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EVALUATION OF VOTER EDUCATION
PROGRAM IN CHILE
INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF HUMAN RIGHTS - CIVITAS

FINAL REPORT

LAC Grant Number:
0591-G-SS-8005-00

Submitted to:

Office of Democratic Initiatives
Latin American Caribbean Bureau
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C.

Submitted by:

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February 6, 1989

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In February 1988 the U.S. Agency for International Development provided a grant to the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIDH) to implement a voter education program in Chile during 1988. The grant totalled \$1,285,000. The IIDH, based in Costa Rica, is an independent international academic organization dedicated to the research and promotion of human rights. The activities funded by the grant took place between Dec. 1, 1987 and Feb. 28, 1989.

The purpose of the grant was two-fold: 1) to strengthen the grantee's capacity to provide technical assistance and training in election support activities in Latin America; and 2) to support a nonpartisan voter education program related to the October 1988 plebiscite in Chile.

This report, including the annexes, represents the final evaluation of the program. The evaluation was conducted during December 1988 by a three-member team provided by Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. under an Indefinite Quantity Contract. The primary method used by the evaluators was interviews with 140 persons (mostly in Chile) who had participated in the voter education activities or who were knowledgeable about such activities and the political and economic context of Chile at the time of the plebiscite. The evaluation team also reviewed all materials utilized as training and promotional instruments by the implementing institution. Contact was made with individuals and organizations not only in the capital city of Santiago but also in rural areas and provinces in the northern and southern regions of Chile.

CIVITAS, a non-profit organization dedicated to social action and education, and with close ties to the Catholic church, approached the Inter-American Center for Electoral Assistance (CAPEL), the subdivision of IIDH, to monitor the activities, provide technical assistance and funding. CAPEL, in turn, requested AID/Washington for funding support.

Due to the unique political environment in Chile in 1988 and the sensitive nature of the grant activities, the program had to be conducted with particular care. The program was named "The Crusade for Citizen Participation", popularly known as "The Crusade", because the main objective was to rescue the dormant democratic principles of the Chilean people. Upon the support of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of Chile, CIVITAS agreed to provide the legal and institutional framework for the Crusade. Even though CIVITAS' role was limited to that of an umbrella organization, its prestige as a nonpartisan entity permitted the Crusade to function with minimum interference from the government.

The Crusade was implemented by a group of Chilean experts in adult education and project management under the guidance of CAPEL and CIVITAS. The organization was headed by a Program Director assisted by an Executive Committee, and a staff of 35 persons, mainly young people. The Crusade was divided into three departments: operations, communications, and finances.

In order to achieve the general purposes of the grant, the Crusade established three primary objectives.

1. To promote the registration of Chilean voters for the October 1988 plebiscite;
2. To provide potential voters with basic concepts of civic education so that they would be aware of the importance of voting as well as the implications of choosing either of the two options offered in the plebiscite; and
3. To encourage citizen control of the electoral process.

The Crusade faced two main challenges: first, to overcome the fear and skepticism of participating in political activities; and second, to ensure the credibility of the results of the plebiscite.

The activities of the Crusade were organized around three levels of training in order to create a multiplier effect of the voter education program throughout the country. Training was carried out as follows:

- Level 1: Crusade staff trained 484 regional coordinators.
- Level 2: The regional coordinators trained 7,200 community leaders.
- Level 3: Under the guidance of the coordinators, the community leaders organized numerous activities in 208 communities throughout the country.

The most important condition that the movement imposed on all volunteers was nonpartisanship. The Crusade was very careful in the preparation and review of all printed materials and the selection of the coordinators and community leaders so that the completely impartial character of the program would not be endangered. Tolerance and nondiscrimination in the training process were essential requirements of all the activities.

The Crusade activities were implemented efficiently, professionally, and with the participation of Chileans from all the political parties and regions of the country. Project staff were dedicated to achieving the stated objectives and developed creative solutions to the challenges and obstacles encountered. The message of the Crusade reached its audience through numerous

means: television, radio, newspapers, pamphlets, rock concerts, mock elections, debates, and public meetings.

The results of the project far exceeded initial expectations. Civic education activities were carried out peacefully during 1988 without government intervention; public debates and other open activities were well attended all over the country, with people defending both sides of the plebiscite options; and most important, the Chilean people regained confidence in the democratic electoral process.

Before the Crusade began, only four and a half million people were registered to vote out of a potential voting population of eight million. By October 1988, when the plebiscite took place, seven and a half million people were registered. On the day of the plebiscite, more than 97% of the total registered population cast their vote. There was active participation in the vote counting process by members of the Chilean Electoral Board and people representing both options of the plebiscite. Many people involved with the Crusade also participated as individuals in a "fast-count" which accurately projected the results as early as 9 p.m. on the day of the plebiscite.

The project proved to be the correct response to a vacuum produced by the political stalemate that Chile was experiencing at the end of 1987. In addition to the concrete results mentioned above, by the end of the project there were many other positive long-term effects of the grant, such as a strengthening of the IIDH's capacity to give technical assistance, institution building within CIVITAS and the Crusade, and the development of new training methodologies in the area of voter education.

The evaluation team supports funding a second project of this type for Chile during the electoral year of 1989, but with modified purposes and less ambitious goals. The evaluation also supports developing similar projects in other Latin American countries where the political context makes it both suitable and feasible. Many of the lessons learned in Chile could be transferred to new projects, such as the condition of nonpartisanship, the participation of credible local institutions which offer integrity to the program, the use of experienced staff from an institution like the IIDH to provide technical assistance, a high level of staff expertise in adult education and project management, the importance of flexibility in project design, development of a wide range of activities to reach the public which are adapted to the local social and political environment, and the use of the new training methodologies for voter education developed in Chile.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Grant Description

Under Grant No. LAC-0591-G-SS-8005-00 the Agency for International Development (AID) funded the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIDH) to develop and implement a Voter Education Program in Chile. The grant resulted from an unsolicited proposal originating in Chile with the CIVITAS organization and submitted through IIDH. Obligation of funds took place on January 26, 1988 but the grant was made effective retroactively as of December 1, 1987 and was to be completed by February 28, 1989. The original agreement was for \$1.2 million and amended for an additional \$85 thousand. The office of Democratic Initiatives of the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC/DI) was responsible for monitoring and evaluating the program.

The purpose of the grant was two-fold: to strengthen the grantee's capacity to provide technical assistance and training in election support activities; and to support a program of nonpartisan voter education in Chile with the objective of encouraging broad voter registration and participation in the national plebiscite, held on October 5, 1988.

The grantee, the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIDH), is an independent international institution dedicated to human rights education, research, and promotion. The IIDH was created in 1980 through an agreement between the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Government of Costa Rica. Its headquarters is in San Jose, Costa Rica but it operates throughout Central and South America and the Caribbean. The IIDH delegated responsibility for this grant to its functional center, the Inter-American Center for Electoral Assistance and Promotion (CAPEL). CAPEL was created in January 1983 as a specialized branch of the Institute to give technical assistance in Latin America and to promote democratic electoral procedures and laws. IIDH/CAPEL subcontracted CIVITAS, the Chilean non-profit social development and education organization which originated the proposed program, to implement it. The Crusade for Citizen Participation is the name given to the movement started by CIVITAS and which encompassed all of the activities of the voter education program.

The program implementation plan of the grant stated the following specific objectives:

1. To formalize an agreement between the IIDH and CIVITAS.

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2. To train 216,000 volunteers with the goal of reaching 5,533,309 Chilean citizens. The pyramid multiplier effect would require an initial training of 315 voter education coordinators. These coordinators would train 7,200 community leaders, who would then train the 216,000 volunteers at a second level of training. Finally, these volunteers would reach the total number of Chilean citizens cited above. The primary activity of the 216,000 volunteers would be door-to-door canvassing of all potential voters to encourage registration.
 3. To enlist a group of Chilean experts in electoral processes to develop appropriate training materials with the assistance of CAPEL.
 4. To design a monthly newsletter and distribute it among the volunteers in order to supplement previous training.
 5. To produce three video and one audio tapes for training purposes; and to develop a series of six radio spots as well as certain number of television spots for dissemination of information throughout Chile.

The program reporting requirements stated in the grant agreement included the submission of a monthly performance report summarizing the following information:

1. A comparison of actual accomplishments with the goals established for the period.
2. The reasons why established goals were not met, if applicable.
3. Other pertinent information.

The grant also required an internal evaluation consisting of a study of the workshops and courses and a study of the entire program. This report was to be submitted to the LAC/DI.

The expected program outcomes were as follows:

1. The IIDH would strengthen its capacity to manage the programmatic and financial aspects of voter assistance activities including the design, implementation, and internal reporting and evaluation of such activities.
 2. CAPEL and CIVITAS would develop expertise in project planning and implementation including design of materials, organizational techniques, working with the mass media, institution building, and how to increase voter registration.
 3. Through the experience of CAPEL and CIVITAS, the IIDH would develop training methodologies that could be utilized in similar programs in the future.
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4. The IIDH, through CAPEL, would develop stronger program planning, supervisory, and monitoring capabilities.

The grant was amended once, in September 1988 at which time funds in the amount of \$85,000 were added for the cost of media campaigns, particularly television broadcasting.

B. Agreement Between IIDH and CIVITAS

The IIDH formalized an agreement with CIVITAS on March 9, 1988. The agreement, excluding information already cited in the grant description, is summarized in the following six points:

1. The voter training seminars were to be held at three levels. The first level would entail the training of 315 voter education coordinators from 105 electoral districts. The second level would be the training of 7,200 volunteers by the coordinators; these volunteers would be chosen on the basis of their leadership roles within their communities in order to maximize the expected multiplier effect at the subsequent third level. The second-level volunteers would work in selected communities in order to recruit the 216,000 volunteer citizens. The criteria used to select the communities would be low voter registration. Each volunteer of the third level would be responsible for motivating 24 other citizens to register and for educating them in the voting procedures. The final results of the training would affect, theoretically, more than 5 million Chileans. This last target group was defined as people more than 18 years old who were not already registered as voters when the Crusade started.
2. Funds would be advanced periodically to cover thirty-day operational periods, and a report of actual disbursements would be submitted monthly by voucher.
3. The IIDH was to contract the services of an outside accounting firm with offices in Chile during the implementation of the program to assist the IIDH in its financial supervision.
4. The IIDH would appoint a resident representative in Chile to give technical assistance to CIVITAS in the areas of constitutional law and electoral processes, and to exercise permanent supervision of the program.
5. CIVITAS' Board of Directors would be responsible for the overall execution of the program; a Program Executive Committee would be responsible for the implementation of the program; and a Program Director would be responsible for planning, staffing, directing, coordinating and controlling the activities. The activities would be performed by three departments described on the following page:

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- a. An Operations Department would be created with the responsibility of developing plans, strategies and timetables, recruiting the voter education coordinators (first level) and assisting the Program Director. The head of this department would act in the Program Director's absence.
 - b. A Communications and Public Relations Department would be responsible for the design and production of a monthly newsletter and for the coordination of the production of audiovisual materials.
 - c. An Administrative and Financial Department would be responsible for preparing and updating the budget, procuring goods, overseeing salary transactions, and processing all financial documents.
6. It was expressly agreed by the IIDH and CIVITAS that all voter education activities would be nonpartisan. CIVITAS was not to be influenced by, affiliated with, nor supportive of the interest of any political party, candidate or partisan political viewpoint.

C. Internal Evaluation by CIVITAS

CIVITAS, in fulfillment of one of the grant requirements, carried out an internal evaluation during November 1988. The outline of this evaluation is included as annex G.

The most important conclusions of the internal evaluation were:

1. The Crusade met the three objectives of the movement:
 - a) To register a high percentage of Chileans over 18 years of age as voters.
 - b) To assist new voters in understanding the meaning of the different options offered in the October 1988 plebiscite.
 - c) To promote participation of citizens in the control of the vote count.
 2. The Crusade recognized that the success of the voter education program and the high level of voter registration were the results of the common effort exerted by many Chilean organizations as well as the Crusade, including the political parties, some media organizations, and the government, all of which are dedicated to civic education.
 3. The methodology utilized was successful and the three training levels used to obtain the desired multiplier effect was adequate.
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4. The Crusade became an organized and respected institution capable of implementing other projects of a similar nature.
 5. The participation of the Chilean youth was a contributing factor in the success of the movement.
 6. Flexibility, defined as the capability to keep a clear definition of objectives while adapting the means to achieve those objectives, was a second major factor in ensuring the excellent results of the initiative.
 7. The talent demonstrated by staff members and the first level trainees in communicating values such as respect for the individual, sincerity, liberty, and solidarity was a third necessary element to the program's success.
 8. The use of signs and symbols in the Crusade to modify values and attitudes was very successful because of the care given to their choice and design.
 9. Chileans helping Chileans in a common effort to democratize the country was a basic message which was successfully communicated to the citizens.
 10. The impact created by the Crusade in Chilean society exceeded all expectations. The movement provided a buffer for the political tension created by a plebiscite of this import, and, at the same time, stimulated the dormant civic nature of the Chilean population and their confidence in democratic principles.

II. Final Evaluation

A. Purposes of the Evaluation

Under the AID Indefinite Quantity Contract No. PDC-0085-I-00-6097-00 Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. of Washington, D.C. was contracted to conduct the final evaluation of the grant given to the IIDH to carry out the Voter Education Program in Chile. The evaluation, completed in January 1989, covers the period from December 1, 1987 through December 30, 1988.

The purposes of the final evaluation were:

1. To measure the effectiveness of the program and the degree to which it had achieved its objectives.
2. To assess the potential application of the training methodology developed under the program for any other similar projects in the Latin American countries.
3. To evaluate the financial and management structure and assess its efficiency.
4. To study the possible extension of the program in Chile for the electoral year of 1989 and its institutionalization after 1989.

B. Team Composition and Methodology

The evaluation was carried out by a three-person team: a sociologist and educator who served as team leader (Charles Curry-Smithson); a Latin American law graduate with training in Political Science (Jorge Obando); and a Latin American management and financial analyst (Hector Guerrero).

Field work of the evaluation was carried out in Costa Rica and Chile as follows: 9 person-days in Costa Rica and 41 person-days in Chile. As stated in the scope of work the team gave special attention to assessing the potential for using training methodologies and materials for future Chilean and Latin America voter education programs funded by AID.

The primary method of data collection for the evaluation was interviews with officials of the three implementing organizations, with representatives of the Catholic Church, political parties, unions, and other organizations dedicated to civic education in Chile and with university professors and journalists – a total of 140 persons. The team also carefully reviewed the written and audiovisual materials produced and used by the Crusade. The financial analyst reviewed the accounting controls of the IIDH and CIVITAS.

III. Relevant Project Context

A. Social and Economic Context

During the period between January 1985 and October 1988 Chile showed substantial and sustained economic growth. Today it is considered one of the strongest economy in Latin America, with low unemployment, high productivity, and an overall GNP growth rate of 6.5% for 1988. Parallel to this "economic miracle," however, is another economy which has great impact on the social and political life of Chile and which must be understood as an important part of the context of the AID grant. This weaker, informal economy is based on the urban and rural poor who have not benefited from the macroeconomic growth. The existence of these two economies and two corresponding social realities is one of the factors which greatly influenced the Crusade and its impact on the outcome of the plebiscite.

The Chilean Miracle

All of the macroeconomic indicators show a strong and dynamic Chilean economy. It is a free-market economy rebuilt over the last 15 years which is now in an accelerated process of privatization; an economy which can successfully compete with the economies of developed countries such as New Zealand and Australia. On the social level, this has produced a self-confident, economically-oriented new Chilean entrepreneur.

The following figures demonstrate the striking difference between Chile and other Latin American countries for 1988:

Country	Annual Growth	Inflation
Argentina	0.5	372%
Brazil	0.0	816%
Nicaragua	-9.0	7,778%
Peru	-7.5	1,307%
Chile	6.5	12%

The balance of payments also shows positive figures. Exports in 1988 were \$6,750 million and imports \$4,600 million, giving a positive trade balance of \$2,150 million. In 1988, exports from Chile grew 31.8%, with the only country in Latin America showing a higher rate being Argentina (35.3%), and the average for the rest of Latin America being 14.5%. In 1971, Chile was exporting 412 products to 58 countries and in 1988, Chile exported 1,343 products to 112 countries.

The foreign debt was reduced in the last four years from \$19,318 million to \$17,000 million, while the ratio of debt payments to exports decreased from 62% to 28%. Foreign exchange reserves increased from \$1,867 million to \$2,600 million during this same period.

In the last three years inflation has been kept low, as the following figures indicate: 1986- 17.4%; 1987 - 21.5%; 1988 - 12%. While the average inflation rate in the rest of Latin America was 478% for 1988, Chile's inflation dropped to 12%. Average growth of GNP for 1988 was 0.7% in the rest of Latin America, for Chile the figure was 6.5%.

The "Other Economy"

The parallel economy is informal, based primarily on state aid, and subsists on a day-to-day basis. This sector is not only the result of the 15 years of the Pinochet administration, but its relative situation has worsened under the current government. It is represented by approximately four million Chileans who live in the poor neighborhoods of the big cities such as Santiago, Valparaiso, Concepcion and Antofagasta. The worsening predicament of these people is generating a growing resentment towards the government and increasing politicization of the population.

By 1973, the last year of the Allende administration, the economy was basically out of control. Inflation was high and increasing, production was low, and consumer products were very limited. When the military took power in September 1973, many Chileans were ready for a solution to the economic problems even though it involved an authoritarian government.

Just a few years after that, people were talking about the economic miracle: inflation was under control, national production started growing in 1977, exports grew year after year, and the balance of payments showed a positive balance.

In 1981, the world economy and Latin America in particular suffered a dramatic contraction which affected Chile. The crisis lasted four years. Guided by the economic theory of Professor Milton Friedman and others from the University of Chicago, the Pinochet government believed that free economic forces would drive the country out of the crisis. However, two years after the crisis started, with its multiple gatherings and protests, the government intervened in the economy in order to promote internal savings and domestic investment. By 1985, the country showed significant signs of recovery and privatization of the economy was accelerated.

This recovery and development did not affect all levels of Chilean society; many Chileans were left out of the development process. The new economically-oriented and self-confident Chilean was reluctant to share his country with a sector of the society which had not benefited by the economic boom, and the policies of the government focused on increasing investment and savings as opposed to redistributing wealth or increasing social welfare programs.

Thus, two different societies coexist in Chile today. The first is strong, modernized, with internationally competent managers—these are the Chileans who shop in large malls in Santiago and export wood or fresh fruits to New Zealand, Europe or Australia. The second society is as numerous as the first, but more politicized. These are the Chileans who work for low wages in non-unionized jobs, who work as day laborers with 12 hour shifts, who engage in petty commerce on city streets and markets, or who are simply unemployed. The level of frustration of this group has increased as they see that they are not receiving any of the benefits of the highly publicized economic prosperity.

In the capital of Santiago, the urban poor total approximately two million individuals. Between 1979 and 1984, the government carried out mass removals of some of these people from the upper class areas. Over 28,000 families were moved from the "Barrio Alto" (Santiago's rich neighborhood) to other places in town where land was cheaper; there, some families were provided with houses measuring only 50 square meters.

In many of the poor neighborhoods of Chile the repressive arm of the government is still a daily reality and the contrast in the lives of the privileged and those of the poor is stark. In La Victoria, a neighborhood on the south side of Santiago, persons interviewed spoke of the number of their neighbors recently being picked up illegally by the police, the youth who was wounded by a stray police bullet and the military's helicopters which continue to fly low over the neighborhood taking photographs of the people. In the city of Antofagasta, in the north of Chile, the military has developed the south side of town for its own personnel, taking over a public beach and converting it to a "county club" for exclusive use of military personnel and building residential divisions with paved streets and public utilities never provided to the poor on the north side of the city.

While Chile undoubtedly has a very strong economy compared to other Latin American countries, a significant group of Chileans have not benefited from this economic development process. It is an economy which appears to be stable and steady, but which does not admit the existence of a secondary economy.

The evaluation found that the Board of Directors, the Program Director, and many of the staff and volunteer Crusaders were sensitive to the existence of the two coexisting economies in Chile.

The Crusade assumed this fact as part of the context in which it had to function. The evaluation considers that this awareness was one of the factors which assured the success of the program.

B. Political and Legal Context

The military coup d'état that convulsed Chile on September 11, 1973 was a dramatic interruption of institutional life in one of the world's oldest and most stable democracies. During the first years of the Pinochet administration many changes took place. A mixed economy was substituted by one based on liberal and competitive economic policies; many Chileans left the country and emigrated mainly to other Latin American republics. Human rights abuses were common. A strong military rightist regime controlled Chilean civil society. There are no official numbers, but common estimates place approximately four thousand people missing and killed, twenty thousand tortured and one million forced into exile.

Seven years later Chile was run by a group of successful neoliberal bureaucrats and "never-lost-a-war" military leaders. Euphoria, optimism, and pride were the common attitudes shown by government officials due to the steady economic growth the country had achieved. This positive outlook is embodied in the speeches given by two ministers of the government in 1980. Sergio de Castro, Minister of Finance, promised that by the end of the 1980s Chile would be "a developed country with a per capita gross domestic product of thirty-five hundred dollars annually" and José Piñera, Minister of Labor, stated that "...at the end of this transition period, the military government and the Chilean people will have transformed a destroyed Chile into a developed country."

The Constitution of 1980

Based on the climate of economic euphoria, the government resolved to legitimize its authority through a new constitution. General Pinochet called the Chilean voters to a plebiscite on September 11, 1980 to approve or reject the new Constitution. Approximately 66% of the voters approved it and only 30% voted against it, with approximately six and half million Chileans voting. During the pre-plebiscite period of only 30 days, the opposition did not have access to television and only limited access to newspapers was granted.

There are six articles of this constitution which are key to the political context. They are summarized as follows:

Art. 8 limits and conditions the creation of political parties and gives the government the discretion to decide which political parties can be approved.

Art. 45 establishes that the Senate would be formed by: a) 26 senators elected in free elections, two for each of the 13 regions; b) all ex-Presidents of the Republic who had been in the position for at least six years; and c) nine senators appointed by the government (three chosen by the Supreme Court, four by the Security Council, and two by the President of the Republic). Consequently, President Pinochet, two persons appointed by him, the four representatives of the Armed Forces, and the three appointed by the Supreme Court would control 10 of the 35 votes in the Senate.

Art. 49, division 5, establishes that the President of the Republic can be impeached by the Senate; division 7 states that the Senate has the power to declare a President incompetent due to mental or physical reasons; division 9 gives the Senate the authority to appoint a new President of the Republic with a simple majority of its members in the case of a vacancy and provides for this new president to remain in power until new elections take place. The laws must be approved by the House of Representatives with concurrence by the Senate. The Congress of the Republic is formed by both chambers.

Art. 95 establishes that the President of the Republic presides over the National Security Council. Besides the President, the members of the Council are: the President of the Senate; the President of the Supreme Court; the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the General Director of the National Police. This council judges all matters related to national security.

Art. 23 establishes that any member of a union or professional association is prohibited from being an active member of any political party.

Art. 116 requires that any bill of constitutional reform must be approved by the three-fifths of the votes in both chambers.

In addition to the above articles, the Constitution of 1980 also has twenty-nine divisions which regulate the transition to democracy from 1980 to 1989. General Pinochet has remained as President during these nine years. One of these articles establishes that in the 1990 presidential election, the junta formed by the three heads of the armed forces and the director of the police shall propose a candidate and this candidate, who must be nominated unanimously, would be accepted or rejected by the citizenry in a plebiscite. This plebiscite must take place before December 11, 1988.

Evolution of the Political Parties

When the economic crisis described above began in 1981, the political parties in Chile were completely disorganized. Civilian protests were again a common occurrence due to the new

economic crisis; after the third wave of massive protests in 1983, six of the opposition parties established a coalition called "Alianza Democratica" (AD). This alliance was formed by one rightist, three centrist, and two leftist parties. A key occurrence during the formation of this alliance was that the Communist Party was rejected by the others to participate in the AD. This was an indication of the split between the moderate opposition and radical opposition to the Pinochet regime.

Through the recently appointed Minister of the Interior, Sergio Onofre Jarpa, the government decided to open a dialogue with the AD. This marked the first opening given to the opposition in ten years. In 1983, for the first time the hermetic system created by the military government in 1973 permitted a penetration of the opposition into the macropolitical level. However, the opposition could not remain cohesive due to internal disputes, resulting in the split into two coalitions six months later, followed by a collapse of the dialogue with the government.

The social protests resumed in 1984 with increasing violence promoted by armed groups such as the movement "Manuel Rodriguez," which is considered the armed faction of the Communist Party. The government reacted to this situation by strengthening the political controls on the civilian society, declaring the country under a state of emergency and suspending constitutional rights.

The economic crisis was brought under control by the government by 1985. During this year various political factors permitted a democratic leader, Sergio Molina (who had been President Frei's Minister of Finance), to unite eleven opposition parties into what was called the "National Accord for Full Transition to Democracy." Three major factors facilitated this effort: the conviction developed within the opposition parties forming the 1983 alliance that it was politically unrealistic to attempt an "all-or-nothing" transition to democracy; the Catholic Church took a strong interest in seeking a solution to the political problems; and sectors of the right wing were distancing themselves from the government.

The group of parties which formed the National Accord showed a surprising sense of political realism. They did not ask for the resignation of President Pinochet but instead declared their acceptance of the 1980 Constitution, and asked for only partial reform of the Constitution. However, this raised a legal technical problem because the Chilean Constitution is classified as "rigid" (constitutional rigidity is related to the level of difficulty established by the same constitution in bringing about constitutional amendments). The National Accord made a special request to the government to carry out the amendments before the national presidential and congressional elections took place because of the difficulty in obtaining the majority required by the Constitution. The changes requested were as follow: 1. To make the Constitution amendable by a qualified electoral majority. 2. To replace the presidential election with free and competitive

balloting. 3. To end the State of Emergency. 4. To establish electoral voting lists. 5. To legalize political parties.

The government did not accept the proposal. In 1986, a national strike was declared by a coalition of various organizations. In response, the government again strengthened its control and a period of political inactivity began. This period was partially explained by the 1987 summer vacation in February and the preparations to welcome Pope John Paul II to Chile.

The content of the speeches given by the Pope during his visit in April 1987 reactivated the political response to the regime. Acts of terrorism increased and in September 1987, President Pinochet escaped an assassination attempt. The idea of free elections spread throughout the whole country promoted by the Catholic Church, by some newspapers, by a new aggressive group of politically-oriented magazines, by the political parties, by the unions, and by numerous civic education non-profit organizations. The universities, which historically had been politically active, played a very limited role, explained in part by the fact that the universities had been intervened by the military government and because a smaller percentage of the student body now comes from the low economic sector.

The best characterization of the political climate was that of a stalemate. Two opposing social forces were at work in Chile, one represented by the military, government officials, some media organizations, and some private sector business leaders, and the other represented by the Catholic Church, most of the unions, most of the political parties, the urban poor ("pobladores"), and a large sector of the Chilean youth. Both forces were apparently equal in power, with the result that neither of them could impose conditions on the other without using force. This was the political and social context found by the Crusade promoters when the movement started.

The two forces implicitly agreed to end the stalemate by implementing the instrument established in the 29 articles dedicated to the transition period in the Constitution of 1980: the plebiscite. The military Junta formed by the head of the three branches of the armed forces and the head of the police would propose, by unanimous agreement, a candidate to be the President of the Republic from 1991 to 1999. The candidate would then be presented for approval by Chilean citizens in a national plebiscite, with re-election constitutionally possible. In case the group formed by the Commanders in Chief and the Head of the National Police failed to reach a unanimous agreement, the nomination would be made by the National Security Council through a majority vote. After the candidate was chosen, a period of thirty days would be established to inform the society and the plebiscite would be held right after this period. To vote in the plebiscite, Chileans had to register, since the pre-1973 registration system had been abolished and all records destroyed, and able to identify themselves with the new identification card with their picture.

The day of the announcement of the government's candidate would close the registration of new voters. Because the date of the announcement would be left to the discretion of the government, it left the Chilean population without knowing when the deadline was to register to vote.

If the governmental candidate lost the plebiscite, a competitive election for President and members of the Congress would be scheduled for the following year, December 11, 1989. In the event that the opposition wins the 1989 election, the Constitution, as it was described previously, then provides for the establishment of a military power independent of the new civilian president.

IV. Findings: Activities and Results

A. The Crusade

1. General Introduction

The name “Crusade for Citizen Participation” was chosen with the objective of reflecting the main purpose of the movement—the call to the Chilean population to participate in the October 1988 plebiscite. The name used, the “Crusade,” implied the tremendous effort to rescue the Chilean traditional democratic values after a period of dormancy, just as at the beginning of medieval times Christians mobilized to recover their symbols and values. The name also implied the element of voluntarism; the participants in the Crusade were not to receive any income for the energy and time dedicated to the movement.

The Crusade received some of its impetus from the visit of Pope John Paul II to Chile in April 1987. In order to extend the effectiveness of the use of symbols and signs which could affect the ordinary Chilean citizen’s subconscious, the Crusade appropriated as its motto one of the phrases used by the Pope in his speeches: “Chile has the vocation of understanding, Chile does not want internal confrontation” (in Spanish, “Chile tiene vocación de entendimiento y no de enfrentamiento”). This message carried a powerful emotional charge and was adopted quickly throughout the nation.

The Crusade faced a difficult task, that of overcoming the fear and the skepticism shown by the Chileans before the movement started. The Crusade leaders were conscious that only through a strong emotional appeal were they going to be able to succeed in their attempt. They needed to find the wording, the signs and the symbols that could create a reaction that was powerful enough to motivate the Chilean people to register and to vote during the plebiscite, after fifteen years of being denied these rights.

The Crusade required an efficient organizational structure which had the flexibility to adapt itself to changing situations in order to achieve its objectives. The need for permanent adaptation was due to the unique political context in which the Crusade had to operate.

The Crusade required a well-known, respected, and impartial institutional shield. Since the Voter Education Program was going to function as an independent project, however, the best option was to look for a parent organization which could provide protection and guidance without

getting too directly involved in implementation. At the same time, this organization would have to trust the group of people who were going to implement the program. In this way, the parent organization would not be forced to dedicate much energy and time to the project and the Crusade would not be a burden.

CIVITAS was chosen to give this legal protection after a first attempt to enlist the aid of another Chilean non-profit organization was unproductive. CIVITAS is a private, non-profit social development organization with strong ties to the Catholic Church. Its founder is also director of Caritas, the Church's official economic relief and development organization. Prior to sponsoring the Crusade project, CIVITAS had a small program, consisting mostly of health education activities. Upon the request and urging of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, CIVITAS agreed to provide the legal and institutional framework for the Crusade project. Several of the positions in the Crusade's Advisory Council were filled by individuals from the Board of Directors of CIVITAS.

Choosing an organization such as CIVITAS which has many connections in Chile was a wise decision on the part of the IIDH and AID, since it was more likely to gain the confidence of the government and permission to carry out program activities than a new organization. The government was obviously going to be particularly careful with this type of activity, as civic education could easily be transformed into political instruction, and the plebiscite was a political act with potentially tremendous repercussions.

The evaluation team interviewed the head of CIVITAS, and two other members of the CIVITAS Board of Directors. We concluded that the organization was aware of the risks they assumed when they undertook this initiative. The Board showed a clear understanding of the objectives of the Crusade, the methodologies used, and the function of the staff. They knew most of the staff and had confidence in the members of the Executive Committee. On two or three occasions when the CIVITAS Director intervened in certain Crusade activities and requested modifications in some materials so that there could not be any doubt of the nonpartisanship, the Crusade staff immediately accepted his suggestions. He was asked to appear before government authorities three times, and although he was not pleased to be called up by the National Security officers, he understood that his participation was necessary.

CIVITAS was the right organization to play this limited but very important role; the directors were cautious and flexible at the same time and although not directly involved in the implementation of the program, they were always informed of the activities and met regularly with the Executive Committee and the Program Director of the Crusade.


An additional finding of the evaluation, based on the interview with the director of CIVITAS, is that this organization is already developing its own separate program of civic education.

CIVITAS staff are working on a proposal now and will submit it to potential donors in late January or February 1989. The evaluation raises this finding because such a project could affect future programs of this same nature funded by AID in Chile. It also might force the Crusade to search for another organization which could offer the same benefits and legal protection.

Through its provisional protection, CIVITAS permitted an institutional building effort to occur simultaneously with the implementation of the program. This effort ended in the consolidation of a group of experienced, motivated, and well qualified civic educators. This group is represented by the Program Director, the Executive Committee, and the staff of the Crusade.

2. Structural Organization of the Crusade

The organizational structure of the Crusade is described in the following chart.



Program Director

The requirements for the Program Director described in the sub-tenant agreement signed between CIVITAS and the IIDH were: extensive experience in adult education and project management; clear leadership skills and the ability to work under pressure; an outstanding capability to communicate with young people; and familiarity with the political, social, legal and economic context in Chile. This person would gain the confidence of government circles, the opposition parties and pressure groups, and infuse and maintain in all the participants in the project a nonpartisan attitude at all times, in spite of any pressure to the contrary.

The evaluation team found that the choice of the person selected as Program Director was entirely appropriate. She is a very well-known and respected professor of social work with close ties to the Catholic Church. Her field of specialization in the academic world for over 15 years was precisely implementation and evaluation of social projects. She has been member of the Board of Directors of the Catholic University of Chile since 1986 and also has been the President of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Chilean Catholic Church since 1978, and an advisor to the Vatican. She also has served as a consultant in social development to the FAO, the Ford Foundation, and the Inter-American Foundation. She received a degree in Social Work from the Catholic University of Chile and a Master's degree in Social Work from the Catholic University of Washington, D.C.

The personality of the Program Director, her educational background and commitment to non-partisanship were key to her success in managing the Crusade. She showed outstanding judgement throughout the period in balancing divergent forces as well as with operations and communications. She was a great communicator of the Crusade's message to people of all educational backgrounds and ages.

Executive Committee

The functions of the Executive Committee were:

1. To provide guidance to the Program Director regarding strategies and methodologies to be used during the program.
2. To assure that all activities remained nonpartisan.
3. To provide technical assistance to the Crusade in electoral activities.

One of the members of this committee developed a system which permitted constant feedback to the Crusade about the social and political climate through scientifically designed surveys that track the process of registration. The quantitative and qualitative information gathered as a result of these surveys was very important in the decision making process. Another member of this committee provided valuable information about the evolving political context which permitted constant adjustments in the strategy and tactics of the Crusade.

The members of the committee were highly educated professionals with a comprehensive awareness of the Chilean political situation and they formed a pluralistic and serious group of advisors. The composition of this committee reflected a range of political orientations and it was this mixture which allowed the Program Director to form a consensus and strengthen the non partisan balance.

Staff Departments

There were three departments in charge of program implementation: Operations, Communications and Public Relations, and Management and Finance.

Operations

The responsibilities of this department were: 1) in the absence of the Program Director, to be responsible for carrying out all of the Director's responsibilities; 2) to develop plans, strategies and timetables for the activities of the Program; 3) to recruit the voter education coordinators; 4) to assist and supervise the staff in charge of communications and electoral education; 5) to coordinate and supervise all field operations; and 6) to review monitoring and evaluation reports. The Operations department was headed by a young engineer experienced in project management.

The evaluation team found that this department, and particularly its head, were very important to the success of the program. The person in charge of the department showed a great deal of skill in working with large groups of people and his strong organizational skills were fundamental to the efficient recruitment of the volunteers which established the national Crusade network. As mentioned earlier, the Program Director provided the balance and the sense of direction of the Crusade but she was very well complemented by the energetic and organized personality of the head of the Operations department. The combination of these two individuals was one of the key factors which led to the success of the project.

Communications and Public Relations

This department had the following responsibilities: 1) to design and produce an information bulletin; 2) to propose ways of using mass media; 3) to coordinate the production of audiovisuals; 4) to design publicity and the program's public character; 5) to evaluate its reception among the public; and 6) to support the Director in public relations.

The evaluation team found that the Communications and Public Relations Department carried out well-designed and strategically-disseminated information programs which, acting together with the other activities, permitted the movement to have a greater impact on a large number of Chileans and become an effective factor in the success of the registration and voting process. The evaluation team, unfortunately, did not have the opportunity to interview the head of the department because he was no longer working for the Crusade when the team arrived in Chile.

Management and Finance

This department faced some problems at the beginning. Two individuals were hired who lacked the necessary qualifications to oversee the financial components of the project. Through the hiring of the current department head the situation was resolved and the department fulfilled all of its responsibilities. The evaluation found that this department functioned very well and the administration and finances were totally under control according to the requirements established by the grant and the agreement with IIDH.

Participants in the Crusade

The network created by the Crusade to disseminate its message was formed by a very heterogeneous group of volunteers. The evaluation tried to find some common factors in them in order to obtain a profile of what might be called the "Crusaders". This profile does not cover the total group of more than seven thousand volunteers but it does represent the large majority of them. The main characteristics were: relative youth (people between 18 and 40 years old), social and political awareness, leadership capability, tolerance of the different political views, middle class origin, and eagerness and willingness to dedicate free time to a cause which would benefit the whole society.

Through the seminars and workshops, more than six hundred supervisors were prepared to train more than seven thousand volunteers, who were then supposed to reach the three hundred thousand Chileans who could spread the message of the Crusade to the rest of the population. The Crusade prepared almost double the number of coordinators initially planned (315) due to the judgment made by the Department of Operations that three hundred fifteen supervisors were an insufficient number to train almost eight thousand volunteers. The evaluation found that this adjustment was completely justified. Without the increase in the number of coordinators, it would have been impossible to achieve the overall goal for voter registration.

The evaluation interviewed many volunteers (128) in different cities throughout Chile and found them to be very well informed and motivated Chilean citizens, satisfied with the job they did and wanting to continue with the activities that the Crusade initiated.

3. Monitoring and Reporting System

The Program Director bore most of the responsibility for monitoring the progress of the program. She participated actively in the planning and implementation of the workshops and training courses and personally served as a trainer in the four six-day workshops (level 1) held in Santiago, La Serena, and Temuco training more than one hundred coordinators.

The head of the Operations Department assisted the Program Director in the follow-up of the program activities. During the seven months of the program he was informed of the activities and the problems faced in each community. Based on this information the department was able to make appropriate adjustments to assure the success of the Crusade.

Halfway through the program the Program Director and the Head of the Operations Department carried out an internal evaluation of the workshops and seminars. During the month of November, they also evaluated the program as a whole and developed a report, previously discussed on page 4. The methodology chosen was appropriate, the conclusions were based on a rational analysis of the situation, and the structure of the report, its length and content reflect a professional and objective effort.

There were two reporting systems followed: one numerical and one narrative, representing the financial accounting and the program progress respectively. These two reports were submitted monthly to IIDH in Costa Rica. The reports were clearly written and provided the necessary and appropriate information. The reporting system from Chile to Costa Rica was appropriately designed and functioned in a timely fashion.

4. Financial Administration

a. Background

Program Fund Flow

The Program Fund Flow is executed according to the provisions of Grant No. LAC-0591-G-SS-8005-00 signed between AID and the Interamerican Institute of Human Rights (IIDH), Amendment No. 1 to the Grant, and the Agreement signed between IIDH and the CIVITAS Foundation for administering the sub-grant. The Program Fund Flow must follow the Mandatory Standard Provisions for Non-U.S. Nongovernmental Grantees and the Applicable Standard Provisions as indicated in the Grant's Attachment No. 4.

AID granted the sum of \$1,200,000 to IIDH for the operation of the Program. Amendment No. 1 signed on September 16, 1988 increased this amount to \$1,285,000. The Agreement between IIDH and CIVITAS entered into force on March 9, 1988 for an amount of \$1,010,091. Later Grant Amendment No. 1 increased the above sum in the amount of \$85,000. Due to the fact that the actual program began in January of 1988, but the Agreement with the Institute wasn't approved until March, pre-grant assistance was provided in order to finance the operations during the first two months. This assistance totaled \$9,403.50. The pre-grant was later absorbed by the general grant funds. Consequently the total amount received by CIVITAS equaled \$1,104,494.50 as shown in Exhibit 1 on the following page.

**Exhibit #1
Grant Budget (U.S. Dollars)**

	Grant	Grant Ammend #1	Total	IIDH/ CIVITAS Agreement	IIDH Costs
Pre-Contract Costs	\$50,000		\$50,000	\$9,403.50	\$40,596.50
1. Program Management	\$135,043		\$135,043	\$135,043.00	
2. Training	\$578,358		\$578,358	\$578,358.00	
3. Media Campaign	\$200,333	\$85,000	\$285,333	\$285,333.00	
4. Bulletin & Newsletter	\$33,667		\$33,667	\$33,667.00	
5. Office Costs	\$62,690		\$62,690	\$72,093.50	
6. Technical Assistance	\$25,220		\$25,220		\$25,220.00
7. International Air Fares	\$11,500		\$11,500		\$11,500.00
8. Overhead/Adminstrative Expenses	\$103,189		\$103,189		\$103,189.00
Total	\$1,200,000		\$1,285,000	\$1,104,494.50	\$180,505.50

Notes:

1. CIVITAS is authorized to adjust line items by a maximum of 5%, as may be reasonably necessary without exceeding the total amount. IIDH must be notified prior to such a modification.
2. Funds added by Amendment No. 1 shall be used to finance new voter education television spots.

Cash Advances and Reimbursements

Since the Program is solely financed by an AID Grant through the IIDH/CIVITAS Agreement, it is crucial to have an expeditious and timely schedule for the delivery of funds in order to cover operations. To insure that this occurred, IIDH initially advanced CIVITAS the sum of \$247,000 (in two payments of \$71,337 and \$175,703) which proved adequate to cover Program needs during the months of January through May.

Initially the requests were prepared and sent monthly, but beginning in June and through October they were sent twice a month to speed reimbursements. Since the time period between the candidate's nomination and the date of the Plebiscite was so short (30 days), program activities were intensified. Furthermore a television advertising bill which was in dispute was settled and paid for in the amount of almost \$44,000. These factors drastically reduced cash availability, obligating Program Management to negotiate postponements of some payments and to request an additional advance of \$150,000 from IIDH. In addition, as previously mentioned, a Grant Amendment was negotiated with AID for the amount of \$85,000 to finance voter education TV spots, including the one in dispute.

These measures and the subsequent deliveries of the requested advances (\$50,000 on August 24 and \$100,000 on September 5) together with regular reimbursements of expenses, brought the cash position back to normality without seriously impairing pre-plebiscite activities.

The amount of funds received by IIDH and transfers to CIVITAS are shown in Exhibit No. 2.

Exhibit #2			
Grant Funds Transfers (U.S. Dollars)			
IIDH Funds Received From AID		IIDH Funds Transfers To CIVITAS	
Date	Amount	Date	Amount
02-29	\$88,936.00	02-26	\$71,337.00
03-04	\$202,081.00	03-18	\$175,703.00
04-07	\$2,927.96	05-23	\$10,000.00
05-24	\$75,916.11	05-24	\$99,635.96
05-24	\$121,362.92	06-01	\$72,610.30
06-27	\$128,766.89	06-27	\$114,899.57
08-15	\$108,408.07	07-15	\$61,626.57
09-01	\$271,051.78	08-10	\$35,340.94
10-26	\$114,073.78	08-22	\$50,000.00
11-14	\$25,103.51	09-02	\$212,829.52
		09-22	\$50,000.00
		10-05	\$54,942.34
		11-09	\$50,451.71
		12-06	\$34,548.29
Total	\$1,138,628.02	Total	\$1,093,925.20

Funds Flow Effectiveness

Despite the above-mentioned problems, the evaluation team concluded that the funds flow was adequate for the needs of the program, in that it allowed activities to be performed as scheduled. However, CIVITAS was forced to cope with numerous difficulties. These included timing constraints for planning activities, uncertain access to the media due to the political context, and the reactions of institutional authorities. The program was successful despite these difficulties, due in part to the strong management capabilities of the Program Director. The Administration and Finance Department also played a determining role in the solution of these day-to-day problems. And finally, the flexibility and cooperative attitude of the IIDH Comptroller's office was an additional factor which permitted the system to function efficiently.

The project operated within certain constraints, one of which was that AID was the sole supplier of operating funds. This constraint posed a problem in that monthly expenses were highly variable and difficult to estimate while monthly disbursements were based on past estimates, which varied.

b. The Control of Financial Resources

The Role of the Institute

IIDH completed the Federal Cash Advance Status Report and Check Listing Forms along with expense reports. The Comptroller periodically revised the expense reports submitted by CIVITAS and completed the expense reports for the Institute. All of this information was used to prepare a voucher (Standard Form No. 1034) which was sent to the Program Accounting and Finance Division of AID on a monthly basis. AID funds, according to the Grant provisions, were deposited in IIDH's account at the Bank of America International in New York.

Prior to awarding the CIVITAS grant, AID/Washington commissioned the Puerto Rican accounting firm Clapp and Mayne to examine the financial and administrative capabilities of both CIVITAS and IIDH. Its report, submitted in 1987, indicated that IIDH has an adequate accounting and reporting system but noted ways it can be improved. The Institute has taken steps to implement changes. The evaluation team would emphasize the following three changes: a functional financial manual, adequate human and physical resources for electronic data processing, and concise financial reporting to provide information needed for strategic decision making.

It should be noted that the 1987 year-end audit conducted by Peat, Marwich, Mitchell & Company concluded that IIDH's Balance Sheet and related Statements fairly set forth the financial condition of the Institute, according to generally accepted accounting principles. The evaluation team totally concurs with this opinion. The preceding comments are aimed at preventing future problems as the Institute continues to expand.

Organization for Financial Control and Accounting System

The duties and responsibilities for the Program's financial management and control were defined in Grant Attachment No. 3 "IIDH's Implementation Plan" which was required by the IIDH/CIVITAS Agreement (Article II).

Accordingly, the IIDH Comptroller exercised accounting and financial control and audit responsibilities for the funds assigned to the Project in accordance with provisions of the agreed procedures between IIDH and CIVITAS. Specifically he had to establish and supervise a system

to transfer the Grant's funds to CIVITAS after receipt of documentation pre-audited by an external accounting firm.

The CIVITAS Program Director administered the funds assigned, according to the powers delegated by the CIVITAS Board and in compliance with the procedures established by IIDH in line with the Grant and the Sub-grant Agreement.

The Implementation Plan provided that an external accounting firm, contracted by IIDH, would exercise accounting functions in accordance with the provisions of the Grant. Specifically the firm would:

- Pre-audit all disbursement supporting documents submitted by the Program;
- Maintain accounting records of all Program transactions in accordance with the systems and forms required by the IIDH Comptroller;
- Prepare regular financial reports as required by IIDH or the Program Director.

The responsibilities of the Head of the CIVITAS Program Administrative and Finance Department were as follows:

- Process all financial documents prior to the disbursement authorization made by the Program Director and other appropriate officers;
- Maintain files for all the documentation and assure their proper custody;
- Maintain liaison with the accounting firm to assure the timely flow of the financial documents;
- Perform tasks related to the procurement of goods and services.

In compliance with the Grant requirements, the Institute contracted the Chilean accounting firm of Salas y Cia to develop and implement the accounting system currently in use; including the Chart of Accounts, the Accounting Manual and the design of accounting forms and internal procedures.

The Institute also contracted Price Waterhouse as an external accounting firm. Their responsibilities consisted of auditing disbursements and examining the accounting manuals and procedures in order to verify that they matched the Institute's requirements. The team found that Price Waterhouse was totally satisfied with the performance of both Salas y Cia and the CIVITAS

program Financial Department. Price Waterhouse also concluded that the systems utilized were appropriate and efficient.

After studying the systems, the evaluation team found that they were in fact adequate for the implementation and control of the accounting information. The four traditional accounting instruments (general balance sheet, analytical balance sheet, journal and general ledger) were conscientiously completed. In addition, the monthly information sent by CIVITAS to the Institute to request fund reimbursements was audited by Salas and revised by Price Waterhouse. These actions therefore resulted in external control and permanent and efficient verification of the finances of the program. The evaluation team also found that the cost of this double control was reasonable and necessary, as described below.

- Salas y Cia - Accounting entries and processing, permanent assistance in accounting and labor law	\$23,100
- Salas y Cia - Definition of the accounting system	3,480
- Price Waterhouse - External auditing	9,900
TOTAL	\$36,480

The accounting system manual prepared by Salas and Company was an adequate guide for efficient operations. The description of the accounts included in this manual was clear and appropriately described the transactions which occurred.

The Administration and Financial Department prepared a monthly cost information report in order to obtain analytical control of each area and each line item. These reports facilitated the preparation of the comparative monthly budget balances. This Department then submitted a detailed numerical analysis of each activity's cost behavior.

The Agreement did not establish a procurement system. The only internal control required was the approval of the Department Head who requested a specific purchase and the concurrence of the Executive Director. Despite the lack of an established procurement system, the procedure utilized was reasonably adequate for the project.

Salas y Cia provided much more than accounting services and financial control, including consultations on labor law issues such as employment agreements, labor contracts, social security remittances and income tax payments.

Internal Control Effectiveness

The system was designed in such a way that few problems were encountered. Approximately 35 percent of the total expenditures were represented by advances given to volunteers and staff members, yet these expenses were fully accounted for and no mismanagement of funds occurred. Price Waterhouse developed a general audit which proved that the expenses were used for the established purposes.

c. Use of Financial Resources

Program Cost Analysis

Eighty-six percent of the total resources available under the Grant were allocated to the Chilean program of CIVITAS and the balance of the resources (14%) was kept by the Institute to finance the technical assistance, overhead expenses and international airfares. In absolute numbers, CIVITAS received \$1,104,495 while the Institute retained \$180,505. The Institute spent \$36,720 on international airfares and technical assistance and \$143,785 on overhead.

The accounting control expenses which totaled \$36,480, were absorbed by the Institute. These figures are detailed in Exhibit No. 3 shown on the next page. The only deviations from the budget occurred in the line item for expenses in the central office under the Central Administration Category. After analyzing the costs, the evaluation team concluded the following:

**Exhibit #3
CIVITAS Program Costs
As of November 30, 1988**

	Chilean Pesos (thousands)		U.S. Dollars*		Percent
Central Administration and Office					
Salaries	21288.7		\$ 87,788		
Rent	1382.3		5,700		
Office Supplies	3073.4		12,674		
Office Services	6113.7		25,211		
Insurance	1429.9		5,897		
Maintenance	1273.0		5,250		
Equipment	6794.8	41355.8	28,020	\$ 170,540	17.0%
Training					
Salaries - Staff	15409.0		63,542		
Travel & Per Diem	11551.7		47,636		
Audio & Printed Material	30940.6		127,590		
Seminars	54471.3		224,623		
Community Work	6794.3		28,018		
Regional Offices	5621.1		23,180		
Local Transportation	1754.8		7,236		
Other Expenses	4149.4	130692.2	17,111	538,936	53.8%
Mass Media					
Production Costs	10787.6		44,485		
TV Contracts	24321.6		100,295		
Radio Contracts	20603.6		84,963		
Press Contracts	6897.2	62610.0	28,442	258,185	25.8%
Information System					
Radio News Edited	6268.5		25,850		
News File Material	757.6		3,124		
Other Expenses	1266.6	8292.7	5,223	34,197	3.4%
Total Cost		242950.7		\$1,001,858	100%

* Rate of exchange: 242.50 Chilean Pesos per U.S. \$1.00

1. Central Administration and Office

Seventeen percent of the total budget was spent on this line item, which represents \$170,540. Out of this amount, \$85,203 was dedicated to salaries, as shown in Exhibit 4A on the following page.

The Administration and Finance Department Head earned \$1,000 monthly, which is consistent with the workforce.

Exhibit #4 A
Salaries
Central Administration - As of November 30, 1988

Position	No. of Persons	Salaries	
		Chilean \$ (Thousands)	U.S. Dollars
Director General	1	5959.5	\$24,575
Director Operations	1	4076.2	16,809
Director Administration & Finance	1	3634.4	14,987
Director Communications	1	1403.3	5,787
Secretary	9	3666.2	15,118
Administrative Assistant	1	241.98	998
Programming Advisor	1	870.0	3,588
Labor Reserve	1	810.4	3,341
Total	16	20661.9	\$85,203

The purchase value of the equipment appears in the books without a depreciation credit. As provided for in Section 15.1 of the IIDH - CIVITAS Agreement, this equipment, upon completion of the program will be used to further the objectives of the program. A detailed listing follows:

Office Equipment

Audio-Visual	\$ 9,634
Office Furniture	11,366
Back-up generator	408
Switchboard	4,618
Telephone lines	1,934
TOTAL	<u>\$28,020</u>

2. Training

The training expenses totaled \$538,936 which represents 53.8% of the total costs of operations and includes all the training workshops and seminars and other activities. It also includes the publishing and distribution of printed and audio-visual materials. Out of this amount \$60,178 was dedicated to salaries as shown in Exhibit 4B.

Exhibit #4 B				
Training				
As of October 31, 1988				
Position	No. of Persons	Persons/ Months	Salaries	
			Chilean \$ (Thousands)	U.S. Dollars
Central Supervisor	1	8	832.0	\$3,431
Area Supervisor	22	117	9207.6	37,970
Pedagogical Consultant	4	16	2084.7	8,597
Communications Support	2	15	1004.4	4,142
Comptroller for Operations	1	8	807.8	3,331
Service	3	20	656.5	2,707
Total	33	184	14593.0	\$60,178

3. Mass Media

The expenditures for this item totaled \$258,185 which represents 25.8% of the total costs of operations as detailed in Exhibit #3.

The high cost of TV broadcasting resulted in Amendment No. 1 of the Grant for \$85,000.

4. Information System

A weekly radio broadcast incurred a cost of \$34,197, which represents 3.4% of the total costs.

Local Contribution

The Grant did not establish a requirement for a local counterpart contribution, but since the internal evaluation quantified it at \$601,991 the evaluation team believes that this amount is in some degree overestimated. The value of the items related to voluntary and non voluntary work

and the contribution of amplifying equipment for the so-called special events are very difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that this support coming from many people was a real contribution to achieving program goals.

5. Community Linkages

In order to effectively implement a program of activities and to establish itself as a viable institution, any organization must establish effective working relationships with other relevant organizations and institutions in its environment. The Crusade project has achieved this very well, especially considering the short duration of the project.

The Crusade established effective working relationships with a number of organizations and institutions which provided the resources and support needed to carry out its activities. These included CIVITAS, the Chilean Catholic Church, the United States Embassy, the Chilean government, other civic/electoral education programs, the media, and the political parties, unions and similar organizations (See Annex I).

The Catholic Church

The Chilean Catholic Church, in some instances since the day of the military coup in 1973 and certainly since 1974, has played a very strong role in defending human rights, alleviating poverty, and promoting participation. Even with the greater political opening during the 1980's, when the political parties and other institutions became more active, it was still the Church, both at the grass-roots and hierarchical levels, which played the key role in the process. The Church has been the principal defender of the integrity of the individual, the provider of assistance to the poor, the promoter of citizen participation, the rallying point, unifier and legitimizer of peaceful change.

In a 1987 pastoral letter the Conference of Bishops issued a call for a free and honest plebescite. In that same year the Pope made his historic visit to Chile. It was within this historical context that the Conference of Bishops considered and supported what came to be the Crusade for Citizen Participation project. Although some bishops favored, and still favor, a single project of civic education, they decided to encourage two programs. The first, the Belen Program of Civic Education, is clearly a church program run by each diocese and directed toward church-related organizations and individual persons active in church affairs. The other program, the Crusade, was to be associated with the Church but was to reach out to groups and persons not directly involved in the church.

While the Crusade did not take directions from the Catholic bishops or other church institutions, nor did it present itself as an official program of the Catholic church, it nevertheless was operationally closely related to and publicly perceived as being closely related to the church. The

Crusade recruited many of its paid staff and volunteers from personnel active in church affairs. For example, its director had headed the Catholic University's Social Service Department and is a papal consultant; its director of operations had been national director of the papal gurads for the pope's 1987 visit; and at least one regional coordinator in Antofagasta, had directed the pope's visit to that city. The Crusade utilized church symbols, including a stylized cross and the papal colors; rituals, including an investiture service for its volunteers; and values, including truth, transparency, peace, respect for the person, conciliation, unity, faith, commitment, and transcendency. The Crusade also, whenever feasible, collaborated with church groups and movements at the diocesan and parish levels and used parish facilities for some of its activities.

The United States Embassy

The Crusade directorship maintained a low-profile relationship with officials of the U.S. embassy in Santiago, including then Ambassador Harry Barnes. These relationships were primarily informative by nature but on occasion became operational. For example, the Ambassador alerted the Chilean government to the fact that the Embassy could inform the public that the government cut off its share of the food for the Caritas program in retaliation for the Crusade's activities, if it went ahead and carried out its threat.

The Chilean Government

The Crusade generally did not relate directly to government officials except on those occasions when its staff or volunteers were harrassed, as when the auto of one of its staff was set on fire, when its volunteers were picked up by the police and held, or its regional office's phones were tapped. In these instances the Crusade's national directorship normally dealt with the corresponding national officials, urging them to have the regional or local officials conduct themselves professionally. This usually resulted in the appropriate resolution of the immediate abuses.

Other Civic/Electoral Education Programs

Prior to 1973, Chile had had a long and rich history of civic education. An established curriculum of civic education existed in the school system. In addition, the political parties and other institutions had their own programs. Furthermore, Chile had had a rich cultural history of popular and community education and participation. Beginning again with the political opening in the 1980's many organizations re-initiated organized programs of civic and later electoral education.

Thus, the Crusade was one, although a very influential one, of several programs engaged in similar activities. More importantly, the Crusade defined its activities in light of and often in collaboration with these other programs (Annex H). Following are some of these programs, with many of which the Crusade had some relationship.

(1) Belen - Programa Belen de Educacion Civica

The Belen Program of Civic Education is the Catholic Church's official program directed toward its own institutions and membership, as indicated above. Established in 1987, the program is intended to be permanent, that is, it was not initiated solely in relation to the plebiscite or the upcoming elections. It is essentially a diocesan level program, with coordination provided at the national level. Its purpose is to educate persons concerning political options. In relationship to the plebiscite, the Belen program was active in both civic/electoral education and in citizen control of the electoral process.

The Crusade in most cases, depending on the leadership at the individual diocesan and parish level, maintained a friendly relationship, with each program directing its activities to different target populations. Frequently there was active collaboration at the diocesan and especially the parish level, while in a few instances there existed antagonistic or competitive relationships.

The Belen program intends to continue and hopefully expand its program during the period in preparation for the 1988 elections and to continue indefinitely beyond the elections.

(2) CIDE - Centro de Investigacion y Desarrollo de la Educacion

The Center for Research and Development of Education was established in 1975, as an outgrowth of educational programs of religious private schools. CIDE is closely related to church institutions and appears to be soundly established. It focuses on the development and implementation of non-formal popular and community education programs especially among low-income populations. In addition to designing popular education models and materials, the program also trains community educators to use its educational models and materials.

CIDE obtained a grant of \$40,000 from a private foundation to carry out its own program. It developed and published extensive materials, many in the format of simulated games, and with six full-time staff in a period of less than four months reached 15,000 persons in low-income neighborhoods in Santiago and Valparaiso. Although there was not much direct collaboration between the Crusade and CIDE, the Crusade did utilize some of the materials which CIDE developed.

CIDE intends to continue its civic and electoral education program, and its staff expressed interest in collaboration with like-minded organizations in its future programs.

(3) CESOC - Centro de Estudios Sociales

The Center for Social Studies is a pluralistic nonpartisan, private non-profit organization working in the political arena. It relates mostly to the political parties of the democratic left and center. It has three programs: Publications, Small Enterprise Development or "productive workshops", and Civic Education or "democratic formation". Its civic education program has been operative since 1984.

In preparation for the plebiscite, CESOC's program focused on the youth, grass-roots church groups, and the above-mentioned political parties. It trained the "apoderados" chosen by several of the political parties, including the PPD, Humanistic Party, Radicales, and PDC.

The Crusade did not relate directly to CESOC, although there was some relationship through the IDEAS coalition. CESOC's director was originally to be a member of the Crusade's Advisory Council, but he withdrew partly in relation to his concern over the choice of an accounting firm. Its staff allegedly had close relations to the Chilean government and he feared it might secretly supply information on the Crusade to the government.

CESOC intends to continue its civic education program, focusing on both the popular grass-roots level and the technical aspects of ensuring the democratic electoral process.

(4) CEAAL -Consejo para la Educacion de Adultos en America Latina
IDEAS -Programa IDEAS de Educacion Civica

The Council for Adult Education in Latin America has operated in Chile since 1980, currently having ten centers throughout the country. Its educational program has included human rights, women's issues, and peasants' concerns. In preparation for the plebiscite, CEAAL took the leadership with other non-profit organizations and the left-to-center political parties in creating the IDEAS Civic Education Program.

IDEAS's purpose was to provide civic education explicitly in favor of the "No" vote, and to ensure citizen control of the electoral process. The IDEAS coalition both developed materials, including 100,000 copies of the "Apoderados de Mesa" manual, and trained, "vocales", and 70% of the "apoderados" chosen by the democratic leftist and centrist political parties. The Crusade used some of the IDEAS materials in its education program.

B. Technical Assistance given by the IIDH and CAPEL to the Crusade

1. Local Representative

The electoral branch of IIDH ,CAPEL, as part of its responsibilities, was required to engage an expert in electoral processes and constitutional law to give ongoing technical assistance to the grant activities in Chile throughout the period of project implementation.

CAPEL contracted a young expert in constitutional law, and a Chilean citizen, who holds a law degree from a Chilean university and a doctorate degree from Lovaine University. In spite of his youth, CAPEL's representative is very respected and well known in the academic world in a field which normally requires many years of expertise to be publicly accepted. Under his leadership, the position became a full-time position.

In addition, a professor in consitutional law from the University of Chile agreed to assist the full-time CAPEL representative on a pro-bono basis. This team represented a highly qualified and informed human resource to provide technical assistance to the program, especially to the Program Director.

The CAPEL local representative wrote a handbook on the subject of constitutional law and electoral processes which was the technical guidance to the Crusade's staff for the training programs. The evaluation team reviewed this publication and found it to be very well written and in appropriate language for people without a legal background. It was an excellent synthesis of constitutional doctrine and an analysis of the Constitution of 1980.

The CAPEL representative was frequently consulted by the staff members, the Executive Committee, and the Program Director. He was always able to respond to their technical questions. He also reviewed all the materials published and utilized by the Crusade to ensure their technical accuracy. He played a very important role during the time when The Mercurio newspaper brought up the issue of the Crusade's nonpartisanship. The dedication of this expert, his educational background, and his personality were significant ingredients which permitted CAPEL to fulfill its technical assistance and monitoring responsibilities.

Both members of this team also dedicated many working hours to answering technical questions during the day of the plebiscite on October 5, 1988. They gave legal advice concerning technical problems to the members of voting centers on many different occasions.

2. CAPEL Staff

The grant agreement required CAPEL's Executive Director to monitor, supervise, and evaluate the program and its Voter Education Expert for Latin America to supervise the project on a daily basis. The Executive Director played a key role initially by identifying quality candidates for the CAPEL Local Representative position.

CAPEL's Voter Education Expert, contracted by IIDH's director, maintained close supervision of the project through frequent telephone communications, review of correspondence and materials, and three visits to Chile. He played a key role in counseling the Local Representative and Crusade staff, and in informing IIDH/CAPEL staff regarding significant aspects of the program.

3. External Consultants

As also stipulated in the grant agreement, CAPEL provided three well qualified external consultants with experience and training in political science, electoral processes and human rights. The three consultants, a Colombian and two Venezuelans, both IIDH board members, visited Chile, observed the program in action, visited different operation centers, participated in workshops, reviewed materials, and gave counsel to the Crusade's staff members concerning technical legal problems and political strategies.

The visits by the external consultants, although they did not provide a significant contribution to the program itself, did serve two functions which offset the time and attention which the visits occasioned on the part of the Crusade personnel. They reassured IIDH/CAPEL regarding the program and they provided the program with a more international perspective and visibility.

C. The Voter Education Program

1. Objectives

In order to achieve the general goals and purposes of the grant, to fulfill the requirements established in the agreement with IIDH, and to follow the guidelines given by the implementation plan, three objectives were established:

- a) To promote voter registration.
- b) To provide the voters with sufficient civic education so they would be informed of the options given by the plebiscite and the consequences of each of these options.

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- c) To encourage citizen control of the electoral process in order to guarantee clean and transparent elections.

2. Program Activities and Methodology

Recruitment and Training

Regional Coordinators (Level 1)

The recruitment and training of the coordinators took place in March and April of 1988. By contacting institutions working in 105 communities, such as other civic education organizations, religious organizations, political parties, and individuals, the invitations to participate in the training courses were widely distributed. People were invited to be trained as individuals and not as members of any particular organization.

Those recruited through this mechanism participated in a two-day seminar conducted by CAPEL and Crusade staff (seminar program attached in Annex F). At the end of the training, participants were asked if they wanted to dedicate their time to the Crusade with a commitment to nonpartisanship. The trainers carefully explained the objectives of the Crusade and the performance expected of the coordinators. Those whose commitment was to a political party or who for any other reason did not agree with the goal of the Crusade were free to leave the meeting places. Those who accepted the challenge and resolved to work for the Crusade as regional coordinators were initiated in a formal ceremony with the Crusade symbols. The main identifying symbols were a scarf of the same type used by the Scouts with the colors of the Vatican flag (yellow and white) and a circular badge of the same colors with a cross in white emblazoned with the words "My Voice, My Vote."

Originally nine seminars were planned for the coordinators but due to time constraints, only four seminars were carried out. The four seminars were held in two main cities close to Santiago as well as in Santiago. A total of 660 individuals were trained, of whom 484 decided to work for the Crusade. Thus with fewer than half of the planned seminars, the outcome far exceeded the original expectations of training 315 coordinators.

Most of the people who decided to work for the Crusade were already active members of various civic organizations. This can be explained as a result of the recruitment system and by the fact that these people were more likely to be receptive to a program of this nature due to their previous experiences. The coordinators saw in the Crusade an unique opportunity to participate in a well organized and pluralistic movement to restore Chilean democratic values. It appears that many participants who decided not to become coordinators, ended up working for different political parties during the plebiscite campaign.

Community Leaders (Level 2)

Once trained, the coordinators began their work by trying to form community teams. The first step was to organize all coordinators who were working in the same community. The fourth coordinators seminar was dedicated mainly to this purpose. Once the coordinators had developed working relationships among themselves, they started to activate the planned multiplier effect by developing seminars for community leaders. (The program for these one-day seminars is included as Annex G.) Each coordinator trained approximately 30 community leaders and taught them how to train others.

The seminars for the community leaders were held mostly during May and June 1988, with a few held between July and September. In the six-month period between May and September, 517 second level seminars were organized and 16,370 persons participated as trainees. From this group, the Crusade recruited 7,200 volunteers who constituted the real Crusade organization throughout the country.

The community leaders started working in 151 communities, 80 of them coordinated by provincial teams. The type of work developed by them is described below under Level 3 activities.

The most salient findings for these processes were:

- i) Some communities did not require large numbers of trainers as was expected because most of the people in those sections were already registered. An unexpected self-regulated growth of trainers appeared as the result of the relationship between the demand for civic education and the supply of trainers.
- ii) In other communities a different phenomena occurred, in which it was impossible to recruit more volunteers in spite of such a need. The Crusade found that there were limited numbers of volunteers who could fulfill the nonpartisan condition. In those cases where the community leaders had to wait for more than three weeks before the teams were organized, some discouragement showed.
- iii) A third important finding was the ability shown by the community teams to deal with pluralistic approaches to political decisions. There were no significant problems among community leaders working with other people with different political points of views.
- iv) In some cases, the Crusade leaders were asked to be flexible and to accept that people trained to be community leaders ended up becoming coordinators due to departure from the Crusade and several coordinators' commitment to a specific political party which

thereby excluded them from the Crusade. These individuals tended to work very hard and performed their tasks well. The departure of some community leaders should not be interpreted as a failure because most of them left the Crusade to work with political parties and they carried with them the message received during the Crusade seminars.

Registration and “Get-Out-the-Vote” Activities (Level 3)

The role of the community leaders was to perform level three activities. These activities were fundamental because they represented the real impact of the movement at a national level and it showed that the methodology, strategy, and tactics developed by the Crusade were successful. General findings regarding Level 3 include:

- i) Many community leaders felt they could not wait until the whole program was organized on a national level and thus they decided to initiate activities by themselves. The first of these activities took place on May 22 when several of these groups organized meetings in their own communities. Unfortunately, the printed materials for the community leaders were not available yet and so some opportunities were lost for using an important training instrument.
- ii) The activities generated by the community leaders covered a much broader scope than was expected. The diversification of activities was not planned by the Crusade’s staff and therefore flexibility was necessary to incorporate these unplanned activities into the whole program. This diversification was based on the different cultures and social attitudes found within Chile, which although not a large country by square miles, measures more than three thousand miles from north to south. The political explanation for this diversification of needs is that in those instances where people are permitted to exercise a level of political expression and freedom which they are not accustomed to, behavior is hard to predict. Such spontaneous behavior often results in actions and initiatives that surprise political leaders and those responsible for program implementation. For 15 years Chileans did not have the opportunity to express themselves freely and the plebiscite gave them an unprecedented opening. Trainees became active participants in the movement rather than passive recipients of a message.
- iii) In some cases, the community teams went beyond their geographical limits in order to bring the Crusade’s message to those communities where no coordinators or volunteers had gone. There were volunteers in 200 communities, but only in 151 were the volunteers organized. The extra effort made by some communities permitted the program to cover more than 57 communities and more than 165 small neighborhoods where no volunteers had been recruited. In total, the third level of training reached 208 communities far surpassing the initial objective of reaching 105 communities.

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- iv) A fourth finding was that two social groups were made special targets, the urban poor and the youth. Themes such “Your Voice, Your Vote”, “Tomorrow could be too late”, “The Northern Region will also decide”, etc. represented basic messages communicated to these two populations. The youth population was an important sector since it represented 48% of the potential voters. Also, young people had never had an opportunity to vote in a truly democratic process until this time. To motivate this group the Crusade broadcast radio programs in which well-known artists encouraged young people to participate in the plebiscite. These radio programs were backed by a brochure in which some of the artists were shown interviewing those youths who had just registered. Finally, special rock concerts were held to publicize the Crusade.

The various activities carried out at Level 3 included:

- i) *Training of volunteers:* The community leaders recruited and trained volunteers in half-day workshops, and then coordinated their participation in local activities.
- ii) *Door-to-door canvassing:* This was to promote voter registration and to distribute the materials containing information on how to vote, the importance of registering as early as possible, and an explanation of the two options presented in the plebiscite. The volunteers spent about thirty minutes in each visit motivating the residents to register and to vote.
- iii) *Mock voting centers:* The volunteers built boxes and held moot voting activities with false ballots in order to familiarize the people with the specific voting mechanism and reduce their fear and suspicion of the whole process. These activities were held throughout the country on the main streets, universities and institutions. A total of 101,752 people participated in 378 such activities.
- iv) *Political debates:* Debates were organized and leaders from the different political parties actively participated in them. These debates were held in universities, schools, and different community halls throughout the country.
- v) *Distribution of flyers:* Flyers were handed out everywhere. The leaders of the Crusade decided that the information should be handed out personally by Crusaders wearing their scarves and badges so that people would know who was responsible for the materials distributed. This was also an effective way to guard against the distribution of falsified materials which did occur in some instances. Over 1,289,650 people received information from the Crusade as result of these particular activities.

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- vi) *Poor neighborhood targeting*: In some cases volunteers concentrated their efforts in specific areas, frequently poor urban neighborhoods, which were known to have low voter registration. A comprehensive approach was used to reach most of the population, utilizing a variety of activities during one full day in each area. A total of 71 of these activities took place, with the participation of approximately 26,529 persons.

 - vii) *Rock concerts*: These were organized and admittance was free for those who could show their voting identification card. These rock concerts were very successful and many artists participated in them without charging any fee. The concerts took place between July 11 and August 28 in 18 cities throughout the country and 58,000 people participated in them. Some of these concerts were broadcast to other regions, and thus extended the coverage. There were 23 of these events organized by the Crusade.

 - viii) *Video forums*: After a video related to constitutional issues was shown, open discussions were organized in the different communities. Representatives from both sides of the plebiscite ("yes" and "no") were heard by 5,240 people.

 - ix) *Training of "vocales" and "apoderados"*: "Vocales" were citizens chosen by the National Electoral System and "apoderados" were individuals nominated by the political parties as their representatives. These people participated in the voting process on the day of the plebiscite, organizing the voting centers and counting the votes.

 - x) *Law student training force*: Fifty-nine law students were trained and organized to disseminate technical information about possible legal problems related to the registration and voting process.

In conjunction with the activities at all three levels, the Crusade's Department of Communications had a special role to play. It defined a profile for the Crusade early on and maintained this image during the whole movement. This profile was that the Crusade was formed by a group of Chileans who believed in democratic principles and who were actively committed to the objective of recovering these principles. The main characteristic of the movement was tolerance of the opinions of all the citizenry expressed by peaceful means.

Based on the fact that 90% of Chilean homes have television sets, the department designed a massive communication strategy based television advertisements which were to be backed by radio broadcasts. But when the problems of access to the television necessitated a change in strategy, the department exhibited flexibility and switched to radio broadcasting as its primary media.

Sixty contracts with AM and FM radio stations were established. A special five minute radio program called " United from North to South" was broadcast once a week at nine p.m. every Thursday with the purpose of keeping all volunteers updated with the latest news from the movement. Thirty-seven of these weekly programs covered the entire country.

3. Outcomes

First Objective: Voter Registration

As stated previously and recognized by the Crusade, there is no way to measure the extent to which the Crusade was directly responsible for the high level of registration, although there is no question that the role of the Crusade was vital. When the activities of the Crusade started in March 1988, the number of registered Chileans totaled four and a half million while the potential voter population was just over eight million. By the end of the registration period almost seven and a half million persons were registered voters. Thus three million new voters were registered in six months. The Crusade played a vital role in this outcome both directly by registering voters and then getting them to vote, and indirectly by giving confidence to other voter education programs to participate in the process.

The main challenge faced by the Crusade and the other civic education groups which participated in this concerted effort was to overcome the apathy, fear, and lack of credibility the plebiscite created in the Chilean population; the second, but no less important, was to combat the ignorance concerning how to register and to vote. Few Chileans were aware that once the candidate was nominated by the government, the registration process would close and no one except for those people registered at the time could vote. And all voters needed instructions in the voting procedures to guarantee that their votes would be valid.

Second Objective: Educated Voters

Civic education was conducted throughout the whole period of the Crusade, in order to provide potential voters with both reasons to vote and information needed to cast informed and valid votes. The first instrument used to provide electoral and constitutional education was the handbook written by the representative of CAPEL called "Civic Fundamentals of My Vote." This is a synthesized and well-written description of the constitutional rights and procedures to be followed in order to make voting decisions. The second material developed was the "Volunteers Guidebook" which clarified many common doubts of the volunteers and worked as a supportive tool for their own training tasks. Both these and other materials, including simulation games, were extensively used and shared.

The Crusade staff and especially the Program Director, recognize that the collaborative efforts with other civic education institutions (listed in Annex I) were very important in producing the positive results. The voter turnout was of historic proportions. Over 97% of the registered voters actually voted; the abstention rate was only 2.47%. And of the votes cast, only 1.37 were void and 0.97% blank.

Third Objective: Citizen Control of the Electoral Process

Due to the widespread skepticism surrounding the plebiscite, many Chileans needed to be assured that the results would represent the true figures obtained from a clean election and an accurate counting of the votes. The Crusade contributed to this end through several activities.

The Crusade conducted 139 courses dedicated to training electoral officials and political party representatives working in the voting centers. These courses trained 5,284 “vocales” and “apoderados” representing almost one quarter of the total number of voting centers. Specific materials were developed for the day of the plebiscite, such as “What to do on the day of the plebiscite”, they were distributed among the communities where the voting centers were located and broadcast to the public via radio.

A national movement called the Committee for Free Elections in Chile (CEL) designed a system to develop a fast counting process, based on the results in ten percent of the voting centers, to produce estimated results two hours after the voting process had ended. The purpose of the Committee for Free Elections in developing this process was to discourage the government from any attempt to manipulate the results of the plebiscite. More than 3,000 people were involved in this fast counting process and the projections developed proved to be excellent estimates. The difference between the CEL projection and the actual results of the plebiscite was only 0.2%. The fact that the public was kept informed of the results as reported via radio by the CEL network, at the same time that the government controlled television was distorting the results, helped ensure that President Pinochet eventually accepted the outcome. The Crusade decided not to participate in the CEL vote-reporting program as an institution, but staff and volunteers were permitted to participate on the day of the plebiscite provided they in no way identified themselves with the Crusade.

4. Parallel Outcomes: Citizen Control of the Social Climate through the Campaign for Peace

By June and July, preparations for the plebiscite had divided the citizens into two opposing forces. Due to the political context outlined in Chapter III, the confrontational character of the plebiscite was leading Chileans to increasing polarization and creating elements of violence.

The Crusade played a key role in developing a national strategy to reduce the intensity of the social climate and make a political resolution by the plebiscite viable. The Crusade initiated its "Working in Peace for Peace" campaign (in Spanish "Trabajando en Paz para la Paz") just a few days before President Pinochet was nominated as presidential candidate. Beginning with a "Declaration for Peace" the Crusade cooperated with many other organizations in the effort to encourage all Chileans to follow the rules without violence. The campaign included public forums, musical concerts, religious services, reflection groups and other acts, totalling forty-seven activities and reaching 35,456 persons.

The campaign culminated on September 25, ten days before the plebiscite, with the impressive and well publicized peaceful demonstrations in support of peaceful participation in the plebiscite. In seven cities throughout Chile tens of thousands of people joined hands to form "Human Chains for Peace". On Santiago alone, more than 100,000 persons joined hands to surround the city for 68 kilometers. This and other aspects of the peace campaign contributed greatly to the outcome of the plebiscite.

5. Meaning of "Neutrality for Democracy"

The evaluation team gave particular importance to determining whether the Crusade had actually been able to remain impartial. A total of 37 persons were interviewed about this issue, as follows: the director of the National Electoral Service; five political science professors; three journalists specialized in covering political news for the three leading papers in the country; three union leaders; five political party leaders representing the entire political spectrum; five leaders of private voluntary organizations dedicated to civic education; members of the Board of the Chilean Bar Association, the Engineers Association, the Journalists Association; five representatives of the Catholic Church; and twelve businessmen from large, medium, and small private companies. The unanimous response was that the Crusade had been successful in its effort to promote registration and to inform people about the value of the vote. The respondents agreed that the primary characteristic of the Crusade was the tolerance shown by the movement to the different options and total fulfillment of the condition of nonpartisanship.

Some of the people interviewed expressed their concern about the high risk that the Crusade took of being influenced by the Christian Democrat Political Party since the two CAPEL consultants, the head of the Operations Department, some of the members of the Executive Committee and many staff members were publicly known as active numbers of this party. The interviewees recognized that although the Crusade risked appearing partisan, the activities of the Crusade never showed any favoritism for one option or party. A careful review by the evaluation team shows clearly that there was no sign of partiality in the materials developed, in the speeches or press conferences given by the Program Director, or in the radio and television spots. The materials produced and used by the Crusade were carefully reviewed not only by experts in

constitutional law, but also by government representatives. The evaluation concludes that the Crusade always fulfilled the nonpartisanship condition.

It is important to note that although the Crusade was without a doubt impartial in one sense, it was openly partial in its effort to recover democracy for Chile. This subtle difference could have been understood by some government officers and part of the population as a commitment to the "No" group. The evaluation tried to dig deeper in this issue, but, as stated earlier, those persons and institutions consulted which were related to the government were not able to prove specific charges of partiality.

It is understandable that some people confused the message of the Crusade with that of the groups promoting the "No" vote, due to the political context in which the Crusade operated. To defend democratic principles in a plebiscite where one of the options was to legitimize a man who became President as the result of a military coup could be easily confused with siding with the "No" vote. On the other hand, the fact that the government's position was that it, too, favored democracy - a "protected" democracy - allowed for an interpretation in favor of the "Yes" vote. Indeed, the Crusade fulfilled the highest expectations and permitted those who represented the "Yes" option to express their ideas in public debates.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Relevance and Impact

1. *Conclusion:* **The program exceeded all expectations.** Chile needed an activity of this nature. The program was designed and implemented at the right time and in the right way to meet the mission of AID and IIDH, as well as the needs of the Chilean people. Civic education and promotion of voter registration had to be a joint effort with the participation of several organizations, but the Crusade proved to be the best structured and well-implemented program of all the initiatives in Chile in 1988. There is no way of quantifying the precise impact of the Crusade, but it is recognized by the other organizations, by the media, by the political parties, by political specialists and by the Chilean people in general as the leading movement not only in the registration process, but also in providing civic education and promotion of pro-peace activities throughout the year of the plebiscite.

Recommendation: The evaluation team agrees with the proposal to develop a new program similar to the Crusade for Chile during 1989, the year of the national presidential and congressional elections. Even though the political parties will necessarily play a more important role during the elections than the plebiscite, there are roles which non-partisan civic organizations can and should legitimately exercise.

Effectiveness

2. *Conclusion:* **The quality of the personnel of the Crusade was the key factor in the program's success.** The Program Director, the head of the Operations Department, and CAPEL's Local Representative were especially significant to the success of the project. Their leadership, experience, contacts, technical knowledge, managerial skills and mature judgement were key.

Recommendation: Any new project should build on these human resources and take into account the institution building which has occurred in IIDH/CAPEL, CIVITAS, and the Crusade as the result of the grant. The "learn by doing" approach has resulted in the development of valuable human resources, significant institutional memory of lessons learned, and effective systems. If the leadership of CIVITAS is not willing to lend its status to the program, another nonpartisan, nonprofit organization must be identified.

3. Conclusion: The flexibility of the project design allowed project staff to make valuable adjustments to the program throughout the period of implementation. The grant agreement between AID and the IIDH specified the purposes of the funding and a detailed implementation plan specified the way to achieve these purposes, but they permitted a certain level of discretion on the part of the subgrantee which proved essential to the success of the project.

Recommendation: The evaluation team concurs that prior to the definition of the specific project design of any new project, discussions should be held with the grantee and subgrantees to establish general guidelines and flexibility built into the program to adjust to changes in the local political circumstances. There should be emphasis on choosing personnel who can maintain consistency in objectives and flexibility in strategies.

4. Conclusion: The rigorous fulfillment of the condition of nonpartisanship during the 1988 program was fundamental in developing acceptance of the movement on the part of the government, the political parties, the pressure groups and other civic education organizations.

Recommendation: Any future program should pay scrupulous attention to this requirement. In light of the increased politicization anticipated in 1989, the evaluation team recommends broadening the political representation of both the Executive Committee and staff. More individuals from the democratic right and left should be actively invited and included in the implementation of the new program; the representation of those from centrist political parties should be reduced if necessary in order to create a balance.

5. Conclusion: The Crusade was especially skilled at utilizing the mass media, radio, television news, and the written news media. This proved a very effective and cost-efficient means of conveying timely information to large numbers of citizens, and providing a social dimension to its message.

Recommendation: Any future program, as long as it has a broad civic education component, consider more extensive use of radio - perhaps creating a "radionovela" (radio soap opera) or similar "soft sell" vehicle for educating listeners in democracy or other civic education themes.

6. Conclusion: The Crusade, by maintaining good relationships with relevant publics and organizations in its environment, was highly successful in accessing resources, strengthening its effectiveness through collaborative action, and minimizing resistance from sectors which opposed its program.

Recommendation: Any future program pay at least an equal degree of attention to this critical function.

7. Conclusion: The IIDH/CAPEL played an important role by providing: the institutional backing of a prestigious international organization, technical assistance in designing and implementing the program, and an international perspective and linkages.

Recommendation: In any future program in Chile, IIDH continue its same threefold role, but providing less technical assistance –eliminating the external consultancies – and at less cost, and concentrating more on disseminating the lessons learned in the Chile program.

8. Conclusion: The Crusade mobilized an incredibly impressive level of volunteer effort throughout the country. The commitment, enthusiasm and vitality of the volunteer Crusaders produced a quantitative and qualitative level of activity which could not be matched with even several times the funding level had it not been for the volunteer nature of the movement.

Recommendation: This level of volunteer effort was possible partly due to the particular historical circumstances in 1988, including the fact that the program was clearly limited to a relatively short time span making it easier to enlist volunteer support. Future programs will not operate under the same circumstances and therefore will require higher levels of funding to achieve the same level of impact.

Efficiency

9. Conclusion: IIDH, CIVITAS and the Crusade demonstrated capability and efficiency in the administration of the financial resources with three different parties involved in the transfer of funds. The contracting of two external accounting firms was a prudent decision and confirmed the trustworthiness of these institutions.

Recommendation: A smaller project need not contract two external accounting firms. The Crusade's staff were efficient and conscientious in the management of funds and since a new program would likely involve a lower level of funding, one firm would be sufficient.

Sustainability

10. Conclusion: Aside from the extensive volunteer's effort and in-kind contributions generated within Chile, the external financing came from the AID grant.

Recommendation: It is recommended that a percent of the budget for a new project come from sources other than AID. These sources could be the local private sector, individual citizens, other governments, or international organizations. It is especially important to identify local sources in order to motivate this type of political development program by nationals.

Replication

11. *Conclusion:* The lessons learned in the implementation of the program in Chile may be transferred to other countries, but it is necessary to establish a clear distinction between those elements which were particularly Chilean and those which may be common to other Latin American countries.

Elements particularly Chilean included:

- Chile's long democratic tradition prior to 1973.
- The relatively short (15 years) period of authoritarian rule; half of the voting age population had experienced democracy as adults prior to 1973.
- The strong role played by the Catholic church and its broad credibility with the Chilean population.
- The highly developed level of human and organizational resources in Chile.
- The existence of a large segment of the population which had benefited neither politically nor economically from the status quo.

***Recommendation:* Prior to deciding to initiate similar voter education programs in other countries, careful analysis be done to determine the suitability and feasibility of such programs based on the respective historical, cultural, and political national contexts; then, lessons learned from the Crusade experience be drawn and their adaptation be determined.**

EVALUATION OF SCOPE OF WORK

ANNEX A

SCOPE OF WORK

I. Activity to be Evaluated

The evaluation will assess the performance of a \$1.285 million grant (LAC-0591-G-SS-8005-00) to the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIDH) and its sub-grantee, Fundacion Civitas, supporting a program of non-partisan voter education for the October 1988 plebiscite in Chile.

II Purpose of the Evaluation

This end-of-project evaluation will determine: 1) the effectiveness of the project in achieving its stated program objectives; 2) the effectiveness of the grantee and sub-grantee in administering technical and financial resources; 3) the potential for sustaining continuing program of voter education in Chile after the project ends; and 4) the replicability of project components in other countries in the region.

III. Background

The project was based on an unsolicited proposal from the IIDH requesting A.I.D. funds that would enable the IIDH and its subdivision, CAPEL, to respond to Civitas' request for financial and technical assistance in carrying out a non-partisan voter education and registration program in Chile. At the time the project was first proposed, only two million out of approximately eight million eligible voters had registered. Several factors combined to discourage their participation. A new electoral law made voting non-compulsory and instituted costly (to low-income people) and time-consuming mechanisms for registration. Polls revealed a sizeable degree of apathy, skepticism and lack of confidence on the part of the Chilean electorate in the power of an individual vote.

The project supported a nationwide program of civic education to encourage eligible voters to register and exercise their voting privilege. It was designed to train approximately 216,000 volunteers over a period of one year, using a pyramidal methodology that would train at the first level some 300, who would then train 7200 at the second level, who would reach the ultimate target of 216,000 community leaders. The volunteer work at the community level was reinforced by a broadcast and print media voter education campaign.

Because of delays in approving the grant agreement, including the need to obtain approval of the Institute's board of directors at its January 1988 meeting, implementation of most pre-plebiscite project activities was compressed into a seven month period (March to October, 1988). A.I.D. provided \$50,000 to the IIDH for a

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three-month pre-grant preparatory phase, during which IIDH/CAPEL and Civitas drew up a detailed implementation plan, delineating the roles and responsibilities of the two organizations. This became a part of the sub-agreement between IIDH and Civitas, and is one of the key documents to be used in guiding the design of the evaluation.

IV. Methods, Procedures, Level of Effort.

A team of three persons will conduct the evaluation through site visits to 1) IIDH headquarters in San Jose, Costa Rica (3 to 5 days); and 2) Civitas' project office in Santiago, Chile and to other locations in the country where a significant level of project activity was carried out (12 to 15 days). Data analysis and writing should be coordinated on an ongoing basis. Following completion of the field work, ten working days will be allocated for preparation of the final report.

The team will examine all aspects of the program, with particular attention to the institutional and operational relationships between the IIDH and Civitas. One member will focus on the training elements of the project, including the design, methodology, materials produced and other relevant aspects of both the volunteer training and media campaigns, to determine their quality, effectiveness, impact and potential replicability. Another will focus on the financial management of the project by IIDH, Civitas and the contract audit firm, assessing the quality of the financial management plan as well as of the efficiency of its implementation. The assessment of performance, impact and possibilities of continuing or replicating the project must carefully take into account the historical context and political environment of the country.

Prior to commencing field work, the contractor will consult with the A.I.D. project manager to obtain background information on the grantee organizations and the project, to identify the key people to be interviewed, their locations and organizational affiliations; and to develop and refine the scope of the issues to be examined.

During site visits in Chile, a staff member and a board member of IIDH/CAPEL will accompany the evaluation team as participant observers to enhance the grantee's understanding of project activities, political environment, potential follow-up programs and other evaluation findings. These individuals will be identified by the IIDH director and their expenses will be borne by the IIDH. They will not participate in writing the evaluation report to A.I.D.

V. Team Composition, Qualifications:

The scope of work for this evaluation requires three professionals with the following skills and qualifications:

- fluency in Spanish;
- thorough knowledge of Latin American social and political culture gained through living or working in the region, preferably in Chile.
- substantial experience with and knowledge of Latin American volunteer organizations, and with non-formal adult education programs in Latin America.
- background in political science, institutional analysis, adult education, financial management;
- demonstrated effective writing skills;
- experience in evaluation of A.I.D. projects.
- knowledge of A.I.D. financial management and accountability regulations and procedures.

One of the three will be the team leader with principal responsibility for writing the final report and for coordinating the work of the team throughout the evaluation.

VI. Reporting Requirements

A draft report will be completed five working days after returning from the field. The final report will be submitted five working days after receiving the A.I.D. project officer's comments on the draft.

The final report will be organized as follows: Executive Summary, Table of Contents, Body of the Report, Appendices.

The executive summary states the development objectives of the activity evaluated, purpose of the evaluation, study method, findings, conclusions and recommendations, and lessons learned about the design and implementation of this type of development activity.

The body of the report should include discussion of 1) the purpose and study questions of the evaluation; 2) the political and social context of the project; 3) team composition and study methods (one page maximum); 4) evaluation findings; 5) conclusions drawn from the findings; 6) recommendations of actions to improve project performance, particularly with respect to follow-on activities in Chile, or potential replication elsewhere in the region.

The appendices should include a copy of the evaluation scope of work, a list of documents consulted, and individuals and institutions contacted.

IV. Evaluation questions

The evaluation questions presented below illustrate the key issues that the evaluators will have to address in this evaluation. These questions may be refined and reformulated during discussions with the project officer and other AID officials in the initial phase of the evaluation.

A. Effectiveness and impact

Questions should be addressed to the performance of the grantee, IIDH and its subgrantee, CIVITAS.

1. CIVITAS Voter Registration and Education Project

What was the impact of the project in encouraging voter registration? What were the impacts in urban and rural areas, in median income and poor neighborhoods and with youth under 33 who had never voted before? Were there differential impacts in these sectors based on targetted efforts, receptivity or other factors such as security, political environment, etc.? What were the impacts on voter registration by differentiated activities: volunteer efforts such as door-to-door canvassing, community events and activities, national TV, radio advertising and other programs?

Similarly, assess impact of voter education programs for informing voters on issues relating to the plebiscite, the provisions of the 1980 Constitution, election and voting procedures, vote counting, the role of parties in poll watching and any other voter education activities undertaken by CIVITAS? Differentiate by socio-economic status, urban/rural, regions, etc.

2. Describe the method of selecting volunteers for leadership roles, field work and community activities. Provide a general profile of the types and numbers of volunteers by occupation, age, socio-economic status, political persuasion and other distinguishing characteristics. What factors motivated volunteers? As best you can, assess the views of volunteers to the CIVITAS program - their level of commitment, their ability to provide inputs into voter education activities and their willingness to continue these types of activities in the future. How much direction was required for volunteer activities and how much was self-initiated?
3. Review the operations of the CIVITAS headquarters. How was it organized? Was staffing appropriate? How effective was the leadership of the paid staff? Did the staff work as a team? What was the role and activities of volunteers at the headquarters? Were there tensions between paid and unpaid staff? For project success, how important was charismatic leadership, if it existed?
4. How did the pyramid training methodology work? Review the Level 1 training program, materials and results undertaken by the "monitors" at national training sessions. How many were trained and provided continuing support for CIVITAS activities. What was the drop out rate for these leaders and why did they stay or leave the CIVITAS program?
5. Similarly, assess the Level 2 and 3 training programs? What were the problems in moving from Level 1 to Level 2 and 3? Did they reach their targeted numbers? What modifications in Level 2 and 3 training programs were made as experience was gained in undertaking these activities? Were adult education techniques used and effective in these training programs? Describe how the training methodology assisted in creating a volunteer network or were other approaches more (less) effective in gaining and retaining committed volunteers.

6. Review training materials (books, manuals, volunteer handbooks, training video, etc.) for Level 1 and Levels 2 and 3, and assess their effectiveness and utilization. Provide an assessment of the "successes" and "failures" of the training materials. Also, review effectiveness of voter education handouts, flyers, posters, etc.
7. Describe the communications network between national headquarters and the field? Assess the effectiveness of the radio "newsletters" and discuss the reasons for not initiating a volunteer printed newsletter. Review the quality of communications including telephone contacts, word of mouth, regional coordinators/team leaders, roving field staff for building and sustaining the volunteer network and for undertaking national, regional and local activities.
8. Based on analysis of secondary data, how effective was the paid media campaign? What sectors of the population were reached? What types of messages were most effective? Assess TV as compared to radio? Review the free press and describe the effectiveness of the CIVITAS communications program including press releases, press conferences, interviews, etc.
9. During the project, there was a decision to concentrate on youth and poor neighborhoods. Describe the specialized projects for these target audiences? How important were rock concerts and other events? Review the role of volunteer artists for posters, performances, etc.
10. Review issues relating to the adoption and implementation of the nonpartisan principles and procedures in the CIVITAS program. How does CIVITAS define non-partisanship? What was the direct involvement of CIVITAS volunteers in the "No" campaign? Was CIVITAS viewed as nonpartisan - by political party leaders, church officials, government, others?
11. Compare the CIVITAS voter registration and education project with other similar efforts in Chile such as the Belen project. How was it unique? How much collaboration was there with other nonpartisan efforts? Was the CIVITAS project more or less effective than other efforts, for example by the political parties and their alliances?

12. Review the role of the Catholic Church in CIVITAS activities? How effective was CIVITAS in working with other voluntary organizations in its voter education efforts? Provide examples of collaboration.

B. Efficiency

1. Have IIDH/CAPEL and CIVITAS established effective linkages, lines of authority, staffing and monitoring systems to enable a timely implementation of the program?
2. Have IIDH/CAPEL and CIVITAS established a financial management system that permits both a timely delivery of funds and accurate accounting of financial resources?
3. Where there too many controls or not enough? How well did the in-country IIDH representative function? Was there too many or too few supervisory trips? How helpful were the supervisors?
4. Assess the effectiveness and types of IIDH technical assistance for the voter education programs?
5. Assess the effectiveness of the CIVITAS Advisory Board. How often did it meet; what were its recommendations and contributions to the project?

C. Sustainability

The project was undertaken for its immediate impact within the context of the Presidential Plebiscite. However, the evaluation would also be helpful in assisting AID in consideration of additional support for establishing a permanent nonpartisan and voluntary organization for sustaining voter education.

1. Has CIVITAS gained the capacity for becoming a viable organization which can implement nonpartisan voter education programs in the future?
2. Does CIVITAS have the capacity of raising sufficient financial resources to maintain a viable program in the future? What level of resources would be necessary and over what length of time necessary for establishing a permanent voter education program?

- 4
3. What are the views of CIVITAS, its advisory committee, project staff, volunteer leaders and volunteers for creating a permanent organization.
 4. How does the political environment affect the chances for the survival of a nonpartisan voter education program?

D. Replication

1. What components of this project are transferable to similar programs in other countries in the region? What components are unique to this specific project?
2. What new voter education techniques were introduced through the project? How were the techniques modified to fit the Chilean context?
3. How can the elements of the project which were successful be best disseminated to other countries in the region? What is the role of IIDH in assessing the lessons learned and transmitting them to other countries?

PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED

ANNEX B

PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED

U.S. Agency for International Development

1. Norma Parker - Director LAC/DIO Washington
2. Roma Knee - Project Director LAC/DIO Washington
3. Carl Cira, Jr. - Regional Coordinator - RAJO program Costa Rica
4. Paul Fritz - AID representative in Chile
5. Renato Hidalgo - AID officer in Chile

U.S. Embassy in Santiago, Chile

1. Charles Gillespie - Ambassador
2. George Jones - Deputy Chief of Mission
3. Ronald Goddard - Chief of Political Section
4. Marilyn McAfee - Public Affairs officer
5. Charlotte Roe - First Secretary (Political Affairs)

Inter-American Institute of Human Rights

1. Thomas Burgenthal - President
2. Carmen Delgado - Member of the Board of Directors
3. Sonia Picado - Executive Director
4. Jorge Garcia - CAPEL's Director
5. Constantino Urcuyo - Political Adviser to CAPEL
6. Eduardo Piccolo - Controller
7. Francisco Navarro - Accountant
8. Rafael Villegas - CAPEL Advisory Council Member
9. Humberto Nogueira - CAPEL representative in Chile

CIVITAS Organization

1. Baldo Santi - Chairman of the Board
2. Juan C. Godoy - Administration Manager
3. Juan Pablo Roman - Advisory Council Member
4. Manuel Pereira - Advisory Council Member
5. Fernando Irarrazaval - Advisory Council Member

The Crusade

1. Monica Jimenez - Program Director
2. Eduardo Arriagada - Executive Committee
3. Sergio Munoz - Executive Committee
4. Laura Novoa - Executive Committee
5. Manuel Pereira - Executive Committee
6. Marta Lagos - Executive Committee
7. Juan C. Latorre - Operations Department
8. Patricia Massardo - Finance Department

9. Enzo Pistacchio - Supervisor
10. Roberto Berenguella - Supervisor
11. Dennis Godoy - Supervisor
12. Pablo Rodriguez - Supervisor
13. Mauricio Tolosa - Supervisor
14. Jorge Munoz - Supervisor
15. Hector Olivo - Supervisor
16. Fernando Roman - Supervisor
17. Josefina Guzman - Supervisor
18. Pedro Delano - Supervisor
19. Gino Gnecco - Communications Coordinator
20. Teresa Bravo - Public Relations
21. Arnoldo Yanez - Regional Coordinator
22. Norma Tejada - Regional Coordinator
23. Maria Morales - Regional Coordinator
24. Sergio Hurtado - Regional Coordinator
25. Ramon Abarca - Regional Coordinator
26. Rene Sepulveda - Events Coordinator
27. Jorge Munoz - Supervisor
28. Carlos Uribe - Supervisor
29. Noelle Pascal - Supervisor
30. Maria C. Concha - Supervisor

.....and fifty-two crusaders in seven Chilean cities. Their names are not listed due to the request of the Executive Director based in security reasons.

Other Organizations

1. Hugo Flores - Movimiento Poblacional Solidaridad
2. Hernol Flores - Central Democratica de Trabajadores
3. Jose A. Vieragallo - CESOC
4. Claudio Vasquez - CESOC
5. Francisco Geisse - CESOC
6. Luis Brahms - CESOC
7. Juan Jose Silva - CESOC
8. Francisco Vio - CEAL
9. Javier Egana - BELEN Civic Education Program
10. Humberto Vergara - BELEN Civic Education Program
11. Francisco Estevez - IDEAS
12. Carlos Gonzalez - President of the Episcopal Conference
13. Sergio Contreras - Executive Secretary of the Episcopal Conference
14. Alicia Vidal - Vicariate of Solidarity
15. Ernest Lakansheck - Director of Marinknoll Fathers and Brothers
16. Juan Carlos Tonkin - Price-Waterhouse
17. Carlos Lopez - Salas and Company
18. Jorge Salas - Salas and Company
19. Eduardo Arriagada - Association of Engineers
20. Gonzalo Duarte - AVEC
21. Oscar Sepulveda - La Epoca Newspaper

- 22. Sergio Molina - CEL Movement
- 23. Roberto Fantuzzi - Fantuzzi Industries
- 24. Carlos Huneeus - Political Scientist
- 25. Sergio Vitar - Vice-President PPD Political Party
- 26. Miguel Otero - Vice-President Renovacion Nacional Political Party
- 27. Alejandro Hales - President Chilean Bar Association
- 28. Juan I. Garcia - Director of the Government Electoral Service
- 29. Elena Martinez - El Mercurio - Newspaper
- 30. Francisco Cumplido - University Proffesor
- 31. Juan Arriagada - Lawyer

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS CONSULTED

ANNEX C

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS CONSULTED

Grant Agreements

1. AID-IIDH Pre-Grant Assistance (PIO/T 598-0591-3-865600)
2. AID-IIDH Grant No. LAC-0591-G-SS-8005-00
3. AID-IIDH Grant Amendment No. 1
4. Chilean Voter Education Program - Implementation Plan
5. IIDH-CIVITAS Agreement

Reports

1. Monthly Program Reporte by Program Director (March to November 1988)
2. Monthly Activities Report by CAPEL representative (April to October)
3. Mission Reports by Political Science Expert Mr. Constantino Urcuyo (April, July, October)
4. Consultant's trips reports by CAPEL Advisory Council Members Allan Brewer-Carias and Carlos Restrepo
5. Briefing Paper by Ted Weihe (U.S. Representative for the Crusade (June 24, August 18)
6. Internal Evaluation Report - November 1988

AID Project History

1. A.I.D. Support to Capel
2. Grant request from CAPEL to AID, September 11, 1987
3. Action Memorandum "Voter Education project in Chile" written by Terrence J. Brown, December 11, 1987
4. A.I.D. Press Guidance, July 22, 1988

IIDH-CAPEL

1. IIDH Financial Statements as of September 30, 1987
2. CIVITAS accounting system Manual
3. Report on the management and implementation capability of IIDH in Costa Rica and CIVITAS in Chile (Clapp and Mayne)
4. IIDH statutes and bylaws
5. IIDH description brochure
6. An Assessment of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, August 1988 by Creative Associates International, Inc. submitted to AID/LAC/DIO
7. CAPEL Annual Activity Reports, February 1985 to January 1987, February 1987 to January 1988, and semiannual Report February 1988 to August 1988

Chilean Publications relevant to The Voter Education Program

1. "The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende" by Nathaniel Davis
2. "Chile, El Galope Muerto" by Jacobo Timerman
3. "Andre de La Victoria" by Patricia Verdugo
4. "El Dia Decisivo" by Augusto Pinochet
5. "Chile, Revolucion Silenciosa" by Joaquin Lavin
6. "Los Silencios de la Revolucion" by Eugenio Tironi
7. "Chile en el umbral de los Noventa" by Jaime Gazmuri
8. "Chile para Todos" by Sergio Vitar
9. "Un Desafio Colectivo" by Patricio Aylwin
10. "Analisis" (Political Magazine) - Issues 255- 256-257
11. "Cauce" (Political Magazine) - Issues 187- 188
12. "Hoy" (Political Magazine) - Issue 593
13. "Accion Latinoamericana" (Political Magazine) - # 3
14. "APSI" (Political Magazine) Issue 282

66'

LIST OF CRUSADE PUBLICATIONS AND MATERIALS

ANNEX D

MARZO

Credenciales	62.500
Cartillas	18.000
Carpetas	12.400
Autoadhesivos	600.000
Trípticos	20.000
Pañuelos	12.500
Chapas	12.500

ABRIL

Afiches propaganda e información (logo)	20.000
Trípticos ¿ Quiénes somos?	100.000
Fichas o cartillas de información	19.000
Fichas de inscripción para monitores	15.000
Compromisos Voluntarios	12.000

MAYO

"Fundamentos Cívicos para mi Voto"	15.000
Volantes para promover inscripción electoral	1.000.000
"Se acerca el Plebiscito"	20.000
Cuadernos del voluntario (entrega parcializada)	220.000

JUNIO

Afiche "Gran baile"	1.000
Afiche "Recital Rock"	500
Hojas para máquinas de escribir	10.000
Compromisos	10.000
Fichas de inscripción	10.000

Himnos	10.000
Cartillas de formación:	
Org. Trabajo Comunal	1.000
Prog. la acción en la Comuna	1.000
Prog. Recorrido Domiciliario	1.000
Volantes "Significado del SI y NO"	1.000.000
Tríptico "Boletín Escrito"	100.000

JULIO

Volantes con información "Como Votar"	1.000.000
boletines escrito en forma tríptico	100.000
Entradas de dos colores	30.000
Ejemplares del cuadernillo ¿ Qué hacer el día del Plebiscito?	10.000
Afiches a tres colores	4.000

AGOSTO

Afiches para eventos	4.000
Entradas recitales	30.000
Tríptico boletín escritos	100.000
Facsimiles de votar	50.000
Pañolines	1.500
Chapas	1.500
Compromisos "Cadena por la Paz"	2.000
"Manifiesto por la Paz"	5.000
Hojas de firmas	5.000

SEPTIEMBRE

Objetivo: 1	
Volantes de "Votación"	1.000.000
Folletos "El día del Plebiscito"	300.000
Cuadernillos instrucciones básicas para el Plebiscito	10.000
Objetivo:2	
Facsimiles de voto	100.000
Objetivo:3	
Volantes "Cadena por la Paz"	750.000
Himno "Canto por la Paz"	100.000
Afiches 2 tamaños "Cadena por la Paz"	35.000
Etiquetas autoadhesivas "Cadena por la Paz"	60.000



**DESCRIPCION Y UTILIZACION
DEL MATERIAL GRAFICO DE LA CARPETA**

Página 1.

Elementos identificatorios del Voluntario.

- . Pañolín
- . Insignia
- . Credenciales

Utilizados en acciones territoriales, salidas masivas, actos públicos, eventos.

Página 2.

Registro e identificación del Voluntario.

- . Ficha de Inscripción
- . Certificado de Compromiso

Página 3.

Materiales informativos y publicidad.

- . Portada del Cuaderno del Voluntario.

Entregado como material informativo y educativo en seminarios Nivel II y III, y recorridos domiciliarios.

- . Autoadhesivos.

Utilizados como material publicitario, en lugares públicos de concurrencia masiva, como vidrieras comerciales, Metro, buses.

- . Tríptico de información institucional.

Utilizado como material informativo y de invitación a participar en la Cruzada, entregado a instituciones o personas.

Página 4.

- . Hoja y sobre de correspondencia institucional.
- . Comprobante de egresos para gastos menores.
- . Himno Oficial de la Cruzada.



Página 5.

- . Primer afiche publicitario.

Utilizado para presentar la Cruzada, en lugares de concurrencia masiva de público en comunas, tales como Parroquias, colegios profesionales, sindicatos. Afiche de identificación para locales de seminarios, eventos, etc..

Página 6.

- . Afiche publicitario.

Utilizado en los mismos lugares, de forma más específica.

Página 8.

Materiales incentivando a la inscripción.

- . Tríptico sector juvenil.
- . Tríptico sector poblacional marginal.

Página 9.

- . 3 tipos de boletos para eventos musicales juveniles, de promoción de la inscripción.
- . Primer volante promoviendo la inscripción.

Entregado mano a mano en lugares de alta concurrencia de público.

Página 10.

- . Afiche para promover la inscripción.

Dirigido a sectores juveniles y poblacionales marginales.

Página 11.

- . Afiche de eventos musicales en la zona Norte del país, para promover la inscripción juvenil.

Página 12.

- . Afiche de eventos musicales en la zona Sur del país, para promover la inscripción juvenil.

70



Página 13.

- . Afiche de evento musical en Santiago promoviendo la inscripción juvenil.

Página 14.

- . Afiche de evento musical en Santiago, promoviendo la inscripción en general.

Página 15.

- . Afiche standard para comunicar distintas actividades, como recitales en comunas, foros, etc.,.

Página 17.

- . Flujograma para explicar el cronograma publicitario.

Utilizado por el equipo de monitores jurídicos.

- . Volante de las opciones del plebiscito.

Entregado mano a mano en acciones territoriales.

Página 18.

- . Dos caras del volante de votación.

Entregado mano a mano en acciones territoriales.

- . Facsímil de voto.

Utilizado en simulacros de votación realizados en lugares públicos, en instituciones, y entregados por convenios, a sindicatos, partidos políticos, instituciones.

- . Volante Instrucciones para el día del plebiscito.

Entregado mano a mano y vía convenios, a instituciones, etc.

Página 19.

- . Afiche del foro-panel sobre el plebiscito realizado en la Universidad Católica, Santiago.

Se colocó en los 4 Campus de esta Universidad.



Página 20.

- . Afiche de lugares de votación en las comunas de la Región Metropolitana.

Colocados en locales comerciales, parroquias, etc..

Página 21.

Campaña por la Paz.

- . Manifiesto por la Paz invitando a adherir a la campaña.

Entregados a organizaciones sociales, religiosas, políticas.

- . Compromiso de no-voluntarios para adherir a trabajos preparatorios de la Cadena por la Paz.

- . Autoadhesivo entregado a participantes en la Cadena por la Paz, como elemento identificatorio.

Página 22.

- . Afiche publicitario de la Cadena.

Colocado en locales comerciales, lugares de concentración masiva de público, postes de alumbrado en el recorrido de la Cadena, parroquias, instituciones de diversa índole.

Página 23.

- . Volante (dos caras) con instrucciones al público para participar en la Cadena.

- . Plano del recorrido de la Cadena por la Paz realizada en la ciudad de Santiago. (68 kilómetros).

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RELEVANT PLEBISCITE STATISTICS

ANNEX E

RELEVANT PLEBISCITE STATISTICS

Total registered voters.....7,435,913
 Total registered men.....3,609,454
 Total registered women.....3,826,459
 Total voters for each center.....350
 Total number of vote centers.....22,248
 Number of Chilean Regions.....13
 Number of Chilean provences.....51
 Number of Communitties.....343

R E G I O N	V A R O N O S			M U J E R E S			T O T A L		
	REGISTROS OCUPADOS	DE RESAS RECEPCIONALES	TOTAL ELEC- TORES MAI- LES	REGISTROS OCUPADOS	DE RESAS RECEPCIONALES	TOTAL ELEC- TORES MAI- LES	REGISTROS OCUPADOS	DE RESAS RECEPCIONALES	TOTAL ELEC- TORES MAI- LES
I	291	265	91.062	271	267	90.033	562	532	181.095
II	355	246	115.470	338	333	113.514	693	666	228.984
III	191	164	61.044	160	175	56.994	371	364	120.038
IV	398	391	129.394	403	397	133.701	801	793	263.095
V	1.166	1.150	381.070	1.243	1.227	419.377	2.409	2.392	800.447
VI	601	591	196.257	574	563	191.416	1.175	1.163	387.673
VII	727	712	237.442	701	696	233.009	1.428	1.412	470.451
VIII	1.453	1.435	474.065	1.454	1.440	485.596	2.907	2.885	959.663
IX	672	657	216.714	655	643	215.605	1.327	1.312	432.319
X	805	787	257.330	778	759	253.127	1.583	1.563	510.457
XI	81.	72	22.763	64	55	16.736	145	136	41.519

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PROGRAM OF LEVEL I TRAINING COURSES

ANNEX F

PROGRAM OF THE FIRST LEVEL SEMINARS

(IN SPANISH)

Primer Día

- 17:00 - 18:00 hrs: Recepción, inscripción y acomodación.
18:00 - 19:00 hrs: Acogida:
Presentación, objetivos del Seminario y expectativas de los participantes.
19:00 - 20:00 hrs: Primer Tema: M. JIMENEZ - J.C. LATORRE
Visión General y Mística de la Cruzada.
Democracia y Derechos Políticos.
20:00 - 21:00 hrs: Comida.
21:00 - 22:30 hrs: Trabajo Comisiones 1º tema

Segundo Día.-

- 08:00 - 09:00 hrs: Desayuno.
09:00 - 09:45 hrs: Segundo Tema: H. NOGUIERA
Las opciones de Chile en 1988
09:45 - 12:00 hrs: Trabajo en Comisiones Segundo tema.
12:00 - 13:00 hrs: Dialogo con HUMBERTO NOGUEIRA
13:00 - 15:00 hrs: Almuerzo
15:00 - 15:45 hrs: Tercer Tema:
Estrategias de Acción Territorial
a) Datos básicos de inscripción electoral
LESLIE FAURE
b) Planificando nuestra acción en la comuna.
ALEJANDRO ORMEÑO
c) Los recorridos domiciliarios
MANUEL FERREIRA
15:45 - 19:00 hrs: Trabajo en Comisiones tercer tema
20:00 - 21:00 hrs: Comida

- 10'

22:00 - hrs: Actividad recreativa

Tercer Día

08:00 - 08:30 hrs: Misa.

09:00 - 10:00 hrs: Desayuno

10:30 - 11:30 hrs: Cuarto Tema: J.C. LATORRE

Apoyo y seguimiento que ofrece la Cruzada
para el trabajo de los voluntarios.

11:30 - 13:00 hrs: Trabajo en Comisiones Sexto Tema -
Evaluación

13:00 - 14:00 hrs: Ceremonia de Clausura

14:00 - 15:30 hrs: Almuerzo

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LIST OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE CRUSADE
AND OTHER CIVIC EDUCATION ORGANIZATIONS

ANNEX H

LIST OF FORMAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS

- 1.- Movimiento Poblacional Solidaridad (20 de Abril de 1988).
- 2.- Asociación de Jubilados de la E.T.C. del Estado (4 de Mayo de 1988).
- 3.- Centro de Promoción Social CENPROS. (11 de Mayo de 1988).
- 4.- AVEC, Fundación para la acción vecinal y comunitaria (17 de Mayo de 1988).
- 5.- Federación Nacional de Trabajadores del Comercio y Cooperativas de Chile. (19 de Mayo de 1988).
- 6.- Colegio de Asistentes Sociales (25 de Mayo de 1988).
- 7.- Movimiento de Mujeres Pobladoras, MOMUPO (14 de Junio de 1988).
- 8.- Asociación de Juntas de Vecinos de la Granja (14 de Junio de 1988).
- 9.- Congregación Salesiana (14 de Junio de 1988).
- 10.- CLAT, Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores (6 de Junio de 1988).
- 11.- Colegio de Abogados (5 de Julio de 1988).
- 12.- Instituto CANON, Departamento Cultural (8 de Julio de 1988).
- 13.- Confederación Empleados Particulares de Chile, CEPCH (13 de Julio de 1988).
- 14.- CONFECOOP, Confederación General de Cooperativas de Chile (5 de Mayo de 1988).
- 15.- Colegio de Profesores (12 de Mayo de 1988).
- 16.- SHALOM, Asociación de Profesionales Cristianos (La Serena, 1 de Septiembre de 1988).

LIST OF INFORMAL AGREEMENTS

1. Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos.
2. SERPAJ, Servicio de Paz y Justicia.
3. INPROA, Instituto de Promoción Agraria.
4. Facultad de Arquitectura, Universidad Católica, Santiago.
5. CESOC, Centro de Estudios Sociales.
6. Pastoral Juvenil, Parroquia de Lourdes, La Serena.
7. Sindicato de Transportistas, La Serena.
8. Sindicato de Trabajadores, Cía. Minera "El Indio", La Serena.
9. Comando Socialista por el NO, (COSONO).
10. ANEF, Agrupación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales.
11. JUNDEP, Juventudes para el Desarrollo.
12. Asociación de Guías y Scouts de Chile.
13. Colegio de Arquitectos de Chile.
14. Embajada de Francia.
15. INACAP, Instituto Nacional de Capacitación.
16. Movimiento Teocrático.
17. Radio Carrera.
18. INPRU, Instituto Nacional de Pastoral Rural.
19. Centro de Pastoral Juvenil, (CPJ).
20. CONFERRE, Conferencia de Religiosos.
21. Centro "El Canelo de Nos".
22. Cooperativa Liberación.
23. USACH, Universidad de Santiago de Chile.
24. Comunidad Monseñor Enrique Alvear.
25. Radio Gigante.
26. Instituto ESANE.
27. Colegio San Ignacio.
28. Hospital Barros Luco.
29. Colegio San Juan.
30. ILADES, Instituto Latinoamericano de Doctrina y Estudios Sociales.
31. Instituto ARCIS.
32. Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Chile.
33. FEUC, Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Católica
34. Colegio de Profesores.
35. Instituto EDUCARES.
36. Teatro Abril.
37. Instituto Profesional Blas Cañas.
38. Conferencia Episcopal de Chile.
39. Belén, Programa de educación para la participación.
40. INDISO, Instituto de Difusión Social del Arzobispado de Santiago.
41. Colegio Saint George's.

42. Vicaría Zona Cordillera, Arzobispado de Santiago.
43. A.F.P. Magister.
44. Sindicato San Pablo.
45. Colegio Saint Gaspar.
46. Colegio Universitario Inglés.
47. Vicaría Zona Centro, Arzobispado de Santiago.
48. Preuniversitario Cardenal Caro.