

7. 850,000 man days of employment for refugees and nationals;
8. Environmental improvements in place.

II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION/PURPOSE

The Refugee Self-Reliance (RSR) Project and a sister project, CDA Forestry CDA-F, were funded in FY 1983 under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. The theme underlying both the projects is to provide refugees with income opportunities and skills, and in the case of CDA-F, address damage done to tree resources during the earlier refugee emergency period; and to relate these refugee activities to the Somali milieu. The RSR Project Agreement was signed on 22 December, 1982. The Project Activities Completion Date was March 1988. Sub-project activities began in April 1983 and were completed in September 1986. In order to provide technical assistance to the National Refugee Commission, the Project was extended until March 1988.

The goal of the RSR Project was to "increase the capacity of refugees in Somalia to become more productive and self-reliant, thereby improving their economic status while reducing their dependence on the Somali government and donor countries." The Project was experimental in its purpose of testing what strategies and interventions would increase the self-reliance of refugees. Full self-reliance was not anticipated during the life-of-the-Project, and it was understood that only a limited number of refugees would benefit. Non-refugees in the area were also to share the benefits.

III. PROJECT COMPONENTS

The Project components were to provide:

1. Institutional support to the National Refugee Commission;
2. Support for Socio-Economic and Technical Studies (SETS) on refugees;
3. Direct assistance to refugees through PVO field projects; and
4. Project monitoring and management assistance.

The bulk of financing (US\$9,844,000/US\$ in So. Shs.) for this Project was devoted to supporting specific refugee self-reliance interventions implemented by the following four private and voluntary organizations (PVOs).

1. Save the Children Foundation (SCF);
2. Partnership for Productivity (PFP);
3. New Transcentury Foundation (NTF); and
4. The Experiment in International Living (EIL).

IV. END OF PROJECT STATUS

1. General

Project objectives were generally met with refugees engaged in income-productive activities, some studies contributing to policy formulation, and most of the NRC and related managers benefiting from training in improved management skills. The Project has been very successful in training a significant number of Somali professionals in various development activities. Engineers, extensionists, trainers and administrators held responsible positions with PVOs and gained first hand experience in the design, implementation and evaluation of sub-projects.

The RSR Project implementation led to discussions between the GSDR and the USAID Mission in the development of durable solutions on refugee matters such as refugee settlement and, in 1986, to the initiation of the Refugee Settlement Project. USAID and US PVOs have become familiar with some of the successful project implementation formulas for rural development in Somalia. Through the implementation of the RSR Project the Mission established a good relationship with PVOs which extended the effectiveness of USG assistance to Somalia and resulted in the initiation of the PVO Development Partners Project.

However, the activities under this Project were faced with problems common to all project activities in Somalia -- difficulty in communication, a cholera epidemic in the project area, fuel shortages, delays in local currency disbursement by the Ministry of Finance, and late arrival of commodities.

2. Institutional Support to NRC

Support to the NRC Planning Unit (PU) produced mixed results. Advances were made towards the projected outputs. The expatriate implementation managers provided sound technical advice. An international and external information system for the PU was designed. A standardized system for monitoring and evaluation of camp based activities was introduced. Seminars organized by EIL helped establish communication at camp and regional levels between the different agencies. The provision of out of country educational opportunities for PU staff resulted in better trained personnel. The PU has benefited from their increased skill. The efforts to improve the overall infrastructure of the PU were moderately successful. However, there is little evidence that the PU has developed staff potential for the coordination between the departments within NRC, or line ministerial cooperation for effective planning. The Project life period seems too short to create such significant changes. The objectives set out in the Project Paper (PP) appear overly ambitious.

3. Socio-Economic and Technical Studies

The activities envisaged under SETS have not met expectations in providing a flow of scientifically objective data for use in planning overall refugee activities. However, some relevant studies led to the designing of the present USAID-funded Refugee Settlement Project.

Out of the six completed studies, three (B.C. Spooner's Refugee Settlement in the Lower Shabelli Region, Africare's Jalalagsi Socio-Economic Survey, and the Settlement Analysis by Planning Unit/NRC) were useful in the planning of program strategies and investigation of a 'durable solution' for refugee settlement. The other three studies did not yield important data and answers to key refugee-related development issues.

4. Self-Reliance Sub-Projects

The Project called for sub-project inputs to agriculture, skills training, infrastructure and regional development. A summary of EOPs in each of these sectors follows.

5. Agriculture

Meeting all the agriculture development objectives as described in the PP was problematic, given the uncertainties surrounding refugees' access to farm land in and around the camps. The project design called for the development of 1300 ha. of irrigated land and 700 ha. of rainfed land to benefit 7,400 households over the four year project life. Development of rainfed land exceeded the target (1,235 ha. developed) while irrigated land development fell short (320 ha. developed). Project extension activities consisted of distribution of improved seeds, tools and tractor services to the beneficiaries, and on-the-job training to refugee extensionists and farmers. The Project has provided a total of 4,275 refugee households with irrigated/rainfed land (.1 to 1 ha. per household). A large number of indigenous farmers benefitted from the extension services. In general, the Project dispelled the myth that refugees are not willing to do any work. The major constraints for the implementation of the irrigated agricultural component were non-availability of suitable farm land, policy issues regarding land and plot size for distribution to refugee farmers, lack of land tenure policy for refugees, delays in the access to UNHCR funding and needed equipment and, in the case of SCF, internal management difficulties.

6. Skills Training

Under the PFP sub-project, vocational skills and management training programs were developed for both refugees and non-refugee beneficiaries. The overall success of the sector to promote enterprise development seems to have been achieved through:

- A. Adaption of the activities to the reality of the local economy;
- B. Assisting ongoing business in the project area through business advice to new enterprises/entrepreneurs;
- C. Training people to upgrade their existing skills so that they could contribute to the local economy; and
- D. Planning surveys to determine what local businesses see as needs and opportunities.

The EIL sub-project provided administrative skills needed in the management of refugee related projects through a series of field workshops and training programs for planners and implementors involved with refugee assistance projects. The effect of this on the targeted beneficiaries is unclear.

7. Infrastructure Improvement:

Two hundred forty (240) kilometers of roads were constructed, rehabilitated, or worked on by NTF in the Northwest and Awdal regions using intensive wage labor. This effort was well received by the people of Awdal and the Northwest. The improved roads facilitated easier and more efficient transportation of refugee rations to Darayamaane, Darbi Hoore and Tugwajaale refugee camps and cut transportation time in half. The road building component has certainly shown that refugees as a group are ready and willing to do labor to contribute to their own support. The extra income of the refugees has contributed to increased business of the stores, shoemakers, furniture makers and blacksmiths within the camps.

8. Regional Development

In addition to the absence of a good road network, the scarcity of developed water resources is a major constraint to development in the Northwest region, which hosts more than 65% of the Somali refugees. NTF's impact on water exploration work was significant. They found large amounts of water at new locations near Borama and Baki where other conditions favor refugee settlement potential. NTF has established an on-going metal fabrication capacity in Hargeisa town, which will provide significant employment, and provide critically needed gabion to the region for agriculture and infrastructure construction and maintenance. This sub-project also created employment opportunities through refugee participation in the construction of the Hargeisa city drainage system.

V. THE PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS VS PLANNED OUTPUTS

<u>Planned Output</u>	<u>Project Achievements</u>
1. 7,000 refugee families growing 20-30% of their food.	4,265 refugee families farming; farm production generally sold for cash to meet household need; 132 refugee families also earning cash through beekeeping.
2. 2,000 hectares of land.	1,555 hectares of land cultivated.
3. 3,000 refugee farmers trained.	4,400 refugee families and 400 non-refugee families were trained in agriculture and provided with agriculture extension services.

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|---|---|
| 4. 2,500 refugees trained in vocational skills. | 734 refugees received vocational skills training or benefited from business advisory services. |
| 5. 5 Somali managers trained. | Four NRC senior staff and two RHU administrators attended a two month management training course at EIL in Vermont. Four senior staff were given one year non-degree training in Nairobi. 250 field staff attended seminars on management skills. |
| 6. 25 k, of access road constructed and 50 km improved. | 159.5 kilometers of earthen road constructed or improved. |
| 7. 850,000 man days of employment for refugees and nationals. | 597,471 person days of employment for refugees and nationals. |
| 8. Environmental improvements in place. | One sub-surface water storage dam constructed; one reservoir cleaned; 9,410 meters of Hargeisa drainage system renovated or constructed; 8 test holes drilled; 4 struck water, 2 of which had potable water. |

The extent of land under cultivation and refugee families farming were less than planned because less than the projected number of agricultural sub-projects were funded. It is not possible to determine the percentage of food needs being produced by the farmers due to lack of baseline or production data. The three PVOs implementing agricultural programs met or exceeded their sub-project targets.

The number of refugees to be trained in vocational skills was not attained. PFP, the PVO doing the preponderance of training, attained its planned target. NTF project which produced significant unplanned outputs was not fully budgeted for. The cost of all the sub-projects exceeded the cost estimated in the PP.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED

1. Projects that address a temporary and volatile situation such as refugee assistance should: (a) be stated in broad and realistic terms; (b) frequently evaluate socioeconomic, technical and policy issues affecting the project; (c) not depend on timely provision of resource inputs by agencies and/or donors outside the management control of the project itself; and (d) be able to respond rapidly and effectively to opportunities as they arise during implementation.
2. Refugees respond to opportunities to earn income; many refugees are able farmers who adapt well to new farming techniques.

3. PVO sub-projects should rely on one donor to avoid delays, miscommunications and conflicts.
4. PVOs can be effective and efficient implementors of refugee projects.
5. Programs in which local businessmen train refugees in an apprenticeship arrangement is an effective training approach.
6. There is a need and a large market for business advice services in accounting and small business practices in rural Somalia.
7. Labor intensive road rehabilitation is technically feasible in Somalia. To be effective, the supervision of experienced engineers is important.
8. Resettlement of refugees can best be promoted through assistance projects that focus on regional development, such as the provision of minimal basic infrastructure.

VII. Pending Actions for Project Close-out

A. Financial

1. Obtain a statement from the GSDR that the contract has been completed.

Action Agent

Time Frame

ARD/GSDR

August, 1989

2. Send a letter requesting the PVOs to submit a final voucher to GSDR/USAID.

Action Agent

Time Frame

ARD/CONT

August, 1989

3. After careful reconciliation among the USAID ARD Division Chief and Controller, AID/W and the GSDR, a total of approximately \$49,792 undisbursed funds be deobligated and returned to the U.S. Treasury.

Action Agent

Time Frame

CONT

August, 1989

4. Close the project files and prepare for forwarding to appropriate storage.

Action Agent

Time Frame

ARD/MGT

October, 1989

5. Prepare a contract/project completion statement.

Action Agent

CO

Time Frame

September, 1989

Clearances:

PDS:TLOfgren _____

PROG:RMDepp _____

11/11 EONT:TJohnstone *T Johnstone*

MGT:SBellows *SHB* _____

Drafted:ARD:LJayaraman