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**Mid-Term Evaluation**

**Sahel Regional Institutions Project  
(No. 625-0975)**

by

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation examines the attitude shift on issues of regional development and aid coordination which occurred in the Sahel over the past decade. The focus of the evaluation is on donor-Sahelian collaboration--and the two Secretariats responsible for fostering this collaboration. The CILSS Secretariat was created in 1973 and the Club Secretariat in 1976. In the intervening years donors have channeled over \$40 million through the Secretariats to help promote development in the Sahel. The principal issue is how effective have these Secretariats--and their donor sponsors--been in fostering a regional framework within which member states and donors collaboratively pursue agreed on objectives.

As a newcomer to the development arena, the CILSS/Club in 1976 had to carve out a niche for itself. The Secretariats decided that strategy formulation--as opposed to macro-planning or project development--would be their area of specialization. Enormous energy was expended in drafting (and updating) a regional development strategy for the Sahel in the expectation that it would be used as a reference document for preparing national development plans and aid policies. Over the years, however, there has been little evidence that Sahelian planners or donors have heeded the CILSS/Club "global-view" of the Sahel's development needs. As a result the Secretariats moved away from regional strategizing to explore special themes or opportunities (e.g., private sector, decentralization, trade flows).

The CILSS/Club can rightfully take credit during the 1980s, for helping to change Sahelian attitudes on the need for more open discussions on cereals-related policy issues. The airing of these issues by the Secretariats, at the regional level, enabled planners and donors to engage in more productive dialogue at the national level. As the "protectionist debate" continued into 1988-89, however, it became counterproductive and failed to recognize that micro-level policy preoccupations should be less focused on cereals or even on crop production and more on the household as a set of enterprises.

The Secretariats have used sector working groups as their principal analytical tool over the years. Recently, more emphasis has been placed on inter-sectoral ramifications because of concerns about overly narrow sector prescriptions. There is now need for more involvement of nationals from the private sector (e.g., NGOs, consulting firms) in the working-groups to help maintain report quality and objectivity.

In its role as a catalyst for development action, the CILSS/Club has had difficulty translating regional discussion, or sensitizing into action planning at the national level. Expectations of a significant filtering down of CILSS/Club ideas as Sahelians returned home from conferences have not been met--at least in the anticipated time-frame. The Secretariats have also

had difficulty trying to lobby directly at the national level to convert CILSS/Club sector recommendations into action. On the other hand, the Secretariats have been effective in providing support and guidance for fledgling development networks (e.g., MIS) throughout the Sahel.

Much of what has passed for as Sahelian-donor policy dialogue has been serious and protracted debate among the donors themselves. The idea of using the CILSS/Club as a regional forum for policy dialogue was never part of the CILSS Presidents' vision. This suggests that the CILSS/Club policy dialogue effort is "at the wrong level--it is at the national level that significant dialogue has to occur."

The CILSS/Club has hosted more than a score of regional meetings over the years to help donors better coordinate their development approaches. These sessions have been more successful in helping donors understand the rationale behind their differences than in melding program strategies or standardizing aid procedures. Since the formation of the donor advisory group in 1986, there has been an improvement in the quality of dialogue among donors--and with the Secretariats. At the same time, the more disciplined approach has highlighted short-term political, economic and social realities which can inhibit donor coordination.

The task for the CILSS/Club in the 1990s is not to try to figure out where the Sahel's regional economic future lies, any more than that is the principal task of governments or donors. The Secretariats' role in this decade will be to help prepare the Sahelian peoples to capitalize on whatever options may emerge and to help create an open, nurturing environment congenial to innovation. Better information and data are key conditions for helping Sahelians to discover and capitalize on their emerging options. The CILSS/Club, with its considerable experience in information brokering over the years in the Sahel, is in an excellent position to undergird the whole nurturing process with a Sahel Development Networking System.

The Sahel Development Networking System (SDNS) does not call for new institutions, large staff build-ups or significant new budget outlays. The SDNS is largely a matter of actualizing unused potential within the CILSS/Club system, breathing life into relationships and linkages that now exist only on paper, and bringing a more disciplined approach to the 'nurturing process.' The SDNS should be focused on the CILSS/Club's two emphasis areas, food security and environmental management. A strategy covering these two areas should be drafted as soon as possible in order to determine the relative priority of existing and planned CILSS/Club initiatives and, thereby, improve resource allocation within the system. The CILSS/Club workplan for 1991 should be revised to reflect the priorities established in the new mandate related strategy.

The CILSS/Club should rely more extensively on its regional arm for applied research coordination, the Institute of the Sahel (INSAH). The Institute has made considerable progress in recent years in putting in place an organizational structure, work program and financing arrangements which now permit it to address mandate areas assigned to it at the creation of the CILSS structure. The CILSS/Club group should come in time to regard INSAH as the central data base source for the elaboration and revision of all Secretariat strategies and initiatives. To this end, there should be a better rationalization of the division of labor between the CILSS Secretariat and INSAH. CILSS should assume responsibility for policy analysis, strategy formulation, and resource mobilization. The regional institute should have responsibility for collating, synthesizing and disseminating project results and research information through Sahelian networks.

The principal role of the Donor Advisory Group (DAG) in the 1990s will be to assist the Secretariats in creating and strengthening the Sahel Development Networking System (SDNS). This will call for a much more structured exchange of information between the donor community and the CILSS/Club systems. The CILSS/Club/INSAH should take responsibility for the initiation and maintenance of a region-wide inventory on research activities currently being carried out in the Sahel in the two CILSS/Club mandate areas. The DAG will then work with the Secretariats to determine gaps in the research effort and establish priorities for future donor collaboration on research endeavors.

Given the limited opportunity for genuine policy dialogue between Sahelians and donors within the regional CILSS/Club framework, more attention should be devoted by the Secretariats to supporting selective policy dialogue efforts at the national level--through technical analysis and advice. Efforts to create donor coordination 'products' like the Food Aid Charter should continue. The process of coordinating is beneficial even when the result is a qualified success. The CILSS/Club 'high-level' meetings should be viewed not so much as occasions for policy dialogue as opportunities to sensitize senior officials--both donor and Sahelian--through carefully structured presentations and discussions entailing specific follow-up.

The Secretariats should undertake a more systematic assessment of their audience, i.e., the size, composition and information needs of various CILSS/Club user segments. There is also a need for periodic surveying of literature on the Sahel that originates outside the CILSS/Club nexus. The best of this material should be culled into an abstract review, which is development-action oriented and scholarly in tone.

CILSS/Club colloquia and workshops should be part of a well thought-out strategy aimed at furthering development progress on the ground. Sensitizing cannot be an end-goal, rather it is a

means to effect some specific change over time. Consequently, a methodology for assessing the impact of CILSS/Club initiatives should be incorporated into each activity workplan.

Initiatives conceived by the Secretariats or the DAG must be embraced and internalized by the Sahelian member countries--if their impact is to be felt in the Sahel. Trying to accelerate or circumvent the process by staging 'donor happenings' will be illusory in terms of development progress. In this connection, there should be a review of the recent CILSS/Club decision to open a donor-financed office at the ADB in Abidjan to promote trade between the Sahelian and the coastal countries. Without greater evidence of Sahelian interest in this endeavor, manifested by material support, there is little chance that the trade office will make a difference in this area of crucial importance.

In selecting themes and initiatives for future CILSS/Club concentration, the Secretariats should coordinate carefully with other West African regional organizations. In particular, the CILSS/Club Secretariats need to familiarize themselves with current CEAO program plans and organizational strengths.

In the future, financial support for CONACILSS should be borne by the member states to reflect their recognition of the need for the CONACILSS agency.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Sometimes the headlines do not seem to jibe with the small print. "Segou Encounter Great Success"--"Donors Congratulate Club for Brainstorming"--"CILSS Regains Credibility." These plaudits are usually accompanied by more sobering references to the unfolding Sahelian reality: "cereal imports have quadrupled since 1965...exports have declined since 1975...Sahelian external debt proportionately heavier than Latin America's."

Of late, a note of angst has even crept into CILSS/Club documents:

Westerners...can clearly see that (Sahelian) countries are not working well, what with the all pervasive corruption, the nonsensical decision-making, the utter reluctance to take the right decision... Westerners do not realize that they are looking at a facade of laws, rules and regulations, and Western-style organization -- and that behind the facade lies a different way of thinking and social relationships with which Westerners are not conversant...[I]f they were conscious of the reality behind the scenes, one wonders whether they would have spent so much money in re-surfacing the facade by building new institutions or strengthening those that already existed.<sup>1</sup>

This is quite different thinking from that expressed by OECD chairman, who wrote in 1976 that:

The prospects for the Sahel are more encouraging than had been previously realized. The consensus of the studies, and of the Club du Sahel meeting in Dakar, was that, despite a difficult climate, with additional resources the region could achieve self-sustaining economic growth and a decent standard of living for its peoples. An important study by the FAO concluded that the Sahel could reach food self-sufficiency within the next fifteen years, with primary emphasis on dry-land agriculture supplemented by small irrigation works. The constraints on food production are not natural ones -- cultivable land is available, the necessary technologies are known, and the irrigation potential is practically untapped. Rather, the principal constraints are those of appropriate management of human and financial resources.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> CILSS/Club Joint Workplan for 1990-91, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> OECD Publication, Nov. 1976, on The Club des Amis du Sahel, p. 178.

What has transpired in the Sahel since the 1976 signing of "the contract for a generation", to cause some to question the efficacy of official assistance -- indeed, even to suggest that donor aid may be becoming a hindrance? The CILSS/Club Work Plan for 1990-91 indicates that "there is real anxiety about the widening gap between the state and the non-government sector. The instability of the economic and social environment is fueled by poorly defined ground rules of which the majority of players are often unaware, unclear land registration codes, and the prevailing conviction that the state can be used for one's own personal profits, to the detriment of other members of the community. There are even grounds to wonder whether official development assistance ... is not exacerbating this situation or at least perpetuating it."<sup>3</sup>

This evaluation examines the attitude-shift on issues of regional development and aid coordination which has occurred within donor-Sahelian circles over the past decade. The intent is to explore the reasons behind the shift in order to extract insights which can be useful in planning future assistance. No attempt is made to assess the overall impact of multi-donor assistance in the Sahel region even though that is undoubtedly one of the underlying factors in the attitude shift which has occurred. Such an exercise would require considerable resources as well as a methodology not yet perfected. The evaluation does not even try to assess the effectiveness of A.I.D. assistance in the Sahel. This would entail a broad sampling of evaluations for A.I.D. sponsored projects throughout the Sahel as well as extensive ground truthing--once again, a very time and resource intensive undertaking.

The focus of the evaluation is on donor-Sahelian collaboration--and the two Secretariats responsible for fostering this collaboration. The CILSS Secretariat was created in 1973 and the Club Secretariat in 1976. In the intervening years, donors have channeled approximately \$40<sup>4</sup> million through the two Secretariats to help promote development in the Sahel. The

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<sup>3</sup> Sahel D (89) 336 (Nov. 1989), p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> The donors have given the Club some \$20 million over the years. CILSS will have received at least as much because it also manages project funds. Unfortunately, "attempts to assemble necessary data [for reasonable estimate of total donor funding to the Executive Secretariat over the years] have proven fruitless due to dispersion and absence of financial documentation." Personal communication, OAR/Burkina, fax of 28 June 1990.

principal issue is how effective these Secretariats--and their donor sponsors--have been in fostering a regional framework within which member states and donors collaboratively pursue agreed-on objectives?

In evaluating the effectiveness of the CILSS/Club Secretariats, one must heed the advice of those who warn against "pigeonholing the Club du Sahel as an institution, an administration or a bureaucracy cast in the same mold as other development agencies....The Club is quite unlike other governmental or cooperative organizations in the development field, since it is an informal arrangement with no legal status, no constitution, no statutes, internal regulations or rules."<sup>5</sup> The observations in the A.I.D. 1987 Project Paper are also instructive: "the nature of the mandate assigned to the CILSS Club--'to serve as a forum, encourage cooperation, inform and create awareness'-- does not lend itself to quantitative analysis. Even where specific results have been delineated (e.g. improve national sectoral strategy), "it is difficult to prove causality between a CILSS/Club action and a successful national strategy change."<sup>6</sup>

With these pointers in mind, this assessment has shied away from the customary input-output analysis to concentrate on functional areas where most of CILSS/Club energies have been expended over the years. We have tried to trace the effect of CILSS/Club efforts in five areas:

- drafting regional strategies.
- serving as a catalyst for development action.
- structuring policy dialogue.
- facilitating donor coordination.
- functioning as an information clearing house.

While mindful of the need to draw conclusions about CILSS/Club performance, we have been even more interested in accurately capturing what the CILSS/Club experience has been in each of these five areas. Judgments about the "success" or "failure" of particular CILSS/Club initiatives can be subjective or short-sighted. By contrast, a thorough exploration of what has been

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<sup>5</sup> For the definitive account of the CILSS/Club history from 1973-84 -- from the donor perspective -- see the "Club du Sahel: an Experiment in International Cooperation," OECD, Anne DeLattre and Arthur M. Fell.

<sup>6</sup> AID, PP, p-C1.

tried, how it fared, what lessons can be drawn and where the experience leads--promises more value for decision-makers. For this reason, the evaluators did not limit their review to the period covered by the current project paper (i.e., three years). It was felt that a more penetrating analysis of the CILSS/Club experience could be made by placing recent initiatives in the longer term context.

The evaluation was carried out by two consultants, Jim Kelly and Gordon Appleby, during April and May, 1990. They reviewed an extensive sampling of CILSS/Club documents (see Annex F) and interviewed a representative group of A.I.D., Sahelian and donor officials familiar with CILSS/Club operations (See Annex G).

## II. THE SETTING

It all began in September 1973 when the presidents of six West African states<sup>7</sup> banded together in Ougadougou to seek outside assistance in the face of a drought that had ravaged their region. While concerned mainly with emergency aid, the Presidents also drew attention to the need for a longer term approach to "drought curtailment" and, for that reason, set up a Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Prevention in the Sahel (CILSS). The Committee was authorized to set up a Secretariat whose mandate evolved, over the next two years, into "responsibility for developing an indigenous capacity for regional planning, coordination and evaluation of programs and mobilization of funds."

As the drought emergency operation wound down, the "donors began to realize that they could not continue to pour millions of dollars into the Sahel without some kind of regional framework and a much improved donor coordination system." In 1976 it was decided to create a "Club des Amis du Sahel" which would enter into a "contract for a generation" with the Sahelians to foster the long term development of their region. The Club set up a small Secretariat in Paris, housed by the OECD, to facilitate donor-Sahelian interaction. The Club Secretariat's role was to:

- support the work of the CILSS.
- sensitize the international community about Sahelian development prospects and needs.
- encourage cooperation between donors in order to implement projects envisaged by Sahel governments, and facilitate the mobilization of development resources.
- be a forum in which the Sahel states can outline their policies and priorities for medium and long term development and discuss them with the donors.

The Club Secretariat and the CILSS Secretariat have worked closely together over the years. As one USAID staffer put it recently, "it's hard here in the field to differentiate between them since they normally work jointly on endeavors." The Secretariats have hosted numerous and well attended conferences and workshops, drafted model sectoral strategies, and acted as an able catalyst for development dialogue throughout the Sahel region. The Secretariats have also served as an important information clearing

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<sup>7</sup> Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Burkina Faso. Gambia later joined the group, as did Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau.

house on Sahelian development issues for the donors as well as the CILSS member countries. The CILSS Secretariat has been heavily engaged in project implementation activities in addition to regional planning and analysis. The Club Secretariat has concentrated on global and sectoral strategizing and, in recent years, on "special themes" development. The two Secretariats issue a joint annual work plan.

Donors have provided at least \$40 million in support of the Secretariats over the years -- \$20 million for the Club and at least as much for the CILSS. Some donors--the Canadians, the Dutch, the US and the French--have been actively involved in the two Secretariats' planning and operations. A.I.D. has been a key participant in the CILSS/Club process from the beginning.<sup>8</sup> A special A.I.D. project was set up in 1978 to provide financial support for the two Secretariats under which approximately \$12.2 million has been transferred (\$5.6 million for the Club and \$6.6 million for the CILSS). These funds have been used to cover operating expenses for the Secretariats, support for conferences and workshops, special studies and evaluations, and funding for U.S. advisors.

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<sup>8</sup> Indeed, "the idea to consider setting up a study and coordinating mechanism for the Sahel came from the United States[in 1975]." The Club du Sahel, op.cit., p. 40.

### III. ASSESSING CILSS/CLUB EFFECTIVENESS

As a newcomer to the development arena, the CILSS/Club had to carve out a niche for itself. The Secretariats decided that strategy-formulation--as opposed to macro-planning or project development--would be their area of specialization.<sup>9</sup> This led to a focus on (1) a Sahel regional strategy, (2) sector assessments with a special emphasis on (3) cereals policy and (4) anti-desertification. The first three topics will be treated in this section, anti-desertification in Section III-B.

#### A. STRATEGIZING

##### 1. Search for a Regional Global Strategy

The Club's first attempt at strategy formulation was eye-catching.<sup>10</sup> It produced the Ottawa strategy an integrated development perspective on the Sahel which could be used to guide investment decisions throughout the region. This strategy framework, with its synthesis overview and quantified targets, was useful to donor officials, in 1977-78, as they urged their legislatures to underwrite a massive program of rehabilitation for the Sahel.<sup>11</sup> But the regional strategy was rather quickly mothballed because of the Sahelian reaction to donor regional planning.

While mindful of the donors' need for an overarching strategy, the CILSS ministers were concerned about the amount of time<sup>12</sup> the donors were taking "to study constraints" without making any significant funding commitments to the implementation of long term programs. The Ministers urged that the Club's focus be shifted from global strategizing to a CILSS list of some 600 projects

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<sup>9</sup> See DeLattre/Fell (p. 92): "The Club did not question the utility of [the planning and project] approaches but felt that they were not in and of themselves sufficient."

<sup>10</sup> The Club's comprehensive plan for the Sahel was hailed by OECD which suggested that "the Club's approach should be supported generally by bolder assistance programs and more flexible aid procedures." OECD Review for 1978, p. 27.

<sup>11</sup> AID had submitted to Congress its "Proposal for a Long Term Comprehensive Development for the Sahel" in 1976. The program was to unfold in three phases--1976-80, 1981-90, and 1991-2000) requiring an estimated \$15-20 billion of multi-donor financing.

<sup>12</sup> The Regional Strategy exercise involved 84 consultants and took ten months to complete.

(reflecting a \$3 billion commitment) known as the First Generation Program. "Some of these projects were important, some trivial, some first rate, others of marginal utility."<sup>13</sup> The Club spent considerable energy during 1978-80 culling promising project ideas from the first generation program list and fielding design teams to develop project portfolios. This led to donor financing for some of the First Generation activities, but the CILSS/Club suggestion that approximately 60% of this program was eventually financed never was taken seriously within the donor community. Most donors ignored the First Generation Program and continued to select project activities based on their own surmise of priority issues in the region together with discussions with individual Ministers in national capitals.

Beginning in 1980, the Club Secretariat was able to start moving away from the auctioning of First Generation projects to more substantive exchanges with donor and Sahelian programmers. Increasingly, energies became focused on sector level strategy formulation (Section III A-3).

By the close of 1983, however, donors were beginning to agonize over the effectiveness of aid assistance to the Sahel. As the Club Secretariat put it at the time, "perhaps it was illusory to believe that the numerous activities undertaken would lead to visible results within a few years, but we have yet to notice even the earliest signs of change in the principal negative trends... in spite of the efforts of the Sahelians, in spite of the growth of foreign aid, in spite of the Ottawa and Kuwait strategies."<sup>14</sup> The Fifth High Level meeting in 1983 produced a recommendation that the Secretariat devise "a new strategy framework that would be more global, more future oriented, more coherent."<sup>15</sup> By late 1984, the Club had drafted "a revised, broadbased strategy unlike those formulated in Ottawa and Kuwait which had emphasized the productive sectors." The fifty-six page document covered the development

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<sup>13</sup> DeLattre/Fell, p. 54.

<sup>14</sup> DeLattre/Fell p 79. The malaise within the CILSS/Club was compounded by the CILSS Secretariat's identity crisis: "the Secretariat was confronted by member states intent on restricting its function to fundraising with no responsibilities for brainstorming activities, monitoring, or evaluation. The crisis was souring the working relationship between the Club and CILSS...draining their synergism." See CILSS Executive Secretary Activity Report for 1989, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> Club 1984 Revised Strategy, p. 1.

front and aimed at "serving as a basis for a regional program of action."<sup>16</sup>

The new revised strategy did not take hold either among the CILSS member states or in the donor community. Within a year (October 1985), the Club Secretariat issued a "special think-piece" with the following reflection:

"Why has the new strategy's impact been so restricted and why hasn't it been used to promote better coordinated activities between donors and Sahelians countries... [since] the analyses and proposals in the various strategy documents did not seem to be disputed by the Sahelians or donors? Shouldn't the strategy serve as a document for preparing national plans and aid policies ...as a basis for bilateral discussions, consultative groups, roundtables, etc."<sup>17</sup>

The Secretariat concluded that there were two areas where some new thinking was in order: (i) linkages between Sahel countries and coastal countries--which were poorly understood yet important for the Sahel's future; and (ii) linkages between the sectors covered in the CILSS/Club strategy--to better understand overlapping policy constraints. Recognizing that these were obstacles which the CILSS/Club may have failed to recognize, the Secretariats decided to undertake a futures study to provide an added dimension to drought control and development strategy.<sup>18</sup>

In October 1986, the Secretariats once again reassessed the effectiveness of the CILSS/Club development strategy and decided that it had produced some positive results such as:

- good issues had been raised and frankly discussed on policy and sectoral problems.
- relationships had been highlighted between economic and social policies of the Sahelian states, on the one hand, and the success of development projects and programs on the other.
- knowledge of the Sahel had improved and new policies proposed.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Sahel D (85) 281, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> ibid, p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> CILSS/Club workplan for 1987-88, p. 9.

At the same time, the Secretariats felt "that the strategy had not had sufficient influence on the policies and planning of Sahelian states, nor on donor policies and programs. Dialogue between the Sahelian states and donors had progressed but not achieved adequate results for effective coordination of action." Consequently, "a restricted committee of Sahelian and non-Sahelian experts was being established to direct the CILSS/Club Secretariats in drawing up a newly revised strategy to be submitted to the Donor Advisory Group and The Council of Ministers by the end of 1987."<sup>20</sup>

The restricted committee was never formed. Instead, the Secretariats decided in October 1987 to distribute the much reworked<sup>21</sup> Futures Study in lieu of a revised regional strategy. The Futures Study was intended to be provocative as it tackled a number of subjects considered virtually taboo in the past, particularly cultural and political factors and their impact on development programs and policies. After reviewing the study in Bern, the Donor Advisory Group (DAG) found it to be "bold, clear, and instructive"--required reading, especially for Sahelian authorities.

The Futures Study had real shock value as it vividly highlighted the key constraints to development in the Sahel. However, the study offered very little by way of program insights to overcome these constraints and, consequently, could not be promoted as a strategy for the region. But the Secretariats used the study as the next best thing to a strategy--i.e., "a framework that can provide impetus to the undertaking of development." They called a conference of Sahelian journalists in Dakar in June 1989 to discuss follow-up to the Futures Study. They also organized a seminar on the subject for the CILSS ministers in N'Djamena.

The next step was to approach donors for financial assistance to carry out national-level Futures Studies--as had been done in Senegal a few months earlier. The DAG donors in December 1989 "agreed that the study is still highly relevant to the work of Sahel governments and donor agencies...[but] the objective now must be to apply the study's methodology, approach and conclusions to the real context." The DAG discussion "highlighted the limits and value of these studies and decided that donors would not actively encourage further national studies."<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> CILSS/Club workplan for 1987-88, p. 9.

<sup>21</sup> The 1986 draft of the Futures Study had not been well received--concerns being expressed about the methodology used, the quality of the analysis and the sparing use of Sahelian experts particularly on socio-political issues.

<sup>22</sup> Sahel CR (89) 64.

At present, there is no intention to resurrect the CILSS/Club regional development strategy which was last reviewed in 1987. For the past year, the Secretariats have been operating under a "special themes" strategy. The two major themes which will be controlling in the future are: (i) continued research on development of the private sector and decentralization and (ii) examination of agricultural, ecological and food policies.<sup>23</sup>

## ■ CONCLUSIONS

The CILSS/Club experience with regional strategizing has been frustrating. The Secretariats poured enormous energy into preparing an initial synthesis document (which underwent two major revisions) with the expectation that it would be used as "a reference document for preparing national development plans and aid policies...and as a basis for bilateral discussions, consultative groups, roundtables, etc."<sup>24</sup> Yet, there is little evidence that Sahelian planners have utilized these strategies in strengthening regional coordination or formulating national plans. Donors have paid scant heed to CILSS/Club priorities when targeting their aid funds.<sup>25</sup> Why has the CILSS/Club regional strategy not fared better?

The need for a Sahel regional strategy first arose in 1975 when donors were faced with the task of accelerating economic growth in six of the poorest countries in the world. Given the bleak economic prospects for at least three of the countries, it was decided to cast the investment plan in a regional perspective to highlight the benefits that could accrue to the region as a whole through increased agricultural production, diversification and expanded trade. The regional strategy was also needed, in some donor capitals, to persuade legislatures that there existed a well thought-out plan for the rehabilitation of the Sahel which the donors could agree to and implement in concert.

As things turned out, the 1976 CILSS/Club investment plan was useful as an analytical framework or economic profile of the countries in the Sahel region. However, it never acquired the status of a strategy for regional development despite its various revisions. A strategy implies agreement on direction, defined

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<sup>23</sup> Sahel D (89) 336, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup> Sahel D (85) 281, p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> For example, only 4 percent of development assistance was earmarked for dryland farming at a time when CILSS/Club viewed it as the top priority area. Aid to the forestry-environment management area currently represents barely 1 percent of total aid. See Sahel D (90) 341, p.2.

objectives. As we have seen, such a broad based agreement was never worked out between the Sahelians and donors. Nor should we be surprised. Studies have shown how difficult it is for organizations with a "global view"<sup>26</sup> of development to work out effective agreements at the regional level. Successful agreements are more likely to be worked out by "mandate-specific" regional units focused on very task-specific areas. The more focused and technical service-providing organizations--in research, training, education, infrastructure--are the regional organizations with potential for advancing regional strategies.<sup>27</sup>

The implications for the CILSS/Club are clear. The idea of up-dating or revising the broad regional strategy to reflect the CILSS/Club "global view" of the Sahel development task should be dropped--if it has not already been.<sup>28</sup> The Secretariats strategy formulation efforts should be narrowly confined to their two mandate-specific areas--food security and environmental management.

## 2. Search for a Regional Cereals Policy

The search for a comprehensive regional cereals policy for the Sahel can be traced to the Nouakchott Colloquy convened in July 1979. As one participant put it:

Two distinct positions emerged: one the classic stance in favor of trade liberalization and the transfer of purchasing operations to the private sector... and the other which aimed at freeing the

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<sup>26</sup> The CILSS/Club "global view" strategy has encompassed "drought control and economic and social development in the Sahel in order to promote the formulation, adaptation, and coordination of the development policies of the Sahel countries and programs, on the one hand, and of those of aid donors on the other." Sahel D (86) 297, p. 8.

<sup>27</sup> "Regionalism and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa", Vol. I, Applied Development Economics Inc., (Oct. 1988), pp. i and 11.

<sup>28</sup> In an interview with evaluators in April 1990, the Club Secretariat Director indicated that he had no intention of reviving a CILSS/Club regional development strategy.

Sahelian countries from economic neo-colonialism resulting from North-South imbalance. No definite conclusions were drawn but most of the key issues involved in successful agricultural development were covered in the session.<sup>29</sup>

Following the Nouakchott Colloquy, the Secretariats set up an ad hoc group on the Economics of Food Production which met once or twice a year between 1980-85. Through this group, the CILSS/Club was able "to improve information on cereals related issues, demonstrate how agricultural and cereals policies affect the success of development projects and point to the positive and negative effects of food aid. Attempts were also made to assess the pace of the cereals policies reform in each of the CILSS countries."<sup>30</sup>

Perceptions on rates-of-progress can vary, of course, depending on who is measuring. By 1986 some were suggesting that "very little progress had been made in cereals policy reform since Nouakchott.... A plethora of seminars and working groups enabled the Club to define the conditions needed to optimize the positive effects of aid...but the donors themselves and the CILSS were never able to agree on the ways and means to create the appropriate conditions."<sup>31</sup> A few believed otherwise, however, noting that "there were promising signs of liberalization in some countries... even though most Sahelian intellectuals and officials do not share the view that competitive markets are more efficient and more beneficent as allocation devices than...public sector administrative controls."<sup>32</sup>

By late 1986, the CILSS and Club Secretariats were increasingly distracted by the mounting Sahelian dependency on imported rice and wheat (approximately a five-fold increase over a 20-year period) despite growing surpluses of locally grown coarse grains. Deciding that the Nouakchott recommendations had been based on "scarcity" and hence no longer appropriate, the Secretariats convened a Cereals Policy Conference in Mindelo, Cape Verde. The conference working papers covered a number of pressing topics, but the notion that gained the most momentum among the

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<sup>29</sup> Michel Casse, "Nouakchott to Mindelo -- Conferences with a difference?" 1987, p. 2.

<sup>30</sup> 1987-88 CILSS/Club Joint Work Plan, pp. 11-12.

<sup>31</sup> See Jacques Giri, "The Regional Cereals Market", 1988, p. 1. and Michel Casse, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>32</sup> Elliot Berg, The Competitiveness of Sahelian Agriculture.

delegates was the idea of a "protected Sahelian grain market." The Secretariats commissioned an analysis of the issue--"Regional Protected Cereals Market: First Exploration of a New Idea"--which was circulated in November 1987. The paper proposed free movement of cereals and harmonization of subsidies within a four country orbit and the imposition of higher tariffs on all imported cereals.

The issue of protectionism would consume considerable CILSS/Club attention and energy over the next two years. Donor differences over the issue surfaced immediately at the DAG session in Bern (Dec 1987) with the "liberalist" element (the North Americans) suggesting that protection would be a "dangerous step" and the protectionists (the Europeans) suggesting it was the only way to check the alarming trend in rice and wheat imports.<sup>33</sup>

At the Tucson DAG meeting, one year later, "discussions showed that the problems involved [in introducing a protected regional cereals market] are extremely complex and, two years after the Mindelo conference, points of view are now more varied and less clear-cut....Opinions differ, in particular, on whether to advise Sahelian governments to adopt protectionist policies or whether such a policy would be contrary to their interests." The DAG group concluded that a restricted CILSS/Club committee should be set up to bring together experts from the international community and from West Africa to examine the work of the different donor agencies, to commission further studies, and to draw conclusions.<sup>34</sup>

In the meantime, A.I.D. had financed two international meetings of researchers to shed light on the protectionist issue, and France had financed a series of studies with IRAM focused on regional trade and markets. As a result, considerable new information became available on the significant extent of informal trade flows throughout West Africa and the effect of government regulations (tariffs, quotas, etc.) on these flows.

The Club Secretariat had also asked the two consultants most heavily engaged in Club cereals policy analysis over the years to update their views on the controversial issue. Jacques Giri pointed out that the protection concept had been "warmly discussed among Sahelians ... but one would be at a loss to find one measure taken by a Sahel government over the past two years to implement the idea." He suggested that Sahelian as well as donor practices were more driven by short-term political and social considerations than by notions of food self-sufficiency or agricultural

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<sup>33</sup> See Bern DAG Minutes, 1987, pp. 2 - 3.

<sup>34</sup> See Tucson DAG Minutes, 1988, p. 4.

modernization.<sup>35</sup> Since governments are not ready to establish "standardized free-trade areas surrounded by a uniform customs barrier jointly managed by all member countries...it seems more realistic to promote...a regional space for concerted action which should range far beyond Sahel countries and cover the whole West Africa region."

Elliot Berg pointed out that "a protected regional market calls for agreement on the level of protection, the level of input subsidies to domestic producers, adjustments for variations in exchange rates, and sharing of tariff revenues." He believed that it would be hard to find any historical precedents for an agreement covering so large an array of policies, especially those that impinge on food supplies. He concluded that a protected market "has to be regarded as highly unlikely to succeed in the Sahel."<sup>36</sup>

Shifting the focus from a "rigid regional protection" to "a coordinated regional market," the CILSS/Club committee invited over 100 public officials, traders and researchers to Lome in November 1989 to examine "how trade dynamics can be reconciled with production dynamics at the same time as maintaining food security." Fortified by several interesting research papers, the conference discussions ranged widely over informal trade networks, unrecorded regional trade, valuation of the CFA, diversification and comparative advantage, and the use of food aid. In a summary of the meeting, the Secretariats reported that:

Participants raised a number of questions on the limits of the current approach adopted by the CILSS/Club

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<sup>35</sup> According to Giri, "the donors are looking for market outlets, however small, for their agricultural surpluses; they are even prepared to donate surpluses ... And the Sahelian governments are quite willing to accept these gifts. As for aid programs aimed at modernizing Sahel agriculture -- these are really designed to accommodate the conscience of both parties".

<sup>36</sup> Berg was struck by "how small a place recent literature leaves for Sahelian innovation and entrepreneurship... It sees the future as a projection of the past, with some marginal changes ... Whereas, a lesson emerges from the recent past -- the Sahel's future can only be perceived and shaped by government planners and their donor partners to a small extent ...[O]n a micro level, policy consideration should be less focused on cereals, or even on crop production, and more on the household as a set of enterprises. The future of the region may lie less in crop production and more in livestock, in village industry, or even in large scale migration to forest zones."

Secretariats. Despite the considerable efforts deployed for the Lomé seminar, it was seen that it is no easy matter to obtain the large scale participation of the CILSS neighbors, i.e., the Gulf of Guinea countries. Participants wondered whether an approach based on studies and seminars was too limited and whether it would be better to discuss the coordination of agricultural policies within a specific geographical area for a single product, such as rice.<sup>37</sup>

At the DAG session in Montpellier, a month later, several participants suggested that the Lomé Seminar draft synthesis "had not reflected the varied analysis put forward at the meeting on how the productivity of Sahelian agriculture could be increased ... too much attention had been given to the production of local cereals, supporting cereal prices and self-sufficiency--not enough to diversifying agricultural production (e.g. cotton, meat, oleaginous products) and increasing Sahelian country incomes."<sup>38</sup> A number of participants regretted that there had not been more rigorous analysis on the most important "price" factor of all--currency exchange rates. Furthermore, several felt that the residual protectionist emphasis in the Lomé synthesis would not encourage West Africans to seek regional trade integration.<sup>39</sup> According to the DAG, a number of issues would have to be clarified: "more data is required on the issue of comparative advantage; the concept of diversification is also somewhat nebulous--what products does it involve?--what exactly is meant by regionalizing food aid."<sup>40</sup>

After reviewing the Lomé session, the Secretariats concluded that much of the contentiousness could have been avoided if there had been a closer working relationship between the French and American researchers during the early stages of their investigations. Consequently, the Secretariats resolved to bring together the two groups--INRA-IRAM and TUFTS-AIRD--in 1990-91 "to test the Delgado Formulation through empirical data collection and model building."<sup>41</sup> This collaborative research effort will be a key element in the CILSS/Club ongoing cereals-policy initiative--along with the promotion of coarse cereals (PROCELOS) and the strengthening of marketing information systems (COMAC-MIS). The CILSS/Club cereals initiative will be complemented by the Secretariat's spin-off operation, housed at the African

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<sup>37</sup> DAG Montpellier minutes, p. 18.

<sup>38</sup> Montpellier minutes, p. 17.

<sup>39</sup> See A.I.D. reporting cable on Montpellier, p. 6.

<sup>40</sup> CILSS/Club report Montpellier meeting, p. 20.

<sup>41</sup> AID Montpellier cable.

Development Bank in Abidjan, which will promote regional trade between Sahelian and other West African states.

## ■ CONCLUSIONS

During the mid-1970s Sahel governments had frowned on donor offers to examine the impact of national cereals policy on the well-being of their citizens. Cereals policies were considered too sensitive to be debated outside host government circles. The CILSS/Club can rightfully take credit for helping to change Sahelian attitudes on the need for more open discussion on cereals policy issues. The airing of these issues by the Secretariats, at the regional level, during the 1979-85 period, enabled planners and donors to engage in more productive dialogue at the national level.

Even the early discussions on protected markets in 1985-87 were useful, particularly to donors who were trying to sort out their differences on policy recommendations. But, in retrospect, it is now clear that the analysis and discussion of protectionism under CILSS/Club auspices was allowed to go on too long. As the debate continued into 1988-89, it became predictable, contentious and counterproductive.

Discussion of the protectionist issue might have been truncated had there been closer coordination between CILSS/Club and CEAO. The idea of a regional protected market was not new at the time of Mindelo (1985). A CEAO report, commissioned in 1983, had concluded that a protected market for all agricultural goods should be implemented in the CEAO zone. Over the next four years additional studies were carried out to clarify modalities, and working groups were set up to help implement the scheme.<sup>42</sup> By 1987, CEAO had spent considerable money and energy trying to enact the protectionist strategy--without much to show. The evidence from the CEAO effort should have been sufficient to persuade CILSS/Club to concentrate its energies on more promising objectives.

The problem with the prolonged CILSS/Club debate on protectionism is that it kept the spotlight on cereals and continued "to treat the cereals sector as the equivalent of agricultural development."<sup>43</sup> It failed to recognize that, "on the micro-level, policy preoccupations should be less focused on cereals, or even on crop production, and more on the household as a set of enterprises. The future of the region may lie less in

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<sup>42</sup> See Regionalism and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 59.

<sup>43</sup> See AID internal memo on "Response to Lome Synthesis", dated Nov. 27, 1989.

crop production and more in livestock, in village industry, or in large-scale migration to the forest zone."<sup>44</sup>

By November 1989, the CILSS/Club secretariats had concluded that "it does not seem realistic to support the creation of a protected Sahelian cereal market."<sup>45</sup> They then agreed to renew their efforts to help clarify how households and markets really work in the Sahel by supporting more policy relevant research (see Section III-C). This new emphasis is more likely to lead to a harmonization of views among donors than the staging of "big donor happenings" on the Sahel regional circuit.<sup>46</sup>

### 3. Devising Sector Strategies

The need for sector assessment became evident in the mid-1970s. The CILSS member countries had earlier presented a compendium of projects for funding, and, in response, the donors had requested a prioritization of these projects in order to determine which endeavors were of utmost urgency and highest impact. Even though the CILSS member countries failed to prioritize their projects, the individual donors chose to fund particular undertakings in accord with their understandings of the needs for action. This situation led in the late 1970s to a series of studies to determine the needs and priorities in various sectors. These studies covered irrigated agriculture, rainfed agriculture, livestock, rural water supply, fisheries, forestry, energy, and transport. About the same time, the CILSS/Club also commissioned a number of specific studies on environmental concerns, such as soil conservation.

The CILSS/Club sector studies were carried out by working groups, of specialists, composed of expatriate and regional experts. Each group was charged with reviewing of progress and experience to date. In principle, the working group would be disbanded once its charge had been completed; in practice, several working groups continued to study particular sectoral problems for a number of years.

Initially, sectoral studies were submitted to high-level regional committees for review and critique. Now the studies are submitted to the national committees for their technical review, whereupon a higher-level regional meeting can be convened to consider policy implications.

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<sup>44</sup> The Competitiveness of Sahelian Agriculture, Elliot Berg, Dec. 1988. !

<sup>45</sup> Sahel D (89) 336, Nov. 1989, p. 2.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

By the mid-1980s the CILSS/Club Secretariats had become concerned that sectoral analyses were leading to overly narrow prescriptions. The concern was that the analyses failed to take into account the intersectoral ramifications of the actions in a particular sector. The CILSS/Club Secretariats therefore initiated a series of studies and meetings on new, inter-sectoral topics or themes. The CILSS/Club commissioned studies on local cereal consumption (nutrition) in 1987, on local cereal markets, the private informal sector, and rural social organization in 1988, and on decentralization in 1989. At the same time, the CILSS/Club commissioned an update of the 1979 irrigated agriculture sectoral study.

The process for the sectoral update largely follows the study-and-consultation process developed earlier. There has, however, been a shift in the composition of the working groups. At the outset, the Club commissioned the studies, hiring donor-country experts as well as CILSS-country experts. This mixed group then produced the report that was submitted to the CILSS-country representatives. Now, instead of the earlier working groups composed of donor-country and CILSS-country experts, the CILSS/Club has in each country delegated the studies to committees of national experts chosen from the ministries concerned with that topic. These national reports are then reviewed by a supervisory committee composed of donor-country and Sahelian experts. This approach aims to involve ministerial personnel in the assessment process earlier and more completely. It has also had the effect of producing inferior reports, as the national committee members evidently feel constrained in the extent of their reporting and analysis. Unfortunately, the use of a supervisory committee to provide technical guidance has not overcome this deficiency.

This recent experience with the sector assessment process underscores the need to include in the working groups private-sector experts. These experts may be representatives of either non-governmental organizations working on the topic or local consulting firms that have particular expertise in the subject. By working collaboratively with government personnel in fieldwork and analysis, these private-sector specialists can help ensure a greater completeness and objectivity in the final reports.

#### ■ Conclusions on the Sector Assessment Process

More nationals from the private sector (e.g., NGOs, consulting firms) should be involved in this work in order to maintain the quality of the reports as responsibility for the studies is devolved through CILSS to the member states.

The challenge for the CILSS/Club group is both to involve national experts more completely. The more nationals who integrally work on a report, the broader the expert consensus for

policy or program change in-country. The glaring need at present is improvement in the national data bases, so the studies and updates can be done efficiently and quickly (Section IV-A).

#### B. SERVING AS A CATALYST FOR DEVELOPMENT ACTION.

The Club du Sahel has carried out its mandate as a catalyst "by organizing discussions at the regional level between, on the one hand, representatives of the Secretariat of the CILSS and of CILSS member countries, and, on the other, representatives of aid agencies."<sup>47</sup> These discussions have taken the form of colloquia, workshops and meetings which have produced a significant body of technical literature. Thousands of Sahelians, donor representatives and, increasingly, NGO's have been exposed to CILSS/CLUB deliberations and analyses over the years. Many who have taken part in the "moveable feast of new ideas" believe that the Secretariats have rendered a valuable service by "fueling the debate throughout the Sahel." Some wonder about the costs of the "traveling seminar." As one European representative put it, "seems like pretty heavy machinery for the task, and a lot of meetings in exotic places."

#### Sensitizing

Of course, it is difficult to assess results that flow from "discussing," "sensitizing," or "catalyzing." After five years of operating at the regional level, the Club Secretariat came to the conclusion, in 1981, that there were "limits to the approach of sensitizing through discussion."

When meetings are held at the regional level, participants readily agree as to the priority to be given to...reforestation, maintenance of irrigated perimeters, the need for a satisfactory price policy for cereals, etc... A gap remains, however, between that agreement and the actual preparation of development projects and supporting measures... It is striking to see how slowly some ideas which have found agreement at the regional level are taken up by the states in a concrete form.<sup>48</sup>

Three years later in 1984, the CILSS/Club Secretariats were still struggling with the problem of "translating strategic declarations made on the regional level...into action at the national level....More and more, we have come to realize that the work done on the regional level was not having sufficient impact

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<sup>47</sup> D (81) 137, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> *ibid*, p. 3.

at the national level."<sup>49</sup> The 1984 AID evaluation found that "specific policy recommendations by CILSS/Club and technical findings of working groups, seminars, colloquies, etc., have only rarely--and then mostly incidentally--been implemented by CILSS members in their countries. The multi-billion contribution by the donor community has been programmed, almost entirely without specific regard to regional development considerations, on a bilateral basis between individual host countries and donor organizations."

By 1986, the Secretariats felt that their strategies had not had sufficient influence on the policies and planning of Sahelian states "even though frank discussions had been organized between Sahelian and non-Sahelian partners."<sup>50</sup> The Club Secretariat was frustrated enough to propose that a special Club representative be designated--from the in-country donor ranks--in each member state to ensure CILSS/Club penetration at the national level.<sup>51</sup> This idea of a "Club Correspondent" never caught on among the donors.

### Translating Discussion into Action

The "Club's weakness in translating discussion into action"<sup>52</sup> is best illustrated by its effort in desertification control, which, at one point, had been cited as "a good example of how the CILSS/Club can have a significant positive impact on Sahel development."<sup>53</sup> After carrying out sectoral analyses in six countries over a two year period, the Secretariats convened a large seminar on desertification in 1984 where, "for the first time, the leading Sahelian officials in agriculture, livestock and water supply gathered together with international experts to devise a regional strategy of desertification control capable of being implemented in each of the Sahel countries." With the approval of the CILSS Council of Ministers, consultants on the Secretariats staff worked with experts in Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mauritania, Niger and Mali over a two year period to convert the global, multi-sector strategies into national plans for desertification-control in these countries.

By 1987, the significant CILSS/Club outlay in staff and fiscal resources for anti-desertification planning had not yet been translated into action. The national master plans designed with

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<sup>49</sup> DeLattre/Fell, p. 87.

<sup>50</sup> AID Evaluation 1984, p. 7.

<sup>51</sup> Sahel D (86) 297, p. 9.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p. 36.

<sup>53</sup> "The Club du Sahel," op.cit., p. 87.

coaching from the Secretariats had not moved forward in any of the Sahel states. According to the Secretariats, the problem was foot-dragging by the member states and the aid donors "who oppose the global or multi-sector approach to desertification control" espoused by the CILSS/Club. "Projects are still being designed according to the traditional sector-by-sector approach."<sup>54</sup>

Several attempts were made during 1987-88 to revive the masterplans--given CILSS/Club sunk costs--but to little avail. By 1989, the draft masterplans had been so tailored by national forestry departments that they had lost much of their interdisciplinary and multi-sectoral character. A few months ago, USAID/Niamey asked AID/W to intercede so that the CILSS/Club "would not encourage the government-based national anti-desertification planning committees to dominate the après-Segou process." According to the USAID Mission, an IBRD-led, multi-donor initiative to develop a national resource management strategy was in some jeopardy partly "because of the arrival in town of a CILSS team working on plans to finalize the national anti-desertification plan."<sup>55</sup>

### Encouraging Networks

In the meantime, the CILSS/Club Secretariats had become engaged in another endeavor--strengthening incipient networks--which was beginning to show better dividends in terms of translating studies and strategies into action.

The Secretariats' first experience was with the "Network for the Prevention of Food Crisis" which evolved from a meeting called by the CILSS/Club in December 1984 to speed up the delivery of food relief to the Sahel. In time, the Secretariats have structured a regular flow of information on harvests, stocks, logistics, triangular exchanges and counterpart-fund uses for a network of CILSS member states, bilateral and multilateral aid organizations and private groups. The nucleus of the operation is the DIAPER team<sup>56</sup> whose efforts to improve "cereals balance sheets" throughout the region have greatly facilitated the task of CILSS governments and donors when it comes to the annual assessment of the region's

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<sup>54</sup> Sahel CR (86) 53, p. 15.

<sup>55</sup> Niamey 4930, d8d 2 Feb 1990, par. 2. The message also referred to an UNSO team examining the financial implications for the plan and a FAO team in town working on a tropical forestry action plan.

<sup>56</sup> A "permanent regional diagnostic unit" created in 1984 (financed by the FED) to improve the dependability of agriculture and livestock statistics throughout the Sahel.

"food gap". Under CILSS/Club tutelage, the Food Crisis Network has matured into a very useful tool in the campaign for food security.<sup>57</sup>

In 1988, the Secretariats decided to support another incipient network--the PROCELOS program. Begun in the late 1970s with French aid in Senegal to counteract the growing rice and wheat imports, the initiative has been extended to four other Sahelian countries. In addition to experimenting in new grain-processing techniques and promoting local cereals-based dishes, PROCELOS has set up a region wide network which disseminates information on issues ranging from policy development through consumer surveys to loan financing for small operators. Although some donors have difficulty foreseeing a technical processing opportunity for increasing Sahelian demand for coarse grain<sup>58</sup>, the PROCELOS network now has multi-donor backing -- thanks to support from CILSS/Club.

The market-price information system (MIS) currently instituted by CILSS represents another instance where networking and technical consultation can provide significant efficiencies for the member countries. By bringing together specialists concerned with price information systems, CILSS facilitates the sharing of information. The specialists have, for example, outlined how such a system should be structured, how and where information should be collected, and how it can be analyzed. Moreover, the technicians have begun to assess the usefulness of this information for different groups, including rural producers, urban consumers, and government officials. Sharing national experiences through a technical network significantly speeds the process of designing and implementing such systems and eliminates the pitfalls of independently inventing such systems anew in each place.

## ■ CONCLUSIONS

Over the years the CILSS/Club Secretariats have experienced difficulty translating discussion, or sensitizing, into strategy for change at the national level. Expectations that there would be a significant filtering down of CILSS/Club ideas as Sahelians returned home from conferences, have not been met, at least in the anticipated time-frame. The reason can be found in the nature of some Third World bureaucracies where communication tends to be one way--vertical and downward, seldom from the bottom upward. Most of the CILSS/Club conferences and seminars, other than high-level

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<sup>57</sup> The DIAPER initiative will become even more valuable when methodological advances are made in estimating "on-farm" stocks.

<sup>58</sup> The Futures Study saw little opportunity. IFPRI and AID also are doubtful.

meetings, are attended by mid-to senior level Sahel officials who profit personally from exposure to broadened agendas. Upon return home, however, their new-found knowledge is not easily channeled to the "higher floors." Consequently, there is little to point to by way of follow-up or impact from the CILSS/Club regional meetings. Of course, it is hoped that, sooner or later, some of these sensitized cadres will move into positions of leadership so that, in the longer run, there will be some delayed pay-off from the CILSS/Club succession of colloquia and workshops.<sup>59</sup>

But the Contract for a Generation called for quicker development returns than the filter-down approach could yield. Consequently, the Secretariats felt obliged to initiate direct, sector-level planning exercises to translate CILSS/Club strategies into action. The Secretariat's lack of success in lobbying at the national level (as discussed above) was due in part to "turf" related issues. The anti-desertification masterplans, for example, impinged on the interests of several national Ministries or departments -- to say nothing of FAO and UNSO concerns. Mediating these interests would have been difficult even for resident experts familiar with the officials concerned, the lay-of-the-land, and local sensitivities. For the CILSS/Club, without a permanent representation, the task was simply out of reach.

There is a, however, more fundamental reason for the Secretariats' difficulties in directly lobbying change at the national level, and it is related to the aphorism "he who pays the piper calls the tune." Scenarios calling for significant change--like global or multi-sector strategies--usually entail considerable cost for their implementation at the country level. National officials tend to be unreceptive to advice from external agents on what a program strategy should consist of unless the outsiders are willing to earmark funds for the implementation phase. The CILSS/Club Secretariats have never had these kind of resources.

The Club/CILSS has had considerable success in providing support and guidance to fledgling networks throughout the Sahel region. This success bodes well for the Secretariats role in the 1990s--see Section IV.

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<sup>59</sup> See AID 1984 Evaluation, p. 40.

### C. STRUCTURING POLICY DIALOGUE<sup>60</sup>

In examining much of the CILSS/Club record for the past decade, one is struck by how little real policy discussion has taken place between donor and Sahelian officials within the CILSS/Club framework. This may sound strange in that the CILSS/Club has been characterized as "probably the most active agency of policy dialogue in Africa...sponsoring scores of seminars and workshops...most of them organized around studies and policy documents."<sup>61</sup>

#### Policy Debate Among Donors

On a closer look, however, it is clear that what has passed for Sahelian-donor policy discussion, over the years, has been serious and protracted debate among the donors themselves. Two donor factions -- one "protectionist", the other "liberalist"--have advocated a different set of remedies for dealing with Sahelian agricultural issues dating back to the landmark 1979 Nouakchott session on cereals.

The debate has been sustained by a series of CILSS/Club commissioned papers which have been aired at landmark colloquia as well as informal meetings. While useful in clarifying donor differences, these sessions have not been successful in promoting a genuine donor-Sahelian policy dialogue. In 1988, one of the principal contributors to CILSS/Club policy discussions described these colloquia as "big donor happenings" rather than serious occasions for dialogue with Sahelian officials. "The discussion of these meetings is too often marred by the presence of a shifting cast of characters, a tendency towards formalism and the dominance of a resolution-producing objective, i.e., the search for words of art to put in a final resolution."<sup>62</sup>

#### Why Policy Dialogue is Inhibited?

Two principal factors tend to inhibit genuine policy dialogue at the regional level in the Sahel: (i) a disinclination by

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<sup>60</sup> "Policy dialogue," here, refers to a series of discussions focused on a policy (ies) in need of change. The policy dialogue process has a beginning (delineation of the relevant issues) a middle part (exploration of options and negotiation) and a closure agreement or no agreement).

<sup>61</sup> Regionalism & Economic Development, in Sub-Saharan Africa: (Applied Development Economics [ADE]), Volume I, p. 128.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p. 68 of Annex.

Sahelians to air national policy issues, unless strategically necessary, and (ii) the inability of donors to agree on desired policy directions. The first is discussed in this section; the second in the following section, III, D.

Writing in 1987, Michel Casse found "that none of the recommendations on price policy made by the technical working group at the Nouakchott Colloquia had subsequently been turned into resolutions by the CILSS Council of Ministers--as had been [the case] with recommendations on food aid, marketing and storage... thus [allowing] a number of ideas and suggestions to sink into oblivion which are still perfectly relevant today."<sup>63</sup> An earlier A.I.D. evaluation of the CILSS/Club Secretariats suggested that "one of the puzzling and distressing aspects of the history of CILSS is its inability or unwillingness to deal with policy issues."<sup>64</sup>

But the wariness of CILSS country ministers to discuss their national policies at regional fora should come as no surprise. Their view on the usefulness of the CILSS/Club nexus has been consistent from the beginning--the Secretariats' function is to mobilize "add-on" funding for the Sahelian states.<sup>65</sup> The idea of using the CILSS/Club as a regional forum for policy dialogue was never part of the CILSS Presidents' vision. Internal national policies, being part of the sovereignty fabric, are to be discussed critically with outsiders only when there is a compelling reason to do so. This happens, for example, when riparian rights are at stake, monetary compensatory mechanisms are threatened or the IBRD conditions its next tranche of funds on reformulation of a country's agricultural credit policies. Simply stated, senior Sahelian officials have never viewed the CILSS/Club formulation of

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<sup>63</sup> Casse goes on to opine: "the fact the [recommendations] were not taken up or only partially applied may well explain the poor results obtained from agricultural policies implemented in the Sahel." Acts of the Mindelo Conference, OECD, 1987, p. 498.

<sup>64</sup> A.I.D. Evaluation of CILSS/Club, 1984, p. 9.

<sup>65</sup> In his "reflections document" (1989) on leaving office, the outgoing CILSS Executive Secretary gives a dramatic account of how the CILSS Secretariat almost "went under" as a result of two large donor contributions "getting away" in 1984. In the same connection the 1984 A.I.D. evaluation concluded: "Evidently what remains uppermost in the minds of the CILSS leadership is not regionalism and concerted development, coordination, cooperation, and liaison, but attracting attention, sympathy and, above all, funds to the member countries in addition to--not in lieu of--existing bilateral assistance flows," (p. 68).

policy issues as sufficiently compelling to warrant a hammering out of differences and problems with donor representatives at the regional level. Indeed, according to some, readership of CILSS/Club commissioned policy papers is rather limited among Sahelians.<sup>66</sup>

#### High Level Meetings

Until fairly recently, the high-level Sahelian-donor meetings have fostered camaraderie among the participating countries, but not promoted "concrete lines of action on issues that are of paramount importance to all involved."<sup>67</sup> This explains why there was little need for substantive preparation by Sahelian states (or donors) for these high-level meetings. Normally, regional plenary sessions require months of careful preparation by national experts who must negotiate differences with their counterparts throughout the region so that ministers can come together to ratify strategies which have already been agreed to at the national working level. With the emphasis on "sharing ideas" and "exploring differences" at the CILSS/Club hosted sessions, however, there has been little pressure to work out "concrete lines of action" and, consequently, no need for substantive preparation. It is little wonder that the CILSS/Club Secretariats would conclude in 1987 that "dialogue between the Sahelian States and donors has progressed but not achieved adequate results for effective coordination of action."<sup>68</sup>

During the last two high-level sessions--N'Djamena (January 1988) and Guinea Bissau (January 1990)--the donors and CILSS/Club Secretariats have made a conscious effort to structure a more productive dialogue with the assembled Sahelian ministers. The agendas for these meetings were better focused than in the past and the presentations cast in more strategic terms.

#### Recent Attempts at Policy Dialogue

The discussion at N'Djamena covered much useful ground, but the donors' number one priority--to use the Futures Study to stimulate "concrete lines of action"--was thwarted by the Sahelians' defensive reaction to the year-old study. The CILSS ministers "questioned the intrinsic validity of the Futures Study" and indicated that a panel of Sahelian experts should be convened to examine the study and report back to them. The Secretariats got

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<sup>66</sup> Regionalism and Economic Development, op. cit., p. 128.

<sup>67</sup> From the opening speech of the Minister of Plan of Guinea-Bissau at the VIII Meeting of CILSS/Club (Feb. 1990) where he suggested that the "promoting concrete lines of action" should be the goal of the high level meetings.

<sup>68</sup> Sahel D (86) 297, p. 9.

the message. What had been described by the donors, a year earlier, as "bold, clear, instructive and required reading"<sup>69</sup> was now characterized, in the CILSS/Club work plan for 1988-90, as "calling for prudence: prudence in ideas, restraint in action, moderation in hopes."<sup>70</sup> The Sahelian panel of experts was convened several months after the N'Djamena session but, according to the donors, "did not appear to shed any light on the unspoken truth of the Sahel--the many instances of poor mutual understanding that distort dialogue between Sahelian leaders and aid policy makers."<sup>71</sup>

Two years later, in February 1990, the CILSS Ministers were "more favorably disposed in general to the recommendations of the Future's Study" according to the A.I.D. reporting cable. Under the heading of "policy dialogue" at the Guinea Bissau session three topics could be bracketed: the food aid charter (discussed in Section III,D, follow-up to the Segou Conference, and promotion of regional trade.

With respect to Segou, the meeting adopted the "Segou Landmarks"--a list of eight tenets encompassing the economic, legal and institutional conditions needed to encourage rural Sahelians to cultivate and invest in their own land. The list had emerged from the Segou Encounter, hosted by the CILSS/Club in May 1989. The key word was "decentralization," signifying the need for a fundamental realignment of the relationship between Sahel governments and rural populations. The CILSS Ministers agreed, in principle, on the need to have local groups participate in their own development but were wary of the term "decentralization." "Responsibilization" was the goal, in their view, and they felt this process was already underway in their societies. As one donor representative who attended the meeting put it: "the discussion on decentralization at Bissau was awkward and unrealistic." However, the CILSS/Club minutes for the Guinea Bisseau meeting put the best face on the awkwardness by suggesting that "the discussions revealed a wide diversity of opinion as to the way to go about the responsabilization process, and, consequently, participants were not surprised that a consensus could not be reached on an implementation methodology...The discussants agreed to continue prudent research on this topic and to encourage collaboration between the partners involved."<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Minutes of DAG meeting in Bern, 1987, p. 1.

<sup>70</sup> Sahel D (88) 322, Nov. 1988, p. 5.

<sup>71</sup> Sahel, CR (89) 60, p. 2.

<sup>72</sup> Sahel CR (90) 65.

The policy dialogue on promoting regional trade, at the Guinea Bissau meeting, was much more conclusive. At issue was the suggestion that a small Club Secretariat branch office be set up in Abidjan, housed by the African Development Bank (ADB), to promote Sahelian-West Africa trade. It was a donor idea, and would be financed entirely by donor contributions. Not surprisingly, the CILSS Ministers nodded an endorsement, and the meeting moved on to "other business."

## ■ CONCLUSION

The record clearly shows that the Sahelians have been reluctant over the years to engage donor representatives in genuine policy dialogue at CILSS/Club hosted regional sessions. In explaining their reluctance, the Sahelians would most likely go along with the formulation in the ADE Report that the CILSS/Club policy dialogue effort is "at the wrong level--it is at the national level that significant dialogue has to occur."<sup>73</sup> This would suggest that the CILSS/Club Secretariats should pay more attention to supporting selective policy dialogue efforts at the national level--through technical analysis and advice.

Shorn of the policy dialogue mystique, the CILSS/Club high-level meetings should be viewed more functionally as excellent opportunities to sensitize senior level officials--both donor and Sahelian. Greater care should be taken in preparing for these sessions IV-C.

### D. PROMOTING COORDINATED DONOR APPROACHES.

One of the original three planks in the CILSS/Club platform called for the "fostering of cooperation among donors in order to implement projects envisaged by Sahel governments." Over the years, the CILSS/Club has hosted a score of regional meetings to help donors better coordinate their development approaches. The focus has been on improving donor aid procedures as well as program strategies. Participants at these sessions have usually gained useful insights on a range of issues, and used them to good avail at home. The CILSS/Club venue has been particularly useful in helping donors understand the rationale behind their differences. The informal donor network, hosted by the CILSS/Club, has also made it easier to reach out to other capitals for reinforcement when a donor cause may be in jeopardy in a particular Sahel country.

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<sup>73</sup> Applied Development Economics Report, op. cit., p. 128.

Nevertheless, when it comes to the bottom line--increasing the productivity of foreign aid resources--some informed observers believe that the coordination and dialogue efforts of regional development coordination organizations, like CILSS/Club, have not made a real difference. As Berg suggests, "it would be hard to argue that the productivity of foreign aid resources has increased as a result of better coordination or dialogue."<sup>74</sup>

#### Club Secretariat Efforts to Promote Coordination

The Club Secretariat got off to a running start on the coordination front in 1977 by using the working-group methodology to elaborate a commonly-shared vision of what should be done to overcome Sahelian poverty. Donor representatives and consultants conferred over a period of months, worked out their differences, and produced a regional strategy stamped "multi-donor." The Club Secretariat then turned to program implementation priorities; the goal was to assist donors in simplifying what the OECD had called "a bewildering variety of aid procedures." The OECD felt that some standardization of donor procedures was needed, that "adapting them more flexibly to the administrative capabilities of recipient countries...could yield important savings in the time and nervous energy of overburdened country officials."<sup>75</sup>

The Club Secretariat first drew up a standard project proposal format drawing on features found, in various forms, in donor documents. Months were spent in trying to persuade individual donors to adopt the format--without success. The Club then tried to improve the circulation of information and documents among donors, who it felt "sometimes treat feasibility studies and project reports like secrets to be kept under lock and key."<sup>76</sup> A draft agreement was worked on whereby donors would send selected evaluations and diagnostic reports to the Club for circulation on the donor circuit. As the Club suggested, "great improvements could be made in this area at little cost." Circulating donor evaluations did not catch on, however, and by 1984, the Secretariat had become "dissatisfied with the level of information exchanged, pointing out how much costly time was wasted by consultants trying to find copies of documents or redoing work which should already be available."

By far, the most strenuous effort by the Club to help standardize aid program approaches was in the area of recurrent cost appraisal. A two-year, \$600,000 study was commissioned to

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<sup>74</sup> Regional and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa Vol I, Applied Development Economies, p. 127.

<sup>75</sup> See OECD 1978 Development Cooperation Review, p. 26.

<sup>76</sup> DeLattre/Fell, op. int., p. 88.

examine the severity of the problem and to derive a formula for recurrent cost financing which could be used to move towards project sustainability. The study resulted in recommendations (and later a series of workshops) on topics ranging from alternative project design, to decentralized taxation, user charges, the need for private-sector initiatives and the desirability of allocating greater volumes of foreign aid to recurrent cost financing. There is no doubt that this massive analytical and sensitization exercise --stretching over a five year period--provided Sahelians and donors with much deeper insights into the nature and size of the heavy fiscal burden Sahelian countries were inheriting in the wake of donor supported projects. By late 1985, however, the Secretariats suggested that although "the conceptual work has enhanced awareness of the recurrent costs problems, we are still a long way from the implementation of the recommendations of the 1982 Ouagadougou symposium." The Secretariats decided to send questionnaires to the member states and donors to ascertain what kind of progress was being made. The response was spotty.

The Sahelians had hoped, of course, that the recurrent costs exercise would produce a significant increase in donor funds to cover a larger percentage of ongoing operational/maintenance costs which previously had been the responsibility of member states. A few donors did move in this direction but usually by dropping a number of their new-start projects. What really put the lid on Sahelian expectations in this area, however, was the IBRD imposition in the mid-1980s of its structural adjustment programs with a heavy emphasis on demand-reduction. The issue of recurrent costs does not appear in CILSS/Club work plans prepared after October 1986.

By the mid-1980s, there was general dissatisfaction with the rate of improvement in donor coordination that had been achieved for the CILSS/Club. The Secretariats felt that "donor coordination was somewhat unsystematic and dispersed."<sup>77</sup> Some delegates (Netherlands, West Germany, World Bank) at the Fifth Club High Level Conference suggested that "much had been said but little done about coordination...indeed, it is not clear what we mean by coordination."<sup>78</sup> A large part of the problem was the nature of the High Level conferences. With an average of 150 participants--some very title conscious--these conferences tended to be heavy on protocol, plenary speeches and inflated prose. The agendas were carefully orchestrated to avoid controversy and little was required by way of preparation or follow up on the part of the attendees.

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<sup>77</sup> DeLattre/Fell, p. 88.

<sup>78</sup> Sahel CR (83) 40, p. 6.

### Donor Efforts to Improve Coordination

Donor representatives decided in 1986 that they had "to better organize their interaction with the Club Secretariat and interject more of their own analysis and experiences"<sup>79</sup> into the Club planning process. They formed a "Committee of Reflection" which became known as the Donor Advisory Group (DAG). This group was to interact with the Club Secretariat twice a year, at the policy-making level, "since coordination could no longer be considered a luxury but a pressing need."<sup>80</sup>

There have been four DAG meetings held since 1986. The cumulative effect of these sessions has been a significant improvement in the quality of dialogue among donor representatives --and with the Secretariats. More preparation has gone into the DAG meetings. Agendas have been kept tight, discussions focused and the number of participants manageable. At the same time, the improved DAG format has revealed "deep-seated donor differences" which had been masked under the earlier, less disciplined proceedings. According to the CILSS/Club Secretariats, "the donor community is becoming increasingly aware of the serious flaws in their aid policies, which tend to be fragmented and competitive, and are frequently inspired by short-term political, economic, and social concerns."<sup>81</sup>

### Constraints to Donor Coordination

Trying to work around donor deep-seated differences has proven time-consuming. The problem of trying to improve the effectiveness of the CILSS Secretariat over the years is related, in part, to the donors inability to agree on the program functions of the Secretariat. Canada, Netherlands, IBRD and the US have maintained that the Secretariat should concentrate on regional strategies, policy analysis and networking. Project design and implementation should be left to others who have more experience in these areas. Meanwhile, the EEC, UNSO and Germany, all of whom channel funds through the Secretariat for project activities, argue strongly for a project operational role for the Secretariat. (France suggests that the issue should be left up to the CILSS member countries.) So, the donor group "has agreed to disagree" on the program role for the CILSS Secretariat--while providing approximately \_\_\_\_\_% in support of the Secretariat's budget, over the years.

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<sup>79</sup> Sahel CR (86) 53, p. 54.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> CR (90) 65, p. 38.

Differences among donors about how to proceed on a particular Sahelian issue often stem from the fragility of the data base in the Sahel, particularly at the household level. Available information can be unreliable, widely scattered and, at times, contradictory. This can result in intense disagreement, even among scholars, over intervention modalities--as witnessed by the CILSS/Club Secretariats at the November 1989 Lome Seminar. The aim of the seminar was to promote a consensus on a "coordinated regional market for West Africa." However, the participants, many of them researchers, were unable to agree on major points, "next steps" or even a synthesis report reflecting the meetings proceedings.

Sometimes "coordination lag" is caused by a difference among donors over values as well as facts--for example, over how much relative weight should be given to equity and efficiency in policy formulation. Much of the diversion of CILSS/Club energy on protectionism, dating back to Mindelo, came down to "ideological debates"<sup>82</sup> between the open-trade and protectionist wings of the donor advisory group. While one element was "making concrete proposals to support countries ready to take steps towards a protected cereals market,"<sup>83</sup> the other was lamenting "the amount of time, energy, analysis capacity and money being expended on difficult to implement protectionist schemes."<sup>84</sup> The bottom line is that, after three landmark colloquia--stretching over a decade--"nobody actually knows which cereals import policies should be recommended to Sahelian governments."<sup>85</sup> More than one Sahelian Minister has echoed the Senegalese Finance Minister who singled out conflicting policy advice from donors as one of the most important problems he saw in the aid administration process.<sup>86</sup>

At times, progress on coordination can be slowed by differences of views within bilateral governments. In 1986, the Club Secretariat felt thwarted in its efforts to promote desertification control at the national level partly "because of divergent viewpoints between officials of donor agencies in the field and the representatives of those same donor agencies at their headquarters."<sup>87</sup> At the DAG session in Montpellier (1989), after

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<sup>82</sup> Sahel D (87) 301, p. 102.

<sup>83</sup> Club du Sahel Newsletter, Sept. 1988, p. 8.

<sup>84</sup> A.I.D. internal briefing memo, Nov. 1988.

<sup>85</sup> Sahel D (89) 332, p. 5.

<sup>86</sup> OECD Development Review for 1987 (Paris 1988), p. 39.

<sup>87</sup> Sahel CR (86) 53, p. 15.

committing the U.S. to "food aid planning-transparency," the U.S. delegate reminded the group that A.I.D. had no control over U.S. commercial cereal exports, subsidized or otherwise.<sup>88</sup>

In view of the constraints that work against donor coordination at the regional level, expectations for coordination breakthroughs in the CILSS/Club context must be restrained. When a donor consensus does emerge in an area of significance, it tends to be somewhat fuzzy and wobbly as in the following instance:

A kind of consensus seems to have developed as to the necessity to have control over the price of cereals imported by the Sahel countries, at least temporarily. However, this consensus applies only to an ill-defined concept so far, which probably does not involve the same reality for each (aid) agency and which does not have an operational character.<sup>89</sup>

The Food Aid Charter illustrates the fragile nature of donor accords, particularly those reached on regional terrain. After two years of DAG discussion on the need for "a good conduct code" on food aid to the Sahel, the French Ministry of Development submitted a draft text for the group's review in July 1988. A DAG committee of six was created in December to re-work the text to ensure eventual participation by the Sahelian governments as well as the NGO's. When a final Charter Text was approved a year later in Montpellier (1989), the Chairman observed that "although a consensus had been reached, the text was simply a basic outline... in years to come, efforts should be made to work towards a higher ideal as set out in the preamble to the Charter. The challenge [lies] in defining how best to use the document and how to apply its principles."<sup>90</sup>

After the Montpellier session the Secretariats went to work on "a plan of action to set up Charter coordination groups within each Sahelian country," whose task would be to "define concrete initiatives based on principles set out in the Charter." It remains to be seen what results will be obtained from these coordination groups. During the evaluators' visit to Europe, a few months after the Charter had been ratified, several European donors asked whether it was true that the U.S. would be shipping 15,000

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<sup>88</sup> See State

<sup>89</sup> Sahel D (89) 332, p. 6.

<sup>90</sup> Sahel CR (89) 64, p. 14.

m.t. of grain to Niger in a few months--when there was a surplus of perhaps as much as 150,000 m.t. in Mali which could be trans- shipped to Niger. As one of them pointed out, "if this happens, both the U.S. and Niger will be in violation of the Charter."

## ■ CONCLUSION

In the early 1980s, the Club Secretariat proposed several initiatives to help donors better coordinate their development approaches. These initiatives were more successful in helping donors understand the rationale behind their differences than in melding program strategies or standardizing aid procedures. Since the formation of the donor advisory group in 1986, there has been a significant improvement in the quality of dialogue among donors-- and with the Secretariats. At the same time, the more disciplined approach has highlighted short-term political, economic and social realities which can influence aid policies and inhibit donor coordination.

In view of the constraints that work against donor coordination at the regional level, it is time to realize that the present coordination within the DAG is about as good as can be expected. Efforts to produce coordination "products" like the Food Aid Charter should continue--the process of coordinating is beneficial even when the result is a qualified success. Four product-areas requiring DAG attention in the up-coming decade are: (i) a better system for gathering and sharing "lessons learned from the development front," (ii) improved collaboration among donors in carrying out research endeavors, (iii) more sharply focused CILSS/Club strategies for food security and environmental management, and (iv) a new approach to high-level sessions.

## E. FUNCTIONING AS AN INFORMATION CLEARING HOUSE

Increasingly the CILSS/Club has become the information clearing house for the international community on Sahelian development issues. Many believe that the information exchange function has been the most valuable activity undertaken by the two Secretariats.

From its inception the Club Secretariat has regularly prepared and distributed pertinent reports, sectoral studies, information bulletins and proceedings (most often in both English and French). Over the years a comprehensive bibliography on CILSS/Club publications has been compiled and periodically updated. The widely-praised Club du Sahel newsletter is now distributed three times a year. A carefully prepared and revealing analysis of official development aid (ODA) flows to Sahel countries is prepared annually for use at Sahelian-donor high level meetings.

In recent years, the Club Secretariat has spent considerable energy trying to improve outsiders' access to the mounds of information now accumulating on Sahelian development. To this end, the Club has transferred all of its documentation to the "Antenne Sahel"--a computerized inventory located at the OECD development center in Paris.<sup>91</sup> The Secretariat has also decentralized the archiving of its own reports and studies by entering into agreements with the University of Montpellier, the CILSS RESADOC Center in Bamako and the University of Laval whereby copies of Club material (in hard copy or microfiche) will be made available to researchers and consultants. Finally, the Secretariat is exploring the possibility of linking existing Sahel-oriented documentation centers, research centers, universities and donor archives/data banks into an expanded Sahel network to facilitate information flows.

### ■ CONCLUSION

The clearing-house function performed by the Club Secretariat has been impressive but relatively unheralded. By facilitating the flow of information and improving access to archives focused on Sahel issues, the Secretariat has rendered a valuable service. Given the newness of the computerized information exchange system, the Secretariat should schedule a performance assessment of the network during 1990 to identify and eliminate bugs in the system. One aspect of Sahel information exchange requiring more attention is the "corralling" of useful development material (e.g. "think pieces," evaluation studies, etc., from donor files). The Secretariat will need more support from donor capitals to make progress on this important front.

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<sup>91</sup> Within the Club Secretariat itself, an effort is currently underway to computerize Club produced texts and correspondence with a view towards facilitating internal document retrieval and reproduction.

#### IV. THE CILSS/CLUB ROLE IN THE 1990s

The CILSS/Club has had to adjust its place in the Sahel firmament over the years. In the beginning, the Secretariats were seen, at least by the donors, as the 'keepers' of the strategy for the development of the Sahel region. This perception changed as the CILSS/Club strategy went unheeded by the member states and, then, by the donors as well. The Secretariat next advocated strategies designed to produce a regional agricultural policy and regional anti-desertification control. In time, the Secretariats moved from sponsoring these strategies to stressing special themes or 'opportunities'--e.g., private sector growth, decentralization, trade promotion.

The shift of the CILSS/Club away from regional strategizing has been healthy, and is based on a growing realization that "the Sahel's future can only be perceived by government planners and their donor partners to a small extent." The Secretariats should now turn the corner in their thinking by recognizing that "their task is not to try to figure out where the Sahel's economic future lies"--anymore than that is the principal task of governments or donors. As Elliot Berg stresses, "populations of the Sahel have to be seen as the determinants of their region's competitiveness, not as the passive victims of technical and economic constraints imposed by history or by nature. The task of government and donors is to better prepare the Sahelian people to capitalize on whatever options may emerge, or that they may discover, and to create an open, nurturing environment congenial to innovations."<sup>92</sup>

#### CILSS/Club Comparative Advantage

What is the CILSS/Club's comparative advantage in the "nurturing of innovation" process? Better information is a key condition if the Sahelian people are to be helped in discovering and capitalizing on their emerging options. For example, more in-depth information is needed on the household as a set of enterprises. On the macro level, nurturing requires better information on "the ways and means" for developing more solid legal institutions, entrepreneurship, policies that increase public awareness, etc. The CILSS/Club with its considerable experience in information-networking in the Sahel is ideally situated to help undergird the nurturing process with a Sahelian Development Networking System.

The Sahel Development Networking System (SDNS) does not call for new institutions, large staff build-ups or significant new budget outlays. The SDNS is largely a matter of actualizing unused potential within the CILSS/Club system, breathing life into relationships and linkages that now exist only on paper, and

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<sup>92</sup> Sahel D(89) 332, p. 71. Author's underlining.

bringing a more disciplined approach to the 'nurturing process.' The SDNS task for the CILSS/Club Secretariats is not one of creating a new entity, but allowing it to emerge, inducing it from the efforts, experience and lessons of the past fourteen years. The SDNS will require some changes in attitude, consolidation of activities, and refocusing of strategies.

In pursuit of the SDNS in the 1990s, the CILSS/Club Secretariats should concentrate their energies in three principal role areas: compiler of investment information, clearing-house for development insights, and regional development interlocutor.

#### A. COMPILER OF DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT INFORMATION

The CILSS/Club focus, over the years, has been on questions of food security and environmental management. Early on, it was learned that food security is more than a question of food stocks. It involves an understanding of the household economy, of how people earn money not only in agriculture but also in a wide range of other remunerative activities. The complexity of the household economy must be taken more fully into account in planning investment decisions because how people plan for contingencies and where they wish to expand their enterprises closely reflects the reality of everyday economics. In fact, an appreciation of the importance of the household economy is already emerging: the extensiveness of the inquiry on food security issues has led the Secretariats in recent years into new mandate areas, such as trade-related issues.

The second major Club/CILSS theme, environmental management--deforestation, soil conservation and erosion, water and air quality--has yet to be incorporated into any systematic data collection, analysis, and diffusion program. Here, too, an understanding of the household economy is fundamental, for it is impossible to prescribe successful actions for local initiative if one is unaware of why people are behaving in the manner that they are.

#### Creating a Development Investment Information Base

The need at present is to maintain and utilize a multi-sector data base of pertinent research that provides a basis for appropriate decisions on food security and natural resources management.

The creation of a coordinated data base system requires six endeavors. First, it is imperative to refine the notions of who will use the information, and for what purposes. This 'audience analysis,' which has long gone on informally, makes it possible to

determine what information must be collected, how it should be analyzed, and how it should be presented. In a fundamental and important sense, this analysis defines the information needs.

Second, data collection systems must be strengthened in order to ensure that the materials gathered are complete, reliable, and pertinent. Some information is available--for example, vegetative cover, which is indexed from satellite photographs. Some data--size and dispersion of animal herds--are only estimated by national agencies. Some concerns--the extent and type of pesticide use, and air and water quality--are measured only sporadically at best, even though government agency staff are positioned to collect this information.

Besides official sources of information, there are many projects undertaken by research organizations, donors, and non-governmental organizations. If collated, information about these undertakings could provide a much needed assessment of local level conditions. The need is to pull these dispersed materials together, so that the lessons being learned in different localities can be synthesized and shared. In other words, the research agenda can be implemented, in part, by taking advantage of government and non-government initiatives in the CILSS-member countries.

Third, comparison of the information needs with the inventory of on-going efforts will reveal gaps in the current project and program information agenda. Once identified, these gaps need to be filled, either by collecting additional information from existing projects or by initiating new endeavors.

Fourth, these data must be compiled in national and regional centers. Compilation itself is a major undertaking, for many documents are elusive and difficult to obtain. To ensure the quality of the information being received, the coordinating agency must establish a review system wherein applied researchers evaluate the reliability and utility of the materials received. Also, a systematic and compatible analytic format for documents that are approved for inclusion in the centers' archives must be developed.

Fifth, a coordinating agency must have the means to make the documents and any analyses available to diverse but specific audiences, including researchers and development agents, decision makers, extension agents, and producers. This activity implies both a distribution network for each audience and a roster of interested agencies, researchers, and other personnel.

Sixth, and finally, there must be a comprehensive and long-term strategy for training Sahelian researchers. The needs here are both short- and long-term. In the short term, researchers and technicians would benefit from supplementary training in new techniques and approaches. In the long term, these professionals

must define a coherent program of agricultural and environmental research. An agency that coordinates the dissemination of research results would be well situated to promote the exchange of experiences among personnel in the region through colloquia, seminars, and training programs. The same agency could assist in strengthening national services through programs in personnel and financial management and program planning.

#### Need for a Coordination Unit

These six needs have been recognized for some time. Indeed, some of them have been attended to in piecemeal fashion by AGRHYMET, DIAPER, and RESADOC. The CILSS/Club Secretariats have themselves undertaken other data collection, analysis and dissemination, particularly in the area of food security. Nevertheless, even where the CILSS/Club staff are themselves qualified technicians, much of the field work and analysis is farmed out because the staff are already occupied fully with administrative matters. For example, much of the analysis of different approaches to cereals policy was contracted to the Michigan State University and to the Université de Montpellier. Although the CILSS/Club group sponsored a series of working sessions and conferences on these topics, many of the materials developed under the research program have been deposited with the contracted institutions.

What needs to be done is the core task of coordinating and integrating the available information and of synthesizing these materials into rigorous analyses of promising opportunities for investment. This task too has long been recognized. Indeed, a coordinating agency--The Institut du Sahel or INSAH--has been set up in the region. But for a variety of reasons it has yet to fulfil its mandate.

INSAH, the regional Sahelian agricultural research coordination agency, encountered many of the same problems as its parent organization, CILSS, through the mid-1980s. As the 1990-94 plan notes, "The difficulties of the CILSS system particularly affected INSAH, which suffered from several weaknesses--duplication of effort, loss of credibility, lack of a logical and coherent portfolio of projects, notwithstanding certain large undertakings" (1989:1). A number of studies were undertaken to assess this situation, and by 1988 INSAH was reorganized in order to regain its rightful place in regional--and international--research coordination.

As the regional center for the coordination of agricultural (including socio-economic) research, an institution such as INSAH is more crucial than ever. The high cost of agricultural research, in the context of the economic crisis now gripping the Sahelian countries, makes it imperative to share findings and experiences and to learn from mistakes. The member countries can no longer

afford--if they ever could in the past--to invent the same approaches being devised elsewhere. INSAH has the mandate necessary from both the Sahelians and the donors, and it can perform a critically important role in coordinating applied research programs in the member states, in maintaining a central data base and archive, in promoting scientific cooperation among centers in the region, and in disseminating available research findings.

Moreover, there is tremendous need for the provision of better integrated information to decision makers, for the transfer of practical advice to producers, and for the exchange of scientific information among researchers. An institute such as INSAH would be well situated to perform these services in the regional context, which promises economies of scale in that one program can be designed and then tailored to each national situation. To succeed, however, the Institute must establish strong links to producers in the region in order to define and refine its agenda. It must maintain and extend its links with research institutes outside the region in order to provide pertinent services to professional researchers. And, it must assess the needs of decision-makers--and the most successful forms of presenting the information to them--in order to help guide the regional and national programs.

Last but in no ways least, attention and emphasis must be paid to the training of researchers. Much work in the past decade has aimed to bridge the chasm between agricultural research and farmer needs. This reorientation of research direction is especially important today, now that the fundamental importance of local action for natural resource management is recognized and given paramountcy. Researchers must not only learn how to define pertinent problems but also how to communicate their findings to the target audiences. These matters must be inculcated if the new orientation of the CILSS/Club program is to be implemented successfully.

#### B. SERVING AS A CLEARING HOUSE

The second principal function of the CILSS/Club Secretariats in the 1990s will be to facilitate the flow of information on Sahel development issues to carefully targeted groups. The Secretariats have worked hard on their clearing-house service, progressively improving it over the years. The suggestions offered here are of a fine-tuning nature. The clearing-house function involves establishing the information exchange infrastructure, deciding on the kinds of information to be disseminated and to whom, and assessing the exchange system periodically for effectiveness.

The Club Secretariat is well along in putting in place the information infrastructure as pointed out in section III-E. The final stage of the computerized network--linking into three donor

development agencies, the FAO and the IBRD--is being examined now and could be accelerated with support from the DAG. The next step will be to facilitate access to the network by developing comprehensive but carefully categorized lists indicating what is available and where it is located. The CILSS/Club bibliography of its own published material is a good start but should be significantly amplified with the help of archivists at the other nerve centers of the exchange network.

Determining who are the principal users of an information system and what current material will best serve their needs is a problem for all clearing houses. In the beginning, distribution lists are often based on contacts made at conferences, personal solicitations and "priming the pump" efforts. An "old-boy network" is formed which gets informally pruned and expanded over the years. The Club Secretariat has gone through this process and now has a mailing list of over 1,200. As the importance of the CILSS/Club clearing-house function becomes more apparent, the Secretariats should consider undertaking a more systematic assessment of their "audience"--i.e., the size, composition, and information needs of various CILSS/Club user segments. The services of a professional marketing agency should be engaged to carry out this assessment.

Currently, the Secretariat gives wide distribution to its aid flows report (ODA), the Club newsletter and specially featured analyses. The carefully prepared ODA report offers fresh insights into the pattern of aid flows to the Sahel. Better use could be made of this report, however, if it were distributed several weeks before CILSS/Club high-level meetings so that participants could reflect and prepare comments on its contents--rather than hastily scanning the report during the course of the high level deliberations. The authors should be encouraged to reveal the reality behind the ODA figures even more than they do now, by, for example, "backing out" the food assistance data from development aid, and highlighting the proportion between capital assistance and technical assistance. Finally, the report could be even more useful if the data were more current. For the most part, the aid flows analyzed in the 1990 ODA reflect 1987 aid transactions. Since most of the data are derived from "first world" sources, it should be possible to acquire figures for 1988 transactions in time for a January 1990 issuance. DAG members should be asked to "run interference" for the OECD/Club in their home capitals to secure more current data.

The Club newsletter has evolved into a valuable tool for disseminating "reflections," summaries of meetings, profiles of interesting programs and a future-events calendar. Recently a book review section has been added covering publications on the Sahel. Two suggestions are offered. First, considering the newness and potential importance of the computerized-linked archives system, the newsletter should contain a regular feature explaining the uses of the system, giving illustrations of how it has helped particular

segments of users, and inviting suggestions for system improvement. Hopefully, an increasing number of users can be coaxed into the fold to help justify the sunk costs of the information infrastructure.

Secondly, the book review section should be considered a victim of its own success. It should be up-graded, expanded and broken off into an "Abstract/Review" publication separate from the newsletter. The array of important monographs, "think pieces" and book publications published annually about the Sahel require a quality of abstracting and/or analysis which is difficult to maintain under newsletter time constraints. The Club Secretariat has been aware of this scattered material and tried to corral some of it by circulating select pieces under the Club cover sheet. But a more systematic surveying of non-CILSS/Club work needs to be undertaken on a regular basis for culling into an "Abstract Review." Development practitioners and university staff should be invited to supplement Club Secretariat efforts by contributing abstracts and reviews to the new publication--which should be development action oriented but scholarly in method and tone. The Club Secretariat should work closely with INSAH during the start-up and trial phases of the new publication with the goal of divesting a "Sahel Development Digest" to INSAH in the mid 1990s.

The development digest approach calls for an attitude change within the CILSS/Club. Over the years the Secretariats have viewed themselves as "centers-of-reflection" and initiators of "think-tank pieces." This self-image has resulted in an unwitting rationing of staff energy for tracking the work of others. The time has come to realize that more and better insights can be achieved at reduced cost by "excavating" nuggets brought to the surface by others than by excessive reliance on CILSS/Club spade-work. Of course, the Secretariats should continue to undertake selected studies and synthesis reports. A more systematic tracking of the work of others, however, would help the Secretariats identify the areas of need for these studies as well as the desired focus for each.

### C. FUNCTIONING AS A DEVELOPMENT INTERLOCUTOR

The third priority function for the CILSS/Club Secretariats in the 1990s will be serving as a development interlocutor. The Secretariats have hosted an impressive number of colloquia, workshops and high-level meetings over the past fourteen years. Several insights emerge from this experience which should prove useful in the coming decade.

Development coordination organizations like CILSS/Club must stage meetings periodically, of course, to hold the attention and confidence of their backers--it is somewhat analogous to the researchers' need "to publish or perish." Given the imperative, however, care has to be taken that meetings do not become an end in

themselves. Few would deny that some excellent presentations were made and that there was an interesting exchange of views among the participants at the Remote Sensing Conference held in Niamey in 1989. Yet the "value-added" contribution of that exchange to a more effective application of remote sensing products in the Sahel was somewhat marginal. Several participants at the "decentralization" working group meeting held in Paris in April 1990 felt the session was premature and could have benefitted beforehand from a clearer statement of the group's mandate and scope in a relatively uncharted area.

CILSS/Club meetings must be part of a well thought-out strategy aimed at furthering development progress on the ground. Sensitizing cannot be the end-goal: rather, it should be a means to effect some specific change overtime, e.g., policy related, procedural, behavioral. Without such a strategy (and accompanying credible benchmarks to gauge progress<sup>93</sup>), organizations like CILSS/Club will be susceptible to criticism such as that leveled in 1984:

In the end, these conclaves, even when they result in actionable recommendations, produce few, if any, tangible acts in the countries of the participants, and to date have added little to the poor Sahelian's food bowl.<sup>94</sup>

This is not to imply that the CILSS/Club should strive to produce immediately verifiable or dramatic results from regional meetings. On the contrary, experience suggests that there should be a lowering of expectations--as well as of results claimed--from these meetings. The number of CILSS/Club "landmarks" and "turning points in history" tends to become confusing. Humility compels us to recognize that budgetary crisis had as much to do with market restructuring in the Sahel in recent years as landmark colloquia. The encounter value of a Segou meeting on decentralization can pale in comparison with a spontaneous demonstration by a few agitators in Bamako.

In selecting issues, topics or initiatives for regional deliberation, CILSS/Club should be guided by three criteria: the themes chosen should be (i) mandate related, (ii) Sahelian driven, and (iii) manageable.

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<sup>93</sup> A number of individuals interviewed for the evaluation suggested that the Secretariats should make a greater effort to trace the effect of their initiatives.

<sup>94</sup> AID Evaluation 1984.

### Mandate-Related

The mandate issue arises because of overlapping responsibilities among several regional organizations in West Africa. CILSS/Club has coordinated closely with two of its sister agencies, CIEH (water management) and CEBV (livestock management), but has had difficulty working out a modus operandi with the third --CEAO, whose mandate parallels CILSS' but includes responsibilities for trade, commerce and monetary issues.<sup>95</sup>

Tensions between CILSS and CEAO culminated in a public confrontation at the 1989 Lome Seminar with CEAO officials disputing CILSS' credentials for operating in the trade sphere. The CILSS/Club justification, as contained in its 1990-91 work plan, is based on the belief that organizations like CEAO "are making only minimal progress, or no progress at all."<sup>96</sup> This CILSS/Club view is not supported by the IBRD's 1989 report on "Sustainable Growth in Africa" which suggested that "only one trade group--CEAO--has scored some success"<sup>97</sup> in sub-Sahara Africa.

The issue of CILSS/Club's becoming involved in the trade sphere should not be resolved solely on the basis of organizational mandates. A good case can be made that an organization with responsibility for food security (i.e., CILSS) must retain an interest in regional trade issues. More important at this juncture is institutional competence for dealing with trade issues. Competence involves experience, technical talent and judgment. Even if the CILSS/Club's view on CEAO's success is accurate, one has to wonder how long it will take CILSS/Club to build up the degree of competence on trade matters now found within CEAO.

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<sup>95</sup> The CILSS/Club Secretariats have discussed the need for closer coordination with CEAO over the years. The CILSS/Club work plan, issued in October 1986, pointed out that "satisfactory coordination of the future work program between the CILSS/Club and the CEAO would probably make it possible to progress more rapidly in analyzing the remaining problems and in making proposals as to how to solve them." Sahel D (86) 297, Oct. 1986, p. 13.

<sup>96</sup> Sahel D (89) 336, p. 2.

<sup>97</sup> The paragraph continues: "Thanks to lower non tariff barriers, a common convertible currency, a satisfactory compensation mechanism, and labor mobility, trade among the members has grown to around 10 percent of their total trade." "Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth." IBRD, 1989, p. 12.

Furthermore, what reason is there to believe that a new organizational cast of characters will have greater success than CEAO?

Before travelling too far down the trade path, the CILSS/Club Secretariats need to familiarize themselves with current CEAO program plans and organizational strengths. By coordinating more closely with CEAO, and deferring to it in areas of its strength, the CILSS/Club may be better able to quicken the pace of regional trade integration--the aim of both institutions. In the process the CILSS/Club will be able to conserve resources for use in those areas where it has established competence over the years. Given heavy donor involvement in both CEAO and CILSS/Club, the donor advisory group (DAG) should play a supporting role in improving CILSS-CEAO coordination.

### Sahelian-Driven

The second criteria for CILSS/Club theme selection is that it be Sahelian driven. This does not undervalue the importance of donor creativity or resourcefulness within the CILSS/Club partnership. It simply recognizes that all inspirations and stratagems must be embraced and internalized by Sahelians--if the impact is to be felt in the Sahel. The internalization process may be time consuming and test the patience of donors. Trying to circumvent the process, however, by staging donor happenings will be illusory in terms of development progress.

The literature is replete with donor-inspired initiatives which seem to flourish for a while, but never really take root. Development practitioners have learned one lesson well--there must be a local "felt need" for an initiative as well as some commitment of local resources to attest to that need. A good part of the success of the DIAPER activity, for example, relates to the Sahelian's need for better data for their negotiations with donors on annual food aid requirements. Up until a few years ago, these discussions were based almost entirely on FAO's version of the food gap.

Donor supporters of the CILSS/Club have felt for some time that trade and commercial links between the Sahel and its coastal neighbors should be strengthened and expanded.<sup>98</sup> Recently the

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<sup>98</sup> Some donors have been stressing the importance of improved economic relationships for over a decade. For example, A.I.D. in its 1979 Strategy Paper on the Sahel suggested: "Regional integration is critical to the achievement of self-sustaining growth in the Sahel. Part of our regional development strategy, therefore, will be to assist regional organizations...to provide a better understanding of regional economic linkages in West

suggestion was made that the Club Secretariat open a small office in Abidjan (at the ADB) to promote trade between the Sahel and the coastal countries. In keeping with the second criteria for CILSS/Club theme selection, the issue arises--to what extent is this a Sahelian driven initiative? Do the CILSS member countries believe that this is the route to take? What resources are the Sahelians making available to reflect their support for the initiative? All agree that real progress on trade expansion depends upon Sahelians themselves becoming seized by the problem. The troublesome question is will a donor initiated and supported operation in Abidjan really help to strengthen trade linkages and exchanges between the Sahel and coastal countries.

### Manageable

According to the third criteria, CILSS/Club themes and initiatives should be kept manageable in the sense that the desired objective is within the range or reach of the CILSS/Club. At the Montpellier DAG meeting, the Secretariats asked donors to submit material, including time flow charts, on their food aid allocation processes. If the Secretariats' aim was to reveal the complexity and time-consuming nature of donor decision-making on food allocations, the request made sense. If, on the other hand, the Secretariats hoped that the chart-material would better position them to influence donor headquarters by guiding them to decision-points in the food allocation process, the CILSS/Club hope was unrealistic. This is not to imply that the Secretariats should not try to influence donor food aid allocations. They should and can try to do so through their normal channels. But they should not waste their time scanning chart-mazes.

The choice of CILSS/Club initiatives should also be kept manageable in the sense that the Secretariats have a good understanding of where they hope the endeavor will lead and the wherewithal to nudge the initiative along the desired path. This may call for a dry-run or preparatory session beforehand, as the Secretariats intend to do in the case of the private sector seminar to be held later this year. These preparatory sessions help sharpen the CILSS/Club focus and help keep expectations reasonable as to what can be promised under CILSS/Club husbandry.

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Africa and...strengthen those linkages to the benefit of both Sahelian and coastal countries."

At the 1983 high level session in Brussels, a USAID representative presented a simple simulation model which pointed to a savings of approximately \$5 billion for the Sahelian countries if they pursued a regional trade plus self-sufficiency strategy rather than one of national food self-sufficiency. Sahel CR (83) 40, p. 2.

The discussion on decentralization at Guinea Bissau (January 1990) would have benefitted from additional of brainstorming beforehand. This would have revealed the need to (i) develop a set of definitions around "decentralization," (ii) determine how the term is conceptualized in member states, (iii) weigh the potential contributions and limitations that a decentralization initiative can make, and (iv) identify practical implementation issues which need to be addressed.

## V. THE DONORS AND THE CILSS IN THE 1990s

The donors decided in 1986 that they had to better organize their interaction with the Club Secretariat and interject more of their own analysis and experiences into the Club planning process. Since the formation of the donor advisory group there has been a noticeable improvement in the focusing of CILSS/Club program initiatives. The principal role of the advisory group in the 1990s will be to assist the Secretariats in creating and strengthening the Sahel Development Networking System (SDNS). This will call for a much more structured exchange of information between the donor community and the CILSS/Club systems.

### Development Investment Lessons Learned

The principal donor programs in the Sahel are, in effect, large development laboratories capable of yielding penetrating insights which should form the basis for future investment strategies. The CILSS/Club Secretariats are now positioning themselves to disseminate these development insights in a systematic fashion so that there will be an incremental upgrading of project design and implementation activities throughout the Sahel. However, the Secretariats are dependent on the donor community for the monitoring of their individual assistance programs and the culling of lessons-learned material for circulation by the CILSS/Club system. Without strong support from the donor advisory group, the Secretariats will not be able to get the "insights from the development front" initiative launched.

The new initiative is not simply a hearkening back to the Club's effort in the early 1980s to get donors to circulate some of their project evaluation reports, an effort that did not succeed. At issue now is a belated recognition by donors that their on-going projects represent a rich--but poorly exploited--resource for development investment guidance. The challenge for the DAG is to motivate donors (i) to review their project design systems to see if activities are being properly "wired" to emit timely and discernible signals for analytical purposes, (ii) to examine their project monitoring and assessment systems to see if progress indicators are being appropriately identified and aggregated so that useful impact conclusions can be drawn, and (iii) to structure, with the Secretariats' assistance, a periodic flow of material about lessons and insights learned to the CILSS/Club for dissemination throughout the region. If such a system for capturing lessons-learned had been put in place in the 1970s, many of the "inventing of the wheel" efforts of the 1980s surely would have been unnecessary. A.I.D. is well positioned to funnel its lessons-learned materials to the Secretariats because of the advances made in this area by CDIE over the last four years.

## Development Investment Research Priorities

The CILSS/Club Secretariats should reciprocate the flow of donor insights on "likely-to-work interventions" by providing guidance back to the donor advisory group on the areas of need for future research. One of the areas where donor collaboration has been the weakest within the Sahel Regional Framework is research. Opportunities to better understand the reality behind the "Giri facade"<sup>99</sup> have been wasted because of donor unwillingness to combine resources, both money and researchers. Recently, with the help of the CILSS/Club Secretariats, the French and the U.S. took a first important step in the direction of collaborative research. This should be just the beginning in a surge of collaborative research undertaking throughout the Sahel.

Reference has already been made to the Sahel Development Research Agenda which forms a key element of the SDNS. Forming the "first generation" research agenda for the Sahel region will be initiated by the CILSS/Club through INSAH. Then using the Secretariats' system of studies and workshops, the inventory compilation will be used to determine research gaps as well as priorities for near-term research. The priority list should next be vetted through the donor advisory group to determine modes of collaboration and possible sources of financing. Eventually, a research coordinator for each principal activity will be appointed to implement the research under the guidance of INSAH. The whole process--from inventory to channeling research results to investors --will require consistent encouragement from the donor advisory group. Without strong DAG support, research in the Sahel will remain fragmented and never reach critical-mass levels.

## CILSS/Club Strategies and Workplans

In recent years the Secretariats' Joint Workplan has served as the CILSS/Club program strategy. This has had its advantages and limitations. The Secretariats have not felt locked into a restrictive strategy. They have been able to range freely, choosing program targets opportunistically. As the number of CILSS/Club activities has grown, however, it has become increasingly difficult to assess their relative importance. In the environmental management area, for example, the workplan does not ascribe priority values among land tenure resolution, decentralized management issues and butane gas exploitation. In the area of food security, there is no document to consult regarding the relative importance of PROCELOS, the Food Security Charter and trade-flow research. Without an understanding of the relative importance of individual endeavors, resource allocation among them tends to be somewhat arbitrary. Of course, one could pursue a strategy of "let

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<sup>99</sup> See Sahel D, 89, 336, Nov. 1989, p. 3, which is cited in the introduction of this evaluation.

a thousand flowers bloom" to ascertain, eventually, the activities with the highest pay-off. With recent world events, however, and aid resources becoming more scarce, there are few who would endorse this approach.

What is needed is a multi-year strategy in the two CILSS/Club concentration areas (food security and environmental management) that will guide the Secretariats' efforts and be the basis for future workplans. The strategies would examine the principal constraints in the concentration areas, select priority interventions (from among alternatives), identify needed resources, project likely outcomes and lay out progress indicators. The strategy identification process would not preclude activities only tangentially related to emphasis areas, but it would ensure the existence of a main road map with scope for alternate routings as deemed desirable.

The CILSS/Club Secretariats should assume responsibility for drafting the new multi-year strategies. The donor advisory group can assist the Secretariats by commenting on early drafts and securing "ratification" of the strategies within donor bureaucracies. The strategy-building process could prove helpful in renewing interest in the CILSS/Club by highlighting the relevancy of its mission for Sahelian development in the 1990's.

#### Policy Dialogue

As suggested elsewhere in this evaluation, the CILSS/Club nexus was never envisioned by Sahelians as a regional locus for dialogue with donors on policy related issues. With the exception of the first session in Ottawa (1977) where policy issues were heatedly debated, high-level meetings between the donors and CILSS member officials have been camaraderie-building exercises, for the most part, which have impacted little on development strategies in the Sahel.

There are some donor representatives, however, who believe that meaningful policy dialogue should be manageable under CILSS/Club auspices. They point to the most recent meeting (January 1990) held in Guinea Bissau as evidence of a turn-around in the Sahelian willingness to engage in policy discussions. Our review of the Bissau transcript and discussion with several attendees at the meeting did not lead us to concur with this view. Nevertheless, we agree that the high level sessions offer excellent opportunities for sensitizing which have not been fully capitalized on to-date. We recommend that the donor advisory group work closely with the Secretariats in structuring future presentations at the high level sessions.

Agenda topics for the high-level sessions should be agreed to at least six months in advance of the meetings. This will allow for more adequate staffing out of each topic's implications and a

narrowing of the focus to areas where progress is achievable within the high-level context.

In dealing with issues like the respective roles of the state and the non-government sector, under the new scenario, it will be necessary to move beyond the consensus reached at Bissau which simply agreed "there was a need for modern states to continue to take steps to ensure that a better balance could be struck between the state and the non-government sector." A carefully prepared sequence of steps--which could lead to a better balance--would have to be worked out by Sahelian and donor staff groups in advance of the high level meeting. Country situations would have to be cited where "better-balance" measures had already been enacted with a description of their impact to-date. A few veterans of "better-balance" experimenting would be on hand to provide real-life insights on difficulties which inevitably arise and how they can be handled. Care would be taken, however, to keep experts from dominating the discussion in order to permit a real exchange of views among the senior level officials (Sahelian and donor) in the room.

The object of the presentations on state and non-government sectors would be to persuade these senior officials that "better-balance" experimenting should be tried because the benefits outweighed the risks--which can be contained. The minimum expectations from the meeting would be (i) new ministerial invitations to re-enact the presentation at the national capital level and/or (ii) some ministerial requests for assistance in tailoring a "better-balance" experimental program for their country situation.

## VI. INSAH IN THE 1990s

The CILSS/Club group focuses on questions of food security and environmental management. Various of the domains related to food security--rainfall, production, stocks--are covered by the Agro-Hydro-Meteorologie (AGHYMET) and Diagnostique Permanent (DIAPER) programs. Within the CILSS system, however, the broad mandate for research coordination and information dissemination lies with INSAH. Also, INSAH is a permanent agency within CILSS, with a professional staff seconded from member state ministries, so that the Institute, unlike a project, could carry on this work independently. The challenge for the CILSS/Club group, as well as for the donors, in the near future is to actualize INSAH's potential as a research coordinator, that is, as a compiler and disseminator of agricultural and environmental information, and as a modeler of investment programs in the region.

The Institut du Sahel (INSAH) began operation in 1978 as a specialized agency of CILSS charged with regional coordination in the areas of agro-pastoral and environmental research, information dissemination of scientific techniques for the Sahelian region, and training. More specifically, the mandate of INSAH comprises:

- the collection, analysis, and dissemination of scientific research findings;
- the adaption and transfer of appropriate technologies;
- the coordination, promotion, and harmonization of scientific research and techniques;
- the training of researchers and technicians in research techniques;
- the consideration and definition of themes for regional research; and,
- the planning of regional research.

These functions were assigned to INSAH because there was at the time no single institution to consolidate information on development activities in the Sahel and to report on the status and lessons learned from research activities in the region. Nor was there a technical research journal that treated the long-term considerations of development in the region. These concerns, as well as the needs for an applied research training center, constituted--and constitute--the raison d'être of INSAH.

Unfortunately, INSAH encountered a number of difficulties over its first ten years. The governing board failed to provide oversight and guidance. The Institute duplicated initiatives being undertaken by other organizations, such as SAFGRAD. The Institute

undertook the implementation of projects only marginally related to its mandate. Managerial chaos resulted in an inability to implement many of these projects in its portfolio. And, the organization was overstaffed in relation to its workload.

Many of these difficulties have been resolved in the intervening years. INSAH today has strong top management that is giving direction to the organization. The Institute has been reorganized into three departments: Agriculture and Environmental Research, Information and Training, and Administration and Finances. (CERPOD is an essentially independent institute within INSAH.) The project portfolio has been severely pruned. A strong research information network has been established. And, the Institute has defined a feasible five-year plan (1990-94) that accords well with its original mandate.

The five-year plan covers activities in agriculture, pastoralism and the environment. In agriculture, the Institute aims to strengthen genetic collections in the region, carry out crop-protection activities, and complete a varietal testing program. In pastoral production, the Institute has scheduled work on small ruminant diseases and animal nutrition. INSAH has also initiated a socio-economic program focused on food security, technology transfer, and local participation, as well as continuing earlier efforts in soil conservation, reforestation, and ecological monitoring of the desertification process.

In addition, as mentioned, the Institute has developed an important information-distribution network, RESADOC. This network, which still requires strengthening and consolidation, is established in all CILSS-member countries and enables the distribution of scientific information through a single national center.

Finally, INSAH will be very much involved with training programs for technicians and decision makers in order to share experiences and help further national programs. A major emphasis of these programs will be training so that the people themselves become the motor of development.

The current and planned staffing of INSAH clearly indicates the Institute's priorities. Most resources are presently channeled into documentation and training: over half the staff work in this department, mostly in the documentation unit. Additional staff will be added to the documentation unit and, importantly, to the training unit. The Research Department, by contrast, is staffed by four technicians, but two additional specialists will be recruited in the future. The Administrative Department remains small--four persons, including the financial comptroller--and has no plans for expansion. In short, INSAH is a small institute staffed by qualified technicians, focused largely on research documentation and training but with an appreciable technical support staff.

The member states contributions to INSAH cover staff salaries. Most of the INSAH program is financed by donors as projects.

### The Challenge

With its organizational structure, staff, financing and work program in place, INSAH is prepared to carry out its mandate for applied research coordination in the Sahel. There are nonetheless certain matters that still must be resolved for the Institute to perform its tasks successfully.

First, the CILSS Secretariat must allocate to INSAH those concerns that fall appropriately within its--INSAH's--mandate. In other words, there must be a rationalization of the division of labor between the two organizations such that CILSS is responsible for policy related analysis while INSAH is responsible for the coordination of all information in the areas of rural production and the environment. This clarification of responsibilities, which accords with the original charters of the two agencies, has long been called for, but never effected, in part because this clarification may involve reallocation of funds between the two agencies.

Second, the Institute must strengthen its RESADOC network. The national RESADOC liaison in each country is not always the most effective institution for the compilation of pertinent national documents in agricultural research or for the distribution of other materials from the RESADOC center. In The Gambia, for example, the national library has been designated as the in-country RESADOC liaison. New centers may have to be designated where the present system of collecting results and distributing findings has failed to reach the intended audiences.

Third, INSAH must build a collaborative network with government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and donors in order to compile the documentation. The Institute's technical staff already have many contacts with these different parties, but these linkages need to be strengthened and expanded, that is, institutionalized. A schedule of technical working meetings on specific topics--e.g., soil and water conservation, coarse grains research, crop protection and locust control--could contribute significantly to the strengthening of these applied research networks.

Fourth, INSAH can institute a development digest, ultimately taking this role over from the Club. The technical digest would enable researchers and implementors in each member country to learn from the experience of colleagues in the other countries. The digest would also serve to tie the technical networks together, for practitioners would be able to call for advice and assistance from compatriots elsewhere in the region.

Fifth, the CILSS/Club group should come in time to use INSAH as the regional data base source for the elaboration and revision of food security and environmental programs. The Sahel needs an institution to carry out analyses that up until now have mostly been contracted out to institutions in developed countries. As has been mentioned earlier, since the problems of the Sahel can only be dealt with by the people of the Sahelian countries, the development of a regional institute to collate, synthesize, and disseminate research and project results in the Sahel is a sine qua non for future investment and progress.

Finally, the CILSS/Club, in collaboration with INSAH, can then sponsor conferences, seminars, working sessions, much as it has in the past. In this regard, the CILSS/Club system of studies and conferences could be useful in defining the lacunae, in prioritizing research areas, and in enlisting donor assistance for needed programs. This work, it should be noted, very much accords with the CILSS/Club mandate of taking a leadership role in the identification and discussion of new themes and initiatives. The important difference recommended here is the concerted development of INSAH as the regional research coordinator, with the mandate to improve the reliability and completeness of the information available to decision makers. In time, there should evolve a real complementarity between the two agencies.

## VII. TWO ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

Over time, several coordinating agencies have been created to improve the operation of the CILSS system. Specifically, national correspondants (CONACILSS) were instituted as liaison between the CILSS Executive Secretariat and the member state governments. Subsequently, an in-country donor group, the Ouagadougou Group, was formed to monitor donor inputs into CILSS operations and project activities.

### A. CONACILSS

The CONACILSS is the official link between the CILSS Executive Secretariat and the member state governments. The CONACILSS correspondant is responsible for coordinating all CILSS activities in country. And, he is responsible for involving government representatives in the CILSS programming and project activities through the mechanism of national committees. Much of the financial support for CONACILSS operations comes from A.I.D. contributions to CILSS.

CONACILSS has not worked well over the years, despite fitful efforts to improve the office. The reasons are many: the CONACILSS correspondant cannot give full attention to the CILSS program; he lacks staff, equipment and mobility; the CILSS Executive Secretariat itself fails to inform the representative of missions, reports, and initiatives. (See Appendix A for a fuller discussion of these concerns.)

Importantly, the remedies to this situation lie within the grasp of the CILSS Executive Secretariat and the member states themselves. First, CONACILSS must be made a full-time representative with a small staff to assist in the CILSS program in-country. This will require that the Executive Secretary obtain greater support from the member states. After all, CONACILSS is the liaison between CILSS--the regional organization of the Sahelian nations--and the member states themselves.

Second, CILSS itself must consistently coordinate with the CONACILSS on the CILSS program. Annual CONACILSS meetings should be re-established. All correspondence must pass through the CONACILSS. And, most importantly, all CILSS project activities must be coordinated through CONACILSS and not through project committees established independently in each country.

Third, and at the same time, CONACILSS must begin to play a more active role in national-level coordination. Meetings of the national committee must be regularly scheduled. The CONACILSS must monitor CILSS project activities in country, and, with the national committee, the success of CILSS projects.

These actions by the Executive Secretariat, the member states, and the CONACILSS correspondants would, as has long been recognized, transform the role of the correspondent and national council from that of liaison to that of national reflection.

B. THE "OUAGADOUGOU GROUP"

The group of donor representatives, resident in Ouagadougou, was formed in 1986 to monitor donor inputs into CILSS Secretariat operations and project activities. There is a growing belief among members of the Group that their biannual review sessions no longer constitute adequate oversight of donor inputs into the CILSS system.

New terms of reference should be drawn up which spell out more clearly:

- (i) the monitoring responsibilities of the Group,
- (ii) the requirement for quarterly meetings between the Group and the CILSS Executive Secretary,
- (iii) the specific documents and CILSS submissions which will constitute the basis of the Group's discussions,
- (iv) the requirement that official minutes of the meetings be maintained, and that these minutes highlight issues needing attention (and steps to be taken to address concerns identified in previous meetings), and,
- (v) the need for an annual report from the Group which summarizes progress made during the year to improve donor-Sahelian collaboration on oversight modalities.

These new terms of reference should be drawn up as soon as possible so that they can be discussed with the new CILSS Executive Secretary early in his tour of service.

## VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are offered to help strengthen donor-Sahelian collaboration at the regional level in the 1990s.

RECOMMENDATION 1. The role transition of the CILSS/Club in terms of its regional strategy function has been a healthy one, based on the growing realization that "the Sahel's future can only be perceived by government planners and their donor partners to a small extent." Consequently, any notion of reviving the broad regional strategy to reflect a CILSS/Club "global view" of the Sahel development task should be dropped as an anachronism.

RECOMMENDATION 2. The task for the CILSS/Club is not to try to figure out where the Sahel's economic future lies, any more than that is the principal task of governments or donors. The Secretariats' role in this decade will be to help prepare the Sahelian peoples to capitalize on whatever options may emerge and to help create an open, nurturing environment congenial to innovation.

RECOMMENDATION 3. Better information and data are key conditions for helping the Sahelian peoples to discover and capitalize on their emerging options. The CILSS/Club, with its considerable experience in information brokering over the years in the Sahel, is in an excellent position to undergird the whole nurturing process with a Sahel Development Networking System.

RECOMMENDATION 4. The Sahel Development Networking System (SDNS) does not call for new institutions, large staff build-ups or significant new budget outlays. The SDNS is largely a matter of actualizing unused potential within the CILSS/Club system, breathing life into relationships and linkages that now exist only on paper, and bringing a more disciplined approach to the 'nurturing process.'

RECOMMENDATION 5. In the pursuit of the SDNS, the CILSS/Club Secretariats should concentrate their energies in three principal areas: compiling investment information, serving as a clearing house for development insights, and functioning as a regional development interlocutor.

RECOMMENDATION 6. In its role of compiler of investment information, the CILSS/Club should rely more extensively on its regional arm for applied research coordination, the Institute of the Sahel (INSAH). The Institute has made considerable progress in recent years in putting in place an organizational structure, work program and financing arrangements which now permit it to address mandate areas assigned to it at the creation of the CILSS structure. The CILSS/Club group should come in time to regard INSAH as the central data base source for the elaboration and revision of all Secretariat strategies and initiatives.

RECOMMENDATION 7. To this end, there should be a better rationalization of the division of labor between the CILSS Secretariat and INSAH. CILSS should assume responsibility for policy analysis, strategy formulation, and resource mobilization. The regional institute should have responsibility for collating, synthesizing and disseminating project results and research information through Sahelian networks.

RECOMMENDATION 8. The SDNS should be focused on the CILSS/Club's two emphasis areas, food security and environmental management. A strategy covering these two areas should be drafted as soon as possible in order to determine the relative priority of existing and planned CILSS/Club initiatives and, thereby, improve resource allocation within the system. The CILSS/Club workplan for 1991 should be revised to reflect the priorities established in the new mandate related strategy.

RECOMMENDATION 9. The principal role of the Donor Advisory Group (DAG) in the 1990s will be to assist the Secretariats in creating and strengthening the Sahel Development Networking System (SDNS). This will call for a much more structured exchange of information between the donor community and the CILSS/Club systems. The DAG should take responsibility for having 'lessons-learned' material from donor-sponsored projects channeled to CILSS/Club/INSAH for circulation throughout the Sahel.

RECOMMENDATION 10. The CILSS/Club/INSAH should take responsibility for the initiation and maintenance of a region-wide inventory on research activities currently being carried out in the Sahel in the two CILSS/Club mandate areas. The DAG will then work with the Secretariats to determine gaps in the research effort and establish priorities for future donor collaboration on research endeavors.

RECOMMENDATION 11. Given the limited opportunity for genuine policy dialogue between Sahelians and donors within the regional CILSS/Club framework, more attention should be devoted by the Secretariats to supporting selective policy dialogue efforts at the national level--through technical analysis and advice.

RECOMMENDATION 12. The CILSS/Club 'high-level' meetings should be viewed not so much as occasions for policy dialogue as opportunities to sensitize senior officials--both donor and Sahelian--through carefully structured presentations and discussions entailing specific follow-up.

RECOMMENDATION 13. Donor coordination within the CILSS/Club framework is about as good as can be expected. The quality of dialogue has improved in recent years but progress in coalescing program strategies and standardizing aid practices has been marginal. Nevertheless, efforts to create donor coordination 'products' like the Food Aid Charter should continue. The process

of coordinating is beneficial even when the result is a qualified success.

RECOMMENDATION 14. The information clearing-house function performed by the Club Secretariat has been very useful to Sahelians as well as to donors. As the importance of this function becomes more apparent, the Secretariats should undertake a more systematic assessment of their audiences, i.e., the size, composition and information needs of various CILSS/Club user segments.

RECOMMENDATION 15. The Club ODA report, which offers fresh insights into the pattern of aid flows to the Sahel could be even more useful if (i) the data were more current and (ii) the authors were encouraged to reveal more of the reality behind the ODA figures.

RECOMMENDATION 16. The much-praised Club newsletter should contain a regular feature explaining the uses of the computerized Sahel archives system to coax more users into the fold, thereby helping to justify sunk costs for the information infrastructure.

RECOMMENDATION 17. A more systematic surveying of analytical materials on the Sahel that originate outside the CILSS/Club nexus should be undertaken on a regular basis. The best of this material should be culled into an abstract review, which is development-action oriented and scholarly in tone. This initiative should be undertaken jointly by the Club Secretariat and INSAH but eventually divested completely to the Institute.

RECOMMENDATION 18. Club/CILSS colloquia and workshops should be part of a well thought-out strategy aimed at furthering development progress on the ground. Sensitizing cannot be an end-goal, rather it is a means to effect some specific change over time. Consequently, a methodology for assessing the impact of CILSS/Club initiatives should be incorporated in each activity workplan.

RECOMMENDATION 19. CILSS/Club initiatives should be kept manageable in the sense that the Secretariats have a good understanding of where they hope the endeavor will lead and the wherewithal to nudge the process along the desired path. This will usually call for some kind of brainstorming or trial run beforehand to sharpen the Secretariats' focus with respect to what can be promised under CILSS/Club husbandry.

RECOMMENDATION 20. At times, Club/CILSS documents have given the impression that developmental changes can take place in a shorter timeframe than experience suggests. There should be a lowering of expectations, as well as of claimed results, from CILSS/Club sponsored initiatives. Too many 'landmark colloquia' and 'turning points in history' can become confusing.

RECOMMENDATION 21. Initiatives conceived by the Secretariats or the DAG must be embraced and internalized by the Sahelian member countries--if their impact is to be felt in the Sahel. For outsiders, the internalization process may be time-consuming and may test patience. Trying to accelerate or circumvent the process by staging 'donor happenings' will be illusory in terms of development progress.

RECOMMENDATION 22. In this connection, there should be a review of the recent CILSS/Club decision to open a donor-financed office at the ADB in Abidjan to promote trade between the Sahelian and the coastal countries. Without greater evidence of Sahelian interest in this endeavor, manifested by material support, there is little chance that the trade office will make a difference in this area of crucial importance.

RECOMMENDATION 23. In selecting themes and initiatives for future CILSS/Club concentration, the Secretariats should coordinate carefully with other West African regional organizations. This is not solely a matter of mandate but a question of conserving scarce resources by capitalizing on individual institutional competencies. In particular, the CILSS/Club Secretariats need to familiarize themselves with current CEAO program plans and organizational strengths. The goal of regional trade integration will be better served--and the pace probably quickened--by a closer coordination between these agencies.

RECOMMENDATION 24. CONACILSS is considered important by the Executive Secretariat, the national correspondents, and the member countries, despite its operational difficulties. The Executive Secretary is in the best position to take the steps necessary to resolve the problems identified in the internal 1986 CONACILSS evaluation. Moreover, this obligation should in time be borne by the member states in order to reflect their recognition of the need for the CONACILSS agency.

RECOMMENDATION 25. The Ouagadougou Group responsible for monitoring donor inputs into CILSS operations and project activities needs new terms of reference to better meet its oversight responsibilities. These new terms should be drawn up as soon as possible so that they can be discussed with the incoming CILSS Executive Secretary.

**ANNEX A**  
**STRUCTURE OF THE CILSS SECRETARIATS**

## CILSS STRUCTURE

### I. The Overall Structure of the CILSS System

The Comite Permanent Inter-etats de Lutte Contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS) comprises an Executive Secretary, and two specialized agencies, the Institut du Sahel (INSAH) and Agro-Hydro-Meterologie (AGRHYMET). INSAH itself has an additional specialized agency, the Centre de Recherche en Population et Demographie (CERPOD). CILSS is based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; INSAH and CERPOD in Bamako, Mali; and AGRHYMET in Niamey, Niger.

By charter, CILSS is the supreme agency, charged with coordination of all regional programs for the member states. By contrast, INSAH (including CERPOD) and AGRHYMET are research agencies. INSAH coordinates agricultural research information within the region; CERPOD compiles population and demographic information; and, AGRHYMET collects climatological information throughout the region. INSAH, CERPOD, and AGRHYMET are each managed by a General Director, who reports to the CILSS Executive Secretary. The budgets of the Executive Secretariat and the two specialized agencies, however, are separate.

The CILSS Executive Secretary is linked to the member states through a National Correspondant (termed CONACILSS), who chairs a national committee composed of representatives of all ministries concerned with the CILSS program.

Figure 1 outlines the overall structure of the CILSS system.

### II. The Situation of CILSS in 1984

In 1984 a management review of CILSS executive secretary and its specialized agencies (the "Palin Report") recommended restructuring and strengthening the organization. About the same time, a final evaluation of the Sahel Regional Aid Coordination and Planning Project, the predecessor of the present project, was carried out. These two reviews contain a number of similar, as well as complementary, recommendations.

Two tasks were defined as priority matters for CILSS. First, it was recognized that the organization had to formulate a new, "actionable" mandate that charted a course towards the organization's defined objectives. Second, there was the need "to prune radically the size of the Executive Secretariat's staff while at the same time raising its professionalism" (Final Evaluation, p. 8). The Palin Report had espoused much the same recommendation with its suggestion that the Secretariat professional staff be reduced from 21 to 10 and that of INSAH from 16 to 6. That is, the senior professional staff would be reduced from 37 to 16.

FIGURE 1  
**ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CILSS SYSTEM**




Figure 2 depicts the organization of the CILSS Executive Secretary in 1984. As can be appreciated, the organization then had five directorates. One of these directorates was essentially a single project (the integrated pest management project). Another directorate, Projects and Programmes, itself contained both sectoral units (e.g., crop production, transport, livestock) and cross-sectoral units (e.g., human resources, planning and evaluation). In addition there was an administrative unit, a documentation unit, and a non-governmental organizations unit. The recommendation at the time was to reduce these to an administrative service, a documentation and statistics service, a strategic planning secretariat, and a specialized committees secretariat (Figure 3).

The final evaluation also noted that a special concern is the CONACILSS, the national councils which relate member state ministries to the CILSS structure. As the evaluation notes (p. 9), "within the CILSS structure, they seem the weakest link, although as the member country secretariats they are theoretically the primary, grassroots building blocks. Virtually none of them function" (p. 9). The report therefore called for "a new mandate [to] address the question of the mechanism through which regional policy recommendations will be implemented by CILSS members as part of their national policies, be it through a revitalized CONACILSS or other means." Indeed, the evaluation recommended that AID "suspend the financing of national CILSS units (CONACILSS) pending...clarification of the role of CONACILSS" (p.16).

In its recommendations, the evaluation team made a number of other observations. Namely, the roles of the Club, CILSS and INSAH "need to be clearly defined (Recommendation No. 4). "AID's future support should aim, when feasible, at strengthening the role of CILSS (rather than the Club's)" (Recommendation No.5). CILSS should not "duplicate tasks already being acted upon by others among the plethora of West African organizations." "Neither CILSS nor INSAH...should manage projects, as opposed to coordination, evaluation and dissemination of information." These recommendations are as pertinent today as they were in 1984.

### III. The Restructuring of CILSS

#### A. The Executive Secretariat

In view of these studies and others undertaken by the Executive Secretariat itself, the CILSS was reorganized into two technical divisions, a financial and administrative division, and a documentation division (Figure 4).

FIGURE 2

Present and Proposed organisation charts of the Executive Secretariat





FIGURE 3




(b) Proposed

**NOTES :** In the interest of distinguishing clearly between projects and the more permanent structures, projects have not been included in the chart.

Figures in brackets indicate proposed member of staff positions at Category A level (corresponding to director and senior technical adviser).

FIGURE 4  
**ORGANOGRAM OF THE CILSS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**



1/1

As may be appreciated from this organizational structure and staffing pattern, CILSS was initially a smaller organization. The two technical divisions were created from the earlier Projects and Program Department. Sectoral activities were allocated to the current Department of Projects and Programs (DPP). This Department has sections for livestock, and agriculture, ecology and environment, water resources (rural wells) and human resources. At the same time, cross sectoral activities were delegated to the Department of Studies and Programming (DEP). This Department has three sections: Studies and Reflection, Documentation, and Monitoring and Evaluation. Each technical service is staffed by a single professional.

Over time, each department has come to coordinate one or more regional projects. DPP now coordinates the regional butane gas project, the regional solar energy (solar power for rural water wells) project, and the regional cereals project (PROCELOS). Meanwhile, DEP provides assistance to national cereals offices through the PAROC project (Project d'Appui Regional aux Offices Cerealieres). When the staff of these projects is considered part of the Executive Secretariat, the size of CILSS organization today is about what it was five years ago.

#### B. CONACILSS

As has been mentioned, the CONACILSS system has operated poorly since its inception. Indeed, the CILSS Executive Secretary itself commissioned an assessment of the CONACILSS in 1986. The review was carried out by two National Correspondants. This study, pinpoints a number of problems and difficulties expressed by the Executive Secretariat, the CONACILSS themselves, and the member state government ministry representatives.

CONACILSS plays a key role in the CILSS system. The National Correspondant and through him, the National Committee, is the in-country liaison for CILSS. They are charged with coordinating CILSS efforts in-country, and with monitoring and evaluating CILSS activities there. They assist CILSS teams with logistics, arranging meetings and itineraries, and they arrange all CILSS meetings, conferences and seminars in their countries. They disseminate CILSS information, and forward national information and documents of interest to CILSS departments. They participate in the assessment and programming of all CILSS actions. And, they prepare, spend, and account for the CONACILSS budgets.

The CONACILSS system has worked only imperfectly at best. CONACILSS may be unprepared to assist teams, and in some instances fail to respond to telexes about prospective missions. They do not field monitoring or evaluation of CILSS initiatives. They may distribute CILSS documents among their ministries, but they seldom compile and forward national information for CILSS departments.

Finally, although there have been improvements in recent years, the CONACILSS have been notoriously inefficient in accounting for their funds.

Many reasons are put forward to account for these breakdowns. The National Correspondant is usually a part-time representative, seconded from the tutular ministry to handle CILSS matters. He has no staff and little equipment. He receives only a limited number of copies of CILSS documents for distribution in-country. He has neither the time nor the mobility to review field projects. The membership of the National Committee changes frequently.

The Executive Secretary's evaluation team suggested a number of actions that might remedy this situation. They recommended that the National Correspondant be made full-time, and provided with a small technical and administrative staff. They recommended incorporating the CONACILSS budgets into the core CILSS budget. Also, they recommended limiting the size of the National Committee, clearly defining its role, fixing periodic meetings, and designating a permanent representative from each ministry. Significantly, all these recommendations were within the charge of the Executive Secretary or the national governments. In neither case, however, were any of the recommendations ever implemented.

#### IV. The Present Organization of CILSS

##### A. The Division of Labor within the CILSS Executive Secretariat

The restructuring of CILSS created an initially smaller organization. Although the incorporation of project staff within the CILSS Executive Secretary has created growth within the organization, the minimal staffing of each technical section has resulted in an unequal distribution of work between and within divisions.

The DPP has the clearest and fairest division of tasks because each technician is responsible for a sector, wherein programs are coordinated throughout the region. At the same time, DPP is the institutional locus for the various regional projects being financed by the donors. This internal division creates a certain amount of duplication. The solar energy project, for example, aims to install solar-powered pumps at village water holes, a program that since the inception of CILSS has been the domain of the hydraulic section.

By contrast, DEP has the most unequal division of work. The monitoring and Evaluation Section simply compiles statistics from the regional projects on a quarterly basis. Meanwhile, the Studies and Reflection Section is in charge of all commissioned reports and

subsequent conferences that are not the direct responsibility of another section. This section therefore is responsible for the majority of post-Segou initiatives. The fact of the matter is that one individual cannot carry out this responsibility alone.

## B. The Role of CONACILSS

The necessity of regional projects, and the failure of the CONACILSS structure to operate effectively, has led to the creation of a multiplicity of working committees. In effect, each regional project creates its own national committee. The committee may or may not include the CONACILSS as a member. Obviously, where CONACILSS is not a member, all correspondence and official communications bypasses his office. This may occur even when CONACILSS does sit on a committee. Such alternative arrangements for the implementation of regional projects in member states has long been a concern. The assessment of the CONACILSS system commissioned by the Executive Secretariat in 1986 underscored the difficulties that arise in this alternative system.

As was just mentioned, the CONACILSS system has never functioned well, and the problems have long been recognized. The National Correspondent is typically detached only part-time from his Ministry to coordinate the CILSS program in country. Because he typically serves as a councillor to the Minister, the CONACILSS often finds that he must drop all other work, including CILSS matters, when the Minister assigns him a specific task. Moreover, the national committee system has not worked in most countries. After an initial meeting in the early years of CILSS, various ministries, such as external affairs and finance, have not participated in these meetings. Moreover, the ministries that do continue to send representatives to the CONACILSS meetings often reassign the personnel concerned. Thus, the person who attends one meeting may well not be informed about previous decisions and discussions because that person was not the ministry representative to CONACILSS only a few months previously.

The situation with CONACILSS is doubly difficult because many of the internal regulations that would resolve the situation already exist. For example, Regulation 23, Title 8, of the CILSS charter specifies that the CONACILSS is a direct responsibility of the Executive Secretariat. In its words,

Pour le suivi et la coordination des actions CILSS, chaque comité est doté d'un secrétariat permanent assuré par un fonctionnaire de haut niveau de Ministère de tutelle appelé correspondant national du CILSS assisté d'un cadre d'un Ministère Multisectoriel. Les frais de fonctionnement du comité national sont à la charge du CILSS.

Despite this regulation, the staffing of the liaison office is often no more than one part-time person, and the costs of the nine CONACILSS have yet to be absorbed by CILSS. They are in fact borne by several donors: the present project pays the operating expenses of seven of the nine CONACILSS; the Netherlands pays those of CONACILSS/Mali; and, Canada covers those of CONACILSS/Burkina Faso.

**ANNEX B**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CLUB SECRETARIAT**  
**BY DONOR COUNTRY**

RESUME		
CONTRIBUTIONS TOTALES DEPUIS LA FONDATIONS DU CLUB		
Pays	FF,000	%
-----		
Allemagne	1.50	0.01
Autriche	1.30	0.01
Canada	15.80	0.13
Danemark	1.40	0.01
Etats-Unis	49.00	0.41
France	25.60	0.22
Italie	5.00	0.04
Japan	2.50	0.02
Pays-Bas	10.80	0.09
Suisse	6.00	0.05
-----		
	118,90.000	1.00

Ces chiffres comprennent une estimation du coût des conseillers du Canada, des USA et des Pays-Bas mis à la disposition du Secrétariat.

**ANNEX C**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CILSS SECRETARIAT**  
**FROM MEMBER COUNTRIES AND DONORS**  
**1987-89**

**TABLEAU N°1 - BUDGET CONSOLIDE RESUME 1987  
DU SECRETARIAT EXECUTIF**

46.

DESIGNATION	PREVISIONS	REALISATIONS	D E P E N S E S			%
			Activités	Appui Instit.	Total	
Contributions des Etats Membres	444.481.709	298.730.880	29.841.459	392.500.487	422.341.946	141,4
Donateurs	781.922.369	781.922.369	265.923.065	140.600.786	406.523.851	0,52
Projets Régionaux	344.245.149	344.245.398	146.696.577	95.803.391	242.499.968	0,70
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>1.570.649.227</b>	<b>1.424.898.647</b>	<b>442.461.101</b>	<b>628.904.664</b>	<b>1.071.365.765</b>	<b>0,75</b>
	100	90,7	-	-	68,2	

**TABLEAU N°2.1 - SITUATION DES CONTRIBUTIONS EN FIN D'EXERCICE 1987  
DES ETATS MEMBRES DU CILSS**

48.

ETATS MEMBRES	CONTRIBUTIONS RECUES 1987	ARRIERES FIN 1987
BURKINA FASO	30.419.000	47.778.004
CAP-VERT	19.109.400	19.109.400
GAMBIE	14.718.500	23.500.300
GUINEE-BISSAU	25.479.200	
MALI	52.773.502	22.773.502
MAURITANIE	27.773.502	
	39.789.793	15.849.001
	23.789.793	
NIGER	47.773.502	0
SENEGAL	47.773.502	0
TCHAD	7.034.679	79.498.467
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>336.434.373</b>	<b>208.508.674</b>

**TABLEAU N° 2.2 - RECETTES DIVERSES DU SYSTEME CILSS 1987**

	RECETTES DIVERSES
Secrétariat Exécutif	6.662.115
Institut du Sahel	5.809.422
Centre Agrhymet	1.392.185
<b>TOTAL.....</b>	<b>13,863.722</b>

TABLEAU N°3 - BUDGET GENERAL DES DONATEURS DU SECRETARIAT  
EXECUTIF EN 1987

49.

DESIGNATION	PREVISIONS	REALISATIONS	%
<b>DONATEURS</b>	<b>780.393.869</b>	<b>408.579.811</b>	<b>52,0</b>
ITALIE (AT) Phase 1	17.184.206	17.184.206	100,0
ITALIE (AT) Phase 2	176.575.000	104.326.939	59,1
FED	72.172.224	38.816.895	53,8
UNESCO	4.140.000	1.670.400	40,3
CRDI	4.300.000	2.152.800	50,1
PNUD-RAF 83-030	2.615.819	2.615.819	100,0
RFA/PAS	17.120.946	14.661.714	85,6
ACDI	58.318.088	46.166.394	79,2
PAYS-BAS	97.181.408	81.180.505	83,5
DORSCHKAMP	16.000.000	6.224.376	38,9
FWD/SIDA/FOYERS AMELIORES	25.879.833	20.712.100	80,1
USAID	209.956.864	35.935.879	17,1
OUA	71.058.592	10.619.550	14,9
ITALIE SUDV.	4.920.373	22.475.623	456,8
IDA BANQUE MONDIALE	2.871.700	1.826.700	63,6
CTS	98.816	2.003.911	2027,9
<b>PROJETS</b>	<b>344.245.149</b>	<b>242.499.968</b>	<b>70,4</b>
PRE-CRESAL	21.845.467	21.845.467	100,0
DIAPER	322.399.682	220.654.501	68,4
<b>TOTAL GENERAL</b>	<b>1.124.639.018</b>	<b>651.079.779</b>	<b>57,6</b>

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**TABEAU N°3.1 - FINANCEMENT DES ACTIVITES DU SECRETARIAT  
EXECUTIF PAR LES DONATEURS EN 1987**

50.

DESIGNATION	Lutte contre la Désertif.	Sécurité Alimentaire	Activités Multi-Sect.	Appui Institution.	T O T A L
ITALIE			73.009.050	48.502.095	121.511.145
FED	4.691.296	14.446.145	19.679.454		38.816.895
UNESCO			1.670.400		1.670.400
PNUD				2.152.800	2.152.800
RFA/PAS			7.587.768	7.073.946	14.661.714
ACDI			36.079.364	10.087.030	46.166.394
PAYS-BAS	195.000	28.541.642	15.887.551	36.556.312	81.180.505
DORSCHKAMP			6.224.376		6.224.376
FWE/SIDA/FOYERS AMELIORES			7.057.912	14.220.047	21.277.959
USAID			31.180.729	4.755.150	35.935.879
OUA	2.268.300		8.351.250		10.619.550
ITALIE (Subvention)			5.222.217	17.253.406	22.475.623
IDA			1.826.700		1.826.700
CTS			2.003.911		2.003.911
FAO/IDA (Précresal)		21.845.467			21.845.467
DIAPER		124.851.110		95.803.391	220.654.501
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>7.154.596</b>	<b>189.684.364</b>	<b>215.780.682</b>	<b>236.404.177</b>	<b>649.023.819</b>

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TABLEAU N°1 - BUDGET CONSOLIDE RESUME 1988  
DU SECRETARIAT EXECUTIF

51.

DESIGNATION	PREVISIONS	REALISATIONS	D E P E N S E S			%
			Activités	Appui Instit.	Total	
Contributions des Etats Membres	424.481.709	235.749.421	9.954.601	381.524.799	391.479.400	166,1
Donateurs	1.088.959.003	1.088.959.003	433.387.870	126.342.047	559.729.917	51,4
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>1.513.440.712</b>	<b>1.324.708.424</b>	<b>443.342.471</b>	<b>507.866.846</b>	<b>951.209.317</b>	<b>71,8</b>
	100	87,5	-	-	62,9	

**TABLEAU N°2.1 - SITUATION DES CONTRIBUTIONS EN FIN D'EXERCICE 1988  
DES ETATS MEMBRES DU CILSS**

53.

ETATS MEMBRES	CONTRIBUTIONS RECUES 1988	ARRIERES FIN 1988
BURKINA FASO	40.000.000	55.546.506
CAP-VERT	19.109.400	19.109.400
GAMBIE	10.245.901	32.636.799
GUINEE-BISSAU	25.468.450	10.750
MALI	22.773.502	47.773.502
MAURITANIE		47.698.002
NIGER	47.773.502	0
SENEGAL		47.773.502
TCHAD	63.849.001	47.498.467
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>229.219.756</b>	<b>298.046.928</b>

**TABLEAU N° 2.2 - RECETTES DIVERSES DU SYSTEME CILSS 1988**

	RECETTES DIVERSES
Secrétariat Exécutif	3.079.097
Institut du Sahel	3.422.518
Centre Agrhymet	28.050
<b>TOTAL.....</b>	<b>6.529.665</b>

TABLEAU N°3 - BUDGET GENERAL DES DONATEURS DU SYSTEME CILSS  
EN 1988

DESIGNATION	PREVISIONS	REALISATIONS	%
<b>DONATEURS</b>			
USAID	221.244.850	93.647.872	42,3
A.T.I.	240.200.196	96.219.293	40,0
SUBVENTION ITALIE	118.043.512	80.823.547	68,4
PAYS-BAS	109.133.204	77.669.629	71,2
ACDI	182.148.932	87.633.855	48,1
DDA	35.094.405	2.354.185	6,7
CCE	80.472.637	55.106.608	68,5
OUA	60.439.042	29.308.230	48,5
RFA	14.116.251	13.704.734	97,1
ABF	1.357.350	971.071	71,5
FWD/SIDA	7.776.000	6.730.935	86,6
DORSCHKAMP	9.775.624	9.730.822	99,5
UNESCO	2.469.600	37.936	1,5
MAC	315.000	0	0
CRDI	2.147.200	1.700.000	79,2
PNUD	1.129.200	1.129.200	100,0
IDA	1.020.000	1.020.000	100,0
FAO	2.076.000	1.942.000	93,5
<b>TOTAL GENERAL</b>	<b>1.088.959.003</b>	<b>559.729.917</b>	<b>51,4</b>

TABLEAU N°3.1 - FINANCEMENT DES ACTIVITES DU SECRETARIAT  
EXECUTIF PAR LES DONATEURS EN 1988

55.

DESIGNATION	Lutte contre la Désertif.	Sécurité Alimentaire	Activités Multi-Sect.	Appui Institution.	T O T A L
<b>DONATEURS</b>					
USAID	1.759.700	14.884.807	58.149.318	18.854.047	93.647.872
I.T.A.		49.942.145	9.825.371	36.451.777	96.219.293
SUBVENTION ITALIE			43.561.981	37.261.566	80.823.547
PAYS-BAS	2.209.200	33.280.430	30.439.457	11.740.542	77.669.629
ACDI	19.551.381	21.815.503	36.681.529	9.585.442	87.633.855
DDA			2.354.185		2.354.185
CCE	21.020.293	18.891.658	15.194.657		55.106.608
OUA	2.406.942	9.357.991	11.609.251	5.934.046	29.308.230
RFA			8.333.192	5.371.542	13.704.734
ABF	971.071				971.071
FWD/SIDA	1610		6.715.440	13885	6.730.935
DORSCHKAMP			9.730.822		9.730.822
UNESCO	37.936				37.936
CRDI		1.700.000			1.700.000
PNUD				1.129.200	1.129.200
IDA		1.020.000			1.020.000
FAO			1.942.000		1.942.000
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>47.958.133</b>	<b>150.892.534</b>	<b>234.537.203</b>	<b>126.342.047</b>	<b>559.729.917</b>

**TABLEAU N°1 - BUDGET CONSOLIDE RESUME AU 30/09/89  
DU SECRETARIAT EXECUTIF**

56.

DESIGNATION	PREVISIONS	REALISATIONS	D E P E N S E S			%
			Activités	Appui Instit.	Total	
Contributions des Etats Membres	435.198.797	366.998.819		296.161.140	296.161.140	87,7
Donateurs	1.459.901.233	747.625.583	579.450.620	168.174.963	747.625.583	100,0
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>1.895.100.030</b>	<b>1.114.624.402</b>	<b>579.450.620</b>	<b>464.336.103</b>	<b>1.043.786.723</b>	<b>93,6</b>
	100	58,8	-	-	55,1	

**TABLAU N°2.1 - SITUATION DES CONTRIBUTIONS AU 30/09/1989  
DES ETATS MEMBRES DU CILSS**

58.

ETATS MEMBRES	CONTRIBUTIONS RECUES 1989	ARRIERES FIN 1989
BURKINA FASO	90.000.000	33.320.008
CAP-VERT	19.109.400	38.218.800
GAMBIE	10.245.901	51.473.119
GUINEE-BISSAU	25.466.457	23.493
MALI	58.150.750	37.396.254
MAURITANIE		79.547.003
NIGER	47.773.502	
SENEGAL	47.773.502	47.773.502
TCHAD	61.849.001	49.347.468
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>360.368.513</b>	<b>337.099.647</b>

**TABLAU N° 2.2 - RECETTES DIVERSES DU SYSTEME CILSS 1985**

	RECETTES DIVERSES
Secrétariat Exécutif	1.231.806
Institut du Sahel	
Centre Agrhymet	5.398.500
<b>TOTAL.....</b>	<b>6.630.306</b>

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TABLEAU N°3 - BUDGET GENERAL DES DONATEURS DU SECRETARIAT  
EXECUTIF AU 30/09/89

DESIGNATION	PREVISIONS	REALISATIONS	%
<b>DONATEURS</b>			
USAID	319.596.978	89.674.543	28,1
A.T.I.	312.491.903	154.302.027	49,4
SUBV. ITALIE	40.470.211	40.298.046	99,6
PAYS-BAS	146.547.315	89.291.652	60,9
ACDI	237.515.077	113.262.261	47,7
D.D.A	32.740.220	28.248.575	86,3
CCE	81.686.526	33.845.189	41,4
OUA	31.130.812	18.656.452	59,9
RFA	9.028.071	8.616.554	95,4
ABF	386.279		0
FWD	1.045.065		0
DORSCHKAMP	44.802		0
UNESCO	2.431.664		0
MAC	315.000	157.500	50,0
CRDI	447.200		0
FAO	16.400.240		0
CLUB	4.600.000	748.914	16,3
PROJETS	223.023.870	170.523.870	76,5
<b>TOTAL GENERAL</b>	<b>1.459.901.233</b>	<b>747.625.583</b>	<b>51,2</b>

**TABLEAU N°3.1 - FINANCEMENT DES ACTIVITES DU SECRETARIAT  
EXECUTIF PAR LES DONATEURS AU 30/09/89**

60.

DESIGNATION	Lutte contre la Désertif.	Sécurité Alimentaire	Activités Multi-Sect.	Appui Institution.	T O T A L
USAID		30.001.655	36.598.898	23.073.990	89.674.543
ITALIE	34.021.700	35.877.952	50.380.675	34.021.700	154.302.027
ITALIE (Subvention)				40.298.046	40.298.046
PAYS-BAS	10.370.644	33.906.398	15.985.850	29.028.760	89.291.652
ACDI	11.700.996	26.007.593	57.659.511	17.894.161	113.262.261
DDA			28.248.575		28.248.575
CCE	5.435.630	42.000	11.152.515	17.215.044	33.845.189
OUA	5.445.633		13.210.819		18.656.452
RFA			1.973.292	6.643.262	8.616.554
MAC	157.500				157.500
CLUB DU SAHEL			748.914		748.914
PROJETS REGIONAUX	115.273.870	55.250.000			170.523.870
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>182.405.973</b>	<b>181.085.598</b>	<b>215.959.049</b>	<b>168.174.963</b>	<b>747.625.583</b>

Clé de repartition suivant % des engagements 76.887.699 de l'exercice 1986

**ANNEX D**  
**USE OF FUNDS CONTRIBUTED TO**  
**CLUB SECRETARIAT FROM AID**  
**1988 - 1989**

## ETAT DES DEPENSES DU DON OCTROYE PAR LES ETATS UNIS POUR L'ANNEE 1988

Versement 1988 : 400.000 \$ soit 2.400.000 FF

<b>Secteur</b>	<b>Sujet</b>	<b>Montant FF.</b>
<b>Aide Alimentaire</b>	Participation aux études sur l'aide alimentaire la Charte de l'Aide Alimentaire la Sécurité alimentaire Consultant : Mr Henry Josserand	565.000
<b>Secteur Privé Cultures Irriguées Espaces Régionaux</b>	Participation à ces diverses études Consultant : Mr. Jacques Giri	171.590
<b>Ecologie et Développement Rural</b>	Participation aux études sur la Gestion des terroirs villageois au Sahel et rédaction du rapport "Femmes et développement rural durable". Consultant : Mme Marie Monimart	160.000
	Traduction vers le français du rapport "Ecologie et Développement Rural en Afrique Sub-saharienne" de F. Weber, P. Wright, Broekhuysse. Traducteur : Lauren Sedofsky	5.062
<b>Espace Régional</b>	Participation à la réunion "Espace Régional" à Paris et à la réunion AGRHYMET à Niamey Invités : Mr John Lewis	29.756
<b>Espace Régional</b>	Participation à la réunion "Espace Régional" à Paris Invités : Mrs Phyllis Dichter	13.214
<b>Espace Régional</b>	Participation à la réunion "Espace Régional" à Paris Invités : Mr John Igué	14.545
<b>Secteur Privé</b>	Participation à l'étude sur le Secteur Privé au Sahel Consultant : Mr Philippe Lassalle	72.000
<b>Secteur Privé</b>	Participation à une réunion sur le Secteur Privé au Sahel Invités : Mr S. Brushett	15.344
<b>Secteur Privé</b>	Etudes sur le Secteur privé, Mali, Sénégal Consultant : M. Michel Courcelle	259.017
<b>Sécurité Alimentaire</b>	Contrat société GRET Contrat société CEEMAT Programme régional de promotion des céréales Locales au Sahel.	315.000 334.000

<b>Secteur Privé</b>	Saisie de la synthèse sur le secteur privé de M. Giri Société MGTEXT	1.688
<b>Sécurité Alimentaire</b>	Participation à la rédaction du bilan des opérations triangulaires et des achats locaux d'aides alimentaires dans le Sahel. Consultant: M. Stéphane Jost	37.500
	<b>Conférence à Niamey sur la Télédétection Satellitaire Juin 1989</b>	
	11 experts invités et organisation de la réunion : location de salles, de véhicules etc.	
	Total :	228.870
	Construction d'un logiciel de suivi des importations céréalières pour les pays membres du CILSS. Consultant : Mr. Dabjen	2.000
	Structuration d'un logiciel de gestion de l'aide alimentaire au Sahel. Consultant : Mme Faria	2.000
<b>Espaces Régionaux</b>	Participation à la mise au point de collaboration avec les néerlandais sur le programme CILSS/Club Espaces régionaux en Afrique de l'Ouest". Consultant : Mr. J. Coste	2.823
<b>Ecologie et Développement Rural</b>	Mission de Mr. Rochette à Bamako et à Ouagadougou sur l'organisation de la rencontre de Ségou	20.826
	Mission de Mr. Rochette à Ségou, participation la rencontre régionale sur la gestion des terroirs villageois.	24.540
	Mission de M. Rochette à l'USAID à Washington	14.154
<b>Etudes générales : politique économique</b>	Mission de M. Gabas à Dakar, entretin à l'Institut PANOS	11.326
	Mission de M. Gabas au CILSS à Ouagadougou	13.524
	Traduction du document de M. Lawry sur les politiques de tenure : traducteur : Mme El Meslouhi	5.115
	Appui au Club du Sahel dans le domaine informatique Consultant : M. Eric Bruant	13.200
	Appui au Club du Sahel dans le domaine de la documentation Consultante : Mme Nadine Monchau	32.250
	Appui au Club du Sahel dans différents domaines et participation à la Conférence de Niamey sur la Télédétection.	

<b>Stagiaire : Mme Anna Strang</b>	<b>29.710</b>
<b>Divers frais de réunion, location de salles et déjeuners de travail</b>	<b>5.945</b>
<b>Total :</b>	<b>2.400.000</b>

**ANNEX E**  
**USE OF FUNDS CONTRIBUTED TO**  
**THE CILSS SECRETARIAT**  
**1990**

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SECRETARIAT EXECUTIF DU CILSS  
PROGRAMME DE TRAVAIL - 1990  
BUDGET EN '000 CFA

ACTIVITE	RESPONSABLE	DUREE	COUT GLOBAL	DISPONIBLE AU 31/12/89	FINANCEMENT A RECHERCHER	FINANCEMENT A RECHERCHER-1990	DONATEURS SOLLICITES
<b>FINALITE NO. 1 : SECURITE ALIMENTAIRE</b>							
1.1.1.1 : Valorisation etude sur politiques de maintenance des equipements hydrauliques	DPP/SRE	02/90 - 06/91	9,650	2,236	7,500	7,500	USAID
1.1.1.2 : Elaboration schema directeur du Tchad	DPP/SRE	02/90 - 02/92	12,000	4,286	8,000	0	ACDI, USAID
1.1.1.3 : Programme regional d'utilisation de l'energie solaire (PNS)	DPP/SRE	01/90 - 01/92	279,000	279,000	0	0	
1.1.1.4 : Etude sur les problemes strategiques poses par l'equipement en moyens d'exhaure	DPP	05/90 - 07/90	81,117	62,075	19,042	19,042	
1.1.1.5 : Technologie a faibles couts: Vulgarisation des citernes en ferro-ciment	DPP/SRE	01/90 - 10/90	6,034	4,234	1,800	1,800	ACDI, USAID
1.1.2.1 : Developpement des cultures irriguees	DPP/SPVA	01/90 - 05/90	47,000	28,000	19,000	19,000	PAYS BAS, USAID
1.1.2.2 : Etude sur la problematique des politiques rizicoles en region sahelienne	DPP	03/89 - 07/90	81,117	62,075	19,042	19,042	
1.1.4.1 : Appui aux pays membres pour elaboration de plans nationaux de developpement de l'elevage	DPP/SPVA	04/90 - 04/92	79,000	0	79,000	40,000	ACDI PAYS BAS
1.1.4.2 : Recueil et analyse des textes legislatifs et reglementaires des pays membres/elevage	DPP/SPVA	03/90 - 03/91	21,250	0	21,250	21,250	ACDI
1.1.4.3 : Creation d'un reseau de suivi des ressources pastorales	DPP/SPVA	02/90 - 05/90	6,000	0	6,000	6,000	FRANCE
1.2.1.1 : Projet diagnostic permanent (DIAPER)	DIAPER	01/88 - 12/92	P.M.	P.M.	0	0	
1.2.1.2 : Projet d'enquete de structure sur la filiere agro-alimentaire	DEP	06/90 - 05/92	P.M.	P.M.			ITALIE
1.2.2.1 : Promotion du commerce prive des cereales	DEP	01/90 - 10/91	42,000	22,268	19,732	9,866	ACDI USAID
1.2.3.1 : Projet d'appui regional aux organismes cerealiers (PAROC)	DEP	01/90 - 12/93	830,000	830,000	0	0	

ACTIVITE	RESPONSABLE	DUREE	COUT GLOBAL	DISPONIBLE AU 31/12/89	FINANCEMENT A RECHERCHER	FINANCEMENT A RECHERCHER-1990	DONATEURS SOLLICITES
1.2.4.1 : Promotion des cereales locales (PROCELOS)	DPP	01/90 - 12/90	40,000	0	40,000	40,000	ACDI, PAYS BAS FRANCE
1.2.5.1 : Espace cerealier regional: suite du seminaire de Lome	DEP/SRS	04/90 - 03/92	89,500	0	89,500	44,000	ACDI, FRANCE PAYS BAS, USAID
1.2.5.2 : Etude sur la commercialisation des animaux et de leurs produits	SPP/SPVA	03/90 - 03/92	34,700	0	34,700	10,800	USAID
1.2.5.3 : Seminaire de sensibilisation et de programmation sur les echanges cerealiers	DEP	01/90 - 06/90	20,000	20,000	0	0	FRANCE
1.2.6.1 : Appui aux Etats dans l'elaboration de leurs politiques cerealieres	DEP/SRS	01/90 - 12/91	71,000	0	71,000	35,000	ACDI, FRANCE PAYS BAS, USAID
<b>TOTALS (FINALITE NO. 1)</b>			<b>1,749,368</b>	<b>1,314,174</b>	<b>435,566</b>	<b>273,300</b>	

ACTIVITE	RESPONSABLE	DEBUT	COUT GLOBAL	DISPONIBLE	FINANCEMENT	FINANCEMENT A	DONATEURS
			AU 31/12/89	A RECHERCHER	RECHERCHER-1990	SOLLICITES	
<b>FINALITE NO. 2 : EQUILIBRE ECOLOGIQUE</b>							
2.1.1.1 : Programme regional d'information et de sensibilisation/environnement (PRISME)	CAB/SDI	11/89 - 11/93	600,000	0	600,000	150,000	ACDI, PAYS BAS, USAID, ITALIE
2.1.1.2 : Assistance inter-sahelienne	DEP	01/90 - 12/90	21,838	7,838	13,000	13,000	ACDI, USAID
2.1.2.1 : Etude sur la problematique de la transhumance	DPP/SPVA	05/89 - 09/91	38,850	3,296	35,554	24,791	USAID
2.1.2.2 : Etudes sur la gestion des terroirs au Sahel: decentralization, foncier, credit/epargne	DEP/SRS	03/90 - 02/93	A.P.	0	A.P.	97,350	
2.1.2.3 : Analyse de la problematique de la gestion des terroirs au Sahel Burkina	DPP/SEE	05/90 - '05/93	19,175	0	19,175	7,500	PAYS BAS
2.2.1.1 : Programme regional de reboisement et de conservation des sols au Sahel (PMECONS)	DPP/SEE	01/90 - 12/94	510,000	510,000	0	0	
2.2.2.1 : Promotion de l'utilisation du gaz butane	DPP	01/89 - 05/92	2,900,000	2,900,000	0	0	
2.2.3.1 : Programme regional de semences forestieres (PKSF)	DPP/SEE	01/90 - 12/90	23,650	0	23,650	23,650	FRANCE PAYS BAS
2.3.1.1 : Programme de suivi de la dynamique de la desertification au Sahel (PSDD): Phase preparatoire	DPP/SEE	02/90 - 12/91	27,192	8,500	18,692	5,992	ACDI
2.3.1.2 : Programme suivi de la dynamique/desertification: observatoire du Sahara et du Sahel	DPP/SEE	A.P.	A.P.	A.P.	A.P.	A.P.	FRANCE
2.3.2.1 : PNLCD Cap Vert: Reunion de concertation etude de factibilite	DPP/SEE	01/90 - 12/90	17,058	17,058	0	0	
2.3.2.2 : PNLCD Gambie: Reunion de concertation, etude de factibilite	DPP/SEE	02/90 - 02/91	14,839	7,839	7,000	7,000	ACDI
2.3.2.3 : PNLCD Guinee Bissau: Reunion de concertation, etude de factibilite	DPP/SEE	01/90 - 12/90	19,040	0	19,040	19,040	ACDI, USAID
2.3.2.4 : PNLCD Senegal: Reunion de concertation, mise en place d'une cellule operationnelle	DPP/SEE	02/89 - 02/92	24,718	3,558	21,160	10,900	RFA
2.3.2.5 : PNLCD Tchad: Reunion de concertation, etude de factibilite	DPP/SEE	02/90 - 12/90	17,320	9,820	7,500	7,500	ACDI
2.3.2.6 : Etude forestiere globale au Burkina Faso	DPP/SEE	02/90 - 08/90	50,415	0	50,415	50,415	RFA
<b>TOTALS (FINALITE NO. 2)</b>			<b>4,284,095</b>	<b>3,467,909</b>	<b>815,186</b>	<b>417,138</b>	

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ACTIVITE	RESPONSABLE	DUREE	COUT GLOBAL	DISPONIBLE AU 31/12/89	FINANCEMENT A RECHERCHER	FINANCEMENT A RECHERCHER-1990	DONATEURS SOLLICITES
<b>FINALITE NO. 3: DEV'PT DES CAPACITES ORGANISATIONELLES</b>							
3.1.1 : Approfondissement des etudes prospectives	DEP/SRS	01/90 - 12/92	108,130	0	108,130	23,210	ACDI
3.1.2 : Appui aux cellules de prospectives agro-alimentaires	DEP/SRS	01/90 - 12/92	266,624	0	266,624	96,624	ACDI
3.1.3 : Appui aux activites LCD du CILSS: mission Allemand/CILSS	DEP/SEE	01/90 - 12/92	143,220	143,220	0	0	
3.1.4 : Reunion comite politique cerealiere	DEP/SRS	03/90 - 07/90	8,000	0	8,000	8,000	ACDI
3.1.5 : Creation d'une banque de donnees et d'un annuaire statistique du Sahel	DEP/SPS	01/90 - 12/93	13,333	0	13,333	3,424	ACDI
3.2.1 : Etude du plan d'organisation de la Direction des Etudes et Planification (DEP)	DEP	02/90 - 03/90	1,570	0	1,570	1,570	USAID
3.2.2 : Renforcement cooperation CILSS/OIG	DEP	01/90 - 12/90	6,700	0	6,700	6,700	ACDI, USAID
3.2.3 : Atelier de planification par objectif: Securite alimentaire	DPP/SKS	01/90 - 06/90	5,434	0	5,434	5,434	RFA
3.2.4 : Redynamisation du systeme documentaire du Secretariat Executif	CAB/SDI	03/90 - 02/95	35,000	0	35,000	28,600	UNSO
3.2.5 : Analyse des besoins en informatique des directions techniques du Sec. Executif	Sec. Exec.	03/90 - 10/90	5,200	0	5,200	5,200	ACDI, USAID
3.3.1 : Suivi des activites du Sec. Executif	DEP/SSE	01/90 - 12/90	5,850	0	5,850	5,850	ACDI
3.3.2 : Appui aux correspondants nationaux du CILSS (CONACILSS)	DEP/SSE	03/90 - 02/91	58,000	A.P.		58,000	ACDI, PAYS BAS USAID
<b>TOTALS (FINALITE NO. 3)</b>			<b>657,061</b>	<b>143,220</b>	<b>513,841</b>	<b>242,612</b>	
<b>TOTALS (FINALITES 1+2+3)</b>			<b>6,690,524</b>	<b>4,925,303</b>	<b>1,764,593</b>	<b>933,050</b>	

**ANNEX F**  
**DOCUMENTS CONSULTED**

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European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)

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Secretariat Technique du Reseau Strategies Alimentaires (STRSA)

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**ANNEX G**  
**PERSONS CONTACTED**

PERSONS CONTACTED

COMITE PERMANENT INTER-ETATS DE LUTTE CONTRE LA SECHERESSE DANS LE SAHEL (CILSS)

SECRETARIAT EXECUTIF

Brah, Mahamane                      Secrétaire Exécutif (outgoing)  
Diard, Ali Djalbord                Secrétaire Exécutif (incoming)

Direction Administrative et Financière

Salomon, Abba                      Directeur  
Tapsoba Mitbsamda                Chef de Service, Financier  
Campaore, Issouf                  Chef de Service, Personnel et Matériel

Direction des Etudes et Planification

Camara, Ibrahim                    Directeur  
Thiam, Amadou Moctar            Chef de Service, Suivi et Evaluation  
Kamara, Oumar                      Chef de Service, Reflexion Stratégique

Direction des Projets et Programmes

Koutaba, Michel                    Directeur  
Guigma, Salif,                      Chef de Service, Animale et Végétale  
Goumandakoye Mounkaila        Chef de Service, Ecologie et Environnement  
Kabore, Francois                  Chef de Service, Ressources en Eau

Conseillers Techniques

Neufeldt, Heinrich                Conseiller du Secrétaire Exécutif (GTZ)  
van Mourik, Dirk                  Conseiller en Economie et Environnement (GTZ)  
Reid, Stephen                      Conseiller en Gestion, DEP (USAID)

INSTITUT DU SAHEL

Jallow, Tijan                      Directeur General  
Josue Dione                        Head, Socio-economic studies

CERPOD

Ouaidons, Nassour                Director

CONACILSS/Bamako

Drave, Hassane                    Correspondant National, CILSS

CONACILSS/Niamey

Boureima, Harouna                Correspondant National, CILSS

CONACILSS/Ougadougou

Tontorogobo, Ousmane            Correspondant National, CILSS

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

USAID/Washington

Saiers, Larry                      Deputy Assistant Administrator, AFR  
Dichter-Forbes, Phillis            Director, AFR/SWA

Simmons, Roger  
Lewis, John van D.  
Fischer, Dana

Deputy Director, AFR/SWA  
Regional Projects Officer, AFR/SWA  
Regional Projects Officer, AFR/SWA

**USAID/Bamako**

Brennan, Dennis  
Atwood, Tracy  
Atwood, David  
Byess, Richard  
Whitlock, Reid  
Bressler, John

Director, USAID, Mali  
Agricultural Development Officer  
Project Officer  
Program Office, USAID, Bamako  
PL 480 Officer  
Anthropologist, USAID, Mali

**USAID/Niamey**

Martin, Frank  
Taylor, George  
Slattery, Jack  
Blum, Roger

Ibrahim, Omar  
Adrien, Jamie  
Conde, Georges  
Price, Thomas

Economic Officer, Mission CILSS Officer  
Agricultural Development Officer  
General Development Officer  
Agricultural Sector Development Grant  
(ASDG) Project Officer  
ASDG Program Assistant  
AGRYMET Project Officer  
Chief of Party (CRED/UM)  
Program Development Office

**USAID/Ougadougou**

Thomas, Wilbur  
McCarthy, Dennis  
Zongou, Antoine  
Yaro, Mamadou

USAID Representative  
Agricultural Development Officer  
Financial Analyst  
Regional Projects Accountant

**FRENCH EMBASSY, OUAGADOUGOU**

Basquin, Marc

Economic Advisor

**MINISTRY OF COOPERATION, PARIS**

De Verdière, Michel  
Caudron, Louis

Deputy Director for Rural Development  
Former Director of Sahel Activities

**SWISS AID, OUAGADOUGOU**

Fellay, Pascal

Coordinator

**SWISS AID, BERN**

Bisag, Andri

Chief Office for the Sahel

**GERMAN AID, BONN**

Hansen, Joseph  
Luhrs, Georg  
Pfeiffer, Jochen

Chief, Office of the Sahel  
Economist  
Economist

**DUTCH AID, THE HAGUE**

Van Steekelenburg, Pieter Senior Social Scientist

**EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, BRUSSELS**

Bandet, Jean Loïc