dialogue has been established between community groups which will be continued after the feeding program has stopped - the focus of the monthly meetings has already turned to self-help projects for the area.

The U.S. image was enhanced by the favorable publicity received and this, in turn, has overcome to some extent the previous suspicion of and reluctance to accept non-Jamaican assistance.

Although hard to judge, a presumption can be made that this six months of food assistance has contributed to the institutionalizing of the peace movement by relieving some of the immediate pressure in existence after the truce was declared.

Events in the next few months will be looked at to see how justified are the above conclusions. If the truce continues and the community continues to strengthen, the program can be judged a success in providing specific assistance in a crisis situation where needs were as urgent as in a natural disaster.

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AID/W
3/12/79