PD-ABB-398
07412 Q

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART I

(BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM, READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS)

IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. REPORTING A.I.D. UNIT: USAID Dhaka (Mission or AID/W Office)

(ES#)

B. WAS EVALUATION SCHEDULED IN CURRENT FY ANNUAL EVALUATION PLAN? yes ☑ slipped ☐ ad hoc ☐

Eval. Plan Submission Date: FY ___ Q ___

C. EVALUATION TIMING: Interim ☑ final ☐ ex post ☐ other ☐

D. ACTIVITY OR ACTIVITIES EVALUATED (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated; If not applicable, list title and date of the evaluation report)

Project #	Project/Program Title (or title & date of evaluation report)	First PROAG equivalent (FY)	Most recent PACD (mo/yr)	Planned LOP Cost ('000)	Amount Obligated to Date ('000)
388-0061	Food for Work III	1976	07/90	$9,353	

Institutional Assessment of Food For Work & Feeder Roads Programs in Bangladesh--May 1987.

ACTIONS

E. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR — Action(s) Required	Name of officer responsible for Action	Date Action to be Completed
1. Provide incentives for the Upazila Chairman to improve FFW performance.		
A. Design an Upazila performance rating system accepted by the BDG and, at the end of each season, disseminate the results.	Sears(AID/CARE/WFP/BDG)	June '88
B. Use the rating system to make allocations the following year.	Sears(CARE/WFP/BDG)	
C. Provide certificates to Upazila outstanding performers.	Sears(CARE/WFP/BDG)	July '88
2. With other donors, pressure the BDG to provide greater inputs in terms of personnel and transportation to the FFW program.	Sears(AID/CARE/WFP)	Sept. 30, '88
3. Have the BDG rationalize the current personnel staffing in the Upazila in relation to FFP.	Sears(AID/CARE/WFP)	Jan. 1, '89
4. Meet with key parties in FFW to agree on a set of institutional development goals and design a strategy for reaching them. First with CARE, than WFP and bilaterals, then BDG.	Sears	Sept. 30, '88
Contd.		

(Attach extra sheet if necessary)

APPROVALS

F. DATE OF MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE REVIEW OF EVALUATION: mo 10 day 15 yr 87

G. APPROVALS OF EVALUATION SUMMARY AND ACTION DECISIONS: Reviewed and approval updated 05/90

	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission or AID/W Office Director
Signature			Ann Schwartz	
Typed Name	Julie Deffler	Douglas Atwood	Ann Schwartz	Malcolm J. Purvis
Date:	May/90	May/90	May/90	May/90

Actions Required (Contd.)

5. With BDG and CARE, institute training courses to cover general management and planning for all Upazila officials and MORR personnel. Sears, Jan. 1,

6. Get MORR and MLGRD to utilize FFW management systems in other Upazila development activities. N.A.

7. Assess need for implementation of pilot decentralized feeder roads project. Carduyner

H. EVALUATION ABSTRACT (do not exceed the space provided)

The Food for Work program supported by USAID through CARE is one component of a national program which offers employment to unemployed and underemployed laborers building rural infrastructure during the agricultural slack season. This mid-term evaluation was conducted by a team of three expatriate consultants and four locally recruited staffers who were to identify strengths and limitations of sub-District (Upaziala) and Union administrations in their implementation of the program and recommend means for more effective management of program resources. A second purpose was to determine if the Upazila administrations could be given responsibility for the Feeder Roads project. The major findings are:

Performance by the individual Upazilas in implementing FFW varies widely. Those that have recorded superior performance were characterized by committed Upazial Chairman and sound management practices in which the Upazila Parishad functioned as a team. Poor performers were characterized as having ambiguous personnel relationships and being under-staffed.

Good performance is also dependent on physical variables. Large Upazilas with many Unions and poor transportation tend to be poor performers due to the difficulties in reaching work sites by Upazila management personnel. Poor performance was also noted in Upazilas with sandy soil and high distress factors.

Institutional efficiency suffered from not having a clearly defined strategy aside from the implementation of the monitoring system itself. Such a strategy would incorporate training, incentives for performance, publicity, and encouraging greater public participation.

The decentralization of the Feeder Roads program was found not advantageous at funding above the minimal levels current at the time of the evaluation. If pilot studies are to be conducted the report provided 10 recommendations for ameliorating the most obvious weaknesses of the Upazila management system.

ABSTRACT

I. EVALUATION COSTS

1. Evaluation Team Name	Affiliation	Contract Number OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (US$)	Source of Funds
Jonathan Hodgdon	MSI	90 Person Days	$56,130	Project Funds
Allen Jones	MSI			
Michael Loft	MSI			
Olivier Carduner	USAID	Mission Staff		
Syed Sadrul Ameen	USAID	110 Person Days		
[illegible]	[illegible]			
Syed S. Arefeen	BDG			

1. Name 2. Mission/Office Professional Staff Person-Days (estimate) 3. Borrower/Grantee Professional Staff Person-Days (estimate)

COSTS

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated
- Purpose of evaluation and Methodology used
- Findings and conclusions (relate to questions)
- Principal recommendations
- Lessons learned

Mission or Office: USAID Dhaka

Date this summary prepared: Oct. 15, 1987

Title and Date of Full Evaluation Report: Institutional Assessment of Food for Work and Feeder Roads Programs in Bangladesh

Purpose of activities evaluated

FFW is designed to address three major goals: (a) providing employment to vulnerable groups during peak periods of unemployment, (b) promoting access to the rural areas for the agents of development, (c) developing the capability of BDG institutions to manage development resources effectively. Program mechanics invlove the distribution of wheat as wages to laborers reconstruct rural earth roads during the work season, Dec. to May. The cooperating sponsor, CARE, assesses quantity of work accomplished and monitors the wages actually paid. Based on their findings, CARE calculates the quantity of wheat used by the BDG for the program and informs USAID who, in turn, orders that amount to be turned over to CARE from U.S. Govt. stocks. CARE then delivers this commodity to the BDG at the Port of Chittagong. In addition to the earthworks, bridging structures are built at appropriate locations in the road alignments using local proceeds of Title III, (previously Title II), grants.

Purpose of the evaluation and methodology used.

This evaluation was contracted for in an attempt to identify those institutional bottlenecks, if any, that impeded the FFW program from reaching its full potential in terms of grain utilization. Each year, about 30% of program authorized grain levels is not used through a combination of under achievment of work completed, underpayment to laborers, and failure to begin work that had been authorized.

Secondly, the evauation attempted to measure the institutional impact of the FFW and structures program is having on the implementing institutions, especially the Upazilas and Unions.

Lastly, the study attempted to investigate the instituional feasiblility of delegating responsibiility for upgrading and/or maintenance of Feeder Roads to the Upazila level and recommend an approach for undertaking such delegation on a pilot basis.

The methodology employed in this study included intensive field investiigation of a stratified random sample of 12 Upazilas and their respective Zila headquarters. This sample was deliberately structured to include one high performing and one low performing Upazila in each of CARE's six sub-office areas.

SUMMARY

Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations:

1. Performance of Food for Work becomes largely dependent on the skills and motivations of the Upazila Chairman and the PIO. Where the Chairman is well educated with a team oriented management approach, high job satisfaction on the part of the PIO, and a sense of self reliance, performance is good. Management practices are likely to be the most critical factor in improving FFW performance.

2. Physical constraints impair performance. Large land area with many Unions and a lack of transportation facilities constrain the PIO's from making necessary field visits. Areas with sandy soil and high distress levels also show an inverse relation to performance.

3. The absence of clearly defined goals and an articulated strategy for institutional development have limited the program's institutional impact.

4. The ambiguous position of key staff in the Upazila administration limits the degree to which they can be agents of institutional growth. The PIO, the officer in charge of FFW, is the agent of the MORR at the Upazila but he is not a member of the Upazila Parishad. His effectiveness is determined by his personal realationship with the Chairman and the Upazila engineer. The UNO, the chief civil servant in the Upazila, is rarely if ever involved in FFW.

5. CARE training of Upazila officers has had limited but significant institutional impact. It is most effective where it has given the officers concerned an enhanced sense of their own capability. Their attempts at training in planning has been limited by the low priority accorded to planning at the Upazila level and the perceived limited need for planning for FFW roads.

6. CARE's efforts to promote institutional development by the use of a monitoring system designed to serve other purposes has been limited by its external non-transferable character. CARE's training has focused on technical skills but has given limited attention to strategic, administrative, and communicative capacity-building.

Recommendations

1. Increase internal accountability and supervision at the Upazila Office by a) strenghtening the role of the UNO in FFW. b) providing technical assistance to the PIO, c) providing a motorcycle to the PIO; and d) experimen with incentives for the Upazila Chairmen to improve FFW performance.

2) Increase public awarenes of, and encourage public participation in, Food for Work activity at the union level through quarterly announcements of union FFW allocations.

SUMMARY (continued)

3) Conduct a more thorough study of CARE performance measures to test for regional positive or negative bias, and expand the secondary data analysis to include more post-surveyed Upazilas and more variables such as winter crop production.

4) Consider alternative uses of USAID/CARE wheat to expand a) construction of bridges and culverts; b) the Rural Maintenance Program; and c) water resources development projects.

5) Key parties in FFW meet together to agree on a set of institutional development goals and a strategy for acheiving those goals.

6) CARE's training efforts should continue on a regular basis for the other actors in the field.

7) Training should include explicit attention to assisting local officials in utilizing information from the Final Reports for improved management of FFW. Once key indicators of performance are identified or instituted, CARE training courses schould be modified to include use of this information by Upazila officals.

8) Strenghen the position of the PIO with additional resources or transfer responsibilities or the position itself to another office, such as the Upazila Engineers.

9) Convene a small task force of selected Upazila officials to advise CARE and the BDG on ways in which FFW management systems and procedures can be adapted for use in other development activities.

10) Actively experiment with new incentives for efficient and effective performance.

11) Training programs and government guidelines should increasingly encourage the adaptation and use of FFW systems for other development activities.

Lessons Learned

1. Assumptions about institutional impact cannot be made without evidence from trial field studies. The initial assumption that the current monitoring system would result in a predictable increase in efficiency over time proved optimistic.

2. Project design that does not attempt to take into account local political realities puts goal acheivment at risk.

ATTACHMENTS

K. ATTACHMENTS (List attachments submitted with this Evaluation Summary; always attach copy of full evaluation report, even if one was submitted earlier)

Institutional Assessment of Food For Work & Feeder Roads Programs in Bangladesh-May 1987.

MISSION COMMENTS ON FULL REPORT

L. COMMENTS BY MISSION, AID/W OFFICE AND BORROWER/GRANTEE

The initial draft of this evaluation was unsatisfactory and extensive comments had to be provided the contractor as a basis for redrafting. Field work was disjointed in that field investigation was split among several investigators and their findings were drafted in isolation. The final draft represented an aggregation of these reports without any attempt at synthesis. Several of the findings were not in accord with USAID experience. For example, the contractor found that the CARE monitoring system actually impeded the type of institutional development it was designed to promote. While this could have been the case, it was obvious the contractor's representative did not understand the interaction of the system and the local government institutions. Desp' ' these faults, the report was articulate in identifying the questions the Mission whished to have answered and, after redrafting by the contractor, the end product was what we had wanted.