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Zambia Human and Institutional Resources Development Project
(HIRD, 611-0206)

REVIEW

April 1989

Team Members:

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After four years of delays, false starts, and controversy over the management and role of the Human and Institutional Resources Development Project (HIRD), USAID/Zambia and the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) reached an agreement in June 1988 that has enabled project implementation to proceed at or close to its intended pace. More progress has been made in the ten months following that agreement than was realized in the previous four years. An effective management structure is now in place, the large majority of participants are being trained in "critical shortage skill areas" as identified by the Project Paper, the GRZ and USAID are working harmoniously together on the project, and all returned participants with whom the review team spoke expressed their satisfaction with the quality and utility of the training they received. All involved are to be commended for having made so dramatic a recovery from so difficult a beginning.

Nonetheless, some significant problems remain. The basic project documents -- the Project Paper, the Project Authorization, and the Project Grant Agreement -- have never been amended to reflect the various changes approved by USAID and the GRZ. In particular, the level of technical assistance described in those documents is well out of date, and the output targets for long-term, short-term, and in-country training have been rendered unrealistic by the circumstances described above. More substantively, HIRD is not moving toward two key End of Project Status indicators: it is not providing training to parastatal and private sector employees, nor is it augmenting the capacity of indigenous Zambian training institutions. Further, the management structure for the in-country training program seems in immediate need of revision.

To correct these deficiencies and smooth project management and implementation, this review team recommends that USAID and the GRZ take, among other actions, the following major steps:

1. Draft a Project Paper Supplement and Project Authorization Amendment and submit these to the Regional Legal Advisor for review. The RLA will then assist the mission in drawing up a Grant Agreement Amendment.
2. Establish formal, written criteria for the selection of trainees from the parastatal and private sectors and expand efforts to provide training to employees from these sectors.
3. Conduct at least two in-country training seminars through established Zambian training institutions.
4. Direct the prime technical assistance contractor to assume direct responsibility for in-country training.
5. Take steps to ease the transition back to Zambian life for returned participants.

The review team believes that these measures will help HIRD continue, and expand upon, the successes achieved since June 1988.

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA SHEET

1. Country: Zambia
2. Project Title: Human and Institutional Resources Development
3. Project Number: 611-0206
4. Project Dates:
 - a. First Project Agreement: September 19, 1984
 - b. Final Obligation Date: FY 1990 (anticipated)
 - c. Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD): June 30, 1991
5. Project Funding: (amounts obligated to date in dollars or dollar equivalents from the following sources)
 - a. A.I.D. Bilateral Funding (grant and/or loan) US\$ 5,390,000
 - b. Other Major Donors US\$ - 0 -
 - c. Host Country (In-kind and Counterpart Funds) US\$ 2,500,000 (est.)
 - Total: US\$ 7,890,000
6. Mode of Implementation: A.I.D. direct contract:
Roy Littlejohn Associates
7. Project Designers: Government of the Republic of Zambia, USAID/Zambia, AFR/PD/SAP, AFR/TR/EHR
8. Responsible Mission Officials:
 - a. Mission Directors: John Patterson, Ted Morse, Leslie A. Dean
 - b. Project Officers: Fred Perry, Marcia Ellis, Alan Van Egmond
9. Previous Evaluation: March 1987

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IV. REPORT

A. Review Purpose and Study Questions

1. Purpose.

The purpose of the review is to assess project progress towards meeting objectives following nine months of implementation since the GRZ and USAID agreed upon the future direction of the HIRD project after a long hiatus and numerous project changes. The review will also examine the management structure of the project and implementation responsibilities, especially in light of several key personnel changes that have occurred and will occur over the next three months. Attention will be given to the role and efficacy of the Project Executive Committee as the decision-making body for the project and the Training Subcommittee, which has major responsibility for what is essentially now a training project. The effectiveness of the Contractor in handling its responsibility for project implementation will also be assessed.

The results of the review will provide USAID/Zambia, the GRZ and the Contractor with an assessment of the progress to date, indications of areas requiring changes or additional input, and recommendations of steps to take to redress any design, implementation or management weaknesses.

2. Study Questions.

Implementation Progress and Issues

- a. What progress had been made in meeting project objectives prior to June, 1988?
- b. What progress has been made in meeting project objectives since the reduction in the level of effort and other decisions made in June, 1988?
- c. Is the project meeting its implementation targets in terms of person years of training?
- d. Are the participants being trained in "critical shortage skill areas" as envisioned during project design?
- e. To what extent do proposed trainees nominated by the Project Executive Committee and its Training Subcommittee come from sectors of the Zambian economy identified as "critical" during project design?
- f. What activities can be implemented over the next two years and by what target dates?
- g. How effective is the overall management structure for the project?

- h. Has the Project Executive Committee and Training Subcommittee been an effective mechanism for monitoring and approving activities under the project? Is the HIRD Project implemented in a collaborative fashion with the GRZ?
- i. How effective have the Contractor and its subcontractors been in the implementation of the project? What weaknesses can be identified, if any, and steps recommended to redress them?
- j. What are the weaknesses, if any, in the USAID management of the project? What additional actions can be taken to ensure the smooth transition of the USAID management of the project? What additional steps, if any, can be taken to streamline the management of the project?
- k. What procedures, guidelines, and processes should be put in place for a more efficient and effective project?
- l. During the remaining life of the project, what are the key benchmarks for bringing the project to an orderly and successful conclusion in June 1991?

Goal and Purpose Level Questions

- a. Do the goal and purpose statements accurately reflect the objectives of the A.I.D. program in Zambia and of the HIRD Project? If not, how might those statements be modified?
- b. If the purpose statement is modified, how might the End of Project Status indicators be changed to reflect this modification and permit USAID to measure the success of HIRD in achieving its purpose?

Output Level Questions

- a. Are trainees placed in "critical shortage skill areas"?
- b. What evidence exists that the technical and managerial skills of trainees have improved as a result of their training?
- c. Is there any baseline data against which to measure improvements in technical and managerial skills? If not, should the project attempt to gather such data now?

B. Team Composition and Methodology

1. Team Composition

Leon S. Waskin, REDSO/ESA/PRJ
Marcia V. Ellis, HIRD Project Officer
Asina Sibetta, Training Specialist

2. Methodology

- a. The review team studied all basic project documents -- the Project Paper, Project Grant Agreement, and Project Authorization -- as well as all Project Implementation Orders, Project Implementation Letters, and Project Implementation Reports. Additionally, the team examined USAID/Zambia's files on HIRD and consulted relevant correspondence, participant's files, contracts and contractor reports contained therein.
- b. The team conducted a series of interviews with Zambian Government officials who are involved in the implementation of the HIRD project and knowledgeable about overall project activities; met with both long and short-term returned participants to assess the relevance of their training programs and whether they acquired skills necessary in their areas of responsibility; met returned participants' supervisors to discuss participants' performance before and after HIRD - sponsored training; met contractors' representatives to assess their overall responsibilities and project management; and met USAID officials to discuss processes and procedures for assessing the project.
- c. The team then compiled the following report, which was reviewed in draft with USAID/Zambia.

C. Evidence/Findings

1. Progress Toward Project Objectives.

"Project progress" can, and should be, assessed on at least two levels: achievement of outputs, and achievement of purpose. This document makes such an assessment first, by reviewing the purpose and outputs of HIRD as originally designed; second, by summarizing how planned outputs have changed over time; third, by comparing actual accomplishments versus planned outputs at two points in the project's history; and finally, by reviewing progress to date toward the project purpose.

a. Purpose and Outputs.

As expressed in the Project Paper, HIRD's purpose is "To assist the GRZ in developing its technical, administrative, and managerial human and institutional resources in critical shortage skill areas." To realize this purpose, project activities were designed to provide four types of outputs:

- a. Increased numbers of Zambians trained and staffing high and middle level positions in critical shortage skill areas.
- b. Improved quality of administrative and management skills of upper and middle level managers in the civil service, the parastatals, and the private sector.
- c. Improved efficiency in GRZ planning and analysis.
- d. Strengthened capacity of Zambian training institutions to conduct ongoing education and training programs in critical shortage skill areas.

Recognizing that evaluation of accomplishments in three of the above categories would involve difficult subjective judgments, the designers offered three quantitative standards by which to measure whether outputs were being realized as planned: HIRD was to provide 160 person years of long-term post-graduate training degree in the U.S., 300 person months of U.S. and/or third country short-term training, and 1000 person months of in-country training (1). A more nebulous standard was offered for evaluating whether the capacity of Zambian training institutions was in fact being strengthened: here the designers said only that "Staff or faculty at NCDP, NIPA, and UNZA engaged in either operational work or teaching in the critical shortage skill areas will be strengthened."

b. Changing Output Targets.

To evaluate HIRD's progress, one would normally simply compare actual achievements at the purpose and output levels with the objectives described above. For this project, however, such a comparison is difficult, particularly at the output level.

 (1) It is arguable that these "Magnitude of Output" indicators should have been labelled project inputs.

As shown in Appendix C, "Project Chronology," the anticipated outputs of HIRD have been adjusted several times. Most of these changes were occasioned by attempts to redesign the project to support other objectives of the A.I.D. program in Zambia. For example, even before implementation began, USAID and the GRZ elected in October 1985 to decrease the anticipated life of project budget from \$13.028 million to \$11.028 million; the \$2 million thus saved was devoted to supporting the Government of Zambia's (GRZ's) nascent foreign exchange auction system. This reduction was achieved by eliminating plans to provide institutional development assistance to the National Institute for Public Administration (NIPA) and to the University of Zambia's (UNZA's) Ndola campus. Assistance to the Public Administration Department at UNZA's Lusaka campus was also deleted. The planned size of the team of project-supported long-term "Operational Experts" was therefore reduced from seven to three. Thus, USAID and the GRZ decided to forego much of the institution building activity envisioned in the project design, though this change has yet to be reflected in the basic project documents or in the End of Project Status (EOPS) indicators included in the Logical Framework.

Then, in August 1986, only one month after the TA team reached full strength, the mission began an ill-fated attempt to redesign HIRD activities to support GRZ economic policy reforms. This effort met with substantial resistance, and by March 1988 had been abandoned. By this time, however, tension between the GRZ and USAID about HIRD had reached such a level that the Director General (DG) of the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP), the GRZ implementing agency, had suspended implementation of the project's training component entirely following USAID's decision to terminate the contract of one of the operational experts, a decision that seems to have been fully justified, but on which he had not been consulted.

These delays and false starts inevitably required that the project timetable be adjusted, and that the anticipated level of outputs be modified. USAID/Zambia and the GRZ made these necessary changes through a series of memoranda, PIO/T's and contract amendments. Yet the basic project documents -- i.e., the Project Paper, the Project Authorization, the Project Agreement, and the Amplified Project Description attached to that Agreement -- have not yet been amended to reflect these changes. Thus, one can draw different pictures of HIRD's success (or failure) in meeting its objectives depending upon the basis chosen for comparison.

To provide a fair view of HIRD's accomplishments, it is necessary to compare actual project achievements against both the objectives established at the design stage and the objectives being followed in practice. This furnishes a more complete perspective than would comparison against either the original or the revised criteria alone. Moreover, one should also distinguish between the critical state the project had reached by June 1, 1988, and the far more robust condition it now enjoys.

c. Progress Toward Planned Outputs as of June 1988.

Table I below examines the training component of HIRD as of June 1, 1988. It compares actual training outputs as of that date with both the levels foreseen at the design stage and the levels anticipated at that time. As is evident from the table, this component of HIRD was in serious trouble whether measured against its original or its revised objectives. Almost four years after obligation, and with less than two years remaining before the Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD), HIRD had provided no in-country training, less than nine percent of planned short-term U.S. or third-country training (and only slightly more than two percent of its initial objectives in this category), and less than 18 percent of planned long-term U.S. training.

Table I: Actual vs. Anticipated Outputs
(as of June 1, 1988)

<u>Outputs:</u>	<u>Project in TA Contract Paper</u>	As Revised	<u>Actual</u>	<u>As % of PP</u>	<u>As % of Revised</u>
		<u>7/11/86</u>			
In-Country Training (Person Months):	1000	1000	0.0	0.00	0.00
Long-Term Training (Person Years):	160	148	26.0*	16.25	17.57
Short-Term Training (Person Months):	300	80	7.0	2.33	8.75

*Completed or in process.

The extent to which the project was helping to strengthen the capacity of the two Zambian institutions still targeted for assistance -- NCDP and UNZA/Lusaka -- was also problematic. At NCDP, a Manpower Economist/Planner furnished by Roy Littlejohn Associates (RLA), the prime technical assistance contractor for HIRD, had arrived in May 1986. RLA's contract called for this individual to work with NCDP's Office of Manpower Planning on:

- Strengthening [its] manpower planning and analysis process;
- Formulating [its] training plan;
- Strengthening the research section of the department; and
- Providing on the job training to a Zambian counterpart in manpower planning and research, statistical analysis, and the utilization of computer technology.

Yet by December 1987, this technician had failed to submit an acceptable workplan for his activities, and in January 1988 USAID terminated his contract. (He was not replaced; USAID and NCDP concluded that a similar technician scheduled to be provided by the United Nations Development Program made the services of an A.I.D.-funded advisor redundant. The BNDP expert, however, did not arrive in Lusaka until April 1989.) HIRD had by June 1988 provided two months of short-term training at the U.S. Bureau of Labor

Statistics to one NCDP employee, training that he described to the review team as "very relevant" to his work. It had also sent one NCDP employee to the U.S. for long-term training. Yet as of June 1988, the project's overall contribution to "strengthening" NCDP's Human Resources Planning Department had been minimal.

At UNZA, the situation was somewhat better. HIRD was funding the services of one technical expert provided by RLA, a Senior Statistician assigned to the Mathematics Department at UNZA's Lusaka campus. This individual was teaching undergraduate and graduate students, drafting lecture notes and giving tutorials for departmental colleagues at the Lecturer level, and had drawn up comprehensive proposals for the establishment of both an undergraduate degree program in statistics and an advanced statistical laboratory to be equipped with 20 personal computers and used for teaching and research purposes. In March 1988, the Acting Chairman of the Department said that this technician "has done an overall tremendous job." Yet even here there were rumblings of trouble: the Senior Statistician had written to RLA's Chief of Party in February 1988 that "it is highly unlikely that it will be possible to effectively implement a statistics degree program and establish a computing laboratory as called for in the project agreement." Other project contributions to UNZA were more unqualifiedly successful: Six faculty had been sent to the U.S. for long-term post-graduate degree training, and two others had attended a short-term course in statistics in Tanzania.

d. Progress Toward Planned Outputs since June 1988.

June 9, 1988, was a watershed in HIRD's history. On that date, USAID's Director met with the Director General of NCDP to resolve outstanding issues concerning the management and implementation of the project. It was agreed that:

- HIRD activities would be guided by the original PP (thus putting to rest the policy-based redesign launched in 1986);
- The Project Executive Committee (PEC) would be the decision making body for HIRD; and
- The organization of the in-country training program would be assessed.

As a result of this meeting, the GRZ allowed implementation of the training component to resume. Moreover, the project then began to function in an orderly manner: whereas before it had not been clear whether NCDP or the Cabinet had authority to approve nominations for training, now it became established that this was the responsibility of the PEC, a body which had been established by the Project Paper but that had never met regularly.

The PEC convened for what it termed its "first" meeting on June 30, 1988; it has continued to meet regularly since then. By establishing a Training Subcommittee to review all nominations for training, and by approving written criteria by which to assess those nominations, the PEC has imposed order on a process that previously had managed to produce candidates consistent with the project

objectives only through the goodwill and hard work of the USAID Project Officer and the RLA and GRZ staff involved. Of equal importance is the role the PEC plays as a forum for communication between USAID and the GRZ and as a means of legitimizing management actions: there are unlikely to be future recriminations about unilateral decisions, for the presence of the PEC minimizes the possibility that either USAID or the GRZ will seek to impose its will on the other. All knowledgeable GRZ officials with whom the review team spoke expressed satisfaction with the operation of the PEC and with relations between USAID and the GRZ since June 1988.

In the ten months following this June 1988 meeting, HIRD achieved more of its output targets than it had in the previous four years. Table II below illustrates the stepped-up pace of implementation:

Table II: Actual vs. Anticipated Outputs
(as of March 31, 1989)

<u>Outputs:</u>	<u>Project Paper</u>	As Revised		<u>Actual</u>	<u>As % of PP</u>	<u>As % of Revised</u>
		<u>in TA Contract</u>	<u>3/20/89</u>			
In-Country Training (Person Months):	1000	500		7.0	0.70	1.40
Long-Term Training (Person Years):	160	75		68.5*	42.81	91.33
Short-Term Training (Person Months):	300	60		20.0	6.67	33.33

*Completed or in process.

With the departure of 16 participants for long-term post-graduate study in the U.S. in January 1989, HIRD is on the way to achieving over 90% of the person years of long-term training now planned. Nine of the 33 participants placed had been women; of the three still "in the pipeline", two are women. Achievements in other categories have been less spectacular, but here too significant progress has been made. Since June 1988, approximately 13 person months of short-term U.S. and third-country training have been provided (versus just seven person months prior to that date), and one in-country training course (totalling seven person months) has been held (versus none before). Three of the 19 short-term participants, and ten of the 28 in-country participants, have been women.

In contrast to the participant training component, the institutional development component of HIRD has achieved little since June 1988. Indeed, it is fair to say that HIRD has become almost entirely a training project. As noted, USAID and NCDP elected not to replace the Manpower Economist/Planner formerly stationed at NCDP. Moreover, NCDP asked that the RLA Chief of Party, whose office had been located at NCDP, move to USAID. Thus, HIRD is no longer providing on-site assistance to that institution.

With the failure of technical assistance at NCDP, HIRD's only measurable contribution to NCDP has been the provision of training for a number of employees. HIRD has sent three NCDP employees to the U.S. for long-term degree training, and plans to send one more in CY 1989. It has also funded short-term training for four participants from NCDP. In one sense, this will be the sum of HIRD's efforts toward the institutional development of NCDP: four employees with Master's degrees in Economics, and a yet to be determined number given short-term courses. Has this strengthened NCDP's capacity to conduct operational work in critical shortage skill areas? Undoubtedly. Has it strengthened that capacity significantly? The PP provides no criteria by which to judge.

One should not ignore, though, the impact that working together may have had both on USAID and NCDP. It is clear that the two organizations are enjoying a good working relationship in which there is mutual understanding and appreciation for the other's perspectives on human resources planning, constraints and processes. Whether this has resulted from their work together on the PEC is probably impossible to determine.

At UNZA, the once-promising technical assistance effort also ended. After a series of disagreements between the Senior Statistician and the Mathematics Department, the PEC asked USAID in January 1989 to terminate this advisor's contract. Most observers with whom the review team spoke agree that little in the way of institutional development was left behind: no statistics laboratory was or will be established, only one of the planned twenty personal computers will be purchased (and it is not clear that the Mathematics Department has the software or the expertise to make full use of it), and no formal proposal has yet been submitted for an undergraduate degree program in statistics. Without the Senior Statistician's presence to shepherd such a proposal along, its prospects for approval are at best problematic. Nonetheless, this advisor did teach for two years, and thereby imparted a more thorough knowledge of statistics to several hundred Zambian students than a less experienced instructor might have been able to provide; beyond that, he left with his colleagues lecture notes for several courses that should improve the quality of instruction in statistics at UNZA for years to come.

Other HIRD contributions to UNZA are more evident: by PACD, one faculty member will have received a Ph.D. in Statistics, one a Ph.D. in Nutritional Planning, two Master's degrees in Mathematics, one an MBA, and one a Master's in Accountancy. Three others have already received short-term training; more will follow. Again, this has surely strengthened UNZA's faculty who are teaching in critical shortage skill areas, but there are no criteria by which to judge whether their abilities have been strengthened significantly.

e. Progress Toward Achievement of Project Purpose.

As noted, the project purpose is "To assist the GRZ in developing its technical, administrative, and managerial human and institutional resources in critical shortage skill areas." The Project Paper provides two criteria by which progress toward this purpose is to be judged:

1) [The presence of] increased numbers of Zambians with the appropriate training employed in high and middle level positions of responsibility within the government, parastatals, and the private sector in the critical shortage skill areas identified in the Project Paper.

2) Zambian Institutions...capable of providing supplemental training which contributes to the nation's development.

In terms of the first criterion, HIRD is moving, albeit more slowly than expected, toward achievement of its purpose. Four Zambians have already returned from long-term U.S. degree training to resume middle level positions in the GRZ. A fifth is expected back soon, while a sixth has used his MBA to leave government service and secure a job with a large parastatal. 27 others are in training now; three more are preparing to depart this year.

One must then ask whether these returned trainees, and their colleagues still in training, have been placed in "critical shortage skill areas." The Project Paper, reconfirmed by USAID and the GRZ in June 1988 as the governing document for HIRD, identifies several such areas as appropriate for long-term training: development planning, accounting, statistics, economics, business administration, and public administration. Of the 36 long-term participants, 26 are studying or have studied economics, accounting, statistics, business administration, public finance, or public administration. The PP adds a catch all category in which at least three others seem to fit: "high and middle-level managers." All of these 29 may be said to have come from jobs that involved "development planning." This leaves seven long-term trainees in areas that might seem to be outside the project's scope: two in pure mathematics, one in nutrition planning, one in law, two in health education, and one in education. But given the GRZ's desire to keep HIRD flexible, and USAID's willingness to accommodate that desire so long as trainees fall in one of the areas of emphasis of the A.I.D. program in Zambia, even these trainees may be said to be studying in "critical shortage skill areas" as now defined.

The PP mandates that similar criteria be applied to applicants for short-term training. Once again, HIRD is largely adhering to these criteria. Of the 19 individuals who had received short-term training through March 31, 1989, 16 had studied economics, accounting, statistics, public administration, public finance, or management. Of the remaining three, one studied manpower projection and analysis and one census data; both of these seem to be within the project's scope. Thus, only one participant, a woman who studied family planning, might be said to have been outside one of HIRD's original target areas, although this too is an important sector for the A.I.D. program.

Likewise, short-term in-country training is now proceeding, although considerably more slowly than intended, toward the objectives envisioned when the project was designed. The PP says that such training "will be provided for senior and middle-level professionals to improve the knowledge and skills required to perform their day to day responsibilities more effectively." HIRD's first in-country training course, a one week seminar on International Banking Operations held December 5 - 9, 1988, did precisely this. 28 professionals from institutions such as the Bank of Zambia, the Zambia Export-Import Bank, and the Zambia National Commercial Bank studied topics including foreign exchange, trade products, and operations. The review team spoke to two participants in this seminar, one from the Bank of Zambia and one from the Export-Import Bank. Both supervise employees who also participated in the seminar. They reported that the gathering offered them an opportunity to brush up on their own skills; for most of their employees, they added, it provided a chance to learn new skills of direct relevance to their day to day responsibilities.

The PEC has approved plans to hold eight or nine similar seminars between now and the PACD. Topics will include budget management and expenditure, a follow-up workshop on the application of specific banking skills to actual business situations (designed for and at the request of participants in the December seminar), training of trainers, negotiating skills, project implementation, microcomputer applications, management development, and human resource management. While this subcomponent of HIRD is far from reaching even its modified objectives (approximately seven person months of training have been provided to date as compared to the present target of 500), it is at least now off the ground and moving in the direction intended.

In these respects, the project is progressing toward its purpose. But in two other very important areas, it is falling far short. First, all long-term and short-term overseas trainees have been from the public sector including quasi-public entities such as the training institutions and the Central Bank. The only private sector participants to date have been three in-country trainees from the National Commercial Bank and one short-term trainee -- a total of 3.75 person months of assistance in almost five years. This is particularly unfortunate when one recalls that one of the End Of Project Status Indicators is supposed to be "increased numbers of Zambians with...appropriate training employed in high and middle level positions of responsibility within government, parastatals, and the private sector... (emphasis added)." Those responsible for the project recognize this deficiency and intend to correct it. But until they do, it will not be possible to say that HIRD has fulfilled all its objectives at the purpose level.

Second, HIRD seems to have made little progress toward its other EOPS indicator, the establishment within Zambian institutions of the capability of "providing supplemental training which contributes to the nation's development." As noted, the project is no longer providing technical assistance to the three human resource-related institutions identified in the PP, and has not yet employed Zambian training institutions to conduct in-country training. USAID should thus think seriously about whether this remains an appropriate EOPS indicator for HIRD, and whether this should still be considered a "human and institutional resource" development project.

2. Performance of the Contractors.

a. Roy Littlejohn Associates (RLA).

RLA has been the prime technical assistance contractor for HIRD since October 21, 1985. The latest amendment to its contract, signed on March 20, 1989, estimates total contract costs at \$5,801,179, of which \$4,171,889 has been obligated. RLA is responsible for the implementation of all participant training. However, in 1986 it subcontracted responsibility for all U.S. and third country training to the Transecentury Corporation (TCC), and for all in-country training to the University of Maryland - Eastern Shore (UMES). RLA was thus left with the tasks of fielding a technical assistance team, accounting for the use of project funds, and monitoring the performance of its subcontractors.

The firm's record in providing qualified technical assistance is mixed. As noted, RLA's Manpower Economist/Planner arrived in Zambia in May 1986, and was terminated at USAID's request in January 1988. In those twenty months, he failed to produce an acceptable workplan, and is not credited with having left with NCDP, the institution to which he was assigned, any sustainable capacity to carry out the tasks in his Scope of Work as described above. Admittedly, the candidate selected was neither USAID's nor RLA's first choice for the job. He was chosen at the behest of the GRZ on the grounds that he had worked with them previously. Yet how RLA and USAID allowed a man to remain in this position for over a year and a half without preparing an acceptable workplan bears asking. It is clear from the record that RLA's Chief of Party made extensive efforts to explain to this individual the role he was expected to play. It is also apparent that these efforts were unsuccessful.

The Senior Statistician was also terminated, though in this case the request came from the GRZ. Here, though, the individual did carry out almost all of his scope of work successfully. Per the terms of RLA's contract with A.I.D., the Senior Statistician was to:

- Serve as an instructor in Statistics.
- Provide assistance in the establishment of a statistics degree program at UNZA.
- Assist in establishing recommendations concerning the most appropriate equipment required for (a statistics) laboratory, and possibly assist in the procurement of such equipment.
- Develop training manuals geared to statistics and statistics laboratory courses needed as well as for those currently being taught.
- Make suggestions and recommendations to junior staff members in the Department of Mathematics teaching statistics which will increase their teaching proficiency.

All these tasks (except the preparation of manuals for the proposed statistics laboratory, which became impossible when it was concluded that a laboratory would not be appropriate) seem to have been carried out with enthusiasm. Indeed, as late as June 1988, when USAID asked the DG of NCDP whether it was necessary to continue this

position, the GRZ expressed its satisfaction with the incumbent's performance. But the review team's conversations with UNZA and project officials and with the Senior Statistician himself suggest his very enthusiasm for his work may have created difficulties. Once they became aware in late 1988 that this technician was encountering serious interpersonal and professional problems with his senior colleagues, the record shows that USAID and the RLA Chief of Party made repeated, although ultimately unsuccessful, efforts to rectify the situation. When on January 19, 1989, the PEC formally asked USAID to terminate this technician's contract, the mission did so the following day. Both USAID and RLA seem therefore to have acted in a responsible manner.

RLA also furnishes an on-site Chief of Party/Development Management Specialist. While her performance in the former role has, as witnessed by the early departure of the other two advisors, been plagued by factors largely beyond her control, her performance in the latter role has by all accounts been outstanding. This individual is charged with an unusually ambitious scope of work; it is thus not surprising that some of her tasks may have been performed less well than others. For example, she does not seem to have been able to work closely enough with the other technicians involved in the project to head off the difficulties they encountered (a point of particular relevance in the case of the Manpower Specialist), nor has she yet been successful in enhancing GRZ awareness of constraints to the development of the indigenous private sector or in integrating that sector into HIRD. Yet the review team was advised that in virtually all other respects of her scope of work, she has been invaluable to the project. Per that scope of work, she has successfully:

- Liaised between governmental and institutional entities and with USAID;
- Participated in the selection of candidates;
- Assisted in the selection of U.S. training institutions;
- Assisted in the processing of all participants per A.I.D. regulations; and
- Assisted in the design and implementation of the in-country training program.

These are significant accomplishments, and they reflect well on the incumbent Chief of Party (COP), on RLA, and on the USAID Project Officer responsible for guiding the contractor's activities.

This performance is particularly impressive when one considers that many of the project achievements took place against a background of controversy between USAID and the GRZ over the structure and role of HIRD. Less dedicated individuals might have used this as a rationale for taking no action pending resolution of the matters in question. This contractor, however, continued to cooperate with the USAID Project Officer to implement HIRD despite the troubles. It should be remembered, for example, that between the COP's arrival in June 1986 and the resolution of matters in dispute in June 1988, nine long-term participants and five short-term participants received training. Even in the absence of an agreed-upon mechanism

for reviewing training nominations, and despite the ongoing debate over HIRD, all these trainees came from "critical shortage skill areas" as defined by the PP. Even when the Chairman of the PEC asked in June 1988 that the COP move her office from NCDP to USAID, she continued to carry out her duties effectively; indeed, in one sense her performance may have been enhanced by her more ready access to communications and secretarial support.(2)

The performance of RLA's home office appears to be adequate but not superlative. While the firm is carrying out the Scope of Work included in its contract, it is not providing its COP (and thus not providing USAID) with adequate financial data on the basis of which to make informed management decisions. For example, the COP and the USAID Project Officer were unable to provide the review team with up to date information about accrued expenditures against the budget line item for short-term training. The periodic reports submitted by RLA do not contain this information. Appendix D outlines an approximate format via which such information could be transmitted from the home office to the field. While RLA's contract, if strictly interpreted, does not require it to provide information of this sort, good managerial practice suggests that it should be readily available. If RLA proves reluctant to furnish financial data in this format its contract should be amended to require this.

b. Transcentury Corporation (TCC).

RLA executed a subcontract with Transcentury in July 1986. The most recent amendment of the prime contract lists the cost of the TCC subcontract at \$528,895 excluding participant training costs. The scope of work for this subcontract charges TCC with responsibility for implementing all U.S. training (both long-term and short-term) and all third-country training.

The review team does not have access to enough objective information to draw reliable conclusions about TCC's performance. Both the USAID Project Officer and the RLA COP expressed general satisfaction with TCC, though concerns were raised about what was said to be TCC's practice of not recording its contacts with trainees in the U.S., its tendency to refer routine problems back to USAID and the RLA COP without first trying to resolve them, and the unexpectedly high number of transfers experienced among long-term trainees. Four out of the eleven such trainees placed by TCC before January 1989 found it necessary to transfer from the academic institution in which they were first enrolled, a phenomenon that raises concerns about the quality and appropriateness of the initial placements secured by TCC. On the other hand, TCC was praised for its effectiveness in facilitating contacts with trainees in emergency situations.

 (2) The incumbent COP plans to leave Zambia for personal reasons in July 1989. It should be noted that the GRZ asked her to remain with the project, and that the Chairman of the PEC told the review team that "It is a pity [she] is leaving. We are worried about the time it will take to replace her, and about the loss of her familiarity with the project's history and her knowledge of its activities."

The review team also discussed TCC with three Zambians who have completed long-term training in the U.S. under HIRD. The first left Zambia in 1985, i.e., prior to TCC's involvement in the project, and thus had no contact with the firm. Of the two for whom TCC was responsible, one reported that he had had extensive contacts with TCC and expressed his appreciation for its support. The other, however, reported that his contact with the firm was limited primarily to receipt of his monthly allowance check. Although he experienced serious academic difficulties while at Boston University, TCC did not, he said, help him resolve these problems.

Given the small size of this sample, it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions about TCC's overall performance. Suffice it to note that this remains an open question, one that a full scale evaluation at the end of the project should address.

c. University of Maryland - Eastern Shore (UMES).

RLA executed a subcontract with UMES in June 1986. The most recent amendment of the prime contract lists the cost of the UMES subcontract at \$706,628. The scope of work of this subcontract charges the University with providing 37 person months of short-term technical assistance and with orienting, supporting, and monitoring those technicians. (3)

As HIRD did not support any in-country training activities until December 1988, UMES had nothing to do for the first two and a half years of its subcontract. Since then, the pace has picked up only slightly. Most of the preparatory work for the first in-country seminar on International Banking Operations was done by the RLA COP, the GRZ, and USAID. UMES was expected to perform only three tasks:

- Execute a contract with Citibank for three person weeks of short-term technical assistance.
- Recommend appropriate reference materials for use during the seminar.
- Forward a \$25,000 check (drawn from HIRD funds) to the RLA COP to defray the costs of the seminar.

UMES completed the first task successfully. It also attempted to carry out the second task, although the materials it recommended were not judged appropriate for the seminar. It failed to complete the third task in a timely manner; despite repeated entreaties from RLA and USAID, the check did not arrive until nearly four weeks

 (3) The subcontract with UMES is exceptionally poorly written. It also charges UMES with tasks clearly not among those which project management intends the University to carry out. For example, the subcontract says that UMES must provide "narrative for participant activities including student placement..." and "a discussion of the status of long-...term advisory assistance." Yet in practice, UMES is not expected to place students or to provide long-term assistance. These seem to have been boilerplate phrases inadvertently included.

after the seminar; the record suggests that only creative work by the USAID Project Officer and Accountant enabled the seminar to take place at all. UMES' lack of performance in this regard is documented in letters from the COP to RLA headquarters of March 22 and April 3, 1989. Additionally, those letters state that UMES has:

- Routinely failed to respond to telexes and telephone calls;
- Ignored requests for documentation about the a Mid-Winter Seminar held at UMES in December 1988 with HIRD funding (this seminar itself, however, is said by RLA and USAID to have been a success);
- Not provided any progress reports on the development of a consultant's CV data bank from which UMES will be expected to obtain the names and resumes of candidates for anticipated short-term technical assistance;
- Not forwarded information on the identification of training resource materials in priority skill areas.

RLA Headquarters has sent USAID/Zambia copies of two letters they sent to UMES raising some of these concerns. As of April 27, no written response from UMES to these letters had been received in Lusaka. We are informed, however, that discussions on the matter are taking place between RLA and UMES.

With the exception of the Mid-Winter Seminar, then, it appears that UMES' performance has been unrelievedly dismal, though in fairness no final conclusions can or should be reached until the University's response is received. USAID and RLA told the review team that they intend to give UMES one more chance to carry out its tasks; they do not intend to take any action re UMES until they assess the contribution the University makes to the planned follow-up seminar on banking skills. If no improvement is apparent, they plan to take action to terminate the subcontract.

The patience of USAID and RLA in this matter is admirable but perhaps misplaced. UMES has demonstrated its capability to conduct effective short-term training for HIRD participants on its own campus. But the review team finds it very questionable whether the institution can effectively implement the in-country training program at this time given the problems already experienced. The bulk of the preparatory work has fallen on the shoulders of those already in the country, i.e., the USAID Project Officer and the RLA COP. The UMES subcontract thus serves little purpose. As recommended below, it should be terminated, and formal responsibility for in-country training should revert to the prime contractor.

3. Overall Project Management Structure and the Role of USAID.

a. The Project Executive Committee and the Contractors.

As described above, the HIRD management structure in place since June 1988 appears on the whole to be functioning well. The Project Executive Committee and its Training Subcommittee constitute an effective mechanism for reviewing and approving annual workplans, establishing criteria by which to review candidates, processing and approving applications, and for reviewing project progress. Moreover, their operations have coincided with, and indeed seem to have contributed to, improved relations between USAID and the relevant CRZ entities.

RLA and its Chief of Party also appear to be playing, on balance, an effective role, or rather, many effective roles, in project management. All observers and trainees with whom the review team spoke praised the substantive and organizational quality of the Banking Operations Seminar, and those familiar with how that seminar was arranged attest that it could not have been carried off without the efforts of the RLA COP. USAID officials also stressed the critical importance of the COP in liaising between the PEC, USAID, and the Government ministries from which trainees come, in helping to match trainees with appropriate programs in the U.S. and elsewhere, and in monitoring the progress of and communicating with individual participants in the U.S. The same officials spoke highly of her work in helping to focus the efforts of the Training Subcommittee on important matters such as the drafting of Terms of Reference, the preparation of trainee selection criteria, and the systematic presentation of reports to the full PEC. Clearly, the COP carries out essential tasks for which USAID/Zambia does not have the staff resources to become responsible. Moreover, because of her direct connections with the prime contractor (and through it to the subcontractors), she plays a role that no Personal Services Contractor could duplicate. In the review team's judgment, the COP's position should be filled upon the incumbent's departure. Moreover, her replacement should retain her seats on the PEC and the Training Subcommittee, for the responsibilities she now assumes in facilitating the work of these bodies could not be taken over by already overburdened USAID and CRZ personnel.

One significant change, however, should be made in project management. As described above, UMES failed in two of the three tasks assigned to it in connection with the December 1988 banking seminar. RLA's subcontract with UMES should be cancelled, and RLA should itself assume responsibility for in-country training.

b. USAID/Zambia.

USAID/Zambia appears to have performed well in its primary tasks of monitoring project progress, facilitating implementation, and making sure that trainees come from fields consistent with the project's objectives. The same comments made above with respect to the RIA Chief of Party should be applied with equal force to USAID's PSC project officer: despite the controversy and repeated course corrections endured by HIRD between 1985 and 1988, implementation of the long-term training program did go forward in accordance with the objectives outlined in the PP. This is to her great credit. She and the mission accountant also appear to have done heroic work in arranging last minute funding for the Banking Operations seminar when UMES failed to produce the money on time.

Though many of the implementation delays HIRD has experienced can be traced to changing signals from USAID, the responsibility for these changes does not lie with the Project Officer or with the present senior mission management team. Indeed, only when this team took over were years of indecision finally resolved, and only then did project implementation begin to approach full speed.

Three criticisms, though, can be made of USAID's performance in overseeing this project. First, it is odd that the mission allowed one member of the IA team, the Manpower Economist, to remain in his position for over a year and a half when careful scrutiny of the situation would have revealed that he was not performing. Second, the mission has operated, and continues to operate, without sufficiently detailed financial information from the prime contractor on the basis of which to make informed management decisions. It is not possible, for example, to assess the amount of short-term training that can be carried out before the PACD, or to evaluate precisely the impact that failure to obligate FY 1990 funds would have on the short-term program, unless one knows how much has been spent on that program over the LOP, and thus how much money remains in the budget for that category. Finally, the mission has been tardy in updating the basic project documents -- the Project Paper, the Project Authorization, and the Project Grant Agreement.

USAID management of HIRD is now about to enter an important period of transition. The incumbent PSC Project Officer, who has been with the mission since 1985, is scheduled to depart Zambia for personal reasons this summer. She will be replaced by an PSN with some 13 years of A.I.D. experience who is now serving simultaneously as USAID's Participant Training Coordinator and Population Liaison Officer. Two steps will have to be taken to assure that this transition proceeds smoothly. First, the mission should proceed with its plans to hire a Human Resources Development Assistant. This individual should be on the job before the HIRD Project Officer departs. Second, the Project Development Officer, who supervises the HIRD Project Officer, should be prepared to take, at least temporarily, a more active role in overseeing HIRD than has heretofore been necessary. This role will likely diminish as the new HIRD Project Officer becomes increasingly familiar with the history, personalities, policies, and politics involved.

IV.D. Conclusions and Recommendations.

1. Procedures and Processes.

Following are the review team's recommendations for improving the management and implementation of HIRD. In some cases these are presented in summary fashion, as they often echo observations and recommendations made in Section IV.C above. Where the team believes more explanation is required, it is provided.

a. Amend the Basic Project Documents.

The anticipated life of project funding, the level of the technical assistance effort, and the magnitude of expected project outputs have all changed significantly since HIRD was authorized in 1984. These changes should be formally recorded through the preparation of three documents -- a Project Paper Supplement, Project Authorization Amendment, and Project Grant Agreement Amendment. Among the changes that should be incorporated in these documents:

- 1) The authorized life-of-project funding should be reduced from \$13.028 million to a level consistent with the amount USAID actually plans to obligate. For example, the only obligation scheduled between now and the PACD will be that of \$1.7 million in FY 1990. This would bring total LOP funding to \$1.09 million. If the mission does not intend to extend the PACD or make any other obligations, the authorized LOP funding level should be made consistent with this figure. If on the other hand USAID wants to preserve the option of extending HIRD's PACD and adding more funds to it, it may wish only to lower the authorized LOP to \$11.028 million, the level agreed upon with the GRZ in 1985.
- 2) The number of Operational Experts, or technical assistants, should be reduced from seven to three, and the level of effort adjusted to reflect the actual number of person years of TA now scheduled to be provided.
- 3) The magnitude of anticipated outputs should be adjusted to realistic levels. For example, it is clear to everyone that HIRD will never reach its present target of 500 person months of in-country training by June 1991. In the best of circumstances, nine more seminars (one per quarter) of one week's duration could be held. These seminars will contain an average of 30 trainees, thus generating approximately seven person months of training per seminar. When added to the seven person months already provided, this would raise the LOP total to 70. If HIRD also supports some short courses offered by local training institutions, 100 person months might be an attainable, though ambitious, target. On the other hand, if the RLA COP's estimate that \$250,000 remains in the budget for short-term U.S. and third-country training is correct, and if RLA's estimate of the cost of such training holds constant at \$6,250 per person month, another 40 months of short-term training could be provided, thus bringing the LOP total to 60. There is therefore no need to amend this target now.

Reasonable estimates for the various "output" targets might be as follows:

-Person years, Long-Term Training:	75
-Person months, Short-Term Training:	60
-Person months, In-country Training:	100
-Person months, Short-Term TA:	12

4) Though the project purpose is adequate and need not be amended, USAID should give serious thought to attaching appropriate quantitative estimates to the End of Project Status Indicators presented in the Logical Framework. For example, the Logical Framework calls for increased numbers of Zambians with appropriate training to be employed in high and middle level positions. The measurability of this indicator might be improved by attaching a number to it. For example, 36 Zambians are to receive long-term training from HIRD, approximately 60 short-term training, and approximately 250 in-country training. A reasonable objective might be to say that approximately three quarters, or 260, of these trainees will be employed in such positions at the PACD. If this is not done, it will be extremely difficult to determine at the PACD whether or not HIRD has fulfilled its purpose. Further, in light of the joint USAID - GRZ decision in 1985 to delete most institution - building activities from the project, the mission should consider whether the presence of "Zambian institutions...capable of providing supplemental training..." remains an appropriate EOPS indicator at all.

Writing these documents need not be an arduous task. In particular, it is not necessary for USAID to attempt to recapitulate in these documents all the various changes in project direction that have taken place over the years. Instead, these documents should merely amend those aspects of HIRD that now differ from their original design. The PP Supplement itself need not be lengthy: as A.I.D. Handbook 3, Chapter 13, Section D.3.a. points out:

"The detail and depth of analysis supporting the PP Supplement will be determined by the significance, scope, and complexity of the proposed project modification. In many cases, the supplement will be no more than a synopsis of the implementation problem...and the proposed solution.... This could serve as well as the essence of any action memorandum accompanying the proposed Authorization Amendment."

The review team recommends that USAID/Zambia draft a PP Supplement and Project Authorization Amendment and submit these to the Regional Legal Advisor for review. The Action Memorandum itself could serve as the text of the PP Supplement. The RLA will then assist the mission in drawing up a Project Grant Agreement Amendment.

b. Direct Project Efforts to Fulfillment of EOPS.

As noted, HIRD is in some important respects not moving toward attainment of the EOPS included in the Logical Framework. For one thing, it is not helping parastatal or private sector employees. To correct this, HIRD should:

- 1) Establish formal, written criteria for the selection of trainees from the parastatal and private sectors and expand efforts to provide training to employees from these sectors.

Further, if USAID chooses to keep some aspects of HIRD focused on developing Zambia's indigenous training capacity, the project should:

- 2) Conduct at least two additional in-country training seminars through established Zambian training institutions. This will help develop the capability of these institutions to continue effective training programs post-PACD.
- 3) Use funds allocated to short-term technical assistance to bring out a training specialist to:
 - Assess the quality of the curricula and instruction offered through the short-term and in-country training programs.
 - Design at least one in-country course targeted toward parastatal and private sector participants.
 - Suggest how baseline and endline data might be gathered on trainees in a manner that will help USAID and the GRZ assess objectively the impact of training received. Though the review team's strong impression is that the technical and managerial skills of participants have improved as a result of their training, there is no empirical evidence available to validate this conclusion. This consultancy should help gather such evidence.

c. Improve Project Management.

With the concurrence (where necessary) of the PEC, USAID should:

- 1) Proceed with plans to hire a full-time Training Assistant to work for the PEC's Training Subcommittee. This will substantially relieve the workload of the members of the Training Subcommittee, and will facilitate communication between the PEC, USAID, and relevant GRZ entities.
- 2) Proceed with plans to hire a Human Resources Development Assistant to aid the new HIRD Project Officer.
- 3) Direct Roy Littlejohn Associates to cancel its subcontract with the University of Maryland - Eastern Shore.
- 4) Require that RLA provide more timely and complete financial data to USAID and to its own field team.

d. Smooth the transition for returned participants.

The review team found that retention of returned trainees in the positions they held prior to departure has not yet become a significant problem. Of the six individuals who have completed long-term degree training in the U.S., four have returned to the GRZ agencies they left. One other has resigned from government service to join a parastatal, but is still in Zambia. The sixth has not yet returned. Nonetheless, retention of trainees is often a problem in neighboring countries, and HIRD would be wise to take what steps it can to smooth the transition these participants experience as they return to life within the GRZ. Among the steps that might be considered:

- Procure appropriate software (and, if necessary, appropriate hardware) so that those employees who learned computer skills in the U.S. can apply those skills in their jobs.
- Use returned participants whenever possible as instructors during in-country training seminars.
- Organize at least one get-together for returned participants to allow them to compare their experiences.

2. Proposed Workplans.

a. If the Brooke Window Opens.

If the Brooke window opens as expected in early FY 1990 (i.e., if the GRZ pays its loan arrears), and thus enables USAID to proceed with plans to obligate a final tranche of \$1.7 million to HIRD during the first quarter of the fiscal year, this will enable the RLA technical assistance contract to be fully funded, and will permit planned in-country and short-term training activities to go forward (the PIO/P's of all long-term participants in the U.S. are already fully funded; thus, these participants are not vulnerable to Brooke-related funding constraints). In this case, the review team recommends that USAID and the GRZ adhere to the following plan as they continue implementation of HIRD.

<u>Target Date:</u>	<u>Planned Action:</u>	<u>Action Agent:</u>
<u>Fiscal Year 1989:</u>		
Third Quarter:	- Amend project documents.	USAID
	- Approve Terms of Reference for Training Subcommittee.	PEC
	- Submit workplan and budget for short-term training to PEC.	Training Subcommittee (TSC)
	- Submit written criteria to PEC for review of candidates from the parastatal and private sectors.	TSC
	- Review and approve nominee for RLA COP position.	RLA/PEC
	- Hire Training Assistant.	PEC/TSC
	- Hire HRD Assistant.	USAID
	- Conduct follow-on banking seminar.	RLA
	- Terminate UMES Subcontract.	RLA

<u>Target Date:</u>	<u>Planned Action:</u>	<u>Action Agent:</u>	
Fourth Quarter:	- Approve workplan and budget for short-term training.	PEC	
	- Approve written criteria for review of candidates from the parastatal and private sectors.	PEC	
	- Submit draft procurement plan for commodities to be used by returned trainees.	TSC	
	- New RLA COP on-site.	RLA	
	- New USAID Project Officer in place.	USAID	
	- Draft amendment to RLA contract adding funds and changing financial reporting requirements.	RCO/RLA	
	- Submit nomination of ST consultant to assess training program.	RLA	
	- Conduct budget management seminar.	RLA	
	<u>Fiscal Year 1990:</u>		
	First Quarter:	- Obligate \$1.7 million.	USAID
- Begin implementation of short-term training plan, including private and parastatal sector trainees.		RLA/PEC	
- Approve commodity procurement plan.		PEC	
- Begin commodity procurement.		RLA	
- Submit revised in-country training plan incorporating local training resources.		TSC	
- Amend RLA contract.		RCO/RLA	
- Approve ST consultant to assess training program.		PEC	
- Conduct Training of Trainers workshop.		RLA	
Second Quarter:		- Approve revised in-country training plan.	PEC
		- ST Consultant arrives to assess training program.	RLA
	- Hold get-together of returned trainees.	USAID	
	- Conduct Negotiating Skills workshop.	RLA	
Third Quarter:	- Revise training program in light of ST consultant's recommendations.	PEC	
	- Conduct next in-country workshop	RLA	
Fourth Quarter:	- Decide whether to extend HIRD, design a new project, or allow the project to terminate.	USAID	
	- Schedule design of new project or extension of HIRD.	USAID/REDSO	
	- Conduct next in-country workshop.	RLA	

<u>Target Date:</u>	<u>Planned Action:</u>	<u>Action Agent:</u>
<u>Fiscal Year 1991:</u>		
First Quarter:	- Prepare PID for new project (if necessary). - Conduct next in-country workshop.	USAID/REDSO RLA
Second Quarter:	- Prepare PP for new project or extension of HIRD, if appropriate - Hold get-together of returned trainees. - Conduct next in-country seminar:	USAID/REDSO USAID RLA
Third Quarter:	- Obligate funds for extension of HIRD or for new project - Conduct final in-country workshop. - Conduct final evaluation of HIRD (if necessary).	USAID RLA USAID/PEC

b. If the Brooke Window Does Not Open.

If the Brooke window does not open as anticipated, USAID should take the actions with respect to HIRD described in the Phaseout Plan submitted in April 1989. Since HIRD is comprised of relatively discrete activities, it would not be difficult to pare these back. The PACD for technical assistance, short-term, and in-country training could be changed to June 30, 1990 without wasting funds that have already been spent.

As noted in the phaseout plan, USAID and the PEC should proceed with plans to recruit a replacement for the incumbent RLA Chief of Party, who will depart in July 1989. This replacement is clearly needed to implement the in-country training programs that have already been scheduled during the next year. All in-country programs slated to take place after June 1990, however, would be cancelled.

Continued short-term U.S. and third-country training in FY 1990 and beyond may be contingent upon obligation of the planned final tranche of \$1.7 million of FY 90 funds. Thus, if Brooke is not lifted, this training might have to be cancelled.

All long-term trainees in the U.S. have fully funded PIO/P's, so no large amounts of additional funds will be needed to permit them to complete their studies. An appropriate amount of funds, however, should be earmarked for unforeseen changes and extensions of PIO/P's. As a large number of Master's degree participants are expected to complete their degrees just prior to the present June 30, 1991 PACD, the PACD for long-term training would need to stay the same.

Life of Project: From FY 84 - FY 90
 Total U.S. Funding: \$13,028.0 million
 Date Prepared: 5/7/84

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Project Title and Number: Human and Institutional Resources Development (611-0206)

ARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p><u>Project Goal:</u> to assist Zambia in developing its human resources in skills areas considered by the GRZ to be critical to the nation's development.</p>	<p><u>Measures of Goal Achievement:</u> Effective planning, analysis and management of the Zambian economy which results in more efficient utilization of its resources.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. GRZ five-year development plans. 2. Budgetary allocations in the various sectors. 	<p><u>Assumptions for Achieving goal targets:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. That the GRZ remains committed to more efficient and effective utilization of its resources. 2. Political and social stability is maintained within the Southern Africa region.
<p><u>Project Purpose:</u> to assist the GRZ in developing its technical, administrative and managerial human and institutional resources in critical shortage skill areas.</p>	<p><u>End-of-Project Status:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased numbers of Zambians with the appropriate training employed in high and middle level positions of responsibility within the government, parastatals, and the private sector in the critical shortage skill areas identified in the project paper. 2. Zambian institutions will be capable of providing supplemental training which contributes to the nation's development. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. GRZ civil service training and employment records. 2. Parastatals' training and employment records. 3. Private sector new hires. 4. Training institutes' records. 	<p>That GRZ policy continues to emphasize development of Zambia's indigenous human and institutional resources in critical shortage skill areas.</p>

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Outputs:</p> <p>Increased numbers of Zambians trained and staffing high and middle level positions in critical shortage skill areas.</p> <p>Improved quality of administrative and management skills of upper and middle managers in the civil service, the parastatals, and the private sector.</p> <p>Improved efficiency in GRZ planning and analysis.</p> <p>Strengthened capacity of Zambian training institutions to conduct on-going education and training programs in critical shortage skill areas.</p>	<p>Magnitude of Outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 1000 person months of in-country training for high and middle level Zambians to strengthen their administrative and management skills will be provided. 2. 160 person years of U.S. long-term post graduate training in critical shortage skill areas will be provided. 3. 300 person months of U.S. and/or third country short-term training in critical shortage skill areas will be provided. 4. Staff or faculty at HCDP, NIPA and UNEZA engaged in either operational work or teaching in the critical shortage skill areas will be strengthened. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Project evaluation and training records. 2. GRZ five-year development plan and annual budget submissions. 3. Training institutions records. 	<p>Assumption for Achieving Outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. There are qualified Zambians available for training. 2. Local institutions are receptive to institutional strengthening.

<p>Costs:</p> <p>AID</p> <p>Technical Assistance: \$2990.0</p> <p> Long-Term (2090.0)</p> <p> Short-Term (900.0)</p> <p>Training: \$6740.0</p> <p> Long-Term (3840.0)</p> <p> Short-Term (2900.0)</p> <p>Instructional Materials and Commodities \$272.5</p> <p>Project Support Costs: \$562.3</p> <p>Inflation: \$1841.5</p> <p>Contingency: \$620.9</p> <p>TOTAL: \$13027.2 rounded to \$13028.0</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Country Budget Submission 2. Contractor Progress Reports 3. Audit Reports 4. Internal and External Evaluations 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. AID funding will be made available in a timely manner. 2. GRZ contributions will be provided in a timely manner.
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• GRZ

Local salaries and salaries
for trainees, housing for
long-term staff and office
supplies and equipment,
office space:

\$4,979.9

APPENDIX B: Individuals and Agencies Contacted

Mr. Cristofa Chirwa	Economic Advisor, Budget Office, Ministry of Finance (Returned Participant)
Mrs. Irene Kamanga	Permanent Secretary, Director of Budget, MOF (Supervisor of Returned Participants)
Mr. Emmanuel Musenge	Economist, Budget Office, Ministry of Finance (Returned Participant)
Mr. L. Kaemba	Human Resources Planning Dept., NCDP (Chairman, Training Subcommittee; Short-term and In-country Training Participant)
Dr. Gretta Middleton	Chief of Party, HIRD Project
Mr. B. Phiri	Foreign Operations, Dept., BOZ (Formerly BOZ Trng. Dept. and Participant in In-country Banking Seminar)
Mr. D. Mtonga	Training Dept., Bank of Zambia
Mr. James Malungo	Asst. Manager, Foreign Operations Dept., Zambia, EXIM Bank Ltd. (Requester of and Participant in In-country Banking Seminar)
Dr. D. Theo	Dean, School of Natural Sciences, UNZA (Former Head, Math. Dept.)
Dr. Leonard Chivwano	Director General, NCDP and Chairman, HIRD Project Executive Committee

Mrs. J. Muchelemba

Former Director, Human Resources
Planning Department, NCDP

Alan Van Egmond

Project Development Officer,
USAID/Zambia

Dr. Michael Dummer

Statistician, Former HIRD
Long-term TA

Mr. John Nalube

Lecturer, National Institute of
Public Administration (Returned
Participant)

APPENDIX C: Chronology of Implementation Events
Zambia Human and Institutional Resources Development Project

(HIRD, 611-0206)

1984

- July 11: AA/AFR signs Project Authorization for planned obligations not to exceed \$13.028 million.
- September 19: Project Agreement signed; initial tranche of \$1.068 million obligated; PACE set at September 30, 1990 (although PP facesheet had specified December 31, 1989). Amplified Project Description states that 160 person years of long-term U.S. training, 300 person months of short-term U.S. or third-country training, and 1000 person months of short-term in-country training will be provided. Note: Section 5.3 of the ProAg refers to Annex 3 entitled "Selection of Trainees", which was intended to fix criteria by which participants would be selected. No copy of this Annex is available in project files.
- September 28: ProAg Amendment No. 1 increases LOP funding to \$1.322 million. Note: This amendment was incorrectly executed. It was intended to obligate \$1.322 million in new funds, thereby raising total obligations to \$2.39 million. Yet this amendment simply raises total LOP amount to \$1.322 million. This was corrected by ProAg Amendment No. 3, issued in June 1985 (see below).
- November 1: PIO/T reserves \$1.567 million for long-term technical assistance. Seven long-term TA positions are foreseen; total LOP cost for technical assistance estimated at \$10.959 million. Note: PIO/T reduces number of person years of long-term U.S. training from 160 (as specified in ProAg) to 148.

1985

- February: Request for Proposals (RFP) for long-term technical assistance issued by AID/W.
- February 6: PIL No. 1 ratifies GRZ's fulfillment of Condition Precedent set forth in Section 4.1 of ProAg, i.e., submission of specimen signatures. Note: As Regional Legal Advisor Borns has advised USAID, no "Basic PIL" was ever issued for HIRD.

Appendix C (cont.)

1985 (cont.)

- March 5: GRZ accepts PIL No. 2 of February 6 approving nominations of five participants for long-term training even though GRZ had not yet fulfilled Condition Precedent in Section 4.2 of ProAg, i.e., that it would "furnish to A.I.D.: a training plan, satisfactory to the Project Executive Committee, outlining Zambia's professional manpower needs and priorities..."
- April 12: ProAg Amendment No. 2 raises total obligations to \$4.22 million. Note: This amendment added \$3.0 million in FY 85 funds to HIRD, which should have raised total obligations to \$5.39 million. However, its authors did not catch error in Amendment No. 1, which incorrectly listed total obligations through September 28, 1984 as \$1.322 million rather than \$2.39 million. These errors were corrected by ProAg Amendment No. 3, issued in June 1985 (see below).
- April 26: Joint GRZ/USAID selection panel meeting in AID/W ranks Roy Littlejohn Associates (RLA) first among respondents to RFP.
- June 5: ProAg Amendment No. 3 corrects errors in Amendments No. 1 and 2. Total obligations to HIRD are cited as \$5.39 million.
- September: First two participants begin long-term degree training in U.S.
- October: - AID/W elects to audit RLA before issuing award.
- USAID/Zambia decides to reduce planned LOP funding to \$11.028 million. Savings are to be achieved by reducing long-term IA positions from seven to three and decreasing planned short-term U.S. and third-country training. Note: These decisions are recorded in an internal, undated USAID memorandum: the Project Authorization, PP, and ProAg are not amended. This memorandum, however, was attached to a PIO/T amendment signed by GRZ in November 1985.
- October 21: AID/W issues interim letter contract to RLA for \$749,000, thus permitting implementation to continue while audit proceeds.
- November: Creative Associates, Inc. consultants Gretta Middleton and Robert Cole complete and submit to USAID a Zambia Manpower Assessment Study.

Appendix C (cont.)

1985 (cont.)

November 19: PIO/T for long-term TA is amended to reflect decisions made in October. Amount reserved remains \$1.567 million, but long-term TA positions are reduced from seven to three, planned short-term U.S. and third-country training is reduced from 300 to 160 person months, and planned short-term technical assistance is reduced from 51 to 37 person months. Anticipated total contract costs are reduced to \$7,800,900. Director General of NCDP co-signs this document on GRZ's behalf, thereby approving amendments in project design put forward by USAID in October.

1986

- January: Third participant begins long-term training in U.S.
- January 27: J.M. Mtonga, Director General of the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) and Chairman of the Project Executive Committee (PEC), agrees to USAID's January 23 proposal that short-term U.S. and third-country training be further reduced from 160 to 80 person months. He also approves nomination of Robert Cole for Manpower Economist position on grounds that GRZ has already worked with him, and approves USAID's proposal that AID/W proceed immediately to sign contract with RLA.
- February 7: USAID submits Zambia Manpower Assessment Study to NCDP with letter saying that, if study is "found acceptable by you," it will satisfy Condition Precedent (Section 4.2 of the ProAg) that GRZ submit to USAID an acceptable national training plan.
- February 27: Draft Terms of Reference prepared for PEC.
- April 30: University of Zambia (UNZA) ranks Dr. Michael Dummer as leading candidate for Senior Statistician position.
- May:
- "Participant Selection Subcommittee" sends memo to full PEC nominating seven candidates for long-term U.S. training to begin in September 1986.
 - Manpower Economist Robert Cole arrives in Zambia.
 - Fourth participant begins long-term training in U.S.
- June:
- Chief of Party/Development Management Specialist Gretta Middleton arrives in Zambia.
 - RLA executes sub-contract for \$463,743 with University of Maryland - Eastern Shore (UMES) for implementation of in-country training.

Appendix C (cont.)

1986 (cont.)

- July:** Senior Statistician Michael Dummer arrives in Zambia.
- July 9:** RLA executes sub-contract for \$671,707 with Transcentury Corporation (TCC) for implementation of U.S. and third-country training.
- July 11:** AID/W executes contract with RLA through Small Business Association. Effective date is February 1, 1986. Contract calls for 3 long-term TA positions, 37 person months of short-term TA, 148 person years of long-term U.S. training, 80 person months of short-term U.S. and third-country training, and 1000 person months of in-country training. Contract obligates initial tranche of \$1,567,000 of total estimated LOP TA cost of \$7,481,963.
- August:** USAID/Zambia begins effort to redesign HIRD to focus project inputs on supporting the GRZ's planned economic policy reform measures.
- September:** Five more participants begin long-term training in U.S.

1987

- February 18:** Discussion Paper on refocusing HIRD to support GRZ policy reform submitted to GRZ for review.
- March 19:** Preparation of Action Memorandum and PP Supplement refocusing HIRD to support GRZ policy reform is completed.
- April 24:** USAID writes to NCDP requesting approval to proceed with long-term training for 5 participants and short-term training for two participants "pending resolution of the issues surrounding the proposed new focus of the HIRD project..." NCDP approves this proposal on May 21.
- May 1:** President Kaunda discontinues IMF reform program, thus calling into question HIRD's new reform focus.
- June:**
- Tenth participant begins long-term training in U.S.
 - First short-term trainee departs for U.S.
 - First long-term participant completes studies.
- July:** GRZ releases a new economic reform plan.
- August:**
- 11th participant begins long-term training in U.S.
 - Two short-term trainees depart for U.S.

Appendix C (cont.)

1987 (cont.)

- September 30: HIRD PIR refers to the "recently focused project".
- October 2: USAID submits draft PP Supplement to NCDP for review.
- October 23: "Assessment of the USAID/Zambia Program" accompanying the PIR's reports that "the Mission is utilizing discussions on the HIRD Project as one means to test the GRZ's direction on restructuring policies."
- November 7: USAID submits to Director General (DG) of NCDP a plan for organizing HIRD. Primarily based on PP and ProAg, this plan incorporated various input changes already agreed upon, and would have narrowed project focus by having HIRD respond to "specifically targeted problems and management shortcomings at key economic ministries." Shortly after plan is submitted, DG is replaced; the record does not contain any official GRZ reply to this initiative.
- December: Two participants receive short-term training in Tanzania.
- December 16: USAID advises both DG of NCDP and Deputy Secretary to Cabinet for Manpower and Training of admission of three candidates for long-term U.S. training. Candidates are to depart on December 29. Comment: At this juncture, there seems to have been confusion between USAID and USA as to which GRZ entity had authority to approve candidates for training.
- December 22: RLA CGE Middleton writes Manpower Economist Cole to request that script be due in December be submitted.
- December 23: USAID Director meets with HIRD to discuss "continuing serious concerns re Dr. Cole's implementation of the Manpower Planning Component of HIRD."

1988

- January: - Three participants depart for long-term training in U.S.
- Second long-term participant completes studies.
- January 5: RLA telex authorizes CGP to "repatriate" Cole immediately. Note: Telex says that "USAID [emphasis added] has made decision that Manpower Economist position is no longer required." Termination is for convenience of the USC and in no way reflects on contractor performance."

Appendix G (cont.)

1988 (cont.)

- January 12: - RLA telex advises Cole that his contract is to be terminated.
- USAID advises Dr. Leonard Chivuno, new DG of NCDP, of Cole's removal.
- January 13: Middleton meets with Chivuno, who says he is "shocked and outraged." He objects to USAID's having taken unilateral action without consulting him; says that Cole was an employee of GRZ and that only GRZ could remove him. Chivuno suggests that all HIRD personnel move to USAID and states that HIRD "is obviously on the wrong track."
- January 19: Middleton meets with Mrs. Machelemba, head of Human Resources Development Department of NCDP. Machelemba says that she has been prohibited from continuing discussions re HIRD in light of "the serious nature of unresolved issues between the two governments and the necessity to hold high level talks."
- January 22: Middleton advises Cole that his contract is terminated as of January 29.
- February 16: DG rejects nomination of Mrs. Machelemba for short-term training "in view of...the unilateral dismissal of Dr. Cole..."
- February 19: RLA COP forwards to USAID a report from the Senior Statistician concluding that "it is highly unlikely that it will be possible to effectively implement a statistics degree program and establish a computing laboratory as called for in the project agreement."
- March 3: DG of NCDP declines USAID Director's request for meeting to discuss HIRD pending advice from GRZ on issue of Cole's dismissal.
- March 21: USAID Director again requests meeting with DG of NCDP to discuss HIRD. DG does not reply.
- March 25: RLA COP reports to USAID that head of UNZA Mathematics Department says Senior Statistician "has done an overall tremendous job."
- March 26: USAID Director Morse departs Zambia for consultations in U.S. While in Washington he is assigned to head a special task force; Mr. Morse never returns to Zambia.
- March 31: "Assessment of the USAID/Zambia Program" accompanying the PIR's reports that "the Minister has decided not to link the [HIRD] project explicitly to assisting in the implementation of the restructuring process."

Appendix C (cont.)

1988 (cont.)

- April 12: DG of NCDP advises RLA COP that he is not aware that he is responsible for approving training nominations. Moreover, he declines to consider such nominations pending "instructions from the Government" and notes that "the Government was concerned at the lack of courtesy by those who removed Dr. Cole..."
- April 15: Acting USAID Director Dean meets with DG and explains background of Cole's termination. DG says that he is awaiting "advice from the Cabinet"; until then, he cannot "provide clearance on the training nor discuss issues related to the future of the project."
- April 22: New PIO/T adds \$1,439,000 to amount reserved for RLA contract, thus increasing total amount reserved to \$3,006,000. LOP budget for TA is not changed.
- June: Third long-term participant completes studies.
- June 9: USAID and DG of NCDP meet and resolve outstanding issues concerning HIRD. It is agreed that:
- HIRD activities will be guided by the original PP;
 - USAID/Zambia is willing to expand the categories of training to other fields related to its program;
 - The RLA COP's office will be moved to USAID;
 - The Senior Statistician will continue in his position through the end of his contract;
 - The Project Executive Committee will be the decision making body for the HIRD Project; and
 - The organization of the in-country training program will be assessed.
- As a result of this meeting, the CRZ allows project implementation to resume. These decisions are recorded in separate memoranda prepared by USAID and NCDP; however, the basic project documents are not amended.
- June 14: USAID sends to NCDP a summary of decisions reached on June 9 and requests that DG co-sign this summary.
- June 22: RLA signs contract amendment increasing total amount obligated to \$3,006,000. LOP budget for TA is not changed.
- June 23: DG of NCDP accepts, with minor modifications, text of USAID's June 14 letter, but does not co-sign it.
- June 30: First meeting of PEC. Committee approves revised Terms of Reference for its work; notes that "policy guidance" is to be obtained at its next meeting.

Appendix C (cont.)

1988 (cont.)

- July 28:** Second meeting of PEC. Committee concludes that its policy with respect to trainee selection will be to adhere to original Project Paper objectives.
- August:**
- Fourth long-term participant completes studies.
 - One participant departs for short-term training in U.S.
- September:**
- RLA Senior Statistician is assigned to teach only one course in 1988/89 academic year.
 - Two participants begin long-term training in U.S.
 - Three participants receive short-term training in Kenya.
- October:**
- Two short-term participants depart; one for training in Egypt, one for training in Tanzania.
- October 6:**
- GRZ accepts PHL No. 3 extending PACD to June 30, 1991.
 - Third meeting of PEC. Training Subcommittee is formed and "given responsibility for screening the applicants for presentation to the PEC for approval."
- October 16:** Acting Head of UNZA Mathematics Department writes to his Dean that RLA Senior Statistician "is no longer willing to work with the Department" and requests "an immediate review" of that advisor's status.
- November 15:** A.I.D. Regional Contracting Officer and RLA meet in Lusaka. An exchange of letters on November 16-17 agrees that:
- Long-term training will be reduced to 75 person years;
 - Short-term U.S. and third-country training will be reduced to 60 person months;
 - In-country training will be reduced to 500 person months;
 - Short-term TA will be reduced to 30 person months;
 - The contractor's Scope of Work had not been expanded.
- These changes have not yet been incorporated in the basic project documents.
- November 16:** Fourth meeting of PEC. Committee hears oral report of Training Subcommittee; directs subcommittee to draw up its own Terms of Reference and submit them to PEC.

Appendix C (cont.)

1988 (cont.)

- December: - Two more participants complete long-term training in U.S.
- Two participants depart for short-term training at UMES.
- December 5: First in-country training session begins. 28 participants receive one week of instruction on International Banking Operations. Short-term TA (3 persons for one week) is furnished by Citibank.
- December 14: Fifth meeting of PEC. Committee declines to approve applications from employees of parastatal companies on grounds that criteria for reviewing such applications are still being drawn up.
- December 21: Deputy Vice-Chancellor of UNZA writes to Chairman of Project Executive Committee (PEC) to request that Senior Statistician's services be terminated.
- December 29: Chairman of PEC responds to UNZA letter; he concurs that Senior Statistician should be removed.

1989

- January: - 16 participants begin long-term training in U.S.
- Five participants begin short-term training in U.S.
- January 19: Chairman of PEC writes to USAID formally requesting that services of Senior Statistician be terminated.
- January 20: USAID approves termination of Senior Statistician.
- February 6: RLA COP notifies Senior Statistician that his contract is terminated as of February 15.
- February 17: PIO/T Amendment (co-signed by DG of NCDP) adds \$1,165,889 to RLA contract, thereby raising total amount reserved for TA to \$4,171,889. This effectively ratifies decisions made by RCO and RLA in November 1988. Level of effort for long-term technical assistance is fixed at 9.5 person years, and total LOP cost of TA is estimated at \$5,797,897.
- March 20: RLA signs contract amendment raising total obligations by \$1,165,889 to new total of \$4,171,889. Total estimated cost of contract is revised to \$5,801,179. Revised SEN calls for 9.5 person years of long-term TA, 30 person months of short-term TA, 75 person years of long-term training, 60 person months of short-term U.S. and third-country training, and 500 person months of in-country training.

Appendix C (cont.)

1989 (cont.)

March 29: Sixth meeting of PEC. Committee approves detailed criteria drawn up by Training Subcommittee for review of applications from public sector for long- and short-term training, approves workplan drawn up by Training Subcommittee for in-country training over remainder of LOP, and agrees in principal that it will not review applications received from individual parastatal employees, but rather that any such applications will first have to be vetted by the Training Departments of ZIMCO and INDECO, the two largest parastatal umbrella groups. PEC also agrees to review draft Terms of Reference for Training Subcommittee at its next meeting.

APPENDIX D: Recommended Financial Reporting Format

Long-Term Training

Person Years
(P Ys) Amount

- 1. Total Budgeted _____
- 2. PIO/Ps Issued/Expenditures _____

<u>Participants</u>	<u>Projected</u>		<u>Actual</u>		<u>Balance</u> (b-a)
	<u>P Ys</u> (a)	<u>PIO/P Amount</u> (b)	<u>P Ys</u> (c)	<u>Expenditures</u> (d)	

3. TOTAL	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4. Balance Available for Programming (1-3)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
5. Total Reimbursed Amount					_____

APPENDIX D (Cont'd)

Short-Term Training

	Person Months		Actual		Balance (b-a)
	(P M's)	Amount	P Ms (c)	Expenditures (d)	
Total Budgeted	_____	_____			
PIO/Ps Issued/Expenditures					
<u>Participants</u>	<u>P Ms</u> (a)	<u>PIO/P Amount</u> (b)	<u>P Ms</u> (c)	<u>Expenditures</u> (d)	
TOTAL	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Balance Available for Programming (1-3)	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Total Unbursed Amount					_____

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