

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY (PES) - PART I

1. PROJECT TITLE Structuring Nonformal Education Resources	2. PROJECT NUMBER 931-1054	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE S&T/ED, AID/W/USAID/L
	4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) 632-84-1	

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING		7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION	
A. First PRO-AC or Equivalent FY 79	D. Final Obligation Expected FY 85	C. Final Input Delivery FY 85	A. Total	\$ 2,965,000	From (month/yr.)	12/82
			B. U.S.	\$ 2,611,000	To (month/yr.)	11/83
					Date of Evaluation Review	

B. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., telegram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
1. Update detailed implementation and budget plan for last 2 years of project.	Layne-Hoxeng-Makheha	July 1985
2. Redeploy staff in view of recent growth and assumption of new functions.	Layne-Makheha	July 1985
3. Revise on-site training plan to increase amount and focus on specific identified problem areas.	Layne-Hoxeng	June 1984
4. Develop detailed networking plan for 1985.	Hoxeng-Makheha	June 1984
5. USAID/Lesotho establish more viable assistance fund management procedures and brief LDTC.	Cully-Moloko	June 1984
6. MOE establish final positions for ASANTE staff.	Makheha-Layne	July 1985
7. ASANTE diversify activities.	Makheha-Layne	

8. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS			10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT	
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	A.	<input type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T		B.	<input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or
<input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement	<input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P		C.	<input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project
11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles)			12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval	
LDTC Director: L. Makheha S&T/ED: James Hoxeng USAID/L HRDO: P. Layne			Signature	
<i>P. R. Layne 7-2-85</i>			Typed Name	
			Jesse J. Snyder	
			Date	
			<i>10/1/86</i>	

MEMORANDUM

To : A. de Graffenreid
Evaluation Coordinator

From : Patsy Layne, HRDO *OWL*

Subject: GOL Contribution Information for Project 931-1054 Evaluation

Date: November 20, 1986

The following information is for your use in finalizing the Project Evaluation dated April, 1986 for Project 931-1054.

In accordance with the Project Agreement, the GOL is committed to contribute \$200,000 over the LCP. The contribution was to be in kind, as follows: housing and hard furnishings for three Technical Advisors; Office operations, as required to carry out the in-country training and to house the TAs, as well as other facilities and services normally provided by the GOL to carry out regular tasks of TAs, and of the newly created Assistance Fund operations; ~~and~~ benefits and dependent allowances for GOL employees while they are in long-term training; and funding of LDTC staff in positions created as a result of project.

No records are available from the GOL for computing exact amounts of contribution. The contribution from the beginning of the project through the date of the evaluation was estimated at \$292,000 computed as follows;

Housing: 100 mos @ M900	M90,000
Office operations:	108,000
Training support 216 mo. @ M500	120,000
Staff costs for 5 new positions:	<u>120,000</u>
	Total
	M438,000
Average \$1=M1.5	\$292,000

PROJECT EVALUATION SUMMARY

LESOTHO DISTANCE TEACHING CENTER ANNUAL EVALUATION FOR 1982-83

Part II

13.0 Summary. The summary provided by Creative Associates is clear and to the point. I would only add as a major problem that the Assistance Fund seems to be taking too much LDC staff time in proportion to number of groups helped. This PES Part II should be read in conjunction with the Executive Summary (pages 1-4) of the attached report.

14.0 Evaluation methodology. Creative Associates sent a team of three to Lesotho, none of whom have done previous work in the country. During 12 days in Lesotho, they spoke with roughly half of the LDC staff, 22 Government of Lesotho civil servants, three USAID officers, and a number of other non-governmental local and foreign development workers. They visited groups which had received loans through the Assistance Fund, and reviewed documents available in the country. In the United States they reviewed relevant documents and spoke with LDC staff as well as professors at the University of Massachusetts. The evaluation team noted two constraints on their work: key individuals were either not available or were too busy for more than brief conversations, and it was not possible to see LDC staff under normal working conditions, because the staff was too busy talking with the evaluators. It should be noted that no contact was made with ordinary LDC "customers" other than those given grants through the Assistance Fund.

15.0 External factors. The Executive Summary does not mention one of the findings of the evaluation, namely, that there appears to be a continuing market for the Printing and Production unit, a market which is not being tapped as a way to provide support for LDC. Another external factor, which is not mentioned is the increased pressure by South Africa, including a border closure during the evaluation period, which makes it all the more imperative that LDC move more rapidly toward independence of outside support.

16.0 Inputs. This portion of the Executive Summary did not deal with training inputs. The main problem is that long-term overseas staff training has not always been relevant. In particular, UMSS has not provided training in certain key areas, e.g. radio. A second problem is that short-term training has been inadequate, poorly focused and not designed to consolidate skills already partly learned.

Qualitative and anecdotal accounts of long-term training in the evaluation report emphasizing the weak points rather than the strong points, seem to suggest that the long-term training is not achieving its objectives. Eleven short-term training workshops are listed, of varying quality and impact.

17.0 Outputs. In the discussion of outputs it should be noted that output from the Assistance Fund has been very limited, and not necessarily directed to the groups in greatest need. The output from the Printing and Production unit has been confined recently to services requested by LDTC itself. Likewise, the Radio unit has not produced to its fullest capacity.

18.0 Purpose. The purpose of the project is to assist the Government of Lesotho through the LDTC to develop and test an innovative organizational approach to provision by central government agencies of technical and financial assistance to organizations and communities involved in nonformal education activities.

The LDTC Assistance Agency has developed the capacity to provide technical assistance to the target groups, however, the mechanism for providing financial assistance is not functioning efficiently. Further, there are philosophical differences of opinion among the decision makers of the MDE/LDTC as to the kind of financial support that is to be provided, and groups to be served. These basic "purpose" issues must be resolved.

19.0 Goal/Subcontract. Among the goals implicit is financial self-sufficiency. It is important for LDTC and USAID to agree on this goal, e.g. the extent to which the printing and production unit should be a commercial money-making unit or a service to the organization, and whether the Assistance Fund should only lend money at interest at a "profit" level. It would appear that policies are being operationalised without setting them in the entire context of LDTC's scope of work, or of the project's stated purposes.

20.0 Beneficiaries. The Assistance Fund had assisted seven groups by the time of the evaluation, and the groups were already beginning to repay their loans. However, there is a real question whether this is the most appropriate use of LDTC's time and money. The Literacy/Numeracy section was working with 28 learning posts in rural areas, and with UNICEF assistance was helping 40-60 learners at each post. The Printing and Production Section has served relatively fewer outside agencies than in previous years, with an income of only M2,000 in the first 9 months of 1983. The Service Agency had provided assistance on 63 different occasions from April 1982 to September 1983 to roughly two dozen organizations. Of this activity 33% was in training, 23% in materials development, 5% in research, 5% in pre-testing materials, and 35% in copy editing, printing or recording of materials.

21.0 Unplanned effects. The Executive Summary covers this topic adequately with one exception. It seems that the continued presence of expatriate advisors, e.g. in the Research and Evaluation Unit, allows Basotho staff in other divisions the opportunity to put their responsibilities on expatriate shoulders. Further, there is a tendency for the LDTC "at large" to use Service Agency resources (project funded) as a substitute for lack of support from GOL budget and income activities. This weakens the infant Service Agency unit, and postpones the necessity for sound management practices throughout the LDTC.

22.0 Lessons learned. In addition to comments made in the Executive Summary, it should be noted that staff trained to do a particular job do not necessarily remain in that job. LDIC has experienced this mobility of staff to its detriment in all too many cases. The negative consequences of not having firm objectives should also be noted, e.g., when the work of the Service Agency gets swallowed up by the business of giving loans to small groups. The tendency of government to allow international donor agencies to carry development projects as long as funding is available and the donors don't complain too loudly is also an important lesson to learn. What we haven't learned is what measures can effectively guarantee staff continuity, timely assumption of responsibility by government and the relative effectiveness of the Service Agency approach, which combines financial and technical support vs technical support unaccompanied by loan or grant support.

In general, the LDIC operation, including the Service Agency Unit which this project has institutionalized, is an example of successful use of creative approaches for solving educational problems. Unfortunately evaluation summaries tend to focus on "problems to be overcome" because of the practical need for recommendations for improvement. Hence, this summary sounds more negative than the situation warrants. The project is a success, as confirmed by the complete evaluation report attached.