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EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIONS AND SPECIAL STUDIES CONDUCTED FOR A.I.D. IN ASIA AND NEAR EAST IN FISCAL YEAR 1986

Bureau for Asia and the Near East
Office of Development Planning
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C.

PREFACE

In keeping with A.I.D.'s emphasis on using evaluation findings to improve project planning and implementation, the Asia and Near East Bureau has prepared this collection of summaries of evaluations and special studies of A.I.D.-supported projects and programs in Asia and the Near East during the fiscal year 1986 (October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1986).

This collection provides a record of Bureau evaluation accomplishments in Asia and the Near East as well as concise, easily accessible information on the outcomes or relatively recent status of specific projects. This volume, as well as the volumes representing previous years, should be a valuable reference for project designers in the field and project reviewers in Washington, as well as for contractors and developing country personnel with whom A.I.D. works.

Eighty-three reports are summarized in this volume. (The actual number of evaluations conducted for A.I.D. in Asia and the Near East in FY 1986 was higher than the number of evaluations summarized here, but these reports were not received by A.I.D./Washington in time to be included in this report.)

Copies of the evaluations summarized here can be obtained from PPC/CDIE/DIU, A.I.D.'s Center for Development Information Utilization, or from ANE/DP/E, Room 6663, New State.

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A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

PANGLADESH - Family Planning Services Project

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

NAME OF MISSION/OFFICE

USAID/Bangladesh, Office of Population & Health

PURPOSE OF ACTIVITY EVALUATED

The purpose of the activity is to provide access for girls to secondary education through stipends to young women in secondary school, and beyond, as a means to delay marriage, create a demand for modern family planning services and, thereby, reduce fertility in 2 pilot project areas.

PURPOSE OF EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY USED

The purpose of the evaluation was to address 3 basic management questions: 1) are the pilot female scholarship sub-projects under the Family Planning Services Project (388-0050) accomplishing the objective of fertility reduction among the sub-project beneficiaries, e.g., among the targetted population group; 2) are there other more effective, low-cost female education and employment related approaches to fertility reduction; and 3) considering the present pilot sub-project and other potential program options, how might USAID/Bangladesh most effectively achieve fertility reduction through female education/employment activities?

An evaluation team was contracted and the evaluation performed in November 1985. The evaluation methodology involved:

1) a comprehensive review of recent and available literature on female education and employment in Bangladesh, and of all project documents including previous evaluations;

2) interviews with appropriate staff in USAID, the Asia Foundation (TAF), the Bangladesh Association for Comminuty Education (BACE), and the Southern Gonounnayan Society (SGS), relevant BDG offices, UN agencies, other donor agencies, and personal service contractors;

3) site visits to the two TAF supported pilot projects - BACE in Sharasti upazila, and SGS in Gopalgonj upazila, and other NGO informal education programs; and

4) assessments of other existing or potential education and employment activities related to reducing fertility.

SUMMARY

Date this summary prepared: March 6, 1986

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings of the evaluation team included the following:

1) The female secondary scholarship program

   a) increases female enrollment for Grades V through X and beyond;

   b) raises the age of marriage; e.g. BACE alumnae delayed marriage from 16 to 17.2 years, thereby averting 1.3 births on average, per alumna;

   c) lowers desired family size to an average of two children per couple;

   d) affects positively the KAP of family planning services; and

   e) is performing well at 2 rural sites (BACE at Sharasti and SGS at Gopalganj), although BACE was found to be experiencing management and administrative problems.

2) The BDG is unlikely to commit scarce education funds to expand secondary education as long as emphasis is on universalization of primary education and literacy.

3) Other program options for reduced fertility exist but it is not possible at this time to calculate the cost effectiveness of them when compared to the scholarship program.

4) Findings in this evaluation compare favorably with other research findings on the effect of secondary and higher education on fertility. (cf. World Fertility Survey).

5) Studies on the relationship between female employment and reduced fertility in Bangladesh are inconclusive at this time given the high unemployment and high underemployment situation in Bangladesh in general and in the rural areas in particular. However, there does seem to be reduced fertility when women are employed outside the home. This finding is compatible with studies done elsewhere.

6) Parents uniformly support the idea of education for their children, and respond positively when there is a program that addresses the chief obstacle to that idea - namely lack of financial resources for secondary education.

7) Other local upazila-level based NGOs have been identified by TAF as willing and able to support similar scholarship projects.

8) The stipend of Tk.60/mo or Tk.720/yr meets one-half of the education costs when uniforms , text books, copy books, writing materials, transportation, and small miscellaneous expenses are factored in.

9) When queried, the scholarship recipients in the pilot schools expressed the desire for only two children as the ideal number regardless of sex. However, when the boys were asked the same question, they insisted upon male issue regardless of how many births it took.

10) Costs of educating a girl in the scholarship program, (BDG cost plus NGO cost) are $44.43, per year. Further, the cost of a birth averted is $170.88.

From their findings, the evaluation team concluded the following:

1) By raising the age of marriage, there is a clear effect on the population growth rate in addition to creating a more informed female population that uses FP services;

2) The relationship between reduced fertility and female employment needs further study in Bangladesh;

3) The potential for program expansion exists through TAF/USAID pilot projects; however, there are financial and managerial constraints to rapid replication;

4) The BDG expenditures on secondary education are likely to increase in response to demand for more teachers and classrooms created by an expanded female secondary education program.

5) Costs of the scholarship program are $44.43, including high overhead per girl, per year. However, comparative costs of female sterilization (about $50.00) occur after 4 or more children have already been born whereas education affects alumnae before marriage and child bearing.

6) The benefits of the target group to the community will outlive the project and will continue to demonstrate how to postpone marriage, increase generation length, lower infant and child mortality, instill greater educational aspirations in offspring, and keep family size to 2 children regardless of sex.

7) The pilot projects are consistent with the basic premise of US Government population assistance in using education of women as a way to create demand for modern family planning services.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1) Gradual expansion of the program to 15 upazilas in 2 years;

2) Testing a variety of options to involve more young women in educational enrichment activities, income generating projects which would indirectly reduce their fertility.

3) Continued support of BACE for an additional calendar year to resolve administrative problems, and if problems remain, to consider terminating financial support and reallocating funds to a similar project through another upazila-based NGO;

4) Continued support of SGS and its expansion into an adjacent upazilla provided that another equally-qualified NGO is not available to operate a scholarship program. SGS should be evaluated after its second year along the same lines as BACE was in 1984 and 1985;

5) Continued operation by TAF of the current scholarship program and implementation of the proposed modest expansion through upazila-based NGOs;

6) Adding administrative duties to TAF that include closer supervision of field staff, possible collaboration with upazila education officers, development of teaching skills on population education topics, and improvement of donor coordination with other donors working with BACE.

LESSONS LEARNED

1) International and local NGOs in Bangladesh demonstrate administrative talent and the means to provide female secondary level scholarships at the upazila level.

2) Secondary level education for females delays marriage and, without the conclusive evidence of a longitudinal study, appears to avert births in Bangladesh.

3) Parents and communities in Bangladesh support female secondary education when scholarship programs are available.

4) Young women, with up to secondary level education, in poor, conservative societies in rural areas prefer only two children regardless of sex in Bangladesh.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

BANGLADESH - Technical Resources Project (388-0027)

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

NAME OF MISSION OR OFFICE

PRO/USAID/Bangladesh

PURPOSE OF ACTIVITY EVALUATED

The purpose of the In-Country Modular Training Program for Women was to provide management training for mid-level women in response to a BDG directive of 1976 which required active recruitment and placement of women in mid-level jobs with the government. The women recruited realized that they as a group did not have sufficient experience in mid-level management nor well-developed management skills to perform their tasks.

USAID/Bangladesh made a Technical Resources Project grant to the BDG which included management training for women in March 1982. USAID however, suspended the training program portion of the project in January 1984.,

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY USED

The purpose of the evaluation was to determine the usefulness of the program, and, based on the evaluation, to decide whether or not to continue the project, and if so, with what modifications.

In conducting the evaluation, a team composed of an American Public Administration expert, two faculty members from Dhaka University and a research assistant performed the following tasks; 1) reviewed the curriculum used in the In-country Modular Management and Training Courses; 2) conducted a retrospective appraisal of the training by interviewing a statistically valid sampling of the participants; 3) interviewed personnel in the Ministry of Social Welfare and Women's Affairs (MSWWA) invsived in planning and administering the training program; 4) interviewed and assessed the institutional capabilities of the three training institutes involved and the problems associated with the courses; and 5) made suggestions to improve course content and administration of the program.

SUMMARY

Date this summary prepared: 02/23/84

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation team found that:

1) all 67 women alumnae interviewed responded positively, and agreed that the training should be continued;

2) there was need for improvement in three categories: a) curriculum development, b) training methods, and c) training program administration;

3) the MSWM had many internal problems that had a negative impact on the project, but the major one was the lack of preparation internally to keep the project functioning well;

4) USAID had no one specifically charged with responsibility for the project;

5) the performance of the three training institutes was adequate, and they were skilled at managing their own formats;

6) even though this initial project was sidelined, the need for training women in management skills continues to grow, as the numbers of women responding to the BDG's affirmative action policy continue to increase;

7) men in BDG positions do receive management training;

8) other training opportunities exist for women in banking services;

9) little management training exists elsewhere for women to enable them to work in NGOs, small businesses, or government;

10) the Establishment Ministry, which is responsible for implementing BDG training programs, has not succeeded measurably and has no particular interest in training women;

11) the reaction to the evaluation team's suggestion of a consultancy group to work with the training institutes was conservative to negative;

12) the institutes were not ready or willing to make more than small changes in their training methods;

13) the overall costs of training, including food and lodging, averaged $10.50 per person day, making these costs higher than other training programs in Bangladesh.

The team concluded that:

1) the alumnae interviewed were generally satisfied with the course and found it useful;

2) the management training program increased the women's self-confidence and reduced their dependence on male superiors, colleagues, or subordinates;

3) the MSWWA had lacked clear interest in and responsibility for the management training program for women;

4) USAID should have maintained a consistent relationship with the program and with the parties involved, and USAID could have handled the reimbursement and notification problems within MSWWA had someone been charged with overall responsibility for monitoring the program;

5) the training institutes, APD, CPMR, BMDC, were more effective in handling reimbursement and notification problems;

6) the management problems common to MSWWA, USAID, and the training institutes were solvable by assigning adequate/interested staff in each entity with clearly defined responsibilities;

7) for $10.50 per person day, the quality of the program could be improved and the number of trainees increased if there is effective management (the costs could go higher if major changes were made in the curriculum, course materials, and if the materials were translated into Bangla);

8) MSWWA must assign a woman with sufficient authority, interest, experience, and clerical support t manage the training program for women;

9) a consultancy group of 2 Bangladeshis and 1 expatriate is needed to advise MSWWA and the training institutes to help resolve fundamental management issues before resumption of the project;

10) both MSWWA and USAID could act together to revive the project.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation team recommended that:

1) USAID should continue the program;

2) management of the program be invested in the MSWWA with 2 provisions:

a) that MSWWA choose someone with knowledge of training, a demonstrated interest in management training for women, and who agrees to work on the program; and further,

1) MSWWA must agree to provide sufficient staff to assist with contract negotiation, recruitment notification, monitoring, evaluation, and financial management; and

2) that the person be placed in the Directorate of Women's Affairs;

b) that MSWWA agrees to work, for at least 2 months, with a consultancy group composed of 3 persons, 2 of whom to be Bangladeshi, who should be knowledgeable in training methods including needs assessment, competencies identification, learning unit development, and management, in order to:

1) develop selection criteria;

2) develop and implement a needs assessment;

3) set guidelines for curriculum and training methods to be used as the framework for contracting with training institutes;

4) establish a monitoring/evaluation process which MSWWA staff will follow;

3) that USAID have a person whose duty it is to relate to the MSWWA throughout the implementation phase of the program in order to assist in handling problems as they arise.

LESSONS LEARNED

1) A project can flounder and risk termination when neither the host government nor USAID exercises due diligence in its implementation.

2) A project, no matter how poorly conceived and implemented, can nevertheless have an important salutary effect on its intended beneficiaries. Despite the inadquacies in implementation, participants perceived the critical importance of management training. This perception lead USAID to persist in its efforts despite the problems encountered and an initial reaction to terminate the project.

Part II

J. Evaluation Summary

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH II PROJECT EVALUATION (388-0051)

1. USAID
Office of Food and Agriculture
Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Bangladesh Agricultural Research Project II
Report of the 1985 External Evaluation Team,
May 25, 1985.

2. Purpose of Activity Evaluated:

The Agricultural Research II, an extension of Phase I, aims at increasing the effectiveness of agricultural technologies for Bangladeshi farmers. Its purpose is to establish a functional agricultural research system that will assist in increasing domestic food production, small farm income, and rural employment.

3. Purpose of Evaluation and Methodology Used:

This was an annual evaluation to assess progress, analyze problems, suggest course corrections and to determine how effectively resources were being used to achieve objectives and to recommend improvements in the performance of the project. The Evaluation Team reviewed project and BARC documents, talked extensively with project administrators and scientists (including expatriate consultants) and visited field sites of on-going and planned research accompanied by Ministry of Agriculture and USAID Officers. A draft of the report was reviewed with concerned BARC leaders and consultants as well as with USAID staff, to insure factual accuracy and perceptual honesty.

4. Findings and Conclusions:

The research system through ARP-II has made significant accomplishments over the past several years. A number of new high yielding varieties have been developed and some excellent work is being done in analyzing how these fit into traditional cropping systems. The new varieties and improved cropping patterns have been adopted by many farmers. For more widespread adoption, however, researchers must "package" their results, particularly at moderate input levels, and get them into the national system for delivery to farmers. This will require a major effort over the next few years, including further strengthening of the research system, as well as the extension delivery system.

This evaluation has led to the conclusion that the objectives (proposed outputs) of the Project were appropriate as originally conceived, are still valid for building a national agricultural research system, are only partially accomplished, and that USAID should continue support until an effectively functioning National

Date this summary prepared: December 1, 1985

Agricultural Research System is in place.

Research, extension and farmer linkages at farmers fields have been developed through the cropping systems research program under ARP-II. Plans are now maturing to incorporate non-crop activities into the field program, achieving a full farming systems approach.

Project management by the prime contractor has improved substantially and with additional improvements planned and with the personnel now in place, good project management should become routine.

Management by the Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council (BARC) has also improved but further significant improvement is constrained by a number of factors. Scientific staffing at BARC is inadequate, difficulties in maintaining a full complement of Member-Directors has constrained progress in certain program areas, as has insufficient authority of BARC to fully implement its mandate.

Research planning and setting of research priorities will improve as BARC becomes more involved, as planned, in review and analysis of institute long range and annual plans. The National Agricultural Research Plan (NARP) has been prepared by BARC, assisted by IADS staff and senior Bangladeshi agricultural scientists. There is much uncertainty on the part of various elements of the Bangladesh agricultural establishment about a Program Planning and Review Board (PPRB) for BARC. All of the pros and cons of such a Board have not surfaced so as to be understood by expatriate observers. The GOB will need to sort out this issue among its constituent elements and create a PPRB in appropriate form, or decide that one is not necessary and bring the issue to resolution.

The NARP provides a good overview of research requirements and prioritizes them. A major effort for BARC, and for the International Agricultural Development Service (IADS), is conversion of the NARP into high priority research programs. BARC will then have precise criteria to guide its review of institute plans and to effectively carry out its role in the review process for contract research and for new Annual Development Plan (ADP) projects which involve also the Ministry of Agriculture, Planning Commission, Establishment Ministry and Ministry of Finance.

A major problem in the National Agricultural Research System is the lack of funding balance between research personnel and the operating expenses required to make them productive. USAID has relieved the problem temporarily with PL-480 Title II funds. A permanent solution is essential. This will require a major effort by GOB and will require changes in philosophy and procedure. Philosophically, the GOB apparently feels compelled to relieve unemployment to the maximum extent possible. This is a major factor in funding imbalances for personnel and operating expenses for agricultural research. The increased productivity of the research system when provided operating expenses has been clearly demonstrated over the past year or so. If this evidence is convincing to Government, they could, over the next several years, improve the balance of personnel/operating expense by not approving any new

research projects that did not have a proper balance. In the interim, government should increase operating expenses for on-going projects. Continued USAID assistance will be very productive in assisting government to improve the balance.

Decentralization of activities within the rese rch system has progressed substantially over the past year or so. Effectiveness of regional research planning and execution has been facilitated by the IADS Production Agronomists.

There are critical manpower shortages throughout the research system, particularly at the field level. Additional staff, reallocation of some staff, and further in-the-field training will require innovative management by BARC/IADS and the institutes to make the expanded cropping systems research (CSR), farming systems research (FSR), and Multiple Location Testing (MLT) programs work.

5. Recommendations:

1. BARC/IADS and USAID should review the fiscal situation, set targets for scientific/administrative accomplishments and budget, and self-consciously use the annual work and financial plan progress to allocate resources to various program areas.

2. GOB/BARC should remove the above constraints and establish an effective Training Division at BARC as expeditiously as possible. The Team also recommends that both IADS and USAID use resources at their command to assure execution of the manpower development program.

3. While the World Bank is financing additional construction, BARC/GOB should consider renting temporary office space.

4. BARC/IADS and USAID should review the maintenance policy under ARP-II, determine whether it is causing under-utilization of AID-procured equipment, and set a policy accordingly.

5. BARC, based on priorities for research programs established in NARP and other available sources, should make an indicative allocation of available contract research funds to the various program areas, holding some portion in reserve.

6. BARC should advertise the availability of contract research resources and invite proposals based on the prioritized research programs.

7. BARC should re-establish technical committees for each program area (We understand this is now being done informally, but to be really effective, and so the research system can understand what is going on, the arrangement should be formalized) and these committees should meet quarterly.

8. Should involve IADS expertise, along with local expertise, in technical review of proposals.

9. BARC should consider simplification of the management of

approved contract research projects as suggested elsewhere in this report (see section VI).

10. BARC should ensure that its contract research project monitoring and evaluation responsibilities are carried out.

11. BARC should ensure that new contract research funds from the World Bank and other donors are administered using uniform proposal approval, monitoring, and evaluation procedures, with IADS Specialist assistance when necessary.

12. BARC should assure that the results coming out of contract research are appropriately utilized in the research system and particularly in the extension system.

13. BARC should manage the program on an annual rather than quarterly basis, purely for simplification; more financial and monitoring responsibility should be shifted to the administrators of the institutes and universities, and additional incentives should be provided to PI's to increase competition for awards, and then require commensurate substantive inputs from the PI into the project. It is recognized that annual financial monitoring will not sufficient but AID/BARC/IADS should do some creative thinking to simplify procedures now in force.

14. BARC/IADS should carry out a systematic study of the response of farmers to improve technologies developed at CSR sites and regional stations. Specifically, researchers should look at such issues as: how much farmers know about new technologies, their information sources, their evaluation of various technologies, constraints to adoption, adoption rates, and measurable consequences of adoption. This study should compare villages close to and distant from CSR sites. Promising sites for these studes include, Kalikapur in Ishurdi, which has fairely active researcher-farmer and research-extension linkages with surrounding villages, Jamalpur or Hathazari sites, where there have been less active outreach efforts, and a set of villages in some area where there is no CSR site or regional station.

15. Publications covering all aspects of production of a particular crop should be prepared as research results permit. This will require scientists in Crops, Soils, Entomology, Plant Pathology, Irrigation, and Economics to pool their knowledge and make recommendations useful to extension workers and Bangladeshi farmers.

16. BARC should carry out a solid manpower analysis of the research system and develop a strong training program and personnel policy to address recognized needs.

17. If USAID and BARC are interested in increasing the effectiveness of FSR site research and the quality and relevance of regional station research, they should extend the Associate Specialist positions through the life of the project.

18. BARC/IADS should document several cases of successful

transfer of improved technology and see that this information reaches the hands of appropriate administrators and scientists within the system.

19. IADS and BARC should ensure that BARC Member-Directors and program area staff are trained in these relevant research management skills (i.e. annual work plan and financial plan, progress reports) by participating fully in document preparation and evaluation of progress.

20. Given inadequate operating funds for an effective agricultural research system USAID, a should either continue to provide funds under direct project assistance or Title III funds should be provided through BARC.

21. Every GOB organization in the channel of approval for new research projects - the institutes, BARC, MOA, the Planning Commission, and the Ministry of Finance should give careful attention during the approval process to the balance in project budget between personnel and operating costs.

It is the feeling of the Team that additional senior scientific and administrative staff are needed to support each BARC Member-Director and to gradually take over many of the duties now being performed by IADS Specialists. These administrative and scientific professinals should be able to provide continuity during changes in Member-Director staffing.

22. There should be a manpower analysis of BARC itself, to determine what personnel at which levels of training are necessary to effectively accomplish duties assigned to BARC. The GOB should then establish and fill the needed positions and provide associated salaries and operating expenses.

23. BARC, USAID, and other major donors (i.e. World Bank) should have frank discussions about the adequacy of present contract research procedures (as presented in the Contract Research Manual) and agree on necessary adjustments.

24. This evaluation leads the Team to conclude that the objectives (Proposed outputs) of the projects were appropriate as originally conceived, are still valid for building a national agricultural research system, and are only partially accomplished. USAID should continue to support these objectives until the bulk of the outputs have been satisfactorily achieved.

25. The Team agrees with the draft proposals emphasis on decentralization of technical assistance to regional stations and CSR sites, and with the emphasis on full development of the farming system research activities. To ensure that both of these objectives are met, the Associate Production Agronomists working at the BARI regional research stations should be retained, but should expand their attention to work in support of all agricultural research institutes activie in the region. Furthermore, they should work closely with the Mobile Farming Systems Team.

26. The proposed extension should provide technical assistance to the core disciplines of Crops and Soils Management to encourage basic research (e.g. development of new varieties) that will lead to new technologies for testing at FSR sites.

The Team strongly endorses proposed support for operating expenses and believes that USAID should ensure, throughout the remaining life of the project, that lack of operating expenses does not constrain the productivity of the research system.

27. The Team endorses the proposed direct payment procedures for contract research.

28. The Team has concluded that the overall performance of the IADS has been at a satisfactory level. For the project extension, it is recommended that a host government contracting arrangement be continued between BARC/GOB and IADS.

29. All CSR sites should conduct corresponding high input and low input trials, measure residual soil fertility effects and devise other approaches to reach both rich and poor farmers.

30. Components which are essential to food production at the system level, water management & grain storage technology, must eventually be incorporated into trials at the CSR sites.

31. Links between the Bangladesh agricultural research system and the international and regional centres should be increasingly shifted from IADS Specialists to Bangladesh scientists. Project funds should support visits of Bangladesh scientists to international centres and their participation in research conferences. Since GOB approval delays often limit timely travel of Bangladesh scientists, project funds should also be used to bring international centre scientists to Bangladesh.

32. ARP-II resources should be utilized to assist in this major undertaking. In the interim, BARC and IADS should take available livestock and forage research results and begin to incorporate them into the FSR programme.

33. Lower levels of fertilizer and other inputs should be researched, resulting in technology packages that will be more appropriate for Bangladesh farmers at the lower end of the resource-availability scale.

34. There should be more CSR research on rhizobium inoculation trails with HYV grain legumes and sulfur and zinc inputs.

35. Field soil test-crop yield correlations should be carried out on selected farms at CSR sites.

36. BARC/IADS and USAID should analyze Water Management fund requirements for the life of the project and make reallocations to other programs as appropriate and feasible.

37. The Vertebrate Pest Management program is working well and should be continued.

38. Required physical facilities and equipment for adequate pest management research (e.g. nethouse for plant pathology, screen-house/insect rearing facility, and toxicology lab.) should be included in the next Annual Work and Financial Plan by BARC/IADS.

39. The Horticulture research program should be strengthened, making use of the AVRDC linkage. A new seed production, distribution and promotion should be established as part of it.

40. Greater emphasis should be given to working with junior level scientists at research institutes and field stations emphasizing inter-disciplinary research and preparation of commodity oriented publications for extension and farmers.

41. BARC and the associated institutes should initiate their National Farming Systems Research Program by adding Livestock, Horticulture, and other research components to the CSR sites in 1985-86.

42. Give high priority to analysis of data previously collected and largely un-analyzed and preservation of data in a computerized data bank.

43. Arrange regular fora at BARC and the institutes for interchange/discussion among agricultural scientists from all program areas and the agricultural economists.

44. Institutionalize the research skills training at BAU and other training institutions.

6. Lessons Learned:

1. The impetus for decentralization of control over donor resources and control of the research and training agenda by the regional field station level came from USAID and IADS. Without strong pressure for decentralized control, changes in policy the central headquarters of the national research institutes (e.g., BARI, JRI) would not have taken place.

2. Although the contract research concept has been useful in stimulating research in new and key areas and in helping researchers to improve proposal and report writing, spending and disbursement rates have been to slow due to: 1) disproportionate allocation of funds early on to certain institutions and researchers and failure to reobligate unused funds; and 2) cumbersome multi-tiered financial reporting and financial management procedures. USAID and IADS should have pushed for more efficient accounting and reporting procedures early on in the project.

3. In spite of the ARP-II design emphasis on the response of farmers to the improved agricultural techniques developed under the

project, neither USAID, IADS, nor the GOB have given enough attention to obtaining feedback from the farmers and measuring adoption rates, increased farm productivity, or increased farm income. The project extension should have specific requirements for obtaining and using this feedback.

4. For a complex project like ARP-II, with nine program areas and twenty five long-term consultants, the Annual Work Plan, Annual Financial Plan, Six Month Progress Reports, and Annual Evaluations are essential management tools that are now being well-used. BARC needs to better understand how to use these skills.

5. Some unanticipated BDG factors have seriously threatened BARC's leadership role. One factor is the entrenched authority of the separate crop research institutes which see BARC as potentially undercutting their authority. A second factor is the BDG tendency to delay too long in appointing permanent incumbents to top administrative positions (in this case, the BARC Chairman and Member-Directors positions). This has created a leadership vaccum which undercuts the momentum and authority of BARC.

6. Another unanticipated problem is the GOB lack of funding balance between research personnel and the operating expenses required to motivate productive personnel. The GOB philosophy emphasizes salaries over operational support. The USAID provision of PL-480 Title II funds for a year resulted in increased research productivity, but this is not a permanent solution.

7. Although the "farming systems research" concept is appropriate to Bagladeshi farmers and promises useful contributions to increased farm productivity, operationalizing this concept in a bureaucratic context is extremely difficult. It was probably unrealistic for USASID to expect more than the "Cropping Systems Approach" at this point in the project. It may prove impractical to get real research cooperation between the multiple divisions and ministries covering the different sub-fields in Bangladesh.

8. The ARP-II designers did not give enough consideration to the serious research skill deficiencies of particularly junior staff in the agricultural research system. The BARC Training Cell was not capable of handling the manpower development program needed for satisfactory implementation of the ARP-II project. By default, IADS has developed an adhoc in-country training system. Short-term foreign training has been repeatedly thwarted by a cumbersome GOB selection and approval process. Project designers must give more attention to manpower needs assessments and develop realistic ways of carrying out manpower development programs.

9. The ARP-II push to develop Cropping System Research Sites has been a useful experiment that is paying off and should have future returns if more technical assistance in support is provided at the researcher/farmer/extension worker interface level. The CSR officers are gaining experience and progressing with the daily support of the IADS Production Agronomists and occasional assistance from the other IADS Specialists. Continued and increased project support for such

field based consultants or a mobile team is essential for improving and expanding such farmer oriented research.

10. More emphasis should have been given by USAID, IADS and BARC in getting field trial data analyzed and out in a usable report form. IADS consultants have been essential in this with some painstaking efforts to transfer basic analytic and report writing skills. It is a teaching and learning process that will require more long term consultant support.

11. It is extremely difficult to get agricultural researchers (USA as well as Bangladeshi) to organize field experiments that are more appropriate to resource poor farmers. (e.g. corresponding high and low input trials, residual soil fertility movements) and not to over emphasize high yield experiments. Also, more research is needed under production conditions of farmers with less control over water management, pest control, planting time, seed selection, and grain storage.

Purpose of This Study

The purpose of this study was therefore to review the current levels of reimbursement for sterilization to determine: (1) whether these levels are appropriate; (2) whether sterilization is being provided in a general context of voluntarism and informed consent; and (3) whether additional studies concerning voluntarism are needed. Primary attention was to be on the reimbursement payments to clients.

Methodology

Findings are based on clinic visits, document review, and intensive interviewing during visits to Bangladesh in June and November of 1985, and on comparison with sterilization services in other countries. Unannounced, spot visits were made to clinics and interviews were conducted with a comprehensive range of people, including critics.

Major Findings and Conclusions

A. Concerning the General Context

1. Sterilization incidence and decline. Only a small percentage of Bangladeshi couples have had a sterilization and fewer sterilizations are being performed now than previously. Although sterilization is the most common method of family planning in Bangladesh, less than 9 percent of all couples of reproductive age (either the husband or wife) have had a sterilization.

2. Is the sterilization program voluntary? The sterilization program in Bangladesh is clearly voluntary. This is formal policy and many safeguards and monitoring systems have been established to ensure that only people who want the operation have it and to bring to a halt any deviation from this policy. The large number of studies and evaluations that have been conducted are evidence of the vigilance of the Bangladesh government and the donors.

3. Coercion. Bangladeshis who become sterilized do so of their own free will; they are not coerced. Over 870,000 men and women underwent sterilization in Bangladesh between January 1, 1984 and September 30, 1985 and there is no evidence that any of them was coerced. Research shows very high satisfaction rates of

96 to 98 percent. The tiny minority who express dissatisfaction do so because the operation failed (a pregnancy occurred anyway) or because of health reasons not related to the operation.

4. Informed consent. The general atmosphere is one of informed consent. Knowledge of family planning is nearly universal among adults in Bangladesh. Nearly all men or women becoming sterilized know that alternative methods of family planning are available and they have a basic understanding of the operation.

5. Cultural and religious appropriateness. Sterilization fits the traditional Bangladeshi cultural preference for early marriage followed immediately by a series of pregnancies until a couple has its desired number of surviving children. The mean number of living children at the time of sterilization is approximately four. There is no organized religious opposition; many religious leaders, or their wives, have had a sterilization.

6. Client reimbursement. The client reimbursement payment does not coerce people to have the operation and does not appear to be an important influence on the decision as to whether to get sterilized. Rather, its importance appears to be in enabling an individual to have the operation relatively soon once the decision has already been made.

7. The sterilization decision-making process. The decision to become sterilized is generally carefully contemplated over a relatively long period of time (7 to 12 months). Consideration of sterilization is usually triggered by the pregnancy or birth of a third or subsequent child--not by reimbursement payments or any other aspect of the government family planning program.

8. Other donors' concerns. Other donors and organizations are not particularly worried about the client reimbursement. Rather their concern has focused on the helper payment and on the need to improve the entire range of family planning and maternal and child health services. None of the critics, however, has been able to identify any alternative strategy that the government could actually implement.

9. Alleged discrimination against women. Sterilization services are not targeted at poor women--or at any other category of people. As of 1985, more vasectomies are being performed than tubectomies.

10. Complexity and alternatives. The voluntary sterilization reimbursement system is extremely complex and alternatives are not apparent. Much progress has been made, but anyone looking for irregularities can easily find isolated examples. To propose feasible alternatives is much more difficult.

B. Concerning The Levels of Reimbursement

1. The role of cost reimbursement. Given the poverty in Bangladesh, sterilization would be prohibitively expensive for many potential clients in the absence of cost reimbursement. Large numbers of people desiring sterilization would either not be able to have it or would need to postpone it for months or even years.

2. Current reimbursement levels. Actual costs are very close to current reimbursement levels for all recipients. Sterilization clients, male and female, currently receive a cash reimbursement of 175 takas, which is judged to be close to average actual expenditures.

3. Average cost reimbursement. It is necessary administratively to reimburse on the basis of average costs rather than attempt to reimburse actual costs on an individual basis. To reimburse on an individual basis would create administrative chaos and greatly increase opportunities for corruption.

4. Adjusting reimbursement levels over time. It is reasonable to adjust reimbursement levels over time to reflect the effects of inflation. Data necessary for this are readily available from the Bangladesh government.

Major Recommendations

1. The reimbursement system. AID should continue reimbursement for sterilization at the present levels. The reimbursement payments should not be eliminated or changed under any circumstance without first: (a) identifying an alternative arrangement that can maintain the successes and momentum that have been achieved and (b) testing the alternative arrangement on a pilot basis

2. Screening and counseling. AID should increase its efforts to help the government improve pre-sterilization screening and counseling of requestors to be certain that low-parity or otherwise inappropriate requestors do not become sterilized.

3. Monitoring. USAID/Dhaka should continue its systematic monitoring and analysis of results.

4. Research. Where monitoring information is not adequate, USAID/Dhaka should continue to supplement this with special studies aimed at meeting program management needs. AID should join with, or support, the Bangladesh Government and World Bank in their comprehensive study of the present payment system, but not conduct a separate parallel study.

Elaboration of these findings and recommendations is presented in sections II and III.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

BANGLADESH - Rural Industries, MIDAS Component

U. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

USAID Dhaka - Evaluation of MIDAS-Recommendations for MIDAS-II, April 25, 1986

Rural Industries Project (388-0042): MIDAS Sub-Component

I. Funding for MIDAS is one of several components of the Rural Industries Project (RIP) approved in August 1981. The MIDAS Cooperative Agreement was signed November 1983 and, as amended in Project Implementation Letter No. 13, will expire December 31, 1986. The purpose of the grant was to further enhance the ability of MIDAS to identify exceptionally promising small scale industrial opportunities, and provide financial, managerial and technical assistance to entrepreneurs prepared to exploit those opportunities.

The problem that this activity addressed is that the Bangladesh business/industrial sector is not growing rapidly enough to absorb the almost 2,000,000 individuals who are entering the labor force every year. The most promising source of jobs for new entrants is the small business sector.

This project addressed USAID's program goal of expanding employment (CDSS FY86). The project represents part of the initial strategic phase of USAID/Dhaka's major, long-term commitment to the development of small and medium enterprises (SME) in Bangladesh.

II. Purpose of Evaluation:

Over the last four years MIDAS operated without the benefit of a comprehensive evaluation. A series of short studies served to monitor project performance and led to a number of amendments to the Cooperative Agreement. The last two years have seen is a significant maturing of the organization and ample evidence of ability to carry out its mandate. In May, 1985 a project implementation document was approved by AID/W for FY 86 funding of a follow-on project to support MIDAS over the next five-years. It will provide $8 million in technical assistance and loanable funds. This final evaluation was conducted to provide USAID Dhaka with an objective, outside analysis of the progress and problems of this program, and to provide guidance on design of the follow-on Enterprise Development Project.

SUMMARY

Date this summary prepared:

III. Methodology:

The methodology used in this evaluation effort involved the following six steps:

- Review of available documents
- Interviews with key individuals
- Internal team discussions of observations and hypotheses
- Testing of hypotheses during follow-up discussions with key individuals
- Deriving conclusions based on hypotheses
- Checking conclusions for internal consistency and revising accordingly.

Questions addressed were concerned with how well MIDAS has fulfilled its goals and objectives, how effective its management and operations have been, what has been the economic impact of its programs on employment and the development of SMEs in Bangladesh, and, through the participation of a Women In Development (WID) specialist on the team, what MIDAS has done for women in Bangladesh. The following areas were examined in detail:

- Performance of MIDAS loan portfolios
- The project proposal and approval process
- MIDAS project monitoring and MIS systems
- Internal accounting procedures, and
- Personnel policies, salaries and incentives.

The team noted that measuring the employment generation impact was difficult if not impossible due to insufficient and/or inadequate information. A basic problem was the relative newness of the portfolio and the associated difficulty in determining whether or not assisted enterprises are truly viable in the long run. Additional complicating factors are; reliably attributing the establishment of new enterprises solely to project activities, measuring the net effect on the economy when project activities in one sector have impacts on other sectors, and finally, the difficulty associated with measuring the indirect creation of new jobs due to linkage effects of varying scale enterprises. The team concluded that MIDAS investments have resulted in a net employment gain, but the number of new jobs cannot be determined. An improved information and monitoring system in the new project will limit but not eliminate these difficulties.

Continued

IV. Findings Conclusions and Recommendations:

Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
1. There has been a dramatic shift in emphasis for the MIDAS program from the original Project Paper through the revised Cooperative Agreement and Amendments	The mandate for MIDAS is a mix of development and commercial objectives which has translated into negative consequences for operation in both areas.	The cost accounting system needs to be revised to allow tracking of costs by activity. USAID should change its orientation from providing subsidies to the MIDAS organization as a whole, to providing subsidies for development functions performed by MIDAS.
2. The MIDAS program has been managed and administered in a responsible and competent manner.	MIDAS is developing a credible administrative loan disbursement/recovery and technical assistance capacity.	The loan approval process should be streamlined by USAID delegation of sign-off authority. Loan supervision, accounting procedures and personnel procedures need to be improved.
3. MIDAS has adopted conservative financial management policies and this is reflected in the financial statements.	The development impact of MIDAS will be maximized by focusing on industry sectors that have significant linkages to small scale enterprise.	MIDAS should continue research directed at identifying sectors with such linkages. Particular emphasis should be placed on sectors that involve female producers and employees.
4. MIDAS has been very responsive to donor wishes in structuring financial activities in support of small-scale enterprise.	Technical assistance is needed to consolidate the administrative and technical capacity of MIDAS and to assist in the development of a business plan	Assistance should be available throughout the five-year period of MIDAS II but should be front-loaded. USAID should offer assistance in marketing, accounting, computer applications, personnel management, and technical areas.
	MIDAS has gained a reputation among other donors as a responsible and technically qualified organization in selected industrial sectors.	USAID and MIDAS should jointly address the issue of MIDAS entering new lines of business, such as contracting with other donors for project implementation. USAID should take advantage of the opportunity to leverage its own resources by increasing the capacity of MIDAS to contract responsibility with other donors for development services.

Family Planning Services

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of the U.S. Agency for International Development Mission in Bangladesh, the International Science and Technology Institute arranged for an overall evaluation of the Family Planning Services Project (FPSP) No. 388-0050, which has been providing support to the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) for the national population and family planning (FP) effort since 1981. The Team selected for this undertaking included David A. Oot (Team Leader), Sallie Craig Huber, John Knodel, and Alan J. Margolis. The evaluation, carried out during the entire month of March 1986, was preceeded by four other assessments of individual components of the FPSP--the non-governmental organization (NGO) programs, the Social Marketing Project (SMP), the International Center for Diarrheal Disease Control/Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) and the Female Secondary Education Project. The draft reports of these evaluations were used in the preparation of this overall evaluation.

The scope of work for the evaluation was divided into four parts as follows--an examination of project accomplishments, status of mid-term evaluation recommendations, key issues related to past and future assistance and identification of future activities for USAID population assistance to Bangladesh. This scope of work was accomplished through a review of relevant documents, analysis of data, field visits, and interviews with selected individuals.

The original FPSP, funded in 1981 for a three year period provided support to two main components--the national program of the GOB and projects carried out by selected NGOs, which include the SMP and ICDDR,B. Amended in 1984, the project will now continue until 1987. The original purpose, to increase the contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) from 13 to 25 percent, was revised with the amendment to reach a modern method CPR of 28 percent by the end of 1987. Elements supported by the FPSP include commodities, voluntary sterilization (VS)costs, contraceptive prevalence surveys (CPS), training, operations research, maternal and child health interventions, and the projects for service delivery carried out by NGOs.

Despite an accelerated increase in the CPR over the past two years to approximately 19 percent (modern methods) and 25 percent (all methods), it appears unlikely that the project goal of achieving a CPR of 28 percent will be achieved. This conclusion is reached through a detailed analysis of 1983 and preliminary 1985 CPS data and a comprehensive review of the GOB Management Information System (MIS)statistics. A rapid decline in VS procedures during the past 18 months without a concomitant significant increase in the acceptance of other methods is identified as the primary reason for the potential shortfall in goal achievement. An analysis of the contribution of the three main components of the project reveals the proportionate contribution of each to the overall increase in CPR to date and recommendations are made regarding the need to undertake special studies to further refine this information.

With regard to the various components of the FPSP, the evaluation assessed the separate elements being supported under each. Specific recommendations are made to continue elements of support to the GOB program in the area of VS support--recognizing that the number of acceptors has probably leveled and is not likely to increase in the near future. The need to monitor quality of VS services is stressed and recommendations are made in this regard. Continued support to the IUD program is also recommended with suggestions for improving this service. Although support for future CPSs will be provided by another donor, the evaluation makes several suggestions for possible USAID funding in support of this effort.

The NGO component is reviewed in detail with short descriptions of the activities of each agency. This component has grown over the life of the project to become an important contributor to the national FP effort. Continued funding of this component is recommended. Specific suggestions are made to improve the activities of the NGOs in keeping with the USAID strategy for their projects. In particular, this componest is seen as having an important role in the transfer of innovations to the GOB program, and NGOs should be further encouraged along these lines. Recommendations are also made to examine and fill gaps in urban services; undertake reasoned expansion to rural areas in collaboration with the GOB;extend project planning cycles to reduce management burdens; and to continue working for better collaboration and coordination among the NGO community.

Continued support to the SMP component is also recommended. However, a number of recommendations are made including the need to modify the SMP strategy somewhat. Also suggestions are made to improve the efficiency of the distribution system. The Team recommends continued funding for the ICDDR,B component and suggests specific measures be taken to transfer lessons learned to date for possible replication in the GOB program.

A number of key programmatic issues were examined in some detail. Three specific areas deserve mention here. The Team carefully assessed the issues related to integration of MCH and FP and conclude that this is having a generally negative impact on the program, both from the perspective of workers' morale and consequently on the delivery of services as well. This is especially the case at the upazila level and below. Specific recommendations are made to attempt to involve the elected Upazila Chairmen and Parishads through training and involvement in specific FP programs to effect a solution to some of the problems at the lower levels of the program.

Related to the above integration issue, the importance of domiciliary services cannot be overstressed, given the Bangladeshi culture. Thus, the need for a greatly increased fieldstaff (especially females) is recommended.

Finally, the role, importance and oftentimes preference for temporary methods is examined. There appears to be a large, and possibly growing, group of couples who say they want no more children but who wish to use non-permanent methods of contraception. Increased attention must be focused on serving this group appropriately.

In closing, the Team believes that primary attention should be given to supporting the efforts of the GOP to reduce the rate of population growth for the remainder of this project period and into the future. USAID's primary focus should continue to be expansion and improvement in the delivery of FP services. Based on the various program elements and data examined in the course of the evaluation, the Team believes there is significant receptivity to quality FP services. This suggests that significant changes in demographic behavior are underway and efforts to target specific subgroups in the population could result in a substantially higher overall CPR.

USAID and the GOP are commended for the efforts and accomplishments to date in the FPSP. That changes are taking place to improve the program and more and more couples are being served through increased and expanded high quality services is recognized as a significant achievement. The fact that the program continues despite the changes that occurred in the structure and design of the program (e.g. integration into clinics) in spite of changes in the U.S. administration and political climate is thought to be remarkable. It is hoped that the program, with USAID support, will continue to grow the thrive.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.1 Research System Management

Activities in this programme area were mainly in human resource development for the national agricultural research system. A computerized database for human resource planning and training was established. An international workshop on Management of Human Resources in Agricultural Research was held in March 1986. BARC is now preparing a revision of the Five-Year National Agricultural Research Plan and will help the research institutes prepare their plans. The committee recommends that overseas training be facilitated by simplifying the selection procedure and granting BARC approval authority; that computerized human resources data bases be set up at the research institutes; and that contract research funds for livestock research be increased.

2.2 Financial Management and Accounting

Satisfactory performance is reported. Over 77% of the amended contract budget was spent or committed. The 17th amendment of the contract shifted many allotments and moved all contingency items to other areas. Due to reasons outside the control of project managers, some items exceeded or fell far below the anticipated costs. The overall financial management of the project has improved, but little progress is reported in strengthening BARC's in-house accounting practises. Recommended to improve BARC's financial management are the installation of

dedicated computers, increased use of the BARC Computer Centre facilities, training for the personnel in the use of computers and a manpower supplement in the accounts section of BARC.

2.3 Farm Development and Maintenance

The evaluators report good progress here. Since the beginning of the project, over 150 acres of research land have been levelled, and irrigation and drainage facilities were constructed or upgraded at several locations. A valuable Farm Management Procedures Manual, for the use of managers of research farms, has been developed. Equipment maintenance support has been very good at BARI and its regional stations, including the preparation of an equipment inventory and the development of maintenance procedures. It is recommended that such support be extended to the other institutes, with more training programmes and short-term technical support. The committee also suggests that procurement of spare parts be assured, that a computerized inventory of equipment be prepared for use of all the institutes, that farm management training be provided, and that the programme be continued in the project extension.

2.4 Training Communication and Information

This programme area reports that implementation of training programmes has been satisfactory for long-term courses but disappointing for the short-term. Overseas training is restricted by government policy while in-country training is hampered by inadequate training facilities and student benefits.

Communication activities have included a national symposium, publication and distribution of reports and newsletters, and providing computerized library and documentation services. The committee recommends that training programmes be carefully planned according to the identified needs, that in-country training programmes be strengthened, that the approval process for overseas study be simplified, and that reports be published promptly and distributed more widely.

2.5 Farming Systems Research

This project is very new, having only recently replaced the Cropping Systems project, and progress has only begun. Both long and short term regional and in-country training programmes have been carried out, though many of the trained personnel were subsequently assigned to other programmes. New FSR cells have been set up in most of the institutes, with a National Coordination Unit to be organized as soon as possible at BARC. Publication and distribution of various scientific documents was supported by the programme, particularly at BARC. The Coordination Unit should help extend these services to the institutes. Basic laboratory equipment was supplied to the institutes. Several research findings have been successfully transferred to local small farmers, but there is no mechanism for disseminating the improved technology on a large scale. Pilot programmes using agricultural extension personnel are being organized for this purpose. Recommended are frequent meeting of the FSR National Technical Coordination Committee, special

training for FSR personnel and analysis of Cropping Systems Research data by the Coordination Cell of NCFSR.

2.6 Crops Research

While good progress is reported in the field crops component, both agronomy and horticulture components have been hindered by the absence of a specialist and limited funds and manpower. Recommended for the agronomy section are increased funds, training and equipment, especially vehicles; and research in haor, char, Chittagong Hill Tracts, saline and barind areas. The field crops section reports research success in maize, groundnut and others, with multi-location trials in their third year. Results in Rhizobia and disease resistance in pulses is promising. Overseas training has proceeded well while in-country training has been troubled with administrative delays. Some lab and field equipment has been procurred. Recommended for the field crops section is the expedition of approval for in-country training, the strengthening of tissue culture facilities and varietal improvement of rainfed crops. The horticulture component also notes a lack of support for in-country training but reports tremendous progress with homestead garden research. Recommended for this component are increased support to Horticulture Divisions of the institutes, long-term integrated research plans and the development of courses to implement technology transfer.

2.7 Agricultural Economics and Social Science

The emphasis of this year's programme was on upgrading the analytical and reporting skills of mid-level scientists. Through workshops and short-courses now institutionalized at three locations, researchers from various institutes were trained in data analysis and presentation and 16 technical reports have been prepared to date. There are currently 16 on-going cortract research projects. Some commodity items, largely books and other publications were provided. The programme continues to provide backstopping for the BARC Computer Centre. Utilization of funds was 82%. The least utilized item was in-country training. Government restrictions were a constraint for both local and overseas training programmes. Some of the many recommendations were that support for training programmes be increased, that research institutes be informed of priority research topics, that the programme have the capability to carry out quick policy analyses for planners and policy makers, that micro-computers be provided for the various institutes and that a socio-economic data bank be established at the BARC Computer Centre.

2.8 Livestock Research

This programme area is only two years old and is still at an embryonic stage of development. Major constraints have been the absence of a Member-Director for livestock and lack of project continuity with other programme areas. The committee has prioritized recommendations that all livestock research in Bangladesh be co-ordinated by BARC, and that the Livestock

Division of BARC should work with the Crops and Farming Systems Research Divisions to resolve problems in the sector.

2.9 Soil Management

The main emphasis in Soil Management this year was on soil fertility and plant nutrition. Overall achievements were good to excellent, though not all activities could be completed due to certain constraints. Important among these were delays in short-term overseas training due to procedural bottlenecks. Excellent progress has been made in developing a national soil fertility evaluation system at BARI. Some of the committee's recommendations are that BARC finance the publication of a picture manual of micronutrient deficiencies for various crops; that the soil section of BARC be expanded; that the Soil Fertility Advisory Committee be reactivated to function in technology transfer; that linkages with SRDI be sought; and that contract research programmes be expanded.

2.10 Irrigation Water Management

Emphasis this year was on the development of small-scale irrigation systems, research training, provision of research equipment and the promotion of contract research. There were two short-term consultancies, 11 scholars studying overseas, four in-country courses, a workshop, nine on-going contract research programs, and delivery of commodities worth over $83,000. Constraints were largely bureaucratic, such as government restrictions and delays in government clearance. The committee

recommended greater use of local counterparts and consultants; evaluation of training programmes; greater involvement of Ag. Eng./Irrigation staff in IWM contract research; improvement of irrigation facilities and caliber of scientists at the research stations; the organization of a multidisciplinary team for irrigation; more emphasis on technology transfer; and the provision of microcomputers at the participating institutes.

2.11 Pest Management

The Entomology and Plant Pathology areas have had good progress, and would have been much better if crop protection experts had been hired from the beginning. A comprehensive National Pest Management Research Plan is well under way. The renovation of the Entomology facilities are nearly completed, and the screenhouse and headhouse are now ready to be built at BARI. Many activities in Plant Pathology were not followed up when the specialist left, but a consultancy has been successful in introducing a method of disease-free propagation in banana. Delays in government approval and lack of support from BARC and BARI have been constraints. The committee recommends that a national co-ordinated Pest Management group be instituted, that the need for consultants be clearly identified and their recommendations followed up, and that BARC be granted authority to approve overseas travel and the hiring of local consultants.

EVALUATION FOR OFFICE OF ENERGY, USAID
"RURAL ELECTRIFICATION IN BANGLADESH
MANAGEMENT, ENGINEERING, AND FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT"
November, 1985
Revised February, 1986

Overview: Bangladesh's Rural Electrification Board (REB) was established by an Act of Government in 1977 and began operation in 1978. Its major purpose is to provide electric services to rural Bangladesh through organizing, financing, and administering the rural electric societies (Palli Bidyut Samities, or "PBS"). The societies are to be autonomous and locally controlled, but the REB was to serve as their banker, prime contractor, and advisor. REB currently overseas 33 PBSs who in turn buy their power from the government owned Power Development Board (PDB).

US Assistance: AID has funded 17 PBSs in RE Phase I & II. AID funding for RE III is expected to provide commodities for an "intensification" of services provided by the existing AID funded PBSs as well as provide Technical Assistance (TA) to the REB and the AID and non-AID funded PBSs.

This report represents the partial findings of a five person multi-disciplinary team requested by USAID to assess the progress of the RE Program in Bangladesh.

The Purpose and Methodology of the Evaluation: The purpose of this evaluation was to analyze project progress to date. The results of this assessment are to be used in the implementation for an anticipated Phase III of the RE program in Bangladesh, beginning FY 1987.

Findings:

1. Management System

   A. The initial organization of the PBSs by REB has been excellent. The REB has an excellent reputation among government officials and the public in general and, therefore, has little difficulty working with government agencies at all levels.

   B. REB is thinly staffed and although the training of REB and PBS staff has been very good, additional training needs to be given for problems which arise that are out of the ordinary; i.e., training for PBS personnel in operation and maintenance techniques for electric plant equipment. PBS staff also need to be trained in handling emergency situations, particularly in the area of restoring service where there has been equipment failure.

C. Members rights have been effectively addressed in RE I and RE II, and member participation in PBS's activities has been excellent.

- Communication between PBS staff and members of the PBS could be strengthened by increasing the frequency of meetings and encouraging greater member participation.

- Studies could be performed to find out how small power users can be encouraged to more effectively utilize electricity.

- Staff retention is a problem in rural PBSs, especially in key technical and managerial levels.

- Incentives need to be made available including higher salaries, better benefits, and performance bonuses.

2. System Planning and Engineering

- PDB is scheduled to have adequate generating capacity by January, 1987. However, there is some uncertainty associated with this goal in that the load is growing faster than forecasted, and questions have been raised about the feasibility of some proposed units.

- There is a need for more attention to be focused on customer characteristics in load forecasting at the PBS level.

- Material handling and quality assurance needs to be improved.

- More stringent specifications needed on electrical equipment given the harsh operating environment.

- REB has engineering capabilities to implement RE III. A smooth transition between RE II and RE III is critical for maintaining private sector firms for RE III.

3. RE Tariffs and Energy Sector Pricing

1. RE is primarily a substitute for petroleum products. Electricity prices are subsidized, while petroleum prices are significantly above world market prices, which gives an artificial advantage to electricity use.

Government pricing policies should attempt to move energy prices toward equivalency.

To encourage more efficient electrical use: the PDB bulkpower rate tariff should be productive uses in order to smooth curve loads.

2. The financial condition of PBSs varies greatly. Four PBSs have positive operating margins, while nine have negative operating margins.

REB needs to re-evaluate its requirements that all PBSs be financially self-sustaining after five years. However, after realistic goals are set, they need to be adhered to.

PBSs could raise tariffs without losing customers because alternative energy sources are so expensive.

4. Technical Assistance (TA)

- TA has been excellent and will continue for several years. Changes in TA contractors should be made gradually, over a period of one year to 18 months.

- REB needs to evaluate its use of TAs and concentrate on institution building with TA help rather than using TAs as staff additions.

- RE III will require three additional positions over present levels in the areas of maintenance and repair, material handling, and an additional financial analyst.

- The most critical areas for TA in RE III are in the areas of material management, management and finance, and operations and maintenance.

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Do not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
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USAID/EGYPT
MID-TERM EVALUATION REPORT
IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS PROJECT
(263-0132)

Background: This project aims to assist the GOE in improving the operating efficiency of the irrigation system, by strengthening the planning, operations and maintenance capabilities of the Ministry of Irrigation (MOI). The project goal is to improve control of the Nile River waters for agricultural irrigation.

The initial Project Agreement was signed in 1981 and included five components with total project funding estimated at $42 million. By far the largest component is a construction program to rehabilitate and replace damaged and obsolete irrigation structures. The other components are a set of related institution building activities including support for a MOI Project Preparation Unit (PPU) to perform feasibility analyses; in-service training for MOI staff; the North Sifta Feasibility Study, to develop a replicable model for redesign of existing irrigation systems; and the Gharbia Study, to develop a replicable plan for improving the operation and maintenance (O&M) of irrigation systems.

The project was amended in 1984 to expand the structural replacement program and to add three components: support for the Water Research Center (WRC), to continue research activities initiated under the Egypt Water Use Project (EWUP); the Regional Irrigation Improvement Project (RIIP) to apply EWUP research results in a regional program for improved irrigation management; and a telemetry project to institute electronic data collection and analysis for improved water control. The total project authorization was increased to $135 million.

Purpose of the Evaluation: This is a mid-project evaluation intended to review overall progress toward EOPS and to provide guidance for strengthening project implementation. Since the structural replacement program was recently evaluated, the current evaluation is intended to focus on the other, institutional development components of the project.

Key Questions: The scope of work calls for the evaluation team to assess the quality and effectiveness of inputs; the quality and replicability of project outputs; the implications of a complex umbrella project such as IMS for USAID monitoring and management; and the potential for, and financial implications of, nation-wide replication of some of the IMS project components. The scope of work also requires the team to address the extent to which the current project has incorporated the work of EWUP.

Methodology: The evaluation team reviewed relevant project documents, interviewed USAID and MOI project officials, and made field trips to Tanta and Minya to visit project sites and interview field-level MOI personnel.

Date this summary prepared: November 27, 1988

Findings: Project inputs have generally been provided in an adequate manner. With the exception of the Gharbia O&M project, technical assistance has been well received and commodities provided under the original agreement are mostly in country and in use. Training activities - both in-country and in the U.S. - are proceeding on schedule. The GOE has provided key project counterpart staff to direct the various project components. However, the MOI's difficulty in acquiring and retaining qualified engineering staff, owing to low levels of remuneration, has had a negative impact on implementation, particularly in the case of the PPU and telemetry components which require highly skilled technical personnel. A brief summary of the status of the major project components follows.

The PPU (Project Preparation Unit) has fulfilled several of its objectives: it has conducted a variety of feasibility studies of international standards, instituted a staff training program, installed data-processing facilities and collected basic data. However, there are no formal screening procedures for feasibility study proposals. The PPU has been torn between its dual objectives of project preparation and training, with priority generally given to operational needs. Training activities are, however, essential to reduce its dependence on expatriate technical assistance.

The North Zifta study is nearing completion, but is unlikely to provide a replicable model for improvements to the irrigation system as originally envisioned. This is primarily owing to the selection of the study area, which, because it is reasonably well served by irrigation and drainage facilities already, will not benefit significantly from system redesign. Data on potential benefits are also sufficiently unreliable to cast doubt on the study's findings. However, specific irrigation designs developed by the study merit further consideration.

The Gharbia O&M study was completed a year ago, but requires additional work to relate the general O&M functions described in the report to conditions in Gharbia Directorate. Other problems were absence of a step-by-step plan for implementation, a lack of involvement of the MOI Directorate responsible for implementing the O&M plan. These problems must be promptly addressed in order to proceed with procurement and complete the activities in a timely manner.

The Training and Manpower Development component has provided in-service training to 600 MOI engineers and technicians since June 1982. The quality of the training courses appears very good, but further follow-up of trainees is necessary to fully determine their impact. Consideration should be given to expansion of this activity into a national irrigation training institute.

The RIIP and WRC will not achieve the target for improving irrigation systems on 40-50,000 feddans by July 1987. A fundamental difficulty has been the delay in amending the Project Agreement to incorporate these new components and in the arrival of the consultants to assist in developing a strategy for transforming the EWUP research approach into a regional production program. Moreover, the lack of coordination between MOA and MOI field-level staff is likely to hinder the effective implementation of these project components. Initial activities under RIIP have begun, however, and now that the consultant team is in place on both RIIP and WRC activities, the pace of implementation should improve.

The telemetry component is a good example of donor collaboration. It is on schedule and within budget. However, a serious problem is the lack of skilled Egyptian staff assigned to the project. Unless the MOI can assign adequate, qualified staff immediately, it will not have trained personnel to operate the sophisticated equipment once the TA contractor completes its installation.

Overall, the IMS project is contributing to a more functional institutional structure within the MOI. However, progress has been slower than planned, and the project will not achieve all of its targets within the specified time-frame, which did not make adequate allowance for the lengthy processes of institutional development, A approvals, and contracting procedures. Though the team did not focus on the question depth, in its opinion, the umbrella approach is a reasonable one, given the linkages between individual project components and the advantages in terms of funding and administrative flexibility.

Recommendations: The report recommends that the Project be extended to provide adequate time for achievement of planned outputs. It also recommends that USAID and MOI explore ways to resolve the MOI's difficulty in attracting qualified engineering staff. The project should also attempt to improve field-level coordination of MOI and MCA staff through the RIIP and WRC.

The report makes several recommendations specific to individual project components The most important among these are that USAID and the MOI should not proceed with the design and construction phases of the North Zifta project; they should take immediate steps to complete and to utilize the Gharbia O&M study; and they should consider providing additional inputs for expansion of the in-service training program into a national irrigation training institute.

Lessons Learned: The major lesson is the need to be realistic in formulating assumptions underlying institutional development projects. The team cited several project assumptions which have not proved correct (e.g., the ability of the MOI to recruit needed staff effectively), as well as several implicit assumptions for project success which were never addressed in the project design, regarding the level of institutional change required. The institutional building objectives of IMS have been hindered by the MOI's shortage of qualified engineering manpower. More explicit attention should be given at the project design and negotiation stages as to how project components which require highly skilled manpower for successful implementation can be adequately staffed, given institutional constraints.

A second lesson is the need for screening or prefeasibility studies to precede costly feasibility and design efforts. In the case of North Zifta, the feasibility study for redesign and improvement of the irrigation system did not yield evidence of adequate benefits to farmers to justify implementation. Some form of screening process to determine the appropriate selection of the study area and to estimate the approximate magnitude of potential benefits could have reduced the time and resources expended on this study.

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USAID/EGYPT: SUMMARY EVALUATION
NUTRITION EDUCATION IN HEALTH CENTERS PROJECT
(263-0042 Subactivity)

Project Purpose: The Nutrition Education in Health Centers Project (NEHCP) was implemented in two phases, beginning in 1979, by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Nutrition Institute of the Ministry of Health (MOH). The general objective of the project was to improve child health and survival, through a program to educate mothers in basic health, nutrition and child care. The program, modelled after successful CRS projects in Morocco and Tunisia, planned to accomplish this by training nurse teachers in government health centers to provide nutrition education to mothers. Phase I was a pilot program covering 165 centers. Phase II aimed to expand the program to 1400 centers. Phase II also aimed to incorporate growth monitoring activities and institutionalize nutrition education in the Egyptian public health care system.

Evaluation Purpose and Methodology: Several internal and external evaluations were undertaken during the course of project implementation. This final evaluation was carried out by an external consultant, who was given the task of consolidating and integrating information collected during previous evaluation efforts. The purpose of the evaluation was twotold: to assist in decisions regarding whether and how to use unspent funds remaining in the project, and to identify lessons for the forthcoming Child Survival Project.

Specifically, the evaluation consultant was tasked with:
(i) evaluating the adequacy of project design and implementation;
(ii) assessing the cost effectiveness of the project approach;
(iii) identifying aspects of the NEHCP that should be replicated and avoided in future projects. Methods employed in the evaluation included a review of project documents; interviews with CRS, USAID, Nutrition Institute and MOH staff; field visits to selected NEHCP centers; and discussions of the project with participants at the First Regional Conference on Diarrheal Diseases held in Cairo in April 1986.

Key Findings:

(a) Coverage: The NEHCP was officially instituted in 534 of the MOH health centers, compared with a target of 1400 centers. (There are a total of 2800 MOH centers in Egypt.) The program reached only 30% of the target number of centers, and very few centers received all planned program components. Most of the key components for a complete health center program were operational in 50-80% of project centers. The single most important component - regular nutrition education classes - was implemented in about 342, or 64% of the official NEHCP centers. Growth monitoring was only partially implemented. Scales and growth charts were only found in some centers (scales in 65%, charts in 50%, both in 39%). Only 47% of centers maintained charts on a regular basis.

Date this summary prepared: August 14, 1986

(b) Effects on Health Center Staff and Mothers: The project did have some modest impacts in this area. There is evidence from previous evaluations that the NEHCP has increased nutrition knowledge among health clinic nurses. This is an important achievement because these health professionals can reinforce nutrition messages provided through other channels, such as the mass media. There is also weak evidence that the project has had limited but positive effects on the knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) of mothers. These effects include breast feeding of colostrum to newborn infants; earlier introduction of supplemental weaning foods; more appropriate use of PL 480 Title II foods; and greater use of indigenous weaning foods. The usefulness of these findings is, however, limited by major methodological deficiencies in data collection efforts.

(c) Institutionalization: There has been some limited progress towards institutionalization of nutrition education in the MOH. MOH staff at various levels are now more aware and knowledgeable about nutrition. The project has laid the groundwork for the Nutrition Institute to develop an improved capacity for evaluation of nutrition programs. Some capital equipment has been acquired and distributed. Perhaps most importantly, the project has created a willingness within the MOH to integrate nutrition education into the existing health service delivery system. Nevertheless, major insitutionalization outputs were the not accomplished. The primary strategy for institutionalizing the program at the governorate level, the establishment of nutrition cells, was not realized. While several other specific outputs were achieved, most notably the Project Committee, these did not lead to the anticipated degree of institutionalization.

(d) Evaluation: The project included an ambitious evaluation plan, which was only partially realized. As a result of these shortfalls, there is no information on program impact on child health and survival. With the benefit of hindsight, the evaluation plan was totally unrealistic. The proposed impact evaluation depended on implementation of an accurate and complete growth monitoring system, an enormous undertaking requiring years of effort and substantial resources. The NEHCP did not allow sufficient time and funds for this effort. Moreover, evaluation efforts suffered from a lack of baseline data, inadequate testing for statistical significance, and serious biases in sample selection.

Conclusions: The NEHCP Phase II fell far short of attaining its planned outputs. While the Phase I effort exceeded its planned coverage, Phase II reached only 30% of target health centers. It also failed to institutionalize the activity, since it did not establish governorate level nutrition centers as orginally anticipated. These outcomes are particularly surprising, since the successful experience of a large pilot such as Phase I should have facilitated good planning and implementation. The evaluation concluded that faulty design, rather than poor implementation or unforeseen external events, was the major reason for the project's failure to achieve its objectives.

Design Failures: In the evaluator's opinion, the project design was overambitious, unrealistic and misfocused. It underestimated the time necessary to accomplish outputs requiring major bureacratic changes, such as establishment of incentive payments and nutriton cells, and development of a standardized growth chart. Moreover, the evaluation pointed out that, in moving from a pilot effort to a national program, there are important trade-offs between extensiveness and intensity.

The NEHCP made a major strategic error in opting for quantity, not quality. Although the first phase program had achieved its quantitative targets, there was little evidence of achievement of qualitative objectives.

The design underestimated the complexity of the project. Phase II introduced major modifications to the original project design, including organizational changes necessary to institutionalize the project, incorporation of growth monitoring systems, and an ambitious evaluation program. However, the project lacked a systematic implementation plan for these complex tasks. Nor did it provide the resources required for their realization. For example, introduction of growth monitoring has major clinic supply and personnel training implications, but the design only called for the MOH to purchase scales and charts, and did not allocate funds for this activity.

Implementation: The project was subject to several major implementation delays. Moreover, the Nutrition Institute, a research center outside the line operations of the MOH, was not the appropriate implementing agency for the project. Other implementation problems included discontinuity of CRS personnel, delays in incentive payments, and difficulty in achieving long-term, full-time GOE management. Nevertheless, the evaluation concluded that, in the face of a faulty design and some unanticipated difficulties, CRS and Nutrition Institute managers deserved credit for their implementation efforts.

Cost-Effectiveness: The project used Nurse Teachers as agents to change mothers' behavior. There are more cost-effective single channels such as television for changing mothers' behavior. However, multiple channels are generally more effective than single channels, and in the long-run, mass media messages need reinforcement from health professionals to sustain behavioral change.

Recommendations: The evaluation recommended that the training and motivation of local-level health providers in nutrition, and maintenance of some focal nutrition activity in health centers, should be continued under the upcoming Child Survival project. The Nutrition Institute should establish an evaluation and research section to evaluate nutrition components of the Child Survival project; to undertake a systematic operations research program to improve individual nutrition messages; and to evaluate their impacts and interactive effects with other information channels. Finally, every effort should be made to institutionalize the NEHCP into MOH health service delivery systems. The evaluation report suggested that this was an appropriate use for remaining NEHCP grant funds, to minimize the gap in nutrition activities until the Child Survival program is underway.

Lessons Learned: The design did not allow sufficient time and resources for achievement of complex objectives. It underestimated the complexity of moving from a pilot design to a national effort and making major modifications to the pilot design. Concentration on making a smaller number of centers more effective might have been more feasible and appropriate.

Secondly, project implementation was too dependent upon the dynamism and organizational skills of the project director, but he had many other responsibilities which prevented him from full-time work in the project. A realistic assessment should be made at project start of the time key managers can comm. , and back-up strategies should be planned.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
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USAID/Egypt
Agricultural Management Development Project
(263-0116)

Project Description. This project was initiated to address the problem of management shortcomings in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in Egypt. The Ministry is a huge operation, with over 110,000 employees scattered throughout Egypt; most of those in managerial positions have technical training and competence rather than management skills. The project aims to assist the Center for Agricultural Management Development (CAMD) in developing the institutional capacity to conduct an ongoing management training program for MOA mid-level managers and to perform analyses of management problems in public sector agricultural institutions. The project goal is to contribute to increased agricultural production by improving the MOA's overall efficiency.

Evaluation Purpose and Methodology. This final evaluation was undertaken in May and June, 1986, to assess the effectiveness of the project in enhancing the performance of managers in the MOA. The principal sources of data were (1) a survey of a non-random sample of 143 former CAMD trainees (2) a series of interviews with MOA and USAID officials (3) a review of documents relating to the CAMD and (4) observation of training sessions. The evaluation sought to evaluate the Center's effectiveness to date, as well as to assess its future prospects and sustainability.

Findings and Conclusions. Since the mid-term evaluation in 1983, the larger part of the Center's facilities have been completed. It is expected that they will all be completed by the end of June 1986. The CAMD has conducted 72 sessions of the Basic Course, 21 sessions of the advanced course, and a number of special courses. Approximately 1400 individuals, or an estimated 10 per cent of the pool of mid-level MOA managers, have been trained since 1980. Courses are short-term, lasting two or three weeks and primarily emphasize method in the role of manager, rather than the communication of technical information.

The overwhelming majority of former trainees who have passed through the Center's various courses (basic, advanced and special), and who were interviewed during the evaluation, were satisfied with the quality of training provided. Trainees considered the method of teaching, with its emphasis on discussion, problem-solving and the work process, to be stimulating. For the most part, the trainees perceived the instructors as competent. There appears to be a correlation between trainees' perceptions of instructor ability and their perceptions of what they acquired from the training course. One shortcoming is that there do not seem to be enough case studies based on Egyptian agricultural experience. Some of the trainees remarked on the gap between the content of the instruction and the reality of their jobs.

SUMMARY

Date this summary prepared: July 9, 1986

Almost all trainees interviewed felt that participation in the training program had improved their effectivenes on the job and won them increased respect from their supervisors. However, a consistent problem has been for the trainees to make proper use of their training once they have returned to their jobs. Interviewed afterwards, many of them felt that there were many obstacles to the full implementation of the new techniques they learn in actual work situations. Senior MOA officials who commented on this agreed that the process of accumulation of new work styles would necessarily be slow, but that middle management was the place to start. Many mid-level managers, on the other hand, felt that it would be easier to implement their new ideas if their supervisors were aware of the content of the training program. It should be noted that most of the respondents reported that other colleagues had attended the training sessions so that they were not, as individuals, isolated.

Some areas of the Center structure and training program need further development. The research and evaluation unit has not achieved its full potential. The Center has been only marginally involved in the analysis of management problems within the Ministry and other public sector agricultural institutions. Needs assessment and follow-up activities are still overly routinized, despite the recommendation in the 1983 evaluation that these areas be further strengthened. Some efforts were begun, but there has been no follow through. Job responsibilities and lines of authority are sometimes uncertain and unstable, thus making it more difficult to ensure the continuity of quality programs. There is no ongoing case development effort.

To some extent, the Center has been isolated from mainstream MOA activities. It lacks a strategy that is integrated into overall Ministry objectives and priorities. Development of such a strategy would help to determine the types of training that should be provided, and which groups should be targeted for training. It would help to shift the emphasis gradually from individual development towards development of the organizational structure of the Ministry, and to enhance the long-term impact of the training program. Other issues relating to the future of the Center could also be more easily resolved if the MOA were to develop a long-term strategy for the Center in relation to the agricultural plan.

The Center itself enjoys good support from the higher level officials in the Ministry of Agriculture. The Center's immediate survival appears assured. After the project ends, the status of the Center is likely to change from that of a "project"; it is anticipated that it will be incorporated within the MOA structure under the Chairman of the Department of Management and Financial Affairs. This unit also has responsibility for the other training programs under the Ministry's auspices, but by reporting directly to the Chairman, the CAMD would occupy a special position. The Ministry also plans to provide a budget for the CAMD, that appears adequate to meet local operating costs.

There is some discussion regarding provision by the CAMD of training courses in research management for the various agencies involved in the National Agricultural Research Program (NARP), on a fee levying basis. It seems likely that in the immediate future there will be increased interest in training higher level officials from the Agricultural Research Center and other MOA agencies that will receive funding through the NARP.

Recommendations. Key recommendations are listed below. More detailed recommendations are elaborated in the report.

(a) There is a need for an overall strategy regarding the role of the Center in relation to the MOA's agricultural plan, and to the overall assessment of training needs within the MOA. The MOA should also consider expanding the Center to increase its impact.

(b) The Center should continue to emphazize training for MOA middle managers, especially those outside Cairo, while redirecting some attention to managers of research programs and others at a higher level. MOA budgetary support is necessary to make this continued commitment to middle management training possible.

(c) The Center should continue to keep abreast of current ideas in the field of management. This will require some institutional support for contact between the CAMD management and trainers and other management institutions inside and outside Egypt. This means, among other things, access to foreign exchange through the MOA, USAID or other donor agency.

(d) The Center should devote renewed efforts to developing instructional materials and case studies drawn from the Egyptian agricultural experience.

(e) More effort should be devoted to improving follow-up of former trainees, since this is an integral part of the training strategy.

(f) The internal organization of the Center needs to be clearly defined so that tasks and responsibilities are unambiguously laid out; at the same time, the channels of communication between the Center and the rest of the Ministry need to be multistranded and open.

(g) USAID should encourage use of the Center by the NARP, but this should not detract from core management training activities. USAID should also consider specific requests for further training for Center staff.

Lessons Learned. Establishing a training center to revamp management procedures in a mammoth organization like the MOA is no easy task. This evaluation has drawn attention to some major accomplishments, and also some shortcomings. The real test will be in several years, to see if, in fact, the Center has survived after direct USAID funding ceases. At the moment the Center and the management improvement program it represents seem likely to survive, but perhaps at the cost of becoming routinized. It remains to be seen whether the Center can maintain sufficient critical distance from the MOA if it is, in fact, administratively integrated within it; and if it can not only survive, but make a real contribution to Egyptian agricultural development.

In the final analysis, the project should be judged on its contribution to increased agricultural production. This is virtually impossible to do, however, because one cannot isolate the impact of management improvements. Quite legitimately, this project focuses on managers in the government bureaucracy rather than on farmers. It must be remembered that these managers play a supporting role to the farmers and their contribution to agricultural production is only indirect. Ultimately, improved production depends on the farmers.

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USAID/EGYPT: BASIC EDUCATION PROJECT (263-0139)
SECOND ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT, SEPTEMBER 1985

Background: The Basic Education Project aims to assist the GOE in expanding enrollments of rural Egyptian children, particularly girls, and to increase the efficacy of basic education in Egypt. The $85 million project was initiated in 1981 and comprises three major components:

(i) construction of basic education schools (grades 1-9) in ten governorates selected for their low educational enrollments, targeting under-served areas. The project is expected to increase enrollments of six-year olds in target areas by 9%.

(ii) provision of educational equipment to basic education schools to strengthen the teaching of practical and science subjects.

(iii) provision of technical assistance to the Ministry of Education (MOE) to conduct a series of studies to improve the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of basic education.

Evaluation Purpose and Methodology: A life-of-project evaluation contract was awarded to Creative Associates Inc. in 1982 in order to assess the impact of USAID contributions to the Egyptian Basic Education program. The current evaluation report is the second annual report of a planned four year study. The evaluation utilizes data collected from school enrollment records and from sample surveys of households in the new school communities. School observation visits and interviews with headmasters, teachers and MOE officials provided complementary information. The evaluation is essentially a longitudinal effort and seeks to build on data in the first annual report. It comprises four separate but related studies:

(i) analysis of enrollment data to assess the net impact of the new schools on enrollment -- the "extensive" study;

(ii) a survey of households in the new-school communities to determine factors affecting school participation and persistence -- the "intensive" study;

(iii) an assessment of the adequacy and utilization of new educational equipment provided under the project;

(iv) an assessment of the implementation and impact of the technical assistance contract in support of the basic education program.

Findings and Conclusions:

(i) School construction component: The second-year evaluation report confirms the first-year finding that the project schools are having an important impact on enrollment, particularly on female enrollment. The new schools are drawing new children into the school system and increasing Grade 1 enrollments. The new schools are also "holding" children who may otherwise have dropped out owing to the distance to neighbouring schools, thereby increasing enrollments in Grades 2 to 6.

Date this summary prepared: 12/10/85

SUMMARY

The "extensive" study projects total enrollments in neighbouring schools in the absence of the new schools. It then compares these with actual enrollments for all schools in the area after the new schools opened. The difference is the net impact of the new schools. The average 12.9% net increase in Grade 1 enrollment, estimated for the two-year period since the opening of the new schools in the sample, substantially exceeds the project target of 9%. A detailed breakdown of percentage enrollment increases by grade and sex follows:

	Grade 1	Grade 2-6
Boys	11%	5.5%
Girls	16%	-8.1%
Overall	12.9%	6.4%

The study estimates that 64 new students (34 boys and 30 girls) were added to each new school site over the two-year period, as a result of increased Grade 1 enrollments. Moreover, 90 students were added to Grades 2-6 as a result of decreased dropout in these grades during this two year period.

There is also some evidence that the more rural and isolated the site, the greater the impact of the new school, since the potential pool for first-grade enrollment is larger. The evaluation points out that new schools in isolated rural villages may be underutilized in the upper grades for a time. However, they may themselves act to stimulate chronic low enrollment rates, and are more likely to result in major net increases in enrollments (particularly in female enrollments) than new schools located in more modernized villages and towns. This conclusion supports the current project strategy of targeting under served rural areas, as more likely to meet MOE goals of universal education than building in areas of immediate need alone.

The findings of the "intensive" study confirm at the community level the project's impact on enrollment. Following the opening of new primary schools in the four sample villages, all six-year old boys in the household sample were found to be enrolled in school, and only 5% of six-year old girls remained unenrolled. This contrasts dramatically with 89% of six-year old boys and 49% of six-year old girls enrolled in Grade 1 three years prior to the opening of the new schools. Girls rates of age group enrollment in particular have shown phenomenal increases following the opening of the new schools. This is impressive statistical evidence of the rapid impact of the new schools on enrollment.

The study also concludes that the MOE focus should be on increasing Grade 1 enrollments, since once children have enrolled, relatively high percentages complete both Grades 3 and 6, presumed levels of functional literacy. Girls constitute the largest unenrolled group, and their initial enrollment should be given the highest priority. However, the report advocates caution in considering single-sex schools as a long-term solution to increasing female enrollments.

The intensive study also points out the significant impact of distance from school facilities on the initial enrollment of children in schools. At one kilometer, five times as many children enroll as stay home; at two kilometers and further, equal numbers go to school and stay home. These tendencies are exaggerated for girls. The report's findings indicate that the project criterion of a two kilometer minimum distance between schools is generally sound. However, in certain instances the "distance threshhold" may be significantly lower, and the two kilometer project guideline should not be strictly adhered to where benefits in terms of increased enrollment and/or persistence appear significant.

A final important issue raised by the evaluation regarding enrollment is that the current expansion of primary/basic education facilities will lead to tremendous pressure on preparatory level facilities in the next decade. The MOE needs to plan now for expansion of these facilities.

(ii) Commodities Program: This project component provides teaching aids and educational equipment to Basic Education schools. The equipment is intended to support Basic Education goals by facilitating practical learning, particularly in the three practical subjects and science.

Overall, the MOE equipment distribution system has worked relatively well, despite some minor problems. Approximately 93% of schools surveyed in 1984 had received some USAID-funded equipment. However, fewer than 10% had received their full allocation, underlining the need for continued assistance in order to provide sufficient equipment to all schools.

With the exception of agriculture teachers, the majority of teachers viewed the type and quality of equipment as appropriate, but felt that the supply of equipment was inadequate for their teaching needs. The evaluation team supported this view, stating that more equipment was necessary to permit students to use the equipment themselves. The majority of the agriculture teachers were dissatisfied with the equipment, which did not include items relevant to their curriculum or sufficient hand tools.

In the evaluation team's opinion, the equipment provided is for priority subject areas and is having an impact in changing the instructional emphasis in schools. More than half the teachers interviewed had recently received training in practical course instruction. However, the team felt that there is a need not only for further in-service training for teachers and headmasters, but also for other innovative mechanisms to improve instructional techniques. Finally, the evaluation identified the lack of workshop facilities in many schools and the lack of a budget for the repair and replacement of educational equipment as important constraints to optimal utilization of equipment. USAID and MOE should take steps to address these problems.

(iii) Technical Assistance (TA): The project provides for a host-country time-and-effort contract for provision of technical expertise to conduct studies of high priority to the MOE. These were anticipated to include studies in curriculum design, teacher training, and educational planning and economics. The Academy for Educational Development Inc. was awarded the contract.

From the very beginning, the technical assistance component suffered from a series of bureaucratic delays that caused work under the contract to slip increasingly behind schedule. The TA activity is now seriously behind schedule and may not be completed as planned within the contract period. Moreover, virtually no effort has been made to implement the recommendations of those TA reports that have been completed and accepted. Two completed reports have been shelved, and even a third, which was enthusiatically received, has not seen any follow-up action.

The evaluation concludes that under these circumstances it is premature to assess the likely impact, if any, of TA. It recommends that current priority be given to implementation, and that the Technical Secretariat be made responsible for developing a system to utilize recommendations in completed reports. The evaluation also recommends translation of all reports into Arabic. Finally, it suggests USAID and the MOE hold discussions to resolve the problems surrounding the technical assistance program, and to determine the need for continued support in this area.

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USAID/EGYPT
PHASE III MID-TERM EVALUATION
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING STUDIES PROJECT (263-0061)

Project Purpose: The Development Planning Studies Project (DPSP) aims to strengthen the development planning and implementation process in Egypt. The project was initiated in 1978 to promote collaboration between the Egyptian academic community and GOE Ministries in applied research related to the design, analysis and implementation of technical development programs. The Development Research and Technological Planning Center (DRTPC) was established as an autonomous unit within Cairo University (CU) in 1979 to provide a permanent institutional framework for the project. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was selected as the U.S. counterpart institution to assist the DRTPC in working towards these objectives.

Purpose of the Evaluation: This is an interim evaluation of the third phase of the project (1984-87), intended to provide guidance for the final eighteen months of project implementation and to assess the potential for the Center to achieve institutional and financial viability by the current PACD, March 1987.

Methodology: The evaluation report notes the difficulties inherent in the evaluation of analytical efforts and of the institutionalization of capacity to conduct analytical studies. The principal approach utilized by the team was a series of interviews with DRTPC Executive Committee members and staff, CU faculty, GOE "client" agencies, MIT faculty and administrative staff and AID personnel. The team conducted a superficial review of research reports to assure themselves that these were of acceptable quality, but they had neither the time nor the expertise for a detailed review of the quality of DRTPC research. However, they recommended such a review be undertaken. They also reviewed annual reports of the DRTPC and financial information on contractual income and expenditures.

Findings and Conclusions: In the team's assessment, the project has successfully demonstrated a model for University-Government collaboration in the application of expert scientific and technological skills to real, current Egyptian problems. This is a major accomplishment of the project.

In the team's assessment, the project has made considerable progress at the purpose level, i.e., in assisting GOE Ministries and companies in providing solutions to important practical problems. Central to this success was the establishment of effective interdisciplinary research teams from two prestigious U.S. and Egyptian universities. CU-MIT research teams have worked for a decade, in close association with technical experts from Egyptian client organizations, on a number of important problem areas -- water resource management, transportation

SUMMARY

Date this summary prepared: December 23, 1985

planning, plastics production, energy conservation and planning, etc. The studies have identified and explored a number of important policy issues and suggested innovations of great potential economic importance. From reports of ministries, it would appear that a number of these innovations have been adopted and have resulted in substantial cost savings. Based on the perceived value of the Center's work by client agencies, it is viable and institutionalized.

The DRTPC has also contributed to improved understanding of development issues and improved planning and implementation of development programs. This is a long-term process, and one that is difficult to quantify. However, based on anecdotal evidence, the Center has been unexpectedly effective in achieving these goal level objectives. Specific examples cited by the report include DRTPC research on allocation of the Nile waters and on improved efficiency in steel production and electric power generation. The team noted that DRTPC research has focused on technological areas with a high potential economic pay-off. In summary, the evaluation confirms the overall value of the Center and suggests that, conceptually and practically, this is an important and sound project.

The evaluation also notes that the work of the Center has had a significant educational impact at CU. It has involved about 80 graduate students in CU/MIT projects each year and contributed to a substantial number of graduate degrees. It has also led to the introduction of new courses and in some instances to major changes (e.g., in electrical engineering) in the undergraduate and graduate curricula. The Center has also provided training in research for faculty members through 26 post doctoral fellowships.

This assessment of the Center's achievements, however, is tempered by the team's assessment that full institutional and financial viability is not achievable within the current phase and that progress has been less significant in developing capacity for research administration. This has been partly the result of funding delays and interruptions, particularly in 1983-84, and of changes in leadership.

Considerable progress has been made towards developing administrative capacity in areas such as accounting, publications, etc. However, despite AID's emphasis in the third phase of the DPSP on diversification of sources of funding, additional efforts are needed in marketing DRTPC services. In part, of course, this reflects the lack of a climate in Egypt which encourages contracting or seeking such analytical support as the DRTPC can provide, but still, much work remains to be done in marketing of research services to the GOE and donor agencies. There is also room for improvement in certain research support services, especially in library and computer facilities, and in attracting research teams in new areas.

MIT has made an important contribution to the project's success. MIT research collaboration has generally been very highly valued, although on a few occasions, MIT was unable to provide appropriate expertise. The evaluation team however noted the relatively high cost of MIT involvement. (MIT expenditures are twice those of the DRTPC). With the analytical strength of MIT deeply committed to the DRTPC, there has been little apparent need to stress development of local management capacity for quality control, but this capacity will be needed in the future.

Since 1983, AID has encouraged more rapid progress towards self-reliance of the DRTPC. The Center has had some success in diversifying sources of funding. Funding from Egyptian contractual sources increased

from L.E. 194,000 in 1981-82 to L.E. 422,000 in 1984-85. While the percentage of non-USAID funds coming in to the Center has shown a healthy increase and currently constitutes 56% of the DRTPC's income (excluding MIT expenditures), this is still considerably less than the L.E. 1.2 million needed for self-sufficiency. However, the team considered the targets for local revenue generation in the 1983 Strategic Operating Plan for the DRTPC to be unreasonably optimistic.

USAID emphasis on eventual financial self-sufficiency has thus resulted in considerable progress towards independence of the Center. However, the team felt that overemphasis on commercialization of DRTPC services has led to a shift away from longer-term efforts directed at economically more important technological issues to shorter-term efforts to explore more limited problems. The team also noted that AID itself has the potential to utilize DRTPC services more extensively and that many sections of AID that could profitably use the services of the DRTPC are unaware of their availability.

Recommendations: The report's principal recommendation is that the current phase of assistance be succeeded by a five-year, follow-on project that would be the final phase of USAID institutional development support and that should result in the firm establishment of an independent DRTPC. The focus of USAID assistance should be on research management. It is recommended the program emphasize long-term technology planning studies chosen by the GOE in collaboration with USAID, and continue subsidies for locally contracted short-term studies with a declining, matching formula. In the team's assessment, a final phase of assistance along these lines would help to ensure the full institutionalization of the DRTPC.

The report also suggests that a follow-on project consider replication of the DRTPC model with another university in Egypt and/or elsewhere in the Middle East. However, care should be taken to avoid diffusing the small existing market for applied technical research.

The report recommends that to meet changing technical assistance (TA) needs, TA in different areas be provided by different sources, and that unlike the current MIT contract, these TA contracts should be competitively awarded. The team saw the need for different kinds of TA to be provided in research collaboration, in research management (especially marketing), and in replication of the model. Careful attention should, however, be given to designing the transition to a new mode of TA to avoid disruption of Center activities and dispersal of ongoing research teams.

Finally, the report emphasizes the need to increase the awareness and utilization of DRTPC services by USAID. However, the team also notes the Center's concern that USAID utilization of its services should not detract from its credibility with GOE client Ministries and companies.

Lessons Learned: A critical factor in the success of this project appears to have been the selection of first-rate local and U.S. counterpart academic institutions. However, with the benefit of hindsight, more emphasis should have been given both in design and in the initial stages of implementation to strengthening research administration and marketing, which are essential to the successful institutionalization of the applied research process. Further, institutionalization efforts could not be completed within the planned time period. Such efforts need considerable time to mature, and project designs should provide a more realistic time frame for accomplishing institution-building objectives.

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USAID/EGYPT
Mineral, Petroleum and Groundwater Assessment Program
(Project No. 263-0105)

Project Description: The Mineral, Petroleum and Groundwater Assessment Program (MPGAP) aims to gather basic geotechnical information and to develop improved means of disseminating this information to potential investors, in order to increase foreign and domestic investment in the development of Egypt's natural resources. The project is implemented by four agencies: the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), the Egyptian Geological Survey and Mining Authority (EGSMA), the Desert Research Institute (DRI) and the Remote Sensing Center (RSC).

Evaluation Purpose and Methodology: This interim evaluation was intended as a management tool, to assess performance, identify problems and recommend actions to help ensure project success. The evaluation was conducted by five external consultants, including experts in mineral and petroleum geology and remote sensing. The team examined four areas, namely (i) overall project management (ii) contractor performance (iii) information generation and (iv) publication and dissemination of information. The evaluation report was based on a review of project documents, technical reports and interviews of MPGAP agency personnel.

Findings and Conclusions:

(i) Overall Project Management: The framework originally envisioned for overall direction of the project has not been realized. The Coordination Committee chaired by the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT) has not functioned effectively. This has led to a vacuum in overall GOE project coordination that has slowed project progress. The evaluation team considered it of paramount importance to reestablish top-level GOE management of the project.

At the operational level, management of project activities at individual MPGAP agencies ranges from good to excellent. Project staff are competent, knowledgeable, and enthusiastic. The project has stimulated increased cooperation, but there is room for further improvement in information sharing and interagency cooperation. A strong GOE management presence would assist in achieving these objectives.

The GOE management vacuum has to some extent been filled by USAID, which has been too involved in the details of project implementation. This may have inhibited project institution building objectives. The evaluation team felt it was highly desirable to fill the vacancy for a U.S. project coordinator with an individual experienced in management development and information systems. This would relieve USAID of some administrative tasks as well as provide for advisory services to GOE project management, assuming a GOE management role is revived.

Date this summary prepared: July 14, 1986

Delays in procurement of project equipment have set the project behind schedule. The original implementation plan and schedules were unrealistic, and have been revised to reflect procurement delays. Revised schedules appear to be realistic.

(ii) Contractor Performance. The project contracting approach is very different in the petroleum sector on the one hand and the mineral, groundwater and remote sensing (MGRS) sector on the other. In the petroleum sector, the GOE agencies do not implement projects, but rather plan and manage studies performed on a turn-key basis by U.S. contractors. In the MGRS sector, the agencies implement project activities with assistance from a long-term technical assistance contractor, Bendix Field Engineering Corporation.

The team judged the Bendix in-country contract team to be performing a complex task in a creditable manner. Bendix has helped to strengthen institutional capabilities through training and data processing activities, and provided valuable assistance in equipment procurement. However, the team perceived some problems. While the in-country contract team is technically competent, stronger management experience might better serve project objectives. Moreover, inadequate marketing background has limited the contractor's capability to assist EGSMA in developing mineral information packages. Finally, inadequate "cross-cultural" orientation or consultants, trainers and trainees has led to misunderstandings and dissatisfaction with contractor performance and personnel. These problems need to be addressed.

Few difficulties have been encountered to date with contractors in the petroleum sector. Interagency cooperation on the completed aeromagnetic/radiometric survey has been very good. The team did not examine the final report, but the various MPGAP agencies involved in the project judged performance by the contractor, Aeroservice, to be excellent. It is too early to assess contractor performance on other, more recently initiated contracts in the petroleum sector.

(iii) Information Generation. All four agencies face common problems in establishing computerized data bases and data management capabilities. To a large extent, the project has now moved beyond the data collection phase to the conversion of data to information. This is critical to the project purpose, which involves the formation, maintenance and computerization of natural resource data bases. All the agencies need more assistance and training in establishing and managing computer facilities than is currently provided. The team felt that a U.S. Coordinator with a strong management information background could contribute to development of data management capabilities.

EGPC faces a major, long-term task in developing, coding and computerizing data collected over several decades. The task is ongoing and is well-managed. However, the team suggested that the effort underway to digitize logs be discontinued or reduced, since it was unlikely to generate new data or create interest among investors. DRI and RSC activities have been delayed by procurement problems, but DRI has subsequently made good progress. A large volume of data has been collected but has yet to be processed. In the team's assessment, all four agencies require additional time to complete project activities.

(iv) Publication and Dissemination of Information: The adequacy of publications is mixed. The Aeroservice report is excellent, as is evidenced by the sale of parts of the survey to three oil companies. Presentation of mineral packages, however, needs improvement to cater better to the needs of potential investors. No DRI reports have been completed to date under the project, but the team reviewed DRI reports currently under preparation and concluded that DRI has a good reviewing and publication process. RSC, however, has not provided the quality and quantity of Landsat imagery and products originally anticipated, for reasons largely beyond its control.

Dissemination of information is also uneven. The evaluation team judged the EGSMA marketing approach to be extensive and ambitious, but felt it could improve on these efforts by expanding distribution of information and undertaking analyses of the local and world markets for mineral commodities. EGPC dissemination efforts for the Aeroservice report represent an overly passive approach. The team recommended that EGPC not only maintain the information in "open file" status, but adopt a more aggressive marketing strategy.

Key Recommendations: The basic concept of the project remains valid. The project is improving GOE abilities to acquire, organize and disseminate natural resource information. Information generated by the project is likely to attract investors, as is demonstrated by the purchase of project data by three oil companies. Project activities are unlikely, however, to be completed within the current time frame, owing to the complexity of project activities and procurement delays. The evaluation team recommended the project be extended through 1989.

The team recommended that USAID attempt to energize the management structure originally anticipated. In the event that a central role for ASRT is no longer feasible, USAID and the parent Ministries of the MPGAP agencies should work out a new mechanism for effective GOE project coordination and management. The team also recommended recruiting a new U.S. Coordinator with strong management development and information systems expertise. USAID project management should shift back from project implementation to a monitoring, facilitating and consulting role. (Note: USAID does not accept certain of these recommendations.)

The team also recommended that USAID provide technical assistance to EGSMA in analysis of the international mineral market and in development of information packages designed to meet the needs of potential investors.

Lessons Learned:

- o Project implementation plans should be more realistic, and allow sufficient time for equipment procurement. Project designs should also incorporate adequate technical assistance in complex, specialized tasks such as procurement and data systems development.

- o In the absence of strong host-country project management, USAID became overly involved in the details of project implementation. This may have facilitated the rate of implementation, but in the team's perception, inhibited long-term institution-building objectives.

- o Improved orientation of contractor personnel and host-country trainees to both cultural sensitivities and bureaucratic procedures can avoid misunderstandings that can jeopardize project effectiveness.

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USAID/EGYPT
POPULATION ASSISTANCE ASSESSMENT
FEBRUARY 1986

Evaluation Purpose and Methodology:

Over the past decade, USAID has provided substantial assistance to Egyptian efforts to increase family planning practice among Egyptian couples of reproductive age through the Population/Family Planning I Project and its successor, Population/Family Planning II. This assessment was scheduled prior to the preparation of a major Project Amendment for the Population/Family Planning II Project. The purpose was to review the institutional context and effectiveness of the current USAID population assistance program in Egypt and to provide guidance to USAID in identifying priority areas for future support, maximizing program impact and improving program management.

The assessment was conducted by a four person team - two AID/W personnel and two external consultants - in February 1986. The assessment report is based on interviews with over eighty Egyptian Government, USAID, private sector and technical assistance personnel; a review of published materials, project files and financial data; and selected site visits. The report also draws on a background paper prepared prior to the team's arrival, which compiles available information on USAID-assisted subproject activities.

Findings:

Since 1977, USAID has contributed more than US$ 63 million to the Government of Egypt (GOE) program, or about 47 percent of total foreign assistance for population activities. USAID initially funded a range of initiatives, including clinical and management training, biomedical and social science research, construction activities, family planning service delivery, contraceptive commodities, and logistical and administrative improvements. The program supported activities in both the urban and rural areas of Egypt, and gave some emphasis to policy dialogue with national leaders and to the involvement of the private sector.

The 1984 Contraceptive Prevalence Survey indicated a prevalence of contraceptive use of 30 percent of married women of reproductive age, an increase in prevalence from less than five percent in 1960, but only about five percentage points higher than the 1974-75 level. Prevalence data and contraceptive distribution statistics indicate that about three-quarters of Egyptians receive contraceptives or family planning services from the private sector. The successful family planning service initiatives of such private sector organizations as the Family of the Future (FOF) and the Alexandria Family Planning Association (AFPA) indicate the existence of a significant but primarily urban-based demand for family planning services.

SUMMARY

Within the last two years, the GOE has begun to bring more focus to its population program, beginning with the establishment of the National Population Council (NPC), charged with planning, monitoring, and evaluating all population and family planning activities in Egypt. More recently, the Minister of Health has stated plans to create a unit to coordinate the implementation of all family planning activities in the country. However, government policies and programs to implement a coordinated and comprehensive family planning program are still inadequate. The recent decisions and actions of the GOE, and the limited effectiveness of current program activities, suggest that population and family planning activities in Egypt have reached a turning point.

Conclusions:

The assessment team concludes that the following have been the major features of USAID population assistance:

o USAID assistance has been characterized by plurality. The diversity of activities supported has contributed to a diffusion of effort. Service delivery activities have not received sufficient emphasis. Several early initiatives have, however, recently terminated, while core service delivery, training and research activities continue to be supported.

o Policy dialogue has been limited to a few top-level GOE leaders. Strategies to support policy development and awareness of population issues are inadequate, and project activities in IEC and policy development need redirection to provide more focused support for the GOE's evolving needs.

o USAID support for private sector activities has increased over time, and these activities have generally been highly successful. However, USAID assistance has emphasized the non-profit sector and has had limited coverage, focusing primarily on urban areas. Family planning services are still not fully available in rural areas, which have been perceived in the past as the responsibility of the MOH health care delivery system.

Recommendations:

The GOE's current interest in addressing its population problem requires a measured, patient, and deliberate response from USAID. USAID should support Egyptian initiatives by working closely and collaboratively with Egyptians in both the public and private sector. This support should be characterized by: (a) a more focused approach; (b) an expanded role for the private sector; and (c) increased policy development activities.

(a) Program Focus: Through close, candid, and continuous cooperation with the GOE, USAID should frame its program to achieve two objectives:

- o develop institutional capacity to design, implement, monitor and evaluate family planning programs
- o increase the availability and acceptance of safe, efficacious family planning commodities and services through both the public and private sectors.

In keeping with the team's understanding of GOE delegations of authority for the population program, assistance to the National Population Council should center on policy development, family planning operations research and clinical trials. The team was given to understand that most Council activities will be undertaken in cooperation with other GOE and Egyptian institutions. Assistance to the Ministry of Health and to PVOs should be directed primarily to improvements in family planning service delivery in both the public and private voluntary sectors. Current support to the MOH clinical training programs should continue. At the same time, the child spacing component of USAID's Child Survival Project provides a unique opportunity for the MOH and USAID to emphasize the maternal and child health benefits of child spacing.

(b) Expanded Private Sector Role: Given the acceptability of the private sector and USAID's success with the social marketing of contraceptives through the FOF project, USAID is in a position to capitalize on its private sector advantage. The report recommends that USAID develop a comprehensive private sector strategy for family planning service delivery. This strategy should include the traditional PVO sector, represented in the present program by FOF and the Egyptian Family Planning Association, and the more market-based sector, represented by pharmaceutical firms and private physicians. This strategy should include, but not be limited to, analysis for supporting three types of activities: factory-based programs; increased pharmaceutical production; and technical and financial assistance to private Egyptian physicians.

(c) Increased Policy Development Activities: Given the apparent difficulties the GOE has experienced in implementing its family planning program and some observed misconceptions and lack of information in policy-making circles, USAID should place a priority on providing coordinated and quality assistance to the government in the area of policy development. The character of this policy development must be carefully targeted to different audiences, predominantly Egyptian in content and presentation, and well-coordinated and monitored. Such a program would provide support to the twin objectives of developing institutional capacity to design and manage family planning programs and expanding the availability of safe and effective family planning services.

Management Considerations:

The assessment team felt that implementation of the initiatives outlined above would require increased levels of long-term technical assistance, which is likely to be sensitive to the GOE. Moreover, in the event that proposed initiatives are successfully realized, the program may also require increases in USAID staffing levels. Finally, the team recommended that USAID develop more comprehensive, "management-useful" systems to track inputs and outputs for subproject activities, as well as indicators to measure institutional change.

Lessons Learned:

Without a strong host-country political commitment and institutional framework, USAID efforts to energize the GOE family planning program have had limited success. The "targets of opportunity" approach, adopted in the absence of a strong host-country program, has resulted in a diffusion of effort and program impact. In this context, assistance to the private sector has proven relatively more effective.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Project Background

The Small Farmer Production Project was designed to provide credit and technical assistance to small farmers to increase agricultural productivity and farm incomes. The implementing institution is the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) whose over 700 village banks make inputs and agricultural credit available to all Egyptian farmers.

Working through village banks, SFPP has improved lending procedures and evaluation so that all types of credit are available to small farmers and agri-businesses at market rates. One third of the interest may be used for incentives for bank employees and extension workers and consulting fees to subject matter specialists. New personnel evaluation criteria have been introduced to base incentives on performance. Thus the marginal costs of providing intensive extension services and upgrading extension workers' skills through collaboration with research institutions are primarily borne by recipients themselves. SFPP's role has been to organize, coordinate and supervise extensionist performance.

B. Principal Findings

1. Economics

Overall rates of return for the project cannot be determined directly; however, evidence indicates that average farm level rates of return were at least 31% on total costs. Returns for some activities were much higher. Thus selection of enterprises and practices on the basis of rates of return should permit a significant increase in average farm level returns. Technical extension was a critical factor in some cases and returns were very high relative to costs. Credit was critical for other changes, especially for large, indivisible investments such as cattle and machinery. Project delivery of inputs was also critical for certain changes, especially use of additional chemicals and some types of machinery.

SFPP's overall rate of return, excluding construction, is estimated at over 20% based on a 31% farm rate of return on all costs and 65% of project funds used for lending. This is a very conservative estimate of the rate of returns since available evidence indicates that farm level marginal returns to project supported marginal costs for crops tended to be much higher than average returns on all costs - frequently 200% or more. Often extension was the

only service provided farmers in a block. Additional credit was not needed because costs were increased little or reduced. In such cases, the returns were many times the cost of extension services. In some such cases, of course, adoption of production increasing technology may have only been possible because credit was allocated to suppliers of inputs and services.

About 25% of project resources were allocated to the construction of village bank facilities and input warehouses. Data on return on these investments were not available since construction is just getting underway. The evaluation team does not consider them a critical part of SFPP. If these costs were included, the overall rate of return would probably be in the 15 - 20% range.

2. Credit

SFPP has made impressive gains in developing policies and procedures so that credit can be made available to small farmers. Even at relatively high interest rates, farmers are willing to borrow to invest in profitable enterprises. Repayment rates have remained high as a result of PBDAC's strength and SFPP systems for loan evaluation and technical support.

In the remaining two years, SFPP has several important credit tasks to finish in the pilot area:

a. The SFPP policy and procedures manual has been completed, but has yet to be translated and put into operation. This manual includes budgeting and the farmer line of credit concept.

b. An improved accounting system must be field tested and installed in project districts. Systematic automation of some accounting activities is essential for accurate record keeping and timely management information.

c. A loan monitoring and classification system should be developed to manage loan risk.

d. Establish a revolving loan fund at village level and consolidate system throughout SFPP districts. Develop budgeting and planning procedures at village bank level.

The decision in November 1984 by the Government of Egypt to expand SFPP systems and policies into eight new governorates presents a tremendous opportunity to replicate past successes and boost farm productivity and rural incomes on a national scale through economically sound policies. If supported adequately, it will make needed inputs along with technical assistance and credit widely available to small farmers. Achievement of this goal will require substantially

increased involvement at the national level of PBDAC.

C. Project Replicability

The feasibility of widespread replication of the project has been examined from the following perspectives:

- the economic viability of the project activities at the farm level and at the institutional level.

- the administrative and operational feasibility of the SFPP credit system within the PBDAC structure.

- potential for mobilization of substantial capital from savings and commercial borrowing to support expansion of the program.

The construction element of the project (one fourth of total funds) is just getting underway so it is not possible to make judgments concerning its rates of return. This element should not be included in a future expansion, except for construction as financed from internally generated resources.

The remainder of the project shows very favorable returns. At the micro level, they vary from about 30% measured in terms of average return on total investment in livestock (80% of total loan funds) to 800% on extension inputs which achieved important simple changes in farm practices. These "extended" changes which often involved little or no increase in costs but high returns generally resulted from use of herbicides, improved seeds, a better balance of fertilizer and/or mechanical seeding.

An important aspect of the initial SFPP project was identification of opportunities to shift from low value to high value crops (e.g. tomatoes, citrus, bananas). This involved higher returns per LE invested than changes within the existing crop pattern. These possibilities have not been included in considering returns to widespread replication since the feasibility of widespread shift to such high value crops is limited by market demand.

Widespread introduction of some high return technology (mechanical planting and fertilizing equipment) now available in limited quantities will raise returns above experience of SFPP to date.

In the next project, some high cost overhead items such as technical assistance will be a smaller percentage of the total funds. Key features such as concentration on small farmers, high repayment rates and economic interest rates, and extension should be continued. Thus the internal rate of return for the follow on project will be well above the present phase. It should easily exceed 30%. An important aspect of the program will be injection of sufficient equity

funds at the village bank level to permit village banks to operate with a substantial degree of autonomy in mobilizing savings and other financial resources and making lending decisions based on careful examination of the economic viability of individual activities proposed for loans.

The analysis of credit operations and administration indicates an adequate base in terms of trained personnel, tested procedures and experience to permit a fairly rapid expansion of the SFPP approach in the three project areas. The expansion to eight new governorates in the next year or so as proposed by the MOA will put more strain on the system and may result in some sacrifice of quality and rates of return. It might be better to concentrate another year or two on expansion in intensity of coverage in the present three governorates with start up in only one or two more in 1985-86. This is not to say that a larger expansion is unfeasible but that the more intensive approach involving the same number of new village banks would be less difficult.

The current enthusiasm among FBDAC, governors and bank chairmen presents a positive climate and opportunity to see the policies embodied in SFPP expanded on a national scale which may be lost if AID declines to provide broader geographical support. This consideration should substantially outweigh negative aspects of more rapid expansion. Intensive support and liaison with FBDAC at the national level will be necessary to ensure that the FBDAC expansion gets off to a good start. The two critical issues for a successful Egyptian expansion are organization and training. The team view, which has found wide support, is that overlap between SFPP and a larger scale credit project is essential to allow orderly transition, and ensure that the lessons learned at considerable cost are not lost. This will require not only that the two projects function in a more co-ordinated manner, but also that the current ACDI team continue in Egypt until the next credit project is functioning. The marginal cost for a minor increase of technical assistance and related inputs are more than justified by the potential benefits in paving the way for a large scale project.

Evidence indicates that at most the village banks will be able to mobilize 25 - 30% of their resource needs from local savings and perhaps 40% from commercial bank borrowings. The rest should be equity capital to permit banks to operate in a financially sound manner.

D. Recommendations

1. That AID provide approximately $10 million of additional funds to the current SFPP to permit it to proceed in an orderly fashion in support of the GOE plans for replication of the project in 1985 - 87.

2. That AID extend the ACDI contract through the current PACD of July 1987. The contract now expires on July 31, 1985. Ten to eleven positions for a total of twenty to twenty-two person years plus some short term input is recommended. Details of proposed positions are provided in the Input Section.

3. SFPP should continue its current program, and support GOE plans for expansion with some changes in technical assistance and major outputs. The work remaining to accomplish these goals include:

a. Final testing, refinement and presentation to FEDAC of the policy and procedures manual.

b. Development of training materials based on the policy and procedures manual, technical assistance and funding for FEDAC's training program for expansion.

c. Assistance in developing an overall management development plan.

d. Completion of construction of bank and warehouse facilities agreed to in the SFPP agreement. The only further AID support for construction should be modification of training facilities urgently needed during the next four to five years.

e. Testing and preparation for wide adoption of Dr. El Maazawy's accounting proposals or an alternative. Before final adoption, these should be reviewed for compatibility with the EDP system to be used.

f. Development of a loan classification and monitoring system as well as a simple method of risk analysis for use in the village banks.

g. Collect data on village bank depositors and develop a training program to assist village bank managers in increasing deposits.

h. Increased liaison with FEDAC and support in planning and organization for expansion of SFPP.

i. The SFPP project has outgrown its current staffing pattern which basically reflects needs established when the project was much smaller. The project director and team leader need understudies in farm management and credit to relieve them of daily operating responsibilities.

j. Re-orientation of technical assistance to serve both project and expansion areas.

k. Continued expansion of SFPP in the three project governorates with testing of new approaches and techniques.

l. Identification and testing of high return practices and investments. By directing financing to those investments having the highest rates of return, the project's overall rate of return should be greatly increased.

m. Increased support to suppliers for development of planting machinery and other high return inputs identified through work described above. Increased production has created needs for other farm services and opportunities for food processing enterprises which should be supported by the project.

n. Data on FEDAC should be collected and maintained at SFPP for use in developing the follow-on project.

o. In the absence of adequate research information from the ARC, SFPP should expand data collection and analysis to determine rates of return at the farm level to different production practices.

p. Develop "packages" suitable for management by farm women to offset decreased loans for livestock and poultry.

If the extension of the project technical assistance contract with ACDI is approved by May 31, 1985 and other recommended inputs committed by June 15th, major progress can be achieved on these recommendations during the next two years.

Mission intent must be clarified so that project work can continue and so that necessary qualified personnel can be recruited and arrive in country this Summer or Fall. Given the normal time for the new contractor selection and posting, a decision not to renew the contract would result in a hiatus of at least 18 months during which technical assistance would not be provided. The project technically might continue to exist, but project momentum would be lost and the most talented GOE staff might leave the project. The Small Farmer Production Project has consistently received outstanding evaluations and merits AID's continued support.

4. A follow-on credit project supported by AID should include the following:

a. Support of a well directed, motivated extension cadre based on SFPP's successful experience.

b. A specific allocation of credit funds to suppliers of inputs and services which are essential to adoption of many kinds of production increasing practices. The evaluation indicates that in many cases financing of a pump or mower for a small farmer who then does custom work for his neighbors or financing for a small repair shop or inputs distributor is more important than supplemental crop credit.

c. Ample funds to provide the Village Banks with basic equity capital structure - about LE one million per bank.

d. A contract for TA similar to the current contract with personnel centralized and designed more to support the expansion in the FBDAC structure.

e. A turn-key contract for software, hardware, and training for a suitable EDP system.

f. Funds to assist in assessment of staff needs and planning of a comprehensive staff development plan.

g. Adequate dollar support from AID to finance a 5 year in country staff training program.

h. Funds to develop FBDAC marketing department to ensure mobilization of local resources.

II. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The major problems this project addresses are low rates of agricultural production, resulting in rapidly increasing import dependence and a stagnating rural economy. One of the serious broadly felt results of this situation is massive rural-urban migration which in turn has led to large scale urban unemployment and under-employment, and unsupportable demand for urban services and cheap consumer goods. Since the 1970's these problems have existed and worsened. The underlying causes of this situation include:

- tight management of prices of outputs and inputs, in most cases at levels a fraction of world economic levels.

- a widespread system of controls and rationing of off-farm supplied inputs including credit, agricultural chemicals, seeds, commercially prepared feeds, mechanical equipment and also control over land use and cropping patterns. These controls are to allocate resource use in the absence of appropriate economic prices.

Development and transfer of appropriate production increasing technology to farmers has suffered from price distortions, and preoccupation of the bank, government officials and extension workers with design and enforcement of the many quotas and

controls. Crop credit has been rationed on the basis of decreed cropping patterns and uniform input quotas for each crop. Long or term credit has been restricted to farmers with substantial land based collateral and uniform formulas rather than individual enterprise needs and opportunities. In this environment, private investment in supply of key production inputs and services and marketing of agricultural produce has suffered both from un-economic control of prices and margins and capital restrictions.

The SFFP attacks these problems by providing both technical assistance and credit to small farmers and agribusiness to increase production and return per LE invested in agriculture and rural enterprises and to facilitate procurement of inputs (seeds, machinery and needed services).

A. Project History

SFFP was developed after a major MOA/USAID study on how to remove constraints on agriculture to improve production. The Small Farmer Production Project is carried out through the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC), the GOE institution responsible for all institutional farm credit and bank services, as well as distribution of farm inputs, particularly fertilizer. Through its network of 750 village banks and 4,300 agencies, the bank serves practically every Egyptian farmer with input and seasonal credit.

The project agreement was signed on July 25, 1979. A host country technical assistance contract was negotiated with Agricultural Cooperative Development International (ACDI) and signed August 2[illegible], 1980. The first advisors arrived in September 1980 and the project made its first loan in May 1981.

The project was evaluated by a joint PBDAC/ACDI team in 1983 and by an external USAID team in 1983. The major achievements cited were:

1. Provision of credit at 10% interest and farming advice to 12,490 farmers (6/83) and 100% collection record.

2. Improved farm production and increased incomes.

3. Acceptance of higher interest rates by small farmers.

4. Successful demonstration of new systems for credit delivery, accounting, loan processing and analysis.

5. Highly effective system of information dissemination to Egyptian farmers.

AID EVALUATION SUMMARY PART I

J. Summary of Evaluation Findings, Conclusions and R[illegible]dations

USAID/EGYPT
FINAL EVALUATION REPORT
STRENGTHENING RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY [illegible]
(263-0015)

BACKGROUND: The purpose of the Strengthening Rural [illegible]elivery (SRHD) project was to test the assumption that given appropri[illegible]erventions, the rural health system of Egypt could and would result in [illegible]el health care and an improved health status of the rural population. [illegible] project assisted the Ministry of Health (MOH) in identifying and valida[illegible] applicable interventions to reduce or eliminate some of the major [illegible]aints to rural health delivery. These constraints generally are in t[illegible]s of manpower development, technological development, community cost-[illegible]g, training, and management and supervision.

The initial project agreement was signed in 1976, and [illegible]nded five times for a total obligation of $13.9 million. The project'[illegible]inal purpose was to address the above constraints by developing and tes[illegible]ecific interventions - namely outreach, up-grading of in-facil[illegible]H care, community participation, training, logistic support, supervision [illegible]otivation, and program information and evaluation. Another interven[illegible] added later on, health services research, which resulted in the establi[illegible] of the R&D unit in the MOH.

This final evaluation of the project was undertaken at [illegible]quest of the Strengthening Rural Health Delivery (SRHD) Project and [illegible]pt USAID Mission. After ten years of project implementation, th[illegible]se of this evaluation was to determine the validity of the above [illegible]ion and also to determine whether a research and development capabili[illegible]n established to continue developing applicable interventions. In o[illegible]ing its work, the evaluation team studied documents of previous evaluat[illegible] involved project implementors, observed field operations in project and [illegible]ject areas and analyzed data available through the project staff. Th[illegible]ich was completed on May 15, 1985.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: The project was highly succ[illegible] in creating a strong and technically sound R & D unit within the Minis[illegible] Health. It has also created a climate of success in introducing new inn[illegible]tions into the processes of service delivery. In general, the interventi[illegible] attempted did, in one degree or another, extend health care and impro[illegible] effectiveness of services. Impact on the health status of the rural po[illegible]n was also probably favorable but difficult to gauge in a quantifi[illegible]y.

The establishment of the R&D unit is one of the positi[illegible]ses of the project. It has established the presence of capable, [illegible]ally competent personnel who can undertake applied research and develo[illegible] the improvement of rural health delivery. The major recom[illegible]n of the 1984 project evaluation was the official institutional [illegible]e R&D unit. This was done by Ministerial Decree #307 in 1985.

The most effective interventions were in the outreach and in-facility MCH activities. When carried out by motivated personnel such as the well trained nurse, systematic outreach and in-facility care led to improvements in service coverage and utilization. Overall upgrading of service quality was found to require a combination of interventions which included supplementing staff income with incentives and ensuring, through systematic and supportive supervision, that the incentives were performance based.

Information collection and dissemination was perhaps less satisfactory and continued to be of limited use at higher levels of the system. The multiple recording requirements of diverse MCH departments and projects constrain productivity. The project successfully demonstrated the impact of good information coordination in the development of the family health record.

Logistic support, particularly in the purchase, and maintenance of vehicles has been a major contributing factor in the strengthening of the rural health system in the project areas. Outreach activities benefitted substantially from additional availability of transportation. However, replication strategies should take into consideration the high cost factor and procurement difficulties .

Greater efforts are needed to strengthen the supervision and management aspects of the rural health system at the facility, local, district, governorate and central levels. Effective replication of interventions will need further development in the quality of supervision and management.

The evaluators noted that, despite the increased costs associated with these interventions, per capita costs were lower in test areas due to the expanded coverage of the facilities.

A final output of the project was the development of specific proposals for a national rural health strategy, in the five critical areas of manpower development, health care financing, alternative health care, logistic support and primary health care. The strategy was accepted by the Egyptian Government during the Fourth National Conference on Basic Health Services for Rural Communities, held in April 1986.

The team believes the project has been successful. However, inadequate attention to the design of evaluation instruments in the early stages of the project precluded reliable quantitative measures of success.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Systematic outreach should be institutionalized using the MCH/CP home visiting program as its focus.

2. Community participation should be actively encouraged in all health education activities in rural areas.

3. In-service and pre-service task oriented training linked to supervision should be institutionalized for all categories of rural health personnel.

4. Logistic support should be considered an integral part of every operational health program.

5. Performance-based staff incentives should be systematically introduced by the MOH. This could be financed partially by increasing the nominal fees charged by local facilities.

6. The MOH Statistics Department should be strengthened to serve as a clearing house to ensure that new projects and new activities build on a common data base.

7. Replication of successful interventions is feasible and should concentrate initially on complete coverage of the four governorates involved with the project.

8. Community cost sharing mechanisms should be adopted in order to fund the upgrading of service quality and physical facilities.

LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Systematic outreach as carried out through the home visiting program had considerable impact on improving service coverage and utilization, particularly of MCH services.

2. The expanded role of the nurse in providing both in facility and home care could be further strengthened by the inclusion of the dayas as part of the outreach program.

3. The effectiveness of health education is more dependent on staff commitment than on the means used to educate the community.

4. In-service training has proven to be a valuable motivating factor and effective when linked to perceived job needs, although it cannot compensate for shortcomings in basic professional education.

5. Planning for the purchase and maintenance of vehicles and procurement of these vehicles was unrealistic in terms of overall cost and encumbered by bureaucratic processes.

6. Improving motivation will require a complex array of interventions such as increased staff income, relevant and applied training, and clearly defined management and supervisory roles.

7. The national implementation of the family health record is a valid experience that can be applied in other programs involving primary health care services in rural areas.

8. Planning among and with decentralized units of government requires the creation of an appropriate management climate with more effective coordination and correlation of manpower, money, material and information.

Control Diarrheal Diseases
(263-0137)

SECOND JOINT NCDDP/USAID/UNICEF/WHO Review of NCDDP Activities Executive Summary

1. Introduction

The review was conducted by a team of eight national and 11 international members. For two days NCDDP staff presented an overview of the project to the review team. Five subsequent days were spent in interviewing Project staff and resource persons, in groups and individually, and in reviewing the extensive documentation of the Project. During a 6-day field visit eight 2-person teams visited 17 districts in 10 governorates and conducted more than 150 interviews with government health staff, pharmacists and private practitioners. In addition, 161 interviews with mothers focusing on knowledge and use of ORS, and other aspects of diarrhea case management were conducted. To a large extent, places visited and interviewees were randomly selected.

The review team then spent a week in Cairo compiling data from the field visits and preparing a final report. This report is briefly summarized here and presented in greater detail in Parts B-F.

2. Major Findings of the Review

Consistent with findings of a number of studies reported by the Project, the Review found impressive levels of knowledge and use of ORT among mothers. Of 161 mothers interviewed during the Review, 96% knew what a packet of ORS was used for, 82% said they used it and 71% knew some signs of dehydration. Of the users 97% could correctly mix ORS.

The production of adequate quantities of ORS within Egypt and its effectiv distribution through more than one channel to approximately 5,000 government facilities and approximately 6,000 commercial pharmacies is a major achievement. Only six of 63 facilities visited and one of 52 private pharmacies visited were without stocks of ORS, and few had experienced significant difficulties in its supply. The establishment and equipping of over 2,700 ORT units in government health facilities is commendable.

The greatly increased access to and knowledge of ORS have afforded mothers opportunities to prevent death due to dehydration in their children - an important accomplishment which has been achieved at a modest cost of a little more than 1 Egyptian pound 1.0 for each mother gaining this benefit.

It is apparent that the above findings can be attributed in large part to a well planned and carefully implemented mass media campaign very largely channeled through television of which ownership in Egypt is remarkably high.

The Project's wise focus on the primary target audience, mothers, has resulted in creating a demand-driven system which has important positive implications for the sustainability of the Project achievements.

There is general agreement in the international health community that properly administered ORT will reduce the risk of death due to dehydration. Given the widespread use of ORS achieved by the NCDDP in Egypt it is reasonable to assume that there has been favourable impact on childhood mortality. It is now important for the Project to undertake the necessary studies to estimate the extent of this impact by appropriate demographic and epidemiologic means.

The semi-autonomous administrative model of the NCDDP as a coordinator of a multisectoral approach was useful and successful. Integration of the activities of the Project into the appropriate section of the MOH is desirable in the long-term.

Large numbers of existing, trainee and newly graduated health care providers have been trained in diarrhea case management. The recent initiation of a task-oriented training program with an emphasis on practical treatment skills is commended.

The Project's management information system is ambitious. It is designed to obtain information for Project planning and evaluation, however, partly due to its complexity, it has as yet yielded insufficient information useable for these purposes.

In both the government health services and in the private health care sector, use of ORS is widespread; however, it is rarely used alone. Antibiotics and "antidiarrheal" drugs are frequently prescribed as a routine treatment for diarrhea. It is noted that it was a deliberate strategy of the Project not to focus, in the first instance, on modifying drug treatment.

The strategy used by the depot holder scheme is an effective means of increasing mothers knowledge and use of ORS.

3. Major Recommendations

The Review recommends that:

The NCDDP should be extended beyond September 1987 within the limitations of the original budget resources. It is envisaged that this will prolong the life of the Project for 2-3 years. The current administrative structure should be maintained in the short-term, but planning for phased transfer of administrative responsibility for all Project activities to relevant sections of the Ministry of Health should be initiated as soon as possible.

Priority should be given to the training of health professionals in diarrhea case management skills based on the newly developed guidelines of the NCDDP. This training should be formally incorporated into the curricula of all health educational institutions.

Having effectively created public demand for ORS, the NCDDP should direct attention toward its correct use, feeding diarrhea and the prevention of diarrhea. Health education through health facilities should be strengthened particularly by improving the communications skills of health staff.

The NCDDP should actively involve governorate and district level personnel in the planning, implementation, supervision and evaluation of Project activities.

The routine reporting system of the NCDDP should be simplified to collect only the information needed for Project management. There should be a tiered reporting system with appropriate compilation and analysis of data at each level.

A variety of carefully planned and implemented research and evaluation studies should be undertaken. Priority areas include the effective use of ORT, diarrhea-preventing interventions and health services management, as well as infant and child mortality, especially that part attributable to dehydrating diarrhea.

Evaluation activities carried out by contractors should be closely monitored. In view of the large amount of quantified statistically-based evaluation and research being undertaken, consideration should be given to employing a skilled epidemiologist/statistician to ensure appropriate statistical design and analysis.

Efforts should be undertaken to limit the inappropriate use of drugs in the treatment of diarrhea. These may include:

- guidelines for health care providers on the correct indications for the use of antibiotics.

- restrictions on the registration of inappropriate drugs particuarly multi-component "antidiarrheal" drugs.

- stopping the distribution of inappropriate drugs through the government health services.

The ORS depot holder scheme should be expanded to other rural areas, beginning in governorates where the responsible officials are already familiar with the scheme.

The payment of incentives to health personnel should be linked to objectively evaluated performance. To this end, the incentive system should be reviewed with the involvement of district level personnel. Non-financial incentives should also be considered.

Drafted by:RClay:clb:7/11/86:Wang No. 4457r

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT STATUS OF PROJECT

The USAID and Government of Egypt (GOE) funded project, "Housing and Community Upgrading for Low Income Egyptians", was authorized in 1978. The project was designed to demonstrate the premise that basic housing and community facilities--that are socially acceptable and affordable--can be provided for low-income families in a manner that allows the GOE to recover a "substantial" percentage of its investment.

The project was designed to test the viability of this premise in six communities. The residents of these communities were to be provided with basic physical and social infrastructure and services, land title, and home improvement loans. USAID and the GOE agreed to share the project expenses, estimated at $160 million equally. Of the total estimated budget, approximately US $57 million was budgeted for upgrading interventions. These interventions are to extend upgrading to a estimated population of 80,280.

As of mid-1984, the majority of the activities focused primarily on three of the six communities. Major accomplishments included:

- the operation of a Home Improvement Loan Program and Small Scale Enterprise program in three communities, and their recent introduction in an additional two communities;

- an active vocational training program in building trades;

- construction of 2 schools, a community training center and a youth center;

- trial programs for sewage pumping vehicles and solid waste collection were underway or just completed;

- a variety of community organization activities had taken place and been essential to involving community residents.

While there seems to have been sufficient progress achieved in implementing programs in the upgrading communities and introducing social infrastructure, progress on physical infrastructure construction has been limited. Construction undertaken to date has included extension of a water distribution system and washstands in one community and soakaways in another. However, draft tender documents for infrastructre construction are now ready for most communities, and the project is entering its most critical stage.

- Based on current cost estimates and income levels, the project can certainly recover a greater percentage of costs than traditional GOE housing and infrastructure programs while still reaching low income groups. It is, therefore, a more replicable model for providing shelter to low-income groups. Our analysis suggests that a majority of the total costs allocable to each building are affordable to households below the median at the current interest rate. The level of subsidy on on-site infrastructure could be halved. This argues for institutionalizing greater recovery on GOE infrastructure programs in general.

- The objectives toward which little progress has been made, or for which there is, as yet, little evidence of the degree to which these objectives will be met, involve policy issues and changes. Acceptance of substantial lowering of standards to reduce costs and subsidies has proven difficult to achieve for infrastructure services. In addition, land title, one of the principal components of formalizing informal settlements through upgrading, is still an unresolved policy issue. Finally, while the project has the potential for recovering costs and demonstrating the cost-effectiveness and replicability of upgrading, there is as yet no decision on what level costs are to be recovered or what mechanisms are to be used. JHP is only beginning to address these issues and until recently has not had the opportunity to distance itself from operational issues to reflect on policy issues.

B. Project Beneficiaries and Replicability

No attempt was made to define the affordability of the upgrading component relative to beneficiary income levels when the original cost estimates were made. Nonetheless, the ET was requested to estimate the level of recovery that

could be expected. This analysis was made on the basis of a consideration of current cost estimates of land, infrastructure and the HILP program. The ET's analysis of land costs suggests that if land were valued at the market rate, it would not be affordable to households within the target group. Moreover, it is questionable whether beneficiaries who have been living for extended periods of time in these communities should be charged current-market prices.

Recovery of some cost of land, however, is important in upgrading sites if the project is to meet its objectives of replicability and cost-effectiveness. In estimating cost recovery potential, the ET has assumed land prices similar to those being charged by the GCE on sales of adjacent sites for new housing. It also assumed on-site infrastructure costs would be "partially" recovered at 50 percent. These cost recovery objectives could be met by households as low as the 25th percentile of the urban income distribution ($100/month), provided they could pay an additional 25 percent of income for shelter.

If the total cost of on-site infrastructure were included, the affordability levels would be 63 percent of the total allocable cost of on-site infrastructure, HILP and land for households at the 25th percentile of the urban income distribution and 91 percent for those households at the median (given an additional 25 percent of income available for shelter). Households below the 25th percentile, however, would not be able to afford to pay for HILP, infrastructure and land, even if they devoted 25 percent of their income to shelter. It is likely that such households would be forced to use credit facilities to purchase the land and pay for infrastructure and forego the option of home improvement.

C. The Home Improvement Loan Program

The home improvement program has been functioning effectively since March 1981, principally in three of the upgrading communities with the very recent addition of two more. A substantial number of loans have been made, nearly reaching original expectations already.

The loans have been quickly translated into tangible housing extension improvements. Borrowers have added significant amounts of their own money to the loans in making improvements and built a significant number of rental units. Additionally, benefits of the loans have gone systematically to people of lower incomes as intended. The major constraints facing the lowest income beneficiaries is that they receive very small loans. Moreover, their current level of indebtedness for home improvements, especially where households have obtained additional guarantees to get larger loans, may limit their ability to pay for infrastructure and land once these components come on stream.

Administrative costs for HILP have been reasonable and the process for operating the programs seems adequately efficient and coordinated among participating parties (PIU, CFE, CHF). Loan repayments have been complete and generally prompt. As a result, the program is reaching Project Paper established goals for cost recovery, though subsidies are nonetheless being paid by the GOE and AID. These subsidies are primarily to cover operational costs to which beneficiaries contribute only a small portion.

Full cost recovery would require charging higher interest rates to reflect the true value of capital if put to alternative uses. Our analysis suggests that higher

interest rates could be charged on loans while still reaching low-income groups. Some, but not all, of the borrowers would need the current interest rate to make loans affordable. However, higher interest rates on HILP loans would reduce the ability of these borrowers to pay for other upgrading components (land and infrastructure).

The HILP could, if necessary, operate without further AID and GOE support beyond that originally budgeted. It would do that by proceeding as a revolving loan fund, relending the remainder of loans repayments received once operating costs were paid. But on that basis the HILP would be scaled back significantly from even its present level and would fall short of meeting well-established demand in just the Helwan upgrading communities.

Given the good performance to date, it may well make sense to extend the program. This could logically be done by giving the HILP further direct support in its current form by carrying operating costs. Later, some restructuring might be appropriate.

At least in the long-term, restructuring could include capturing somewhat more of the resources of the program's highest income beneficiaries. But more centrally, it could include arranging for financial institutions to provide the home improvement loans from their own funds, rather than only servicing loans made with GOE and AID resources.

To do that, either land titling or loan guarantees are needed to provide sufficient security to the lender. The current program participant, Crédit Foncier Egyptien (CFE), insists on land title and secured mortgage lending; but the guarantee may still have potential if titling cannot be achieved. In either case, some interest subsidy would be required in order to involve financial institutions, whose cost of obtaining money to lend requires lending at higher than current HILP interest rates.

The GOE and AID role could then focus on providing adequate operating budgets and skilled staff, sufficiently low interest payment levels (subsidized, if necessary), and loan-security arrangements to keep the program functioning and to ensure that it continues toserve lower income people. The up-front costs of such an approach would be significantly lower, allowing more extensive early progress.

D. Engineering Design and Construction

Currently, most of the design work has been completed for four sites and final tender documents are complete for three of the seven sites. The design standards used for infrastructure in these documents has largely followed standard Egyptian practices due to the reluctance of infrastructure agencies to approve lower standards. Cost-savings have nonetheless been incorporated by reduction of roadway widths, the use of compacted and unpaved roads, and reduction of service standards for community facilities. In addition, the electrical network has been eliminated from the project budget. At this stage in the implementation of the project, it is difficult to tell whether additional cost-savings through lower standards could have been incorporated, given the delays experienced in obtaining approval for lower standards.

As noted earlier, construction of infrastructure has thus far been limited, however, major construction activities are almost ready to begin on several sites. There are several constraints and issues which face JHP/PIU in attempting to assure a smooth implementation of construction activities on time and within budget. First, successfull execution of the construction phase will require close and continual monitoring by the JHP/PIU and AID in order to contain and resolve the many problems that are bound to arise. The amount of monitoring required is beyond the present staffing levels of JHP/PIU and AID. It is therefore recommended that JHP/PIU have an additional cadre of 3 field engineers assigned and that AID hire an additional full-time engineer to collaborate with JHP/PIU engineers.

Second is the issue of off-site facilities for final disposal of sewage. The fact that this was overlooked in the site selection process has necessitated addition of construction of a temporary facility within the project budget at considerable cost and could possibly delay project implementation. At this stage, there is no option but to go ahead with construction of the sewerage network as designed. However, written assurances should be obtained for the final disposal of sewage to adequate and functioning off-site facilities for all the upgrading sites.

Third is the issue of linking installation and functioning of sewerage systems to a functioning solid waste disposal system. This linkage has often been overlooked as a necessary requirement when installing sewerage systems. In the present project, trial solid waste programs have been

attempted. It is recommended that these be reviewed and a solid waste disposal system be adopted as part of the project to assure the effective operation of sewerage networks without the blockages caused by dumping solid waste.

Fourth, current road and sewerage network design will require demolition of houses and cesspits, respectively. Resolving this issue is likely to cause delays in implementation. To avoid these delays, it is recommended that JHP/PIU should agree to allow enough flexibility for the contractor/consultant not to install roads and sewers that would require demolition. This may require reclassifying roads and excluding some areas from direct connection to sewerage systems, but is likely to be less costly and time-consuming than demolition.

Fifth, securing of land for rights-of-way and facilities may prove difficult due to encroachment on land identified. However, JHP/PIU should exhaust all efforts to secure the land required before it begins to explore alternative network design and sites for facilities.

E. Project Management

The management structure that has evolved represents a workable response to the problems encountered in implementing an innovative and complex project while simultaneously establishing an effective management unit. Although initially committed to carrying out the entire upgrading program, the Joint Housing Program Agency (JHP)/Project Implementation Unit (PIU) came to realize that its role had to be modified and focused if the program was to be launched and the philosophy of upgrading accepted.

Current project management has a recognizable organizational identity, a good understanding of its resources, and operates as a coordinating, contracting and monitoring agency for upgrading activities. Operations are defined by these functions and effectiveness is assessed by the extent to which JHP/PIU can establish and maintain good relationships with the other agencies needed to implement the components of the program. The enthusiasm for upgrading is an important component of urban development, exhibited by a number of the agencies working with the JHP/PIU, is one indication that this management style and structure has been effective.

The present structure places the least strain on the management capacity of JHP/PIU staff while enhancing

available skills and increasing flexibility. At the same time, the existing structure relies heavily on the resources of the Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) contracted for technical assistance and private sector design tangible improvements in the upgrading communities. This structure facilitates implementation and recognizes that project success is directly tied to the maintenance of harmonious relationships with other GOE agencies and units needed to implement the components of the project. The principal mechanism for achieving coordination are the standing committees composed of representatives of agencies and units involved in the project to discuss and resolve issues pertinent to implementation.

To avoid the common problems faced by public agencies in recruiting staff, JHP/PIU has resorted to hiring consultants in key positions. It has also relied on CHF's hiring on consultants as mid-level and upper-level staff for the project. This process has allowed JHP/PIU to staff up and avoid a high rate of staff turnover. However, current attempts to train a full complement of staff to carry out all tasks, appear questionable. It would seem more appropriate to focus on development of a small well-trained staff capable of carrying out coordinating, contracting and monitoring functions. This approach may seem contrary to JHP/PIU's recent efforts to be reorganized as a general organization as a means of resolving management issues of staff recruitment and retention.

Reorganization is also viewed as a means of providing JHP/PIU with the financial autonomy required to fund additional projects, emphasizing the importance of upgrading and establishing a format for implementing the present program and launching future programs. While these objectives are valid, the assumption that they can only be achieved by creation of a large traditional bureaucratic structure appears questionable. Our analysis suggests that the current lean management structure should not be viewed as contrary to achieving these objectives whatever the ultimate constitutional base for the agency.

1. Role of CHF

CHF has played a seminal role in the development of project management and implementation. CHF's role has, however, been made difficult due to the need to serve both staff and line functions. It has had to provide technical assistance

to develop the management structure of JHP while simultaneously performing a large amount of the specific staff activities for its client.

It has made a major effort to establish sound management procedures. However, resources for its efforts to develop and launch training programs and activities that institutionalize upgrading process have only recently been available, despite a steady increase in the technical assistance component of the project.

Past problems regarding the proper role that CHF should play have prompted CHF to have its tasks spelled out and take a literal approach to what its tasks are. While this position is understandable, CHF should be encouraged to continue to provide assistance in a flexible manner with specific focus on those areas where JHP/PIU is weakest, developing skills that are absent in the local environment, and framing the work of short-term consultants in a creative and innovative fashion that responds to local conditions.

2. Role of AID

Initially, AID interpreted its review/approval and monitoring role very broadly by taking an active part in project management and implementation. This active involvement produced some friction between AID on the one hand, JHP/PIU and CHF on the other. This situation has been resolved and relations between AID, the CHF and JHP/PIU are more collaborative.

H. Project Implementation

The project is obviously not proceeding according to the original project paper schedule. However, this schedule was unrealistic in its estimate of the time required to set up a functioning management unit and accomplish each activity in the implementation process. A new, more realistic schedule has been proposed in the 1983 Implementation Plan. Comparing project progress to this schedule, we find that the project is generally proceeding according to this revised schedule, but with some delays in certain areas due principally to lengthy reviews and approval procedures for design and the difficulty of obtaining approval for the proposed design changes. Design review and approval has proven to be the most time consuming process since it involves numerous agencies.

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At the current rate of project activity, we estimate that 29 months are required for completion of all activities. This assumes that all steps preceding draft tender documents are completed and all remaining steps will take place as scheduled. If this estimate is accepted as accurate, completion of the upgrading activities will not occur until after the PACD of December 1986, and is likely to be after the first or second quarter of 1987.

There is one major factor that may prevent the project from being fully implemented. The total project budget estimates have been increased, despite the fact that the upgrading component has remained largely within the original budget proposed in the project paper and only $160 million has been committed. The anticipated shortfall presents JHP/PIU with a serious constraint. To overcome this constraint JHP/PIU should make every effort to find the additional resources now estimated to be necessary while at the same time develop plans based on the currently available funds so as to avoid having work remain incomplete, if additional funds are not forthcoming.

III. Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Some of the lessons learned to date have a bearing on future stages of the effort, the design development and replicability of the project. First, with regard to the issue of beneficiary affordability and cost recovery policy, it is important to establish a clearer definition of target beneficiaries and to estimate their capacity to pay for upgrading costs at the outset during the design of the project. It is also imperative to define more precisely the elements to be charged to beneficiaries and the extent to which they are to be recovered. Without such clear guidelines it is difficult to evaluate the replicability of the project.

Second, in planning future upgrading programs, attention should be paid to the following design issues:

- Assuring at the site selection phase that off-site sewerage disposal facilities are available and the timing of their availability coordinated with the timing of completion of on-site facilities.

- Integrating the acquisition and reservation of land for rights-of-way and facilities into the site selection process.

This issue may not be an easy one to resolve even in future upgrading projects, given the amount of time it takes to obtain land. However, the involvement of community residents in assuring that land identified for facilities remains vacant so that construction can proceed, as was done in Arab Rashed, may be an effective mechanism to use in the future.

Recognizing the time required for introducing innovations in design of materials or techiques or standards. In addition, innovations should be developed and tested on a trial basis as a separate pilot demonstration activity run in parallel with the main flow elements, such as was done for the solid waste programs, so as not to slow down implementation.

A. The Home Improvement Loan Program

The HILP is a model that has merit not only in future upgrading programs, but as a housing finance system that can effectively reach low-income groups. If the program is to be extended, attention needs to be paid to land-titling issues. Consideration should also be given to providing guarantees beyond the present salary guarantees for repayments of loans that are not secured by land. While the present guarantee system has been effective as demonstrated by the absence of default, financial instititutions are less likely to accept it as a form of security on an expanded program in areas where publicly salaried workers are not likely to form the majority of beneficiaries.

B. Project Management

1. It takes time and considerable patience to introduce new ideas and to have them accepted. Innovation and change are not compatible with fixed, defined management structures. Innovations are most easily introduced when structures are allowed to be responsive rather than rigid.

The evolution of the management style and structure of the Helwan Upgrading Project substantiates this principle. The current management configuration evolved in order to introduce the idea of upgrading informal settlements as an important and established policy of urban development in Egypt. Changes in management structure and staff functions were dictated by the UHP/PIU's realization that (1) the agency could not carry out all aspects of the upgrading program and that (2) it was necessary to establish cooperative relationships with the agencies and institutions

capable of executing the upgrading activities. These changes were designed to make the agency more responsive to the needs of the project and to the cause of promoting the importance of upgrading. Still, within the current structure, the roles of JHP/PIU need to be more differentiated with JHP concentrating on overall policy formulation and directing interagency liaison functions. The PIU on the other hand should continue to concentrate on direct supervision and evaluation at the program level.

2. It is JHP/PIU's obligation to define the meaning of upgrading, and an overall implementation strategy. At present, there is general agreement among all agencies and institutions involved in the project that upgrading low-income settlement is an appropriate component of urban development in Egypt. There is a concensus among the agencies involved in the project, also, that land tenure is an essential element and that the community must be involved in the upgrading process from the beginning. There are, however, different views on which elements and essential facilities are required. It also remains to be decided whether cost recovery is an acceptable objective.

3. The efficacy of project management is directly attributable to the extent to which the JHP/PIU can maintain a very lean, flexible structure dedicated to contracting, monitoring and coordinating upgrading activities and providing policy guidance and direction. This structure needs to be staffed by a few, key senior staff who can handle all areas of contract management and construction monitoring and the technical specialities of water, sewer and roads and policy formulation and overall program direction. In addition, if upgrading programs are to be replicated in other settlement areas, JHP/PIU needs to have the authority to (1) retain the revenues it receives and (2) coordinate the work of other, local government agencies carrying out upgrading activities.

4. When programming technical assistance for innovative projects, a broad and flexible definition should be utilized. Through the experience of CHF, it was realized that technical assistance should be designed (1) to respond to the evolving needs of the client and (2) to encourage the client to test approaches that will have positive effects on the implementation and acceptance of the program.

As CHF has discovered, providing technical assistance to an evolving structure and a new program is very difficult. It

is difficult even with an established agency. In this project CHF has been forced to respond both to program and institutional needs. On the one hand, it has performed a large amount of the staff work of PIU. On the other, it has worked to develop the management capacity of the JHP.

The amount of technical assistance required to accomplish both sets of activities was underestimated at the start of the project, although there was some understanding of the magnitude of the tasks. Still, the extent of the need for technical assistance only became apparent over time.

5. Although eager to see that funds are properly utilized and that tangible results are produced with investments, AID should remember that lasting impact will be achieved only if the program and approach are accepted and institutionalized by the GOE.

F. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

1. Implementation plans must be realistic. If not, those responsible for executing the project are held to standards of performance that cannot be achieved. In addition, donors and project beneficiaries with expectations of certain results within a given period of time will be unnecessarily disappointed.

   The delays experienced in project implementation are understandable. If the implementation plans had anticipated the amount of time needed to build a new and functioning management unit, and for this unit to establish effective working relationships with agencies and institutions involved in upgrading, a more realistic timetable might have been developed and the current difference between anticipated and actual levels of project activity might not be so large.

2. Once developed, implementation plans should be used as management tools. Performance targets should be defined and given fixed budgets. Those responsible for managing activities must be made aware of targets and budgets, and held accountable for achieving specific results on time and within budget. Project implementation must be recorded in the context of the plan and the budget. Deviations from plan and budget should be explained.

3. Effective implementation occurs on two levels--from the top down and the bottom up. On one level, implementation is achieved through the development of a

harmonious relationship among the institutions, agencies and companies responsible for designing, constructing and operating the components of the upgrading project. On another level, implementation can be effectively stymied unless the beneficiaries are involved in the upgrading process. There is general agreement on this principle among those involved in the project.

Coordination at the level of JHP/PIU has been slow to develop. There have been misunderstandings in the past among the agencies involved. Only recently have effective mechanisms been established to bring the principal actors together to discuss the objectives and components of the project, and to agree on a course of action. Until JHP/PIU defined its management role in the project, it was not possible to define the tasks of others.

The content and process of upgrading have been promoted at the community level. The relationship between community involvement and project success is well understood by the JHP/PIU. A negative experience in one community and positive experiences in others have had the effect of prompting the JHP/PIU to inform and involve the community.

4. Successful project implementation currently depends on JHP/PIU's ability to (1) contract firms who can install the infrastructure and community facilities on time and within budget, (2) maintain effective coordination with the GOI agencies who have the authority to review and approve designs and to operate the facilities once in place, and (3) motivate the community to participate fully in the upgrading program.

5. In general, components involving the least number of agencies and requiring the least amount of coordination are quickly implemented. This explains the success of the HILP and the completion of four community facilities. It is also apparent that there is a direct and positive relationship between the degree of community participation and the rate of project implementation. This lesson has been well learned by JHP/PIU.

7. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

1. USAID India
Maharashtra Social forestry Evaluation
(Project No. 386-0478)

2. Purpose of the Activity: India faces severe shortages of wood and fodder as a result of increasing land use pressures by people and livestock coupled with ineffective systems for managing these resources. The Sixth and Seventh Five Year Plans (1980-1990) have placed increasing emphasis on social forestry as an important element in India's development plans. Today, all states in India have social forestry programs and the larger states have major, donor-assisted programs. The Mission in its CDSS has stressed the importance of assistance to India in its Social Forestry efforts.

The goals of the Maharashtra Social Forestry Project (Project No. 386-0478) are to increase the supply of firewood, fodder, fruit and small timber in rural areas; reduce the rate of deforestation; and increase rural employment. The purpose of this eight year project (October 1982 - September 1990) is to develop the institutional capability of the Government of Maharashtra's Horticulture and Social Forestry Department (H&SFD) to assist villagers to manage their community and private lands for increased and sustained production of forest products.

3. Evaluation Purpose and Methodology: This evaluation was the first major in-depth review of the project. It was originally scheduled and actually conducted near the end of the project's third year (September 15 to October 10, 1985). The purpose of the evaluation was to determine the project's progress in 1) implementing an extension organization and tree planting program based on villager participation in community and private forestry activities, and 2) developing a management system that is capable of sustaining social forestry activities through and beyond the life of the project. The six member team interviewed officials at all levels within the H&SFD as well as Government of Maharashtra and Government of India officials with major responsibility for social forestry programs. The team divided itself into two groups and collectively visited 54 villages throughout Maharashtra during a nine-day period. At each village, community and private tree plantings were observed and interviews were conducted with H&SFD field staff, village leaders and villagers of various ages, classes and gender. Findings and conclusions are based on the site visits and interviews, and on the analysis of management data and documents provided the team by the H&SFD.

4. Findings:

A. Training

Significant progress in staff training and extension was accomplished during the first two years of the project. However, the perceived need and current effort to equip staff with additional skills required for the successful transfer of plantation management responsibility from the H&SFD to the village is decreasing.

B. Technical Support Activities

To make informed decisions, management needs data that provides information on project productivity, that identifies problems constraining project effectiveness, and that can be used to formulate plans, budgets and project alternatives. Information on plantation productivity, market conditions and village dynamics is needed and is not being obtained.

C. Project Management Activities

Government of Maharashtra funds allocated to this project have exceeded levels proposed in the project paper. However, during the past year the funds have been expended almost exclusively on tree planting activities. Expenditures on activities that directly effect the department's operational capability, personnel recruitment and staff effectiveness are rapidly diminishing.

5. Recommendations

A. Training

Village level: Training be modified and targeted at specific social/economic groups within each village; training methods should emphasize techniques requiring minimal literacy skills; and village motivators should be given specialized training.

Staff Training: Overseas training be included as an integral component of the staff training program; and permanent training programs be developed and implemented for specific categories of staff and be taught by professional extension educators.

Extension: All villages be assigned motivators, the motivators role and responsibility be increased and women motivators be encouraged. The H&SFD move towards having 100 percent directly recruited Assistant Plantation Officers and that this recruitment emphasize selection of women staff.

B. Technical Support Activities

1. Research Recommendations:

a. Research proposed on agro-forestry systems submitted by a Maharashtra Agricultural University be initiated immediately.
b. H&SFD collect and analyze plantation data so trends in production can be quickly made available to extension officers.
c. Studies on the following be undertaken.

(1) Detailed wood balance study to estimate present and future returns that can be expected from marketing of food products from private and community plantations.
(2) Long-term case studies of village dynamics as they relate to the management of community plantations and the distribution of forest products;
(3) Studies on the impact that forest laws and regulations governing the sale and transport of forest products.

2. Monitoring and Evaluation Recommendations:

H&SFD proposal to strengthen and computerize monitoring and evaluation of social forestry activities be implemented.

C. Project Management Activities

a. Expand the H&SFD from five to six circles so its divisional boundaries conform to administrative units in other state departments thereby facilitating inter-department coordination.

b. Provide H&SFD a complete complement of staff in all 29 administrative districts of the state and transport mechanisms that ensure the flexible mobility of extension personnel.

c. H&SFD provide employee's staff incentives that could include special pay and residential quarters, and promotional opportunities for directly recruited Assistant Plantation Officers.

d. H&SFD emphasize the planting of fodder and fruit trees, feature information on fuel-saving devices in extension programs, and encourage school nursery programs.

e. H&SFD encourage women to operate small private nurseries adjacent to their homes and provide training in cottage industry activities since both of these activities directly impact and benefit females.

f. Planting targets be revised so the proportion of block plantation to private plantation acreage averages 40:60.

g. Funding and expenditures for buildings, technical support, training, and research be increased to the levels specified in the project paper.

h. Government of Maharashtra and USAID develop and agree on a modified PAR payment schedule which reflects present project activities and costs as of December 31, 1985.

6. Lessons Learned

Project goals need to be more carefully constructed based upon the interests and abilities to achieve the goals of all parties concerned. In some instances goals may be inconsistent with one another, i.e. to achieve the aim of social forestry to produce timber to increase the rural supply of fuelwood and fodder may be inconsistent with the aim of providing maximum income return to the participants through sale of timber as a cash crop. Also, the aim of full community management may not be an attainable goal given the inability of communities to decide on how the project products will be divided within the community.

In terms of training, the project has demonstrated that more specificity is needed in the PP as to who is to be trained, by whom, the quality and level of training, the facilities to be used and the numbers to be trained against a specific project timetable.

Finally, the sustainability of the program needs to be stressed. A greater emphasis is needed on measuring the success of the project not simply in terms of production output e.g. number of hectares of trees planted but rather in terms of how successful the H&SFD has been in getting the concerned communities to be aware of and to participate to the greatest extent possible in all aspects of the program.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

1. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following, items:

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Mission: USAID/India

Purpose of Activity: The principal purpose of MPSF was to build institutional capacity to motivate participation of villagers in the establishment of community plantations.

Purpose of the Evaluation: MPSF Project Agreement required a second evaluation in [illegible] to assess project accomplishments and to determine desirability and timing for a follow on project of AID assistance.

Methodology used: Intensive program of meetings and site visits by five person team over period of three weeks to collect information and data. Representative sample of sites selected by SFD visited.

Findings, Conclusions and Major Recommendations: The basic programmatic conclusion is that social forestry as it has been implemented in Madhya Pradesh is fundamentally flawed. The principal purpose of the MPSF -- building institutional capacity to motivate participation of villagers in the establishment of community plantations -- has fallen by the wayside. Fodder, fuelwood and small timber plantations cannot be managed on a long term, self sustaining basis by Panchayats because the existing political economy of the Panchayats militates against it. The combination of short term political motivation of Panchayat leaders and the tremendous pressures for grazing land for cattle owned by villagers are far too great to allow community owned plantations to exist for very long under Panchayat management.

In light of the above, the evaluation team strongly recommends that SFD undergo a period of program reconceptualization, restructuring and consolidation.

The following are high priority areas for program exploration and reformulation:

Land Availability
--development of estimates of amount of land potentially available for social forestry and its quality. These estimates would take into account encroachment, the likelihood of the Panchayats allocating land for social forestry and competing claims of other government programs on revenue lands. Enough evidence turned up during the evaluation to suggest that the availability of revenue land and its quality is a serious constraint on MPSF.

Economic and Financial Analysis
--exploration of the feasibility of establishing community plantations as financially viable self-sustaining enterprises. The team found that none of the plantations visited, as they are presently managed, will be financially self sustaining. However, the team's very rough estimates indicate it is technically feasible for some plantations to be financially self sustaining. Major changes would be required in the behavior and attitudes of both SFD and the Panchayats for this to happen.

Date this summary prepared: December 10, 1986

Community Participation
--formulation of an approach to engage Panchayats in the management of community plantations from the outset and in the case of established plantations for turning over full management responsibility to Panchayats as soon as feasible. The team found that much work remains to be done in engaging village level authorities in the management of community woodlots. To the extent villagers are engaged as managers in forestry by SFD it is through the nursery and seedling distribution programs.

Institutional Arrangements
--examination of arrangements with other institutions such as the Forestry Department, Revenue Department, Panchayat Department, Rural Development Department, Horticulture Directorate and various non governmental organizations to determine effectiveness of existing arrangements and alternative structural arrangements that would improve program content and implementation. The team found that the present institutional arrangements, including staff assignment and transfer procedures, within the parent Forest Department are an important constraint on the development of MPSF. Additionally, the traditional functioning of the Forest Department, from which all of SFD top management is drawn, may constrain development of an extension oriented program. By contrast, although their reach is decidedly smaller, the Horticulture Directorate and some non governmental organizations are extension oriented and accordingly their resources could be drawn upon to help execute MPSF. Radical alternatives such as splitting off SFD from the Forest Department or merging Horticulture Directorate and SFD and separating both organizations from their parent Departments should not be excluded from consideration.

Social Forestry Directorate Management
--determine means to improve continuity and strength of the top SFD leadership and hire personnel with background and interest in extension. The top position in SFD has been both a revolving door and "port of last call" for senior Forest Department officials on the verge of retirement. Over the past one year the virtual absence of top leadership has had a devastating affect on SFD morale and program direction. At lower levels in SFD many personnel have been transferred from the Forest Department to SFD with limited qualifications for their jobs and interest in them. Actions such as closing off transfer to SFD from the Forestry Department except by request, allowing staff interested in social forestry to remain with the SFD, and recruitment of qualified personnel from other agencies and the open market could help to rectify this situation.
--examine SFD program content and procedures with a view to emphasizing SFD extension services and private farm and agroforestry. At present the areas in which extension services are being provided are for private nurseries and in a few cases, private farm and agroforestry. SFD may want to give further emphasis to programs in these areas. Similarly targets could be reformulated to reflect program emphasis on extension as well as numbers of hectares of new community plantation established and numbers of seedlings distributed.

Note
The above summary covers only the major points in each of the sections of the paper. There are numerous other recommendations in the report and also in the first mid term evaluation of November 1983 that SFD could follow up on to the benefit of the State's social forestry and wasteland development program.

Concluding Comment
It may be that a major overhaul of SFD might help to establish community plantations that will have a life beyond SFD management. In the absence of a major overhaul, the conclusion is that the plantations will continue only so long as SFD or some other

government agency is directly involved in their management. Even then successful management of hundreds of small and scattered plantations will be no small feat and may very well not be an efficient use of scarce Government of Madhya Pradesh (GOMP) resources.

Following from the above, the main issue may be how to adopt and institute alternative approaches to forestry in Madhya Pradesh. There very well may be better investment programs than the establishment of community woodlots on Revenue wastelands.

GOMP/USAID Follow on Project
In considering any GOMP/USAID follow on activity to MPSF, the scope of work should be broad enough to permit the kinds of important change in the MPSF approach and structure that have been discussed in the report. In addition, it would be important to consider investments that are related to, but outside the framework of the MPSF.

Finally as regards the present GOMP/USAID MPSF project, the team recommended USAID not commit to exploration of a follow on activity without prior agreement on the far reaching type of scope suggested above. In the absence of such an agreement, the team recommends an extension of the project completion date by two years to March 28, 1989 with no additional funding.

Lessons Learned: The following are lessons learned from MPSF:

Quantitative targets -- in the case of MPSF number of hectares of trees planted and seedlings distributed -- raise havoc with projects that have as their primary purpose institution building. Physical targets laid out in the Project Description overwhelmed the institution building purpose of MPSF.

Time should be allowed for at least one successful run of an experimental activity before major commitment of resources dedicated to rapidly expanding the activity. MPSF design work carried out in 1980 drew heavily on Ford Foundation experimental field work begun in M.P. in 1978. With benefit of hindsight, it is clear the design was not up to coping with the powerful political and financial motivation associated with this massive scheme to introduce community managed plantations throughout 21 Districts of M.P.

Major innovative programs with complex political economies should be built gradually from a small base. MPSF leapt from a small, experimental activity to a major program in a period of two to three years. Given the indestructible nature of large bureaucracies, gradual development may make it easier and less costly to call a halt to or redirect an experiment that in replication failed to meet the promise envisaged.

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

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- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

Name of Mission

USAID/Indonesia, Office of Population and Health. Health Training, Research and Development Project, Project No. 497-0273, Final Assessment of the HTR&D Management Training Component Final Report, by Dr. Gary Bergthold, February 1986.

Purpose of activities evaluated

The HTR&D Project was designed to improve the MOH's planning abilities at both the central and provincial levels, and to assist in the extension of primary health care, particularly through improved services to mothers and children. The project contained four components: Planning/Manpower Development; Research; Management Information; and Diarrheal Diseases Mortality/Morbidity Reduction.

This evaluation focused only on the Planning/Manpower Development (management training) component of the project, with the objective of enhancing the training and technical assistance capability of the Pusdiklat and MOH. The specific outputs creating this capacity are people with various levels of skills in training and technical assistance consultation, materials such as case studies and training modules, and task analysis studies.

Purpose of the evaluation

1. Assess the major impacts of the HTR&D management training component on MOH training capacity and utilization of that capacity.

2. Determine which HTR&D training capacities are supportable by the MOH without USAID funding and describe the obstacles to continuing support.

3. Recommend a close-out strategy for USAID support for HTR&D management training activities.

Methodology used

This evaluation made use of two types of data - interviews with 40 individuals at MOH and Pusdiklat headquarters and the three participating HTR&D provinces, and a review of project documents.

Findings and Conclusions

1. The HTR&D management training component has been largely successful in introducing modern management training methodologies (i.e., problem-solving training) into five provinces in Indonesia and into the Pusdiklat. These methods have been disseminated vertically into virtually all levels of the organization. In selected provinces these training methodologies have also been disseminated horizontally into technical and management training for family planning, immunization and community health, as well as to some medical schools and public health institutions.

Date this summary prepared:

2. The program's training methods do not greatly increase the costs of training over more traditional methods. They are also socially and culturally acceptable technologies.

3. There is great demand for the program's management training methods in a variety of high priority health programs. These methods are also likely to spread to other provinces through normal dissemination channels, but more quickly through the large training expansion program about to begin with World Bank funding.

4. At least 10 individuals have received advanced training and have trained hundreds of others in modern management training methods. Other participants have received training in task analysis case development, impact evaluation, and case writing.

5. HTRaL has greatly expanded the opportunities for Pusdiklat and the provinces to work and train together. This has created an effective informal network for planning and has provided considerable cross-provincial support.

6. In most HTRaL provinces an informal network or supervisor/trainer "team" is developing. These networks have been effective at disseminating their skills and knowledge and in beginning to change the conception of the role and purpose of training.

7. Other technical inputs introduced by HTRaL, such as task analysis, case studies and impact evaluations, are seen as useful by many Indonesian health authorities, but are less appropriate technologies than the management training methodologies. The expenses and technical difficulties make these inputs unlikely candidates for permanent adoption in the absence of external funding. It is possible, however, to make these methodologies less costly and difficult, and introduce them as part of the training methodologies.

8. Pusdiklat is understaffed and does not have the technical resources to fulfill its mandate to coordinate all inservice training in MOH. The Directorate General does out of service training, with little Pusdiklat involvement. Although Pusdiklat's technical capabilities are still weak in relationship to its mandate, the project has made a substantial contribution toward building its capacities.

9. Mechanisms are not available for "loaning" personnel as consultants from one office to another in the MOH.

10. No inventory or information system exists within the MOH to identify and locate people with specialized skills who might be available for consultation.

11. The existing pool of experienced Indonesian trainers/consultants capable of assuming full responsibility for continuation of the program is still very limited, but 8-15 individuals could gain the necessary skills with additional supervised training experience.

12. There have been some attempts to set up permanently staffed training offices but this has not yet received official sanction.

13. There are no clear career development opportunities open to trainers and consultants.

14. Pusdiklat's expansion strategy is based on developing a training center (BLKM) network throughout the country. It is anticipated that BLKM will attract many of the HTRaL trainers as full-time staff.

15. Most provinces do not have a clear training strategy and plan. Much training is still done in response to opportunities and agendas set by central authorities.

16. Training and trainers have gained increased visibility but their role within the management system is still unclear.

17. Little evaluation of training is being done to determine whether management training is producing its intended result. This creates the danger that training will become irrelevant.

18. Trainers do not have access to relevant literature on training methods and management concepts and techniques, and their evaluations and follow-up methodologies are weak.

19. Pusdiklat's internal management is weak, and it seems unclear about what its proper role should be.

Recommendations

1. The highest priority should be given to the development of training interns so that sufficient individuals are available to expand and extend the pool of skilled trainers as they are needed.

2. The MOH should decide on a policy for "anchoring" trainers who are training within the organization. It seems to be moving toward making the BLKMs the training office in each province.

3. Efforts should be made to adapt the task analyses, case studies and impact evaluation technologies into less costly, less difficult, and simpler methods for collecting data on organizational problems. Training methods might make use of such task analysis techniques as short "vignettes" written by supervisors and health workers to illustrate field problems, and simple follow-up and evaluation techniques (such as collecting "critical incident" reports).

4. Mechanisms should be developed to obtain consultation resources from within the MOH.

5. Pusdiklat should consider expanding its role for identifying and inventorying skills, and for brokering internal consultations.

6. Pusdiklat should demonstrate to the Directorate General training models for trainers to work with technical specialists.

7. The Project's training activities should be continued with the objective of preparing interns capable of assuming full responsibility for continuation of the program. To support internships, 24 months of short term TA will be required.

   The continuation of MKMI training activities at Pusdiklat is important because of the need for a "home institution" for the trainers and for the potential multiplying effect this activity can have, if it influences the direction of other donors' support for Pusdiklat.

8. Pusdiklat should create mechanisms for upgrading the skills of trainers, provide exchange forums and enable trainers to tie into the international trainer network.

9. Efforts to create full-time positions for trainers and to isolate training from other management functions should be discouraged.

Lessons Learned

1. The integration of management training within the supervision function, where training combines skills building, problem solving and planning, should be encouraged.

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (May not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

Agricultural Research and Planning Division of the Office of Agriculture and Rural Development - USAID/INDONESIA

Purpose of Activity Evaluated.

The purpose of the Sumatra Agricultural Research Project (SARP) is to expand and improve agricultural research on food crops to address agro-climatic factors peculiar to Sumatra by developing a network of research stations and experimental farms in Sumatra. The network consists of nine research stations and experimental farms.

In 1980, the Sukarami Research Institute for Food Crops (SARIF) was created with Sukarami as the principal center. Five of the research stations and experimental farms were grouped with the Sukarami center and experimental farms to form the SARIF network. The SARP contributed to SARIF's growth and development through development of physical facilities, training, and provision of technical assistance.

Purpose of Evaluation was to assess:

- The overall capability and performance to date of SARIF to do research in the areas which constitute its mandate;
- The capability and demonstrated performance of SARIF to evaluate its achievements and to readjust its programs in lights of emerging priorities;
- Quality and impact of the program development in research conducted in SARIF during the SAR project, especially in areas where long-term and short-term expatriate staff were provided to SARIF:
- The adequacy of physical development of SARIF (building, land development, laboratories and equipments) to support its research objectives.
- Training of Indonesian personnel and building of the necessary manpower needed for the SARIF network.

Methodology

Evaluation methods used consisted of joint SARIF/USAID meetings throughout the one month evaluation process, as well as site visits to seven locations, formal interviews, meetings with SARIF staff, review of all project related documents, meeting with the Governor of West Sumatra, and an USAID-AARD internal final debriefing session.

Findings and conclusions

1. The original SAR Project activities were completed except for the development of farms for experimental use.

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2. Some confusion exists as to the precise mandate of SARIF. A mandate for SARIF has been prepared, though it appears to overlap with the mandate for other Indonesian agricultural research institutions.

3. Training of scientists for advanced degrees is progressing as rapidly as qualified candidates become available. The existing staff, when augmented by some 40 individuals who will receive advanced degrees within the next two years, will provide, with few exceptions, a well-rounded staff. A special effort will still be required to develop additional personnel in the fields of agricultural economics and plant pathology.

4. Time and expense involved in travelling from the headquarters at Sukarami to the various experiment stations is high. Every effort should be made to post as many as possible of the research scientists at the outlying stations.

5. One of the weakest elements in SARIF is the "general services" unit which maintains the buildings and grounds, including machinery and equipment.

6. Construction and development of physical facilities which are completed and/or scheduled for completion shortly are well conceived and should be adequate for the next 5-10 years.

7. A proposed international research and training center for upland rice at Sitiung would severely strain the administrative and management capabilities of SARIF, which is still in the process of consolidating its network of stations and programs.

8. Most of the experimental fields of the experiment stations of SARIF have not been prepared for use. Roads, drainage ditches, and leveling remain to be done. All experimental fields are small as compared with the size of the planned research staff as well as the physical plant that has already been built on most of the stations.

9. Collaboration with the C.S.R./TROPSOILS team in the Sitiung area is inadequate. Joint planning of projects would reduce duplication and result in mutual reinforcement of programs.

10. Funds are inadequate to support the research programs that are being planned for the six experiment stations directly under SARIF, as well as for the proper maintenance of infrastructure and related activities which support the research program.

11. The technical assistance provided to SARIF under the SAR Project by IADS/Winrock has been successful and significantly contributed to SARIF's development. Continuing technical assistance in selected areas during the next five years is necessary to consolidate advances made and to move ahead in developing and implementing research programs.

Recommendations:

1. The following mandate is recommended for SARIF: (1) upland rice, (2) high-elevation rice, and (3) farming systems for the humid tropics. Although it is recognized that SARIF's mandate is national in scope, its research programs should be restricted to its current geographic coverage for the next five years. Placing it programs on a solid organizational and operational basis should be the primary objective during this early period. SARIF should undertake plant breeding only with rice; other crops included in the farming systems research program should be those developed at other institutions.

2. Because most of the scientists of SARIF have only recently returned from advanced study toward the M.Sc. or Ph.D. degrees, it is recommended that arrangements be made for experienced researchers, from both national and international sources, to be brought to SARIF to assist the young scientists in planning their programs, and in designing individual research projects.

3. Training of scientists should be a continuing process. The majority of the staff expected by 1988 will have received advanced degrees in Indonesian institutions. In continuing training for upgrading the staff, it is recommended that external institutions be utilized as much as possible. Training of technical staff in support of research is as important as training of research scientists. This could be accomplished mostly in-country. The laboratories in Bogor could provide this training at low cost. Provisions for financing this should be included in follow-on projects. The organization of training courses for equipment operators and maintenance personnel as well as for building and plant maintenance staff is urgently needed. Much of this could be done on-the-job.

4. SARIF organizational structure should be modified to add a position Director of Research. Research support should be placed under the Director of Research and should contain the analytical laboratory, the computer, statistical laboratory, experimental farms, and the research stations unit.

5. Urgent steps must be taken to complete the construction work on all six experimental fields by the end of 1986.

6. It is recommended that an expatriate assist in the maintenance and operation at the physical plant and its vehicles and equipment.Adequate operating funds must be provided.

7. In view of the cuts in the GOI development budget for 1986, and considering the inadequacy of operating funds. It is suggested that no additional development funds be spent for construction other than those already programmed and planned for the period ending in December 1986.

Lessons Learned:

Institutional development needs are dependent on various outside forces and can shift substantially over a seven year period (SAR Project spanned the 1978-1985 period). Donors as well as contractors must be sensitive to these unexpected changes and must be willing to adjust project resources accordingly. When the Project was designed, GOI funds were not considered to be a constraint; but in the 1985/86 agricultural budget reductions as high as 50% severely threaten the operation maintenance, and repair of physical infrastructure already in place. Reduced budget levels also threaten support services to returning Ph.D. and M.Sc. degree holders, who are expected to operationalize the programs outlined for SARIF's future growth and development. The assumptions, upon which successful project implementation is based, should be examined periodically. In this case budget cuts have only recently become a problem and both AID and GOI are responding by curtailing further construction and by focusing on a smaller number of research sites. This contraction has been necessary in order to fully develop a limited number sites where trained staff and equipped facilities can be put to immediate use, rather than spreading these resources over a larger base with little likelihood of full utilization. Given the circumstances, GOI and AID have chosen to consolidate physical and human resources and emphasize more efficient management and administration of the research system, rather than to continue expansion.

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Name of Mission

USAID/Indonesia. Provincial Small Business Management Training in Indonesia: The IPPM/PPK Program, by Russell H. Betts, March 1986.

Purpose of Activity(ies) Evaluated

Because almost half of the two million Indonesians who enter the labor force each year are unable to find employment in the formal agricultural, industrial, or commercial sectors, many create their own jobs in the informal business sector. However, most of these businesses fail, largely because they are unable to manage the financial, accounting, budgeting, or cash flow aspects of business. To help overcome many of the constraints faced by small business and to meet AID/Indonesia's policy objective of strengthening the role of the private sector in the Indonesian economy, AID is supporting IPPM (the Institute for Management Education, a non-governmental agency for private sector business management training) and PPK (IPPM's Small Business Management Department) to provide business management training and technical assistance to the non-formal small business sector.

The purpose of the PPK Program is two-fold: to improve the financial stability and management capability of regional non-government organizations (NGOs) and to teach the NGOs how to instruct rural small businesses in the basic elements of business management. In 1983, AID began providing grant support to IPPM to meet these objectives through upgrading IPPM's institutional capabilities (largely through MBA and PhD scholarships to IPPM staff) and a three-pronged outreach program. Outreach I was to promote the institutional development of private management institutes outside Jakarta (via short-term management training programs for up to three provincial management institutes). Outreach II was to expand IPPM's expertise in small business consulting to other organizations (via providing yearly training for up to ten trainees from each of six NGOs over the six-year life of the project). Outreach III was to enable IPPM to support the efforts of NGOs and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to gain experience and skills in their provision of small business development activities (via scholarships to up to ten NGO staff members each year to attend the Jakarta sessions of a 13-week Small Business Consultant Development Course).

Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used

Purpose - The purpose of the evaluation was to (1) recommend revisions to the outreach program design which will make it more effective and realistic in terms of NGO development and using NGO staff for small business management training; (2) help interview, assess and select eight regional NGOs throughout Indonesia who are best qualified and willing to participate in the outreach program; and (3) advise IPPM on staffing needs, costs, and the best approach to start up the outreach program. Based on discussions with AID staff and the evaluator, Task 2 was dropped from further consideration at this time.

Methodology - Discussions were held with a broad range of people concerned generally with the issues of small business development, management education, and the Indonesian

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SUMMARY

NGO community, both during the four-week evaluation period and earlier periods over the past 15 years that the evaluator lived in or visited Indonesia. Several project documents, course materials, and other relevant publications were also reviewed.

Findings and Conclusions

In the four years since its inception, the PPK Program has developed to the point where much of its capacity is in place (staff are trained, a curriculum is developed, standardized procedures are in place, a coordinator is functioning, etc.). The program is basically a good one, but problem areas have arisen as the program has changed its outreach aspirations.

Program Directions - A data base on the conditions of small business in Jakarta has been compiled and the capacity exists to replicate the base in other areas. The program is also experiencing increased demand for its (donor-sponsored) services. However, largely as a result of being overly responsive to sponsor preferences at the expense of identifying its own sense of market or development priorities, the program has no long-term strategic planning, no process for establishing consensus on goals, and no procedures for assuring a logical progression in its development.

The PPK Program is also nowhere near being able to support itself as a cost center, and still requires heavy subsidies. USAID grants provide support in the short term, but do not help address the issue of long-term sustainability.

Program Content - The 13-week course modules seem good in general, especially conceptually. Specific curricular presentations were not evaluated here.

No feedback evaluation mechanism exists to benefit the development of future curricula. Also, the program concentrates on the trade and services sectors, rather than on production and marketing, which may not make it fully responsive to the business community's needs. Further, there is no indication that as the program's clientele changed from the original bank loan officers for small business and small business consultants to its current NGOs, the program also changed to meet the needs and interests of its new clientele.

Staff - While the program's staff are good, they are still relatively inexperienced. There is no process for replacing existing staff and recruiting qualified experienced staff when attrition occurs.

Finances - PPK has been losing money since its inception. Because it relies on sponsors for its support, it has concentrated on responding to donors' wishes rather than taking steps to strengthen itself financially.

Outreach Program - There is no evidence of strategic planning for this program: market analyses to determine future activity areas, criteria on which to base program decisions, and plans to guide the program's relationships with outreach clients are lacking. IPPM has not attempted to determine NGO availability, perspectives or ability (for example, most NGOs have little experience with small business management and other economic issues, and may be reluctant to accept IPPM's perspective). There has also been little attempt made to establish continuing dialogue with other interests, such as banks, who might use PPK.

Establishing Self-Sustaining Regional NGOs - In November 1985, IPPM requested that AID combine the three outreach activities and create eight regional NGOs. IPPM would then develop these NGOs' capacity to conduct the 13-week course and other unspecified small business activities. This attempt to create capabilities in new and untested provincial institutions will be labor intensive, require management and monitoring support that IPPM cannot yet provide, and will divert the PPK from activities that promise greater cost-benefit.

Universities - PPK is interested in working with provincial universities as "regional NGOs." Although there may be good reasons for this affiliation, it may not be

appropriate due to universities' emphasis on theory rather than practical training.

The USAID Project - Several activities specified under the AID grant have never occured, while others that were not in the grant have begun. Other questions must be resolved between AID and IPPM, for example, should the Outreach I program be abandoned and should more than one activity be undertaken in the same province.

Recommendations

The first four recommendations represent a short-term action plan for IPPM/PPK. Longer-term recommendations are then discussed.

1. Initiate an ongoing market analysis capacity that can provide PPK and IPPM with information on mid- and long-term market demand and prospects for small business training and services. This would involve taking a more anticipatory approach to market research to: (1) enable the evolution of integrated activities that are closely tied to an analysis of PPK's needs and potential future clients and (2) develop specific plans and actions for market outreach. The information gathered would allow the identification of, for example, paying clients such as banks and industry, potential clients from donor projects, and support from other donors.

2. Following from the market analysis, inaugurate a strategic planning process for PPK. This process would form the basis for developing (1) market plans (e.g., holding loss-leader promotional seminars); (2) program planning for outreach operations (e.g., identifying and implementing strategies to accomplish agreed-upon project objectives, establishing criteria for selecting project activities); and (3) preparing a PPK program development plan, including defining overall program goals, objectives and identity in terms of markets, program content, staffing, outreach and financing.

3. Inaugurate a program of regular dialogue with appropriate personnel from the NGO community as a prerequisite to any program planning for outreach operations. This would include developing a fuller understanding of NGOs, learning to deal more effectively with this community, and attempting to establish collaborative objectives and relationships between the program and the NGO community.

4. Develop a proposal to AID that outlines a new PPK outreach program for small business management training. This proposal should help clear up the present disagreement about the role and intent of AID's assistance to the program and should include evidence of having dealt with the following: (1) Finding ways of supporting NGO programs at the margin to promote more NGO involvement in the PPK program, rather than attempting to set up regional NGOs. (2) Establishing a training schedule for courses held in Jakarta. Instead of being fully subsidized by AID, other methods of leveraging support for these courses should be sought. (3) Developing a strategy, policy, and procedures for any institution building and upgrading efforts that might be attempted (e.g., dealing with PPK's outstanding committments, establishing performance criteria and escape clauses in the event of non-performance). (4) Establishing linkages and mechanisms for working with specific Jakarta-based NGOs, especially those with wide networks and demonstrated or potential interest in small business management development. (5) Making plans for filling program gaps which may result as a consequence of the departure of the program's developer, whose consultancy was scheduled to end shortly after this evaluation was written.

5. Longer-term recommendations. PPK should further develop and strengthen its curriculum, taking into consideration clients, program priorities and trainers' evaluations of their own programs. It must pay continuous attention to the development, professional upgrading and periodic replenishment of its teaching staff (e.g., employing successful small business entrepreneurs, developing an attrition plan, and perhaps offering incentive systems to staff). Last, realizing that the program will have to be subsidized to some degree, IPPM must determine how best to finance the program, by balancing paying and non-paying clients, and using current donor support to strengthen its program and position itself to operate on a self-sustaining basis rather using support as a substitute for market analysis, marketing and strategic planning.

Rural Electrification

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. BACKGROUND

The Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara (PLN), Indonesia's National Electric Company, is conducting an evaluation of their Rural Electrification Project, which was funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The evaluation, also supported by USAID, is designed to measure the social and economic effects of providing electricity to villages in Central Java. The evaluation will describe the characteristics of households, businesses, and other facilities using PLN electricity, what the electricity is used for and extent of use. It also will measure changes in patterns of energy use, consumption and expenditures and assess changes in household and community life styles, employment and income, educational and health care opportunities, entertainment and security. Finally, it will describe the quality of PLN service to customers and the demand for and affordability of electricity among the village households and businesses.

This is the second evaluation report issued by the PLN and their technical advisor, the United States Bureau of the Census. An earlier report (August 1981) described the conditions existing immediately after the introduction of PLN electricity to three demonstration area villages in the Klaten region of Central Java.[1] This report documents "baseline" measures in six villages in two of the seven USAID-funded project areas in Central Java--Klaten and Banyumas.

All households, businesses and public facilities in these six villages were included in the data collection with interviews taking place in January through March 1984. In three of these villages, PLN electrification began in 1983. This report describes the initial uses of electricity and the resultant changes in these villages. In the other three villages, electrification was scheduled to begin in 1984, that is, after the surveys were conducted. The PLN plans to conduct followup surveys in all six villages to monitor the changes due to electrification.

2. SUMMARY OF BASELINE SURVEY FINDINGS--HOUSEHOLD SECTOR

The survey investigated the uses of electricity and other energy sources among all households. A summary of these findings is presented below.

2.1 Socioeconomic Status of Villages and Households

The socioeconomic status of the three Banyumas villages, whose economic base is predominantly agricultural, can be described as "average" when compared to the rest of Indonesia. The three Klaten villages, located in an industrial area, are somewhat more affluent than average.

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[1] Klaten Area Surveys on Costs, Uses, Affordability and Quality of Service of Electricity, International Statistical Programs Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census, August 1981.

At the time the surveys were conducted, approximately 20 percent of the households and 50 percent of the businesses in the villages had electricity. In general, the households with PLN connections are better off economically than the households without electricity. Almost 60 percent of the highest income households compared to less than 10 percent of the lowest income households, have PLN electricity.[2] The electrified households in the highestincome quartile consume an average of 57 KWH of electricity per month while the lower income electrified households consume an average of 33 KWH per month. In 1980, the lower income electrified households in the three Klaten demonstration areas consumed an average of only 23 KWH per month. The higher income households in these areas consumed about the same amount of electricity as the comparable households in the 1984 survey villages.

2.2 Use of Electricity by Households

All the electrified households use the electricity for lighting, and between 30 and 42 percent use electricity to run radios, televisions, phonographs and irons. Although the ownership of these appliances is income related, they are used even by the lowest income group. Seventy percent of the households report that the major benefit of electricity is improved lighting.

2.3 Use of Electricity in Home Businesses

Twenty-four percent of the households in these villages have home businesses, but only eight percent of these have electricity. Among the electrified businesses, most of which sell retail products or process agricultural goods, 72 percent use electric lighting for an average of 4 hours per day to accomplish more work, 50 percent use electric for security lights, 10 percent use electricity for tools and equipment, and 4 percent for refrigeration. Forty-four percent of these electrified home businesses report that electricity has extended working hours. The average number of employees among the electrified businesses is also higher (2 persons) than in the nonelectrified home businesses (1 to 2 persons).

2.4 Use of Alternate Energy Sources by Households

While all the electrified households use electricity for lighting, all the nonelectrified households use kerosene for lighting. No household reported using electricity for cooking. Ninety percent of all the households use firewood as their major energy source for cooking, with most of the others using kerosene. These results differ substantially from the 1980 Klaten study, where only 34 percent of the households used firewood as their major energy source for cooking and boiling water. Although the use of kerosene for cooking predominates among the higher income households, more of the electrified households use kerosene rather than firewood for cooking at all levels of income. It appears that as households switch from kerosene to electricity for lighting, some then continue to use kerosene (which they are accustomed to purchasing) for cooking and boiling water, and reduce or eliminate their use of firewood for these purposes.

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[2] Households were divided into four income groups of approximately 1250 households each.

2.5 Household Energy Expenditures and Consumption

The average expenditure for energy by households is Rp. 6221 (approximately U.S. $6.00) per month. After adjusting for inflation, this is 1.5 times greater than the expenditure reported in the 1980 study. The electrified households spend approximately the same percentage of income as the nonelectrified households for all energy sources when controlling for income level with one exception: the lowest income group. In the group of lowest income households, electrified households spend 25 percent of their income on energy (15 percent on electricity) and nonelectrified households spend only 18 percent of their income on energy. Among the highest income group, both electrified and nonelectrified households spend 12 percent of their income on all energy sources. The electrified households in this group spend 4 percent of their income on electricity.

Comparing the results of the 1984 survey to the 1980 survey shows that the figures for average consumption of electricity and firewood have increased while average kerosene consumption has decreased. This is not surprising, as the price of both electricity and firewood has increased by a factor of approximately 1.6 during this time, while the cost of kerosene has increased by a factor of 3.75.

2.6 Gathering of Firewood and Agricultural Wastes

Households can purchase or gather firewood, while agricultural wastes are usually gathered. At all levels of income, approximately the same percentage of electrified and nonelectrified households purchase firewood, while more of the nonelectrified households gather firewood. In addition, this study concludes that after controlling for the effects of differing income levels, size of agricultural landholdings, and household size, electrified households spend significantly less time gathering energy sources than the nonelectrified households. The major beneficiaries of these time savings realized by the electrified households are the adult men.

2.7 Energy Using Household Activities

Most households members listen to radios, with little difference between electrified and nonelectrified households. However, 83 percent of the electrified households watch television while only 50 percent of the nonelectrified households do so; there are available battery powered or village televisions.

Households use lighting in the evening for a variety of purposes: security (51 percent), studying (57 percent), pleasure reading (25 percent), religious reading (15 percent), social activities (12 percent), doing chores (5 percent), and producing handicrafts (2 percent). At all levels of income, a greater percentage of the electrified households, compared to nonelectrified households, use lighting for security and for religious reading. At the highest level of income, a greater percentage of electrified households use lighting for pleasure reading.

3. SUMMARY OF BASELINE SURVEY FINDINGS--BUSINESS SECTOR

3.1 Characteristics of Businesses

In the Klaten villages, where the majority of the businesses are manufacturing establishments (factories), 21 out of the 111 businesses have PLN electricity, and most received their connection in the year prior to the interviews. In Banyumas, most of the businesses are small retail stores or restaurants. The vast majority of these 90 businesses are electrified, having obtained connections over several years. The average number of employees is higher in both Banyumas and Klaten in electrified businesses. The electrified businesses also operate more hours per month than the nonelectrified businesses.

3.2 Use of Electricity by Businesses

The businesses, just as the households in both areas, use PLN electricity primarily for lighting. Approximately 75 percent of the electrified businesses in both areas use electricity for security lighting and for lighting work areas. A smaller percentage of businesses also use electricity for water pumps, fans, and sound systems. In Banyumas, a small percent of the businesses also use electricity for cooking. Most of the businesses that operate machinery (primarily in Klaten) still use diesel generators as their power source.

3.3 Energy Expenditures and Consumption by Businesses

The factories in Klaten consume considerably more energy than the Banyumas retail stores. However, the average electric bill in Klaten of Rp. 5445 (for 71 KWH) is only 6 percent of total expenditures for energy for electrified businesses while the average bill in Banyumas (Rp. 9216 for 87 KWH) is more than 60 percent of total expenditures energy. The Klaten businesses also consume large quantities of kerosene, diesel fuel and lubrication oil.

3.4 Effects of Electrification on Businesses

While the Klaten businesses have had electricity for a considerably shorter time than the Banyumas businesses, a greater percentage report positive benefits from PLN electricity. In Klaten, 71 percent report an increase in profits, 43 percent report an increase in production, sales or service, 24 percent report an increase in working hours, and 14 percent report an increase in the number of employees. The respective percentages for Banyumas electrified businesses are 26 (profits), 19 (production/sales/service), 15 (longer hours) and 2 (more employees).

4. QUALITY OF PLN SERVICE AND DEMAND FOR CONNECTIONS

4.1 Quality of Service

Sixteen percent of the electrified households reported a "high" degree of satisfaction with PLN service, 81 percent reported a "fair" degree and

3 percent a "low" degree. These households as well as businesses experienced an average of three electric interruptions in the month prior to the interviews, lasting an average of 3-4 hours each. Approximately 25 percent of the businesses also reported voltage fluctuations.

4.2 Demand for PLN Electricity

Overall, 78 percent of the nonelectrified households reported that they want PLN electricity. The amount that they would be willing to pay for electricity varies greatly. Subscription could be a problem in the Banyumas area, where more than 50 percent of the households report that they would not be willing to pay a monthly bill of even Rp. 1500 ($1.50) for electricity; also, 50 percent report that they cannot afford to pay the Rp. 55,000 ($55.00) connection fee, even if granted credit.

Of the businesses who answered the question on demand of electricity, 71 of the 84 nonelectrified businesses in Klaten and 5 of the 11 in Banyumas said they wanted PLN electricity. A majority of these businesses plan to use the electricity for lighting, and more than half of the Klaten businesses intend to use it to run equipment. In addition, almost 20 percent of the currently electrified businesses desire a larger connection, and 8 of the 13 businesses using diesel generators for machinery plan to switch to PLN electricity in the future.

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND USAID/INDONESIA

A Review of the In-Country Management Development Project 497-0317 - August 21, 1985

Purpose of Activity: The purpose of the project is to improve the management capability of the Indonesian Ministry of Public Works. It proposed to do this by providing an American expert consultant in management training, who would provide advice and guidance in developing an appropriate management training program that would help to train a cadre of Indonesian management trainers. These trainers, with the consultants' assistance, would conduct management training workshops for officers of the Ministry. The workshops use experimental learning as the primary methodology.

Evaluation Purpose: This review of the In-Country Management Development (ICMD) project of the Training Center (PUSDIKLAT) of the Indonesia Ministry of Works was made by two consultants; an Indonesian and an American, with the help of a loan provided by AID. The purpose of this review is to evaluate the project and propose a strategy for the remainder of the project.

Methodology Used: The two consultants, after discussing their responsibility with both the PUSDIKLAT and USAID officers, reviewed the project documentation. This included the USAID Project Paper, the Project Loan Agreement, Project Implementation Documents (PILs, PIO/Ts, and PIO/Cs), reports on the project by the project team, reports by the management training consultant, and the actual training materials. Next, they interviewed the individuals who were concerned with the project. These included project directors, key leaders, and ex-participants from various workshops. The consultants also attended a three-day maintenance workshop in Lampung.

Findings and Conclusions: Based on interviews with ex-participants, the workshops have been very valuable in facilitating communications at all levels. Of the management techniques learned, the logical framework was mentioned most. This, they said, was helpful in making the project more successful, although some found it difficult to implement.

Perhaps the most important output to date is the cadre of 24 trained instructors who can successfully lead both the initial as well as the maintenance of follow-up workshops.

Because of wrongly assumed cultural constraints, it was believed that the workshop participants should all come from one or at the most two echelons. Actually, the workshops have been successful when two or more echelons of managers are included, and perhaps the most successful workshop included the Project Directors and their assistants down to three levels below.

The project has a wider influence than is realized by the workshops because the instructors are in demand to teach in other management programs of PUSDIKLAT, the Public Works Directorates, as well as those of other ministries.

ICMD project has had only limited success when compared to the expectations for the project. This is true primarily because the expectations were not realistic and too high.

The workshops started as general management training courses but were changed to focus on project management in order to improve effectiveness. Still, thousands of project managers and subordinates in the Ministry of Public Works are still in need of training.

This project has shown that the ingredients of an effective managerial training program are:

1. Support from the leadership;

2. A favorable environment or climate in the organization, a willingness to accept new concepts.

3. A good training course;

4. Instructors with management experience and the ability to communicate effectively; and

5. Enough of the key staff numbers involved in the training to create a "critical mass", enough people to make change possible.

Recommendations:

- Changes in the training program should be evolutionary rather than major overhauls.

- In-service training of instructors should continue in order to increase dialogue among instructors and improve instructors effectiveness.

- The use of instructor teams has worked well because it makes possible having specialists in each of the four modules working together at a workshop.

- In order to keep up the quality of workshops, no more than 12 two-week workshops should be conducted each year (24 instructors in 6 teams; 2 workshops per team) with an equal number of three-day maintenance workshops.

- A week to ten days before each workshop it is helpful for one or more of the instructors to visit the project site to meet with the top leadership there to find out what the needs are there. A follow-up visit should also be conducted in order to gain feedback to make further improvements.

- Although long-term TA is no longer need, short-term consultation would be helpful in teacher training, preparation of instructional materials, etc.

- Communication with the external organizations which work with the Ministry can be improved if these organizations know about and use the elements of the project workshops which are appropriate to their situation (i.e., local Government officials).

- In order for this project to have a lasting effect, it must become institutionalized into the Government framework.

- In order to accomplish the other activities which are important for the project teams, the team members will need to be divided up into task forces or working groups in order to: (1) train new instructors; (2) prepare a newsletter; (3) prepare instructional materials; (4) conduct workshops for other groups; (5) develop a KM-5 workshop; (6) develop good instructional uses for video equipment; and (7) attend the Development Management Course at AIM Manila.

- Participants expressed some frustration because it was not always possible to apply what they learned in the GSS or EMP workshops because their superiors could not accept their new ideas.

- Best to invite two - three people from each section of an organization since this made it easier for the participants to apply their new knowledge and skills when they returned to their units.

Lessons Learned: No lessons learned were provided by the evaluation.

USAID/INDONESIA
FINAL REPORT: NGO TRAINING ASSESSMENT
(497-0249) MARCH 30, 1985

Purpose of Activity: There is almost universal agreement among Indonesian and foreign planners that the country's future growth is dependent on the availability of trained manpower. Indonesia has an abundance of natural resources and substantial flows of capital; however, the country lacks trained manpower to utilize fully those resources or to insure the production absorption of large injections of capital. The NGO Training project is aimed at developing effective training programs, especially within the Indonesian NGO community.

Purpose of Evaluation: This final report was made to assess the current training situation among Indonesian NGOs and to assist VHP-USAID in developing criteria, rationales, and mechanisms for supporting further development of effective training programs undertaken by the Indonesian NGO community.

The evaluation sought to help VHP-USAID obtain a better picture of training in general, assess areas and programs where limited VHP-USAID funds can be used most effectively, and develop better communications and levels of understanding with regards to current objectives, needs, and activities within the Indonesian NGO training community.

Methodology Used: These issues were addressed by (1) case studies of innovative training programs conducted by major NGO training institutions funded by VHP-USAID; and (2) mapping of training institutions, programs, and resources.

- Discussions were conducted with major NGOs involved in training and with VHP-USAID.
- Workshops were conducted for the analysis of the training programs.
- Evaluations and surveys were distributed regarding training methods and curriculum.
- Observations were made of training programs on progress at various locations.
- A National "NGO training workshop" was developed, implemented, and documented for 25 training institutions.

Findings:

- There are now over 2,000 graduates of YIS courses spread throughout government and private groups.

- Most major government programs have connections with NGOs and visa versa.

- Training capacities of major NGOs are in high demand for two audiences: (1) for government line agencies, and (2) for smaller, newer NGOs.

- The development of NGO training capabilities can be credited largely to the fact that the groups were given discreet, flexible assistance by a variety of agencies allowing them to develop prototype programs, staff, materials, and skills that could later be applied to wider audiences.

- Large government programs also have found it effective to assist the development of NGO capabilities that can provide assistance to their own programs.

- Government agencies and multilateral donors want an increased role for NGOs in their programs. Yet, due to staffing, administrative constraints, guidelines, etc., NGOs are not getting the "institutional capability development funds" they need.

- Many NGOs (especially small or new NGOs) do little or no needs assessment.

- Few groups view training as an ongoing program where most training takes place outside the classroom.

- Trainees face institutional problems that keep them from applying what they have learned when they go home.

Recommendations:

- VHP Co-Fi guidelines must be developed and communicated to NGOs concerning the type of effort they can/want to support.

- A pro-active rather than reactive stance is needed when communicating with NGOs. Funding organizations should state guidelines and constraints, yet allow the NGOs flexibility. There should be contact persons between funding organizations and NGOs that have freedom to speak authoritatively but also must take responsibility.

- For projects too small to merit a full proposal/process, block grants should be considered to channel support directly to indigenous NGOs. International PVOs working in a partnership with indigenous NGOs can also facilitate the channelling of funds.

- Joint activities should be designed to improve training capabilities.

- New staff should be trained, and current staff should be given special training in technical assistance, etc. so NGOs are not just stretching existing staff still further.

- VHP should encourage the development of a training rationale based on a situation assessment. VHP should assist such groups by providing short consultation or technical assistance from more experienced organizations.

- People who actually do the training should be involved in needs assessment and participant selection.

- Combinations of training structures can often be mixed to make an effective program. "Pre-service" and "in-service" training is most effective when the two are combined within one overall system.

- Participatory training with a <u>combination</u> of methods is the best approach to training if used appropriately.

- Training goals should not be abstractly articulated but easily understandable.

- Funders should support field level follow-up activities as if they were (and they are) part of the training program.

- NGOs should be called upon for formal or informal assistance in designing and developing training programs.

An Assessment of Indonesian NGO Small Enterprise Development Programs

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose and Objective

In recent years there has been considerable interest among private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and donor agencies in the role of small enterprise development in strengthening the economics of less developed countries worldwide. Following the USAID-sponsored Small Enterprise Development Workshop held in Washington, D.C. in November 1983 and the Pisces II Asia Regional Workshop held in Manila in February 1984, USAID/Jakarta determined to find out more about the capabilities and effectiveness of Indonesian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) carrying out small-scale enterprise (SSE) development programs. An independent consultant and an Indonesian counterpart were contracted to conduct an initial assessment of various NGO programs in enterprise development. The major issues addressed in this assessment are as follows:

-- What are the respective strengths and weaknesses of selected NGO SSE development Programs? How effective are these programs? How might they be improved?

-- What Indonesian institutions have the capacity to provide relevant technical backstopping--staff training, consultation on program design and management--to ongoing NGO programs?

-- How might USAID most effectively support current and future NGO activities in SSE development?

Indonesian NGO SSE Development Programs: Some General Findings

During this three-month study, we conducted interviews with program staff and fieldworkers of 12 different NGOs and also visited their project sites to observe ongoing SSE activities, interview their small

entrepreneur clients and to assess what benefits were accrued through NGO intervations and what aspects of the programs might be improved. Our findings are highly subjective, based on what data we were able to gather in our brief visits, the interviews and questionnaires we used, and follow-up discussions. Some of our major findings are as follows:

Indonesian NGO small enterprise development programs are diverse, aimed at a wide variety of micro-entrepreneurs, involving numerous types of NGO interventions, and producing a wide range of benefits. Almost all NGO SSE programs are designed to reach the poorer segments of the population, frequently the very poor and marginal sectors. These include traditional artisinal craftsmen, home manufacturers, fishermen, small-scale processors of agricultural products, pedicab drivers, street venders and small grocers, among others. All NGOs seek to develop beneficiairy groups (pre-cooperatives) as mechanism for channeling assistance and to support members' individual and collective enterprises. While these beneficiary groups often have revolving credit funds as well as collective materials purchase, production and marketing functions, NGOs also intend them to generate increased community self-reliance and solidarity and contribute to an overall improved quality of life.

NGOs usually employ combinations of assistance components in their SSE programs. As mentioned, all utilize beneficiary groups and so offer instruction in group organization, management and bookkeeping. Some NGOs offer assistance in production management, marketing, and in providing specific production skills training. Others provide low-interest credit to groups and group members, or provide the initial means of production -- land, seeds, simple equipment, fertilizers, breeding stock -- to extremely disadvantaged clients on a loan basis.

Current NGO programs in enterprise development are producing a number of benefits. Because of the stress on the beneficiary group approach, the socio-political benefits--increased equity, popular participation,

self- reliance and self-esteem of the entrepreneur, and broader community spread effects--are more noticeable and often cited by client groups. Certain economic benefits, such as increased personal income and productivity, and the creation of additional employment opportunities, are also being produced by some NGO programs. Lobbying efforts by some larger NGOs have had some positive, though still minor, effects on national government policy towards small entrepreneurs and the beneficiary groups.

Despite the benefits being produced, NGOs have some common weaknesses that will have to be addressed before their programs can be truly effective in responding to the needs of Indonesian small entrepreneurs. These weaknesses include the following:

-- Because of their own uncertain financial circumstances and dependence on outside sources of funds, NGOs are unable to attract high-quality, experienced personnel. Also, because promotional opportunities within NGOs are limited beyond the "middle management"/technical support positions, NGOs have a relatively high staff turnover rate, frequently losing their most experienced staff who see fewer and fewer opportunities for personal development and significant remuneration within their respective NGOs. This "brain drain" has a damaging effect on the overall continuity and effectivenss of NGO programs.

-- The current ready availability of donor agency funding has pushed NGOs to shift program emphasis from careful staff development and maximal utilization of scarce resources to producing highly visible outputs thought to be desired by donor agencies. Programs are less cohesive and new staff are less prepared to assume the responsibilities vacated by their more experienced predecessors.

— Many NGOs do not have a clear concept of what is involved in SSE development. They view their programs as "income-generating activities" without seriously considering the long-term economic viability of such activities.

-- Even those NGOs with a comprehensive vision of SSE development requirements generally lack the institutional and staff capabilities to provide meaningful technical assistance and problem-solving services to individual entrepreneurs. NGO staff lack technical business skills and experience, specifically small business management, accounting and financial management, product development and design, and marketing. Program activities are rarely accompanied by relevant market research and/or feasibility studies, even for problem-solving purposes.

-- Perhaps because they themselves lack solid business instincts and experience, NGOs are generally weak in motivating individual entrepreneurial attitudes and behavior, or they fail to recognize where such motivation is needed for their clients' business success.

— NGOs tend to think small in the design and implementation of their SSE development programs. They do not give enough consideration to enterprise sustainability through developing economies of scale or establishing linkages with larger economic sectors. There also tends to be a lack of commitment to replicating or institutionalizing successful programs.

-- There is a general reluctance amongst NGOs, especially larger ones, to cooperate on issues of mutual concern, to share information and resources, and to learn from each other's program successes and failures.

Small Business and Entrepreneurship Training Institutions

There are several Indonesian institutions that offer consultation and training courses on small business management and entrepreneurship. These included private institutions, small business colleges and specific NGOs themselves. Some offer regularly scheduled training programs at their own facilities while others receive special training requests from clients and design training packages to meet the client's needs. We visited eight different Jakarta-based training institutions, interviewed program coordinators and trainers, and reviewed training materials. We also conducted interviews with former participants of many of the training programs. Mansour Fakih, a co-author of this report, has participated as a trainer and materials developer at most of the institutions we reviewed. Our assessments of the institutions and training packages draw heavily on his experience and familiarity with the training materials and methodologies as well as the trainers' capabilities at the respective institutions. Our major findings include the following:

a. The available small business and entrepreneurship training programs utilize three basic approaches:

— Managerial and Technical Business Skills, in which the focus is on providing necessary business management, accounting and marketing skills to the small entrepreneur.

— The Beneficiary Group Approach, in which the emphasis is on the formation and development of pre-cooperative support groups as a means of overcoming poor communities' socio-political and economic problems. These training programs develop skills in group administration, financial management, production skills and marketing.

— The Entrepreneurial Character-Building Approach, in which the basic assumption is that proper business attitudes, instincts and behavior are the first things that must be developed in a successful entrepreneur before providing more technical operational skills.

b. Some good training courses are offered in developing pre-cooperative groups, simple accounting and business auditing systems, entrepreneurial attitude-formation, and marketing. Any of those courses might be of value to NGOs wishing to upgrade their SSE development capabilities. Attention should be given to selecting the course most suited to NGOs' particular program needs, and also to obtaining the best trainers for a particular course.

c. Most training centers that offer regularly scheduled courses no longer conduct systematic needs assessments of their intended participants as an important feature of participatory adult education. Their increased training experience has not led them to refine and improve their participatory methodologies but rather to rely on their own expertise in designing training curriculums and materials.

d. Only a small minority of the training institutions have programmed post-training monitoring of participants' progress and problems. None of the institutions we reviewed had a comprehensive system by which to measure the actual value of its training material in increasing participants capabilities to provide SSE development assistance upon returning to their field duties.

e. Most of the training institutions are currently facing problems maintaining and upgrading their training standards due to high staff mobility. Even the best training packages are sometimes less effective because the current training staff are less capable and experienced than their predecessors.

Recommendations for Improving NGOs' Program Effectiveness

a. NGOs should begin to move beyond the beneficiary groups and provide technical assistance and problem-solving services directly to the individual entrepreneurs. Efforts to stimulate and develop proper business attitudes and behavior in the individual entrepreneurs are extremely important. This is not to suggest that the beneficiary group approach should be abandoned, but simply to stress that small entrepreneurs' individual business problems are not being solved through beneficiary groups and require specific attention.

b. In order to provide meaningful services to individual entrepreneurs, NGO staff must be able to identify small business problems and offer appropriate and practical solutions. To do this, NGO staff capabilities require significant upgrading, particularly in motivational skills, small business management, practical bookkeeping, product development and design, cost calculation and pricing, and finally promotional and marketing skills. It is possible for such skills to be acquired at any number of the existing training institutions. Selection of the most appropriate training courses should be based upon which acquired skills are most relevant to a particular NGO's program activities and clients' needs.

c. NGOs should seriously consider how to best improve the long-term economic viability of their clients' enterprises. Relevant market research and feasibilities studies should be conducted to determine product and enterprise viability. Increased production and marketing relationships between small enterprises themselves should be investigated as well as the possibility of establishing linkages to larger economic sectors. NGOs should seek increased cooperation with the private business sector as sources of capital, business expertise, and product development and marketing capabilities. Cooperation between NGOs themselves must also be increased in the area of SSE development. More sharing of relevant program information and experience in needed. NGOs should also

investigate ways in which their respective strengths might be joined in common program efforts and how specific program successes--product designs, production efficiency measures, effective marketing strategies --might be replicated by other NGOs in other areas.

Recommendations for USAID

a. In considering future SSE development program funding requests, USAID should inquire into the NGO's staff capabilities to provide more individual consultation to its entrepreneur clients, the NGO's marketing capabilities, program evaluation standards and prospects for developing sustainable small enterprises.

b. USAID can make available funds for upgrading NGO staff skills at some of the small business and entrepreneurship training institutions. Attention should be paid to how such training is relevant to a particular NGO's program goals and how the acquired knowledge and skills will be utilized in actual SSE development activities. Specific attention should be given to courses providing entrepreneurship motivational skills, practical bookkeeping, product development and marketing.

c. USAID might request that some of the earmarked outreach funds in its $4 million grant to the Institute for Management Education and Development (LPPM) be utilized to adapt LPPM's Small Business Appreciation Course to better suit NGO needs. Such funds might also be used to adapt LPPM's simple cash entry only accounting system (CEOS) to a variety of small enterprises. This accounting system, if made more universally applicable, would provide an initial and practical tool for NGOs to offer their clients as a means of separating personal and business assets, and for measuring small enterprise profitability.

d. USAID/Jakarta can request that USAID/Washington sponsor a comprehensive evaluation of Bina Swadaya's pre-cooperative program and/or LPBES's small industries development (PIK) program. Both programs are well-established and employ a variety of assistance components. The results of such in-depth evaluations would provide invaluable resource material for improving ongoing enterprise development programs and aiding in future program design, implementation and evaluation. (Refer to past cable communication--STATE 105370 and JAKARTA 17368--about this possibility.)

e. USAID might consider sponsoring a Small Enterprise Development Workshop in Jakarta and similar to the November 1983 USAID workshop. Such a workshop would draw together NGO SSE program planners and practitioners, private sector small business professionals, entrepreneurship trainers and educators, and PVO and donor agency staff. The major issues to be addressed would be as follows:

-- A discussion of the major goals and benefits of small enterprise development. What are NGOs trying to achieve?

-- Outlining important considerations for program planning, implementation and evaluation in the achievement of those goals and benefits.

-- Consideration of how available NGO and private resources might be jointly used to increase overall SSE development program effectiveness.

Such a workshop would provide an initial forum for discussion of the above crucial issues, and might lead to at least two possible results: a small enterprise development resource center actively supported and utilized by all NGOs and private institutions interested in SSE development, and the collective design of a comprehensive SSE development training package, aspects of which might be applied to address the specific needs of each individual NGO.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report contains the findings of a study conducted during a one month visit by Dr. Bungaran Saragih, Director of the Unit Studi Dan Evaluasi Sosial Ekonomi (USESE), at the International School for Agricultural and Resource Development (ISARD). The main objective of Dr. Saragih's visit was to use micro-computers to analyze a data set from the Citanduy II Project and to identify future research needs.

The Citanduy II Project (Procit II) started in 1981/82. Its objectives are to increase farmer incomes, reduce soil erosion, and increase employment in the uplands of the Citanduy River Basin. The project uses demonstration farms, subsidies and credit to induce farmers to construct bench terraces and to adopt new cropping patterns and input mixes.

While further analysis is still required, our one month study reached the following preliminary conclusions:

1. Farm incomes increased by an average of 310,000 rp/ha/yr because of the project, an increase of over 300 percent.
2. Terracing alone contributes an average of 80,000 rp/ha/yr. Discounted at 12 percent for 15 years, this annual return has a present value of 544,880 rp/ha.
3. Increased farm income from conservation measures is largely due to changing cropping patterns. Cassava production declined from 42 to 12 percent of the average value per plot, rice production increased from 7 to 27 percent and peanut production rose from 3 to 18 percent.

4. Labor inputs increased from an average of 860 hr/ha to 1,774 hr/ha, for an average increase of 200 percent.

Among the recommendations of this study are the following:

1. Quantification of both on- and off-farm benefits due to reduced soil erosion is necessary to fully evaluate the project.
2. A larger sample with more diversity of agro-climatic conditions needs to be collected in order to assess the importance of these conditions to the benefits of the project.
3. The costs of terracing need to be determined in order to assess the economic viability of the project.
4. The role of extension in shaping the input and output mix of farmers and their adoption of conservation measures needs to be determined.

The Citanduy II project began in September, 1980 with life-of-project funds of $ 18.9 million (L) and $ 4.25 million (G). The goal of the project was to sustain and enhance the productive capacity of the Citanduy Basin and to increase food production through the better use of soil and water resources. In pursuit of this goal, it was anticipated the project would:

- establish local and national capacities to design and implement a comprehensive watershed management program in selected areas of the Basin;

- increase sustained levels of food production in irrigated areas;

- improve local government capacity in the Basin to plan and manage integrated rural development.

The project has had serious implementation problems. With twenty months of its 6 year life to go, it has a loan pipeline of 86%. Although the Grant will be almost fully expended at the PACD (Attachment 1), unexpended Loan funds are anticipated to exceed $ 10 million (Attachment 2). Of twenty-five distinct activities under the project, several have just begun, one is unlikely to ever begin and virtually all have been plagued by confusion and disagreements about their purpose and implementation.

The project's very real difficulties have, however, diverted attention from some equally real achievements.* A sober decision on what to do with the remaining resources of the project requires a balanced look at what has and has not actually been accomplished. It also requires an appreciation of the changing development context of Citanduy II; what was desired in 1980 and what is needed now are not necessarily the same.

The sections below summarize the achievements and failures of the project. The primary conclusion is that although Citanduy II has achieved more than is generally appreciated, design problems turned what was intended to be a learning effort into an implementation struggle. The struggle to implement has overwhelmed opportunities to further the technical and administrative state of the art for approaching Java's upland or watershed problems. But most obstacles to implementation are

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* Most of the pipeline, for example, can be accounted for by over-budgeting and a major devaluation (Attachment 3), factors which should not prejudice an analysis of what has actually happened on the ground.

now removed and there are signs that implementing agencies are ready to experiment, learn and adjust. Although there are variety of projects underway in the growing GOI/donor program for upland areas, only Citanduy II has the staff and experience on the ground now to learn the lessons which have missed so far but which have applications common to all. A three-year extension of selected, scaled-down Citanduy II activities is recommended to further develop technical and administrative techniques for upland/watershed work in Indonesia. The Upland Agriculture and Conservation project, the GOI's Regreening program, local government in the Citanduy Basin, and the rumoured BIMAS Uplands would be the targets for application.

I. Output Achievements

At the output level, the project is not the failure that the pipeline suggests. Outputs can be divided into two categories:

Core Activities: the core outputs of Citanduy II were to be a) model farms and expansion of model farm technology in the upland areas of the Citanduy Basin and b) model irrigation blocs and irrigation systems rehabilitation in the Basin lowland. At present implementation rates, all output targets for these activities will have been met or exceeded by the PACD:

- 48 Model Farms, on target, demonstrating both terrace/food crops and agro-forestry technologies;
- Over 4,500 hectares of subsidized expansion of Model Farm technology, exceeding the target, with at least as much additional unsubsidized or "spontaneous" expansion;
- 28 or 30 High Yield Rice Model Blocs, exceeding the target of 22, established and operating;
- 10 rehabilitated irrigation systems, on target.

Complementary Activities: all other activities of the project were to complement or revolve around the core technologies introduced. Here the achievement of outputs has varied from fair to poor. Examples include:

- cropping research: results are evident in Model Farms and expansion areas. Greatest achievements have been the identification and popular acceptance of an improved rice strain and improved fertilizer regimes. Research, however, has focused primarily on food crops at the cost of other elements of upland farming systems. No mechanism to multiply improved seed varieties has been established. [Trials to that direction is being made for upland rice e.g. Ciwalen]
- local initiative projects: have been enthusiastically accepted by Kabupaten governments which have programmed some of the activity to areas where the project has otherwise failed e.g. seed multiplication and the provision of livestock. No targets were set but all loan funds will be exhausted.

Executive Summary

- A mid-project review of CHIPPS was conducted to determine progress being made in achieving the project's objective of establisning an epidemiologic health planning approach in the three provinces of D.I. Aceh, Sumatra Barat and Nusa Tenggara Timur.

- The review team established that virtually all activities agreed to between the GOI and USAID four years ago have been or are being carried out.

- Although each province is at a different stage and undertaking different activities, highlights of achievements include: neonatal tetanus mortality surveys, tuberculosis prevalence surveys, intervention designs, work on a vital statistics/cause of death reporting system, development of system to support community-level nutrition-health program, and training in critical analysis skills and techniques, such as, epidemiology task analysis, and drug management.

- Surveys carried out indicate that neonatal tetanus is accountable for 25% to 35% of deaths of children under one in two provinces.

- Issues identified in the review focused on how the problem - identification/problem-solving approach was understood, praticed and was becoming part of the system.

- Kabupatens are not being included in the planning process by provincial officials..

- At province level too much of the project planning was being done by the pimpro.

- Some local control over Pusat funds (Kakanwil's discretionary, supervision funds) plus Daerah and kabupaten funds constitute a significant source of currently available funds for local programming.

- The organizational development training activities were not being followed-up sufficiently.

- More information on the economic implications of CHIPPS approach or on the planning/budgeting process at the kabupaten and province levels would be beneficial for future orientation of health activities.

- Inadequate information was available on future funding possibilities for Come and SPK activities after CHIPPS.

- Delays in posting SPK graduates is a concern.

- Provincial system to monitor project Loan/GOI fund distribution or loan reimbursement status needs to be strengthened with LTC and pimpro monitoring the process more closely.

- Pusat-level officials generally were aware of CHIPPS but not familiar with details on policy implications of results of some of the activities. Bureau of Planning still has a need for assistance to orient, monitor process and advocate institutionalization at Pusat level.

- Based on findings, the following recommendations were made:

1. A facilitator be appointed at Pusat to focus attention on institutionlization and process issues;

2. More efforts be made to publicize CHIPPS activities, results, and policy implications at Pusat;

3. Greater emphasis be placed on institutionalization of CHIPPS approach (i.e., systemic/budgetary support that will ensure that epidemiologic planning will continue);

4. Broader-based involvement take place in CHIPPS planning at the province level to include the kabupaten and to coordinate among the subactivity project managers;

5. Long-term Indonesian consultants, who have undergone advanced training action-oriented/task analyses training approach, be appointed in all three provinces to follow-up and promote training/organizational development activities;

6. Quarterly Loan/GOI Disbursement and Reimbursement forms be adopted to facilitate financial management of the activities;

7. Studies be conducted on the economic implications of CHIPPS and planning/budgeting process at the kabupaten/province levels;

8. SPK curriculums and field activities be evaluated and problems with posting new graduates investigated; and

9. A process review be conducted in November 1986 to coincide with the 87/88 DIP planning cycle.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

INDONESIA - Secondary Food Crops Development Project (497-0304)

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (May not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

Name of Mission

USAID/Indonesia. Mid-Term Evaluation of the Secondary Food Crops Development Project, by William L. Collier, Sadikin Sumaatmadja, Sardjono Reksodimulyo, Gerd Juntermanns, Howard E. Ray, and Anthony J. Meyer, June 1986.

Purpose of Activity(ies) Evaluated

The Secondary Food Crops Development Project (SFCDP) was begun in May 1983 as a pilot effort. Its purposes are (1) to increase the production of secondary crops by about 15-30%, (2) to improve the marketing system of secondary crops, (3) to increase household consumption by 10-15% and improve the nutritional status of target groups, (4) to increase employment by 20-30%, and (5) to increase farm income by 20%. The SFCDP's four components have the following purposes: (1) crop trials and demonstrations to test replicable cropping systems that can provide an empirical basis for the formulation of policies on prices, subsidies, production, consumption and market development; (2) the introduction of improvements in the quality, storeability, and market acceptance of secondary crops; (3) the promotion of appropriate and tested production technologies using improved varieties, commercial inputs (fertilizers, seeds treatment, pesticides), improved agronomic practices, and site-specific cropping systems; and (4) the identification of changes in extension and marketing to maximize the contribution of secondary crops to improved nutrition.

Another important project element is the development of a planning and project implementation system that allocates increasing responsibilities to provincial and kabupaten agricultural staff to identify specific problems constraining production, to plan research activities for testing technical solutions to these problems, and to establish on-farm trials and demonstration plots to determine these technologies' farm-level acceptance.

Purpose of Evaluation and Methodology Used

Purpose - In examining the extent to which the SFCDP can serve its primary role as an integrated secondary crop research and demonstration pilot project, the consultants were asked to (1) evaluate the progress of the marketing and other agricultural economics studies and make suggestions to improve these activities' future implementation, (2) evaluate the system of demonstration farms and on-farm trials as the central feature of the SFCDP for disseminating new technologies to farmers in the project kabupaten, and (3) evaluate the entire demonstration package and delivery mechanism and provide recommended changes or adjustments in this project component.

Methodology - Messrs. Ray and Meyer evaluated agricultural extension and communications. During their one-month consultancy, they met USAID and GOI officials, took a field trip to East Java and South Sulawesi, and held follow-up interviews. Although their report is published separately, its recommendations are included in this assessment. The remainder of the team also met with GOI and USAID officials, and visited South Sulawesi, South Sumatra and East Java, accompanied by two consultants from the project office in Jakarta and the Dinas Pertanian office in Ujung Pandang.

Date this summary prepared:

SUMMARY

Continuation of Section J

Findings and Conclusions

After two and one half years of field implementation, baseline studies have been completed for each project area, 110 5-ha demonstration plots have been used over five cropping seasons, an in-depth marketing assessment is being conducted in the three project provinces, and adaptive field trials of improved varieties have been carried out over three cropping seasons.

The project's strategy for adopting secondary food crop commodities through intensively cultivated and supervised dem farms has had mixed success. East Java has shown excellent results, with a well-functioning extension system and long-established input/output markets. In South Sulawesi and Sumatra, the lack of sufficient extension staff and infrastructure dictate a need for more innovative communication and extension mechanisms. Specific successful results are discussed below.

Production/Expansion - Production increased 20 percent since 1981 to 1985. In East Java, the area harvested increased dramatically in 1984, fell in 1985, and is expected to rise in 1986. In South Sulawesi, area expansion rose from 11,025 ha in 1984 to 32,000 in 1985. The area planted tripled in Sumatra since 1982/83. Because expansion has occured in successful SFCDP dem farm areas, a share of these results can be attributed to the SFCDP.

Dem Farms - Yields on SFCDP dem farms have sometimes been double those in other areas, the dem farms have been very successful, and thus serve as a flexible diffusion mechanism for recommended technologies.

Cropping Intensity - In South Sulawesi and Sumatra, intensity has changed from one crop per year (rice) to two or three secondary crops per year. In East Java, intensity has increased somewhat from its high pre-project status.

Fertility - The SFCDP has contributed to cooperation between extension and research workers that has resulted in more site-specific fertility recommendations and the correct identification of soil problems.

Private Sector - Cooperation between extension workers and the private sector has increased, and a private company has offered a course on herbicide use to extension workers and farmers.

Pest Control - Close supervision by extension workers has led to improved pest management at the dem farms.

The SFCDP has provided tested research results, improved cropping patterns, and successful dem farms. The dem farm concept has now progressed to the intensification area where the inputs are provided as credit from the Bank of Indonesia. The Directorate of Production will have 90 units in each kabupaten. This new program is a direct outgrowth of the dem farm approach. Funded directly by the Bank, this program illustrates how the SCDP can test an extension method and then the government takes over the approach without additional funding from USAID.

What credit rate?

In addition, a number of problem areas still constrain project success. These include:

Training - Only 10% of the SFCDP's allocated training funds have been used to send staff abroad for short-term training or to develop an in-country training program.

Operational Support - A substantial part of the SFCDP is behind schedule, including cropping systems research, marketing and baseline studies, and dem farms.

GOI Counterpart Funds - Only a small amount of the GOI funds for training and operational support have actually been expended. However, beginning in the 1986/87 GOI budget for the SFCDP, the Bank of Indonesia will provide funds for the program.

Baseline and Marketing Studies - Methodologies for the studies carried out by local universities need to be reviewed and strengthened.

Pilot Implementation Unit - The Palawija Project Office (PPO) has had four heads in three years and these heads have not worked full time on the SFCDP. This has caused administrative, planning and implementation problems.

USAID Support - The PPO has had problems understanding USAID's financial and narrative reporting requirements and reimbursement procedures. It is felt that USAID has not provided sufficient training to the PPO in these areas.

Cooperation - Both USAID and the PPO do not fully understand each others' procedures. Cooperation between these two organizations has not always been adequate for conducting the program.

Technical Assistance - Only 50% of the technical assistance planned for the SFCDP has actually been provided.

Bulog, Bank of Indonesia and Ministry of Cooperatives - There has been almost no support from SFCDP to these organizations for their involvement in the project. The project paper clearly envisioned their presence in the program.

National/Marketing Support - The SFCDP has not been active in supporting the marketing of secondary food crops nor in the national crash production programs.

Private Industry - Although there are some private industry activities in the supply of inputs and extension programs, the SFCDP should do more to encourage these activities.

Recommendations

The consultants make major recommendations in four major areas and discuss a set of supporting recommendations. The major recommendations include:

Extension/Expansion of the SFCDP - The project should be extended until 1993. One to three kabupatens should be added in each of the project's three provinces, and the project should be expanded to include the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur.

Project Goals - SFCDP goals should be more realistic: the development of appropriate strategies for the transfer of improved technologies from the research institutions using an integrated extension approach to food crop diversification.

Project Implementation Unit (PIU) - An experienced Indonesian, assisted by a full-time staff, should be appointed to be full-time head of the SFCDP. The staff should be provided with sufficient incentives to allocate their full-time energies to the project. If there is no full-time staff, USAID should consider discontinuing the project.

Location of PIU - Emphasis should be placed on locating SFCDP in the Directorate most able to provide full-time staff.

Supporting Recommendations - The consultants make additional recommendations on revising the major responsibilities of the organizations working with the SFCDP, and on lending further support for dem farms, private industry cooperation, post-harvest programs, cooperation with other extension projects, and Indonesia's extension philosophy. They also recommend further efforts, study and/or application for the following areas: cropping systems, extension of improved technology, social and economic studies, project planning and implementation, and training.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

INDONESIA - Village Family Planning/Mother-Child Welfare Project

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

Name of Mission or Office

USAID/Indonesia. KB-Gizi -- An Indonesian Integrated Family Planning, Nutrition & Health Program: The Evaluation of the First Five Years of Program Implementation in East Java and Bali, by National Family Planning & Coordinating Board (BKKBN), the Universities of Udayana, Brawijaya & Airlangga, and Community Systems Foundation, September 1986.

Purpose of Activity(ies) Evaluated

KB-Gizi is the BKKBN-supported portion of the UPGK (Family Nutrition Improvement Program), which was established in 1974 by the Ministry of Health (MOH). BKKBN began its portion in 1979, when it introduced the KB-Gizi Program into existing family planning areas with high rates of contraceptive use (MOH targeted its portion in areas where protein-energy malnutrition was prevalent).

Under the KB-Gizi Program, basic packages of nutrition services are provided at the village-level weighing posts (pokbang) by trained village nutrition volunteers (kader). The services include the weighing of children under the age of five (balitas), the provision of family planning and nutrition education to mothers, food demonstrations, nutritional first aids (oral rehydration therapy, high potency vitamin A capsules, etc.), the referral of severely malnourished children to health centers, education about home gardens, and simple family planning services.

USAID's Village Family Planning/Mother Child Welfare (VFP/MCW) Project, which was established in 1979, has supported the KB-Gizi Program in East Java, Bali, West Nusatenggara (NTB), and most recently, Central Java. Through this project, province-specific models of integrated community-based nutrition, family planning, health and income generating activities are being tested. It has also contributed to the formation of operational delivery models and has provided the research and development laboratory to test, refine, and modify various strategies and approaches that have provided input for policy formulation and program implementation.

Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used

Purpose - This evaluation is the result of a two-year study (January 1984-January 1986) initiated by BKKBN on the KB-Gizi Program as implemented in all 8 of Bali's regencies and 10 of East Java's 29 regencies. The purpose of the evaluation was to respond to: informing policymakers on the efficacy of combining family planning services, mother-child nutrition and health services at the community level, and to establish and strengthen capacities to conduct evaluation research on the part of BKKBN and local university personnel.

Date this summary prepared:

KB-Gizi - 2

Research was conducted under the guidance of the Director of BKKBN and BKKBN's Deputy for Program Development. The principal research staff for implementing the surveys were: 7 individuals from BKKBN, 1 from the MOH, 3 from Brawijaya University and Airlangga University (for East Java) and 2 from Udayana University (Bali), and 10 from Community Systems Foundation.

Methodology - The primary tools for this evaluation were formal surveys, developed collaboratively by the team. After field testing the questionnaires, all data were made available to all researchers to ensure that each would have the capacity to continue the analysis at the end of the project. Three tasks were assigned and carried out under the study:

1) Bali Resurvey. This survey was conducted as a follow-up survey to a baseline study conducted in Bali (N = 1380) in 1980 in order to compare data at two time periods on certain variables. Both surveys emphasized pregnant and lactating women, but the resurvey (N = 1380) included a small sample of all other eligible women. The surveys included child-level variables (e.g., height, weight, age, and immunization) and household-level variables (e.g., education, number of children, age, method of family planning, water, sanitation).

2) Household Behavior and Community Profile Surveys. These surveys (N = 1200 in Bali, 513 in East Java) were conducted to provide comparative information on conditions that lead to successful program outcomes. The household surveys involved large questionnaires dealing with knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) and anthropometric measurements. The community profiles (N = 78 and 30 in Bali, 317 in East Java) were prepared for each community where households were interviewed, and included examinations of records and interviews with key personnel.

Together, the resurvey, household behavior survey and community profile survey allowed the compilation of composite variables on 1) status of child nutrition, health and spacing, 2) practices associated with nutrition, child health and family planning, 3) KAP on nutrition, health and family planning, 4) household characteristics, including home facilities, wealth, education, external relations, exposure to media, mobility, workplace, participation in community affairs and religion, 5) community profile (travel and accessibility, infrastructure and government activity, and agricultural resources), and 6) KB-Gizi program level, including duration, intensity, kader characteristics, participation of community leaders, and proportion of couples using family planning.

3) Determinant Studies. Twelve small-scale case studies were conducted at selected sites to shed light on specific determinants of the KB-Gizi Program. The topics included two surveys of women's participation in the program, factors influencing mothers' participation in KB-Gizi activities, two studies of the factors affecting kader effectiveness, two studies of factors affecting the implementation of kader training, the impact of the income-generating program, two studies on how information, education and communication programs affect mothers' KAP, the influence of economic and socio-cultural factors on program implementation, and banjar (sub-community) self-sufficiency in the program.

Findings and Conclusions

The consulting team offers findings and conclusions in 11 areas:

Bali Baseline Resurvey - There were significant positive changes between 1980 and 1985 in the province of Bali: the percentage of women who have ever used contraceptives increased significantly, as did the immunization of children, average age of weaning, and use of latrines and piped drinking water. While the KB-Gizi Program seemed to lead the rate of change for the first two variables, the degree to which these changes can be attributed to the program is not clear.

Findings and Conclusions (Page 2)

Program Messages - In both provinces, mothers know the purpose of growth monitoring, and while the purpose of weighing is strongly related to mothers' having attended weighing posts, considerably fewer have growth monitoring cards. Almost all mothers breastfeed their two youngest children, but knowledge of colostrum, giving children solid foods, frequency of feeding, increasing fluids while lactating, and vitamin A remains low to moderate. The percentage of mothers who have sought prenatal care is very high in Bali, and 23% less in East Java. Home gardening is very active, but only around 50% grow vegetables in their gardens. Although about 51% and 26% of mothers in Bali and East Java, respectively, know about oral rehydration solution, this knowledge is strongly related to attendance at the weighing post. Most mothers in both provinces know when their child should be immunized, and this knowledge is related to having attended the post. The most striking fact regarding immunization practices is their uniformly significant relationships with attendance for the youngest child under 5.

Nutritional Status - In both Bali and East Java, chronic malnutrition is more prevalent than acute malnutrition. Despite the difficulties found in measuring age and the consequent distortion of nutritional status, a relationship was found between ever having attended the weighing post and weight for age of the youngest balita (child under 5) in East Java. This suggests a positive program effect, especially when the dilution effects of misclassification are taken into account.

SKDN - There is great variation in the K/S (number of balita registered for the program and number of balita) and D/K (number of balita weighed in the previous month). There is also a great variation between both the number of balita who ever attended the post and the rate of attendance. These differences could be attributed to differences in communities in the two provinces. The authors find that there are limits to the usefulness of the SKDN data as they are collected and potential problems in interpreting data, although the system has strong merit and provides a solid base on which to build.

Fertility and Family Planning - Marital fertility has declined since the late 1970s among women in the two samples, and both provinces have significantly lower cumulative fertility and current fertility when compared with other regions of the country. Since 1965-1970, fertility in Bali has declined by 40% and in East Java 44%. While there is no evidence linking the level of cumulative fertility to KB-Gizi program participation, there was a moderately significant relationship between current fertility and participation. Also, current use of contraception was found to be significantly associated with the frequency of women's participation in program activities.

Women Under 30 Years of Age - The findings presented here include: 1) About half of the young couples in the project area have practiced family planning, 2) contraceptive prevalence is evenly distributed among age groups, husband's occupation, and women's educational level, 3) the higher the intensity of using contraceptives, the higher the users' knowledge of family planning practices, which is in turn dependent on mass media, contacts with family planning and health workers, social organization membership, and weighing post attendance, and 4) for those with over 6 years of education, knowledge is related to mass media exposure and social organization membership, while for those with less, it is related to contact with family planning and health workers, memberships, and weighing post attendance. These and other findings imply a different strategy to motivate mothers depending on their education. For women with low education, the strategy would be most effective if implemented through the pokbang, PKK, religious organizers and personal contact.

Kader Effectiveness - The several findings include: 1) Kaders who are newly married are the most likely to drop out of the program, 2) the ratio of balita to kader and the guidance provided to kaders have a significant effect on kader performance in Bali but not in East Java, 3) supervision and guidance by village family planning fieldworkers significantly influence kader performance in East Java but not in Bali, 4) only when the method of selecting kaders was during village meetings was there significant correlation with kader performance variables, and 5) there is no effect from awards provided to kader on the percentage of kaders still active or on program achievements.

Findings and Conclusions (Page 3)

Mothers' Participation - Only two household-level factors influence mothers' attendance at the weighing post: who cares for the child when the mother works (thought to be parent-in-law or grandparent) and if the mother works outside the house and far away. The PKK's level of participation is also uniformly significant to mothers' attendance and is related to the youngest balita's age at the first weighing in Bali. The relationship between feeding at the post and mothers' attendance is not consistent between provinces. The village level health worker's attendance at post was favorably related to mothers' attendance in Bali, but the results were unclear for East Java. The midwife's attendance is also significantly related to mothers' attendance, as is the attendance of doctors: these relationships hold more strongly in Bali. Likewise, persuasion of the village leader is clearly influential in Bali.

Interaction between Family Planning and Nutrition - The analysis reasonably well affirmed a strong interaction and apparent mutual reinforcement between family planning and nutrition in terms of weighing post participation and contraceptive use, family planning knowledge and practice, and childbirths.

Self-Sufficiency - The findings here include: 1) the P2K (Family Income Generating) unit has great potential for achieving a level of village self-sufficiency not found by other means, 2) more mothers attend posts where they receive nutrition-related services, 3) P2K mobilizes village credit for the economic activities of women, which develops entrepreneurial skills and presumably increases family income, 4) low-income families benefit from P2K to the extent that they participate in enhanced weighing post activities, 5) demand for the program is sufficient, 6) the program has an indirect but significant effect on kader retention and motivation, and 7) if properly operated, P2K can provide more financial support to nutrition and family planning activities on a sustained basis.

Future Studies - The mix of policy personnel and researchers was found to contribute to the success of the evaluation team because of the knowledge each could impart to the other. The Indonesian team now has greater knowledge of software and handling data sets, which should greatly reduce the time necessary for evaluation in the future. Accessibility of research facilities at the University of Michigan was also a feature of program success.

Recommendations

Bali Baseline Resurvey - Four recommendations are made here: 1) Develop a comparable indicator of wealth for the two surveys in order to determine changes in economic status as an explanation for some of the findings; 2) explore different nutritional status cut-points as a means of reducing the error introduced by inaccurate measurement; 3) categorize nutritional status measurement by team and identify those teams that exhibited less heaped data; and 4) employ procedures to more precisely adjust the paired banjar statistically before comparing those with and without the KB-Gizi Program.

Nutritional Status - Despite the careful field protocol employed, there was difficulty in measuring children's ages. This suggests that a better means of gathering information on the nutritional status of children should be used, and an on-going built-in system should be employed. Also, although mothers are bringing in children at highest nutritional risk (ages 12-30 months), weighing posts should increase their efforts to bring in older and younger children.

SKDN - Although this reporting system can work, further study should be done to determine why it works well in some communities but not in others. This system should also be used to monitor program activities and the implementation process in order to enhance the supervision of workers at all program levels. Because each community is unique, SKDN should provide local workers with information that will enable them to improve their program, and SKDN data should be reviewed with kaders on a regular basis so that statistics can be translated into concrete actions at the banjar level.

Recommendations (Page 2)

Fertility and Family Planning - There is a need for additional study focusing on the determinants of fertility behavior and family planning practices. This should include the modeling of an explanation of fertility differentials and a closer evaluation of the family planning program's outputs and effects on fertility.

Self Sufficiency - Program personnel should emphasize broader participation in weighing post activities, especially by trying to recruit lower-income families. Further, P2K should provide a loan size that would be useful for low-income borrowers, but reduce or eliminate the administrative charge and compulsory savings from such loans.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

INDONESIA - Village Family Planning/Mother-Child Welfare Project (Family Income Generating Component)

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

Name of Mission

USAID/Indonesia. Evaluation of the East Java Community-Level Income Generating Program (P2K) of the National Family Planning & Coordinating Board (BKKBN) of Indonesia, by John D. Nystuen and Mary Judd, June 1986.

Purpose of Activity(ies) Evaluated

The Peningkatan Pendapatan Keluarga (P2K) (Family Income Generating) pilot project was begun in July 1982. This scheme has been implemented by the National Family Planning and Coordinating Board (BKKBN) of Indonesia as part of the USAID-supported Village Family Planning/Mother Child Welfare (VFP/MCW) project in East Java. The project was designed to function as one component in BKKBN's integrated Family Planning-Nutrition (KB-Gizi) program.

The original purpose of P2K was to "augment the disposable income of participating women" in order to improve family welfare, "particularly improvement in the nutritional status of mothers and children..." The purpose embodied the assumption that the recipients of P2K benefits would be low-income families because "limited food supply at the household level (is) usually a direct result of low income" (USAID letter to BKKBN, February 16, 1982). The current objectives of P2K, however, make no reference to low-income families. BKKBN's Implementation Guidebook of May 1984 lists the following objectives: 1) to increase participation in family planning, particularly in more effective methods of contraception, 2) to increase the participation of mothers in acceptor group/weighing activities, 3) to assist the community to become self-supporting in improving family nutrition, and 4) to increase the ability and income of family planning acceptors/mothers of children under five through productive economic activities.

At the beginning of the program, P2K was to provide money to 26 villages in five kabupaten (regencies). This money was to be loaned to finance productive enterprises of mothers or female family planning participants, and would be repaid to BKKBN over 50 months without interest. BKKBN would then revolve the funds to begin P2K in other villages. In the meantime, repayments to the P2K from individual borrowers would also include fees for continuing weighing and supplementary feeding, administrative costs, incentive payments to P2K unit cadres, and compulsory savings to replace original lending funds. Thus, while the village is repaying funds to BKKBN, it would also be financing its own nutrition activities and mobilizing its own savings to continue lending in the future.

The original 26 villages received lending funds (between Rp. 700,000 and Rp. 1,500,000) between August 1982 and August 1983. In 1983, USAID expanded its P2K assistance to cover 790 East Java villages, which receive initial capital of Rp. 500,000 each. By the end of FY 1986, almost 900 villages were participating. Similar activities have now been introduced in 18 Indonesian provinces.

Date this summary prepared:

Purpose of Evaluation and Methodology Used

Purpose - In assessing the effectiveness of the P2K as a village-level revolving credit organization and in evaluating its contributions to BKKBN nutrition and family planning activities, the following were considered: 1) P2K's financial viability, 2) the identity of the membership and their uses of funds, 3) the support given by P2K to the village nutrition/growth monitoring posts (UPGK), 4) P2K integration with UPGK activities, and 5) P2K's contribution to the family planning information, education and communication (IEC) campaign.

Methodology - The consultants, two BKKBN representatives, and one PVO representative, conducted this 5 1/2 week evaluation. The evaluation focused on 17 villages that had the longest program experience (30 to 43 months); three villages with 19 to 33 months experience, which were begun with revolving funds from the program, were also visited. These villages encompasse poor to very good financial performance. An "historical comparative" methodology was used to determine the change in time of financial status and program impact of P2K activities. For each village, information was obtained via interviews with formal and informal village leaders, P2K cadres, and nutrition and family planning cadres (N = 200); monthly P2K case recapitulation records were obtained; financial records were collected (N = 62 villages); every fifth borrower's records were cotained (S = 100); delinquency information was gathered; nutrition information was collected (records on weighing post attendance and expenditures); and family planning acceptor rate records were collected when available. Because of incomplete records, the evaluators feel that some data may be biased or incomplete.

Findings/Conclusions

Because the objectives of the program and indicators of achievement are so general, P2K has achieved them all to some extent. Thus, the evaluation was concerned about the degree to which these achievements were significant.

Of the 20 sample villages, six had over Rp. 400,000/month of working capital available for loans and their programs are growing rapidly. Six had Rp. 100,000 - 400,000/month and represent a middle range of success. Eight had less than Rp. 100,000/month and their programs are considered to have failed.

Successful villages - These villages give more and regularly sustained financial aid to the nutrition program (the weighing post or pokbang activity) than ever previously experienced, and this support comes from the local community. The nutrition and P2K cadres are energetic and enthusiastic about their program because of the resources they now have on hand. These villages have no deliquencies, loan activity is brisk, and several of the borrowers pay off their loan a month or two early in order to be able to borrow again.

Compulsory savings - Half of the fee charged for providing loans is used as a source of capital and has been designated as compulsory savings. The variation in managing compulsory savings is too broad. The practice of giving back part or all of these savings jeopardizes the program in many villages. Again, the most successful villages are very conservative about returning compulsory savings to borrowers.

Failed villages - Program failure is generally the result of high levels of deliquent borrowers, who are late in making payments or stop paying entirely. Programs are also in trouble if they return 50% or more of the compulsory savings to borrowers because this reduces the amount of working capital with which to make additional loans. In a few cases, misappropriation of funds seems to cause decline in the program.

Financial support - Most programs gave financial support (Rp. 16 to 125/month/child) to pokbang nutritional activities. No support came from P2K units that have failed financially. Using Rp. 125 as the minimum amount for a nutritional meal for a child, nine units were providing above that figure.

Weighing post attendance - Available data from 12 villages showed that attendance of children at the weighing posts had increased 17% since the beginning of the program. P2K has contributed to the opening of nine additional pokbang in six villages.

Borrowers - Almost all borrowers had at least an elementary school education, 84% were family planning acceptors, and 93% were married women of reproductive age. From cadres' impressions, borrowers were mainly middle-income people by village standards. Most of them found the seven-month loans of Rp. 50,000 or less useful and they had very productive enterprises which could be used to pay back the loan. Very few loans of Rp. 10,000 or less were given. In general, loans were used as working capital for existing enterprises.

Family planning acceptors - P2K cadres from 10 villages reported a few women becoming acceptors in order to borrow, but most were already acceptors before the program began. A few women who changed to more effective forms of contraception were given loan preferences. Family planning-nutrition information and education activities were not regularly part of loan transactions.

Cadres - Of the P2K cadres, 40% were also family planning volunteers and 60% were also nutrition cadres. Seven of 60 cadres have dropped out of the program since August 1982, a low rate when compared to other types of volunteers. Most P2K cadres and a few nutrition cadres received some incentive pay from the program.

Conclusions - The P2K program's contributions include: increased attendance of mothers and children at weighing posts; the mobilization of village credit for women's economic activities, increasing both entrepreneurial skills and presumably family income (however, the lowest income families are unable to borrow from the program because they lack the means to meet the monthly repayment schedule); benefits to low income families to the extent that they participate in enhanced weighing post activities (thus representing a village-level income transfer from middle income families); and positive program effects on cadre retention and motivation through financial and other incentives.

P2K should be part of BKKBN operations as long as it is related to achieving nutrition and family planning objectives, primarily because of its extensive network of trained cadres who can effectively integrate P2K activities with nutrition and family planning activities. Further, an independent credit and loan program or one supported by another government sector could not support a village-level infrastructure as extensive as BKKBN's. Conclusions are limited regarding P2K influence on new family planning acceptors and maintenance of acceptors. Although acceptor rates continue to be high in P2K villages, it could not be determined if this is a response to P2K presence. The authors' subjective impression is that P2K activities support the maintenance of acceptors.

Overall, if properly operated, P2K is capable of providing more financial support to nutrition and family planning activities on a sustained basis than has been possible to date, and all villages, even poor ones, appear capable of supporting a P2K unit. Further, the P2K program has the potential to contribute to achieving some of BKKBN's overall objectives.

Recommendations

Before making their recommendations, the team notes that over the past three years, the original P2K villages have received an exceptional amount of assistance from the USAID technical consultant to the project. Even with this resource, only 40% are operating effectively, and only half of these are growing financially. Unless more resources are made available for supervision now, the rate of financial success will decrease. Major recommendations include the following:

1. AID should carry out a cost-benefit study of the program, and any additional support should be clearly tied to improved methods of management and supervision. The team recommends an initial capital outlay of not less than Rp. 1,500,000 per village.

2. Renewed effort should be focused on preventing loan delinquencies through stressing the necessity for repayment, fining late payments, and on-the-job training by P2K cadres from successful villages.

3. For villages with serious deliquency problems, highly visible campaigns should be undertaken to recover delinquent payments. After the campaign, uncollected debts should be subtracted from loans outstanding to provide a more realistic estimate of working capital.

4. Any return of compulsory savings should not be more than 8% of the total loan repayments in a given month and no savings should be returned if the monthly repayment total falls below Rp. 250,000.

5. Cadres should not be encouraged to retain funds in savings accounts in local banks to earn interest, a practice which removes working capital from circulation.

6. Financially successful P2K units should be encouraged to increase their range of nutrition activities and open additional weighing posts as their budgets permit and where circumstances warrant.

7. The policy of lending to family planning acceptors and mothers of children under age five should be continued as a first priority. Also, the current policies on the size of loans should be maintained (because they target middle income women) and the administrative charge on smaller loans (which target low income women) should be lowered. The present use of administrative fees should be retained.

8. BKKBN should continue to implement P2K programs, while upgrading its management, administrative, and supervisory capabilities at all levels. Likewise, USAID should continue to support the development of the program, stressing consolidation rather than expansion.

9. USAID should support training and supervision projects to assure adequate training for both cadres and BKKBN supervisory personnel. In addition, AID should explore ways to improve the monitoring and supervision of P2K activities.

A.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

INDONESIA - Private Sector Development Project -- Investment Promotion Contracts (497-0329)

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

Name of Mission

USAID/Indonesia. Memo: Private Sector Development Project No. 497-0329: Evaluation of BKPM Investment Promotion Contracts, by Gordon H. West, EED/Indonesia and Lawrence Brown, PRE/Bangkok, February 19, 1986.

Purpose of Activity(ies) Evaluated

The purpose of the Private Sector Development Project is to "test methods of strengthening the Indonesian private sector through training and links to the U.S. private sector, and to provide information to Indonesian decision-makers about opportunities to develop the Indonesian private sector." This evaluation concerns the Facilitating Private Investment component, under which the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) was to retain local consulting firms with U.S. ties in order to identify opportunities, prepare investment project profiles, and facilitate joint activities between Indonesian and U.S. entrepreneurs.

The contractors retained-- P.T. Resources Jaya Teknik Management Indonesia (RMI) and Business Advisory Indonesia (BAI)-- were to prepare project profiles and provide consulting assistance to Indonesian entrepreneurs and U.S. investors interested in projects that both meet the priorities determined by the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and demonstrate potential for generating employment with a minimum dislocation or displacement of new jobs. The contractors were to give special attention to projects in agribusiness and light manufacturing. A copy of the contract for consulting services is found in Attachment II.

Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used

Purpose. In this mid-term evaluation, information was to be obtained on the number, quality, and purpose of the profiles; the amount of money and hours spent preparing each; and the resulting indications of investor interest. For the consulting services, the number of companies using the service, the money and hours spent on each business consulted, the results of the consultations, and the quality of services were to be evaluated. Also, the initiative, promptness and organization of BKPM, each contractor, and USAID were to be evaluated, as were the appropriateness of the scope of work, format, procedures, and nature of the contract. Recommendations for needed changes on all of the above-mentioned aspects were also to be provided.

Methodology. Three drafts and two completed profiles were reviewed, as were costs and other data submitted by the contractors. Gordon West, one of the evaluators, also served as Project Officer for this component, and thus had frequent communications with BKPM and the contractors, as well as opportunities to review their work.

Date this summary prepared:

Findings and Conclusions

Industry Profiles - BAI. Three profiles were nearing completion when the evaluation was conducted. The first was on glass fiber production, which was prepared with assistance from PPG Industries. Given the market's current over-capacity and the limited local market, BAI questioned the near-term prospects for glass fiber. However, this situation could change in the next five years. The second concerned single-cell protein production of animal feeds. Realizing that this industry's processes are still too experimental for commercial operation in Indonesia, BAI wrote the profile as a result of Indonesian interest, with the intent of dissuading potential investors. The third profile was on pumps, compressors and hydraulics. The main problem in this area was the extreme segmentation and thus limited potential market for pumps. A fourth profile was assigned (on active electronics) but BKPM later changed its focus to high-tech active electronic components. Because a potential investor pulled out of Indonesia when this profile was being prepared, BAI felt it should not be completed.

The average cost per profile was $40,000. Also, although BAI attempted to tie the selection of profiles to expressions of investor interest, BKPM changed the profile topics and refused to terminate a profile once it proved infeasible. Thus far, no signs of investor interest have been ascertained as a result of the profiles.

Industry Profiles - RMI. Two profiles were completed; both are reasonably thorough, although neither contains the required overview of the Indonesian investment climate. The first was on industrial salt production. In this profile, RMI did not clarify the roles of foreign investors or the position of a proposed company vis-a-vis the dominant government company within this industry. The second concerned pig raising, which was deemed infeasible because of the current market situation.

The average cost per profile was $15,000. After submitting 18 profile topics to BKPM, all of which were rejected, RMI did preliminary work on 6 topics suggested by BKPM and 4 received approval. All four were subcontracted, which minimized costs but disenfranchised the profiles from the investment consulting. The salt and pig raising profiles were completed by P.T. BMB and two others, on furfural and salicylic acid production, are being prepared by P.T. Trihasta. No investor interested has been expressed thus far.

Consulting - BAI. Eight large U.S. firms and 12 Indonesian firms of various sizes used BAI's consulting services. Referrals came from USG and private sources; none came from BKPM. As a result of billing and profile delays, BAI postponed its consulting, which greatly limited this activity. On the whole, BAI had a rather passive approach to pursuing potential investors, but proved very effective with customers who sought its services The cost for BAI's 150 hours of consulting was about $10,000, with $70,000 used for promotion and market research.

Consulting - RMI. Following 200 inquiries, investment consulting services were provided to 34 private firms. Four referrals were made by BKPM. Approximately 67% of the Indonesian inquiries were related to agribusiness, as compared to 25% of the U.S. inquiries. Light manufacturing received about 65% of RMI's consulting services. RMI was more aggressive in pursuing potential joint venture partners, spending about $160,000 for promotion and research. Approximately $20,000 was spent on consulting services.

Consulting Results. Out of a total of 250 inquiries, 54 U.S. and Indonesian firms received consulting time. Of these, 8 received the full 25 hours alloted and 3 U.S. firms paid for additional time. As a result of consultations, 6 applications were made to BKPM and 4 seem relatively certain (Duracell, Monsanto, Parker Drilling, and P.T. Cipta Restu Sarana). Their potential investment and jobs created are $10 million and 550, respectively. These figures can be compared to an investment of $240,000 ($80,000 to BAI and $160,000 to RMI), a very good percentage return by world investment promotion standards.

The quality of consulting varied greatly depending on the business of the applicant. For some obscure requests, more research time was needed by the consultants, which may be justified in light of possible returns.

Project Administration. BKPM performed poorly in implementing the contracts, issuing almost no written direction, incurring delays of 6 months or more, and showing no real interest in the project's substance. By reversing decisions on profile selection and refusing to give reasons for rejecting choices, it proved a negative factor in project implementation. The Chairman was enthusiastic, but numerous staff changes contributed to inconsistency and lack of understanding of the project.

Although the contractors' work appears to be good, their administration was not. Quarterly reports were late and not well documented, and billings were irregular and poorly substantiated. RMI did better at communicating with BKPM than BAI. While USAID expended much effort to improve contract administration, a firmer stance should have been taken earlier in the project and more effort should have been made to elevate contract problems to the Chairman's attention.

Recommendations

1. Profiles should be dropped from the contract's scope of work and the focus should instead be on investment promotion and consulting. For several reasons, including rapidly changing market conditions, lack of contractor expertise, BKPM selection priorities that do not reflect investor interest, and lack of promotion on the part of BKPM, the market profiles are of questionable benefit.

2. Allow contractors to market their services more aggressively. Because the current market in Indonesia is not sufficient to make investment consulting profitable, the hours available to Indonesian investors should be increased. The 25 free hours per U.S. investor should be continued in order to support consulting businesses that might not survive otherwise. To market more aggressively outside Jakarta or in the U.S., a cost-reimbursable line item for travel and promotion should be added to the scope of work. Also, market research related to potential investments should be allowed. Last, expectations about increasing BKPM's participation in investment promotion and about total investments should be kept realistic in light of current regulatory and market environments.

3. Clear up uncertainties in billing and reporting procedures, and insist on the BKPM Chairman's oversight of contract backstopping. In this vein, recommendations include: the Chairman should take an active role in ensuring that his staff complete required actions, BKPM must accept a contract structure that assumes a certain amount of trust, contractors' requests to pay invoices must be honored after 30 days, billing and report formats must be established and added to the contract, invoices and reports must be submitted promptly based on contract-established deadlines, BAI must establish better rapport with BKPM, regular meetings must be held with all concerned parties, scopes of work must be revised based on agreed-upon changes in the profiles, and the contract should stipulate that reports be submitted in both English and Bahasa Indonesia.

4. Based on the encouraging initial results of the project and because no other efforts are being made in investment consulting in Indonesia, the two contracts should be extended for the full three years, provided that agreement is reached on the various points discussed in this evaluation. Despite the tremendous implementation problems encountered to date, four investments valued at $10 million and possibly creating 500 jobs, will likely be concluded as a result of the project's contract promotion activities. Thus, it was concluded that this project was a worthwhile effort and should be continued.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SOUTHERN ITALY EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT OF THE PVO COMPONENT

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROGRAM BACKGROUND

On November 23, 1980, at 7:30 p.m., a devastating earthquake registering 6.8 on the Richter Scale struck Southern Italy. Major damage was centered in the Avellino, Salerno, and Potenza Provinces. Almost three thousand lives lost, thousands injured, and over a quarter million were made homeless. Roughly 100,000 structures, e.g., schools, houses and public buildings, were damaged or completely destroyed. The Government of Italy estimated the cost of recovery (repair and reconstruction) at $18.5 billion.

Governments, relief agencies, churches, individuals, families and fraternal organizations throughout the world responded with an immediate outpouring of assistance. The U.S. Congress appropriated $50 million for relief and reconstruction for the earthquake victims and with these funds a $4 million relief effort was quickly launched by the USG's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. U.S. private and voluntary organization (PVO) efforts paralleled the USG response by providing medical supplies and services, temporary housing, food assistance and other interventions to the affected areas.

Numerous Italian-American federations, associations and groups raised money to respond to the disaster. In December 1980, a group called IDEA (Italian Disaster Emergency Assistance) was formed in an effort to prevent duplication of PVO efforts, enhance coordination, and stimulate release of funds by donor groups to PVOs that had already launched their relief and reconstruction programs. In April 1981, AID and the Government of Italy (GOI) signed an "umbrella agreement" for a school reconstruction program. At the same time, through the efforts of IDEA and with the support of Congress, AID established a $4 million Matching Grant program with the U.S. PVOs. Over the course of the next three years, Congress appropriated an additional $30 million for the Southern Italy Earthquake Reconstruction program (SIERP), bringing the total of USG support to this effort up to $80 million. The amount of

$15,960,640 was obligated in grant support for the PVO reconstruction efforts. Three U.S. PVOs have been the principal participants in this program--Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children Federation, and the Salvation Army World Service Office. Their reconstruction activities have involved housing, education, welfare services, health, and livestock-related projects.

The largest portion of AID's SIERP funding, $64 million, has gone to the design and construction of 28 medium to large sized schools. Additional activities under SIERP include a fellowship program for university researchers valued at $1.5 million and a $2 million project designed to assist the seismically active area near Naples to more fully develop its early warning capability for potential volcanic eruptions.

The purpose of this evaluation was to review the overall progress of Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Save the Children (SCF), and the Salvation Army World Service Office (SAWSO) and the impact of their programs financed under AID Matching and Operational Program Grants. Equally important purposes of this evaluation were to assess the effectiveness of AID/Naples management of the program and the role played by IDEA.

II. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. General Assessment

AID-funded programs administered by CRS, SCF and SAWSO have been successful in contributing to the overall goal of the program in demonstrating the concern of the American people and government for the people of Southern Italy in their reconstruction efforts following the earthquake of November 23, 1980. These three PVOs have played a role complementary to the work of the AID Office in Naples. They have successfully managed their own private donor monies as well as the USG grant funding made available to them for this purpose through SIERP. The projects selected and implemented by CRS, SCF and SAWSO have met the stated expectations of Matching Grant funds (totaling $5,164,333) and Operational Program Grant funds (totaling $10,836,002). Overall, it was the assessment of the evaluation team that the subprojects met Congressional intent and AID criteria. They are: located in the earthquake affected areas; permanent reconstruction or construction efforts meeting defined community needs; operational facilities with programs capable of sustaining their recurring costs; and

symbolic statements of the goodwill and concern of the people and government of the United States of America.

AID/Naples intentionally "arms-length" involvement in the PVO program was found to be generally effective in not increasing staffing demands on the AID office. The consultative role played by AID/Naples Office was valued by the PVOs. The administrative and management assistance provided by the AID/Naples Project Manager when combined with the technical expertise of engineering staff was an effective way to backstop this project. AID/Naples ability to foster an environment of exchange and participation was consistently cited by the PVOs as a major contribution to the program's successful implementation.

The formation of the consortia, Italian Disaster Earthquake Assistance (IDEA), was found to be an innovative and effective vehicle for mobilizing a concerned constituency of Americans who sought to coordinate American relief efforts in Italy. This body was also successful in engaging AID financial support for PVO earthquake reconstruction efforts. IDEA was able to distribute AID grant resources through a budgetary allocation process involving PVO representation. Limitations were encountered, however, in IDEA's subproject selection and approval process.

B. Administration

In the administration of this program, it was necessary for AID and the PVOs to seek an administrative balance between the emergency response demands of the earthquake affected areas and the administrative requirements of a long-term reconstruction effort. Given the "people-to-people" nature of this program and the subtle complexities of working within the context of Southern Italy, the decision made by AID to utilize the administrative structure of U.S. PVOs working with local affiliates and offices for the implementation of these grants was affirmed by the evaluation team. PVOs, through their local contacts, constituency support networks and familiarity with the earthquake-affected areas, were able to solve operational problems involving land site acquisition, local contract negotiation, local building permit authorization, and utility connections necessary for the implementation of this program. Although some delays in the implementation of grants were experienced by PVOs as they confronted and resolved these operational concerns, by December 31, 1986, all approved PVO project construction, reconstruction and renovation efforts

will have been completed. As of June 30, 1986, 90% of the PVO reconstruction component had been carried out.

C. Impact

Under the SIERP, AID funding through PVO Matching and "umbrella" grants has committed approximately $13,800,000 for subproject assistance to nearly 60 local organizations and hundreds of families in the earthquake zone. Projects have involved the reconstruction of existing facilities, the construction of new facilities and the purchase of equipment.

Assistance was provided to 5 housing projects, 7 educational institutions, 5 health facilities, 1 factory, 2 livestock projects, 8 community centers, 6 orphanages, 3 athletic fields or playgrounds, 6 homes for the aged, 5 service institutes for children, 2 drug rehabilitation centers and a variety of other community welfare programs. The impact on beneficiaries was varied and broad with projects not only providing for immediate relief needs such as the CRS housing in Montella but also impacting on the establishment of health care facilities in areas previously not reached. The impact of this program is geographically extensive covering over 50 communities in the earthquake affected provinces. A conservative estimate is 85,000 direct beneficiaries have been assisted through AID grant funding to the PVOs.

D. Observations and Recommendations

1. Role and Effectiveness of PVOs

Observations

- PVOs will tend to concentrate on target areas where they are known or have links to the community. While this can serve to enhance the likelihood of project success, it can also negatively influence project selection and reduce the chances for broader distribution of project benefits.

- PVOs can be participants in national education and health programs developing innovative models for replication. SCF's medical center and elementary school projects are serving as prototypes for broader regional application.

- PVOs worked effectively with Italian Government levels (national, regional, and municipal).

2. Role and Effectiveness of IDEA

Observations

- IDEA was highly effective in lobbying the Congress to make funds apportioned for the SIERP program available for funding of U.S. PVO reconstruction efforts.

- Notwithstanding IDEA's membership composition and limited resources, it was generally effective in managing or brokering the PVO budget allocation process for AID. However, it was less effective in conducting a substantive and technical PVO program review and approval process.

Recommendation

AID's normal way of doing business is to directly review and approve unsolicited PVO proposals. In the evaluators' opinion, this is the generally preferred approach. When for either situational or political reasons it is necessary for AID to distance itself from the PVO budget allocation process, AID could consider utilizing an IDEA-like body to advise on an overall PVO budget level. However, it is recommended that program review, approval and obligation authorities rest with AID. This would enable direct negotiation between AID and PVO applicants and would base project selection and funding decisions on a substantive and technical review.

3. Matching Grant vs. "Umbrella" or OPG Concept

Observations

The AID Matching Grant program requiring PVOs to match USG funds on a dollar for dollar basis generally slowed programming and was not highly effective in leveraging new private dollars. AID's decision to begin providing OPGs in 1982 was a good one because:

- The parameters of USG funding commitment to a PVO were set providing a framework for PVO planning and staffing.

- The "umbrella" mechanism was less AID management intensive.

- OPGs readily accommodated the longer time frame requirements of a reconstruction phase.

o A means for linking local or other donor contributions with USG funds was maintained.

Recommendation

In similar future circumstances, AID should consider the feasibility of instituting an OPG and/or a fixed amount reimbursement program early in the disaster response effort for funding of PVOs.

4. Currency Fluctuation Issues

Observation

o Because of the currency fluctuation in the value of the dollar the PVOs and AID/Naples have had to reassess their current commitments to projects already underway and determine where cost economies or cuts can be made.

Recommendation

With the participation of the AID Controller and General Counsel, AID/W should explore ways to protect AID programs from significant foreign exchange fluctuations. Some options to be considered include: currency swap arrangements, local currency recovery arrangements under grant provisions, and establishment of contingency funds or inflation funding provisions. Consultation with AID-financed PVOs is also encouraged.

5. Program Management and Administration Issues

Observation

o Account should be taken by AID and the PVOs that a substantial reconstruction program following a disaster occurrence inherently carries technical and administrative staffing requirements that should be satisfied and in place as early in the program as possible. Failure to have done this resulted in decisions impairing project soundness and subsequently called for additional investments and staff time for necessary corrections.

Recommendation

Hire technical and managerial staff appropriate to the context. Where PVOs engage in support for infrastructure related projects, the evaluators

recommend that as early as possible appropriate technical expertise be engaged. In addition, when a U.S. based PVO is carrying out a major AID-funded program on a multi-year basis, it is recommended that serious consideration be given to hiring a program/project manager knowledgeable about AID funding procedures and requirements. AID's project approval procedures should include a review and assessment of these elements.

Observation

o AID could have been useful in convening in-country PVOs on a regular basis to review implementation issues and update representatives on overall AID procedural matters, e.g., funding disbursements, reimbursement guidelines, and reporting requirements. While the evaluators noted that there was considerable improvement in this area once decision-making authority was delegated to AID/Naples, there continued to be information gaps that affected monitoring and implementation on the part of the PVOs and AID/Naples.

Recommendation 1

For AID financed PVO projects seen as complementary to AID's country programs, AID should provide timely support to PVO field representatives, e.g., an orientation session/workshop on AID's programming goals and administrative and grant requirements.

Recommendation 2

During the grant negotiation process, AID should obtain statements from the U.S. PVOs describing the levels of authority regarding subgrant management and administration that have been delegated or exist at the field office or with the affiliate agency.

Recommendation 3

AID grant agreements and contracts should specify that copies of all reports, including SF269 quarterly financial status reports also be sent concurrently to the concerned AID field office and AID/W.

6. AID Guidelines for PVO Project Submission and Approval

Observation

o The guidelines and criteria for the PVO matching and operational program grants were to a significant degree open-ended and gave a certain amount of needed flexibility to the program. However, they did not require sufficient analysis for projects that were beyond straight construction.

Recommendation

Notwithstanding the need for flexible programming under certain situations, AID should ensure that its guidelines for project submission and approval are sufficiently explicit to provide grantees with a clear sense of expectations and to ensure that AID's general programming guidelines and requirements have been addressed.

7. Constituency Building

Observation

o AID and the PVOs both seek to create an informed U.S. constituency supportive of foreign aid programs and policy. The U.S. private sector and nationwide attention focused on the Italy earthquake disaster proved to be an occasion for engaging the support of a targeted constituency for U.S. foreign aid.

Recommendation

In particular, where defined constituencies exist, AID and the PVOs should ensure that a process exists for response to their interest and should explore ways of maintaining their collaboration and participation beyond the focus on the immediate and specific disaster.

CLASSIFICATION

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) — PART I

Report Control Symbol U-447

1. PROJECT TITLE	2. PROJECT NUMBER	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE
Jordan Valley Agricultural Service Project	278-0241	USAID/JORDAN

4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) 85-5

☒ REGULAR EVALUATION ☐ SPECIAL EVALUATION

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING	7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY 81	B. Final Obligation Expected FY 81	C. Final Input Delivery FY 86	A. Total $ 9,863 B. U.S. $ 5,620	From (month/yr.) 3/84 To (month/yr.) 7/85 Date of Evaluation Review 6/27/85-7/15/85

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
1. Mission is still considering a PACD extension, decision to be made upon completion of Agricultural Sector Assessment, CDSS and another internal review of project.	Director	3/86
2. If project is not extended final evaluation will be conducted o/a August 1987.	Project Officer, Ag.	9/87
3. USAID will continue monitoring of Project	Project Officer, Ag.	

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS

- ☐ Project Paper
- ☐ Implementation Plan (e.g., CPI Network)
- ☐ Other (Specify)
- ☐ Financial Plan
- ☐ PIO/T
- ☐ Logical Framework
- ☐ PIO/C
- ☐ Other (Specify)
- ☐ Project Agreement
- ☐ PIO/P

10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT

- A. ☐ Continue Project Without Change
- B. ☐ Change Project Design and/or ☐ Change Implementation Plan
- C. ☐ Discontinue Project

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)

William Furtick, Agricultural Development Project, USAID/J
Nabil Katkhuda, Director of Research and Extension, MOA
Ousama Bulbeisi, Director of Evaluation, MOA
Hani Haddadin, Crop Protection Advisor, MOA

12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval

Signature: Gerald F. Gower

Typed Name: Gerald F. Gower

Date: 30 December 1985

AID 1330-15 (3-78)

NEAR EAST EVALUATION ABSTRACT

PROJECT TITLE(S) AND NUMBER(S)	MISSION/AID/W OFFICE
JORDAN VALLEY AGRICULTURE SERVICE PROJECT (278-0241)	USAID/Jordan

PROJECT DESCRIPTION The project is designed to establish and institutionalize a viable mechanism capable of developing and disseminating appropriate agricultural technology for vegetable and fruit production in the Jordan Valley

AUTHORIZATION DATE AND U.S. LOP FUNDING AMOUNT	PES NUMBER	PES DATE	PES TYPE
9/27/81 $5,620 million	85-5	12/30/85	[XX] Regular [ ] Other (Specify) [ ] Special [ ] Terminal

ABSTRACT PREPARED BY, DATE	ABSTRACT CLEARED BY, DATE
David Schroder Acting Evaluation Officer	PO:TRi[illegible] PROG:RBrown PRM:NHard DD:RJohnson DIR:GFGOWER PO:WFurtick

The mid-term evaluation was conducted by a three member American team with expertise in administrative management, vegetable and citrus production. The mid-term evaluation was intended to document achievements with respect to inputs, outputs and the progress made towards project purpose. Using a combination of technical assistance, training, technology transfer, and an adaptive research program the team found the project had made some contribution toward both increased crop productivity in the Jordan Valley and to strengthening research skills of Jordanian staff. Project inputs as envisioned in the PP have been provided with little difficulty and delay. The quality of the expatriate staff is good but the arrival of the citrus horticulturalist and soil scientist were scheduled much too late in the PP to have maximum effect. The elimination of the vegetable horticulturalist by the JVASP Director was deemed to have been an error and has affected the development of the horticultural research program. Project outputs have not developed as well as envisioned. Problems encountered involved administrative arrangements for the center that reduced its viability as an institution and hampered the effectiveness of the research and extension programs, farm demonstrations, and the technical training of Jordanian staff. The establishment and equipping of four research sites including several laboratory facilities at the Deir Alla Station have developed well. However, progress made towards the project purpose at this stage of development is less than anticipated. This is understandable because important assumptions on which achievements were to be based did not come about such as incentive pay for local staff, and appropriate organization/administrative procedures were not developed. These factors contributed to a high staff turnover and the frequent changing of Project Directors. A noteworthy achievement of the project is its research towards control of the spherical mealy bug on citrus through biological methods. The original institution building purpose of the project has not been completely fulfilled, although significant contributions to institutional capacity are being made. For a variety of reasons, Washington State University has been faced with difficulty in their effort to develop appropriate Jordanian project management and administrative procedures. Adequate incentives for attracting and retaining qualified leaders and scientific personnel have not emerged

leading to severe implementation and management problems throughout the life of the project. Efforts to remedy these are now being addressed by the GOJ, but this has come too late in the current life of the project to be a significant factor in achieving final outputs.

In summarizing, the main lessons learned are:

1. Building and strengthening institutional capacity takes time, patience and continuity of effort.

2. Projects that require installation of facilities should be designed to allow ample time for installation before the main body of technical staff arrive.

3. Administrative problems can easily overshadow substantive project achievements.

USAID/JORDAN - MINISTRY OF HEALTH

HEALTH MANAGEMENT SERVICES DEVELOPMENT
END OF PROJECT REPORT AND
END OF TOUR REPORT
(278-0208)
November, 1986

Project Purpose: In July, 1980, a contract agreement was made between the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Health Services Division, for technical assistance for the Health Planning and Services Development (HPSD) project. The project purpose was to assist the MOH and the Government of Jordan (GOJ) in developing and implementing a Primary Health Care (PHC) approach to the delivery of health services. The project proposed to:

1. Establish in the MOH a planning unit capable of planning for health improvement on a national basis; and

2. Reorient the training, assignment, and functions of basic health manpower toward provision of PHC services.

Purpose of Evaluation: This final report was prepared to serve as an end-of-tour report for Dr. William H. Boynton, Chief of Party, and an end-of-project report for HPSD.

Methodology Used: References to early project activities are dependent on various secondary sources and personal interviews. The writer worked on the project for the final year and used personal experience as well as an analysis of primary data (relative to the project goals) for the evaluation. Secondary data from existing project papers/documents were also used.

Findings and Conclusions:

- The two major objectives of the project have been met by: (1) establishing a planning unit in the MOH and (2) improving PHC.

- The five-year old Directorate of Planning, Training, and Research (DPTR) is now firmly established in the MOH and is widely accepted and used.

- Physicians for PHC are numerically abundant but the nurse/midwife auxiliaries are deficient both in training and numbers.

- The MOH is very dependent upon the DPTR for analysis, planning, and documentation.

- The MOH, through DPTR, has developed a three volume plan of action and a one volume implementation for a national PHC program. The plan includes innovation in service delivery designed to reduce the excessive infant mortality rate (6-77) by such means as more prenatal care, child spacing, supervised deliveries, health education, and out-reach teams. Management improvements include four levels of services, with a referral system, a new HIS, integration of MOH and PHC, and training for PHC administrators.

- Most existing PHC staff are currently being retrained in 18-day courses for their duties in the new PHC scheme. This training of 250 physicians and 1,000 auxiliaries is being done by the MOH staff, with no outside help, in order that it might be repeated as needed in the future after the project ends.

- Perhaps the most significant result which may be attributed to the HMSD project, among other factors, is the change in philosophy of the MOH. Development of planning has been coincidental with or even causative to a reorientation of health priorities.

- The new five-year plan (1986-1990) is much more consistent with the ideas of the project strategy paper than the previous five-year plan. It intends to redress the imbalance between PHC and high technology clinical hospital care by emphasizing the following objectives: (1) an emphasis on the PHC; (2) development of the health insurance scheme; (3) adding slowly to the number of hospital beds; (4) improve manpower, especially in the areas of nurses and midwives; and (5) improve health management.

- The DPTR is accepted and used by the MOH and capable of carrying on after the termination of the HMSD project.

Recommendations:

- A long-term nursing education project proposed by the DPTR should be implemented.

- After five years, it is time for AID assistance to be shifted to new health projects.

- AID should continue ad hoc assistance to DPTR as needed by non-project TSFS funds, centrally funded consultants, and general participant funds.

After five years, Westinghouse can declare the project a success and say it has worked itself out of a job as planned.

Lessons Learned: No lessons learned were provided by the evaluation.

NEAR EAST EVALUATION ABSTRACT

PROJECT TITLE(S) AND NUMBER(S)	MISSION/AID/W OFFICE
Water Management Technology (278-0192)	USAID/Jordan

PROJECT DESCRIPTION To upgrade agricultural productivity in the Jordan Valley by systematically raising the efficiency of water utilization, the project provided the GOJ with U.S. technical assistance, training and commodities and was originally designed to complement a prior AID sprinkler equipment loan project.

AUTHORIZATION DATE AND U.S. LOP FUNDING AMOUNT	PES NUMBER	PES DATE	PES TYPE Project Completion Report
FY 77 $[illegible],320 Million	PCR 85-3	2/9/86	☐ Regular ☒ Other (Specify)
ABSTRACT PREPARED BY, DATE	ABSTRACT CLEARED BY, DATE		☐ Special
Nancy C. Hardy Evaluation Officer 2/9/86	PRM:RBrown PO :FQushair PO :TRishor PO :WFurtick	DD :RJohnson DIR:GGower	☐ Terminal

Water Management Technology (WMT) was designed to provide technical assistance, training and equipment to complement AID loan 278-K-016, Sprinkler Equipment project. The training and research components of the WMT project were tailored primarily to facilitate the introduction of sprinkler irrigation into the Jordan Valley. This Project Completion Report was prepared to: 1) assess progress and overall impact of project activities, 2) provide a record of problems faced and lessons learned, and 3) make recommendations for future programming, design and implementation of similar activities.

During the early stages of project implementation, external factors to the project such as the lack of a working agreement among key GOJ institutions involved in agriculture development in the Valley (the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), the Ministry of Agriculture and the University of Jordan's Faculty of Agriculture); drought resulting in inadequate water supply; and the unexpectedly high farmer adoption rate of drip over sprinkler irrigation technology inhibited the introduction of sprinklers as planned. A project evaluation conducted in May 1981, recommended project termination and deobligation of remaining funds. These recommendations were never carried out; instead, USAID and the GOJ agreed, in order to attempt to achieve the project purpose, to extend the project and provide additional training to Jordan Valley Authority staff, and equipment and spare parts to assist the Authority in solving some of the irrigation and drainage problems in the Valley. The additional training and agreed-upon commodities were provided by December 31, 1984, the final Project Assistance Completion Date. Outputs of the project since the 1981 evaluation include trained JVA staff in irrigation techniques and system management, computerization of JVA's administrative and irrigation operations, and improved reliability of the Valley irrigation system through JVA's use of the project-financed excavator and trencher. Although Water Management Technology did not achieve its prime objective, i.e. to facilitate the introduction of sprinkler irrigation into the Jordan Valley, the technical assistance, training, and commodities provided under the Project did make a positive impact on increasing the efficiency of water utilization in the Valley, primarily by improving the JVA's institutional capability to manage the Valley's irrigation system.

The most important lessons learned from the Water Management Technology project are:

1. Sufficient research should have been carried out prior to the design and implementation of this project. Results from research in such areas

WATER MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY ABSTRACT CONT.

as adoption of sprinkler irrigation techniques versus other methods in Jordan would have undountedly changed the design of this project and/or increased the chances of project success.

2. Bringing institutions together to collaborate in project implementation is a difficult task and excessive optimism in the level of expected collaboration may not be warranted. Unless host country institutions are seriously committed to a project and are willing to commit the required level of resources and co-ordination, the success of a project which depends upon institutional collaboration will be limited.

NEAR EAST EVALUATION ABSTRACT

PROJECT TITLE(S) AND NUMBER(S)	MISSION/AID/W OFFICE
Jordan Potash Plant, (278-0210 and 0222)	USAID/Jordan

PROJECT DESCRIPTION Under this project, AID provided $38 million in loan funds to assist the GOJ in constructing and equipping the APC Potash plant designed to produce potash for export and thus, to assist Jordan in increasing its foreign exchange earnings.

AUTHORIZATION DATE AND U.S. LOP FUNDING AMOUNT	PES NUMBER	PES DATE	PES TYPE
FY 78 $38.0 million	PCR 85-4	2/10/86	Project Completion Report ☐ Regular ☒ Other (Specify)

ABSTRACT PREPARED BY, DATE	ABSTRACT CLEARED BY, DATE	
Nancy C. Hardy, Evaluation Officer 2/15/86	PRM:RBrown DD :RJohnson PD :RRousseau DIR:GGower PO :TRishoi	☐ Special ☐ Terminal

The Project Paper, did not anticipate a formal, final evaluation of the Potash project; this project completion report was prepared to review the project's inputs, outputs and end-of-project status, to analyze in a preliminary manner what the project's impact may be and what lessons have been learned, and to close out the project. All goods and services financed by AID were delivered by the PACD of March 31, 1984, and the final disbursement of AID's contribution to this $507 million, multi-donor project was made in December, 1984.

Under the loan agreement with the GOJ, AID loan funds were re-lent to the Arab Potash Company (APC) to finance foreign exchange costs of selected technical services and equipment to be obtained under the project. AID funds helped the APC to finance design and construction supervision; fiberglass reinforced pipe; carnallite harvesters and spare parts; and refinery equipment, machinery and spare parts.

Despite the complex technical nature of the project, the number of donors involved, and the remoteness of the project site and corresponding infrastructure challenges, actual project costs remained close to the original estimates and construction of the plant was completed within schedule, both noteworthy accomplishments. An initial delay in potash production, a failure of the solar evaporation pans to produce potash at the designed level, technical problems within the refinery, much lower than projected world potash prices and some possible difficulty in replacing foreign consultants with Jordanian managers have delayed the achievement of a positive cash flow and of project purpose. The APC expects to break even in 1986 as potash production levels increase and operate "in the black" by 1987.

The PCR recommends that USAID continue to co-operate with the APC on correcting its current problems and on developing ideas for plant expansion and diversification. As a follow-up activity, USAID is considering partial financing of a plant expansion feasibility study and is also actively discussing privatization of the APC.

A lesson learned from this project: A project the size and complexity of Potash Plant could never have been implemented on schedule without a concerted coordination effort on the part of APC and the participating donors. This effort included following international contracting procedures, whenever possible, and annual donor meetings to review project status and to discuss pending and future actions. Future, multi-donor projects should be designed and implemented with the same degree of co-ordination.

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) — PART I

Report Symbol U-

1. PROJECT TITLE	2. PROJECT NUMBER	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE
Jordan - Potash Plant	273-0210 and 0222	USAID/Jordan

4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) PCR 85-
Project Completion Report

☐ REGULAR EVALUATION ☐ SPECIAL EVALUATION

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING	7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION
A. First PRC-AID or Equivalent FY 78	B. Final Obligation Expected FY 79	C. Final Input Delivery FY 84	A. Total $ 507 MM B. U.S. $ 38 MM	From (month/yr.) 9/78 To (month/yr.) 1/85 Date of Evaluation Review

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
1. As a follow-on to this project USAID/Jordan is now considering a request from the Arab Potash Company to partially finance the costs of a feasibility study for plant expansion. If approved by the Government of Jordan and AID up to $1.5 million would be allocated from the Mission's Technical Services and Feasibility Studies V Project.	R. Rousseau D. Masters T. Rishoi	9/86

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS

- ☐ Project Paper
- ☐ Financial Plan
- ☐ Logical Framework
- ☐ Project Agreement
- ☐ Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network
- ☐ PIO/T
- ☐ PIO/C
- ☐ PIO/P
- ☐ Other (Specify) _____
- ☐ Other (Specify) _____

10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT

- A. ☐ Continue Project Without Change
- B. ☐ Change Project Design and/or ☐ Change Implementation Plan
- C. ☐ Discontinue Project
- D. Project Completed

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)

Stanley Stalla Ass't Project Development Officer *
Mr. Ali Ensour, Managing Director, Arab Potash

*Completed tour in USAID/Amman 6/85

12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval

Signature: Gerald F. Gower

Typed Name: Gerald F. Gower

Date: 20 Feb 1985

AID 1330-15 (3-78)

NEAR EAST EVALUATION ABSTRACT

PROJECT TITLE(S) AND NUMBER(S)	MISSION/AID/W OFFICE
Jordan Valley Farmers Association, 278-0186	USAID/JORDAN

PROJECT DESCRIPTION Through the provision of U.S. technical assistance and training, the purpose of the project is to "assist the Jordan Valley Farmers Assoc. in establishing policies and procedures and developing viable operating systems in the specific areas of: (1) Overall management/planning; (2) Farm management, guidance and information; (3) Credit; and (4) Supply."

AUTHORIZATION DATE AND U.S. LOP FUNDING AMOUNT	PES NUMBER	PES DATE	PES TYPE
FY 77 $1.51 million	PCR 85-1	8/29/85	☐ Regular ☐ Other (Specify)

ABSTRACT PREPARED BY, DATE	ABSTRACT CLEARED BY, DATE	PES TYPE
David Schroder Acting USAID Evaluation Officer - 8/29/85	PRM:NCHardy PO:MFurtick DD:RJohns PO:TRishoi DIR:CFCowe PROG:PBrown	☐ Special ☑ Terminal

This evaluation was undertaken to assess project progress of the Jordan Valley Farmers Association (JVFA) since the last formal evaluation PES 80-4 and serve as a project completion report and final evaluation report of the JVFA.

The Project Completion Report/Final Evaluation (PCR/FE) draws from information sources such as past project evaluations, a special review conducted in May 1983, Mission in-house project reviews, press reports, and discussions with JVFA and Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) staff. The JVFA project was an institutional building project designed to strengthen management capabilities and provide services to association members. Implementation ended in 1984 and all funds have been disbursed.

The PCR/FE reveals that despite commodity procurement delays and implementation problems the project has made significant progress towards achieving the project purpose and goal. Vegetable yields in the Jordan Valley have increased approximately 115 percent since 1977 when the JVFA was created. Approximately 4,700 farmers have been provided with farm services such as farm inputs, information on improved cropping practices, production credit, etc. External factors such as budgetary constraints on government expenditures, the association operating under temporary by-laws and the non-implementation of certain activities such as product marketing resulted in the JVFA not fully meeting its project purpose. There have also been internal factors which produced negative results and adversely affected achievement of project purpose. These include delays in commodity procurement, the late recruitment of the Farm Input Supply Advisor, the JVFA staff lack of understanding of AID regulations and procedures, and having to implement this project thru another agency (Jordan Valley Authority).

Key findings of the PCR/FE include the importance of the commitment of the Government of Jordan in continuing to support the JVFA as a potentially viable institution serving Jordan Valley farmers. The GOJ has established a committee to evaluate the JVFA and make recommendations that will improve the management capacity of JVFA and its financial situation. However, the Project

Officer believes that the JVFA is unlikely to be able to carry-out its overly ambitious programs outlined in its by-laws due to inadequate management abilities of its staff and the cash flow problems currently facing the association due primarily to low repayment of production loans and underpricing of farm inputs sold to farmers.

LESSONS LEARNED ARE :

1. Avoid, whenever possible, working with more than one institution with respect to administrative matters. USAID was working with the JVFA through the JVA and this contributed to delays in executing project activities. The JVA gave excellent support and cooperation to this project. An effort should have been made to clearly delineate the actions required from both the parent organization, the JVA, and the direct recipient, the JVFA.

2. Evaluations should be conducted with "outsider's" participation to allow more objectivity in measuring project progress and impact.

3. The GOJ Project Managers of AID-funded projects should be encouraged to receive training in AID regulations governing project implementation and evaluation.

PROJECT TITLE(S) AND NUMBER(S)	MISSION/REGION OFFICE
Vocational Training, 278-0238	USAID/Jordan

PROJECT DESCRIPTION Purpose: To increase skills of the work force; economic opportunities for youth from lower income families; and the understanding of constraints & opportunities to expand women's participation in the labor force. Key AID Inputs: Technical assistance to & training for the GOJ Vocational Training Corporation (VTC) & financing construction and equipment for a trade training center near Amman.

AUTHORIZATION DATE AND U.S. LOP FUNDING AMOUNT	PES NUMBER	PES DATE	PES TYPE
FY 79 $2.125 million	85-6	1/12/86	☐ Regular ☐ Other (Specify)
ABSTRACT PREPARED BY, DATE Nancy C. Hardy Evaluation Officer 1/12/86	ABSTRACT CLEARED BY, DATE AAhmad, ENG LDonnelly, PAG RJohnson, DD RBrown, PRM GGower, DIR		☐ Special ☒ Terminal

The primary objective of this project was to increase the number and productivity of trainees at the skilled labor level by addressing an immediate problem of limited physical facilities for vocational training and assisting the VTC in further developing its vocational training programs. The project consisted of 5 elements: (1) construction and equipping of the Yajouz Trade Training Center; (2) establishing a sister-school relationship between VTC and an appropriate U.S. institution; (3) training; (4) conducting a study of women's employment opportunities and (5) conducting in-country training seminars for VTC staff on modular unit training.

The initial PACD for this project was June 30, 1981, and was extended several times, primarily due to delays concerning construction of the trade training center and equipping the center with AID-financed commodities in conformance with project specifications. Final PACD was October 31, 1983. Final project evaluation was undertaken in FY 1985 in order to assess the quantity and quality of vocational training provided by the VTC, particularly that provided by the project financed center which became operational shortly before the final PACD.

The project evaluation revealed that the Vocational Training project achieved its purpose. The Yajouz Training Center has an enrollement of 900 students annually (300 more than planned) and has attracted both younger students interested in learning vocational skills as well as older skilled workers desiring to improve their capabilities. According to VTC records the majority of its trainees are from lower income families, and many students at the Yajouz Center work in their spare time to help support their families. The project-funded study of women's employment opportunities provided the VTC with a basis for planning and implementing vocational programs in traditional and non-traditional skills at its six training centers for women. The training and technical assistance inputs provided by the contractor, Ohio State University, were well-received by the VTC staff, and although a strong sister-school relationship did not last after project completion, the two institutions maintain correspondence and continue to exchange information.

LESSONS LEARNED:

1. It is important to set realistic implementation target dates during project design. Original LOP for this project was only 21 months, due to the urgent need of VTC for a new training facility. The 26-month extension of the project might have been avoided had better data been available and more realistic goals for contracting and construction been set.

2. Project design included the host country contracting of a U.S. procurement agent to assist the VTC in the procurement and delivery of approximately $800,000 worth of commodities (300 line items) for the Yajouz center. It was anticipated that the agent would reduce the workload in commodity procurement. However, VTC received some commodities which were not in compliance with source and origin requirements and in a few cases, project specifications. In future projects with sizeable commodity procurement, USAID should consider all options including direct procurement by host government agencies. If the procurement service agent mode is selected, careful attention should be given to early availability of specifications for commodities to be procured, PSA previous experience and most importantly, accountability of the PSA.

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY
WATER SYSTEMS AND SERVICES MANAGEMENT (278-0259)
FIRST INTERIM EVALUATION

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND:

The Water Systems and Services Management (WSSM) project began in August, 1983. The project purpose is to develop and improve the institutional capability of public and private organizations in Jordan's water sector to conserve and manage water resources and as part of that effort, to extend and improve certain municipal water distribution and wastewater collection facilities. U.S. life of project funding consists of $17 million in loan funds and $4 million in grant funds. The Jordanian implementing agencies are the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) and the Ministry of Planning. U.S. project inputs consist of: 1) provision of technical advisory services for water quality monitoring, WAJ training, and public sector managerial skills upgrading; 2) financing the design of water and wastewater systems and construction supervision for ten cities in Jordan; and 3) financing the construction of water and wastewater facilities in Karak and Tafila, two cities in souther Jordan. WSSM places special emphasis on private sector technology transfer. In the design phase of the project, the three Jordanian firms which were contracted for facility and system design for the ten cities were required to form sub contractual relationships with U.S. sanitary engineering design consulting firms. The design of water distribution, sewerage collection and treatment and storm drainage for the ten cities were divided between three associations: Arabtech Consulting Engineers and CH_2M Hill International; Consulting Engineering Center and Black and Veatch International; and Jouzy and Partners Consulting Engineering Bureau and Engineering Science Inc. The design phase of the project ended in mid-1985; the First Interim Evaluation was conducted in February-March 1985, and the evaluation contractor's final report was received by USAID/Jordan in June 1985.

OBJECTIVE:

The objective of the First Interim Evaluation was to determine the progress of the three Jordanian firms in developing improved capabilities to complete sanitary engineering design projects. Secondary objectives were to identify, or indicate, the technology transfer; define and evaluate the mechanisms used in the transfer; and to recommend means of improving the mechanisms for the technology transfer.

Data was obtained through the review of available references. Numerous discussions were held with the Project Managers and project related personnel from the Jordanian firms, the Project Coordinators of the Water Authority of Jordan, the Ministry of Planning, and USAID/Jordan. In addition, there were discussions and/or correspondence with the Project Managers and project related staff from the US firms, after these personnel had returned to the United States.

The evaluation system utilized in the First Interim Evaluation was the system developed and used in the Baseline Survey Evaluation. This was consistent with project design and produced results which were themselves consistent and comparable. The differences in the two evaluations measured improved capabilities and also were indicative of technology transfer during the design phase.

MEANS AND METHODS:

All three of the associations used virtually the same means for the transfer of technology during the design phase of this project. The differences came about more in the degree of application of the methods, the time exposures for transfer and the areas of technology transfer. The transfer for purely technical matters included the use of lectures (in varying degrees of intensity and topics), special seminars by long term and short term US personnel, provision of reference materials, and one-on-one training as the opportunities arose during the design process.

In addition to transfer on purely technical matters, two of the associations undertook the transfer of management technology and techniques. The third association made a conscious decision not to include this area, based on the desires of the Jordanian firm. In the instances where project management issues was addressed, the general approach was strikingly similar for both associations. The U.S. subconsultant was instrumental as the lead in defining and instituting project management organization and philosophy. The lead responsibilities were then shifted to the Jordanian firm. In one case this was done with an informal approach with the US counterpart playing a low key but highly supportive role as needed. In the other case a rigidly defined chain of command was established and scrupulously adhered to in conducting project activities. Both of the Jordanian firms felt comfortable with these two differing approaches. They felt they had learned valuable lessons from these two approaches even though they were different in application.

Each of the associations did something a little different in the technology transfer process. Examples of individual activities which were utilized include: field trips within Jordan to visit existing systems for a better understanding and appreciation of the application of theoretical knowledge, an extensive participatory workshop using a case study and group problem solving approach, lectures and seminars by outside experts, and a combination project review and training trip to the office of the US consultant.

EVIDENCE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:

All three of the Jordanian firms showed evidence of technology transfer and increased capabilities in the following common elements:

- All developed, or expanded, their library of reference materials such as textbooks, technical publications, periodicals and catalogs.

- All acquired, or added to, existing, general and technical specifications for sanitary work.
- All acquired, or added to, existing, standard details for sanitary design work.
- All gained experience and confidence in the design of sewerage treatment plants.
- All gained a greater appreciation of the needs of project financed by international lending agencies.

INFLUENCES-EFFECTIVITY OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:

The influences can be divided internal and external as follows:

Internal Influences:

Individual desires of the Jordanian project personnel to gain new technology, the commitment levels of the firms and their willingness to provide corporate support for technology transfer, the individual personalities of the Jordanian and US project-related staffs can all be classified as internal influences on technology transfer.

External Influences:

This phase was the change from the Water Supply Corporation (WSC) to the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) and the multiplicity of WAJ Project Coordinators. This no doubt actually enhanced technology transfer even though it may have had adverse impacts on scheduling and costs.

Virtually everything that was tried to effect technology transfer was successful, in varying degrees. The field trips, and the participatory workshops and seminars were very effective methods for transferring technology. As might be expected, the most effective means of technology transfer was the one-on-one working opportunities. The least effective approach was reading, or studying, outside the normal work environment. The next least effective method was the lecture approach unless closely tied to the design aspect and immediately followed by hands-on applications.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS:

1. Major technology transfer efforts, especially in non-technical areas, should be continued to be grant funded. It is difficult for a newly developing country to hold to the long view and commit scarce financial resources to training. This may appear to benefit a few in lieu of meeting immediate critical needs of the masses for such essential items as potable water supplies.

2. AID should try to obtain agreement from the host country to add the needed funding and manpower to any planned project. This will allow for the technology transfer in addition to the completion of the other project elements. It is possible for a critically tight project schedule to cause advers effects on the technology transfer activities if they are only an adjunct to the main project activities.

3. Define the Scope of Work for the technology transfer activities and require a planned approach with scheduled milestones and deliverable items.

4. Encourage the use of participatory workshops and seminars as training tools.

5. Continue the requirement for the provision of all lecture, seminar and workshop notes for future reference of the host country personnel. This should be matched with a continued, or increased level of supplies of reference materials and equipment under the contracts. These items will remain and be useful long after the US consultants have departed.

6. Attempt to schedule lectures linked to ongoing project work activities and to be followed by practical application in problem solving.

7. Increased use of field trips on a selective basis within Jordan, the region or to the US. These should be working trips, for qualified personnel, to observe and understand the design and operational concepts as they are applied and practiced. Such training will provide a better appreciation of the relationships between the theory and the practical.

8. The short range gains under this project have been real and identifiable. How well the newly gained technology will be retained and applied by the firms and individuals involved in this project will depend on the ability of the firms to obtain additional sanitary design projects. If additional opportunities are not provided to utilize, reinforce and adapt this new technology, it may be lost. If new sanitary projects are obtained, this new technology will improve and reinforce the capabilities of these Jordanian firms for sanitary design.

CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISION BASELINE:

The project paper envisioned a baseline survey of the construction supervision capabilities of Jordanian firms to be used as the point of reference to identify the increased capabilities and indicate the technology transfer during the construction phase.

The construction supervision contracts had not been finalized at the time the evaluation was prepared, but all three of the

above-mentioned Jordanian consulting firms submitted cost proposals and negotiating discussions were underway. Although the project people had not been selected and the agreements with the US subcontractors had not been finalized, it wad decided that it would be cost effective to begin the construction supervision evaluation. The objective evaluation was undertaken as part of this study. The subjective evaluations will take place at the time of the baseline evaluation of the Jordanian contractors when all agreements have been signed and the project people are in place.

The objective evaluation is based on a system developed along the same lines as the evaluation format for sanitary design capabilities. The Construction Supervision Development Index (CSDI) also reduces to a single pure number that is a useful indicator of the variance in the capability of a firm in construction supervision over time.

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- Purpose of activity or activities evaluated
- Purpose of/reason for this evaluation
- Key issues or questions addressed
- Types and quality of evidence used to assess short-term effects, trends and/or potential for impact.
- Findings
- Conclusions
- Principal recommendations
- Lessons learned

1. This is the summary of the final evaluation of the Range Management Improvement Project (RMIP) in Morocco. The project is scheduled to end in August of 1986. The purpose of the RMIP is to strengthen the capability of a GOM institution, the Range Management Service (DE/SP), to plan and implement its applied research, extension, and rangeland development programs. The RMIP, implementation of which began in 1981, originally focused on range extension and long- and short-term training. Utah State University (USU) fielded a five person team to implement the project.

2. A mid-term evaluation of the project conducted January of 1984, while identifying several serious implementation problems that needed urgent attention, was optimistic concerning the Project's potential. Following upon their recommendations, the project underwent a major redesign, involving changes in personnel and TA structure and the adoption of a more explicit focus on an institution building objective for the project. Given the very serious problems encountered in the first three years of implementation, AID decided against obligating additional funds to the project or significantly extending the life-of-project. Consequently, the project had only two years in which to carry out the program outlined in the redesign. Many of the more serious implementation problems identified in the final evaluation stem directly from the time and resource limitations inherent in the redesign.

3. In assessing the role and function of DE/SP and its performance to date, the evaluation team examined the following project-related activities:

Applied Forage and Animal Production Research. This research included: forage adaptation trials; grass and legume seeding; shrub plantings; the collection of production data; contouring and water catchments to increase water infiltration on rangelands; fertilization to increase forage production; research into livestock production; livestock health activities; and ram sterilization. Though problems were encountered in carrying out this research program, the evaluation team felt that it was appropriately conceived, and should be continued.

Sociology Research. The evaluation team felt that the sociological research under the project was not adequately focused in that it was not explicitly directed at answering questions posed by range managers. The evaluation team felt that much of the information gathered from the project's Agro-Pastoral Systems Study could have been obtained more easily through a more extensive literature search and through better use of Moroccan staff. In addition, the analysis and application of data collected to extension programs was inadequate. While the capabilities of the lower level DE/SP staff to collect sociological field data were increased, little attention was given to training them in data analysis and application of the results. The social science component still has not been well integrated into the RMIP and local administrative staff often do not understand why the sociological data is being collected. The evaluation team was concerned that sociological efforts by DE/SP staff would cease after completion of the project, unless those Moroccans returning from the U.S. with training in sociology were given an opportunity to redesign this component.

Date this summary prepared: 11/12/85

Economic Research. Progress in meeting the project's economic analysis objectives has been limited. This is because the responsibility for directing the economic research program has rested with the project's chief of party (COP), whose managerial responsibilities have precluded sustained effort in this area.

Extension Activities. Extension-oriented technical assistance has been somewhat limited as the team has concentrated its efforts on obtaining data for future extension applications. Extension efforts have included: seeding of perennial forages; extension programs for users of perimeters; cooperative formation; and field days. Though identifying operational problems, the evaluation team felt that the seeding of forage on private land was a promising approach which could provide a basis for greatly expanded activity by DE/SP in the future.

Training. By the PACD 11 Moroccans will have received MS degree training in the United States (9 in range management and 2 in rural sociology). Also by the PACD, 80 person months of short-term training will have been completed and a large number of DE/SP field staff will have benefitted from in-country training activities. The evaluation team concluded that the training component of the RMIP was both an essential and a successful effort, with little doubt that DE/SP capability has been greatly enhanced. The evaluation team suggested that the training component should not be neglected in future activities developed in Morocco, though emphasis might be shifted from short-term training in the U.S. towards assisting Moroccan educational institutions to provide it.

The Plant Materials Center (PMC). Establishing the PMC as a viable institution has been one of the major achievements of the RMIP--a combination of resource availability, training, the calibre of the Moroccan staff, and intensive, experienced TA on a one-to-one basis. The process of developing the PMC reflects a very coordinated effort between the GOM and the RMIP. Planning, design and construction have been well organized and were completed in a timely manner. The evaluation team recommended that the GOM consider "privatizing" that facility.

4. The evaluation team was generally impressed by the enthusiasm and professionalism of DE/SP personnel assigned to the project. The evaluation team noted, however, that those sites with the most active programs were those with the most experienced senior staff and at which DE/SP has been working the longest. The quality of interpersonal and working relationships between DE/SP project managers and their immediate superiors was a significant determinant of the success of project activities at the various sites.

5. After the mid-term evaluation, the majority of the TA team was relocated to Rabat. This was done in order to better coordinate the project, ensure a common program of activities across the sites, and make the differing technical expertise available to all sites. It was hoped that the TA staff would become mobile technicians visiting sites on a regular basis to assist with planning and monitoring, provide technical assistance, and to resolve any problems that arose. To supplement the efforts of the senior TA staff and to ensure continuity of effort in the field, several PCVs whose tours were ending were employed to serve as junior technicians. As a consequence, the amount of time per month that TA staff were able to spend at any given field site was limited. While the visits from Rabat were appreciated, Moroccan personnel felt they were too brief and left little time for serious discussion of the problems and issues that had arisen since the previous visit. In addition, the centralization of the TA, combined with the lack of available space in MARA, led to the creation of a separate project office in Rabat. This has not served the long-term interest of creating institutional capacity in DE/SP.

6. The evaluation team noted that the problems of extensive livestock production in the lower rainfall areas of the country do not receive adequate priority from the GOM. In part, this is because of the position of DE/SP within MARA. DE/SP is the youngest service within the DE and its mandate, improving degraded rangelands, is a departure from DE's traditional orientation towards animal health, genetic improvement, the augmentation of milk production in ORMVAs, etc. Historically, the lion's share of DE's resources has gone to these latter activities. The upgrading of DE/SP to the division level would provide those responsible for range management with improved budgeting, additional staff, and a louder voice in policy decisions that affect Morocco's rangelands.

7. Under the auspices of the RMIP, DE/SP is currently engaged in both research and extension. This was due to the lack of functioning of rangeland research and extension in Morocco. The evaluation concluded that the proper role of DE/SP should be limited to land use and range management. The burden of research and extension activities should be passed to the appropriate specialized agencies.

8. As a relatively new institution, DE/SP is concerned with establishing a presence in those parts of the country where it can make a contribution to rangeland development. As DE/SP spreads itself thin, however, it becomes less effective, given limited personnel and resources. The evaluation team suggested that DE/SP re-evaluate the degree to which it wants to concentrate or disperse its resources and personnel, as well as whether it should transfer personnel and resources to more promising sites and from those where there has been little progress to date.

9. DE/SP's strategy is focused on the creation of range management perimeters, with DE/SP playing the role of both manager and policeman. Inadequate attention has been given, however, to creating institutional capacity at the local level, through local beneficiary organizations. Such organizations, however, can promote sustainable and replicable development, especially by marshaling local resources and mobilizing beneficiaries. The evaluation team argued that DE/SP cannot do rangeland management and development in a vacuum and that it is in DE/SP's self interest to support beneficiary groups.

10. The goal of the RMIP is "to increase livestock productivity and production efficiency by Morocco's low income livestock producers." At present, this goal has <u>not</u> been met, as a result of climatic, temporal, political, and social factors. In addition, given the start up problems of the RMIP, the complexity of the issues faced, and the long-term nature of the project's institution-building purpose, it was unrealistic to expect this goal to have been achieved during the life of the project.

11. The major recommendations of the evaluation team included:

- The completion of the RMIP as planned;
- AID continue its involvement in the extensive livestock sector (with DE/SP as the lead agency);
- AID promote the upgrading of DE/SP from the status of a Service to that of a Division; and
- The privatization of the Plant Materials Center.

AID actions on these and other recommendations are presented in Section E of the face sheet.

12. The evaluation team concluded that USU had made an important contribution to the long-term American commitment to create a range management capability within DE, and that both USU and AID should take pride in having contributed to this process. The decision to redesign the project in 1984 and continue with the USU involvement was a rational one. Failure to do so would have set back and perhaps permanently impaired the creation of this range management capability in Morocco.

ASIA/NEAR EAST EVALUATION ABSTRACT

PROJECT TITLE(S) AND NUMBER(S)	MISSION/AID/W OFFICE
WINTER SNOWPACK AUGMENTATION 608-0190	USAID/RABAT

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: The project develops within the Government of Morocco an ability to design, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate scientifically based weather modification programs, as an integral part of overall management of water resources in Morocco. The project accomplishes this through technology transfer, technical assistance, execution of special analyses, provision of scientific equipment, and training.

AUTHORIZATION DATE AND U.S. LOP FUNDING AMOUNT	PES NUMBER	PES DATE	PES TYPE
April 4, 1984 $6.0 M	68-85-05	Nov. 27, 1985	[X] Regular [ ] Other (Specify) [ ] Special [ ] Terminal

ABSTRACT PREPARED BY, DATE	ABSTRACT CLEARED BY, DATE
Samir Zoghby Nov. 15, 1985 Steve Lintner, ANE/PD/ENV John Giusti, Evaluation Office	Robert C. Gray Mission Director

A 2-week project evaluation by a 3-person external review team was conducted in April 1985 to assess the progress and problems and to develop recommendations needed to improve the scientific, technical and institutional aspects of this 5-year demonstration project.

The project's goal is to develop and use a scientifically-based weather modification project to improve Moroccan water supplies. The purpose is to develop capabilities within the Government of Morocco to design and execute a scientifically-based weather modification program in Morocco.

After one year of implementation, the project is revealing excellent progress. The U.S. equipment installations, staffing, and training are on schedule, and Moroccan commitments of facilities, equipment and staffing have largely been fulfilled. Field operations including cloud seeding missions on 16 days were accomplished in the winter-spring seasons of 1984-85. These operations have served as an excellent shakedown and training period, and have yielded badly needed weather data sets (radar, satellite, and aircraft) for planning future operations and the scientific research which is just beginning in the U.S. and Morocco. Progress in training and technology transfer is on-schedule with rapid learning by well-trained and highly motivated Moroccan meteorologists and technicians. In addition to its excellent progress, the supporting agencies are still committed to the project, and the project management bodies and individuals are reasonably well organized.

The major problems encountered in the first year were (a) difficulties in coordinating field operations, and (b) inadequacies of the cloud seeding system. The major field activities were located and operated at four widely scattered sites. Poor communications between sites led to inferior operations during many precipitation periods and kept project personnel from all important interactions needed for learning and planning. The cloud seeding was accomplished by Moroccan Air Force aircraft that for various technical reasons were limited for long-period and night operations.

Major recommendations of the evaluation include:
- Consolidate operations by locating project aircraft at Casablanca, and by performing numerous other site actions to improve communications, training, maintenance, and general coordination.
- Do airborne seeding with aircraft capable of all weather flight conditions; provide for installation of special meteorological systems on 2 aircraft; train at least 2 pilots in cloud seeding techniques; and initiate data collection and studies by U.S. scientists to develop, install, and test a ground-based cloud seeding system in the mountains to supplement the aircraft seeding.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

NAME OF MISSION

USAID/RABAT: Mid-term Evaluation of Dryland Agriculture Applied Research Project No. 608-0136 (May 1986)

PURPOSE OF ACTIVITY EVALUATED

The Dryland Agriculture Applied Research Project (DAARP) was authorized in 1978 and substantially redesigned and expanded in 1983. The goal of the project is to increase basic food production and improve income of traditional small dryland farmers. The purpose of the project is to establish an applied agronomic research program capable of adapting existing technology to local conditions. In addition, the project is establishing a socio-economic research program which will give a better understanding of the behavior of dryland farmers and thus provide a basis for effective extension programs as well as influence the direction of applied research. Technical assistance, training and commodity procurement are performed by Mid America International Agricultural Consortium (MIAC). The government of Morocco through the National Agronomic Research Institute (INRA) provides physical facilities, operational inputs and participant trainees. The socio-economic program is conducted by the National Agronomic and Veterinary Institute (IAV) through a separate Memorandum of Understanding with USAID.

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY USED

The purpose of this scheduled mid-course evaluation was to determine the extent to which the project s purpose and goal are being achieved following the redesign in 1983. The initial project had various implementation delays compounded by drought, contractor difficulties and insufficient funding. Following an evaluation in 1983, the project was redesigned to overcome these difficulties. The results of this 1986 Evaluation will be used by USAID as a basis for amending activities where necessary within the Life of Project (LOP) time frame and to determine the need, potential, and benefits of extending the project beyond the current PACD (August 31, 1988).

The evaluation was conducted by a four-person, multidisciplinary team provided by Winrock International. The team spent 5 1/2 weeks in Morocco, between Rabat and the Aridoculture Center in Settat and in the field within the project area. Three days were spent at the University of Nebraska evaluating home office support for the contractors. Each team member concentrated on particular areas of their expertise. The

Date this summary prepared: 16 September, 1986

team reviewed all pertinent documents provided by USAID, MIAC and the GOM and conducted detailed interviews with officials including field visits to observe project implementation. The team used the objectively, verifiable indicators of the logframe as a basis for measuring change and progress in meeting the purpose and goal of the project.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite several consecutive years of drought which has hampered research activities, the project has made excellent progress since 1983. All of the MIAC (T.A.) positions are filled and the staff, along with the staff of the National Agronomic Research Institute (INRA) and participant trainees are actively engaged in applied research pertinent to the development needs of dryland farming in Morocco. Research projects, conducted at the Aridoculture Center, field stations and private farms, involve cereal breeding, food legumes, breeding and management, soil and water conservation and management, forages, agricultural engineering and mechanization, socio-economics and plant management. A more in-depth discussion of the findings of the evaluation by categories follows:

a. Technical assistance has been provided in accordance with the Project Paper and has been of excellent quality. The Evaluation Team identified needs for additional T.A. in various areas including plant pathology, food legumes and livestock in order to complement the other disciplines already provided and to strengthen the overall program.

b. The resident technical assistance team has received strong administrative support from the MIAC office at the University of Nebraska in Lincoln. Their recruitment policy of bringing prospective contractors to Morocco on TDY prior to their long term assignments has resulted in a resident staff that is well adjusted to Moroccan conditions.

c. Twenty-six of thirty-two planned participants are currently in long term training with 17 of them actively engaged in thesis research in Settat. The trainees have been of high quality due to the rigorous selection process. Priority areas for training the remaining long term participants have been identified by MIAC.

The plans in the PP to provide 200 Moroccans with short-term training will not be realized by the PACD with only 34 having completed training. However, the 34 have been prudently selected for training to satisfy priority needs. It is anticipated that the demand for short-term "speciality" training will increase as the project progresses.

d. There remains some confusion about procedures for project participants applying for admission to the IAV doctoral program.

e. The INRA support staff to research programs, laboratories and operational maintenance is insufficient to sustain the center.

f. The relative salary levels for INRA researchers as compared to other GOM civil service are uncertain. New personnel statutes were put into effect in 1983 for INRA professional employees which provided for promotions based on merit, potential for career advancement and an increase in base

SERIALIZE (continued)

salary. However, the effect of these statutes has been rendered obsolete, concerning salary levels, by new statutes implemented this year which disproportionately raised the salary levels of "Ingenieurs and Architects" in the civil service (including the Ministry of Agriculture) relative to INRA researchers. This has caused much consternation on the part of the project participants.

g. There are currently 150 research trials at three of the stations and another 40 on-farm trials, representing an increase of 2.5 times over the 1984/85 cropping season, which was 3 times that of the 83/84 season. A good foundation has also been laid for further farming systems research. The focus of the research has been in accord with regional needs.

Excellent progress has been made in the areas of agricultural machinery, soil fertility, weed science and resistance to the Hessian Fly.

The evaluation stressed that there needs to be greater integration of research disciplines as the farming systems and extension focus develops.

The Moroccan and MIAC scientists have been working well as a team and there is evidence that the Moroccan researchers easily adopt improved research methods.

The annual workplan and "Scientific Panels" have proved to be valuable tools in guiding project activities.

h. The socio-economic research program at IAV has been of little practical use to the agronomic research team as it has been primarily academic and difficult to use. MIAC has, therfore, embarked on its own quicker, more focused studies to meet project needs. Both basic and applied research could be useful to the long term success of the project if properly managed.

The Agricultural Information Resource Center (AIRC) has undertaken very little dissemination activity and suffers from a leadership gap, lack of adequate training, lack of transportation and lack of clear objectives.

i. The facilities at the Aridoculture Center at Settat are all in place except the greenhouse. A misunderstanding concerning the foundations has been resolved and construction should be finished by 1987. The technical Reference Center and Computer Center are operational but lack Moroccan counterparts.

The Aridoculture Center is showing signs of institutional maturity as evidenced by linkages with various national and international institutions.

j. Although the research has been on track and achieving excellent results in a relative short time, it is still too early to evaluate the effectiveness of technology transfer as new technology packages are not yet prepared for dissemination. Testing for validity often takes 4-5 years and there has been only two good years of research results due to drought.

k. The GOM remains committed to support the project despite some budget problems and the hiring freeze brought on by the current financial crisis. INRA management has expressed its intention to improve research management at the National level.

In conclusion, progress has been made toward attainment of the project goal, but is not reflected in increased food production as yet. Sufficient data are not available to assess confidently research results or to detemine if the technologies being developed are economically viable or socially acceptable. Progress toward achievement of the project purpose has been considerable as evidenced by the development of the Aridoculture Center and its related facilities and activities.

Technology is being developed and evaluated under local conditions. Moroccan staff are being trained and farming equipment is being developed. The contributions of the socio-economic component have been limited but could be improved. A good technological base for implementing a farming systems/extension program is being developed. However, the transfer methodology is unclear.

There is a cooperative relationship between the MIAC team and INRA staff. However, increased cooperation should be fostered between INRA/MIAC and IAV, as is happening with the farm machinery group.

Finally, although substantial progress has been achieved, the Aridoculture Center will need continued technical assistance beyond the PACD to reach a level of institutional sustainability.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The principal recommendations of the Evaluation Team are:

a. USAID, IAV, INRA and MIAC take measures to improve collaboration including a review of procedures for INRA/Aridoculture participants to pursue advanced degrees.

b. GOM resolve issues of inequitable compensation between civil service and INRA pay scales.

c. INRA and MIAC complete arrangements to recruit and train remaining long term participants, and recruit and train additional laboratory and field technicians.

d. The conceptual framework and purpose of entire socio-economic program be reviewed with a view of improving performance and objectives of both applied (INRA/MIAC) and basic (IAV) research. The Agro-Economics Information Research Center (AIRC) or "Centre de Conjoncture" being supported through a MOU between USAID and IAV should be reviewed to determine its value and future role at the Aridoculture Center.

e. INRA develop a strategy to strengthen overall management and assignment of research program priorities within the context of overall national economic priorities.

f. The project be continued in some form past the PACD in order to complete existing and planned activities of the 1983 design. Consideration should be given to both selected adjustments and new additional program components during the process.

LESSONS LEARNED

a. The rigorous selection process used to select quality participants among disciplines and proper scheduling permitting participants to return to the project early enough to work along side T.A. on their thesis research have contributed significantly to project success.

b. The use of outside scientific panels to evaluate research and use of annual workplans have helped to provide a proper and dynamic focus for guiding the research program.

c. Interviewing long-term T.A. in Morocco prior to assignments has resulted in a well-adjusted, productive technical assistance team.

d. Strong team leadership and high quality technical assistance are essential for project success.

(Continued) OVERLEAF

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

MOROCCO - Conventional Energy Management and Training (608-0176)

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

The subject evaluation was initiated by the USAID/Morocco Office of Energy and Natural Resources and the AID/Asia and Near East Bureau, Technical Resources Division, Office of Energy and Natural Resources (ANE/TR/ENR). The final report dated May 1, 1986, is entitled "Evaluation of the USAID/Morocco Conventional Energy Training and Management Project."

The Project Agreement (608-0176) calls for two external project evaluations during the four year term of the project. TEM Associates, Inc. received a contract to conduct the first of these evaluations, which was scheduled to be performed approximately fourteen months after the arrival in Morocco of the prime contractor, the Williams Brothers Engineering Company, Inc. (WBEC).

The project goals are to alleviate economic/monetary balance of payments problems and assist Morocco to reduce importation of fossil fuels by increasing domestic oil and gas production. The purpose of the project is to build the internal capability of the Office National de Recherches et d'Exploitation Pétrolières (ONAREP), the parastatal organization responsible for oil and gas development. This is to be achieved through (1) transferring cost effective private sector management principles and techniques to ONAREP, (2) strengthening Moroccan ties to potential private sector petroleum development partners, and (3) supporting a program to explore, develop, and produce domestic petroleum resources.

The assumptions upon which the project was based include the following:

a) exploitable commercial petroleum reserves exist in Morocco;
b) there will be no major new international oil price fluctuations;
c) sales prices can be negotiated to allow conversion to domestic fuels;
d) ONAREP's management and technical capabilities can be enhanced, and the government of Morocco is committed to ONAREP's continued existence.

The purpose of the evaluation was to critically review the roles and responsibilites of the technical assistance contractor (WBEC), the supplemental training contractor, the Institute for International Education (IIE), ONAREP, and USAID/Rabat. This was to be achieved through review of project documents and interviews in the U.S. and Morocco with representatives of the respective cooperating organizations.

SUMMARY

Date this summary prepared: September 18, 1986

SUMMARY (continued)

The baseline project assumptions were shaken by recent dramatic drops in the world price of oil and by exploration results that showed considerably smaller reserves than expected in the Meskala region. Staff changes within the WBEC field team, ONAREP, and USAID project management, combined with delays in start-up of several critical elements in the early stages of the project, resulted in an initially weak technical assistance effort. WBEC staff roles evolved from initially being advisory to increasingly becoming operational functions within the ONAREP organization; resulting in some divergence from the perceived goals and appropriate role of AID. Internships and academic (Master's Degree) training programs were found to be somewhat behind schedule, but an ambitious training component plan for 1986 could bring this back to schedule. Project expenditures are below plan, due to adjustments in WBEC overhead and under-runs in training components.

Coordination with related projects funded by the World Bank have declined due to the disappointing finds in Meskala. Technical data gathering and reporting systems need to be improved before private sector promotional activities can be successfully initiated.

The evaluation team recommended minor project refocusing. Oil prices are sure to rise, and ONAREP must have a strong cadre of well trained individuals to coordinate with the private sector and respond to any level of interest in Moroccan petroleum development by the international oil companies. Refocusing should include increased emphasis on promotion, institution building, and reconciliation of diverging goals. The team recommended that USAID re-evaluate and clarify its goals, particularly in light of increased emphasis on privatization, and more strongly assert them while at the same time maintaining the delivery of key operational services which are highly valued by ONAREP. The team proposed development of a "model project" concept around objectives which are common to USAID and ONAREP.

Specific recommendations were made regarding staffing changes for WBEC and supplemental personnel for WBEC and ONAREP; improvements in the training program, particularly related to counterpart on-the-job training and internships; and developing the model project focus.

The project is an interesting experiment in economic development intended to assist the public and private sectors to integrate their interests and capabilities. It runs some risk of establishing a parastatal organization that could potentially compete with the private sector, however, if the three elements of the original project purpose are viewed in relation to each other, the private sector can be seen as a mechanism for assistance and continued exploration and production after the resource base has been proven.

Summary of Recommendations

The evaluation team provided the following summary of recommendations to be taken to improve the project, the agency or agencies (in parentheses) that would seem to have direct responsibility for implementing each recommendation, and reference to the section(s) of the evaluation report which discuss the background.

Project Re-Focus:

- o Develop new focus for the project in response to changing circumstances and first year's experience (all). 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.
- o AID/USAID review and clarify goals; establish consensus on goals among executive and project staff (USAID). 4.1.3, 4.2.
- o Increase visibility of project and participating agencies (all). 3.2, 4.1.
- o Build activity on areas of common interest between ONAREP and AID (ONAREP, USAID). 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.
- o Revitalize relations with World Bank (USAID). 3.6, 4.6.
- o ONAREP acknowledge priorities of finite term project needs and reduce time for decision-making and administrative processing (ONAREP). 3.2.

Model Project Concept:

- o Develop model project focus around joint venture promotion, related to exploration and geophysical activities (all). 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 3.4.7.
- o Improve data gathering and reporting techniques (ONAREP; WBEC). 3.7, 4.3.

Training:

- o Maintain high priority in English language training (all). 3.4.1.
- o Consider economics/management candidates suggested by Mr. Douieb for academic training; activate remaining Master's degree slot for geological sciences (ONAREP, USAID). 3.4.6, 4.5.3.
- o Revitalize relations with IIE in planning (and possibly implementing) short-term training programs and/or academic program logistical support and/or internships (all). 3.4.5, 4.5.2.
- o Integrate more structure into on-the-job training (WBEC). 3.4.7, 4.2, 4.5.3.
- o Solidify internship arrangements (all). 3.4.4, 4.5.1.

Staffing Changes:

- o Extend Joint Venture Promotion Specialist (Sullivan) to end of project (WBEC, OSAID). 3.2.1, 4.4.2
- o Extend Surface Facilities Engineer (Connor) six months (WBEC, USAID). 3.2.1, 4.4.3
- o Specify Geophysicist's (Bhattacharjee) contract end date (USAID)
- o Add two explorationists*, one to replace Senior Financial and Planning Advisor (Currie) as per his suggestion (WBEC, USAID). 3.2.1, 4.4.3.
- o Review budget and consider adding a short-term surface facilities development inspector (WBEC, USAID). 4.4.3
- o ONAREP add construction supervision personnel (ONAREP). 4.4.4.
- o ONAREP acknowledge USAID's need to broaden operational focus of the project; USAID more effectively assert these goals through the remainder of the project (all). 4.1.2, 4.2, 4.7.

WBEC Home Office Support:

- o Increase activities in provision of internships, through WBEC** or subcontract (WBEC); USAID to closely supervise. 3.4.4, 4.5.1.

Notes:

* One explorationist to be added for a 12 month period.

** WBEC will complete its 1986 training program including internships; subsequent internships to be arranged by IIE.

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
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The evaluation team has come to the conclusion that the project, and with it CDER's program, ought to be redirected and better focused. At present the scope of activities pursued by CDER and partially supported by this project is very broad. At the same time, the vision guiding this project appears to have been very narrowly confined to technological questions. This relationship needs to be reversed. The project must encourage CDER to narrow the scope of its activities to concentrate on a few promising technologies, and at the same time broaden its approach to consider financial, economic, and sociological problems along with technological questions.

The primary activities of the project which were to assist CDER are listed in the Project Paper as:

1. Short- and long-term training in Morocco and in the U.S.;

2. Technical assistance by two long-term and numerous short-term advisors;

3. A small projects fund through which CDER could support renewable energy activities in the private and public sectors; and

4. A series of pilot projects, most of which had originally been selected and analyzed under phase I of this project.

Of these the training component has unfortunately been lagging throughout the project. The evaluation team regrets this, as training and human capital transfer are clearly at the heart of institution building. It must be pointed out, however, that until a little over a year ago CDER did not have a viable staff of its own that could have taken advantage of the training opportunities offered under this project. Nevertheless, once staff was hired, training should have been pursued more vigorously.

The technical assistance was provided by Research Triangle Institute (RTI) and a subcontractor, A.T. Kearney, under a host country contract. In some technical areas, such as wind, and micro-hydro, the assistance provided has been of good to excellent quality. Less commendable was the technical assistance in systems analysis, economics, and policy analysis was virtually absent. This is most unfortunate, because the evaluation team believes that the barriers to the spread of renewable energy technology in Morocco are not exclusively, nor even principally, of a technical nature. If CDER wants to pursue renewable energy development in Morocco it therefore cannot confine its attention to technical issues, but must consider economic, social and political questions as well. The Small Projects Fund (SPF), if used effectively, could become an important catalyst to interest private entrepreneurs in investing in renewable energy technology in Morocco. At the time of this evaluation the SPF was not yet operational. From the available documentation through it seems that the implementation of the SPF is on the right track.

Date this summary prepared: December 20, 1985

SUMMARY

The pilot projects have, unfortunately, taken up an undue amount of USAID and Moroccan resources, and have distracted from the project's primary purpose of institution building and training. Originally, pilot projects had been proposed only as a means for providing hands-on experience to CDER staff (ProAg). During phase I of the current project, though, a number of engineering firms were hired, and out of their assessments was developed a PP amendment that assigned the pilot projects a much broader role. The technological gadgetry of the pilot projects has raised CDER's visibility and has made it easier for the center to keep the momentum for renewable energy going. However, the pilot projects have also directed CDER's attention to purely technological issues, and may, in the long run, turn out to have been the least effective component of this project.

Principal Recommendations

General and specific recommendations are listed in Section V of the evaluation report. Listed here are only those that the evaluation team considers most important:

1. CDER Must Define Its Mission

CDER must develop a goal-oriented plan for its activities. The plan documents that the evaluation team has seen are deficient. What needs to be stated clearly in CDER's plans is (a) What is CDER going to produce (e.g. what question is CDER's research going to answer)?, (b) Why is this product important for Morocco?, and (c) How will CDER go about producing it? General statements such as "conducting research to gain more knowledge" are not sufficient.

2. CDER Must Strengthen Its Analytical Capabilities

In cooperation with USAID and the USAID contractors CDER must find ways of introducing analytical thinking among its staff. This can be achieved only by providing additional training in fundamentals of economics and systems analysis to CDER's current staff, and/or hire additional professionals to complement the current cadre of engineers. The additional staff that CDER needs ought to be recruited from the fields of systems analysis, economics, finance, etc. At the same time, the short-term advisors should be primarily drawn from economic and systems analysis disciplines. Their primary role is to complement the long-term advisors and assist CDER in its reorientation.

3. The PACD Shoud Be Conditionally Extended

The evaluation team recommends that the PACD be conditionally extended to enable CDER and its contractors to implement the recommended concentration and focusing of activities, however, this extension should be clearly linked to a demonstrated willingness of all concerned to implement the recommended re-direction of CDER's program. Specific conditions for this extension ought to include: No new technology projects are undertaken until monitoring and analysis of the current projects are well underway, no regional centers are opened and staffed with CDER engineers, a senior engineer who can grow into the role of technical director is hired as a counterpart to the long-term technical advisor, a training plan for the current CDER staff is developed with clear-cut goals and incentives, a workplan as outlined elsewhere in this evaluation report is developed, and the CDER management agrees to consider this workplan as binding on all parties concerned. The only area where CDER could and should expand is in the social sciences, particularly economics.

4. The Project Should Be More Carefully Monitored

The ProAg and the contract contain provisions for USAID monitoring of the project. These should be used, as far as possible, to help CDER and RTI/A.T. Kearney to redirect the project and to assert some quality control. USAID should consider the formation of a monitoring committee or a technical advisory board to assist the CDER directorate and advise its board of directors.

5. New Pilot Projects Should Be Reconsidered

Pilot projects should not be evaluated on the basis of the energy they produce, but on the basis of the information they provide, or the training opportunities they afford, or their demonstration effects. Economic considerations based on the actual energy produced are important principally in a prospective or macro sense, i.e., is this technology economically viable for Morocco?. They are less important in a micro sense, i.e., does this project show an adequate rate of return? In practice the two are closely related, of course, but nevertheless should not be confused. An additional important consideration under this project should be the effect that the pilot project has on CDER's other activities.

6. Improve Quality Control For CDER/RTI/A.T. Kearney Work Products

The best way of improving the quality of the different CDER/RTI/A.T. Kearney work products (reports) is through professional peer review. RTI should make full use of the institute's renowned professional staff in North Carolina for this purpose. The services and consulting advice provided have two impacts which are both key to the successful development of CDER. The first impact relates to the particular subject and the quality of the analysis and advice. The second impact involves training and the transfer of skills through example and interaction with CDER staff. It is therefore, very important to assure that the consulting services and reports be of high quality.

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The project is part of a three-phase, twenty-year period of assistance to the Government of Morocco in establishing a university-level training and research institution which can provide the managers, scientists, and technicians required to modernize the agriculture sector. Approximately mid-way through the ten-year third phase (1980-90), ANE Bureau's Office of Agriculture and Rural Development and PPC's Impact Evaluation Office evaluated the degree to which institutional development objectives were being met and the socioeconomic impact of the implementing agency, the Agronomic and Veterinary Institute of Hassan II University (IAV), on the agriculture sector. A five-person team, including specialists in the fields of agronomy, agriculture science, agricultural economics, rural sociology and institutional development, spent one month collecting data for the analysis in early 1986. The methodology consisted almost exclusively in direct contacts between team members and over a hundred Moroccan informants, ranging from small farmers to industry representatives and from IAV faculty and administrators to senior-level government officials. This summary includes the broad findings of the Impact Evaluation as well as the specific issues covered in the Mission's annual evaluation review.

The success of IAV in meeting its objectives for training top-quality researcher/trainers for the agriculture sector is unique among similarly financed USAID efforts in Francophone Africa. By the end of the current phase, the project will have financed training for 140 doctoral degrees, 150 third-cycle degrees (equivalent to BSc. plus two years of specialized training), and 28 MSc. degrees in a wide range of agricultural disciplines. Among the major factors which account for the success of IAV are the sense of mission of the leadership of the school, its commitment to build on a diverse body of experience in creating a uniquely Moroccan, world-class institution, strong and sustained (over fifteen years) institutional and programmatic leadership, the interplay between structural autonomy and the entrepreneurial attitudes of both leadership and staff, a long-term, sustained commitment by both USAID and the primary Title XII contractor to the development of IAV, the University of Minnesota, a curriculum model which integrated classroom experience with rural realities, and a

Date this summary prepared:

continuing openness on the part of IAV leadership to new ideas and evaluation feedback. The fact that the early development of the IAV occurred during a period of generally strong growth of the economy (1966-1978) and the broad base of secondary school graduates in science also contributed to the success of the IAV.

Despite its relatively young age (most land grant colleges in the U.S. did not begin producing positive impacts in state agricultural economies until fifty years after founding), the two-decade old IAV has generated a range of direct and indirect impacts on the agricultural sector in Morocco. One of the most impressive direct impacts is the process of "Moroccanization" of the IAV staff. Starting from a single Moroccan faculty in 1969, the IAV has established a 350-member faculty, more than ninety percent of which is Moroccan. This highly qualified national human resource is exploited widely by a number of external governmental, international, and private organizations for agricultural research, training, and consulting in Morocco. For example, Institute faculty are heavily involved in the conduct of the in-service training program of the Ministry of Agriculture. Senior-level GOM officials make use of data from IAV's computerized reference Library, which has been recently elevated to the level of National Agricultural Documentation Center, in sectoral planning and policy formulation. The school acts as an impetus and coordinator for an overlapping network of agricultural professional organizations. These organizations serve as mediating entities for the exchange of technical information, the introduction of new ideas, the publication of industry-related data and experience, and the organization of national and international symposia.

Both students and faculty interact directly with beneficiary populations. Students impact directly on the quality of life of rural farmers by their participation in village-level problem identification and project development exercises. One of the results of this "rural life" component of the program has been to build strong linkage between farmers and the Institute. On several occasions, farmers come directly to the Institute to seek assistance from faculty with their farm management problems. Finally, the Institute's Division of Rural Development is actively involved in carrying out technical analyses and conducting multi-disciplinary research in development projects funded by external donors.

The IAV has also been responsible for a wide range of indirect impacts on the development of agriculture sector. Doctoral-level students have made substantial contributions to the development of scientific knowledge in their disciplines through publications in

internationally refereed journals. Graduates of IAV now occupy a wide range of management positions in government, state-run (approximately fifty percent in those sampled), and private enterprises. In one example, an IAV graduate, working as the plant manager of a private vegetable oil refinery, modified aspects of European-supplied processing equipment which doubled production at no additional cost. The report documents examples of ex-IAV students who are in the forefront of transferring modern technology to the agriculture sector. One graduate, after ten years experience with the citrus and vegetable exporters extension service, launched a profitable and innovate greenhouse banana -growing project which employs 20-30 people during most of the year.

The Institute also plays an important regional role in training students from other African countries (10 percent of student body) and in organizing symposia and conferences in collaboration with international organizations. An indication of the increasing prestige of the Institute to play this role is the number of organizations which solicit the IAV to collaborate in the establishment of regional research and service institutes. The most recent example is the International Irrigation Center, a joint effort of Utah State University and the IAV to provide regional training in the area of irrigation management. The Government of Mauritania is working closely with IAV to promote the dissemination of animal-drawn, water-retrieval technology adapted from the Atlas Mountains.

The evaluation determined, however, that the striking success of IAV is a fragile accomplishment. The Institute is entering a phase when strong charismatic leadership in program and institutional management is being replaced by more routine bureaucratic authority. Increased attention to organizational planning and budgeting, personnel and facility management, and computerized information systems will be required to facilitate successfully this transition. The school is confronting an extremely critical recurrent cost financing burden which is impinging on its ability to maintain an effective teaching and research program and to retain highly motivated staff. An issue related to the recurrent cost crisis is the ability of the Institute to pursue a research agenda which responds to uniquely Moroccan concerns in the absence of non-donor tied research funds. As a result of serious difficulties experienced by the Moroccan economy, IAV graduates will have to seek employment increasingly in the private sector, a sector which has demonstrated concern for the relevance of job-related training provided by the Institute. The success which IAV has enjoyed in

preparing its own doctoral students in Morocco, many of whom will continue as tenured IAV faculty, may paradoxically eliminate a valuable input of diversity for the teaching faculty. Finally, the IAV has placed little emphasis on the integration of extension, farm management, and economic sector analysis skills into its program.

The fragility of the maturity which IAV has achieved suggests that withdrawal of AID support at the end of the current phase may be premature. On-going support for faculty exchange, research, access to recently published technical information, the organization of international symposia, and selected short-term technical assistance will allow IAV to consolidate its achievements, to collaborate with American university partners in promoting international agricultural development, and to play a valuable role in the development of the region's agriculture.

The evaluators identified the following key "lessons learned" for use in similar institutional development efforts:

- high-level political commitment to a well-articulated "mission", strong, continuous institutional leadership, a commitment to organizational quality, structural and operational autonomy, access to sustained resource support over a ten-fifteen year period, effective management of multi-donor resources (to the extent that more than one donor participates in the project), an incremental development approach, and flexibility in design are all critical inputs to institutional development efforts; the absence of any one of these factors may jeopardize the institution development effort;

- in addition to these essential factors, selectivity in choosing faculty and students, standards of international recognition, promotion of entrepreneurial behavior by staff in seeking resources and building support constituencies, an organizational structure which encourages multi-disciplinary information sharing, and openness to on-going program evaluation are key factors which contribute to the success of an institutional development effort;

- AID can control several key factors which influence the success of institutional development efforts: the length of commitment to the development effort, the incremental nature of the effort, and the nature of participation by an American university contractor.

K. <u>Attachments</u>:

1. "Project-Specific Findings," Jim Lowenthal, ANE/TR/ARD

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Problem and Overview

The Resource Conservation and Utilization Project (RCUP) is a multifaceted and integrated watershed project that attempts to halt the rapid degradation of Nepal's environment. There are currently three other active watershed projects in Nepal: 1) Tinau (SATA/GTZ), 2) Phewa tal (UNDP/FAO), and 3) Bagmati (GON). Related USAID activities include the Rapti Integrated Rural Development Project, the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science Project, and the recently completed Integrated Cereals Project.

B. U.S. Assistance

RCUP involves three major efforts: 1) Assisting in the development of the Institute of Natural Resources and related manpower training, 2) Construction of buildings to serve as field centers and 3) Implementation of a field program of integrated resource management. The project purpose is to assist HMG/N in the protection and restoration of the soil, water and plant resource base upon which the rural population is totally dependent.

The project is administered through the Department of Soil Conservation and Watershed Management (DSCWM) of HMG and involves seven line agencies under 4 ministries plus Tribhuvan University. The project was funded at $ 27.5 million for the period 1980/81 thru 1984/85 and has been extended without additional funds until 7/15/86. The contractor is the Southeast Consortium for International Development (SECID). The basic field strategy involves supporting line agencies in working with local people on 17 project components. The project was conceived as the first phase of a long term commitment by USAID to help halt the rapid deterioration of Nepal's environment.

C. The Evaluation

During the 1985 Nepal program review by USAID the Asia Bureau recommended that the project be extended for one year with an evaluation in the fall of 1985 to assess the progress and impact of the project. A special evaluation was conducted in 1983. The present evaluation was conducted in Kathmandu and at selected field sites. The evaluation team split in two groups which spent 10 and 18 days respectively in the field. The primary documents used were the Project Paper, Project Implementation Plan, 1983 Special Evaluation Report, 1985 Project Extension Paper, and a evaluation briefing book prepared by SECID staff. Interviews were conducted with project staff, HMG officials, and representatives of related donor projects. The major obstacles in evaluation were the normal time involved in visiting the widely dispersed field sites in the difficult terrain of Nepal and the limited amount of primary field data.

D. Findings

Following is a summary of the findings of the evaluation team: 1. RCUP assistance in forming the Institute of Renewable Natural Resources, participant training and, and on-the-job training will have a very significant impact on natural resource management in all of Nepal for decades to come. 2. The project resulted in the construction of 174 buildings including 12 DSCWM field centers in three districts. These centers can serve as the foci for future integrated resource management. 3. The construction program carried out under very difficult conditions, mostly without road access, resulted in the development of a private sector construction capability for such conditions. 4. Although the project has made significant contributions in many of the components, no model for integrated watershed management has been developed. 5. A plan for integration was not included in the project design. The concept of a watershed as an integrating unit has not been used, rather line agency programs are being implemented within the designated watershed with only minimal integration. A plan for integration was not included in the project design. 6. Another reason why this integration was not achieved is that too many components were tried over too large an area too quickly. 7. A good start has been made in developing a structure for peoples participation, but it has not always been used effectively. There is no synthesis of this experience. 8. Although a good system of fiscal monitoring has been established, physical accomplishments are reported only as achievement against work plan targets. The monitoring system, repeatedly insisted on by USAID, has not yet been implemented in the field. 9. Considering the components most relevant to the project purpose of soil, water, and plant conservation, the activities in these components are rated high in technical soundness, moderate in institution building and potential impact, moderate to low in peoples' participation, and low in integration with each other and with other project activities. 10. RCUP made a significant contribution in increasing the awareness and concern of people for natural resource conservation and management in the three districts of the project area. 11. A good start has been made in developing the organizational structure in HMG and at the local levels as well as the facilities on which a major follow-on project can be built.

E. Project Design and Policy Implication

The evaluation team believes the project design was too complex and diffuse to effectively accomplish the project purpose with the resources available. Although the watershed was to be the integrating unit and peoples participation thru village dialogue the integrating mechanism, there was no evidence of a plan to bring these elements together to produce integration. Integration was in part inhibited by the number and diversity of components in the project and further complicated by a major construction effort plus an effort to assist in developing a new

Institute. The implication would be to carefully consider both at the design and during implementation the precise purpose and the core elements necessary to achieve that purpose.

F. Recommendations

Considering the limited amount of funds remaining in the project, after termination of the SECID contract in July 1986 it is recommended that these funds be managed directly by USAID with the following priority: 1. Continue support to all persons overseas so that they can complete their training programs. 2. Complete turn-key construction. 3. Continue support to the Institute of Renewable Natural Resources. 4. Continue support to HMG Ministry of Forestry and Soil conservation to begin an integrated field watershed program in very small watersheds in close proximity to the DSCWM field centers in the project area.

Furthermore it is recommended that work begin immediately on designing two new follow on projects: 1. A major support project for the Institute of Renewable Natural Resources. 2. A project to directly support HMG effort to develop an internal capability to implement a tightly focused watershed program.

NEPAL - Population Policy Development Project

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Project

This report contains the results of an evaluation by a three-person team of the joint Nepal/U.S. Population Policy Development Project which began in 1979 and was scheduled for completion in September 1985. The project's dual purposes were:

1. Institutional development of the National Commission on Population (NCP) (especially its capacity to provide Nepal with useful research on population matters).

2. Support to the NCP in formulation and implementation of a national population policy for Nepal.

It was financed jointly by His Majesty's Government (HMG) of Nepal ($365,000 worth of rupee contribution) and a grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) ($2 million).

2. The Evaluation Scope of Work

The evaluation team's scope of work called for examination of the following project-related matters:

- Population research, including dissemination to policy makers.
- Training.
- Finances, including possible future financial constraints.
- Three critical analytical and program balances.
- Any obstacles to overall NCP performance.
- Follow-up of previous evaluations.
- Capability of the NCP, including its need for additional technical assistance.

A constraint placed on the team was the statement by NCP officials that the team should evaluate the utilization of the USAID grant but not the performance of the NCP. Despite efforts to do so, the team was unable to comply with that restriction and still carry out the contractual scope of work.

3. Principal Findings

Useful progress was made during the project's life in a number of areas. The NCP was staffed, procurement and training got underway, and a number of in-country activities were undertaken, including vigorous pursuit of research projects and dissemination of information about population through publications and seminars.

The most notable accomplishment was NCP's lead in the government-wide population planning process which culminated in an ambitious but feasible National Population Strategy aimed at reducing Nepal's total fertility rate to 2.5 by the year 2000.

Partially offsetting these indicators of success, however, was a downturn of project activities in mid-1983. At present, both implementation of population strategy and the institutional strength of the NCP have waned. Behind this decline is an apparent refocusing of government officials on other high-priority areas.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

The history of the PPD project illustrates the value of focusing on key national development policy issues. Much can be accomplished in a short time. It also illustrates how much those accomplishments depend on active support from the nation's top political leadership. In Nepal, the loss of that support has put in doubt the long-term significance of project expenditures and accomplishments. The following nine recommendations by the team leader constitute his judgment of what practical steps should be taken if this potentially vital activity is once again to be pointed towards success and if the expenditures are to be viewed as significant.

1. The Palace could make a major contribution to remedying Nepal's severe population problem. It could do this by ensuring that with every major change in government leadership an understanding is reached that overseeing operations of the National Commission on Population and implementing the National Population Strategy remains a constant high priority for leadership attention.

2. The Prime Minister should be appraised of the current situation and HMG should take the following simple, clear steps to begin revitalizing the NCP:

   a) Call a meeting of the NCP for the near future to be chaired by the Prime Minister. The meeting could review implementation of Nepal's National Population Strategy and provide direction for the future.

   b) Call a meeting of ministry secretaries to be chaired by the Vice Chairman of the NCP. The meeting could outline how the NCP will proceed to carry out its dual functions of coordination and assistance.

3. The NCP Secretariat should lay out a clear plan of action for the next six to 12 months to put renewed vigor into its annual work plan.

4. Donors should endorse the revitalization efforts in conversations with HMG leaders and should continue to encourage HMG leaders to to review implementation of the National Population Strategy at the next Nepal USAID Group Meeting.

5. USAID should stand ready to provide prompt and relevant assistance to the NCP when requested by HMG and as soon as NCP revitalization seems likely. (Assistance through AID/Washington-managed projects may be adequate if they have sufficient flexibility.)

6. The NCP should further strengthen its research management process as well as its own technical assistance capacity to help other entities carry out the National Population Strategy. Outside technical assistance should be provided to help with this strengthening, if requested.

7. The NCP should give increasing attention to the issues involved in finding a proper balance between permanent and temporary contraceptive techniques in HMG's programs.

8. The management responsibility for population policy research, population operations research, and NCP's current public information functions, need to stay with NCP, not be shifted to a new Population Studies and Training Center, as proposed.

9. Those recommendations of the 1982 Mid-Term Review which remain "open" should be readdressed as part of the NCP revitalization. As an example, the Ministry of Law and Justice should proceed to carry out the Cabinet Secretariat's instruction to draft a proposal to provide a statutory basis for the NCP.

NEPAL - Rapti Zone Rural Area Development Project (367-0129)

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Problem, Overview, and US Assistance

The Rapti Zone Project began in 1980 with planned funding of US$ 33.0 million as the first phase of a proposed 15 to 20 year rural area development effort directed at the one million rural poor in the Zone area, one of Nepal's least developed. After a slow start, annual USAID Project expenditures increased from US$ 0.7 million in FY 1981 to US$ 4.8 million in FY 1985. US$ 15.4 million was expended on the Project by USAID and US$ 3.5 million was expended by HMG during fiscal years (FYs) 1981 through 1985. Scheduled to end in September 1985, the project was extended until September 1986.

The stated goal of the Rapti Project was to help HMG promote development to meet the basic needs of Nepal's poor majority, especially those in the "Middle Hills". The purposes were to improve production levels, income and other measurable quality of life indicators of Rapti Zone families and to improve local demand for and control of delivery systems, including those for agriculture, education, and resource management.

The Project strategy was to pursue balanced development and growth in the five districts of the Zone by increasing food and agricultural production, forestry and natural resource management, employment and skills development, road improvement and rural works, and institutional development. Institutional development was designed to support the important on-going political process of decentralization, devolving responsibility for planning, implementation, and for mobilizing local private resources for development to District and Village assemblies.

B. Purpose of Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation was to assess Project progress through September 1985 and recommend 1) whether the Project should be continued after September 1986 and, if so, 2) the substantive content and strategy of the extended Project.

The Evaluation Team took into account serious concern about the effectiveness of multi-sectoral or integrated area approaches to development and assessed each component of the Project in terms of output, impact, manageability and sustainability. Because the evaluation was designed to serve HMG and AID, the Team was mindful of HMG's concern that a mid-stream change in donor strategy regarding area development projects might undermine the political process of decentralization and local development planning and implementation.

The evaluation's methodology included document review, interviews with implementers, beneficiaries and others, and observation of project activities and impacts. Three Nepalis and four Americans served as members of the Evaluation Team, and spent substantial time visiting all five Districts of Rapti Zone.

C. Conclusions

The Project was overly complex and disparate, its components remained separated rather than strongly linked and focused upon Project purposes. Management structure was fragmented, relying too much upon planned-for individual outputs of the Project's many components and unable to integrate them effectively to achieve Project purposes.

About 54 percent of the planned level of Project inputs was reached during the 1980-85 period. Substantial inputs were used for building construction and to support HMG operations. They were scattered among many activities, which claimed a great deal of management time and effort. Inputs were not focused effectively on key production sectors.

The Project did not achieve its--often unrealistic target--output production levels in any of its critical areas. However, it established a sound foundation for future growth in agricultural output which can be achieved with better coordination of technical, input and extension services. It also laid the basis for improving and preserving the endangered resource base through reforestation and soil conservation.

Most significantly, the Project contributed substantially to strengthening District and Village capacity to plan and manage resources effectively on a sustainable basis, particularly during 1984 and 1985. Private resources at the local level were mobilized and combined with external or new technologies to boost productivity, income, and quality of life in many instances.

D. Summary Recommendations

- Close out the Project (No. 367-0129), which represented the first phase of a 15 to 20 year bilateral effort;

- Initiate the second phase of the Rapti Zone development effort as an institution-building local development project more sharply focused on technology transfer in agriculture and the environment. Recommended project strategy involves three elements: a) continuing support for strengthening institutional capacity for managing development at District and Village levels; b) expanding and strengthening natural resource management programs; and c) concentrating resources efficiently and effectively on agricultural production in both valley and hill areas. This project's phase-in should ensure no disruption of important on-going activities; and

- Mission strategy should focus on coordinating Mission and other donor projects to supplement and reinforce project resources in the Zone.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

OF THE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (272-0101)

The purpose of this evaluation was to review the project after the first year of implementation and to determine what revisions in the project design, level of funding, nature and amount of technical assistance, and other components should be made based on experience to-date. This evaluation recognized that initial planning was necessarily somewhat general and that a year of implementation has provided valuable experience by which to refine and detail the initial design.

Drs. Klima and Clark spent two weeks in Oman meeting with officials of the Directorate General of Fisheries (DGF) in Muscat, visiting fisheries sites in Barka and Muttrah as well as the Directorate of Fisheries office and fisheries sites in Salalah. Mr. Hawley also visited the DGF office in Muscat and participated in the visit to Salalah.

This report has concluded the following:

The technical design and direction of the project are sound, if a bit ambitious. Resources Development Associates (RDA) should concentrate its assistance in institution building in DGF to research, extension, data collection and analysis, surveillance and enforcement of GovOman regulations; RDA should also provide direct technical services, without necessarily becoming involved in institution building per se in economic and financial feasibility analyses for private sector activities and policy development and evaluation. This division of work will permit RDA to focus its technical resources more precisely and more efficiently and will allow the GovOman to support the improved welfare of traditional fishermen while also promoting the growth of the commercial fisheries in the private sector, growth which is expected to contribute to the national economy.

The project needs to define more precisely what is meant and desired by the institutional development of DGF. This definition should include technical and non-technical (managerial and administrative) operations of DGF. RDA's institutional building activities should include training (short-term, long-term, in-country, U.S., on-the-job training by RDA consultants, and training in local training institutions) as part of the strengthening of DGF's administrative and managerial staff and operations.

The project needs to identify more precisely the socio-economic circumstances of the fishermen whom the project intends to benefit and to detail how the project's activities will benefit them.

The project needs to overcome major institutional constraints which limit DGF's ability to develop: long hiring procedures, low government salaries, low level of technical, managerial, and administrative skills among current staff.

The staffing and program of the Marine Science and Fisheries Center are being designed, and technical assistance for the center is now being sought by competitive selection.

The statistical program is producing an initial estimate of Oman's fisheries resources which will be a valuable basis for decision making for the Five Year Plan. Future statistics work needs to improve the quality of data now being gathered, broaden the scope of data collection, improve the skills level of data collectors, and broaden the range of analyses of data being collected.

The concept of Fisheries Development needs to be broadened to include stimulating private sector investment and activity in the fisheries sector.

The Directorate of Fisheries Affairs should take on this responsibility. The concept of Fisheries Management needs to be broadened to include surveillance of fisheries resources nation-wide and enforcement of national regulations protecting fisheries resources. A Directorate of Fisheries Management should be created with this responsibility.

Greater work is needed in developing, evaluating, and implementing national policy for the development and management of the nation's fisheries resources and the fisheries sector.

SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the three pages provided)

Address the following items:

- Purpose of activity or activities evaluated
- Purpose of/reason for this evaluation
- Key issues or questions addressed
- Types and quality of evidence used to assess short-term effects, trends and/or potential for impact
- Findings
- Conclusions
- Principal recommendations

Purpose of the Development Support Training Project: "to upgrade the managerial and technical expertise of Pakistanis in the private sector and the federal and provincial government who are involved in the palnning and implementation of Pakistan's priority social and economic development programs through long and short term training programs. (Source: AID Assistance to Pakistan:FY 1982)

Purpose of the Evaluation: This is an interim evaluation, occuring at a point in time when long term project activities could be viewed within a context of opportunities for significant funding increases and the perspective of recent project experience.

Methodology Used: The methodology included: (1) Review of project documents and other related materials (see bibliography, Appendix 1); (2) Survey of current(US) and returned participants and their supervisors (see Appendix 3 for copies of the survey instruments, and Appendix 4 for a tabular report of survey data); (3) Interviews with (see Appendix 2 for a complete list of interviewees): (a) Current and past GOP officials involved with the project. (b) AID personnel, including project officers in some of the "add on" project.
(c) Contractor and subcontractor personnel in Pakistan, Washington D.C., and home offices. (d) A sample of returned and current (in US) training participants and their supervisors. (e) In-country ESL experts.

FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Successes:

1. Three training organizations (NIPA/Karachi, PIM and the Training Wing of the Pakistan Audit Department have been assisted in the development of strategic plans which will have a major impact upon their respective ability to upgrade their management training capability.
2. Fifteen of the thirty-four management training courses, seminars and workshops scheduled for development and delivery with project assistance have been completed, with positive results overall.
3. Over 400 individuals have been involved with the Participant Training program. Most of these have been through the DSTP "add on"activities serving other Mission projects.
4. The role of DSTP to serve other Mission in-country and out of country training and placement/support of participants is regarded as a successful, efficient way to use participant training resources.
5. ESL activities have been initiated that will enable many more Pakistanis to utilize participant training opportunities.

J. continued

B. Constraints:

1. The level of effort needed to cary out the project is not sufficient to meet project goals and evolving opportunities. As participant training activities increase, all the involved offices (including GOP, AID/HRT, and AED/EIL) may need more staff. The components of institutional development, management training, and ESL are currently understaffed and as project opportunities and expectations grow, this problem will become more acute.
2. In the area of participant training, there are serious policy differences regarding jurisdictional responsibility and procedural bottlenecks within the GOP that will make it impossible for participant training goals to be reached.
3. The GOP's ability to make more effective use of DSTP (and other donor agency assistance) is limited by the lack of a comprehensive human resources development planning process that links training needs and opportunities to the career growth of individuals, and to organization growth and strengthening. This is especially true at the provincial level of government.
4. The private sector goals of the project, and of the Mission generally, lack a [illegible] focus. This constraint limits the development of project activities in all components, especially participant training and institutional strengthening and development.

Recommendations

1. Funding for the Development Support Training Project should be increased to the maximum extent possible. There are no serious limitations to the absorptive capacity of the GOP and the private sector in the areas of institutional strengthening, management training and ESL. The project has reached a phase in these areas where new windows of opportunity are emerging that could provide AID with a unique chance to influence management practices in the sectors that it sees as strategic (i.e. agriculture, energy and the private sector).
2. The project termination date should be extended as long as possible, given the institutional strengthening priorities and activities of the project, as well as the commitment to long-term participant training.
3. All components of the project need increased resources and levels of effort.
4. The project extension agreement should have a covenant requiring GOP action to streamline the process of participant training nomination and selection.
5. The GOP should undertake activities to develop a human resources development plan, and should include provincial government needs in these activities.
6. AID should offer to provide technical assistance and financial resources to the GO in order to streamline participant training nomination and selection processes, an for undertaking a human resources development plan.
7. Participant training activities should give a higher priority to long-term training.
8. All parties need to assure that short-term activities (particularly study tours) are closely monitored.
9. AID should review English language requirements for short-term training, with a view towards lowering required TOEFL scores or using another indicator.
10. The Mission needs to provide leadership in giving a focus to private sector goals so that this project can organize its private sector activities more effectively.
11. Institution strengthening and management training activities should focus on the training units within GOP and the private sector that have closest connection to AID's priority areas of agriculture, energy and the private sector. Institution strengthening should follow a strategic plan developed by the local training unit. Management training activities of these units should aim at creating a "[illegible] mass" of trained supervisors and managers in operating units, in order to [illegible] effective management practices, and to create and maintain a new managerial [illegible].
12. Project planning and coordination should include the technical divisions of [illegible] a greater extent. There is interest among some project officers and technical staff in seeing closer coordination between participant training and in-country management training in the organizations they work with, and they feel that Mission

SUMMARY (CONTI. -D)

J. continued

goals would be better served and resources better utilized through more coordinated efforts.

3. Opportunities to impact training related to women are beginning to develop, and more responsiveness to these at this time is recommended.

SUMMARY (CONTD.)

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - Part II

PAKISTAN - Primary Health Care Project (391-0475)

SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the three pages provided)

Address the following items:

- Purpose of activity or activities evaluated
- Purpose of/reason for this evaluation
- Key issues or questions addressed
- Types and quality of evidence used to assess short-term effects, trends and/or potential for impact
- Findings
- Conclusions
- Principal recommendations

Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Finding: Service delivery personnel have an incomplete understanding of the specific tasks they are expected to carry out to achieve a high degree of coverage of priority services at a defined level of quality and completeness.

   Conclusion: Uncertainty regarding the job to be done renders effective service delivery less likely, leaves supervisors with unclear criteria for assessing performance, and tends to reduce job satisfaction and morale based on self-assessment of performance, particularly in preventive services where immediate results are often undramatic.

   Recommendation: Convene a working group of project, Ministry, Department and outside experts to write detailed task descriptions for service delivery pesonnel. After appropriate administrative approvals, these should be provided to every service provider and discussed in person by the corresponding supervisor.

2. Finding: First level supervisors have a low level of understanding of methodologies for identifying and solving individual service delivery problems.

   Conclusion: If the project is unable to effectively improve the performance of individual service delivery tasks, overall improvements in service delivery and health impact are unlikely.

   Recommendation: Develop supervisory guidelines for ll problem identification and resolution methodologies and their application to the major tasks involved in each of the priority services. Disseminate these guidelines to first level supervisors and incorporate them into management workshops for these personnel. Update these materials with case study material generated by actual project material.

3. Finding: Higher levels of the supervisory hierarchy have no established techniques for assessing and improving the performance of lower level supervisors.

   Conclusion: In the absence of a concerted effort to improve performance, supervision has plateaued at a low level of effectiveness.

   Recommendation: Apply the strategy proposed for first level supervision to the specific requirements of personnel who supervise professionals that are themselves supervisors. As noted in the report, this will involve systematic sampling of actual service delivery activities for every level of the supervisory hierarchy.

J. continued

4. Finding: The observations and interventions of supervisors are not recorded.

Conclusion: The systematic efforts of a complex hierarchy to improve service delivery performance are difficult to coordinate without organized information. Any opportunities for higher level supervisors to assess and intervene in problems without field travel are largely foregone in the absence of supervisory reports.

Recommendation: Develop and implement a supervisory reporting system that at a minimum summarizes the dates of evaluation and problem status of priority service delivery activities. Implement on a trial basis narrative problem-oriented supervisor reports and evaluate the feasibility of expansion. If this proves feasible, develop and test standardized categories for identifying common problems and interventions, based on the content of the narrative reports.

5. Finding: The effectiveness of individual service interventions and the degree of population coverage have not been directly assessed.

Conclusion: Policy, management, and supervisory decisions are not informed by the project's progress toward achieving its health impact objectives. Given the complexity of the decisions to be made, it is virtually certain that decisions made on an intuitive basis do not bring the delivery system to its full potential.

Recommendation: Develop and implement a variety of routine information gathering activities to describe the relationship between project services and indicators of health status, including:

a) hospital-based sentinel surveillance

b) active monthly surveillance of rural population clusters, using MTs where feasible

c) a flexible reporting system for units such as BHUs, specifying small scale special efforts to collect field data based on random household visits and followup visits to subpopulations identified through clinic patient records.

d) an expanded individual clinic record.

6. Finding: A number of elements of the project delivery system do not feature a design which appears feasible to implement to a degree which would allow achievement of project health objectives. Complete coverage of outreach activities, for example, presents difficult problems of design as well as implementation because of unresolved questions related to travel and gender roles. Other design features appear plausible, but are not based on empirical evidence that they are more cost-effective than alternatives. Implementation of suboptimal designs in a large program over a long period implies a hidden but cumulative cost in terms of resources and/or effectiveness.

Conclusion: For these issues, formally-designed but generally simple research efforts represent the most practical strategy.

J. continued

Recommendation: Engage technically qualified assistance to develop an operations research capability for the project. Form province level working groups to identify priority issues for which a small research staff would develop formal proposals for official approval. Provide resources for contracted data collection where service delivery staff are unable to play this role. Offer to carry out initial descriptive studies of service delivery in the form of a systems analysis to identify delivery system problems.

7. Finding: A small number of highly capable project contract staff are available for all project activities.

Conclusion: Efforts to improve the effectiveness of service delivery should take precedence over further expansion.

Recommendation: Direct project efforts toward promising opportunities to develop insights into performance variables in

whatever approved sites make operational sense rather than focusing on expansion or on project sites that prove technically, logistically, or administratively difficult.

8. Finding: Program staff have incomplete knowledge of some technical areas, are not well informed regarding the epidemiological basis for priority services, exhibit low interest and morale in preventive compared to curative activities, and specifically complain about lack of recognition for difficult outreach work.

Conclusion: In view of the program's limited capacity to provide face-to-face training, encouragement, and recognition, written communication provides a low cost and potentially effective medium for supplementing other measures.

Recommendation: Support, if necessary though contracts, production and distribution of a professional quality periodic project bulletin in the lingua franca, including technical articles on epidemiology, public health, clinical reviews and treatment protocols, summaries of project activities, in-depth case studies of service delivery issues and recognition for outstanding personnel. Begin with interpretations of the project's baseline survey.

9. Finding: The outreach effectiveness of MTs could be improved with expanded knowledge of specific techniques for planning, implementing, and evaluating their own activities in this sphere, while the need and opportunity to apply much of their clinical training is less than originally thought.

Conclusion: It is feasible and desirable to further focus MT training on the outreach component of the project's priority services.

Recommendation: Assign a field-oriented working group to immediately schedule a series of reviews of the revision of the MT curriculum while it is under development, including selective field testing of portions, using competency-based and performance-based criteria.

10. Finding: While the planned MT training schools and hostels have a number of potential uses, the projected role and personnel requirements for MTs have changed in some provinces and not all authorities wish to proceed with construction of the full compliment.

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Conclusion: There are alternative uses for these resources that more directly address project objectives of reducing morbidity and mortality, while not necessarily reducing the development of MTs.

Recommendation: AID should offer to negotiate with provincial authorities regarding the option of reprogramming funds designated for these schools to specifically support activities directed toward improving project performance.

11. Finding: The project's inservice training program for medical officers and paramedical personnel in preventive services, supervision, and clinic management has not yet developed a medium-term plan specifying objectives in terms of competency and coverage.

Conclusion: Planning other activities and assessing the effectiveness of this program is difficult without such a plan.

Recommendation: Assess training needs in terms of objectively defined skills, develop alternative strategies in relation to other activities, and negotiate a plan with provincial authorities.

12. Finding: Medical officers exhibit and openly acknowledge poor preparation in the preventive medicine, management, and supervisory skills necessary for their role in the project's priority services.

Conclusion: The central and expanding role of physicians in priority services continues to be hampered by deficiencies in their formal training, which are widely recognized.

Recommendation: Sponsor development of a model program in preventive medicine in a selected Pakistani medical school, with emphasis on priority services. Consider reinforcing this effort with support for post-graduate training in public health to expand the nation's supply of specialized expertise.

13. Finding: Numerous officials commented on the extensive overlap of the training of female MTs and of lady health visitors, while noting the greater recognition and acceptance of the LHV.

Conclusion: The role presently assigned the female MT may benefit from the obstetrical skills and public recognition accorded to LHVs.

Recommendation: Convene a panel of respected authorities in training, nursing and public health to consider the desirability of maintaining the current distinction between the female MT and the LHV.

14. Finding: Current project interventions do not include all feasible measures to reduce the health impact of closely-spaced births, early termination of breast feeding due to pregnancy, and ill-timed or unwanted births.

Conclusion: Family planning technologies could be offered by every category of project service provider.

Recommendation: Add family planning services to the project delivery system.

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15. Finding At all levels of the organizational structure which manages, administers, supervises and directly delivers the basic health services, there is a striking lack of those incentives which are necessary to motivate efficient performance by those persons comprising this whole delivery system.

Conclusion The efficiency with which any organization performs depends upon various factors, e.g., the skills of the organizations' planners, managers and administrators. However, the most crucial factor is the incentive system. Unless the members of the organization have incentives to motivate efficient performance, efficient performance cannot be expected (whatever the attention given to promoting management and adminstrative skills).

Recommendation The team recognizes that this is a complex problem the solution to which may entail major structural changes in these organizations. (There is a recommendation for research on this crucial question). However, short of a full engagement with this probelem, it may be possible usefully to engage it on a more modest scale. For example, in Pakistan, the term "incentive" seems usually taken to mean a payment (or other reward) made in anticipation that it will evoke efficient performance. The term "incentive" also has another meaning -,- namely, payments (or other gains) earned as a consequence of demonstrated (and measured) efficient performance. The team recommends some field trials with incentives of this latter kind. For example, a scheme might be tried under which, say, outreach workers could earn a bonus to be paid for superior work performance which was objectively measured.

PAKISTAN - An Evaluation of Existing Irrigation Water Pricing Policy in Pakistan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study evaluates the existing water pricing policy in Pakistan within the framework of various developmental objectives and existing studies that have been done on the subject. This is necessary because the question of raising water rates to make them compatible with relevant economic parameters needs urgent answers in view of the huge rehabilitation investments now occurring. In the last five years, only two authoritative studies (PIDE, 1981; Chaudhry, 1985) have been conducted to address some of the important issues that frequently arise in the process of fixing water rates. These are treated in this paper; but in view of the very increased cost of water supplies caused by the current major rehabilitation effort as well as the presumably altered repayment capacity of farmers, need for evaluation of current pricing policy can hardly be overemphasized.

This paper asserts that an economic evaluation of existing water pricing policy reveals that present levels of water rates for different crops are considerably lower than the water charges rationalized either on the basis of applying a cost principle or a marginal value product principle. The current low charges are also attributed in this paper as a major cause for inefficient water use in Pakistan. If water charges are set purely on the basis of a marginal benefit approach, they are found to be beyond the payment capacity of the farmers. However, a preliminary analysis of the cost and income

parameters of various crops indicate that a reasonable increase in existing water charges would still be within the paying capacity of the farmers. In essence, the existing water charges constitute a very small fraction of the per acre income and therefore cannot be regarded as having a significant impact on the cropping patterns.

Review of the literature and regulations shows that the objective of cost recovery has not been given much attention in the Pakistani project planning process. The facts show that the revenue-expenditure gap of the entire irrigation system is consistently increasing at an alarming rate. It has gone up nation-wide from Rs.578 million in 1980-81 to Rs.1002 million in 1983-84. In Punjab, cost recovery has dropped from 88 percent in 1974-75 to 64 percent in 1983-84; while cost recovery in Sind has dropped by 23 percent during the same period. It is estimated that O&M costs were Rs.20.61 per acre-ft, Rs.51.67 per irrigated acre, and Rs.31.20 per cropped acre as compared to recovery of Rs.13.02 per acre-ft, Rs.32.64 per irrigated acre, and Rs.19.71 per cropped acre in 1982-83.

The O&M costs for canal water was Rs.15.30 per acre-ft in Punjab and Rs.11.09 per acre-ft in Sind as compared to the O&M cost of public tubewell water which was Rs.84.93 per acre-ft in Punjab and Rs.85.93 per acre-ft in Sind in 1982-83. The cost of public tubewell water was 82 and 87 percent higher than the canal water cost in Punjab and Sind provinces, respectively.

The most significant effect of neglecting the cost recovery objective is that the irrigation infrastructure has deteriorated over

a period of time. Lack of adequate O&M funds lead to deferred maintenance. Today, a major canal rehabilitation program is being financed in order to overcome deferred maintenance and to restore the original capability of the system. This will further increase the cost of water, at least in the short-run. In future, a necessary condition for efficient continued operation and maintenance of the restored system is that it must be financially self-supportive. Aside from technical and management improvements in O&M, this essentially calls for: (i) an improvement in the cost recovery situation through an increase in water charges; (ii) technical revision of the "yardstick model" to make it an effective tool for budgeting procedures; and (iii) elimination of "financial leakages" from the revenue collection system.

In Pakistan, subsidization of irrigation water amounted to Rs.10.89 per acre-ft and Rs.35.78 per irrigated acre in 1983-84. Total subsidies on irrigation water in Punjab and Sind had gone up from Rs.217.70 million and Rs.140.30 million in 1979-80 to Rs.435.30 million and Rs.288.50 million in 1983-84, respectively; showing an increase of almost 100 percent in 4 years. A major portion of this subsidization is going for operation and maintenance of the public tubewell schemes. In 1983-84, per farm subsidy amounted to Rs.138.30 for small farms, Rs.383.50 for medium farms and Rs.849.80 for large farms. The income inequalities among large and small farmers are further increased due to a very high subsidy on irrigation water because large holdings not only get higher subsidy in proportional terms but also derive more benefits by growing cash crops whose water rates are highly subsidized.

In Summary, this review of literature and data on existing water pricing policy within the context of various developmental objectives suggests an urgent need for a significant increase in the prevailing water rates. But, on the other hand, introduction of Ushar (an Islamic levy on agricultural output) in 1982-83 has stopped further increases in water charges for the time being because the amount required to be collected through Ushar is significantly higher than the amount foregone due to elimination of the land revenue tax. It is therefore, imperative to analyze the farmers current payment capabilities before justifying a specific increase in the present level of water charges.

An increase in water charges could not only improve the efficiency of resource allocation both at micro and macro levels but also relieve the Government of heavy financial strains. However, it may not be possible (for many economic and political reasons) to raise the existing water rates to the target level with one stroke. The most appropriate way to reach the target level would be to develop a phased schedule that is based on gradual increases so that it would be acceptable to farmers. Those gradual revisions should take into account the changes in general price level which affects the value of returns as well as certain components of the cost of cultivation. Moreover, considerable political support will be needed to implement a promotional type pricing policy if subsidies are to be reduced over time.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY -- Part II

PAKISTAN - Malaria Control

SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the three pages provided)

Address the following items:

- Purpose of activity or activities evaluated
- Purpose of/reason for this evaluation
- Key issues or questions addressed
- Types and quality of evidence used to assess short-term effects, trends and/or potential for impact
- Findings
- Conclusions
- Principal recommendations

1. Office of HPN/USAID initiated the evaluation as part of annual evaluation program designed in the Malaria Control II (391-0472) Project.

2. The purposes of this joint WHO/USAID external evaluation, held from October 6 to October 24, 1985 were to: (1) assess the present status of the MCP Pakistan, with an emphasis of progress made to meet program objectives; and, (2) formulate recommendations for the further improvement of the program.

3. The team used annual and special reports of the MCP, both provincial and federal, the WHO and of the A.I.D. during this evaluation. Specifically, the team was requested by the MCP to evaluate the following areas of its program:

Current status of the provincial MCP with emphasis on efficiency of surveillance operations; current status of integration of the MCP into the primary health care (PHC) service; adequacy of planning and efficiency of spray operations; suitability of a continued sole reliance on malathion for use in the MCP by the assessment of significance of early emergence of vector resistance; current status of the chloroquine resistant falciparum malaria problem; malaria control activities in urban areas; and, adequacy of operational research and training capabilities and facilities.

Since 1979 when the total reported cases reached the lowest level for the past 10 years, there has been a slow but steady increase in the annual cases which in 1984 were reported as 72,996 a level of approximately 2 times the program goal. More significant was the finding that the increase in malaria cases is due to a large extent to an increase in cases of falciparum malaria which increased from 17.47% in 1982 to 33.3% of the total reported cases in 1984.

4. The anti-malaria activities in Pakistan rely on two major technical tools - spray operation and surveillance. The team recognizes the need to decrease the reliance on insecticide usage as a major control method. However, the present high level of parasite reservoir coupled with a weak surveillance system would indicate that aggressive anti-vector measures must remain an essential strategy for the MCP in Pakistan for the foreseeable future. The major difference in the present spray operation as compared to the past is the selection of spraying sites by criteria rather than on a total coverage basis. This stratification has evolved over several years as the program progressed. Surveillance remains a weak activity of the MCP and is in need of continued improvement in order to provide reliable epidemiological information to guide program activities, including the targeting of spray operations.

5. Findings:

There are two major technical problems confronting the Pakistan malaria control effort - chloroquine resistance in P. falciparum and insecticide resistance in the vectors. The general finding of the team was that chloroquine resistance is presently an operational problem in limited areas of the Punjab province and requires the closest watch, intensive studies and additional control measures in order to keep this problem from getting out of hand. Insecticide resistance is an equally serious and urgent

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problem as there are strong indications that malathion is not as effective as in previous years in some districts of the Punjab and Sind provinces. Prior to the replacement of malathion, the sole insecticide used by the MCP. Currently, the team emphasized the need to fully justify the change with compelling evidence, both entomologic and epidemiologic that malathion no longer accomplishes the desired objectives.

The need for more in-country training for all categories of staff is continually highlighted in the report. The report recognizes the important role of the National Malaria Training Center (NMTC). A training plan and support for such training are essential in the orientation of personnel within the general health services to a malaria control concept. Operational research to keep abreast of the dynamic malaria situation was strongly supported by the team and specific projects are described in the report.

No public service program is possible without the operation and support of the community. The proposal to include a major community participation effort through use of volunteers, increased health education and mass media, is strongly supported by the team.

6. Conclusions:

Based on the observations of the team, it is apparent that operationally the MCP Pakistan is in a state of transition from the rigid comprehensive house spraying approach of the eradication era to one of flexible application of alternative control methods based on local epidemiologic conditions and available resources. From the assessment of the objectives of the MCP and the USAID project, the team concluded that the program progress is variable as might be expected, but there has been achievements in many fields - laboratory services, passive case detection and others. When one considers the field difficulties of implementing such a massive health program over a population of some 85 million, it becomes obvious that a major effort has been made and accomplishments can be shown. There is much more to do in the years ahead, but a working base is available to provide the level of malaria control desired by the country it supports is provided as planned in the basic operational documents.

7. Recommendations:

Efficiency of a malaria control program is dependent on the availability of reliable epidemiologic data to guide its operations, a technically competent senior staff to modify control measures as required and a well-trained and well-motivated field staff to implement the program. To assist the MCP in improving its program operations, the following recommendations were made under areas of program operations as under:

a. Epidemiology

Reporting of malaria cases should be by sprayed and unsprayed areas; the development of out-reach preventive medical teams like those established in Punjab for active case detection should be encouraged; and, training of PHC personnel on passive case detection is essential.

b. Laboratory Services

Decentralization of malaria smear examination should be through supplementation of retrained laboratory technicians/assistants as microscopists and not through the reassignment of existent microscopists.

c. Operational Entomology

Filling of vacant assistant entomologist post is essential; annual meeting of MCP entomologists to discuss fundings and review work plans should be encouraged; evaluation of impact of spraying by pre and post spray serial entomologic and

SUMMARY (CONTD. -D)

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parasitologic monitoring in fixed indicator villages is important; and, annual work plan should be developed and coordination with district health officer is essential to justify funding requirements for field work.

d. Insecticide Resistance

Improve efficiency of resistance monitoring by:

Verification of resistance in progency of survivors; proper selection of localities to evaluate resistance; strengthening of susceptibility testing in NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan; use of bioassay tests as part of standard resistance monitoring method; and, intensive studies in areas with insecticide resistance and increasing malaria transmission.

e. Spray Operations

Retraining of malaria (CDC) supervisors must be conducted annually; intensify cholinesterase testing to monitor passive insecticide toxicity problems in spraymen; modify spray planning criteria to include only indigenous cases of falciparum malaria; and, adjust timing of spray operations to epidemiologic needs and include need for focal spray in annual spray plan.

f. Chemotherapy

Intensify monitoring activities of chloroquine resistant falciparum malaria by use of WHO micro-in-vitro test; evaluate alternative antimalarials; evaluate wider use of primaquine as part of falciparum malaria containment strategy; intensify vector control activities in areas with chloroquine resistant falciparum malaria transmission; and, evaluate radical treatment for vivax malaria.

g. Urban Malaria

Develop and implement training plan for urban malaria control staff; provision of supplies and commodities to urban centers from federal MCP through provincial MCP; a work plan must be developed if urban centers are to receive assistance; the federal MCP should develop plans for technical assistance to urban centers; and, provincial MCP personnel should conduct malaria surveys in urban fringes at least once/year until surveillance mechanisms are fully developed by the urban centers.

h. Operational Research

Evaluation of vector bionomic and behavior under various ecological conditions; further clarification of role of A. stephensi as malaria vector in rural areas is essential; studies on selective spraying (concentrating spraying to known preferred resting sites), are important; study is required to define the role of suspected vectors in malaria transmission; evaluate alternative methods of vector control; and, studies are greatly needed to improve surveillance operations.

i. Training

Intensify retraining of PHC personnel ensuring adequate provisions for travel and board and lodging of trainees; "back to basics" for MCP staff at all levels should be stressed; the recruitment and provision of long term training for future entomologists and malariologists must be viewed as an action of the highest priority; and, conduct workshop on alternative malaria control methods in 1986.

j. Integration and Community Involvement

Until system of CHWs is fully functional, develop use of village volunteers for malaria detection and administration of presumptive treatment.

SUMMARY (CONT.)

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - Part II (391-0296)

PAKISTAN - Participant Training Component of Strengthening Agriculture Research Project

SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the three pages provided)

Address the following items:

- Purpose of activity or activities evaluated
- Purpose of/reason for this evaluation
- Key issues or questions addressed
- Types and quality of evidence used to assess short-term effects, trends and/or potential for impact
- Findings
- Conclusions
- Principal recommendations

Purpose of Activity Evaluated:

- To increase agricultural production and improve farmer income.

- To establish a functioning centrally coordinated program of agricultural research for major agricultural commodities.

- To provide development and research training for appropriate personnel from the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC), National Agricultural Research Council (NARC) and provincial agricultural research and training institutions.

Purpose of this Evaluation/Key Issues Addressed:

- To complete statistical data on participant training regarding numbers trained, level of training, place and subject of training.

- To determine difficulties experienced in selection and processing, pre-departure training, English language preparation and monitorig during training.

- To ascertain how training received has been utilized.

- To highlight lessons learned and make recommendations which will benefit USAID, NARC, and the Management of Agricultural Research and Technology (MART) project which began in 1984.

Evaluation Methodology:

- Review of project documents and related materials.

- Questionnaire survey of returned participants and supervisors.

- Interviews with selected participants and supervisors, GOP, PARC, and NARC officials, and Mission and contractor personnel.

Findings/Conclusions:

- The evaluation found that most of the original program and training objectives were met. The study also showed that 92 more participants received short-term formal training and study tours that had previously been indicated due to change of contractors and poor record keeping.

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- A total of 197 participants were sent abroad for advanced degrees and for short-term non-degree training. At the time of the evaluation, the vast majority had returned to Pakistan and were employed in their GOP sponsoring institutions and provinces. Only 3% of the participants are known to have left government service after completing training.

- Several returned participants have made outstanding contributions to the field of agriculture in education, training, or community extension services.

- Newer and more effective levels of technical expertise have been introduced by many returned participants, who voluntarily trained colleages and communicated their expertise through publications, seminars, etc.

- Constraints noted include under-utilization of returned participants, lack of research facilities and necessary supplies, a personnel and assignment transfer system which is archaic and arbitrary, and poor information exchange between agricultural stations throughout the country. The government processing system was also found to be cumbersome, hindering or preventing training appointments from being approved within a reasonable time period.

Principal Recommendations:

- Training, both long-term and short-term US and third country program, should be continued. Although laboratories and resources available to returned agricultural scientists may not be of the standard utilized while obtaining further education, most participants have indicated they are able to contribute to their profession and to their communities to a degree that was not previously possible.

- Ensure more timely GOP participant nominations and approvals. The most often mentioned problem was that of cumbersome processing procedures. The loss of valuable training slots offered to Pakistan through USAID and other donors in incalculable, especially in the provinces. Although delays occur at all levels in a cumbersome processing chain, the point often cited as most constraining is Planning and Development ministries at the provincial level. At the federal level, the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) is cited as another major area of delay.

- A yearly training needs analysis should be carried out at the federal and provincial level to identify training needs and select personnel for training nominations. Both participants and supervisors indicated that on some occasions the proper participant was not selected, or training was not coordinated with the needs of the institution or with the background of the participant selected.

- Improved pre-departure orientation needs to be offered to participants. Other than letter of notification at the time of selection, or a brief orientation when a candidate received airline tickets, little preparatory information was offered to participants .

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- When possible, schedule sufficient time for orientation in the U.S. Participants who received the three-day orientation at the Washington International Center (WIC) rated the services highly. Participants assigned to the U.S. must be selected with enough lead time to attend orientation.

- Language assessment tests should be conducted at the time of candidate selection. Language training should be required in-country prior to departure and taught by native English speakers. Valuable classroom and training funds can be conserved by correcting language deficiencies before candidates depart from Pakistan.

- The GOP needs to reexamine its personnel policy system. If participants could look forward to better opportunities for career advance and more fairly determined assignment and reward systems, there would be more incentive to stay with government employment and put more effort into their work.

- Closer coordination between PARC, USAID, and contractors is needed. At a minimum, copies of all trainee nominations from PARC and CIMMYT should be forwarded to USAID. USAID was not informed of more than 92 CIMMYIT and IRRI contract funded participants. PARC was unaware that some CIMMYT trainees were also funded by the World Bank and UNDP.

- Record keeping in all agencies needs to be improved. Updating of addresses, transfer information and career advancement should be maintained in participant or master files.

- Increased efforts should be made to disseminate agriculture information throughout the country concerning successess in laboratory research and field work.

- Efforts should be made to ensure that USAID receives proper recognition for its contribution to Pakistan's training program, especially in the case of short-term and mid-term trainees sent out under contract.

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A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - Part II

PAKISTAN - Tribal Areas Development Project (391-0471)

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the three pages provided)

Address the following items:

- Purpose of activity or activities evaluated
- Purpose of/reason for this evaluation
- Key issues or questions addressed
- Types and quality of evidence used to assess short-term effects, trends and/or potential for impact
- Findings
- Conclusions
- Principal recommendations

The purpose of the Tribal Areas Development Project is to (1) strengthen the capability of government institutions to implement development programs in the Tribal Areas; and (2) Construct basic infrastructure (roads and irrigation works) to support the continued development of the region. The project is behind schedule and is experiencing a number of difficulties and delays which the Mission is attempting to resolve. The evaluation team considered the following project areas:

1. Assess the overall implementation progress to-date for the project activities and their impact on the local population.
2. Evaluate technical assistance. Have the 3 long term PASA advisors been effective in performing their respective project assignment? What should be the future size and type of technical assistance?
3. Evaluate on-site physical accessibility of project personnel and local cooperation which hindered the progress of the project.
4. Assess the performance and capability of implementing agencies in carrying out their project responsibilities.
5. Evaluate the adequacy of institutional arrangements provided for project implementation. Is the coordination of government agencies contributing or hindering progress of the project to meet goals and objectives?
6. Evaluate the impact of the socio-cultural factors on the project implementation.
7. Assess the fixed amount reimbursement (FAR) system in relation to the project construction work. Is the FAR system appropriate as an implementation mode?
8. Evaluate the economic feasibility and possible social impact on the local population of alternatives subprojects to be undertaken with remaining funds allocated for the Bara Irrigation Scheme.
9. Examine the problems which delayed project implementation activities. What factors have contributed towards the delay in project implementation?
10. Assess the potential for expansion of the project in the post-87.

The Evaluation Team used several sources of evidence to assess the actual progress of the project. The team members interviewed with the concerned USAID personnel located in AID/W and USAID/Pakistan, government officials in Peshawar and Tribal Agencies related to the project implementation. They also made extensive field trips to the different Tribal Agencies and observed in person the project implementation activities. The team members consulted with the official records maintained in the USAID offices in Islamabad and Peshawar.

USAID is the first major donor to provide development assistance in the Tribal Areas. The project is experiencing difficulties and delays in implementation and is more than two years behind its schedule. USAID should had learned more about the special nature of the area, local environment and unique characteristics of the inhabitants before designing this project.

SUMMARY

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The lessons learned from the Tribal Areas Development Project could be applied to the Baluchistan Area Development Project with almost similar objectives in the Makran Division which is a remote area. The major project management activities experienced in the Tribal Areas Development Project are: the necessity of numerous PC-1s, incapability of government implementing agencies, inadequacy of institutional arrangements, non-accessibility to the project sites and non-cooperative attitude of the local population towards project implementation. Mission should closely examine these problems and take steps to avoid a repetition of these bottlenecks in the implementation of the Baluchistan Area Development Project.

Findings and Conclusions

Findings and conclusions can be summarized as follows:

- TADP has been ineffective in achieving its goal and purposes;
- TADP has not accommodated to the special requirements of development in Tribal areas;
- TADP has not systematically planned for subproject activities;
- TADP has not transferred technology to the implementing agencies.
- The Project Agreement requiring a PC-1 for each expenditure.
- Mission management and procedures for TADP have constrained its ability to rapidly pursue project goal and purposes; and the construction portion of TADP has dominated the resources of the Project.
- TADP constraints are subject to USAID and GOP resolution, which suggests that the project can be refocused and successfully implemented.

D) SUMMARY (CONTD.

Recommendations

Recommendations are summarized as follows:

- In the absence of a major refocusing of the Project, the funds remaining in TADP be deobligated.
- If USAID elects to reshape this Project, the following must be done:
  - i) Integrate the project into the P&D Department NWFP through two linkages--a Special Development Unit (SDU) to handle routine business and a Project Coordination and Review Board (PCRB) for policy matters;
  - ii) Establish a revised Research and Evaluation Unit;
  - iii) Upgrade implementing agency capacity by technology transfer thru technical assistance and training support;
  - iv) Use A&E firms to assist in design upgrading, training programs and field practicums;
  - v) Either design multiple umbrella subproject components which cover small schemes, area development initiatives, staffing for the SDU, and support for P&D operations;
  - vi) Or, place all project activities under one new GOP document (PC-1);
  - vii) Decentralize authority from Islamabad to Peshawar and;
  - viii) Consider forestry and agriculture and other non-infrastructure development activities.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

PAKISTAN - Rural Electrification Project (391-0473)

I. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

I. Name of Mission or Office Initiating the Evaluation: Energy and Environment Office, USAID/ Islamabad. Report Title: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Pakistan Rural Electrification Project, June 10, 1986.

II. Purpose of Activity: This project has two major objectives: to increases the institutional capability of the power distribution wing of the GOP's national electrical utility, WAPDA; and to provide the rural poor of Pakistan with additional access to electricity for social and productive uses. To insure adequate power supply for the extension of electricity services, the project is also providing partial funding for construction of a 600 MW combined cycle gas turbine power plant at Guddu.

III. Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used: This midterm evaluation was to examine project progress to date, to examine the quality and appropriateness of project outputs, and to recommend any changes in direction or emphasis that might be required to reach project objectives. The evaluation team examined all the project's written outputs and most of the voluminous USAID/PTAT/WAPDA correspondence; interviewed USAID, WAPDA, and PTAT staff; visited four AEBs and one model division; and examined ongoing energy loss reduction work.

IV. Findings and Conclusions:

1. Whether measured against the 1984 or the 1986 work plan, the project is behind schedule, despite acceleration of the PTAT's level of effort PTAT in August 1985. This is partly due to the delayed reorganization of the WAPDA distribution function, and partly to the addition of new tasks for the PTAT staff in 1985 and 1986.

2. On an item-by-item basis, actual vs. expected percentages of accomplishments by June 1986 ranges from 100% for most training activities, to 60-70% for institutional improvement activities (finance, computerization, inventory and stores, etc.), to 25-60% for technical engineering areas.

3. The Institutional Improvement Plan (IIP) is lacking a professional analysis of WAPDA's internal norms, key operating procedures and relationships with other GOP agencies and ministries. Rather, it is an implementation plan for two basic policy decisions: WAPDA/D should be reorganized to be functionally self-contained; and the reorganization should be based on the American Electric Power Model. Many of the IIP's deficiencies have been recognized and rectified in the new IIP summary paper.

4. The Comprehensive Training Plan is sound and well presented. It is already serving as the basis for joint PTAT/WAPDA training activities and for the WAPDA/D overall training program.

SUMMARY

Date this summary prepared:

5. The Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Rural Expansion Master Plan (MP) is not a step-by-step implementation plan for WAPDA/D activities, since it does not contain projects, geographical distribution of activities, or a time-series of activities proposed. It is a description of aggregate levels of activities that can be undertaken under certain scenarios and with certain financial constraints during the period 1985-93. While successful at raising resources from outside donor agencies, the MP does not provide WAPDA or other GOP decision-makers with a process for allocating resources and setting new goals as external circumstances change. It needs a detailed, multi-year implementation program, developed with involvement from WAPDA and other GOP senior officials concerned with energy planning.

6. The Work Order System developed by the PTAT appears to be sound and technically feasible. To date, it has been used primarily in the energy loss reduction (ELR) program, and virtually all of the initial work orders were developed and supervised by PTAT staff, with WAPDA construction staff doing the actual work. The AEBs are just beginning to generate work orders on their own, and the quality of these cannot yet be judged.

7. The Sister Utility Exchange Program (SUEP) is far behind schedule. It has not really operated effectively, due to initial planning delays and, then, to a stop-work order instituted by USAID in February 1986.

8. Institutional relationships among the top management of USAID, PTAT, PTAT subcontractors and WAPDA are excellent, and have contributed to project progress toward an ongoing policy dialogue. Contact at the work level among PTAT and WAPDA staff has been less satisfactory, due in part to a lack of permanently posted WAPDA counterparts in many technical areas.

9. The technical assistance provided by the PTAT staff has been sound and in keeping with modern utility practices. The scope of work, as accelerated in mid-1985, addresses the requirements of the project except in the areas of strategic planning and institutional change, where different skills will be required from those of the current PTAT team.

10. While strategic-level management by USAID has been good, day-to-day project oversight has been inconsistent and insufficient. Heavy demands on USAID staff time, and a problem with delegation of authority within the responsible USAID office, have been contributing factors, along with an inadequate contractor work plan.

11. "Soft" technology transfer to PTAT subcontractor members, for the purpose of strengthening in-country engineering capabilities, has occurred. Their capacity to undertake a number of technical activities, ranging from ELR circuit redesigns to training curricula developent has increased. However, little transfer of skills and technique has taken place to WAPDA staff to date, except in several specific areas such as training, computerization and financial services.

12. While there has been a good deal of constructive policy dialogue on WAPDA/D reorganization, more attention needs to be placed now on reforming WAPDA's electrical tariff and tariff setting system, as well as on concrete steps to strengthen WAPDA as a modern, independent utility system.

V. Recommendations:

1. Introduce a three-person institutional strategy team, comprised of high-level specialists in institutional change and reform, to work with senior GOP ministerial staff and WAPDA management to reach consensus and agreement on resolution of issues such as WAPDA autonomy, management attitudes and style, staffing, employment procedures, etc.

2. Provide a follow-up procedures and process team to assist in implementation of the goals and strategies agreed upon for the institutional strategy team.

3. Have WAPDA rework the Energy Master Plan to transform it into a detailed implementation plan for energy loss reduction and system expansion.

4. Insist that the reorganized WAPDA/D headquarters be staffed and operating by September 1986.

5. Accelerate the physical and functional integration of PTAT and WAPDA staff, with WAPDA taking over lead responsibility in all areas by June 1987.

6. Allocate the Component 5 funds within the project as follows:

$2.0-2.5 million for institutional strategy, procedures and process technical assistance;

$17 million for electric tubewells, all equipped with load management devices to eliminate additional peak load demands; and

$52-52.5 million for total electrification of the largest villages, in one or more geographical regions, not falling under WAPDA current system expansion criteria. Load management devices would be installed concurrently on tubewells already operating in the geographical regional to minimize any additional peak loads.

7. Expand the scope of work and level of effort for the Guddhu Combined Cycle Power Plant to reflect the additional responsibilities in the final 18 months of the contract.

8. Accelerate implementation of the SUEP and the short-term in-country training.

9. Institute a major program of monitoring and data collection within the project.

SECRET (continued)

PHILIPPINES - Population Planning III Project (492-0341)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation of Population Planning III (PP III), the current bilaterally funded population program in the Philippines, was mandated in the original Project Paper. The need to assess progress at this time is particularly urgent both because the Government of the Philippines has not yet submitted a proposal for a follow-on project after 1986 and because it is generally recognized that progress in controlling population growth in the Philippines has been slow. This evaluation accepts the estimates, generated by others, that the crude rate of natural increase (CRNI) is currently around 2.8 percent, that the crude birth rate (CBR) is in the mid 30s, that prevalence of program methods is no more than 30 percent of all married couples of reproductive age (MCRA), and that the mean desired family size is still about four children.

PP III is currently achieving about half its targeted numbers of new acceptors and about half its targeted rate of increase in prevalence. These are significant achievements, because the targets have been set unrealistically high. The targets were based upon evidence of high achievement prior to PP III, which apparently was exaggerated, and also upon a goal of replacement fertility by the year 2000, a wholly unrealistic goal. The genuine achievements--an estimated annual increase of roughly one percent in prevalence of program methods and steady declines in total fertility rate (TFR)--have been almost completely offset for the past 10 years by declines in marriage age and duration of breastfeeding, and by an unfavorable age structure. Because there are so many young women in the Philippines, their fertility dominates the crude birth rate.

It would be a serious mistake to discard or dramatically restructure the core of the current community outreach program, particularly without careful pilot studies. The network of paid Full Time Outreach Workers (FTOWs) and Barangay (village) Service Point Officers (BSPOs) should be maintained and strengthened. In the long run, the outreach network will indeed become obsolete, as prevalance reaches high levels, as the motivational role is accomplished by friends and relatives in normal social contact, and as contraceptive technology and delivery are improved. But in the short run, effective personal motivation within the community is needed, particularly in those barangays where prevalence is low. This report offers numerous specific recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the basic structure.

The outreach system is currently endangered by three probable changes, each apparently motivated mainly by fiscal and organizational considerations, and not by decisions made on the basis of studies and analyses of impact in the field. These changes have been buttressed by theoretical arguments, but there is no empirical evidence that any of them will have a positive effect on levels of prevalence and fertility. It is likely that they will actually have a negative effect.

The first of these changes is the rapid transfer of all outreach costs to local governments. This has already produced a decline in the number of FTOWs and is likely to eliminate outreach almost completely in the poorest areas. There are advantages to local administration, but some kind of cost sharing or block grants will be necessary if outreach is to be sustained and to remain responsive to central government guidelines.

A second probable change is the proposed Cost Recovery Scheme (CRS), whereby users of condoms and pills must pay for supplies. The evaluation did not find a single individual outside of the central Philippine Commission on Population (POPCOM) staff who supported this approach at this time. CRS should be regarded as a long-term objective and be deferred.

The third change, proposed integration of population with health and nutrition, is a danger to the effectiveness of outreach. While there may be potential theoretical advantages of such an integration, it seems unlikely they will translate down to the field level. If a single volunteer barangay worker is to combine the functions of the current Barangay Health Worker (BHW), Barangay Nutrition Scholar (BNS), and BSPO, the health function will probably dominate and she will have little time to carry out the motivation, monitoring, and referral activities of the BSPO. At present, many BSPOs are also BHWs and/or BNSs, but one cannot assume that in general the BHW will have the time and the inclination to be an effective population worker. At the very least, an integrated PHN scheme should be field tested and should be phased in gradually.

The current POPCOM leadership is viewed very positively in this evaluation. Generally speaking, the central and regional offices seem to be managed efficiently. The effectiveness of the program as a whole, and of POPCOM in particular, however, is impaired by too broad a definition of POPCOM's functions. Some conflict has arisen and is likely to intensify over two related issues (see III.12, Some Organizational Issues).

The first issue is whether POPCOM is a coordinating or implementing agency. With virtually no exception, persons outside POPCOM view it as an implementing agency; this view is apparently correct, although one must also recognize that POPCOM coordinates the population activities of ministries, local governments, non-governmental organizations (NGO), etc. This issue is significant because there is role conflict when one agency has primary responsibility for the outreach program, including training, service delivery, logistics, management information systems (MIS), and so on, and also has an influence over the budgets of other organizations, particularly private ones, which may be regarded as its competitors. This role conflict must be acknowledged and not be regarded as just a matter of semantics. A review several years ago by the University of the Philippines College of Public Administration (UPCPA) also made the same observation. It is not healthy for POPCOM to have a kind of regulatory capacity over such NGOs as the Population Center Foundation, the Family Planning Organization of the Philippines (FPOP), and the Institute of Maternal and Child Health (IMCH)—all of which are important to the overall population program and simultaneously to have elements of both symbiosis and competition with these organizations.

As a second and related issue, it is undesirable for POPCOM to have regulatory and gatekeeper responsibility over all basic and applied population research in the Philippines. This is a misuse of POPCOM staff, it leads to bias against certain kinds of research, and also leads to potential conflicts of interest.

Some planning and evaluation activities and authority over non-POPCOM budgets should be conducted externally to POPCOM. Detailed recommendations should be generated in another review, perhaps conducted by UPCPA in behalf of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA).

Perhaps the single most important reason fertility remains high in the Philippines is that the desired family size remains at about four children. The program has been oriented around supply: service delivery for those couples who want to terminate or to space childbearing. It is important that this emphasis continue. It should, however, be supplemented by another emphasis: demand generation. The demand for contraception must be increased, or equivalently, the demand for large families must be reduced.

Progress in this direction has been made during the past couple of years, but it should be given even higher priority. Vocal and continuing commitment from the political leadership is needed. Accomodation with Catholic and Islamic leaders is essential, as in the Responsible Parenthood Campaign.

The advantages of low fertility should be put in terms appropriate to various target groups. Thus, the national leadership should be made even more aware of the negative impact of high population growth on economic development. Local government leaders should become more aware of the negative impact of high growth in terms that are relevant for them--e.g. the impact on schools, housing, unemployment, water supply, etc. The thrust of information, education, and communication (IEC) should be on the advantages of fewer children at the level of the family--that is, for the parents and the children themselves. Young people must be convinced of the advantages of child spacing and of allocating limited resources to a smaller number of children. There should be sharp focus on an ideal family size of two children. Efforts along these lines are a strength of the present program, but should be intensified. A future program should specifically have the reduction of desired family size as one of its objectives.

USAID and other donor agencies should be receptive to government initiatives in the development of a successor program. In the past, USAID has perhaps been intrusive. It may now be more appropriate for USAID to be reactive rather than directive. Changes in the program, however, should be based on evidence that they will improve program effectiveness. Such evidence could come from field studies or from programs in other developing countries. Present planning is motivated by administrative and fiscal exigencies (e.g. local government funding and cost recovery) and/or by theoretical expectations (e.g. integrated outreach) rather than by evidence of potential positive impact.

The staff of the USAID mission has reached critically low numbers. The PHN Office should be reinforced by a replacement Population Officer and additional skilled Filipino staff. It is essential that sufficient staff be available so that all staff members can have greater familiarity with actual field activities than at present. USAID staff should actually have the possibility of serving as advisors--although low-key advisors--and not just as enforcers of fiscal and procurement regulations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PHILIPPINES - Mid-term Evaluation of the Primary Health Care Financing Project (492-0371)

1. The USAID Mission Office in Manila commissioned the Economic Development Foundation (EDF) and John Snow Inc. (JSI) to undertake a mid-term evaluation of the Primary Health Care Financing Project (USAID Project No. 492-0371). The EDF evaluation was conducted from 13 November 1985 to 30 January 1986 while the JSI consultants were limited to the first three weeks of this period. This Executive Summary covers the EDF evaluation only.

2. The Primary Health Care Financing Project is an innovative and pioneering activity providing:

   - Research findings to serve as a basis for the formulation of national health policies and programs intended to increase access to and utilization of sustainable primary health care services managed and financed by communities and the GOP; and;

   - Resources to further implement specific services identified by the Ministry of Health (MOH) as being of priority concern.

3. Specifically, the Project aimed to field-test a variety of schemes for financing self-reliant health care services at the community level, undertake some studies to determine ways of improving the delivery of selected PHC activities and provide financing for improvement of the Botica sa Barangay program, training of Barangay Health Workers and Midwives the effectiveness of the MOH's Information, Education and Communication efforts.

4. The evaluation was intended primarily to assess the progress of implementation of PHCFP activities at the input/output levels as well as identify problems and recommend measures to improve project implementation. The evaluation focussed on the efficiency and pace of implementation of planned activities, examined the various processes and institutional arrangements that influenced project progress and analyzed the quality of completed or intermediate outputs. To the extent possible, the quality of project planning and the relevance and adequacy of expected outputs were likewise examined. Information gathered for the evaluation was limited to that generated by the project recording/reporting system, supplemented by interviews of key officials and staff to gain insights on actual processes and institutional arrangements adopted by the project. One field visit was also conducted to look at the progress of the one financing scheme which is currently being implemented. No data was gathered to determine impact or measure changes in macro-economic factors that may influence project impact.

5. The project has progressed very slowly in two-and-a-half years of implementation. Only one Special Study has been completed out of the eight scheduled for completion during the period. Of the targetted range of 21-31 Financing Schemes, only three have been approved, of which only one was on-going at the time of the evaluation. Pending completion of the Special Studies, the projected improvements in program design and policy for PHC volunteer and supervisor training, village drug supply and herbal drug processing technology could not be undertaken. Only the IEC activities and commodity procurement were accomplished under the Service Delivery component of the project, and most of these were simply reiterations or modifications of previous efforts along the same lines.

6. The major bottlenecks in implementation have been identified as being structural and systemic in nature. These were compounded by observed flaws in the project plan itself. The project was particularly hampered by the absence of full-time project and component managers who could direct the day-to-day operations of the project, analyze problems and act or prod parties to act on identified bottlenecks in operation. In the case of the Special Studies, it was observed that the review process adopted was unnecessarily long and cyclical and did not provide sufficient assurances that the quality of outputs were adequate or even appropriate. In the case of Financing Schemes, both the project plan and the project management were inadequate in providing clear guidelines as to what schemes are desirable and worthy of support.

7. The delays in implementation of project activities have masked the potential problems to be faced with regard to the level of funding support provided. Funds allotted and released to the project have been much lower than programmed and the adopted procedures for the 90-day cash advance/ liquidation method are anticipated to create cashflow problems if the activities are more efficiently implemented. On the other hand, it has been observed that due to the devaluation of the Peso over this two-and-a-half year period of project implementation, substantial excess Peso funds are likely to be available from the foreign exchange being provided by the USAID.

8. The salient recommendations made to improve project operations can be summarized as follows:

   - Centralize overall project management in the Office of the Minister of Health, reinforce project management with full-time consultancy support and upgrade staff support in the Secretariat at MOH and PCHRD;

- Streamline systems and procedures to eliminate redundancies and facilitate approval of worthwhile studies/scheme proposals;

- Review the level of Peso funding available for project activities as well as fund release procedures both on the part of the GOP and USAID;

- Re-plan project activities to provide more focussed directions and guidelines -- particularly in the financing schemes component - taking into account the prevailing socio-economic situation, changing health priorities and financial constraints of the GOP.

9. The evaluation recommends that in the future planning of projects that are innovative and pioneering in nature, the organization and management aspects as well as the systems and procedures to be adopted should be well-defined and understood by all parties concerned. The idea of involving two or more institutions in implementing one project would be particularly problematic unless lines of authority and responsibility are clearly delineated. Also, spreading responsibility for deciding on key project activities to a number of committees and ad-hoc bodies seems to be a deterrent to efficient action and should not be encouraged unless no other feasible alternatives exist.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

PHILIPPINES - PVO Co-Financing II Project (492-0367)

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

1. Mission: USAID Philippines

2. Purpose of Activity: The ability of the Philippine Government (GOP) to provide services at the community level is very limited and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Private organizations have a demonstrated capacity to work effectively at that level. The basic objectives of the project are (a.) to stimulate private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to attempt more numerous and diverse development activities, (b.) to strengthen PVOs (especially indigenous PVOs) in the areas of project design, management and evaluation, and (c.) to provide constructive development programs and activities through PVOs for poor, primarily rural beneficiaries. Activities under the project take the form primarily of grants to Philippine and U.S. PVOs to carry out sub-projects which fit mission criteria. Project activities also include mission-financed efforts to guide and assist PVOs in planning, managing and evaluating development projects.

3. Purpose and Methodology of the Evaluation: The basic purpose of the evaluation was to conduct a mid-term assessment of the project to determine whether it was attaining its stated objectives and to provide a basis for mid-course revisions as needed. In addition, the evaluation was intended as a backdrop for consideration of a mission proposal to increase the amount of funds authorized for the project.

The mission provided a set of specific questions as a framework for the evaluation. The methodology followed by the evaluation team was also substantially prescribed by the mission scope of work. It involved initially a review of project materials and other background information followed by field visits to a representative sample of sub-projects. A total of twelve grants involving fourteen different activities were included in the field reviews. This represented approximately one-third of the on-going Co-Fi II grants.

4. Findings and Conclusions: The Co-Fi II Project was authorized in February 1984. Although in terms of time the project is approximately halfway through its allotted five years, 78 percent of the funds committed have been obligated in Fiscal Years 85 and 86. Consequently, several of the activities reviewed by the evaluation team have been in implementation for only one year, more or less. This should be taken into account in considering the conclusions reached in the evaluation.

The basic conclusion reached by the evaluation team was that the project is, overall, an excellent effort. It is well designed, having benefitted from the experience gained in the implementation of its predecessor Co-Fi I, and it appears to be on the way to achieving its three primary objectives.

Stimulating PVOs to Attempt More Numerous and Diverse Development Activities

Findings: There are literally thousands of PVOs registered with various agencies of the GOP. Most of them are small, local and have very limited capacity. However, there ,pahas been a growing number of Philippine PVOs which are sufficiently strong to qualify for USAID grants. In 1980, the first year of Co-Fi I, 20 Philippine PVOs met USAID registration standards. By 1986 there were 51 Philippine PVOs registered with

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SUMMARY

the mission plus 24 U.S. PVOs registered with AID/W for work in the Philippines. Additional PVOs are qualified. Some on the list earlier have allowed their registration to lapse because they did not receive grants. At the same time the mission no longer encourages organizations to register if there is little likelihood that they would receive a grant. In addition to the growth in numbers of organizations there has been a parallel growth in the number of projects approved and the range of activities included. In the four years encompassed by Co-Fi I a total of 30 grants were made, 13 to U.S. PVOs and 17 to Philippine PVOs. In the three years in which Co-Fi II has been underway 38 grants have been made, 10 to U.S. PVOs and 28 to Philippine organizations. Projects have been concentrated in three areas - agriculture, health and micro-enterprise development. However, within these broad categories there has been considerable diversification, particularly in the area of micro enterprise development, with seven grants specifically focussed on this area plus other multi-sector projects also incorporating this type of activity.

Conclusion: Since the initiation of Co-Fi II there has been a significant increase in the number of PVOs - particularly Philippine PVOs - with the capacity to carry out development activities as well as in the number and range of sub-projects being implemented.

Strengthening the Capacity of PVOs - Especially Indigenous PVOs - in Project Design, Management and Evaluation.

Findings: As indicated above there has been a substantial increase in the number of PVOs which could demonstrate sufficient institutional capacity to qualify for USAID registration. Under Co-Fi I, 57 percent of the grants went to Philippine PVOs while thusfar under Co-Fi II, 74 percent of the grantees are Philippino. In addition, several of the Philippine PVOs are now sufficiently established to be used as intermediary institutions which make and monitor sub-grants to smaller PVOs.

The mission has conducted annual orientations for grantees, arranged training seminars on planning, evaluation and management subjects and sponsored training for PVO staff members at the Asian Institute of Management. The mission has produced a substantial number of guidebooks and manuals to assist PVOs to design and evaluate projects. It has also provided consultants in the design and evaluation areas as well as making available the services of a public accounting firm to assist PVOs in establishing effective financial systems. These services have been well-received by PVOs and have had a favorable impact on their operations.

In their field travel the evaluation team visited PVOs which have clearly grown and matured as a result of working with the Co-Fi II project.

Conclusion: The combination of increased experience in planning and managing grant-supported development activities and the impact of USAID-sponsored training and guidance materials has resulted in a growing number of PVOs with the capacity to qualify for and manage USAID grant funds.

Impact on Beneficiaries

Findings: The constraint on time available for the evaluation and the relatively short time most projects had been in operation limited the opportunity to assess in a quantitative manner the impact of project activities on the beneficiaries. However, field observations and interviews with groups and individual beneficiaries revealed that they believe the projects are genuinely contributing to an improvement in their lives. In addition, observation of PVO staff relationships with beneficiaries revealed that they generally are very effective in working with village people and helping them organize for development purposes.

The team noted a multiplicity of income generating activities, many of them based on credit schemes of various sorts, some involving marketing of agricultural or other

products and all of them on a small scale. Discussion in the field suggested that some PVO staff members may not grasp the complexity of marketing and credit managment. Most of the PVOs have had limited experience in these areas. There was some doubt among evaluation team members regarding the economic sustainability of some of the activities observed.

Conclusions: The impact of the PVO sub-projects observed was positive and was perceived to be so by the beneficiaries. However, some of the income generating activities warrant closer examination by an economist capable of assessing their economic viability.

Sustainability

Findings: While the mission is not rigid in its approach to the length of grants, they are generally made for periods of one to three years. Many of the sub-projects reviewed by the evaluation team involved the organization of village level organizations. In some cases projects were designed so that the organizing effort in a given community was planned to be complete in only one year, while others were designed to take place over the entire three year period. Some beneficiaries as well as some PVO staff expressed concern that insufficient time was allowed for organizing and establishing local organizations and phasing out support from the PVO.

There is a concensus among most development practitioners that in order for village level organizations to be self-sustaining some sort of institutional support structure needs to be in place. In the longer run it is logical to look to the GOP to provide such a structure. However, some PVOs in recent years were reluctant to associate their efforts with the central government, and in any case in most areas government institutions do not extend close enough to village communities to provide the support required. In a few sub-projects involving primary health delivery schemes minimal support from a university or medical school could be envisaged following completion of grant support. In other cases, however, no institutional support was provided for.

Conclusions: The establishment of viable community organizations is not an easy or rapid process. In many instances three years is too short. In addition, provision needs to be made for a phased withdrawal of sub-project activities.

In most cases self-sustaining community organizations require some form of continuing institutional support or reinforcement. In the review and approval of grants involving the establishment of village level organizations, continuing thought should be given to means for providing such support after the grant phases out.

Project and Sub-project Management

Findings: The mission registration and grant approval processes appear somewhat time-consuming and cumbersome to some PVOs. Most, however, find both processes rational and acceptable. Both processes are important to project effectiveness and are not excessively complicated. They do not appear to represent an obstacle to selecting and implementing sensible sub-projects.

Conclusion: While mission staff should continue to be sensitive to PVO concerns regarding both processes, there does not appear to be a need to change them at this time.

Findings: PVOs are generally cost conscious. Their administrative/overhead costs are relatively low - Philippine PVOs average around 7 to 10 percent while U.S. PVOs average around 25 to 30 percent. Their operations and facilities are simple and unostentatious. Their staffs generally use public transportation in the field or draw on their own vehicles when they are available. However, in some cases observed in field travel, project transportation poses a problem. The mission generally opposes the use of grant funds for procuring vehicles, partly because of the long lead time

for U.S. vehicles and the difficulty of maintaining them. The mission suggests that PVOs use their own resources to procure vehicles, but in some cases this is not possible because of the limited resources of some of the Philippine PVOs.

Conclusions: PVOs are generally cost effective mechanisms for delivering development services.

While the mission policy regarding the procurement of vehicles is understandable, in some situations it is too restrictive. Consideration should be given to permitting the purchase of motorcycles and locally manufactured vehicles with grant funds.

Findings: The Office of Food for Peace and Private Voluntary Organizations is very small, with only four direct hire staff members of whom only two work substantially on the Co-Financing activities. In addition, however, there are two persons employed as personal services contractors using project funds who assist the PVOs in planning and evaluating sub-projects. With the expansion of the project in the past two years and the anticipated additional funding it will be difficult to effectively manage the increased activities.

Conclusion: The mission should consider the following possible options for dealing with the growing management burdens presented by the Co-Fi II project: (1.) reduce the degree of monitoring and oversight, accepting the liklihood that there are increased risks of project failures, (2.) increase the use of intermediary PVOs to award grants to smaller PVOs and oversee their implementation, and (3.) make provision for a greater amount of planning and monitoring services from within project funds.

Recommendations:

1. That the USAID adopt guidelines which would permit the addition of up to a one year phase out period for three-year grants involving the establishment of community organizations and that the extent, nature and rate of phase out be worked out as part of the mid-term assessment.

2. That an agriculture economist be employed to review ongoing and planned income generating activities to ensure that they are economically viable.

3. That the USAID alter its policy regarding the procurement of vehicles and on a selective basis permit PVOs to purchase motorcycles or locally manufactured utility vehicles when they are needed to achieve project purposes.

PORTUGAL - Technical Assistance and Training Project, Science and Technology Cooperation Program (150-0001)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Science and Technology Program funded under the AID Technical Assistance and Training Project (150-0001) is moving well toward achieving its purpose, namely in assisting the Junta Nacional de Investigacao Cientifica e Tecnologica (JNICT) in planning and implementing programs in selected areas, and encouraging cooperation between scientific institutions and scientists in the United States and Portugal.

This internal program review covers the period February 1982 - February 1985, the first three years of activities during which seven workshops were implemented in Portugal with the participation of 234 Portuguese and 31 NAS/NRC panelists; 26 Portuguese fellows visited or studied in the U.S.; and seven advisors wor' d in Portugal with research institutions.

The program has established itself as being a quality activity. Positive signs of program impact emerged repeatedly in responses to the questionnaires as provided by panelists, hosts, participants, and fellows. The participants are utilizing ideas, techniques and knowledge they gained through the workshops and, in the case of the fellows, during the tailored training programs.

At the same time, there is a key question pressing: Should the activity be continued, and, if so, what type of format would be most beneficial? The reviewer feels that the program should be continued, even if such is done without AID support, but several recommendations should also be considered.

1. Follow-up meetings for identification and design of key industrial development projects should be encouraged.

2. Decision making people should play a leading role in relating to high level policy makers final workshop recommendations which may be translated into action programs.

3. Draft summaries of findings and final recommendations should be distributed to all workshop participants and relevant key institutions and policy makers.

4. JNICT's leadership in R&D should be emphasized and utilized to explore new program modes, other than formal workshops, and to accelerate private sector development.

5. Establishment and/or expansion of professional societies and other human resource development mechanisms should be encouraged.

6. Fellows should receive certificates of accomplishment.

Much of the credit for the progress and success of the project is due to the Portuguese leadership, the performance of the U.S. contractor, National Academy of Sciences, and to good Portuguese-USAID/Lisbon cooperation and flexibility in quickly addressing project challenges as they arose. JNICT's ability in identifying key individuals in promising areas of development is a major contribution to the success of the program.

J. Summary of Evaluation Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

USAID/COLOMBO
Final Evaluation of Water Management Project (383-0057) - December 6, 1985.

A. Purpose:
The purpose of the project is to develop an institutional capability which can be replicated to manage large irrigation schemes in Sri lanka more efficiently and effectively with active farmer assistance. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the outcomes and achievements of the Water Management Project which ended on December 31, 1985. The methodology adopted by the evaluation team included - (1) direct interviews with farmers, farmer representatives, Irrigation Department officials, and other relevant officers who were either directly or indirectly involved in the project; (2) analysis of previously collected socio-economic data and (3) review of the numerous available reports on the project, including the midterm evaluation report.

B. Findings:

1. The original project design overemphasized the following:

   a. Purchase of heavy equipment. This has resulted in low equipment utilization and continuing maintenance problems.

   b. Detailed planning and preparation of master plans. A pragmatic approach was adopted after the midterm evaluation which improved progress on physical rehabilitation.

   c. Research and testing of farmer organization and water management aspects of the project.

2. The original Project Paper (PP) did not include a specific plan and specific funding for rehabilitation of Distributory and Field Channels. The amended PP formalized the Fixed Amount Reimbursement (FAR) procedures but the issue of farmers' contribution to field channel earthwork was never satisfactorily resolved.

3. The project has resulted in better hydraulic performance of the system, which now serves water directly to 53,006 acres and indirectly to an additional 7015 acres. In the whole system 80% of the work on Distributory channels is complete. None of the field channels are complete below Navakiri dam. Above Navakiri 35% of the field channel structures and 25% of the earthwork in Field-channels have been done. Although the system is fully rehabilitated in only about 15% of the total area, it must be emphasized that the system is functioning effectively now. Despite the fact that distributory and field channel work is incomplete, water is being distributed throughout the system and is reaching farmers' fields. This is in comparison to the pre-rehabilitation situation where water distribution problems were endemic.

4. The Institutional Organizer (IO) program was a critical element to the success of the project but was undermined by high staff turnover.

5. About 350 field channel organizations have been created and are functioning in 47 percent of the project area. Farmer Organizations were not formed in Tamil speaking areas due partially to ethnic disturbances.

6. As a result of the project there have been fewer water disputes, less complaints to MPs and the Government Agent on water issues and many more farmers abiding by the cropping calendar.

7. Most structures were rebuilt and measuring devices were introduced at all offtakes. The overall quality of the construction work appears satisfactory.

8. Both the original and final strategy have paid inadequate attention to maintenance of both the physical system and farmer organizations. There has been virtually no maintenance on the rehabilitated canals, some over a period of 2 years.

9. The computer model designed for operational purposes is being used daily to evaluate water requirements.

10. An Irrigation Department inservice training institute was reopened and an effective training program was developed which has institutional effects far beyond Gal Oya. The overall training activities have been a success, except for some training activities, which were not well documented.

C. CONCLUSIONS:

1. Overall Assessment of the Project

Mistakes have been made in the design and execution of the Water Management Project and there are lessons to be learned from it. But, by any reasonable standard, the project as a whole has definitely been as success.

- A badly deteriorated major irrigation scheme has been rehabilitated in a cost effective manner, and it is operational.

- Farmer organizations have been formed and are functioning despite a fragmented social structure.

- Changes in agronomic practices, increased yields and increased cropping intensity, all due at least partly to improved water delivery and reliability, have combined with an increase in irrigated acreage to produce an estimated Internal Rate of Return of 47.4 percent.

2. The Project Strategy:

The strategy, as it has evolved, is appropriate for the project's goals and purpose, but the end of the project strategy differs significantly from the strategy set forth in the original Project Paper. The adoption of the pragmatic approach to design and construction in the PP amendment and the formalization of the Fixed Amount Reimbursement method have been key elements in the physical rehabilitation effort. The intensive effort to promote farmer organizations was justified. Testing of alternative methods of organizing farmers would have been beyond the project's administrative capability. The same intensity of effort is no longer needed in Gal Oya and it is probably not needed in other schemes.

3. Overall Result:

The project has substantially achieved its purpose, however, the capability and methodology that have been created at Gal Oya cannot be replicated as is. The results should be extended to other irrigation schemes, but this will require adaption to different physical and social environments. One of the the most important outcomes of this project is the improvement in attitude, communication and behavior among farmers and government personnel. This achievement is the result of a combination of the project components, not any one of them.

4. Agricultural Production and Economic Benefits:

The benefits of increased acreage and increased yields have been larger and have come sooner in the project than anticipated. The anticipated acreage increase was 5000 acres in the seventh year, the actual increase was 11,000 acres in the sixth year. The cropping intensity has increased from 129% to 179% in the past two years as a combined result of good weather and improved water distribution. Paddy yields have increased from an estimated 65 bushels per acre in 1983 to 79 bushels per acre in 1985 as a result of physical rehabilitation, organization of farmer groups, weather and agricultural extension activities. Despite the lack of systematic linkage between irrigation and agricultural extension departments, and despite the absence of specific project activities with agriculture agencies, agronomic activities have improved significantly in the project area with regard to (1) timeliness of land preparation; (2) shortening the time between land preparation and sowing; (3) enhanced use of fertilizers and (4) improved weed and pest control.

D. Recommendations:

1. The Irrigation Systems Management (ISM) and any successor projects should include less detailed planning, strict adherence to the requirement that counterparts be available

before technical assistance is called for, more focussed research and testing, specific provision for system maintenance, appropriate maps at the begining of the project, and the FAR method of reimbursement.

2. That AID and the GSL work to effect the following: the Irrigation Department finish remaining rehabilitation and continued Farmer Organization work prior to successor project activity at Gal Oya; a solution be found to the problem of field channel earthwork; any future Diagnostic Analysis be based on a pragmatic definition of data collection; the present Diagnostic Analysis be carried to completion; a limited permanent IO cadre be established in the Irrigation Management Division of the Ministry; the Department of Agriculture participate more fully in a successor project; long-term participants be given opportunities for advanced degrees; a domestic water supply plan be developed and implemented in the Gal Oya project area; water charges be utilized in consultation with farmers and the FAR reimbursements go into a revolving fund under the control of Ministry or Department and not to the Treasury.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mission and Purpose: A Mid-term Evaluation Team was requested by USAID/Colombo and selected by VBCP/MSCI/Washington to review progress and direction of the Project Loan and Grant Agreement between Sri Lanka and the United States of America (as amended for 1984-7). Its purpose was to review progress and make recommendations for direction and activities for the remaining length of the project.

Team Approach: The evaluation occurred from March 10 through April 4, 1986. The first week was spent visiting representatives of the Ministry of Health, administrators and scientists of the AMC, WHO, and ISTI, and reviewing documents relevant to the Project. The second and third weeks were spent in 8 AMC Regions, including System H of the Mahaweli Development Scheme, reviewing current operations and data with visits to volunteer operations and health service institutions. The final week was spent reviewing information with AMC members, preparing documentation, debriefing and report preparation.

Conclusions and Recommendations: The results of the teams' review are given in the body of the report with particular emphasis on the following areas: (1) commodities, (2) surveillance systems and epidemiology, (3) vector biology and control programs, (4) training and manpower development, (5) health education, (6) programming, planning and management, and (7) suggested activities for the length of the project.

The major recommendations and conclusions are as follows:

The major objective of the current USAID project as amended is to develop an integrated malaria control program on the basis of existing technology by adding vector control methods, health services, and volunteer programs. Excellent progress has been made in training personnel at headquarters and regional levels toward the primary objective. Training has included both external and internal training and the effort is on schedule.

There is still a dependence on malathion residual house spraying and chloroquine drug treatments as the main tools in the anti-malaria campaign. The graph in Appendix H. illustrates the correlation between insecticide usage and reduction of cases detected. When insecticide usage decreased (or DDT resistance occurred), the number of cases increased and conversely when insecticide usage increased, the number of cases decreased. Although the two chemical interventions are still potent, currently the number of cases continues above an acceptable level as defined by the project, and there is concern about long-term sustainability.

A loss of mosquito susceptibility to malathion has been demonstrated, but this insecticide is still operationally useful. Chloroquine-resistant Plasmodium falciparum has also been detected. The

potential for insecticide resistance in the near future coupled with increasing human resistance to house spraying resulting in reduced coverage confirm the importance of the Project's objective to develop an integrated control program.

The team found excellent progress in training, limited progress in the development of additional vector control methods, and progress in intersectoral coordination of anti-malaria measures.

The team's primary recommendation is the planning and operational implementation of a Regional trial and demonstration of the integrated malaria control program. At present an overall plan for such a project does not exist. The development of such a plan is a major priority.

The team feels that the time allotted to make the transition from the conventional malaria methodology to the integrated system was under-estimated. The team agrees that the long-term technical assistance as designed under the Project remains appropriate. Assistance for final planning and initial implementation for the demonstration can be accomplished with short-term consultants (already provided for under the contract). Ideal timing would be October-November, 1986.

Specific recommendations in specific areas are included under projected needs in each section of the report

The team recommends the following actions:

(1) The selection of a Region to serve as the area for trial and demonstration.

(2) The development of a plan and modification of staff duties at the Regional level to accomplish this project.

(3) The detail of the Regional Malaria Officer (RMO) in the selected Region to a fully operational mosquito control district in the U.S. for 2-3 months of direct experience in entomological surveillance and control with the return of the U.S. counterpart to Sri Lanka for another 2-3 months.

(4) Modifications in current surveillance system to allow directing the integrated approach and more rapid diagnosis.

(5) Further development of computerization of AMC at the Headquarters and in the Region which is selected as the demonstration area.

(6) Development of a standardized, routine entomological surveillance system to be used in conjunction with epidemiological surveillance at the Regional level.

(7) Project extension with existing resources to provide for system planning and RMO work experience followed by one year to organize and modify the Regional program and accumulate, integrate, and analyze epidemiological and surveillance data over an entire season. The second year of extension would provide for testing and demonstration of the integrated malaria control approach.

(8) If items 1, 2, and 3 have not been accomplished by the end of calendar year 1986, the team recommends that the extension of the Project be reconsidered.

Note: Recommendations #'s 1, 2, 4 and 6 should be primarily the responsibility of the AMC; #3 the responsibility of ISTI; #'s 5 and 7 the responsibility of AMC with assistance of ISTI and USAID #8 the responsibility of USAID.

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

SRI LANKA - Mahaweli Environment (383-0075)

1. PROBLEM AND OVERVIEW

The Accelerated Mahaweli Program (AMP) is Sri Lanka's highest priority development activity. More than $2 billion of multidonor financing is assisting the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to bring 117,000 hectares of dry-zone land under permanent irrigation. Approximately one-half million people will be resettled on small farms in the area, leading to increases in agricultural production. Through the completion of four new dams in upper catchments of the Mahaweli River, the country's total electric generating capacity will be more than doubled. The development of infrastructure and service industries accompanying resettlement will create new opportunities for off-farm employment, helping to bring a major portion of the previously underdeveloped dry-zone into the mainstream of Sri Lanka's economy.

A river basin development scheme of this massive scale is certain to generate significant environmental impacts. Major changes in land-use and human settlement will create pressures to utilize natural resources more intensively, natural landscapes will be altered permanently, and a certain amount of environmental degradation will be inevitable.

2. U.S. ASSISTANCE

USAID was the first foreign donor to provide assistance to the GSL in addressing the environmental impacts of Mahaweli development. USAID funded an Environmental Assessment of the AMP in 1979-80 and helped the GSL develop an Environmental Plan of Action in 1981. Through its Mahaweli Basin I Loan, USAID provided $400,000 to the GSL for carrying out activities in the AMP region to monitor and control the movements of problem elephants displaced by agricultural development.

USAID and the GSL approved a five-year Mahaweli Environment Project in September 1982 to respond to the specific recommendations on wildlife conservation and management contained in the AMP Environmental Assessment and Plan of Action. The project was designed specifically to be part of the overall development effort in the Mahaweli. It's purpose was to "ensure the stability of irrigated agricultural development and human settlements in the AMP area by providing alternative protected habitats for displaced wildlife in a manner that is ecologically sound and socially acceptable."

The project was designed to improve the institutional capacity of the Department of Wildlife Conservation (DWLC) to continue managing Mahaweli protected areas beyond the life of the project. The total project budget was $6.9 million, of which $5 million was a grant by USAID.

Date this summary prepared: December 5, 1985.

3. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

This mid-term evaluation is the first of two planned evaluations of the Mahaweli Environment Project (383-0075). The objective of the evaluation is to review the progress made toward attaining planned outputs and end-of-project status conditions, and to recommend changes in project implementation if warranted and practicable.

4. FINDINGS

While there has been significant progress in legally establishing the Mahaweli protected areas, little or no progress can be reported on the development of buffer zones, habitat enrichment, and construction of physical infrastructure (buildings, roads). Only 6 percent of AID funds have been disbursed after three years of project implementation. The delays have been caused by problems in project administration, changes in both GSL and USAID management personnel, difficulties in tendering and contracting for local procurement, and the lack of a planning framework for site development. Because the construction component is beyond the present capacity of DWLC to implement, development of physical infrastructure should be transferred to the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka, which has proven expertise in this area.

Conservation of wildlife in the AMP area is being inadequately addressed, due to the lack of trained personnel in the DWLC and slow implementation of the Wildlife Conservation Unit as planned in the PP. Although technical expertise and resources are available from Sri Lankan universities and the private sector, the DWLC has not encouraged cooperation with these groups.

The technical assistance and training component has worked relatively well, but could be improved. In-country workshops implemented through a PASA arrangement with the U.S. National Park Service (USNPS) have demonstrated great potential for developing DWLC personnel, but results have been less than satisfactory because of poor coordination, participation and follow-through in-country. This element of the project could be greatly improved by providing a long-term Technical Advisor to facilitate preparation for and application of USNPS contributions.

Local participation of AMP people in the project has been far less than envisaged in the PP, largely due to inappropriate DWLC policies, lack of a rural sociologist in DWLC, and delays in implementing the capital investment portions of the project. Greater cooperation among DWLC, other GSL agencies, and PVOs would enhance this element of the project.

Administration of the project has been a source of major difficulties, with no clear authority established, sporadic support from DWLC, and poor coordination among DWLC, Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka, and other involved institutions. Key elements of

improving project administration include clarifying authority and responsibility in Colombo and decentralizing authority for field level decisions to field personnel.

The internal security situation in Sri Lanka has had a major impact on the project. Northern and eastern portions of the AMP area have become vulnerable to insurgent activity, affecting the establishment and development of Somawathiya Sanctuary as a national park. DWLC personnel no longer go to Somawathiya; however, most of the remaining protected areas in the AMP region are reasonably secure. This situation presents both a dilemma for DWLC and an opportunity to redirect project resources planned for development of Somawathiya to cover the costs of recommended actions indicated in this mid-term evaluation.

5. PROJECT DESIGN IMPLICATIONS

The evaluation has identified critical areas for improvement that entail adjustments in project design, administration and implementation. The project purpose as stated in the PP is unrealistic; the purpose and end-of-project status conditions (EOPS) should be modified to place greater emphasis on developing a strong interagency mechanism to support the DWLC in planning and managing protected areas within the AMP land-use system (revised EOPS are indicated in Part II of the evaluation report). The project implementing mechanism requires strengthening, which will call for changes in GSL administrative arrangements. Progress in constructing park infrastructure will require MASL to take the lead in coordinating and supervising this project component. The internal security situation warrants a redirection of project resources planned for development of Somawathiya to cover the costs of the recommendations outlined in the evaluation.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The project should continue, with a major effort by the GSL and USAID in 1986 to correct implementation problems. A full-time Project Director in Colombo and a DWLC Deputy Director for the Mahaweli region should be appointed by the Ministry of State as soon as possible to overcome shortcomings in project administration. A long-term Technical Advisor is required to help coordinate technical assistance and training contributions in-country; this should be facilitated through an amendment of the existing PASA with the U.S. National Park Service. The project's construction component should be transferred as a package to MASL, with major progress expected by the end of 1986. Inputs planned for development of Somawathiya should be redirected to other priority uses identified in the evaluation.

If substantial progress is indicated by the end of 1986, USAID should extend the project by two years -- to September 1989 -- to make up for the initial slow pace of implementation in 1982-1985.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Not to exceed two 1 pages provided)
Address the following items:

Initiating Mission: USAID, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Title "The Second Mid-Project Evaluation of the PVO Co-Financing Project (383-0060), USAID/Sri Lanka". July 1986.

Brief Project Description:

The project purpose is "to enhance the opportunity of local communities to participate in their own development by assisting indigenous and US PVOs in undertaking collaborative activities which improve the lives of the poor." Through the project, USAID provides partial funding to development "subprojects" designed and implemented by Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). The subprojects are "co-financed" in that USAID will not support the full cost of PVO subprojects; substantial non-USAID contributions must be demonstrated by the PVO, the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL), and/or local communities before a subproject grant is approved. The minimum non-USAID contribution is 25%, but in general a contribution closer to 50% is expected.

The project is intended to meet eight objectives which are the topical criteria for accepting subproject applications: (1) to enhance the opportunity of the rural poor to participate in their own development; (2) to develop the institutional capacity of indigenous PVOs to effectively collaborate with local communities on development activities; (3) to increase the participation of women and disadvantaged social groups in development activities addressing problems of their socio-economic status; (4) to create employment opportunities and raise incomes of the rural poor; (5) to promote private enterprise; (6) to enhance other aspects of levels of living in poor rural and urban communities such as health and nutrition; (7) to accelerate the application of appropriate technology at the local level; and (8) to promote community based, integrated rural development on a self-sustaining basis.

Purpose and Method of Evaluation:

The purpose was to examine the overall impact of PVO sponsored subprojects and the value of the project as a mechanism for involving PVOs in achieving Mission objectives. This included the effectiveness of PVOs in carrying out development activities and the impact on the intended beneficiaries. The evaluation reviewed the effectiveness and appropriateness of the subproject approval criteria and monitoring and evaluation roles. Recommendations related to the continuation of the project were expected.

The review was conducted near the end of the seventh year of the ten year (as amended) project. Information was gathered by review of USAID project files, particularly related to individual subprojects, interview of USAID officials involved with the project, and visits to 43 subproject field sites and PVO offices.

Major Findings and Conclusions:

(1) The project is meeting its purpose. It has had positive impacts related to each of the different objectives except one (promotion of appropriate technology, for which impacts were negligible). No negative impact was identified.

(2) Particularly notable characteristics were (a) strong and fairly effective collaboration with local communities for some subprojects; (b) effective promotion of micro-enterprises in two subprojects; and (c) a good record of effectively involving and benefiting women, with eight projects focused on women and eight others having a high percentage of women participants.

1 Will normally provided:

(3) The purpose, objectives, and management structure of the project require no change for a follow-on project or a further extension of the present project. Suggestions which have been made could all be implemented within the present project design.

(4) Most subprojects are for two or three years. Extensions of three months to one year have been required for many.

(5) February 1987 is the critical date by which the bulk of outstanding grant commitments must be made. After that date, two-year subprojects have a high probability of not being completed before the overall project PACD.

(6) The project is behind where it should be in the commitment of grants if all funds are to be used by the PACD. To be completed without an extension of the PACD, approximately $2.2 million more must be committed by February 1987. Though this requires a much higher rate of commitments than in the past, there is a possibility that it can be done. By September 1986 (the latest time when a new subproject could be submitted and be approved by February 1987) it will be possible to get a fairly accurate reading of this.

(7) The proven sustainable annual level of grant commitments is about $900,000. It hovered around $500,000 for the first six years and jumped to $1.2 million for the seventh. When the project was extended and the funding increased, it was at an implied annual level somewhat higher than justified by experience to that date.

(8) Management of the project has been sound. Good relationships exist with PVOs. Subprojects are well monitored; there is immediate follow-up whenever problems develop. There is a good balance of firmness and flexibility in dealing with changes requested by PVOs.

(9) Approval of subprojects has been well within the objectives of the project. However there are informal unwritten criteria which are important in Mission decisions, which are not all consistently applied, and which are not adequately communicated to PVO applicants. The most important and difficult criterion regards "sustainability" of subprojects.

(10) Several aspects of the management of projects and grants are a problem for some PVOs and could be addressed more deliberately and in a sustained way by the project. They include project design, proposal preparation, reporting (both for donors and internal project management), accounting and evaluation. There also seems to be little discussion among PVOs about common development and implementation issues.

(11)Though the purpose and objectives are being realized through the existing grants, the range of Sri Lankan PVOs which have been funded is narrow. Most funds have gone to a fairly small number of PVOs which have developed the capacity to manage relatively large projects. The team believes the project has not reached its potential for improving the capacity more broadly among national and regional PVOs to manage development activities and funds.

(12) The project has not developed a mechanism to give very small grants to local, community based non-governmental organizations, of which Sri Lanka has many. These cannot be administered in the same way as the present larger grants.

Major Recommendations:

(1) The PVO Co-financing Project should be continued. Plans should be made soon either to extend the project further (five years increasing the funding level by $4.5 million) or to authorize a follow-on project (suggested eight years at a level of $5.0 million). Start-up by early FY 88 is suggested.

(2) In October 1986, the Mission should reassess whether the bulk of subproject grants can be committed by February 1987. It if appears not, an extension of 6 to 12 months will be sufficient to commit all funds, if that extension is done promptly.

SUMMARY (continued)

(3) The USAID Mission should define and write out the informal criteria used in considering PVO proposals. These should be included in the guidelines given to PVOs and should help guide PVO Committee deliberations.

(4) Recommendations are made in the text for discussing and defining the sustainability issue for different types of PVO subprojects.

(5) The project should take a more active role in building the capacities of PVOs to implement development projects and increase the level of discussion among PVOs about development. Suggested mechanisms are subproject grants for series of workshops, seminars, and training sessions conducted by PVOs, PVO umbrella organizations, or training institutions.

(6) The cummulation of direct and indirect beneficiaries categories on the quarterly report format needs to be clarified for PVOs.

(7) A USAID Controller's Office staff member should visit any new subproject grantee to help set up an acceptable accounting system before the project gets underway.

(8) USAID should make a concerted, low key effort to expand the list of national and regional PVOs applying for co-financing grants.

(9) USAID should produce a brochure for distribution through PVO channels simply describing the co-financing grants and specifying the criteria for considering subproject proposals.

(10) The team suggests that the project fund an experimental program of "micro-grants" to community-based PVOs through subproject grants to one or more PVOs or umbrella organizations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Name of ANE Bureau Office initiating evaluation: ANE/DP/E

Title of Evaluation: Impact Evaluation of Rice Research Project (383-0040)

Date: October 15, 1985 to November 8, 1985

2. Purpose of Project Evaluated

The purposes of the Rice Research Project (Sri Lanka) were to increase domestic food production (essentially by achieving increased rice output), expand employment opportunities, and improve the living standards of small farmers. The project was to contribute to the achievement of these goals by developing the technological base to permit increased productivity of paddy land.

3. Purpose and Methodology of the Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation was to measure the impact of the Rice Research Project on Sri Lankan rice production and on the intended beneficiaries: the Department of Agriculture (DOA), the Regional Research Centers (RRC), and paddy farmers. This evaluation was conducted three years after the conclusion of the major portion of the project. The evaluation methodology included visits to 11 research stations, interviews with administrators, researchers, extension personnel and farmers, and a review of documents relating to the project or relevant to project activities. Secondary data was obtained from the Agricultural Economics Division of the DOA, the data bank at the Agrarian Research and Training Institute (ARTI) and other sources cited in Appendix 8.4.

4. Findings

4.1 Institutional Development

The RRP gave added impetus and resources which contributed to a change in rice research in Sri Lanka. The positive effects of the RRP contribution to training and commodity availability are still being felt in the DOA. However, the efficiency and effectiveness of RRP assistance were reduced by poor management of the project and by continuing weaknesses in research planning and bureaucratic obstacles within GSL.

4.2 Research Achievements

The rice varietal improvement program was strengthened during the course of the project and remains currently active. Twelve new varieties were released during the course of the project, two new

varieties have been released since project completion, and many others are in the breeding pipeline. New varieities developed continue to be bred for resistance to pests and diseases and adaptation to various agro-ecological zones. The varieties have been readily adopted by farmers. Development of agronomic practices appropriate for small paddy farmers has progressed slowly due to continual difficulties in establishing field trials or an adaptive research program. Strong linkages exist between research and extension.

4.3 Impact on Rice Production and Farms

The project contributed to increased rice production through support of the development of new varieties. Rice production has increased to the point that Sri Lanka has become virtually self-sufficient in rice. Farmers net returns per acre and per bushel from rice have decreased due to increased costs of production per acre and per bushel. Intensified cropping systems have been adopted by high resource farmers but are not a practical option for farmers with economic or environmental constraints.

5. Recommendations

Detailed recommendations are included in Chapter 1 of this report. The recommendations cover the following general measures:

5.1 Programming of training, selection of trainees and selection of courses should be coordinated with other planned activities external to the project, such as staff recruitment and staff upgrading on a research center as well as a division basis.

5.2 Training for technical support staff of other than Research Officer grade should be supported.

5.3 A careful examination of the conditions under which vehicles/equipment/materials will be used should be undertaken before detailed procurement specifications are prepared.

5.4 U.S. manufacturers and suppliers should be encouraged to become familiar with the foreign conditions under which their goods will be used and adapt their products to the needs of users in recipient countries.

5.5 USAID should support the review of the appropriate functions and deployment of resources to the regional research centers.

5.6 USAID should work with PGIA and DOA to develop an in-service training program on research planning and management.

5.7 Regional rice breeders should continue to select varieties adapted to limiting conditions and resistant to pests and diseases.

5.8 Researchers should work closely with extension to assess the potential of various agronomic practices for farmers with limited resources.

5.9 The DOA should seriously consider how it can effectively build on the foundations for adaptive research which have been established under the World Bank Agricultural Extension and Adaptive Research Project.

5.10 Research and extension efforts to improve cropping systems should consider alternatives other than cropping intensity.

5.11 The DOA should direct research efforts to minimize costs of production of rice and improve production of other food crops.

5.12 The GSL should develop economic policies that maintain farm incomes in the event of surplus rice production.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

Initiating Mission: USAID/Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Title: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Private Enterprise Promotion Project (383-0082) December 16, 1986.

Project Description:
USAID, the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MF&P) and private sector leaders collaborated in 1982 and 1983 to plan and initiate a Private Enterprise Promotion Project whose purpose was "to improve the investment climate in Sri Lanka and to increase investment." The project agreement was signed September 11, 1983. The project components include:

(1) Establishment of a private Sri Lanka Business Development Centre (SLBDC), which became the project implementing agency for the other four components;
(2) Investor services/investment promotion;
(3) Economic and business policy;
(4) Management development; and
(5) Entrepreneur development.

A key objective of the MF&P was to stimulate a dialogue on major policy issues between it and the private sector, a role that the SLBDC was expected to play. Early signs were favorable because business leaders played an active role during the design stage, subsequently served on the SLBDC Council of Governors and Board of Directors, and successfully spearheaded a fund raising drive to establish a SLBDC endowment fund, which raised the equivalent of approximately $300,000 including a matching grant by the MF&P.

The SLBDC was incorporated as a private, non-profit company in May 1984, and it began full operations in November 1984. A U.S. contractor, Coopers & Lybrand (C&L), started work in February 1985. They were to assist SLBDC and perform a number of specific tasks in each of the four program areas for two years. The C&L contract will end in February 1987.

Purpose And Methodology Of Evaluation:
The purpose was to assess the current status of the project and to make recommendations aimed at achieving the project purpose by the PACD of 8/31/88. Primary emphasis was to be on identifying possible mid-course corrections and adjustments to the project objectives.

The evaluation team met with contractor and AID representatives and reviewed documents in Washington prior to initiating field work in

Date this summary prepared:

Sri Lanka. The team interviewed officers of the USAID, Ministry of Finance & Planning, the SLBDC and some of its clients, the contractor staff and Sri Lankan businessmen. Two team members visited the site of an SLBDC Entrepreneur Development Program in Hambantota District for five days to interview participants and local officials. The team also received a substantial number of reports, correspondence and other documents prepared by the SLBDC, the contractor and USAID.

Major Findings And Conclusions:

Considerable work has been performed by both SLBDC and C&L. However, progress to date falls short of initial expectations. None of SLBDC's programs is making a truly significant impact on private sector development, although positive steps have been taken and more are planned.

Overall, too many diverse interventions were given to a new untested institution (SLBDC) to plan and implement. Also, thus far the "Private Sector" has not yet demonstrated that it is prepared to engage in a formal dialogue with the Government on major policy issues through the mechanism offered by SLBDC. Such policy dialogue, supported by project-funded policy studies, is viewed as the principal intervention through which the project would help improve the climate for private sector investment.

The project, through its investor services program, has produced an increase in investments, and it may produce more. This includes a mix of small-scale local ventures aimed at domestic markets and larger projects involving foreign collaboration aimed at export markets. The project's target of creating at least ten new investments has already been met.

Technical assistance ($2.8 Million of the total $4.0 million AID funds) was substantially underutilized, due in large measure to a poor working relationship between SLBDC and the contractor. That was due, in part at least, to project structural and timing factors. SLBDC was functioning before the contractor arrived and demonstrated, in a number of instances, skepticism about the value of the technical assistance. For its part, the contractor provided some inappropriate consultants, which reinforced SLBDC's attitude. As it has turned out, two months short of contract completion the specific technical assistance services provided contributed only marginally towards achieving overall project objectives, and the poor relationship has actually detracted from achieving those objectives.

Specific implementation arrangements were not made in advance of project initiation. USAID did not assign sufficient staff time to the design and implementation of this complex project in a new sector with which USAID was heretofore unfamiliar.

SLBDC represents an interesting experiment by Government and the Private Sector in pursuit of an ambitious goal, and continued support should be provided to SLBDC with a primary focus on Small and Medium-scale Enterprise (SME), as recommended below:

Recommendation:
The principal recommendations of the evaluation are summarized under six headings, as follows:

1. Investor Services/Investment Promotion
"Investor-based" profiles and prefeasibility studies (entailing a cost share by clients), should be continued but "general" investment profiles (with no pre-identified client in mind) should be discontinued. SLBDC's "opportunity summaries", which are a shortened form of the general investment profile, should continue to be used.

SLBDC Investor Services Division should continue to receive support to provide direct advice and support to new and small businesses.

Objectives in this component of the project should be measured by the amount of money invested and jobs created, not by numbers of profiles or studies completed.

Additional expatriate technical assistance (if any), should not be handled by the SLBDC.

Foreign investment promotion and services should be handled by the Foreign Investment Advisory Committee (FIAC) and the Greater Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC).

2. Business and Economic Policy
SLBDC should concentrate its attention on providing analytical support to SLBDC efforts to promote the SME sector.

SLBDC should discontinue its role in "national-level" policy studies/dialogue. (USAID believes that this role could be played by SLBDC, but only under specific conditions including close SLBDC Board involvement in the direction, oversight and use of policy studies.)

Other groups should be considered for carrying out policy studies, e.g., private chambers of commerce or industry, in addition to SLBDC.

3. Management Development
SLBDC's management development programs should focus on the SME sector and not on the larger, Colombo-based firms.

Significant assistance to other management development institutions should not be attempted through PEPP.

4. Entrepreneur Development
SLBDC's entrepreneur development program should receive continued support.

SLBDC must strengthen its program by (a) developing a strong participant follow-up service, (b) ontaining more trainers, and (c) improving the integration of the program with its management development program.

5. Project Structure
USAID should devote increased staff time to its private enterprise program.

The SLBDC program supported by PEPP should be funded via a direct grant between USAID and SLBDC, with MF&P concurrence.

SLBDC should not utilize expatriate technical assistance unless for very specific services that the SLBDC defines and requests.

6. SLBDC Viability
SLBDC should organize itself to concentrate on the SME sector, where it could make the most significant impact.

SLBDC's principal source of future revenue should be viewed as grants or contracts funded by foreign donors or government agencies:

SLBDC should devote no more than 20% of its core staff time to actual delivery of program services, and it should rely on consultants charged as direct costs to funding agencies to perform at least 80% of direct services. As a corollary, the major portion of SLBDC core staff time must be spent on planning, managing and marketing (to donors, etc.) of SLBDC services.

USAID, via PEPP, should provide some continuing support for SLBDC operating (indirect) costs.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

1. Name of Mission: USAID/Thailand

"Khon Kaen University Research Development Project: Mid-term Evaluation," January 13 - February 8, 1986.

2. Purpose of the Activity or Activities Evaluated:

Scientists at Khon Kaen University have been engaged for a number of years in research aimed at increasing the productivity of small rainfed farms in Northeastern Thailand. However, new technologies developed on university-managed experimental plots were not adopted by the farmers because they were not suited to actual farm conditions. It was realized that a better understanding of the human ecology of Northeastern agriculture is needed before they could successfully generate technologies.

In 1983 USAID Thailand provided a grant to Khon Kaen University to develop its institutional capability to conduct research contributing to rural development in Northeastern Thailand. A major share of this grant supports the Farming Systems Research (FSR) Project. This Project is an interdisciplinary activity involving staff from three faculties. Its major objectives are: (1) to use various rural systems analysis approaches; (2) to develop ways of linking the university-based FSR Project to action agencies; (3) to use information generated by the FSR Project to improve the academic quality; (4) to develop a long-term rural systems research capability at KKU.

3. Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used:

The evaluation team consisted of an ecology anthropologist, an agricultural economist and an animal scientist. The team as a whole had 18 working days to collect and analyze the information. Sources of information included reading all of the extensive documentation produced by the FSR Project and holding of in-depth discussions with KKU staff and action agencies. The evaluation was designed to look specifically at the FSR Sub-project.

4. Major Conclusions and Recommendations:

The FSR Project at Khon Kaen University has made substantial progress in meeting its major objectives during its first two years of operation. Various conceptual approaches (human ecology, agroecosystem analysis, and farming systems research) and innovative research methodologies (Rapid Rural Appraisal, Agroecosystem Analysis Workshops, Village-level Monitoring, etc.) have been employed to generate new information and understandings of rural development problems in the Northeast. The level of research activity maintained by the FSR Project is very high and the scientific quality of results is generally above that of work done before the initiation of the project.

5. Recommendation:

For the future of the FSR Project, the evaluation team put forth the following recommendations:

Date this summary prepared: June 5, 1986

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - (CONTINUED):

- CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES EMPLOYED BY THE FSR PROJECT The Project has adopted conceptual approaches to rural systems research and linked them into a single comprehensive research. However, the use of these new systems concepts is still imperfect. The evaluation team recommends that the FSR Project should establish a special Systems Analysis Section, composed of scientists from all of its existing disciplinary sections, to be responsible for relating component research to the overall systems framework of the Project.

- UNDERSTANDING OF RURAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH CONCEPTS BY FSR PROJECT SCIENTISTS. There is a limitation of training in rural systems analysis to the KKU staff. Most of the senior members of the Project hold degrees in agricultural sciences without formal training in ecology or human ecology. The evaluation team recommends that at least one senior scientist from each section should be provided the opportunity for advanced non-degree study of rural systems research at leading Asian and Western institutions.

- FOCUSING PROJECT RESEARCH ON DEVELOPING LEVERAGE METHODOLOGIES. The university is not the appropriate institution either to develop new technologies on a large-scale or to take responsibility for their extension to the farmers. Instead, the limited resources of KKU can be most effectively utilized in (1) developing new methodologies for operating technology suitable to the Northeastern rural environment, and (2) developing new methodologies for extending new technologies to the farmers. This is called "leverage methodologies" which are intended for use by action agencies. It is recommended that the Project leaders reassess the contribution that current component research activities are likely to make to development of leverage methodologies. Technology development should be given a priority to component research efforts to development of new methodologies.

- INCREASING THE RESEARCH PRODUCTIVITY OF FSR PROJECT SCIENTISTS. KKU staff lack adequate time to do intensive research because of the very heavy representational and administrative burdens. It is recommended that to reduce the burdens, a hiring of a competent administrative assistant for the Project Director, a consultant to develop a slide tape set for use in briefing visitors, and a provision of editorial assistance to scientists writing Thai and English language reports are suggested.

- CREATING AN INSTITUTIONAL BASE FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY RURAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH AT KHON KAEN UNIVERSITY. The FSR Project is perceived by many members of the university community as being dominated by the Faculty of Agriculture. The evaluation team recommends that appropriate recognition to the status of the FSP as an interdisciplinary project should be understood. Location of the FSR Project Central Office in a building outside of the Faculty of Agriculture is suggested.

- OBTAINING LONG-TERM FUNDING FOR RURAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH AT KHON KAEN UNIVERSITY. Continued provision of core funding by both the Thai government and foreign donors for many years to come is probably essential to the survival of this research capability. The evaluation team recommends that USAID and Royal Thai Government should explore ways to ensure that long-term core funding is available.

6. LESSONS LEARNED:

University Level Farming Systems Research can be very innovative but cannot be a replacement for a well functioning widespread government effort. The university cannot attempt to be the sole source of new agricultural technology nor of a large effort at extension. Instead, the proper role is that of a catalyst, using new conceptual methods to show how farmer problems can be identified, analyzed and solutions found in a quick and responsive way.

USAID/THAILAND

HILL AREAS COMMUNITY BASED EDUCATION PROJECT
(493-0297) - 1985

Purpose of Activity: The economic status of the hill tribe peoples is considerably lower than that of the average Thai, and due to widespread illiteracy, most are frequently at a disadvantage in communicating their needs and requesting government services, marketing produce, purchasing goods, etc.

Consequently, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) has committed itself to facilitating the eventual permanent resettlement and integration of the hill tribes people into mainstream Thai society. The Hill Areas Community Based Education (HAE) project is one of several agencies involved in educational endeavors in the hill tribes areas.

In March 1980, a five year project grant agreement (493-0297) was signed between the RTG and USAID. AID bilateral funding amounts to $1.6 million and RTG counterpart funds are $958,000 for a total of $2,558,000. The project paper called for the development and testing of a community based education model which would provide non-formal education activities for both children and adults in six sites involving about 36 villages. The Project Activity Completion Date (PACD) was February 28, 1985. End of Project Status (EOPS) was to be indicated by the following: community based non-formal education programs and staff operating in all sites; community decision making and participation in all phases of program development and implementation; initial steps taken to provide for post-project replication and expansion of availability of the education model; and enrollment of about 60% of village children and 30% of adults in the educational programs. The sector goal was the provision of educational opportunities in a context of individual and village level decision making.

Evaluation Purpose: The three main purposes of this final evaluation are as follows: (1) to evaluate project achievement in the development of various models and systems; (2) to compare village baseline data collected at the beginning of the project and follow-up data collected in this evaluation; and (3) to analyze changes in the six clusters of villages under the project by the end of the pilot phase.

Methodology: The evaluation data derives from two main sources: (a) primary data collected by means of interviews, observations and questionnaires; and (b) secondary data from existing project papers/documents and research/evaluation reports.

Findings and Conclusions:

1. The HAE model has been designed for life and community education organizations with the Village Education Center (VEC) as a center for knowledge, information and various village

activities. The teachers' way of living will, therefore, implicitly be an educational example for the villagers. Although the evaluation results indicate satisfactory achievements on the VEC objectives, some VECs still do not perform their functions well because the teachers' residences are located away from the VECs, and consequently, the center is left empty when the teacher leaves. Opportunities for the villagers to learn from the teachers way of life then rarely occur.

2. Based on this evaluation, the Primary Education Curriculum for Hill Areas Communities, 1981, is successful and satisfactorily accepted by the hill tribes themselves. The flexible self-study format has been developed to be responsive to individual and community needs. HAE teachers see (as a problem) the absence of students during the growing season because this naturally segregates students into many groups and levels, causing difficulties in class management and slow learning progress. Yet, learner performance has been appropriate given the curriculum.

   Teachers are familiar with and have experience in only the formal education system. The villagers, likewise, are only familiar with the formal system and expect to be taught that way. They have a general misunderstanding of the VEC's functions and objectives as well as the HAE curriculum.

3. A number of group and public benefit activities have been generated and developed. But, the groups have difficulty working consistently. The problems faced by these groups are due to a large extent to the failure of the groups and activities to address the villagers felt needs.

4. Coordination among the Operations Unit staff of HTWD and the HAE head teacher and teachers of the villages is very good. In clusters with regular health and agriculture officials, the teachers have established coordination in the form of advice and support.

5. Quite a number of HAE teachers cannot follow and put into practice the concept of "Inter-disciplinary Approach". It appears that the two curriculum areas, that is, Thai Language and Numeracy on the one hand, and Life and Social Experiences on the other are separate.

6. Increased coordination between agencies, the national, provincial and local levels, has been satisfactorily achieved as a goal.

7. Ability of village people to speak Thai was up 9% from 1980 - 1985. Classroom enrollment was up 58% in same period. Felt educational needs of people have shifted from their language to health, agricultural techniques, mathematics, etc. Frequent contact between hill village people and Thai's has increased by 41%. Contacts between hill population and local government agencies has increased 33%.

8. Villagers look highly upon the HAE teachers for health, community development and the VEC in general.

9. Most HAE teachers suffer demoralizing factors especially those related to administrators and administrative practices. This is far more important than monetary factors.

Recommendations

1. Where the VEC and the teachers residence are separately located, they should be moved into the same place to better respond to the project objective in education for life and community.

2. The HAE educational model concepts and principles should be made clear to all responsible persons during both implementation and expansion phases. Confidence in the HAE non-formal educational model should be strengthened.

3. In certain villages, the community's needs should be surveyed prior to any group formation. Educational programs for villagers need to be emphasized until they realize the importance of group formation and public benefit activities.

4. The new dimension of "Inter-disciplinary Approach" should be introduced to educational circles, both formal and non-formal. Also, the HAE teaching/learning materials on Thai language and Numeracy and Life and Social Experiences should be reviewed and developed to bring about curriculum content integrity at this implementation phase.

5. The prospective head teacher should have experience in educational activity organization as an HAE teacher for about 2-3 years.

6. HAE officials need to give special attention to HAE teachers; their needs and perceived problems. Supervisors should make frequent trips to villages to get a better understanding about the working situations.

Lessons Learned: No lessons learned were provided by the evaluation.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

THAILAND - Special Interim Evaluation of the Private Sector In Development Project (493-0329)

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

USAID/Thailand and the RTG's (Royal Thai Government) Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation (DTEC) signed a Project Grant Agreement (493-0329) on May 13, 1983, for the Private Sector in Development Project. The goal was to contribute to the RTG's Fifth Development Plan structural adjustment objectives of improving balance of trade and reducing unemployment problems, particularly in areas outside Bangkok. The purpose over a four year period was to increase private sector investment in employment generating, export oriented, resource based ventures in areas outside of Bangkok.

The project was intended to aid in meeting the above-mentioned objectives by the following Activities:

(Activity 1) providing technical assistance ($2.551 million) to the Board of Investment (BOI) to undertake a selective analysis and marketing program to identify business opportunities consistent with Fifth Plan objectives and to attract appropriate private enterprise participation in exploration of these opportunities, together with the equivalent of $1.5 million to be contributed by the BOI.

(Activity 2) establishment of means for effective policy analysis by the private sector to analyze important issues and problem areas affecting private sector development and to recommend appropriate policies to the RTG (Royal Thai Government), by financing staff and studies ($460,0090) for the Joint Standing Committee for Commerce, Industry and Banking (JSC), together with the equivalent of $60,000 to be contributed by the RTG and $360,000 by the Thai private sector.

(Activity 3) establishment of linkages between private sector associations in agribusiness in Thailand with counterpart organizations in the U.S. to encourage mutual cooperation, transfer of technology and future business relations through staff support ($75,000) for the Thai Counterpart of the U.S. Joint Agricultural Consultative Corporation (JACC), together with the equivalent of $75,000 to be contributed by the Thai private sector.

It was expected that a number of new investments and other business arrangements would be made in export oriented, labor intensive and natural resource based industries as a direct result of the surveys, promotional program, policy dialogue and U.S.-Thai agribusiness linkages benefitting from assistance under the project. In addition, the relationships established between the private sectors in Thailand and the U.S. were expected to stimulate a steady flow of information on markets and new technology between the two countries. The improved policy analysis and planning capability established under the project to address private sector related issues were expected to result in realistic policies and regulations that would steadily improve the investment climate for industries particularly in priority development areas.

Purpose of Evaluation: The purpose of this evaluation is to: (a) determine progress toward the attainment of the project's purpose; (b) identify and analyze problems which may inhibit such attainment; (c) recommend solutions to any problems found; (d) determine if appropriate information is being collected to enable subsequent evaluations to be done and to recommend improvements to such data collection if necessary; and (e) recommend a plan and the timing for a subsequent evaluation. In addition, specific questions were provided by the Project Committee.

Date this summary prepared: June 6, 1986

SUMMARY

The findings and conclusions in this report result from four weeks of reviews of project documentation and interviews. This evaluation covers only the first half of the Project's life, i.e., from May 1983 to June 1985. An initial draft of this evaluation was submitted to USAID/Thailand for review on September 27, 1985. A number of comments were received on October 28, 1985, which have been addressed in this revised draft dated November 15, 1985.

Findings:

1 The July 1984 Project Workshop was a particularly productive accomplishment of the initial two years of the project. Representatives from each project component agree that only after this intensive workshop was progress made in forumulating studies of policies and regulations under Activity 2 (Dialogue).

2. Project participants believe that progress is being made toward achieving project objectives. Although progress is slow, two notable accomplishments cited were: (a) private sector associations are concentrating more on issues to raise to the JPPSCC (Joint Public/Private Sector Consultative Committee) and (b) more private sector representatives are included on government committees, contributing to acceptable policy decisions.

3. Only Activity 3 (Thai Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee) has been on schedule and can show substantive result. All other activities under the project are at least one year behind schedule. Activity 3 has developed linkages between the Thai and U.S. agribusiness communities and is actively supporting the development of several investment opportunities. No substantive policy or regulatory changes have resulted from Activity 2 (Dialogue), nor is the private sector any more capable of effecting such changes as a result of the project. Due to start-up delay, the Board of Investment (Activity 1) reduced its role under the project by reducing the level of effort expected of its consultants who began work only in October 1984.

4. The Joint Standing Committee of Commerce, Industry and Banking is not the implementing agent for Activity 2 (Dialogue) as envisioned in the Project Agreement. The Joint Standing Committee (JSC) does not, nor did it ever, have a Secretariat or staff to perform as required under the project. The Project Committee, a Sub-Committee of the JPPSACC (Joint Public/Private Sector Consultative Committee), has assumed the responsibility for Activity 2, diminishing the potential for the private sector to play as significant a role in formulating policies or regulations through the projects as would have been the case if the JSC had been assisted in developing the capacity to perform this function. The fact that JSC representatives are members of the JPPSCC, and the Project Committee, does not diminish this deficiency in that this fact is simply the status quo, i.e., the JSC representatives have been members of the JPPSCC since its inception which pre-dates this project by several years. On the positive side, this weakness may have contributed to the Project Committee's decision to fund a study of the effectiveness of the overall JPPSCC progress.

5. Excessive emphasis is placed on Activity 2 (Dialogue). Activity 2 represents only 13% of project resources, and its importance in achieving project objectives was diminished when the Joint Standing Committee did not assume responsibility. The Project Committee devotes a significant portion of its time to this activity reducing time for overall project administration. On the positive side, the regular Project Committee meetings called to consider studies under Activity 2 provi excellent opportunities for interaction between the Public and Private Sector.

6. The Project Committee emphasizes the "dialogue process" over "private sector development" on investments. A review of project documentation indicates that the intention was to generate private sector investment and to evoke policy and regulatory change at the instigation of the private sector to improve the investment environment. This is no longer the focus of the project.

7. Over $600,000 of project resources remain unprogrammed. Over 17% of project resources remain unprogrammed under budget line items "Contingency Fund" and Activity 1. At the

same time, the level of effort under Activity 3 (Thai Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee) was reduced by one-third due to insufficient funds under that budget line item. There are not known planned for the use of these unprogrammed resources.

8. There is no overall project implementation plan nor has the Project Committee required or reviewed implementation plans for the three activities. Little effort has been made by the Project Committee to assure the formulation of reasonable implementation plans against which progress could be measured or problems could be identified.

Project Design and Policy Implications:

1. Project goals and purposes should be specific, i.e., clear, concise and easily understood. The goal of this project is very broad and multifaceted, as evidenced by its three components each of which is a project in its own right. This breadth defies specificity in expected accomplishments and diminishes the likelihood of maintaining control over project administration.

2. Projects should include a realistic, reasonably detailed implementation plan and schedule to be negotiated with, and committed to by the implementing agent(s). Perhaps as a result of the breadth and complexity of this project, there was no implementation plan or schedule provided to the implementing agent. This lack of targets or benchmarks lessens the sense of obligation to perform in a timely, effective and decisive manner. It also reduces the ability of the project manager to identify problems usually highlighted by slipping schedules.

3. During the Administrative Analysis of project design, care should be taken to assure claimed capacities are actual capacities. This project has suffered from two of the three sub-implementing agencies' inability to provide adequate human resources to perform their responsibilities, i.e., the Board of Investment and the Joint Standing Committee. Had this been recognized during design analysis, the means to satisfy these shortcomings could have been included in the project.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

The overriding conclusion is that:

> At the mid-point of the project, there is no indication that private sector business investment has increased as a result of project activities, but there is the likelihood that several investments will occur as a direct result of the project and there is the potential of project activities having a long-term impact on the investment environment.

The evaluators have reached the following conclusions (C) concerning the project and offer recommendations (R) which we believe could improve the likelihood of achieving project objectives.

C. The Project Committee has de-emphasized its project administration role.

R: The Project Committee should undertake its project administration role, conducting a workshop as soon as possible involving representatives from each activity re-establishing the purpose of the project and developing work plan that assure progress in a fully coordinated manner. Efficient budget management techniques should also be included. As stated in 3 below, responsibility for Activity 2 should be that of the Private Sector.

2.C: The Board of Investment (BOI), due to human resource limitations, has delegated its project responsibilities to consultants.

R: The BOI should develop a strategic plan for itself integrating the work plan of the project-funded consultants and demonstrating how benefits will be derived to the BOI from the involvement of the consultants, i.e., how the consultant

BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)

designed and driven promotion program is being institutionalized within the BOI; how transfer of technology is occurring. This is not to say that the BOI should necessarily develop the capacity to carry out the functions now being performed by the consultants, but simply that the BOI as a participant and beneficiary of this project should have an independent plan.

3.C: Activity 2 (Dialogue) concentrates on Public Sector interests.

R: Every effort should be made to transfer the responsibilities of Activity 2 to the Private Sector, e.g., the Joint Standing Committee, as envisioned in the Project Agreement and to be more flexible in accepting study proposals. The intent of strengthening the capability of the Private Sector to address the Government should take precedence over the generation of studies.

4.C: The Thai Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (Thai JACC) has inadequate resources to fulfill its role.

R: The Thai JACC should be provided resources sufficient to retain staff for the life of the project and to establish a revolving fund for feasibility study financing. The potential for U.S.-Thai business linkages and technology transfer is the greatest for this component of the project.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
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EVALUATION SUMMARY

USAID/Tunis
Evaluation Report, Central Tunisia Rural Development Project (664-0312), by RONCO Consulting Corporation

PURPOSE OF ACTIVITY EVALUATED:

The evaluation report represents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of a joint GOT-AID team concerning the Central Tunisia Rural Development Project and its various subprojects. The project was designed with two major purposes:

1) To develop cost-effective and managerially efficient projects for Central Tunisia which could be replicated in other parts of Tunisia where conditions of similar marginality apply, and

2) To increase income, labor productivity and improve the quality of life of rural Tunisians living in the CTRD zone, thereby decreasing regional and intra-regional disparities in level of living.

The establishment of the Central Tunisia Development Authority (CTDA) was an important step in the GOT move toward decentralization as a means of addressing service delivery needs at local levels, as well as toward equalization of the quality of life in the peripheral areas with more urbanized areas. The CTDA was designed as an instrument for region-wide, multi-sectoral planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

The Project was authorized in 1979 to assist the recently organized CTDA to pursue its regional rural development mandate. CTDA was the first multi-sectoral, multi-gouvernorat, decentralized authority to be created in the otherwise highly decentralized Tunisian government. Since 1979, several AID-funded subprojects have been implemented by CTDA. Although virtually all USAID-funded, 664-0312 Project activities were examined, the evaluation team focused on six or eight subprojects:

a) 664-0312.1 - Area Development
b) 664-0312.2 - Dryland Farming Systems Research
c) 664-0312.3 - Small Holder Irrigation
d) 664-0312.7 - Rural Potable Water
e) 664-0312.8 - Rangeland Development
f) 664-0312.9 - Rural Extension and Outreach

The other two subprojects include a potable water (664-0312.4) activity which terminated in 1982 and a newly activated PVO subproject (664-0312.10).

Date this summary prepared:

SUMMARY

METHODOLOGY: The evaluation contractor fielded a large and senior team, including Dr. Richard Newberg who has extensive AID and Tunisia experience. The evaluation team was sub-divided into three teams, to cover institutional/organizational analysis, economic and agricultural/production analysis, and social impact analysis. The team spent three and one half weeks in the field in Central Tunisia, with some visits to key GOT ministries and other organizations in Tunis. An additional two weeks were spent in carrying out those interviews and in report preparation.

The evaluation involved the Ministry of Agriculture and several of its regional development agencies, including the Kef Agricultural Institute (ESAK), the Range and Livestock Office (OEP), the Regional Commission for Agricultural Development (CRDA) and the National Agricultural Institute (INAT), as well as the Central Tunisia Development Authority.

The team undertook an in depth evaluation of the four active subprojects for which CTDA is the primary implementing agency, and, to a lesser degree, evaluated the remaining two active subprojects for which CTDA shares implementation responsibility-- with ESAK (Research) and OEP (Rangeland).

A decision was made by the team that all 17 delegations of the current project area should be visited by at least one representative of each sub-team. Two additional steps were taken. First, the institutional/organizational sub-team designed a questionnaire for each of CTDA's subdivision and division heads. Second, the economics sub-team designed a farm budget format for the subdivision heads to fill out for those farms which the team has visited. Other methodologies included document review and interviews of expert respondents. The team worked closely with the CTDA Planning and Evaluation Director, who was assigned to backstop the evaluation within the CTDA, as well as with his colleagues, and with the Tunisian and expatriate advisors.

Two debriefings were held with AID and the CTDA during the evaluation process and one meeting was held later at the USAID. CTDA and USAID reviewed each recommendation with the team, and some recommendations reflect, therefore, the combined suggestions of CTDA and USAID.

FINDINGS:

1) The Central Tunisia development effort supported by AID has been successful and cost effective both in terms of subprojects designed to improve the quality of rural life, and in setting into motion a process for increasing agricultural production, especially through small-holder irrigation and improvement in forage supplies for ruminant livestock;

2) CTDA has identified and effectively provided important development services not heretofore adequately provided by existing line agencies of the GOT;

3) CTDA has strong support both from regional and national political entities for continuing its activities under a broadened development mandate.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) AID should continue to give high priority to assistance and financing of selected economic and social development activities in Central Tunisia.

AID should support agricultural activities including:

a) Small-holder surface well irrigation toward improved efficiency of water use from existing wells, including supplemental irrigation and other water-extending approaches and financing of some new wells;

b) Support of cooperatives and other private agribusiness activities particularly in marketing of the increased supplies of fruit and vegetables and in provision of production inputs and services;

c) Increased emphasis on efficient water management, whether on PPIs or from surface wells, particularly in terms of water delivery systems which reduce water losses and which key water application to plant consumption needs.

3) AID should support non-agricultural activities, including:

a) Potable water;

b) Health service development.

4) AID resources directed to Central Tunisia should be channeled principally through the CTDA, and

a) The CTDA should continue to have responsibilities along present lines in its current area of responsibility;

b) However, to conform CTDA's regional authority to the boundaries of the economic "region" of the Central West, the CTDA mandate should be broadened geographically to include the governorates of Sidi Bou Zid and Kairouan in terms of emphasis on new areas of non-agricultural activities such as development of potable water and health infrastructure, and;

c) The CTDA would best continue under the tutelle of the Ministry of Agriculture with a strong liaison with the Ministry of Plan for non-agricultural activities.

The evaluation team noted the following lessons learned:

-- Where timing permits, institutional strengthening activities should be completed well before project implementation activities are undertaken, to allow a fledgling regional authority to work from an improved base.

-- Given the more favorable rate of return in shallow well irrigation programs, the GOT should place greater emphasis on this type of irrigation.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (EVALUATION OF 664-0304 AND 664-0315)

Technology Transfer by Participant Training: Tunisia, An Evaluation of ATT Project and TT Project

RESUME

The Agriculture Technology Transfer Project (664-0304) began in 1979 (Grant Agreement). The Technology Transfer Project (664-0315) began in 1981 (Grant Agreement). Both projects are now operating with their fourth Amendments. Both projects have focused on participant training in the United States: graduate study in management (TT) and agricultural sciences (ATT) as well as undergraduate and graduate study in engineering (TT). Both projects require, therefore, that students master English. The current agreements will bring the cumulative numbers of students trained to roughly 90 (ATT) and 500 (TT).

These projects, via successive amendments, also have sought to foster linkages--researcher to researcher, professor to professor, and institution to institution--between Tunisia and the United States. Beginnings have been made with short-term visitations, collaborative research projects, and faculty sabbatical exchanges between Tunisia and the United States. The development of linkages of institutions is only in an exploratory stage. These efforts already have had worthwhile effects on teaching styles, curriculum content, and degree equivalency in Tunisia.

These projects complement a substantial program in institution building by the Government of Tunisia (GOT). New schools of agriculture, engineering, and technology have been started in recent years as constituent parts of the country's only university, the University of Tunis. These projects also contribute to indigenous efforts to reduce cultural and other dependency on France. Tunisians aim, as they express it, to achieve "real independence."

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team reviewed documents in French and English, in Tunisia and the United States. Site visits were made to agricultural, engineering, and language schools in Tunisia. Graduate students and former students were interviewed as availability permitted in Tunisia and the United States. A random sample of engineering undergraduates was interviewed by telephone in the United States. The team also interviewed professors, deans, directors, and officials of participating institutions (both governments and several universities). Both contractors were interviewed in the United States: MidAmerica International Agricultural Consortium (ATT) and the Academy for Educational Development (TT).

FINDINGS

Both projects are subjectively desired and objectively appropriate in Tunisia. Project snags and delays have been within an acceptable range and have been handled in a straightforward manner. These projects are efficient and effective, therefore, in the collective judgment of the evaluation team.

Both projects, as scholarship programs, are outstanding successes. Participating students are carefully selected. The nationwide competition for undergraduate engineering scholarships has emerged as the functional equivalent of the National Merit Scholarships in the United States. The best and the brightest aspire to be selected for this undergraduate program in the United States. The graduate students are selected with comparable rigor on the basis of nationwide competition or grade point averages (in the case of undergraduate engineers in the United States).

The scholarship students actually complete their degree programs. Tunisian officials claim the drop-out rate is higher for their students in France. The drop-out rate is considerably less than ten percent in any case, in the United States. Grade point averages are quite high for undergraduate participants. American professors express a high regard for students in both programs. English intructors, in particular, express some astonishment at the speed the students "get up on" English.

English language training is clearly adequate, as shown by the students' success at universities in the United States. Graduate students are responsible themselves for acquiring a passable mastery of English in Tunisia. A four to five week program is required for undergraduate students, after preliminary selection and before departure, in Intensive English. All (graduate and undergraduate) students, with few exceptions, follow through with Intensive English in the United States. The few exceptions have high scores on the TOEFL Test. These exceptions are significant inasmuch as their grade point averages are lower on average than the grade point averages of the other students. Intensive English in the United States is important for every student not only for language fluency but also for cultural adjustment

These projects as linkage programs (as distinct from scholarship programs) are still exploratory. The short-term visitations, faculty exchange sabbaticals, and collaborative research projects are useful beginnings. These preliminary overtures are worthwhile themselves, but follow-up is needed for broad and sustained linkages. The evaluation team has considered a number of possibilities. Tunisian professors, for example, might teach in summer sessions at selected universities in the United States. Summer teaching has the advantage that the basic cost (salary) is a routine expense for universities in the United States. (And many universities seek outside faculty for summer sessions.) Such expedients are desirable, but outside funding is required for sustained institution to institution linkages.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation team recommends the following, inter alia, to GOT and USAID.

English Language Training. Do not try to do it all in Tunisia. Do retain the present model of a four- to five-week program of Intensive English in Tunisia followed by Intensive English as needed in the United States. USAID probably should continue to fund the four- to five-week program of Intensive English in Tunisia.

Tunisia-United States Linkages. Continue current types of person-to-person linkage activities: short-term visitations, faculty sabbatical

exchanges, collaborative research projects. There should be, as a matter of course, a decline in visitations by governmental officials. Broaden activities to include, for example, a program of seminars/lectures by recognized authorities as well as summer teaching by Tunisian professors in the United States. To maximize institutional awareness/commitment, focus the development of institutional (school-to-school) linkage efforts on a few universities that have been responsive to USAID programming in Tunisia--for example, the University of Minnesota, Ohio State University, Michigan State University, the University of Missouri, and University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Tunisian councils of engineering deans and agricultural deans should be established to draft desiderata for institutional linkages. The Tunisian Scientific and University Mission in the United States, rather than a contractor, should have the lead role in negotiations with universities in the United States.

Sustained linkages of academic institutions are not likely to endure without outside funding.

Manpower Planning. Continue these projects. Skilled manpower is in short supply. Ph.D.s, in particular, in science and technology will be needed for many years, until institution building is further along in Tunisia.

Short-term training of returned (and other) degree holders is important to update skills in particular fields and to compensate for shortfalls in particular fields by (re)training specialists in kindred fields.

Rationalize the salary scales for scientific researchers and faculty members. These need to be roughly comparable.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview of Major Features of the Economy

Tunisia is engaged in a gradual, long-term process of liberalizing its economy. This process is threatened by the country's current balance of payments shortfall. The Government of Tunisia (GOT) can respond to the balance of payments pressures in either of two ways. It can revert to increased regulations and controls, attempting to mandate increased exports and seriously restrict imported inputs. Or it may seek to alleviate the institutional, financial, and policy constraints on the efficient production of domestic as well as export goods. Some evidence suggests that the GOT is leaning toward the first option. This is a particularly critical time, therefore, for the U.S. Agency for International Development and other donors to provide support to the second approach, which many believe offers brighter prospects for long-term growth of the economy.

Private sector activities in Tunisia are subject to a wide variety of controls and regulations affecting virtually all dimensions of the production process. The most important of these are investment controls, price regulations, labor legislation, and foreign trade controls. In principle, all industrial investments in Tunisia require authorization from the Agency for the Promotion of Investment (API) or the Small Enterprise Division of the Ministry of National Economy. Although the mandate of API is to promote profitable investments, its approval procedures are a major hindrance to the development of a more flexible and dynamic private sector.

Price controls touch all but a limited range of manufactured goods. These controls make it difficult for business people to adjust their price upward in response to cost increases, are time consuming, and do not allow for returns to investment in product development. Highly favorable labor regulations have created concerns among foreign companies considering investing in Tunisia and reduced the efficiency of domestic firms. It is virtually impossible to fire workers after they have been employed for more than three months. And, in the past, wage increases were not tied to productivity gains, leading to relatively high wages. The GOT recently has taken steps to reverse this trend, as evidenced by the fact that no wage increases have occurred during 1985.

The Central Bank exerts a strong influence on Tunisia's financial system, leading to some inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. Although the development of the private sector is now being promoted, during the 1970s public institutions received a large share of financial resources to the detriment of the private sector. Virtually every bank loan, in practice, still must be approved by the Central Bank. It exerts control over financial institutions through carefully controlled access to rediscount facilities, the imposition of credit ratios,

the determination of priority sectors that must receive a minimum proportion of loans, and a comprehensive and detailed system of interest rate floors and ceilings on deposits and loans. Commercial banks are the major source of loans to small and medium enterprises. Development banks were created to provide medium- and long-term loans and equity to large industrial projects; in general, their investments rarely fall below Tunisian dinars (TD) 1 million per borrower.

Savings levels have declined in recent years. The Central Bank is trying to encourage savings by raising interest rates and creating new savings instruments with tax benefits. If inflation continues at its approximate 1984 rate of 8 percent, however, most savings interest rates will remain negative in real terms.

The deterioration of Tunisia's balance of payments and foreign exchange position has led to the creation of numerous institutions and programs to promote exports. Some hold promise for the future whereas others are less certain. Perhaps the institution with the most potential is the Federation of Exporters (FEDEX). Formed in July 1985, it is the first private export association representing Tunisian exporters.

One main problem Tunisia faces in its determination to export is that Tunisian business and government officials understand little of how different markets function and what they require in the way of products, qualities, quantities, timeliness, and labeling. There is little appreciation that the very size, complexity, and dynamics of large markets (especially the U.S. market) are what offer opportunities.

The principal financial constraint particularly affecting small- and medium-scale resident exporters is the problem of securing foreign exchange and import licenses for raw materials and equipment to produce exports. As of April 1985, the GOT stopped issuing import certificates that guaranteed access to foreign exchange on an annual basis. Each request is now carefully scrutinized on an individual basis, requiring much documentation and causing lengthy delays. Although most large exporters interviewed by the team claimed that they had no difficulty getting needed imports, small- and medium-scale producers were suffering greatly as a result of cutbacks or refusals to authorize imports. This situation is not expected to improve in the near future.

Private Sector Development Project

To date, the Private Sector Development Project has financed a variety of activities ranging in size from $8,500 to $350,000. This has involved funding seminars in Tunisia and abroad; trips to promote joint ventures between American and Tunisian businesses; and technical assistance provided through Catholic

Relief Services, the Institut Superieur de Gestion, and the International Executive Service Corps. A review of funded activities indicates that they have made a useful contribution to relieving specific constraints faced by private sector producers.

However, the lack of coherent focus of subproject activities is a key constraint to achieving the overall project goal and purposes. These discrete activities have been scattered in a variety of directions rather than focused on one or two issues. In addition, managing these small efforts and gaining separate approval for each component from the GOT have imposed a high administrative burden on those managing the project. It is therefore recommended that the project be redesigned to focus on issues relating to export promotion. Given the limited funds available to USAID/Tunis, we suggest that remaining funds be reprogrammed to help finance the activities proposed. By concentrating the limited resources of USAID on a particular, more focused set of issues, it can be expected to make a greater contribution to the development of the Tunisian private sector.

Future USAID Strategy

During the past five years, the GOT has begun a variety of programs to promote small and medium enterprises. These programs were examined closely to determine whether there is a need for USAID assistance. On balance, the sector is generally well served by existing programs. Since some of them are new, it is unclear whether they will function efficiently and achieve their objectives. This is true for financial assistance programs as well as technical assistance activities. It is suggested that all of these be kept under review for possible further support in the future.

Given the critical balance of payments problems facing the country and USAID's limited funding, we recommend that the mission focus on private sector export promotion. This is an area seriously constraining the growth of the private sector; it is also of prime concern to Tunisian officials. A well-targeted assistance program will help moderate existing restraints and contribute to a return to a longer-term movement toward liberalization. Since past studies have shown that manufacturing export activities create many more jobs per dinar of value added than import substitution efforts, an expansion of export production will also be highly beneficial in helping the country to solve its serious unemployment problem.

An integrated effort is suggested involving several different project components, each focused on key constraints. The constraints on export development and proposals for a comprehensive USAID strategy are summarized in Table Ex-1. Taken individually, each is a useful activity; together, they

constitute a coherent program through which USAID can make an important contribution to the growth of the private sector and the economy as a whole.

EVALUATION OF THE AMERICAN NEAR EAST REFUGEE AID PROGRAM

I. Executive Summary

American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA) is one of five Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) to work in the West Bank and Gaza as part of a development assistance effort to the Administered Territories which was initiated by Congress in 1975. The program demonstrates American concern for the humanitarian and development needs of Palestinian residents and seeks to enhance the quality of their lives and to promote peace in the region. ANERA's projects have not been surveyed in-depth since 1981 and only briefly during a 1984 evaluation of AID-funded PVO development assistance programs, necessitating an evaluation of its program to date to assist future AID planning and help ANERA guide its program more successfully. This report focuses on ANERA and the overall progress and impact of its program, addressing project administration, staff, evaluations and future plans.

The evaluation team was composed of the cooperative development specialist/team leader provided by Agricultural Cooperative Development International (ACDI), an AID/W agricultural development officer and an AID/W program officer. The views, interpretations and recommendations contained in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Agency for International Development.

ANERA's program includes financial and technical assistance to cooperatives, municipal water systems and markets, road projects, health clinics, community buildings, schools and universities. In addition to ANERA, AID assistance is channeled through Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the Community Development Foundation (CDF), Holy Land Christian Mission International (HLCMI) and America-Mideast Education and Training Services (AMIDEAST). Much of the success of AID's efforts is due to the diverse yet complimentary nature of these organizations and their programs and their collaboration on projects whenever feasible.

ANERA administers a variety of development projects which include agriculture, education, sanitation, health, small industry, marketing, water and waste systems and women's programs. More than 100 sub-projects have been approved for AID financing, 75% of which have been implemented or completed at this time. The team visited thirteen ongoing and four potential projects and sub-projects and met with municipal mayors, cooperative managers and board members, military government and ministry officials, American Embassy and Consulate staffs and ANERA and other PVO personnel in order to assess fully ANERA's capabilities and achievements.

The team concluded that ANERA's goal of promoting self-help economic development is being met. This is evidenced

by: 1) a substantial growth in membership of assisted cooperatives (see Appendix I); 2) an increased value of services offered to members; 3) a diminished reliance on outside financing; 4) increased reclamation of land for cultivation; and 5) the provision of improved and increased municipal services.

ANERA's program appears to be constructive, important and of great benefit to the Palestinian residents of West Bank and Gaza and although many of its projects have yet to be implemented, it is clear that these cooperative and municipal projects alike will have a positive impact once effected. Traditionally, cooperative projects have had the greatest potential for success; their development promotion processes have been in place longer, their success rates higher and their operating methods are understood better by organizations assisting them. Municipalities function differently and this fact must be recognised and addressed when assistance to them is contemplated. In implementing its program, ANERA continually attempts to involve other institutions and individuals, not only giving them a stake in the project but also giving the project greater access to locally available expertise. The projects summarized here serve to provide a general overview of ANERA's development program.

The Gaza Municipal Rainwater Conservation Project, ANERA's largest, is impressive in the quality of the work being done and the dedication of the engineers and workers constructing it. The project focuses on conserving a valuable and limited resource and is of the utmost importance to area residents. The Khan Younis Municipal Slaughterhouse will provide custom slaughtering according to Islamic Law for regional butchers. This project, still in the early stages of construction, will contribute to the general health of the population as all animals will be inspected by a veterinarian prior to slaughter, a precaution never before taken. Local government and individual farmers will experience increased incomes through the nearly completed Halhul Municipal Wholesale Fruit and Vegetable Market and its proposed refrigeration storage units.

ANERA's cooperative projects utilizing farm machinery and land clearing equipment have had a particularly profound effect on Palestinian rural life. Residents of this region feel strongly that once land is cleared and planted, their chances of being able to remain are much greater than if they do not cultivate it. The Tarqumiya and Nablus Regional Cooperatives exemplify the growth in membership and services that has come about as a direct result of ANERA assistance in providing land reclamation machinery and revolving loan funds (Appendix I). The Tarqumiya Olive Cooperative provides excellent service and oil quality for members and non-members alike, charging 1 kg of oil for every 11 kgs processed. ANERA's first project, the Ramallah

Agricultural Cooperative

Poultry Farmers Cooperative Society, is an excellent project meeting all of its objectives. Recently, new management was hired, helping to overcome previously noted management and financial problems (Appendix II). A surplus of eggs throughout the region has limited membership and caused marketing problems but the cooperative, with ANERA financing, plans to diversify its operations with a feed mill for large animals once GOI approval is received.

Jointly with AMIDEAST, ANERA is assisting the Polytechnic Hebron Engineering Science College and University Graduates Union with funds for scientific equipment and ANERA and CDF have worked together, on occasion, to aid cooperatives.

The Bethlehem Arab Women's Union has been assisted with small annual grants from ANERA, allowing it to establish the School of Fine Arts and Crafts to train Palestinians in sculpture, painting and other fine arts, the Museum of Palestinian Culture and Handicrafts and a school for the mentally retarded. The union also provides medical assistance to mothers and children and distributes food to poor families. In general, women benefit from ANERA-assisted cooperative, university, rural electrification, water conservation and distribution and land reclamation projects in a variety of ways from improved services to increased income and standard of living.

Recommendations made in this report concern several areas including the need for ANERA to formalize and upgrade its proposal acceptance and project planning and the methods it uses in managing these important areas. The current representative is designing new procedures and guidelines to help overcome previous limitations and problems. A change in GOI's approval process for ANERA and its easing of restrictions on some types of projects previously disallowed may mean that recommendations concerning markets in other Arab states and Europe can be implemented. ANERA has used outside consultants on occasion but should consider using specialists to help in all areas of its operations including proposal assessment and project implementation. ANERA also needs to think of training as a project component rather than as an isolated undertaking in order to help ensure project continuation when outside assistance ends. ANERA assistance in the Gaza Strip contributes much to residents' welfare but, due to the large number of refugees living there in less than ideal conditions, community service projects should receive additional special attention.

Realities of life in the West Bank and Gaza place a number of unique and complex constraints on development projects, all of which demand tact, persistance and know-how to overcome. ANERA seems to cope well with these restraints while striving to succeed in its development efforts. Administration of its

projects has been politically sensitive and humanely centered as well as innovative in its methods. Recent and major staff changes due to retirement of the Regional Representative and newly created positions should only strengthen ANERA's administration capabilities. The evaluation team was impressed by the grasp of mission evidenced by the ANERA staff.

Constraints to project implementation and success involve several factors; 1) delayed approval from the GOI for certain projects such as those involving land reclamation, marketing and scientific equipment; 2) a lack of Arab banks dealing in Jordanian Dinars (JDs)in the WB; 3) the need for Palestinian borrowers to convert their JDs to Israeli Shekels to purchase inputs and then to reconvert the shekels to JDs to pay off their loans; 4) political problems which have closed borders and eliminated markets; 5) high Israeli taxes on PVO imports, which increases project costs considerably; and 6) extremely low interest rates on loans due to tradition and Islamic Laws prohibiting the charging of interest, making it difficult for co-ops to obtain matching grant funds for land clearing machines. These constraints, added to others less easily defined and identified.

In spite of these problems, everywhere the team went, appreciation and gratitude were expressed for ANERA, its projects and its staff. Where ANERA has provided funds to a cooperative, in most cases membership has shown a steady increase and it is estimated that 400,000 people have benefitted from ongoing and completed municipal and cooperative projects. This figure represents approximately 30% of the people in the West Bank and Gaza. Discussions with villagers indicate they are aware of and grateful for American input in ANERA's projects.

ANERA personnel were extremely helpful and their assistance in making arrangements and accompanying the team on visits made the many miles traveled for this evaluation an easier and more pleasant task by far.

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

USAID/Yemen

Purpose of activity evaluated: Establishment, acceptance and initial implementation of methodologies for increasing the capacity of LDAs (local development associations) to plan, implement and evaluate locally initiated development projects and (b) increased government and external support for locally initiated development projects.

Purpose of evaluation and methodology used: The purpose of this report was to evaluate specifically the training component and provide a final review of the Project by means of a Project Completion Report. This decision was based on several factors: (1) a 1982 special evaluation had been very thorough and had contributed to the Mission's decision to terminate the Project before an orginally planned phase two; (2) the Mission had already learned invaluable lessons on project development from its experience with 045; (3) the institutional impact of the Project on its YARG grantee had been assessed in an extensive institutional development report in November, 1985; (4) the Mission chose to evaluate in-house so as to increase the evaluation capacity of the Program Office and to avoid using scarce Mission financial resources on a project already well understood by the Mission.

Due to Mission exigencies, the Project Completion Report was written in a staggered fashion during the months of March, July and September, 1986, by the Program Office Research Coordinator, a rural sociologist, and was largely a review of relevant literature followed by field trips and selected interviews. The most important documents considered were the Chemonics Final Report, the 1982 special evaluation, the 045 case study from the 1985 institutional development assessment report, and the Cornell University Final Report. These were augmented by all relevant 045 files, planning documents, contractor reports and interviews with USAID/Yemen and CYDA personnel and local beneficiaries. This exercise was followed by two field visits to 8 sites where 10 subprojects were examined. The first field trip included the author, the FSN Agriculture Assistant and a CYDA representative, and the second the author and the Program Office FSN Evaluation Officer.

Findings and conclusions: **An overly ambitious design, lacking in linkages between various components, made achievements of Project goals impossible. USAID/Yemen put much faith in LDAs, yet an informational base on which to develop such a broad, multi-faceted project did not exist. **An inadequately strong relationship existed between USAID and CYDA on which to build such a project. A very basic difficulty was the lack of consensus between USAID and CYDA as to the CYDA mandate which the Project was to address; the largest dispute centered on whether 045 was to have a process or a product focus. **Many of the assumptions underlying the Project were either incomplete or incorrect. For example, the structure and political nature of the LDA system were not fully appreciated by the Mission; LDAs existed at various stages of development and most could not absorb the technical assistance offered by the Project. Relations among the LDAs, CCs and CYDA were much more political and potentially hostile than perceived by the Mission and Chemonics. **It was the YARG's general perception that too much funding went to expatriate personnel, while CYDA wanted funding for tangible, visible

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outputs. Had such products been forthcoming earlier, they may have given the Project credibility and, consequently, more influence in developing within the Yemeni organizations the Project's process components. **The matching grants did not encourage local contributions as had been expected; instead, the meagerness of these funds relative to the total Project worth created resentment among CYDA staff; US$ 900,000 was insufficient, considering the capital intensive subprojects envisioned in the PP. **Language skills among expatriates were inadequate to meet the demands of a project such as 045 which, because of it ambiguity, required much discussion and negotiation. **Training was the most salient Project achievement, despite the shortfalls in U.S. and Third Country training. The Project substantially reached its expected outputs with over 700 individuals receiving training for a total of over 200 person years. Constraints to training efforts related to CYDA's internal operations and could not be overcome by Chemonics. **Fourteen (78%) of the minimum of 18 subprojects were completed; the quality of workmanship and materials across all subprojects was high. **Most PCVs were insufficiently integrated into Project implementation. Their language skills were insufficient to allow them to work as community development planners, as originally anticipated. Ultimately, many PCVs were not given responsibilities corresponding to their expertise. However, PCV contributions in Hodeidah were significant, once the Volunteers were situated. Relations between PCVs and Chemonics, however, were strained during much of the Project and PCV resentment regarding their assignment to a profit-making firm was common. **Several factors influenced Cornell's generally inadequate research output. The research design was too broad, resulting in highly aggregated, qualitative data. The inability to convince CYDA/CCs/LDAs of the importance and utility of research activities resulted in travel restrictions which detracted from Cornell's work. The inability to recruit an agricultural economist and the co-directors' voluntary absence limited the focus required to support overall Project objectives. The lack of Mission direction allowed Cornell to remain at the periphery of Project research aims.

Recommendations: **Ambition in a project should be tempered by realistic expectations; goals, purposes and objectives of USAID projects should be limited to a few issues which can be reasonably addressed. **USAID should create a stronger, more sophisticated facilitation function to keep projects like 045 on track. A more stringent and exploratory semi-annual review involving key Mission personnel might be a logical means for more effective monitoring and redirection. **Research efforts should be conducted in close cooperation with Program and Project Officers with an eye toward basic programmatic concerns and the requirements of project data for adequate evaluation of project impact. In the Yemeni context, minimal, focused research is most useful and obtainable. **Research and process-oriented projects must be carefully designed; research and training must be legitimized with visible, tangible outputs which give credibility to both the project and the host country organization. Project designs should be carried out in close cooperation with Yemeni ministries, agencies or departments. **USAID needs to move carefully in choosing agencies of the YARG with which to work. It must understand as clearly as possible their strengths and weaknesses and, importantly, their real, as opposed to stated, agendas. Project design must accommodate any perceived weaknesses as realistically as possible. **Institutional development is perhaps the best hope for national development here. However, in this setting it is a long, difficult process with many obstacles in its way. USAID must recognize, acknowledge and internalize the limits that exist on their ability to initiate change in Yemeni organizations. **A large measure of administrative and programmatic flexibility is required in working with Yemeni organizations; it is the responsibility of the expatriate project staff to adjust to the relative weakness of Yemeni institutions with which a project is associated. There should be constant testing of the logframe assumptions and, where necessary, a reorientation of tactics so as to validate the assumptions. **Institutional development of organizations such as CYDA or LDAs is complex, very politicized and is compounded by the vagaries of personality. Americans working in the Middle East are often at a disadvantage because of America's image and foreign policy actions in the

region. This should be realized and every effort should be made to foster understanding between American staff and YARG personnel. **Selection of implementing contractor firms should be based, to a high degree, on the combination of overseas development experience and Arabic language skills in proposed personnel. When Arabic skills are unavailable, arrangements must be made to assign adjunct staff with requisite interpreting capabilities to contractors without Arabic fluency. **Regional training represents a good option for the training of Yemeni candidates and, in many cases, may be preferable to U.S. training. Whenever feasible, use of existing Yemeni training agencies should be considered. **Every effort should be made to match PCVs with jobs commensurate with their abilities and educations.

Lessons learned: **A strong, cooperative relationship with a grantee organization is essential for adequate project design and implementation. **In a context such as Yemen, projects must be relatively simple in design and must provide tangible outputs which contribute positively to the grantee's reputation. **Projects which require negotiation at every turn stand little chance for success, as the Arabic language skills of most USAID staff and contractors are inadequate for such discussions. **The level of technology transfer in a project should depend on the absorptive capacity of a grantee which must be determined early in project development. **Confidence in a project's potential for success depends on the accuracy of assumptions which underlie the logical framework. Thus, the context in which a project is to be developed should be studied carefully and understood before a project design is finalized.

Comment: The outcome of this Project reminds USAID of the serendipitous nature of overseas development planning. A good fit between a project and an opportune economic and political moment is a constant challenge to all donors. For example, before and during the Project, considerable economic strength resided at the village level. CYDA, CCs and the Project attempted to harness this strength. However, the LDAs apparently resented such efforts and felt threatened by the perceived (and accurate) threat of widening central government power. At present, the situation appears to be very different in that remittances have declined and a restructuring of the local development movement has served to make the LDAs (now LCCDs) more representative and to bring them under the central government umbrella formally. This is apparently welcomed by the villagers, as they see the need to tap into an increasingly wealthier central government (based on oil discovery) at a time when their personal incomes (based on remittances) are decreasing. So the balance has shifted from a wealthy citizen/poor government to the reverse, making for an entirely different climate in which to approach development. Given that the potential for hostilities among the parties seems to have declined somewhat and the local level no longer has the economic independence it once had, it is likely that a sparer project of this sort would meet with considerable success.

YEMEN - Tihama Primary Health Care Project (TPHCP); Contract with Management Sciences for Health (279-0065)

SUMMARY

The mid-project evaluation recommended continuing project activities aimed at the existing project purpose. It acknowledged significant progress in reaching planned output levels under changing external circumstances. However, it recommended that counterpart relationships be strengthened, written agreements be prepared as to the nature of project inputs, and that outputs be focused on priority activities such as management training and extension of basic preventive health services.

Specific recommendations are as follows:

1. Strengthening Counterpart Relationships:

MOH policy has changed substantially since project initiation and there have been many staff changes among all parties involved in the TPHC. Developing good working relationships and clarifying the decision-making process requires an immediate effort.

Recommendations:

a) Secure the services of an independent facilitator to work with a Yemeni counterpart in organizing one to two week sessions including officials and staff from the MOH, the TPHCP, USAID and other organizations involved in the project. Plan the sessions in such a way as to develop consensus and agreements on the evaluation recommendations and the 1985-87 implementation plan.

b) Written agreements clarifying MOH and USAID inputs should be drafted during the consensus-building work sessions, either in the form of Memorandums of Understanding or PILs.

c) Continuation of the project should be contingent upon both MOH and USAID identification of proper procedures for obtaining future decisions and policy guidance.

2. Focusing and Consolidation

The project has addressed a range of health problems and training needs that are too ambitious for a small TA team whose intended function as trainers has been overwhelmed by administrative and technical work that is not being transferred to counterparts.

Recommendations:

a) The project should immediately be focused on a core package of priority health problems identified in the work sessions.

b) Implementation of training programs for trainer/supervisors should proceed immediately, and should include specific training in supervision methods.

c) Work session participants should be encouraged to agree upon the scope of training for Traditional Birth Attendents and/or Licensed Birth Attendents.

d) The mass media component of the project should be replaced with more appropriate information campaigns carried out by project PHCWs and LBAs.

3. Project Sustainability

The ability of the YARG to sustain the project, both technically and financially, and the rationality of doing so in the face of deepening budget constraints, needs to be examined. This evaluation was unable to fully cover that aspect of the SOW due to a lack of solid financial information and adequate time to examine alternatives.

Recommendations

a) Implementation of in-country training for central and mid-level MOH management should move forward immediately in order to develop expertise in the MOH conducive for future projects.

b) The project's financial management system initiated in CY 1985 should continue to be developed so as to provide information on project costs by specific category.

c) An extension of the project LOP should be considered by all parties in terms of the likelihood that adequate technical skills will have been transferred to sustain the project by the current PACD.

14. Evaluation Methodology

This was a special evaluation carried out in accordance with project monitoring and evaluation plans specified in the 1982 project paper amendment. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess planned vs. actual levels of progress to date in terms of a PACD of June 1987; to report on changes in YARG circumstances and priorities with regard to carrying out their Basic Health services plan; and to identify outstanding issues requiring immediate resolution.

Three outside experts were contracted for this evaluation: A PHC Management Specialist, a Public Health Physician and a Primary Health Care Training Specialist. Four full-time Yemeni counterparts participated in the evaluation team: The General Director of Planning and Statistics, MOH; the Director of the Nutrition Unit, MOH; the Acting Chief of the Department of Technical Assistance and Conferences in the Central Planning Organization (CPO); and the Director of Follow-UP, CPO. Numerous MOH officials, USAID and AID/W staff, all contracting staff involved in the project, and various multilateral and bilateral AID agencies operating in the country were contacted.

The duration of the evaluation in country was six weeks, allowing for discussion with all concerned parties, extensive field investigations with visits to 55% of all Tihama project sites, and daily discussion sessions among evaluation team members so as to develop consensus.

15. External Factors

The 1982 TPHCP Grant Agreement and Project Paper amendment were drafted in a very early stage of BHS implementation in Yemen. Due to the continuous process of change and development in MOH policies, the process of communication and decision-making on key issues has been perceived by project staff to be unclear and inconsistent. From the standpoint of the MOH, the TPHCP has been uncooperative in adhering to YARG policies.

One aspect of this problem is that the YAR is one of the least developed countries in terms of local technical and managerial expertise. MOH decision-making has been doubly constrained by inadequate in-service training for officials and an insufficient pool of trained midlevel management personnel capable of carrying out their directives.

Problems with adherence to BHS implementation over time have also been complicated by the fact that the Central Planning Organization (and not the Ministry of Health) was the official signatory to the 1982 bilateral agreement. This contributed to and has continually reinforced a lack of clarity regarding counterpart relationships.

The other major external factor examined in this evaluation was the issue of financial sustainability. Increasing balance of payments constraints since project initiation have required a drastic curtailment of YARG recurrent expenditures. However, the ability of the MOH to increase spending between 1982-84 in the face of overall declines can be considered encouraging. In addition, all of the primary health care workers and LBAs trained by the project are already on the MOH payroll, as are all trainer-supervisors. Assuming discontinuation of several clerical and support personnel currently paid by the project, the prospects for project sustainability and replicability on a wider scale appear to be better than pre-evaluation analyses suggested.

Serious problems with projecting MOH primary health care expenditures remain though. Categorical financial data is not available from the MOH, and this inhibited a thorough evaluation of this project from the standpoint of economic sustainability. A financial accounting system for the project has been established (based on a short-term financial consultancy) which should show both USAID and MOH-funded costs by functional category by the end of CY 85. This system will be a key tool for project planning and management throughout the remaining LOP.

16. Inputs

A total of $8,943,000 has been obligated, including a current total of $5,983,370 under the Management Science for Health contract. No problems have been identified with financial inputs, although the reprogramming of existing contract funds under the 1985-87 implementation plan is likely.

All long and short-term consultancies have proceeded as planned with the exception of a long-term media specialist identified in the 1982 project paper amendment. The evaluation team recommended this position be eliminated from current LOP plans as part of a general effort to intensify existing project components, particularly training.

Misunderstandings about contractual agreements regarding selection of candidates and payment of international airfares

have slowed U.S. and third country participant training. An initial agreement was reached between USAID and the MOH on these issues in the process of this evaluation, which will be the subject of a written memorandum of understanding during the implementation of the evaluation recommendations.

In relation to this, additional inputs in the form of workshops chaired by an independent facilitator and a Yemeni counterpart will be included in the project immediately upon election of an appropriate facilitator. Consensus decisions and written agreements clarifying the nature of project inputs, e.g., TA job descriptions, will be one of the major focuses of these workshops.

17. Outputs

The project is on target with regard to training of PHCWs. All 33 of the project's PHCWs are now government employees, and in March 1985 the project began to train its next cohort of 8 PHCWs. No problems have been identified with the project's reaching its planned output level of 70 PHCWs trained and employed by the PACD.

LBA training has been temporarily suspended following placement of 8 trained LBAs out of a planned LOP level of 35. This has been due to changing policies by the Ministry of Health with regard to LBA (Licensed Birth Attendant) vs TBA (Traditional Birth Attendant) training. The need for immediate policy guidance on the issue of LBA/TBA outputs will be discussed on the consensus-building workshops planned as a new input to the TPHCP.

A manual (1985) to be used in training PHCWs has been completed by the project's Training Director with assistance from a short-term consultant. This manual will be adopted by the Health Manpower Institute, which is responsible for PHCW training on a nationwide basis. An LBA curriculum has been comleted in draft form, and a TBA curriculum is in the design and testing stage. Procedures manuals involving management, supplies logistics, transport, and information systems are all in the first draft stage at the time of the evaluation.

In-country workshops and seminars for central and mid-level MOH staff have not occurred to date due to the contractor's contention they are expensive and difficult to organize. However, this evaluation identified workshops as a key output to be proceeded with immediately.

18. Purpose

The project has maintained its original purpose, which is to establish a functioning primary health care system in the

Tihama region in accordance with MOH policies and guidelines. Planned outputs supporting this purpose have largely proceeded on schedule, with the exception of activities affected by new developments in MOH policy. This evaluation pointed out the need to redouble efforts to ensure that the TPHCP receives timely and well-defined guidelines from the MOH and that all parties involved have a clear idea of the ways in which the project will conform to MOH guidelines, and the ways in which the project will test model concepts and activities.

19./20. Goal/Beneficiaries

The basic goal of the TPHCP has been to improve health status in the Tihama region by training PHCWs, LBAs and project management staff to carry out a selected mix of PHC activities and services.

A community KAP survey was carried out in 1981 and a baseline facilities survey was completed in 1983. The project is beginning to gather additional data on maternal and child morbidity and mortality in the Tihama this calendar year. [redacted] To date, outputs such as numbers of trained personnel and functioning support systems or facilities are the most appropriate measures of project achievements.

One of the major recommendations of this evaluation is that the TPHCP reiterate a list of priority health problems. The proposed list of interventions includes immunizable diseases affecting large numbers of women and children (including neonatal tetanus), diarrheal disease, lower respiratory tract infections, malaria, and possibly eye and skin infections. Assuming primary health care unit reporting proceeds at the current level, an evaluation of changes in PAC coverage indicators can be a major component of the final project evaluation.

21. Unplanned Effects

See "External Factors."

22. Lessons Learned

This project has made clear progress in attaining planned output levels to date. However, despite the generally acknowledged successes of the TPHCP, decision-making on a number of issues had been at a standstill for several months at the time of this evaluation. Several activities were impeded as a result of a lack of clarity regarding decision-making channels and proper procedures for entering those channels on the part of all parties concerned.

As is typically the case with long-term projects, the original project planners from both USAID and the MOH have departed, and the implementors must attempt to understand the history of the project while interpreting the project plan. Day-to-day implementation involves a continual process of decision-making. Ensuring that collaboration on all levels continues requires considerable time. This is particularly true in a country like North Yemen where MOH policy is at a very early stage of development.

In addition to the broad necessity for maintaining an ongoing communication and collaboration process, extra effort is required in countries with relatively brief administrative experience to fully explain all aspects of contracts as well as USAID rules and regulations which may eventually have an impact on decisions. The TPHCP is expected to benefit from a full explanation to counterparts of USAID's standard planning and implementation process. This explanation should also provide a valuable tool to planners when they seek future financial assistance.

Furthermore, technical assistance contractors operating in the least developed countries must be aware of the need to adjust their concepts and plans to allow for full absorption of their expertise, even at the risk of completing fewer planned activities. The purpose of technical assistance must be viewed as transferring a relatively intangible product--knowledge--rather than implementing a set of only partially understood activities.

The key output of this project has been and will continue to be training. This evaluation has brought to light the importance of extending training beyond service delivery personnel to upper and mid-level management in order to assure active collaboration at all levels.

Team planning sessions were built into the evaluation prior to the beginning of in-country analysis. A professional facilitator was hired to orient the evaluation team and to contribute to successful completion of the Scope of Work within the alloted time period. When the team arrived in country, this process was extended to host counterparts, and led to an excellent atmosphere for cooperation and consensus-building. The actions required following this evaluation will draw heavily on this particular concept in order to develop solid communication channels for future work.

23. External Evaluation Team Report on the Tinama Primary Health Care Project has been transmitted to AID/W by Evaluation Team Leader, C. Ajello, in accordance with contractual obligations.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

YEMEN - Agriculture Development Support Program -- Ibb Secondary Agricultural Institute Subproject (279-0052.2)

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

0. USAID/YEMEN

1. Purpose of Subproject. To improve the efficiency of the secondary agricultural education system of the Ministry of Education (MOE) to supply Yemen's agricultural sector, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) and the private sector, with qualified manpower.

2. Purpose of Evaluation. To assess ways of improving the instructional component of ISAI - one of the three secondary agricultural institutes in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR).

3. Methodology Used. Evaluators used the "CIPP" model recommended by Stufflebeam et al - context, input, process and product. Background on context was obtained by reading the subproject paper and other documents, supplemented by visits. Inputs evaluated included student recruitment, faculty and staff, facilities, finances and instructional materials. Input evaluation methods included student and staff interviews, MOE interviews, inspection of facilities and materials. Transcripts of Yemeni teaching staff and curriculum vitae of expatriate teaching staff were reviewed. Instructional process was assessed by student and graduate interviews, inspection of class and practical schedules, attendance at in-service and faculty meetings and inspection of in-service records and reports. Product evaluation (i.e., of graduates) was performed by interviewing graduates (44 at 11 sites) and employers (17 employers evaluated 27 graduates).

4. Findings and Conclusions.

a. Context. ISAI is Yemen's first secondary agricultural education school; established in the fall of 1979, four classes have graduated. Some of the facilities were set up by the World Bank prior to AID funding of the unbrella Agricultural Development Support Project (ADSP). ADSP subprojects are implemented by land grant universities - in this case New Mexico State University (NMSU) - coordinated through the Consortium for International Development. The ISAI subproject is fully functioning and the facilities more than adequate (exceptions noted later). Students show great enthusiasm, dedication, and interest in their own education. Staff and faculty are well trained, committed, and interested in making the school and its instruction better. A new director is grappling with his new job, but with a willingness to work hard to get it done. The NMSU team leader is dedicated and patient and suppoers the subproject fully. The farm manager is hard working.

ISAI graduates and their employers are generally positive in their evaluation of the school, its curriculum and facilities. Overall, the program is viewed as positively contributing to the manpower needs of the Yemen Arab Republic.

Date this summary prepar

b. Input.

-- Student Recruitment. The recruitment plan is working well as evidenced by the large increase in 1985 enrollment at 47 from that of 1984. Recruitment efforts include school visits, nationally televised recruitment spots, and student studies. However, the plan is unwritten and concern exists that recruitment efforts exaggerate post graduate scholarship availability.

-- Faculty and Staff. Yemeni teachers are well qualified. Their transcripts show relatively high grade point averages in graduate programs. Curriculae vitae of expatriate staff compare well with those of U.S.-trained teachers. Although expatriate staff may in fact be overqualified for primarily teaching jobs, their Arabic country backgrounds are appropriate for their status as interim staff.

-- Facilities. Facilities are excellent. Only additional farmland for the school farm is lacking. With expansion of practical lessons and student projects, the need for land is critical.

-- Instructional Material. Textbooks in some areas are non-existent. Development of appropriate texts for several of these areas is in progress - four have been completed and two are in publication and subcontracts are in process for others. The teachers' resource center has adequate research material for development of instructional materials and is used extensively by most of the teachers. Instructional equipment is sufficient, but as use increases, additional motion picture or VCR equipment should be acquired.

c. Process. Most students come to ISAI because they like agriculture and feel there is a need for Yemen to do better in agriculture. A surprising number of students at all class levels indicate their desire to continue their education - which is not the intended purpose of the institute. Agricultural subjects were favored, the least popular being the more difficult science subjects and English. Generally, students are in favor of more practical classes.

Instruction is generally impressive. Teachers are well prepared, organized and motivated. Students seem to be attentive and motivated.

Lesson plans are not in evidence; class syllabi are non-existent in many classes. The curriculum used was developed by expatriate staff in 1980 and modified in only a minor way in 1982. Although in accord with MOE testing requirements, the curriculum is very and possibly unduly complex - not only in terms of number of subjects but in level of coverage which in some respects is at university level.

Practical courses receive much attention; nearly everyone agrees that more are needed. Most afternoons are devoted to various practical lessons. In-service workshops have focused on "practicals," although the

term does not mean the same thing to everyone. The faculty is not unanimous in agreeing that "practical" means hands-on activity where a student learns by doing. To some, it means demonstration or formal laboratory sessions.

Faculty in-service activities are improving. A defined plan for each faculty member and administrator exists. Consultants have been provided to conduct some activities.

d. Product. Status of outputs follows:

-- Staff trained. BS ahead of schedule, MS behind. Staff is adequate for now and other schools aér not so well off.
-- Training materials developed. Instructional materials are fairly well developed; lesson plans and course syllabi are lacking.
-- Curricula developed. Completed in 1980; modified somewhat in 1982; needs revision.
-- Facilities completed and equipped. Good but more farm land needed.
-- Administrative policies and procedures developed and in operation. By-laws developed in 1980 have not been reviewed.
-- Outreach program developed and in operation. Needs attention.

5. Recommendations.

-- Develop a process for continual curriculum review and revision to include more farm practice and observation visits to extension offices and agriculture projects.
-- Develop instructional materials to include lesson plans, class syllabi and textbooks appropriate for Yemen.
-- Improve time management and communication to include orientation for new students, updated handbooks, and consultation hours with teachers.
-- Resolve land acquisition problems.
-- Determine strategies to encourage direct employment of graduates.

6. Lessons Learned.

-- Development of an educational institution is a long-term effort, which requires training of teachers, managers and administrators.
-- Interim use of expatriate Arabic-speaking teachers from cultural backgrounds similar that of the students is vital.
-- Management training must be offered to ministry staff to offset the threat of new, more highly trained employees.

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

NEAR EAST REGIONAL - Near East Regional Population Project (398-0048)

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- o Name of mission or office
- o Purpose of activity (ies) evaluated
- o Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology Used
- o Findings and Conclusions
- o Recommendations
- o Lessons learned

A.I.D. Evaluation Summary - Part II

J. Summary of Evaluation Findings Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Name of Mission or Office

The evaluation was initiated by the office that manages the project, Office of Technical Resources, Health, Population and Nutrition Division (ANE/TR/HPN). This PES will be considered the full evaluation report.

2. Purpose of Activity Evaluated

The Near East region's population growth rate of 2.7 percent per will cause a doubling of the population in 27 years. High growth rates are due to significantly reduced mortality since 1945 and to the general failure of Near Eastern countries to adopt effective fertility control programs during the past 15 years. The goal of the Near East Regional Population Project is to reduce fertility in the Near East Region to a level compatable with resources and development objectives. More specifically the project's purpose is to assist Near Eastern countries, individually and collectively, to develop, implement, and evaluate population/family planning programs and policies. To accomplish this purpose, the project supports activities which do the following:

SUMMARY

-- Strengthen regional insitutions, especially in training in family planning.
-- Promote policy dialogue with Host Countries and Arab Donors.
-- Test innovative approaches to family planning
-- Develop/disseminate region-specific IEC materials.
-- Enhance role of private sector in family planning service delivery.
-- Train individuals in countries without bilateral programs.
-- Foster regional cooperation in family planning.
-- Link family planning with other development activities, especially Maternal Child Health.

3. Purpose of Evaluation and Methodology Used:

Since this project is comprised of a large number of relatively small and unrelated elements it is rather difficult to conduct an in-depth and meaningful evaluation. (Though many of the subprojects do have built-in evaluation elements.) The project evaluation plan does call however for an evaluation during the third year of the project. This evaluation was carried out mostly during the third year and has considered the quality of the work performed, the level of demand, the relevance of activities to project criteria, the management process, and the success of the project in identifying new opportunities for involvement in family planning.

Date this summary prepared:

This mid-term evaluation was conducted on an in-house basis. ANE/TR/HPN compiled a summary of activities funded by the project since its beginning. (copy attached) The summary was reviewed by the Project Review Committee. The missions that have used the project were asked to comment on the project's usefulness in furthering their family planning goals. An issues paper was developed and discussed by the Project Review Committee.

4. Finding and Conclusions:

Attached is a summary presentation of all the activities funded by the project in its first three years. The summary provides a description of the activity, the country where it took place, the amount and source of funds (DA or ESF) and the project goal or goals to which the activity contributed.

Eighty activities were funded over the three years in nine Near Eastern countries. Most the activities and most of the funds went to the high priority countries where there is no bilateral project. The activities almost always contributed to more than one of the project goals.

Cables from the Missions proved to be supportive of the project. (Copies attached) The following points summarized statements made in the cables:

-- The Regional Population Project is highly valued by the Missions and in keeping with project purposes.
-- The demand for project funds is higher than the availability.
-- Administration and management of the project has ben adequate.
-- The relative speed with which the project can provide funds is important in some countries.
-- The project has been useful in identifying potential targets for assistance.
-- Most requests for funds originate with the host country.
-- The project has been helpful in allowing the missions to develop innovative approachss to population problems (Tunisia).
-- Activities funded by the project have had a number of other positive results:

-Opened doors for other activities.
-Helped develop relationships with host government officers and organizations.
-Promoted policy dialogue.
-Provided a source of population funds where there was none.
-Stimulated the development of a new bilateral project (Tunisia).

5. Recommendations:

A. Expand the project to include Asian countries. A high demand for funds has been shown in these countries. In this regard, the project should not be limited to countries without bilateral population projects. These funds are needed to supplement bilateral programs and especially to finance short-term technical assistance, innovative activities with NGO's, and operations research. Asian countries would primarily use the project to "buy-into" selected S&T/POP projects. This would minimize project management staff requirements in A.I.D./W.

B. Provide additional funds commensurate with the expanded level of activity expected as the result of the addition of Asian countries to the project.

C. Extend the PACD to 1991 in keeping with the finding that there will be continuing demand for a project of this type in the forseeable future.

D. Extend the life of the project to FY 1991. There will be a continued demand for this type of project support in the foreseeable future (FY 1987 is the current PACD).

E. Change the requirement that all activities in excess of $100,000 be approved by the DAA. Keep the requirement only for activities in excess of $100,000 which are not "buy-ins" to S&T/POP projects. These projects have already gone through extensive review.

1. Summary

The project is very successful in terms of its cooperative and institution-building aspects. The number, range, and quality of the cooperative activities have exceeded the original expectations of the Israeli and Egyptian participants, in spite of the decline during this period of relations between their two nations.

Success is due to the following factors, which largely mirror the appraisal criteria for such projects originally set forth by AID.

The Project deals with **real scientific and health problems of mutual concern.** These diseases spread across borders and call for continuing cooperation between neighbors. The direct mutual advantages of such cooperation are significant and apparent.

It is based primarily on **cooperation** between Israel and Egypt- **not technical assistance** from Israel to Egypt.

The Project is **institutionalized** in both countries - in prestigious universities, one step removed from government. Also in each country, the project involves researchers from other universities, ministries, and research organizations.

Project is perceived in both countries to be **producing high quality scientific research of practical importance.**

The cooperation accomplishments of the ECVBD Project are significant. The highlights are two highly publicized conferences, one in Egypt and one in Israel, a combined Israeli/Egyptian team's successful response to a small medical emergency in Egypt, workshops and lectures given at Ain Shams University by Israeli scientists, five jointly authored papers published in leading international journals, and a genuine creation and strengthening of a long-term network of personal and institutional scientific ties between Israel and Egypt.

Appendix D

MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

General

1. A training program should be instituted to promote regional cooperation. The program should include M.Sc and Ph.D exchanges between Israel and Egypt for periods up to one year, and post-doctoral training of paired Israeli and Egyptian fellows at U.S. institutions with "new investigator" support upon their return to work in the Regional Project at Ain Shams, Suez Canal, Hebrew or Ben Gurion Universities.

2. In order to facilitate regional cooperation, the Project should follow the administrative arrangements and procedures for travel clearance practiced by the Regional Project in Agriculture and Development. Exchange visits are indispensable for success of the Vector-Borne Diseases Project and formal arrangements should be made to facilitate travel between Egypt and Israel.

3. The scientific research areas of a) rickettsial diseases, b) epidemiology of other vector-borne viruses and c) biological control of vectors should be considered as worthy of inclusion in the Regional Program.

4. If Rift Valley fever and other viral and rickettsial agents are to be worked with in Egypt, the biocontainment level 3 facility should be completed as planned. The biosafety course should proceed in January, 1986 as planned. Additional animal rearing facilities will be needed when laboratory animal work starts coinciding with opening of the containment laboratory.

5. An American scientist knowledgeable in biocontainment procedures should be recruited to act as resident consultant in biocontainment to participate in the virology laboratory component of the project as soon as the containment facility is operational.

6. A biocontainment level 3 facility should be sought for the work with rickettsiae in Israel if this activity is incorporated in current research plans.

7. Improved access to current scientific literature should be developed for Egyptian scientists. This might be accomplished by a photocopy program of malaria, leishmaniasis, filariasis, rickettsial diseases and Rift Valley Fever publications with Hebrew University and by computer communications between Hebrew and Ain Shams Universities.

8. A workshop on scientific writing should be held with special emphasis on the problems faced by Egyptian scientists.

9. Formal arrangements should be made for the safe and adequate handling and international transport of biological specimens, including adequate legal agreements to safeguard against any physical or psychological accidents.

10. A human subjects review committee consistent with DHHS standards should be established and assurance provided in order that studies may be undertaken with human subjects.

11. Assistance should be provided to the scientists of the Regional Project in locating ancillary sources of funding for project-related research so that they may vigorously pursue such opportunities.

12. If funding for the Regional Project is renewed, consideration should be given whenever possible to a Program Grant mechanism with advance payments and/or NIAID intramural sub-projects. There should be continued direct control of regional funds by the Principal Investigators with flexibility, in consultation with the Project Officer, to reallocate funds among sub-projects.

13. The Kuvin Centre should be considered by NIAID and USAID as a potential regional/international resource in immunodiagnosis - for other countries in need of assistance, and for the field research and immunodiagnostic studies that will be necessary as malaria vaccines are tested.

Leishmaniasis

1. A leishmanial immunologist or immunoepidemiologist should be added to the Ain Shams Center's leishmaniasis team. A young U.S.-trained expert with training in hybridoma and kDNA restriction and analytical techniques and preparation of leishmanial strain-specific surface monoclonal antibodies would be preferred.

2. Project should sponsor a leishmaniasis immunological hands-on workshop on monoclonal/hybridoma techniques and recent immunodiagnostic procedures for a limited number of actively working leishmaniasis team members from both the Ain Shams Vector Center and the Hebrew University Kuvin Centre group.

3. The close liaison with Schnur et al. of the Kuvin Centre is exemplary and should be increased. There is also a pressing need for increased recognition of the multi-institutional team approach.

4. Strong emphasis on graduate training and instruction, involving graduates directly in both field and laboratory activities is commended and encouraged.

5. Direct exchange of personnel to review new procedures, adapt them to local needs, and train personnel in their use should be encouraged.

6. The solid-phase RIA method of mass screening of wild-caught sandflies should include testing of infected sandflies after prolonged intervals and temperature and humidity stresses, to determine its suitability with older, temperature-shocked sandfly collections. In addition, field-adapted techniques should be developed and tested that employ simpler procedures and non-radioactive materials.

7. New serodiagnostic procedures need to be adapted to filter paper collecting methods for use in areas (like Egypt) where venipuncture is not acceptable. Similarly, simplified or more sensitive diagnostic methods, (e.g., adaptation of a purified skin test using hybridoma-developed antigens) in order to detect subclinical infection, would be valuable both for the leishmanial field studies, and future epidemiological research.

8. Consideration should also be given to the potential public health application of epidemiologic, entomologic, survey, and field testing procedures developed under the program.

Malaria

1. Ecological studies of the vectors of malaria in Egypt, especially in Faiyum, Siwa Oasis and Aswan Governorate, should be continued. In addition, isoenzyme and cytogenetic investigations should be undertaken with the anophelines to determine whether biological differences are present which relate to the variations in malaria incidence.

2. Increased effort should be placed on the development of diagnostic methods that do not require isotopes (such as the dot-ELISA and the Indium dot test), and on tests that can be performed in the field or with filter paper specimens.

3. Specimens from Egypt and other malarious areas should be obtained to aid in the development of diagnostic methods that can be applied in the field and to quantitatively define sensitivity and specificity using a non-serologic case definition. If these studies are encouraging, they could lead to the application of similar assays for sporozoite antigen in anophelines, and ultimately, to the development of assays which do not require isotopes. Such a series of studies would provide useful technology for developing countries while simultaneously strengthening regional collaboration. Although obtaining these specimens may require travel to areas other than Egypt (e.g., Kenya, Sudan, Turkey), we strongly recommend that it

be covered as an allowable expense under the contract, if such specimens are not otherwise available. The unavailability of such material has already slowed the development of both the RIA antigen test and the nucleic acid hybridization technique.

4. Both these efforts can and should be coordinated with the training of young investigators such as Dr. Shehata in immunology, including time for him and his associates to work at the Kuvin Centre, additional visits of Kuvin Centre staff to Ain Shams, and sharing of specimens as new procedures are implemented in Cairo. Similar plans should be made as other young Egyptian investigators are identified in areas such as nucleic acid technology.

5. The research should be extended to test the effects of blood feeding behavior on mosquito vectors in Israel and Egypt, which may be useful in isolating parasites and viruses of interest to the regional contract.

6. Surveillance for malaria and for the reappearance of *An. gambiae* in the Aswan Governorate are important, but are primarily the responsibility of the MOH. The efforts of the Project should be focused on the development of the methodology and of strategies that could ultimately be used by the MOH in its performance of those functions.

7. Whether or not malaria studies *per se* continue to receive a high priority, every effort should be made to preserve and develop the entomologic and serologic (immunologic) expertise developed during the course of this project.

Rift Valley Fever

1. The serological surveillance for Rift Valley fever in children under five years of age should be enlarged to include additional populations in the Delta Region and the Upper Nile.

2. The serological surveillance for Rift Valley fever in sheep, cattle, and buffalo under three years of age should be carried out in the Upper Nile region.

3. Additonal Rift Valley fever vectorial capacity studies with larger numbers of mosquitoes should be done to confirm the superiority of *Cx. pipiens* and *Cx. antennatus* as potential vectors in Egypt. These studies could also include geographically selected populations and populations infected with *Wuchereria bancrofti*.

Sinai Activities

1. The Sinai activities should be continued and could serve as a model of cooperation and collaboration within the Center, between units in Egypt and their Israeli counterparts.

8. Study on a limited scale the importance of low density carriers of microfilariae in selected endemic foci of periodic bancroftian filariasis.

9. Intensify studies on Cx. pipiens sub-speciation and on their vectoral capacity.

10. From these multidisciplinary studies of parasites, host and vectors, develop a quantitative epidemiologic model to monitor disease control and prevention of filariasis, and to permit extrapolations from geographically limited intensive studies to larger populations with only basic data.

11. Start studies of urban filariasis in selected communities of Greater Cairo.

2. Future emphasis should include basic research on all mosquito, sandfly, tick, flea, and chigger species; and previous Sinai scientific information and data on vectors and disease agents should be provided by Israel to Egypt under the Regional Project.

3. Additional information should be obtained to identify and define the disease agents these arthropods transmit, including: malaria, viruses, filariasis, cutaneous leishmania, and rickettsial agents.

Negev Activities

1. This sub-project has fulfilled one of the objectives of the project, i.e., identifying the potential insect vectors involved in Rift Valley fever. The project has surveyed and mapped both the larvae and adult mosquitoes in the Negev. The remaining period of the contract should be used to complete the above two manuscripts for publication.

2. The committee feels that further geographic mapping and distribution efforts should be combined with the Ministry of Health's efforts in monitoring mosquito larvae in Israel, but not be directly supported by the regional contract.

Filariasis

1. Include filariasis in the Regional Health Project of Research on the Epidemiology and Control of Vector Borne Diseases.

2. Extend the multidisciplinary studies to other villages in the Nile Delta and other parts of Egypt from where indigenous cases of filariasis have been reported.

3. Improve cooperation between the investigators at Ain Shams and the team(s) of the MOH charged with filariasis control, and establish a mechanism through which all relevant data on the epidemiology of filariasis, from active and passive surveillance, can be obtained routinely.

4. Intensify research on development of new diagnostic tests for filarial infection (pre-patent, patent and past) and carry out field trials.

5. Intensify research on improvement of field methods for larval identification of *W. bancrofti* in mosquito vectors and carry out field trials.

6. Study the nature and role of immunity and of excessive immune responses in filariasis.

7. In cooperation with the Faculty of Medicine, participate in multi-center trials (phase III) of new macro- and micro-filaricidal compounds.