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NUTRITION PLANNING IN CHILE

A Review by
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RECOMMENDATIONS - CONPAN

CONPAN should contract staff, develop orientation practices, and initiate management procedures that reflect its shift from design and monitoring of studies to overseeing implementation of major program activities.

CONPAN should shift emphasis from generation of further information to organization, comparison, and analysis of material already available, by forming the proposed Analysis Group.

CONPAN should assemble and catalogue available nutrition-related information from other sectors, and from its own work, in a central location and develop procedures for assuring continuous collection.

CONPAN should recognize that identification of intervention costs and benefits through present studies and pilot projects will be specific to the population characteristics and conditions studied, hence of limited general application to other populations and locations.

CONPAN should involve all agencies likely to participate in any eventual national program in the initial discussion and planning of studies and pilot projects that may result in later expanded activities.

CONPAN should develop, and disseminate widely, procedures for assuring that all potential contractors a) know of its needs, b) are offered regular opportunities for responding to them, and c) if selected, receive orientation and performance ratings.

CONPAN should continue trying to build a responsive information system in the Ministry of Agriculture and USAID should provide maximum support to this effort.

CONPAN should assist USAID to justify further PL 480 contributions to the Minimum Employment Program by marshalling evidence of its potential value for preventing malnutrition at little cost and thereby reducing need for more expensive supplementary feeding and recuperation centers.

CONPAN should give more attention to the problems of a) mobilizing, b) screening, c) training, d) programming and e) supervising and coordinating, the increased number of volunteers needed for expansion of Recuperation Center and Breast-Feeding Center projects.

RECOMMENDATIONS - CONPAN (Continued)

CONPAN should continue current emphasis on learning by doing, but should insulate program from delays inherent in the process (page 30).

CONPAN should assess carefully the costs of pilot projects before proposing expansion, to identify elements that may be omitted without serious impairment of results.

RECOMMENDATIONS - CONPAN AND USAID

USAID and CONPAN should view their relationship as a collaboration, making special efforts to accommodate to the constraints of their separate bureaucracies and to their different management styles.

USAID and CONPAN should revise output indicators to reflect more accurately their shared understanding of desired results and accepted criteria, including indicators of CONPAN consolidation as manifested by a) Analytic Group, b) Central Information System, c) Contractor effectiveness, and d) Bridges to other agencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS - USAID

USAID monitoring should concentrate on early detection of problems and approval of solutions by field observation and participation in initial project discussions, without waiting for documentation.

USAID should view CONPAN documents as summaries, or statements for the record, of matters already agreed upon, instead of using them as the basis for review.

USAID should recognize that adherence to proposed project performance schedules is often inconsistent with the more important goal of educating inexperienced, untested contractors, making schedules less relevant as indicators of CONPAN efficiency and effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATIONS - CSF

CSF should consider procedures for helping CONPAN reduce resistance from other agencies by familiarizing them with its role and with the language and concepts of Chilean nutrition planning.

CSF should calculate the extent to which David Nelson's reduced involvement with CONPAN will subtract from the Agency's operating capacity, since his contributions include both guidance and direct involvement in task performance

RECOMMENDATIONS - TA/N

TA/N should note that the trans-disciplinary organization of CONPAN has produced good results and avoided many of the typical problems found in multi-disciplinary groups.

TA/N should make increased use of CONPAN and Chilean nutrition planners as resources for training others, by encouraging visitors from other countries and Chilean visits elsewhere.

TA/N should consider the general applicability of CONPAN's tactic of improving efficiency as an entry point for coordination of, and influence on, activities of other agencies.

NUTRITION PLANNING IN CHILE

This Report seeks to meet evaluation needs of the Chilean National Council for Food and Nutrition (CONPAN), the U. S. AID Mission in Chile (USAID), Community Systems Foundation (CSF), and the AID Technical Assistance Bureau's Office of Nutrition (TA/N). Although the interests and concerns of each differ, all relate to aspects of CONPAN's nutrition planning work in Chile, including both activities and their consequences. The Report, based on two weeks in Chile and review of extensive documentation, proceeds from the Logical Framework statement of purposes, goals, and measurement indicators that accompanied the \$5,000,000 Nutrition Loan made by USAID in October, 1975. Investigation included concern for CONPAN progress in relation to documentary or formal criteria (e.g., number of projects, meeting of schedules) and also an attempt to assess, both subjectively and by more concrete measures, the underlying institution-building process. Although the formal indicators are important, they do not alone reflect adequately the likelihood that a permanent, self-perpetuating and consequential organization is evolving.

The Report assumes reader familiarity with the nature and goals of CONPAN, the USAID loan, the CSF rule, and CONPAN's approach to reducing malnutrition. Capital Assistance Paper AID/DLC/P-2079, the Loan Agreement dated October 24, 1975, and Carlos Schlesinger's "Short-term strategy of CONPAN" provide the relevant information. Checkmate to Underdevelopment by Dr. Fernando Monckeberg and Bases and Actions for a National Food and Nutrition Policy in Chile (Span.), edited by the same author, are useful for understanding the history and broader context of Chilean nutrition planning.

Meetings and interviews included all senior CONPAN staff and several direct hire and contracted employees, directors of major CONPAN contractors, and all available USAID staff concerned with the Loan. Extensive discussion with Dean Wilson and other CSF contract staff, visits to garden, environmental sanitation, and recuperation center projects, attendance at some CONPAN and USAID staff meetings, and a visit to the Interior Ministry, also contributed to conclusions. Remarkable openness, candor, and cooperation from all groups generated a level of information, involvement, and confidence in judgments unusual for a short visit.

METHOD

The Report approach distinguishes carefully between "process" and content or substantive aspects of the CONPAN Project. Both CSF assistance and the management style of Carlos Schlesinger, CONPAN's

Executive Secretary, emphasize process or "the way things happen" over immediate concern for the results of what happens. This means that conventional measures are less relevant to early outcomes, though both CSF and CONPAN accept their eventual relevance. For example, an evaluator might expect to review CONPAN management, in part, by examining organization charts, personnel and orientation policies, and the design of various internal systems. The Organization's style makes these concerns less important than indicators reflecting Schlesinger's claim that creativity and analytic thought have been furthered more by his relatively non-directive and informal team-building process than by early direct attention to formal structure.

CSF shares his emphasis on process, stating the technical assistance goal as development of "a way of thinking" about nutrition planning. Any activity or project must then be viewed primarily as part of that learning process, not as an end in itself, and appraised accordingly. Unlike many process-oriented trainers and managers, CSF and CONPAN directors acknowledge that their processes are directed to specific goals, the eventual reduction of malnutrition and the related, intermediate goal of a solid and effective CONPAN.

These process considerations broaden and complicate evaluation. It is no longer a matter of looking primarily at activities and results but requires assessment of the process ("what is the approach?"),

measurement of the outcome (e.g., "Are people analyzing and creating better?"), and relation of the process to stated purposes ("In this approach building a strong CONPAN?"). New measures are needed and the evaluator must also deal with traditional criteria. CONPAN and CSF are, in part, saying "look at process and quality, not quantity and form." This evaluation considers all of these elements and suggests a perspective for relating them.

The evaluation approach also emphasizes goal congruence. USAID and CONPAN, though jointly committed to the broad nutrition goal, have independent concerns and agendas. By making differences explicit, the evaluation seeks to ease their reduction. The approach is also less concerned with measuring project "success" or "failure" than with feeding back information that can help participants agree on new ways to improve effectiveness.

The Evaluation reconstructs a baseline from USAID and CONPAN recollections, to provide a level from which progress can be measured. It also appraises Chilean nutrition planning in relation to other countries and to the principles propounded and disseminated by TA/N. The Chilean experience, though difficult to duplicate as rapidly in countries with less favorable contexts, offers many useful lessons for nutrition planners.

THE CONPAN CONTEXT

The existence and permanence of CONPAN depend heavily on the personality and accomplishments of Dr. Fernando Monckeberg. With CONPAN, the Institute of Nutrition and Food Technology of the University of Chile (INTA) and the Corporation (Foundation) for Child Nutrition (CORPANI), he has created the best institutional framework for nutrition planning and action in the world. Coordination among the three flows far more easily because of Monckeberg's relation to them. His prestige and contacts generate private industry support and protect CONPAN in the shoals of Chilean political and bureaucratic life.

Dr. Monckeberg is a man with a broad vision that includes a malnutrition-free Chile. It is a paradox that, having built the means for making the vision a reality, achievement of the goal will require that they become less dependent on him. Until CONPAN can clearly thrive without Dr. Monckeberg's constant political and other support, nutrition planning will not be a permanent part of Chilean development. Almost everyone interviewed tied CONPAN's immediate future to Dr. Monckeberg and objective evidence of his political role supports that prediction. This Report assumes that he will continue to exercise his excellent survival skills successfully on CONPAN's behalf, for the next few years. This is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for future CONPAN progress.

INTA and CORPANI are important resources for CONPAN. The Chilean context also includes a 20-year history of nutrition interest and feeding programs that accelerates CONPAN impact. Various Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education affiliates have delivery systems that handle nearly \$100,000,000 of Chilean and PL 480 food annually. The plethora of different feeding activities demanded rationalization in an economy with ever-increasing difficulty in financing them, providing CONPAN with an entry point rarely available in other countries.

CONPAN also benefits from the high level of literacy and education in Chile. It has assembled a group of professionals that, for proficiency in operations research, information systems, and analytic capability, cannot be matched in the developing world. The array of available consultants leaves little need for international help. CSF assistance is more a dialogue among equals than a didactic relationship. Schlesinger's group should be considered "trans-disciplinary". There is little of the rivalry and poor communication that characterizes "multi-disciplinary" groups in the U. S. and elsewhere. The talented generalists available in Chile made possible, but did not assure, creation of this impressive CONPAN team.

The Chilean political system also influences the CONPAN context. The organization stays relatively free of partisan politics, but

much senior staff time goes to protecting the institution. An outside evaluator gets little more than the flavor of such activity, but the volume is significant. Government by decree facilitates CONPAN involvement with other agencies and reduces differences among its inter-ministerial governing board (CONSEJO). It has also deceived some CONPAN staff into thinking that coordination among field level government agency people will be easy. The little experience already available suggests that this is not the case. CONPAN attempts to organize projects in Administrative Regions and to coordinate feeding activities among various agencies encountered the same difficulties found in other countries. The transition from planning to action will not be much easier in Chile than elsewhere.

The Ministry of the Interior recently replaced Health as the parent ministry of CONPAN. Interior is one of the strongest ministries, with responsibility for all social programs and the political power to compel the appearance of coordination from top staff of participating agencies. The present political context makes ODEPLAN, the national planning agency, less influential than most operational ministries. Nutrition planning groups in many countries are part of the national planning agency, often with little impact on nutrition-

related activities. The decision to move CONPAN to Interior reflects, in part, the nutrition planning group's bureaucratic strength and the Government's commitment to improve feeding programs. Future results should offer guidance for organization problems of nutrition planning everywhere.

Chile's economic instability, high unemployment (estimated at 20 percent by many), and inflation problems force CONPAN to focus on modification of existing activities. Chile lacks the resources and stability needed for longer-term planning of new nutrition-related activities. Until current programs become more efficient and more consistent with nutrition goals, it is difficult to assess need for new efforts. Current Chilean expenditures on health and feeding may well be adequate to achieve CONPAN's goal of 50 percent reduction in malnutrition within 10 years. Chile's extensive health service systems and data collection allow CONPAN to function at a level of analytical sophistication unavailable to most countries.

THE BASELINE

CONPAN, USAID and CSF agree that the nutrition planning agency has made substantial progress during the three years since it was formed. They refer, with varying emphasis, to CONPAN's image and power, its ability to prepare and present documents, the number of projects undertaken and completed, and the increased ability of

staff to think, analyze, and learn from experience. There is not too strong a word for the impression conveyed by discussions of CONPAN's first two years. Despite early CSF assistance through the \$500,000 grant that preceded the loan, and contrary to the orderly picture drawn in the Loan Paper, reports of the early days describe an almost paralyzing confusion about directions, organization, and staff orientation. While such reports easily exaggerate how bad things were, sometimes an unconscious justification for current deficiencies, CONPAN clearly started from a small and uncertain base. The 1976 Implementation Plan, though transmitting an air of confidence and direction, was apparently unaccompanied by staff and organization sufficient to carry it out. These emerged during the year of implementation, so that review of this emergence is as important as activities and impact of the projects contemplated. The 1976 Plan, if taken as an indicator of CONPAN's situation at the time, overstates the reality, emphasizing the need to assess progress by other measures as well. All conditions precedent to Loan disbursement were not met until February 21, 1976 and the CSF contract was executed on July 15. This review, starting from a baseline of about one year ago, comes very early in the institutional life of CONPAN. Compliments and criticism in the Report are offered with full consideration of the fragile context and short period in which CONPAN has functioned.

1. THE EVALUATION

A. CONPAN Today

The logical Framework Indicators and levels of output for the loan's first year include: a) 8-10 staff members, b) 5-8 studies or surveys, and c) 35-70 projects. CONPAN was also to "analyze 100-200 projects" and "select 50-75", while also making "50-100 project performance specifications." At least one major policy recommendation in some sector was anticipated.

CONPAN today has nine direct hire employees, called "la planta," and another 18, referred to as counterparts, who are under contract but otherwise indistinguishable from permanent staff. It maintains continuing relationships with at least five contractors and has been involved with others. Former counterparts have become consulting contractors, "created" by CONPAN, so lines are blurred.

The Agency started 14 projects, completing eight, during 1976 and expects to be involved in 31 this year. Various policy recommendations were made, almost all to the national school feeding agency (JUNAEB), and contractors received project performance specifications, though far fewer than 50.

CONPAN spent \$621,000 in 1976 with \$225,000 from the Loan and \$396,000 from Government. Major expansion proposed in the 1977 Implementation Plan contemplates use of \$550,000 in Government funds and about \$2,000,000 from the loan. No rate of disbursement is specified for the \$4,000,000 total Government commitment during the

loan period. During the evaluation visit, CONPAN delivered to USAID a letter from the Minister of the Interior to the Mission Director, confirming a mutually acceptable disbursement schedule, thereby reaffirming Government commitment to the Project.

The foregoing, though useful, shows the limitations of quantification. End-of-Project purpose indicators, such as adherence to schedules and accurate prediction of pilot project results, also reflect the difficulties of measuring the building of an institution. The indicators, though some indication of institutionalization, are misleading and too easily become ends in themselves. The Project Summary refers to the need to institutionalize a nutrition policy planning, implementation, and evaluation process. Viewing CONPAN in terms of its role in this process reveals major accomplishments, perhaps the most impressive nutrition planning progress in the world.

B. CONPAN as an Institution

Institutionalization refers to the process whereby new ideas become meaningful and valuable to a society. This implies that the organizations propounding and disseminating these ideas also become valuable, so that both ideas and organizations are lasting parts of the social system.^{1/} Sociologists suggest that permanence

1/ For a useful discussion and analytical framework of institutionalization, see Institution-Building: A Source Book, Melvin G. Blase (ed. AID, 1973, particularly contributions of Milton J. Esman.

of an institution is served when it has good a) Leadership, b) Doctrine, c) Program, d) Resources, and e) Internal Structure. Survival depends also on relationships ("Linkages") with other groups and organizations, including enabling linkages, functional linkages, normative linkages, and diffused linkages.

Behind this jargon are insights useful for viewing the prospects for CONPAN and its ideas to become serious and important in Chile and for assessing current progress toward this goal.

C. Leadership and Doctrine

CONPAN has, in a relatively short time, developed leadership and doctrine that offer great promise for institutional progress. Dr. Fernando Monckeberg B. and Carlos Schlesinger F., Coordinator and Executive Secretary of the Council that CONPAN serves, have attracted loyalty and commitment from a capable staff, selected largely from among people made available through their wide contacts.

CSF technical assistance, emphasizing nutrition planning as a learning system based on careful use of disaggregated data, also contributes to institutional strength, by adding to the doctrines of nutrition planning an empirical, pragmatic approach that makes CONPAN more than a research center or a haven for "desk planners." The entire staff speaks and acts with a striking commonality of approach that discourages ideology and insularity, substituting experiment, observation, and learning what "works."

Through a combination of careful selection and informal orientation, a shared language and understanding permeates the Group. CONPAN staff, whether direct hire or contracted, know what they are doing. They can describe the study projects they initiate and monitor, explain relationships to other information and to CONPAN's broad strategy, and project logical consequences of study outcomes. Their ability to talk intelligently about these matters is an objective indicator of CONPAN progress, but does not by itself assure adequate performance of the contracting and monitoring activities that are major staff tasks. The studies now planned or underway make sense and will answer questions important to Chilean nutrition planning. They are being done in orderly fashion and, despite delays, most have been completed in time to be useful.

D. Program

Staff understanding of goals and approach does not alone assure effective planning and execution of program. CONPAN depends heavily on contractors for some planning and most execution. Staff concentrates on generation of ideas, preparation of specifications, and the monitoring of contractor performance. Program suffers from staff inexperience with contractors and from contractors' lack of experience with the needs and doctrine of CONPAN. Nevertheless, the past year produced an array of program outcomes consistent, in number and quality, with the age, size, and context of CONPAN staff and contractors.

In fairness to CONPAN and CSF, it should be noted that program activities were viewed as learning experiences, ways of building understanding and ability, not just an outpour of information (e.g., studies) or nutrition impact (pilot projects). Contractors generated new data and refined existing sources. They completed initial testing of a center for improving incidence and duration of breast-feeding and another for treating severely malnourished infants and maintaining them at adequate nutrition levels. An experiment to test nutrition impact of "casetas sanitarias" (indoor water and lavatory facilities) and another exploring benefits and costs of home gardens, with 60 gardens planted, are underway. Nutrition status data is better, a system for speedier retrieval and analysis of agricultural information is almost finished, and a technique for identifying concentrations of malnutrition has been used to focus future efforts. CONPAN has also moved into the school feeding system, after studying ways to improve efficiency, and is now testing a more efficient, pre-cooked food with 10,000 children.

Although the brief evaluation visit was not intended for a detailed review of each project, limited observation supported some conclusions about their quality. The activities listed above, and others not included, are being done well. It was easy to identify delays and omissions. There are also contractor studies that overlap

and are unimpressive, and a Pudahuel recuperation center with a few volunteers when sixty are critical. A television training program, for volunteers who will work in new breast-feeding centers, finished much too long before assignments were available, making it of little value. Despite these and other mishaps, the overall impression is very favorable. In the field, where it is much harder than in the laboratory, CONPAN has made things happen in a way so close to what was contemplated that concepts have been fairly tested. This is a useful objective criterion for assessing quality. Studies have produced data that has demonstrable relation to improved nutrition planning. CONPAN activities are consistent with the Agency's doctrine and are moving fast enough and well enough to suggest that program, far from being an impediment to institutionalization, is a major factor in CONPAN's clear movement into the Chilean system.

The doctrine emphasizes relevance, application, finding out "what works," but CONPAN has not, except in school feeding, moved into other systems. Pilot projects undertaken by contractors do not test capacity of the Government systems that would have to carry out a national program. The explanations that CONPAN must have "something" to offer" before dealing with national agencies, and that contractors do better and faster work, make clear limitations of the CONPAN program. The Agency is not yet in the operating arena. This is not said critically, but to make explicit the major challenge still ahead.

Failure to test projects through the delivery systems with ultimate responsibility taken prior cost figures and reliable guidance for replicability. The Recuperation Center project, for example, offers little guidance for the costs of a realistic and efficient national program. The 1983 contribution of \$4 per child per day covers less than half the actual cost of keeping children in the present centers. Although Dr. Monckeberg can raise the balance privately from donors who would give only for this purpose, a review of costs would still be useful. Having shown that recuperation is possible, it behooves CONPANI to try and establish that it can be done at lower cost.

The environmental sanitation and garden projects raise similar issues. Testing concepts, they require the additional step of reviewing success to determine what inputs were critical, so that broader implementation can be based on minimum cost feasible for attaining a like result.

Program also includes development of additional information through studies, and integration of it into a planned, but not yet implemented, central information system. There is adequate attention to use and improvement of existing sources. Plans for analyzing and using the information, though conceptually consistent, have so far rarely gone beyond studies of methodology. CONPANI seems a little reluctant to jump in and draw conclusions, possibly because the high standards of Chilean research make staff sensitive to possible criticism. CONPANI seems a little uncertain about the difference between standards for scientific acceptance and those for use of information in decision-making.

CONPAN's extraordinary attention to volume and quality of information is saved from the traditional academicism of nutrition planning by concern for rapid collection, use of secondary sources, and willingness to base conclusions on limited knowledge. A good combination of careful social scientists and practical administrators has so far maintained appropriate balance. Involvement with SNS (National Health Service) and the Ministry of Agriculture, though not always successful, has improved CONPAN sources of data. An information base sufficient for nutrition planning exists. CONPAN now needs to systematize it and to develop a program of analysis related to the planning tasks ahead.

E. Resources and Internal Structure

CONPAN has, for the moment, more money than it can profitably use. The AID loan, though a major impetus to CONPAN, creates a pressure to disburse that is not always useful. USAID willingness to accept slower disbursement than originally proposed in the 1977 Implementation Plan helped reduce that pressure. It is more important that CONPAN develop in an orderly way conducive to permanence than that the loan be fully disbursed on schedule. Stretching the loan period would encourage careful expansion of CONPAN and ease transition to the time when outside funds are not available.

CONPANI now looks like an organization. It has internal structure and systems, supervision and communication patterns that work reasonably well, and administrative relations with the Chilean Government and USAID that keep it out of trouble.

All of this evolved through a conscious management choice, supported by CSF, to avoid imposition of job descriptions, organization charts, and specific procedures, until the staff learned what it wanted. Despite the pain to both staff and to USAID, the worst is over. CONPANI staff express only minor concerns about adequacy of their systems, objective manifestations conform to accepted management and organizational practices, and the work gets done. What first appears to be a chaotic CONPANI turns out, on closer observation, to be the healthy movement of an active organization. Structure and management support the present level adequately, though some improvement will be required for the ambitious expansion planned.

F. Linkages

CONPANI's recent support comes primarily from what sociologists call normative and diffused linkages, meaning relationships to institutions (e.g., church, newspapers) that set moral tone and to the general public. These linkages reinforce "enabling" relationships which, in Chile, are few and centralized.

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The excellent state of these relationships highlights weakness of "functional linkage," relations with producers of inputs and consumers of outputs, the key to survival of nutrition planning agencies everywhere. Multi-sectoral nutrition planning forces the nutrition planning agency to depend on others to do what has to be done. CONPAN's authority excludes implementation. It is to plan, coordinate, and evaluate. Without the understanding and cooperation of others, it will join too many other nutrition planning groups outside the mainstream of development decisions and action.

CONPAN has been doing well politically. In a Chilean polity given to empire building, Dr. Monckeberg and colleagues overcame a Ministry of Health challenge and were "promoted" to the more powerful Interior Ministry. They soon took the measure of ineffective officials in the school-feeding agency and are ensconced as powerful technical advisers. The Council of Ministers that is the Board of CONPAN gives little difficulty to either Dr. Monckeberg or the staff.

The political power that makes things easier now has led CONPAN to neglect the more fundamental task of building support among other agencies, that is based on shared understanding of nutrition goals and CONPAN's approach to achieving them. Without this, CONPAN remains highly vulnerable to changes in political winds. Its present reliance on political backing can only alienate rivals who will rush to destroy CONPAN when that backing diminishes. CARE, CARITAS and other private

voluntary agencies represent a constituency that COMPAN has not yet enlisted successfully, despite similar ultimate goals, which could be helpful later.

Monckeberg and Schlesinger claim that COMPAN will coordinate successfully through the superior knowledge it is now acquiring. This is better than exclusive reliance on political power, but ignores the inevitable resentment among those thereby castigated as having less knowledge and wisdom.

COMPAN's relationships with other agencies do not now appear promising for institutional influence and survival. With full allowance for distinctive aspects of "The Chilean Mentality" (a COMPAN explanation) and Chilean political life, the cultivation of other agencies needs attention. It is not premature, because delay increases isolation of COMPAN, stimulates defensiveness and freezes existing threatening impressions.

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SUMMARY

The foregoing describes a CONPAN that has made remarkable progress in a short time. Its ideas, and the organization itself, are well on the way to fulfilling the vision of Schlesinger's strategy paper and the USAID Loan. Morale is high, staff work hard and effectively, and pilot projects are verifying intervention possibilities that may eventually eliminate malnutrition in Chile. Media coverage is so good that consumers would think malnutrition was already on the run.

Sensitive technical assistance from CSF, non-directive and non-condescending, provides moral support, a useful catalyst and sounding board, and access to new ideas. Perhaps most important, it has helped CONPAN learn from mistakes, so that, throughout the evaluation visit, there was frank acknowledgment of past mishaps and shared concern for ways to avoid recurrences.

This Report deliberately ignores these mishaps, because they are negligible in relation to the learning they produced and the substantial accomplishments made despite them. Remainder of the Report, resting mainly on weaker aspects of CONPAN performance, is not intended to detract from these accomplishments.

II. SOME CAUTIONARY NOTES

These notes deal with CONPAN's institutional survival, technical aspects of its approach to reducing malnutrition, and relationships with its North American lender and technical assistance contractor. They view CONPAN as having reached a consolidation period, where concern to understand, reinforce, and secure what has happened so far becomes more important than the headlong rush to "get things going" that characterized the first three years.

Concern for consolidation requires attention to the four major areas of a) Internal coordination and systematization of information, b) Preparation for monitoring of projects, c) Improved contractor performance, and d) Building relationships with other agencies.

A. Internal Information

Although the staff has demonstrated capacity for collecting and presenting data, they have not yet reached the more difficult tasks of analyzing them and applying findings. A proposed "Analytical Group" has not yet materialized and descriptions of what it will do are still vague. The staff takes too literally the goal of finding which interventions "work", failing to recognize that it is part of a continuing learning process and not a static point that will

be reached at some time. There is inadequate understanding of the importance of management and operation factors to intervention impact and of the difficulties of generalizing pilot project outcomes to different populations and conditions.

These observations are not offered critically but as guidance. The CONPAN group shows remarkable facility with the concepts, information, and techniques of nutrition planning. Many lack non-academic field experience and the whole world shares their uncertainty about how to select and link nutrition-related activities in an efficient and effective attack on malnutrition. The Community System Foundation emphasis on testing and learning by doing, shared by CONPAN, should keep the staff from making too many mistakes twice, but should be accompanied by immediate consolidation of information and analysis within the Organization.

CONPAN's efficiency and effectiveness would be increased substantially if it paid more attention to the storage and retrieval of information, both that produced internally and the large quantities generated by others. New staff mention difficulties in finding both kinds of information and an outside observer soon sees other signs of inadequate institutional memory. The problem will become more serious as CONPAN continues, so a little attention now will avoid later anguish.

CONPAN's grand vision includes a computer-stored information system and design plans are already underway. Before this eventuality emerges, the Organization could easily drown in the information now being accumulated. Even with the projected more sophisticated system, CONPAN needs a simple library where relevant materials from various sectors are brought together conveniently. The same facility, which can easily fit within present office space, should also include all project documents and reports produced by CONPAN and contractors. By initiating a simple numbering system now, CONPAN will make retrieval of documents easier and encourage the kind of information review that facilitates and improves project preparation. INTA already has a library with useful nutrition planning material that should be integrated with CONPAN.

CONPAN has discussed and may eventually install a "Documentation Center" that requires considerable planning and design. That is much lower priority than the simple steps here proposed, which require nothing more than some instruction to a librarian or a short concentrated effort by current staff.

The failure to take simple steps, while planning more elaborate ones, reflects a CONPAN concern for advanced technology that occasionally slows and impairs performance. No amount of technology can substitute for conscious and systematic sharing of information. Director Schlesinger should set the example without further ado.

The number and cost of CONPAN projects are poor indicators of the Agency's past performance or future operating and management burdens, because these depend more on the kind of activities involved and on contractors' capability. For example, in 1977, CONPAN proposes to move from small initial experiments with two Nutrition Recuperation Centers and eight Breast Feeding Centers to larger numbers of both. The exact increase was not fixed at the time of the evaluation visit, but will probably call for at least 10 recuperation facilities and almost 50 of the other centers, CORPANI, an agency with little operating experience, will be the vehicle for both activities, assisted by other contractors retained by CONPAN. These two projects are likely to tax CONPAN far more than equivalent expenditures on studies by experienced consulting contractors. The lack of operating experience among CONPAN staff and contracted monitors supports this conclusion.

This does not mean that the proposed major expansion is unwise. It does suggest, however, that CONPAN and USAID should recognize that loan implementation is moving to a new phase that requires quite different management and monitoring concerns. During the "design and experiment" phase, CONPAN could be organized to encourage creativity and could enjoy the luxury of loving attention to small pilot operations. Its new responsibilities call for the kind of scheduling and adherence to plans that USAID overemphasized during the first year. CONPAN proposes to contract out the initiation of many CORPANI activities, but this broadens the monitoring task

while it simultaneously brings additional competent people to the operation. Hiring contractors to run programs is not so different from adding to your own staff to do it.

Calling attention to implications of this fundamental change in CONPAN's activities, which their closeness to it seemed to prevent CONPAN and USAID from recognizing fully, may help to restructure management and monitoring. CONPAN needs to organize for managing "production" and USAID needs to monitor new activities. Perhaps the most important consequence for both is the increased importance of field visits. Neither consultants' reports to CONPAN nor CONPAN reports to USAID will describe adequately what is going on, and the little they do convey will be too late to be useful. With fifty or more sites involved, magnitude of the tasks is clear. While neither agency will need to cover all locations, maintaining reasonable grasp of what is happening is still a formidable job. The possibility of sharing oversight by joint scheduling should be considered as part of a more collaborative relationship between the two agencies.

CONPAN's priority to encouragement of breast-feeding, installation of recuperation centers, and rationalization of school lunch and other feeding activities, reflects accurately the initial findings of diagnostic investigation. They also respond to political constraints and the need to take advantage of existing service systems and resource distribution. Although the strategy appears, at first, to be vulnerable to the charge that symptoms instead of fundamental causes are being attacked, careful examination reveals adequate

concern for prevention of malnutrition. The recuperation Center project, for example, emphasizes use of social casework to link families to employment opportunity and to existing service systems, assuming that this will break the cycle that produces and maintains malnutrition. Experience in the United States illustrates the difficulties of doing this and evaluation should view rehabilitation of children as only an intermediate step in the broader prevention process. Infants with third degree malnutrition can be rehabilitated at much lower cost, but if evaluation shows that the Project has real impact on family self-sufficiency, based in part on appropriate use of available Government services, it will be worth the higher cost.

Even CONPAN views supplementary feeding as short-term and palliative. Chilean history suggests, however, a commitment to food distribution as a political tool and income distribution vehicle. Rationalization of feeding activities becomes, then, a way of improving the nutrition impact of programs likely to remain indefinitely. Nutritional self-sufficiency and independence are not inconsistent with supplementary feeding based on taxation, local participation, and reliance on domestic production. CONPAN's recognition that Government food purchases will be a major stimulus to improved agriculture and food processing implies acceptance of feeding programs as part of any long-run solution. This reduces the need for coordination of the agricultural sector, since Government purchases use the market to redirect production to the malnourished.

Acknowledgment of supplementary feeding as more than a short-run phenomenon highlights its potential for reducing incidence, not just prevalence, of malnutrition. Chilean economic policies may produce new malnutrition as fast as recuperation centers and targetted feeding eliminate the old, unless this is recognized. While the Minimum Employment Program, that gives food for work to the otherwise unemployed, is politically sensitive and difficult for CONPARI to touch, it would be useful to consider more fully its potential for preventing malnutrition. This could be done as part of the Recuperation Center Project, since linking of the two projects is vital to full detection of third degree malnutrition. Unemployment of the bread-winners is a major determinant of serious malnutrition. This means that the Minimum Employment program prevents a significant amount of need for nutritional recuperation. If the concentration of malnutrition in unemployed families is high enough, and the cost of the Minimum Employment Program is low enough, "preventive feeding" may be substantially more efficient than recuperation, without even counting the prevention of human suffering involved. Data already available to CONPARI would permit some a priori comparison that would be helpful for both projects. Additional activities to assure full use of the prevention potential in the Minimum Employment Program should be a major concern of CONPARI and USAID. Although the Program was to be temporary, it offers an outstanding opportunity for design of a Chilean feeding strategy that maximizes efficient prevention of malnutrition.

1. Expansion and Learning

Although CONPAN and CSF shared a management approach that abhorred imposition of formal structures, prescribed roles for new staff, and early adoption of documentation procedures, these conventional indices are now at reasonable levels in the Agency. It took a cash crisis to force CONPAN into development of an adequate financial reporting system and the shock of confronting an ambitious 1977 Implementation Plan to generate formal project preparation procedures. Explicit definition of monitoring practices flowed from the pain of discovering damage from failure to track contractors adequately.

These examples illustrate the virtues of CSF and CONPAN concern to "learn by doing", with the concomitant delays and mistakes that accompany the process. Schlesinger and Dean Wilson affirm that unstructured orientation and job assignments generate more effective learning motivation and performance. Evaluation interviews were consistent with this conclusion, though what would have happened, had more structure been imposed, could not be compared.

USAID should recognize that the approach implies evaluation by review of learning and not by assessment of formal indicators of management efficiency. CONPAN and CSF have not provided USAID with different indicators that reflect their approach more adequately. Until they do, USAID can only assume that they are content to be reviewed against conformity to schedules, number of projects, existence of protocols, and similar measures.

Although CONPAN and CSF exhibit a tolerance for ambiguity that taxes USAID, growth seems to have brought their management concerns

closer. Perhaps in part from USAID prodding, COMPAN now has a finance and administration director who is installing internal management systems that should produce information required by USAID and useful to COMPAN. While maintaining a fluid table of organization, COMPAN has evolved departmental structures, executive committee, and supervisory patterns consistent with increased size and expanded activities. There is reasonable likelihood that the improved organizational structure can handle the management burden imposed by the projected expansion. The earlier centralized, unstructured system would have been inadequate to the new tasks, though useful for the initial period.

Learning by doing is a luxury that COMPAN may not be able to afford during the coming expansion. The price of some delays and mistakes will be unacceptable to USAID and the Government, COMPAN management and technical assistance staff can adapt their approach to this constraint. Emphasis on the learning process need not diminish, and a management style that encourages initiative and evolution of forms from practice is still desirable. However, program must be consciously insulated from the consequences of these processes. This can be done by (a) Responding to ambiguity and pain earlier, without sacrificing the learning value of such experiences, (b) Accelerating feedback of management information to assure early detection of operating problems, and (c) Monitoring staff performance to eliminate quickly those who do not learn rapidly and well. If these steps are taken, integrity of the

non-directive, experiential learning process can be maintained while adhering to a performance schedule consistent with USAID indicators and the other COMPAD goals they reflect.

2. Efficiency and Effectiveness

CONPAN efficiency in performance of activities would have to be assessed by exploring contractors' activities and costs, since the Agency acts primarily through them. This was not possible during the evaluation visit. In a narrow sense, the evaluation assessed CONPAN's efficiency as a generator of project ideas, monitor of their performance by contractors, and coordination of nutrition-related activities among other agencies. Without attempting rigorous cost comparisons, difficult at best in this context, it seems clear that CONPAN has initiated activities consistent, in number and quality, with what could be expected from a reasonably efficient group of its size and resources.

People work hard at CONPAN and interviews showed morale to be high. Internal lunch facilities discourage excessive mid-day respites and office conversations deal primarily with business matters. Schlesinger's management style encourages "creative chaos", but the outcome compares favorably, in quantity and quality, with more directive approaches in similar groups.

The CONPAN decision-making process, more participatory since size compelled Schlesinger to increase delegation, needs attention. It is not clear that the group has recognized the need to relate involvement and time of participants to importance of decisions being made. There will be some inefficiency and wheel-spinning until more explicit specification of the decision-making process evolves. This is not unusual and is a minor concern.

CONPAN develops management structure, procedures and techniques when the pain of not having them becomes critical. Some reduction in the pain threshold would improve efficiency without sacrificing the management principles involved. The proposed Library, Analysis Group, and Operations Center, for example, have been delayed too long, since need for them emerged months ago.

Efficiency of CONPAN contracting procedures and monitoring has improved, as the Agency, USAID, and the contractors have learned more, AID had reduced requirements for contract approvals and speeded clearance on those submitted. A few contractors were weeded out and the others maintain close contact with CONPAN. Requests for proposals are generally well thought out and contractor responses appear much like those made in the United States. Close review, during the visit, of a problem encountered in performance of a contract to review SNS nutrition status data afforded opportunity to check operation of the contracting system. CONPAN's request had been clear but INUAL, the contractor chosen, responded ambiguously though better than others. Four months later, CONPAN discovered, through an interim report, that the contractor seemed to have misconstrued the assignment. The damage was promptly discussed and corrected, without serious impairment of schedule or efficiency. Whether CONPAN would have acted as effectively without CSF consultant David Nelson, who was heavily involved, is not clear, but learning value of the experience was communicated promptly. CONPAN will be reviewing proposals more carefully and getting reports earlier in the future.

Efficiency may suffer as the Agency moves into monitoring of larger project operation contracts, though CONPAN is now developing procedures intended to anticipate this. The major expansion contemplated for 1977 will tax CONPAN, but present and projected staff should be able to handle it without serious deterioration in efficiency. Study contracts, and others with established contractors such as TERRA and INUAL, require relatively little monitoring. Problems will come in the large operations projects with untested contractors. CONPAN and USAID should concentrate monitoring on these.

3. Expansion and Volunteers

CONPAM and CORPAMI will be involved, through expansion of the recuperation centers and the center for encouragement of breast-feeding, in dramatic increase of the number of volunteers working in Chile. Each recuperation center can easily use fifty volunteers for "inside" work alone, with the number required for follow-up social work not yet clear. The breast-feeding centers base impact on continued personal contact with participating women and also require many volunteers. It seems likely that 1500-2,000 more volunteers will need to be mobilized, assigned and supervised within the next twelve months.

TASA, the impressive consulting group contracted to implement the project for CORPAMI, has some awareness of the problems involved in major expansion of voluntary service, but lacks the time and experience necessary to cope with them. CONPAM and CORPAMI appear less familiar with the complex tasks involved. The recruitment, selection, training, programming, supervision and evaluation of volunteers requires more attention than the already difficult tasks of finding and training professional staff.

There is a CORPAMI volunteer group that has successfully staffed the Pedro de Valdivia Center in Santiago, but has had trouble keeping the Pudahuel Center at full strength. The prevalence of vacations during January and February, among middle-class Chileans, raises

doubts about feasibility of a year-round volunteer-staffed program and needs special attention. CARITAS and Red Cross volunteers also do useful work in Chile, but neither they nor any other single group seem capable of managing the expansion contemplated. This means that coordination of participation by volunteer groups will present problems, since many want to be involved in the nutrition-related activities. If these activities are to materialize as described, Chile needs some help with the professionalization of volunteer services.

The Overseas Education Fund of the League of Women Voters, (OEF) has done useful work on professionalization of volunteer service in many Latin American countries. The Colombian Association of Volunteers (ACOVOL), which became even more effective with OEF help, maintains high standards of volunteer performance. Both organizations are good sources of knowledge, experience, and training materials. Their approach to volunteer service shares CONPAN's emphasis on planning and evaluation, adding a concern for inter-personal effectiveness and communication skills that could benefit CONPAN along with prospective volunteers.

Chile has a Secretaria de la Mujer that coordinates all matters relating to women, including volunteer service. There are rumors that CONPAN and CORPANI have already dealt unhappily with it, though details were hard to confirm. The Secretaria is highly political and, if it is not an appropriate vehicle, the CORPANI group is an adequate base for building the volunteer support essential to the projects.

Secretaria volunteers staffed a CORPANI-assisted milk study survey effectively and also maintain several CEBA's (Maternal and Child Centers) that should be linked more closely with the recuperation centers. CORPANI has also been in touch with CIDE (Center for Education Development Research), a university offshoot that has done interesting work with community volunteers. With CARITAS, the Red Cross and others, an adequate volunteer force can undoubtedly be mobilized, but the coordination problems may not be manageable. They can be made more tractable by involvement of all groups in a common training experience addressed to professionalizing volunteer service, creating cooperative attitudes, and resolving differences through better listening skills.

Many open questions remain about use of volunteers. The use of poor people as volunteers, a practice widely encouraged elsewhere, receives little attention. The design of volunteer tasks and training to facilitate later entry into paid jobs, done in Colombia, also merits attention. Training of recuperation center volunteers includes little field practice, useful for self-selection and skill reinforcement. Fundamentals of the social work task, and the related attitudes and skills, remain vague. CORPANI has no system for evaluation of volunteers and feedback to improve service. A meeting at CORPANI showed seeds of conflict between paid staff and volunteers that could be serious if left unattended during expansion. Achievement of projected impacts require speedy attention to these and related questions.

CONTRACTING PROCEDURES

CONPAN uses contracts to avoid the constraints of compensation policies that impede rapid recruitment of qualified people. Some contracted people are treated as direct hire staff, while others are hired to perform specific studies or other tasks. This heavy reliance on contracts needs to be legal, though some CONPAN staff express doubts about propriety of it. The understandable desire to reduce bidding burdens, and to contract continually with individuals and firms that have learned CONPAN's needs and approach, conflict with the need to give others competitive opportunities. CONPAN has not yet resolved this conflict and, to an outsider, appears vulnerable to, though not guilty of, charges of favoritism. It may also be losing useful ideas from potential contractors who do not know of CONPAN needs or are not given opportunity to respond.

This can be remedied by (a) Wide dissemination of CONPAN needs and specific contract opportunities, (b) Using submission of capability statements as a device for assuring eligibility of all qualified contractors, without augmenting excessively the number of bidders, and (c) Opening more contracts to fully competitive bidding, accompanied by a requirement that potential contractors outline their conceptual approach to each assignment. The last step should also save CONPAN some expense of methodology development, since contractor proposals will include much of it.

CONPAN should consider developing an orientation for contractors to be given perhaps twice a year. This would save time over the

present system of individual orientation. Rigidity and narrowness of contractors, major factors in the occasional poor performances to date, would be alleviated and orientation sessions also provide useful screening. A current proposal to have contractors give mid-contract seminars to CONPAN staff also seems promising.

Like USAID, CONPAN must recognize that waiting for contractors' reports leads to ineffective monitoring. Staff should know, long before, what will be in documents, by early and continuing contacts with contractors. Contracts to implement major projects, like the TASA involvement in recuperation centers, will require more field visits than CONPAN staff have been accustomed to.

D. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

COMPAN worries less about, and takes fewer actions to encourage, inter-ministerial cooperation than nutrition planning agencies in other countries. It also pays less attention to developing a "Nutritional Plan". The progress of Chilean nutrition planning, despite these deviations from typical practices, suggests useful lessons.

COMPAN's strategy looks first to development of superior knowledge, through operations research and timely information, for establishing credibility. While this does not assure eventual ministry collaboration, early experience indicates that it is probably a prerequisite. To be "first among equals", any nutrition planning and coordination agency must first prove that it has something to offer peers. The COMPAN experience also shows that improvement of efficiency is a less threatening entry point than attempts to modify goals or basic elements of program structure.

Building a national nutrition plan "from the ground up" offers promise at least equal to that of attempts to "get nutrition into the national plan". While COMPAN's approach reflects the limited role of ODEPLAN, the Chilean planning agency, countries with stronger planning agencies may still benefit from it. Taking an agency-by-agency approach, starting with rationalization of feeding programs, COMPAN creates a context that should make synthesis of inter-agency coordination and joint nutrition planning, with a resulting National Nutrition Plan, more effective and as rapid as other methods.

The CONPLAN approach, perhaps reacting to the overconcern of other nutrition planners, involves little effort to transfer ideology to, or "sensitize", other agencies and ministries. CONPLAN people refer to themselves as an "island", in political, bureaucratic, and ideological terms. This is an advantage for the first two, but damaging in the third sense. Institutionalization of nutrition planning requires transmission of ways of thinking that go beyond the introduction of specific operational techniques. Chile's twenty years of milk distribution and related discussion eliminates the need for telling ministries about the prevalence of malnutrition and the importance of nutrition goals. There is pressure on CONPLAN to "do something". Schlesinger interprets this as requiring well-proven actions before CONPLAN orients other agencies. This loses the multiplier effects and sources of useful ideas that would flow from early involvement of them, through orientation to the CONPLAN approach. Despite the limitations of Chilean bureaucracies, there are among them people who would, if given guidance and opportunity, contribute substantially to identification of promising interventions. Once alerted to nutritional implications of intra-agency activities, some would energize "nutritional review", looking to CONPLAN for technical help. CONPLAN has no monopoly on creative thinking about nutrition improvement in Chile. A small effort to enlist other private and governmental groups even through nothing more than invitations to join in some CONPLAN sessions, could generate ideas, improve CONPLAN's image, and begin the long and difficult process of getting nutrition consequences taken more seriously.

There is a tendency in COMPAN, reflected in various interviews to assume that if an intervention produces favorable outcomes, in study and pilot phases, appropriate ministries will adopt it with little additional effort from COMPAN. This faith in the power of demonstration should yield to the evidence of countless successful pilot projects that went no further, found all over the world. COMPAN use of contractors, instead of Government agencies, to carry out most pilot activities, may reflect lack of confidence in ability of these agencies to implement rapidly and efficiently. They are even less likely to operate regional or national programs effectively. COMPAN experience with JUBAEB, the agency involved in the school feeding pre-prepared food project, indicates the resistance, defensiveness, and problems associated with inter-agency coordination. Those closest to field tasks, having learned the hard way, acknowledged these difficulties the most. At the regional level, COMPAN's representative in Tunisia, described vividly his tactics for the difficult task of building regional coordination of nutrition-related agencies.

The 1977 Implementation Plan includes projects to identify the best models for inter-agency and intra-regional coordination. These are useful, but do not attack the more fundamental problems of building functional linkages based on collaboration rather than control.

COMPAN, now under the Ministry of Interior charged with coordination of social action activities, has new leverage. The strong temptation to substitute muscle and technical knowledge for the more arduous techniques of communication and sensitization must be resisted. Self-awareness and vigilance are the best antidotes to the arrogance of power.

The establishment of functional linkages requires early involvement of staff from relevant national private organizations and Government agencies, despite the delays and other frustrations that often accompany it. Communication and sensitization need not involve surrender of COMPAN prerogative. Without it, eventual transformation of successful pilot efforts into national programs will be delayed excessively and will often be impossible.

COMPAN has avoided the problem with the recuperation and breast-feeding projects by "buying coordination" using its funds to do these activities through CORPANI, which it is simultaneously building up. The promising huerto (family garden) and caseta sanitaria (environmental sanitation unit) projects will be more difficult to institutionalize. There may not be enough money to buy coordination. Organizations, whether Governmental or the private groups executing activities formerly done by Government, likely to implement have not been much involved in initial efforts. They should be "learning by doing" along with COMPAN. This would build the support for later adoption of proven interventions.

The foregoing does not suggest that CSE and CONPAN have neglected completely the need to build bridges with others. Experience from other countries makes clear that such bridges require strong and continued effort, with success related to style and humility, along with power position and superior knowledge. Current CONPAN and CSE efforts can be expanded without increasing workload or reducing achievement of current implementation plans. Expansion can do much to assure permanence and influence of CONPAN. Bridge building involves more than participation in inter-ministerial meetings. It requires communication of goals, approaches, and language at all levels, with related efforts to reduce defensiveness and encourage collaboration.

The Chilean political context discourages broad, continuing attempts to build a grass roots constituency among agencies, since authority is centralized, and influencing senior officials is critical. Nevertheless, if nutrition planning is to survive in Chile, and pilot projects are to yield national programs, CONPAN must build on current power and credibility by creating shared understanding and commitment wherever possible in Chilean bureaucracies. Reliance on authority and political machinations alone will not make nutrition planning a permanent part of Chilean life .

Some simple and short inter-agency training sessions, emphasizing experiential learning value of current projects,

would benefit agencies and COMPAN. COMPAN need only recognize the similarity between learning needs of its own staff and those of people in other agencies. The non-directive experiential approach, so successful within COMPAN, applies as well outside. The learning styles of others are not likely to be so different.

E. THE CONPAN RELATIONSHIP WITH USAID

USAID and CONPAN have evolved a satisfactory work pattern after several months of difficulty. The suggestions offered below seek to improve collaboration between borrower and lender, though the present situation is far better than what appears to have gone before. USAID turnover and staff shortages compounded early difficulties, but are currently not a problem. Early differences in emphasis, between USAID and CONPAN, on documentation also complicated the relationship, but the agencies have now moved closer. CONPAN addition of a good finance and administration person has also contributed to clearing the air, since he can produce information required by USAID routinely and is already serving as primary contact point for monitoring of the loan.

CONPAN and USAID could collaborate more effectively if USAID used direct observation, rather than documents, as the basis for monitoring. A standing invitation from Schlesinger to have a USAID representative use the CONPAN office should be taken up. If this doesn't materialize, USAID should still make a special effort to detect problems long before documents come in. The papers should be no more than summaries or a record of things that USAID already knows about, to be prepared only after agreement on substance has been reached. This means that USAID monitors must try to clear with other USAID offices before documents are submitted, to reduce

delay and re-drafting. As COMPAN moves into overseeing larger projects, such as fifty breast-feeding centers and 10-15 recuperation centers, field monitoring by USAID will become more important, since documents, if they report problems at all, will come too late to allow early action.

COMPAN needs to understand better the implications of a \$5,000,000 loan for relationships with the lender. USAID seeks to do no more with COMPAN than the nutrition planning agency tries to do with its contractors. COMPAN acknowledges that USAID has, in its other activities, reinforced nutrition planning by insisting that proposals be referred to COMPAN for review. USAID can, and is prepared to, do more of this, especially in agriculture, but will be hampered **unless** COMPAN reduces defensiveness and concentrates on building a collaborative relationship.

The two agencies need to identify new indicators for the coming year and this offers a good opportunity to improve communication. Both groups accepted, in broad terms, the consolidation directions recommended in this Report. They now need to agree on some indicators of progress in those directions. If COMPAN does not accept USAID indicators or the importance given to them, it must come in with an alternative pattern for assessing progress. USAID, recognizing that institution-building is what the loan is all about, should be very flexible in accepting Chilean indicators of progress.

F. NEW PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

The Project Design Summary in the Capital Assistance Paper states that output indicators will be revised to reflect each year's Implementation Plan. This provides the Mission and CONPAN with a good opportunity to shift emphasis from crude indicators, such as number of staff and number of studies, to measures that reflect more accurately the Project purposes. A few key indicators are suggested here, to illustrate the change. The two agencies should jointly identify others, to assure shared understanding of desired results and measures.

The consolidation of CONPAN's position suggests emphasis on indicators that reflect attributes of a functioning and effective organization. For CONPAN, these might include, for example, a) an internal information center that is useful and used, b) an Analytic Group that is providing useful conclusions, and c) a group of responsive contractors who produce work consistent with CONPAN's approach and directions. While all of these involve qualitative judgements, quantitative indicators that reflect desired qualitative levels can be derived. Instead of counting studies made by the Analytical Group, for example, uses made of their findings can be recorded. A simple contractor rating system could make more useful the tabulation of number of contracts. It is important, too, that CONPAN's internal information procedures be modified to produce information on new indicators routinely, to avoid later special requests that will take time and be answered inadequately.

Indicators of initiation and improvement of relationships with other agencies derive from planning to reach these goals. The number of joint training sessions and seminars, for example, would indicate a new direction on inter-agency dealings. Technical assistance requests from other agencies reflect a different approach than unilateral pronouncements from CONPAR. It is less important to establish and measure new indicators than to recognize that consolidation requires substantial modification of current goals and measures. Becoming more sensitive to consolidation, CONPAR and USAID will readily identify signs of it, if the process occurs.

Relationships with other agencies include both functional linkages, with specialized ministries and organizations, and involvement in the decentralized Regional Administration program now underway. Regional planning groups have control over as much as one-third of all Government spending in the Region and, unless nutrition goals figure in their plans, can nullify such CONPAR influence. CONPAR and USAID should be able to agree on a strategy for CONPAR involvement with these groups and some indicators of progress and effectiveness.

III. THE FUTURE

A. FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The line between technical assistance and use of contracts to supplement staff becomes fuzzy at COMPAN. David Helson and the two Chilean professionals working under the CSF contract provide help while doing jobs that would otherwise require COMPAN to hire more people. The model works well, since it keeps CSF staff from being pontificating "experts" and makes their help practical and relevant. Senior CSF staff, who visit intermittently, play a less clear role, though Dean Wilson effectively maintains integrity of the learning process he helped to introduce.

There is little indication that CSF or COMPAN have planned for Helson's departure, the end of the loan, or even the immediate program of technical assistance. Bart Burkhalter, though hampered by poor Spanish, would be more useful if programmed effectively. Careful thought about Helson's daily activities would permit orderly transfer of operating tasks and development of a return visit schedule that optimizes technical assistance value. Similar thought should be given immediately to a plan for gradually phasing out CSF help and compensating for staff reduction, instead of waiting for the end of loan disbursements.

Getting COMPAN staff out to see nutrition planning in other countries, and bringing others to Chile, should be part of technical

assistance. Exposure to new ideas is a continuing need, because CONPAM has become very attached to current pilot projects and information structures. The Colombians, while less sophisticated in intellectual approach, have much to share with CONPAM on the practical problems of coordination and action. INCAP functional surveys offer another possibility for useful exchange.

There are a few areas where outsiders can perform technical tasks more effectively or introduce alternative techniques worth exploring. Applied behavioral science for improved communication and participation within and outside CONPAM, and professionalization and coordination of volunteer service, are two useful kinds of help that CONPAM has not yet identified, because they are relatively new to staff. The 1977 Implementation Plan should be reviewed systematically to identify any others.

B. LESSONS FOR NUTRITION PLANNERS

1. Training

Chilean nutrition planning suggests that a "trans-disciplinary" group functions more effectively than a collection of people from various disciplines. The best CONPAN staff understand well the need to seek help on specific technical questions and show skill in recognizing when such help is required. The distinctive contribution of nutrition planners lies in synthesis, putting things together dealing with relations among variables from several disciplines or sectors. Training demands attention to ways of thinking well known in epidemiology and systems analysis, supplemented by aid in identifying technical gaps. There is no evidence that CONPAN analysis, planning, or project design suffers from the relegation of doctors, nutritionists and other specialists to supporting roles. Teaching planners to use specialists effectively seems more important than providing them with specialized knowledge. Conventional academic training does not automatically provide this skill, so there is a role for trainers of nutrition planners. TA/N would do well to distill, with CSF help, the essential behavioral goals associated with Chilean nutritional planning, for use elsewhere.

2. Staff Selection

CONPAN's strength comes partly from Schlesinger's freedom to choose staff freely. In many countries and universities, multisectoral groups formed with people from individual ministries or departments suffer from divided loyalties, inability to communicate, and the reluctance of sources to lend their best people.

The CONPAN label makes relation to other agencies more difficult, because staff have fewer contacts. This explains part of the Chilean reluctance to begin building personal collaborative relationships with other agencies. Good people with solid political leverage may need guidance in importance of, and techniques for, developing a team-building coordination style.

3. Tackling the Agencies

Although the evidence is not yet in, the Chile experience **calls** attention to the importance of using limited resources, available for "buying coordination", to involve agencies expected to convert pilot projects into national programs. CONPAN's experiments with home gardens and environmental sanitation units for example, will suffer from failure of contact with likely national delivery agencies. Concepts are being tested, but not delivery systems. When the time comes to expand, CONPAN may be dependent on the goodwill of others who will be without experience in the proposed activity. The nutrition planning agency cannot lightly reject an existing system, despite the frustrations of working with it.

4. The Need for a Community Entry Point

Chile confirms the need to disaggregate to community level in nutrition planning. National planning translates into reduced malnutrition through what happens in diverse communities with distinctive problems and solutions. CSF and CONPAN have continued to refine Dean Wilson's useful approach to community planning, but have not yet confronted the question of who guides the community process. This will differ in each country, but requires specific attention. Few governments achieve multi-sectoral coordination in

approaching community problems. Nutrition, usually lacking an advocate, winds up neglected unless a promoter is identified and prepared.

5. Feeding Food for Work

Chile's Minimum Employment Program, juxtaposed with myriad other feeding activities, emphasizes the preventive potential of Food for Work. Recuperation centers filled with children of the unemployed dramatize the need to feed before unemployment does its damage. The nutrition planning community has seemed reluctant to take the broad view necessary for a preventive supplementary feeding strategy. Chile offers an outstanding opportunity to test comparative effectiveness of alternative feeding models, despite political limits to conversion of findings into new national policies.

6. The Need for Flexibility

Nutrition planners waste endless words on identifying the best blueprint or model for organization of multisectoral units, committees, and work plans. The Chile experience, so different from other countries, shows the virtues of a more flexible approach. CORFAM's organization and role, still evolving, flow from Dr. Monckelberg's history and political position, the staff's knowledge and style, and availability of feeding activities as a target of opportunity. Because improving efficiency looked like a good entry point to the feeding system, CORFAM developed a management consulting capability and role. Close relations between individuals and their universities led to an impressive CORFAM impact on research directions by judicious use of contracts.

Perhaps the outstanding lesson to be drawn from Chile is the demonstration that effective nutrition planning can be done. Impact is still small and politics can still destroy the whole effort, but CONPLAN has already linked multisectoral analysis and nutrition programming more effectively than any other agency. Despite the difficulties that lie ahead, in rationalizing activities and modifying policies in accordance with that analysis, the Chilean experience offers evidence that national nutrition planning can raise issues and provide alternatives that leave policymakers little excuse for perpetuating malnutrition.