

9320076

BE

PD-ABA-561

65159

Barnett & Engel

9 MARION ROAD
WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT 06880
203 / 226-0118

DRAFT
REPORT

EVALUATION OF THE OIC / TOGO

AGRICULTURAL TRAINING PROGRAM

Stanley A. Barnett


Chen Tian

Robert D. Hardy

Quy Nguyen

Contract AID/afr-C-1613

11 January 1980



OIC
INTERNATIONAL

OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTERS INTERNATIONAL INC.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
I. OVERVIEW.	1
A. Major Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations	1
B. Guidelines to Replanning and Redesign	4
C. Lessons Learned	6
1. Attributes and Training of Project Staff.	6
2. Project Organization, Management, Administration and Monitoring.	8
II. BASIC DESIGN ELEMENTS	10
A. Problems Addressed; the Target Group Defined.	10
B. Project Strategy for Accomplishing the Task	11
III. EVALUATION OF RESULTS THROUGH DECEMBER 1979	13
A. Introduction: Previous Assessments of the Project	13
B. Achievement of Planned Results.	14
1. Program Goal, The Impact Survey	14
2. Achievement of Purpose OVis	17
IV. CAUSAL FACTORS: PERFORMANCE AND REMEDIES.	22
A. Internal.	22
1. Inputs.	22
2. Performance	24
a. Agriculture	24
(1) Land	24
(2) Animal Husbandry	25
(3) Crop Production.	26
(4) New Personnel Required	28
b. Financial Planning and Reporting.	29
(1) Revenue/Expense Ratio.	29
(2) Cost Overruns.	29
(3) Financial Planning and Control of the Farm Operation	31
c. Management, Organization and Administration	31
d. Education and Training.	33
(1) Strengthening the Effort	33
(2) Trainee Costs and Recurring Costs.	34
3. Technology: the Motorized Cultivator.	36
B. External.	37

APPENDICES

A. Persons Interviewed 38
B. Notes Concerning The Gambia/OIC 40
C. Methodology, Survey of Graduates
of OIC/Togo Group I 43

PREFACE

This evaluation is the first step in a three-part strategy developed jointly on 3 October 1979 by OIC/Togo, OICI, OAR/Lomé and PDC/PVC to analyze OIC's agricultural training/farm production project in Togo with three alternatives in mind: (1) ending the project, (2) deferring a major decision until relevant indicators become clearer, or (3) redesigning the project and providing it with adequate funding to achieve revised goals.

The General Scope of Work for Contract No. AID/afr-C-1613, covering the Evaluation Team Leader, calls for (1) a brief overview of the project since inception; (2) a detailed assessment of Project Years II and III (FY 1978 and 1979), analysis of the degree to which project targets for goal, purpose and outputs were achieved and reasons for successful accomplishment and shortfalls; and (3) determining the degree of accomplishment of project objectives, lessons to be learned, and how the project can be redirected to a more successful result, including cost-effectiveness.

The evaluation team consisted of four persons selected respectively by PDC/PVC-AFR/DR, OAR/Lomé, and OICI:

Stanley A. Barnett, Socio-Economic Development Planner, Senior Evaluation Generalist, and Partner of Barnett & Engel - Team Leader.

Chen Tian, Togo Agriculturalist and Agricultural Consultant, formerly Deputy Director of the Republic of China Agricultural Mission to Togo.

Robert D. Hardy, PhD, Economic Analyst, OICI/Philadelphia.

Quy Nguyen, Evaluation Officer, OICI/Philadelphia.

Other members of the team, to have been selected by REDSO/WA and AFR/DR, were unable to participate.

The evaluators performed pre-project research at OICI and AID/W. From November 26 through December 20, the team undertook primary and secondary research at The Gambia/OIC, REDSO/WA and in Togo, spending 17 days in the last named. It visited The Gambia/OIC

training center/farm at Farafenni and the OIC/Togo training center/farm at Todomé, near Notsé; conducted a four-day on-site survey of young farmers who had graduated from the Notsé center, their parents, neighbors and village chiefs; and met with OIC local staffs, Technical Cooperation Team (TCT) staffs, Boards of Directors, relevant host country and U.S. officials in Togo, The Gambia and Abidjan. (The names of persons interviewed during the course of the evaluation are listed in Appendix A to this report.)

Preliminary major findings, conclusions and recommendations were reviewed in West Africa during separate meetings with the Program Advisor of OIC/Togo, the OAR/Lomé and REDSO/WA. Important elements of the draft evaluation report were presented to AID/W on 11 January 1980. The final evaluation report was submitted to the agency on 31 January.

I. OVERVIEW

I-A. MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The OIC/Togo agricultural training project should not be closed, nor should an attempt be made to transform it into a radical new concept. Instead, a redesign/replanning effort should be undertaken to improve project performance to acceptable levels. This can be done.

In spite of a disappointing, problem-studded early record, the project concept is basically sound. OIC/Togo is beginning to impact positively upon its target group. It may be the only agricultural training project in Togo that is capable of providing full service (including organized followup assistance) to the group.

With the type and extent of redirection suggested in this evaluation report -- and with outlined operational and management improvements -- the project can significantly increase the productivity and income of small, semi-modern farmers of the Plateau Region.

We base this recommendation upon:

- The degree of success observed in a similar OIC agricultural training project in The Gambia.*
- Lessons learned from errors committed in the OIC/Togo project and put into practice at OIC/Togo and/or The Gambia/OIC.
- Our assessment of project problems and potentials at OIC/Togo.
- Our comprehensive, in-depth, on-site survey of the impact of the first group of graduates of OIC/Togo.

Some key findings, conclusions and recommendations:

1. OIC/Togo is an agricultural training project; its aim is to upgrade semi-modern farmers. The associated production farm is

* Appendix B of the report presents a short review of The Gambia project.

a necessary training tool; it never was intended to be a profit-making enterprise. Uncertainty over the relative priorities of the training/production elements has created (a) confusion, (b) simultaneous pursuit of both objectives at the Notsé site without adequate differentiation, and (c) resultant impairment of effort that has hindered project progress. (See Section I-B, below.)

2. The OIC/Togo training center/production farm has soil, water and climatic conditions that typify those encountered by the semi-modern farmers of the Plateau. Its working environment is not as inimical to project success as some have stated.
3. The Notsé center is training small farmers to return to semi-modern agriculture with increased knowledge and skill. Seventy-eight percent of the graduates of the first class have "returned to the farm" and have applied learned techniques during the year since their return. As a result, they have begun influencing their villages. Based upon our survey, we calculate this multiplier effect at 3.3 (i.e., typically, the returnee has induced 3.3 others to adopt techniques learned at OIC/Togo). Because OIC/Togo followup has been sporadic to date, use of learned techniques by returnees and emulation by villagers have been below potential. The December 1979 appointment of a full-time coordinator should significantly increase impact.

(Graduates of OIC/Togo farmed, usually for relatives, from the time they left school until they started OIC training. Acquisition of land, normally from relatives, is no problem for them -- the region has large amounts of unworked terrain that is easily obtainable at no cost. The graduates mainly cultivate corn and cotton on 0.5 to 3.5 hectare* plots which they own. The plots generally replicate the soil and climatic conditions of the Notsé OIC farm and are located from two to six kilometers from the villages where they reside. Plots are reached by foot or bicycle over narrow dirt paths. In 1979, the average value of their production was \$245. Half of the interviewees have received credit -- for land clearing, seed and fertilizer -- from the agricultural development bank.)

4. Project revenues can be multiplied several times through (a) full clearing and cultivation of 100 hectares and (b) increased

* One hectare equals 2.47 acres.

animal production. Marketing is not a current problem. Speedy use of a rented bulldozer is prerequisite to increased revenues from crops; there is no need to purchase a bulldozer with project funds.

5. Cost per student will drop sharply with enrollment of 60 full-time trainees and concurrent expansion of just-started outreach services to nearby farmers and to GOT agricultural extension workers.
6. Heightened levels of training and farm production will require two new TCT specialists -- an OIC-experienced Feeder/Counselor/Trainer and a professional farm manager -- and a limited increase in local staff. The TCTs must be French fluent to ensure maximum transfer of knowledge.
7. To improve project efficiency and develop a smoother operating, more effective training center and farm, project personnel must spend more time in Notsé and at the project site. This means (a) the move of training center/farm staff and TCTs to the Notsé area; (b) reducing the size and staffing of the OIC/Lomé office to a small contact office, with at least half of the time of management/finance/administration personnel being spent at a main project office at Notsé; and (c) establishment of overnight accommodations in the vicinity.
8. Plans for potential project expansion to another site must first await the solution of current organization and management problems at the Notsé training center/farm, and its attainment of cost-effective operation. It is only after such improvement has occurred that project personnel and the local Board of Directors can even consider an operation at Davié, whose water and soil conditions are atypically favorable and thus essentially irrelevant to the needs of the project's target group. The small farmers of the Plateau would be unable to replicate much of their Davié learning in the relatively stark conditions under which they have to earn a living.
9. OIC/Togo's large cost overruns appear to result mainly from OICI's inexperience regarding the nature and magnitude of expenses directly related to agricultural training (OIC/Togo was its first such project), and resultant underbudgeting.

OIC/Togo can become viable if redesigned realistically and in light of lessons learned.

However, timing imperatives make it critical that redesign be initiated and completed in the next few months. Students are enrolled,

training continues at the facility and operating costs continue to be incurred, despite lack of approval for FY 1980 funding.

On a priority basis. AID should authorize interim funds during preparation of the required new project paper and the approval process.

I-B. GUIDELINES TO REPLANNING AND REDESIGN

During late 1978 and in 1979, inordinate amounts of time were focused by OIC/Togo's project management (the Program Advisor and the Board of Directors) on a felt need to improve the profitability of the production farm. This resulted from (1) the realization that the project had sustained large cost overruns, (2) a perceived emphasis by AID on project viability, and (3) what were considered inadequate levels of funding.

Farm income -- a by-product of the program -- appears to have taken the place, in their minds, of its planned prime product: trained young farmers, many barely above the subsistence level, who would become more productive as individuals and as members of farming communities.*

The focus on profitability, while perhaps understandable given the project's often-troubled history, appears to have been detrimental to accomplishing its prime aim. To treat training and production as equally important may have resulted in failure to perform either adequately. Put another way, preoccupation with project viability as expressed in the overly ambitious local revenue/local expenses ratios of the Logframe may subtly have transformed a project means into its major end.

Neither OICI nor AID support the OIC/Togo project because it potentially may spawn a profitable farming operation. The farm is operated in order to help students of the training center to learn. Like

* Indicative of the confusion is the following extract from the Monthly Project Report for December 1978: "TCT team developed what we consider a clear approach to training in an agricultural setting ...To provide clarity, we simply state that OIC/Togo is a production farm where training takes place." (N.B., original underlining.)

classrooms and instructors, the production farm is an important component of the training process. It helps the project by assisting it to become cost-effective. It is a demonstration arena for the benefit of trainees, rather than a demonstration farm whose aim is maximum (profitable) production.

If the main criterion for project success was to have been profitable production, the training center/farm would not have been located at Notsé on the poor, semi-arid land that typifies the holdings of the small individual farmers of Togo's Plateau Region.

We do not suggest that farm production and revenue are unimportant. Efforts to improve yield and raise revenues should continue, although not to the extent of blurring project focus. An encouraging start has been made in the development of forms for financial analysis of farm activity, which shortly should provide needed data. Indeed, initial calculations by project personnel indicate that swine production, and under proper circumstances, crop production, can generate profit. And projections by the evaluation team suggest that annual farm revenues approaching \$100,000 are possible, given increased cultivation and animal production.

A primary responsibility of project management should be to maintain an intake rate and trainee population capable of ensuring maximum utilization of training capacity. Full-time enrollment of trainees should and can be increased to 60; the dormitories at the project site can accommodate that number without severe overcrowding. This effort, combined with quality training and adequate support services (and increased farm production) will contribute to the attainment of cost-effectiveness.

Restructuring of staff responsibilities and recently started replacements of key local staff should continue. At this stage, however, OIC/Togo's current levels of funding and staffing are too anemic to permit the maintenance of separate training and production personnel. TCT specialists, local instructors and other project staffers divide their efforts between the training and production efforts. With only four instructors -- three of whom double as the farm mechanics specialist, animal husbandry specialist and agronomist, respectively, and two Notsé-assigned TCTs, the two functions cannot now be separated. (The situation admittedly requires instinctive classroom awareness, so that all farm events -- e.g. birth and care of newborn pigs -- can be turned into classroom exercises.)

Local financial support must be augmented. Indeed, under the 75%-25% matching formula which might be applied to a redesigned effort, increased levels of local support will become imperative.

In addition to financial support in the form of farm revenue, the project proposal conceives two other potential sources: GOT direct and/or in-kind assistance as negotiated by the Board of Directors; and funds generated directly by the Board.

Inasmuch as human capital development implies substantial financial investment and slow returns, eventual GOT support will be requisite to the ultimate success of OIC/Togo. The local Board also will have to commit itself to an explicit, detailed and realistic fund-raising program to provide additional project input.

Time from project start to viability needs to be extended. We recommend that the project redesign investigate lengthening the program by an additional four or five years. The current four-year (FY 1978-1981) implementation phase is too short a period in which to develop reasonable cost/benefit ratios for an agricultural training program of the type involved.

Based upon the early, mostly unchanneled, impact of OIC/Togo's first graduating class, the multiplier effect of a strong, replanned project may be so pronounced by 1985 or 1986, that budgetary support -- even by a financially constrained GOT -- may not be out of the question.

I-C. LESSONS LEARNED

Problems encountered by OICI in the early operation of its first agricultural training project in Togo have resulted in a number of "lessons learned." As a result, various aspects of OIC/Togo have been reshaped. Much of the learning also was applied in the planning for and start up of OICI's second agricultural training project in The Gambia -- in part because the Project Advisor of The Gambia/OIC was a member of the initial TCT staff on the Togo project.

We recapitulate below some of the more important lessons learned. It will be noted that several have not yet been put into practice, and should be.

I-C-1. Attributes and Training of TCT and Local Project Staff

(a) TCT field staff on OICI agricultural training projects require developing country experience. All members of The Gambia TCT staff have previous professional experience in LDCs, averaging 6.6 years.

At its inception, three of the four TCTs assigned to OIC/Togo had not previously served overseas.

(b) The TCT team should contain at least one member with previous OICI overseas experience, because of the importance of transmitting knowledge concerning OICI philosophy, concepts, organization and operation to other TCTs, local staff and the local Board of Directors.. None of the original Togo TCTs had this knowledge; half of The Gambia TCTs had had previous OICI field background.

(c) A TCT Finance/Administration specialist should be present throughout the life of the project. The 18-month delay in phasing in a Finance/Administration specialist in Togo caused the project to start without adequate on-site financial planning, monitoring and control; created cash-flow problems (delayed reimbursements by OICI) because records and reports did not comply with OICI and AID rules and regulations; and required extensive expenditure of time to upgrade and update financial records and reports.

(d) Because of that specialist's potentially significant contribution to the training process, an experienced Feeder/Counselor/Trainer should be part of every TCT team. The Gambia project has always had one; OIC/Togo never has had one.

(e) The low level of Pre-(Field) Service Training of TCT staff at OICI for the Togo project hampered its start. Pre-Service Training for The Gambia TCTs was longer, more relevant and more practical -- and, therefore, more beneficial to project progress.

(f) A correspondingly low level of participant training in the U.S. for local staff and members of the Board of Directors of OIC/Togo compounded the project's problems by limiting locals' exposure to and understanding of OICI philosophy and methodology. During the first three years of the project, less than 40% of scheduled participant training took place.

(g) Relevant participant training under the OIC/Togo project should be adapted to permit selected local staff members to study The Gambia/OIC project. The normal four-week training period in the U.S. should be reduced by one, to permit The Gambia visit.

(h) French fluency is indispensable for the transfer of knowledge in the OIC/Togo project. Future applicants for TCT positions must have a working knowledge prior to arriving at OICI for Pre-Service Training. One cannot learn the language sufficiently during such training.

(i) Periodic exchanges of ideas and experience between TCTs of the two agricultural training projects should be initiated -- for mutual enrichment regarding training, transfer of technology, and farm production.

I-C-2. Project Organization, Management, Administration and Monitoring

(a) OICI pre-proposal feasibility-study teams must include OIC/TCT staff, already in the field on other projects, who possess relevant expertise.

(b) OICI's budget projections in the project proposals for both OIC/Togo and The Gambia/OIC assumed that prices would not vary significantly during the life of the projects. Projected budgets failed to provide adequately for inflation or for contingency costs normally associated with major line items, and did not take into account possible fluctuations in the dollar/CFA conversion rate. Future projections of revenue and expenses should undergo thorough internal review by field-experienced TCT specialists in finance/administration and the technical areas involved.

(c) The student-training aspect of an OICI agricultural project should not begin until the project site has been cleared, needed infrastructure is in place, basic items of equipment are present, water is either available on-site or access to it is ensured, and all TCT and local staff are on hand and clear about plans for program implementation and their respective duties and responsibilities.

(d) The seasonal rainfall pattern, which forces concentration on crops and animals at specific times of the year, should shape the student training, farm production and marketing, and procurement patterns of an OICI agricultural training project.

(e) In Togo, commitments were made to some key local staff before arrival of the TCT team. On the other hand, the TCT staff in The Gambia project was actively involved in the recruitment and evaluation of counterparts, providing for a closer working relationship with fewer problems.

(f) Transfer of control of the Togo project to local staff was done too fast and too early, and has required extensive modification. In The Gambia, the process has been more carefully planned and executed. In the case of the Finance/Administration specialist, the local counterpart should not assume responsibility before two or three years of practical experience in the position.

(g) Top project staff (TCTs and counterparts) should be based at and live near the site of the agricultural training project. Only a part-time contact office should be maintained in the capital/port city.

(h) The OICI Management Information System is not geared to agriculturally oriented projects. Overruns tend to surface long after they have become acute, and details of the overruns are difficult to isolate. This weakness was pointed out in the Wolf and Company evaluation of Spring 1978 and has still not been corrected.

(i) OICI internal evaluations of new projects should be performed early --within nine months of startup -- and periodically thereafter. Early and periodic evaluations will enable OICI management to detect problems while still small and when remedial action is relatively easy and inexpensive. They also help set parameters for priority action when funds are limited. Project Logframes should be updated as part of each internal evaluation.

II. BASIC DESIGN ELEMENTS

II-A. PROBLEMS ADDRESSED; THE TARGET GROUP DEFINED

The underlying objective of the OIC/Togo project is assistance to the small individual farmer of the Plateau Region, which is among the more impoverished in the country, "through the introduction of semi-modern farming methods and intermediate farm technology to a sector of the population whose needs heretofore have been neglected by (elaborate and costly) international agricultural and rural development projects."

A 2 November 1979 cable, "Agrarian Reform in Togo," of the American Embassy/Lomé sheds light on the basic problem. An excerpt:

"Togolese farms/farmers: Agricultural plots are small, ranging from 2.5 to 5 hectares -- frequently too small to warrant use of modernized equipment or to generate sufficient capital to allow purchase of essential inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides. If these inputs are made available initially, it is often difficult for Togolese farmers to continue purchasing inputs on a yearly basis. Moreover, the soil and climate in many areas of Togo are generally poor, requiring either a fallow period or investment in expensive fertilizer and irrigation systems. In some cases, even plots ranging up to 20 hectares may provide no more than a subsistence living and certainly not enough capital for the investments necessary to improve the land."

OICI's Project Proposal (in effect the Project Paper) identifies two immediate target groups of beneficiaries of OIC/Togo: "(1) young adult farmers (aged 31-35) of the Todomé, Attitsohoé and Djemegni villages in the area of Notsé who are plagued by a persistent inability to produce enough for home consumption, let alone a surplus for profitable sale in the market; and (2) rural post-primary school leavers (16 and over) or school dropouts who have not yet migrated to the towns.

"Most of the young school leavers and the young adult farmers reside in villages of 160 families or less, which are entirely outside of

the money economy and are only marginally affected by government-sponsored rural development programs. The OIC/Togo program is specifically targeted at members of the group who still reside with their families and who, after attending the farmer-training course, will carry the benefits of their training back to the family farm unit."

II-B. PROJECT STRATEGY FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK

OICI's Project Proposal for an Operational Program Grant to fund the OIC/Togo agricultural training program was submitted to AID on 25 March 1976. The proposed AID budget over the five-year life of the project (FY 1977 through FY 1981) was set at \$1,364,427.

The stated broad purpose of OIC/Togo is the "design and demonstration of an agricultural training model that will contribute to a higher productivity and a concomitant rise in the living standards of Togo's semi-modern farmer, through emphasis on instruction in labor intensive farming methodology, rather than capital intensive labor-saving technology beyond their means and capability."

Specifically, the Project Proposal calls for establishment of an agricultural training center/production farm with the following objectives:

- a) To train post-primary school leavers in intensive extension methods in order to create a core of agricultural extension workers capable of working directly with village family farm units.
- b) To train young adult village farmers on improved intensive and extensive farming methods adapted to their physical and socio-economic environment.
- c) To design and implement a training program in simple farm mechanics, equipment maintenance and repair, to enable the rural farmer to be as self-sufficient as possible.
- d) To design and implement a crop and livestock production farm from which revenue is generated to finance in part the training component.
- e) To provide a viable economic alternative to rural school leavers who now migrate to the city in search of wage income employment.
- f) To advise and assist OIC/Togo-trained farmers in obtaining arable land and agricultural credit on favorable terms.

Training, in an agriculturally oriented modification of proven OICI urban vocational/technical methodology, was to stress: (1) pre-training "feeder" courses, to build a positive attitude among trainees regarding farming as a livelihood, and to motivate them to improve farming practices; (2) practical, farm-related, local and short-term non-formal agricultural training; and (3) post-training support in the form of continuing followup advice, counsel and assistance.

On 29 June 1976, under Amendment No. 4 to OICI's Contract No. AID/pha G-1125, implementation of a first year pilot phase was approved to assess the viability of the identified Notsé site. This research phase spanned eight months through 30 June 1977. It included a soils study; determined that irrigation of the site at reasonable cost was unfeasible; assessed the suitability of crops and adaptability of livestock proposed for production; found that recommended cultural practices were agronomically feasible; and investigated the ability of the target group to sustain the system.

The pilot phase has been followed by an implementation phase, currently in the third of four scheduled years, in which agricultural training and farm production take place.

The Project Proposal recognized that a major problem faced by the program was the building of a sound financial basis for operating and maintaining the training center in the allotted time frame, and attempted to solve the problem by "establishing a small economic enterprise to market crops and livestock produced...at the farm as a means of financing major operating expenses."

III. EVALUATION OF RESULTS THROUGH DECEMBER 1979

III-A. INTRODUCTION: PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS OF THE PROJECT

OIC/Togo has been the object of three earlier assessments:

1. OIC/Togo was one of three country programs operated by OICI that were reviewed in Wolf and Company's May 1978 Evaluation of OICI, under Work Order No. 7, Contract AID/otr C-1381. Wolf's evaluators assessed the project in March/April 1978, as feeder training for Group I trainees was ending. The report noted that the program was behind plan, that OICI's Management Information System was ill-adapted to the flow of pertinent data from OIC/Togo, and the the local Board of Directors required enlargement and strengthening. It also signalled two weaknesses: lack of French fluency by the TCT team, which severely hampered communication and transfer of knowledge, and absence of an OICI/OICA-experienced trainer with student services (feeder) and curriculum development background.
2. The OIC/Togo Project Evaluation, June 1976 to July 1979, Submitted by OIC Management, reviewed project accomplishments, project shortfalls and lessons learned from unanticipated problems that had developed (including origin of project overruns, adverse results of dry weather and a failure to make optimum use of the project site, and lack of timeliness of financial reports caused by early-project absence of a TCT Finance Officer); and explored the reasons for and implications of a perceived shortage of budgetary funds. Importantly, it quantified additional requirements: \$170,002 for the final six months of FY 1979 and \$787,695 for FY 1980, the fourth project year; and outlined program plans and budgetary requirements for the 18 months from April 1979 through September 1980.
3. In connection with a proposed third OICI agricultural training project in the Ivory Coast, specialists from REDSO/WA visited OIC/Togo in August 1979. Their trip reports covering the Togo project raised questions concerning cost-effectiveness, recruit-

ment and selection of trainees, lags in projected agricultural production, integration of trainees into extension service, and the impact of OIC/Togo graduates who return to the farm.

The three-part strategy developed in October 1979 to analyze OIC/Togo (see the Preface to this report) is a direct result of the last two noted assessments: the July 1979 internal OICI report, and the August 1979 REDSO/WA memoranda. We note earlier that our November-December 1979 evaluation represents the first step of the three-part strategy.

III-B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PLANNED RESULTS

This section reviews the degree of achievement reflected by Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs) at the Goal, Purpose and Output levels of the project's Logframe matrix. Coverage of Output OVIs is subsumed under our discussion of Purpose OVIs, because of their close overlap and the fact that the Purpose OVIs provide annual indicators of achievement. Project Inputs are reviewed in Section IV-A-1 of the report, under "Causal Factors."

III-B-1. Program Goal; The Impact Survey

The stated goal of OIC/Togo is an increase in agricultural productivity of small farmers in the rural areas of Togo. Only an insignificant number of that country's small semi-modern farmers (140, according to the Logframe, during the five-year course of the project) are to receive direct training at the Notsé site. Even if all were to return to their villages after graduation, their own adoption of more efficient agricultural techniques cannot make a discernible difference. If additionally, however, they influence relatives, friends and neighbors to copy some of their newly learned techniques, they may be able to make a measurable, albeit minor, impact on the problem in the Plateau Region.

For that reason, the Project Proposal calls for OIC graduates to function as agricultural extension workers (some official, employed by the GOT; others part-time and unofficial), spreading knowledge through example and then emulation by others.

In the concluding paragraphs of a 27 August 1979 trip report, "Training of Young Farmers at OIC, Togo," Steve Grant, Human Resources

Development Advisor, REDSO/WA, outlined a scenario for measuring success of OIC/Togo's agricultural training project based on its goal: impact --

"Much of the evaluation," he noted, "should focus on the trainee's impact on his village upon return after training...In order for (the graduates) to have any impact on village farmers, a whole host of pre-conditions must be met...including:

"Trainees' access to credit, land and markets; trainees' rapport with villagers (and) trainees' support from OIC; and access to modern farm implements, including motorized cultivators.

"Villagers' access to credit, modern farm implements, markets (and) openness to innovation.

"An evaluation plan should be drawn up which contains data items on such critical components to project success as these. The training component in itself can be evaluated only in terms of its ultimate objective -- favorable behavior change on the part of farm families -- not on its own terms."

In full agreement, the evaluators conducted a detailed, on-site impact survey of 16 of the 18 farmer-graduates of OIC/Togo's Group I, who had finished OIC training in December 1978 -- gaining an in-depth insight into the characteristics and post-graduate activities of the target group.*

The survey took place on four successive days, December 10-13, 1979, with four graduates interviewed each day. Usually, the graduate was met in his village and walked with the surveyors to the plot of land he cultivates. The interview and a visual inspection of OIC techniques applied took place there. Frequently, subsequent discussions were held with members of the graduate's family, friends and/or neighbors and, occasionally, village chiefs, in an effort to pinpoint the nature and extent of the impact. Appendix C to this report reviews the survey methodology used. Our major findings are noted below:

- o The youths averaged 23 years of age upon enrollment. 81% had completed primary school. The rest had some secondary school education.
- o All lived in villages. The 15 who farmed crops lived in 13 different villages and sub-villages within a 32 kilometer radius of the Notsé project site. Their average distance from the site

* The 18 returned farmers represent 78% of the 23 graduates in Group I.

- was 9-1/2 kilometers (6 miles). Their small plots of land, reached by narrow paths, vary up to 7 kilometers from their home villages and average about 3 or 4 -- a half hour trip by foot. The 16th graduate was employed at a pig farm, 40 kilometers from Lomé.
- o During the 4-16 years between school-leaving and OIC training, 14 had been farmers, working on the family farm or assisting nearby relatives. One had been a taxi driver in Notsé. One had studied mechanics in Ghana.
 - o Except for the employee of the pig farm, all had farmed since graduation: 12 on their own land (usually given to them by family), 2 on their fathers' land, and one on land that was loaned to him free of charge. Land acquisition had not been a problem to anyone.
 - o They planted from 0.3 hectares to 3.5 hectares during the two-crop season of 1979 -- averaging 1.5 hectares -- usually corn the first planting season and cotton the second. However, plantings also included peanuts and yams.
 - o Generally their land is quite similar to that at the Notsé OIC farm, with mediocre soil and no on-site source of water.
 - o Marketing is no problem. Corn is easily sold on the open market. All cotton is purchased by the GOT cotton marketing company.
 - o The estimated cash value of graduates' crops averaged \$245 for the whole of 1979, ranging from a low of zero (all produce used for family consumption) to a high of \$800.
 - o None as an individual is a potential market for a hand-held motorized cultivator or costly farm equipment -- at least for the short-term future.
 - o All but one of the crop farmers had applied at least two specific practices learned at OIC/Togo. Most frequently cited (and visually verified) were row planting, proper spacing between plants, preparation of land, rotation of crops, and record-keeping. Almost all stated that their crop production had risen since OIC training; the claim was unverifiable.
 - o The employee of the pig farm had introduced new techniques learned at OIC/Togo, including mixing of animal feed and separation of litters into different pens. The manager of the pig farm considers the OIC graduate his most valuable employee. (N.B., only one of the crop farmers also keeps animals; however a sizeable percentage report that they plan to do so. Some advise family members on animal husbandry problems.)
 - o Calculated conservatively, the graduates appear to have sufficiently impressed 53 others -- parents, brothers, uncles, friends and neighboring farmers -- to adopt a technique or techniques learned

at OIC/Togo. We calculate this direct multiplier effect at 3.3. The range varied from one returnee who has inspired eight neighbors, friends and his father to adopt new practices, to three who apparently have not changed anyone's habits except their own.

- o Most of the graduates devote small amounts of time (consciously or unconsciously) to unpaid, unofficial farm extension work. They had received an average of 1-1/2 followup visits since returning to the farm, far below the number needed to produce optimum impact by the graduates on their villages. In spite of this, three had formed informal cooperatives with neighbors and/or relatives, as vehicles to help spread their learned techniques.
- o Eight of the 15 crop farmers had received and put to use the first installment of a credit package worked out between OIC/Togo and CNCA, the agricultural development bank, to provide for land clearing, seed and fertilizer.

Based upon the survey findings, the evaluators conclude that OIC/Togo is reaching its target group; that in spite of the casual followup by OIC program staff to date, their 12-month impact is modest but measurable; and that it can be many times greater over the course of time, as increased numbers of graduates leave the training center and more effective post-graduate outreach services are developed.

III-B-2. Achievement of Planned Results: Purpose

III-B-2(a). Number of School Leavers Trained as Semi-Modern Farmers

Planned, per Logframe: 20 school leavers graduating in 1978 and 40 in each of 1979, 1980 and 1981.

Actual - Group I (December 1977 - December 1978): Twenty-five school-leaver/farmers entered the first training cycle. Twenty-three were graduated a year later, for a dropout rate of 8%. The

* The terminology used in the Logframe obscures the nature of the trainees and their backgrounds. The "school leavers," we have seen, are also young farmers, almost all of whom worked on the farm before OIC training, and most of whom return to the farm after training.

number of graduates exceeded plan by three, or 15%. Our impact survey (III-B-1, above) indicates that 18, or 78% of the graduates of Group I, are practicing farmers.

Actual - Group II (October 1978 - November 1979): Twenty-two trainees began the second training cycle; 18, or 45%, below plan. The class consisted of 18 school-leaver/young farmers and four GOT farm extension workers sent to OIC/Togo for upgrading. Ten of the school-leavers dropped out early in the training year: two in October 1978, the other eight by March 1979, for an attrition rate of 45%. Thus, the graduates in November 1979 consisted of only eight school-leavers and the four GOT farm extension workers.*

Replacement of the dropouts, a normal procedure so early in the training year, was not initiated by project management because it became preoccupied with financial difficulties and low trainee morale. OIC management became aware of large cost overruns as 1979 began and sought ways to trim operating costs and raise revenues. At the same time, it had become apparent that the GOT, which had been expected to employ numbers of the Group I graduates as farm extension workers was not in a position to do so. The large agricultural development planned by the GOT during 1975, when much of the Project Proposal was researched and written, failed to materialize by early 1979 it instituted a wage and hiring freeze that continued through the time of our evaluation. As a consequence, many graduates of Group I became overtly dissatisfied as their chance for government employment faded, and they affected the entering trainees of Group II, some of whom also had looked forward to government jobs. In hindsight, the dropouts should have been replaced.

Actual - Group III: OIC/Togo's third training cycle began during the latter part of December 1979. By the time (December 20) the evaluators left Togo, 41 trainees had been selected for the group. Thirty-seven had reported to the training center; the remaining four were to begin the following week, upon completion of their second-season harvesting activity. Project management reports that it will replace all dropouts. The number of graduates should, therefore, be on the planned target, 40. The educational mix of the new entering group is somewhat different from previous groups; several of the trainees are illiterate.

* The GOT farm extension workers are reported to be enthusiastic about the training they received at OIC/Togo and to have informed their home agency of the fact.

III-B-2(b). Number of School-Leavers Attending
Basic Skills Instructional Program (Feeder)

Planned, per Logframe: 40 in 1977, 70 in 1978, 90 in 1979, 150 in 1980 and 150 in 1981.

Actual number in Feeder: 0 in 1977, 25 in 1978 (Group I), 21 in 1979 (Group II), 41 in 1980 (Group III).

The magnitude of feeder students called for by the Logframe is unrealistic, in view of the Logframe requirement for a 40-bed dormitory (Project Inputs, OVI #15-vi) and the 40 graduates per annum from 1979 through 1981 projected in III-B-2(a), above. The 150 feeder students projected in 1980 and 1981 would suggest a revolving-door type of attrition and an almost four-times turnover of trainees which should never have been part of the Logframe design. This OVI should be eliminated in the project redesign.

III-B-2(c). Number of School-Leavers Trained
as Agriculture Extension Workers

Planned, per Logframe: 20 each in 1979, 1980 and 1981.

Actual: None trained formally as extension workers. The GOT (see (a), above) is not hiring any. Although we note earlier that many returned graduates devote some time to unpaid, unofficial agricultural extension work, large scale and formal training of extension workers should be deleted from the project and Logframe until (1) the GOT is able to hire additional extension workers, (2) OIC/Togo is able to place extension workers in non-government entities (such opportunities presently are close to nil), or (3) OIC/Togo can employ more than one or two of its graduates in its own followup extension work.

III-B-2(d). Number of Farmers in Off-Site Training Program

Planned, per Logframe: 30 in 1979, 60 in 1980, 90 in 1981.

Actual: OIC/Togo initiated this outreach program in December 1979. By December 20, when the evaluators left Togo, five of a projected 25 farmers of Todomé and nearby villages had been identified, with the assistance of local chiefs. Visits to farmers will be performed by technical instructors and the technical followup coordinator, a

position created by OIC/Togo's Board of Directors at the start of December. Not yet ready are an analysis of farmers' needs or plan to handle offsite and onsite instruction with the project's limited current manpower (see Section IV-A-2(d)).

III-B-2(e). Number of Farmers Acquiring Credit to Purchase Motorized Cultivator Equipment

Planned per Logframe: 15 in 1979, 30 in 1980, 45 in 1981.

Actual: None. The cultivators (see III-B-1, "The Impact Survey," and IV-A-3, "Technology,") are unsuitable for the project's semi-modern-farmer target group.

However, as noted earlier, OIC/Togo and the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole have developed a credit package for OIC graduates in which the development bank is scheduled to lend ten graduates a total of 912,000 CFA (\$4,560) for land-clearing, seed and fertilizer. Each of the ten received a first 12,500 CFA installment in October 1979. OIC/Togo is to develop a comprehensive plan, outlining credit needs for specific purposes, before the development bank pursues the plan to its full ramifications.

III-B-2(f). Local Revenue/Local Expenses Ratio of the OIC Training/Production Farm

Planned, per Logframe: 1:10 in 1978, 1:2 in 1979, 11:20 in 1980 and 7:10 in 1981.

Actual, 1978: Although crops were planted and harvested in FY 1978, no revenue was recorded that year.

Actual, 1979: Farm revenues equaled \$25,304 (see IV-A-2(a) "Agriculture," for details). Local expenses, excluding capital improvements, etc., totaled \$210,793. The revenue/expense ration, therefore, was 1:8.*

Projected, 1980: Updated OIC/Togo farm production plans (as of 12 December 1979) indicate anticipated revenue of \$49,813 and antici-

* In addition to revenue being \$43,029 (63%) under plan, local operating expenses were \$75,809 (56%) over plan. This and other cost overages, are discussed in IV-A-2(b), "Financial Planning and Reporting."

pated local costs, less capital improvements, of \$348,300. \$149,200 of total expenses are accounted for by the projected purchase of a bulldozer. Research by the evaluators reveals that the rental of a bulldozer to fully clear 100 hectares at the farm and to rebuild earthen dam(s) will cost somewhat under \$30,000; in that event, the local expenses total for FY 1980 would be reduced to \$229,100.

In the first instance, the local revenue/local expenses ratio is 1:7, in the second it exceeds 1:5.

Our calculations suggest that under maximum utilization of the farm—with 100 hectares planted in crops and a doubling of anticipated 1980 swine production -- a local revenue/local expenses ratio will not exceed 3:7, or 43% of costs. The Logframe plan for a 7:10 ratio in 1981 is clearly unattainable.

III-B-2(g). Training and Organization
of the Local Board of Directors

Plan, per Logframe: The Board is to be fully trained and organized by FY 1981.

This OVI should be attained well before the end of 1981. The original, admittedly weak Board of Directors, was enlarged from five to eight members in mid-1978, and was further reorganized and enlarged to 15 members in January 1979. Its membership now includes the Director of the National Agricultural Development Bank (CNCA), Director of Rural Development/GOT, a technical advisor to the Ministry of Rural Development, a member of ECOWAS, the Paramount Chief of the Notsé Region, and several influential business executives. Its members now have a good perception of OIC philosophy and methodology. The Board sets overall policy, but the Program Advisor TCT still assumes a critical role in initiating solutions to the project's important internal problems.

III-B-2(h). Heavy Utilization of Road Improved for the Project

Residents of Totomé and four surrounding villages, and outsiders, use and have benefitted from the improved stretch of road. The evaluators are unable to quantify "heavy utilization" for a rural road in the Notsé area.

IV. CAUSAL FACTORS: PERFORMANCE AND REMEDIES

IV-A. INTERNAL

IV-A-1. INPUTS

IV-A-1(a). Inputs by OICI

TCT Support Costs: During the first three years of project activity, the actual number of TCT person-months of effort, 114, exceeded the Logframe projection by two person-months. The four TCT staff originally projected for OIC/Togo were: Program Advisor, Farm Manager, Animal Husbandry Specialist and Farm Mechanics Specialist. The first two were each to devote nine person months of effort in FY 1977 (the pilot phase); the last two were to start with the beginning of FY 1978.

The Animal Husbandry specialist was phased in six months earlier than scheduled. Some months after his arrival, he also assumed the position of Farm Manager, when the first Farm Manager, who had been hired in Togo, resigned. The new arrangement was adopted by OICI to create an opening for a new, originally omitted, but sorely missed slot: Finance/Administration Specialist, who joined the team in November 1977. In January 1979, the Farm Manager/Animal Husbandry Specialist was transferred to The Gambia/OIC. He was replaced by the current Animal Husbandry Specialist. However, the duties of Farm Manager were assumed by the Farm Mechanics Specialist.

Unlike other OICI projects in Africa -- whether urban/vocational-technical, or agricultural training as in The Gambia, the OIC/Togo matrix never has called for a Feeder/Counselor/Training TCT Specialist. The slot will be needed more than ever in a redesigned new OIC/Togo project (see IV-A-2(d) for further discussion of the subject).

Consultant Costs: The Logframe provides \$3,000 for consultant services to be provided during FYs 1977 and 1978. The projected amount was exceeded by \$1,087.

Pre-Service Training: Although the overall actual 12 person-months of Pre-Service Training at OICI/Philadelphia for TCTs going to the field equaled the number projected, TCT turnover -- which necessitated such training for six rather than four TCTs, resulted in an effective one-third reduction per-person. The reduction did not benefit OICI's first agricultural project, in which TCTs generally lacked previous OICI experience and had difficulty communicating in French.

IV-A-1(b). Training and Staff Development for Participants in the Local Program

Four members of OIC/Togo's Board of Directors benefitted from OICI's Participant Training Programs in FYs 1978 and 1979 -- twice the number projected in the Logframe. On the other hand, only one of a projected eight local-staff members received participant training in the U.S. during the same period. Board members apparently availed themselves of vacant slots because most staff members were deemed to be too recently recruited and untested to be sent. Net loss to the project in terms of person-months was 61% (actual time spent in participant training was 3-1/2 versus a planned 9 months).

The loss of project staff exposure to and understanding of OIC philosophy and methodology was compounded by OIC/Togo's various early internal problems (discussed elsewhere in this report) which further limited transfer of the knowledge. With respect to the training for Board members, net results have been positive in terms of their understanding and support for the project.

IV-A-1(c). Commodities, Installation/Infrastructure

Due to the financial accounting and accounting systems employed by OIC/Togo, it is difficult to track exactly and accurately the amounts spent for Commodities (farm equipment, tools, vehicles and office equipment) and Installation/Infrastructure (buildings, well construction, road improvement). Hence, we have combined both line items to facilitate comparison of planned versus actual expenditures.

Over the 5-year time frame of the project, the Logframe estimates that Commodity costs will reach \$174,177 and Installation/Infrastructure at \$124,850 -- for a two-category total of \$299,027. As of 30 September 1979 -- 3-1/4 years into the project -- actual expenditures for the two categories totaled \$318,901, exceeding planned 5-year costs by \$19,874, or 7%. Additional details are provided

in our analysis of cost overruns in Section IV-A-2(b), "Financial Planning and Reporting."

IV-A-1(d). Other Direct Costs

The line item covers communications, maintenance and repair of equipment, office supplies and resource materials. Projected five-year costs are \$99,828. Actual costs through 30 September 1979 were \$163,970, an overage of \$64,124, or 64%. The nature and causes of this overrun also are discussed in IV-A-2(b).

IV-A-1(e). Government of Togo

The Logframe calls for counterpart support costs in the form of three agriculture technicians to be provided to OIC/Togo annually from 1978 through 1981; and for provision of veterinary services and a fertilizer subsidy. Because no agreement to provide these services was negotiated or signed between the GOT and OICI, the projections have no legal force. OIC/Togo has not received the projected services of agriculture technicians or the fertilizer subsidy. Veterinary services have been made available upon request. Current inputs consist mainly of in-kind donations of food (totaling about a quarter of total food cost) for trainees.

IV-A-1(e). Local Community (Notse) Arable Farm Land

By the inception of the project, the stipulated 120 hectares of land had been donated to the project by local owners in the Todomé area.

IV-A-2. CAUSAL FACTORS: PERFORMANCE

IV-A-2(a). Agriculture

(1) Land

Soil at the OIC/Togo training center is fairly typical of that found in the Notse area. It can be cultivated successfully. The agricul-

tural specialist member of the evaluation team has done well operating a 70-hectare farm on soil that is less favorable.

The pre-proposal feasibility study and the Project Proposal developed by OICI erroneously assumed that an adequate on-site water supply would be available at the OIC Todomé site. Instead, water for agricultural purposes and the personal use of trainees must be transported from Notsé to the training center six days a week. Three tankfulls of water, each containing three cubic meters of the liquid, supply the site per day. Based on current prices, the water costs about \$655 per year. Half of a person's (the driver-loader's) working time also is required to maintain the supply.

Of the 122.8 hectares that OIC/Togo has been granted for 99 years, 100 have been partially cleared: approximately 40 hectares have been cleared by bulldozer, but reportedly still contain tree roots; and an additional 60 hectares have been sufficiently cleared to permit hand planting and animal grazing, but not mechanical cultivation. Trainees cultivate about six hectares in demonstration plots. Eight hectares are used for animals (mostly pigs) and three are allocated for buildings.

(2) Animal Husbandry

Pigs: The pigs bred at OIC/Togo are of the German "Landrace" variety, which contains a low proportion of fat. They are slaughtered when about 55 kilograms live weight. Dressed weight averages 10 kilograms less. Dressed carcasses sell for 400 CFA per kilo, bringing about 18,000 CFA. The head, liver and intestines, sold separately, add another 2,000 CFA to the per-pig revenue.

To date, OIC/Togo has responded to demand for pigs. Its regular customer is the SGGG Supermarket in Lomé. Additional sales are made to diplomatic personnel and other individuals. Because supply has not reached levels for which a sustained marketing effort would be required, the effort has been characterized mainly by order-taking. The dimensions of the potential market remain unknown.

From February through November 1979, 138 pigs were sold dressed and 13 were sold live. Total revenue was 3,511,670 CFA (\$16,887*). Based on actual costs of feed, labor, transport to market, slaughter, medicines, repairs and depreciation, etc., OIC calculates that the 10-month operating profit on pigs sold was \$5,544.

* The currency conversion ratio used in this section is 207.95 CFA to the dollar, the average for 1979.

In its July 1979 Management Evaluation of OIC/Togo, OICI projects sales of 500 pigs during the 18 months from April 1979 through September 1980 and revenues of \$80,000. In an updated forecast, dated 17 December 1979, OIC/Togo projects the sale of 250 pigs during the 12 months of FY 1980 and a revenue of \$23,078. The evaluators reviewed the methodology used in the revised forecast and deem it both realistic and on the conservative side.

OIC/Togo claims that it produces the best quality pigs in the country. Thus far, they have been corn fed. However, because its supermarket customer does not pay premium prices for OIC pigs, project specialists plan to experiment supplementing the corn with grass feeding, in an effort to lower production cost. Using the new formula, they project an operating profit of \$11,648 on FY 1980 pig sales.

Small Ruminants: OIC/Togo long has maintained a small herd of goats. Through 30 June 1980, it sold four, for a total revenue of \$336. It recently added sheep to its stock after a long search, but is experiencing difficulty raising the animals.

(3) Crop Production

OIC/Togo has never generated significant crop production, apparently because so little of its available land has been bulldozed sufficiently clear to permit mechanized production. No more than 22.5 hectares have been planted in a single growing season (exclusive of the trainee demonstration plots):

- o In the first growing season of 1978, 22.5 hectares were planted:
 - 21 ha of corn, 10,990 kilos of shelled corn produced (value of crop \$2,300).
 - 0.5 ha of sorghum, 740 kilos produced and used for animal feed (value of crop \$300).
 - 1 ha of peanuts, used for reseeding (value of crop \$45).
- o In the second growing season* of 1978, 11.25 ha were planted:
 - 5 ha of cotton hand planted, 4,021 kilos produced (value \$1,200).
 - 5 ha of sorghum, 4,000 kilos produced (value \$800).
 - 1.25 ha of beans, no production, total crop lost.
- o In the first growing season of 1979, 13 ha were planted, all in corn. 28,340 kilos of shelled corn were produced (value \$5,700).

* In the Plateau, less land normally is cultivated during the second season, which has a shorter rain period than the first.

Plantings had been limited to corn by management decision, because (1) it is potentially the OIC farm's prime cash crop (newly discovered project overruns at the time focused attention on revenue-producing activity) and (2) it provides feed for the project's pigs.*

- o Nothing was planted for the second season of 1979, reportedly because OIC's farm machinery could not get out into the muddy, rain-soaked fields. Some manioc was planted by hand.

At the evaluators' request, OIC/Togo updated the crop production figures that appear in the July 1979 evaluation report by OICI management:

- o For the first growing season of 1980, 34 ha are to be planted, exclusive of six ha in trainee demonstration plots -- 30 ha in corn and four ha in cotton.
- o For the second growing season of 1980, 30 ha of corn.

Management of OIC/Togo projects 1980 crop revenues at \$26,735. The organization has established a cost system that should enable it to determine the profitability of each component of its agricultural production. The system includes monthly animal production reports, crop management reports, and transfer records for farm products that permit OIC/Togo to determine internal cash value support. Parts of the system have been in use since the summer of 1979.

Priority rental of a bulldozer and preparation of 100 hectares for cultivation in 1980 would enable OIC/Togo to more than double the crop revenues cited above. Based on first season plantings of 80 ha of corn, 10 of cassava and five each in peanuts and demonstration plots; and second season plantings of 30 ha of cotton, 20 of corn, and five each in peanuts and demonstration plots -- we estimate that resultant crop revenues could reach \$55,500 for 1980.

Such revenues, plus doubled pig production could raise cost-effectiveness of the project and lower the local revenue/local expenses ratio for 1980 to 3:7 (local revenue of \$101,650 versus local expenses of \$229,100, including \$30,000 for a rented bulldozer). Estimates by SOTEXMA (Société Togolaise d'Exploitation de Machines Agricoles)

* Depending upon fluctuations in the volatile corn market, the crop is either sold immediately after harvest or held for pig feed and/or later sale for human consumption. OIC reports that, to date, feeding it to pigs has normally been the most cost-effective method of use.

indicate that it can provide a bulldozer and experienced driver to plow the 100 available hectares for the first growing season of 1980 and repair the project's earth dam, for a cost under \$30,000. This represents 60 working days for the bulldozer and its operator.*

Because planting must take place by March, priority authorization for such rental should be rushed.

(4) New Personnel Required
for Increased Profitable Production

Cost effectiveness and the importance of training through demonstration require high level accuracy in land preparation, planting and harvesting activities. Thus, management planning should emphasize proper preparation for each growing season with respect to timing and application of manpower, materials and financial resources. Neither OIC/Togo local staff nor TCT staff appear to have the requisite professional field experience needed to raise farm production to optimum levels at Todomé.

We therefore recommend that the redesigned project provide for:

1. A full-time professional farm manager. The TCT specialist must have a background in successful commercial farm production and management, possess expertise in agronomy and be French fluent -- a difficult but not impossible combination of attributes to find in one person. He requires the combination of skills because, in addition to operational responsibilities, he must provide counterpart training in farm management and operation, agronomy and in instructional methods regarding agronomy.
2. Part-time consultant services of experienced agricultural specialist(s) from both within and without Togo, who know(s) Togolese farmers, farming methods and motivation. The French fluent consultant(s) would advise project management and the TCT Farm Manager, help acclimate the latter to the realities of Togolese agriculture, and help organize the planting and harvesting efforts.

* Current OICI estimates of \$348,300 for 1980 local project expenses include \$149,200 for purchase of a bulldozer. Purchase is unnecessary in view of the availability of a rented machine. In either case, the bulldozer has to be used only once.

IV-A-2(b). Financial Planning and Reporting

(1) Local Revenue/Local Expenses Ratio.

Inability to meet the local revenue/local expenses ratios of the Logframe results as much from an overanticipation of revenues as from an underestimation of expenses in the planning for a first-time (for OICI) agricultural training project.

Local expenses in FY 1979 were 56% above planned expenses because of underbudgeting, unplanned but necessary agriculture-related costs, declining value of the U.S. dollar and its relation to the CFA, and an earlier increase in local staff positions relative to those planned for in the Project Proposal. (The number of positions was belatedly reduced when the nature and scope of project overruns became apparent.)

Local revenue in FY 1979 was 63% below its projected level due mostly to cultivation of a smaller area than initially planned and a resultant reduction of crop production income, overestimation of revenue from animal sales, and the almost complete absence of goat and sheep production.

(2) Cost Overruns

The project's needs, as discovered by OICI and OIC/Togo, have been greater than those stated in the Proposal. The budgets for FYs 1977-1979, submitted to and approved by AID/W (including the additional sum to cover April through September 1979), exceeded those in the Project Proposal by \$209,909 (+20%).

Local operating costs also have exceeded those projected in the Proposal. For FYs 1977-1979, the overage totaled \$93,604 and 32%. Put another way, the Proposal presented oversimplified and underestimated the nature of local operating costs.

Moreover, actual cost overruns for local expenses exceeded budgets that had been proposed, approved and obligated subsequent to the Project Proposal.

In order to isolate areas of greatest overrun, or underbudgeting, we have, through analysis of OIC/Togo Management Information System reports, identified overruns by line item for FYs 1977-1979:

<u>Line Item</u>	<u>Amount of Overrun</u>	<u>% of Total Overrun</u>
Local Personnel Expenses	\$7,174	4.0
Consultant Expenses	1,174	0.7
Travel & Transportation	15,911	8.9
Other Direct Costs	83,515	46.8
Commodity & Equipment Expenses	70,823	39.6
	<u>\$178,597</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The line items for "Other Direct Costs" and "Commodity & Equipment Expenses" accounted for 86.4% of all overruns. Analysis of the two line items required time-consuming research. The assessment revealed that:

- o The "Other Miscellaneous Direct Costs" category of "Other Direct Costs" (one of 11 categories listed under the item) accounted for 54.3%, 74.7% and 71.1% of the total during FYs 1977, 1978 and 1979, respectively. According to OIC/Togo's financial records, the following costs/expenses are included under "Other Miscellaneous Direct Costs": crops, seeds, fertilizer, fuel and lubrication, animal feed, trainees' stipends, trainees' food, and miscellaneous(!). "Animal Feed" and "Fuel and Lubrication" comprise the largest elements -- 33.1% and 29.5%, respectively -- in the category.

Recommendation: OICI's MIS reporting forms make it difficult to isolate some of the major costs of agricultural training projects and to effectively monitor key agricultural expenses. They should be thoroughly revised. Certainly, the "Animal Feed" and "Fuel and Lubrication" components of the "Other Miscellaneous Direct Costs" category should be reported as separate categories, as should the "Trainees' Stipends" and "Trainees' Food" components, which together average 16.2% of costs in the miscellaneous category.

- o The "Training Equipment" and "Training Supplies (Non-Consumable)" categories of the "Commodity & Equipment Expenses" line item account for from 86.6% to 95.1% of the total. While the meaning of "Training Equipment" is fairly clear, that of "Training Supplies (Non-Consumable)," as interpreted in OIC/Togo's accounting system requires clarification. Worksheets for monthly reports of project activity indicate that it is used as a catchall to include everything from installation, infrastructure, building materials, land clearance and maintenance, to spoons and knives and beds and mattresses.

Recommendation: Expenses of installation, infrastructure, building materials, land clearance and related labor and main-

tenance should not be reported under the category of "Training Supplies." Reporting them under separate line items would enable OIC/Togo's project management to do a far better job of planning and monitoring.

Factors outside of OICI's and OIC/Togo's control (e.g., declining value of the U.S. dollar and inflation within the Togo economy) may have accounted for part of the overruns in local costs. But they also may have resulted from inadequate understanding of a new type of project's cost needs, and/or failure to study and formulate remedies when cost overruns first were realized. Since these alternatives represent mere speculation, it is important that OICI and OIC/Togo initiate an in-depth study of past overruns, in order to minimize the probability of similar problems recurring in the future. The study should be initiated prior to project redesign.

(3) Financial Planning and Control
of the OIC/Togo Farm Operation

The new financial analysis forms for livestock and crop production developed by OIC/Togo form a good start towards more profitable operation of the farm at Notsé/Todomé. Farm operation can become even more business-like through the creation of a systematic financial planning, accounting and control system; production planning strategy with specific objectives based on actual/realistic projections; and regular processing of farm operational data to enable monitoring and analysis.

We recommend involvement of the Finance/Administration TCT Specialist in the development and implementation of a systematic financial planning, accounting and control system for the OIC/Togo farm.

IV-A-1(c). Management, Organization and Administration

The apparent inseparability of the project's training and production profitability goals, as expressed in many OIC/Togo documents, has resulted in periodic management uncertainty and lack of clear, consistent directives. At times, the production of revenue from the farm has assumed priority; at times the training function has appeared paramount; and at times neither has been pursued forcefully, with management apparently unsure which aspect should be stressed.

The damaging effects of this confusion on cost-effectiveness were dramatized during portions of 1979 when visitors to the training

center/production farm found only 13 trainees undergoing instruction and from nil to 13 hectares being cultivated in addition to student demonstration plots.

In Section I-B of the report, we note that OIC/Togo's reason for being is the training of young semi-modern farmers to return to and impact upon their villages, and that a primary responsibility of project management should be maintenance of an intake rate and trainee population capable of ensuring maximum utilization of training capacity. (Full-time enrollment should and can be increased to 60.)

While productivity and efficiency at the Notsé site have increased somewhat during the past year as a result of restructuring of staff responsibilities and recently started replacements of key local personnel -- much remains to be done. OIC/Togo's Board of Directors, TCT staff and some local staff acknowledge that too many local employees still take a "7:30AM to 4:30PM" approach to the work day; and that they generally are reluctant to expend the long sustained effort required of those in agriculture during certain seasons of the production and training cycles. The previous working experience of many employed at the project site appears to have been limited to government offices and/or technical agencies.

Some tightening of management and improvement of work habits at the training/production site will result from the hiring of the experienced professional Farm Manager/Agronomist and part-time Agricultural Consultant(s) discussed in IV-A-2(a) above; in the new specialists currently being recruited to replace the local Project Director and the Farm Manager counterpart; and the Feeder/Counselor/Trainer TCT Specialist noted in IV-A-2(d), below.

But, improved project efficiency and smoother operation also require that project personnel must spend more time in Notsé and at the project site at Todomé. This means (a) the move of training center/farm staff and TCTs to the Notsé area; (b) reducing the size and staffing of the OIC/Lomé office to that of a small contact office, with at least half the time of management/finance/administrative personnel being spent at a main project office at Notsé; and (c) establishment of overnight accommodations in the vicinity.

IV-A-2(d). Education and Training

(1) Strengthening the Effort

Because OIC/Togo is an agricultural training project, recruitment of trainees, the training cycle and overall training design are based upon the Plateau Region's annual climatic pattern of two rainy seasons (normally March-July and August-October). The pattern dictates the timing for soil preparation, planting and harvesting for both training and production purposes.

The basic project design consists of four interrelated components over an 11- to 12-month period: (1) Outreach, consisting of recruitment and intake/orientation; (2) a three-month Feeder (motivational training) program designed to provide the trainee with the basic educational upgrading needed to enable him to profit immediately from the basic agricultural skill training that follows; (3) Training in agricultural science, animal husbandry and technical skills; and (4) Supportive Services, including counseling.

The absence of a Feeder/Counselor/Trainer Specialist among the TCTs -- all of whom originally lacked OICI or OIC-America background, and who underwent on average two-thirds of planned Pre-(Field) Service Training -- has resulted in inadequate preparation of the local training staff to assume instructional responsibilities. This has been compounded by a continuing problem of transferring knowledge across linguistic and cultural barriers.

Several months after his arrival in mid-1978, the new Program Advisor for OIC/Togo assessed the training program. He found poor orientation procedures and content due to lack of understanding of OIC design by local personnel, lack of knowledge of OIC objectives regarding student placement, poor coordination with the production unit which provides practical experience to trainees, and a level of instruction that was too theoretical for OIC's trainees. As a result, instructional staff was restructured and reoriented, and TCT staff assumed greater roles in the training process.

Subsequent personnel cutbacks modified the training approach. Instructional staff was reduced to the current four: Training Coordinator, Agronomy Instructor/Farm Manager, Animal Husbandry Instructor, and Farm Mechanics Instructor. The last three have both training and production responsibilities.

Recommendations for the strengthening of OIC/Togo's education and training effort under a project redesign:

1. Of priority importance: a Feeder/Counselor/Trainer TCT Specialist is badly needed to expand the capabilities and effectiveness of the instructional team. All OICI urban technical/vocational project designs have included the specialist, and The Gambia/OIC has one. The new advisor should have OICI or OIC-America experience in training, student services and curriculum development, and French fluency.
2. Feeder and counseling instruction must be provided before, during and after training. The nature and intensity of post-graduation followup will shape the program's impact on the trainee, his family and close friends, neighbors and village officials. Follow-up also is key to ensuring that the graduate enhances chances for improvement through application of methods and techniques learned in training. The direct multiplier effect of returned graduates will be significantly increased by consistent, close followup and assistance.
3. The project's impact multiplier effect can further be enlarged by enrolling, either as full-time or part-time off-site students, GOT farm extension workers, for upgrading, as in Group II. Future entering classes should include a number of these specialists.
4. OIC/Togo should consider inclusion of basic extension work techniques into the agricultural training curriculum. The instruction will facilitate trainees' sharing of technical knowledge with fellow farmers after graduation, enhancing impact and increasing the multiplier effect of OIC training. Section III-B-1, "The Impact Survey," notes that most Group I graduates, on their own, act as part-time, unofficial farm extension workers.
5. Detailed planning for the new off-site training program (see III-B-2(d)) should be initiated and should include: (1) study of farmers' needs; (2) division of labor among local staff to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of both on-site and off-site training programs, given current limited project manpower; and (3) training of staff involved in off-site training with respect to communication, farmers' openness to innovation, and followup and evaluation techniques. (The urgency to reach out and to increase enrollment should not overshadow the importance of effective planning to ensure attainment of both the desired quality and quantity of output.)

(2) Trainee Costs and Recurring Costs

Agricultural training is costly. It involves the purchase of expensive farm equipment, long training periods (11-12 months

in Togo), and intensive, often individualized instruction in a diverse number of areas, including agronomy, animal husbandry and farm mechanics.

To date, OIC/Togo's training-cost-per-student has been excessive. For Group I's 25 trainees, per-student-cost was \$6,006. For Group II's 22 trainees, per-student-cost almost doubled to \$11,836. The average cost-per-trainee for both groups was \$8,735.*

The costs must and can be lowered, progressively, to acceptable levels. If the number of trainees had been set at 60 for each of Groups I and II -- 30 per dormitory, as we recommend for future intakes -- and line-item expenditures were at the same level as during the past two years, cost-per-trainee would have been \$3,421.

If, rather than per-trainee cost, we use another cost-benefit criterion, such as the number of farmers impacted by OIC/Togo's graduates, the per-capita cost lowers. Based upon the first-year 3.3 direct multiplier effect of Group I returnees, the cost-per-person impacted (including the trainee plus 3.3 others) for two 60-person groups of trainees in FY 1978 and FY 1979 would be \$796. That figure could be significantly lowered, as a more effective and expanded graduate followup system is implemented. A more intensive followup effort, for example, could result in direct multiplier effect ratios of ten or more in the year after graduation.

Cost per full-time student also will be lowered as a result of OIC/Togo's outreach program, started in December 1979, which is to provide continuing part-time assistance annually to 25 farmers of Todomé and nearby villages. Little in the way of additional overhead costs will be incurred for this new type of training and for these trainees.

Those who prepare the anticipated project redesign should take into account the above factors, among others, when considering cost-effectiveness and viability, and when setting realistic Objectively Verifiable Indicators of progress and goal achievement.

The recurring cost of providing refresher training and of technical visits to the graduates' cultivated plots should be relatively minor. No expensive equipment is required for such assistance and the burden

* To calculate per-student-cost, we have divided the number of trainees into the total for the period's local expenses. These include the line items for local wage expense, direct cost expense, commodity and equipment expense, and indirect cost expense.

of such periodic part-time aid upon the project staff will be relatively small in comparison to their total workload.

IV-A-3. TECHNOLOGY: THE MOTORIZED CULTIVATOR

The Project Proposal advocates the use of hand-held motorized cultivators by the target group "to fill in the gap between the hoe and the tractor in the project area, because: (a) a pair of farmers can realistically afford the purchase price...with a loan from the CNCA ... (b) cultivators can easily be imported, and (c) servicing and maintenance will be provided at the OIC/Togo training center by staff specialists."

Experience at the Notsé training site indicates that the motorized cultivator can be used effectively only on land that has been well cleared: i.e., bulldozed of stumps and large roots. The fact that the cultivators at the project site lack the roto-tiller attachment that would permit them to be used instead of hand-weeding has restricted them to limited use that has failed to impress either TCT staff, trainees or the CNCA with its practicality.*

Its high cost (approximately \$2,000) in relation to the average annual income (about \$245) of the target group, and the users' need to provide for gasoline, adequate maintenance and occasional replacement parts, make it too costly and complex for individual or family use by the small, semi-modern farmers who attend and graduate from OIC/Togo.

We recommend that the motorized cultivator be de-emphasized in the technical training curriculum. Instead, more time should be devoted to the instruction and practice of farming and cultivation methods which are within the technical and economic reach of trainees and their kin.

Animal traction might be explored as an alternative in the new project design.

* Its use in The Gambia/OIC project also has been somewhat less than satisfactory, according to the TCT staff located there.

IV-B. CAUSAL FACTORS: EXTERNAL

The Government of Togo: We note in IV-A-1(e), "Inputs," that OIC/Togo never negotiated or signed an agreement with the GOT for it to provide the three agricultural technicians, fertilizer subsidy and veterinary services called for in the Logframe, and that only the last has been made available. Presence of the GOT agricultural technicians at the training center/farm would have provided valuable additional expertise.

The GOT does provide a regular allocation of foodstuffs for trainees who board at the training center, as part of a regular program of food assistance for educational institutions.

OIC/Togo's Board of Directors: After reorganizations and expansion, the Board now is strengthened and contains members who are influential in development banking, rural development and business. The Paramount Chief of the Notsé region also is a member.

Its members are working more closely with the Program Advisor to institute more effective management and operation procedures, and are participating with him in the replacement of inefficient/unproductive local staff. Members of the Board have been unstinting in the time they devote to OIC/Togo affairs and have provided their own expense money on frequent occasions.

Thus far, however, the Board has been less effective in another aspect of its responsibility -- that of spurring tangible local support for the project. Such support will be more important than ever under the matching formula type of arrangement that may be applied to a redesigned effort. The current project design calls for the Board to help produce financial support through GOT direct and/or in-kind assistance as negotiated by the Board, and through funds generated directly by the Board. In view of the improbability that farm production alone can generate sufficient local revenues, Board-generated and/or expedited financial support will have to be augmented.

Other: We already have noted that the 122 hectares of the OIC training center/farm at Notsé/Todomé were donated by local land owners. Since that time, the Village Chief of Attitsohoé has donated land he owns near the project site to individual graduates. Early in the project, free labor for clearing, weeding and harvesting was provided by neighboring villages.

OIC/Togo has benefitted from the services of a farmer/farm mechanic Peace Corps volunteer, who assists at the site. The PCV has completed one year of a two-year assignment.

APPENDIX A

PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Adjavon Komi, Assistant Business Manager, Société Togolaise d'Exploitation de Material (SOTEXMA)
Chief Afadji, Village Chief of Djemegni, Togo
Adela Komla, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Sogba
Adjako Komla, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Alati
Afatodji Komi, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Afawaukefé
Akakpo Kokou, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Mono
Eric Akolatse, interim Finance/Administration Advisor, OIC/Togo
Alagbé Gagno, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Tchekpo
Ashorgbor Kumi (Simon), Followup Coordinator, OIC/Togo
Atsu Komla, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Dalé-Dzébé
Ross Bigelow, AID/PDC/PVC/OPNS
Theodore Cook, Advisor, Projet Vivier Notsé-Dayes T-V-1
Frank Dimond, AID/AFR Evaluation Officer
A. K. Djadoo, Technical Advisor, Ministry of Rural Development/GOT, Board of Directors of OIC/Togo
Paul Doe, Customer Services Manager, Hotel Sarakawa, Lome, Board of Directors of OIC/Togo
Gordon Evans, Director, REDSO/WA
Fanouvi Komivi, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Djemegni
Bernard Faulkner, Program Advisor, OIC/Togo
Ganyo Kwami, Village Elder, Attitsohoé, Togo
Gbekou Fagninou, Livestock Instructor, OIC/Togo
Tilahun Giday, Farm Machinery Advisor, The Gambia/OIC
Steve Grant, Human Resources, REDSO/WA
Hoglo Djaka, Village Chief, Attitsohoé, Togo
C. D. Jadju, Acting Production Manager, The Gambia/OIC
Chief K. T. Jammah, District Head Chief, Chairman of the Board of Directors of The Gambia/OIC
Brenda Jarra, Feeder/Counselor Specialist, The Gambia/OIC
Marilyn Johnson, American Ambassador to Togo
Kaiser Komla, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Gakpé
Kassegne Kodje, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Totavé
Ketoglo Koffi, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Attitsohoé
Ketonou Kossi, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Batoumé
Kokou Kouma, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Djemegni
Kossi Yaevi, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Notsé

M. Kougbrenou, Manager, Ferme Hano-Mono (pig farm), Tchekpo, Togo
 Kueviakoe Teko, Finance Officer, OIC/Togo
 Richard Silla, Training Director, The Gambia/OIC
 Patricia Lerner, contract employee, USAID/Togo
 Irving Licht, Rural Development Group, Conseil de l'Entente, Abidjan
 Logo Yaevi, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Dogbeavou
 Bernard Lane, Togo Desk Officer, AID/AFR/CWA
 John Lundgren, OAR, USAID/Togo
 Connie Mannings, Program Advisor, The Gambia/OIC
 Mazna Médézinawè, General Director, Caisse Nationale de Credit
 Agricole (CNCA), Board of Directors of OIC/Togo
 Manyo Kossi, Training Coordinator, OIC/Togo
 Mensah Amegname, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Dalé-Atchavé
 Jerry Mitchell, Commercial-Economic Officer, American Embassy/Lomé
 Triðib Mukerjee, Agricultural Economist, REDSO/WA
 P. J. Nichols, Economist, American Embassy/Abidjan
 N'Tsougan Mensah, Agronomy Instructor, Acting Chief of
 Production, OIC/Togo
 Nudekor Koffi, businessman, Board of Directors of OIC/Togo
 Nyuiefo Kossi, farmer, graduate of OIC/Togo Group I, Dalé-Atchavé
 Don Parker, AID/AFR
 Quashie Anani, Mechanics Instructor, OIC/Togo
 Steven Rainer, Anthropologist, REDSO/WA
 Gary Robinson, Executive Director, OICI/Philadelphia
 J. A. Sodatonou, business executive, Chairman of the Board
 of Directors, OIC/Togo
 Sokel Atsu, Project Director, OIC/Togo
 Daniel Sparks, Financial/Administrative Sepcialist, The Gambia/OIC
 Stanley Straughter, former Finance/Administrative Specialist,
 OIC/Togo
 Henry Taylor-Cline, Animal Husbandry Specialist, OIC/Togo
 Chief Togbui Keke Agokoli III, Superior Chief of Notsé, Togo
 Norman Ulsaker, AID/AFR/DR/AG
 Samuel Walton, Farm Manager/Farm Machinery Advisor, OIC/Togo

APPENDIX B

NOTES CONCERNING THE GAMBIA/OIC

The Gambia/OIC training center/farm is located on good agricultural land near Farafenni, some 135 miles from the capital, Banjul. The site is leased at no cost from the district chief, who is Chairman of the OIC's Board of Directors. Some 320 acres (130 hectares) of the project's terrain have been cleared through low-cost use of a GOTG bulldozer. Construction of the training center began in February 1979; most buildings were completed and in use at the time of the evaluation team's visit. Dormitories are to be completed in time for the enrollment of Group II, early in 1980.

The Gambia/OIC, OICI's second agricultural training project, benefitted from many of the lessons learned by its predecessor, OIC/Togo (see Section I-C of the report).

The Gambia/OIC concentrates on young farmers with a secondary school education, i.e., graduates of technical middle school who are unable to qualify for entrance into one of the country's two high schools (total enrollment 2,650). Twenty-eight of the 30 Group I trainees had completed technical school. Perhaps two-thirds had been working with parents on farms before attending The Gambia/OIC. There is strong parental influence upon youth, and parents own the land, which cannot be sold. Parents expect OIC students to return to work family plots.

For Group I, The Gambia sought to enroll youths who lived nearby -- in part because dormitories were lacking. Villages for 70 miles around were visited and technical school headmasters were solicited for the names of potential candidates. After the target applicants were interviewed, parents were visited. Both were informed that the aim of OIC training was to teach agricultural skills that would enable trainees to remain on the farm and increase earning capacity. Despite this, half of those in Group I withdrew during pre-feeder orientation, upon confirmation that OIC did not intend to prepare students for city-oriented employment. The dropouts were shortly replaced from The Gambia/OIC's waiting list of applicants.

Feeder instruction continued from May through July 1979; some students, out of school for three and more years, were below level aca-

demically. Agricultural training began with the rainy season in August. Training and production are based on season. Crop production is stressed during the wet season; animal and vegetable production, cooperatives and bookkeeping are studied during the dry season. Group I graduated at the end of 1979. A syllabus on detailed post-graduate followup procedures was under preparation at the time of our visit. Plans call for parents to be visited periodically and for graduates to be brought back for two days of refresher training before the next rainy season. OIC followup extension visits are to be made to returnees on their plots of land.

Nine Group I trainees spent December 1979 in Banjul attending a special course given by the Ministry of Agriculture's cooperatives unit. They are to become part-time teachers of coop concepts among illiterate farmers in their home villages. The Gambia has a well-organized cooperative movement which markets much of the nation's agricultural produce.

Group II is to consist of 50 -- 30 boarders from throughout The Gambia and 20 day-students from the Farafenni area. They were being interviewed and screened during our visit.

During the 1979 planting season, The Gambia/OIC planted 196 acres (79.4 ha) of crops: 113 acres (45.8 ha) in groundnuts, 52.7 acres (21.3 ha) in corn, 22.5 acres (9.1 ha) in sorghum and 7.5 acres (3 ha) in millet. Revenue from the sale of 1979 crops is expected to gross 27,000 dalasis at a cost of 13,000 dalasis, for a net revenue of about \$7,200. (One dollar equals 1.7 dalasis.) The gross revenue, the equivalent of \$15,882, is approximately that projected in the project proposal.

As in the Notsé region of Togo, land is owned by individual farmers in The Gambia. However, in The Gambia, land cannot be sold. The local and district chiefs do not exercise control over land in either area. They are administrators and intermediaries who make introductions and are seen for reasons of politeness and expediency.

Like most other OICs (but not as yet OIC/Togo), The Gambia/OIC has integrated itself into the local community, in a short period of time. The local OIC Committee at Farafenni and surrounding villages have contributed the following to the project:

- Project site (land leased at no cost);
- Nine sheep, each worth 80 dalasis;
- Three goats, each worth 50 dalasis;
- Free and/or minimal-cost labor during planting, weeding and harvesting;
- Free boarding for the 11 out-of-town Group I trainees;

50 loads of sand for farm structures;
100 bags of cement, from Community Development;
Entertainment of guests to the training center/farm; and
Free use of the Chairman's tractor and trailer.

The Gambia/OIC's construction budget reportedly is about on target. It built some of its own structures. The project will be able to house 68 trainees and train 80-90 at a time. The water source is a bore hole which cost \$25,000 (water was located on the second attempt); it produces 2,000 gallons per hour.

The project TCT staff is comprised of Program Advisor/Cooperatives/Animal Husbandry Specialist, Feeder/Counselor/Training Specialist, Farm Machinery Advisor, and Finance/Administrative Specialist. The first three are based at Farafenni; the last at Banjul.