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**AN EVALUATION OF THE CRS  
COMMUNITY FOOD AND  
NUTRITION DEVELOPMENT  
PROGRAM (CFNDP)**

**FNP and IGA Components**

**Volume I: Main Report**

**DECEMBER 1989**

**CRS USCC INDONESIA PROGRAM**

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COMMUNITY FOOD AND NUTRITION  
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM**

**FNP and IGA Components**

**Volume I: Main Report**

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**DECEMBER 1989**

**CRS USCC INDONESIA PROGRAM**

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## **Glossary**

<b>Arisan</b>	<b>Savings Association</b>
<b>Camat</b>	<b>Sub-district Head</b>
<b>Desa</b>	<b>Village</b>
<b>Kabupaten</b>	<b>Regency or District</b>
<b>Kecamatan</b>	<b>Sub-district</b>
<b>Kepala Desa</b>	<b>Village Head</b>
<b>LKB</b>	<b>Lembaga Karya Bhakti (CRS counterpart in Tanjung Karang, Bandar Lampung)</b>
<b>ORT</b>	<b>Oral Rehydration Therapy</b>
<b>PKK</b>	<b>Family Welfare Organization</b>
<b>PL</b>	<b>Field Worker</b>
<b>PUSBS</b>	<b>Panitya Usaha Sosial Bina Sejahtera (Affiliate of YSBS/Cilacap implementing FNP in Klaten, Central Java)</b>
<b>Puskesmas</b>	<b>Sub-district Health Center</b>
<b>Posyandu</b>	<b>Integrated Village Health Services Post</b>
<b>SHU</b>	<b>Annual dividends paid to UB members from UB loan profits</b>
<b>UPGK</b>	<b>Family Nutrition Improvement Program</b>
<b>UB (Usaha-Bersama)</b>	<b>"Self-Reliant Group" of mothers organized under CFNDP for savings, loan and other Income Generating Activities (IGA)</b>
<b>YASPEM</b>	<b>Yayasan Sosial Pembangunan Masyarakat (CRS counterpart in Maumere, Flores, NTT)</b>
<b>YSBS</b>	<b>Yayasan Sosial Bina Sejahtera (CRS counterpart in Cilacap, Central Java)</b>

## I. BACKGROUND

### **The CFNDP Program**

During the last quarter of 1983 a team of consultants carried out a "review and redesign" of the CRS Title II Program in Indonesia. To follow up on the team's recommendations, CRS Indonesia submitted a proposal to USAID in February 1984 under the title of "Community Food and Nutrition Development Program" (CFNDP). USAID approved the proposal and planned to support the program with funds derived from monetization of Title II commodities. However, for a variety of reasons, monetization of Title II commodities failed to materialize, and the project remained unfunded until June 1985. At that time USAID/Jakarta decided to support the project with the newly established U.S. Government Child Survival Fund. Monies from AID started to be disbursed to CRS in November 1985.

According to the grant agreement, the purpose of the grant was to provide partial support in the implementation of CRS's redesigned PL 480 Title II program. CRS was to assist its counterpart organizations in increasing their management capabilities to promote program implementation and achieve developmental impacts by:

- 1) providing technical assistance for both the Food and Nutrition Program (FNP) and the Food for Work (FFW) program in the effort to maximize program results,
- 2) training of village cadres to maximize participation,
- 3) increasing beneficiary knowledge and application of nutrition information, and
- 4) developing a system for generating funds to finance village nutrition activities in preparation for the phase-out of Title II assistance.

Most of the monies from the Child Survival Fund were allocated for the FNP. Out of the total grant of US\$ 1,600,000, US\$ 1,500,000 funded FNP; the balance (US\$ 100,000) funded technical assistance for FFW.

The goal of the Food and Nutrition Program (FNP) is to improve the economic and nutritional well-being of families in poor Indonesian communities. FNP is implemented through local counterpart organizations which are private voluntary organizations (PVOs). In the field, the counterparts employ FNP supervisors and field workers to manage and supervise the programs. Currently, the FNP benefits approximately 80,000 mothers and under-five children, and in its operation has covered Jawa Timur, Jawa Tengah, Lampung, Sumatera Selatan, Kalimantan Barat, and Nusa Tenggara Timur.

One of the eight sub-components of the FNP is the Income-Generating Activities (IGA). IGA is the system by which funds are generated locally for the dual purposes of increasing family incomes and funding village nutrition activities. This component will ideally help

alleviate the conditions (i.e. poverty) that make Title II assistance necessary in the first place, as well as fund on-going health and nutrition activities after the phase-out of food assistance. Considering the importance of these two purposes to overall programming, IGA was evaluated separately from FNP.

## **II. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION**

The primary purpose of this evaluation is to assess CRS/Indonesia's support in promoting counterpart management capabilities for planning, implementing, and sustaining programs that will achieve development impact. Although the goal of the CFNDP called for CRS to "assist its counterpart organizations in increasing their management capabilities", CRS and USAID staff have only recently defined and articulated that this--the support to counterparts, or institution-building--is the present over-riding programming concern. Thus, the overall focus of this evaluation is on institution building, both within and between CRS, its Counterparts, and the communities they serve. The use of institution-building as a framework for the evaluation also comes at a time when CRS is aggressively retargeting to the outer islands where organizational structures are less sophisticated than on Java. Implicit in this approach is a concern for the sustainability of the CFNDP program, or in other words, the ability of CFNDP to create lasting mechanisms in Counterparts and villages for addressing economic, health and nutritional needs after CRS assistance ends.

Under the terms of the CFNDP contract, CRS was obliged to conduct an "in depth evaluation" with USAID/VHP during the third year of project implementation. May 1988 marked three years from start-up, however, the evaluation was undertaken in late 1989 for two main reasons. First, an evaluation prior to 1989 would have been premature; some program sub-components (most notably the Income Generating Activities) were initiated quite late in the funding cycle. Second, in the same vein, the new counterparts in the newly targeted geographic areas have only recently adopted many of the program management requirements and so could only recently be usefully evaluated. Due to difficulties in identifying qualified consultants, this evaluation addresses only the FNP and IGA components of CFNDP, and does not cover FFW. But while FNP and IGA are closely interrelated both in concept and implementation, FFW is largely a "stand-alone" program, lending itself for a separate evaluation at a later date.

## **III. RESEARCH APPROACH**

The Team consisted of the Team Leader, who acted as evaluation coordinator and management specialist, and two senior researchers responsible for the FNP and IGA components of the evaluation, who supervised the work of twelve field interviewers. Field work was carried out in September and October and covered the programs of three CRS counterparts: YSBS in Cilacap, along with its affiliate, PUSBS in Klaten, Central Java; LKB in Lampung; and YASSPEM in Maumere, Flores. The choice of counterparts was dictated by the need to focus as much as possible on off-Java programs in areas targeted by CRS for future assistance, while at the same time selecting programs mature enough to allow

meaningful conclusions. LKB and YASPEM are the oldest CRS counterparts outside Java and both have operational FNP and IGA programs. CRS assistance to YSBS is scheduled to end in 1990. Food assistance in Cilacap ended this year but will continue in Klaten through 1990, offering the opportunity to gain at least limited insights on the impact of program phase out on counterparts and villages.

This is an evaluation of the process of program development and implementation rather than an evaluation of final impacts. The general underlying hypothesis used by the Team is that "program consistency" i.e. a common understanding of program objectives and strategy among program implementors and participants, will lead to program success. The research techniques employed by the Team were primarily qualitative, involving in-depth structured interviews with CRS and Counterpart staff, village cadres, program participants, as well as local government officials and community leaders. However the need to study the economic performance of the IGA program also required a considerable amount of quantitative data collection and analysis. A more detailed description of the evaluation's research approach, survey sample and interview guides appear in Volume 2 of this report.

## IV. MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. Overview:

The Team's overall impression is that CRS and its counterparts have made substantial progress in implementing CFNDP in a highly professional manner. We were generally quite impressed with the commitment, motivation and professionalism of both CRS and counterpart staff. And given the limitations and constraints faced by CRS counterparts as local non-government organizations, they are doing an exceptional job of implementing what can only be regarded as an ambitious, multifaceted, program design. But in discussing the Teams findings and conclusions, it must be stressed that this is not a final evaluation of the success or impact of CFNDP - instead our purpose is to help CRS and its counterparts find ways to improve the impact and effectiveness of CFNDP and future CRS nutrition programs. As a result, this evaluation does not represent a wholly "neutral" balancing of positive and negative outcomes, and it inevitably focuses on identifying problems and possible solutions. In light of this, the Team hopes that CRS and its counterparts will accept our comments in the spirit of "constructive criticism", and that outside readers will keep in mind that our findings do not necessarily represent a "complete" picture of CFNDP.

### B. General Findings: The CFNDP Program

1. Goals, Objectives and Strategy: The overall goal of FNP - to improve the health and nutrition of children and families in poor communities - appears to be well understood by everyone, including most program recipients. But beyond this central goal the team found confusion regarding purposes, objectives, and strategy.

Among CRS management and staff, the team found different views regarding the role of food aid in FNP, the role of nutrition education, and a variety of other issues. It appears that over time, the need to adapt the program to field realities, and the influence of changing personnel with changing views has led to a degree of "program drift" without any conscious decision on CRS' part to modify program goals or design. Examples of this "drift" include:

1. While FNP technical staff in CRS tend to emphasize the role of food aid as an incentive for mothers to attend FNP centers, CRS management generally puts more stress on the economic value of the food in increasing family incomes of participants. As a result, the economic rationale underlying recent plans to increase recipient rations were found to be poorly understood within CRS as a whole, especially among the staff most responsible for communicating this policy to counterparts.

2. CRS FNP staff treat nutrition education as the central goal of CFNDP, and tend to assume that it can have an immediate, direct impact on nutritional practices, whereas CRS management places more stress on economic factors as the critical determinant of nutritional behavior. The latter view appears to have resulted in rather

less management attention to the implementation of nutrition education than one might expect given the central role of this component in the program design.

3. There is no clear consensus understanding within CRS whether CFNDP should limit its focus to nutritional activities in FNP centers, or should attempt to upgrade the quality of center services as a whole, including services such as immunizations, ORT therapy, etc. which are primarily the responsibility of government health agencies. This has resulted in tensions between USAID, CRS and counterparts over the scope of CRS and counterpart responsibilities in these latter areas.

While these ambiguities are more a reflection of differences in interpretation and emphasis than any fundamental disagreements, they do result in counterparts getting "mixed signals" from CRS regarding the real priorities of CFNDP.

CRS counterparts ability to conceptually relate the specific components of the CFNDP program to its higher-level objectives such as maximizing beneficiary participation, increasing nutritional knowledge and application, and IGA as a means to sustain FNP activities is often limited. There is a general tendency among counterparts to regard any program that delivers resources and training to villages as intrinsically good, and a corresponding lack of curiosity regarding the "logic" of program design. As a result, the eight program components (targeting, growth monitoring, food distribution, etc.) are often treated as "the purpose" of FNP, with the greatest emphasis being placed on food delivery as an end goal.

While most beneficiary mothers understand that the general goal of FNP is to improve the nutritional status of their children, their understanding of how participation in FNP center activities will contribute to that goal remains weak, and their general perception of the program continues to center on the distribution of food rations. Awareness of FNP goals and objectives among community leaders appears to be quite low, especially for those not directly involved in the program.

2. Managerial Capability: For both FNP and IGA, the management of resource deliveries have been more effective and well organized than the management of message delivery. CRS and its counterparts have organized themselves under the CFNDP to deliver two basic types of resources to program recipients: 1) Economic Resources, in the form of food, loan capital, materials, etc.; and 2) Information Resources, or the nutritional, health, and other messages that intended to help change recipient's behavior.

Overall the team was impressed with the managerial performance of both CRS and the counterparts and found few serious problems regarding food distribution, the UB loan system or CRS material support to counterparts. Efforts to transfer information, both between CRS and counterparts, and counterparts to mothers have been less well organized and have received only sporadic management attention. Stringent accountability requirements associated with CFNDP material and financial resources, combined with the "charity" orientation of most CRS counterparts have led to a "resource-driven" program in which effective training, communication and education activities are often treated as an afterthought. Weaknesses in these communication links result in a loss of "message content"

at every stage, with the final impact being that messages reaching beneficiaries regarding nutritional and economic skills and knowledge are often stripped of meaningful content or are ineffectively communicated.

3. CRS/Counterpart Supervision: In the course of establishing basic project implementation mechanisms as quickly as possible, CRS has adopted a "micro-management" approach, where CRS FNP and IGA staff have attempted to directly monitor and supervise operations at the village and center levels. This approach presents problems at several levels. First, the sheer number of villages and centers covered by CFNDP creates an overwhelming task for CRS staff who can only focus on the more easily quantifiable aspects of program performance, at the expense of more qualitative assessments or problem solving. Second, field level supervision is inherently the responsibility of counterpart staff, so the ability of CRS staff to influence FNP center operations is indirect at best. And third, the workload associated with this "micro-management" approach leaves CRS staff little time to provide the kinds of meaningful technical or problem solving assistance that would ultimately help counterparts improve their capability to manage the program.

4. Program "Acceptability: Government and Community Relationships: The team found a strong positive relationship between government acceptance of, and involvement in FNP, and its subsequent acceptance and ultimate success at the village level. Involvement and support of government from the Provincial level on down is critical to smooth program operation in the short-term, and to the sustainability of program benefits in the long-term. The team found both positive and negative examples of government/counterpart relationships, but on balance the team found that the importance of this element has been underemphasized by both CRS and its counterparts. It is not uncommon for foreign or privately-funded development projects to attempt to "leapfrog" over what are often incapable or uncooperative government institutions in order to maximize the immediate impact of the projects at the village level. But the Team observed numerous examples where this lack of coordination has created serious problems for counterparts in areas such as village targeting, cadre training and motivation, food delivery, and particularly in the areas of growth monitoring and the provision of government services to FNP centers. CRS has tended to regard government relationships as the responsibility of the counterparts and has not realized its potential role in creating support for FNP at national and provincial levels. For their part, counterparts often find the task of cooperating with local government problematic at best, and are inclined to minimize their formal contact with government agencies whenever possible.

5. Counterpart Organization and Management Styles: Management styles vary among the counterparts - ranging from clearly top-down to more open and democratic. Where management is less open, key program decisions can be made "outside the system". For example, decisions regarding food delivery and village targeting have in many cases made by top management based on personal relationships with village "initiators" rather than formal program criteria or field worker input. Also associated with this "top-down" management pattern is the failure to delegate authority for day-to-day implementation to subordinates based on clear job descriptions. While job descriptions do exist for

counterpart field workers, FNP and IGA supervisors often lack clear responsibilities or decision-making authority, leaving them to wait for case-by-case instructions from counterpart management.

The lack of an effective decision-making "system" in counterparts is linked to the lack of effective oversight mechanisms to insure that counterparts are accountable for their performance. None of the counterparts studied had an independent, functioning Board of Directors to oversee their operations, nor have local church leaders served in a meaningful oversight role.

6. Targeting: The Team found that targeting criteria for selecting individual beneficiaries are well understood by all parties, and are being effectively applied within FNP centers. However, it appears that village targeting criteria intended to insure the selection of the neediest villages are not being systematically applied by counterparts. Instead, the selection of FNP villages is often based on wholly intuitive assessments of need, personal relationships between counterpart and community leaders, and on considerations of logistical or political feasibility. This failure to apply formal village targeting criteria is not necessarily the fault of counterparts. The targeting guidelines established by CRS are based on statistical indicators which are often either unavailable to counterparts or are of highly questionable validity. Furthermore counterparts generally lack the manpower and skills necessary to collect these data themselves.

7. Field Worker/Cadre Performance: The Team was generally impressed by the commitment, quality and performance of both counterpart field staff and FNP cadres. But the Team also found that the often overwhelming workload of counterpart field workers and village cadres was perhaps the key contributing factor leading to weaknesses in FNP training, education, and nutritional counselling activities. The problem is simple. Time pressures force field workers and cadres to make choices regarding the "essential" and "non-essential" aspects of their responsibilities, and under these circumstances it is understandable that they place priority on food distribution, child weighing, and reporting tasks. The team found cases of five cadres attempting to serve 150-200 mothers on weighing days, and of single field workers being responsible for over 50, often widely dispersed FNP centers or sub-centers. Under such circumstances, meaningful cadre supervision, nutrition counselling or education is virtually impossible, and the quality of growth monitoring suffers. Even more important, mothers become dissatisfied the FNP center because of long waits for food distribution and poor quality services.

8. Management Information: The FNP program has utilized a highly centralized information system with CRS as the focal point. Data gathering has taken precedence over data analysis or decision-making and there is little evidence that the formal information system has improved the quality of CRS supervision. Counterparts see themselves as passive suppliers rather than consumers of management information. There is now interest in CRS and counterparts in streamlining and decentralizing the reporting system. But counterparts have no experience in "information-based decision-making" so attempts to decentralize data analysis are likely to face serious problems in the short-run. Still, the

potential for reducing reporting workloads appears to be substantial and well worth the effort. The major constraint to developing an effective formal monitoring system is that many of the most important factors in identifying program progress are either qualitative or difficult to measure.

9. Sustainability: Despite the fact that sustainability and village "phase out" are key elements of the CNFDP program design, the team found little awareness or understanding of these issues in FNP villages. While villagers may be aware that FNP food assistance is not permanent, they are not specifically aware of any time-frame for assistance or that the village is expected to achieve sustainability of FNP activities within that time-frame. Few mothers participating in the IGA program understand the intended role of UBs in supporting FNP activities.

This lack of awareness in the field is primarily due to the fact that CRS and its counterparts have not communicated the temporary nature of FNP assistance to recipients. Among CRS and the counterparts, serious interest and commitment to deal with these issues appears to have developed only recently. Consequently there is no common understanding of how to assess sustainability, nor are there criteria for deciding when villages are ready for "phase-out". To the extent that a coherent strategy for FNP sustainability exists, it appears to be based on a number of doubtful assumptions:

First, CRS appears to have assumed that simple exposure to more or better quality health and nutritional services will necessarily stimulate long-term "demand" and support for Posyandu programs. This would be true only if mothers clearly perceived the relationship between these services and their children's health. In most villages studied, mothers' understanding of these causal links was weak.

Second, CRS assumes that implementation of the eight FNP program components of FNP over time will lead to "institutionalization" of FNP approaches to growth monitoring and other services in Posyandus. But after counterpart supervision ends, FNP cadres will respond to signals and guidance from local health officials and community leaders, the very groups that have yet to be "co-opted" into FNP.

Third, even if the village IGA programs are economically capable of generating sufficient funds to sustain village nutrition activities after phase-out (which under the current program they are not), it is doubtful whether members of UBs will actually uphold their assigned responsibility to support FNP centers. These responsibilities have been poorly communicated to mothers, who generally perceive FNP and IGA as separate, unrelated programs.

Building community solidarity and local government support are recognized as factors affecting sustainability, but they are not dealt with explicitly, and their importance appears to be underestimated.

### **C. Special Findings: Income Generating Activities (IGA) Component**

1. FNP/IGA Coordination: The team found that actual coordination between FNP and IGA is weak both at the counterpart level, and to a lesser degree in CRS. IGA PLs (Field Workers) and Cadres appear to understand the intended role of UBs in supporting FNP Center activities, but that understanding has not been successfully communicated to mothers, who tend to see the UB purely as a mechanism for obtaining loans. IGA field workers focus their efforts on promoting and supervising UB credit operations and do not use the UB group as a means to strengthen the community's relationship with its FNP Center

Within CRS, the existence of separate IGA and FNP units, while obviously necessary, tends to reinforce the impression among counterparts that FNP and IGA are two different programs that just happen to target the same groups. There is a high degree of awareness among FNP and IGA staff of the interrelationships between FNP and IGA, but once again that understanding does not appear to be communicated to counterparts in the course of routine supervision.

2. IGA Supervision and Technical Assistance: CRS and counterpart supervision and technical assistance to UB groups has concentrated almost exclusively on the establishment and operation of credit and savings activities. These efforts, on the whole, have been quite successful. Very little sustained or coordinated effort has gone into assisting UB groups or members establish or manage viable business activities. The original IGA "model" envisaged by CRS appears to have assumed that UBs themselves would be capable of identifying and articulating their own training needs, with counterpart field workers playing a largely "reactive" role in coordinating requests for assistance with outside experts. The Team found, however, that UB members often lack the knowledge and motivation required to identify business opportunities or training needs, and that counterpart IGA staff lack the time and skills necessary to help UBs in these areas.

3. Viability of the UB Credit System: As savings and credit mechanisms, the UB systems in the counterparts studied were doing fairly well. Loan default rates were quite low, and credit growth averaged 68% per year. UBs are well established as non-formal organizations. The quality of UB administration is generally quite good, and UB members are in control of the UB loan mechanism.

However, a number of problems appear to threaten the long-range economic viability of UBs. Interest rates varied considerably from a 1% flat rate to 5% on the outstanding balance, but are generally too low in terms of the real rate of return for UB savings, and in terms of the ability of UBs to support FNP activities. CRS and counterparts have allowed individual UBs to determine their own interest rates. While this practice could be seen as a positive reflection of UB autonomy, the fact remains that UB members lack the financial analysis skills necessary to anticipate the long range impact of specific interest rates on UB viability. The continuing high proportion of loan vs. self reliant capital (64% loan, 36% SR) also presents a danger, as UB may not always be able to depend on external

sources of credit. The high proportion of Voluntary Savings (66%) to Compulsory and Regular Savings (36%) is also a danger, as Voluntary Savings can be easily withdrawn, making the capital base of the UB unstable.

4. IGA and FNP Sustainability: Under the current system, the team projects that the 15% SHU (UB profits) designated as "FNP capital" will not cover the cost of FNP Center operations after "phase out" of food aid. Based on the demonstrated absorptive capacity of the UBs studied, projected loan turnovers are only expected to reach about 65% of the level required to generate profits sufficient to cover the current operating costs of FNP centers. And because few UB members understand and accept the role of the UB in supporting FNP activities, there is the real danger that some UBs will refuse to turn over the required 15% of SHU to the FNP Center.

5. Impact on Family Income: The team found that 66% of UB loans were utilized for business purposes, and that the UB program has generally increased members incomes. Over 60% of UB members reported that either incomes from family businesses had increased since joining the UB, or that UB loans had enabled them to engage in a new business. Actual profit levels are highly variable depending on the specific business activity and local market conditions. The highest returns were for trading activities, while among the lowest were for low turnover cottage industries and service businesses, some of which reported actual declines in income during the period studied.

6. Loan Administration: Since all new loan requests must be funded by new CRS capital, UBs have often had to wait 2 - 5 months between the time loans are requested and when funds arrive from CRS via the counterpart. In many cases, CRS IGA staff must actually make personal visits to UBs prior to approving loans. Such delays have caused some enterprises to collapse for lack of working capital, and have depressed the real demand for loans among mothers who are often forced to seek alternative, more expensive sources of credit. CRS plans to delegate loan review and approval responsibility to counterparts next year, which may reduce these delays. However there are no plans to change the practice of funding new loans from CRS capital rather than counterpart's existing revolving funds. This practice may continue to delay loan disbursements.

7. Absorptive Capacity for Loans: The impact of UBs on family income, and the growth of the UB system itself is constrained by the limited capacity of members to make loans for productive enterprises. Credit only represents one of many constraints to small scale enterprise development and may not be the most important. In fact, marketing was the most commonly cited problem (39%). This points to the need for a more integrated, comprehensive approach to enterprise development in FNP villages.

#### **D. General Recommendations: CFNDP Program:**

1. Bottom-up Approach: CRS and its counterparts should place much more emphasis on village-level needs assessments for both FNP and IGA based on broad community participation that includes the views of mothers, community leaders, and local government. CFNDP has had the quality of a "top-down" program that attempts to implement a standard package of program components in villages with widely varying social, economic and cultural characteristics. We are not suggesting that this approach is wrong or that the "standard package" is necessarily inappropriate to conditions and needs in individual villages. Instead we are suggesting that more careful, systematic assessments of village needs both before and during program implementation would help CRS and its counterparts more effectively target efforts to overcome field-level constraints, as well as build stronger community support for the program. Without a deeper understanding of problems and opportunities in specific villages, program implementation is myopically viewed as a matter of "compliance" or "non-compliance" with the program plan. In this sense top-down guidance from CRS and counterparts and bottom-up needs identification can be complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

a. Community Self Assessments: For FNP, village targeting should be based on collaboration with local government and on a community "self assessment" conducted by villagers themselves with the assistance of counterpart staff. The assessment would identify general patterns of economic, health and nutrition problems in the village, as well as assess existing manpower and institutional resources. This assessment could serve as a basis for planning FNP implementation, as well as act as a "baseline" for future evaluations of the impact of FNP assistance. Most important, it would enhance villagers' understanding of how and why FNP can help them solve their own nutritional and economic problems.

b. IGA Needs Assessments: For IGA, assistance should begin with an intensive assessment of local productive potential, followed by an integrated "problem solving" approach approach to business development. Information required for planning an effective business development strategy goes beyond the more general picture of economic status which could be obtained by a community self assessment. Instead, counterparts must develop their economic and business analysis capabilities in order to collect and act upon this kind of in-depth village-specific information.

2. Government/Community Support: CRS and counterparts must focus less on the delivery of resources to villages, and concentrate much more on building community participation and local government support into FNP activities. These are the factors most critical to long term impact. CRS and its counterparts should make explicit, formal agreements and coordination with development-related agencies at all levels of local government a basic element of the CFNDP program. We do not wish to minimize the problems that closer government collaboration could present for counterparts, but if such collaboration is really not possible in a given region, we would have to question whether FNP is in fact a "feasible" program to implement in that area. CRS can help counterparts by using its potential influence to gain high level support for FNP at the Provincial level

and by insuring that such support is communicated to lower levels. At the village level, counterparts must do more to collaborate directly with community leaders, PKK groups, and other existing village development programs in FNP implementation, and must intensify efforts to communicate the goals of FNP to program beneficiaries.

**3. Sustainability:** CRS and Counterparts should utilize a "contract system" in FNP villages. The contract should clearly specify a fixed time period for FNP assistance and should identify specific performance goals regarding FNP Center performance, UB growth and FNP Center financing. We can see no other way to reinforce villagers' understanding that FNP is a temporary program, or that there is any sense of "urgency" in meeting the program's long-term objectives. The team cannot recommend any specific time-frame for assistance, indeed this might be a point of "negotiation" with villages, but the five-year target already identified by CRS appears to be a reasonable target.

In order to adopt this system, CRS must overcome its current reluctance to make a "commitment" to FNP villages for more than one year at a time for fear that USAID food and financial resources may not be available in the future. CRS' relationship with USAID remains strong and stable, and in any case if assistance was abruptly interrupted, villages would not be any worse off for having adopted long-term goals.

**4. Targeting:** CRS and Counterparts should consider targeting assistance at the Kecamatan level and attempt to cover most or all villages in a targeted area. Unlike villages, reasonably good aggregated socio-economic and health data are available for kecamatans, which would help insure that targeting is based on objective criteria. Concentrating resources in limited areas would lower program costs and streamline management and supervision and may make it more feasible for counterparts to reach more distant, poorer regions. Finally, the process of Kecamatan targeting would increase counterpart contacts with concerned Provincial, Kabupaten and Kecamatan level government agencies, as well as increase the likelihood of gaining Kecamatan-level support for FNP.

**5. Field Worker Workloads:** Steps should be taken by counterparts to increase the number of FNP and IGA field workers in their programs, and/or reduce the amount of time field workers spend on routine reporting and clerical tasks. Even if CRS is willing to fund more field worker positions, counterparts may still find it difficult to recruit new qualified and/or trainable personnel. In many cases it may be more feasible to hire additional administrative staff in counterpart offices to handle the the routine administrative tasks which currently prevent field workers from providing more effective training and supervision to UBs and FNP cadres.

## **E. Recommendations - FNP Component:**

**1. Cadre/Recipient Ratios:** Action must be taken to keep cadre/recipient ratios in balance and keep cadre workloads to manageable levels. Cadre workload is the key to the quality and effectiveness of FNP Center services. Solutions to this problem might include

establishing more FNP sub-centers in a given area, increasing the number of cadres at existing large centers, or splitting FNP activities into "shifts" held on different days. The geographic distribution of recipients and the availability of people willing to serve as cadres will determine which alternative is most appropriate in specific areas.

2. Recipient Contributions: CRS and counterparts should intensively review the financial management and cost structure of FNP Centers. Under the new Monetization program there appears to be the potential of substantial capital accumulation in centers from the Rp. 500 recipient contribution. This capital could be used to insure long-term funding for Center activities, but this potential will only be realized if action is taken now to control center costs and manage excess funds.

3. Growth Monitoring and the Sistem Nilai: CRS should either do more to stimulate positive support for the Sistem Nilai at the National and Provincial levels, or seriously reconsider the future use of Sistem Nilai in FNP. The team does not question the technical merits of the system, but it fears that program sustainability could be undermined when cadre training, educational messages and growth monitoring are linked to a system that may be abandoned when CRS assistance ends. CRS has never made a serious effort to gain endorsement or adoption of the Sistem Nilai at the national level. It could start doing so now, but if CRS does not find this to be an appropriate or feasible goal, it should consider not introducing the Sistem Nilai to new counterparts and new FNP centers. An alternative "intermediate" approach could be to limit use of Sistem Nilai purely to center-level growth monitoring and nutritional counselling, and curtail its use as a reporting system. This would retain the pedagogical potential of the system while reducing both cadre workloads and frictions with skeptical local health officials.

#### **F. Recommendations - IGA Component:**

1. Business Development Consultants: CRS and counterparts should recruit business development specialists to help them develop a more comprehensive, integrated approach to promoting IGA. The CRS position could be filled by a temporary advisor who would develop an overall conceptual approach to business development and supervise the counterpart consultants. Counterparts should have permanent business advisors skilled in needs assessment, cost/benefit analysis, small enterprise training and other areas where existing counterpart expertise is lacking. Specialized technical assistance and training needs will still have to be met by utilizing outside experts and groups, but the counterpart consultant should be able to train IGA field workers to provide basic business analysis/management/marketing training to UBs.

2. Interest Rates: Adopt a 3% per/month flat rate system. This rate will boost UB profitability and allow UBs to meet the cost of FNP centers. While substantially higher than rates charged by many UBs, the 3% flat rate is still lower than alternative sources of non-formal credit.

**3. Stability of UB Capital:** Steps should be taken to increase the proportion of stable Regular Savings vs. potentially volatile Voluntary Savings. One approach might be to reinvest members share of SHU as Basic Savings rather than Voluntary Savings. Another approach, proposed by CRS and Counterpart IGA staffs, would be to modify current loan limit ratios to favor members who deposit higher levels of Basic savings.

**4. Reduce Loan Delays:** Loans from counterparts to UBs should come directly from counterpart's revolving fund rather than from CRS. Counterparts can be reimbursed by CRS for disbursed loans on a periodic basis.

**5. Use of "Idle Funds":** Counterparts should be allowed to put capital accumulating in their IGA revolving fund to productive use. Current U.S. Government regulations restricting the use of USAID grant funds prohibit counterparts from earning interest on these funds. But starting in 1990, CRS plans to replace USAID grant money currently in counterpart Revolving Funds with CRS private funds, raising the possibility that these funds could be more flexibly and productively managed. Uses could include working capital for counterparts' productive enterprises, non-UB credit, or at least deposit accounts. This would maximize the capital available for UB loans after CRS assistance to counterpart IGA programs is eventually phased-out.

**6. Legalization of IGA:** Technically speaking, virtually all of the credit programs currently operated by Indonesian NGOs are "illegal" in the sense that they are not recognized as legitimate programs under Indonesian law. But under the Government's 1988 financial markets deregulation package (PAKTO 27), it is now relatively easy for counterparts to obtain legal status as financial institutions (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat). So far, the lack of legal status for Indonesians NGOs involved in credit has not presented a problem, but given the frequent ups and downs seen in recent Government/NGO relationships it would seem prudent to take steps now to prevent any future difficulties.

#### **G. Future Evaluation of CFNDP:**

Given the limitations of the Sistem Nilai as a means for evaluating aggregate changes in nutritional status, and the expense and uncertain validity of stand-alone nutritional survey techniques, the Team does not feel that it is practical or cost-effective to evaluate the success of CFNDP in terms of direct nutritional impact. However, worldwide experience with nutritional interventions does support the general hypothesis that improvements in health services, health and nutritional knowledge, and economic status are positively related to improvements in families' nutritional status. Furthermore, as CRS has increasingly defined program sustainability as a central program objective, it appears more appropriate to limit the scope of CFNDP evaluation to indicators which focus on success in message delivery, economic impact and institutionalization.

Based on these considerations, an assessment of the impact of CFNDP should focus on the following outcomes:

**1. Beneficiary Knowledge of Health/Nutritional Information:** Information on mothers' knowledge of FNP health and nutrition messages is not currently collected on a systematic basis, but this data could be collected periodically by counterpart field workers and cadres. Increased nutritional knowledge is the final indicator of success in FNP growth monitoring, counselling and education interventions making it practical to focus on this single indicator rather than attempting a complex, quantitative and qualitative assessment of the services themselves. It should be stressed that knowledge, not "practice" is the correct indicator. Changes in actual nutritional practices are virtually impossible to measure, and in any case are a function of economic and other external factors as well as the effectiveness of education.

**2. Impact of Food Aid & IGA in Raising Family Incomes:** Significant increases in family incomes deriving from food aid in the short-run, and participation in IGA in the long-run can be expected to lead to improved nutritional practices and nutritional status. Calculating the economic impact of food aid is a fairly straightforward exercise, but assessing the economic impact of IGA is both more important and more difficult. The more intensive counterpart monitoring of UB businesses recommended by the Team as a means of implementing an effective UB business development program could provide both the required baseline and monitoring data necessary to assess the impact of IGA in family incomes.

**3. Coverage of Health Services and IGA:** Clearly the overall impact of FNP in a village is influenced by the degree to which it is actually reaching the greatest possible number of eligible participants. Performance in this area can be monitored easily using data already collected by CRS, i.e. attendance rates, targeted vs. enrolled participants, participation in UBs, and data on new enrollments which can be used to measure the successful application of targeting criteria.

**4. Institutionalization and Sustainability:** Ideally sustainability should be assessed through a follow-up village study conducted one to two years after phase-out, but there are a number of intermediate measures which could be used during the period of CRS assistance. Data on the performance of the IGA system in generating FNP Capital is already available in CRS and counterparts. Measuring the "institutionalization" of FNP, requires more indirect measures. One quantitative indicator of local government support could be the performance of Posyandus in providing services to FNP centers, such as Posyandu staff visits, immunizations, and the distribution of government-supplied materials such as Vitamin A and ORT packets. The regularity of their provision can serve as a powerful indirect indicator of the relationship between FNP centers and local health officials. A simple measure of the strength of Posyandus, as well as its community support, could be cadre

attendance and drop-out rates. The Team observed that the key motivating factor for continued cadre participation was the degree of status and respect conveyed upon them by local leaders and the community at large. The only direct indicator for community support is the rate of participation in FNP activities, although it must be kept in mind that during the course of the program center attendance is often determined by the availability of food.

The "baseline" for these indicators should be information obtained from the "community self-assessments" discussed earlier in this chapter. In light of limited counterpart capabilities and manpower, this is a more practical and cost-effective approach than conducting formal "baseline surveys" and will have the additional advantage of involving communities in the process of evaluation.

## **V. GENERAL BACKGROUND ISSUES FOR CFNDP**

### **A. Worldwide Trends in CRS Food Aid Approaches:**

The current CFNDP in Indonesia is a product of a gradual evolution in thinking about food distribution and child nutrition programs that has taken place worldwide both within CRS and among other development agencies since the 1950's. Originally, food aid programs consisted simply of food distribution to malnourished groups, motivated by the availability of surplus food in Western countries and the straightforward charitable goal of feeding the poor. Early programs did not take into account the medium and long term impact of food aid on the economic or public health status of targeted groups.

In the early sixties international donors refined programs to target aid more explicitly to nutritionally vulnerable children. Various methods for growth surveillance were adopted, and the concept of "Supplementary Feeding" was refined. Supplementary feeding was based on the idea of using food aid to make up for a measured "caloric deficit" among undernourished children. Food aid was combined with nutrition education for mothers to assure that families understood the importance of good child nutrition. To greater or lesser degrees, most donors, including CRS, assumed that the supplemental food given to families would directly result in improved child nutrition and growth.

This supplemental feeding approach began to be questioned in the mid-sixties by critics within CRS and other donors. While supplementary feeding may be a sound from a clinical nutrition perspective, it failed to treat poor households as a single economic unit, and assumed that supplementary foods would be given directly to the targeted children. On the contrary, critics contended that there is in fact an inverse relationship between the percentage of household income spent on food and the likelihood that additional increments of income will be spent to feed children. Poor households already spend a high percentage of total income on food, and are in fact more likely to spend any incremental increase on modest luxuries, i.e. radio batteries, clothes, etc. which improve the quality of life for the family as a whole.

In a poor village where children are as a rule "thin", it is hard for parents to see why they should divert scarce family resources to a child that appears normal by local standards, especially if they are not obviously sick. A key element in this perspective is that food aid must be seen as a supplement to family income rather than food per se. Furthermore, the idea that nutrition education in itself will lead to significant changes in a household's "marginal propensity to feed children" is seen as simplistic and misguided.

These observations led to a new breed of food programs in CRS, beginning first in Africa and spreading to Asia in later years. Food aid was seen as economic assistance aimed at relieving stress on strained family budgets. This implied much larger food rations per family, as the goal was to provide a significant increase in family resources rather than directly relieving the caloric deficit of targeted children. But food aid resources were limited, making it impractical to artificially increase family incomes to the point where child nutritional needs would automatically be met. Instead the goal was to provide a food ration

large enough to represent a significant increase to family income, and link that supplement to an explicit "social contract" between the donor and the family. In return for the food aid, the family had to agree to a simple set of guidelines aimed at insuring that the dietary needs of their children were met. In addition the family had to accept the growth of the child, as measured in periodic weighings as the "contract verifier" that proved to the donor that they were adhering to the dietary guidelines.

This program refocus led to other changes. Growth surveillance systems became the key element in the relationship between health worker and mother. Surveillance systems evolved from a clinical diagnostic tools for use by health workers to a pedagogical tool for mothers to better understand the growth status of their children. The latest manifestation of this trend is CRS' adoption of the Grade System (Sistem Nilai as it is known in Indonesia) for its food and nutrition programs on the grounds that it is more comprehensible to mothers than graphically oriented growth charts. Greater emphasis has also been placed on individual consultation with mothers at the time of child weighing, with health messages based on the specific condition of the child. General nutrition education is not abandoned, but the system relies heavily on one-on-one consultation within the framework of the "social contract" agreed to by recipient families.

While the increased awareness of the economic roots of malnutrition and the economic behavior of poor households led to changes in the design of food and nutrition programs, it has also led CRS to see increased household and community income as the only long-term solution to malnutrition and child mortality. Thus, under the 1984 CFNDP program, CRS/Indonesia added the Income Generating Activity component, with the long term goal of increasing family incomes to the point where external income supplements are no longer necessary.

#### **B. Transferring the Model to Indonesia:**

While elements of the approach pioneered in CRS' African programs have been incorporated into the CFNDP, the program elements were modified in light of the very different conditions existing in Indonesia at the time the FNP program was redesigned in 1983/4. At that time the bulk of CRS counterparts and programs were in Java. Villages assisted by CRS, while poor by any absolute standard, were nevertheless better off than their African counterparts or even Indonesian villages outside Java. Possibly as a result of this, and because of the limited amount of food commodities available to CRS/Indonesia, no attempt was made to set food rations at a level that would represent a major supplement to family incomes; rather the food was seen as an incentive for mothers to attend FNP centers. The economic value of the food ration offset the opportunity costs for mothers for participation in FNP activities. Father C. Capone, regarded by many in CRS as the intellectual "father" of CFNDP, commented on the role of food aid in the program in 1983:

"It is known, in fact, that health programs for infants and mothers, primarily the educational programs, are too often perceived by members of the public as a 'burden' rather than a 'service'. It is the subsidy that changes the 'burden' into a 'service'."

Capone further observed that participants perceived the recipient contribution paid for the food as a "fair price" rather than seeing the food ration as an outright "income transfer". **Thus the primary benefit of the food aid was to be seen in higher attendance rates at FNP centers rather than its direct impact on family income or nutrition.** This in turn places greater emphasis on the performance of the FNP centers in delivering its package of services - immunization, health and nutrition education, etc.. as a key determinant of program impact.

The explicit "social contract" was also modified. While African programs focused explicitly on child feeding practices, in Indonesia the focus of the "contract" has been on attendance and active participation in FNP center activities. The nature of the contract itself has also been transformed in the Indonesian context from an explicit written or oral contract to a looser verbal agreement relying more on peer pressure and social obligation than on specific sanctions (i.e. exclusion from the program) to insure compliance.

### **C. Current Thinking on CNFDP: "Program Drift" and Mixed Signals:**

Despite the admirable efforts undertaken in 1983/4 by CRS, USAID and external consultants to refine and clarify the goals and objectives of the CFNDP, we now find a situation where CRS staff no longer share a common understanding of overall goals and their relationship to program strategy. The evaluators cannot say that there ever was such a common understanding, but it is likely that both the need to adapt the program to field realities, and the influence of changing personnel with changing views has led to a degree of "program drift" without any conscious decision on CRS' part to modify program goals or design. This drift has led to CRS sending mixed signals both to AID and to CRS counterparts regarding the real priorities in CFNDP. Some of the more critical areas of "uncertainty" to be discussed below include: 1) the actual role food aid plays in CFNDP; 2) the expected impact of nutrition education; and 3) the relationship between CFNDP and GOI health programs.

1. Food Aid in CFNDP: During the 1984 program redesign, CRS made it very clear that the goal of food aid in the program was purely to encourage attendance at FNP centers. In view of the economic value of the food commodities, and the "recipient contribution" collected from mothers, the food aid was expected to offset the opportunity costs of Posyandu attendance as well as provide a modest incentive payment. As has been discussed, there was no expectation that food aid would be directly applied to the diets of targeted children or that it would represent a large enough increase to family incomes to significantly change feeding practices.

But there is now some drift away from this "food as incentive" approach back to the "food as income" approach found in CRS' African programs. The CRS PL 480 Title II Submission for 1990 now states that one of the objectives of FNP is "to mitigate poverty in the short-term through the provision of an economically-meaningful food aid package to needy families. This objective is reflected in the recent decision to begin collecting one recipient contribution per family rather than one per recipient (child or pregnant mother). The goal is to effectively increase the economic impact of food assistance going to most targeted families. In this view, food aid is a short-term boost to family incomes, to be

followed by longer-term, permanent increases provided through Income Generating Activities (IGA).

The concept of food aid and IGA as parts of an overall strategy to increase family incomes is not shared by all CRS staff, nor does it appear to have been clearly communicated to the counterparts. **Furthermore it appears to be based on an overestimation of the real value of food aid to recipients.** Under the new Monetization plan, each recipient will receive 4 kilograms of rice and 2 kilograms of Wheat Soy Blend (WSB) per month. Families will pay a single recipient contribution of Rp. 500 regardless of the number rations received. To estimate the value of food aid to targeted families, it is necessary to consider:

a. How many families will receive multiple rations? - Because CRS tracks recipients, not families, CRS does not know with any precision how many families have or will receive multiple rations. Rough estimates from CRS staff indicate that perhaps 50% of participating families may receive more than one ration, but very few receive three or more. Excessively high recipient contributions may have discouraged families from taking more than one ration in the past, but the future impact of the new contribution policy can only be guessed at. However, if CRS targeting criteria were modified to include all mothers with children enrolled in the program, rather than only those who are pregnant or lactating, nearly all families would receive at least two rations.

b. What is the real economic value of the ration? - The current market value of rice in villages is approximately Rp. 400/kilo. There is no market price for WSB, but given the serious problems many counterparts have experienced in getting mothers to accept and use WSB, it is reasonable to assume that its "perceived" economic value is negligible, or at least considerably lower than that of rice. So the total value of the ration is  $4 \times \text{Rp. } 400/\text{kg.} = \text{Rp. } 1600$  for rice plus whatever value can be assigned to the 2 kgs. of WSB. If we assume that WSB is half as valuable as rice (or  $2 \times \text{Rp. } 200/\text{kg} = \text{Rp. } 400$ ) then the total annual value of one recipient's ration is  $12 \text{ mos.} \times \text{Rp. } 2000 = \text{Rp. } 24,000/\text{year}$ .

Subtracting the Rp. 500 recipient contribution ( $12 \text{ months} \times \text{Rp. } 500 = \text{Rp. } 6000/\text{year}/\text{family}$ ) we find that the annual value of CFNDP food aid for a family receiving one ration is Rp. 18,000/year, while for a family receiving two rations the annual value is Rp. 42,000/year. If we disregard the value of WSB altogether (as several informants have suggested we do) those values drop to Rp. 13,200/year and Rp.37,200/year respectively.

The above totals, while small in absolute terms, really should be compared to family incomes before we can determine whether FNP food aid is "economically-meaningful". But CRS has no real data on actual levels of family incomes in FNP villages, nor is this data available from the GOI. Anecdotal information from the field regarding family incomes is often based on reports of cash incomes rather than the total cash, food and material resources available to poor families. Even in light of these uncertainties, it is unlikely that the value of food aid under the FNP program represents more than 10% of family income, and in most cases it would amount to less.

If the opportunity costs to mothers participating in the program are factored in (which would further lower the perceived economic value to recipient families), it appears that the

most realistic role for food aid remains as that of an incentive to participate in FNP activities. Increasing the ration to achieve a significant impact on total family incomes appears to be impractical within the confines of the current program, both because AID is unlikely to approve a drastic increase in the ration amount, and because the logistical challenge of delivering large rations to recipients would strain counterpart capabilities.

2. Nutrition Education: The team found divergent views within CRS regarding the role of nutrition education and its potential impact on behavior. One view is that nutritional education, however it is packaged or delivered, cannot be expected to result in short-term changes in infant and child feeding practices unless it is combined with significant increases in family income. Another view treats nutrition education as the central goal of CFNDP and implicitly assumes that its impact on behavior is largely a function of how well the "message" is conveyed to mothers.

Without attempting to settle the question of which view is correct, it is important to note that the "pessimistic" view of nutrition education tends to be held by CRS managers, while the "optimistic" view is more common among technical and field staff. While all in CRS agree that nutrition education is worthwhile, whether in the short-run or long-run, it appears that CRS management's more modest expectations regarding this program component has resulted in a lower degree of management attention being paid to this component than one might expect given the central role of nutrition education in the program design.

3. CFNDP and GOI Health Programs: FNP utilizes village Posyandus as its delivery point for food distribution, nutrition education and growth surveillance. Central to this approach is the need to maximize attendance at the Posyandu (through food distribution and "commitment") and to improve the quality of service delivery (through cadre training and educational packages). But the specific program elements of growth surveillance and nutrition education only represent a part of the services offered by Posyandus. In the course of CFNDP, uncertainties have developed regarding the degree to which CRS and its counterparts can, or should attempt to upgrade the services of the Posyandu as a whole, including immunizations, vitamin and ORT distribution, referrals and other services.

On one hand, it is recognized that promoting child survival requires an integrated approach combining both nutritional and health interventions. On the other hand, CRS is reluctant to ask its counterparts to take responsibility for the quality of services that are beyond their direct control. Underlying this reluctance is the fear that adopting general "institutional development" of Posyandus as a more specific end goal will make CRS accountable for the overall performance of FNP Posyandus. Indeed that fear is not unfounded. AID has periodically criticized CRS for the failure to insure that immunizations are performed properly in FNP Posyandus and for the failure to insure that vitamin A, Oralit, and other supplies are available to mothers.

CRS has responded to these criticisms by noting that neither CRS nor its counterparts are responsible for these services, and that counterparts cannot directly control the performance of government-run Puskesmas in providing them. This is consistent with the objectives of the original CFNDP proposal, which are limited to nutrition-related activities.

But during the CFNDP grant period, CRS has sent mixed signals both to AID and counterparts. In 1987, CRS requested that the original CFNDP project plan be replaced with a new document entitled "The Title II Child Survival Project". In that document, CRS broadened the scope of CFNDP to embrace the overall child survival goals of the GOI and UNICEF, which clearly go beyond growth monitoring and nutrition education. AID officially rejected the new document, largely on the grounds that its goals and objectives were too broad and were not linked to measurable performance indicators. But even though the new project plan was discarded, AID was left with a clear impression that CRS wanted to pursue a broader approach to the development of integrated services in FNP Centers.

Regarding CRS counterparts, the information system established for monitoring FNP includes information on immunizations, vitamin A and ORT distribution, and CRS supervision of counterparts has included suggestions that counterparts "do something" when these services appear to be inadequate. But CRS has never communicated exactly what actions counterparts should take, nor has CRS ever specified what relationships it hopes counterparts will establish with local government health offices.

#### **D. Relationship to USAID:**

The current CFNDP project plan is the product of the "Assessment/Redesign of the CRS PL 480 Title II Program in Indonesia" undertaken jointly by CRS and AID in 1983. The resulting project plan appears to have satisfied AID concerns regarding what it had seen as serious weaknesses in CRS' previous approach to Title II child nutrition activities. Since then AID has remained broadly supportive of the overall FNP program, with its attention focusing on CRS implementation of the plan.

In the early years of the grant, AID was fairly critical of CRS performance in managing the redesigned program. Of particular concern to AID was high turnover in CRS staff, with AID noting in 1987 that five or six different people had identified themselves as being in charge of FNP in the previous twenty months. As management and personnel have stabilized in recent years, AID concerns have been abated, and AID has settled into a supportive but more "hands-off" role vis-a-vis CRS. With major questions regarding program design largely settled, interactions between CRS and AID have tended to focus on questions of Title II commodity levels, accountability, and compliance with AID regulations.

The 1983 Assessment/Redesign called for CRS and AID to work together to find ways to minimize the administrative burden of CRS/Counterpart compliance with USG food accountability and other requirements. It was noted that these administrative requirements were diverting CRS/Counterpart management attention away from the substantive objectives of the program in favor of managing and accounting for food and money. But during the grant period, there has been virtually no progress in this area, and indeed the problem has probably gotten worse. Fortunately CRS has incorporated a number of program modifications in the 1990 Monetization plan that appear to promise at least some relief.

AID is charged with insuring that its grantees comply with the myriad regulations that Congress adds to foreign aid and Title II legislation each year. The USAID Mission feels that it has little or no latitude to insulate its grantees from these accountability requirements, each of which may require an additional information gathering or certification process. New regulations are added, but old regulations are seldom repealed.

The growth of "administrative barnacles" may be beyond the control of the USAID Mission in Indonesia. But it also appears that current USAID management is considerably more "liability conscious" than in the past, and is unwilling to exercise what little discretion it may have to enforce accountability requirements in a sensible, cost-effective manner. To illustrate, CRS has experienced particular problems in settling claims for lost food commodities - a backlog of claims, some dating from 1984, remain open despite intensive efforts by CRS to close them. The actual amount of lost commodities is small - from 1985 to 1987 the loss was 0.4% of the total value of imported commodities, but AID seems to lack any sense of the cost-effectiveness of investigating and documenting small claims.

Since there has been so little progress in reducing the administrative overhead of CFNDP, CRS has taken steps in the 1990 Monetization program to in effect "make AID pay for its own bureaucracy". Under the monetization program approved by AID, monetization funds will entirely fund the direct costs of food program administration, allowing CRS and its counterparts to concentrate private resources on village development activities. CRS also plans to limit counterpart audit vulnerability by eliminating recipient contributions handled by counterparts, and by removing CFNDP grant funds from counterparts' IGA Revolving Funds and replacing them with CRS private funds. These are important changes, because; 1) AID has asserted the right to audit the use of recipient contributions, which CRS has found notoriously difficult to monitor itself; and 2) use of AID grant money in the IGA revolving fund has created a theoretically infinite audit trail, and has imposed restrictions on the use of IGA funds which have threatened the financial viability of the program.

While most recent AID/CRS interactions have centered on accountability issues, AID has also expressed increasing concern over the performance of CFNDP in upgrading the overall quality of Posyandu health and nutrition services. AID has suggested that CRS must do more to insure that FNP centers are providing a complete integrated package of services, including immunizations, ORT, referrals, in addition to growth monitoring and nutrition education. The basic point is well taken, but AID continues to be sufficiently sensitive to the fact that CRS/Indonesia's ability to control Posyandu operations is indirect at best. CRS depends on its counterparts for actual program implementation, and those counterparts in turn must work through the GOI Posyandu system to reach project beneficiaries. CRS/Indonesia's real role in CFNDP has been to upgrade the capabilities of its counterparts to operate the program at the field level. Developing counterparts with limited staff resources and administrative skills is necessarily a long-term process in which CRS attempts to "micro-manage" field level operations would appear impractical at best, and at worst, counterproductive in terms of institutional development. In this light, comparisons of CFNDP to other AID-funded village health programs where grantees directly supervise Posyandu activities, or where AID works directly with GOI health agencies are inappropriate.

On a final note, the 1983 Assessment/Redesign team recommended that CRS draw upon USAID information and experience in areas of mutual interest such as health and nutrition services delivery, rural credit and off-farm employment. USAID/Indonesia has amassed considerable experience through current and past projects including the Village Family Planning/Mother-Child Health Project, Village Family Planning Project, Comprehensive Health Improvement Program - Province Specific (CHIPPS), as well as Financial Institutions Development (FID) and Central Java Enterprise Development (CJEDP) projects. It does not appear that either CRS or AID have taken the initiative to share information or identify areas where experiences in these projects might contribute to the CRS program. The inclination of CRS to minimize contact with AID whenever possible, combined with overworked USAID staff and the Mission's generally poor performance in disseminating information continues to prevent such collaboration. The Team does not mean to suggest that all or most USAID project experiences and approaches are directly relevant to CFNDP, nor does it seem that USAID is in a position to provide extensive technical assistance to CRS. Still, the ongoing failure to at least investigate these potential resources continues to represent a significant "lost opportunity" for CRS.

#### **E. CRS/Counterpart Relationships:**

The 1983 Assessment/Redesign report, described counterpart perceptions of CRS at that time:

"CRS does not have enough concern for, or even understanding of the problems faced by them in their day-to-day interactions with villagers and local governments...CRS merely 'passes down rules' while refusing to recognize the difficulties and contradictions engendered by the need to follow what are thought to be inappropriate CRS demands".

The evaluators also noted that too many CRS/Counterpart interactions focused on auditing and accountability issues, and suggested that CRS separate monitoring and programming functions both in CRS and the field. CRS has done this, by establishing separate field review and FNP programming sections, and has taken additional steps to improve CRS/Counterpart communication such as holding annual management and planning workshops with Counterparts. **But despite these efforts, the fundamental quality of CRS/Counterpart relationships has not changed significantly since the above observations were noted in 1983.**

The present Team is convinced that CRS is sincere in its commitment to improve the quality of its relationships with Counterparts, but it faces a number of systemic constraints in achieving that goal:

1. Power relationships between CRS and counterparts are inherently unequal. As CRS controls CFNDP resources, and reserves the right to make all basic decisions regarding program design and implementation, it is a fiction to suppose that CRS and counterparts can be "equal partners" in CFNDP. This is not to suggest that CRS can or should change this relationship, but it must be recognized that the only real power Counterparts possess is to accept or reject the program as a whole. And once the

decision is made to accept assistance, growing dependency on CRS resources locks them into CFNDP regardless of their attitude towards CRS policies. CRS can always select a new counterpart, but for an individual counterpart, the consequences of "bucking the system" can be disastrous.

2. Separating field review and program functions in CRS has not altered the fact that a high percentage of CRS/Counterpart interaction and communication continues to center on auditing and accountability concerns. For reasons basically beyond CRS control, CRS has been unable to reduce the administrative burden of CFNDP for counterparts. Moreover, while auditing and program functions have been separated, the nature of FNP program supervision continues to center on "compliance" with the program design, i.e. it retains an "auditing" rather than a "problem solving" quality.
3. Because CRS must work through multiple counterparts, it is driven to adopt and enforce a "standard" approach to CFNDP implementation. While CRS tries to be sensitive to field-level constraints, it has to balance overall CFNDP goals and objectives with the needs of counterparts as a whole. Consequently, its ability to "customize" the program for individual counterparts is limited. In reality, CRS has adapted the program in response to counterpart needs and suggestions, but that fact may not be apparent to any one counterpart.

CRS has not found an effective mechanism for dialogue with counterparts either regarding program goals and objectives or specific implementation issues. The annual FNP Technical Workshops and Management Meetings basically have served as a forum for CRS to announce its plans for the following year's program. Discussion and feedback is limited both by the relatively short time available in the meetings, and by the inability of counterparts to articulate their views in this setting. The latter constraint is influenced by the organization of the meetings themselves - with forty to fifty counterpart representatives sitting as "audience" and CRS representatives "on stage". Meaningful discussion is difficult in this environment. But even if the structure of meetings was more open, i.e. a roundtable discussion, most counterparts would still find it difficult to formulate a coherent position on many of the issues discussed.

Part of the difficulty lies with the frequent failure of CRS to adequately explain the underlying reasons for its decisions. As an example, in the 1989 Management Meeting a number of counterpart representatives objected to proposed changes in the collection of FNP recipient contributions. They complained that collecting the contribution on a per family basis rather than a per recipient basis was unfair because families with one recipient would have to pay the same amount as families with two or more recipients. In the course of the discussions it was evident that the counterparts were largely unaware that the main purpose of the new policy was to effectively raise the level of rations received by families who might otherwise be unable to pay multiple recipient contributions. Furthermore, the reasons for adopting this approach rather than simply increasing ration amounts (which relate mostly to programming constraints CRS faces vis-a-vis USAID) were also left unexplained. When the rationale for CRS actions are so poorly communicated, it is understandable that counterparts might perceive otherwise well founded and reasonable decisions as "arbitrary".

Perhaps a more fundamental constraint to meaningful dialogue is the fact that CRS and its counterparts are often speaking a different "language" of development altogether. CRS speaks the language of the international development community, replete with references to "development objectives", "strategic planning", and "cost effective approaches". Counterparts come to the table with a different intellectual framework based on their roots as local charitable and social welfare organizations. CRS sees it as one of its long-run objectives to help counterparts transform themselves into more "professional" development organizations. While the Team supports this objective, it must be recognized that counterparts are independent organizations who are justifiably proud both of their "roots" and their demonstrated accomplishments in serving their communities. In other words, it is not always clear that counterparts want to be "transformed".

To a certain degree, counterpart exposure to CRS planning and management techniques in the course of CFNDP implementation can be expected to lead to "internalization" of these skills over time. But if CRS hopes to influence that basic "philosophical approach" of counterparts, extended, higher level dialogue between CRS and counterpart leadership is required. As with any "policy dialogue" status relationships and credibility are important. Counterpart Directors are not likely to reorient their basic approach to development on the basis of contacts and discussions with junior-level CRS staff. But the major communication link between CRS and counterparts consists of visits of CRS supervisors who are not in a position to "speak for" CRS. Yearly Management Meetings are not a practical forum for discussions between CRS and counterpart leadership on broader goals and objectives. Instead CRS management should arrange more frequent one-on-one contacts with counterpart leadership to discuss the broader "non-operational" aspects of CRS/counterpart relationships.

## **VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE FOOD AND NUTRITION PROGRAM (FNP)**

### **A. Goal and Purpose of FNP:**

The first step in examining FNP implementation is to identify how FNP goals and objectives are understood by actors at each level of the implementation chain. It is the contention of the team that the presence, or lack of, a common understanding of FNP is a fundamental determining factor in explaining the performance of CRS, counterparts, and project beneficiaries in achieving FNP objectives. This may seem a commonplace or obvious observation, but given the number of actors involved in FNP, and their divergent backgrounds and interests, it is a critical one as well. Donors too often assume that "acceptance" of a program by counterparts and/or beneficiaries implies that they understand and accept the overall logic of the program design.

#### **1. C.R.S. Perceptions:**

The goal of FNP is to improve nutritional and health status of families in poor communities. Relating to this goal, there are three purposes: (i) to increase community participation in nutrition programs and IGA; (ii) to increase recipients knowledge and application of nutrition information; and (iii) to induce a system for developing locally financial sources in order to increase family income and to fund village nutrition activities.

Under the terms of the CFNDP Grant, CRS activities focus on assisting and upgrading the management capabilities of its counterparts to implement the program, have been organized into eight strategic components:

1. Targeting
2. Commitment
3. Growth Monitoring
4. Food Distribution
5. Nutrition Education
6. Cadres Development
7. Supervision and Monitoring
8. Income Generating Activities

The Team found that in general, CRS staff and management share a relatively consistent, common understanding of the broad goals of CFNDP. Moreover that understanding matches the goals outlined in the original grant agreement. However, there is considerable divergence within CRS regarding both the relative priority attached to each of the eight program components (as well as the causal links between them), and CRS' proper role in project implementation. The most critical of these divergences were outlined in our discussion of FNP background and philosophy. For the purposes of this section, the key point is that the existence of these different views of FNP among CRS staff often result in contradictory or ambiguous signals being sent to counterparts regarding the "true" goals and

objectives of the program. This lack of clarity is critical because of the limited ability of counterparts to grasp and internalize what are inevitably fairly abstract development objectives.

## **2. Counterpart Perceptions:**

From the counterparts' point of view, the goal and purposes of FNP are difficult to distinguish from one another. The hierarchical relationship between "goals", "purposes" and "objectives" so enshrined in Western models of project planning is difficult to convey in the Indonesian language, especially for less-educated people. Not incidentally, these concepts often confound Western donors themselves. It is common to translate goal, purpose and objective into the same Indonesian word : "tujuan" (goal). The CRS FNP manual, Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Program Pengembangan Makanan dan Gizi Masyarakat (PAZIMAS) translates goal as "tujuan umum" (general goal) and purpose as "tujuan khusus" (special goal).

According to the counterparts, the goal of FNP is to improve the nutritional status of "balita" (children under five) in the poor communities. Their ability to recall the tujuan khusus (purposes) of FNP, i.e. "increasing community participation", "generating funds locally to increase family incomes and independently finance village nutrition", and "increasing beneficiary knowledge and application of nutrition knowledge" is weak and inconsistent. One counterpart leader confessed to the Team that he "did not know" what the real purpose of FNP was. While the leader was undoubtedly overstating his ignorance, there is a general tendency among counterparts to regard any program that delivers resources and training to villages as intrinsically good, and a corresponding lack of curiosity regarding the "logic" of program design. It must also be noted that CRS itself has undergone a gradual evolution over its 46 year history from a straightforward "charity" orientation to a more sophisticated approach using financial and food resources to achieve carefully defined development objectives. CRS counterparts in Indonesia share CRS's church-based roots, but as most are relatively "young" organizations, they are only in the early stages of this evolution.

In the absence of any controlling "vision" of the program, counterparts tend to treat the eight program components (targeting, food delivery, etc.) as the "purpose" of FNP, with a major emphasis being placed on food aid as an end in itself. This pattern is reinforced by CRS monitoring and supervision, which also concentrates on these components, sending a message to counterparts that CRS views program "success" is a function of success in implementing the program components rather than progress towards end objectives.

## **3. Community Perceptions:**

In general, targeted mothers know the goal of FNP is to increase status of infant and child nutrition. Only a few mothers think that the goal of FNP is simply to push mothers to attend FNP centers. Although the basic goal appears to be well understood, relatively few mothers can describe how their participation in FNP will actually achieve that goal. There are some local terms used by mothers and community leaders to describe FNP, such as,

"pembagian susu bulgur" (distribution of milk and bulgur), "pembagian jatah" (distribution of food ration), "pembagian makan" (food distribution), "bantuan beras dan WSB" (food and WSB assistance), and "makanan tambahan untuk balita" (food aid for balita). These terms reveal that while mothers may understand that the goal of FNP is to improve the nutritional status of their children, their overall concept of the program still centers on food distribution.

In the case of YASPEM, mothers' understanding of the program was surprisingly strong, considering their low level of education, socio-economic status and lack of mass communication media. Mothers in Maumere were more likely to understand the relationship between food, growth monitoring, and education in the program than mothers in the other areas studied. This corresponds directly to the role of cadres, and field workers (and field worker assistants in Maumere). Particularly in Maumere and Lampung, the two latter groups are very knowledgeable and dedicated.

Among community leaders, understanding of FNP objectives is not obvious, except for a few Pamong Desa (village leaders) and former cadres. Very few could offer a coherent description of the program or its objectives. This is not entirely surprising - most of them have no direct experience with FNP activities, as most are working while centers are open. Moreover, a number of village leaders, while aware of the program, perceive that the centers' activities are urusan ibu-ibu (in the vested interest of mothers only). Other community leaders confessed that their discussion with the Team was the first time that they had heard of the terms and activities of FNP. These findings indicate that FNP has not yet found a place in the normal web of village activities and programs that are important to village leaders, and consequently there is little of sense of "ownership" regarding the program. Given the critical role village leaders typically play in motivating and supervising village cadres, this gap places a heavy burden on counterpart field workers to "keep the system going". But even more important, the failure to communicate the goal and purpose of FNP to key community leaders is an indication that in operational terms, the goal of increasing community participation in nutrition activities has been narrowly defined to involving mothers, rather than the village as a whole, in FNP.

## **B. Organization and Management:**

### **1. C.R.S.:**

CRS-USCC/Indonesia Program consists of three major departments and four units. The Country Representative heads all departments and units with the assistance of the Assistant Country Representative. The departments concerned are Food Program, IGA Program and Finance Departments. Each of them is headed by a Manager. The units concerned are Field Review, Administration, Task Force and Shipping Units which are led by Coordinators.

CRS/Indonesia is an assisting organization whose main task is to support the development programs of local implementing agencies. Due to its position in the development process, its function is basically stimulative. The CRS FNP manual, Buku Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Program Pengembangan Makanan dan Gizi Masyarakat (PAZIMAS) explains that CRS is

a donating institution which provides aid, such as food, funds, and technical assistance, to support the FNP programs of its counterparts. In this sense, CRS is not operational, as the counterparts are in responsible for the actual implementation of FNP in villages.

CRS applies participative "open" management, which is apparent in the way CRS makes decisions. Regular staff meetings are conducted to enhance coordination, while each of the respective departments and units enjoy considerable latitude to identify and propose solutions in their areas of responsibility. Once decisions are made, they appear to be effectively communicated to all units in CRS.

While the current structure and management system of CRS appears well suited to CRS' role in CFNDP, it must be noted that in the early years of the grant period, this was not always the case. Respondents in CRS, USAID, and the counterparts characterized CRS previous management of CFNDP as chaotic and uncoordinated. High staff turnover, unclear divisions of responsibility, and inconsistent leadership from top CRS management left USAID and the counterparts in doubt as to "who was in charge". The fact that CRS is only beginning to deal seriously with such key program elements such as IGA, sustainability, and institutional development of its counterparts is in part a reflection of poor management in the early stages of CFNDP. To CRS' credit, both USAID and the counterparts agree that the quality of CRS management and the professionalism of its staff has improved dramatically in recent years.

## **2. Counterparts:**

A comparison among organizational structures of the three counterparts reveals wide differences relating to each counterpart's organizational history and dominant "management style". CRS has not attempted to impose any specific management structure within counterparts, so each has found its own way to "graft" FNP onto their existing structure. Except for PUSBS, which was more or less established specifically to implement the CRS nutrition program, all counterparts manage a variety of donor and locally-funded programs. When an organization is implementing multiple, discrete programs, it would seem advisable to establish specific sections for each program. YASPEM does have a separate unit exclusively responsible for FNP and FFW, but in LKB there is no officially designated FNP coordinator.

While CRS and its counterparts agreed on standardized job descriptions for FNP and IGA field workers, formal job descriptions for supervisors and other upper-level positions generally do not exist. The lack of clearly defined responsibility and authority has not presented major difficulties for the FNP coordinator in YASPEM, but in LKB the staff member nominally in charge of FNP is left to act on specific case-by-case instructions from the Director, and finds it difficult to plan or initiate actions on her own authority. Thus major decisions or actions are deferred pending directions from the Director, whose attention is divided among several programs. The same general pattern applies in YSBS and PUSBS, where the Directors generally do not delegate real authority to subordinates on the basis of clear job descriptions. When an organization is small and is engaged in a limited range of activities, this "one man show" style of leadership can be quite effective. But when the scale and diversity of activities becomes too great it becomes impossible for

a single leader, however capable or motivated, to responsibly manage the day-to-day implementation of multiple programs or program components.

A final problem relating to the structure of counterpart leadership and authority is the general lack of effective oversight mechanism for the counterpart as a whole. Counterparts typically are responsible to the local Catholic Diocese, but in practice the Diocese plays little or no role in advising or overseeing counterparts on the operational aspects of their programs. Several counterparts have, on paper, independent Boards of Directors, but these Boards rarely meet and are in some cases comprised mostly of members of the counterparts themselves. Thus, if there are significant problems at upper levels of counterpart management, there is no one to "manage the manager". This lack of effective oversight was one of the factors leading to the severe mismanagement problems in LKD/Surabaya - problems which led CRS to discontinue its relationship with that counterpart. But it must be stressed that since CRS counterparts are independent organizations, CRS cannot and should not act in a general oversight capacity towards counterpart management.

Personnel and salary practices commonly found in counterparts represent another systematic constraint to developing counterpart capacity to professionally manage and implement complex programs. As counterparts are typically affiliated with the local Catholic Church, they are under pressure to keep staff salaries in line with salaries paid in other, generally under-funded, Church-related organizations such as Catholic schools and social welfare groups. These restrictions make it extremely difficult to recruit and retain well-educated, qualified staff. The Director of LKB is very sensitive to this issue, and is collecting information on salaries paid for comparable work in other organizations, in the hope of persuading the Bishop that salaries within LKB should be allowed to rise. But even within LKB there is a general attitude that staff should "work for the community" rather than for money. Indeed current salary levels in LKB, although generally higher than those found in the other counterparts studied, are based more on "need", i.e. the size of the staff member's family than on job descriptions, qualifications or responsibilities. Among other counterparts, the Team detected a general attitude that employment in the organization was, in itself, a form of "welfare" for people who could not otherwise find jobs.

CRS attempts to address this problem have thus far been largely unsuccessful. When the IGA was introduced, CRS recognized that counterparts would require staff with strong economic and financial skills to implement the program. As counterpart costs for IGA personnel are paid directly by CRS, a decision was made to fund those positions at a level that would allow substantially higher salaries than those common for FNP staff. This policy drew complaints from counterparts, who asserted that these high salaries would create resentment and jealousy among their staff. The final result has been that IGA staff often "sign" for their full salaries, but actually receive a lesser amount, with the difference being retained by the counterparts for other uses.

### **3. Community Level Organization:**

At the community level, responsibility for FNP appears blurred and there are significant gaps in the links between counterparts, government institutions and FNP villages. According

to CRS policy, the project "superintendent" at the counterpart level is the counterpart Director, while at the village level that role is filled by the Kepala Desa (village head). But at the Kecamatan (subdistrict) level there is no government counterpart for the program, instead this position is filled by the counterpart field workers. Theoretically, by serving as FNP "superintendent" the Kepala Desa is taking overall responsibility for the conduct of the program in his village, while at the Kecamatan level, in effect, no one is responsible because field workers obviously have no authority to influence actions at that level which have an impact on FNP.

In reality the Camat (sub-district head) wields considerable power to facilitate or impede FNP implementation in that his signals to village heads and sub-district level social and health agencies are decisive in determining the level of support FNP receives in the village. Despite the lack of formal ties, YASi-EM and PUSBS have gone through considerable efforts to cultivate good relationships with local Camats, and those relationships can be observed to have had a considerable positive impact on the operation of FNP in villages.

At the village level, the prescribed function of the Kepala Desa is rarely realized in practice, which may in part be because the Kepala Desa's obligations to the program do not derive from the normal government chain of command, i.e. the village head does not feel bound to uphold responsibilities defined by an outside, private group. Also at the village level, FNP is supposed to work through through government organized PKK (health cadre) groups for daily program implementation, but in most cases there is little coordination between PKK and FNP cadre activities. It must be recognized however that in many villages the PKK organization is either weak or nonexistent.

#### **4. Government Relationships:**


It appears that the basic pattern of organizational relationships established under FNP has neglected and bypassed government institutions which have primary responsibility to coordinate and manage village health, social and economic programs. It is not uncommon for foreign or privately funded development projects to attempt to "leapfrog" over what are often incapable or uncooperative government institutions in order to maximize the immediate impact of the projects at the village level. Indeed, if the government's ability to provide village level services were better, there might be no need for projects such as FNP. But it is also clear that very little of lasting impact or substance can be achieved in Indonesia, without the positive support of interested government agencies.

Under Indonesian State Law No.5 of 1974 and State Law No.4 of 1979 the Camat is designated as Coordinator for all development activities undertaken within the Kecamatan. A similar role is assigned to the Kepala Desa at the village level. As noted above, some counterparts have established strong informal links with local Camats and Kepala Desas, and where this has occurred planning and implementation of FNP activities are routinely discussed in "Rapat Koordinasi Desa/Rakordes" (Village Coordinating Meetings) and "Rapat Koordinasi Pembangunan/Rakorbang" (Development Coordinating Meetings). Where these informal links are weak, FNP is effectively "invisible" to the government, leaving it subject to uncoordinated, arbitrary actions on the part of government officials at each level.

For example, in LKB/Lampung, generally weak or poor relations with Kecamatan officials has made it very difficult for LKB to gain permission to operate in villages. LKB usually bypasses Kabupaten and Kecamatan officials and negotiates directly with the village Kepala Desa. If an agreement can be reached with the Kepala Desa, written permission from higher levels is obtained more or less as a formality, although in many cases Camat have refused to allow centers to be opened in their sub-districts. Once a center is opened, LKB often experiences difficulties in obtaining the support of Kecamatan level health agencies such as the Puskesmas in such matters as cadre training and Puskesmas staff visits to FNP centers to provide immunizations and other services. In at least a few cases, Kecamatan officials have insisted that they should control all cadre training and/or food distribution, leading LKB to close already established FNP centers. For another example, in Maumere, the refusal of a Kepala Desa to provide secure storage space for FNP food commodities led to theft and damage of the food when it had to be stored in an unsecured room in the FNP center.

Based on the Team's observation of FNP in the field, it seems inadvisable to leave coordination with local governments to chance, or to rely solely on the cultivation of personal relationships. Even where good personal relationships exist, a change in government personnel can derail coordination, as replacements have no reason to believe that they have any responsibility towards FNP. Instead, such coordination should be an integral part of the FNP mechanism, with clear lines of communication and responsibility established at each level. The following chart shows how this "web" of FNP coordination might look.

**Figure 1. PROPOSED WEB OF FNP ACTIVITY**



The Team does not want to minimize the difficulties that more formal relationships with local government might present for counterparts. Government officials may often insist on a degree of control that would compromise counterparts' ability to fulfill their responsibilities towards CRS and USAID under FNP. And in Lampung, much of LKB's difficulties with local government arise from official suspicion and hostility towards LKB as a "Catholic" organization in a strongly Muslim area, a perception that LKB has done little to foster, and can do little to control. But it is also clear that without stronger links to local government, neither short-run implementation nor long-run sustainability can be assured. In short, FNP probably should not operate in areas where CRS and/or its counterparts cannot obtain explicit approval and support for the FNP approach at all levels of local government. In many cases, this may require "starting at the top" at the provincial level, a process that CRS (which has tended to leave local government relations to counterparts) could do more to support.

### **C. Targeting:**

Targeting in FNP operates at three levels - geographic targeting, village targeting, and recipient targeting, all of which are intended to insure that the program reaches the neediest villages and that program interventions are directed at all children "at risk" in those villages.

#### **1. Geographic Targeting:**

This level concerns targeting of the general geographic areas where FNP operates. Earlier in the grant period, geographic targeting was basically a non-issue, and was not included in the terms of the original grant agreement. CRS implemented the program largely through counterparts with longstanding relationships with CRS in previous nutrition and Food for Work programs. But in 1987, CRS decided that effective targeting of FNP, as well as other CRS programs required "retargeting" its assistance to the poorest provinces in Indonesia.

Based on an assessment of socio-economic indicators, and estimates of the institutional and administrative feasibility of operating in poorer provinces, CRS decided to gradually phase out its activities in Java and concentrate assistance in NTT and South Sumatera. Obviously, existing counterparts played no role in this strategic retargeting. Indeed the decision to leave Java is bitterly resented among counterparts there, who have objected that provincial comparisons of economic status conceal the incidence of localized, extreme poverty in their regions. That observation cannot be denied, but CRS' decision remains sound and defensible because CRS is responsible for insuring that CFNDP resources reach the greatest number of people in the greatest need. While the decision to withdraw aid from individual villages still in need can be morally wrenching, it is clear that targeting FNP resources to the poorest provinces represents the most effective and administratively efficient use of those resources in the long-run.

The success of geographic retargeting depends largely on the ability of CRS to identify suitable counterparts in these new areas. CRS has no formal criteria for selecting

counterparts, but in any case, the relative underdevelopment of local NGOs, particularly in NTT, would make it difficult to apply any strict standards. Instead, CRS looks for existing NGOs that meet an informal set of minimum requirements:

- it has actual activities to help community
- it is an established legal entity
- it has trained staff
- it has a storage building for food commodities
- it has (reasonably) good relations with the local government'

In addition to the above minimum requirements, there is an unwritten but strong preference for working through groups connected with the Catholic Church. When CRS explores moving into a new region, the first step is always to work through the local Diocese to seek out qualified Catholic-based NGOs. Some members of the Team considered this approach a liability for CRS, as religious-based NGOs typically possess a "charity" orientation that values resource transfer as an end in itself and makes it difficult for them to grasp and deal with CFNDP end objectives - i.e. village autonomy and economic development. CRS is well aware of this problem, but its relationships with both the American and Indonesian Catholic Church require that it give Church-related NGOs "first choice" in CRS programs. Still, CRS has displayed flexibility in this area where suitable Catholic NGOs do not exist. Plans are underway to extend FNP to Lombok, with a secular NGO, Yayasan Sosial Masyarakat (YSM), as the CRS counterpart.

## **2. Village Targeting:**

Selection of villages covered by FNP is under the control of counterparts, based on criteria established by CRS. The goal is to insure that FNP reaches villages with the greatest nutritional and economic needs in each region. CRS guidelines require counterparts to select villages include:

- a relatively high Infant Mortality Rate (IMR);
- low cost for monitoring and transporting food;
- potential community participation;
- official approval for FNP, especially from the Dinas Social (Social Welfare Agencies);
- low economic status;
- low nutritional status of children under five years (over 35% with moderate or severe malnutrition)

**It was clear from the Team's field investigations and discussions with counterparts that the formal criteria for village selection were not operating effectively.** Counterparts generally do not undertake a rigorous assessment of nutritional and health status in the villages that they select, and their choices are often dominated by considerations outside the range of FNP guidelines. Furthermore, under the current system, CRS has no means to assess the appropriateness of counterpart selection of villages as counterparts are not required to inform CRS what criteria were used in their decision.

Counterpart Criteria: Each counterpart studied had their own "method" for village targeting, but in general, selection of villages is done more or less unilaterally by counterpart directors, either on their own initiative or in response to suggestions from village elites with whom they have a personal relationship. Staff input, or the application of formal criteria play a very limited role in the decisions. In PUSBS, the operating affiliate of YSBS in Klaten, the criteria of selecting areas incorporated socio-economic factors and level of nutritional status, but the most decisive factor appeared to be the personal relationship between the Director and community leaders. In YSBS/Cilacap, where FNP operations have now ceased, selection of villages was based primarily on the intuition of the Director, combined with his personal relationships with village elites. In LKB, specific assessments of nutritional or economic status play little role in village selection. Dominating factors appeared to be villages' past experience in nutritional activities, coupled with the "political feasibility" of working in a village. LKB's generally poor relationship with Kecamatan government officials means that its choices on where to operate are often dictated by where it is allowed to operate by suspicious local officials.

In YASPEM, ease of food transportation and ease in monitoring and supervision often override considerations of nutritional or economic status. Low administrative costs are a valid consideration according to CRS guidelines, but in YASPEM this has led in some cases to targeting FNP in relatively better-off areas in and around Maumere, to the neglect of poorer and more distant rural villages. A second consideration influencing the selection of better-off areas is the desire of YASPEM to utilize these areas as model "demonstration plots". The hope is that well-run, effective FNP programs in these areas will attract other villages' interest in FNP and will ultimately lead to broader participation.

As of September 1989, YASPEM, PUSBS and LKB covered 22, 35 and 35 villages respectively. The following table presents numbers of villages and centers for each counterpart.

**Table 1. NUMBER OF VILLAGES AND CENTERS INVOLVED IN FNP**

LEVEL	YASPEM	LKB	PUSBS
Regency	1	2	1
Subdistrict	8	8	10
Village	22	35	35
Center	122	114	137

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Source : Evaluation Team.

While the discussion above reveals that formal CRS guidelines are generally not applied by counterparts, that failure is not necessarily a reflection of disregard or indifference towards needs-based criteria. In reality, the application of nutritional and economic indicators presents formidable practical difficulties for counterparts:

- a. In most areas where counterparts operate, the availability of even marginally reliable village-level health statistics is quite limited. Government statistics are based only on villagers actually reached by existing Puskesmas and Posyandus, so are of little help where coverage of government health services is low. Chronically low attendance rates in government-run Posyandus cast further doubt on the validity of data regarding nutritional status of balitas. Also the poor organization of government statistics would make it difficult for counterparts to apply the "35% malnourished" criteria recommended by CRS, or to compare infant mortality rates (if available).
- b. Statistics on village economic status are almost non-existent. Reliability notwithstanding, government data on economic status are aggregated at the Kecamatan level, making distinctions between villages impossible.
- c. Given the limited availability and poor quality of government statistics, counterparts would have to conduct some kind of "rapid rural assessment" of candidate villages on their own in order to make serious use of the CRS guidelines. But counterparts lack the skills necessary to conduct such formal assessments, and in any case, the large number of candidate villages in their areas would render a comprehensive assessment of all villages impractical. Individual assessments of particular villages, while perhaps confirming the existence of "absolute" need, would do nothing to insure that counterparts were not neglecting even worse-off villages in the same area.

In light of the above constraints, it is understandable that counterparts tend to resort to impressionistic, intuitive criteria, dominated by considerations of administrative feasibility and personal relationships with local leaders. The Team cannot offer any definitive conclusion as to what degree these criteria have, or have not led to the selection of the "wrong" villages. Anecdotal observations suggest that "mis-targeting" does occur in some cases, but the point here is that the current targeting strategy does not provide counterparts with the proper tools, nor does it provide CRS with any means of verifying that FNP is reaching the right villages.

Improving Village Selection Through Kecamatan Targeting: A better approach to area targeting would be to target at the Kecamatan-level, and attempt to cover most or all villages in the selected Kecamatans. Such an approach would have several advantages:

1. While village level socio-economic and health indicators are generally unavailable, Provincial and Kabupaten governments do have reasonably complete statistics for Kecamatans. Provincial governments maintain lists of "kecamatan rawan" (disadvantaged districts), based on socio-economic and health indicators, as well as the coverage of government services. These lists, as well as other kecamatan data, could be used to select areas most in need.

2. Concentrating resources in a limited number of areas would streamline food distribution and field supervision for the counterparts. It would also make it more feasible to serve more remote areas that are currently neglected because of the impracticality of reaching distant, geographically dispersed villages.

3. The process of Kecamatan targeting would enhance counterpart/government cooperation, as it would require direct dialogue with Provincial, Kabupaten and Kecamatan level offices. Also, it is highly likely that receptiveness towards, and support for FNP on the part of Kecamatan officials will increase if they see FNP as an area-wide program that helps them achieve their own development objectives.

The above approach does involve some trade-offs that must be recognized. First, area rather than village targeting will inevitably mean that FNP will reach some relatively better-off villages in the area. But this "leakage" must be balanced against the more objectively verifiable knowledge that FNP is generally targeted at the neediest areas in the counterparts field of operations. The current system cannot assure that this is the case. But Kecamatan targeting does not mean that counterparts cannot continue to exercise discretion in selecting individual villages for FNP - i.e. they could still pass over obviously prosperous villages in an otherwise poor area. Second, Kecamatan targeting is likely to be resisted by some counterparts because it limits their ability to foster or maintain their relationships with selected villages and village elites. The "patronage" value of FNP resources to counterparts cannot be denied. However, for CRS' newer, less established counterparts in NTT, these village/counterpart relationships are less developed, which will hopefully make them more receptive to a more objective approach to FNP targeting.

### **3. Recipient Targeting:**

Like village targeting, recipient targeting is under the control of counterparts, based on criteria provided by CRS. In this case however, the targeting criteria are more easily applied and the system generally works quite well in terms of prioritizing FNP enrollments. Current guidelines call for targeting participants in the following order of priority:

1. Newborn infants, and pregnant or lactating mothers.
2. Under-five children (balitas) with a grade of 5 or below under the Sistem Nilai.
3. Children 1-12 months, if food is available
4. Children 13-24 months, " "
5. Children 25-36 months, " "
6. Children 37-48 months, " "
7. Children 49-59 months, " "

These guidelines appear to be well understood by counterpart field workers and FNP cadres. The targeting system is largely intended to insure that FNP reached balitas at the earliest possible stage, preferably by enrolling pregnant women before their children are born. Once a child is enrolled, he will generally continue to receive food until age five, or drop out of the program. Data on new enrollments suggest that the targeting criteria generally operate effectively in prioritizing targeted recipients.

The system works less well, if at all, in targeting food rations under circumstances where food supplies are insufficient to cover all enrolled under-five children. When this occurs, field workers and cadres are more inclined to reduce the size of rations to make up for the deficit rather than deny rations to older children. This practice is endorsed by recipient mothers as well, who perceive it as an issue of fairness to the community as a whole. CRS field staff discourage the practice, but they also exert pressure on counterparts to keep levels of enrolled recipients as high as possible. Much attention is paid in CRS to the gap between targeted recipients (which comprise all children under five) and enrolled recipients. In this sense, better targeting of food aid could actually result in a worsening of counterpart performance according to criteria established, and regularly communicated to counterparts, by CRS.

It is difficult for the Team to generalize as to whether the breakdown of targeting vis-a-vis food distribution represents a major problem. There is some reason to believe, however, that it may not be. Food shortfalls are usually localized and temporary. If food availability were a persistent constraint, it would make more sense to exclude older children. But selectively denying rations on a sporadic, month-by-month basis is probably counterproductive in that it undermines mothers' confidence in the program.

In the early years of CFNDP, when overall availability of Title II commodities barely met recipient demand, CRS guidelines called for counterparts to graduate children over 36 months of age from the program who displayed "acceptable" nutritional status. Although counterpart compliance with the guidelines was poor at that time, largely due to unfamiliarity with the new targeting system, CRS could choose to "re-adopt" more restrictive criteria, such as targeting only children under age three or children below grade five. But it is unrealistic to expect field workers to apply a month-by-month system of selective food distribution under a program which is understood by all parties - CRS, counterparts, and mothers, to be aimed at all children under age five in the village.

#### **D. Commitment:**

##### **1. Mothers' Commitment:**

In the context of CFNDP, commitment refers to the "social contract" between mothers and FNP centers which outlines mothers' responsibilities as participants in FNP. While sample written "contracts" were available in some counterparts, there was no evidence that they are actually used. Often the terms of mothers' commitment to the center is written into the Kartu Peserta Program Gizi (FNP enrollment card) given to all participating mothers and pregnant women. Mothers generally understand the commitment between centers and them. They recall that their commitment establishes that they should:

1. attend monthly weighing sessions
2. take the paket gizi (food ration)
3. take part in counseling activities
4. participate in group meeting
5. take part in other activities undertaken in the center,  
for instance, group discussions, arisan, etc.
6. not sell the food ration

Few mothers interviewed mentioned the seventh, and most important aspect of "commitment", i.e. that they are obligated to improve the health and nutritional status of their child. FNP cadres hold a similar view of the nature of commitment. They feel that mothers have fulfilled their obligations by attending the FNP center, taking food rations, and participating in center activities. Thus, at the village level, few parties perceive "commitment" to the FNP program as being directly linked to the end goal of the program, and there is no expectation that compliance can or will be judged in terms of the actual nutritional status of mothers or children.

Mother's Commitment Gap: The prevailing perception of FNP commitment centers on food distribution, and on "showing up" at the FNP center in order to receive the ration. As was mentioned previously, mothers generally do understand that the end goal of FNP is to improve the health and nutritional status of children, but that end goal is conceptually "de-linked" from their perceived obligations under the program. Furthermore, they have no clear idea of how attendance at the Posyandu will lead to that goal.

Judged on the basis of nominal attendance, FNP commitment appears to be fairly successful in encouraging mothers to attend center activities. The impact of FNP on center attendance should really be judged by comparing attendance rates "before" and "after", but in the centers studied, this data was not available.

Based on the latest data, the attendance rates at YASPEM and LKB are high. During the last three months, attendance rates were over 70%. The following tables present attendance rates at selected centers in Maumere and Lampung.

**Table 2. ATTENDANCE RATES OF  
SELECTED CENTERS-1989/MAUMERE**

CENTER	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER
Magepanda	88.68	77.36	84.62
N e b e	50.30	59.65	56.42
E g o n	92.73	87.04	83.93
Talibura	48.15	61.68	59.32
FNP w/IGA	(69.97)	(71.43)	(71.07)
Kota Uneng	72.87	72.73	60.45
Mekindetung	100.0	87.88	93.94
L e l a	97.14	74.65	-
K a b o r	65.15	63.08	59.70
FNP ONLY	(83.79)	(74.59)	(71.36)
AVERAGE	76.88	73.01	71.20
Darat Gunung	62.83	62.95	-

Table 2 shows that:

(i) the attendance rate in September 1989 tended to decrease. This occurred because in that month, people in Maumere prepared for the visit of the Pope on October 10, 1989;

(ii) the attendance rate of centers involving FNP is higher than those are not involved in FNP. (Darat Gunung was a non-FNP "control village");

(iii) in the centers studied, attendance at centers with IGA programs was actually lower than centers with only FNP.

**Table 3 ATTENDANCE RATES OF  
SELECTED CENTERS-1989/LAMPUNG**

CENTER	M A Y	J U N E	J U L Y
Trimukti	54.57	38.94	44.54
Purbasakti	95.47	90.42	86.18
Margokencono	75.17	94.18	90.49
Sukoharjo	86.36	89.06	89.92
FNP w/IGA	(77.89)	(77.90)	(77.78)
Banyuwangi	61.48	69.17	74.17
Banyumas	51.73	63.21	69.35
Sukomulyo	25.30	46.43	77.78
FNP ONLY	(46.17)	(59.60)	(73.77)
AVERAGE	62.03	68.75	75.78
Bangunsari	-	-	-

Source : Evaluation Team

Table 3. indicates that:

(i) attendance rates increased during the last three months;

(ii) the attendance rates of FNP centers involved in IGA are higher than the rate of FNP centers not involved in IGA.

It should be noted that attendance rates for the sample centers in Maumere are on the low end of attendance rates for YASPEM centers as a whole (82% of YASPEM centers reported attendance rates over 80% for January - June 1989), while the samples for Lampung are more representative of LKB centers. Two points should be considered here:

a. The significance of FNP center attendance rates is difficult to assess without information on the comparative performance of non-FNP Posyandus in the same area. CRS and counterparts do not have this data and tend to rely on "prevailing wisdom" that attendance at government-run Posyandus is chronically low. While that assumption is most likely correct, such generalizations cannot serve as a "baseline" for judging the success of FNP in improving center attendance. A more valid assessment would have to be based either on baseline information on pre-FNP attendance in FNP villages or on a comparison of FNP villages with similar, non-FNP villages in the same area.

b. The Team could detect no obvious relationship between center attendance and the presence of IGA in villages. This casts doubt on the assumption that IGA serves as an additional "magnet" for FNP participation, and reinforces the Team's observation that FNP and IGA are seen by mothers as separate, largely unrelated programs. Since the FNP program assumes that IGA will represent a continuing "incentive" for mothers after food distribution is phased-out, this de-linking of FNP and IGA could undermine post-FNP participation in FNP centers.

Selling of Food Rations: Part of FNP commitment is the promise not to sell food rations. Selling of food is a violation of the terms of Title II food assistance, and could undermine the nutritional impact of food aid to families. However, the Team found no evidence that mothers sell their rations. None of the mothers interviewed reported that they have ever sold the rations, nor were they aware of other mothers doing so. While value of the rations to families is primarily economic, the dominance of food expenditures in poor families' budgets gives them little incentive to turn food commodities into cash. And unlike some participants in the Food for Work Program, it does not appear that the requirement to pay a recipient contribution has forced recipients to sell food in order to make the payment.

Commitment Penalties/Sanctions: The role of sanctions or penalties in enforcing mothers' commitments has never been clearly defined in FNP. Original CRS guidelines imply that mothers will be dropped from the program if they fail to attend for three months, but there is little evidence that either CRS or its counterparts have ever seriously intended to enforce this rule. Mothers in Maumere, Lampung, Klaten, and Cilacap have no direct experience with sanksi (penalties). Despite the fact that sanctions are not enforced, mothers are generally aware that, in theory, they exist. For most centers the only meaningful sanction is that failure to attend the FNP center will mean that mothers will not receive their ration for that month. But in areas such as Klaten, where child weighing and food distribution often occur on different days, it is theoretically possible for mothers to get their rations without attending center activities. We were not, however, able to determine to what degree this actually occurs.

While failure to attend FNP centers does not result in mothers being excluded from the program, at least one counterpart has adopted an interesting additional sanction. In Maumere, the local Puskesmas have agreed not to serve mothers who fail to attend three months in a row. Compliance is verified by checking the completeness of weight entries in the child's KMS card. YASPEM has generally strong relationships with Puskesmas officials, and respondents reported that this sanction is usually enforced.

## **2. Community Commitment:**

Although "commitment" in the context of FNP is thought of in terms of mothers' commitment, the broader FNP goal of stimulating community participation in health and nutrition activities requires that we also consider how the wider community perceives its role in the program.

Under FNP the village head (Kepala Desa) is a party to the relationship between the FNP center and the counterpart, and is formally responsible for insuring the center meets the requirements laid out in the center/counterpart operating agreement. The agreement stipulates among other things, that the village FNP center will implement income generating activities (IGA), conduct nutrition training, and that mothers will not sell food ration. The expectation underlying his signature, is that the Kepala Desa is encouraged and motivated to coordinate program implementation in his village.

This commitment between the counterpart and centers is outlined in the Surat Kesepakatan Bersama Pelaksanaan Program FNP (Gizi). This Letter of Agreement determines criteria of targeting, the kinds and portions of food commodities, the amount of mothers' contributions, and identifies the eight components of FNP program. The obligations of each party are also elaborated clearly.

The Letter of Agreement also describes some important items, such as: (i) the newly enrolled center is subject to a 3 month probationary period, after which continued assistance will be based on satisfactory performance; (ii) the counterpart will end the food assistance if the center violates the agreement, i.e. if food commodities are sold; and (iii) if the donating agency (CRS) ends food assistance, the counterpart is not liable for food delivery.

Thus far, there is no evidence that a counterpart has ended its food assistance during a center's probationary period. The probation period could represent an opportunity for counterparts to assess the managerial capability of new centers. But in current practice, the probationary period is largely a formality because counterparts lack both baseline information and agreed upon criteria with which to assess the potential of new centers.

In most centers and villages, Kepala Desas only function as the "tukang stempel" (the person who signs and stamps papers. Some confessed that they signed the Surat Kesepakatan Bersama Pelaksanaan Program FNP (Gizi) and D.O. (request for food delivery) without reading them. For the most part, they assume that field workers and cadres are responsible for the program. Community leaders confessed that they do not know if their Village Government has responsibility in FNP implementation. Therefore, it

is understandable if they cannot pinpoint who is responsible if, for instance, food is damaged or lost. While community leaders are at pains to explain that they always support development activities in their village, it must be recognized that their attention and interest is divided among the multiple programs thrust upon them by the government, and they tend to see FNP as "somebody else's" program.

As is the case with FNP mothers, "commitment" to FNP on the part of village governments, where it exists, tends to center on material delivery, not on the end objectives of the program. The rights and obligations of the counterpart and the community, as well as penalties and other regulations deal primarily with food.

This general pattern of "program ignorance" is especially disturbing in the case of local government. The Team did find examples where the local government understanding and commitment to FNP was relatively strong (especially in Maumere). In those cases the positive impact on the operation of the program, and on general community support was clear and unambiguous. It is probably not an overstatement to suggest that local government "commitment" to FNP is the single most important key to program success.

## **E. Training:**

### **1. Levels of Training:**

There are three principal levels of training under FNP, including training for FNP Supervisors, Field Workers and Cadres.

- a. Training for FNP Supervisors: this training is undertaken at the national level by CRS.
- b. Training for Field Workers: Field workers play an important role in program implementation. Training for field workers is done partly by counterparts, with assistance from CRS and outside groups. Because of their critical role in training cadres, CRS has sent some field workers to Yayasan Indonesia Sejahtera (YIS) to take courses on training for trainers.
- c. Training for Cadres: Training for cadres is carried out by counterparts in cooperation with CRS and outside groups, such as Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (BKKBN/National Family Planning Coordinating Body), Puskesmas (Community Health Center), Departemen Agama (Ministry of Religion), Dinas Sosial (Agency of Social Welfare) and Pemerintah Daerah (Local Government).

## 2. Counterpart Staff Training:

CRS provides training to counterpart FNP staff both through periodic seminars and workshops, and through one-on-one training and technical assistance (especially for FNP Supervisors). Counterpart staff generally report that CRS training is effective, interesting and well structured. Training subjects cover the entire range of FNP activities - i.e. management, nutrition information and education, cadre development strategies, etc. While the Team did not examine the scope and effectiveness of this training to the degree that it did for cadre training, the following observations can still be made.

Training offered to counterpart staff appears to be effective in developing counterpart staffs' ability to deal with the organizational and administrative aspects of FNP, such as food management, growth monitoring, arranging cadre training, record-keeping etc. Its effectiveness in the areas of nutrition education and counselling, community motivation, and information dissemination is considerably lower. This weakness is not necessarily apparent when examining CRS training outlines and plans, which are generally quite comprehensive. Rather, it appears that the immediate interests of both CRS and counterparts to get the "system up and running" inevitably take precedence over the qualitative aspects of FNP implementation. It is also clear that counterparts have in fact needed considerable training and technical assistance to cope with the administrative, financial and logistical requirements of FNP.

Ideally, CRS training for counterparts should take a "holistic" approach that links technical training with FNP's developmental goals at every stage. But CFNDP, like any other donor-funded project, puts great pressure on grantees to establish implementation mechanisms as quickly as possible. Training related to the qualitative aspects of the program is deferred, becoming the "second-phase" of technical assistance to counterparts. For the most part, counterparts can now handle the mechanics of FNP implementation and should be ready for this "second-phase" assistance, but a number of factors continue to constrain CRS' ability to shift the focus of its training efforts.

One fairly serious constraint is staff turnover in counterparts. The low, sometimes subsistence-level salaries paid by many counterparts drives better qualified staff to seek higher paying jobs whenever possible, forcing CRS to continuously retrain new replacements. For example, CRS has had to provide basic FNP Supervisor training to YSBS several times in the last year because the incumbent Supervisors had left for new jobs. Another impact of low salaries is that they tend to attract less-educated, less-qualified staff who often find it difficult to grasp the more abstract aspects of FNP program goals and are inclined to perceive their job responsibilities in terms of narrowly defined tasks.

The Team feels that CRS can and should shift the emphasis of counterpart training to put more stress on skills relating to the end-goals of FNP, such as nutrition education and counselling, village-based problem identification, strategic planning and the like. In the case of older counterparts, this type of training is long overdue. For new counterparts in NTT, CRS must resist the understandable temptation to continue its present "two-phase" training strategy, and do its best to place equal emphasis on the technical and substantive aspects of FNP. But it must be recognized that without steps to improve the stability and

professionalism of counterpart staff, the impact of such skills training may be limited. It must also be recognized that counterpart salary and recruitment policies can only be determined by the counterparts themselves.

### **3. Cadre Training:**

There are two types of cadre training, initial and refresher training. Initial training takes five days, covering all aspects of cadres' job responsibilities. Refresher training emphasizes more advanced techniques, such as utilization of motivational media, targeting assistance, etc. Refresher training takes three days.

Training Materials: CRS has designed a standardized curriculum for initial cadre training. Training modules are based on existing modules in use by the government, especially the modules used for cadre training under the Usaha Perbaikan Gizi Keluarga (UPGK) program. This approach was taken to avoid overloading cadres, who generally must undergo government training anyway, with overlapping or contradictory training messages. Basically, CRS materials serve as a supplement to the existing government modules, and focus on FNP-specific subjects such as use of the Master Chart and the Grading System (Sistem Nilai). For refresher cadre training, the material is developed by the counterpart with supervision from CRS.

Methods of Training: CRS advocates participative methods of training, as opposed to one-way lecture approach. Training sessions are supposed to be limited to no more than thirty participants. But because cadre training combines government and CRS designed modules, the actual result is a mix of participatory and lecture-oriented approaches. Government health staff assisting in cadre training are generally loath to abandon the podium and adopt a more open approach to training. Cadres report that they find CRS/Counterpart-developed materials to be much more interesting and informative than the UPGK modules. Thus despite the apparent success of the participatory approach, overall cadre training under FNP remains a captive of the weaknesses of the government system.

There may be little that can be done about this in the short-run. Counterparts lack the capability to conduct cadre training without the assistance of outside groups, and in any case would probably not be allowed to conduct cadre training without government involvement. Furthermore, it would be counterproductive to do anything that lessens the participation of government staff in FNP. As it stands, local Puskesmas staff often complain that counterparts only call upon them to deliver lectures, and do not ask them to participate in the planning of FNP cadre training. In some specific cases, this lack of coordination has led the Puskesmas to ignore FNP altogether.

Still, there is the longer term possibility that CRS and the counterparts could "translate" the government modules into a more effective, participative form, and gradually persuade local government health staff to use them.

**Training Effectiveness:** Mothers, community leaders and government officials are generally impressed by the high quality of FNP cadres. On other side, most cadres confess their debt to the YASPEM and LKB field workers, and the training they received from the counterparts. Training has enabled cadres to cope well with the technical and administrative aspects of FNP activities in the Posyandu. In-depth interviews with cadres reveal that they possess a good grasp of general issues regarding health and nutrition, but often do not know how to utilize that knowledge in practice. For example, most cadres can diagnose minor diseases, but are less able to advise mothers as to the proper course of action when such cases arise. The problem carries over to nutritional knowledge as well. While cadre mastery of nutrition subjects was impressive, cadre understanding of educational and counselling techniques was consistently weak, making it difficult to effectively convey their knowledge to mothers.

**Training Coverage:** Counterparts are responsible for establishing training targets, and submitting training budget requests to CRS. The following tables present an overview of training conducted by each of the three counterparts studied.

**Table 4. TYPES AND QUANTITY OF TRAINING  
YASPEM/MAUMERE: 1989**

No.	DESCRIPTION	NUMBER
1	Cadre Training	
	- Initial Cadre Training	194
	- Refresher Cadre Training	362
2	Advance Training for Field Workers	6
3	National Annual Meetings	4
		566

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Source : Evaluation Team

**Table 5. TYPES AND QUANTITY OF TRAINING  
LKB/LAMPUNG: 1989**

No.	DESCRIPTION	NUMBER
1	Cadre Training	
	- Initial Cadre Training	-
	- Refresher Cadre Training	210
2	Advance Training for Field Workers	-
3	National Annual Meetings	-
		210

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Source : Evaluation Team

**Table 6. TYPES AND NUMBER OF TRAINING  
PUSBS/KLATEN: 1989**

No.	DESCRIPTION	NUMBER
1	Cadre Training - Initial Cadre Training	-
	- Refresher Cadre Training	119
2	Advance Training for Field Workers	-
3	National Annual Meetings	2
		121

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Source : Evaluation Team

In every case, the number of cadres receiving refresher training far exceeds the number receiving initial training. This is to be expected, given that most cadres at any one time should have already undergone initial training, assuming that cadre dropout rates are low. But while FNP cadre dropout rates appear low in comparison to regular village cadres in other programs, a certain number of dropouts are unavoidable due to marriage, moving away, etc. So even in well established programs such as those in Klaten and Lampung one would expect that at least some initial training would be necessary over a one year period. But in 1989, LKB and PUSBS only conducted refresher courses. In some cases it was apparent that refresher training was being given to cadres who had never attended initial training.

While the reason for this practice was not always clear to the Team, part of the answer lies in the fact that initial training courses require both a higher level of effort to arrange, and a higher level of involvement with sometimes uncooperative government agencies. In Lampung, it appears that initial training courses have been difficult to conduct because of LKB's poor relationships with Puskesmas staff. Refresher training curricula are less structured, period of training is shorter, and counterparts have more flexibility in involving outside trainers. The observation that some counterparts avoid undertaking initial cadre training was confirmed by CRS staff, who report that they find it difficult to get counterparts to make requests for training funds. The fact that training costs are paid for by CRS is apparently not enough of an incentive in light of the drain on counterpart staff time.

#### **F. Food Delivery:**

Under CFNDP, enrolled recipients receive a monthly food ration consisting of Title II commodities. The logistical and accountability requirements associated with food delivery to hundreds of villages throughout Indonesia present a formidable task for both CRS and its counterparts. Given the magnitude and complexity of the task, it appears that CRS and

most of its counterparts have done an excellent job of managing a timely and efficient food delivery system.

It should be noted however that the Team's fieldwork was confined to counterparts that have not experienced serious problems regarding food accountability or misuse. When CRS discovers a persistent pattern of food misallocation or loss, the need to protect the security of the CFNDP program as a whole generally forces CRS to discontinue its relationship with the counterpart. This has occurred numerous times in the last four years, most recently with LKS in Palembang. So in a sense, overall performance in food management and delivery is a reflection of a system of "survival of the fittest" among CRS counterparts.

Food mismanagement is usually, but not always associated with poor performance in the other elements of FNP. One notable exception was LKD/Surabaya, where top-level mismanagement co-existed with generally excellent technical staff and field operations. While CRS was forced to close the FNP program in Surabaya, it has hired selected technical staff from LKD to work as long-term consultants for new CRS counterparts in NTT.

### **1. Composition/Amount of Food Rations:**

Currently, FNP rations consist of 4 kilograms of rice and 2 kilograms of wheat soy blend (WSB) per recipient per month. According to CRS guidelines, the amount of the ration is fixed and cannot be changed by counterparts or FNP centers. Recipients represent each child, pregnant woman and lactating mother enrolled in the program, so it is possible for individual families to receive more than one ration.

The composition of FNP rations has changed over the years in response to the availability of food commodities under Title II, and to a lesser degree, in response to requests from CRS. Earlier in the program, the principal commodities were bulgur wheat and non-fat dried milk (NFDM). The impact of this change is mixed. In terms of the economic value of the ration, the change from bulgur to more valuable rice was offset by the substitution of high value NFDM with WSB, which has no established market price. Regarding food acceptability, the shift to rice was obviously well received, but many counterparts and mothers have complained about the change from NFDM to WSB. It had taken a long time to educate mothers in the use of NFDM in family diets, and the change to a new, wholly unfamiliar commodity was not welcome. In many areas, mothers' acceptance of WSB remains low. LKB reported that mothers often refuse to accept their ration of WSB altogether. Some mothers also reported that they feed WSB to their animals.

### **2. Mechanisms of Food Delivery:**

Counterparts annually negotiate food allocations with CRS based on approved recipient levels for the next year's program. Submission of food allocation requests occur in early January. Food is shipped directly from the U.S. to the counterparts every three months. All food is stored in the counterparts' warehouses. Transportation of food from the U.S. to

counterparts is the responsibility of CRS and USAID, while transportation to FNP centers is wholly managed by CRS counterparts.

With the exception of a six month period in 1988, food shipments to counterparts have been regular and timely. The delays in 1988 were due the failure of the government to provide duty-free clearance authorization, a problem that has since been resolved. Food delivery to FNP centers in Lampung and Maumere generally runs smoothly, but in Klaten delays are more frequent, apparently because of coordination problems between YSBS/Cilacap and its affiliate PUSBS in Klaten.

Although food deliveries to FNP centers are usually timely, counterparts are experiencing difficulties in matching the volume of deliveries with the number of enrolled mothers in individual centers. This problem was observed in LKB, and especially in YASPEM where FNP enrollment is expanding fairly rapidly. As a result, certain centers do not have sufficient food to distribute full rations to mothers. This does not occur because counterpart food supplies are inadequate - in both Lampung and Maumere there are also centers with excess food, rather the problem appears to stem from poor coordination and communication between the centers and the counterparts.

### **3. Distribution in FNP Centers:**

In theory, mothers must attend the center on the day scheduled for child weighing ("H Day") in order to receive their ration. This rule is applied in Lampung and Maumere, where mothers must come on H-Day and bring their "Kartu Peserta", which serves as a ticket for receiving rations. In Klaten, child weighing and food distribution often occur on different days, and an up-to-date Kartu Peserta is not required. Also, some cadres in Klaten allow mothers to weigh their children after, rather than before food distribution days. Both practices make it possible for mothers to receive food without attending FNP center weighing or educational activities.

In some centers, mothers are allowed to ask friends or relatives to take their children for weighing and take the "Paket Gizi" (food ration). The logic behind this practice seems to be that mothers are complying with the terms of their "commitment" as long as their children are weighed each month. Where this occurs, neither mothers nor cadres appear concerned about the impact of this practice on nutritional counseling and education. But while conducting center activities and food distribution on different days can be problematic, attempting to do both on "H-Day" can create difficulties in larger centers. In Maumere, where some centers have over 200 enrolled participants, mothers complain that that weighing and food distribution can take all day (8 a.m to 5 p.m.).

Normally, counterparts deliver food to centers two days to one week before "H-day". Food is stored in center storage or in the houses of center coordinators, cadres or the Kepala Desa depending on local arrangements. The Team found two distinct methods employed by centers in the weighing and packaging of food rations. In Lampung and Klaten, cadres and/or the FNP center coordinator weigh and package the rations one or two days before "H-Day", which streamlines distribution. In Maumere, weighing and packaging is done on "H-Day" in the presence of the mothers. While this practice slows food distribution, many

mothers prefer it, because past experience has taught them that their ration can often be less than the prescribed 6 kilograms. One of the principal reasons for these "short rations" is that food bags delivered to FNP centers in Maumere are often underweight (45 - 48 kg. rather than 50 kg.).

#### **4. The "Short Ration" Problem:**

As mentioned above, it is not uncommon for FNP food rations to be less than the required 4 kilograms of rice and 2 kilograms of WSB. The Team cannot say how widespread a problem this is for centers as a whole, but where it does occur, it represents a serious threat to the effectiveness of the FNP program. While the reasons for this shortfall vary from center to center, the Team identified three dominant causes:

1. Imbalances occur between the number of enrolled mothers and available food in the center. As mentioned above, this problem can be caused by poor coordination between FNP centers and counterparts.
2. Food bags delivered to centers can weigh less than the official 50 kilograms, causing a shortfall in food even if the counterpart delivers the "correct" amount of food. The problem seems most acute in Maumere, where many cadres report that food bags delivered to their centers are consistently 2 - 5 kgs. underweight. The Team was not able to identify at what point in the delivery system this "leakage" occurs. YASPEM and the other counterparts generally do not check the weight of bags when they arrive at port or in their warehouses. It is apparently possible to remove food from the plastic mesh bags used for Title II commodities without leaving evidence of tampering.
3. As mentioned earlier in our discussion of "targeting", FNP centers virtually never respond to food shortfalls by prioritizing recipients. Instead, available food is evenly divided among all enrolled mothers. In some cases this is done explicitly with the consent of the mothers. In other cases, mothers are left to discover the shortfall themselves. In YASPEM, cadres avoid using the CRS-provided measuring cans for rice and WSB, and instead use milk tins or other containers measuring somewhat less than the required 1 or 2 kilograms. This practice allows them to prepare rations for all recipients without running out of food.
4. In a few centers studied, FNP cadres receive a partial food ration. The rationale used is that it is "unfair" for them to be excluded from FNP benefits when they work so hard for the program. Since they are not listed as enrolled participants, their rations come out of mothers' rations.

Beyond the obvious economic and nutritional impact of families receiving less than the intended amount of food, underweight FNP rations were observed to cause some severe problems in cadre moral and mothers' confidence in their FNP center. Cadres complain that having to distribute underweight rations places them under suspicion and undermines their credibility in the eyes of mothers. And for mothers, underweight rations represent a "broken promise" in the social contract between them and the FNP centers.

### 5. Recipient Contributions:

Under CFNDP, mothers have been asked to pay a "recipient contribution" which is used by counterparts to cover the costs of food distribution and FNP supervision. A percentage of the contribution is retained in the FNP center to pay for cadre transportation, food demonstrations and other costs associated with running the Posyandu program. Until now, both the level of the recipient contribution and percentage going to FNP Centers has been left to the discretion of each counterpart.

This has in turn led to variations both in the size of the recipient contributions and their distribution.

**Table 7. ALLOCATION OF RECIPIENT CONTRIBUTIONS: (1 = Rp 1.-)**

ITEM	YASPEM	LKB	PUSBS
Amount of contribution per mother	1300	900 - 1050	950 - 1250 1150 - 1200
Allocation :			
- Counterpart	1000	600	600/ 900
- FNP Center	300	300/ 450	350/ 300

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Source : Evaluation Team

The above figures are representative of contribution levels in 1989. The figures have varied over the years, partly in response to changes in commodities supplied (i.e. bulgur vs. rice, dried milk vs. WSB). CRS has been concerned that the levels set for recipient contributions have been generally too high, and may have discouraged those families most in need from participating in the program. Theoretically, a mother who cannot afford the contribution should still receive the ration, but this rarely if ever occurs. Even if poor mothers were not ashamed ("malu") to take a free ration when others are paying, it is often the policy of FNP Centers and counterparts to withhold rations if the contribution is not paid. This practice is a technical violation of Title II regulations, but cadres and counterparts have been understandably reluctant to send a message to villagers that they can receive food without paying. A shortfall in recipient contributions would reduce funds available for both the food distribution system itself, as well as the operation of FNP Centers.

Another problem concerning the recipient contribution has been the common practice of assigning a "price per kilogram" on various commodities rather than a single "contribution" to the FNP program as a whole. This reinforces the notion among mothers that they are

"buying" food rather than receiving a ration as FNP participants. In Lampung, where recipients have reacted unfavorably to the shift from NFDM to WSB, some mothers asked why they should have to pay the same price for WSB as they do for more desirable rice. In some cases they refuse to "pay" for the WSB, and take only rice. Beyond the headaches this creates for LKB in commodity management, it sends the wrong signal to mothers - i.e. it obscures the fact that their recipient contribution is meant to support the FNP program as a whole, including the services they receive in their Posyandu.

Starting in 1990, CRS hopes to standardize the recipient contribution at Rp. 500 per family. As all transportation and counterpart supervision costs will be paid out of Monetization funds, the entire Rp. 500 will remain in the village to fund Posyandu operations. The Team found however that many mothers are currently unaware that part of their contributions are supporting FNP center activities, and among those who are aware, few understand how center funds are used. Given existing perceptions of recipient contributions as payment for food, CRS counterparts must undertake a substantial "re-education" effort to insure that recipients understand the true purpose of the contributions under the new system.

#### **6. Use of Center Funds:**

Recipient contributions retained in FNP centers are meant to cover the costs associated with center activities. Beyond stationary, demonstration foods, plastic bags and other supplies, center funds are also used to provide nominal incentive payments to center coordinators and cadres (euphemistically referred to as a "transportation allowance"). In Maumere, center funds are also used for mothers' referrals to the Puskesmas. The availability of adequate funds in FNP centers is one of the key positive factors that distinguish CRS-assisted centers from typically impoverished government Posyandus. But little effort has been made under CFNDP to monitor these funds or assist in managing their use. Until now there has perhaps been no pressing need to do so. The Team did not find any evidence that center funds have been diverted or spent unwisely - in fact many centers are able to save a portion of their funds for future health and nutrition activities. But as CRS changes the system for collecting and spending recipient contributions, the amount of funds going to centers will increase significantly, from 40% - 60% on average. This makes it more important that CRS insure that these funds are well managed, both because of the temptation they represent, and because these additional funds could potentially be used to sustain FNP activities in villages after "phase-out". This latter possibility is examined more fully in our discussion of "FNP Sustainability".

#### **G. Growth Monitoring and the Sistem Nilai:**

The use of the "Sistem Nilai" (Grade System) in CFNDP represents a major innovation in child growth monitoring in Indonesia, and is the centerpiece of CRS' approach to nutritional surveillance and education. Use of the Sistem Nilai began on a pilot basis in 1983 in selected CRS-assisted Posyandus. Under CFNDP the system has been adopted as "standard practice" in all FNP centers.

A 1986 evaluation of Sistem Nilai was undertaken by USAID and CRS which confirmed its superiority over the standard KMS system utilized by the Indonesian government. The principal advantages of the system are that it makes it substantially easier for mothers to understand and recall the nutritional status of their children, offers greater precision in nutritional surveillance than the standard KMS, and is easy for Cadres to master. To exploit the educational potential of Sistem Nilai, CRS has developed educational materials and training modules keyed to specific nutritional "grades".

In FNP centers, the Sistem Nilai co-exists with the government KMS system. CRS-provided KMS cards for mothers retain the graphic orientation and the three color-coded "zones" of the government system. Age and weight data are converted into Sistem Nilai grades using the "Master Chart", and the grades are written into the KMS card at the appropriate point on the KMS graph. The Master Chart is also used to record grades for all children attending the center, which are collected by counterparts for analysis in CRS.

### **1. Acceptance of Sistem Nilai:**

Government: During the initial stages of its introduction, the Sistem Nilai created a considerable amount of confusion among cadres and Puskesmas staffs. The problem was basically that CRS and counterparts were asking them to "deviate" from the official government system without any evidence that the government approved or sanctioned the changes. Cadres, and especially Puskesmas staff, feared that this deviation would reflect poorly on their performance in the eyes of the government. In 1987, CRS attempted to address this lack of official standing by persuading the Ministry of Health to inform USAID in writing that it approved the use of the Sistem Nilai in CRS-assisted Posyandus. However, the Department of Health never communicated its approval to the concerned local-level health agencies. Counterparts report that they have never seen a copy of the MOH/USAID letter and while they are aware that it exists, they still have nothing to show to skeptical local officials. In areas such as Maumere, where counterpart/government relations are generally strong and cordial, the lack of written approval from the GOI has not represented a major obstacle, but in Lampung and Klaten, official resistance to the Sistem Nilai remains a persistent problem.

Counterparts: Counterpart opinion towards Sistem Nilai is mixed. FNP technical staff generally understand and appreciate the virtues of the system, while counterpart directors tend to perceive to it as something forced upon them by CRS. Directors do not deny that the Sistem Nilai may have some advantages over the government KMS system, but their general perception is that Sistem Nilai creates more work for their staff and cadres, and often strains their relations with Puskesmas staff and other local health officials. Counterpart FNP staff believe that grade data from the Master Charts could be valuable for program monitoring and management. However, they assert that thus far they have not analyzed and used Master Charts to take specific actions.

Community: Cadres usually report mothers do in fact find the Sistem Nilai easier to understand. Interviews with mothers confirmed that they find the Sistem Nilai grades, which parallel the system used for school grades, both easier to remember and interpret than their child's position on the standard KMS graph. Most mothers could recall their child's last

grade, and most understood the general meaning of the grades - i.e. grades 1 to five are "bad" and grades 6 to 10 are "good". It was far from clear, however, that mothers are able to link specific grades with specific actions they should take to improve the nutritional status of their children. In this sense the "message" appears to have been communicated but the "meaning" has not. Looking to the larger community, the Team found that few community leaders were even aware of the existence of Sistem Nilai unless their own children were enrolled in FNP.

## **2. Usage of Sistem Nilai:**

As mentioned above, the Sistem Nilai is "add-on" component to the standard KMS. In Lampung, KMS and Sistem Nilai are kept entirely separate. Cadres never insert grades into the KMS, because it is prohibited by the Puskesmas. Instead, cadres record Sistem Nilai grades in mothers' Kartu Peserta (FNP enrollment card). In Klaten, Cilacap and Maumere, grades are written into the KMS card, although in the first two areas YSBS reported complaints from Puskesmas staff that the grades make the KMS cards "too messy". Some health providers see an advantage in combining the KMS and grade systems, in that the KMS graph can "bombong" (make happy) mothers whose children who have gained weight but remain within the same Sistem Nilai grade. Whatever recording mechanism is used, the Team found that almost all FNP centers are using the Sistem Nilai. However, in Klaten and Cilacap, a significant number of centers report that they only do so because they are required to by the counterpart, and do not see the system as an important component of Posyandu activities.

Growth Monitoring in Centers: Under FNP, child weighing in FNP centers is implemented using a "five table" system, in which attending mothers and children proceed from table to table. The procedure is as follows:

- Table One: Registration and new enrollments
- Table Two: Child weighing
- Table Three: Recording of grades in KMS and Master Chart
- Table Four: Interpretation of grades and individual counselling
- Table Five: Referrals, Immunizations, Vitamin A and ORT packet distribution.

Although the Team understands that there are occasional lapses in the accuracy and completeness of child weighing and in the recording of grades, these tasks are generally performed quite well by FNP cadres. However there appear to be major weaknesses at "Table Four" - i.e. the interpretation of grades and nutritional counselling. Based on discussions with mothers and cadres, there is little evidence to conclude that much meaningful or effective counselling actually takes place in FNP centers. Also, while cadres understand that they should use the Master Chart to target "at risk" families for follow-up home visits, mothers reported that this rarely or never occurs in the villages studied. This is a critical lapse, because individual consultation based on children's grades represents perhaps the single most important element of the FNP strategy. Growth monitoring by itself serves no purpose unless it is linked to positive action to improve or maintain a child's health and nutritional status.

There are two major factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of individual consultations in FNP centers:

1. Cadre/Mother Ratios: While the "ideal" Posyandu should serve 40-50 families, actual enrollments in FNP centers vary drastically and many centers have 150 - 200 participants. But in these larger centers there are still only five cadres to man the five tables, as well as to distribute food. Under these circumstances, cadres are hard pressed simply to cope with the demands of registering participants, weighing children and recording grades. It should also be recognized that cadre responsibilities go far beyond those required by CRS. Cadres must spend a considerable additional amount of time completing forms and reports for the Puskesmas. Because of this workload, cadres do not have time to engage in the in-depth discussions with mothers necessary to diagnose the causes of low child weight or to provide appropriate advice.

2. Cadre Skills: As mentioned in our discussion of FNP training, cadres generally possess a superficial understanding of basic nutritional and health information, but they have received little effective training in communication, counselling or follow-up techniques. Without these skills, they are left to repeating standard messages that are not linked to the nutritional problems of specific children.

Between these two factors, cadre workload is probably the most serious problem. Any impact from improved cadre training will be negated if cadres lack the time to put their skills into practice. Although both CRS and the Government of Indonesia are committed to keeping the size of individual Posyandus within manageable bounds, achieving this goal is not simply a matter of telling counterparts to establish more centers. The feasibility of establishing new Posyandus is determined by the geographic proximity of targeted families and availability of people willing to serve as cadres, as well as the consent and cooperation of local health agencies. In some areas it may be possible to establish more, smaller FNP centers, while in other areas it may be possible to either increase the number of cadres in a large center, or conduct center activities in "shifts" on different days. Whatever the solution, the problem of overcrowded FNP centers deserves serious attention from CRS and its counterparts.

### **3. Sistem Nilai and FNP Sustainability:**

As it is currently implemented, the Sistem Nilai is not realizing its potential as an improved tool for growth monitoring and nutrition education. But while steps can be taken to improve the effectiveness of the system through intensified cadre training and reducing cadre/mother ratios in FNP centers, CRS should still reconsider the wisdom of adopting a "deviant" growth monitoring system in a program that aspires to leave self-sustaining nutrition programs in place after CRS assistance ends. For better or worse, the Indonesian government has adopted a different system that has been implemented nationwide, and is firmly entrenched within government health agencies. The Team questions whether it is reasonable to expect that FNP centers will be able to continue to "buck the system" and retain the Sistem Nilai after CRS and its counterparts leave the scene. Once FNP supervision ends in a village, centers will depend the Puskesmas and other government health offices for ongoing supervision and support. But while doctors and staff at certain

Puskesmas appear to accept and support the Sistem Nilai, the more typical attitude is one of annoyance or indifference.

The use of Sistem Nilai in the CFNDP program would be more defensible if one of the program's strategic objectives was to demonstrate the advantages of the system to the government and encourage its adoption on a wider, or even national scale. But CFNDP is not, and never was intended as a "demonstration project". CRS' interactions with the GOI have been limited to gaining permission to use the Sistem Nilai in FNP areas, and no attempt has been made to seek actual endorsement of the system from the government.

In weighing the costs and benefits of the Sistem Nilai, the Team sees a number of broad issues and alternatives:

1. CRS must decide whether FNP can or should serve as a "pilot project" to influence GOI policy on growth monitoring. If CRS wants to pursue this objective, it would have to undertake a substantial effort to open up a policy dialogue with the national government, and would probably have to conduct follow-up studies to the 1986 evaluation of the Sistem Nilai in order to strengthen its case.

2. If CRS does not find it appropriate or practical to push for wider adoption of the Sistem Nilai, it should consider curtailing the use of the system in its future programs in the interest of long-term FNP sustainability. Given the substantial effort already expended in training and institutionalization in existing centers, simply abandoning the system seems inadvisable. A better approach may be to not introduce the system in new counterparts and/or new FNP centers, and develop new training modules and educational media based on the government KMS.

3. If neither of these alternatives are palatable, CRS should consider steps to increase the acceptance of the Sistem Nilai among local health agencies, and modify the use of the system in FNP centers to minimize conflicts with the KMS system. CRS would have to persuade the Ministry of Health, or at least provincial-level health agencies, to issue explicit instructions to Kabupaten and Kecamatan health officials regarding the use of Sistem Nilai in FNP centers. At the center level, use of the system could be limited to nutritional counselling and educational activities. Since aggregated grade data has not proven to be particularly useful to CRS or its counterparts in supervising FNP center activities, there is no compelling reason to require that the system be used for center monitoring or reporting activities. "Containing" the Sistem Nilai at the center level would retain the pedagogical advantages of the system, while minimizing both cadre workloads and conflicts with local health staff.

## **II. Nutrition Education:**

Increasing beneficiary knowledge of health and nutrition information is one of the key objectives of FNP. The principal mechanisms for transferring this information under the program are group discussions and individual counselling. To support these mechanisms, CRS has developed a variety of educational media including posters, flipcharts, and

brochures, and has designed simulation games for use by discussion groups. It should be noted that while nutrition education is a key element in FNP, intensive efforts to upgrade and improve educational materials and methods in FNP centers began fairly late in the life of the project, so in many cases field implementation is basically still in the "start-up" phase.

### **1. Discussion Groups:**

Prior to FNP, Posyandu educational activities were generally limited to mass lectures given by cadres or Puskesmas staff to all attending mothers. Virtually all parties involved agree that this approach was ineffective. CRS has adopted a more participative approach in which mothers are organized into smaller discussion groups (Diskos) in which a revolving set of health and nutrition topics are discussed each month. Diskos are led by FNP cadres, who are expected to introduce and explain the topics, and to facilitate discussion among the mothers. CRS has also introduced simulation games to make messages more interesting and to encourage participation.

While the discussion group concept appears basically sound, implementation of the approach in FNP centers has been slow and uneven. Ideally, each Disko should consist of 15-30 mothers, but it is not uncommon to find Diskos with 40 or more members. When groups reach this size the potential for meaningful participation and group discussion is limited. Even where Diskos are the appropriate size, cadres often report that they find it very difficult to encourage mothers to speak, so in practice discussion remains more or less one-way or dominated by a few outspoken mothers. Also, discussion groups often do not meet regularly. Diskos are generally scheduled on "H-Day" after weighing and food distribution, and in larger centers where these activities can take virtually all day, it is not uncommon for cadres and mothers to view Diskos as an "optional" activity.

### **2. Nutritional Counselling:**

Weaknesses in individual consultation have already been mentioned in our discussion of growth monitoring, where we noted that FNP cadres generally cannot provide meaningful individualized counselling services in the course of routine center activities. In addition to the systematic constraint of excessive cadre workloads, this breakdown in nutritional consultations is a reflection of general weaknesses in communication, training and supervision links throughout the implementation chain. CRS begins with what appears to be a well designed, practical approach to nutrition education, but at each stage of the transfer process, part of the "message" is lost. Counterpart field workers cannot be expected to train cadres in educational, motivational, diagnostic and communication techniques if they themselves have only partially mastered those skills. Underlying these weaknesses is the tendency of both CRS and counterpart to focus on obvious "measurable" outputs, i.e. food delivery, growth monitoring reports, numbers of cadres and field-workers trained, etc. Lack of attention to training effectiveness leads to a progressive reduction in the meaningful content of training messages at each level. The impact of this "message reduction" is not so serious in the case of FNP discussion groups, because the goal is to

convey fairly general messages on health and nutritional topics, but the impact in individual consultation is much more serious.

### **3. Media Development/Use:**

As mentioned above, CRS has developed a range of visual aids and simulation games for use in FNP centers. Actual utilization of these materials and methods varies considerably from center to center. Visual aids, leaflets and brochures are generally available in centers, but cadres often have little idea of how to use these materials effectively for group discussions or consultations. As a result, they are either unused, or cadres simply show or read the materials to mothers, assuming that the content is self-evident and does not require follow-up discussion or clarification.

It should be noted that while the educational media developed by CRS were designed by a qualified staff nutritionist, the materials were never field tested prior to introduction in FNP centers, nor did CRS seek the assistance of experts in village communication or social marketing in developing the materials. Fortunately, CRS plans to conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of these materials in 1990, which may lead to additional refinements and improvements.

While the materials appeared to the Team to be generally well-designed, it is not clear that the messages adequately exploit mothers' understanding of their children's Sistem Nilai grades. For example, the Kartu Pesan Gizi are a series of brochures keyed to Sistem Nilai grades 1 through 5. Mothers are given the Kartu Pesan Gizi that corresponds to their child's current grade. Each brochure is intended to stimulate practical actions tailored to the specific nutritional needs of children in that grade. But in examining the brochures, the team found that the nutritional and dietary recommendations were virtually the same for every grade level. While the general content of the recommendations appear sound, it seems implausible that a mother with a severely malnourished child (grade 1) should be receiving the same messages as a mother whose child is only moderately malnourished (grade 5). Furthermore, the uniformity of these messages can only reinforce inability of FNP cadres to tailor their consultations to the specific nutritional status of children.

### **1. Supervision and Monitoring:**

CFNDP is inherently a "supervision intensive" program. At each level from CRS on down, actors are required to expend considerable effort to insure that all elements of the program are in-place and functioning appropriately. It was clear to the Team that CRS and its counterparts take this task quite seriously, and employ both regular field visits and detailed reporting systems towards this end. However, while "supervision" and "monitoring" are seen as inextricably linked, it appears that in practice the two tasks can often work at cross purposes. Under CFNDP, there has been a tendency for monitoring tasks to dominate at the expense of meaningful supervision.

## **I. C.R.S.:**

CRS FNP staff conduct regular visits to counterparts and FNP centers on a more or less quarterly basis. The focus of supervision and monitoring centers on the eight FNP components. CRS staff spend most of their time in the field spot checking center operations and discussing their findings with counterparts. While CRS FNP staff are not responsible for monitoring financial or logistical aspects of the program, counterparts report that these field visits retain an "auditing" quality, i.e. CRS staff note shortcomings in counterparts' implementation of the eight components, and instruct counterparts to resolve the problems. Counterparts regularly complain that CRS staff are good at identifying problems, but are too insensitive to the constraints that counterparts face in the field, and are often of little help in diagnosing underlying causes or identifying practical solutions. But in discussions with CRS staff, it was clear that they are generally quite aware and sympathetic regarding the limitations and constraints facing counterparts, and do understand that lapses in FNP implementation are not simply a function of counterpart inaction or neglect. The problem here is not a lack of understanding, but rather that CRS attempts to comprehensively monitor and supervise FNP activities at the center level leave little time left over for CRS staff to provide useful technical assistance and advice.

This points to the need, already recognized by CRS, to "step back" from its traditional intensive field-level monitoring and supervision approach, and concentrate efforts on assisting counterparts in addressing broader systemic constraints. The purpose of FNP center visits should be to identify general patterns of weaknesses in cadre training, nutrition education, etc., rather than to identify corrective actions to be taken in particular centers. Center level monitoring, supervision and problem solving tasks can only be practically undertaken by counterpart staff itself. In this sense, CRS' new emphasis on developing counterpart capabilities is entirely appropriate, and long overdue. It will take time, however, for CRS staff to learn to "let go" of their past role in field supervision and reorient their general approach to interactions with counterparts. It will be especially hard to avoid the temptation to "micro-manage" FNP in newer counterparts where basic implementation of FNP in the field will inevitably be weak and wrought with problems in the early stages. But it is precisely those new counterparts who will most need the kind of organizational and management assistance that can only be provided if CRS modifies its style of supervision.

## **2. Counterparts:**

Counterparts appear to have established fairly comprehensive systems for monitoring and field supervision. Field workers visit centers frequently and regularly, and counterparts hold monthly staff meetings to share information and coordinate monitoring and supervision activities. However, most counterpart staff attention tends to focus on the concrete, easily measurable aspects of FNP, i.e. food delivery, center attendance, while little attention is paid to the effectiveness of "message delivery", i.e. nutrition education, counselling, or developing community understanding of FNP. Although a considerable amount of staff time is spent on collecting data and preparing reports on FNP, this information is seldom or never used within counterpart to assess program performance. In this sense, formal monitoring is perceived as an end in itself, and it is done primarily to satisfy CRS.

Perhaps the key constraining factor in effective counterpart monitoring and supervision is the workload of FNP field workers. Field workers are expected to play multiple, demanding roles as trainer, supervisor, community motivator, administrator, clerk, etc. In several of the counterparts studied, it appears that field workers' workloads were extraordinarily high. The following table displays the distribution and coverage of FNP field workers.

**Table 8. NUMBER AND COVERAGE OF FIELD WORKERS**

ITEM	YASPEM	LKB	PUSBS
Subdistrict	8	8	10
Village	22	35	35
Center	122	114	137
Field Worker	8	2	5
<b>AVERAGE:</b>			
-Subdistrict	1	4	2
-Village	2.75	17.5	7
-Center	15.25	57	27.4

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Source : Evaluation Team.

Given that field workers are generally expected to visit FNP centers each month, the task faced by field workers in LKB seems overwhelming, especially given the long distances between centers in Lampung. In PUSBS, cadre workload is somewhat mitigated by the fact that centers are close together and easy to reach. The field-worker/center ratio in Maumere is the lowest of the counterparts studied, but once again many of the centers are widely separated and located far from YASPEM's office. In allocating their available time field workers make choices between the "optional" and "non-optional" elements of their job descriptions. Supervising food delivery and collecting data for reports are tasks that field workers cannot afford to neglect, whereas performance regarding the more qualitative aspects of supervision does not have any immediate impact on counterpart management's or CRS' perceptions of field worker job performance. It is therefore understandable that these "soft" elements of supervision are continually deferred or neglected. CRS has attempted to assist field workers in performing more qualitative, effective supervision of FNP centers by providing a useful "checklist" to assess center activities. However these guidelines are seldom or never used, nor will they be unless the overall workload of field workers is reduced.

In some cases, the obvious answer should be to simply to hire more field workers. But given the demands of the job, and the extensive training required, counterparts may find it difficult to locate qualified, committed candidates. Another approach to reducing workload would be to relieve field workers of many of the administrative and clerical tasks they

currently perform by hiring additional administrative staff in counterpart offices. It is relatively easy to recruit and train such staff, and they would allow field workers to concentrate more of their time on the "substance" of FNP.

#### **J. The FNP Management Information System:**

Early in the grant period, CRS established a computerized system for compiling the voluminous FNP monitoring reports submitted by the FNP centers. The goal was to facilitate analysis of the reports in order to help CRS supervisors to identify problems and perform quick follow-up with counterparts, as well as provide an overall picture of the status of FNP activities for use by CRS management. Since January 1989, the computerized system has been dormant.

CRS staff cited a number of reasons for why the system fell into disuse:

1. The computer use for the system was transferred to the IGA section in late 1988 and was not replaced. The IGA section had developed its own computerized financial monitoring system for the U-B loan program, and apparently CRS management felt that this was a higher priority use of scarce data processing resources.
2. The system was complex and time-consuming to maintain. CRS staff had to enter data derived from Master Charts, Posyandu Report forms and additional CRS forms for over 280 FNP Centers on a monthly basis. Simple data entry took a great deal of staff time. The software used was a hybrid combination of Dbase III and Lotus 123 applications developed in-house. In some cases data had to be entered twice to generate the required reports.
3. CRS staff were devoting more of their time to developing training packages and materials for counterpart training and nutrition education. Travel also increased as CRS undertook intensive training and supervision of its newer counterparts in NTT. CRS hired a temporary computer operator to perform data entry in June/July 1988, but not since then.
4. Since late 1988 counterpart field-workers are now responsible for compiling information for each center and submitting it to CRS on a monthly basis rather than sending the actual Master Charts and other reports. This streamlines data collection somewhat, but reporting is still at the center level. The new reporting format means that the original monitoring system would have to be modified to be used again.

More fundamentally, the discontinuation of the computerized monitoring system is a reflection of doubts among CRS staff and management regarding the real value of the system. Given that some formal monitoring system is necessary, the question becomes what type of data is really necessary to help CRS identify implementation problems and meaningfully evaluate performance of the FNP program.

FNP Supervisors report that they used the monitoring system to identify problems and issues which could then be brought to the attention of the counterparts. When asked to give

examples of which types of data were likely to stimulate follow-up action with counterparts, examples included:

1. Attendance Rate: If it is low in a particular month, counterparts were asked why this was so.
2. Age Distribution: If new enrollees include too many older children, counterparts will be reminded to give highest priority to newborns and infants.
3. Number of Discussion Groups: Supervisors will follow-up with counterparts if the average size of small discussion groups is too large, as large groups imply a lecture style of instruction CRS is trying to discourage.
4. Immunization Rates: While CRS is not directly responsible for immunization, ORT or other Posyandu activities, CRS Supervisors monitor these services.
5. Number of IGA Members: CRS hopes that all mothers enrolled in the FNP program will participate. Supervisors remind counterparts to intensify promotion of the program where participation rates are low.

CRS Supervisors have routinely sent monthly letters to counterparts to bring these and other problems to the attention of the counterparts and to request clarification on why the problems have occurred. However the Supervisors report that, in general the counterparts almost never formally respond to these letters. Follow-up only occurs during field visits when CRS Supervisors can raise these issues face to face. In some cases, the counterparts do take action on problems identified in the monthly letters prior to Supervisor visits, but CRS is simply not informed of the actions until the field visit.

The problem lies not in the information itself, but more in the nature and quality of the supervision it supports, which, as discussed elsewhere, focusses on identifying "deviations" from the FNP program plan on a center by center basis, and demanding Counterpart compliance. Given that CRS is at least two steps removed from FNP center operations, and given the number of centers involved, this "micro-management" approach could never work. A more appropriate approach is to use FNP monitoring information to help identify systemic problems and constraints facing Counterpart FNP programs, as a tool to improve the quality and appropriateness of CRS technical assistance and training.

Having said this, CRS faces several major obstacles in helping its counterparts use the FNP monitoring system to manage their activities:

1. Counterparts generally possess little ability or inclination to use formal information systems to make decisions or manage their programs. Decision-making is basically intuitive, unstructured and personalized, relying on first-hand observation and trusted informants. Furthermore, among some counterpart leadership there is what can only be described as hostility and/or contempt towards "statistics". Counterparts accept data collection tasks as a prerequisite for CRS assistance, but are not convinced that quantitative indicators can tell them anything about the "real picture" in the field.

2. The FNP monitoring system itself tends to reinforce the notion that progress towards FNP program goals is CRS' responsibility and not the responsibility of the counterparts. CRS bypasses counterpart headquarters and gathers data directly from field workers. Information generated by the monitoring system comes to the counterparts from CRS, along with questions and requests for clarification or action from CRS staff.
3. Counterparts find it difficult to perceive the FNP monitoring system as having a separate purpose from other CRS reporting requirements such as food accountability and financial reports which admittedly and unavoidably exist primarily to serve CRS interests. The FNP monitoring system is, in fact, different because it could be used by the counterparts to assess substantive program performance, but it continues to be looked at as just another CRS report.

Ideally, CRS' counterparts should be responsible for gathering, processing and analyzing data on FNP center activities and taking independent action on issues and problems identified in the analysis. CRS should be a secondary consumer of the information rather than controlling it. But in establishing the system CRS had to take into account the capabilities of its counterparts, and such a decentralized information system would have represented an unrealistic burden on counterparts with limited staff skills, manpower and totally lacking in data processing capability.

As CRS increases its emphasis on developing the institutional capabilities of its counterparts, it is now appropriate for CFNDP monitoring systems to evolve towards a more decentralized model, with the twin goals of developing counterparts abilities to manage and make use of management and monitoring information and reducing CRS's role in "micro-managing" FNP activities. Mastery and control of CFNDP information could enhance counterparts' sense of "ownership" of their CFNDP programs, and help transfer skills that could be used in planning and managing non-CRS activities. For CRS, a more decentralized system would streamline field supervision and allow CRS staff to concentrate more on training and other institutional strengthening activities.

But the constraints that dictated a centralized monitoring system still exist in most if not all counterparts. Only one counterpart currently possesses a computer. CRS hopes to "computerize" its counterparts over the next few years. This is an appropriate goal, but it must be accompanied by intensive and well targeted training which shows counterparts how such data processing resources can be used for purposes beyond the CFNP monitoring system.

Even more important, as decentralized monitoring obviously represents an additional burden on counterpart staff, the system must be simplified and adapted so that the counterparts can readily perceive the value of the information. Otherwise it will simply be seen as an additional onerous condition for CRS assistance. This means that implementation of such a system must be preceded by a careful analysis of CRS and counterpart information needs, with perhaps more attention paid to the needs of counterparts than might naturally occur in the face of CRS's management and accountability imperatives.

It also means that the system will have to be phased in gradually as some of CRS's counterparts have a long way to go in developing basic management skills before any computer resources could be effectively utilized. Premature implementation of computerization in CRS counterparts would effectively isolate the information system from the rest of the counterparts operations. Once that occurs, it is difficult to change the perception that the computer, and those trained to use it are engaged in arcane activities unrelated to the counterpart as a whole.

CRS plans to address the development of CRS and counterpart information systems through the newly established Institutional Development Task Force, a separate unit within CRS that reflects CRS' increased commitment to strengthen the management and planning capabilities of CRS counterparts. In the context of information systems, the Task Force's role and objectives are still being defined, but appear to center on the following objectives:

1. To study and revise the existing information system with the goal of coordinating information required from counterparts by different CRS departments in order to eliminate redundant, overlapping reports which are a burden both to CRS staff and counterparts. The goal is to develop a single integrated monthly report to be submitted by each counterpart.
2. To provide computers to counterparts along with the appropriate training, and to coordinate computer maintenance and supplies purchases.
3. To train CRS staff in the use of CRS-developed applications and commercial software and hardware. CRS plans to acquire additional computers for its staff along with a Local Area Network (LAN) that will give CRS departments access to data contained in the new integrated counterpart reports. This will require a major applications development and training effort within CRS.

CRS has hired a computer specialist to work within the Task Force to assist in the above objectives. Clearly CRS recognizes that the development of information systems within CRS and its counterparts is inseparable from the larger goal of institutional strengthening among its counterparts. Systems development will be preceded by a careful analysis of existing CRS/Counterpart capabilities and needs and will be integrated with the management development activities of the Task Force.

However, CRS should remain wary of the risks inherent in planning and developing new information systems. These risks apply to any organization attempting to "computerize", but are magnified by nature of CRS/counterpart relationships and the wide disparities in management skills between CRS and its various counterparts.

First, despite good faith efforts to consider the information needs and capabilities of all parties, it will be difficult for staff both within counterparts and CRS who lack management information or computer skills to identify or articulate their own needs or to realistically visualize how a planned information system will or will not serve them. It is not uncommon to wildly under or over-estimate the capabilities of the system and the effort required to operate it. This puts the Task Force in the position of having to "guess" what users really

need based on what is inevitably uninformed feedback. While there is no quick fix for this, the Task Force will have to consult with Counterparts throughout the process of systems definition and development rather than relying on a one-shot "needs assessment" and use those consultations as an educational mechanism for the counterparts and CRS staff. It also means that any applications must be field tested on a pilot basis in one counterpart before being released to the rest.

Second, in the rush to develop and implement a workable system, it is natural for the technical staff to focus on the technical issues of system development at the expense of a broader perspective on how the system relates to the organization as a whole and the work of the systems' users. Simply getting such an integrated system to work at all is a challenge. Making it "user friendly" is an additional challenge that must not be neglected.

Third, the shifting of CRS programs to the Outer Islands working through new and inexperienced counterparts will inevitably lead to emphasis being placed on developing the counterparts abilities to meet the administrative requirements of the CRS program. This constraint applies to CRS' entire institution building strategy, but in the case of information systems, it will make it more difficult for CRS to foster the sense of ownership among new counterparts. While it will take time before new counterparts can develop the skills necessary for using information systems for purposes other than reporting to CRS, training for such use should begin in parallel with the initial training required to operate the CRS monitoring system.

It is not the intention of the Team to specify exactly how a revised FNP reporting system should work, or exactly what data it should contain. On the contrary, we believe that an effective monitoring system needs to be based on a rethinking of CRS/Indonesia's role in supervising its counterparts, and on positive action to transform counterpart attitudes and capabilities regarding the use of management information. Nevertheless, some preliminary observations are offered for further study:

1. In the process of "streamlining" the monitoring system, CRS should not rush to eliminate indicators because they appear too "micro-level". Most of the data contained in the current FNP report probably should be collected by CRS, and are potentially useful to CRS and counterparts. The problem lies more in the way information is used than the information itself.
2. For CRS, FNP monitoring information is only really useful for identifying patterns or trends over time in counterpart programs. This means that monthly reports to CRS are unnecessary and burdensome. Quarterly reports would be just as useful.
3. A single, integrated CFNDP report offers the prospect of substantial time savings by eliminating overlap and redundancy in counterpart reporting requirements. But it may reinforce counterparts' current inability to differentiate between data meant for them, and information primarily needed by CRS. Whatever reporting system is developed should include separate reporting formats for CRS and counterparts that presents data in a form and at a level of aggregation appropriate to the management needs of each organization.

4. Posyandu-level reporting represents a substantial drain on the time and energy of cadres, who must prepare separate reports for the counterpart and for the Puskesmas. Much of this data concerning Posyandu activities overlaps. CRS should explore the possibility of field workers collecting this data from the Puskesmas. This would reduce cadre workloads, and would have the additional benefit of the increasing the level of contact, and hopefully the sense of collaboration, between counterparts and Puskesmas staff.

## **K. FNP Sustainability and Program Success:**

### **1. The CRS Plan:**

By design, CFNDP represents a temporary intervention in the village that seeks a lasting impact on the health and nutritional status of program beneficiaries. But in the rush to implement FNP programs in villages, neither CRS nor its counterparts have taken much time until quite recently to think through exactly what "sustainability" should mean in the context of FNP. As a result, there is no clear consensus regarding what elements of the program are to be sustained, what indicators should be used to measure the potential for sustainability, or what are the precise mechanism by which this goal should be pursued.

Within CRS, current thinking on sustainability appears to be that individual villages should be ready for an orderly "phase-out" of CRS food assistance under the following general circumstances:

1. FNP centers have consistent, high attendance rates, and mothers are actively participating in all center activities.
2. All of the eight program components (growth monitoring, nutrition education, targeting, etc) are in-place and operating effectively.
3. The IGA program is functioning and can both generate sufficient funds to sustain center activities after phase-out as well as make a significant contribution towards increasing the family incomes of participants.

Implicit in this view are three key assumptions:

1. Exposure of mothers over the course of FNP to higher quality services at the Posyandu will build a strong relationship between mothers and centers that will sustain high rates of participation after the "food incentive" has been removed.
2. Implementation of the eight program components over time will "institutionalize" the FNP approach in Posyandu so that it can continue after counterpart supervision ends.

3. Links between the IGA program are, and will remain strong, i.e. UB groups will be willing to fund center activities out of their groups' profits, and participation in UBs act as a continuing incentive for mothers' participation in FNP activities.

Based on the performance of FNP to date, there is reason to doubt the validity of all of these assumptions. First, it is clear that the high attendance rates under FNP are driven primarily by the availability of food rations, and that mothers' perceptions of FNP continue to center on that food. Many counterpart staff and local government officials predict that without food distribution, attendance rates will revert to pre-FNP levels. While exposure to better quality services may stimulate "demand" and interest on the part of mothers, it will only do so if mothers understand how those services can actually lead to improvements in the health of their families. However, the Team observed that mothers' understanding of FNP at this level is quite weak - they understand the general goal of the program, but the causal link between services and health outcomes is far from clear to them.

Second, it is by no means obvious that implementation of the FNP system under the intensive supervision of counterpart staff will lead to the institutionalization of the FNP approach once counterpart supervision ends. Village cadres respond to the leadership of their immediate supervisors, and after phase-out, those leaders will be village officials and government health staff. But FNP has done little to gain the understanding, cooperation and support of these officials for the program or its objectives.

Third, it does not appear that the IGA program in FNP villages is capable of playing its intended role in FNP sustainability. As they currently operate, UBs cannot generate sufficient funds to support the current non-food costs of FNP center activities. While steps can be taken to improve the economic performance of UBs, the more critical problem is that the perceived links between FNP and IGA at the village level are quite weak. It is not clear that UB members really understand or accept their obligation to provide funds for center nutrition activities, nor does it appear that membership in UBs acts as an incentive for mothers to participate in center activities.

## **2. Counterpart Perceptions:**

While CRS has a fairly coherent, if flawed, vision of FNP sustainability, thinking about this issue within its counterparts remains extremely vague and unformed. This is partly a reflection of the lack of clear signals coming from CRS on this issue until very recently. Furthermore the general charity-orientation of CRS counterparts, combined with their tendency to focus on food delivery as the centerpiece of FNP makes them uncomfortable with the notion of withdrawing food from villages where there are families still in need of this assistance. But while long-range increases in family incomes is one of the ultimate objectives of FNP, the timing of "phase-out" is conceptually based on the sustainability of village nutrition activities, not on the elimination of "economic need" in the village. Also, sustainability, however defined, remains an abstract concept to counterparts because thus far none have had any direct experience with the "orderly phase-out" of FNP villages. FNP programs have ended in villages because both because of CRS retargeting food assistance (as in Cilacap), and because of overwhelming obstacles to implementing the program, but in no case has a village been "phased-out" because its FNP program was judged to be self-

sufficient. Counterpart experiences with this type of abrupt cessation of food assistance have been uniformly negative. Village leaders and mothers are typically angry and resentful, and the both participation rates and the quality of services introduced by FNP tends to rapidly deteriorate.

Perhaps because of these experiences, counterpart leaders tend to hold a fairly pessimistic view of the prospects for FNP sustainability. They may hold a general "hope" that the quality and coverage of services achieved under FNP will continue after phase-out, but they do not really believe that this will actually happen. On the other hand, counterpart leaders and staff are perhaps more sensitive to the role of developing "community solidarity" as a determining factor of FNP sustainability than is CRS, although they generally have no idea of how to assess or measure it. Lacking any clear concept of long-term sustainability or how to achieve it, counterpart staff are left to focus on performance of the eight FNP program components as the measure of "program success", and within those components, attention is concentrated on more obviously quantifiable factors such as attendance rates, food delivery, etc. In the case of the IGA program, counterpart staff look towards membership levels and loan volumes as indicators of success. Little or no attention has been paid to the performance of UBs in generating funds for FNP activities, nor have counterpart IGA staff performed the relatively straightforward calculations required to project whether this objective is likely to be met.

### **3. Community Perceptions:**

FNP cadres are generally aware that FNP assistance to the village is temporary, and that the village is supposed to become self-reliant in its nutrition activities at some point in the indefinite future. Obviously, without any clear signals from counterpart field workers, they have no way to relate that end goal to their own performance or the performance of the FNP center as a whole. They understand that the success of the center is related its performance in increasing mothers nutritional knowledge, the health of enrolled children, attendance rates, etc., but they are not aware of any goals or benchmarks that could be used to judge that success.

Most mothers and community leaders are unaware, or only vaguely aware, that FNP is a temporary program. This does not necessarily mean that they have never been informed of the temporary nature of FNP by counterparts, but rather that whatever statements were made were unclear and infrequently reinforced, making it easy to relegate this unpleasant prospect to the indefinite, abstract future. The only clear understanding found within FNP villages regarding the time-frame for assistance was that food aid is conditional on the availability of food commodities from CRS. Thus, the villagers are aware that assistance may or may not be ended at any time, but not that the duration of the program is linked to any specific end objectives.

### **4. Developing a Strategy for Sustainability:**

The Team believes that CRS' strategy for FNP sustainability, to the extent that it has been articulated, focuses too narrowly on the short-term performance of FNP centers and on the

ability of IGA activities to generate funds for nutrition activities as the major indicators of program success. While one of the goals of CFNDP is to "maximize community participation in nutrition and income generating activities", in operational terms the "community" has been narrowly defined as mothers participating in the program, leaving out other key actors in the village whose participation is critical to sustaining FNP activities. And, as mentioned earlier, CRS has mistakenly assumed that the supply of better quality health and nutrition services will automatically create its own demand, which will in turn translate into community support for FNP-initiated programs in the village.

The Team has identified a number of steps that could be taken by CRS and its counterparts that could both enhance the short-run implementation of FNP, as well significantly increase the probability that the benefits of the program to villages will continue beyond the end of CRS assistance:

1. Village "Contract System": Assistance to villages should be based on an explicit written "contract" between the village and counterparts which specifies the time-frame for FNP assistance, the obligations of all involved parties, and a set of clear goals to be achieved before the end of FNP. Unless assistance is linked to a specific time-frame, it is hard to see how villages could take the notion of "sustainability" seriously, nor do participants have any means of assessing their own performance towards that goal. The Team cannot recommend any standard time-frame for FNP phase-out, indeed that time-frame should probably be developed in cooperation with each village, but the five-year target already identified by CRS appears generally reasonable and appropriate. Specific goals and performance benchmarks are essential, and should be developed in cooperation with village leaders, cadres, and mothers. But without an accompanying time schedule, benchmarks themselves are meaningless. The essence of the "contract system" is that it reinforces the understanding within villages that FNP assistance is temporary, and serves as a mechanism for building strong community support for FNP goals before the program is initiated.

In order to adopt such a contract system, CRS must be willing to make long-term commitment to villages which may not coincide with the guaranteed availability of Title II commodities or operational funds from USAID. The Team found that many CRS staff are reluctant to discuss precise time-frames for village "phase-out" with counterpart staff or FNP participants for fear of making an implicit commitment that food and resources will be available three or five years in the future. But while it is true that CRS cannot predict with certainty the availability of FNP resources that far in advance, the history of CRS' relationship with USAID would indicate that the likelihood of an abrupt cut-off of aid is relatively low. All village "contracts" can be conditional on the availability of USAID inputs, but for the purposes of planning in the village, a long-term time-frame is essential. Even if aid must be terminated before the end of the contract, villages will be no worse off for having adopted long-range goals.

2. Community Self-Assessment: Prior to "negotiation" of the contract, counterparts should work with the village to help it conduct its own "community self-assessment" that would serve as the "baseline" for developing specific FNP performance benchmarks. The assessment would include indicators such as the quality and coverage of existing health services, attendance at Posyandus, manpower resources, general economic status and

potential, and the history of health and nutritional problems in the village. While this assessment can be useful for evaluating the long-term impact of FNP, the real purpose should be to develop a common understanding within the village of its own health and economic needs. This enhanced level of awareness will in turn make it easier for participants to understand how each component of FNP can help them meet those needs.

3. Involving Local Government: The critical role played by local government officials and agencies in village development activities has been a recurring theme throughout this evaluation and need not be repeated here. Still, the Team wants to emphasize that positive support from local government, and by this we mean from the Provincial level down to the village level, is perhaps the single most important factor determining the sustainability of FNP. While the potential for, and obstacles to closer government collaboration vary from counterpart to counterpart, we believe that CRS and its counterparts must put more stress on establishing explicit, formal working relationships with concerned local government agencies.

4. Funding for Nutrition Activities: The Team has identified a number of steps that can be taken by CRS and counterparts that should help insure that the financial performance of UB groups organized under the IGA program will be strong enough to generate sufficient funds for village nutrition activities after phase out. But even if this economic target is achieved, a major educational effort is still required for mothers participating in the program to build consciousness of their responsibility to support those activities.

Another issue that deserves greater attention is the potential role that "excess" recipient contributions under the new Monetization program could play in providing stable, sustained funding for FNP centers. As mentioned in our discussion of food delivery and recipient contributions, CRS does not have complete, accurate information on the actual "direct costs" of FNP center operations, however the limited data available suggest that actual costs per recipient are substantially less than the Rp. 500 per recipient that will go to FNP centers in 1990. Centers currently retain Rp. 300-350 per recipient out of recipient contributions, and are often able to save a portion of this amount for future use, suggesting that actual costs may be only Rp. 200 - 300 per recipient. This in turn suggests that under the new system, centers may be able to save Rp. 200 - 300 per recipient. If these savings were accumulated during the life of FNP assistance and placed in an interest bearing account, by the time "phase-out" occurs centers could receive a stable interest income which potentially could meet 50 - 80% of the estimated costs of center operations. Center savings could be deposited in a "Tabanas" (rural savings) account in a local bank, but it would probably be more advantageous to deposit the funds in the center's UBs, thus increasing the level of self-reliant capital available for loans

The feasibility of the scheme outlined above depends on a number of factors. First, because recipient contributions will be collected on a per family rather than a per recipient basis, the total number of contributions received in centers are likely to be decreased by an as yet unknown amount, which may mean that the actual potential for center "savings" will be lower than indicated above. Second, the issue of how these funds are to be responsibly managed and controlled will undoubtedly present formidable difficulties for CRS, counterparts and centers. Recipient contributions retained in FNP centers are technically not "CRS" or "counterpart" funds, so neither party necessarily has the right to dictate how

these funds are used. But given the vested interests of FNP centers to maintain access to funds, and of UBs to increase their available loan capital, the proper mix of education and technical assistance should make it possible to find mechanisms for managing center funds that will find broad support within villages.

#### **L. FNP Baseline and Evaluation Criteria:**

The original CFNDP project proposal called for CRS to undertake a socio-economic survey of FNP villages in the first year of the grant to serve as a baseline for future evaluation. For various reasons, which are lost in the history of CFNDP, this baseline survey was never conducted. Furthermore, CRS has yet to develop a clear set of criteria for evaluating the impact of CFNDP. Part of the reason for this stems from uncertainties within CRS, and conflicts with USAID, over which elements of CFNDP can and should be meaningfully evaluated. While the central goal of CFNDP is to "improve the nutritional well-being of families in poor communities within Indonesia", CRS has resisted periodic pressures from USAID to commit itself to direct measures of nutritional status as an indicator of program success. The reluctance of CRS to do so is driven by two major considerations:

1. CRS has always stressed that aggregated grade data from the Sistem Nilai cannot be used to judge program impact. Since grade data only applies to children attending centers, there is no way to determine whether those in the program are improving relative to those that are not, nor is it possible to tell whether participants were better or worse off than the total population of children under five when they entered the program.

2. The Master Chart does not track individual children, so it is impossible to determine if the children recorded each month represent a stable or changing sample. Children naturally "graduate" out of the program at age five, and in some areas such as Klaten, cadres often graduate children whose nutritional status has reached a sustained high level in order to admit more needy children. Such practices should be seen as a targeting "success", but will tend to depress overall grade scores over time. This would also be the case if counterparts improved their performance in reaching more distant, poorer families. Thus, even if CRS were willing to limit its measurement of impact to actual participants, it would have to collect data for individual children, a task that appears onerous and impractical both for CRS and for cadres.

Given the limitations of the grade system, the only valid way to measure nutritional impact of CFNDP would be to conduct intensive, stand-alone surveys of nutritional status in FNP areas before, during and after the program. The Team neither believes that this approach would be cost effective, nor that it would necessarily yield unambiguous, valid results. The worldwide history of attempts to measure the impact of specific nutritional interventions using controlled, random sampling techniques does not give cause for optimism. Such studies, taken as a whole, do however support the general hypothesis that improvements in health services, health and nutritional knowledge, and economic status are positively related to improvements in families' nutritional status.

Based on these considerations, an assessment of the impact of CFNDP should focus on the following outcomes:

1. Beneficiary Knowledge of Health/Nutritional Information: While information on mothers' knowledge of FNP health and nutrition messages is not currently collected on a systematic basis, this data could be collected periodically by counterpart field workers and cadres. Such information could both serve as an impact indicator, as well as assist CRS/counterparts to monitor and improve center educational and counselling activities. Baseline data on the general level of nutritional knowledge should be collected as part of the "community self-assessment" to be conducted at the start of FNP in a village. It should be stressed that knowledge, not "practice" is the correct indicator. Changes in actual nutritional practices are virtually impossible to measure, and in any case are a function of economic and other external factors as well as the effectiveness of education.

2. Impact of Food Aid & IGA in Raising Family Incomes: As mentioned before, CRS correctly assumes that actual changes in dietary practices are determined both by a family's level of nutritional awareness, and by its economic resources. Thus, significant increases in family incomes deriving from food aid in the short-run, and participation in IGA in the long-run can be expected to lead to improved nutritional practices and nutritional status. Calculating the economic impact of food aid is a fairly straightforward exercise, but assessing the economic impact of IGA is both more important and more difficult. Developing a baseline for IGA will have to go beyond the general picture of village economic status that could be obtained by a community self-assessment. But elsewhere in this report, the Team has pointed to the need for counterparts to conduct in-depth needs of village economic performance and potential as a precondition to developing a more "business development" oriented program. These assessments, as well as the more intensive monitoring of UB businesses required for an effective technical assistance program could provide both the required baseline and monitoring data necessary to assess the impact of IGA in family incomes.

3. Coverage of Health Services and IGA: Clearly the overall impact of FNP in a village is influenced by the degree to which it is actually reaching the greatest possible number of eligible participants. Performance in this area can easily be monitored using data already collected by CRS, i.e. attendance rates, targeted vs. enrolled participants, participation in UBs, and data on new enrollments which can be used to measure the successful application of targeting criteria. Once again, baseline data on attendance levels for existing Posyandus, as well as their coverage of the village population could be gathered through the initial community self-assessment.

4. Institutionalization and Sustainability: Ideally sustainability should be assessed through a follow-up village study conducted one to two years after phase-out, but there are a number of intermediate measures which could be used during the period of CRS assistance. The most obvious indicator of FNP sustainability is the degree to which IGA or other fund-raising mechanisms are capable of meeting the projected costs of village nutrition activities. Data on the performance of the IGA system in generating FNP Capital is already available in CRS and counterparts. Measuring the "institutionalization" of FNP, or the degree to which it receives broad support from the community and local government support and has "taken root" in the village is more difficult. One quantitative indicator of local government

support could be the performance of Posyandus in providing services to FNP centers. CRS already collects data on visits of Posyandu staff, immunizations provided, and the distribution of government-supplied materials such as Vitamin A and ORT packets. While these services fall outside the scope of the CFNDP program per se, measuring the regularity of their provision can serve as a powerful indirect indicator of the relationship between FNP centers and local health officials. A simple measure of the strength of Posyandus, as well as its community support, could be cadre attendance and drop-out rates. The Team observed that while FNP resources did increase cadre motivation to some degree, the key motivating factor for continued participation was the degree of status and respect conveyed upon them by local leaders and the community at large. The only direct indicator for community support is the rate of participation in FNP activities, although it must be kept in mind that during the course of the program center attendance is often determined by the availability of food.

## VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES (IGA) COMPONENT

### A. Members Consciousness:

The three main "pillars" of UB development are 1) the "consciousness" of its members and management; 2) the strength of the UB as an institution, and 3) the development of its economic capability. Consciousness can grow and develop through various methods, among which are:

(1) Arise spontaneously within the members/management, through community interaction. The consciousness meant here is the understanding on the importance of UB as a mechanism to increase the family income and as a means to generate funds for village nutrition activities.

(2) Grow systematically through a deliberate program of "conscientization". Activities such as extension, motivation, training and the like can develop positive consciousness by helping members understand the objectives and purposes of existing programs.

(3) Direct observation of the benefits of UB activities for members or for the community. This tangible proof lends credibility to the UB and can provide a strong motivation for participation

The simplest and clearest indicator of the development of the members' "consciousness" is the degree of positive participation in UB activities and UB development. Such participation can be observed in the form of:

1. attendance at UB meetings,
2. fulfilling mutually agreed-to obligations, such as contributing to UB savings, repaying loans, participating in UB activity etc.,
3. actively expressing opinions or discussing important topics at UB meetings.

A high level of UB members's consciousness will ultimately encourage a sense of "ownership" among members which will motivate members to protect the organization from internal and external threats, and make them more open to new ideas, inputs and constructive criticism that promise to strengthen the UB.

**Table 9. ATTENDANCE LEVEL OF MEMBERS IN MONTHLY MEETINGS (ROUTINE)**

Location	Level of Attendance
Lampung	94%
Maumere	86%
Cilacap/Klaten	65%
Average	81.6%

n = 21 UBs

Table 9 shows the attendance level of the members in UB monthly meetings. Attendance can be regarded as "good" whenever 75% of UB members attend regular monthly meetings. Members are much less likely to support decisions or implement group activities when they did not participate in the initial decision making process. In general the attendance level for monthly meetings is quite high, except in Cilacap/Klaten. These high attendance rates are a strong indication of the importance of the UBs to their members. Normally, the larger the perceived benefit of the UB to the group, the higher the members attendance level will be. Conversely, the first indication that an UB is about to break up is usually the failure of the members' meetings.

Other form of member's consciousness is the willingness to fulfill obligations which have been mutually agreed, such as the payment of obligatory savings. The following table shows the performance of the UB groups in collecting obligatory savings.

**Table 10. PAYMENT LEVEL OF OBLIGATORY SAVINGS (TW) OF UB MEMBERS**

Location	% Payment of Obligatory Savings
Lampung	41%
Maumere	81%
Klaten/Cilacap	68%
Average	63%

In general, the amount of obligatory savings is between Rp. 100 and Rp. 200, with a minimum of Rp. 50 and a maximum of Rp. 500 per month for each member. The above table shows that the average payment level is 63%, with the highest levels found in Maumere. This is a reflection both of good longstanding savings habits among the local people, and of the strength of the UB system in Maumere. In Lampung the obligatory savings levels are very low because of most members are low income farmers (dry land) who only receive cash incomes during harvest times (assuming the crop is successful), or every 4 months if they have no other income source. The payment level of obligatory savings in Cilacap and Klaten is depressed because in Cilacap most of the UB members consist of wives of fishermen who have no job, while their husbands' income is also uncertain and sporadic. Also, in several UBs in Cilacap the willingness of the members to pay obligatory savings has dropped because food distribution in FNP centers has been stopped.

The main factor which encourages members to pay voluntary savings as opposed to obligatory savings, is the promise of obtaining bigger loans. Voluntary savings can also be easily withdrawn and are a practical alternative to bank savings, as banks are generally located far from the village.

## B. The Process of UB Formation:

According to the guidelines contained in the CRS UP2K (IGA) Manual, the basic strategy for UB promotion is as follows: (a) to motivate targeted community members, (b) to provide training to future members and management of UBs, (c) to encourage UB to mobilize self-reliant capital, (d) to provide revolving fund capital for productive uses, (e) to provide monthly routine guidance and (f) to collaborate with the Government and other LPSMs. These successive steps represent a well designed "top-down" approach in which policies and programs are provided by CRS in a standardized package.

The advantages of this strategy are: 1) all programs can be implemented simultaneously according to stages, and 2) the targets are easily determined and relatively easy to measure. The major disadvantage is that it conveys the impression that UB development serves the interests of CRS and the Counterparts, and not necessarily that of the people. Accordingly, the local initiative is weakened, and villagers tend to wait passively for others to act. As a result, the development of the UB groups is delayed because the dependency level of UBs on their "builders" remains high.

The process of UB formation was traced by identifying: 1) the sources of initial information on UBs reaching prospective members; 2) who initiated the formation of UBs; and 3) the motivations of members in establishing UBs.

### I. Information sources on UBs:

Table II. INFORMATION SOURCES ON UBs

Information Source	Lampung	Maumere	Cilacap/Klaten	Total
- From UB in other area	-	1	-	1 (4%)
- From Village/Yayasan/Puskesmas*)	1	4	4	9 (37.5%)
- Directed by PL/Cadres**)	3	3	5	11 (46%)
- Community Figures	-	-	-	-
- P L K B	-	-	3	3 (12.5%)
Total				100%

n = 21 UBs

\*) Puskesmas = Community Health Center

\*\*) PL = Field Worker

As seen in Table II above, the dominant source of information on UB comes from Cadres/Field Workers (46%), with the second most important source being the Yayasan or Puskesmas (37,5%). Clearly, the role of Counterparts in the UB formation is decisive. This conclusion is further reinforced if we examine who actually initiates the formation of UBs.

## 2. The Initiative for UB Establishment:

**Table 12. INITIATORS OF UB ESTABLISHMENT**

Initiator	Lampung	Maumere	Cilacap/Klaten	Total
- Individual	-	1	1	2 (8%)
- Discussion group	1	4	5	10 (48%)
- Cadres or PL	2	4	5	11 (54%)
- Other parties	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>				<b>100%</b>

n = 21 UBs

The above table shows that Cadres and Field Workers play a very important role in initiating UB formation. While group initiative was only slightly less common than Cadre/PL initiative, it is clear that the typical role of cadres beyond that of merely "motivating" members.

The strength of the UB is also determined by the initial motivation of members in forming the UB. Based on in-depth interviews of members from twenty-one UBs, the following picture emerges:

**Table 13. MOTIVATIONS OF MEMBERS IN ESTABLISHING UBs**

Explanation	Lampung	Maumere	Klaten	Total
- To associate with the community	3	2	6	11 (21%)
- Place for problem-solving	3	2	5	10 (19%)
- Organizational Training	2	2	3	7 (13%)
- Credit Assistance	4	3	6	13 (24%)
- Direction of PL/Cadres	2	-	3	5 (9%)
- Increasing Family Income	1	2	2	5 (9%)
- Improving Knowledge	-	-	-	2 (5%)
<b>Total</b>				<b>100%</b>

n = 53 UB members

The most important reason reported for establishing an UB was to obtain credit (24%), followed by the desire to associate with others in a group (21%). In this case, the influence of PL/Cadres in establishing UB is relatively small (9%). In other words, mothers do not form UBs to "please" PL/Cadres, but because they are attracted by the promise of credit and other benefits of the UB. Beyond the above data, the Team's interviews strongly reinforced the impression that credit is the driving force behind UB development. Indeed, whenever IGA field workers were present during the Team's interviews, UB managers constantly inquired about their loan requests to the Counterpart and when they would be processed.

The team found three basic versions of the UB formation process:

First, During weighing of children at the FNP center, mothers were given information about the plan for establishing an UB. These mothers then inform the other mothers, and a meeting to discuss the UB establishment was held.

Second, PLs met with groups of FNP mothers, and informed them that in order to get credit facilities, an UB must be established. A meeting was then arranged to form an UB.

Third, Initiative came from Cadres after they attended the IGA Basic Course. Cadres requested their neighbors to form an UB and invited a PL to give guidance/training. The UB was formed immediately.

The promise of credit is implicitly or explicitly the driving force in all the patterns described above. Development of autonomy or self-reliance appear to be much less important. This will inevitably create problems when UBs must become independent of Counterpart loans, because UBs were formed primarily to obtain those loans, not to develop "self-reliance". Finally, and perhaps most important, it was clear to the Team that the broader purposes of UBs, to increase the family income, and to generate fund for village nutrition activities, have not been communicated to mothers establishing UBs, and appear to play no role in mothers motivations to participate.

### **C. UBs as Institutions:**

The strength or weakness of UBs as institutions are determined by various factors, including:

- (1) Management Quality - Dedication, Honesty, Authority and Capability
- (2) Management Reliability - (a) clear formulation of duties and functions (b) Administration and Bookkeeping, (c) Sanctions and (d) Management Functions
- (3) Membership - Consciousness, Participation, Motivation

#### **1. UB Management Requirements:**

The team asked UB members what qualifications and/or qualities they expected from their UB Executive Committee members. The responses revealed that UB members have

set surprisingly high standards for the performance of UB Executives, which reveal a good understanding of the need for efficient, "professional" UB management. To illustrate, qualities often cited as requirements for the position of UB Chairman appear below:

Criteria for the Chairman

- Able to read and write
- Honest, responsible and patient
- Disciplined
- Respected by the community
- Flexible
- Has participated in the UB basic course
- Willing to work for UB
- Fair
- Active in every activity
- "Smooth" in every activity
- A natural "fighter"
- Openness

Qualities expected from the UB Secretary and Treasurer followed a similar pattern. It is interesting to note that these expectations are consistent with, but actually exceed the criteria set out in CRS guidelines.

**2. Election Process of UB Management:**

There are several versions of Management election process, they are:

- a. Appointed by the Cadres and the PKK (Fostering of Family Welfare) mothers. Approval of the members is later requested through the Members' Meeting.
- b. The Head of the Village suggests candidates, to be decided upon at the Members' Meeting.
- c. Candidates are taken from the participants of the UB basic course, then later confirmed by the Members' Meeting.
- d. Candidates are nominated at the Members' Meeting, and are elected by vote.

When UB management is selected from "above", members respect for management suffers, resulting in decreased participation and motivation. Fortunately, in the UBs studied, selection of UB Executives generally follows a more or less democratic process (models C or D). As a result, members' support for UB Executives is generally high, meaning that members generally respect the authority of UB management. That respect also leads to a stronger sense of responsibility among members in carrying out their obligations i.e. repaying loans, attendance, etc.

### 3. Opinions of Members Towards UB Management:

The team polled UB members to determine their general opinion of the performance of their UB managers. The results appear in the table below:

**Table 14. OPINIONS OF MEMBERS TOWARDS UB MANAGEMENT**

Opinion of UB Member	LKB	YASPEM	YSBS	Average
Good	17	34	48	33 (73%)
Average	7	8	2	6 (13%)
Poor	1	-	2	1 ( 2%)
Do not know	-	-	15	5 (12%)
Total				100%

n = 134 UB members

In general, the members of UBs share a high opinion of their Executives (73% "Good"), and are satisfied with their performance. This high level of satisfaction is a reflection of the healthy sense of "democracy" and openness observed in the management of most UB studied by the team.

### 4. Management Responsibilities:

In focus group discussions with UB members, the team sought to identify how members perceived the "Job Descriptions" of UB Executives. As an example, the job description of the typical UB chairman appears below:

#### Duties of the Chairman

- To chair UB meetings and to give directions
- To manage the organization
- To counsel "bad" members and those who will leave the organization
- To represent the UB to outside groups
- To solve problems facing the UB
- To develop and implement work plans of the UB
- To be accountable to the Member's Meeting and to the Counterpart

In all cases, UB members and Executives were able to identify a clear, detailed set of responsibilities and tasks for UB Executives. And as with "Management Requirements" discussed above, those responsibilities were consistent with the model guidelines laid out by CRS. While ability to describe management duties does not in itself prove the existence of "rational" management, it is an indication that efforts to establish UBs as rational institutions are bearing fruit. Furthermore, if we compare these results to the positive

perceptions towards UB management reported by members, it is reasonable to conclude that UBs actually are functioning well as structured organizations.

### **5. Member Sanctions:**

Any organization must have some form of sanctions against members who fail to meet their obligations to the group. As there are no standard rules regarding UB sanctions in the IGA Program, each UB is free to determine them on their own. Most UBs have established clear sanctions against members who fail to attend meetings or fail to repay loans. Some of the more common sanctions are described below:

1. Members failing to attend routine meetings three times in a row are warned in writing by the Management.
2. Members who do not attend for five successive meetings without a clear reason are to be discharged from the UB.
3. Loans delinquent over 2 months are charged a 5% penalty. Some UBs impose a penalty of Rp. 500 for every month of delinquency, and/or will not grant new loans for the following three months.
4. Written warnings through the Village Head.
5. Members who fail to pay obligatory savings for three months are given written warning. After four months a formal explanation is required.

In actual practice, the application of formal sanctions appears to be uncommon. Only 10% of the UBs studied reported imposing sanctions, which were limited to written warnings and interest penalties. More drastic sanctions such as expulsion from the group were not observed. Since rules regarding sanctions were voluntarily adopted by UB members, the infrequency of actual sanctions being applied against members should be seen as a reflection of the strength of group identity and informal peer pressure within the UBs. Formal sanctions are rarely applied mainly because they are rarely necessary.

### **6. Administration:**

Basic administrative and financial records are obviously critical to the management of any organization. CRS has developed a standard set of administrative and financial record books for use by all UBs. These books both provide UBs with a basic administrative control system and allow CRS to collect monitoring information in a standardized format. The ability to use and manage these simple recordkeeping instruments is a reasonable measure of the development of administrative capabilities in UBs. The Team gathered the following information on the utilization of the books:

**Table 15. UB ADMINISTRATION**

Type of Record	Used				Unused			
	LKB	YASPEM	YSBS	TOTAL	LKB	YASPEM	YSBS	TOTAL
<u>Organization Administration</u>								
1. List of members /management	8	4	8	20	1	-	1	2
2. Summary of meetings	8	4	8	20	1	-	-	2
3. Book of Activity	4	3	7	14	5	1	1	7
<u>Financial Administration</u>								
4. Daily cash book	8	4	8	20	1	-	-	1
5. Monthly cash recapitulation book	8	4	8	20	1	-	-	1
6. Column Balance	5	1	6	12	4	3	2	9
7. Final Balance/Profit & Loss	5	1	6	12	4	3	2	9

n = 21 UBs

Overall utilization of the seven standard books provided by CRS is fairly high (approximately 80%); moreover, spot checks of the books showed that most were accurate and complete. However, many UBs find it difficult to manage the Column Balance and Final Balance/Profit-Loss books. While basic recordkeeping capabilities are generally well developed, the ability to analyze and interpret those records is not. Such analysis requires skills which UBs Executives do not possess, and which are not a part of existing UB training packages.

### **7. Membership Growth**

An obvious measure of the strength of UB system is a high rate of membership growth. Membership growth is a function both of the actual benefits mothers receive from UB membership, and of the success of active UB promotion efforts. The following table represents membership growth as measured in 13 of the sample UBs:

**Table 16. GROWTH OF UB MEMBERSHIP**

Counterpart	1987	1988	1989	Growth Average
LKB (3)	92	102	113	11.4%
YASPEM (6)	186	246	243	15.3%
YSBS (5)	265	283	291	4.9%
Total	543	631	647	9.5%

n = 13 UBs

The higher growth rate in Maumere is explained both by the overall excellent performance of the UBs, which inevitably attracts interest, and by the scarcity of alternative sources of credit in the villages surveyed. UBs in Cilacap/Klaten have grown very little in the last year. In Cilacap it was evident that the cessation of food distribution in FNP centers has had a negative impact on UB motivation and development, despite the fact that UB loans and supervision from YSBS have not yet stopped. It is likely that the phase-out of food distribution has both undermined YSBS interest in promoting UBs in Cilacap, and undermined mothers' faith in the program as a whole.

#### **8. Obstacles/Problems Faced by UBs**

Through in-depth interviews, the Team identified a composite set of internal and external obstacles constraining the development of the UBs studied:

##### 1. Membership Meetings

- a. Many UB members are unwilling to express their opinions regarding the operation of UBs. Comments are not offered during meetings - followed by much "non-constructive" criticism after the meetings.
- b. Lack of active participation on the part of some members in routine UB activities i.e. meetings, savings, etc. Some of the members entrust savings and credit installments to friends.
- d. Meetings are sometimes postponed because fewer than 50% of members attend.
- e. Decision making by "consensus" is difficult because many members have no opinion regarding the issue at hand.

##### 2. Savings and Loan Activities

- a. Collection of loan installments is difficult during "dry" periods. Many members can only pay interest on their loans, disturbing UB cash flow.
- b. In some UBs, available savings and loan funds are under-utilized.

c. **Lax savings behavior on the part of some members threatens to "contaminate" good members.**

### **3. Productive Activities**

a. **Fear of business failure, coupled with the inability to understand or assess business risk.**

b. **Lack of information regarding potential productive activities.**

c. **Lack of member support for Management initiatives to group businesses. This can be motivated by the fear that UB group businesses will be organized for the benefit of UB Management.**

d. **UB Executives lack the time to manage UB group businesses.**

e. **Lack of guidance/training from Counterparts regarding small business development.**

f. **Inability to compete against established businesses in the area.**

### **9. Demand for Services/Assistance**

In light of the constraints identified by UB members and managers, the Team solicited UB members' views regarding the services and assistance they hoped would be provided by CRS and Counterparts:

#### **1. Guidance/Training:**

a. **Regular and routine visits from counterpart field workers, including attendance at all member meetings, and follow-up visits.**

b. **Intensive training and guidance regarding financial administration.**

c. **Business skills and entrepreneurship education.**

#### **2. Capital**

a. **Provide special loans for group business development.**

b. **Reduce the time required for CRS/Counterpart loan processing to a maximum of one month.**

c. **Make loan ratio requirements more flexible.**

### **3. Business Development**

- a. Provide marketing and production skills training.
- b. Provide special training on the calculation of business profit/loss.
- c. Provide assistance in making business contacts with third parties.
- d. Provide specific business advice on a case by case basis.
- e. Provide special assistance for the marketing of foodstuffs.

#### **D. Economic Performance of UBs:**

Having examined the development of UBs as local institutions, we move on to examine the economic performance and capabilities of UBs. While strong institutional development is a prerequisite for long-term success, the ability of UBs to meet the central goals of increasing family incomes and supporting village nutrition activities clearly depends on their actual economic performance.

UBs can contribute to family incomes in a variety of ways, including:

- a. Through the distribution of 40 % of annual dividends (SHU) to members. UB dividends come from interest paid on member loans, and from UB group business profits if they exist.
- b. By providing working capital for individual productive activities, presumably increasing business efficiency and profits.

These two mechanisms apply to all the UBs studied. Some additional alternatives appeared in Lampung and Maumere. In Lampung, UB activities include purchasing and delivery of fertilizer to members, many of whom have no off-farm employment. These extra services contribute to the farmers productivity and profits. In Maumere, some UBs engage in equipment rental to members, resulting in lower rental costs to members as well as contributing to UB profits.

#### **1. UB Interest Rates:**

In a 1988 IGA Workshop, CRS and its counterparts agreed upon a uniform 3% per month interest rate for loans to UB members. It does not appear however that there was ever any intention on the part of CRS or the counterparts to actually enforce that agreement. CRS and counterpart staff report that the 3% rate is only a suggested rate and that UBs remain free to set their own rates as they have in the past.

**Table 17. INTEREST RATES AND SYSTEMS PREVAILING IN UBS**

Interest	System	Location		
		Lampung	Maumere	Cilacap/Klaten
1%	flat rate	-	x	-
1.5%	flat rate	-	-	x
2%	flat rate	-	x	x
2%	interest on balance	-	x	-
3%	interest on balance	-	-	x
3%	flat rate	-	-	x
5%	flat rate	x	-	-

In general UBs utilize a flat rate system. This system has several two main advantages, first interest payments are is easy to calculate, and second it yields a high effective rate interest, thus maximizing UB profits. A 1% per month flat rate yields an effective annual return of 22%, 1.5% will yield 33%, 3% will yield 66%, and 5% will yield 118%. The 3% flat rate appears ideal if it was only more widely applied. The high effective annual yield of 66% would greatly accelerate the growth of UB self-reliant capital, while at the same time offer loan rates to members are is still lower than alternative sources of credit in the areas studied. Interest rates charged by other financial institutions such as Official Banks, other Yayasans, shops as well as Cooperatives, vary between 2% - 9%, with a prevailing rate of around 4%.

## **2. UB Capital Structure:**

UB capital consists of self-help capital, which includes Basic Savings, Obligatory Savings and Voluntary Savings as well as UB capital accumulation (25% of SHU), plus loan capital provided through the CRS/Counterpart revolving fund. The following table shows the UB structure and capital development during the current 3 years.

**Table 18. STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF UB CAPITAL**

Year and Counterpart		Self-Help Capital	Loan Capital	Total (Rp. 000s)
Year I	LKB	55	359	414
	YASPEM	1830	1600	3430
	YSBS	1446	5955	7401
Year II	LKB	458	659	1117
	YASPEM	4478	4700	9178
	YSBS	1452	11100	12552
Year III	LKB	1101	2582	3883
	YASPEM	4282	3940	8222
	YSBS	2030		2030
Total		17132	30895	48027
		35.67%	64.33%	100%

n = 21 UBs

In general, loan capital from Counterparts/CRS comprises the majority of capital available to UBs. This indicates that most UBs would probably collapse if Counterpart Loans were stopped. This imbalance in UB capital structure is evident in Klaten/Cilacap (YSBS), particularly in the 2nd year, where the self-help capital accounted for only 11,57% of total capital. Self-help capital growth, by itself, has been quite high, with Rp. 3,331,000 in the 1st year growing to Rp. 7,413,000 in the 3rd year (or an increase of 222% over 3 years).

The actual process by which UBs obtain CRS/Counterpart loan capital has created some problems. Loan applications are reviewed and approved by CRS, not the Counterparts, and CRS approval usually must be preceded (at least for initial loans) by an actual site visit by CRS IGA supervisor. Since CRS IGA staff generally make field visits every three months, loan requests often languish for several months. In addition, funds for all UB capital loans come directly from CRS, not from the Counterpart's Revolving Fund, which creates further delays in processing and disbursement.

When UBs repay the loans, the money is added to the Counterpart Revolving Fund, which is only intended to "revolve" after CRS IGA assistance is phased out. The rationale for this system was to maximize the size of the Revolving Fund when phase-out occurs, and to insure that the growth of the Revolving Fund is based on the demonstrated absorptive capacity of each Counterpart's UBs. Both reasons are sound, but as a result, UBs report that loan applications often take two to five months to process. Such a long lead-time inevitably suppresses the effective demand for credit, as members are either discouraged from applying or are forced to find alternative (more expensive sources of credit. A more extreme consequence is that in some UBs businesses have collapsed due to the lack of timely working capital loans.

Beginning in 1990, CRS will delegate the review and approval of UB loans to its Counterparts. This is a positive step, in that it reflects CRS' confidence in the ability of Counterparts to manage the IGA system, and should reduce processing lead-times. But under current plans, funds for all UB capital loans will still come from CRS, which will continue to delay loan disbursements. If Counterparts can approve loans themselves, there is no reason why loan funds should not come directly from their own Revolving Funds. CRS could then reimburse Counterparts on the basis of actual loan disbursements.

Moving on to the structure of UB self-reliant funds, we see that Voluntary Savings clearly dominates the composition of total UB self-help capital (66%), with obligatory savings coming in at a distant second place (28%). The current rapid development of Voluntary Savings is due to several factors. First, in the UBs studied, the members' 40% share of SHU is always reinvested as voluntary savings. Second, better off members contribute voluntary savings primarily in order to obtain bigger loans, as loan limits are based on a ratio of members' savings.

**Table 19. STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF UB SELF-HELP CAPITAL**

Year/Counterpart	Basic Savings	Obligatory Savings	Voluntary Savings	Total
1986	524,100	924,916	1,816,925	3,265,941
1987	205,500	1,366,096	3,958,734	5,530,330
1988	81,500	1,566,036	3,396,131	5,043,667

n = 21 UBs

On the surface, high voluntary savings should be a good sign, because it indicates a high level of confidence in UBs, and because it provides inherently "cheap" capital to UBs. But this high dependence on voluntary savings also represents a danger to the viability of UBs because, unlike obligatory savings, voluntary savings levels are difficult to project, and because voluntary savings can be easily withdrawn at any time. Both these factors are a threat to the stability and predictability of UB capital base. In light of these problems, it is important to maximize the "stable" capital base of UBs. One approach might be to reinvest members share of SHU as Basic Savings rather than Voluntary Savings. Another approach, proposed by CRS and Counterpart IGA staffs, would be to modify current loan limit ratios to favor members who deposit higher levels of Basic savings.

### 3. UB Group Businesses

The CRS IGA strategy has always assumed that UB members would engage in both group and individual businesses. It is clear however that group businesses are still quite uncommon in UBs.

**Table 20. GROUP BUSINESSES MANAGED BY USAHA BERSAMAS (UBs)**

Group Business	1986	1987	1988	1989	Location
1. Small shop	-	1	3	2	Lampung
			1	2	Maumere
2. Services (rental of party equipment, coconut grating utensils)	1	-	2	1	Maumere

The rarity of group businesses is largely a reflection of the general UB constraints previously discussed - i.e. lack of business skills, motivation, time and information on business opportunities on the part of UB Executives. Additional factors include: 1) the current UB loan proposal system appears better suited to individual loans; 2) members feel that participation in group vs. individual activities is an either/or choice; and 3) members perceive greater risk in group activities that they cannot personally control. Underlying all this is the fact that Counterpart IGA staff have given very little guidance or direction to UBs regarding group productive activities, and what information is offered is non-specific and generally unhelpful.

Group businesses can be valuable simply because they can contribute to group identity and commitment. But some observers have assumed that group enterprises per se should be more efficient and profitable than individual businesses due to economies of scale, marketing power and other factors. The following table shows the financial performance of group business observed in Lampung and Maumere.

**Table 21. CAPITAL AND BUSINESS PROFIT OF UB GROUP BUSINESSES**

UB Group Business	Working Capital (Rp.)	Net Profit (Rp.)	(%)
1. Small shop: Lampung	171,000 (1)	17,725	10.37%
	3,593,550 (3)	859,352	23.91%
Maumere	155,000 (1)	16,650	10.74%
2. Services : Maumere	400,000 (1)		
	150,000 (1)	90,500	60.33%
Average	1,020,756	179,272	17.50%

While the sample here is obviously small, it can still be seen that the average net profit (17.5%) is not particularly high, and that profits are quite variable. The highest profits were for the rental of party equipment in Maumere (60,33%), and trading in Lampung (23,91%).

A coconut grating business begun in 1986 in Maumere failed altogether, and its equipment has been sold. Profits going to UB dividends (SHU) varied between 5.5% to 60.33% annually. These returns are often lower than the rate of return to UBs for individual loans.

#### 4. Turnover and Profits of UB Savings and Loans:

UB profits are determined by loan turnover and by the interest rates charged by each group. The table below traces the growth in loan turnover as well as profit margins for the 21 UBs in our sample. Note that in Lampung, turnover is low because UBs can only loan funds from their own self-reliant capital. LKB only uses CRS/Counterpart funds for direct fertilizer loans, not for regular UB borrowing. This practice is disturbing, both because it retards UB growth, and because it discourages UB members from attempting to diversify their sources of income.

Table 22. TURNOVER AND MARGINS FOR UB LOAN ACTIVITIES

Year	LKB		YASPEM		YSBS	
	Turnover	Margin	Turnover	Margin	Turnover	Margin
1987	444	79%	9191	28.6%	13,071	2.75%
1988	815	4.8%	15200	10.8%	27,668	10.21%
1989 (*)	1229	11.4%	22832	6.9%	42,078	11.28%
Average						
Turnover						
Growth	67%	-	57.5%	-	81.8%	-
Average						
Profit	-	31.7%	-	15.4%	-	8%

n = 21 UBs

\*: Up to September 1989

Overall growth in loan turnover is quite high, despite the low absolute level of turnover in Lampung. Both the highest turnover volume and growth rate are found in Cilacap/Klaten. As was stated earlier, land pressures and higher population densities in Central Java tend to create both the need and the opportunity for families to engage in off-farm business, which in the case of UBs has led to a high demand for credit. In Maumere, turnover growth is relatively low, despite the fact that UBs appear well organized and members seem strongly motivated. Poor land, low population densities, and the general low level of economic activity in Flores limit UB members opportunities for productive business, and consequently, their ability to absorb credit.

On the surface, average UB profit margins on loans appear reasonably healthy (18% per year for the sample as a whole). However this average is skewed by the 31.7% average profit reported for Lampung, which is suspect due to the low level of turnover in 1987. If

we consider only 1988 and 1989, the average for Lampung drops to 8.1%, which would in turn reduce the sample average margin to 10.5%. The picture looks more bleak if we take into account inflation rates during this period - 7.92% for 1987, and 9.24% for 1988. In this light, UB loan margins are barely keeping pace with inflation.

Loan profit levels are strongly influenced by total loan turnover, UB operational costs, and especially by interest rates. In this sense, allowing UBs to determine interest rates on their own may not be a good idea, even if it is a sign of independence and autonomy. It is perhaps unfair and unrealistic to expect UB members to be able to project the impact of any given rate on the viability of their UB. Indeed, it is far from clear that CRS and Counterpart IGA staff themselves have fully appreciated the long-term impact of UB interest rates. Given the personal interest of UB members to keep UB credit as "cheap" as possible, it is natural that UBs have tended to select low rates. This is one area where more standardization, rather than more autonomy, is required. The 3% flat rate system discussed earlier represents a reasonable balance between the affordability of credit, and the long-term survival of UBs as economic institutions.

Loan turnover is constrained mainly by the limited capacity of UB members to absorb loans for productive purposes. But it is clear that the CRS IGA approach has done little so far to provide the skills, information and assistance to UB groups that are necessary to increase that "absorptive capacity". CRS and the Counterparts appear to have done a good job of developing UBs as social institutions - the task of "social" development being more within the traditional experience and capabilities of typical voluntary organizations. What is lacking is a coherent, integrated "vision" or strategy of business development for UBs, of which credit facilities are only one part.

Some CRS staff have argued that the UB system had to undergo a "growing stage" before it could pass into a "skills development" stage, which they see as beginning in 1990. While there may be validity in that argument, there is little evidence that CRS or Counterparts have been seriously preparing themselves for new roles in business as opposed to credit promotion. Furthermore, whatever changes occur in the IGA program in 1990/1 may be of little help to UBs in YSBS/Cilacap and YSS/Semarang where CRS assistance is scheduled for phase out in 1990 and 1991 respectively.

## E. Economic Impact of UB Membership:

### 1. Individual Productive Businesses:

The economic impact of individual loans on family income is a function of the degree to which loans are utilized for productive activities and the actual profitability of those activities. The table below presents the Team's findings on the actual end use of UB loans:

**Table 23. USE OF INDIVIDUAL CREDIT**

Use of Credit	Lampung	Maumere	Cilacap/Klaten	Average
1. Productive business	48%	86%	66%	66.6%
2. Consumption (Food, Educ., Medical, etc.)	40%	9%	13%	20.6%
3. No answer	12%	5%	21%	12.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

n = 134 UB members

In general credits are used as working capital (66.6%), with only small percentage used for consumption purposes (20.6%). The highest rate of productive use is found in Maumere. Low agricultural productivity due to the dry climate forces families to find alternative non-agricultural sources of income. The high population density in Cilacap\Klaten and the unavailability of land also forces families to seek alternative income. In Cilacap particularly, it is very rare to find a recipient who has agricultural land; many recipients husbands make their living as fishermen, which typically yields a low and unstable income. The productive use of credit in Lampung is low, because many families can meet their basic needs through traditional agriculture. Land availability is reasonably good - plots average 1 hectare, while in Metro the average of land ownership is 1 hectare paddy field and 1 hectare of dry land. Under these circumstances, the motivation for engaging in off-farm business is weak. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that that the labor intensity of agricultural production is higher in Lampung than in many other areas in Indonesia, meaning that families are less able to divert time to other activities.

### 2. Small Business Problems:

Obviously the availability of credit does not automatically lead to the emergence of successful small business. Indeed some observers have concluded that credit in the absence of complementary inputs can actually promote "anti performance behavior". The following table shows the dominant problems faced by UB members involved in small businesses.

**Table 24. PROBLEMS/OBSTACLES IN INDIVIDUAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT**

Business Obstacle	Lampung	Maumere	Cilacap/Klaten	Total
1. Marketing	1	11	15	27 (39%)
2. Capital	-	3	4	7 (10%)
3. Raw/supporting materials/merchandise	2	9	1	12 (17%)
4. Others *)	4	6	13	23 (34%)
Total				69 (100%)

\*) : Unpaid loans, livestock sickness, high labor costs, poor management, etc.

Marketing problems are the most difficult obstacle faced by the small businesses (39%). Problems include low competitive capability, low prices which cannot keep pace with increases in raw/supporting material costs, the inability to penetrate the complicated marketing systems, inability to match product designs to changing market tastes, and the inability to effectively compete with better established small businesses. As a consequence, turnover and profits are limited. Capital availability is not felt to be a problem for UB members (10%). This is not to suggest that capital is unimportant, but rather that the availability of credit from UBs focuses attention on other equally important problems. Moreover, in many cases, alternative sources of credit are available from other rural credit programs and especially from small shops/traders who provide raw materials and inputs on credit.

The raw materials problem is most significant in Maumere, where many members engage in traditional textile production. Price increases for raw/supporting materials typically outpace increases in price of the finished products, because marketing channels for both inputs and final products are controlled by local traders. The high number of producers relative to existing local demand, and the inaccessibility of external markets has also depressed prices and profits.

Weavers in Maumere are also experiencing problems in coloring/dyeing technology. In general, they are still using traditional coloring substances. This results in products with poor color definition and poor colorfastness (i.e. the dyes run). Textile designs are also very limited, making marketing even more difficult.

### 3. Profile of Individual Productive Businesses:

**Table 25. INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTIVE BUSINESS**

Type of small business	Lampung	Maumere	Cilacap/Klaten	Total
1. Home industry*)	-	10	8	18 (20%)
2. Animal breeding**)	2	11	5	18 (20%)
3. Fishery	-	1	-	1 (1%)
4. Services	-	1	4	5 (1%)
5. Small shop	1	8	8	17 (18%)
6. Agriculture	9	2	1	12 (13%)
7. Candak kulak***)	-	3	15	18 (20%)
8. Tailor/confection	-	-	3	3 (3%)

n = 92 Individual Businesses

- \* : Home industry includes: in Maumere - woven products; in Cilacap/Klaten - tempe production, snacks/ice, batik fans, batik (ngengreng), washing soap and confections.
- \*\* : Animal breeding includes: in Lampung, sheep; in Maumere, pigs, chickens, sheep; in Cilacap/Klaten - chickens, sheep, cows and quails.
- \*\*\*: A small loan to vendor intended for use in purchasing goods for immediate resale.

The most common businesses are home industry, animal breeding and small shops. Home industry is developing in Maumere and Klaten, while animal breeding is best developed in Maumere. Given the availability of land and potential feedstock sources, it is curious that animal breeding is not more common in Lampung. The underdevelopment of small shop business in Lampung is probably a reflection of the scarcity of regular cash incomes in the areas studied. Many families only receive cash incomes at harvest time which occurs about every four months, making it difficult for small retail shops to maintain adequate turnover. In contrast higher population density and a more diverse local economy in Klaten has encouraged the development of "candak kulak", or short-term credit for street vendors.

The profitability of the above businesses varies, and the Team could only collect anecdotal information. From the information received, food stalls, small shops and tempe productions yield a net profit of approximately 10%, although margins and profits in some small shops in Maumere are considerably higher. For example, a small shop run by UB ANASTASIA, reported margins of 49% for sugar, 67.5% for kerosene, and 116% for cooking oil. In Kewapantai, the candak kulak business is making a profit of Rp. 5.000 per week and small shop in Koting B, Maumere is making a profit of Rp. 60.000/month. Most of the respondents find it difficult to calculate the profit of their small businesses, both because of limited administrative skills and because they have only been in business a short time.

#### **4. Increase of Family Income:**

Increasing family incomes of UB members is ultimately the central goal of the CRS IGA program. However measuring those increases is methodologically difficult. The Team attempted to measure changes in income by comparing family incomes before and after UB membership. The limitations of this approach are obvious enough - it cannot account for the many external factors influencing family incomes which have nothing to do with UBs, but it does provide at least a rough measure. For the purpose of illustration, data on 46 randomly selected respondents from the entire sample of 174 (67 from YSBS, 25 from LKB and 42 from YASPEM) appear in Annex 1 of this report.

The respondents fall into four main groups: First, in many cases (54%) respondents reported that their business incomes increased after joining the UB. This occurred because business turnover increased (due to capital injection from credit - at any given margin level, absolute profits are higher); Second, no significant change in income (34.7%), despite capital injections; Third, actual losses in business income (6.5%) once again despite new capital injections; and Fourth, 6.5% of the respondents were able to start entirely new businesses using UB loans as start-up capital. These were generally mother who were previously unemployed.

The most profitable activities included trading, small industry, and animal husbandry. Respondents reporting little or no income change tended to be engaged in the services sector, fishing, medium scale industry, and agriculture. Losses in income occurred in families engaged in agriculture and in agricultural products trading. From these findings, it is clear that informal, off-farm businesses do represent a viable means of increasing family incomes.

#### **F. UBs and FNP Self-Sufficiency:**

Beyond increasing family incomes, the second major goal of the IGA program is to generate sufficient funds in the village to finance FNP center nutrition activities when CRS/Counterpart aid is eventually phased-out. Under the program, the mechanism for generating those funds is to require that UBs set-aside 15% of their annual profit (SHU) for their local FNP Centers. All of the UBs studied by the Team were complying with this requirement. However, CRS records indicate that not all UBs in all counterparts are doing so.

UBs have two basic alternatives for managing their nutrition reserve funds. The first is to record the fund in the UB books, but continue to make those funds available for member loans. This method will help increase loan turnover and UB profits, but it creates the possibility that funds may not be available when they are needed by the FNP center. Second, the nutrition funds can be deposited in a Tabanas (Rural Savings) in the name of the UB. The Tabanas savings book can be kept in the Counterpart's office. This alternative guarantees the availability of funds, and may tend to increase members awareness of the nutrition fund and its importance. The obvious disadvantage is that it reduces the available capital loans.

**It is by no means certain, however, that UBs will be willing to turn over funds to FNP Centers when food aid and recipient contributions end in the village.** The Team generally found that mothers' understanding of the purpose and importance of the FNP reserve fund was quite poor. It is one thing to set aside money - it is quite another to actually let go of it. UB meetings are not utilized by PLs and Cadres to encourage FNP center attendance or to stress the importance of FNP activities to the community. In Cilacap, where food distribution has stopped, there have been at least a few cases where UBs have refused to turn over nutrition funds to FNP Centers. The UB Executives claimed that the funds were not needed yet, and that in any case the amount accumulated in the Nutrition Funds was too small to be of much use. The point here is not whether the UBs' rationale was correct, but rather that that UB groups may reserve for themselves the right to decide when and if they will support FNP Centers. This means that developing a sense of group responsibility towards village nutrition activities is a critical, but neglected element in the CRS IGA strategy.

Assuming that UBs do set aside nutrition reserve funds, a key question is whether those funds will or will not cover the projected costs of maintaining village nutrition activities after food assistance stops. As is discussed elsewhere, ambiguities regarding exactly what activities are to be sustained, and their actual costs make generalization difficult. For the purposes of analysis, we assume that the "cost" of village nutrition activities are the prevailing cost of running FNP centers, not including food aid or counterpart supervision. These costs are variable - they range between Rp. 60,000 and Rp. 360,000 annually depending on the number of mothers served by a Posyandu, but the average is about Rp. 175,000/year. Ideally, Posyandus should have about 3 UBs, but unless we assume extremely high participation rates in UBs, it is safer base our calculations on 2 UBs per Center:

- \* Posyandu expenses average Rp. 175,000/year. If there are 2 UBs, the funds required of each UB is Rp. 85,000 annually or Rp. 7,220/month (Rp. 14,440/mo. if there is only 1 UB).
- \* If the nutrition funds consist of 15% of UBs annual profits (SHU) then total SHU (100%) must be Rp. 48,133/month, or an average of Rp. 577,600/year
- \* If the average of profit margin of UBs is 18.3% (which may in fact be unrealistically high), the capital turnover required the profit target is  $(100/18.3) \times \text{Rp. } 577.600 = \text{Rp. } 3,156,284/\text{year}$  for every UB.
- \* If the prevailing capital/loan structure of UBs averages 36% self-reliant capital vs. 65% CRS loan capital, the loan capital required for each UB is Rp. 2,020,021. This means that for the entire IGA program, total annual loan levels would need to be  $2,020,021 \times 256 \text{ UBs} = \underline{\text{Rp. } 517,125,376}$ .
- \* Based on the demonstrated absorptive capacity of the 21 UB studied (representing 12.2% of all UBs) we see that the UBs absorbed Rp. 20,755,00 in the first nine months of 1989, or an estimated Rp. 27,673,334/year. This means that total credit absorption of all UBs is projected to reach  $(256/21) \times \text{Rp. } 27,673,334 = \underline{\text{Rp. } 337,351,120}$ .

\* Therefore, projected loan turnover will only reach, at most, 65% of the level required to generate sufficient funds for FNP activities. If a center only has one UB, the percentage drops to 32.5%.

**From this rough analysis, it is clear that the existing IGA system is not likely to meet the goal of generating adequate funds for FNP activities after "phase-out.** Clearly, the absorptive capacity and the profitability of UBs has to be significantly increased. This in turn focuses attention on efforts to increase viability and efficiency of UBs as economic mechanisms (i.e. appropriate interest rates, savings regulations, etc.), and boosting the capacity to use loans productively through a coherent business development strategy. Any attempt to meet the "FNP sustainability" target by increasing the percentage of profits extracted from UBs is likely to be counterproductive both in terms of UB economic performance and UB morale.

### **G. Assistance to Small Business Development**

An effective strategy of small business development should always begin with market analyses, i.e. consumer demand, access to markets, and existing competition, followed by feasibility analyses, i.e. the production process, technology, price, market, material availability, skills, cost/benefit etc. From this information it is possible to find the right mix of inputs, be it credit, marketing assistance, motivation training, production assistance, etc. needed by entrepreneurs to help them expand or start-up profitable businesses.

The original plan for the CFNDP IGA component anticipated the need for an integrated approach to small business promotion and included provisions for skills training, needs identification, etc. But in practice the IGA component has focused almost exclusively on organizing credit and savings activities.

There are some valid reasons for this. First, effective training, technical assistance and extension can only be attempted after mothers are organized into functioning groups. This has inevitably led to CRS and its counterparts concentrating their efforts on UB "institution building" as a first step. Second, establishing a workable credit system that serves thousands of low-income families throughout Indonesia would be a formidable challenge for any development agency. CRS/Indonesia undertook IGA with no prior experience in village savings/credit programs (or business development), and while some of its counterparts (such as LKB and YASPEM) had operated some type of credit activity, none were quite prepared for the scale and complexity of the IGA approach. Thus, the first years of IGA have involved intensive work on staff recruitment, staff training and the establishment of financial monitoring and supervision systems. Finally, on a more disturbing note, the emphasis on credit is another reflection of the continuing tendency within CRS and its counterparts to treat resource delivery (i.e. food, credit) as an end in itself, rather than a means for achieving developmental goals

The Team found that CRS and its counterparts have been largely successful in developing UBs as effective local institutions, and in establishing an at least potentially viable savings and credit program. It is now time move on to the other side of the equation.

Counterparts have begun some efforts at skills training for UBs, but so far these activities have been sporadic and uncoordinated. Part of the problem appears to be that the current IGA "model" assumes that once mothers were organized into UB groups they would be, as stated in the 1984 CFNDP project proposal, "capable of identifying their entrepreneurial needs", and communicate those needs to Counterpart field workers. This results in a reactive rather than a proactive or promotional approach that requires UBs to analyse and act on their own problems. But the it is the very fact that UB members are not capable of performing such assessments that makes training necessary in the first place.

CRS and Counterpart IGA staff do not currently possess the skills and expertise necessary to assess local market potential, analyse the feasibility of business enterprises, and identify the particular mix of training and services needed by specific UBs. It is not realistic to expect that Counterpart IGA staff can ever provide specialized technical assistance to UBs, but it is critical that they be able to identify those needs, as well as provide basic motivational and business management guidance. The existing IGA staff are capable of mastering these skills, but both CRS and its counterparts need full time business development specialist to plan overall business development strategy, conduct market and feasibility assessments, as well as train and supervise IGA staff in these new areas.

While the Team wants to stress that future UB business promotion interventions must be based on in-depth, village level assessments of local economic potential and UB capabilities, we did attempt to take a first step towards identifying potentially profitable income generating activities in the areas studied. A description of those activities appears in Annex 2 of this report.

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## Annex 1

Family Subsistence*)	Monthly Income (Rp.)		Change %
	Before becoming UB member	After becoming UB member	
1. Farmer and raising chicken	245.000	270.000	10,2
2. Selling ice	150.000	250.000	66,6
3. Tailor	63.000	75.000	19,0
4. Farmer and brick maker	63.000	75.000	19,0
5. Selling bakso	60.000	90.000	50
6. Fan handicraft	90.000	135.000	50
7. Duck candak kulak	15.000	27.000	80
8. Small shop	45.000	75.000	66,6
9. Batik vendor	125.000	250.000	100
10. Andong driver	22.500	22.500	0
11. Frying oil vendor	210.000	213.750	1,7
12. Ice seller	75.000	75.000	0
13. Confection seller	750.000	750.000	0
14. Tobacco seller	150.000	90.000	- 40
15. Dressmaking	120.000	120.000	0
16. Threat Making Labour	30.000	34.500	15
17. Becak driver	45.000	45.000	0
18. Fisherman	60.000	60.000	0
19. Furniture Maker	300.000	300.000	0
20. Food stall	45.000	60.000	33,3
21. Kitchen Utensil seller	120.000	150.000	25
22. Masonry	65.000	65.000	0
23. Garage	200.000	200.000	0
24. Chicken raising	30.000	35.000	16,6
25. Plaiting works	30.000	33.000	10
26. Farmer and Sheep breeder	58.350	81.670	39,9

27. Farmer	34.000	!	46.000	!	35,2
28. Farmer	42.000	!	42.000	!	0
29. Farmer	12.000	!	12.000	!	0
30. Farmer	26.000	!	20.000	!	- 23
31. Farmer	65.000	!	70.000	!	7,6
32. Farmer and Tapioca Maker		!		!	
	45.000	!	85.000	!	30,7
33. Candak Kulak	43.750	!	65.625	!	50
34. Tani	40.480	!	40.480	!	0
35. Kiosk/Shop		!	250.000	!	0
36. Small shop		!	30.000	!	0
37. Farmer	300.000	!	200.000	!	- 33,3
38. Woven Product	25.000	!	32.500	!	30
39. Woven Product	10.000	!	15.000	!	50
40. Carpenter	60.000	!	75.000	!	25
41. Woven Product	30.000	!	30.000	!	0
42. Woven Product	8.000	!	10.000	!	25
43. Woven Product	9.500	!	9.500	!	0
44. Vendor	25.000	!	25.000	!	0
45. Farmer	50.000	!	50.000	!	0
46. Candak Kulak		!	35.000	!	0

## Annex 2

### POTENTIAL AREAS FOR UB BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT

Based on a necessarily brief investigation of local market demand and production potential, the Team identified the following business activities as being attractive and feasible targets for immediate further development.

Type of business	Remarks
<u>LAMPUNG</u>	
Cow, water buffalo	Animal traction can be used to prepare land for the transition from dry land to irrigated agriculture. Manure can be recycled as compost for fertilizing paddy fields as well as ceteria and king grass fields for animal feed.
Tractor rental	Especially for areas like Trimomukti, tractors for land preparation (irrigated paddy field) are required.
Small Trading	For rural areas, small trading, candak kulak and small-ware/convenience shops. For transmigration areas, small shops for daily needs.
Local chicken raising	Semi-intensive raising, sold when they are young (dere).
<u>MAUMERE</u>	
Pigs and Sheep	A traditional activity. Feed requirements are relatively low. Manure used for planting ceteria or king grass.
Trading	Shopping center/small shop for small-wares and daily needs in suburban areas, and canuak kulak.
Local Chicken raising	Semi-intensive raising, sold when they are young (dere) and carried out as side job.
Woven fabric	Improvement in dyeing techniques, design and marketing is necessary.

CILACAP/KLATEN

Cows and sheep	Animal feed is easily available. Manure for compost.
Local chicken raising	Semi-intensive raising, sold when young.
Trading	High potential due to the high population density, and fast turnover. The forms are local trading, candak kulak, food stall/restaurant, shopping center etc.
Small industry	Confection for surrounding areas of Kec. Cilacap Selatan, Wedi and Ceper, embroidery for Cilacap Selatan. Batik products (fans, purses, hats, etc.) for the area around Kec. Bayat. Wooden furniture for the area around Kec. Trucuk.

TYPES OF SMALL BUSINESSES FEASIBLE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

An effective strategy of small business development should always start with market analyses, i.e. consumer demand, access to markets, and existing competition, followed by feasibility analyses, i.e. the production process, technology, price, market, material availability, skills, cost/benefit etc. In addition to the above list, the Team identified additional activities which also appeared to be potentially feasible, but in this case need further in-depth assessment.

Type of business	Lampung	Maumere	Cilacap/Klaten
<u>Off farm business</u>			
1. Animal breeding (ruminasia)	Sheep Cows Water buffalo	Sheep Pig	Sheep, cows
2. Small shop	Saprotan Saprodi	Saprodi -	Saprotan Saprodi
3. Cashcrop Agriculture	Minapadi	-	Minapadi
4. Yard cultivation	Horticulture Empon-empon Fruits	Horticulture Fruits -	Horticulture Empon-empon Waterpump
5. Irrigation service	Waterpump	-	Waterpump
6. Copra processing	x	x	x
7. Corn mill/coconut grating service	x	x	x
<u>Dry land Agriculture</u> (Up land)			
	Mlinjo Banana Coconut	Cashewnut Petai Mlinjo	Cashewnut Petai Mlinjo

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	Cardamom	Cardamom	Cardamom
	Manggo	Banana	Banana
		Manggo	Manggo
Trading	Small-wares	Small-wares	Small-wares
-----	Daily needs	Daily needs	Daily needs
	Candak kulak	Candak kulak	Candak kulak
	Agricultural	Agricultural	Agricultural
	produce	produce	produce
	Cattle	Sea produce	Sea produce
		Supporting	Supporting
		raw mat.for	raw mat.for
		small ind.	small ind.
		Cattle	Cattle
		breeding	breeding
Service			
-----			
	Electricity	Electricity	Electricity
	Party Serv.	Party Serv.	Party Serv.
	Equipment-	Equipment-	Equipment-
	Rental	Rental	Rental
Small Industry			
-----			
	Tempe/tahu	Woven product	Confection
	Red brick	Red brick	Red brick
	Plaiting	Plaiting	Tahu/tempe
	product	product	Batik
	Banana pro-	Banana pro-	Coconut oil
	cessing	cessing	Smithy
	Ironsmith	Furniture	Furniture
	Furniture	Confection	Net
	Confection	Nets	Cloth fan
	Food	Cloth fan	Food
	Hollow brick	Food	Cloth bag
	Rooftile	Cloth bag	Rooftile
		Hollow brick	
		Rooftile	
Others			
-----			
	Poultry	Poultry	Poultry
	breeder	Seaweed	breeder
			Fresh water
			fish

**AN EVALUATION OF THE CRS  
COMMUNITY FOOD AND  
NUTRITION DEVELOPMENT  
PROGRAM (CFNDP)**

**FNP and IGA Components**

**Volume II: Methodology and Scope of Work**

**DECEMBER 1989**

**CRS USCC INDONESIA PROGRAM**

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# Evaluation Methodology: FNP Component

## I. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the FNP evaluation are to:

- A. Assess the FNP management process at all managerial levels (CRS, counterpart and community), focused on managerial capabilities for planning, implementing and sustaining program;
- B. Recommend an appropriate plan of action for maintaining and sustaining the existing FNP Project, and for expanding FNP to new areas in the Outer Islands of Indonesia; and
- C. Identify variables and indicators to be used as baseline data for future evaluation.

The preliminary result of the evaluation, together with the preliminary results of the IGA evaluation was presented in the CRS-Counterpart Meeting in the second week of November 1989. This meeting was a step for completing the final report of the evaluation by which CRS and counterparts develop FNP.

## II. SCOPE OF EVALUATION

The FNP evaluation is an integrated part of CFNDP evaluation which consists of FNP and IGA evaluations. The FNP evaluation assesses the following components of FNP :

- a. targeting;
- b. commitment;
- c. training;
- d. food delivery;
- e. growth monitoring;
- f. nutrition education;
- g. supervision and monitoring;
- h. management information system; and
- i. program success.

## III. METHODOLOGY


### 1. Evaluation Model

#### a. Basic Concepts

To meet the above objective, the evaluation was carried out with the "hypothesis" that program success is influenced by the consistency of program planning and implementation, and managerial capabilities at all managerial levels.

A model constructed to "test" the hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 1.


Figure 1. MODEL OF EVALUATION



The main indicators for the above variables will be the 9 (nine) program components, i.e.: targeting, commitment, training, food delivery, growth monitoring, nutrition education, supervision and monitoring, management information systems and program success.

Another way to conceptualize the "hypothesis" is by modifying the "Fit Model" developed by David C. Korten. A model presented below is intended to describe that "the program design" and the capacity to implement it are developed simultaneously to produce a three way-fit between the recipients, the FNP program, and the Counterparts.

Figure 2. THE FIT MODEL



- Between recipients and program, the critical fit is between the recipient need and the program outputs. These outputs are the result of resources and services provided by that program.
- Between recipients and Counterparts, the critical fit is between recipient demands and Counterpart decisions. The

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first part can be defined as "the means by which recipients are able to articulate their own needs"; while the second one represents the processes of decision made by the counterparts.

- Between Counterparts and the program, the critical fit is between the program tasks and counterpart competence.

In this model, the CRS is treated as a party which facilitates the counterparts to fit themselves in the model. The effectiveness of the FNP basically is a function of those three fits. There should be a close correlation between effectiveness and the degree of "fit". In terms of managerial capability, the program's "fitness" can be defined as the degree of accomplishment in organizing activities that are to be consistently undertaken by the three parties involved in FNP (CRS, Counterparts and Posyandu) not only in the stage of planning, but also in the implementing and sustaining stages.

#### **b. Operational Definitions**

It is necessary to give operational definitions of some basic concepts occupied in the evaluation :

1. Goal and Purpose of FNP - is defined as the perception of involved parties re.the of goal and purpose of FNP.
2. Managerial capability - is defined as ability and performance in managing planning, implementing and sustaining FNP as seen in assisting organizations (CRS and Counterparts) and in the targeted organization (Posyandu). In a practical manner, managerial capability involves managing manpower, materials, supplies, methods/systems and funds.
3. Targeting - is criteria used for selecting locations and mothers participating in FNP project.
4. Commitment - is the type of obligations and responsibilities that should be assumed by all parties involved in FNP.
5. Training - refers to efforts of CRS and counterparts to increase the knowledge and capability of personnel involved in FNP.
6. Food Delivery - is defined as organizing the distribution of food from the counterparts to the enrolled mothers.
7. Growth Monitoring - refers to activities to deal with monitoring and assessment of the physical growth of the children registered in the Posyandu.

8. Nutrition Education - is defined as activities related to the transfer of nutritional knowledge and ability to practice it.

9. Supervision and Monitoring - are defined as activities undertaken by different management levels to supervise and monitor FNP.

10. Management Information System - is the means for managing the program through the exchange of information. The main objective of the MIS for FNP is to provide information for decision making on planning, implementing and sustaining FNP. The specific issues which run throughout in this evaluation are:

-- what kinds of data or information are required by program managers involved in FNP?;

-- from whom are these data obtained; and to whom they should be delivered?

-- to whom these are these data submitted?

-- what action is taken by personnel concerned after receiving data or information?

-- what is system, process, and procedure used to collect, analyze and distribute this information ?.

11. Program success - is defined in this evaluation as success in continuity and sustainability of activities, particularly in Posyandu monthly session and meetings of mothers.

## 2. Sample Selection Criteria

Three counterparts were selected purposively based on variations of managerial capabilities, geographic location, and on the need to study counterparts where all components of the CFNDP program are operational. They are : Yayasan Sosial Bina Sejahtera (YSBS) in Cilacap/Klaten, Central Java; Lembaga Karya Bhakti (LKB) in Tanjung Karang, Lampung; and Yayasan Pembangunan Masyarakat (YASPEM) in Maumere, Flores, East Nusa Tenggara.

Twenty four villages in which YSBS (Cilacap/Klaten), LKB (Tanjung Karang) and YASPEM (Maumere) have undertaken FNP projects, were selected as samples of FNP evaluation. In this sense, eight villages represented each of Yayasan (Foundation). Selection of the villages were also made purposively through consultation with the counterpart staffs, based on variation of community characteristics and program's types and duration as follows :

- half of the villages are covered by FNP and IGA activities, and the other half are covered only by FNP activities;
- half of the villages are covered by the CFNDP for at least 4 years and the other half for less than 2 years.
- one village which will be covered by FNP next year functions as the "control" village.

The sample of selected centers is summarized in the following figure.

Figure 3. DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED VILLAGES/CENTERS

		Involved in IGA		
		yes	no	
Category of involvement	new	Magepanda Nebe Trimomukti Purbasakti Palar Slarang	Kota Uneng Mekindetung Banyumas Banyuwangi Kawunganten Dongan	12
	old	Egon Talibura Sukoharjo Margoken- cono Tambakrejo Danguran	Lela Kabor Sukamulyo - - Tangkisan Lor Jotangan	11
		12 centers	11 centers	23

The three control villages are Darat Gunung (Maumere), Bangunsari (Lampung), and Cilacap (Cilacap)..

### 3. Selection of Respondents

CRS/Jakarta, FNP management and staff were treated as respondents for the evaluation. In this office, interviews were conducted with the CFNDP Program Manager, FNP Senior Supervisor and other staff involving in the FNP management. All related documents, including data on growth monitoring and surveillance were also searched.

In the counterpart offices, interviews were undertaken with CFNDP Coordinators, FNP Officers and all other staff involved in FNP management. All related documents were also collected.

#### 4. Instruments

For field data collection a set of instruments was developed for use in individual in-depth interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). The instruments were only a guidance and reminder for the research assistants to collect the necessary qualitative data and to record secondary data.

Three groups of respondents in FNP centers, i.e : recipients (pregnant, lactating mothers and mothers of targetted children), cadres and community leaders were organized for focus group discussion. Interviews were carried out with local health officials and other governmental officials involved in the program, and local program supervisors assigned by the counterpart.

Observation on Posyandus, and houses of some mothers was also performed. All related documents, including Posyandu documents and FNP local management documents, were also searched.

#### 5. Data Collection, Processing and Analysis

Data were collected hierarchically from CRS management down to the community level in accordance with variables mentioned in the evaluation model by focusing on the 11 (eleven) main issues of outlines above under "operational definitions" (See Figure 4.).

Information about program design and POA were collected, including program documents at all managerial levels (CRS, counterparts, and community) which confirmed by interviews with the personnel in charge. Implementation of FNP projects were observed. In order to enrich findings, the evaluation did interview concerning knowledge, attitude and of all involved persons.

Success, in terms of "immediate outcomes", was measured using the Posyandu's monitoring system, specially on the attendance rate. And so far, the evaluation reanalyzed data of grading system available in the counterparts' office. Managerial capabilities were assessed in the evaluation through studying documents and interviewing officials in charge.

The following matrix shows briefly kinds of data used and their sources:

Figure 4. MATRIX OF EVALUATION

Issue	Data and Source								
	planning			implement.			sustaining		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
1. Goal and purpose of FNP	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
2. Managerial capability	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
3.a. targeting	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
b. commitment	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	+
c. training	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-
d. food delivery	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-
e. nutrition educ.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
f. growth monitoring	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
g. superv.& monit.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
h. management information system	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
4. program success	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

A = CRS      B = Counterpart      C = Community

Data collection was carried out by 2 (two) research assistants for each counterpart, with each team taking about twelve days to complete their work. During this activities, the teams collaborated closely with the staff of each counterpart.

Within the process of collecting data, research assistants wrote field notes based on the frame of the above matrix. Secondary data were included the field notes. Field notes were processed and analyzed by the consultant and field coordinator assisted by all research assistants, to find out patterns of managerial capabilities at all managerial levels, and their relationship with the program success.

The above data were qualitative in manner, hence, the data were collected and analyzed using qualitative methods. The tools used to describe managerial capability were the "three critical fits". "Fitness", in this evaluation is formulated as consistency in design, plan of action (POA) and program implementation (and appropriate adjustment based on local needs), from CRS level down to community level. Program design and POA including all written documents available at all levels were studied, and changes of design and POA and their reasons to change it were also documented.

6. TIME FRAME

The evaluation was started at the beginning of September 1989, and will be accomplished by the end of December 1989. The following describes time frame of the activity.

- a. Administrative preparation : September 1, 1989
- b. Instruments' preparation : September 4-7, 1989
- c. Data collection : September 9 to  
October 26, 1989
- d. Data processing and analyses : October 1 to  
November 3 1989
- e. Preliminary report writing : November 4-7, 1989
- f. Presentation of preliminary report : November 15-17, 1989  
on CRS-Counterpart Meeting
- g. Final report writing : December 1989.

#### **IV. SURVEY INSTRUMENTS**

General guidelines :

- (1) Data is collected through Indepth Interviews with individuals, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) for groups of respondents and secondary data collected from program documents.
- (2) For this purpose, the research assistant acts as :
  - a. Interviewer for individual indepth interview;
  - b. Moderator for FGD.
  - c. Copier of documents.
- (3) Respondents of the evaluation are :
  - a. CRS : - CFNDP Program Manager;  
- FNP Senior Supervisor;  
- other FNP staffs.
  - b. Counterpart : - CFNDP Coordinator;  
- FNP Officer;  
- FNP Field Supervisor;  
- other staffs.
  - c. Community : - Groups of target mothers (5-8 persons);  
- Groups of Kaders (5-8 persons);  
- Groups of community Leader (5-8 persons);  
- Health and other Governmental Officials.
- (4) The following instruments are developed as general guidance and reminders for the research assistants for conducting data collection. As a reminder, the instruments list area of managerial aspects of the program, and issues in the area to be covered during data collection. The research assistants (and the principle investigator for CRS Management) are free to develop questions to covers ail issues in the selected area. The more information can be collected the better. Reason for doing and not doing something must be searched. Other supporting information, as far as the research assistants think it will be beneficial for the evaluation should also be collected.
- (5) The "same questions" are asked at all levels. A matrix will be provided for administering content analysis of the data, for assessing managerial consistency at all levels and to relate findings across levels for diagnosing managerial capabilities and developing recommendation for improving these capabilities.

**\*\*NOTE:** Due to time constraints, the Team was unable to translate the survey instruments used for the FNP component of the evaluation from the original Indonesian. Our apologies to English-speaking readers.

### **INSTRUMEN A : MANAJEMEN CRS**

1. Manajemen Umum :
  - a. Struktur organisasi dan organogram dari CFNDP; Struktur organisasi dan organogram khusus FNP.
  - b. Deskripsi tugas dan penjabaraan tugas masing-masing kedudukan/posisi (TERTULIS/LESAN)
  - c. Mekanisme hubungan tugas antar kedudukan/posisi.
  - d. Mekanisme hubungan keluar :
    - horizontal dengan organisasi lain : pemerintah, swasta.
    - vertikal dengan counterpart.
  - e. Perubahan kebijakan program, alasan, hasil, dll. (PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION, SUSTAINING)
  - f. Permasalahan manajemen : orang, uang, barang, lain-lain. (PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION, SUSTAINING, WAKTU, WORK LOAD/ COVERAGE)
  - g. Saran perbaikan manajemen.
  - h. Persepsi tentang pendapat counterpart terhadap manajemen umum CRS.
  - i. Persepsi terhadap manajemen umum counterpart pada umumnya.
2. Penentuan target :
  - a. Kriteria penentuan counterpart : manajerial, wilayah, lapangan kerja, lain-lain.
  - b. Keputusan penentuan counterpart.
  - c. Dasar dan kriteria penentuan target keluarga di desa.
  - d. Persepsi tentang pendapat counterpart terhadap kebijakan targetting.
  - e. Persepsi tentang efektifitas penentuan target oleh counterpart.
3. Kesepakatan :
  - a. Dasar dan cara penyusunan kebijakan kesepakatan.
  - b. Kebijakan tentang isi kesepakatan.
  - c. Kebijakan tentang bentuk kesepakatan.
  - d. Kebijakan tentang sanksi pelanggaran kesepakatan, dll.
  - e. Penentuan kebijakan kesepakatan untuk keluarga sasaran.
  - f. Persepsi tentang pendapat counterpart tentang kebijakan kesepakatan.
  - g. Persepsi tentang pelaksanaan kesepakatan di tingkat counterpart.
4. Latihan :
  - a. Dasar pertimbangan jenis, sasaran dan cara latihan.
  - b. Dasar dan prosedur penyusunan modul latihan.
  - c. Persepsi tentang prosedur pelaksanaan latihan oleh counterpart.

- d. Persepsi tentang pendapat counterpart terhadap kebijakan latihan.
  - e. Persepsi tentang manajemen latihan oleh counterpart.
  - f. Persepsi tentang efektifitas materi dan prosedur latihan.
5. Penyediaan bahan makanan :
- a. Penentuan porsi dan bentuk bahan makanan.
  - b. Penentuan kaitan pemberian bahan makanan dengan tujuan dan kegiatan lain terkait.
  - c. Kebijakan dan mekanisme penyaluran bahan makanan.
  - d. Kebijakan tentang penggunaan bahan makanan.
  - e. Persepsi tentang pendapat counterpart terhadap kebijakan pembagian bahan makanan.
  - f. Persepsi tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan penerimaan, penyimpanan dan pembagian bahan makanan oleh counterpart.
6. Pendidikan gizi :
- a. Dasar dan penyusunan kaidah pendidikan gizi.
  - b. Penyusunan pesan-pesan gizi.
  - c. Penyusunan kebijakan penggunaan media.
  - d. Penyusunan metoda pendidikan gizi.
  - e. Persepsi tentang pendapat counterpart terhadap kebijakan pendidikan gizi.
  - f. Persepsi tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi dalam masyarakat : pengetahuan, perilaku, praktek.
7. Monitoring pertumbuhan
- a. Dasar pemilihan bentuk 'grading system' sebagai sistem monitoring pertumbuhan.
  - b. Kebijakan pengumpulan data monitoring pertumbuhan.
  - c. Pengolahan dan analisis data monitoring pertumbuhan
  - d. Kebijakan penyajian dan penggunaan data di semua level.
  - e. Persepsi tentang pendapat counterpart terhadap kebijakan monitoring pertumbuhan.
  - f. Persepsi tentang efektifitas dan keberhasilan 'grading system' serta masalah yang ada.
8. Supervisi dan monitoring
- a. Supervisi dan monitoring terhadap hubungan kerjasama dengan counterpart.
  - b. Kebijakan supervisi dan monitoring kesepakatan di tingkat counterpart dan di tingkat masyarakat.
  - c. Kebijakan supervisi dan monitoring kesepakatan di tingkat keluarga.
  - d. Supervisi dan monitoring kegiatan counterpart : perencanaan, pelaksanaan dan pemeliharaan program, manajemen, lain.
  - e. Supervisi dan monitoring persiapan dan pelaksanaan latihan.
  - f. Supervisi dan monitoring persiapan dan pelaksanaan pembagian bahan makanan.
  - f. Supervisi dan monitoring persiapan dan pelaksanaan monitoring pertumbuhan.
  - g. Supervisi dan monitoring persiapan dan pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi.
  - h. Persepsi tentang pendapat counterpart terhadap pelaksanaan

- supervisi dan monitoring.
- i. Persepsi tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring oleh counterpart.
9. Sistem manajemen informasi (MIS) :
- a. Kebijakan tentang data yang diperlukan semua level untuk manajemen di level-level tersebut.
  - b. Kebijakan tentang sistem pengumpulan, pengolahan dan analisis data tersebut.
  - c. Penggunaan data tersebut untuk pengambilan keputusan manajemen program.
  - d. Kesulitan aplikasi kebijakan MIS tersebut.
  - e. Persepsi tentang pendapat counterpart terhadap kebijakan MIS tersebut.
  - f. Persepsi tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan MIS tersebut.
10. Kesuksesan program :
- a. Dasar dan prosedur penyusunan indikator kesuksesan program :  
bagi CRS, bagi counterpart dan bagi masyarakat.
  - b. Kebijakan persiapan dan pelaksanaan pengukuran kesuksesan program.
  - c. Kebijakan penyusunan rencana kemandirian kegiatan dalam masyarakat.
  - d. Persiapan dan pelaksanaan upaya kemandirian kegiatan.
  - e. Persepsi tentang pendapat counterpart mengenai kesuksesan program dan kemandirian kegiatan.
  - f. Persepsi dan informasi tentang efektifitas kebijakan kesuksesan program tersebut.

## INSTRUMEN B : COUNTERPART

0. Pemahaman terhadap program :
  - a. Latar belakang FNP.
  - b. Tujuan FNP untuk counterpart.
  - c. Tujuan FNP untuk masyarakat.
  - d. Pendekatan program
  - e. Perencanaan & Pelaksanaan FNP di masyarakat.
  - f. Pen-swadayaan masyarakat
  - g. Kaitan antara FNP dengan Posyandu/Pokbang.
  
1. Manajemen Umum :
  - a. Arahan CRS mengenai manajemen umum kegiatan CFNDP.
  - b. Struktur organisasi dan organogram dari Pelaksana CFNDP dan khususnya FNP di Yayasan.  
(STRUKTUR MAKRO-MIKRO)
  - c. Deskripsi tugas dan penjabaraan tugas masing-masing kedudukan/posisi.  
(TERTULIS-LESAN)
  - d. Mekanisme (internal-eksternal, horizontal-vertikal)
  - e. Penanggung jawab pelaksanaan FNP
  - f. Penyusunan POA, perubahan POA, alasan, hasil, dll.
  - g. Komunikasi antar counterparts  
(WAKRU, PESERTA, HASIL)
  - h. Penilaian CRS mengenai pelaksanaan manajemen di tingkat counterpart.
  - i. Persepsi counterpart tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan manajemennya.
  - j. Hambatan yang dihadapi  
(WAKTU, WORKLOAD/COVERAGE, ORANG, UANG, BARANG)
  
2. Penentuan target :
  - a. Arahan CRS mengenai targetting.
  - b. Kriteria dan cara penentuan kecamatan, desa dan kelompok target :  
manajerial, wilayah, lapangan kerja, lain-lain.
  - c. Dasar, kriteria dan cara penentuan target keluarga di desa/kelompok
  - d. Kriteria prioritas lokasi/resipien  
(CALON PESERTA > PERSEDIAAN BAHAN MAKANAN).
  - e. Registrasi resipien baru
  - f. Penilaian CRS mengenai kebijakan pelaksanaan targetting yang dilakukan oleh counterpart.
  - g. Persepsi counterpart tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan targetting.
  - h. Hambatan-hambatan yang dihadapi
  
3. Kesepakatan :
  - a. Arahan CRS mengenai kesepakatan
  - b. Dasar dan cara penyusunan kesepakatan.
  - c. Isi kesepakatan.
  - d. Penuangan bentuk kesepakatan. (FORM B-01A, KARTU PESERTA)

- e. Sanksi pelanggaran kesepakatan, dll.
  - g. Penilaian CRS mengenai kesepakatan yang dibentuk oleh counterpart.
  - h. Persepsi counterpart tentang efektifitas kesepakatan.
  - i. Hambatan-hambatan yang dihadapi.
4. Latihan :
- a. Arahan CRS mengenai latihan kader.
  - b. Penyusunan rencana pelaksanaan latihan kader.
  - c. Pelaksanaan latihan kader.
  - d. Penilaian CRS tentang rencana, pelaksanaan dan efektifitas /hasil latihan yang diselenggarakan oleh counterpart
  - f. Persepsi counterpart tentang efektifitas modul, materi dan metoda latihan kader.
  - g. Hambatan-hambatan yang dihadapi
5. Penyediaan bahan makanan :
- a. Arahan CRS mengenai kebijakan pembagian bahan makanan.
  - b. Mekanisme penerimaan, penyimpanan dan pembagian bahan makanan.
  - c. Penentuan porsi dan bentuk bahan makanan.
  - d. Anjuran penggunaan bahan makanan.
  - e. Penilaian CRS terhadap pelaksanaan pembagian bahan makanan yang dijalankan oleh counterpart.
  - f. Persepsi counterpart tentang efektifitas penerimaan, penyimpanan, dan pembagian bahan makanan kepada ibu.
  - g. Besarnya biaya untuk penerimaan, penyimpanan dan pembagian bahan makanan (PEMDA, YAYASAN, MASYARAKAT)
  - h. Hambatan-hambatan yang dialami.
6. Pendidikan gizi :
- a. Arahan CRS mengenai kegiatan pendidikan gizi.
  - b. Penyusunan rencana pendidikan gizi.
  - c. Penyesuaian dan transfer pesan-pesan gizi.
  - d. Pedoman pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi.
  - e. Pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi.
  - g. Penilaian CRS terhadap pelaksanaan dan efektifitas pendidikan gizi yang dijalankan oleh counterpart.
  - h. Persepsi counterpart tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi (pengetahuan, sikap, praktek).
  - i. Hambatan-hambatan yang ditemui.
7. Monitoring pertumbuhan
- a. Arahan CRS mengenai bentuk monitoring pertumbuhan : grading system.
  - b. Pemilihan bentuk monitoring pertumbuhan, alasan. (grading system, MASTER CHART, display, dll)

- c. Kebijakan pelaksanaan pengumpulan data monitoring pertumbuhan.
  - d. Pengolahan dan analisis data monitoring pertumbuhan.
  - e. Penggunaan hasil monitoring di tingkat counterpart dan tingkat masyarakat.
  - f. Penilaian CRS tentang pelaksanaan monitoring pertumbuhan yang diselenggarakan oleh counterpart
  - g. Persepsi counterpart tentang efektivitas monitoring pertumbuhan
  - h. Hambatan-hambatan yang dihadapi
8. Supervisi dan monitoring
- a. Arahan CRS mengenai pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring kegiatan dalam masyarakat.
  - b. Mekanisme supervisi dan monitoring
  - c. Supervisi dan monitoring partisipasi target sasaran.
  - d. Supervisi dan monitoring kesepakatan dalam masyarakat.
  - e. Supervisi dan monitoring persiapan dan pelaksanaan latihan.
  - f. Supervisi dan monitoring persiapan dan pelaksanaan pembagian bahan makanan.
  - g. Supervisi dan monitoring persiapan dan pelaksanaan monitoring pertumbuhan.
  - h. Supervisi dan monitoring persiapan dan pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi.
  - i. Penilaian CRS mengenai mekanisme supervisi dan monitoring.
  - j. Persepsi counterpart tentang efektivitas pelaksanaan dan hasil supervisi dan monitoring.
  - k. Hambatan-hambatan yang dialami
9. Sistem manajemen informasi (MIS) :
- a. Arahan kebijakan CRS mengenai MIS.
  - b. Kebijakan tentang data yang diperlukan pada level counterpart dan masyarakat untuk manajemen.
  - c. Kebijakan tentang sistem pengumpulan, pengolahan dan analisis data tersebut.
  - d. Penggunaan data tersebut untuk pengambilan keputusan manajemen program.
  - e. Penilaian CRS terhadap pelaksanaan MIS.
  - f. Persepsi counterpart tentang efektivitas pelaksanaan MIS
  - g. Kesulitan aplikasi MIS .
10. Kesuksesan program
- a. Arahan CRS mengenai kebijakan penentuan kesuksesan program dan kemandirian masyarakat melaksanakan kegiatan.
  - b. Persiapan dan pelaksanaan penentuan kesuksesan program dan upaya kemandirian program dalam masyarakat.
  - c. Perkembangan program  
(DIBINA, DIMANDIRIKAN, DIHAPUSKAN)

- d. Penilaian CRS terhadap pelaksanaan penentuan dan pengarahannya kesuksesannya program yang dilakukan oleh counterpart.
- e. Persepsi counterpart tentang efektifitas sistem dan hasil upaya untuk pencapaian kesuksesan program.
- f. Hambatan-hambatan yang ditemui

CATATAN : - Yang dimaksud dengan 'masyarakat' dalam instrumen ini ialah semua pihak dalam masyarakat yang ter- libat, ialah FNP Center, Posyandu, ibu sasaran, kader, tokoh masyarakat dan petugas setempat.

### INSTRUMEN C.1 : KADER

0. Pemahaman terhadap program :
  - a. Nama-nama setempat terhadap FNP.
  - b. Tujuan FNP untuk masyarakat.
  - c. Pelaksanaan FNP di masyarakat.
  - d. Pemswadayaan program di masyarakat
  - e. Kaitan antara FNP dengan Posyandu/Pokbang.
  - f. Kaitan program dengan pembangunan di desa.
  
1. Manajemen Umum :
  - a. Arahan Yayasan mengenai pola manajemen di tingkat masyarakat : FNP Center, Posyandu, PKK-LKMD, dll.
  - b. Pelaksanaan manajemen FNP di tingkat masyarakat : FNP Center, Posyandu, PKK-LKMD, dll.
  - c. Deskripsi tugas dan penjabaraan tugas ibu sasaran, kader, PKK, LKMD, tokoh masyarakat, petugas pemerintah setempat, petugas Yayasan.
  - d. Mekanisme hubungan tugas antar kedudukan/posisi ad c.
  - e. Penyusunan rencana kegiatan.
  - f. Persepsi kader mengenai efektifitas manajemen FNP di masyarakat.
  - g. Permasalahan manajemen : orang, uang barang, lain-lain. dan saran perbaikan manajemen.
  
2. Penentuan target :
  - a. Arahan Yayasan mengenai targetting sasaran.
  - b. Cara penentuan target keluarga sasaran.
  - c. Kriteria prioritas keluarga sasaran/resipien
  - d. Registrasi resipien baru
  - e. Persepsi kader mengenai efektifitas penentuan target.
  - f. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
3. Kesepakatan :
  - a. Arahan Yayasan mengenai kesepakatan dengan target sasaran.
  - b. Penuangan bentuk kesepakatan.
  - c. Sanksi pelanggaran kesepakatan, dll.
  - d. Persepsi kader mengenai efektifitas kesepakatan.
  - e. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
4. Latihan Kader :
  - a. Arahan Yayasan mengenai isi dan pelaksanaan latihan kader.
  - b. Deskripsi pelaksanaan latihan kader.
  - c. Pengetahuan kader tentang isi modul latihan (pertanyaan-pertanyaan teknis!).
  - d. Persepsi kader tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan latihan kader.
  - e. Permasalah yang dihadapi.
  
5. Penyediaan bahan makanan :
  - a. Arahan Yayasan mengenai kebijakan penerimaan, penyimpanan dan pembagian bahan makanan di tingkat masyarakat.
  - b. Penentuan porsi dan bentuk bahan makanan.

- c. Anjuran penggunaan bahan makanan.
  - d. Biaya yang harus ditanggung masyarakat/resipien
  - f. Persepsi kader mengenai efektifitas penerimaan, penyimpanan dan pembagian bahan makanan.
  - g. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
6. Pendidikan gizi :
- a. Arahan Yayasan mengenai kegiatan pendidikan gizi.
  - b. Penyusunan rencana pendidikan gizi.
  - c. Pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi.
  - d. Persepsi kader mengenai efektifitas metoda dan pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi.
  - e. Pengetahuan kader mengenai isi modul pendidikan gizi (pertanyaan-pertanyaan teknis!).
  - f. Permasalahan yang dihadapi
7. Monitoring pertumbuhan :
- a. Arahan Yayasan mengenai bentuk monitoring pertumbuhan : sistem nilai.
  - b. Kaitan dan perbandingan antara sistem nilai dengan sistem naik berat badan.
  - c. Pelaksanaan pengumpulan data monitoring pertumbuhan.
  - d. Pengolahan data monitoring pertumbuhan dalam masyarakat.
  - e. Penggunaan data hasil pengolahan dalam masyarakat.
  - f. Persepsi kader mengenai efektifitas penggunaan sistem nilai dalam masyarakat.
  - g. Permasalahan yang dihadapi
8. Supervisi dan monitoring
- a. Arahan Yayasan mengenai pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring bagi sasaran kegiatan dalam masyarakat.
  - b. Pelaksanaan supervisi kegiatan kader oleh petugas Yayasan.
  - c. Pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring kader terhadap partisipasi target sasaran.
  - d. Pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring kader terhadap kesepakatan dalam masyarakat.
  - e. Pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring kader terhadap pembagian bahan makanan
  - f. Pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring kader terhadap dampak pendidikan gizi di kalangan masyarakat/target sasaran
  - g. Permasalahan yang dihadapi,
9. Sistem Informasi Manajemen (MIS) :
- a. Arahan kebijakan Yayasan tentang jenis dan arus informasi yang diperlukan untuk manajemen program.
  - b. Cara-cara pengumpulan, pengolahan dan analisis informasi tersebut.
  - d. Penggunaan data tersebut untuk pengambilan keputusan manajemen program
  - e. Persepsi tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan MIS tersebut.
  - f. Kesulitan yang dihadapi dalam mengaplikasikan MIS.

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10. Kesuksesan program :

- a. Arahan Yayasan mengenai penentuan kesuksesan program dan upaya kemandirian program.
- b. Persiapan dan pelaksanaan penentuan kesuksesan program dan upaya kemandirian program.
- c. Persepsi kader mengenai efektivitas pencapaian kesuksesan program/upaya kemandirian program.
- d. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.

**INSTRUMEN C2 : TOKOH MASYARAKAT**  
(Pamong, LKMD, PKK, non-formal)

0. Pemahaman terhadap program :
  - a. Nama-nama setempat terhadap FNP.
  - b. Tujuan FNP untuk masyarakat.
  - c. Pelaksanaan FNP di masyarakat.
  - d. Kaitan FNP dengan Posyandu/Pokbang.
  - e. Kaitan program dengan pembangunan di desa.
  
1. Manajemen Umum :
  - a. Pelaksanaan manajemen FNP di tingkat masyarakat.
  - b. Deskripsi tugas dan penjabaraan tugas ibu sasaran, kader, PKK, LKMD, pamong, tokoh masyarakat, petugas pemerintah setempat, petugas Yayasan.
  - c. Mekanisme hubungan tugas antar kedudukan/posisi ad c.
  - d. Penyusunan rencana kegiatan.
  - e. Persepsi tokoh masyarakat (TOMA) mengenai efektifitas manajemen FNP di tingkat masyarakat.
  - f. Permasalahan manajemen ( orang, uang barang, lain-lain) serta saran perbaikan manajemen.
  
2. Penentuan target :
  - a. Cara penentuan target keluarga sasaran.
  - b. Pendapat TOMA mengenai pelaksanaan targetting.
  - c. Persepsi TOMA mengenai efektifitas penentuan target program.
  - d. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
3. Kesepakatan :
  - a. Pelaksanaan kesepakatan.
  - b. Sanksi pelanggaran kesepakatan, dll.
  - c. Persepsi TOMA mengenai kesepakatan dan pelaksanaannya.
  - d. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
4. Latihan :
  - a. Persepsi TOMA mengenai pelaksanaan latihan kader.
  - b. Persepsi TOMA mengenai efektivitas latihan kader.
  - c. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
5. Penyediaan bahan makanan :
  - a. Cara, porsi, waktu dan bentuk pembagian bahan makanan.
  - b. Persepsi tentang manfaat bahan makanan.
  - c. Pendapat TOMA mengenai penggunaan bahan makanan.
  - d. Persepsi TOMA mengenai efektifitas cara dan hasil pembagian bahan makanan.
  - e. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
6. Pendidikan gizi :
  - a. Penyusunan rencana pendidikan gizi.
  - b. Pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi.
  - c. Pendapat TOMA mengenai pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi.
  - d. Persepsi TOMA mengenai efektifitas cara dan hasil pendidikan gizi.
  - e. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.

7. Monitoring pertumbuhan

- a. Pelaksanaan pengumpulan data monitoring pertumbuhan : sistem nilai.
- b. Pengolahan data monitoring pertumbuhan dalam masyarakat.
- c. Penggunaan data hasil pengolahan dalam masyarakat.
- d. Pendapat TOMA mengenai pelaksanaan monitoring pertumbuhan.
- e. Persepsi TOMA mengenai efektifitas pelaksanaan monitoring pertumbuhan.
- f. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.

8. Supervisi dan monitoring

- a. Pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring kader dan tokoh masyarakat terhadap partisipasi target sasaran.
- b. Supervisi dan monitoring kader dan tokoh masyarakat terhadap kesepakatan dalam masyarakat.
- c. Pendapat TOMAS mengenai pelaksanaan monitoring kegiatan.
- d. Persepsi TOMA mengenai efektifitas pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring.
- e. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.

9. Sistem manajemen informasi (MIS) :

- a. Informasi yang diperlukan pada level masyarakat untuk manajemen.
- b. Cara-cara pengumpulan, pengolahan dan analisis informasi tersebut.
- c. Penggunaan data tersebut untuk pengambilan keputusan manajemen program dalam masyarakat.
- d. Persepsi TOMA tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan MIS
- e. Kesulitan yang dihadapi dalam meng-aplikasi MIS.

10. Kesuksesan program

- a. Pendapat tentang kesuksesan program dan kemandirian program
- b. Persiapan dan pelaksanaan penentuan kesuksesan program dan upaya kemandirian program dalam masyarakat.
- c. Pendapat TOMA mengenai kesuksesan program/upaya kemandirian program..
- d. Persepsi TOMA mengenai efektifitas pencapaian tujuan kesuksesan program.
- e. Permasalahn yang dihadapi.

CATATAN :

- Yang dimaksud dengan 'petugas' dalam instrumen ini ialah petugas kesehatan dan sektor lain setempat, yang terlibat kegiatan FNP.
- Sumber informasi : tokoh masyarakat (formal dan non-formal) dalam FGD.

### INSTRUMEN C.3 : IBU-IBU SASARAN

0. Pemahaman terhadap program :
  - a. Nama-nama setempat terhadap FNP.
  - b. Tujuan FNP untuk masyarakat.
  - c. Pelaksanaan FNP di masyarakat.
  - d. Kaitan FNP dengan Posyandu/Pokbang.
  
1. Penentuan target :
  - a. Pendapat mengenai cara penentuan target keluarga sasaran.  
(CALON PESERTA>PERSEDIAAN, DASAR KEPERSERTAAN)
  - b. Persepsi ibu mengenai efektifitas penentuan target (orang, waktu, tempat).
  - c. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
2. Kesepakatan :
  - a. Pendapat mengenai kesepakatan.  
(BEMTUK, PELAKSANAAN, SANKSI)
  - b. Pendapat ibu mengenai kesepakatan.
  - c. Persepsi ibu mengenai efektifitas kesepakatan di antara target.
  - d. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
3. Latihan :
  - a. Pendapat ibu mengenai pelaksanaan latihan kader.
  - b. Persepsi ibu mengenai efektifitas hasil latihan kader terhadap pengetahuan dan ketrampilan kader.
  - c. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
5. Penyediaan bahan makanan :
  - a. Pendapat ibu mengenai jumlah, waktu dan cara pembagian bahan makanan.
  - b. Pendapat ibu mengenai 'harga' yang harus dibayar ibu.  
(BARANG, UANG, TENAGA. WAKTU)
  - c. Manfaat pembagian bahan makanan : segera, jangka panjang.
  - d. Pengguna bahan makanan
  - e. Persepsi ibu mengenai efektifitas pembagian bahan makanan.
  - f. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
6. Pendidikan gizi :
  - a. Pendapat ibu mengenai konsep dan pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi.
  - b. Persepsi ibu mengenai efektifitas hasil pendidikan gizi : pengetahuan, sikap dan praktek (Pertanyaan-pertanyaan teknis!).
  - c. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.

7. Monitoring pertumbuhan
  - a. Pemahaman mengenai monitoring pertumbuhan.  
(sistem nilai : pertanyaan teknis anak sendiri!)
  - b. Persepsi ibu mengenai efektifitas hasil monitoring dengan sistem nilai : terhadap keluarga sendiri dan masyarakat pada umumnya.
  - c. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
8. Supervisi dan monitoring
  - a. Pendapat ibumengenai pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring partisipasi ibu dalam kegiatan program.
  - b. Persepsi ibu mengenai efektifitas hasil supervisi dan monitoring.
  - c. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
9. Sistem manajemen informasi (MIS) :
  - a. Informasi yang diperlukan pada level keluarga.
  - b. Cara-cara mendapatkan informasi tersebut.
  - c. Penggunaan data tersebut untuk pengambilan keputusan keluarga.
  - d. Kesulitan yang dialami dalam meng-aplikasi cara tersebut.
10. Kesuksesan program
  - a. Pendapat ibu tentang kesuksesan dan kemandirian program : makna dan manfaatnya bagi masyarakat.
  - b. Persepsi ibu mengenai efektifitas pelaksanaan upaya pencapaian kesuksesan program.
  - c. Kesulitan yang dihadapi.

CATATAN :

- Yang dimaksud dengan 'petugas' dalam instrumen ini ialah petugas kesehatan dan sektor lain setempat, yang terlibat kegiatan FNP.
- TOMA = tokoh masyarakat (formal/non-formal).
- Sumber informasi : ibu-ibu sasaran dalam FGD.

**INSTRUMEN C.4 : PETUGAS PEMERINTAH**  
(khususnya : Petugas Puskesmas)

0. Pemahaman terhadap program :
  - a. Nama-nama setempat terhadap FNP.
  - b. Tujuan FNP untuk masyarakat.
  - c. Pelaksanaan/pendekatan FNP di masyarakat.
  - d. Kaitan antara FNP dengan Posyandu/Pokbang.
  - e. Kaitan program FNP dengan pelayanan kesehatan di wilayah.
  
1. Manajemen Umum :
  - a. Pelaksanaan manajemen FNP di tingkat masyarakat, dikaitkan dengan program-program pemerintah dalam bidang yang sama.
  - b. Deskripsi tugas dan penjabaraan tugas ibu sasaran, kader, pamong, LKMD, PKK, tokoh masyarakat, petugas pemerintah setempat (Puskesmas) , petugas Yayasan.
  - c. Mekanisme hubungan tugas antar kedudukan/posisi ad c.
  - d. Permasalahan manajemen : orang, uang barang, lain-lain. dan saran perbaikan manajemen.
  
2. Penentuan target :
  - a. Cara penentuan target keluarga sasaran.
  - b. Pendapat petugas mengenai prioritas targetting
  - c. Persepsi petugas mengenai efektifitas pencapaian tujuan targetting.
  - d. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
3. Kesepakatan :
  - a. Pendapat petugas mengenai pelaksanaan kesepakatan.
  - b. Persepsi petugas mengenai efektifitas pencapaian tujuan kesepakatan.
  - c. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
4. Latihan :
  - a. Persepsi petugas tentang modul latihan bagi kader FNP, dibanding dengan modul latihan kader Posyandu pada umumnya.
  - b. Deskripsi pelaksanaan latihan kader.
  - c. Persepsi petugas mengenai efektifitas pelaksanaan dan hasil latihan kader.
  - d. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
  
5. Penyediaan bahan makanan :
  - a. Pendapat petugas mengenai manfaat pembagian bahan makanan.
  - b. Pendapat petugas mengenai penentuan porsi dan bentuk bahan makanan.
  - c. Persepsi petugas mengenai efektifitas pelaksanaan dan hasil pembagian bahan makanan.
  - d. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.

6. Pendidikan gizi :
  - a. Pendapat petugas mengenai modul pendidikan gizi.
  - b. Pendapat petugas mengenai penyusunan rencana pendidikan gizi.
  - c. Deskripsi pelaksanaan pendidikan gizi.
  - d. Persepsi petugas mengenai efektifitas pelaksanaan dan hasil pendidikan gizi.
  - e. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
7. Monitoring pertumbuhan :
  - a. Pemahaman mengenai sistem nilai sebagai cara lain monitoring pertumbuhan, dibandingkan dengan sistem SKDN.
  - b. Pelaksanaan pengumpulan data monitoring pertumbuhan, dibandingkan dengan sistem SKDN.
  - c. Pengolahan data monitoring pertumbuhan dalam masyarakat.
  - d. Penggunaan data hasil pengolahan dalam masyarakat.
  - e. Persepsi petugas mengenai efektifitas pelaksanaan dan hasil sistem nilai.
  - f. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
8. Supervisi dan monitoring
  - a. Pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring petugas Puskesmas dan petugas Yayasan terhadap kader.
  - b. Pelaksanaan supervisi dan monitoring kader terhadap partisipasi target sasaran.
  - c. Supervisi dan monitoring kader dan petugas terhadap kesepakatan dalam masyarakat.
  - d. Persepsi petugas mengenai efektifitas supervisi dan monitoring kader dan TOMA terhadap pendidikan gizi.
  - e. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.
9. Sistem manajemen informasi (MIS) :
  - a. Informasi yang diperlukan pada level Puskesmas dan masyarakat untuk manajemen.
  - b. Cara-cara pengumpulan, pengolahan dan analisis informasi tersebut.
  - c. Penggunaan data tersebut untuk pengambilan keputusan manajemen program.
  - d. Persepsi petugas tentang efektifitas pelaksanaan MIS
  - e. Kesulitan yang dihadapi meng-aplikasi MIS.
10. Kesuksesan program :
  - a. Pendapat tentang kesuksesan program dan upaya kemandirian program.
  - b. Persiapan dan pelaksanaan penentuan kesuksesan program dan kemandirian program.
  - c. Pendapat petugas tentang efektifitas sistem dan pencapaian sasaran kesuksesan program
  - d. Permasalahan yang dihadapi.

# Evaluation Methodology: IGA Component

## 1. OBJECTIVES

Although it may be premature to evaluate the IGA program (UP2K) because implementation of the program is still in the early stages in many counterparts, its importance in the overall CFNDP strategy required that a first step be taken to assess its current impact and future potential.

In general the objective of the IGA evaluation is to see well the existing system will be able to collect community funds to finance village nutrition activities and to see whether this system is capable of actually increasing family incomes.

In particular the evaluation has the objectives of:


- a. To identify factors which can influence activities to collect community funds to finance the village nutrition activities on a sustained basis.
- b. To gain a concrete picture of the forms of activity developed by the community (either individually or through UB) which have a direct impact on increases of family income.
- c. To gain a more complete picture of UB development patterns in various community categories.
- d. To obtain prospective picture on the IGA activities in the future, its relationships and the continuity of its activities.
- e. To assess the current and future effectiveness of existing methods for UB funds collection which make it possible for the community to self-reliantly finance its FNP activities.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

### A. System Evaluation

The success of IGA program is influenced by a working system which consists of several components (sub systems), they are: The policy makers, which consist of the CRS Management and Staff; program executors, including Counterpart Management and Staff, which consists of Director, IGA Manager, Field Workers; and participants, i.e. UB Management and members. Outside of the above system, the following actors are also assumed to have influence over IGA - they are: the parties related to Posyandu and UPGK development, the Village Government and the Community Figures around the UB members's residence.

The first side of the study assesses to the degree of consistency in policy and strategy among CRS and its counterparts and the ability of counterparts to adapt the IGA strategy in the field. Included in this is the assessment of actual UB activities as a measure of how well strategy has been translated into concrete activities. This is essentially a "formative evaluation" approach. The Second side is to assess the development of capabilities of implementation mechanisms at each level, including the decision making processes. The third side assesses the impact of the program on changes in participant incomes (summative evaluation). This is done by comparing income sources and amounts at the time a member joins an UB to their condition at present. Without putting aside the influence of external factors, it is assumed that the IGA program has a strong influence towards the changes in income. The other program impact which will be assessed is the development of the UB either qualitatively or quantitatively. In a simple way the process above can be summarized as follows:



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## B. Respondents

As described above, the data sources consist of several categories, they are:

- a. Written data sources, in the forms of project documents, terms of reference, UP2K manual book, UP2K training manual book, reports and UB profile data.
- b. Information sources (primary data), consist of:

### Main:

- CRS Staff
  - Management and Staff of Counterparts's Institution
  - Management and Members of UB
- ### Supporting
- Posyandu Organizers and Village Apparatus
  - Community Figures

The sources originated from the UB Management and Staff were selected using a stratified random sampling method. With this method, it is expected that representativeness of the data will be more guaranteed. In the first stage sample an inventory was carried out by using the lists and the data base of CRS. In the second stage, the Team worked with CRS staff to determine the UB classification indicators to become group A, B and C. Due to the fact that not all indicators could be provided by CRS, final sampling decisions were made in the field after having received inputs from Counterparts. In the third stage, the UB member sample was selected at random within the UBs selected as respondents. The UB classification indicators and samples selected were as follows:

Category	Routine Meeting	Loan/Savings	Productive Activity
A	Routinely held and attended by more than 75% of the members	Obligatory savings paid more than 90%	Starting to develop productive activity
B	Routinely held and attended by 50-75% of the members	Obligatory savings routinely paid and have been settled between 60-90%	Productive activity not yet developed
C	Not routinely held and attended by less than 50% of the members	Obligatory savings paid for less than 60%	Productive activity not yet developed

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Based on the above indicators, respondents of study are determined as follows:

Category	Lampung	Maumere	Cilacap/ Klaten
A	Sidodadi, Lampung Utara Melati, Lam- pung Selatan	Bakalikat, Kopeta Blukung Bla- pig Kopeta Tarutot Koting B Tokejun, Kewapantai Dopodete, Lela	Teratau Merah, Cilacap Selatan Melati I, Bayat Kasih Ibu I, Klaten Selatan Setyoarum, Prambanan
B	Rukun Sentosa Abang Timur	Bukit Tunggai Kopeta	Roro Mendut, Cilacap Selatan Rukun Sentosa, Kemalang Palar III, Trucuk
C	Mekarsari II, Lampung Utara	Maderebo, Siosina Nyiur Biru, Kopeta	Ayahnda, Cilacap Selatan Palar IV, Trucuk
Individual Respondents (UB members)	25	42	67
Community Figures, Village Admi- nistrators etc.	3	11	4
CRS Staff (2) Counterpart Ma- nagement & Staff	3	5	5

Data collection was carried out with individual interviews using questionnaires, group discussions, as well as Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA). In addition in-depth interviews were carried out with CRS Staff, Counterpart Management and Staff as well as Community Figures.

### C. Processing and Data Analysis

Primary data collection was carried out by 5 researchers. Two working in Lampung, two in Maumere and three in Cilacap/Klaten. In-depth interviews and RRA were carried out by the IGA Research Coordinator for the three study locations. Data processing was carried out by Team using computers. In the first stage, cross-checking of data was carried out, in which researchers checked other researcher's working results. In the second stage, tabulations were made, either single or cross tabulations. The data processing and analyses were carried out as an integrated process. The data utilized originated not only from questionnaires, but also from researchers' daily notes and observation results.

D. SURVEY INSTRUMENTS: IGA COMPONENT

UB-FNP BASIC DATA

1. UB Name :
2. Complete Address:
3. Management :
  - a. Number of management staff: persons.
  - b. Personnel, position and duty :
    - 1) Chairman :  
Duty :
    - 2) Secretary :  
Duty :
    - 3) Financial Staff :  
Duty :
    - 4) ..... :  
Duty :
    - 5) ..... :  
Duty :
4. Date of establishment :
5. Membership :
  - a. During establishment: persons. Consists of ...male/female
  - b. Currently : persons. Consists of ...male/female

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Interviewer :  
Place and date of interview : House of :  
Hamlet :  
Village :  
Subdistrict:  
Regency :  
Province :  
Date : time up to  
Form of interview : individual/discussion with ...  
persons.

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1. From where did you get the information about UB-FNP organization for the first time ?
  - a. From a friend who has establishing an UB in other place
  - b. From the office of Village/Institution/Church/
  - c. Directed by Cadre/Supervisor
  - d. Community Figure
2. What is your consideration, so you think it is necessary to establish/form an UB-FNP ?
  - a. To find an opportunity to associate with fellow citizens who have same interests.
  - b. To have a place to solve the problems together with mutual cooperation, especially the ones related to FNP.
  - c. To have opportunity to get organizational training or to form a group.

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- d. To make it easier to get assistance from other Financial Foundation/Institutions.
- e. Directed (compulsory) by the officer in charge.
- f. other...

3. By seeing the information and consideration above, who is the initiator for the UB establishment ?

- a. Mrs. ... (individual).
- b. Initiative of some people (discussion group).
- c. Cadre/Motivator/Foundation office
- d. Other party ... (specify)

4. In order to clarify the process of the UB establishment, could you please describe this process.

5. What is the process of electing the management, and what are the criteria/requirements for it ? Please describe.

- a. Requirements for management staff candidate:
  - Chairman :
  - Secretary :
  - Financial Staff :
  - Others :

b. The process for electing the management staff:

6. Is there any formulation of duty and responsibility for management staff ?

- a. No  
Why
- b. Yes  
Please explain briefly.

Chairman, her duty and responsibility  
 Secretary, her duty and responsibility  
 Financial Staff, her duty and responsibility

7. Is there any other body whose duty is to control/supervise the activity of the management ?

- a. Yes
  - 1) What is it? Please describe the process of this institutions establishment and its personnel requirements.
  - 2) What are its duties and responsibilities, relation to the UB?

b. No.  
If there is not any, who is supervising this activity ?

8. In your opinion, are UB management currently effective, skilled and collaborating well in managing the UB ?

- a. Yes.  
Explanation:

- b. No, still have to be improved.  
In what way:
9. What is the procedure for someone who wants to become and UB member, is there any criterion/special requirement for said candidate ?
- a. Yes.  
Criteria :  
Requirements:  
Procedure :
- b. No.  
Because
10. If a member deviates from existing regulations, is there any sanction, and how is the implementation ?
11. What is the total and how is the development of the members of UB here ?
- 1st year : ... persons  
2nd year : ... persons  
3rd year : ... persons  
4th year (89) : ... persons
12. What are the forms of activity developed by UB and how is its development from time to time ?

Type of activity	1st yr.	2nd yr.	3rd yr.	4th yr.
------------------	---------	---------	---------	---------

- |   |       |       |       |       |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1. Routine meeting, held every ... days, attendance ... % | ... % | ... % | ... % | ... % |
| 2. Loan and savings                                       |       |       |       |       |
| 3. Productive business                                    |       |       |       |       |
| 4. Other activities                                       |       |       |       |       |
| 5. ...  |       |       |       |       |
| 6. ...  |       |       |       |       |
13. In developing its activities, do you feel there is any obstacle/problem ?
- a. No, everything goes well.
- b. Yes, they are:
- For routine meeting activity :
  - For loan and savings activity :
  - For productive business activity :
  - For other activities (.....):
14. To solve problem stated above, what have been done by/to be done by UB, among others are:
- a. To carry out special effort ( ..... ) to make the member realize.
- b. UB Consolidation or reorganization.
- c. To make the routine meeting and the guidance of Cadre/Supervisor more effective
- d. To request for other party's assistance, i.e.
- e. other...
- f. Do not know.

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15. Please describe the loan and savings activity its development.
- a. The situation of own capital and outside capital from 1st year until 4th year.

Description	Amount (Rp.)				
	1st yr	2nd yr	3rd yr	4th yr	Total
1. Basic savings					
2. Obligatory savings					
3. Voluntary savings					
4. Savings ...					
5. SHU not distributed					
-----					
Total of own capital					
-----					
6. Loans from Counterpart					
7. Aid/loan from other party					
Total outside capital					
Total UB capital					

- b. Turnover of loan and savings activity from 1st to 4th year

Year	No. of members served	Turnover (Rp.)	P/L (Rp.)	Remarks
1	(...)			
2	(...)			
3	(...)			
4	(...)			
Total				

16. Besides the loan and savings activity has UB developed productive activity stated above to increase the UB income ?

a. No.

Why?

- = Do not not how to manage it well
- = The members do not want it
- = Fear for losing, while using the capital of many people/savings
- = Other
- = No comment

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- b. Yes.  
 What kind of business ?  
 = Business/Industry/Processing/Production  
 = Trading/small shop  
 = Cattle breeding  
 = Other
17. What is your (Management) experience in managing the Group's productive business ?  
 a. Easy, ...  
 b. Difficult, there are a lot of problems/ obstacles, such as:  
 = Difficult to arrange time due to the household's problems.  
 = Carried out as side job, as a consequence cannot compete with other businesses.  
 = Carried out in improper way, so profits are low/negative.  
 = Difficult in supervising and control  
 = Other
18. How was this type of productive business in UB chosen ?  
 a. Determined based on the agreement of the members.  
 b. Based on simple feasibility analyses.  
 c. Determined "just like that"  
 d. Based on the advise of other party  
 e. Other
19. Since when was this UB productive activity started ?  
 a. this year  
 b. 2 years ago  
 c. more than 2 years ago
20. Has there been a profit or a loss?  
 1st year Rp.  
 2nd year Rp.  
 3rd year Rp.
21. What factors are influencing the profit/loss of the UB group business?  
 a. The improper management (incidental management only, no particular officer in charge, management not clear)  
 b. No skills  
 c. Insufficient capital  
 d. Competition with other businesses  
 e. Properly Managed  
 g. Skill in production  
 h. Sufficient capital  
 i. Other
22. Compared to loan and savings activities, does the UB productive activity make more profit ?  
 a. Yes  
 Comparison is as follows:

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Description	Capital (Rp.)	Margin (Rp. and %)
-------------	---------------	--------------------

- |                        |  |   |
|------------------------|--|---|
| 1. Loan and savings    |  | % |
| 2. Productive business |  | % |
| = small shop           |  | % |
| = production           |  | % |
| = Cattle breeding      |  | % |
| = Other                |  | % |

b. No.  
Comparison is as follows:

Description	Capital (Rp.)	Margin (Rp. and %)
-------------	---------------	--------------------

- |                        |  |   |
|------------------------|--|---|
| 1. Loan and savings    |  | % |
| 2. Productive business |  | % |
| = small shop           |  | % |
| = Production           |  | % |
| = Cattle breeding      |  | % |

23. Besides loan and savings activity and productive business stated above, is there any other business which can give additional business capital ?

1. Yes  
What kind  
From this activity, fund collection each month  
Rp. .... and one year about Rp. ...

2. No  
Because

24. Besides visits of extension by counterpart Cadre/Field Workers and soft loans, does the UB receive other assistance/guidance from other Counterpart?

- a. No  
Why ?  
= Never submit any request  
= No knowledge of Counterpart guidance program
- b. Yes, in the form of:  
= Training  
= Assistance to small businesses  
= Marketing assistance  
= Assistance for supply of raw/supporting materials  
= Improvement of skills

25. Are there any Statutes and Articles of Association in UB ?

- a. Yes  
Said Statutes/Art. of Association:  
a) made by ourselves  
b) using the model drafted by CRS  
c) combination between CRS model and member's discussion

- b. No
  - Because
  - a) we cannot make it
  - b) do not know the use of it
  - c) do not know

26. What kind of books/administration are used to control UB activity ?

Type of book	Used	Unused	Remarks
-----			
a. Organizationadministration:			
1) members list book			
2) meeting's minutes			
3) activity book			
b. Financial administration			
1) daily cash book			
2) monthly cash recapitulation book			
3) column balance			
4) final balance and profit/loss			
c. Others:			
1) Visitors book			
2) Idea book			
3) ...			
4) ...			

27. Is there any particular hope from UB management as to Counterpart guidance ?

- a. Yes
  - = Related to assistance/guidance of program:
  - = Related to capital assistance:
  - = Related to business development (marketing material supply etc)
  - = Other
- b. If no, why not?

28. Is there any UB known by you which is guided by other Foundations in this area ?

- a. Yes, ...
  - guided by ...
- b. No ...

29. Compared to your UB, does this UB have advantages ?

- a. No
- b. Do not know
- c. Yes
  - = Close relations between the members in UB
  - = To have roots in community and Government
  - = Its functional activity
  - = Growing Faster
  - = The management is better
  - = Other

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30. What is your opinion on UB support to the Posyandu??

a. Agree

How ?

= By separating part of UB profit (15%) which is collected for the Posyandu. If this is done, in one year Rp. ... can be collected.

The requirement for financing the Posyandu is estimated at Rp. ... per year.

So it is more/less Rp. ...

If less, what kind of effort is to be carried out by UB Management ?

=Other method

b. Do not agree

Reason

## GROUP DISCUSSION MANUAL

1. Participants: Management (particularly) and members of UB-FNP

2. Objectives:

a. To get their collective picture, vision (hope) and perception towards UB and the activity to increase the family income in order to enable to finance UB activity for family nutrition improvement.

b. To develop ideas for the possibilities to develop the productive activities in UB or for individuals (members of UB), regarding:

= identifying the local resources:

- nature (raw materials, empty land, water etc)
- existing productive skill
- marketing possibilities and competitors
- skill sources close to location
- purchase power of community as target consumer candidates
- possibility of having assistance from agency or other foundation

= identifying the level of interest re. business and entrepreneurship in general:

- description of their interest and spirit
- interested in what field? (trading/small shop, home industry, cattle breeding, fishery, agricultural/estate, etc)

c. To formulate the feasible productive business to be developed in certain location, in line with the above matters:

= what type or form of the business

= make economic feasibility analyses (market absorption, selling price, process/production price, profit/loss, requirement of capital/loan etc).

3. Discussion Process:

- 3.1. It is best for the meetings to be opened by the UB Chairman and make effort to attend the meeting and to give explanation on TPL LPSM (Counterparts) and Cadres
- 3.2. Explain on the aim of this discussion
- 3.3. If you think discussion will be more effective under your guidance, offer to lead the discussion yourself
- 3.4. Note down completely who gives ideas or discussion conclusions

4. After the close of discussion, please confirm your conclusions with the participants. Is there anything not recorded? If everything is clear, ask the UB Chairman to sign the minutes.

RESPONDENT'S PERSONAL DATA

- 1. Name : .....
- 2. Address : .....
- 3. Occupation : .....
- 3.1. Main : .....
- 3.2. Side : .....
- 3.3. Additional) : .....
- 4. Age : ..... years
- 5. Sex : Male / Female \*)
- 6. Position in : Member / Management staff (Chairman, UB  
- FNP Secretary, Treasurer,  
.....) \*)
- 7. Since when : Member of UB, since .....  
holding the Management staff of UB, since .....  
position of

Interviewer : .....

Place / Date of : Hamlet .....  
interview Village.....  
Subdistrict.....  
Date.....  
Hour.....up to .....

- 1. From where did you get the information about UB-FNP organization for the first time ?
  - a. From friend, other Posyandu participant
  - b. From the office of village/institution/church/.....
  - c. Persuaded by Cadre
  - d. ....
- 2. What do you know about UB-FNP ?
  - a. Integral part of Posyandu
  - b. Means to obtain food-aid, family nutrition improvement, milk etc.
  - c. A kind of Cooperative .....
  - d. ....
- 3. Since when have you been active in the Posyandu the UB? ?
 

	Active in Posyandu	Became UB member
a. Year	1970 - 1975	1970 - 1975
b. Year	1976 - 1980	1976 - 1980
c. Year	1981 - 1985	1981 - 1985
d. Year	1986 - 1989	1986 - 1989
- 4. What factor made you interested in becoming an UB member ?
  - a. Forced / directed by Posyandu organizers
  - b. Promised to be given support
  - c. Believed that UB is a proper means for self-development and family problems solution
  - d. ....

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5. After you become a UB member, is the first image of UB as you mentioned previously proved to be true ?
  - a. Yes  
It is seen from .....
  - b. No, because obviously UB is .....
  - c. Between yes and no, because .....
  - d. Do not know
  
6. How is your participation a UB member ?
  - a. As a passive member (just paying the savings)
  - b. As an active member (attending meetings, paying savings, using the credits etc.)
  - c. Quite good
  - d. Do not know
  
7. How much money do you have in your savings in UB ?
 

a. Basic savings	Rp. ....
b. Obligatory savings	Rp. ....
c. Voluntary savings	Rp. ....
d. Other savings	Rp. ....
-----	
Total	Rp. ....

  - e. Do not know
  
8. Have you ever taken credit (loan) from UB ?
  - a. Yes, ... times, each for the amount of:
  - b. No, because
    - 1) Do not know how
    - 2) Not needed
    - 3) Fear of its repayment risks
    - 4) Other
  
9. If you have ever taken loans, how did you use this credit ?
  - a. To improve the family nutrition quality (consumed)
  - b. To purchase household utensils (consumed/investment)
  - c. Other consumption
  - d. For working capital/business
  - e. Do not know
  
10. What is your opinion on the credit given by UB-FNP ?
  - a. The total is between Rp. ... up to Rp. ...
    - 1). Too small
    - 2). Quite good
    - 3) Too big
  - b. Period (... months up to ... months):
    - 1) Too long
    - 2) Quite good
    - 3) Too short
  - c. Procedures:
    - 1) Easy
    - 2) Normal
    - 3) Complicated and difficult

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d. Interest (... % up to ... % monthly):

- 1) Too high
- 2) Quite good
- 3) Too low
- 4) Do not know

11. After receiving the credit to develop your business activity. what kind of business do you have?

From this activity how much money do you have to increase your income Rp. ... monthly.

12. To make it more clear, please describe your occupation and your family income before and after you are active in this UB activity.

Note	Condition		Change
	Before	After	
-----			
a. Occupation:			
1) Husband			
2) Wife (I)			
3) Other family members			
b. Income:			
1) Husband			
2) Wife (I)			
3) Other family members			
c. Property ownership:			
1) Land & house			
2) Household utensils			
3) Others			
-----			

13. In order to develop the business, have you ever received assistance from other parties?

a. Yes  
From .....

- 1) BRI/BKK/Village Office
  - 2) Other LPSM
  - 3) Other party besides  
1) and 2)
- b. No

14. By looking at your success in developing small business stated above, what factor is influencing the development ?

- a. Own Desire/Spirit
- b. Encouragement from other party (Cadre/Builder)
- c. Market situation
- d. Others

15. When you use the credit for business capital, is there any obstacle/difficulty ?

a. Yes

State the difficulty:

b. No

c. Do not know

16. To overcome the problems stated above, what have you done to solve these problems:

a. To overcome by myself

By way of

b. To ask for other party's assistance

By way of

c. Do not try to overcome

Reason

d. Do not know

17. If credit given by the UB is not used for business and used more for consumption, what is the reason :

a. To improve the family nutrition and food, because the quality of our food is not good.

b. To complete our urgently needed household requirements

c. Do not know how.

d. Do not know what type of business is able to make profit.

e. Fear of failure risks (loss)

f. Other...

18. In your case, if a working capital credit is given by UB, do you want it to be developed or to redeveloped ?

a. No

Because

b. Yes

I would like to develop the business of...

For this purpose, the initial preparation which will be carried out by me to make the business plan a success is ...

19. By looking at the UB activity and the management activity, what is your opinion ?

a. Good, they are capable to work according to their function

b. Quite good

c. Not so good, not according to the members's expectation

d. Do not know

Note:

20. How is your sense of belonging to your UB

21. If you have a sense of belonging to your UB, what is your opinion on:

a. For member, for the UB progress ?

1) Active to attend the members meeting

2) Active to visit Posyandu

3) Active to fulfil obligations:

a) To implement Statutes/Articles of Associations

- b) To pay savings
  - c) To implement FNP according to the stipulations
  - d) To be responsible for the risks of UB development
  - b. Your expectations related to UB:
    - 1) Yes, there is.  
Among others is in the form of:
    - 2) No, there is nothing.  
Because
    - 3) Do not know
22. To make progress for your UB, what do you think has to be done ?
- a. Related to the Management.
    - 1) Yes, there is.  
In the form of:
    - 2) No, there is nothing.  
Because
  - b. Related to the members.
    - 1) Yes, there is.  
In the form of:
    - 2) No, there is nothing.  
Because
  - c. Related to Posyandu.
    - 1) Yes, there is.  
In the form of:
    - 2) No, there is nothing (not necessary)  
Because
  - d. Related to YSBS/YKB/YASPEM\*)
    - 1) Yes, there is.  
In the form of:
    - 2) No.  
because
  - e. Related to Village/LKMD/PKK\*)
    - 1) Yes, there is.  
In the form of:
    - 2) No  
Because
  - f. Related to ...
    - 1) Yes, there is  
In the form of :
    - 2) No, there is nothing.  
Because

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# Evaluation Scope of Work: Community Food and Nutrition Development Program

## I. BACKGROUND

### CFNDP

During the last quarter of 1983 a team of consultants carried out a "review and redesign" of the CRS Title II Program in Indonesia. To follow up on the team's recommendations, CRS Indonesia submitted a proposal to USAID in February 1984 under the title of "Community Food and Nutrition Development Program" (CFNDP). USAID approved the proposal and planned to support the program with funds derived from monetization of Title II commodities. However, for a variety of reasons, monetization of Title II commodities failed to materialize, and the project remained unfunded until June 1985. At that time USAID/Jakarta decided to support the project with the newly established U.S. Government Child Survival Fund. Monies from AID started to be disbursed to CRS in November 1985.

According to the grant agreement, the purpose of the grant was to provide partial support in the implementation of CRS's redesigned PL 480 Title II program. CRS was to assist its counterpart organizations in increasing their management capabilities to promote program implementation and achieve developmental impacts by:

- 1) providing technical assistance for both the Food and Nutrition Program (FNP) and the Food for Work (FFW) program in the effort to maximize program results,
- 2) training of village kaders to maximize participation
- 3) increasing beneficiary knowledge and application of nutrition information, and
- 4) developing a system for generating funds to finance village nutrition activities in preparation for the phase-out of Title II assistance.

Most of the monies from the Child Survival Fund were allocated for the FNP. Out of the total grant of US\$ 1,600,000, US\$ 1,500,000 funded FNP; the balance (US\$ 100,000) funded technical assistance for FFW.

## Title II: FNP, FFW, IGA

Both the FNP and the FFW have the same overall goal: to improve the economic and nutritional well-being of families in poor Indonesian communities. Both the FNP and the FFW are implemented through local counterpart organizations which are private voluntary organizations (PVOs). In the field, the counterparts employ FNP and FFW supervisors and fieldworkers to manage and supervise the programs. Currently, the FNP benefits approximately 80,000 mothers and under-five children, and in its operation has covered Jawa Timur, Jawa Tengah, Lampung, Sumatera Selatan, Kalimantan Barat, and Nusa Tenggara Timur. FFW currently benefits 100,000 villagers (20,000 families) and has covered Jawa Timur, Jawa Tengah, Lampung, Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan Barat, Sulawesi Utara, Sumatera Selatan, and Nusa Tenggara Timur.

One of the eight sub-components of the FNP is the Income-Generating Activities (IGA). IGA is the system by which funds are generated locally for the dual purposes of increasing family incomes and funding village nutrition activities. This component will ideally help alleviate the conditions (i.e. poverty) that make Title II assistance necessary in the first place, as well as fund on-going health and nutrition activities after the phase-out of food assistance. Considering the importance of these two purposes to overall programming, IGA will be evaluated separately from FNP.

### Recommendations

Subsequent to the implementation of the CFNDP, two audits of CRS/Indonesia were carried out that encompassed the CFNDP: a CRS/New York audit and an audit by the Regional Inspector General/Manila through USAID/Jakarta and Price Waterhouse/Jakarta. The recommendations that are presently relevant to the evaluation are:

From the CRS/NY audit:

- 1) "CRS/Indonesia should formally evaluate achievement of the system for generating funds that are intended to finance the FNP after Title II food is curtailed."

From the Price/Waterhouse audit:

- 2) "CRS should utilize the 1987 "Needs Assessment" to establish criteria which would support the implementation or continuation of FNP programs. Once the criteria are established, CRS should systematically review the current programs and projects during field trips to ensure the criteria for continued support are met."

- 3) "CRS should obtain the services of a technical specialist to review and report on the program's economic impact including interest rate levels and similar other matters pertaining to IGA loans. The report should establish the basis and nature of all future IGA loans."

In addition to the audits, observations by USAID staff of posyandu activities have led to discussions between USAID and CRS staff regarding weaknesses in the management and implementation of posyandu-level activities.

### Evaluation

Under the terms of the CFNDP contract, CRS is obliged to conduct an "in depth evaluation" with USAID/VHP during the third year of project implementation. May 1988 marked three years from start-up, however, the evaluation will be undertaken in late 1989 for three main reasons. First, an evaluation prior to 1989 would have been premature; some program sub-components (most notably the Income Generating Activities) were initiated quite late in the funding cycle. Second, in the same vein, the new counterparts in the newly targeted geographic areas have only recently adopted many of the program management requirements and so could only recently be meaningfully evaluated. Third, a false start in identifying the evaluation team has delayed the evaluation from early to late 1989. However, given the current funding situation--extension of the grant monies through June 1990 and the approval of monetization for continued funding of these activities--this time frame is appropriate.

## II. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

CRS/Indonesia is undertaking this evaluation primarily to assess CRS/Indonesia's support in promoting counterpart management capabilities for planning, implementing, and sustaining programs that will achieve development impact. Although the goal of the CFNDP called for CRS to "assist its counterpart organizations in increasing their management capabilities", CRS and USAID staff have only recently defined and articulated that this--the support to counterparts, or institution-building--is the present over-riding programming concern.

This section incorporates all of the CRS's obligations (i.e. the original CFNDP objectives, the audit recommendations, and the USAID concerns regarding posyandu activities), yet essentially restructures them within a framework of institution building. The use of institution-building as a framework for the evaluation comes, not coincidentally, at a time when CRS is aggressively retargeting to the outer islands where organizational structures are less sophisticated than on Java. It is hoped that this orientation will lead to an evaluation that not only assesses past

performance, but also more effectively meets current and future programming needs. In this light, the evaluation team should address four major issues:

FIRST, how well has CRS, through the CFNDP-funded activities, developed counterparts capabilities to deliver Title II program services, target these services to the right people, and support these services over the longer term, as well as develop a system for sustaining FNP activities after Title II withdrawal. These four areas (delivery, targeting, supervision, and sustainability) form the framework for assessing counterpart strengths; the focus is therefore on the following:

a. DELIVERY OF SERVICES. The ability of counterparts and the CRS/counterpart system to plan and implement the food program, the growth surveillance system, and the nutrition education program of the FNP; to plan and implement FFW; and to train FNP kaders and FFW fieldworkers to carry out these programs.

b. TARGETING. The ability of counterparts and the CRS/counterpart system to select appropriate beneficiaries (FNP), communities (for FNP and FFW), and projects (for FFW), and to maximize participation of target groups.

c. SUPERVISION. The ability of counterparts to supervise, support, and retrain FNP and FFW personnel and the effectiveness of the information system for strengthening and modifying programs as needed.

d. SUSTAINABILITY. The viability of the IGA system to a) finance village nutrition activities, and b) increase family income, in preparation for the phase-out of PL 480 Title II assistance.

e. OVERALL IMPRESSIONS.

For FNP, IGA, FFW:

What have been the unforeseen impacts of CFNDP activities? What have been the indirect impacts (real or perceived) of CFNDP activities? What are the broader observations on the current status of the CFNDP? How effectively have the CFNDP activities been linked to the government services at both the local and provincial levels?

For FFW:

Do the rations constitute reasonable payment for the work done by workers? Which payment system (target system or attendance system) is more influential to the quality of the project? Which payment system is more influential to the speed of the projects?

SECOND, based on the assessment of the above findings, what realistic, cost-effective, general plan of action will strengthen existing weaknesses? It is all-important that the evaluation team carefully consider counterpart objectives and objections at all stages. Also, as noted above, CRS is now retargeting its programs from Java to the outer islands. The inherent contradiction between targeting poorer, weaker areas and counterparts and the ever-increasing accountability required in Title II food programs, poses special demands on any realistic plan of action.

THIRD, the evaluation team should present to--and be prepared to discuss --the preliminary results and recommendations in the the CRS/counterpart November 1989 meeting. This discussion should serve as a means for incorporating counterpart suggestions in the final report.

FOURTH, this evaluation should serve as the baseline for future evaluations. As such the evaluation team determine the basis for ongoing evaluation i.e. indicators, the method for collection, the time frame, etc. ), but is not responsible for collecting the actual baseline data.

### III. EVALUATION PROCEDURES AND REPORT REQUIREMENTS

#### Procedures

The evaluation team will work closely with CRS and counterpart staff and will share papers with the steering committee upon completion of the first draft report. The steering committee will be appraised of the progress of the evaluation and will be consulted regularly in order to elicit comments and contributions during the course of evaluation. CRS and the counterparts will assist the expert researchers with the necessary arrangement for field visits and provide data from their files.

#### Reporting Requirement

Upon completion of the first draft report, the expert researchers will meet with the steering committee to discuss the preliminary findings and recommendations. A draft of the report including its conclusions and recommendations will be made available before this meeting.

The evaluation team will present and discuss results in a workshop for counterparts in order to finalize (with CRS) the operational plan.