

PD-ABB-395

70

**PVO DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS PROJECT  
EVALUATION REPORT  
(649-0138)  
March, 1989  
Mogadishu, Somalia**

**A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART I**

1. BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM, READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS.  
 2. USE LETTER QUALITY TYPE, NOT "DOT MATRIX" TYPE.

**IDENTIFICATION DATA**

107423

**A. Reporting A.I.D. Unit:**

Mission or AID/W Office USAID/Somalia  
 (ES# \_\_\_\_\_)

**B. Was Evaluation Scheduled In Current FY Annual Evaluation Plan?**

Yes  Slipped  Ad Hoc   
 Evaluation Plan Submission Date, FY 89 Q 2

**C. Evaluation Timing**

Interim  Final   
 Ex Post  Other

**D. Activity or Activities Evaluated** (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated; if not applicable, list title and date of the evaluation report.)

Project No.	Project /Program Title	First PROAG or Equivalent (FY)	Most Recent PACD (Mo/Yr)	Planned LOP Cost (000)	Amount Obligated to Date (000)
649-0138	PVO Development Partners	85	7/92	18,200	18,200

**ACTIONS**

**E. Action Decisions Approved By Mission or AID/W Office Director**

Action(s) Required

Name of Officer Responsible for Action

Date Action to be Completed

1. Establish Project Management Unit and formally designate a Project Manager to serve as the MOI representative for the project.
2. Conduct financial review of existing OPGs to determine future Dollar and Shilling needs and to reprogram excess funds within project.
3. Establish an umbrella agency to assist and provide funding to Somali PVOs and local community groups.

USAID/MOI

6/90

USAID/MOI

6/90

USAID  
Project &  
Contracts  
Officers

8/90

(Attach extra sheet if necessary)

**APPROVALS**

**F. Date Of Mission Or AID/W Office Review Of Evaluation:**

(Month) September (Day) 20 (Year) 1989

**G. Approvals of Evaluation Summary And Action Decisions:**

	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission or AID/W Office Director
Name (Typed)	K. Rockeman, SADO	Yahye H. Abdi, DG	P. Greenough, PROG	Lois Richards, DIR
Signature	<i>K. Rockeman</i>	<i>Yahye H. Abdi</i>	<i>P. Greenough</i>	<i>Lois Richards</i>
Date	3/26/90	5/6/90	5/14/90	5/14/90

**ABSTRACT**

**H. Evaluation Abstract (Do not exceed the space provided)**

The purpose of the PVOP Development Partners Project (PVOP) is (1) to expand the programs of private and voluntary organizations (PVOs) in development sectors and in areas consistent with USAID and GSDR strategy and priorities; and (2) to develop the capacity of Somali non-governmental organizations and local groups to actively participate in the development process.

In March 1989, a four-person team conducted an independent mid-term evaluation of the project to look at overall progress of the project, with special emphasis on questions of the effectiveness of the PVO partners, funding and registration of Somali PVOs, and the future of the project. The team concluded, "The partners have established a working, and in some respects, impressive project against considerable odds." However, they noted actual accomplishments of the project in terms of grants to PVOs, and especially Somali PVOs, have been limited. To date, only 6 Operational Program Grants (OPGs) and no Community Action Grants (CAGs) have been awarded. Of those, only two of the projects have shown satisfactory progress. Implementation of the other projects has been delayed due to a variety of problems, including the logistics of operating in remote areas, the economic problems of Somalia, and problems of national security. The team recommends concentrating on existing grants and extending their activities rather than funding new OPGs.

The team concluded that the project was not achieving its objective of developing Somali PVOs to carry out development projects. It recommended increasing training and technical assistance to Somali PVOs to encourage their participation in the project and to qualify them for U.S. registration and funding. The team also recommended modifying the project to make grants more relevant and accessible for Somali PVOs.

The evaluation judged the Monitoring Unit for Support and Training (MUST) to be doing a good job as secretariat for the project but recommended that it take a more active role in assisting PVOs, especially in developing the capabilities of the Somali PVOs, and also that it improve its performance in monitoring the projects. The team commended the contribution of the contractor providing training and TA for the MUST and recommended this contract be continued with emphasis on training MUST and PVO staff.

During the evaluation, a disagreement between USAID and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) over the directorship of the MUST highlighted the necessity for full cooperation between the partners. The team felt that a Management Committee, composed of representatives of USAID, the MOI, PVOs and the private sector, should be created to provide long-range planning and monitor the performance of the project and to select and supervise the director of MUST. They also felt the Proposal Review Group (PRG) should be expanded by adding two Somali PVOs to counterbalance the heavy governmental representation.

**C O S T S**

**1. Evaluation Costs**

1. Evaluation Team		Contract Number OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (U.S. \$)	Source of Funds
Name	Affiliation			
Joseph Short	International Consulting	649-0510-S-00- 9014-00	\$19,882	PD&S
Abdirahman I. Farah				
Yasin H. Mohamed				
Abdullahi I. Afi	Ministry of National Planning			

**2. Mission/Office Professional Staff**  
 Person-Days (Estimate) 20

**3. Borrower/Grantee Professional**  
 Staff Person-Days (Estimate) 15

## A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART II

### SUMMARY

J. Summary of Evaluation Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (Try not to exceed the three (3) pages provided)

Address the following items:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Purpose of evaluation and methodology used</li> <li>• Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated</li> <li>• Findings and conclusions (relate to questions)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Principal recommendations</li> <li>• Lessons learned</li> </ul> |
|--|--|

Mission or Office: USAID/Somalia	Date This Summary Prepared: March 1990	Title And Date Of Full Evaluation Report: Mid-Term Evaluation of PVO Development Partners Project in Somalia Jan-Mar 1989
-------------------------------------	---	--

Purpose of Activity Evaluated: The PVO Development Partners Project was designed to expand the programs of private and voluntary organizations working in Somalia in development sectors and areas consistent with USAID and GSDR strategy and priorities. In doing this the PVOP would form a working partnership between the PVOs and local Somali communities and groups which would capitalize on the unique skills of PVOs to implement projects which could be carried on by the Somali groups after the end of the project. The PVOP was also intended to develop the capability of Somali non-governmental organizations to carry out development projects.

Purpose of Evaluation and Methodology: This was the first evaluation of the PVOP, now in its fourth year. The evaluation looked at the overall progress of the project and assessed implementation to date with a view to enhancing future performance and potential impact. Key issues examined included funding and registration of Somali PVOs, the effectiveness of the PVO partners, and the future of the project.

The evaluation team consisted of an expatriate consultant, two Somali consultants, and a representative of the Ministry of National Planning. The team reviewed project documentation and interviewed a wide range of persons in Mogadishu involved with the project. However, the Ministry of Interior denied the team approval for field visits, thus limiting their ability to assess the status of the PVOP subprojects.

Findings and Conclusions of the Evaluation Team:

(1) PVOP is predicated upon the close cooperation and integration of actions among the partners. This has not always been the case and was particularly evident during the time of the evaluation, when the MOI and USAID were in serious disagreement over selection of a new director for the MUST.

(2) The project has not achieved anticipated goals, especially with respect to funding the OPGs and CAGs and in registering and funding Somali PVOs. The Project Paper anticipated 12-15 OPGs, the majority under \$1 million each. To date, 15 proposals have been considered, but only 5 OPGs have been awarded, 4 to US PVOs and 1 to a Somali PVO. One more proposal (submitted by Cooperative Housing Foundation) is now under review. All those to the US PVOs are in the \$2-4 million range. Two of the projects (AMREF and CARE/Somalia) appear to be doing well; three (Africare, OEF and Haqabtir, the Somali PVO) have had various problems which have delayed implementation. Note: The CHF OPG was approved subsequent to the evaluation; however, civil disturbances in July and related security concerns led to the Mission's cancelling the grant before it became operational.

(3) Up to 25 CAGs were envisioned in the Project Paper, but so far no Somali PVO or local group has expressed any interest. At the time of the evaluation, only one Somali PVO was registered with AID and therefore qualified to apply directly for AID funding. The team felt that most Somali PVOs are not qualified for and are not ready to manage a CAG without sponsorship by a US PVO or other entity. However, only one US PVO proposed a partnership with a Somali PVO, and none have evidenced interest in sponsoring CAGs for Somali PVOs or local groups. Note: Since the evaluation, two Somali PVOs have begun the registration process and one has applied for a CAG.

(4) The team noted that during project implementation, the concept of MUST as an independent entity outside government was changed by the decision to hire MUST staff through the MOI rather than an AID contract. The team said the MUST had done a good job as secretariat to the Proposal Review Group, but they felt it should have been more proactive in its role in assisting PVOs, particularly Somali PVOs. The team also felt the MUST, with assistance provided by EIL, had made a good start in fulfilling its role in training PVO staff. However, the team felt MUST performance in the area of project monitoring and evaluation needs definite improvement. MUST staffing was also found to be a problem.

Principal Recommendations of the Evaluation Team:

(1) Concentrate on implementing existing OPGs rather than funding new ones, with the exception of a PVO umbrella to assist Somali PVOs. Use excess funds now allocated for new OPGs for extending activities of existing OPGs and for grants to Somali PVOs. Shift unused CAG funds (both Dollar and Shillings) to OPGs, leaving \$500,000-\$1,000,000 for Somali PVOs to be financed under a PVO umbrella project.

(2) MUST should take the lead to encourage participation by Somali PVOs, with provisional registration of three by the end of 1989. MUST should evaluate the capabilities and needs of the Somali PVOs and should expand its training and technical assistance capabilities to meet these needs. MUST should provide direct financial and bookkeeping services to selected Somali PVOs for at least two years. MUST should also assist Somali PVOs in linking with US PVOs and in finding non-PVOP funding sources. USAID should explore new funding mechanisms and sources of funding for Somali PVOs, possibly modifying the project to make grants more relevant and budgeting \$600,000 (two-thirds in Shilling equivalent) for Somali PVO OPGs and approve grants for two Somali OPGs by the end of 1989. A Somali PVO should be added to the PRG.

(3) MUST should continue its training and technical assistance to PVOs and should assume a stronger leadership and problem-solving role in supporting the projects, recommending actions and changes in projects to the PRG. MUST should increase its staff of qualified people and add the position of Deputy Executive Director. MUST should review PVOP finances and develop a three-year plan for PVOP and MUST, with a proposal for the unused funds should be programmed. MUST should increase its monitoring and evaluation activities, reviewing all existing projects. The staff of MUST should be increased to accomplish these goals, and participant training for MUST and PVO staff should be increased. The EIL advisor should be continued, with his SOW modified to focus on training MUST and PVO staff and assisting Somali PVOs.

(4) A Management Committee should be established to set project goals and resolve difficulties between the partners. The committee would consist of representatives of USAID, MOI, a US PVO, a Somali PVO, and the private sector, with the Director of MUST as a non-voting member. The committee would be charged with providing long term guidance for the PVOP and with selecting and monitoring the performance of the director of MUST. All decisions of the committee would require concurrence of both USAID and the MOI. The PRG should be increased by adding representative of two Somali PVOs to balance the heavy governmental representation.

(5) Extend PVOP PACD to 1994 to accommodate present OPGs plus their anticipated extensions.

(6) USAID should keep a half-time direct hire project manager and full-time FSN assistant on the project.

S U M M A R Y (Continued)

Lessons Learned:

- 1) GSDR hiring limits staff salaries to a level where it is exceedingly difficult to attract and keep sufficient qualified Somali staff to implement the project. In the case of PVOP, this problem would have been avoided if MUST employees had been hired by an AID contract rather than the MOI.
- 2) Meeting AID registration requirements proved much more difficult for Somali PVOs than anticipated. A mechanism should have been included in the project for provision of small grants and assistance on financial accountability by an "umbrella" organization to give Somali PVOs experience in implementing grants and "on-the-job" training in grant design and management.

## ATTACHMENTS

K. Attachments (List attachments submitted with this Evaluation Summary; always attach copy of full evaluation report, even if one was submitted earlier; attach studies, surveys, etc., from "on-going" evaluation, if relevant to the evaluation report.)

Report on Mid-Term Evaluation of PVO Development Partners Project (PVOP) in Somalia.

## COMMENTS

### L. Comments By Mission, AID/W Office and Borrower/Grantee On Full Report

The Mission has carefully reviewed comments and recommendations made by the evaluation team and has formulated action decisions based on most of the recommendations. However, the Mission has rejected the following two recommendations:

(a) The addition of a Management Committee to oversee the project and select the director of MUST is not needed and would only make project implementation more cumbersome. At the time of the evaluation, there were problems between USAID and the MOI over the selection of the MUST director. Since the evaluation, this issue has been resolved and relations with the MOI greatly improved.

(b) The Mission does not agree that promotion of Somali PVOs is best accomplished by strengthening the current MUST. As GSDR employees, MUST staff are subject to a number of restrictions which have made it difficult for MUST to find and keep the qualified staff it needs. The Mission believes assistance to Somali PVOs would be more effectively be provided by a U.S. contractor or PVO under a direct AID contract, with MUST reorganized to serve as the project management unit for the MOI.

Events in Somalia since the evaluation have made it impossible to award grants to non-Somali PVOs not now working in Somalia. This may place limitations on the formation of the "umbrella" grant proposed in the evaluation. Further investigation into various options which might be utilized to promote and assist Somali PVOs is warranted.

The GSDR Ministry of Interior offers the following comments regarding the recommendations made by the evaluation team and the action decisions agreed upon with the Mission:

(a) The Project Management Unit must be under the direction of a Somali Project Manager, assisted by a long-term advisor and short-term consultants provided under a USAID contract.

(b) The contractor supplying the project advisors should also be the umbrella agent responsible for assisting and monitoring the use of funds provided to SPVOs.

(c) The MOI agrees that the best means of overcoming problems related to the recruitment and retention of competent staff is for the umbrella agent to contract the project staff.

YD-1 PC-385-7

ISA 67424

**REPORT**  
**ON**  
**MID-TERM EVALUATION**  
**OF**  
**PVO DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS PROJECT (PVO)**  
**IN SOMALIA**  
**PROJECT NO. 649-0138**  
**EVALUATION CONDUCTED JANUARY - MARCH, 1989**

**Prepared for:**  
**U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**  
**MOGADISHU, SOMALIA**

**by Evaluation Team Members:**

**Joseph Short**  
**Abdirahman Ibrahim Farah**  
**Abdullahi Isse Afi**  
**Yasin Haji Mohamud**

## Table of Contents

### Guide to Acronyms

- I. Introduction
- II. PVOP and the Necessity for Partnership
- III. Status of the OPG Sub-Projects
- IV. Assistance to Somali PVOs
- V. Effectiveness of MUST
- VI. Effectiveness of the Experiment in International Living (EIL)
- VII. Management Effectiveness of USAID
- VIII. Selected Financial Issues
- IX. Proposal Review Process and Proposal Review Group

### Appendices

- I. - Scope of Work
- II. - Organizations and Persons Consulted
- III. - Logical Framework/PVOP Project Paper, 1985
- IV. - Chronology of Major Events in the PVOP
- V. - Map of Somalia
- VI. - Notes on the Operational Project Grants
- VII. - List of Somali PVOs
- VIII. - Selected Somali PVOs
- IX . - MUST Annual Work Plan, 1989
- X. - MUST Staff
- XI. - Roles, Functions and Activities of MUST and EIL
- XII. - Status of USAID Component of Project Finance
- XIII. - Somali Shilling Component
- XIV. - Proposals for a Management Committee
- XV. - Selection Criteria of Executive Director
- XVI. - Documents Consulted
- XVII. - USAID Registration
- XVIII. - Proposal Tracking Chart

### Guide to Acronyms

AADAMIGA:	SPVO name, not acronym
AID:	Agency for International Development, Washington
AID/W:	Agency for International Development, Washington
AMREF:	African Medical and Research Foundation
AL-MUNTADHAR:	SPVO name
CAGS:	Community Action Grants
CARE:	USPVO name
CHF:	Cooperative Housing Foundation
CHWs:	Community Health Workers
CIDA:	Canadian International Development Agency
DARYEEL:	SPVO name
DDD:	Domestic Development Division, MOFR
EIL:	Experiment in International Living
GSDR:	Government of Somali Democratic Republic
HAQABTIR:	Somali PVO name
HRD:	Horumerein Research and Development, an SPVO
ISTAAGEER:	Somali PVO name
MC:	Management Committee (Proposed for PVOP)
MOE:	Ministry of Education, GSDR
MOFR:	Ministry of Finance and Revenue, GSDR
MOH:	Ministry of Health, GSDR
MOI:	Ministry of Interior, GSDR
MNP and JVD:	Ministry of National Planning and Juba Valley Development
MUST:	Management Unit for Support and Training
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NRA:	National Range Agency, GSDR
OEF:	OEF International (formerly Overseas Education Fund)
OPGs:	Operational Program Grants
OXFAM America:	USPVO
OXFAM (U.K.):	U.K PVO
PACD:	Project Assistance Completion Date
PCI:	Project Concern International, USPVO
PHC:	Primary Health Care
PHD:	Participatory Home Development, SPVO
PIL:	Project Implementation Letter, USAID
PIO/C:	Project Implementation Order/Technical
PIO/P:	Project Implementation Order/Participants
PIR:	Project Implementation Review, USAID
PP:	Project Paper, USAID
PRG:	Project Review Group
PVO:	Private Voluntary Organization
PVOP:	Private Voluntary Organization Partners Project
REDSO/ESA:	Regional Economic Development Services Office/ East and Southern Africa
REP:	Rural Enterprise Program, Kenya
SCF:	Save the Children Federation, USPVO
SPVO:	Somali Private Voluntary Organization
SWDO:	Somali Women's Democratic Organization
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
USPVO:	United States PVO
VITA:	Volunteers in Technical Assistance, USPVO

## I. INTRODUCTION

### Objective and Scope of Evaluation

This report contains findings, conclusions and recommendations from the mid-term evaluation of the PVO Development Partners Project (649-0138) conducted by a four-person team, January 23 - March 15, 1989.

The stated objective of the evaluation was "to assess the project's implementation to date (8/85 - 3/89) with a view to enhancing performance and potential impact." The Scope of Work is contained in Appendix 1.

The evaluation team was asked to focus on key issues, especially those cited in the Scope of Work: funding and registration of Somali PVOs, the effectiveness of various PVOP partners, and the future of the project. Team recommendations were to facilitate project redesign, if appropriate, and specific improvements in implementation.

### Evaluation Team

Members of the evaluation team were Abdullahi Isse Afi (Ministry of National Planning and Jubba Valley Development), Abdirahman Ibrahim Farah (consultant), Yasin Haji Mohamud (consultant), and Joseph Short (team leader). Together, they brought to the process years of experience in African rural development, Somali and U.S. PVO management and projects, development education and training, U.S. and Somali government practice, and Somali socio-economic life.

Team members were jointly approved by GSDR's Ministry of Interior (MOI), the responsible ministry for rural development and the implementing ministry for PVOP, and by USAID.

### Process of Evaluation

The evaluation team sought the most collegial kind of process possible, both among themselves and with the project participants

and observers. They assumed that the evaluation process itself would be as useful in catalyzing learning from PVOP experience and favorable project changes, in addition to the formal recommendations from the evaluation.

The team was to base its work on three sources: examination of documentation, financial records, and files; extensive interviewing of key participants; and site visits to the five OPG sub-project in various regions of the country. Among the priority "partners" to be consulted were local groups and communities, Somali and U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs), the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and other relevant GSDR ministries, USAID, the PVOP Management Unit for Support and Training (MUST), and the Experiment in International Living (EIL).

In many respects, the process went well. Appendix II indicates the range of persons interviewed in the Mogadishu area. The team had the opportunity to meet leaders of the Somali PVOs (SPVOs) which are prospective participants in PVOP, as well as representatives of all the PVOs which hold Operational Program Grants (OPGs). They also visited a primary health care center and clinic in a squatter settlement on the outskirts of Mogadishu being established by the Somali PVO, Al-Muntadhar.

The team was continually assisted by the MUST Executive Director, Mohamed Said Omer and his staff; by Weston Fisher, USAID Project Manager, and his deputy, Abdullahi A. Ahmed, Assistant Project Manager; and by Robert Gurevich, EIL's long term advisor to MUST. Interviews were held with four members of the Proposal Review Group (PRG) which approves PVOP grants, including one with the private sector member, Mohamed Abdirahman H. Jama, who has been an active participant from the beginning of the project. The PRG representative from the Ministry of Planning, Ms. Faduma Yasin Osman, gave a valuable GSDR perspective on the project and the PRG process.

Designers, implementers and internal information systems have recorded much that was useful to this evaluation. Regular reports by various parties on OPG projects, for example, compensated somewhat for the inability of the team to visit the project sites.

Ironically, the evaluation period coincided with a period of disagreement between the then Minister of Interior and USAID over the former's attempt to remove the MUST Executive Director without USAID's required concurrence. There had been a history of productive cooperation in PVOP between the two governments until late 1988, and it was hoped that this would resume by the time the evaluation team was actually fielded. However, the Minister of Interior declined to have his ministry participate in the evaluation; to meet with the team members; or to give the necessary approvals for field visits to the OPG project sites. Among other things, this barred contact with Somali communities and beneficiaries, and it eliminated efforts to assess the status and progress of the OPG projects. This turn of events did handicap the evaluation process. Nevertheless, the team accomplished most of the tasks assigned under the Scope of Work and its findings and recommendations may actually contribute to restoring and renewing the partnership which is the taproot of PVOP. The evaluation recommendations should be immediately useful to all the partners and even more so once the current impasse is resolved.

### Other Evaluation Perspectives

#### 1. Development Defined

Two other perspectives guided the team. First, development assistance, can only facilitate or at most catalyze community development. It cannot "deliver" it, through material, technological or other external inputs. The team wanted its work to be guided by the concept of PVOP as facilitator and catalyst, not as deliverer of inputs. Therefore, the impossibility of making contacts with the village and community groups involved with PVOP was a serious impediment to the evaluation process. It was not possible, for example, to assess first-hand to what degree local groups are actually being afforded the opportunity to define the purposes and uses of PVOP resources, and to shape the use of those resources for the benefit of their respective communities.

## 2. Challenges for PVOP

The partners have established a working, and in some respects impressive project, against considerable odds. This should be kept in mind as problems are openly confronted and as the second half of the project is planned. Since the project was designed in 1984, national security issues have gripped the GSDR and development aid groups. Conflict in the north has added to the security orientation of the society and closed down some of the PVOP activities of CARE and Haqabtir in the northwest and northeastern part of the country. The Management Unit for Support and Training (MUST), responsible for project monitoring, has been denied approval to make site visits to the north over the last year for security and other reasons.

In this period too, PVOP represented a novel and unfamiliar approach within the Somalia socio-political context. The planners knew and stated that it was an "experiment", whose success would depend upon several optimistic assumptions.

At the same time, Somalia, a poor country in the best of times, is burdened with economic problems and the pressures of an economic adjustment which has direct impacts on PVOP. A more than three-fold devaluation of Somali currency since 1985, when the project was established, has contributed to societal and project cost inflation, shortages of counterpart Somali shillings for the project, and increasing difficulties in recruiting and adequately paying Somali staff essential to project implementation and sustainability.

Logistics have always been daunting for rural development activities in Somalia, but the PVOs in this project are carrying out their projects in especially remote and logistically difficult assignments. USAID, MOI and the Proposal Review Group (PRG) have, in fact, encouraged PVOs to undertake activities in remote areas. The Africare project, for example, is situated 750 kilometers north of Mogadishu and has been severely tested by communications, start-up and staff retention problems.

In short, conditions in Somalia have not provided an easy and fertile climate for PVO activities. In some respects, it is remarkable that so much progress has been made in establishing PVOP and the sub-projects. It is important to recognize the severe constraints under which the partners have labored. The team, taking all this into account, is inclined to recommendations which stress consolidation, refinement, and extension of existing activities rather than major new undertakings, except with respect to the Somali PVOs which have not yet participated in the project, to any great extent.

### 3. Greater Autonomy for PVOP and MUST

It would be beneficial to project aims and to the co-sponsors, if PVOP and the MUST were permitted a measure of greater autonomy than they currently have. While models of semi-autonomous umbrella projects, such as the Rural Enterprise Project in Kenya, may not be applicable in the Somalia environment, there are ways by which PVOP and MUST can become more effective and productive, and even more accountable to the respective governments. One of the other assumptions of the evaluation team has been that for PVOs and NGOs to contribute most effectively to development, they should be given a measure of freedom to realize the potential of their non-governmental character.

#### Organization of this Report

This report is organized around a series of key issues, which were identified by the Scope of Work and in the course of the evaluation itself. Each major issue is presented in a three-part format within a section: findings, conclusions and recommendations. Each section discusses issues and decisions faced by the partners at mid-term. The conclusions and recommendations identify issues and problems, and propose processes for dealing with them.

The appendices are designed to: (1) provide additional analyses relevant to the body of the report; (2) identify documents and other sources either used in the evaluation or available to others; (3) provide additional material for policy and management analysts, program designers and problem-solvers, and those interested in non-governmental approaches to Somali community development.

## II. PVOP and the Necessity for Partnership

### Findings:

#### PVOP in the Balance

At mid-term, the future of the PVO Development Partners Project (PVOP) is in the balance. USAID and GSDR's Ministry of Interior (MOI), on whose cooperation PVOP is based, have fallen into serious dispute over the then Minister of Interior's attempt to remove the MUST Executive Director, without either consultation with the partners or USAID concurrence. MOI has suspended cooperation and open dialogue with USAID on the project but not on other matters. Some financial and other transactions which enable MUST to function effectively have been placed on hold.

After participating in the early planning and arrangements for the mid-term evaluation, MOI has declined to meet with the evaluation team or to approve its travel for site visits to the sub-projects throughout the country.

At the conclusion of the evaluation process, the situation is at an impasse. USAID and MOI have cooperated effectively over several years to establish PVOP.

#### A History of Cooperation and Partnership

At the project design stage it was difficult to conceive of a major PVO initiative in Somalia, under co-sponsorship by MOI and USAID, that would not require a closely calibrated, tripartite partnership among the two government agencies and the PVOs. That certainly was the spirit in which the PVO Development Partners Project was conceived and designed, and how in large measure it has been implemented.

GSDR, USAID and PVO representatives jointly planned the project and agreed to co-fund it with USAID dollars, GSDR shillings and PVO private dollar contributions. The USAID-MOI grant agreement, which

established PVOP (1985), expressly called for "shared" roles and authority among the partners. For example, the two agencies agreed to share:

responsibility for funding, monitoring and evaluating individual OPGs (Operational Grant Programs) and CAGs (Community Action Grants), as well as the overall project.

(Grant Agreement, Amplified Project Description, p. 10, 8/85)

They agreed that MOI would contract for a Somali staff to provide support and training for PVOP, through the Management Unit for Support and Training (MUST). USAID and MOI further institutionalized partnership by agreeing that they would concur in the appointment of the MUST Executive Director and that USAID would also contract for U.S. technical assistance to assist MUST through general support and training. The Experiment in International Living was selected as the contractor.

Likewise, in the implementation of PVOP, partnership has been a guiding principle, a practical part of everyday operations, and a precondition of project success. GSDR, USAID, private and PVO representatives have been active participants in the Proposal Review Group (PRG), which met 22 times in the first year and which has met regularly since. They have jointly operated a complex system of budget approvals, funds disbursement and PVO contributions. They have worked together to support OPG development projects, and they have jointly carried out training and technical assistance activities.

Where major project objectives have not been fulfilled, difficulties in achieving substantive collaboration among key actors have often been a key factor. For example, adequate cooperation to engage Somali PVOs in the project has not fully materialized, and the partners are equally accountable for that. Also, for whatever design or implementation reasons, PVOs have not been able to play their planned roles "to sponsor locally-initiated project ideas for CAG (Community Action Grants) funding." [Project Agreement, p. 9].

Thus, PVOP is predicated upon close cooperation and integrated actions among the partners. It cannot survive, much less flourish, if the partners--and especially UCAID and MOI--are not in fundamental agreement about directions, shared management and joint accountability for the project.

### Problems in Partnership Defined

Authority within the PVOP system is highly dispersed, and there is nothing like a representative "Board of Directors" or "Management Committee" which can assure or facilitate cooperation, coordination and accountability within the project. No group of key actors meets together regularly to consider all the major policy and implementation needs of the project. Though what one partner does may profoundly affect another partner, or the whole project, there is not a representative mechanism in the system through which the partners can agree on goals and priorities, discuss and resolve their differences, and give sustained direction to the overall project. Partly as a result of this, the overall project lacks sustained direction and momentum. At extremes, it is susceptible to either inertia or to disruptive disagreements. In the absence of a senior authoritative body for consultation and decision-making, four important areas have not received adequate attention.

#### 1. MUST Executive Director and Staff

There is need for a common forum in which the partners can discuss and agree on joint direction and priorities for the MUST Executive Director and staff. The partners have agreed that the MUST is the support staff for the entire project, even though MOI is the appointed partner to contract and compensate them for their services. Yet there is lack of a forum in which the partners can together adopt performance standards for the Executive Director and staff and, when necessary, as now, to discuss and determine the acceptability of performance.

#### 2. Planning and Budgeting

Similarly, there are inadequate arrangements for the partners to jointly review and determine overall PVOP goals and means for

At mid-term, the partners together should be setting goals and budgets for the last two years of the project. Many critical questions await answers. Should PVOP prioritize the consolidation and refinement of the six existing OPG projects or be in an expansion mode to approve more OPGs? What project changes and resources will be necessary to involve SPVOs? What is to be done with the significant dollar surpluses which exist in the original and never revised project budget (1985)? Indeed, what is to be done with the recommendations of this mid-term evaluation, and will the partners decide that together? A better mechanism is needed for the joint review and approval of overall PVOP plans and budgets, such as the MUST might be expected to propose periodically.

### 3. Financial Administration and Accountability

An effective Board of Directors is responsible for assuring the cost-effective and proper use of financial and other resources. There is no comparable body in PVOP to oversee the review of MUST's work, including the dollar and shilling flows and needs of PVOP in relation to its overall objectives. There is no group which routinely requests and reviews financial reports and independent audits of PVOP and sub-project expenditures, although the project has now spent nearly \$5.5 million (dollars and shillings).

### 4. Project Performance and Results

Finally, there is not a collective process by which the partners regularly review progress towards PVOP goals and objectives, whether those be OPG, training, technical assistance, SPVO or other objectives. The Proposal Review Group (PRG) is about to begin OPG project implementation reviews, though its purview will be confined to OPG projects as such.

The need for collective review of OPG sub-project progress is manifest. Despite evident delays and serious problems in sub-project implementation and virtually no field monitoring in the past year, no single representative group is pressing to determine the exact situation in each sub-project and to identify measures which should be taken by the partners to rectify problems and to

### Search for Solutions

Faced with an unexpected crisis of governance within PVOP, the evaluation team developed the following recommendations for strengthening partnership and joint direction of the project for the longer term.

### Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Conclusion: To restore partnership, there are at least two relatively favorable alternatives to consider. Either MOI and USAID reaffirm the partnership principles and agreements which have heretofore guided them and agree on new and effective conditions to give those effect, or they should agree to phase down PVOP.

1A. Recommendation: USAID and MOI should agree to the essential conditions for the continuation of their partnership and of PVOP. The conditions should include those covered in previous agreements and any desirable clarifications or changes. Several new conditions, as follow, should be added:

#### (1) Management Committee (MC)

While the current PRG should continue in its proposal and project review roles, a smaller representative "Management Committee" is needed to give general policy and management oversight for PVOP and MUST, within terms agreed to by MOI and USAID, and with accountability to those agencies. In the interest of effectiveness and efficiency, the MC should be small with strong decision-making and supervisory responsibilities, based on limited delegation of authority from MOI and USAID. It is suggested that there be a committee of six, including: the MOI Director General, the USAID Project Manager, a USPVO representative, a private sector representative, an SPVO representative and the Executive Director, as an ex officio, non-voting member. (See Appendix XIV for the elaboration of this

(2) Management Committee Functions.

The MC should have the following responsibilities. MC decisions should require MOI and USAID concurrence.

- a. Appointment, or replacement of the MUST Executive Director and the processes and criteria for those actions.
- b. Longer-term and annual plans of PVOP and MUST, respectively.
- c. Longer-term and annual budgets for the overall PVOP and for MUST.
- d. Adequacy of financial administration as indicated in regular financial statements and independent audit reports on PVOP and the sub-projects.
- e. Regular review of progress towards goals and objectives in all areas of PVOP, including OPG sub-project performance, technical assistance and training results, and the involvement of SPVOs.

NOTE: The Executive Director should have the authority to appoint and supervise his own staff, without USAID or MOI concurrence, but according to agreed staffing plans, guidelines and budgets approved and monitored by the Management Committee.

(3) MUST Executive Director

A MOI-USAID agreement is needed to establish the process and criteria for selecting the MUST Executive Director. The Management Committee would give general direction and guidance to the Executive Director, and through him, to the entire MUST staff. The Executive Director would remain ultimately accountable to MOI and USAID for the leadership and management of MUST. The suggested process for selecting the Executive Director would be as follows:

- a. The partners would agree to criteria for the selection of the Executive Director (see Appendix XV for model selection criteria). The Management Committee or other nominating committee would screen and rank the candidates by using the agreed-upon criteria. It would propose a single nominee to MOI and USAID for concurrence. Failing to get that, the committee would propose another candidate until concurrence on a choice is obtained.
  
- b. The nominating committee would be either the Management Committee, as described above, or a comparably representative committee, including MOI, USAID, Private Sector, USPVO and SPVO representatives.
  
- c. The proposed MC should have responsibility for overseeing and encouraging the professional development and performance of the Executive Director, including carrying out an annual review of his performance. It should counsel the Executive Director on expected performance improvements and seek those well in advance of instances in which dismissal might be considered. The MC should decide whether dismissal is warranted and, if so, recommend that to MOI and USAID for required concurrences.

### III. Status of the OPG Sub-Projects

#### The Plan for OPGs

The ultimate measure of PVOP will be the extent to which it facilitates self-reliant development efforts among Somali communities and local groups. The Project Paper envisaged that U.S. and Somali PVOs would assist those communities and groups to plan, implement and manage local development projects. Such activities were to be funded by 12-15 Operational Program Grants (OPGs) and up to 25 Community Action Grants (CAGs), totalling \$ 15.8 million and an additional \$5.4 million in GSDR local currency contributions. About 20 USPVOs and 3-5 SPVOs were to receive OPGs. "At least a few OPGs", the Project Paper anticipated, would be in "excess of \$1.0 million in AID funding."

#### The Actual Use of OPGs

Since 1985, only six OPGs have been granted, five to USPVOs and one to the SPVO, Haqabtir. No CAGs have been provided, for reasons discussed elsewhere in this report. All the USPVO OPGs are obligated in the range of \$2-4 million each (including both dollars and shillings). Haqabtir is to receive over \$900,000, mostly in shillings. At this time, total USAID and GSDR obligations to the six projects is \$11,784,000, compared to the 21.2 million budgeted to OPGs and CAGS over the life of the project.

The Proposal Review Group (PRG) has considered a total of 15 OPG proposals from 13 PVOs, mostly in 1986-7, and has approved only the six projects. (See Appendix XVIII for the PVOP Proposal Tracking Chart). Haqabtir has been the only SPVO applicant to date. The five operative OPG grant agreements were signed in 1987, after at least a one year passage through the PVOP grant approval process. Four of those agreements have been in effect for two years. The fifth, OEF International, has had serious problems with implementation. OEF is now seeking PRG approval for a revised project and agreement. Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), is expected to be signed shortly. CHF first submitted its concept paper nearly two years ago. There have been no new OPG applications for nearly two years, since CHF entered that process.

Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) has spent three years unsuccessfully attempting to get a proposal approved. The latest rejection of VITA's proposal by the PEG occurred in November, 1988. No other USPVOs are preparing to apply for OPGs; nor is PVOP inclined to solicit new USPVO proposals. Potentially, several SPVOs may secure USAID registration and/or funding.

#### Current OPG Sub-Projects

The evaluation team was expected to make only a very general evaluation of the status of the six OPC sub-projects. However, even that task proved more difficult than anticipated. While the Ministry of Interior (MOI) declined the team permission to visit four active sub-projects sites, it should also be noted that none of the northern projects (CARE, HAQABTIR or Africare) had been visited by MUST, EIL or USAID staff for nearly one year, due mainly to security restrictions on travel. The overviews of the subprojects provided below were derived from sub-projects quarterly reports, team interviews with PVO field and Mogadishu staff, USAID project implementation reviews and early field reports by MUST. AMREF's health project in Luuq district is the one active project to have received adequate monitoring and evaluation from MUST and other sources over the past year. (See Appendix VI for additional detail).

#### o AMREF - Luuq District Health Services and Primary Health Care Training Project

Luuq and Dolo districts, southeastern Somalia near the Ethiopia-Kenya borders. Project period 3/26/87 - 3/25/90. The project purpose is to create a unified health service in Luuq District based on primary health care (PHC) principles, and to strengthen PHC training at the national level. Approved for \$2,310,000 (dollars and shillings). Program: (a) Primary health care: organizing village health committees in 9 communities of Luuq and Dolo districts, training their voluntary health workers, establishing health posts, and providing immunizations, medical supplies. (b) Managing the Luuq district hospital to provide some out-patient care and mother-child health (MCH) services, and limited in-patient, surgical and emergency treatment. (c) Collection of Luuq district health data.

(d) Strengthening national PHC training, revising training curriculum, workshops, health materials preparation, MCH staff training. The village PHC portion of the project appears the most successful. Hospital and national PHC components are achieving mixed results under serious operating constraints. AMREF has strong capability to further strengthen the village PHC thrust and further the role of village health committees. Sustainability of project activities and results is in question, certainly unless AMREF has 2-3 more years to consolidate/extend most promising aspects. Serious problems have been a project shillings shortage and difficulties in engaging Somali PHC staff in the project. AMREF will finish in 1990, largely within budget. It will also have made its planned 15% contribution to the budget, raised from other sources. The main issue for PVOP/USAID/MOI: timely decision/action on whether or not to extend the project beyond 6/90. In summary, this is one of the best OPG projects.

o CARE/Somalia - Rural Development Initiative Project

Hiran, Northwest and Awdal. Project period 4/20/87 - 10/19/90. Approved for \$2,830,000 (dollars and shillings). The project's main purposes are to accelerate growth and improve incomes, rehabilitate the environment and increase water supplies, and to foster self-reliance and community participation in development. The program was to include: (a) horticulture extension for individuals and groups in improved farming technologies; (b) livestock extension in veterinary and animal husbandry; (c) agro-forestry extension and training in the use of live fencing, windbreaks and shelter belts, intercropping, fuelwood, fodder and amenity tree crops; (d) improving present or opening new marketing and credit systems for agricultural products. CARE's projects in the Northwest and Awdal area are currently not operational due to civil and political instability in those regions. CARE was asked to prepare a problem identification report and recommend ways of using the remaining funds originally allocated to activities in the Northwest and Awdal Regions. Its Hiran project has reportedly been very successful and is currently engaging 26 communities in multi-sectoral activities. The agency has been particularly active in involving the beneficiaries in the identification of their priority needs and in actual implementation. The project warrants serious consideration for extension in 1990.

o Haqabtir - Integrated Rural Development Project

Located in Sool and Togdheer Regions. Due to civil and political instability, it has not been possible for the project to operate in certain parts of the Togdheer Region. Project duration: 5/18/87 - 5/17/91. Approved for \$1,104,000, (mostly shillings). The purpose of project includes increasing water availability and agricultural productivity and the rehabilitation of schools. Program: (a) increasing water availability through construction of 35 berkeds, rehabilitation of 40 wells and 2 earthen dug-outs; (b) provision of technical and financial assistance to one cooperative in Las Anod District by providing an agricultural extension worker, irrigation pumps and store rooms and construction of berkeds for water storage; (c) fighting deforestation by rehabilitating an NRA nursery in Burao, establishing a new one in Las Anod, providing trees and seedlings and introducing live fencing; (d) rehabilitation of at least 8 village schools; (e) providing training in community leadership.

It is difficult to assess the implementation status and progress of this project. However, the project activities started very late, and it also appears that little impact has been registered so far. It is also questionable whether the project will foster much community participation, given the limited time remaining to accomplish the planned tasks in the current project period.

o Africare - Northeast Rural Initiative Project

The project area includes all of Bari Region, Badhan District of Sanag Region, and Taleh District of Sool Region. Because of delayed implementation and increased costs, it is not certain whether the last district will be covered. The project period is 3/31/87 - 3/30/91. Approved for \$4,245,000. The project purpose is to increase the capacity for water collection in order to reduce rangeland degradation and increase agricultural opportunities in the project area. The project also intends to introduce major community self-development programs, including the improvement of health, veterinary and educational services, the creation of adult education programs, institution building

for regional level development projects, e.g., those of NRA, and identifying local groups that have the potential for becoming local level NGOs. Program: (a) construction of 20 dug-outs to increase water collection capacity; (b) diversion of the course of seasonal run-offs in seven dry river beds to reduce erosion, improve soil moisture for rangeland and increase food production; and (c) training of community leaders and local groups e.g., cooperatives and staff of implementing partners (e.g. NRA). Africare's project is trailing well behind in implementation as a result of delayed procurements, high staff turnover and logistical difficulties. Nevertheless, much of the necessary infrastructure for the project is now in place and preparation for the full-scale implementation of the civil works component of the project has been completed. An early decision is required to extend the project by at least one or two more years. Importantly, the project is implementing small scale projects in five communities and has plans to complete ten such activities before the end of the year.

▷ OEF International - Somali Agricultural Enterprise Development (SAED)

Located in the Baidoa District of the Bay Region, to the southwest of Mogadishu, the project period was originally 9/23/87 - 9/22/90. However, start-up problems necessitate approval of a new plan, budget and timetable. Approved budget: \$ 2,388,000 (dollars and shillings). The original purpose was to improve the socio-economic conditions of rural women and their families by increasing food self-sufficiency, strengthening their capability to function as active community development organizations, and by training Somali Women's Democratic Organization [SWDO] women in organization management and to enable them to provide support for self-help community development projects.

The major activities were to include:

- a. Developing a 100 hectare fruit and vegetable farm irrigated with drilled wells, and to introduce egg and honey production.

- b. Training of community development change agents in project implementation to assume responsibility for the project in the future.

OEF has had serious implementation problems due primarily to unanticipated environmental constraints that were not adequately taken into account at the planning stage. Long after the grant agreement was signed and much effort was expended to lay the foundation for the project, and after sizable costs were incurred, it was learned that the soil and water analyses for the original site were wrong and that both soil and water were totally unsuited for productive farming because of high salinity content. The project was then moved to another site which has better soil, but which has proven to have insufficient water for irrigation purposes. OEF is now rewriting its proposal a third time. The revised proposal will retain the original objective, except that it likely will focus on training women in management, rain-fed agriculture and income-generating activities with only a small demonstration plot for irrigated vegetable production. At the time of this evaluation, a new proposal was being prepared for the PRG.

- o Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF)

Mogadishu Peripheral Areas Shelter and Services Improvement Project. Located in the capital city of Mogadishu. The project duration is three years, but the starting and terminal dates will not be known before the grant agreement is signed. Approved for \$2,064,265 (in dollars and shillings). The purpose of the project is to demonstrate a replicable approach to affordable housing for poor communities in the periphery of Mogadishu and to assist them and the municipality to develop the capacity to make and provide basic services on a sustained basis. The main program activities will include (1) improved housing for 253 families and the living conditions for another 10,000 poor persons through a small-scale upgrading component; (2) a demonstration project to provide low-cost housing for families and to make available low-cost building material.

This sub-project is the only urban-oriented project under PVOP. However, the majority of intended beneficiaries are of rural and poor backgrounds.

**Conclusions and Recommendations:**

1. **Conclusion:** Partnership and organizational problems at the center of PVOP have diverted attention and efforts away from the OPG sub-projects which are the main, direct vehicles of assistance to local and community development under PVOP. Each project needs, but is not getting, thorough evaluation, budget review, next-stage planning and specific follow-up support from MUST, MOI or USAID. For example, the AMREF and CARE projects expire within one year, and timely decisions and actions are needed to extend those, if that is desired by all parties. Effective evaluation of, and learning from, the sub-projects is delayed. The shillings shortage of the sub-projects has been alleviated temporarily, but the partners are not jointly analyzing or coming up with long-term solutions for that problem.

1A. **Recommendation:** The partners should concentrate joint efforts on existing and already approved projects (CHF, OEF).

2. **Conclusion:** There is relatively little qualitative and shared knowledge among the partners on whether and how the OPG projects are progressing. MUST's well-conceived and planned monitoring and evaluation system is not functioning adequately to assess progress and problems, much less to facilitate inter-project learning. Site evaluations by MUST to the CARE, Haqabtir and Africare projects have not been conducted over the last year. There have been no workshops for the group exchange of project evaluations and learning. Planned Project Implementation Reviews by the PRG have been delayed. There has been only limited analysis of how local groups and communities are participating in or benefiting from the sub-projects.

2A. **Recommendation:** Priority should be placed upon strengthening the MUST systems for project monitoring and evaluation and upon using the findings of these processes for technical assistance, training and mutual learning purposes.

3. Conclusion: Based on quarterly reports and second-hand accounts, the evaluation team concluded that the two OPG projects (AMREF, CARE) are progressing quite well and beginning to achieve positive results. Two others (Haqabtir, Africare) have experienced serious delays and problems in establishing their projects under difficult circumstances; they are struggling to move beyond preoccupation with infrastructural and organizational arrangements; and neither has formed yet the fully effective working relationships with the local communities which are expected. Implementation of the OEF project has floundered for over one year, and decisions about its future and redesign need to be taken. CHF is about to receive its project agreement for signing in order to begin work in Mogadishu.

Overall, the picture of the OPG projects is one of poor-to-good implementation performance, under very difficult circumstances; of delay and continuing uncertainty, although that is not surprising for two-year old projects; of fairly limited community participation and impact to date; and of much unfulfilled promise, though that may yet come.

3A. Recommendation: MUST should take the lead in helping the partners devise and undertake appropriate support strategies and measures for each of the OPG sub-projects. For example, this might mean helping OEF to achieve a workable redesign of its project, and CHF to start its project, with the benefit of direct MUST assistance which was not available to the first projects.

4. Conclusion: PVOP has many challenges and problems and would benefit from carefully targeting and prioritizing its activities over the remaining life of the project. One choice is between an expansion mode or a consolidation/refinement mode of proceeding with OPGs. PVOP could actively seek to make new grants, on the one hand or, focus on supporting the existing projects and other purposes of the project, on the other. The MUST Executive Director believes that the priority should be on effective implementation of existing agreements, rather than on reaching new ones, except for assertive efforts to make OPG grants to SPVOs.

Considerable effort must be given to helping the current OPG projects -- especially considering how precarious some are -- to achieve their planned objectives and to use that experience to meet the learning and training objectives of the project.

The expansion mode, as PVOP experience in 1986-87 showed, is very demanding of MUST and of partner energies and skills. Also, at a time of great uncertainty about the strength of the PVOP partnership and about the availability of leadership within MUST, MOI and USAID, it is advisable to proceed with more circumspection. The partners will probably be favorable towards a consolidation and refinement strategy, with the understanding that that not preclude a strongly affirmative effort to consider SPVOs for OPGs.

4A. Recommendation: The partners should adopt a consolidation and refinement strategy for the OPG component of PVOP, including:

(1) Placing priority on adequate funding and other support to the six already approved OPG projects; (2) Using existing "surpluses" to fund the extension of current projects beyond term, e.g., CARE and AMREF beyond 1990; (3) Executing few if any new OPGs, except SPVOs, for the remainder of PVOP; (4) Actively supporting efforts to qualify and fund a few SPVOs with OPGs.

5. Conclusion: There needs to be a thorough and immediate review of the financial status, plans and budget for each of the six OPGs. Individual and aggregate financial requirements for the remainder of the project should be determined by: (1) updating individual project budgets to assure adequate and appropriate coverage of financial requirements in both dollars and shillings; (2) estimating what aggregate "surpluses" or uncommitted funds exist which might be applied to other purposes, such as to selected sub-project extensions; (3) estimating the exact nature and extent of the shillings shortage and proposing alternatives for meeting specific needs, e.g., by reallocating shillings among projects or by making dollar conversions. Certainly there is a substantial dollar budget under the project that has not yet been committed.

5A. Recommendation: At MUST initiative, the partners should conduct a management review of the financial status, plans and

budgets of each OPG project to determine individual and aggregate dollar and shilling requirements for the remainder of the project. Based on this, they should identify surplus or uncommitted OPG funds and decide how those should be applied, eg; to several SPVO OPGs, to future extension of current projects, for dollar-to-shillings conversions, or the like.

#### IV. Assistance to Somali PVOs and Local Community Groups

##### Findings

##### Aspiration and Plans

The two main purposes of PVOP are: (1) to expand PVO development programs and (2) to increase the capacities of both Somali PVOs (SPVOs) and local community groups (e.g., village committees), to assist in local community development. The plan was that at least 3-5 SPVOs would receive direct funding by PVOP during the life of the project, either through OPGs and/or as PVOs receiving community action grants (CAGs) to support local groups. About 100 local groups and communities were to receive funding or other assistance. Both SPVOs and Somali local groups were supposed to benefit from PVOP's technical assistance, training and support services, provided mainly through MUST, EIL and PVOs. At least 10 training workshops would be open to their participation. They were to be active partners in shaping the directions and services of PVOP through cooperation with USPVOs and the other partners, for example, through the PVO Advisory Board.

##### Limited SPVO Participation and Benefits

Despite such ambitious plans for the SPVOs, few actually have participated in or benefited from PVOP funding. After four years Haqabtir remains the only SPVO to hold an OPG. The other five OPG-holders are USPVOs. Nor has any SPVO or local group qualified for a Community Action Grant (CAG). The CAG fund has not been used at all, despite Project Paper expectations that it probably would be in "high demand." Besides Haqabtir, no SPVO has USAID registration to receive PVOP funds directly.

A somewhat brighter prospect exists for Somali local groups and communities. All the OPG projects have been approved on the basis of planned participation and benefit for local groups and communities. OPG PVOs are reporting varying degrees of progress in working with and through such groups, though general progress seems slow. For example, AMREF is cooperating with Village Health Committees in Luug district to train and to supply voluntary primary health care workers.

Africare's Northeast Rural Initiations (NRI) Project, which is expected to fund \$300,000 in sub-projects, is supporting 10 community development sub-projects, including cooperative and community groups in clinic construction, improving water supplies, and constructing a salt drying room.

PVOP has served a number of SPVOs through technical assistance, training and support services provided by MUST, and these activities are expanding. SPVOs have received direct consulting on such topics as financial management and computer applications. PVOP and MUST probably have been catalysts for a few of the new SPVOs, through promotion, meetings and networking, but that has not been the dynamic influence yet that might have been expected. MUST and USAID have expended some effort to get individual SPVOs qualified for AID grants through formal registration, but that has been to little avail.

SPVOs have been under-represented in the deliberative bodies of PVOP, e.g., in the Proposal Review Group (PRG) and to a great extent, in the PVO Advisory Board.

#### New Readiness to Engage SPVOs

There is considerable frustration over the fact that PVOP has made little progress towards its declared goals of involving and capacitating SPVOs. Until recently, the partners tended not to recognize their mutual responsibilities for this state of affairs. The partners are now eager to find pragmatic solutions for activating greater SPVO participation in the PVOP. USAID asked that this issue be addressed as a priority in the evaluation team's Scope of Work. MOI's Director General has urged that PVOP place priority emphasis on the strengthening and funding of SPVOs. MUST's Executive Director asserts that SPVO support will be one of MUST's five main objectives over the next two years. MUST is now prepared to accelerate the use of technical assistance and training as tools of institutional development for the SPVOs. The six SPVOs interviewed all seem ready and eager to become involved in the project. USPVOs also express strong interest in working more closely with SPVOs.

### SPVOs Today

Although MUST is knowledgeable about SPVOs, meets with them regularly, and provides them technical assistance and training, neither it nor any other organization in Somalia has done a systematic evaluation of SPVO organizational settings and characteristics, voluntary and community linkages, strategies, programs and projects, board and professional staff resources, budgets, internal and external funding sources/potential, overall capabilities, and organizational needs. In the absence of such an evaluation the Team pieced together its own general picture of the SPVO situation through interviews and reviews of PVOP files and selected SPVO documentation.

At the planning of PVOP in 1984, there were only two SPVOs in the country, Haqabtir and Participatory Home Development in Hargeisa (current status unknown). Only Haqabtir, which was spawned out of an ILO refugee project, was in a position to secure an OPG in the first wave of project approvals. Since that time an estimated 14 more SPVOs have established themselves [See MUST list in Appendix VII.] of these, most are registered with the GSDR/MOI, and one is registered with USAID. Appendix VIII contains thumbnail sketches of several SPVOs which appear to be promising candidates for participation in PVOP.

### SPVO Profiles

The following impressions emerge:

- o Only about 6-8 of the listed SPVOs appear to be more than nominal organizations. Among those are: Daryeel, Aadamiga Voluntary Organization, Al-Muntadhar, Horumerein, Gargaara, Child Aid Somalia and Haqabtir. This is not to say that other SPVOs are without potential. Efforts to support them need to be continuously reassessed.
- o These SPVOs typically have specific areas of emphasis, a few committed professional and voluntary leaders, and perhaps one or two small projects. Daryeel seeks to assist rural and urban small-scale businesses through training, loans and research.

Aadamiga helps women with income-generating activities.

Al-Muntadhar has established a clinic and primary health care program to serve a poor Mogadishu community of 45,000 people.

- o SPVOs aspire to countrywide and rural activities, but they are now confined to Mogadishu and its immediate environs.
- o They have limited staff and financial resources. If PVOP could help them reach a higher threshold of institutional capability, they could probably find and hire available talent and raise funds from diverse external resources. For example, most are without a single vehicle for travel within Mogadishu, much less to distant rural areas. Al-Muntadhar leaders travel by bus to their clinic. Their effectiveness would be greatly increased if they were able to obtain a vehicle that also could serve as an ambulance.
- o Few SPVOs seek or raise substantial funds from Somali sources, but the potential for internal fund-raising within Somalia has not been studied, much less tested systematically. One SPVO raised its first year budget of \$14,000 from handicraft sales and 500 contributions under the Muslim philanthropic principle of Saka. Another's budget of \$19,000 was derived from business consulting fees (20%) and external aid contributions (80%).
- o SPVOs can and do raise funds from external sources. One has just received grants from CIDA and Oxfam America which will underwrite modest staff salaries. Another has a grant from the African Development Foundation. Again, however, potential for SPVO fund-raising with external donors has not been studied or fully tested.
- o SPVOs define one major need as institutional development funding for their core organizations, including salaries, vehicles, offices space, etc. They are more apt to need shillings than dollars. They welcome direct technical assistance and training, but also note that their capacities to absorb those are shaped and partly constrained by their own limited number of core staff and volunteers.

In summary, there are only a relatively small number of SPVOs. They have good potential, but are small and at an early take-off stage. They have critical and particular resource needs, but in aggregate those needs are not large by either foreign aid or even by PVOP standards. They can benefit from flexible, timely and well-targeted approaches to assistance. They have institutional development needs which might be addressed by PVOP.

### USAID Registration

It has been argued that AID's registration requirements for OPG or CAG direct funding are unreasonably difficult for SPVOs and that USAID Somalia has not been sufficiently pro-active in helping them register. Five SPVOs have attempted to register with USAID over the past two years. Of those, Al Al Muntadhar, Horumerein and Aadamiga have come closest to qualifying for provisional registration by USAID. Registration of at least two of these is possible over the next six months.

Have USAID and MUST done enough to help SPVOs register? They have put in much effort, but both could probably be more pro-active in helping the most promising groups. That would mean giving active encouragement to SPVOs to apply and to work with the other partners to remove specific obstacles, specifically, the oft-cited weaknesses of SPVO financial management and record-keeping. (See Appendix XVII for AID registration requirements. Note particularly those related to PVO financial capabilities).

AID registration requirements are basically quite sound, and any SPVO capable of administering a PVOP OPG grant ought to be able to qualify for registration, particularly if the partners take several recommended measures in their behalf. Understandably, some SPVOs will opt not to seek PVOP funding because they choose not to cope with AID's bureaucratic requirements. It is unlikely that the AID registration procedures and criteria, last revised by AID/Washington in December, 1988, can be changed; nor should effort be wasted in that direction. USAID's charge should be to use the existing procedures and to apply them, imaginatively and flexibly, to help a few SPVOs get registered.

SPVOs say that they worry over the recent centralization of final registration approvals in AID/Washington. That worry should be laid to rest because provisional approvals by USAID/Mogadishu permit initial and temporary funding of SPVOs. It is also likely that provisional approval by the Mission, not to mention the SPVO's initial performance under provisional arrangements, will weigh heavily in AID/Washington's final decision to approve full registration.

#### SPVO Participation Without Registration

In any event, USAID registration is neither an absolute obstacle nor the only obstacle to SPVO participation in PVOP. First, the most recently published USAID registration requirements (December, 1988) emphasize that unregistered PVOs are eligible for the kind of technical assistance and training SPVOs are already receiving under MUST auspices. There are no registration or financial obstacles to expanding that kind of very relevant assistance. Appropriate technical assistance and training may be PVOP's strong suit with nascent SPVOs. Well-directed and organized SPVOs are in an excellent position to draw on internal and international funding sources which they have only begun to tap, and which in some respects, could be more suited to them than PVOP funding.

#### Funding Obstacles to Participation

Registration is not the only obstacle to SPVOs receiving funding under PVOP. Another, fundamental problem is that PVOP funding strategies, mechanisms and methods are not adequately designed or implemented to fit the immediate and felt needs of the SPVOs. To some extent, the funding arrangements of the project have past over the actual needs of SPVOs.

#### Characteristics of Relevant PVO Grants

To be most relevant to immediate SPVO funding needs, PVOP would have to provide grants which are:

- o relatively small by OPG standards to date. One-year grants of \$5,000 - \$150,000, or 3-year grants of \$ 60,000 - \$300,000 might be used as benchmarks for budgeting. However, funding levels should be determined by SPVO needs and capacities, not preconceived notions of suitable levels. Some SPVOs may be in a position to qualify for the larger grants by 1990 or 1991.

- o preponderantly in shillings and continually adjusted for inflation.

SPVOs activities are dependent in large degree on shillings and, even more than USPVOs, they need the flexibility to buy locally in Somalia rather than buy U.S. products with U.S. dollars.

- o primarily, for short-term institutional development of the SPVO (e.g. temporary underwriting of staff salaries), as well as for direct sub-project costs. It is noted that OPG PVOs and EIL have sizeable "overhead" components in their respective grants for the support of the PVO home-office functions. SPVOs should be helped to get and use similar overhead budgets to underwrite their core organizations. Also, AID has a history of funding "institutional development" for PVOS worldwide. For example, AID gave a matching grant to the U.S. YMCA, which in turn used that to fund staffing and other institutional needs of the Kenya YMCA which was expanding its local YMCA chapter and rural development programs. At the same time, SPVOs should be advised to avoid the pitfalls of relying too heavily upon external sources of funding for PVO start-up, core and institutional costs. Risks of receiving substantial start-up funding under PVOP could be perpetual dependence or vulnerability to discontinuation of funding by USAID or the GSDR.

- o available to both AID-registered and to unregistered SPVOs.

provided quickly and flexibly, according to simple and pragmatic criteria, without the costly, bureaucratic and time - consuming processes which too often have characterized the OPG proposal approval process within PVOP.

SPVOs need grants with the aforementioned characteristics. Yet, PVOP, as now arranged, is not very responsive to those needs.

#### Specific Relevance of OPGs

Only one SPVO, Haqabtir, has received an OPG. Other SPVOs have not qualified, because they are not registered to receive direct U.S. grants. If PVOs are unable to qualify for registration, OPGs will continue to be largely irrelevant to SPVOs. As critics have said, the PVOP and OPGs will continue to be "just for the large USPVOs."

If a few SPVOs do get USAID registration, they will face other obstacles. As described above, the OPG grant-making process and approval criteria are not likely to yield the kinds of grants which are most appropriate to near-term SPVO needs and capacities. Also, the OPG grant approval process from point of concept paper to grant agreement, is a ponderous and complex process. It has been costly and time-consuming (often taking one year) and has tended to drive up the technical complexity and grant size of sub-projects. That process has been exceedingly difficult for the experienced PVO applicants; it is particularly unsuited to most SPVOs.

The OPG "model" which has evolved is one of large, costly, complex and geographically remote PVO sub-projects. Current OPG-holders are struggling to establish their projects and to form relationships with the local communities they are trying to assist. OPG projects in the \$1-4 million range have become the norm, while an OPG as small as \$50,000 would be a relatively large grant for some SPVOs. To make OPGs relevant to SPVOs, PVOP should visualize grants which are attuned to the near-term capacities of SPVOs, and more in the range of \$50-\$300,000 (mostly in shillings).

OPG project selection criteria need to be simplified and applied flexibly to accommodate the SPVOs. Current OPG criteria have been drawn from the original Project Paper (1984) and reflect the

The scaled-down CAG criteria are more relevant, but still probably too technocratic. Criteria developed by groups which specialize in grants to small, indigenous PVOs -- Oxfam and the Africa Development Foundation -- could be consulted in devising more appropriate criteria for SPVOs. Also, grants need to include institutional development support for SPVOs, underwriting staff salaries, support for financial/bookkeeping services, etc. Support in the latter area could also help to relieve one of the greatest barriers to SPVO registration with USAID -- lack of adequate financial administration capabilities.

Finally, the Proposal Review Group and its procedures need to be adapted in order to accommodate SPVOs effectively and efficiently. The PRG, or any SPVO projects approval committee, ought to be small, well-versed, and trained in grant-making for nascent PVOs and community development projects. Specialists with PVO and rural development experience should be well represented in proposal review and approval processes. Now, only one of seven members of the PRG has a PVO project background; five represent government ministries.

In summary, the OPG mechanism is currently of limited relevance to SPVOs, but there are steps which could be taken to improve this situation.

#### Relevance of CAGs

The Community Action Grants (CAGs) component (\$2 million in foreign exchange and \$1 million in local currency) has not been used in the first phase of PVOP. The project designers considered the CAG program to be "in keeping with the experimental nature of PVOP." [Project Paper, p.19].

CAGs were to permit a more diverse participation in the Project among PVOs, particularly those with much smaller-scale programs who might not be able to command the resources to develop full-scale OPGs. Thus, CAGs were to offer the opportunity to broaden the Partnership.

The designers envisaged that CAGs would offer the potential for almost immediate impact and will by their very nature involve and foster community involvement in grassroots

Ironically, the concept that was to yield "quick disbursing" grants to small projects and communities has not disbursed grants at all. Although the planners took pains to simplify, scale-down and streamline the OPG concept and process for the CAGs-- for example, to reduce the technical requirements and clearance time' -- they did not go far enough. Also, they considerably underestimated the administrative requirements of managing a small grants program which was supposed to produce about 40 grants (under \$50,000 plus Somali counterpart shillings). They overestimated the readiness and capabilities of the PVOs to seek and use the CAGs for community development projects. Also the OPG PVOs became so preoccupied with establishing their large projects that they could not concentrate on applying for or administering the smaller CAGS. Community grant funds were built directly into some of the OPGs (e.g., Africare), so that OPG-holders need not bother with the CAG-approval process. Undoubtedly, PVOs have been reluctant to enter PVOP's demanding proposal approval process for no more than \$50,000, especially considering how costly the OPG approval process has been.

Again, CAGs are not particularly suited to SPVO realities. First, the designers assumed that SPVOs would be able to register with AID and seek CAGs. This has not occurred, nor have funding mechanisms worked to build their "capacity to contribute", as was also planned. The designers believed that most SPVO activity would be conducted in conjunction with a U.S. PVO (PP, p. 58). Did that mean that USPVOs would sponsor SPVOs for CAGs, as well as local community groups? That has never been made clear, and actually has not happened. CAGs were to be approved by the same PRG that would decide on OPGs, but in 2 months rather than 22 weeks. The dollar foreign exchange was budgeted at twice the Somali shillings equivalent for CAGs, although SPVOs and their community projects need shillings more than dollars. The designers did not anticipate the degree to which SPVOs would need outright support for institutional development in order to be effective sponsors of CAG projects. Even USPVOs have said that they cannot afford to sponsor CAGs for SPVOs or local groups without institutional support.

The CAG component is likely to remain underutilized even if (1) more SPVOs were able to register with USAID; (2) SPVO institutional development elements were to be built into the CAG concept, or

provided for in other ways; (3) registered PVOs were be paired with unregistered SPVOs to help the latter utilize the CAGs and (the grant approval process is simplified and shortened); and (4) registered PVOs show more interest in applying for CAGs.

#### How to Fund the Unregistered SPVOs

How then could PVOP be improved to assist unregistered SPVOs in securing funding for their own institutional development and their development activities. A number of promising, new SPVOs will probably remain unregistered for the indefinite future. Subsequent conclusions and recommendations elaborate on the following mechanisms for increasing support to unregistered SPVOs:

- (1) Increasing assistance in the registration process;
- (2) Providing technical assistance training and information assistance to SPVOs;
- (3) Facilitating SPVO fund-raising with other donors;
- (4) Pairing registered PVOs with unregistered SPVOs;
- (5) Creating a new mechanisms for administering a small and flexible grants program for both USAID - registered and unregistered SPVOs; and
- (6) Using adaptations of OPG and CAG funding mechanisms.

#### Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusion: There has been relatively little participation in or benefit to Somali PVOs from the funding component of PVOP, either to increase their organizational capacities or to expand their programs.

1.A Recommendation: MUST should take the lead in helping the partners engage the SPVOs in all aspects of PVOP. The Somali Executive Director and staff are best qualified to do this, but with

strong support from MOI, USAID, EIL and the PVOs. The Executive Director should take a direct, personal role in this effort together with an assigned program specialist. EIL resources should also be used to full advantage.

2. Conclusion: There are about 14 SPVOs, at least 6-8 of which should be participating in all aspects of PVOP, including funding. Technical assistance and training can be used to support all new SPVOs. SPVO organizational settings, needs and capacities ought to be systematically assessed so that PVOP assistance can be targeted accordingly.

Some of the promising SPVOs now have limited capacities to absorb large grants, and they will benefit most from timely, well-targeted and qualitative assistance. At least some should become qualified for substantial grants. SPVOs need institutional development assistance; and the imminent EIL short-term consultancy for that purpose is very relevant and timely.

2.A Recommendation: MUST should systematically assess SPVO settings, capabilities, and needs. This should be done immediately by the MUST staff with the assistance of the long-term advisor, the EIL short-term institutional development consultant and a Somali consultant, perhaps from this team.

2.B Recommendation: Set finite practical objectives and a schedule for engaging at least 2-3 SPVOs in all aspects of PVOP. Identify several SPVOs which seem most ready for immediate engagement, and concentrate partner efforts to upgrade their qualifications for participation.

3. Conclusion: Several SPVOs are close to obtaining USAID provisional registration and need sustained, efforts from EIL and USAID to help them qualify. Efforts like EIL's financial management consultancy, are especially useful. Getting and keeping competent bookkeepers and financial managers is a key step in moving towards registration and one of the most difficult for SPVOs.

3.A Recommendation: The partners should work together to help get at least three SPVOs qualified for provisional registration by the end of 1989.

3.B Recommendation: MUST should provide a direct financial and bookkeeping service to a selected number of SPVOs for two years, both to help them set up appropriate bookkeeping systems but also to do hands-on bookkeeping for them and training of longer-term staff. This service should be closely coordinated with other technical assistance and training efforts.

4. Conclusion: MUST needs to expand, target and refine its technical assistance and training. Its 1989 workplan calls for that. That kind of assistance can be provided to all SPVOs, whether or not they are USAID-registered to receive PVOP grants directly. Such assistance can help the SPVOs to become as effective development organizations, while also preparing them to secure funding from other sources than PVOP. Some of those sources may in fact be better able to respond to the unique funding needs of the SPVOs, than is PVOP.

SPVO benefits from training and technical assistance are as important as funding and should not be discounted when considering the relevance of PVOP to SPVO. However, SPVO absorptive capacity for training and technical assistance is limited by their small numbers of staff and volunteers. Initially, SPVOs need hands-on assistance and on-the-job training to make plans, create bookkeeping systems, handle registration procedures, etc.

4.A Recommendation: MUST should continue to provide technical assistance and training for PVOPs which is targeted to their organizational development needs. Training plans should take into account current SPVO capacities to utilize assistance.

5. Conclusion: To be relevant to SPVO needs, project grants should be relatively small, mostly in the range of \$5,000-300,000 and predominantly in shillings. They should be usable in part for SPVO institutional development. Proposal criteria should be simple and pragmatic. The approval process should be flexible and efficient and available to both USAID-registered and unregistered SPVOs.

5.A Recommendation: The project should be modified so that PVOP can provide grants which are relevant to actual SPVO needs. (See

6. Conclusion: The OPG component of PVOP is of limited use for assisting most SPVOs. Only USAID-registered groups qualify. Grant requirements are complex, and the approval process prohibitively costly and burdensome for the SPVOs. The OPG grant minimum (\$50,000) is above what some one-time grants to SPVOs should be, but lower OPG ranges could cover most, if not all of the larger SPVO grants over the next two years.

The PRG is not structured to review/approve SPVO proposals for OPGs or CAGs. For this purpose, at least, the Review Group should be smaller, with five voting members, at least two of whom should be experienced PVO experts with working knowledge of grant and project implementation. A subcommittee of the PRG might be established for SPVO grant-making. For example, criteria should encourage PVOs to use their skills in engaging local communities rather than predetermining all "outputs" for those communities. Criteria should favor smaller-scale, qualitative interventions rather than complex, large-scale, capital-intensive measures.

6.A Recommendation: Make at least two grants to SPVOs over the next two years. Budget approximately \$600,000 (two thirds in shillings equivalents) for OPG outlays for SPVOs over the next two years.

6.B Recommendation: Adapt the grant PRG approval process and criteria to better yield appropriate and useful grants for SPVOs, along lines suggested above.

7. Conclusion: More than one alternative exists for funding unregistered SPVOs:

(a) Registration. Helping SPVOs get registered with MOI and AID, as recommended above.

(b) Other donors. Technical assistance and training tools can help the SPVOs raise funds outside the project. Assistance can be given to SPVOs to identify those sources, develop effective programs and project proposals, and convince prospective donors of SPVO organizational capabilities and integrity. Several

innovative and flexible grants have been made to SPVOs by such groups as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Oxfam America and the African Development Foundation (USA). There has not been a systematic effort on the part of MUST or any other agencies to research and make available information on funding sources and procedures. There are possibilities for MUST to broker relationships between international donors and SPVOs. For example, the Aga Khan Foundation (Nairobi) might take an interest in the Al-Muntadhar clinic and primary health care project.

(c) Pairing. The possibility exists that a few registered PVOs could be paired with a few unregistered SPVOs, for the purpose of mutual aid, learning and joint funding. The international USPVO could benefit from association with SPVOs which are knowledgeable about the socio-economic and environmental conditions in Somalia, environmental constraints and potentially mitigating actions. The SPVO might benefit from the grants and USPVO technical assistance. AMREF and Al-Muntadhar, for example, might make a natural pair because both are mounting health service activities in Luuq and Mogadishu, respectively. Both have expressed interest, in principle. Al-Muntadhar's total operating budget for the next three years is about \$200,000. AMREF's application to extend its current OPG beyond 1990 might include funds to cover its administrative costs for assisting Al-Muntadhar.

There are obstacles to pairing and the concept depends upon sustained commitment and concrete efforts by the PVOP partners. Some SPVOs have expressed interest in this concept, while other say that they are unwilling to receive funds through a USPVO. Several registered PVOs also express interest, but say that the responsibility and administrative costs are prohibitive, unless the donors are willing to underwrite the additional expense.

Still, the potential exists for pairing, assuming that MUST and the other partners are willing and able to broker specific relationships. Two or three such pairs would represent a quantum leap for SPVO involvement. There is no need to imagine

a large program which would necessarily impose a heavy burden on the cooperating partners. There is not, in fact, a potential for more than a few such pairings. Pairing might also facilitate the use of the existing funding mechanisms, the OPGs and CAGs.

(d) New Funding Mechanism. The team recommends that MOI and USAID consider creating a new mechanism for administering a flexible grants program for SPVOs and their community projects, according to principles laid out above. This might be managed through an OPG to an USAID-registered PVO. That PVO could run a three-year grants program for SPVOs, cooperatives and communities. Most of the funding would be available in Somali Shillings, converting dollars to shillings, if necessary.

The partners would work together to solicit OPG proposals for this purpose and to encourage expeditious consideration by the PRG. The approved PVO would then have the authority to operate the program, with the same degree of independence and the same responsibilities as the other OPG-holders. Under this scenario the PVO would have ultimate authority to dispense the grants, because it would be financially accountable for them. It would not necessarily have to use an approval committee process any more than other OPG-holders does once its grant agreement is signed. However, it would be well advised to create a project selection advisory board, consisting mainly of PVO specialists. The PVO would oversee program, administrative, and financial performance of the SPVOs and community groups receiving grants and coordinate with MUST for technical assistance and training to the grantholders.

A variant on this suggestion would be for USAID to contract directly with a USPVO to carry out a grants program. This might require competitive bidding among potential contractors, entailing a lengthy process of contractor selection.

Yet another scenario for providing grants to SPVOs was considered by the evaluation team. Reportedly, a new SPVO consortium may come into being in the near future, The Forum of Somali Voluntary Development Agencies. Could that, like its

counterparts in other countries of Africa and Latin America, administer a grants fund for its members? That possibility should be considered, but it may take some time for the Forum to organize itself and become prepared to assume that kind of responsibility. There are arguments for and against a consortium mixing coordinating and member service roles with sub-project funding roles. In some countries, for example, grant-making by PVO associates has been divisive and has detracted from the association's coordination and information goals. [For a relevant evaluation of Latin America PVO association roles in sub-project funding, see Final Report, Evaluation of Experience of USAID Missions with PVO Umbrella Groups in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Haiti, AID, January 6, 1989.] It would seem improbable that the Forum will be ready to face these considerations within the near future, and it would seem advisable to initiate (an OPG-managed SPVO grant fund as quickly as possible with an AID registered PVO. Nevertheless, creating an effective mechanism for grant-making to registered and unregistered SPVOs could break a frustrating barrier to implementation of PVO activities in Somalia and prove to be a very worthwhile approach which should be extended beyond 1991.

7A. Recommendation: Must should take the lead in brokering 2-3 pairing relationships between registered PVOs and unregistered SPVOs to facilitate the latter's receiving funding under PVOP and to encourage mutually beneficial relationships between Somali and U.S. PVOs.

7B. Recommendation: MUST should assist SPVOs in developing strategies, information sources and skills for securing resources from non-PVOP donors.

7C. Recommendation: USAID should take the lead in conceiving and, designing a new funding mechanism for making small to moderate-sized grants to both registered and unregistered SPVOs, cooperatives and communities. First consideration should be given to the most effective and expeditious means of instituting a reliable mechanism, such as an OPG to an AID registered PVO which would administer the grants program, on the advice of a representative project review committee.

8. Conclusion: Some of the unused \$3 million CAG budget should be earmarked for SPVO funding options, and the remainder released for other purposes. At the \$50,000 maximum, a \$500,000 set aside (mostly in shillings) would cover at least 10 grants to registered SPVOs or to those sponsored by registered PVOs. That should be ample to cover the likely usage of CAGs. Alternatively, \$500,000 to \$1 million in CAG funds could be reallocated to a special and more flexible PVO managed fund for the SPVOs. If necessary, dollars should be converted to shillings to meet SPVO shilling needs.

8.A Recommendation: CAG funds should be reallocated to a special and more flexible account of \$500,000 - \$1 million for support of SPVOs. This proposed special account should be managed by a PVO with previous umbrella grant experience. Remaining CAG funds should be shifted to the OPG category.

## V. Effectiveness of MUST

### Findings

The original expectations held for the Management Unit for Support and Training (MUST) are found in the PVOP Project Paper, the Project Grant Agreement (See Amplified Project Description, p. 8) and in the background section of EIL's Contract with USAID (Sec. C).

### MUST Formation and Planned Roles

The Grant Agreement (1985) essentially adopted the Project Paper (1984) recommendations concerning MUST. MUST would be established "under direct contract to A.I.D." Though not stated in the Grant Agreement, it is clear that the signatories meant at the time to follow the Project Paper recommendation that "MUST will be staffed by a PVO or firm to be recruited under open competition." (PP, page 4). That Contractor would be responsible to the USAID Project Manager for PVOP (PP, page 230). Further, the MUST would be "staffed by one U.S. recruited Chief of Party" and "a locally recruited U.S. citizen or third country national ... as a training coordinator and administrative assistant" (PP, page 26).

The Grant Agreement described MUST functions as follows:

- (1) act as the secretariat for the Proposal Review Group;
- (2) design and implement a detailed training plan for the Ministry of Interior's Department of Rural Development, PVO and NGO staff in Somalia;
- (3) monitor and assess the Projects' Community Action Grants [Neither the Grant Agreement nor Project Paper mentions a MUST responsibility to monitor and evaluate OPG sub-projects]. EIL's Agreement (1987), however, provides that it "assist the MUST in monitoring and evaluating all operational program grants under the project. [EIL Grant Agreement, Section C.4.3.b.2]; and

- (4) provide information and non-technical support to PVOs with OPGs funded under the Project, and NGOs wishing to participate in Project-funded development activities.

EIL's Agreement (1987) described one more important MUST function which had evolved in the two intervening years since the Project Agreement was signed.

- (5) assist Somali PVOs to get involved in development activities. [The recognition of their limited involvement was being felt more keenly.]

MUST, it seems, was given limited and specific roles and functions. Apparently, the designers did not anticipate a strong leadership role for MUST in PVOP, much less an executive role. It has resembled a British-style secretariat more than an executive support staff to a U.S. board of directors. This is one reason that MUST, in fact, has not asserted its leadership within the project across a range of issues and functions. The relevance of this is discussed below.

#### Major Change in Project Implementation Design

Within months of signing the Grant Agreement, MOI and USAID agreed to a change in design which would have major consequences for the way in which MUST could play, and has played, its assigned roles and functions. As described in the background sections of the EIL Agreement, the project originally planned to have a Contractor (U.S. agency or firm) responsible for the planning, coordination and implementation of the support, training and evaluation component of the project. As the project evolved over the first several months (1986), the MOI and USAID agreed that a MUST composed of senior Somali staff drawn from the Ministry and the private sector would enhance the support and training functions of the project. The Ministry contracted for the position of MUST Project Manager and Controller in addition to key clerical and administrative staff (EIL Agreement, C.3.1).

Thus, USAID chose to satisfy MOI's wish for immediate Somalization and for immediate control of PVOP's support and training unit. That was not to mean, however, that USAID, MOI or other partners expected anything less than that MUST would be operated exclusively for and in the interest of PVOP as a project. They intended that MUST would help MOI with technical assistance and training, not that it should become, or be perceived as, an MOI extension or staff department. As part of the bargain, USAID and MOI agreed that the two governments would concur in the appointment of the MUST Executive Director. USAID and MOI also agreed to contracting with a U.S. organization (EIL) to provide technical assistance to the MUST and to MOI, and to fully establish the institutional capacity within MUST to carry out its functions.

Not surprisingly, this change of project administrative structure has had mixed effects. On the one hand, it has increased GSDR and MOI confidence and willingness to support and experiment with non-governmental programs. It has resulted in significant cooperation and commitment from MOI and GSDR in carrying out critical implementation and support functions, e.g., shillings disbursements and senior governmental participation in the PRG. On the other hand, MUST has been drawn closely into the governmental orbit and not strongly encouraged to be the quasi-autonomous unit that ideally it would be. To some PVO observers, MUST has appeared more the MOI secretariat and ministry department for PVO affairs than the semi-autonomous, active PVO advocate and facilitator which they, the PVOs, would like.

#### MUST Performance of Functions

##### 1. Secretariat to the Proposal Review Group (PRG)

MUST has served quite ably as the secretariat to the PRG, that is, in the main clearinghouse role assigned to it by the various agreements. That has included the "screening of OPG concept papers and proposals to assure clarity, thoroughness and conformity with guidelines established by the Project", arranging meetings, and drafting issue papers and recommendations requested by the PRG [EIL Agreement,

C.3.2.b.1]. A different and more activist definition of MUST is proposed in this report for MUST's future role. It is recommended that MUST also help make the PRG proposal review process, and the PRG itself, more effective and efficient. In its PRG secretariat role MUST has been more the competent clearinghouse and monitoring unit than the assertive, problem-solving, and innovative staff unit it could be. It is suggested that MUST role be expanded to include: finding ways to streamline and shorten the long and costly OPG approval process; suggesting specific solutions and providing training to enable the PRG to work more effectively as a committee and as a proponent of non-governmental approaches to community development; preparing the PRG to be truly useful in the forthcoming project implementation reviews (PIRs); and in fostering PRG adaptations which will better serve the needs of SPVOs.

## 2. Training and Technical Assistance for PVOs, MOI and MUST Staff

Generally, MUST has a clear sense of purpose about its training functions, as reflected in its Training Plan (1989) (See Appendix IX. Having already sponsored a variety of qualitative training activities, MUST can now offer a well-targeted training program on a sustained basis.

Two training priorities in 1989 are: (1) strengthening the internal capacity of the MUST itself (monitoring, evaluation, development management, etc); and (2) increasing institutional support to Somali PVOs (financial management, proposal writing, etc.). Also, in 1989 about eight different training activities will be directed to the needs of MOI staff, including proposal development, computer usage and a formal program for development managers (AIM, Manila).

MUST uses a mix of training modes. Increasing emphasis on the use of on-the-job training is particularly relevant to SPVO and MUST staff who are now stretched to the limits by their work assignments. MUST in-field training on monitoring and evaluation for its program specialists is behind schedule.

On-the-job training in simple financial administration has been one of MUST's best offerings, notably for the SPVOs. Similarly, the organizational consultancies on computers, financial methods and monitoring and evaluation also have been used well for training purposes. The forthcoming institutional program development consultancy should prove especially useful for SPVOs and very timely for boosting the organizational capacity of the SPVOs. The continuing focus on SPVO financial administration capabilities addresses the single most important obstacle to USAID registration. The excellent proposals and plans for the MUST/PVOP monitoring and evaluation system need to be implemented as rapidly as possible. Much more attention needs to be given to technical assistance and training on project design and management with special emphasis on participatory approaches and skills for working with grassroots communities.

Several training questions should receive priority attention: extending the EIL long-term advisor, whose valuable training role should not be interrupted just as it is bearing fruit; developing a clearer rationale and plan for MOI staff training, especially participant training abroad; preparing one or more MUST staff to be training officers; and devising training modes to address key issues and technical subjects which arise within PVOP and OPG sub-project experience. For example, training in village-level dialogue and participatory methods in project planning and implementation would benefit all the PVOP partners.

### 3. Monitoring and Evaluation of Projects

Partly for reasons beyond its control, MUST has been late in fully activating one of its most important roles: OPG sub-project monitoring and evaluation. MUST has established useful information-retrieval systems, e.g., regular program and financial reports from the project-holders. It has provided both the good plans and staff training which promise effective monitoring and evaluation in the near future. But it still cannot readily provide succinct evaluations of the status, progress and problems of each of the OPG projects. As the Project Implementation Reviews begin, MUST is not fully prepared to assist, much less to guide PRG deliberations on the reports which it will receive from the project holders. At the

same time, PRG members have expressed concern that after two years they still have little knowledge of how the projects are evolving. Of ultimate concern is the fact that delays in establishing effective monitoring and evaluation postpone appropriate follow-up actions: detecting and correcting problems; appraising project impacts; qualitative learning and training based on experience; decisions to extend or terminate activities; revision of project selection criteria; etc.

#### 4. Information and Support to PVOs and Others

In this role MUST has a credible and growing record of achievement. On the other hand, some observers would like it to take even more initiative and be more assertive in facilitating PVO activities and projects. As one PVO phrased it, "MUST was somewhat helpful in getting our OPG project planned and adopted; with just a bit more effort it could have made things a lot easier for us."

MUST's information activities have included a PVO training needs evaluation, a contact list for local and foreign PVOs, monthly meetings of the PVOs to exchange information and concerns; many hours of one-on-one advisory and information sessions with PVOs, international donors and others; and a forthcoming directory of training programs in Somalia. A planned MUST-PVO newsletter will surely be a welcome vehicle for better communication among widely scattered persons who are interested in PVOP, PVOs and non-governmental action for community development.

Ironically, a gap in MUST's program is the lack of public information about PVOP and MUST itself. The newsletter, and perhaps a simple brochure, would be timely for promoting wider public awareness and support for the project. MUST needs a simple public relations strategy because too many key people are still unaware of PVOP aims, accomplishments, programs and services. Such education is important in fostering support for non-governmental activities and capabilities. Just advertising PVO development project activities around the country would be beneficial.

MUST's "support" role for PVOs is potentially boundless although MUST has had a tendency to act more as the clearinghouse rather than making a vigorous effort to strengthen PVO programs. MUST's timely intervention to prevent the infringement of PVO duty-free privileges was felt by some PVOs to be the model for stronger MUST support in other arenas. Several PVOs express the hope that MUST will be equally decisive and vigorous in representing such PVO concerns as minimizing regulatory and bureaucratic delays and securing adequate and timely outlays of shillings to meet project needs.

#### 5. Assisting Somali PVOs

MUST and its Executive Director are in the best position to take the lead for involving SPVOs in PVOP, although all partners bear responsibility for the limited progress in that direction to date. The Executive Director believes that SPVO participation and funding under PVOP should be the highest priority of all partners. MUST's strongest interventions to date have been to provide technical assistance and training for the SPVOs. The forthcoming consultancy on program and institutional development for SPVOs is very promising, particularly if it begins with a careful evaluation of the capabilities of the SPVOs. MUST has not undertaken that inquiry, heretofore, although it has done a useful training needs surveys.

#### 6. MUST Institutional Capacities

Following are general findings concerning MUST capabilities.

##### 1. Conception of Role

As has been indicated, MUST was conceived more as a secretariat than as a pro-active executive body. The Executive Director understandably has chosen to work within that definition of role and has done so capably. The team found, however, that there are many needs and challenges within PVOP which could benefit from more visible and active leadership on the part

of the MUST Executive Director and staff. This converges with the need for closer policy and management direction for MUST and all elements of PVOP by a representative body, such as the proposed Management Committee.

It is evident that MUST should take a more activist role in defining problems and mobilizing the partners to solve them. MUST should also identify and propose new initiatives and help the partners play their roles more effectively, e.g., summarizing policy-relevant findings and recommendations from MUST's activities and subproject reviews for the PRG and proposed MC.

## 2. Strategic Vision and Planning

The team believes MUST should be used to strengthen, promote and advocate PVO development efforts. MUST's reactive stance is partly reflected in it not having visualized, planned or communicated its major goals and means over a longer term period (e.g., 2-3 years). MUST's first plan, a one year workplan and training plan for 1989, is a valuable step in the right direction (See Appendix IX), but it is an annual workplan for MUST and not a 2 or 3 year strategic plan of action for PVOP. Even MUST's statement of goals does not entirely reflect certain priorities. For example, although the importance of supporting SPVOs is stated, at least two objectives described by the Executive Director in interview, are not mentioned: (1) to strengthen existing OPG sub-projects and to limit future OPGs mainly to SPVOs; and (2) to marshal project learning and communicate that to GSDR and to others. To achieve the latter objective, for instance, would require ambitious planning and resource allocation of a type and order not yet evident in MUST or within PVOP generally.

This is not to say that MUST is wholly responsible for the strategic planning of PVOP. Rather it could take the initiative in helping the partners, ideally by assisting an authoritative Management Committee, in developing a clear sense of direction and momentum for the entire project.

### 3. Financial Administration and Management

Financial administration and records within MUST are probably sound, but an independent financial management review is needed to confirm that and to identify ways in which systems can be improved. Also, there is a need for more financial planning and closer financial management for all project expenditures. For example, in its financial planning role, MUST should be projecting PVOP shillings requirements for the remaining life of the project, overall and among specific expenditure items. Based on that, it could prepare recommendations for budgeting and/or reallocating shillings to meet current project and sub-project needs. Because this is not being done, the evaluation team was unable to determine either the extent or the specific areas of supposed "shillings shortages." MUST does not appear to be in an adequately informed position to project GSDR shillings allocations or USAID dollar conversions, which may be needed to meet project requirements over the next two years.

### 4. Staffing

MUST has a capable and conscientious staff, including four senior professionals; the Executive Director, Controller and two program specialists, together with the EIL long-term advisor. (See Appendix X). The program specialists have been very responsive to on-the-job training by the technical advisor, and will continue to need and benefit from his mentoring for the foreseeable future.

If MUST adopts the more activist leadership role proposed here, it is almost certainly "understaffed." It needs a third program specialist so that technical assistance, training, SPVO development and PVOP public information and public relations functions can be more adequately covered. Also, a "Deputy Executive Director" is needed to complement the skills and interests of the Executive Director, to provide more depth in the executive staff, and to enable the technical advisor to concentrate on training and advising Somali staff.

It is noted that MUST's 1989 budget submission (9/8/88) called for two additional staff positions: a third program specialist and an office manager, for a total of 6 senior staff. Modest salary increases are being sought in order to increase the chances that capable and newly-trained staff can be retained. A Deputy Executive Director will require a salary commensurate with the responsibility of that position. Obtaining and retaining highly qualified secretaries has been one of MUST's greatest difficulties, and staff are increasingly doing their own word processing to compensate for that.

### Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Conclusion: MUST has been functioning capably in the "clearinghouse" or "secretariat" role envisaged by the PVOP Project Paper and Grant Agreement. Yet, the project could benefit from more assertive leadership and outreach by the MUST Executive Director and staff. In this mode, MUST could actively help the partners to set priorities to focus action, remove obstacles, strengthen PVO efforts and promote PVOP's non-governmental approaches to development. Stronger policy and management oversight through the proposed Management Committee would help MUST assume this role. (See Section II).

1.A Recommendation: The partners and the proposed Management Committee should encourage MUST to stronger leadership, problem-solving and outreach roles.

2. Conclusion: The Proposal Review Group (PRG) needs more from the MUST staff than a limited secretariat service if it is to operate more effectively. MUST can analyze proposals and project implementation data and recommend courses of action. It can use its technical assistance and training resources to improve the operational processes and performance of the PRG, as a committee. "Board development" and related skills should be advanced within PVOP. MUST staff can play a particularly valuable role in helping to prepare the PRG to consider SPVO proposals and to conduct the project implementation reviews about to begin. It is recognized, of course, that the PRG, MOI and USAID must approve and encourage MUST's assuming this larger role.

2.A Recommendation: The PRG should encourage the MUST to take a more active role in assistance to the PRG such as having MUST propose organizational arrangements to improve efficiency and recommend particular decisions and courses of action with respect to grant approvals and project performance reviews. MUST should serve a comparable role for the Management Committee if that is created.

3. Conclusion: MUST technical assistance and training activities are well-conceived. Priority needs include: (a) extending the long-term advisor, whose valuable training role should not be interrupted just as it is bearing fruit; (b) developing a clearer rationale and plan for MOI staff training, especially participant training abroad; (c) preparing one or more MUST staff to be training and technical assistance specialists; and (d) devising workshops and other training modes to address key issues, technical subjects and project learning which arise within PVOP and OPG sub-projects.

3.A Recommendation: MUST should move forward decisively with its planned activities for technical assistance and training. It should also give attention to the priority concerns cited above.

4. Conclusion: MUST is considerably behind schedule in establishing a fully effective monitoring and evaluation system that assesses project progress and impact; helps detect and correct problems; qualitative learning and training, based on project experience; helps assure adequate and timely decisions to extend or terminate activities; allows review of project selection processes and criteria, etc. MUST is not adequately abreast of what is happening in the OPG projects. It is not well prepared to assist the PRG in the forthcoming project implementation reviews.

4A. Recommendation: MUST should strengthen its system for monitoring and evaluating projects. At the earliest, and based partly on site visits, it should inform the PRG of the current status, progress and needs of each OPG sub-project. It should devise means of assisting the PRG to effectively review project progress and problems.

5. Conclusion: MUST has been quite helpful in its information and support services to PVOs. This is one area, however, in which PVOs most need and want a stronger, more pro-active performance by MUST.

6. Conclusion: Although all partners are responsible for the limited participation of SPVOs in PVOP to date, MUST is in the best position to take the lead in assisting SPVOs. It is already making good progress with technical assistance and training. It could play a larger role in devising appropriate means of funding them, and it should continue to help qualify several SPVOs for USAID registration. Personal involvement in this area by the MUST Executive Director is needed, as well as assigned staff support. The exact circumstances and current capabilities of the SPVOs need to be studied more closely.

6A. Recommendation: MUST should take the lead in assisting the partners to engage the SPVOs in all aspects of PVOP, notably to assist them in seeking registration and funding.

7. Conclusion: MUST would benefit from a strategic vision of goals, means and priorities for the next three years - for itself and for all of PVOP. From a multi-year strategic plan, which need not be complex to be useful, annual workplans could be derived. Program and financial planning for the overall PVOP is very much needed and MUST is in the best position to take the lead in this area.

7A. Recommendation: MUST should take the lead in developing a three-year plan for PVOP and MUST.

8. Conclusion: Financial administration and record-keeping within MUST seem sound, but financial planning and management could be strengthened.

8A. Recommendation: MUST and other partners should call for an independent financial management review of all parts of PVOP.

8B. Recommendation: As part of overall planning for PVOP, MUST should review and analyze budgets, expenditures to date, and projected financial needs for all parts of PVOP - existing and planned - in order to make recommendations about future budgets, use of dollar surpluses, foreign exchange/shillings requirements, etc.

9. Conclusion: If MUST is to take a more active role in addressing current problems, e.g., in monitoring and evaluation, and also meet new priorities related to technical assistance, training, SPVO development and project learning, it will have to add staff.

9A. Recommendation: MUST should immediately develop a new staffing plan to cover priority areas of action and responsibility, determine how the two vacant professional positions will be used, and accordingly, move quickly to fill those positions. A Deputy Executive Director is also needed with a salary that is commensurate with the responsibilities of this position.

10. Conclusion: The good work that MUST and PVOP are doing is not widely known outside immediate project circles. Outside recognition is needed both to achieve continuing support for the project and to promote understanding of non-governmental and PVO approaches to development. MUST and PVOP would benefit from greater attention to public information and public relations. The planned newsletter would be very helpful, as would a simple brochure describing PVOP activities and services.

10A. Recommendation: MUST should devise a simple public information and public relations strategy and provide the appropriate staff and other resources to implement it. A newsletter, brochure and selected information pieces on PVO activities would be useful.

**VI. Effectiveness of Experiment in International Living (EIL)**

**Findings**

Experiment in International Living (EIL), under a contract with USAID for the period 7/15/87 - 7/15/91, was engaged to provide technical assistance to the MUST, MOI and PVOs. Having decided that the MUST should be Somali-led and staffed under MOI contract, USAID and MOI also agreed on the importance of contracting EIL to help build the new MUST's capacities to perform its functions in monitoring, evaluation, training, technical assistance, information-dissemination, and general advisory and operational support for PVOP.

This assistance was to be provided by EIL mainly through (a) A Long-term Advisor (two years, subject to a one or two year renewal) to be assigned broad responsibilities in advisory, training and support responsibilities roles; (b) Short-term Technical Assistance (20 person months) and associated in-country training, including systems development for MUST, and technical consultants; and (c) Participant Training in the U.S. and Third Countries (24 person months). This assistance would be variously directed to the needs of MUST, but also to those of MOI, other GSDR units, and PVOs, especially Somali PVOs.

EIL's direct contract with USAID made it "responsible to the USAID/Somalia Project Manager and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior" for the fulfillment of project terms, and called for joint approval by USAID-MOI on several key matters, including whether or not to extend the long-term advisor. Specifically, the EIL contract stated that "USAID reserves the right to extend the long-term advisor for an additional 1 or 2 year period based upon the results of a project evaluation subject to funds availability and approval by AID and GSDR" (EIL Agreement, 1987, Section C.4.2.a.4). EIL's long-term advisor was assigned to "work under the direction of the Project Manager [Executive Director] of the MUST".

### Long-term Advisor

EIL has been active in all spheres of its scope of work since July 29, 1987, when its long-term advisor, Dr. Robert Gurevich, began work. Over the past 18 months, Dr. Gurevich has performed advisory and support functions within most of the areas detailed by EIL's contract. He has designed and helped introduce a variety of management, office, financial and information systems; planned and carried out evaluations of MUST, MOI and PVO training needs; planned and coordinated several technical assistance activities and training events; designed, implemented and trained staff for the MUST project monitoring and evaluation system; served as general advisor to the MUST Executive Director and staff; engaged in direct technical assistance to SPVOs and liaised for the Executive Director with key partners and constituencies for MUST, including USAID, USPVOs and other international donors. Often in his "support" role, Dr. Gurevich has played staff-like roles--for example, reviewing a project proposal or drafting a project agreement--rather than only advising or training others for those roles.

The Evaluation Team found no dissent from the view that the long-term advisor has been generally effective and highly productive.

### Technical Assistance and Training

Two short-term technical assistance consultancies, arranged by EIL, have been generally well received and set promising standards for the future. A management and information systems consultant, Stephen Jackson, focused on financial management and computer use for MUST, MOI and PVO staff for three months in 1988. Somali PVOs appreciated the consultant's hands-on assistance and training to improve their financial administration and bookkeeping systems; and that will be a primary emphasis of the return visit by the same consultant. A monitoring and evaluation consultant, Riall Nolan, worked with MUST and the PVOs for two months in 1988. He developed an overall monitoring and evaluation plan with the PVOs and provided training and workshops on those subjects for the PVOs and MUST staff.

In the future, two or three such external consultancies will be provided each year, to be coupled with continuing technical assistance from the long-term advisor, and by local consultants funded under the MUST shillings budget. Just after the evaluation visit, a program development consultant was provided for the third major round of PVO technical assistance. That consultancy focused on organizing, program planning, registering and fund raising for the newly established Somali PVOs.

In addition to these activities, Somali consultants have been used by MUST to assist in a training needs evaluation, to prepare a directory on local and foreign NGOs, and to prepare a forthcoming directory of training institutions in Somalia.

Approximately fifteen training events are scheduled in the MUST's 1989 training plan drafted by the long-term advisor. Topics include: office procedures, proposal writing and monitoring/evaluation.

#### Participant Training

The participant training component of the MUST program is off to a more uncertain start, at least with respect to training for MOI personnel. One short-term MOI trainee left his program in the early stages and returned home. Another completed his program in the United States and appears unlikely to return to Somalia soon. A third person, who was assisted for Master's study in the U.S., is staying on for a doctorate degree. In the future, closer planning, targeting and coordination of MOI-related participant will be needed.

MUST and PVO-directed participant training and exchange, though very limited so far, holds out promise for the future. MUST, for example, made a small contribution which enabled the Executive Director of AADAMIGA (a Somali PVO concerned with women in development) to attend a training program on PVO management at the Asia Institute of Management, Manila. The 1989 Training Plan provides for MUST/MOI staff participation in that program during the year. Others will be sent to EIL's School of International Training for a short course on monitoring and evaluation.

EIL sponsored the MUST Executive Director's attendance at meetings in Kenya and Sudan. In Kenya he was involved with a seminar on food aid in development and consulted with the AID-funded umbrella Rural Enterprise Project (REP). In Sudan he participated in a conference of African PVOs.

### Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Conclusion: EIL has done a creditable job of providing support, technical assistance and training for MUST and PVOP under its contract with USAID. There is no reason to fundamentally alter its role or contract at mid-term. It is well organized and can be expected to achieve results with increased impact in its third and fourth years. It does need to help MUST set criteria and methods for monitoring technical assistance and training outcomes, just as it has done for the OPG field projects. One measure of EIL's performance should be the degree to which it tangibly increases the capacities of SPVOs to become reliable and effective organizations and to catalyze and facilitate community development.

2. Conclusion: EIL's long-term advisor, Dr. Robert Gurevich, has done his job very well, and MUST is just at the point when it can most benefit from his work and least afford to lose his services. EIL and Dr. Gurevich are still very much needed to further strengthen the staff and the growing capabilities of MUST. For example, systems for MUST monitoring and evaluation of field projects are in place, but there has been relatively little actual on-site monitoring, support and evaluation of projects. Initial training of current MUST program specialists needs to be enhanced and consolidated by on-the-job training, and MOI staff and prospective new MUST staff (at least 2 in the 1989 budget) will require assistance and training by the advisor.

Furthermore, there is the clear and present danger that MUST will lose its Executive Director, unless MOI and USAID resolve the current impasse between MOI and USAID. Dr. Gurevich's experience and expertise should be secured immediately to help stabilize MUST administration and to assure continuity for MUST and the entire project over the next year.

There is yet another reason for continuing the long-term advisor. Effective use of the short-term technical assistance and training elements of the EIL program require coordination and careful meshing with the overall PVOP efforts to assist community development, and to strengthen PVO roles and capacities. It is difficult to imagine an effective and efficient contribution by EIL without senior-level and experienced representation in Mogadishu, such as it now has.

The team might have concluded that the long-term advisor role be extended, but that another person or type of contractor be engaged. However, given Gurevich's experience and creditable performance, and the risks and certain delays of securing a replacement, the team readily concluded that Gurevich himself should be extended.

2A. Recommendation: USAID should extend the contract of the EIL long-term advisor, Dr. Robert Gurevich, by at least one year, subject to concurrence by MOI and to consultation with the MUST Executive Director.

3. Conclusion: The advisor's roles for the next phase need to be clarified and prioritized, within the terms of the EIL contract, at the initiative of the MUST Executive Director. This should take into account PVOP/MUST plans, staffing, and priorities over the next 30 months. While Dr. Gurevich has served as an all-purpose staff person and advisor, it would now be desirable to delineate and to limit his roles and priorities carefully, concentrating more on advising and training others, and less on doing staff work. For technical assistance and training functions, he should be allowed a greater discretion, based on plans and general parameters agreed upon with the Executive Director.

The advisor would benefit from being drawn into a more collegial role and relationship with the Executive Director, for example, in setting priorities and in exchanging information that is important to the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities.

3A. Recommendation: The MUST Executive Director should initiate joint planning with the long-term advisor to determine where his efforts and EIL's resources should be concentrated over the next two years, within existing terms of the EIL contract. That should

include a clear determination of the advisor's priority responsibilities, such as MUST staff training and SPVO technical assistance and training.

4. Conclusion: MUST's annual workplan for 1989 contains a detailed sub-plan for training (Appendix IX). MUST is increasingly targeting and serving SPVO needs for technical assistance and training and that is to be commended. The forthcoming consultancies for SPVOs on financial administration and institutional/program development could not be more timely and relevant. The growing emphasis on hands-on technical assistance and on-the-job training for SPVOs are very suited to SPVO needs and realities. All PVOs also will benefit from workshops and training on technical development topics, such as the CARE-sponsored workshop on water point management.

4A. Recommendation: Extend and refine the technical assistance and training program for SPVOs, according to well-conceived plans such as the 1989 Training Workplan.

5. Conclusion: Several very positive participant training experiences have been provided for MUST and PVO staff members, mostly in third countries such as Kenya, the Philippines and Sudan. Selective and qualitative use of participant training for those groups is planned. The appropriate role and plan for participant training for MOI staff is less certain. The first three training experiences for MOI officials have so far yielded either poor or uncertain results. Offices for PVOP-related activity appear to be lightly staffed, if at all, so it is not clear who the participating staff should be. A clearer rationale and plan for MOI training is needed.

5A. Recommendation: Provide carefully conceived participant training opportunities for MUST and PVO staffs and help determine a rationale and plan for participant training of MOI and other GSDR staff. Training and exchanges with appropriate Third World organizations, notable in nearby African countries, are particularly commended for participant trainees.

## VII. Management Effectiveness of USAID

### Findings:

#### Planned Management Strategy

In 1984, the designers of PVOP were guided by two assumptions in preparing a USAID "management strategy" for PVOP. First, they assumed that PVO projects are labor intensive and that implementation and oversight responsibilities within PVOP for 12-15 OPGs and at least 20 CAGs would be demanding. At the same time, they assumed that USAID staffing would be limited by "restrictions on Mission staffing patterns" (PP, p. 56-57). To manage this "burden" the plan moved the grant proposal review process outside the Mission (Proposal Review Group), proposed to contract an agency to provide monitoring and support of sub-grants (the MUST) and divided management responsibility within USAID between existing staff and technical offices. There would be a PVOP Project Officer who would have responsibility for overall project implementation, but different technical officers were supposed to manage OPGs greater than \$50,000 (PP, p. 57).

The Project Manager's assigned responsibilities included: representing USAID on the PRG; liaison with MOI on implementation; managing the contract for MUST (instead MOI has done that and the Project Manager has administered the EIL contract); providing support to technical officers in sub-contract implementation; handling USAID registration of Somali PVOs, and monitoring CAGs through the MUST. The technical officers were to review relevant sections of all OPG proposals and to act as USAID project managers for OPGs in their respective sectors.

#### How Project Management Evolved

Basic outlines of the original management strategy are still evident, but there have been important changes in the configuration of the project, in the management of it, and therefore, in USAID management requirements.

To date, only half as many OPGs (6) have been approved as were expected over the life of the project, and no CAGs have been

granted. USAID technical officers have been reviewing project proposals, but are rarely involved with management backstopping or support for the few OPGs. The Project Manager has assumed more of the USAID management functions for OPGs than was anticipated.

The PRG has played its planned role in proposal review, but its most intense activity was during 1986-87 when it considered most of the 15 concept papers/proposals which have yielded the project's six OPGs to date. Over that period, the Project Manager was intensely involved in PRG meetings, in arranging internal proposal reviews, and in processing the several OPG grant agreements which received approval. PRG representation remains a continuing responsibility of the USAID Project Manager. Although PRG activity in the past 18 months has subsided, that may well change as the PRG begins project implementation reviews and searches for a way to assist SPVOs in obtaining funding.

MOI and USAID agreed to co-finance and share the implementation, policy-making and management oversight roles for PVOP. That has required continuing contact and coordination mainly between the USAID Project Manager and his MOI counterpart, the Director General of the Ministry.

In 1986, MOI and USAID changed the management plan when they agreed that MUST would not be under an AID direct contract but would instead be funded and directed by MOI. At the same time, MOI and USAID agreed that USAID would seek the services of a U.S. contractor for technical assistance and training to MUST. As a result, both MOI and USAID assumed management oversight roles for important segments of the project. The USAID Project Manager, for example, was to work with and monitor the advisory, technical assistance and training functions of EIL. None of these changes were reflected in a Project Agreement Amendment or a Project Implementation Letter.

#### Current Project Manager Responsibilities

Current Project Manager responsibilities include:

- (a) representation of USAID in the PRG; (b) liaison, coordination and negotiation; (c) management and monitoring of the EIL contract including training activities; (d) management oversight and monitoring of the existing OPG grants; (e) processing grant

registration of PVOs; (g) reporting to USAID and to AID/Washington on PVOP and OPG sub-project status and progress, e.g., quarterly project implementation reviews; (h) providing administrative approval of vouchers; (i) overseeing accruals; (j) tracking use of USAID vehicles under the project; (k) assuring that USAID provides adequate institutional support and resources to achieve stated objectives of the project; (l) assisting in removing obstacles to achievement of project objectives.

#### USAID Staffing Patterns

Throughout the project period, the above functions have been handled by a U.S. direct hire Project Manager for PVOP, who spends roughly half of his time with this project and the remainder with one or two other major project management assignments; an Assistant Project Manager (Foreign Service National - FSN), who assists the project manager in a range of tasks including budget review and documentation research, translation, agreement-processing, and PVO registration. The Project also receives ad hoc assistance from various technical officers, in such functions as grant proposal review. Management responsibility for PVOP has been moved from the Project Office to the Office of Agriculture and Rural Development.

The current team is very able and committed to the project. They have complementary and compatible skills and could be expected to work well together over the foreseeable future. The Project Manager now spends 50-60% of his time with PVOP and the FSN is full-time.

#### Future Staffing Requirements

The current combination of USAID core staff - a half-time direct hire and a full-time FSN- is a satisfactory though still minimalist staff complement. The current incumbents, if they stay together at least for two more years, could provide outstanding leadership and management coverage for PVOP. Also, it is highly desirable to have a U.S. director hire and a Somali deputy on the team, because each brings special knowledge and skills drawn from their respective societies, government practice, cultural orientation and "ways of doing business". The incumbent FSN shares the team's conclusion

that a U.S. direct hire is essential in the Project Manager role; the Project Manager agrees that the FSN is an important management officer.

#### Problems of Understaffing and Turnover

Throughout the project, USAID has felt the pressure to limit the number of internal USAID staff assigned to PVOP and sought outside project support through contracts, grants and mechanisms such as MUST and EIL. That has been a reasonably sound management strategy for PVOP, partly because USAID has maintained the minimally satisfactory complement of internal staff, described above, and partly because the incumbents have been capable.

However, further reduction or even change in the current staff combination over the next 18 months, at least, would be inimical to the overall project.

Personnel turnover within the different PVOP Partner agencies has been an endemic problem, and the risk of another wave of changes in the next 8 months is present. Over just four years, USAID has had two different Project Managers and two ad interim acting managers. The incumbent is just completing his first year and will end his service in June, 1989). In the same period, there have been three different Directors General in the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The MUST Executive Director's tenure is now in question and the EIL long-term advisor's contract also expires in June, 1989.

#### Problems and Opportunities

USAID's project management team will need to continue to perform the functions described above; but ideally, the USAID staff needs more time to take pro-active roles in the search for new solutions and methods for accomplishing project objectives. There are many opportunities for problem-solving and innovation which could energize the project, e.g., new approaches for engaging the Somali PVOs. Implementing the recommendations contained in this mid-term evaluation will require a significant commitment of additional staff time. An experienced team, in place, will help minimize the risks of further instability in the central management of the project.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusion: USAID needs to maintain at least the current complement of internal staff -- a half-time U.S. direct hire Project Manager and a full-time FSN Assistant Manager -- in order to cover basic USAID management functions for PVOP and to stabilize leadership within the larger project.

PVOP is one of USAID's most important projects for responding directly to the needs of people in the rural areas of Somalia. It is also an "experiment" in non-governmental approaches which could well achieve some success in the next two critical years, if effective leadership and management are sustained.

Recommendation: USAID should seek to maintain the two-person complement of internal staff -- a half-time U.S. direct hire Project Manager and a full-time FSN Assistant Project Manager. It should seek to retain the current incumbents in those positions at least over the next 18 month period.

## VIII. Selected Financial Issues

### Findings

#### Financial Planning and Budgeting

Integrated financial information covering both dollar and shilling outlays, in relation to overall and sub-project budgets, has not been readily available, regularly reviewed or analyzed for purposes of planning. Much financial information is at hand, but it has not been consolidated.

Shillings budgets and outlays are closely monitored within the budgeting, financial reporting and disbursement systems of the MUST and the Ministry of Finance's Domestic Development Department (DDD). Dollar outlays for OPG sub-projects are monitored through USAID computerized financial records. But information on overall expenditures, and expenditures by budget line item, is not adequately being brought to bear for such planning and management purposes as: (a) mid-term budget reviews; (b) appropriate

allocation of funds to handle account surpluses or deficits; (c) rebudgeting to achieve new purposes or priorities -- e.g., increasing the amount of shillings vs. dollars available to support SPVOs; (d) preventing and solving specific problems such as "shillings shortages"; and (e) anticipating how "surpluses" of funds in the current project might be rebudgeted under an extended PVOP project. This seems not to be happening because MUST, USAID and MOI do not have joint budget reviews.

One manifestation of having too little consolidated dollar and shilling financial/budget information is the unavailability of consolidated dollar/shilling reports on PVOP financial obligations, commitments, expenditures and balances. The evaluation team, for instance, had to request the gathering and formatting of simple reports on the status of combined dollar and shillings flows, in order to derive a few observations about the financial situation of the overall project. The resulting reports in Appendices XII and XIII, although very general, suggest some kinds of financial analyses and planning which are both necessary and possible. There has been a relative paucity of overall budget review and financial planning for PVOP. USAID, MOI and MUST are generally working according to the overall PVOP budget laid out in 1984 and codified in subsequent agreements. General budget reviews and changes have not been made to adjust to new situations, needs and opportunities which have arisen over five years, (e.g., a more than three-fold devaluation of Somali shillings since a shillings-dollar exchange rate of 83:1 was built into the 1985 grant agreement, domestic inflation, cost increases. etc. There has been insufficient analysis and planning to determine the amounts and combinations of dollars and shillings, respectively, which are needed to meet current and future needs. This has meant that different partners take responsibility for a limited part of financial monitoring and planning, but that there is no adequate mechanism--such as the proposed Management Committee-- for overall budget oversight and planning among the partners.

#### Alternative Uses of Emerging Dollar Surpluses

A cursory examination of the status of the dollar component of PVOP suggests that substantial sums within the current budget may not be

used within the life of the current project, presently scheduled to end in June, 1991. The extent of possible surpluses has not been closely examined. There are, however, several options for effectively using available resources if the project is extended beyond 1991.

As the data on the USAID dollar component indicate (See Appendix XII) a total of \$13 million has been obligated for OPGs. To date, only \$9,231,000 of that has been earmarked or reserved for six OPG sub-projects, leaving remaining OPG funds of nearly \$4.6 million. In addition, none of the \$2 million budgeted for Community Action Grants (CAGs) has been used, and there is little prospect that much, if any, will be under the original CAG concept. Nor is it altogether certain that the troubled OEF project in Baidoa will finally get fully launched and use all of the \$1,468,000 which has been granted to it. Altogether, at least \$4.6 - 6 million in OPG funds remain available for future use.

At the same time, the PVOP project and the OPG sub-projects have unfolded slowly; actual dollar commitments to activities within the project and expenditures to date remain low. Only about one-third of obligated funds have been committed by mid-point in the project. Only a total of about \$4 million has been expended out of the \$18.2 million set aside for the project.

Despite evident project surpluses and slow rates of expenditures, it is noted that the project has been well established only since 1987 when five of the six OPG grant agreements were signed. It can be expected that project financial commitments and expenditures will accelerate over the next 18 months, as the sub-projects gather momentum. At the same time, the exact nature and extent of current "surpluses" cannot be known without much closer examination than was possible in the mid-term evaluation.

Further, reallocation of anticipated surpluses ought not to be undertaken without concurrent planning for alternative uses of funds. Within the project, alternative uses for currently unearmarked dollar funds will require a project extension. A three year extension to 1994 is recommended.

Choices to be considered include: (a) 2 - 3 new OPGs with priority on SPVOs; (b) extension of several existing OPG sub-projects beyond their current terms, e.g., the AMREF and CARE projects which will complete 3-year agreements in 1990; (c) an OPG grant or a contract to an AID registered PVO which would administer a program of smaller-scale sub-grants to SPVOs and local organizations; (d) earmarking a portion of the dollar budget for conversion to meet future shilling needs.

In summary, while at mid-term substantial dollar surpluses are available there are options within the project which could readily and productively use those resources, on the assumption, however, that the PVOP project and some sub-activities are extended beyond 1991.

#### Shillings Shortages

The exact nature of "shillings shortages" within PVOP could not be ascertained within the short duration of the mid-term evaluation, but several findings indicate that it is certainly a matter warranting financial planning attention. As the data on the project shillings component in Appendix XIII indicates, most of the shillings originally budgeted for PVOP have been earmarked to specific project activities, and almost two-thirds of the total obligation of \$6.8 million (shillings equivalent @ 83 shillings = 1 US\$) already has been earmarked to specific activities. That is in marked contrast to the above-cited surpluses of unearmarked funds in the U.S. dollar component. That the entire shillings budget of PVOP is not already earmarked to specific sub-activities is due, in part, to the lower than expected volume of OPG grants in the first half of the project.

The effects of the shillings shortages have included: (a) at least one OPG sub-project (AMREF) was underbudgeted for shillings from the inception of the project, seriously impairing its ability to meet local salary and other costs; (b) growing pressures on the shillings budgets of other OPG sub-projects due partly to four-fold Somali currency devaluation and associated local cost inflation, the budgeted exchange rate for the project was 83 shillings - 1 U.S.\$, where as at mid-term the actual exchange rate is over 300:1).

Partly because of competing demands for shillings in other projects, the GSDR has been unable or unwilling to provide additional shillings to make up for these shortages, with disbursements often less than PVOs agreements specify. They have also typically been made late, which can have serious effects on seasonally dependent activities such as land preparation and planting crops. MUST and USAID succeeded in establishing a more timely disbursement of funds from the Ministry of Finance's Domestic Development Division. Disbursements are now provided in six month advances rather than quarterly, and PVOs are to be notified in writing of proposed alterations in their budgets.

USAID wisely has permitted three OPG project holders to convert dollars into shillings to make up for shillings shortfalls. USAID plans to continue using this method for easing local currency constraints and for meeting priorities which require shillings. In the latter connection, the expansion of grant assistance to SPVOs is very much dependent upon the ready availability of shillings for them, either from direct allocations by GSDR or by conversion of project dollars into shillings. It is noted, for instance, that the 83 million shillings (\$1 million) set aside for CAGS has not been utilized. These funds could be reallocated to OPGs or special funding for SPVOs.

#### Extending PVOP Beyond 1991

There are good reasons for the partners to extend PVOP beyond its current termination date in June 1991 and to proceed immediately with financial planning with that prospect in mind. PVOP is just getting well established after many delays and only two years of experience with OPG sub-projects. The PACD will need to be extended by at least two years to allow CHF to complete its activities which will commence in the summer of 1989. Future OPGs will also require up to three years to implement. At least one current OPG project-holder (AMREF) is interested in an amendment to its grant, with an extension of activities to 1994, in order to consolidate and extend its support to other districts. Renewed efforts and measures to meet the under-served PVOP objective of strengthening SPVOs must certainly extend beyond 1991, especially if SPVOs are to be funded and to be assisted with technical expertise and training over an adequate period of time.

For both USAID and GSDR, PVOP is one of the more promising projects in Somalia for assisting rural development among local communities and for demonstrating the efficacy of voluntary action within those communities.

It is not too early to begin program and financial planning for a project extension. Several immediate issues should be decided in the context of some understanding about how the project should unfold over a longer period of time than the 27 months remaining in the current life of the project. Decisions to make several OPG grants or to establish a new mechanism for funding SPVOs should realistically presuppose operational and support activities of PVOP which continue for at least 4-5 more years. Although it has taken longer than expected, the organisational infrastructure of the project is now reasonably well established, and several sub-projects are just at the point when they can--if allowed enough time--achieve substantial impact in assisting self-reliant development among Somali rural communities. In the latter regard, forming the all-important catalytic and facilitative relationships with Somali rural communities is, at best, a very painstaking and time-intensive process. For that reason, and given the fact that sub-projects have been tardier than expected in forming those relationships, it would be desirable that as much time as possible be allowed for the project to nurture the initiatives and self-sustaining activities of local communities. Similarly, more time to consolidate and extend national leadership and skills for non-governmental approaches to development, as through technical assistance to MOI and through the continued operation of MUST and the PRG, would be facilitated by a project extension.

As project extension is considered, it is noted that prospective surpluses or unused funds in the current life of the project may be used very effectively over a longer period of time. The evaluation team encountered some speculation within USAID that "underutilized" PVOP funds might well be reprogrammed to other Mission projects. Such a move would certainly be premature before the future needs and plans of the project are more closely considered. Assuming a three year extension of the current project, any existing surpluses from the current phase could easily be used well.

### Need for Financial Management Review

In the fourth year of PVOP, and after cumulative expenditures of about \$5.6 million (\$4.1 million and the shillings equivalent of \$1.5 million) a financial management review of both dollar and shillings expenditures would be desirable. Not only would this reassure all partners that financial responsibility and propriety are being observed, it would identify means by which financial administration systems can be strengthened, to the benefit of the project and to that of individual organizations and units which are participating in the project.

Financial audits or review for Somali shillings expended under PVOP are the responsibility of the GSDR Ministry of Finance's Domestic Development Department (DDD). Audits of dollar expenditures under USAID assistance programs are the responsibility of the U.S. Inspector General. "Federal audits," within U.S. governmental practice, focus on the suitability of financial administrative systems and procedures. Non-Federal audits focus on financial compliance. For USAID-funded activities, these non-federal audits can be conducted by independent accounting firms, contracted under indefinite quantity contracts.

It would be desirable that non-federal audits of selected elements of PVOP be conducted at the earliest possible time.

### Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Conclusion: There is insufficient overall PVOP financial information, analysis, planning and regular budget reviews. Much useful financial and budget information is at hand, but that is not being used effectively for planning and management purposes. Dollars and shillings budgets and financial information tend to be analyzed and presented separately so that no comprehensive financial planning picture emerges. An immediate need exists for improved financial analysis and planning, both with regard to individual OPG sub-projects, the unused CAG account and the overall project. It is also needed in planning for proposal extension to PVOP. A task force approach to this could be useful, perhaps employing EIL technical assistance.

1A. Recommendation: MUST should initiate a process of joint financial analysis, planning and budget review by the partners, in order to get a clear picture of the PVOP and sub-project financial status and accordingly, make recommendations to the partners for appropriate follow-up. If the proposed Management Committee is established, findings and recommendations could be considered by it.

2. Conclusion: Substantial sums of budgeted dollars within the project--perhaps totalling as much as \$6 million--need to be allocated to new or active purposes and made available over a longer period by the extension of the project beyond 1991. However, the exact nature and extent of such "surpluses" cannot be known without the closer analysis and planning called for in the above recommendation. Illustrative considerations are: (a) appropriate funding levels for several new and extended OPGs; (b) how much will be needed for a possible new funding mechanism for SPVOs, either to be financed as an OPG grant or as a contract; (c) whether or not, and to what extent, extra project dollars can be used for shillings conversions to offset shillings shortages or to facilitate effective SPVO funding.

2A. Recommendation: USAID and MUST should determine the nature of dollar surpluses and develop options for their use for consolidation by the partners, ideally in the proposed Management Committee.

3. Conclusion: The exact nature of PVOPs supposed shilling shortage should be closely analyzed, within each OPG sub-project and in relation to all other activities which require shillings. Some degree of shortage exists in several OPG sub-projects already, and with currency devaluation and rising costs becoming increasingly onerous, it can be expected that shortages will become all the more burdensome during the second half of the project. At the same time, some future plans for PVOP may hinge on adequate and flexible availability of shillings. Most of the funding relevant and crucial for SPVOs, for example, will need to be available in shillings. In this context, USAID has wisely permitted several OPG project-holders to convert some of their budgeted dollars into shillings in order to meet rising local currency costs and to overcome constraints in their shillings budgets.

3A. Recommendation: MUST should take the lead in helping the partners to determine the nature of shillings shortages and to devise strategies and specific measures which take into account the needs of current activities, and also anticipate the shillings needs of evolving priorities, specifically, the funding of SPVOs.

3B. Recommendation: GSDR and MOI should consider reallocating the budgeted shillings (So. Sh. 83 million) in the unused CAG account to counter shortages in other accounts and to support a possible new funding facility for SPVOs.

4. Conclusion: PVOP should be extended beyond 1991, for at least another three years. Financial planning should proceed with that in mind. PVOP is just getting well established after many delays. More time will be needed within the overall project, and within specific sub-projects to realize even short-term objectives, as well as the fundamental aims of fostering self-reliant and sustainable development action among local communities. Fulfilling the under-served objective of strengthening national PVO leadership and expertise -as through MUST- will also require more than the two years remaining in the current phase. Specific OPG projects will need and warrant extension into the period beyond 1991, and they and others will benefit from continued technical support and training. Some of the measures proposed in this report, notably a new funding mechanism for SPVOs will require considerable time to have effect.

4A. Recommendation: USAID, MOI and the other partners should plan now to extend PVOP beyond its current completion date of 1991 to at least 1994. They should keep that prospect in mind as they carry out financial planning for the current phase of the project.

5. Conclusion: After over three years of operation and expenditures totalling about \$5.6 million, it is desirable that there be non-federal audits of selected PVOP sub-project dollar and shillings accounts, both to assure the financial integrity of the project but also to foster effective financial administration systems. Non-federal audits can be contracted through any accounting firm under an indefinite quantity contract.

5A. Recommendation: Non-federal audits of selected PVOP sub-projects shillings and dollar accounts should be conducted as

## IX. Proposal Review Process & Proposal Review Group (PRG)

### Finding

#### Original Plans for Proposal Review Process and PRG

PVOP designers had three major objectives in designing the grant proposal review process: (1) to assure dialogue among all partners; (2) to promote involvement of the Somali private sector in development; and (3) to ensure rapid and effective review of grant proposals. [PP, p. 109]. The "essential structure" established for this purpose was the Proposal Review Group (PRG), supported by a secretariat, the Management Unit for Support and Training. The Project Paper stated: "Much is riding on the PRG's ability to streamline the proposal review process and involve all participants in the process." [PP, 59].

The designers proposed a PRG consisting of six members, representing MOI, Ministry of National Planning, USAID, a PVO Advisory Board (2 members), and the Somali Private Sector. The senior representative from MOI was to chair the PRG, and a secretariat staffed by MUST was to provide clearinghouse and administrative assistance to the committee. The planners further proposed a review process and criteria for approving both OPGs and CAGs, with a simplified process and criteria for the latter. They expected that the system would yield about 12-15 OPGs and at least 20 CAGs during the life of the project. OPG concept papers and full proposal were supposed to be processed within 22 week cycles, and CAGs decided upon within only 8 weeks. MOI and USAID would review all proposals independently, and their concurrence for grant awards would be required.

#### Evolution of the Process and PRG

In many respects, the process has evolved as intended, but with mixed results in meeting stated objectives. The PRG was established in 1986, with 7 members and a predominantly governmental composition. Representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been added to the planned membership, whereas only one of the two planned PVO Advisory Board

positions has been activated. A private sector member, nominated by the Chamber of Commerce, has been an active and able member from the very beginning. Thus four of seven members have been GSDR ministry representatives, and only two have represented the PVO and private sectors, respectively. Three successive MOI directors general have chaired the PRG, reportedly with considerable enthusiasm and skill.

As planned, the MUST has served ably as a secretariat to the PRG, but at the behest of the latter, more in the manner of a clearinghouse and administrative support group than as an assertive agent of the committee in appraising and screening and soliciting proposals. To date, the PRG has functioned exclusively in the review of OPG proposals, since no CAG proposals have been presented for consideration. Plans for it to engage in project implementation reviews (PIRs) for each of the active projects are only now being effected.

Since 1986 the PRG has considered a total of 15 concept papers and project proposals offered by 12 different PVOs. All of those were under consideration in 1986 - 87, and five of the six OPG grant agreements developed through that process were signed in 1987. The sixth project agreement, with the Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), will be signed shortly. According to a recent MUST evaluation, it has taken an average of at least one year for proposals to pass from point of concept paper to that of signed agreement, more than twice as long as was intended. [See Proposal Tracking Chart, Appendix XVIII] Delays have occurred at different stages of the process, and more often than not PRG meetings have not been major obstacles. For example, PVOs without representation in Mogadishu sometimes have been slow to convert their approved concept papers into full proposals for PRG consideration.

For virtually all grant applicants the PVOP proposal review process has been long and expensive. A considerable lapse of time has frequently occurred between grant approvals and the signings of agreements. If the expected higher volume of OPG and CAG proposals had been achieved, the review process would have been seriously stressed. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that the highest volume of proposal reviews occurred in the early stages when PVOP and the PRG were being organized. MUST was not yet fully

operative. Twenty-two PRG meetings were held in the first year, compared to the seven in the past year. It is assumed that today's experienced PRG, and the MUST staff, would now be much better equipped to process proposals more expeditiously.

The PRG has proven very useful for increasing dialogue among the partners; indeed it is the one continual meeting ground for senior leaders and managers of the overall PVOP. Meeting minutes and interviews suggest that the members have been highly professional, dedicated and diligent in conducting the work of the PRG. With the exception of the occasional arbitrary intervention by one or another influential member, the members have established good esprit de corps and have worked collegially. They have applied agreed criteria for proposal reviews, largely as proposed in the original Project Paper. They have effectively called upon outside technical advice, as needed.

A cursory review suggests, however, that the PRG has been partly handicapped by its predominantly governmental composition and by its lack of familiarity with PVO operating modes, with their comparative advantages particularly in community development, and with their strengths and weaknesses. The evaluation team speculates that has reinforced the committee's tendency to press applicants towards what might be considered government-style projects--relatively larger, technical, capital-intensive, and service delivery-oriented projects -- rather than those designed to facilitate development initiatives by local communities. This could have been a particularly marked handicap for the PRG, if it had actually reviewed proposals for the relatively smaller Community Action Grants (CAGs).

The PRG and the entire proposal review process would benefit from conscious efforts to improve its effectiveness. The long, expensive and complicated approval process has been a burden to all; one PVO says that it has spent \$30,000 in order to advance its proposals over the course of more than one year.

The volume of the PRG's proposal review activity dropped markedly in 1988-89. Only the CHF and OEF proposals were under review over the past year. No other proposals are on the immediate horizon, and should PVOP adopt a consolidating rather than expansionary strategy, the PRG is even less likely to act as a grant-approving body with any great degree of frequency.

1. Conclusion: Given the varying perceptions of the role and value of PVOs in Somalia, the PRG has been an integrating and unifying force. As a broadly representative group, it is an excellent forum for building understanding of and support for non-governmental and PVO approaches to rural community development.

1A. Recommendation: The partners should reaffirm support for the role of the PRG in grant approvals and extensions, and in project implementation reviews.

2. Conclusion: A concentrated effort is needed to create a more effective process for proposal approvals, project implementation reviews, and project extensions. This effort should be focused on the improvement of the performance of the PRG . Some combination of technical assistance, use of different organizational methods such as sub-committees, and greater use of MUST staff for preliminary project review and/or evaluation ought to be considered.

2A. Recommendation: PRG and MUST should set objectives and institute measures to improve the effectiveness of proposal and project implementation reviews, and the PRG's capacities as a deliberative body. Technical assistance and training, use of sub-committees and other organizational methods, and a more active role for the MUST staff in advising and preparing the PRG are suggested.

3. Conclusion: To complement having several GSDR ministries represented in the PRG, at least one or two more PVO/local NGO representatives should be added to strengthen the body's PVO perspective and experience.

3A Recommendation: Add two more NGO representatives to the PRG, bringing the number to three, or to a combination of 1 USAID

representative, 4 GSDR representatives, 3 PVOs including Somali and U.S. groups and 1 private sector representative. Of these nine members, five would be from the proposed Management Committee: MOI and USAID representatives, two PVOs and the private sector representative.

Appendix VI

Notes on the Status of OPG Projects

OVERVIEW

Six PVOs have received OPGs through the PVOP Project to implement projects in various regions (of Somalia). Two of these projects have not reached actual implementation stage yet. OEF International's project was suspended when it was learned that the proposed activities were based on wrong baseline data. Thus OEF is expected to present a revised version to PRG soon. The other PVO, Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), had its project approved last December but has not yet signed the grant agreement with the funders.

The other four PVOs have been engaged in the implementation of their projects for two years. These are Haqabtir, the only Somali PVO among the group, and CARE, AMREF and Africare which are operating in the regions of Sool and Togdher, Hiran, Gedo, and Bari and Sanag, respectively. The objectives of the projects are concentrated on improving the quality and availability of water, increasing agricultural production, improving health and educational conditions, and controlling environmental degradation. The projects are at various stages of implementation, but all are said to be running behind schedule, except for AMREF's project.

Wide-ranging explanations are given for the delayed implementation of the different projects. However, there appear to have been some major constraints which were common to all of them, and which have contributed to slow implementation. Foremost among these has been the rigidity and lack of flexibility of the financial regulations of the funders, the GSDR Ministry of Finance (MOF) and USAID. The MOF insists upon supplying only the amounts of shillings specified for each project at the time of the signing of the grant agreement, even though the purchasing power of the shilling has declined considerably since then. By the end of 1988 the shillings was worth less than a third of its 1986 value when the projects were initiated. While the projects were facing shortages of shillings, they could not change the dollar component

to purchase commodities, pay salaries, or use them for any of their other local needs. The US dollars could only be used for procurements from the U.S. and for expatriate staff salaries. Not only has that curtailed the activities of the projects but also for some, if not all, of the projects, the procurement periods of equipment and other supplies, vital to the operation of the projects, have caused considerable (delays) and (increases in) overhead costs.

Progress in the implementation of project activities (has also been hampered by the physical and infrastructural difficulties encountered in the areas where the PVOs operate. In the more remote areas unforeseen logistical and other communication difficulties were encountered. The further north projects were located, the slower has been the progress toward meeting planned objectives. Both Africare and Haqabtir are far behind schedule compared to AMREF and CARE because of the difficulties involved in transporting machinery, equipment, building materials, and personnel to the field and maintaining regular contacts between the headquarters and the regional offices. These projects also faced difficulties recruiting suitably qualified nationals and expatriates or keeping them in place under remote and harsh conditions. Also, some of the projects were forced to revise their originally planned outputs as a result of growing instability in their areas.

**AMREF:**

There is general consensus that AMREF's PHC project is one of the most successful of the PVOP sub-projects not only in achieving the planned goals but also in view of its plans for long term sustainability. By the end of its second year the project seems to have laid the basis for a unified and integrated health program for Luuq district. So far the most important achievements of the project include:

- (a) Upgrading of the Luuq hospital to meet the basic health needs of the town, and providing the necessary support for PHC activities in other parts of the district, despite occasional shortage of essential drugs.

- (b) Establishing health posts for 3 villages as part of its PHC Program for the rural communities.
- (c) Training a sizeable number of district health personnel and community health workers both for Luug town and for the small rural communities.
- (d) Identifying 4 communities in the neighboring Dolo District that could be potential participants and beneficiaries of the project.
- (e) Most importantly there are indications that this project has achieved a relatively high degree of participation by the beneficiaries. According to AMREF officials, local communities have voluntarily sent their Community Health Workers (CHWs), to the training programs, continued to subsidize and support the CHWs who serve them, and provided free labor and other contributions required from them for the establishment of the health posts. Overall AMREF has found it easier to work and cooperate with smaller communities and rural villages than other groups. Work is particularly difficult with spontaneously settling refugees who have developed a dependency syndrome that may have serious consequences for the development of these areas, and particularly with respect to mobilizing people for participation in their own development. There are several reasons for AMREF's relative successes.

Firstly, AMREF had an early start since it was one of the agencies that provided care and maintenance to Luug refugee camp populations, and had established its country base long before the PVOP project came into existence. Secondly, AMREF took over an ongoing, albeit much smaller project, at a very low key, and therefore had something to build on.

Inter-Church Response for the Horn of Africa, an Agency formed during the refugee crisis in the late seventies, renovated the hospital and initiated the project originally but it had to abandon it when the source of funding ceased. Also, the project was well planned compared to the other PVOP sub-projects. It addressed an immediate need. Health programs and PHC activities did not exist in the area and

favorable community response was inevitable given appropriate delivery methods. And it was reasonably manageable. While the other projects have expanded their activities to whole regions, AMREF limited itself to one district at a time.

This planning advantage was made possible by a preparatory grant AMREF received from USAID, while it waited for PVOP to materialize and which enabled it to do the necessary baseline studies for a good project proposal.

The project has only one more year to accomplish the remaining planned outputs and to consolidate and ensure the sustainability of the present gains. AMREF, however, indicated that the project will be far from obtaining self-reliance or sustaining the present achievements once the external inputs are withdrawn after one year. They believe that the project will continue to be dependent on expatriate staff and on other imported provisions, e.g, drugs and equipment, for the immediate future. In their view, 5 years is too short for such a project to gain a self-sustaining base and for traditional communities to run it and be able to provide the necessary resources. Thus AMREF is recommending a renewal of the grant for at least another two-year term. The project officials have also recommended more flexible financial disbursements. AMREF claims to have been particularly hit by the Shilling shortage. Even though it had an early start it could cover only (a) third of its planned expenditure for the shilling component.

#### CARE

Although CARE was forced to suspend its operations in the northwest and Awdal, its overall performance was assessed as being quite successful. Starting with a refugee reforestation project funded by UNICEF and the Dutch government, CARE was already well established in the country when it joined the PVOP project. Soon after the signing of the grant agreement CARE went ahead with the implementation of its multi-sectoral project and is currently active in 26 communities in Hiran region, working on small scale programs that range from water point rehabilitation to small-scale irrigation to supporting small business enterprises for women and low income groups.

The secret of CARE's success is said to lie in its project document which provided considerable flexibility to choose community interventions. The project proposal mentions the priority areas for CARE's involvement only in the broadest terms. This allowed CARE to base its activities on the felt needs of the beneficiary communities. In addition to a socio-economic and environmental baseline study of the area, CARE used informal assessment to prioritize and determine needs.

Also, because CARE Somalia has greater non-governmental financial resources compared to the other PVOs its activities were not as seriously affected by the rigid financial regulations and disbursement methods of the funders.

#### AFRICARE

Africare's project is believed to be well behind meeting planned targets. In the formulation of the project document the planners assumed "no more than a reasonable level of logistical difficulty in obtaining, receiving and forwarding inputs to the project area and sustaining project activities, and a relatively stable social and economic environment that could enable work to be done, and expenses to be met, within the human and financial resources of the project" (Revised Seventh Quarterly Report). Two years of implementation, or half the project's life time, have elapsed and yet preparations for the more demanding and heavy civil works activities have not been completed. Actual implementation has so far been limited to half a dozen or so community level self-help projects which up to now have consumed less than one fourth of \$300,000 (or 7.5%) of the project funds earmarked for such activities. In spite of this, the project is the most relevant for the northeast region, and the implementers must have had great determination to reach the present stage of development.

According to our assessment, the root cause of the delay is inherent in the original implementation plan. The major activities are designed to be carried out with imported and sophisticated machinery and technical know-how. Consequently, it has not only taken much longer time than expected to procure the equipment.

transport it and make it operational, but it has also taken extra time and effort to replace the technical staff the project has been continuously losing. In addition to the material incentive, it required commitment to the purpose of the project from the expatriate advisors to endure the harsh living conditions of Qardho, which until very recently lacked the most basic facilities for decent expatriate living. Moreover the project had problems in keeping qualified nationals who can earn as much or even more in more attractive settings. Thus, as Africare pointed out in the Seventh Quarterly Report, their greatest challenge has been "getting qualified staff in place and helping them to become functional "(P5). These problems will affect the long-term sustainability of the project.

Another likely mistake surfacing now, as indicated by the field staff, is the undue emphasis given to the settlements, to the neglect of the nomads who form the majority of the population. Traditional activities for rural development, e.g clinics, schools, vegetable gardens have been emphasized instead of range associations, veterinary extension, livestock marketing, etc.

The Africare project is the one that will have the greatest impact if it succeeds. But, because of its heavy dependence on external resources, it may continue to progress slowly. To meet its original objectives, an extension of the project will certainly be required. Furthermore it is possible that the project has already incurred extra direct and indirect costs, which will have to be met if original project outputs are to be achieved.

#### HAQABTIR

Haqabtir was the last of the active OPG holders to embark on implementation. Until about the third quarter of the second year it had not done basic preparation or even established an office in the region.

The reasons for delayed implementation are difficult to understand. Unlike Africare, it did not depend on specialized skills or imported goods. While it involves construction and other types of civil works, e.g., dug-outs and other types of surface water catchments,

their project was to rely on available human and material resources. In fact some innovative ideas, like the use of animal power (camels) for the heavy construction work had given the project a special appeal.

Also, it was not expected that Haqabtir would encounter the infrastructural and logistical difficulties that have held back Africare. Although it too had to transport large quantities of construction materials long distances, fewer problems were expected because Las Anod is located on the main tarmac road from Mogadishu.

There are also questions about the adequacy of community participation in the Haqabtir project.

4. Gargaara  
P.O. Box 1609  
Mogadishu, Somalia  
Telephone: 21345
- Said Bile Adan,  
Director
- Community Development  
Reforestration
5. Haqabtir  
P.O. Box 2925  
Mogadishu, Somalia  
Telephone: 81540
- Abdi A. Osman,  
Director
- Community Development
- Agriculture
6. Horn of African Relief  
and Development Foundation  
P.O. Box 1282  
Mogadishu, Somalia
- Abdullahi Ali Nuur,  
President
- Income Generation
- Social Development
- Research
- Relief Activities
7. Horumarin  
P.O. Box 7015  
Mogadishu, Somalia  
Telephone: 21670
- Ali Abdi,  
Director
- Help regions in planning rural development projects
- Assist isolated and less developed areas training.



12. Somali American Business  
Council  
P.O. Box 1406  
Mogadishu, Somalia

Mohamed M. Khawi,  
Vice President

- Community Development

13. Participatory Housing Development  
P.O. Box 1065  
Hargeisa  
Telephone: 2421 (Hargeisa)

Ahmed Guled,

- Low cost housing development

14. Samawada  
P.O. Box 1914 Mogadishu  
Telephone: 31486(ask for Amina)

Amina Heri Adan,  
Contact Person

- Improve nutritional status of women

- Children, income generation, sanitation

Appendix VIII  
Selected Somali PVOs

Al-Muntadhar  
Social Services and Child-Care Organization

Al-Muntadhar is a private voluntary organization for promotion of social service and has a children care program in the Beesha-shukri (Gubadley), an impoverished squatter community in an outlying area of Mogadishu. That project was officially inaugurated in October, 1988. Al-Muntadhar is registered with the Ministry of Health. It started with an annual income of approximately So.Sh. 7,000,000 which was largely spent on construction of a Medical Health Centre, a school, a wall around its compound and a water well. Al-Muntadhar projects an annual budget of \$67,000 over each of the next three years.

Objectives of the Organization:

oTo help the community to establish health care centres and ambulance services in order to provide modern health care services for the people in the community.

oTo establish women's training centres, where income-generating skills such as sewing, knitting, cooking, etc are taught.

oTo dig wells and boreholes to provide potable water for the community.

oTo introduce formal and non-formal education programs, to eradicate illiteracy.

Organizational Structure:

The organizational structure of Al-Muntadhar consists of three bodies.

1. Board of Trustees: responsible for achieving the aims and objectives of the organization as well as the assets, deposits and investments received from individual organization for support.

2. The Managing Committee: responsible for monitoring of all the activities of the organization and transaction of the funds (income and expenditures), holding committee meetings, authorization and disbursement of items of expenditure exceeding 10,000 sh.

3. The Advisory Sub-Committee: advises and acts as consultants, whenever the managing committee feel it necessary.

#### Source of Income and Registration Situations with AID

The source of income for operation of Al-Muntadhar is from three sources.

- (a) Regular income received from services delivered: i.e., small amounts of fees charged for all services to cover the cost of locally employed staff.
- (b) Local charity income such as Zakat (religious due) and the donations received from generous individuals, companies or organizations.
- (c) Charity income from overseas donors:

Al Muntadhar organized a fund raising trip to the neighboring countries such as Kenya, The Gulf States and the U.K. The funds raised during those trips were mostly used for the construction of the Beesha Shukri Health Centre which is now functioning and for the establishment of a school which is not yet completed. Mr. Stephen O. Jackson, a financial consultant to MUST, was asked to prepare a statement regarding the financial records of four Somali PVOs, including Al-Muntadhar. During the exercise to recast their financial records, he realized that there was room for improvement. He therefore introduced a simplified accounting system commonly used in a number of countries in Africa. At the end of his assignment Jackson was satisfied with Al-Muntadhar's records and recommended them for USAID registration.

DARYEEL

Daryeel is one of the non-governmental private voluntary organizations founded to meet the basic needs of emerging small rural and urban business ventures in the country. Daryeel is registered with the Ministry of Interior and has secured a revolving loan fund from the African Development Foundation and the Somali Development Bank for small enterprise development projects.

The Objectives of the Organizations are:

- o Mobilize resources, both local and international, for the support of small and grass-roots business activities.
- o Provide training in basic business skills.
- o Extend limited loan fund to viable enterprises.
- o Conduct research into development issues and its application to solutions.

The organizational set up of Daryeel consists of one body - the Board of Trustees and an Executive Board that oversees the management of the organization.

The Board of Trustees:

The Board of Trustees is composed of up to eight qualified and well respected individuals who have distinguished themselves in the area of business development. The role of the board of trustee is to:

- o Review all major decisions of the organization.
- o Provide general counsel to the executive board.
- o Meet regularly to review, and monitor the execution of the program goals and also approve the annual financial statements.

### The Executive Board of Directors

The executive board of directors is made up of an Executive Director assisted by four sectional directors. The responsibilities of the board are:

- o The day to day operations of the organization such as promotion of fund raising systems, personnel policies, and recruitment.
  
- o Disbursement of assistance funds with the ratification of the Board of Trustees.

### Sources of Funding:

Daryeel has so far secured for its operation grants from the African Development Foundation, IDRC, and OXFAM America. Others are in the pipeline. It has also project collaboration agreements with UNICEF, WHO, and UNDP. Daryeel charges fees for training services delivered as part of its business development program. However there is no financial statement in their files on the amount of funds received so far and expenditure incurred by the management.

At present Daryeel has expressed no interest in PVO Partners Project funding because the African Development Foundation does not permit it to raise funds elsewhere while it is conducting the project being funded currently by the Foundation.

### Registration Situation with AID

Daryeel has submitted its request for registration with AID on the 20th May, 1987, but is not yet registered. According to USAID the main reason for that is Daryeel was not able to comply with USAID's registration requirements which include financial track records for the agency seeking registration with USAID which is not available yet.

### Istageer Agricultural Development

Istageer is an indigenous private voluntary organization established in Somalia in early 1988. It is registered with the Ministry of Interior. The activities of the Organization are at present geared to the development of small farmers in Southern part of the country where most of the farming activities are carried out. The organization has succeeded in procuring 570 hectares of land for nineteen (19) small farmers and have formed a small community of farmers (Al-RISIQ) in Balad area. It has also been involved in the afforestation of Jasiira - Gendershe plantation project and were actively involved in establishment of a vocational school in Gendershe.

### The Objectives of the Organization are:

- o To assist small scale farmers in the legal aspects of land procurement.
- o To provide technical assistance to small scale farmers in cultivation practices and increasing yields.
- o To provide agricultural education and other types of training using appropriate technologies.
- o To create small income generating projects for rural communities using appropriate technologies

### Organizational Structure:

Istageer is managed by an executive board and an advisory board.

### The Executive Board: responsibilities of the board include:

- o Presiding over all meetings of the board (chairman).
- o Execution of the managerial operations of the organization
- o Financial record keeping, preparation of financial statements and preservation of accounts and books for

- o Performance of all the normal secretarial duties of the organization.

The Advisory Board:

The advisory board is composed of three professionals consisting of two agriculturists and an economist. Their role is mainly to advise the Executive board whenever the Executive Board deems necessary.

Source of Funding:

Principal sources of funding are from the founders and the voluntary contributions from specific supporters and the general public. Istageer's budget of 1988 was 877,040 So.Sh. and its total expenditure was So.Sh. 792,040. For 1989, the budget is 986,000 So.Sh.

Registration with USAID

Istageer has submitted an application and a list of necessary registration documents to the USAID Mission in Somalia on 20th December, 1988. The application is being evaluated for registration.

URURKA SAMAFALKA AADAMIGA (AADAMIGA VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION)

Aadmiga is a private voluntary organization registered with MOI in October 1987 as a non-profit, non-political and non-religious organization. Aadamiga works with the disadvantaged, particularly widowed, elderly, and handicapped women in both rural and urban areas. This organization has a specific mandate to improve the role and status of women and children in the country.

The Objectives of the (Organization) are:

- To assist groups of poor, elderly, handicapped, displaced people, particularly women and children.
- To assist rural and other disadvantaged groups by providing training in appropriate marketable skills and practical assistance in exercising these skills.

- To take part in the overall rural development programs of the country by providing technical assistance and services.
- To co-operate with national institutions in any emergency situation to provide relief assistance.

### Organizational Structure:

The organisational structure of Aadamiga consists of two bodies namely; the management team board and the council of trustees. The management team is comprised of three members headed by an Executive Director. The team is responsible for running the day-to-day operations of the organization. The team is also responsible for adopting major policy decisions involving the spending and the disposal of any large sums of money and/or alteration and amendment of important agreed policies after consulting with other senior staff members.

### The Composition and the Functions of the Council of Trustees

The council of trustees is composed of five respected prominent citizens. Its functions include: inspecting the financial status of the organization and ensuring that the donations received are solely used for the purpose for which they are granted.

### Funding:

Aadamiga mostly relies on donations from individuals and from some donors such CIDA, OXFAM America and the general public. The office premises, transport, furniture and operating costs have all been donated by the public. The organization also brings in funds from the sale of hand-crafted goods purchased from the beneficiaries for sale to the public.

The future plan of the organization includes fund raising through AL-ZAKAT system (a religious dues) from the rich to the poor, by persuading the local Zakat payers to contribute to the Aadamiga projects. The total income of the organization for the period of September and October, 1988 was So.Sh 190,051 mainly from the sales of the hand-made goods.

Like most other Somali PVOs Aadmiga is not yet registered with AID.

HORUMARIN: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (HRD)

Horumarin is a Somali Private Voluntary organization registered with MOI in (March 1987) and also registered with MOH. The organization has secured funding for health project from a U.S. organization known as HEARIN AID whose funds are administered by U.S.A For Africa. The proposed project has been funded for \$100,000.

Horumarin has signed an agreement with the Ministry of Health to under take a PHC program in Wajid District, Balcool Region initially, and the rest of the region if further funds are secured.

Objectives and Targets:

- To raise people's awareness of their health problems; make them understand the ongoing health services, and promote their active participation.
- To reduce infant and maternal mortality and morbidity rates through both effective preventive measures and curative practices.
- To create an effective health infrastructure and support its managerial systems in the whole region.
- To prepare trained and skilled health manpower of different levels and to enable them to run the health activities.

Organizational Status:

Horumarin is administered by a Board of Directors comprised of a chairman, deputy chairman and three members.

The Function of the Board of Directors

The board of directors are responsible for:

- o The formulation of the strategy adopted every year in the annual plan.
- o The formulation of the general policy of the organization.
- o The appointment of the managing staff of the organization.
- o The follow up and monitoring programmes of the organization.
- o The auditing of the accounts and the evaluation of the administrative work of the staff.

Funding:

So far Horumarin has secured an amount equivalent to US dollars 100,000 from HEARIN-AID.

USAID Registration:

Although Horumarin is not yet registered with AID, it has submitted its registration request and based on its financial records and statements, it appears to be a promising candidate for USAID registration and for future funding.

Appendix IX

1989 Annual Work Plan and Training Plan  
for the  
Management Unit for Support and Training (MUST)  
of the  
Somalia PVO Development Partners Project

Submitted to:

Ministry of Interior, GSDR  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
Domestic Development Division, GSDR

Submitted by:

Mohamed Said Omer, MUST  
Executive Director

January 10, 1989

**I. Introduction**

The purpose of this annual workplan and training plan for 1989 is to identify the the overall approach and the specific steps which the Management Unit for Support and Training (MUST) will take to achieve the broad goals of the Somalia PVO Development Partners Project (PVOP). This plan focuses on the MUST as the administrative locus of PVO Project activities as distinguished from the participating PVOs themselves. Specific information about the programs and plans of individual PVOs may be found in the workplan of each PVO.

This 1989 Annual Workplan for the MUST represents an elaboration based on more than two years of experience with the PVO Development Partners Project. It represents current thinking within MUST as to how MUST activities should be organized over the January 1 - December 31, 1989 period. However, we call the reader's attention to the Mid-Project Evaluation for the PVO Development Partners Project which will be conducted during he first quarter of 1989. Depending on the outcome of this evaluation, certain elements of this Annual Workplan may be modified.

**II. Project Background.**

**A. Description.** The goal of the Somalia PVO Development Partners Project is to

foster the sustained economic and social development of Somalia by building a base for increased productivity at the grass roots, local level. The Project has two purposes: 1) to expand the programs of PVOs in development sectors and areas consistent with AID and GSDR strategy and priorities, and 2) develop the capacity to of Somali private and voluntary organizations to actively participate in the development process.

This statement contained in the PVOP Project Paper forms the foundation around which project activities are organized.

Over a period of six years, the PVO Development Partners Project is providing \$18.2 million in USAID funds, \$6.8 million in shillings as the GSDR contribution and additional contributions from PVOs and local groups. Utilizing Operational Program Grants (OPGs) and Community Action Grants (CAGs) as the primary implementation mechanism, the PVOP Project also seeks to fund and foster the growth of 3 - 5 Somali Private Voluntary Organizations.

B. Current Status. At present, the Somali PVO Development Partners Project is providing funding to four U.S. - based PVOs and one Somalia - based PVO. These are:

1. Haqabtir                    Integrated Rural Development Project.  
Sool/Togdeer Regions. 48 months.
2. CARE/Somalia            Rural Development Initiatives Project.  
Hiran, Northwest and Awdal. 42 months.
3. AMREF                    Luuq District Health Services and Primary  
Health Care Training Project. Gedo Region.  
36 months.
4. Africare                 Northeast Initiatives Project. Bari, Sanaag,  
Sool Regions. 48 months.
5. OEF Int'l.               Small Agricultural Enterprise Development  
Project. Bay Region. 36 months.

In addition, the PVOP Proposal Review Group recently approved funding for the Cooperative Housing Foundation's (CHF) Mogadishu Peripheral Areas Shelter and Services Improvement Project. Implementation of this project will begin in early 1989.

### III. Management Unit for Support and Training (MUST).

A. Background. The Management Unit for Support and Training was established to administer the Somalia PVO Development Partners Project. Serving under contract to the Ministry of Interior, MUST began operations on May 1, 1986.

B. Role and Function of MUST. MUST provides project administration, monitoring, training, evaluation coordination and support services to PVOs (external and indigenous), the MOI and USAID. It also serves as the secretariat for the Proposal Review Group which has the responsibility for making project funding decisions. Although the administration of the PVO Development Partners Project provides the specific context for MUST activities, MUST has defined its role more broadly as being

to provide assistance and support to the PVO/NGO community, the GSDR and donors to undertake through a partnership, effective development programs/projects at the grassroots, local level.

Such a role description provides a sense of direction for the MUST that enables it to meet PVOP project objectives while offering the potential to serve a broader constituency in the future.

C. MUST Priorities. The MUST Workplan for 1989 reflects the "mid-project" status of the PVOP and the evolution of the MUST since its inception. While concerned with meeting its PVOP project responsibilities, MUST has identified three priorities for 1989:

1. Strengthening the internal capacity of the MUST to perform its administrative, monitoring and support functions;
2. Providing increased institutional support to Somali PVOs to enhance their capacity to participate in Somalia's development and secure donor support; and
3. Increase donor awareness, support and responsiveness to the capabilities and resources of Somali PVOs.

IV. Chronological Plan of Work for 1989.

The following is a chronological list of MUST activities for the next twelve months. It reflects the priorities outlined above as well as the need to meet on-going project activities.

January 1 - March 31, 1989

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>
Preparation of CHF Grant Agreement	MUST, USAID	January
Review of OEF Project Status	MUST, USAID, MOI	January
Review PVO Annual Workplans	MUST, PVOs	Jan - Feb
Submit 1989 Financial Data to DDD	PVOs, MUST, DDD	January
Submit 6 Month Budget Request to DDD	PVOs, MUST, DDD	January
Submit Annual Workplan/Training Plan	MUST, EIL	January
Update MUST Filing System	MUST	Jan - Feb
Organize WASH Seminar with CARE	MUST, CARE, PVOs, USAID	January
PVOP Mid-Project Evaluation	MUST, USAID, PVOs, Eval. Team	Jan - March
Complete Computer Installation	MUST, EIL, Technicians	January
Review PVO Disbursement Reports	MUST, PVOs	January
Recruit Program Officers	MUST	January
Monthly PVO Meetings	MUST, PVOs	Jan, Feb, Mar
Meetings with USAID, Donors	MUST, USAID Donors	Ongoing
Meetings with MOI, GSDR Agencies	MUST, MOI, GSDR	Ongoing
Meetings With SPVOs	MUST, SPVOs	Ongoing

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Agencies</u>	<u>Target Date</u>
Review Dollar Fin. Status Reports	USAID, MUST	Feb - March
Train New Staff	MUST, EIL	Feb - March
Project Monitoring Field Trips	MUST, USAID, PVO, Eval. Team	Feb - March
PVO Progress Report Feedback	MUST, PVOs	Feb - March
Recruit MIS/Officer Manager	MUST	February
Project Implement. Rev. - AMREF	PRG, MUST	February
Project Implement. Rev. - Africare	PRG, MUST,	February
Identify MUST/MOI Part. Trainees	MOI, USAID, EIL	February
Arrival Program Development Consult.	MUST, EIL	March
Preparation of Trip Reports	MUST	March
Review Mid-Project Eval. Report	MUST, USAID, MOI	March
 <u>April 1 - June 30, 1989</u>		
Begin CHF Project Implementation	CHF, MUST, USAID, Munic.	April
Begin PVOP Project Modifications	USAID, MOI, MUST	April, ongoing
Arrival MIS/ Fin. Man. Consultant	MUST, EIL	April
Dist. MUST Training Directory	MUST, USAID, PVOs	April
MUST, MOI Computer Training	MUST, MOI, EIL	April, Ongoing
SPVO Registration	SPVOs, MUST USAID	April, Ongoing
Assist SPVO Proposal Development	MUST, PVOs	April, Ongoing
Liaison with MOI, USAID, Donors	MUST, USAID, GSDR, Donors	April, Ongoing
PVO Monthly Meetings	MUST, PVOs	April, May June
Feedback on PVO Progress Reports	MUST, PVOs	May
Project Imp. Review - CARE	PRG, MUST, CARE	May
Project Imp. Review - Haqabtir	PRG, MUST, Haqabtir	May
Project Monitoring Field Trips	MUST, USAID, PVOs	May, June
US/Third Country Training	MUST, EIL, USAID	May, June
Meetings with EIL/R.O. Staff	MUST, USAID, EIL	May, June
MUST/PVO Newsletter	MUST, PVOs	May

Train MUST on USAID Train. Regs.	MUST, EIL, USAID	May
WASH Seminar	CARE, MUST, USAID, PVOs	May
Review Financial Status Reports	MUST, USAID	May, June
Fin. Man. Consult. for SPVOs	MUST, EIL, SPVOs	May, June
Review SPVO Proposals	MUST, PRG, SPVOs	May, June
Fin. Management Workshop	MUST, EIL, SPVOs	June
Submission of PVO Bi-Annual Shilling Request/Quarterly Disbursements	MUST, PVOs, DDD	June
Departure of LT Technical Advisor	EIL, MUST, USAID	June
PVO Forum	MUST, PVOs	June

July 1 - September 30, 1989

Computer Training for MUST/MOI Staff	MUST, MOI, Comp. Consult.	July, Ongoing
Review PVO Proposals	MUST, PRG	July, Ongoing
Liaison with Donors	MUST, Donors	July, Ongoing
PVO Monthly Meetings	MUST, PVOs	July, Aug, Sept.
Feedback on PVO Progress Reports	MUST, PVOs	August
Arrival Spec. Topic Train. Consult.	MUST, EIL	August
Field Monitoring of PVO Projects	MUST, PVOs	Aug, Sept.
Review Financial Status Reports	MUST, USAID	Aug. Sept.
Spec. Topic Seminar	MUST, EIL, PVOs	August
Preparation of 1990 Shilling Budgets	MUST, PVOs, DDD	September
PVO Forum	MUST, PVOs	September

October 1 - December 31, 1989

Review Project Proposals	MUST, PRG	Oct, Ongoing
Liaison with Donors	MUST, Donors	Oct, Ongoing
PVO Monthly Meetings	MUST, PVOs, USAID	Oct, Nov, Dec.
MUST/PVO Newsletter	MUST, PVOs	October
Rev. Financial Status Reports	MUST, USAID	Nov, Dec.
Field Monitoring of PVO Projects	MUST, PVOs	Nov, Dec.
Feedback on PVO Progress Reports	MUST, PVOs	Nov, Dec.
Preparation of Annual Workplan	MUST	December
Review of 1990 Shilling Requests	MUST, PVOs	December

#### V. MUST Training Plan for 1989

MUST training activities will be directed at Somali PVOs, International PVOs, selected MOI staff and MUST staff. Training will respond to the priorities identified in section IIIC and is therefore intended to upgrade the capacity of the participating organizations in the areas of management and administration, project design and implementation and project monitoring and evaluation.

Training will be conducted in Somalia, the United States and selected third countries. Training modes to be utilized include: a) on-the-job training, b) organizational consultancies, c) formal training courses, and d) workshops and seminars.

Somalia-based training will be conducted by MUST staff, the Technical Advisor to MUST, local training consultants contracted by MUST, and external brought to Somalia under the auspices of MUST, USAID, EIL, PVOs or other donors. Of particular importance will be efforts to maximize the impact of training conducted by funded PVOs. When individual PVOs conduct in-country training programs (particularly those utilizing external consultants), efforts will be made to provide places for personnel from other participating PVOs and agencies.

Non-Somalia based training will be coordinated through MUST and be conducted in accordance with USAID Handbook 10 Participant Training regulations.

The following chart outlines the training activities scheduled for 1989 by and through MUST.

MUST Training Activities for 1989

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Format</u>	<u>Beneficiary</u>	<u>Trainer</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Dates</u>
Office Procedures Monitoring & Eval.	OJT OJT	MUST MUST, MOI	Tech. Adv. Tech. Adv.	Mogadishu Mogadishu, Field	Jan, Ongoing Jan, Ongoing
Program Dev. WASH Program Proposal Writing	Ind. Consult. Seminar Ind. Consult	SPVOs, MUST, MOI PVOs, MUST SPVOs, MUST, MOI	Ext. Consult. Ext. Consult. Ext. Consult, Tech. Adv. Ext. Consult.	Mogadishu Belet Weyne Mogadishu Mogadishu	Mar, Apr. March Mar. April
Financial Management	Ind. Consult	SPVOs	Ext. Consult.	Mogadishu	April, May, June
Proposal Development Financial Management Computer Training	Workshop Workshop OJT	PVOs, MOI SPVOs, MOI MUST, MOI	Ext. Consult. Ext. Consult	Mogadishu Mogadishu Mogadishu	April May April, May, June
USAID Part. Train. Procedures Program for. Dev. Manager	OJT Short Course	MUST MUST, MOI	Tech. Adv. AIM	Mogadishu Manila	May, June
To Be Determined Monitoring & Evaluation Computer Training Special Topic	PVO Forum Short Course On-Site Train. Seminar	PVOs MUST, MOI MUST, MOI MUST, PVOs	PVO/MUST Staff EIL Local Consult. Ext. Consult.	Mogadishu U.S.A. Mogadishu Mogadishu	June, Sept. July, August July, Ongoing September

Appendix XI

Roles, Functions, Activities of  
Management Unit for Support and Training (MUST)  
and Experiment in International Living (EIL)

I. Introduction:

The Somalia Development Partners Project established MUST which assists in the management, monitoring and training components of the project.

It was originally planned to have a contractor under USAID, to take the responsibility of the planning, coordination and implementation of the support, training and evaluation of the project. But after the first several months of the project period, the MOI and USAID agreed that MUST office be staffed by Senior Somali Nationals which will be drawn from the Ministry and the private sector. The Somali MUST staff are now under contract to the MOI and are headed by an executive director. Hence, this change puts the MUST directly under the MOI which is the Project Implementation agency of the GSDR.

2. MUST specific functions are:

- a- Acts as a secretariat to PRG and performs all tasks necessary to ensure that the PRG thoroughly reviews and approves proposals for OPG and CAGs in a timely fashion, to carry out its role as a secretariat MUST staff:
  - o Develop procedures and guidance for the review of concept papers and proposals for OPG and CAGs
  - o Conduct initial screening of concept papers and proposals



PVOs, a detailed plan for training of PVO and NGO staffs.

- g- Monitor and evaluate OPGs and CAGs through field and administration reviews.
- h. Develop a list of local consultants that PVOs can utilize in proposal preparation, implementation and monitoring.

3. EIL's Technical Assistance Support to the MUST.

USAID contracted EIL in September 1987 to provide technical assistance services to the PVOP. The contractor is responsible to USAID-Somalia and MOI for the fulfillment of the terms specified in the scope of work for the project. Two types of services are offered:

a Long-term Technical Advisor:

Works under the direction of the Executive Director of the MUST to establish the capacity in the MUST to do the monitoring, management training and technical assistance and conduct evaluations necessary for the project.

b Short-term Technical Consultants:

EIL also provides short-term technical assistance to complement Somali consultants. This service will continue over the life of the project. Specifically, EIL will assist MUST in the areas of:

a Training:

- o Based on needs assessment, design and implementation of a detailed training plan for MOI and MUST staff, including in-country training, U.S. and third country training.
- o Design and implement with, MOI, PVO and USAID a

detailed plan for workshops of PVO staff.

b Monitoring & Management

- o Establish adequate monitoring evaluation & financial control procedures.
- o Monitoring and evaluating all OPGs under the project.
- o Assist in establishing information systems and non-technical support to PVOs participating in the project.

4. Selected Major EIL Technical Assistance Activities since Sept. 87

EIL assisted MUST/MOI, PVOs and USAID in achieving project objectives by carrying out the following major activities.

- o Long-term advisor attended the first PRG meeting on Sept 29, 1987, without voting rights.
- o Assisted in the preparation of project Summary Sheets for providing information about PVOP.
- o Helped work on a management information system with the initiation of a project proposal and implementation tracking system.
- o Prepared with MUST a draft plan and schedule for Participant Training.
- o A training needs assessment was conducted by the Long term advisor for MUST, MOI, participating PVO and Somali PVO staff development.

On-the-job training was provided to two MUST staff in needs assessment design and implementation.

- o EIL technical advisor coordinates contractor activities regarding the provision and scheduling of Short-term Consultants.
- o EIL's home office coordinator visited Mogadishu and assisted contract administration to be transferred from REDSO/ESA in Nairobi to USAID/Mogadishu.
- o EIL/Vermont provides MUST with current data on U.S. and third country training opportunities, as well as on other matters of interest to PVO/NGO Community.
- o Prepared Work Implementation plan of EIL for PVOP.
- o Held meetings with SPVOs.
- o Provision of a short-term Monitoring and Evaluation Consultant for MUST and sub-projects.
- o Supervised the preparation of a Directory of Training Resources in Somalia by a Somali National Consultant.
- o Prepares yearly training plans
- o Helped MUST Executive Director visit Sudan and Kenya to observe PVO/NGO activities in these countries.
- o Helped in the procurement of Computers and Vehicles for MUST
- o Reviews Quarterly Progress Reports of Sub-projects.
- o EIL provided a Management Information System Consultant.
- o Assists in the organization of OPG Sub-project monthly meetings at MUST as well as PRG meeting.
- o EIL assisted MUST to carry out Six workshops for MUST/MOI,

funded PVOs staff. All took six days only.

- o Assisted MUST in the preparation of proposals for non-USAID funding to SPVOs.
- o Assisted in the review process for three participant trainees of the MOI.
- o EIL long-term advisor assisted MUST in a number of key monitoring activities including two field trips.
- o Assists MUST in getting SPVOs registered at USAID but with no success so far.
- o Assisting MUST to recruit strategic planning consultant for helping SPVOs secure funding.
- o Assisted staff training in the use of Computers.

Appendix XII

PVO Development Partners Project

Status of USAID Component of Project Finance, 8/85-2/7/89  
As of 2/22/89 (U.S. dollars - US\$)

	<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Commitments</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Balance**</u>
PVOP Total	\$18,200,000	\$6,236,014	\$4,103,863	\$14,096,137
OPG Total	13,800,000	5,691,000	3,653,642	10,146,358
(Africare OPG)	(3,240,000)	(2,300,000)	(1,777,731)	(1,462,269)
(AMREF OPG)	(1,725,000)	(1,725,000)	(1,200,000)*	(525,000)
(CARE OPG)	(1,200,000)	(800,000)	(348,209)	(851,791)
(CHF OPG)	(1,482,000)			(1,482,000)
(Haqabtir OPG)	(116,000)	(116,000)	(42,976)	(73,024)
(OEF OPG)	(1,468,000)	(750,000)	(284,726)	(1,183,274)
CAGs	2,000,000			2,000,000
Tech. Asst.	1,686,000	\$957,441	241,137	1,444,863
Commodities	322,000	\$111,363	90,400*	231,600
Training/Eval	192,000	\$183,643	76,117	115,883
FSU	200,000	\$42,567	42,567*	157,433
<hr/>				
Totals	\$18,200,000	\$9,044,014	\$4,103,863*	\$14,096,137
<hr/>				

\*Estimated

\*\*Balance: Obligation less expenditures

Prepared by Abdullahi A. Ahmed

USAID, March, 14, 1989

# MUST

Management Unit for Support and Training  
P. O. Box D-526 (Karaan) Mogadishu, Somalia  
Telephone 22568

PVO DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS PROJECT  
SOMALI SHILLING COMPONENT\*  
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1989

PVO	OBLIGATED	COMMITTED	EXPENDED
PVOP	\$6,800,000 (564,400,000)	\$4,141,000 (343,703,000)	\$1,499,434 (124,453,022)
Africare	\$545,000 ( 45,235,000)	\$226,000 ( 18,758,000)	\$204,017 ( 16,933,411)
AMREF	223,000 ( 18,509,000)	130,000 ( 10,790,000)	132,123 ( 10,966,209)
CARE	867,000 ( 71,961,000)	600,000 ( 49,800,000)	262,598 ( 21,795,634)
CHF	500,000 ( 41,500,000)		
HAQABTIR	788,000 ( 65,404,000)	400,000 ( 33,200,000)	274,827 ( 22,810,000)
OEP	770,000 ( 63,910,000)	385,000 ( 31,950,000)	120,655 ( 10,014,365)
MUST	1,400,000 (116,200,000)	1,400,000 (116,200,000)	505,214 ( 41,932,762)
CAG	1,000,000 ( 83,000,000)	1,000,000 ( 83,000,000)	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$6,093,000 (505,719,000)</b>	<b>\$4,141,000 (343,703,000)</b>	<b>\$1,499,434 (124,453,022)</b>
<b>BALANCE</b>	<b>\$707,000 ( 58,681,000)</b>		

\* Exchange rate 83.00 So.Sh. = 1.00 \$US

Released by: Mohamed Said Omer  
Executive Director, MUST  
March 15, 1989.

130

Appendix XIVProposals for a PVOP Management Committee (MC)

1. Role of Committee. A Management Committee (MC) would be formed to give general policy and management oversight for PVOP and MUST, within terms agreed upon by MOI and USAID, and with accountability to those agencies. For the key issues and decisions requiring MOI-USAID concurrence (see issues below), the Committee would recommend specific actions for the concurrent approval of MOI-USAID. The latter would be represented in the Committee, but the two agencies would also reserve the right to expressly veto decisions. That prerogative should be used judiciously and sparingly and should become increasingly unnecessary as the Management Committee earns the confidence of all partners. Issues under the purview of the MC would be:

- a. Appointment, or dismissal of the MUST Executive Director and the processes and criteria for those actions. NOTE: The Executive Director should have the authority to appoint and supervise his own staff, without USAID or MOI concurrence, but according to agreed staffing plans, guidelines and budgets approved and monitored by the Management Committee.
- b. Longer-term and annual plans for PVOP and MUST, respectively.
- c. Longer-term and annual budgets for the overall PVOP and for MUST.
- d. Review of adequacy of financial administration, as indicated in regular financial statements and independent audit reports on MUST and the sub-projects.
- e. Regular review of progress towards all goals and objectives of PVO: sub-projects, technical assistance, training, SPVO involvement, etc. MC may supercede the PRG or become its core element.

2. Guidance of Executive Director. The Management Committee would give general direction and guidance to the MUST Executive Director and, through him, to the entire MUST operation. However, the Executive Director would remain ultimately accountable to MOI and USAID for the leadership and management of MUST.

3. Delegated MC Authority. The MC would not have the authority and/or the legal standing typically invested in a private or nonprofit Board of Directors (in other words, the authority to make decisions without qualifications). The MC would have strong advisory, decision-making and supervisory responsibilities, based on limited delegation of authority from MOI and USAID.

4. Composition of Committee. The MC should be relatively small to assure efficiency, as well as effectiveness, and include the minimal number of persons necessary to adequately represent and be credible

to the key partners.

The six person committee should include a relatively greater non-governmental representation, in order to draw on the individuals most knowledgeable and experienced with PVO activities, approaches and potential.

It is recommended that the MC include the MOI Director General, USAID project manager, Somali private sector representative, Somali PVO sector representative, a USPVO sector representative and the MUST Executive Director, ex-officio and non-voting.

5. Proposal and Project Review. If the Management Committee assumes the OPG grant proposal review and sub-project performance review roles, it might include representatives of the Foreign Affairs, Planning or Finance ministries, when it performs those functions. Ideally, however, the latter ministries could be persuaded to leave the Committee so that the MC can supersede the existing PRG. The MC should review project performance as well as project proposals. It should prepare itself to review and approve small grant proposals for SPVOs.

6. Chairperson. The MC should elect its own chairperson and perhaps consider one-year renewable terms on a rotational basis. To avoid deadlock or serious inefficiencies, issues should be decided by a simple majority (three of the five voting members, provided that the majority includes both the MOI and USAID members). Normally, the MC and PRG will attempt to decide major issues by agreement, to underline the importance of consensus-building.

7. Role of MUST Executive Director. The MUST Executive Director should be an active ex officio member of the MC and assure that the MUST secretariat plays an effective role in preparing the MC for its functions. In the first instance, he would be accountable to the MC in the performance of his duties. Through the MC, he would ultimately be accountable to the co-funding agencies, MOI and USAID. Criteria for his selection, performance and dismissal would be developed and administered by the MC, with the agreement of MOI and USAID. The MC would give support and professional counsel to the Executive Director.

8. Cautions: Creating MC should not just add another layer of accountability. All partners must be willing to give PVOP and MUST a degree of autonomy and defer substantially to the MC and MUST for project policy-making and implementation. A danger also exists that the attempt to introduce this arrangement will prolong the heavy occupation of PVOP/MUST and its sub-projects with both organizational and physical infrastructure. At mid-point in the project, PVO energies need to be directed much more to facilitating development results among local groups and communities.

Appendix XVModel Selection Criteria/Qualifications  
for the Executive Director/MUST

1. Knowledge of, commitment to and ability to articulate and advocate PVO roles in facilitating self-reliant development for Somali-based groups and communities.
2. Experience working with PVOs and in fields related to community and rural development.
3. Experience managing a reasonably complex organization, with good knowledge of such functions as: planning/budgeting, financial administration, and staff development.
4. Demonstrated leadership capabilities, ability to motivate others, and proven negotiating and consensus-building skills.
5. Demonstrated ability to work as a member of a team and to manage committees and working groups.
6. Proven written and oral communication skills, in both Somali and English.
7. Reputation for integrity.
8. University degree(s) in management, social science, development studies or another appropriate field.

**Appendix XVI****Major Documents and Files Consulted in  
Mid-term Evaluation of PVOP**

1. Project Grant Agreement
2. Project Paper
3. Project Operational Manual
4. Sub-Project Grant Agreements
5. EIL/USAID Contract Paper
6. MUST Contract/Agreement Paper
7. PRG Meeting Minutes
8. Quarterly Progress Reports of Sub-projects
9. A monitoring and evaluation plan for MUST
10. Project files at MUST
11. Project files at USAID, Mogadishu
12. Field Visit Reports
13. Project Implementation Reports

Appendix XVIIConditions for AID Registration as of 3/15/89Condition 1:

The LPVO (Local PVO) is a legal entity organized under the laws of the Host Country and is philanthropic and/or public service oriented in purpose. It is not a research organizations, private foundation, university, college or other similarly structured and degree-awarding, accredited institution of learning, nor is it a church or organization engaged in exclusively religious activities.

Comments: (See para 3A)

Condition 2:

The LPVO is a private, non-governmental entity which receives funds from private sources (all non-host country government funds) in the amount of \_\_\_\_\_ (US dollar equivalent).

Sources of Funds:

Private contributions	_____	_____	Percent
Private grants	_____	_____	Percent
Revenue	_____	_____	Percent
US Government	_____	_____	Percent
Other Government	_____	_____	Percent
Other	_____	_____	Percent

Comments: (See para 3B)

Condition 3:

The LPVO is a voluntary organization, receiving voluntary contributions of money, staff time or in-kind support from the general public.

Condition 4:

The LPVO is a nonprofit organization with tax-exempt status under its country's tax laws, if they exist and are appropriate.

Condition 5:

The LPVO is engaged in voluntary charitable or development assistance operations of a type consistent with its articles of incorporation, and within the broad purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act and P.L. 480. Include a brief description of purposes and activities.

Condition 6:

The LPVO has an acceptable system to account for the receipt and expenditure of USG funds and prepares an annual financial statement

ORGANIZATION	PROJECT TITLE	OPG/CAG	CONCEPT PAPER RECEIVED	CONCEPT PAPER REVIEWED	ACTION TAKEN BY PRG	PROJECT PROPOSAL RECEIVED	PROJECT PROPOSAL REVIEWED	ACTION TAKEN BY PRG	GRANT AGREEMENT SIGNED
AFRICARE	Northeast Initiatives Project	OPG	April '86	May '86	Approved	Aug. '86	Nov. '86	Approved	March '87
AMREF	Luuq District Health Services and PHC Training Project	OPG	March '85	May '86	Approved	Sept. '86	Oct. '86	Approved	March '87
CARE/Somalia	Rural Development Initiative Project	OPG	April '86	May '86	Approved	June '86	July 2, 19, 30, '86	Approved	April '87
CHF	Mogadishu Peripheral Area Shelter and Services Improvement Project	OPG	June '87	July '87	Approved	Feb. '88	March '88 Dec. '88	Approved	
CLUSA				May '86					
HAQABTIR	Integrated Rural Development Project	OPG	April '86	May '86	Approved	Aug. '86	Sept. '86 Oct. '86	Approved	May '87
IHAP	Middle Shabelle Village Development Project	OPG		Nov. '86	Rejected				
OEF	Production and Marketing of Fuel Wood and Agricultural Products	OPG	May '86	July '86	Rejected				
OEF	Small Agricultural Enterprises Development Project	OPG	March '86	May '86	Approved	Nov. '87	May '87	Approved	Nov. '87
PFP	Somali Rural Enterprise development Program	OPG	July '86	Aug. '86	Approved		Dec. '86	Rejected	
PCI	Primary Health Care Training, Development and Commodity Support Project	OPG		May '86	Approved	June '86 Aug. '86	July '86 Aug. 19, 21, '86	Rejected	
SCF	Community Based Rural Development Program for Qorioley District	OPG	March '86	May '86	Moved Project to Bakool				
SCF	Bakool Integrated Rural Development Project	OPG	Oct. '86	Nov. '86	Approved	May '87	July 9, 30, '87	Rejected	
VITA	An Agricultural Development Program for Jubba River Valley of Somalia	OPG	April '86	May '86	Rejected				
VITA	Nugaal Region Rural Development Project	OPG	Dec. '86	Jan. '87 Feb. '87	Approved	Aug. '87	Sept. '87 Nov. '88	Rejected	

127

120