

PD-AAZ-623
02217

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY: PART I

A. REPORTING A.I.D. UNIT: USAID/Egypt
 B. WAS EVALUATION SCHEDULED IN CURRENT FY EVALUATION PLAN? yes X slipped ___ ad hoc ___
 C. EVALUATION TIMING interim ___ final X ex post ___ other ___

ES#: 86-10

D. ACTIVITY EVALUATED:

<u>Project #</u>	<u>Project Title</u>	<u>First PRGAG (FY)</u>	<u>PACD (mo/yr)</u>	<u>Planned LOP Cost</u>	<u>Amount Obligated to Date</u>
263-0161.05	Neighbourhood Urban Services	FY 81	6/87	\$89 Million	\$89 Million

<u>E. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY THE MISSION DIRECTOR</u>	<u>OFFICER RESPONSIBLE</u>	<u>COMPLETION DATE</u>
1. Increase coverage of popular and executive council members by Local Development II (LD II) training workshops, and increase their emphasis on the respective roles of both councils.	Urban Local Development Committee, Governorates & TA contractor.	12/88
2. Develop and submit a proposal to the LD II technical secretariat (AMANA) for a subproject to modernize municipal tax administration.	G. Kerr & C. Doggett, DR/LAD.	12/87
3. Ensure adequacy of district maintenance plans for NUS subprojects prior to initial LD II disbursements, and monitor implementation of these plans.	Urban Local Development Committee, Governorates & TA contractor.	6/86
4. Develop a "training of trainers" program within the Sakkara Training Center.	LD II Technical Secretariat (AMANA) & G. Kerr, DR/LAD	12/88

11

ACTION DECISIONS (contd.)

OFFICER
RESPONSIBLE

COMPLETION
DATE

5. Assign adequate project staff for program planning and coordination to the LD II Technical Secretariat (AMANA) and the governorates; ensure that technical advisory personnel work closely with AMANA and governorate staff.

Urban Local
Devpt. Committee,
Governorates &
C. Doggett,
DR/LAD

9/89

6. Clarify the technical, advisory role of local Social Affairs Department staff, and emphasize the prime responsibility of local councils in identifying PVO subprojects, in orientation workshops for the expanded PVO component under LD II.

PVO subcommittee
of LD II Technical
Secretariat
& G. Kerr, DR/LAD

12/87

F. DATE OF MISSION REVIEW OF EVALUATION:

June 15, 1986

G. CLEARANCE/APPROVAL OF EVALUATION SUMMARY AND ACTION DECISIONS:

Technical Office/Directorate

Program/Evaluation Office

Deputy Director

C. Doggett, DR/LAD *[Signature]*

S. Conly, PPP/PL *[Signature]*

A. *[Signature]* Conly, DD

G. Kerr, DR/LAD *[Signature]*

T. Ware, PPP/PL *[Signature]*

D. Tinsler, DR/LAD *[Signature]*

V. Mollrem, PPP/PL *[Signature]*

F. Zobrist, AD/DR *[Signature]*

G. Laudato, AD/PPP *[Signature]*

Approved:

[Signature: Frank B. Kimball]

[Date: 2/5/87]

Frank B. Kimball, DIR

Date

H. EVALUATION ABSTRACT

The Neighbourhood Urban Services (NUS) Project provided \$89 million in block grants, technical assistance (TA) and training to assist local government and PVOs in Greater Cairo and Alexandria to plan and to implement 2,800 small development projects. This final phase of a three-year evaluation was to assess project achievements in strengthening local capability to provide basic services, and in improving the quality of life for urban residents. Major findings and conclusions follow:

- o NUS has moved local urban government towards increased public participation and responsiveness to local needs, by increasing opportunities for popular council involvement in local decision-making.
- o NUS has helped to realize the full potential for decentralized administration under local government law in Egypt. It has proved that small infrastructure and services projects can be effectively handled at the district level. However, districts need technical back-up. The TA contractor filled this need under NUS, but the governorate and central levels must provide this support in the next phase of the program.
- o NUS conducted a large training program, but training activities were delayed and had little direct impact on subproject implementation. Training could not be fully institutionalized, owing to the shortage of qualified trainers.
- o 2800 district and PVO projects have addressed important local needs. These include rehabilitation and expansion of schools, street lighting, water and sewerage, and improvements to health, day-care, and vocational centers. Projects are generally appropriate and well-utilized, and serve an estimated four million people annually.
- o Maintenance of this infrastructure is crucial for the continuation of services and benefits. Despite efforts to provide maintenance funds and to survey needs, urgent maintenance needs have not yet been met.
- o The financial means to sustain a program like NUS is not yet in place. Local funds for capital investments are shrinking, but the NUS design increased dependence on central transfers, rather than reorienting local government towards cost-recovery.

Recommendations: The successor, Local Development II program design addresses major problems in training, maintenance and local finance. Implementation should also include:

- o expanded training workshops on the role of the popular councils;
- o a pilot project to modernize municipal tax administration;
- o funding mechanisms that introduce cost-sharing and cost-recovery principles;
- o training of trainers at the Sakkara Training Center;
- o maintenance of all NUS subprojects, and development of preventive maintenance systems;
- o continuation of the current selection system and funding criteria for subprojects.

I. EVALUATION COSTS

1. Evaluation Team

Name/Affiliation	Contract # OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (US \$)	Source of Funds
Richard Huntington, ISTI Team Leader			
Monira Fouad, ISTI Consultant	NEB-0000-C-00	\$ 333,437	NUS
Barry Frazier, ISTI Consultant	3048-00	(Phase III only)	Project (263-0161.05)
Laila El-Hamamsy, AUC/SRC			
Donald Cole, AUC/SRC			

2. Mission Staff Person Days 25

3. Grantee/ Staff Person Days 40 3

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY: PART II
J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

USAID/EGYPT
NEIGHBOURHOOD URBAN SERVICES PROJECT (263-0161.05): FINAL EVALUATION

PROJECT DESCRIPTION: The Neighbourhood Urban Services (NUS) Project aims to strengthen local government capability to provide basic services, and to improve the quality of life in Greater Cairo and Alexandria. The project provided \$89 million in subprojects, technical assistance (TA) and training to assist local municipal governments and PVOs in planning and implementing approximately 2,800 small infrastructure and services projects.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY: This is the final phase of a life-of-project evaluation contract with ISTI. The final evaluation was asked to respond to two key questions relating to project purpose and impact:

- o Has NUS contributed to self-sustaining institutional changes and improved capabilities in local urban government and PVOs?
- o Has NUS satisfied priority local needs in a sustainable manner?

Evaluation data sources included surveys of local officials, PVO representatives, and staff at subproject sites; special studies in public finance and maintenance; project records; and prior evaluation reports.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:

1. Institutional Change and Improved Capability

(a) Administrative Decentralization:

NUS has greatly increased district-level responsibility for construction and delivery of basic services. NUS has served as "a much needed lubricant for the more effective functioning of the local government system at its grass roots." Local government has performed the tasks of project selection, contracting, supervision and coordination for about 1,200 subprojects in 23 districts; construction quality has equalled or exceeded usual standards.

The record of project completion proves that these tasks can be handled at the district level. However, constraints to district government's ability to effectively manage small infrastructure projects include a need for technical - especially engineering - back-up. The TA contractor met this need during the project; in the next phase of the program, the governorate and central technical secretariat must provide technical support to the districts.

(b) Public Participation:

NUS has increased the responsiveness of basic services by giving popular councils a greater voice in local decision-making and by providing increased resources to local-level PVOs. Previously, the councils had few opportunities to exercise their legal right to approve local subprojects. Increased involvement in the annual selection of NUS subprojects by the councils has resulted in some tensions, since elected officials favor projects meeting pressing community needs, whereas appointed officials select projects based on technical criteria. This kind of competition between interest groups is part of the normal, democratic process.

4

(c) Strengthening Local Government Capability

There is indirect evidence that the NUS strategy of learning through repeated implementation of subprojects is an effective model for developing local institutional capacity. Largely owing to the TA contractor's efforts, early problems in subproject implementation occur less frequently. Districts are better able to deal with poor contractor performance; site selection problems have decreased; and coordination among public agencies at the local level has improved. The majority of district officials interviewed indicated that NUS increased their "efficiency in carrying out their regular duties."

Because of delays in conducting the training program, NUS training activities had little direct impact on subproject implementation. NUS financed over 35,000 training days, and reached over 70% of district level managers and engineers. Participants gave the courses high marks for quality and relevance. However, courses on subproject planning and monitoring began after 75% of subprojects were already underway. These may yet have an impact on implementation of the successor Local Development II (LD II) program.

Institutionalization of the training process has also been a slow and difficult task. A training effort on the scale of the NUS program requires a permanent, institutionalized training capability. A major problem was finding trainers competent in the the style of training desired. The TA group had to retain much of the responsibility for quality control and course monitoring.

(d) Sustainability of Institutional Change

The financial means of sustaining provision of basic services by local government is not yet in place. Sustainability requires both (i) increased central allocation of discretionary funds for capital investment to local government and (ii) increased local resource mobilization for the delivery and maintenance of basic public services.

However, central government allocations for local capital investments and their operation and maintenance are shrinking, owing to inflation, a growing wage bill and increased debt servicing. Local government is increasingly dependent on central government transfers, and is unable to exercise its limited existing fiscal authority, owing to inefficient tax administration.

The design of NUS did not reorient municipal government towards self-financing and cost-recovery, or adequately exploit PVO potential to mobilize local financing. NUS increased funds available locally for capital investments, their maintenance, and PVO activities. It also increased local discretionary authority over these expenditures. At the same time, however, NUS reinforced dependency of local government and PVOs on outside grants, and the maintenance fund increased pressures on the central GOE budget.

2. Subproject Impact

NUS was not designed to meet all the needs of the urban poor, or even their most pressing needs - i.e., housing and employment. Nevertheless, it had a significant impact:

5'

(a) Meeting Priority Local Needs:

NUS has met important and felt needs of a broad section of the local population. A total of 2800 subprojects were initiated. District subprojects rehabilitated and expanded schools and health clinics, street lighting, paving, water and sewerage. PVO subprojects improved existing health clinics, day-care and vocational training centers. Based on visits to over 200 facilities, NUS subprojects, with only a few exceptions, are appropriate and well-utilized. An estimated four million people are benefiting from NUS subprojects, primarily in poor neighbourhoods of greater Cairo and Alexandria.

Current criteria for project size are appropriate and should not be changed. District subprojects averaged L.E. 40,000, but the tendency to implement more than one project at each site has raised the average investment and impact per site. Current criteria are flexible and maintain manageability.

(b) Sustaining Subproject Services:

Maintenance is crucial to sustaining NUS subprojects. NUS has made a major effort to ensure maintenance of project-financed infrastructure. Accomplishments include establishment of systems for programming maintenance funds at the local level and identifying maintenance needs. However, progress has been slow in meeting urgent maintenance needs for early NUS subprojects. Maintenance training took place late in the project, and maintenance procedures are not yet well established. Local officials are not aware of the need for ongoing, preventive maintenance. An aggressive effort is needed in this area to protect NUS achievements.

OVERALL PROJECT ASSESSMENT: NUS successfully achieved its ambitious output targets, and produced immediate, tangible benefits to large numbers of urban residents. The project has moved urban local government towards greater responsiveness to public needs, increased public participation, and improved local administrative capabilities. However, the project design failed to address the crucial area of long-term financing of local government initiatives. Moreover, implementation of training and maintenance activities fell short of expectations, owing to competing program pressures.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The design of LD II already addresses problems in the areas of training, local finance and maintenance. The evaluation makes the following, specific recommendations for LD II program implementation:

1. Expand training workshops regarding the role of the popular council.
2. Design a pilot/project to increase local discretionary income, by modernizing tax administration in urban governorates and municipalities.
3. Promote local revenue mobilization through a variety of financing mechanisms which emphasize cost-sharing and cost-recovery.
4. Give priority to "training trainers" specialized in short-term, in-service training for local government personnel, at the Sakkara Training Center.
5. Give high priority to providing maintenance on the early NUS subprojects under the LD II urban services program.
6. Continue to select small infrastructure/service subprojects at the District level, retaining current guidelines for subproject size.

K. ATTACHMENTS:

Neighbourhood Urban Services Evaluation Project; Final Report.

L. COMMENTS BY MISSION

1. Assessment of Evaluation

The NUS evaluation contract with ISTI is one of only two life-of-project evaluations funded by USAID/Egypt. On balance, the evaluation has been very useful to USAID. The first two phases of the evaluation served to identify key implementation issues, and made a major contribution to the design of the LD II program. The final phase of the evaluation added to the development of LD II, by identifying specific, future activities.

The responsiveness of the NUS evaluation to the changing information needs of an evolving program was critical to its overall utility. For example, the final phase of the evaluation looked closely at the area of municipal finance, at USAID's specific request. This flexibility is essential to the success of this type of "rolling" evaluation. Review of proposed evaluation activities, prior to each new phase, is also important to ensure the evaluation addresses current issues and maintains relevance.

However, the evaluation can be faulted for not fully exploiting the opportunity to build on a data base over time, the raison-d'etre for this kind of evaluation. The contractor did not develop an adequate set of longitudinal indicators in the first phase of the evaluation. Subsequent phases of the evaluation were therefore unable to build directly on the baseline effort. In other respects, however, the evaluation benefited from the "continuity" factor. The early case studies and qualitative research provided a useful complement to subsequent quantitative research. Involvement of the same personnel in several rounds of field work brought depth and insight to the studies of the local government process.

This final evaluation of the NUS project provides a balanced picture of overall project accomplishments, as well as design and implementation problems. The report is concise and well-organized. The presentation is very effective, and we plan to use it as a model for other evaluators.

2. Role of Technical Assistance

The evaluation only obliquely addresses the role of technical assistance in the project; it may have missed an important issue here. References in the report suggest that the TA contractor played a very active role in project implementation. The evaluation concludes that, although districts will continue to need technical back-up, systems are not yet in place to provide this back-up after the current TA contract ends. Reading between the lines, one suspects that the TA contractor played too great a role in implementation, at the cost of long-term institution-building.

The first step to addressing this problem is to ensure adequate staff for program planning and coordination, in both the central technical secretariat and the governorates. Once these staff are in place, the Urban Local Development Committee and USAID should work together to ensure that TA is integrated into program implementation structures, and serves in a primarily institution-building capacity.

3. Implications for Local Development II Program

USAID accepts the recommendations made by the evaluation for implementation of the successor Local Development II (LD II) program. Some of these have already been anticipated in the design of the LD II program, as discussed in more detail below.

Local Resource Mobilization: The LD II design has made a good start at introducing financing mechanisms that emphasize cost-sharing. Cost-sharing principles are built into LD II; local and central government must each contribute 5% of total district subproject costs. The Ministry of Social Affairs also requires a 25% contribution from participating PVOS. Ultimately, however, increased local revenue generation and cost-recovery require major restructuring of Egyptian fiscal systems. LD II will assist the Ministry of Finance in this effort, but specific initiatives in this area must await mobilization of the technical assistance contractor.

The Annex "NUS and Local Government Financing", prepared by Monira Fouad, is a good source of information on municipal finance in Egypt, for readers interested in this subject. Steps have already been taken to follow through on specific recommendations in this section, and in particular, to develop a subproject to modernize municipal tax administration.

Maintenance: LD II also recognizes the importance of maintenance. According to the Project Agreement, prior to receiving LD II disbursements, each governorate must submit a comprehensive maintenance plan for NUS subprojects. These plans have been prepared, and are currently being reviewed. The next step is to ensure that these plans are adequate, and that they are actually implemented.

Training Activities: The evaluation points to the very different priorities of local bureaucrats on the one hand and popular councils and PVOS on the other. It singles out the role of the popular councils as an important area for future emphasis in training workshops. However, it will also be important to stress the themes of public participation and local decision-making in training for the LD II PVO program, which will become a nation-wide program under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 26 governorate departments of Social Affairs. Most personnel in these offices are unfamiliar with the project; a large orientation program is needed to ensure that they understand and follow program guidelines for subproject selection and implementation.

NEIGHBORHOOD URBAN SERVICES EVALUATION PROJECT

FINAL REPORT

Prepared For:

**United States Agency for International Development
Cairo, Egypt**

Prepared By:

**International Science and Technology Institute, Inc.
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Washington, D.C.**

**Social Research Center/American University in Cairo
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Cairo, Egypt**

July 1986

NUS Evaluation Project Personnel - Phase III

INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE (ISTI), INC.

Richard Huntington, Chief of Party

Monira Y. Fouad, Consultant (I.D.O.II) on Public Finance
Barry D. Frazier, Consultant on Maintenance and Engineers' Training
Elaine E. Linn, Data Management
Odis Kendrick, Data Management

SOCIAL RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO

The Social Research Center, as sub-contractor of ISTI, undertook all the field work and data processing for the two first phases of the evaluation of the Neighborhood Urban Services Project. It further conceptualized, designed, and undertook the field work, the processing, the analysis and the write up of the data of the final survey (Appendix III).

Laila Shukry El-Hamamsy, Director and Chief Investigator of Survey of Local Government and NUS Subprojects.

Donald P. Cole, Professor of Anthropology, and Co-Chief Investigator of Survey of Local Government and NUS Subprojects.

Researchers:

Samira Abdel Hamid Shehata
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Data Processing

Denise Batani
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Hany Hanne (The Population Council)

NUS EVALUATION PROJECT REPORTS

PHASE I REPORTS (December 1983)

Neighborhood Urban Services Evaluation Phase I Report	I-1
Summary of Responses to Questionnaires	I-2

PHASE II REPORTS (January, April 1985)

Control Management and Subproject Maintenance	II-3
District Decision Making	II-4
Private Voluntary Organization in Six Cairo Neighborhoods	II-5
Facilities Rehabilitation and Maintenance	II-6

PHASE III REPORTS June (June 1986)

Survey of Local Government and NUS Subprojects	III-7
Local Government Finance Study	III-8
Private Sector Impact Review	III-9
Engineer's Training Review	III-10
District Subproject Maintenance Review	III-11

<u>NUS EVALUATION FINAL REPORT</u>	III-12
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Table of Contents

NUS Evaluation Project Personnel	
NUS Evaluation Project Reports	
I. Executive Summary and Recommendations	1
II. Introduction NUS Purposes and Resources	5
III. NUS Evaluation Project (1983-86)	6
IV. Support Administrative Decentralization	9
V. Increase Public Participation	12
VI. Strength Local Government Capability	16
VII. Improve Quality of Life (Subprojects)	22
VIII. NUS Project Assessment and Summary of Recommendations	27
English/Arabic Presentation Summaries	Appendix I
Arabic Final Report	Appendix II
English/Arabic Executive Summaries	
1. Survey of Local Government and NUS Subprojects Laila Shukry El-Hamamsy and Donald Cole (English/Arabic)	Appendix III
2. NUS and Local Government Financing Monira Y. Fouad (English/Arabic)	Appendix IV
3. Maintenance of District Subprojects Barry D. Frazier (English/Arabic)	Appendix V

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Neighborhood Urban Services Project provided finance (over \$89 million) and technical assistance to local urban government and PYOs of Greater Cairo and Alexandria to construct 2,800 small infrastructure subprojects to improve the delivery of basic services (clinics, schools, water, lighting, etc.) to the residents of these over crowded cities. The NUS Project was part of the Decentralization Sector Support Program (DSS I) which provided a total of \$600 million to almost every level of local government. The four purposes of the NUS Project are:

- Support Administrative Decentralization
- Increase Public Participation in Local Government
- Strengthen Local Government Capability to Deliver Services
- Improve the Quality of Life for Urban Residents

SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION

Findings. NUS has greatly increased the volume of service facility construction activity at the district level, and also the local delivery of important and desired public services. Local government performed the tasks of assessing needs, prioritizing, choosing, overseeing private contractors, coordinating among local bodies and with other levels of administration, and follow up and supervision. Over 1200 subprojects were handled directly (through contracts with local building firms) by the 23 districts.

The great majority of local officials totally approve of the goals of NUS and of the criterion of district decision and implementation of subprojects.

Conclusions. The record of completion of facilities at or above the usual level of quality proves that such tasks can be handled at the district level. The NUS strategy of learning through repeated implementation of small and medium size subprojects is a sound and effective model for strengthening local development.

The important ingredient to continuing this progress and increasing the capabilities of local government is the focus on the relationship between the district and higher levels of administration. The governorates and the technical secretariate *amara* need to be able to provide support to district activity.

There remain many constraints on the ability of local government to handle effectively small infrastructure service projects. Some of these constraints are addressed in L.D. II, others are the subject of policy dialogue at higher levels.

INCREASE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Findings. NUS provided the means (subprojects) for the popular council to become involved in a number of significant local decisions, and for private voluntary organizations to apply for grants to improve and expand their delivery of services.

The increased involvement of the popular council is a source of some tension in district government.

Conclusions. The NUS Project has substantially increased the number of significant local decisions that involve the popular council. The popular council already had a role under law, but because there were so few activities locally decided upon and implemented, this authority

remained largely theoretical. The fact that there is tension and some resentment of the popular council's role suggests that they are now involved in the decision-making arena.

Recommendation. Expand the training workshops for popular council members. Through such workshops some of the tensions between elected and appointed officials may be reduced, or at least come to be better understood as part of the normal process of democracy. Workshops should also include issues such as ways to keep contact with and solicit suggestions from the wider public.

STRENGTHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY TO DELIVER SERVICES

Local Resource Mobilization and Sustainability.

Findings. The percentage of local government budgets deriving from central government transfers is in fact increasing, due to the growing wage bill and the increased cost of debt maintenance. Furthermore, governorates and municipalities are unable to collect the revenues due them under law because of their outmoded tax record and collection administrations.

There are untapped possibilities for mobilizing resources through citizens' contributions through PYOs.

Conclusions. The financial means of sustaining local governments' delivery of basic services are not in place. The NUS project may increase the administrative capability for local government to carry out tasks, and it may increase the role of the public in selecting activities, but it is not sustainable if local government remains dependent upon central allocations for funding.

Recommendations. Design a pilot project to modernize the tax record keeping and collection systems of the governorates and municipalities. This could increase local revenues by 25%, a significant percentage of the governorate's discretionary income, and such funds could have an important local impact. To go one step further, local revenue collection could be rationalized within the framework of current law. Some taxes cost more to collect than they yield in revenue; others are more elastic sources of revenue and would respond well to a concentrated effort.

Recommendation. Increase Local Mobilization of Resources through participation funds, revolving loan funds to support the privatization of selected services, and PYO matching grants. A "Participation Fund" would set aside district funds to give priority to subprojects for which citizens, through the popular council and local PYOs raise a share of the subproject costs. A revolving fund would provide loans to organizations providing selected services on a self financing cost recovery basis. PYO matching grants would set aside special funds from the PYO grant program to give priority to PYOs which raise a significant share of the cost of a subproject.

Training and Strengthening Local Government.

Findings. The training reached the intended targets of district management, district engineers, popular council members, and PYO staff. The evaluation final survey found that over 75% of current district level managers and engineers (over 500 officials and technicians) received one or two six-day training courses under NUS. The TA contractor's records indicate that NUS delivered over 35,000 training days to local officials, PYO board members, local government technicians.

Those who participated in the training reported that they found it of good quality and relevant to their work.

The institutionalization of the training process was partially successful, but it was a slow and difficult task. The TA training group had difficulty, especially, finding trained trainers who could effectively carry out the adult learning techniques that are the hallmark of effective training programs.

The training program lagged behind other inputs and the opportunity of the feedback between formal training and the on the job training associated with subproject implementation was delayed.

Conclusions. The formal training provided under NUS had little direct impact on the implementation of NUS subprojects. It may have an impact on the subproject process of L.D. II.

Creating a permanent and institutionalized training process of this magnitude is a task almost as great as that of building 2800 additions to schools, WCs, and youth centers. Training involves several facets, including repeated project orientation, exposure courses, team building workshops, skills brush up, and new skills acquisition. NUS did not have the resources to perform all of the above to the degree needed for significant impact.

Recommendation. A program of training of trainers (TOT) should be a lead component of the Sakkara Training Center in order for it to provide significant support to the large training and orientation programs of the urban and rural service delivery projects. Training busy adult professionals is a special skill that must be taught to a large cadre of trainers if the broad training mandate of LD II is to be realized.

IMPROVE QUALITY OF LIFE

Subprojects.

Findings. NUS is completing almost 2800 subprojects through local government and private voluntary agencies. The subprojects implemented by the districts stress utilities and small infrastructure (35%) and education (35%). For PYO subprojects, 80% are in the categories of clinics, nurseries, and skill centers.

Estimates by the TA contractor indicate that as many as four million residents of greater Cairo and Alexandria benefit from these services.

The average cost of a district subproject is about LE 40,000, and many Egyptian officials feel that this small size limits the impact. On the other hand, several subprojects are usually constructed at the same facility over time, thus increasing the impact while maintaining the flexibility and manageability of the small size.

During the three year evaluation, teams of engineers and social scientists, Egyptian and expatriate visited approximately 200 subprojects. With few exceptions they found these subprojects, schools, clinics, nurseries, street lighting, youth clubs etc. to be appropriate and appreciated by those in charge and heavily utilized by the public.

Conclusion. The NUS system of local selection and implementation of subprojects is responsive to important and felt needs of a broad section of the local population. Much of the subproject work is an essential catching up on two decades of neglect during a period of rapid increase in urban population.

Recommendation. Small infrastructure/service subprojects should be continued under the

present system of district level subproject selection and implementation.

Maintenance and the Sustainability of Services

Findings. The TA contractor and USAID project management took a number of steps to address the issue of maintenance. They encouraged the GOE to distribute the maintenance fund to the governorates and districts. The TA carried out two thorough surveys of the maintenance problems of the FY 81/82 and FY 82/83 subprojects approximately one year after their completion.

The TA survey found that over 60% of FY 81/82 subprojects need some maintenance and that 20-30% are deficient, damaged, or unutilized in some important respect. A program to perform the maintenance on the FY 81/82 subprojects is moving, but as of December 1985, only 4% of the maintenance fund had actually been spent. The survey of the FY 82/83 subprojects indicates an improvement in the early maintenance situation, suggesting that these subprojects were better built than the earlier ones.

Like other aspects of training, maintenance courses came during the last year of the NUS project. Local officials' responses to survey questions about maintenance indicate a distant perception of a problem or of the need for programs of preventive maintenance.

Conclusions. Maintenance remains a crucial issue for the sustainability of the specific subprojects and for the sustainability of the capability of local government to deliver urban services.

The LD II's increased emphasis on maintenance, preventive maintenance systems capability, and the issue of financing of recurrent maintenance costs, is an important development and needs to receive all the attention that is currently planned.

Recommendation. Do Identified Maintenance on NUS subprojects. The TA contractor under the LD II urban services project should make getting the maintenance done on the NUS subprojects from FY 81/82 and 82/83 a top priority. Unless there is an aggressive push to do this maintenance, the NUS subprojects are in danger of deteriorating and thus losing the momentum and morale created by the NUS accomplishment. These subprojects should provide a laboratory for demonstrating approaches to preventive maintenance.

NUS PROJECT ASSESSMENT

The NUS Project delivered all of its inputs and achieved its ambitious output targets. In this respect it produced immediately tangible results of demonstrable value to large numbers of urban residents, especially, but not exclusively, in poor and crowded neighborhoods.

Moreover the project has moved urban local government in the direction of increased responsiveness to public needs, increased public participation, and increased capability of decentralized administration as called for in Egyptian local government laws. The project has the strong support of the broad spectrum of local officials, employees, popular council members, and PYO representatives.

Certain program aspects such as formal training and maintenance lagged behind or fell short of original projections, due to various competing pressures. Furthermore the design of the NUS Project failed to address the crucial area of long term financing of local government initiatives. These three areas are addressed more vigorously in the design of the L.D. II follow on projects.

		FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
IMPROVE QUALITY OF LIFE	MAINTENANCE	60% OF COMPLETED SPs NEED SOME MAINTENANCE TA SURVEY SHOWS 20-30% SIGNIFICANTLY DEFICIENT, DAMAGED, OR UNUSED. TA HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ADDRESS MANY MAINT. PROBLEMS DIST. OFFICIALS NOT VERY CONCERNED ABOUT MAINTENANCE	MAINTENANCE REMAINS A CRUCIAL ISSUE FOR SUSTAINABILITY OF SPECIFIC SUB-PROJECTS AND OF LOCAL CAPACITY TO PROVIDE NEEDED SERVICES	LD II MUST PUT EMPHASIS ON COMPLETING MAINTENANCE ALREADY IDENTIFIED FOR NUS SPs USE NUS SPs AS A "LABORATORY" FOR DEMONSTRATING STRENGTH OF PREVENTIVE SYSTEMS
	SUBPROJECTS	NUS IS COMPLETING 2800 SP SPs ARE APPROPRIATE, APPRECIATED, AND HEAVILY USED BY PUBLIC AVERAGE COST OF SP, LE 40 K - SEVERAL SPs AT SAME SITE INCREASES IMPACT	NUS SYSTEM OF LOC SELECTION OF SPs IS RESPONSIVE TO NEEDS OF A BROAD RANGE OF POPULATION	LOCALLY IMPLEMENTED SMALL INFRASTRUCTURE SUBPROJECTS SHOULD BE CONTINUED
STRENGTHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY	TRAINING	TA TRAINERS WORKED HARD TO INSTITUTIONALIZE TRAINING TRAINING WAS DELAYED AND HAD LITTLE DIRECT IMPACT ON NUS DIFFICULT TO FIND REQUIRED # OF GOOD TRAINERS	A TRAINING PROGRAM OF THIS SIZE IS A COMPLEX UNDERTAKING TRAINERS ARE THE KEY ELEMENT	TRAINING OF TRAINERS (TOT) PROGRAM SHOULD BE A LEAD COMPONENT OF SAKKARA TRAINING PROJECT.
	LOCAL RESOURCE MOBILIZATION	LOCAL GOV. DEPENDENCE ON CENTRAL TRANSFERS IS INCREASING DUE TO GROWING WAGE AND DEBT MAINTENANCE LINE ITEM THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SUCCESSES IN COST RECOVERY FOR CERTAIN SERVICES THROUGH PVOs	DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS LOC. GVT. HAS BECOME EVEN MORE DEPENDENT, NOT LESS, ON THE CENTRAL GVT. FOR FINANCES.	PILOT PROJECT TO MODERNIZE GOVERNORATE AND MUNICIPAL TAX SYSTEMS SO THEY CAN COLLECT WHAT IS LEGALLY DUE THEM
SUPPORT DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION	NUS HAS STIMULATED MUCH DECISION MAKING AT LOCAL LEVEL BY PROVIDING SOMETHING ABOUT DECISIONS AND CHOICES NEED TO BE MADE. ALL NECESSARY SKILLS NOT AVAILABLE AT DISTRICT LEVEL.	DIST NEEDS BACK UP - NOW FROM TA - IN FUTURE FROM GOE	FOCUS ON PARTNERSHIP BTWN DIST. AND HIGHER LEVELS- GOVERNORATE AND AMANA.	
INCREASE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION	LOCAL POPULAR COUNCIL AND PVOs INVOLVED IN SUBPROJECT SELECTION. THERE ARE TENSIONS AND SHARP CONTRASTS OF ATTITUDES BETWEEN POPULAR COUNCIL AND MINISTRY DEPT. PERSONNEL. ONLY 44% OF POP. COUNCIL LEADERS RECEIVED TRAINING.	NUS HAS GREATLY MULTIPLIED THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR POPULAR COUNCIL AND PVO INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL DECISION MAKING	EXPAND WORKSHOPS FOR POPULAR COUNCILS	

II. INTRODUCTION: NUS PURPOSES AND RESOURCES

NUS Purposes

The four purposes of the Neighborhood Urban Services Project provide the framework for the presentation of the material in this evaluation report. They are:

- Support Administrative Decentralization
- Increase Public Participation in Local Government
- Strengthen Local Government Capability to Deliver Services
- Improve Quality of Life for Urban Residents

NUS and Decentralization Sector Support Program

NUS is one of the five AID projects developed between 1978 and 1981 which were grouped into the Decentralization Sector Support Program (DSS I). DSS I provided through these projects sizeable financial resources (\$600 million) to almost every unit of local government to enable them to provide improved basic services, increase their own discretionary funds through investment, and purchase heavy equipment. More than 6,600 subprojects have been implemented, over 800 small loans made, and over 2,000 items of equipment delivered. Funds were also provided for large training programs (over 60,000 participants), and technical assistance. [L.D.II]

This program is being continued under the Local Development II Program, which, building on the experience of DSS I, addresses a number of the important constraints to the long term sustainability of locally implemented small and medium infrastructure subprojects for delivery of public services.

NUS Resources Delivered

Funding of Subprojects. The NUS Project provides \$102.9 million, of which \$74.4 million is for almost 2,800 subprojects implemented by local government and locally-based private voluntary organizations and neighborhood associations in the 23 districts of the four urban governorates of Cairo, Giza, Qaliubia, and Alexandria.

Technical Assistance. Wilbur Smith & Associates (WSA) provided a team of 5-6 expatriates and 30 Egyptian professionals who worked with their GOE counterparts to set up procedures and criteria for subproject selection and implementation, to assure acceptable quality of subprojects, to create a management information system for tracking all aspects of project

activity, to plan and implement training programs, to oversee the PYO grants program, and to solve problems that presented themselves.

Training. The evaluation survey indicates that 75% of the current district level managers and engineers (over 500 officials and technicians) received one or two six-day training courses. The TA contractor's records indicate that NUS delivered over 35,000 training days to local officials, technicians, and PYO board members. Another 800 training days regarding the maintenance of heavy equipment were provided in participant training in the United States for technicians.

Maintenance and Incentive Funds. The Government of Egypt (GOE) contributes the equivalent of \$13.9 million, of which \$6.3 million is earmarked for a maintenance fund, and \$4.2 million for an incentive fund.

III. NUS EVALUATION PROJECT (1983-86)

NUS also provides a special three year, periodic, "rolling" evaluation and monitoring effort funded by USAID and performed by the International Science and Technology Institute (ISTI) Inc., and the Social Research Center (SRC) of the American University in Cairo. Between 1983 and 1986, the combined American and Egyptian team carried out the following evaluation activities.

Sample Surveys 1983, 1986

A major effort of the evaluation has been the surveys of district level officials and NUS subproject sites.

Approach. The success of NUS in strengthening local government in a sustainable way depends directly on how it is accepted by those local officials who implement the program. The interviews administered in this final phase stress a comparison between the NUS experience and the way things were done before NUS and still done in similar types of district activities. NUS does not occur into a vacuum, and districts already had activities, systems, procedures, and staff. NUS comes into that previous structure, not to replace it, but to improve its operation.

Sample. In 1983, the Egyptian researchers of the Social Research Center interviewed over 200 officials in all districts and visited a sample of 50 district and PYO subproject sites.

In 1986, they returned to interview 121 local officials and popular council members in 13 out of 23 districts, and again to visit a representative sample of 100 government and PVO NUS subproject sites.

At the subproject sites they interviewed the director of the facility, or in infrastructure subprojects, citizens benefitting from the service. This sample of subprojects represents the total of NUS subprojects by type of activity, and also by the mix of subproject types in each of the 13 sample districts.

The full report of the Survey of District Local Government and NUS Subprojects, including the database generated by the questionnaires, is included as an annex to this report. [III-7].)

District Case Studies (Helwan, Shoubra, Alexandria East) 1984

The special case studies focused on the structure and process of local administration and contract management in the districts, and on the relationship of selected PVOs to the communities they serve. These studies also provided a mid-project insight into the combined impact of NUS activities on three sample districts. These reports comprise the NUS Evaluation Phase II.

- Contract Management and Subproject Maintenance
- District Decision Making
- Private Voluntary Organizations in Six Cairo Neighborhoods

Consultants' Studies 1985, 1986

The following special studies and reviews were prepared by consultants to the NUS Evaluation Project. The final four are included as annexes to this report.

- Facilities Rehabilitation and Maintenance (Evaluation Phase II)
- Engineers' Training Review
- District Subproject Maintenance Review
- Local Government Finance
- Private Sector Impact Review

Final Report Format

This brief final report provides a comprehensive evaluation of the Neighborhood Urban Services Project, drawing upon the findings of 11 separate evaluation reports, surveys, and studies carried out over the last three years.

The material is arranged as responses to 10 basic questions about the impact of the NUS Project. These questions are derived from the original scope of work and were developed in collaboration with USAID project management and evaluation officers. These 10 questions are divided among the four purposes of NUS and local government in Egypt.

Purpose: Support Decentralized Administration

1. Are local institutions more responsive to local needs than higher levels of administration?
2. From the NUS experience, should modifications be made in allocation of responsibilities among district, governorate, and central institutions?

Purpose: Increase Public Participation

3. To what extent has NUS increased the role of the popular council in the selection of district subproject?
4. How has NUS increased public participation through the PVO grants program?

Purpose: Strengthen Local Government Capability

5. What are the attitudes of local officials towards the NUS approach emphasizing locally chosen and implemented small and moderate sized service subprojects? Is there evidence that these attitudes are changing?
6. Is there evidence of improved technical capacity of districts to carry out NUS type activities?
7. What role has formal and on-the-job training played or not played in increasing institutional capacity?
8. Are improvements in local government capabilities to deliver urban services sustainable?

Purpose: Improve Quality of Life

9. How responsive are the NUS subprojects to the needs and priorities of the urban poor?
10. Are the benefits and services provided by NUS subprojects sustainable?

In this final evaluation effort, the emphasis is on the broader aspects of NUS Project impact rather than on assessing inputs and outputs. The evaluation team does not pretend to have sociologically definitive answers to all 10 questions. Even an evaluation of this scale follows partial indicators. These indicators show that the program is leading in the intended direction.

IV. SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION

Egyptian Local Government Laws determine the principles of District administrative responsibility and participation of popular councils. NUS provided the resources to implement these principles and to develop local government capacity to deliver services. There is a certain pragmatic experimental quality to NUS as the practical details of procedures get worked out during the course of subproject implementation. The flexibility in the original NUS Project design took this into account. Within the centralized political tradition of Egypt, local government needed to prove that it would be capable of coordinating and supervising the building of schools, clinics, youth centers, street paving, lighting, and other service facilities.

The clear demonstration that local districts could do the job, and that NUS targets were to be thoroughly accomplished ahead of schedule did much to dispel any doubts about the ability of the local level.

Question 1. Are local institutions more responsive to local needs than higher levels of administration?

Context. Whether the same amount of funds might have been spent equally well or better by a centralized authority is a heuristic question. Egypt, through the passage of the local government laws has chosen to decentralize certain responsibilities. The NUS record shows that such a response is possible and effective.

Findings. A comparison of the attitudes of different categories of local government personnel indicates some differences regarding responsiveness. [III-7]

The attitudes of the service ministry department heads, as revealed in the survey, suggest that they are less responsive to local public concerns. They represent the older and more centralized way of doing things. Not surprisingly, they are more likely than other district government personnel to be against district level implementation, against the criterion that NUS subprojects should serve low income groups, against the NUS selection procedures that involve local representatives, and against any extension of the process of public participation, or to not know about many aspects of NUS.

By contrast, the popular council members are the strongest champions of NUS. They are more likely than local appointed officials to see NUS as a significant and positive departure from the regular system, especially regarding subproject selection procedures. They identify themselves with the public and they clearly believe that NUS is contributing to public participation, and that district level decision-making and implementation is more responsive than central ministerial authorities. (See diagrams of the Contrasts in Attitudes.)

Local government managers (district chief, secretary general, director of planning and follow-up) tend to be much closer to the popular council in their attitudes than they are to the service ministries. Like the popular council, they are strong supporters of NUS.

The selection process, as analyzed in the district case studies and revealed in the survey, provides a forum at which various local parties are able to contribute to forming the final list of subprojects. The process involves compromises between the priorities of each service department, the district chief, and the popular council. The process takes into account economic, professional, political and personal factors. [II-4, III-7]

Those subprojects (such as street lighting in poor crowded lanes) championed by the popular council represent some of the strongly felt and locally-based needs.

The subprojects pushed by the service department heads are based on their professional analysis of the priorities in their sectors.


The district chief and his senior staff have a district-wide view into which they integrate the sector priorities of the service departments and the specific neighborhood priorities of the popular council members.

Conclusion. When one compares this process with the older decision-making which was largely in the hands of the central service ministries (with attitudes documented above), one concludes that NUS has helped increase the responsiveness of local government to the needs of the people.


Question 2. From the NUS experience, should modifications be made in allocation of responsibilities among district, governorate, and central institutions?

CONTRAST OF ATTITUDES

Popular Council versus All Other Respondents



Service Ministry Staff versus All Other Respondents



Context. It is not the role of this evaluation to pronounce upon Egyptian constitutional issues. From a practical point of view, strengthening local government involves a partnership between the governorate and the districts. NUS has experimented with a new type of partnership by emphasizing the lowest levels. Districts and PYOs have accomplished the NUS task with back-up support from Wilbur Smith and Associates. Some of the support and quality control tasks performed by Wilbur Smith should not be necessary if the districts were truly capable. Other support tasks should rightly be provided to the districts by the governorates or central ministries, or by private consulting firms.

The following findings are not intended as recommendations, but represent opinions and suggestions that emerged during the evaluations regarding the allocation of tasks. We limit the discussion here to the issue of the allocation of tasks. The possible reallocation of financial resources is saved for discussion under the question of sustainability.

Findings and Suggestions.

Engineering Support. The evaluation study on Contract Management and Subproject Maintenance [11-3] reported that district engineers are rarely qualified to perform the design work on large and complex structures such as hospitals. Nor does it make sense in light of the scarcity of highly trained engineers in the public service to expect to staff each local district with such a person. One suggestion emerged that the governorate should have an elite group of engineers to provide its districts with the highly sophisticated design and quality control support called for by more complex subprojects. This unit would thus do some of the work now performed by the TA contractor combined with some of the work regularly (and unevenly) performed by service directorates (providing standard designs for schools and clinics, for instance).

PYOs and the Ministry of Social Affairs. An issue is whether the PYOs are seen as a means of carrying out the program of the Ministry of Social Affairs, or the MSA is viewed as responsible for supporting the programs of the PYOs. As mentioned above regarding PYOs, there needs to be an emphasis on strengthening the partnership between the MSA and PYOs. This may involve efforts to improve and update the MSA's outreach program. NUS provided funds to the PYOs but left much of the direction in the hands of the MSA without any program to broaden or strengthen the MSA at the district and governorate level.

V. INCREASE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Public participation in an urban setting such as the crowded districts of Cairo and Alexandria is a complex and difficult task. Although there are communities with a sense of identity in urban areas, these do not correlate well with the division into districts comprising between 500,000 and one million people. NUS Project addresses the issue of public participation through the role of the local popular council in subproject selection, in accordance with local government law. As an innovation and in an effort to involve an urban public beyond the impersonality of the district, NUS also initiated the PYO grants program.

Question 3. To what extent has NUS increased the role of the popular council in the selection of district subprojects?

Context. The nature of the local popular council has been evolving since it was first established in 1960 (law 124). At present (following laws 57/1971, 52/1975, 43/1979, 50/1981) the local council is chosen by election as one of several competing party slates, and the slate must include 50% "workers or peasants". The local popular council does not possess an administrative function, but one of reviewing, questioning, and approving certain administrative actions.

Findings. Although there were procedural variations among the districts, the popular council approved the final list of district subprojects each year.

In the survey of district subproject facility directors, 33% responded that the popular council was involved in the selection of their subproject.

The case studies on local decision-making in Helwan, Shoubra, and Alexandria East Districts [II-4] revealed that the popular council is significantly involved in the "horse trading" process that creates the annual list of subprojects. The open ended questions in the final survey support this finding.

The open-ended questions of the survey reveal that many executive council members strongly question the competence of popular council members in subproject selection. Especially it was

often stated that they are uneducated, ignorant, and illiterate.

The survey data both confirm and confute such attitudes. Seventy percent (70%) of the popular council members interviewed have university degrees. These popular council presidents and members are as educated and articulate as any members of the district civil service.

However, the other side of the coin is important. Thirty percent (30%) of those popular council members interviewed have only a secondary education or less. Since the interviews were with the president and usually a member known to be concerned with NUS, they probably give an upward skewing to the sample. By contrast, only 5% of the executive council members interviewed were limited to a secondary school degree or less. One can understand the resentment of district professional personnel at being questioned by many of the popular council members.

When asked how they decide what subprojects are needed, some popular council members said they called formal meetings in their constituencies, and others said they discussed it informally with citizens, but there was not evidence of a systematic means of contact with their constituencies.

Conclusions. The role of the popular council has been increased under NUS in that it plays a real political and decision-making part in subproject selection. It is not a rubber stamp organization and its relationship with the local appointed officials varies from strongly adversarial in some districts to complementary in others. NUS has not changed or increased the legal role of the council, but it has provided it with many more subprojects over which to have some power of review. A few popular council members in open-ended responses point out that there are two sides to this. The very bulk, variety and pressure of NUS activity sometimes causes the popular council to get lost in the shuffle more than formerly when there was only the smaller Local Development Services Fund with which to contend.

The degree of awareness and sophistication of local popular council members regarding the nature of their rights and district needs could be improved through special workshops on the role of the popular council (44% of those interviewed had participated in NUS training). Some sessions could be held exclusively with popular council members, and others could include members of the executive council and service ministries. There is tension in local government regarding the role of the popular council. They feel left out and inadequate; district

administrators' feel that popular council members are ignorant and/or motivated by political or narrowly economic self interest.

Question 4. How has NUS increased public participation through the PYO grants program?

Context. The tradition of private voluntary service is an old and strong one in Egypt, rooted in both Moslem and Christian practices and values. The survey of the PYO community conducted by the TA Contractor reveals that of the over 3000 PYOs registered with the MSA for Cairo and Alexandria, over 1000 are engaged in providing important services to poorer urban communities. Many of these PYOs are philanthropic institutions, and many others are community-based groups associated with neighborhood mosques and churches.

Findings. Of the 44 PYO directors interviewed, 86.4% stated that they had an important role in determining the subproject, and 81.8% said that they shared this decision with the PYO Board of Governors.

The PYO directors were given the opportunity to rate the quality and usefulness of the subproject, and 84.1% rated it in the top of three categories - "excellent". This contrasts with the directors of government subprojects who rate only 53.3% of their subprojects in this highest category.

The evaluation did six case studies of community-based neighborhood associations which had received NUS grants [11-5]. Important findings from these qualitative studies include:

Neighborhood associations are effective in delivering important urban services to some of the poorest areas on a cost recovery basis. This is noticeable in the field of solid waste removal, cesspool cleaning, educational tutoring, and health clinics, as well as the more common programs of day care and sewing training centers.

Egyptian neighborhood PYOs are multi service organizations, preferring to serve their poor communities with numerous small desperately needed services rather than providing fewer services of higher quality. Many PYOs used the opportunity of the NUS grants to introduce new services not otherwise available to the people of their

neighborhood.

Many PYOs mobilize significant resources through donations and subscriptions, although these resources generally go toward religious construction rather than service programs.

Subproject selection sometimes followed Ministry of Social Affairs program priorities and not necessarily the priorities of the neighborhood association. (Although the survey results show only 22.7% of PYO directors crediting some role to the MSA in subproject selection. It is likely that this problem was stronger early in the NUS Project.)

The MSA outreach capability did not always sensitively address the needs and goals of the PYOs themselves, especially in some of the poorest and "informal" areas where neighborhood and mosque associations are keenly attuned to local felt needs.

The MSA attitudes toward such PYOs is similar to that of other service ministry personnel and executive council members towards the popular councils.

Only 22% of the PYO directors interviewed received training under the PYO core courses. The PYO training courses were aimed more at board members, on one hand, and technical staff (day care staff) on the other. None the less, future training on basic management issues aimed at the directors would be appropriate.

Conclusions. The PYO grants program is a successful innovation which provides direct support to a wide variety of locally based non-governmental and semi-governmental service organizations.

Under L.D. II, the PYO grants program is being expanded to serve other cities and the rural governorates as well. A more effective partnership between the MSA and the PYOs needs to be developed, perhaps with a program to improve the outreach capability of the Ministry of Social Affairs.

Under NUS, grants were outright and usually on a one shot basis. A special category of PYO grants available on a matching basis could provide an incentive for increased mobilization of private resources for selected urban service delivery programs run on a cost recovery basis.

VI. STRENGTHEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY

This is the most difficult task of the NUS project, and the area where most work remains to be done. The issue of sustainability is of special importance. Building thousands of subprojects, once, with outside funding and outside TA is of little lasting value if the capability to continue serving the people in a similar mode is not established. Many constraints are outside the control of the NUS project. Others are being addressed in L.D. II now that the NUS approach has gained credibility. It is a slow process.

Question 5. What are the attitudes of local officials towards the NUS approach emphasizing locally chosen and implemented small and moderate sized service subprojects? Is there evidence that these attitudes are changing?

Context. The success of NUS in strengthening local government in a sustainable way depends directly on how the project is accepted by those local officials who implement the program. Do they see it as a good program? Do they see it as their program, or as something foreign and extra? Additionally, the NUS project embodies a new set of attitudes in its criteria for subproject selection, and in its principles of decentralized responsibility and accountability. Are local officials coming to accept these goals, procedures, and criteria?


Findings.

Approval. The respondents to the survey overwhelmingly approve the general goals of NUS. Seventy-six percent (76%) answered that they "totally" approve the project goals. Although 14% felt they were not aware enough of the goals to answer the question, only 2.5% disapproved.


More specifically, they approved three of the five specific criteria for subproject selection: Subprojects should serve low income people; be completed within one year; and be decided and implemented at the district level.

The size limitation on subprojects and the priority of rehabilitations and additions over new structures still are not widely accepted, with about 60% of the respondents strongly opposed. On the other hand, the average budget of a district subproject is only half the LE 83,000 limit,

APPROVE SPECIFIC GOALS OF NUS



TOTALLY APPROVE GOALS OF NUS



PARTIALLY APPROVE GOALS OF NUS

due partially, it seems, to the local wish to spread the limited resources among competing needs.

Ownership. There is a sense of "ownership" of NUS at the district level. It is seen as a legitimate Egyptian government activity, with the same goals and subject to the same rules as other government activities. Only 28.1% of the respondents feel that NUS goals differ from other local government projects.

More specifically, the senior management people (district chiefs, secretary generals, heads of planning and finance) insist that NUS subproject selection procedures are much the same as for the Local Services Development Fund. They also see the process of contract selection and district planning as largely the same as their regular procedures.

On each of these questions, those few (for most questions about 30%) who feel the NUS procedure is different were asked to compare it with the regular procedure. Most of these respondents stress the superiority of the NUS procedures.

Changes. Many of the general attitudes are the same ones revealed in the 1983 survey. To quote from the 1983 survey:

The current interviews are full of complaints about the shortage of staff in relation to the workload, the low government salaries (the incentives issue), the amounts of paperwork, etc. These are standard complaints of civil servants and many of them cannot be affected by the NUS project. (Phase I Evaluation, Summary of Interviews, [1-2] p.5)

Most of the respondents in 1986 state that NUS added to the workload. However, they also report that incentive pay has been provided, and surprisingly, half of the respondents state that the amount of incentive pay is adequate. Furthermore, most of the respondents state that they found their own involvement with NUS to be very beneficial (60.9%). It seems that a morale problem revolving around work and pay has softened. USAID project management and the TA contractor deserve much credit for resolving this incentive problem through the NUS Steering Committee.

To the Egyptian researchers and interviewers, local government officials appear more positive and less suspicious of NUS than during the interviews of 1983. The responses to the open ended questions are more pragmatic and more knowledgeable than those of three years ago. (See the discussions and translated quotations from the open ended questions as presented in the Survey Report [III-7].)

Question 6. Is there evidence of improved technical capacity of districts to carry out small infrastructure service activities similar to NUS subprojects?

Context. There is evidence of improved local government capability, but to a certain extent one must still go on faith. The evidence is indirect and the final score is not yet in.

Findings. Whether local government is or is not more capable, it is important that District leadership reports that it is more efficient. Sixty-two percent (62.1%) of the district chiefs, secretaries general, NUS coordinators, and directors of planning and follow-up respond that NUS has increased their "efficiency in carrying out their regular duties".

Early NUS problem areas now occur less frequently. For instance:

Districts have improved their abilities to deal with (or avoid) poorly performing contractors;

Problems of poor site selection have diminished;

Coordination among concerned governmental bodies and utility authorities has improved.

Bringing about these improvement is much to the credit of Wilbur Smith and Associates, who enforced such things as soil analysis, legal clearance of site ownership, agreements of collateral authorities and utilities as prerequisites for subproject approval, and who compiled "blacklists" of poorly performing contractors from their management information system.

It is premature to test most indicators of improved technical capability. For a true test one would like to compare the data on the last 100 NUS subprojects with the data from the earliest 100. Important indicators would be the percentage of districts' subprojects that are completed on time and on budget, the percentage of subprojects that have serious maintenance problems immediately after the the expiration of their one year warranty period. Such data is only now being compiled on FY 82/83 subprojects and preliminary analysis by the TA Contractor shows some improvement. However these subprojects are from the first year of TA activity. One needs to wait at least for the data on FY 83/84 to begin a fair test.

Question 7. What role has formal and on-the-job training played or not played in increasing institutional capacity?

Context. The Project Paper stressed that training under NUS was to serve directly the goals and activities of the project, rather than significantly upgrade the skills and credentials of individual trainees. The project paper idealistically called for a strongly integrated program of TA, training, and subproject implementation.


Findings.

Targets. The TA contractor's training program met its targets. The sample survey reveals that 70% of the present district leadership and engineers received training under NUS. Given the turnover at this level (for district chiefs, especially) this coverage is very good. Coverage of service ministry heads and popular council presidents and members was less complete (40%) but these are large and difficult to target populations.

Timing. The major deviation between NUS implementation and the Log Frame of the Project Paper related to a major disjunction between the delivery of training resources and subproject resources. The implementation of subprojects was considerably spread out and the implementation of the formal training program was substantially delayed. Courses on subproject planning and monitoring did not begin until 50% of the subprojects were completed and another 25% were already well underway. (See graph of subproject and training patterns of inputs.)

Because of the delays in the formal training program, it had little impact on district performance of the NUS subprojects, and the synergy between formal training, technical assistance and the subproject implementation process envisioned in the project paper was partially lost.

Quality. The local government personnel who attended training courses responded favorably when asked to evaluate their quality and relevance. The survey shows that of the 62 respondents who participated in training, 80% gave the courses the highest marks both for course quality and relevance. Sixteen percent (16%) put one or more of their courses into the second category



TIMING OF INPUTS

of being fairly good and partially relevant. And only two respondents rated their course as poor.

The curricula delivered and the training manuals produced are more general and theoretical than hoped for in the project paper. (See Consultant's Report on Engineers' Training [III-10], and Survey Questionnaire [III-7].) This was in large part a response to the practical difficulties of locating trainers competent in the style of training envisioned. None the less, many of the training sessions did include a certain combination of general lectures, specific site visits, and group discussion. The TA training group had to retain much of the responsibility for quality control and course monitoring, some of which was supposed to be handled by the training institutes.

Conclusions. One lesson from NUS is that it may be more difficult to create a large, effective, locally institutionalized training program than it is to construct 2800 small subprojects. Although NUS training met its targets and was well received by the trainees, it did not fully meet the conceptual goals of contributing to the on-going NUS implementation process.

Question 8. Are improvements in local government capabilities to deliver urban services sustainable?

Findings. Sustainability depends on finding solutions, or at least partial solutions to three critical constraints: finance, technical support, and local leadership.

The means of long term financing of NUS type activity are not yet in place. An NUS type project may increase the administrative capability for local government to carry out tasks, and it may increase the role of the public in selecting activities, but it is not sustainable if local government remains dependent upon central allocations for funding over which it has limited discretionary authority.

The amount of local government budgets deriving from central government transfers (over which local government does not have control) is in fact increasing, due to the growing wage bill and the increased cost of debt maintenance. As a result, the funds in the budget available for NUS type capital investments and for the operation and maintenance of such facilities is decreasing.

Sustainability depends on two developments. First the GOE will need to reallocate a portion of its budget for capital investments so that local levels have more authority over their usage, as in the NUS district subprojects program.

Second, more resources must be mobilized locally for the delivery and maintenance of public services.

Resources could be mobilized through a NUS Revolving Fund that would provide loans to public and private organizations to carry out certain municipal services on a self-financing basis. The most likely activities would be solid waste management, street cleaning, sidewalk repairs, and parking services.

An NUS Participation Fund would systematically encourage public participation and PYO involvement in providing capital/maintenance costs for NUS type services. Perhaps a certain amount of subproject funds could be set aside for those priority situations where local citizens raise a portion of the costs required.

Another way to mobilize local resources is to help the governorates and municipalities collect all of the taxes owed to them under current law. If the record-keeping system and collection system were modernized, it is estimated that local government could increase its revenue by 25%. Although this is not a large part of the total budget, it does represent a significant percentage of the governorate's discretionary income. Such funds could have an important local impact.

To go one step further, the system of real estate, cleansing fund, and other taxes and licenses could be rationalized within the framework of current law. Some taxes cost more to collect than they yield in revenue; others are more elastic sources of revenue and would respond well to a concentrated effort. (See the Consultant's Study of Local Government Finance [III-8].)

The higher level practical support for local subproject implementation is not yet in place. As discussed earlier, districts need certain kinds of support in order to carry out NUS type activities. At present much of this support is effectively provided by the TA Contractor. The capability is needed at the governorate or Amana technical secretariat to provide this support and guidance function in the future.

The turnover of senior district management personnel makes it difficult to create a stable local

government cadre. The survey results confirm that the district chiefs arrive in their posts late in their careers, and often from outside local government. Over 35% of the district chiefs are 55 years or older. Of the 12 chiefs interviewed, 33.3% have been in local government for less than five years. Twenty-five percent of the district chiefs (25%) have been in their present position for only one year or less. The information on education suggests that many of the local management personnel come to local government from careers with the military or police. Forty-three percent (43%) have their degrees from police and military academies.

The case studies on district decision making [11-4] stressed that under the Egyptian system of local government with its centrifugal tendencies at the district level, the success or failure of a district's program is particularly dependent upon the effectiveness of one senior person, the district chief or secretary general. The survey data show that this one key person is most likely new to local government, even newer to his present position of responsibility, and approaching retirement.

Conclusions. Much remains to be done. One does not transform an entire bureaucracy in just a few years. Under the LD II Project, the continuation of NUS type subprojects, the regularization of the maintenance fund, the plan to institutionalize the training program, the broadening of the PYO grants program, the increased emphasis on rehabilitation of structures, and the initiation of local resource mobilization all address important issues of sustainability as revealed in the NUS experience.

VII. IMPROVE QUALITY OF LIFE (SUBPROJECTS)

The NUS project is completing about 2800 subprojects through the local government and the private voluntary agencies. These subprojects are the concrete realization of NUS goal to improve the quality of life.

[As of January 31, 1986: 1,166 district subprojects had been started and 1,031 completed; 1,284 PYO subprojects have been started, with 1,013 completions. Special subprojects total 343. The total number of subprojects started is 2,793, of which 2,387 are completed.]

That so many subprojects are being completed is a major achievement. At the beginning of NUS many Egyptians and other residents of Cairo doubted that such a project could produce (through local government and local private building contractors) an average of more than one subproject

a day for five years. Anyone who has ever tried to have minor plumbing, carpentry, or electrical work done at his Cairo home can appreciate the magnitude of the achievement.

The districts are directly completing about 1200 subprojects at an average cost of about LE 40,000. The largest number of these (over 35%) are in the area of education. Typically, they comprise an addition and rehabilitation to an existing school. Utilities and small infrastructure subprojects also make up over 35% of the portfolio. Many of these are street lighting or street paving activities, but there are also small water and sewerage subprojects in this category. Over 15% of the subprojects are in the area of health. Although the numbers of subprojects is not so great here, health subprojects, clinics and hospitals, by their nature, serve a very large number of people. They also account for a disproportionate share of the subproject allocations. Youth centers, government-run nurseries, and other social services account for over 10% of the government subprojects. The smallest (about 2%) sector of subprojects is that concerned with markets and food security.

The portfolio of PYO subprojects is strongly weighted to clinics, nurseries, and skill centers which together constitute about 80% of the total. There are also multi-purpose centers, income generating programs, hostels, and programs for the handicapped and elderly. The PYO subprojects, with an average allocation of under LE 8,000 are considerably smaller than the government ones.

The overall subproject portfolio differs from that envisioned in the project paper. The number of PYO subprojects are half of the target, but their average size is double what was anticipated. This change reflects that inflation made the LE 4,000 subproject almost obsolete, and the number of qualified PYOs is less than originally thought. Another change in the PYO portfolio was the reallocation of about 10% of the funds intended for individual PYO grants to the construction of four multipurpose centers, one for each governorate.

The change in the government subproject portfolio is its division into two categories, district and special. The special funds coordinated certain activities and allocation decisions at the governorate-wide level, although much of the implementation was through the districts. Under NUS, 36% of the funds earmarked for district subprojects were reallocated to the special subprojects. The LD II Project Paper specifically limits the special funds to 25% of the total for government subprojects.

Question 9. How responsive are the NUS subprojects to the needs and priorities of the urban poor?

Context. NUS was not designed to meet all the needs of the urban poor nor necessarily the most pressing needs. One might argue that the desperately poor find the services of schools, clinics, youth clubs, and childcare nurseries to be frills. They have greater needs such as decent housing and employment. Also some of the pressing needs of urban citizens, not just the poorest, do not lend themselves to district level, NUS-type solutions. The overall systems of sewerage and transportation cause more immediate inconvenience. As one harried district official complained during the first year of NUS, AID wants him to prioritize among nurseries, youth clubs, and classrooms when the streets are knee-deep in backed-up sewage. There are other projects addressing these large problems.

Findings.

Site Visit Observations. Several ISTI/SRC evaluation teams including Egyptians and Americans, social scientists and engineers have made site visits to over 200 subprojects since 1983 and have found that the subprojects are with few exceptions, appreciated, appropriate, and their services heavily subscribed.

User Response. The district subproject survey found that 83.3% of the facility directors felt the subproject responded to real and important needs. Although 50% of these stated that these needs were not necessarily the very most important.

The responses to the open-ended questions of the survey reveal that even those who disapproved of the possible political motives of the American project, stated that NUS provided much needed and appropriate services.

Contrasts. In general the PVO sites are more highly regarded and in better condition than the government subprojects. Among the government subprojects, those in the education sector are most highly regarded, followed by health; and the market subprojects are most problematical. [III-7, pp. 51-59] Small infrastructure subprojects such as street lighting and paving are much appreciated by users interviewed in 1986. However, the 1984 case studies on street lighting subprojects [II-4] revealed problematic aspects in crowded areas - vandalism,

maintenance and operation problems, disputes.

Subproject Size and Impact. A look at the record, reveals that the majority of subprojects are parts of a sequenced package of additions and improvements to the same site or facility. NUS delivered over 1,000 district subprojects of an average size of LE 42,000. One frequent criticism from Egyptians about NUS is that such small and fragmented subprojects do not adequately address the huge needs of Egyptian urban poverty.

However, of 67 Cairo subprojects originally selected for sampling by the SRC, 59 were found to take place at 23 sites. The average cost of these 59 subprojects is LE 42,700. A more accurate picture of NUS impact might recognize that 23 sites and facilities received NUS subprojects of an average cost of LE 109,000 per site. From this standpoint, NUS subprojects have a stronger and more coordinated impact yet retain the flexibility envisioned by the size and duration limitations stated in the project agreement. (See Consultants' Review of NUS Private Sector Impact [III-9].)

Conclusions. The evaluation finds no reason to recommend a change in the current selection criteria regarding subproject size limitation. Few subprojects approach the limit, and there are procedures in place for making exceptions. Although the small size of subprojects might reduce their impact, this is offset by the cumulative impact of such a large number of such activities. Furthermore the tendency to construct multiple subprojects at a single facility over several years increases the impact while retaining the maximum flexibility and immediacy of impact. One positive result of this is that it creates a kind of ad hoc phased planning with a several year time horizon. L.D. II should build on this and incorporate such planning more comprehensively into district level planning.

Question 10. Are the benefits and services provided by NUS subprojects sustainable?

Context. This depends progress in the area of maintenance. In the broadest sense, maintenance of public facilities is an organizational complex of activities, including cleaning, periodic replacement of parts and fixtures, periodic upgrading and refurbishing, timely repair of unplanned breakages, as well as long term financing and investment protection. The maintenance of most local public service facilities is done in the very narrowest sense or

responding to an operational crisis.

The provision for maintenance of NUS subprojects was contained in the project agreement calling for the GOE to set aside funds equal to 10% of the construction costs of the subprojects into district level maintenance funds.

Findings. The final evaluation Consultant's Maintenance Review [III-11] (annexed to this report) shows that although the TA contractor conducted an excellent survey of the maintenance needs of over 600 subprojects of FY 81/82 and FY 82/83, few NUS subprojects have actually received maintenance. The needs have been identified for the districts, funds have been released to the districts, and a contract mechanism for maintenance work is essentially in place in most districts, but still, progress has been very slow until recently. As of April 30, 1986, out of 127 FY 81/82 subprojects needing maintenance, 63 are completed, 21 started, and 18 not started at all.

Maintenance was not part of any of the training courses on project planning or supervision until a special course on the topic was added during the last year of NUS. Nor was a maintenance plan or budget required as part of the initial subproject proposals and plans. Relatively few TA contractor resources have been used to create or strengthen a preventive maintenance plan regarding service facilities at the district or governorate level.

Many of the maintenance problems of NUS subprojects result from inadequacies in the original design and workmanship. Plumbing work poorly done and then quickly over-utilized inevitable results in backed up toilets in school yards. [II-3] This aspect of the maintenance problem was aggressively addressed by the TA Contractor in their work with the districts.

A major TA effort has been made regarding heavy equipment maintenance and governorate maintenance garages, but the rate of progress has been frustrating and the LE 7 million assigned to the effort remains largely unspent.

Recurrent Costs. Although the NUS Project provides for the 10% maintenance fund, the mechanisms for its use were unspecified. USAID project management and the TA worked hard to make sure those funds were released to the districts. Also the fund is anomalously situated in the Bab III budget for one time capital expenses, rather than appearing as a recurrent line item in the normal Bab II annual budget for O & M. The design of LD II corrects this for the future.

The Egyptian government is already spending a large amount of its own scarce resources for maintenance of school, clinic, and youth center structures, but the funds go to crisis rehabilitation rather than a planned program of preventive maintenance. [11-6]

The subproject and local officials surveys [111-7] reveal a complacency with the quality of construction work and a very distant awareness of the NUS requirements regarding maintenance of subprojects. To date there is little concern with maintenance on the part of local officials.

Conclusions. The area of maintenance, both the specific maintenance of completed NUS subprojects from the NUS maintenance fund, and the general development of district and governorate level maintenance plans and organizations need priority attention under LD II. The separate maintenance TA contract and project designed for LD II focuses its attention on the maintenance of heavy equipment. The issue of subproject and similar facility maintenance remains to be dealt with largely under the successor urban services project. The sustainability of the specific subprojects and the sustainability of local capability to provide services both depend on progress in this area.

VIII. NUS PROJECT ASSESSMENT AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The NUS Project delivered all of its inputs and achieved its ambitious output targets. In this respect it produced immediately tangible results of demonstrable value to as many as 4 million urban residents, especially, but not exclusively, in poor and crowded neighborhoods. The funds have gone directly into structures and equipment making possible the increased delivery of needed and desired basic public services.

Moreover the project moved urban local government in the direction of increased responsiveness to public needs, increased public participation, and increased capability of decentralized administration as called for in Egyptian local government laws. The project has the strong support of the broad spectrum of local officials, employees, popular council members, and PYO representatives.

Two important aspects of the project, formal training and maintenance, lagged behind or fell short of original projections, due to various competing pressures. Furthermore the design of the NUS Project failed to address the crucial area of long term financing of local government

initiatives. These three areas are addressed much more vigorously in the design of the L.D. II follow-on projects.

Summary of Recommendations

1. Expand the training workshops regarding the role of the popular council. Through such workshops some of the tensions between elected and appointed officials may be reduced, or at least come to be better understood as part of the normal process of democracy. Workshops should also include issues such as ways to keep contact with and solicit suggestions from the wider public.
2. Design a pilot project to modernize the tax record keeping and collection systems of the governorates and municipalities. This could increase local revenues by 25%, a significant percentage of the governorate's discretionary income, and such funds could have an important local impact. To go one step further, local revenue collection could be rationalized within the framework of current law. Some taxes cost more to collect than they yield in revenue; others are more elastic sources of revenue and would respond well to a concentrated effort.
3. Increase Local Mobilization of Resources through participation funds, revolving loan funds to support the privatization of selected services, and PVO matching grants. A "Participation Fund" would set aside district funds to give priority to subprojects for which citizens, through the popular council and local PVOs raise a share of the subproject costs. A revolving fund would provide loans to organizations providing selected services on a self financing cost recovery basis. PVO matching grants would set aside special funds from the PVO grant program to give priority to PVOs which raise 25% of the cost of a subproject.
4. A program of training of trainers (TOT) should be a lead component of the Sakkara Training Center in order for it to provide significant support to the large training and orientation programs of the urban and rural service delivery projects. Training busy adult professionals is a special skill that must be taught to a large cadre of trainers if the broad training mandate of LD II is to be realized.
5. Do Identified Maintenance on NUS subprojects. The TA contractor under the LD II urban services project should make getting the maintenance done on the NUS subprojects from FY

81/82 and 82/83 a top priority. Unless there is an aggressive push to do this maintenance, the NUS subprojects are in danger of deteriorating and thus losing the momentum and morale created by the NUS accomplishment. These subprojects should provide a laboratory for demonstrating approaches to preventive maintenance.

6. Small infrastructure/service subprojects should be continued under the present system of district level subproject selection and with the current criteria regarding subproject size.

APPENDIX I

English/Arabic Presentation Summaries

46

تقييم مشروع الخدمات الحضرية
NUS PROJECT ASSESSMENT

NUS PROJECT IS A MAJOR
SUCCESS.

يمثل مشروع الخدمات الحضرية نجاح
ذو اهمية .

IT HAS MOVED LOCAL GVT
SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE
DIRECTIONS OF:

فقد اتاح المشروع الحكم المحلى
من التوجه الى :

INCREASED RESPONSIVENESS TO
PUBLIC NEEDS,

• استجابة اكثر لاحتياجات الجمهور .

EXPANDED PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION,

• زيادة المشاركة الشعبية .

IMPROVED CAPABILITY OF
DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION.

تحسين القدرات فى لامركزية الادارة
المحلية .

MAJOR SUCCESS DOES NOT MEAN
PERFECT, AND SIGNIFICANT
PROBLEMS REMAIN TO BE SOLVED.

هذا النجاح الهام لا يعنى المشالية
فما زالت هناك مشاكل تحتاج لمعالجة .

GIVEN THE SIZE, COMPLEXITY,
AND EXPERIMENTAL NATURE OF
THE PROJECT, THE FACT THAT IT
ACHIEVED ALL ITS OUTPUT
TARGETS, DELIVERED ALL ITS
SPECIFIED INPUTS, AND MADE
PROGRESS TOWARD SUCH
AMBITIOUS PURPOSES IS A MAJOR
ACCOMPLISHMENT.

و يمثل المشروع انجازات هامة من
حيث الحجم، التركيب، الاسلوب المبتكر
توفير جميع المتطلبات، تحقيق الاهداف
والتقدم فى اتجاه الوصول الى
اغراض طموحة .

لا مركزية الادارة المحلية
SUPPORT DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION

FINDINGS:

نتائج الدراسة :

NUS HAS STIMULATED MUCH DECISION MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL BY PROVIDING SOMETHING ABOUT WHICH DECISIONS AND CHOICES NEED TO BE MADE.

لقد ساهم مشروع التنمية الحضرية في اذكاء عملية اتخاذ القرارات على المستوى المحلي عن طريق ايجاد مشروعات تتطلب اتخاذ القرارات و عمل الاختيارات اللازمة .

FULL RANGE OF NECESSARY TECHNICAL SKILLS ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT DISTRICT LEVEL - ESPECIALLY CERTAIN ENGINEERING SKILLS.

القرارات الفنية اللازمة غير متوفرة بدرجة كاملة على مستوى الحى خاصة للمهندسين .

CONCLUSIONS:

الخلاصة :

THE NUS APPROACH OF LEARNING THROUGH DOING CONCRETE PROJECTS IS A SOUND AND EFFECTIVE MODEL FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT.

ان الاتجاه الذى تبناه مشروع التنمية الحضرية للتدريب من خلال تنفيذ مشروعات فعلية هو اصدق نموذج و اكثر فاعلية للتنمية الحضرية المحلية .

DISTRICT LEVEL NEEDS BACK UP SUPPORT. THIS SUPPORT IS PRESENTLY PROVIDED BY THE TA CONTRACTOR, BUT NEEDS TO COME FROM THE GOVERNORATE OR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IF DECENTRALIZED ACTIVITY IS TO BE SUSTAINED.

الاحياء تحتاج الى دفعة و تعويض يتم تقديم هذه الدفعة حاليا عن طريق بيت الخبرة . و لكن هناك حاجة الى تقديمها من المحافظة حتى يمكن تحقيق اهداف تنمية لامركزية .

RECOMMENDATION:

التوصيات :

L.D. II MUST FOCUS ON THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN DISTRICT AND HIGHER LEVELS - GOVERNORATE, AMANA, AND CENTRAL MINISTRIES.

التركيز على المشاركة بين الحى و المستويات الحكومية العليا و الامانة .

زيادة المشاركة الشعبية
INCREASE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

FINDINGS:

نتائج الدراسة :

LOCAL POPULAR COUNCIL AND PVOS
INVOLVED IN SUBPROJECT SELECTION

اشتركت المجالس الشعبية المحلية
والجمعيات الاهلية فى اختيار
مشروعات التنمية الحضرية .

THERE ARE TENSIONS AND DIFFERENCES
IN ATTITUDES BETWEEN POPULAR
COUNCIL AND MINISTRY DEPT.
PERSONNEL

يوجد خلافات فى الاتجاهات ووجهات
النظر بين ممثلى المجلس الشعبى
المحلى و موظفى الادارات الخدمية .

ONLY 44% OF POPULAR COUNCIL
LEADERSHIP RECEIVED TRAINING

تم تدريب 44 ٪ فقط من قيادات
المجلس الشعبى المحلى .

CONCLUSIONS:

الخلاصة :

NUS HAS GREATLY MULTIPLIED THE
OPPORTUNITIES FOR POPULAR COUNCIL
AND PVO INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL
DECISION MAKING

لقد ساهم مشروع التنمية الحضرية
مساهمة فعالة فى اتاحة الفرصة
للمجلس المحلى و الجمعيات الاهلية
الخيرية للمشاركة فى اتخاذ القرارات
على المستوى المحلى .

POPULAR COUNCILS' RELATION TO
PUBLIC AND PVOS' ABILITY TO
MOBILIZE LOCAL RESOURCES BOTH NEED
FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT

هناك احتياج الى تشجيع و تنمية
العلاقة بين المجلس المحلى و جهود
القطاع العام و الجمعيات الاهلية
لزيادة الموارد المحلية .

RECOMMENDATIONS:

التوصيات :

EXPAND TRAINING WORKSHOPS FOR
POPULAR COUNCILS

التوسع فى عقد الحلقات الدراسية
لاعضاء المجالس الشعبية المحلية .

FINDINGS:

TA CONTRACTOR PROVIDED 35,000 TRAINING DAYS THROUGH CORE COURSES IN ENGINEERING, PROJECT PLANNING, FINANCE, PVO ISSUES.

TRAINING WAS SIGNIFICANTLY DELAYED DUE TO VARIOUS FACTORS.

DIFFICULT TO FIND THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF QUALIFIED TRAINERS.

CONCLUSIONS:

A TRAINING PROGRAM OF THIS SIZE IS A COMPLEX UNDERTAKING. TRAINERS ARE THE KEY ELEMENT.

RECOMMENDATION:

TRAINING OF TRAINERS (TOT) PROGRAM SHOULD BE A LEAD COMPONENT OF SAKKARA TRAINING INSTITUTE.

نتائج الدراسة :

قامت المعونة الفنية بتقديم ٣٥٠٠٠ يوم تدريب لبرامج تداولت النواحي الهندسية ، تخطيط المشروعات ، النواحي المالية و الجمعيات الاهلية .

تسببت عدة عوامل مختلفة في تاخير تقديم التدريب .

توجد صعوبة في توفير العدد اللازم من المدربين الكفاء .

الخلاصة :

ان برامج التدريب بهذا الحجم يعتبر امر بالغ التعقيد . ان المدربين الكفاء هم العنصر الرئيسى .

التوصيات :

يجب ان يكون برنامج تدريب المدربين جزئية رائدة فى معهد تدريب سقارة .

LOCAL RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

تنمية الموارد المحلية

FINDINGS:

نتائج الدراسة:

NUS INCREASED FINANCING USUALLY PROVIDED UNDER GOE BUDGETS FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AT DISTRICT LEVEL. IT ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL MAINTENANCE FUND . ALSO IT INCREASED FINANCING TO PVOs .

اتحاح مشروع التنمية الحضرية من زيادة الاستخدامات الاستثمارية الموفرة تحت موازنة الحكم المحلي على مستوى الاحياء ، فتح حساب خاص للصيانة ، وكذا زيادة التمويل للجمعيات الاهلية .

CENTRAL TRANSFERS SUPPLEMENTING LOCAL BUDGETS INCREASE DUE TO GROWING WAGE AND DEBT MAINTAENANCE RQUIREMENTS .

تتزايد اعانة الخدمات السيادية لموازنة الحكم المحلي لتواجة النمو المطلوب بالنسبة للاجور و التحويلات الجارية و الراسمالية .

BUT LOCAL BUDGET FOR NUS TYPE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AND ASSOCIATED O & M IS SHRINKING IN REAL TERMS. THE PRESSURES ARE SIGNIFICANT AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL.

و لكن القيمة الفعلية تضمحل بالنسبة للتمويل المتاح للاستخدامات الاستثمارية و الصيانة المتطلبة . و تزداد حدة هذه الضغوط على مستوى المدينة .

CONCLUSIONS

الخلاصة:

NUS INCREASED DISCRETION AND RESPONSIVENESS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL THROUGH INCREASED FINANCING IN FORM OF "BLOCK" RATHER THAN "CATEGORICAL" GRANTS .

تمكن المشروع من زيادة الاستجابة لاولويات الاحتياجات المحلية على مستوى الاحياء و ذلك من خلال التمويل المقدم في صورة "منح مجمعة" بدل من "منح مصففة" .

HOWEVER, NUS REINFORCED THE USE OF GRANTS RATHER THAN " SELF-FINANCING" AND "POPULAR PARTICIPATION" APPROACH TO PROVIDE AND MAINTAIN NUS-TYPE PROJECTS .

ولكن هذا الاتجاه ادى الى زيادة الاعتماد على اسلوب المنح بدل من اسلوب التمويل و الجهود الذاتية لتوفير وصيانة الخدمات الحضرية .

RECOMMENDATIONS

التوصيات:

STEPS TO GRADUALLY MOVE FROM EXISTING CENTRAL "SUBSIDIES" TO "BLOCK" GRANTS AND OTHER MEASURES TO INCREASE RESOURCES AND DISCRETION AT LOCAL LEVEL.

التحرك من الاسلوب القائم لاعانة السيادية نحو اسلوب "المنح المجمعة" و غيره من الطرق الملائمة لزيادة الموارد المحلية والاستجابة لاولويات الاحياء .

CREATE A "PARTICIPATION FUND" WHICH WILL GIVE PRIORITY TO NUS-TYPE SUBPROJECTS WHERE LOCAL CITIZENS MOBILIZE 25% OF COSTS .

تشكيل حساب خاص "للمشاركة" يعطى اولوية لتمويل المشروعات التي يشارك الجمهور في تمويل ٢٥ ٪ من تكاليفها .

ESTABLISH A "REVOLVING FUND" WHICH WILL SUPPORT STEPS TO PRIVATIZE SELECTED NUS-TYPE SERVICES THROUGH GRADUAL SYSTEMATIC INCREASES OF CONTRIBUTING FROM BENEFICIANIES TO SUSTAIN SELF-FINANCING .

انشاء حساب "دائري" خاص لتشجيع خطوات منظمة نحو تحقيق اسلوب التمويل الذاتي من خلال زيادة تدريجية في الدفعات من المستفيدين .

MODERNIZE RECORDS AND PROCEDURES TO MAXIMIZE COLLECTIONS OF LOCAL REVENUES UNDER BOUNDARIES OF EXISTING LAWS .

تطوير و تحديث سجلات و طرق تحصيل الموارد المحلية لزيادة جملة الايرادات بقدر الامكان في نطاق القوانين القائمة .

تحسين مستوى المعيشة
IMPROVE QUALITY OF LIFE

FINDINGS:

NUS IS COMPLETING OVER 2800 SUBPROJECTS THROUGH LCCAI, GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES.

DISTRICT SUBPROJECTS ARE LARGELY IN UTILITIES AND SMALL INFRASTRUCTURE (35%) AND EDUCATION (35%). PVO SUBPROJECTS FOCUS ON CLINICS, NURSERIES, AND SKILL CENTERS.

SUBPROJECTS ARE APPROPRIATE, APPRECIATED, AND HEAVILY UTILIZED BY THE PUBLIC.

AVERAGE COST OF DISTRICT SUBPROJECTS IS L.E. 40,000. HOWEVER, SEVERAL SUBPROJECTS ARE OFTEN CONSTRUCTED AT SAME FACILITY OVER TIME, THUS INCREASING THE NUS IMPACT WHILE MAINTAINING FLEXIBILITY.

CONCLUSIONS:

THE NUS SYSTEM OF LOCAL SELECTION OF SUBPROJECTS IS RESPONSIVE TO IMPORTANT AND FELT NEEDS OF A BROAD SECTION OF LOCAL POPULATION (ALTHOUGH NUS IS NOT DESIGNED TO PRIMARILY ADDRESS THE MOST PRESSING NEEDS OF THE POOREST).

نتائج الدراسة :

تمكن مشروع التنمية الحضرية من استكمال اكثر من ٢٨٠٠ مشروع من خلال الاحياء و الجمعيات الاهلية .

تركزت غالبية مشروعات الاحياء في تحسين المرافق الصغيرة (٠/٠٣٥) و الخدمات التعليمية (٠/٠٣٥) و ركزت مشروعات الجمعيات الاهلية على خدمات رعاية الطفل و التأهيل المهني .

يقدر الجمهور ملائمة المشروعات و يستعملها بكثرة .

يتراوح متوسط تكاليف المشروع الى حوالي ٤٠.٠٠٠ ر.ج جنيه مصري. و قد أدى استكمال الكثير من المشروعات في نفس الموقع الى زيادة اثار التحسين مع الاحتفاظ بالمرونة .

الخلاصة :

تمكن مشروع التنمية الحضرية من الاستجابة الى احتياجات ذات اولوية هامة بالنسبة الى نطاق واسع من الجمهور (و لو ان المشروع لم يوجه اساسا الى الاحتياجات الملحة لمحدودي الدخل) .

MAINTENANCE

الصيانة

FINDINGS:

نتائج الدراسة :

60% OF COMPLETED 1ST YEAR NUS SUBPROJECTS NEED SOME MAINTENANCE. 20-30% ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DEFICIENT, DAMAGED, OR UNUSED BY TA CONTRACTOR STANDARDS.

٦٠ ٪ من المشروعات التي تمت تحتاج الى بعض اعمال الصيانة ٢٠ - ٣٠ ٪ يوجد بها قصور و تلفيات و غير مستعملة بالقياس للمستوى الذى حددته المعونة الفنية .

STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ADDRESS MANY MAINT. PROBLEMS AND SITUATION WITH LATER NUS SUBPROJECTS IS IMPROVED.

تم اتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة لمعالجة مشاكل الصيانة و الموقف فى تحسين .

A PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PLAN IS NOT IN PLACE FOR REGULAR GOE OR NUS FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT.

لا توجد خطة صيانة " وقائية " بالنسبة للمشاريع الممولة تحت ميزانية الدولة او مشاريع التنمية الحضرية خدمات كانت او معدات .

MAJORITY OF DISTRICT PERSONNEL DO NOT PERCEIVE ANY MAINTENANCE PROBLEM.

اغلب العاملين بالاحياء لا يلمسوا مشاكل الصيانة .

CONCLUSION:

الخلاصة :

MAINTENANCE REMAINS A CRUCIAL ISSUE FOR SUSTAINABILITY OF SPECIFIC SUBPROJECTS AND OF LOCAL CAPACITY TO PROVIDE NEEDED SERVICES.

مازلت الصيانة هى الموضوع الرئيسى للمحافظة على بقاء و استمرار المشروعات و زيادة قدرتها على المستوى المحلى للوفاء بالخدمات المرجوه منها .

RECOMMENDATIONS:

التوصيات :

LD II MUST PUT EMPHASIS ON COMPLETING MAINT. ALREADY IDENTIFIED FOR NUS SUBPROJECTS.

يجب فى مشروع LD-II التأكيد من استكمال اعمال الصيانة بمشروعات التنمية الحضرية التى تم تنفيذها .

USE NUS SUBPROJECTS AS A LABORATORY FOR DEMONSTRATING STRENGTH OF PREVENTIVE SYSTEMS.

استخدام مشروعات التنمية الحضرية " كنموذج نظام وقائى " يمكن الاسترشاد به .

APPENDIX II

Arabic Version of Final Report

٤٦٠

تقييم مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء

التقرير النهائى

مقدم الى

وكالة التنمية الدولية الامريكية

القاهرة- جمهورية مصر العربية

تم اعداده من :

المعهد العلمى والتكنولوجى الدولى

٢٠٣٣ شارع " ام " وشجتن

مركز البحوث الاجتماعية / الجامعة الامريكية بالقاهرة

١١٣ شارع القصر العينى . القاهرة

يوليو ١٩٨٦

٤٦١

قدم مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء تمويلا يزيد على ٨٩ مليون دولار بالاضافة الى الخدمة الفنية للحكم المحلى و الجمعيات الاهلية فى القاهرة الكبرى و الاسكندرية و يهدف هذا المشروع الى اقامة ٢٨٠٠ مشروع معاون للبنية الاساسية و ذلك لتحسين وصول الخدمات الاساسية (مثل المستشفيات و المدارس و المياه و الاضاءة ١٠٠٠٠ السخ) لسكان هاتين المدينتين المقتظين بالسكان . و يعد مشروع الخدمة الحضرية للاحياء جزء ١ من برنامج دعم قطاع المركزية الذى قدم مبلغا اجماليا قيمته ٦٠٠ مليون دولار لجميع مستويات الحكم المحلى . و اغراض مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء اربعة هى :-

- دعم الامركزية الادارية
- زيادة المشاركة الشعبية فى الحكم المحلى
- دعم قدرة الحكم المحلى على تقديم الخدمات
- رفع مستوى المعيشة لسكان الاحياء

دعم الامركزية الادارية

النتائج : زاد مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء نشاط بناء البنية الاساسية على مستوى الاحياء فضلا عن تقديم الخدمات العامة و الهامة للجماهير . و قامت اجهزة الحكم المحلى بتقييم الاحتياجات و تحديد الاولويات و اختيار المقاولين قطاع خاص بالاضافة الى التنسيق بين الهيئات المحلية فيما بينها و بين مستويات الإدارة الاخرى فضلا عن قيامها باعمال المتابعة و الاشراف . و قد تم مباشرة ما يزيد على ١٢٠٠ مشروع (من خلال عقود مع شركات البناء المحلية) فى ٢٣ حيا .

و قد اتضح ان الغالبية العظمى من المسؤولين المحليين يوافقون على اهداف مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء و على المعايير المستعملة فى اتخاذ القرارات على مستوى و تنفيذ للمشروعات المعاونة .

الخلاصة :

ان سجل اتمام الخدمات الحضرية على المستوى المعتاد او اعلى منه يثبت ان مثل هذه المهام يمكن القيام بها على مستوى الاحياء و استراتيجية مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء للتعليم من خلال التنفيذ المتكرر لمشروعات المعاونة المغيرة و المتوسطة ما هو الا نموذج صالح و فعال من اجل دعم التنمية المحلية .

و العامل الهام فى استمرار هذا التقدم و زيادة قدرات الحكم المحلى هو بؤرة العلاقة بين الحى و المستويات الاهلى للإدارة المحلية . اما المحافظات و الامانة الفنية فتحتاج الى ان تصبح قادرة على دعم أنشطة الاحياء .

و مازالت هناك قيود عديدة على قدرة الحكم المحلى على التعامل بكفاءة مع المشروعات الصغيرة لخدمات البنية الاساسية و بعض القيود. تمت مناقشتها فى المرحلة الثانية لبرنامج التهيئة المحلية بينما يعد البعض موضوع حوار ضمن السياسة .

ريادة المشاركة الشعبية فى الحكم المحلى :

النتائج :

سدم مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء الوسيلة (المشروعات المعاونة) للمجلس الشعبى كى يصبح مشتركاً فى اصدار عدد من القرارات المحلية الهامة ، و كذلك تم تقديم منح الى الجمعيات الاهلية التطوعية لتحسين و توسيع نطاق تقديم هذه الخدمات .

و الاشتراك المتزايد للمجلس الشعبى هو مصدر بعض التوتر فى اخذ القرارات على مستوى الاحياء .

الخلاصة :

زاد مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء بدرجة كبيرة من عدد القرارات المحلية الهامة التى تشمل المجلس الشعبى . و للمجلس الشعبى بالفعل و له دور و سلطات محددة طبقاً للقانون . غير انه بسبب قلته الانشطة التى يتم اخذ القرار فى تنفيذها على مستوى الاحياء فان هذه السلطة بقيت نظرية . و حقيقة وجود بعض التوتر و بعض الغضب بشأن دور المجلس الشعبى توحى بانء مشارك فعلا فى عملية اخذ القرار .

توصيات : توسيع دورات التدريب لاعضاء المجلس الشعبى

من خلال مثل هذه الدورات يمكن تقليل بعض التوتر القائم بين المسؤولين المعنيين و المنتخبين و كذا يمكن انشاء تفاهم افضل بينهم كجزء من الطريقة التطبيقية للديمقراطية . و يجب ان تشمل الدورات على بعض القضايا مثل طرق المحافظة على الاتصال و تلقى الاقتراحات من القاعدة الاوسع من الجمهور .

دعم قدرة الحكم المحلى على القيام بالخدمات

تعبئة الموارد المحلية و المحافظة عليها :-

النتائج :

ان نسبة ميزانيات الحكم المحلى المحولة اليه من الحكومة المركزية تتزايد بفضل ارتفاع الاجور و نفقات الديون . بالاضافة الى ذلك فان المحافظات و مجالس الاحياء غير قادرة على تحميل العائدات المستحقة طبقاً للقانون بسبب الطرق الغير حديثة فى تحميل الضرائب خاصة المحلية .

و هناك امكانيات غير مستغلة بعد لتعبئة الموارد الخاصة فى صورة مساهمات المواطنين من خلال الجمعيات الاهلية

الخلاصة :

ان الوسيلة المالية التى تكفل للحكم المحلى تقديم الخدمات الاساسية المطلوبة ليست متوفرة و قد يزداد مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء من القدرات الادارية للحكم المحلى ليكون قادرا على اداء مهامه ، كما انه قد يزداد من دور الجماهير المنطلبة . و لكن استمرارية مثل هذه الانجازات ستظل عزيزة المنال اذا بقى الحكم المحلى معتمدا على المخصصات المركزية للتمويل فى ميزانياته .

توصيات : القيام بمشروع تطبيقى لتحديث نظم تحليل و ربط الضرائب فى المحافظات و مجالس الاحياء :-

و يمكن لمثل هذا الجهد ان يزداد الايرادات المحلية بنسبة ٠/٢٥ . و هى نسبة كبيرة فى داخل مجالس المدن و سيكون برشيد تحصيل العوائد فى اطار القوانين . فبعض الضرائب تتكلف فى عملية تحصيلها اكثر من قيمتها . بينما هناك مصادر اخرى تتسم بالمرونة و تستجيب اكثر للمجهودات المكثفة لزيادتها .

توصيات : زيادة التعبئة المحلية للوارد من خلال صناديق المساهمة او تمويل لدعم بعض الخدمات على اسس الاستثمار بالقطاع الخاص

و كذا منح مماثلة للجمعيات الاهلية المتطوعة . و يمكن انشاء "صندوق المساهمة" و يتم تخصيص تمويله للمشروعات ذات اولوية هامة يقوم المواطنون بالمساهمة فى نفقاتها من خلال المجالس الشعبية او الجمعيات الاهلية المتطوعة . كما ان مثل هذا الصندوق للمشاركة يمكن ان يقوم قروضا للهيئات التى تقوم ببعض الخدمات على اساس التمويل الذاتى لتغطية النفقات المطلوبة . اما المنح للجمعيات الاهلية المتطوعة فيمكن تخصيص جانبها من الميزانيات الخاصة لمشروعات هذه الجمعيات و لاعطاء اولوية اولى الى الجمعيات الاهلية التى تقوم بجمع جزء كبير من النفقات المتطلبة من المستفيدين من المشروع .

التدريب و دعم الحكم المحلى :

النتائج :-

حقق التدريب اهدافه المرجوه من رفع كفاءة الادارة بالاحياء ، و مهندسيها و اعضاء المجلس الشعبى و كذا الجمعيات الاهلية . و قد بين التقييم النهائى ان ما يزداد على ٧٥ /٠ من مستويات المهندسين و المديرين فى الاحياء (ما يزداد عن ٥٠٠ مسئول و فنى) قد تلقوا دورة تدريبية او اثنين (مدة الواحدة ستة ايام) فى اطار مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء .

ويشير سجل مكتب الخبرة للمعونة الفنية الى ان مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء قد قدم ما يزيد على ٣٥ ألف يوم تدريب للمسؤولين المحليين وأعضاء مجلس الجمعيات الاهلية وفتنيين أجهزة الحكم المحلي .

وأولئك الذين شاركوا فى التدريب أفادوا انهم وجدوه ذا جودة عالية ويتصل بعملهم .

ان اعداد برامج تدريب لهذه الهيئات حقق نجاحا جزئيا ، حيث انه كان بطيئا وشاقا . ففريق التدريب للمعونة الفنية قابلته صعوبات خاصة من ايجاد مدربين مهرة يمكنهم تنفيذ تعليم الاساليب الفنية للبالغين والتي تعد حجر الزاوية فى برامج التدريب .

وقد تأخر البرنامج التدريبي عن العناصر الاخرى للمشروع كما أن فرصة الاسترجاع بين التدريب العادى والتدريب العملى المرتبط بتنفيذ المشروعات المعونة قد تأخرت .

الخلاصة :

ان التدريب الذى تم تقديمه فى اطار مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء كان له تأثير ضئيل على تنفيذ المشروعات المعاونة فى المرحلة الثانية تحت برنامج التنمية المحلية .

وخلق برامج تدريب ملائمة بصفة دائمة ومنظمة انما هو عمل عظيم شأنه شأن بناء ٢٨٠٠ ملحق للمدارس ودورات المياه ومراكز الشباب . ويشتمل التدريب على جوانب عديدة بينها دورات توجيه للمشروع وكذا دورات تدريبية لبناء اسلوب العمل فى مجموعات ورفع مستوى الكفاءة واكتساب مهارات جديدة ولم يكن لدى المشروع الموارد كى يوفى كل المهام المشار اليها بالدرجة التى يمكن ان تترك تأثيرا ملموسا .

توصية : برنامج تدريب المدربين يجب ان يكون وحده رئيسيا فى مركز تدريب

سقاؤه :

كى يتمكن من تقديم الدعم اللازم ببرامج التدريب والتوجيه لمشروعات تقديم الخدمات الحضرية والريفية . ان تدريب البالغين العاملين مهارة خاصة يمكن تعليمها لكدر كبير من المدربين اذا ما أردنا للهدف المرجو من برنامج تدريب المرحلة الثانية من برنامج التنمية المحلية ان يتحقق .

رفع مستوى المعيشة :

المشروعات المعاونة :

النتائج : تمكن مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء من استكمال حوالى ٢٨٠٠ مشروعا معاونا من خلال أجهزة الحكم المحلي والجمعيات التعاونية الاهلية التطوعية . والمشروعات المعاونة التى نفذتها الاحياء تتركز على المرافق والبيئة الاساسية بنسبة ٠/٣٥ . والتعليم بنسبة ٠/٣٥ . أما

١٩٨٥ تم انفاق ٤ ٪ فقط من مخصصات الصيانة . وعملية المسح التى تمت فى عام ٨٢ / ٨٢ المالى للمشروعات المعاونة تشير الى وجود تحسن فى موقف أعمال الصيانة ويوحى بان هذه المشروعات المعاونة كانت قد أقيمت بصورة أفضل من سالفها .

وقبل وجود التدريب الاخرى أتت دورات الصيانة فى خلال العام الاخير لمشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء . وكان رد فعل المسؤولين المحليين لاسئلة المسح عن الصيانة تشير الى ادراك بعيد النظر للمشكلة أو للحاجة الى برامج ذات صيانة وقائية .

الخلاصة :

تبقى الصيانة قفية أساسية من أجل الحفاظ على مشروعات معاونة محددته ومن أجل المحافظة على قدرة أجهزة الحكم المحلى على تقديم الخدمات الحضرية . وقد أزادت المرحلة الثانية من برنامج التنمية المحلية من الاهتمام بالصيانة ونظم الصيانة الوقائية وقضية تمويل نفقات الصيانة تعد تطورا هاما وتحتاج الى كل الاهتمام الذى تم التخطيط له حاليا .

توصيات : القيام بأعمال الصيانة المطلوبة للمشروعات المعاونة التى

تم تنفيذها تحت مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء :

طبقا لمخطط المرحلة الثانية من مشروع التنمية المحلية كأولوية أولى يجب أن يعمل بيت الخبرة الفنية على تقديم الصيانة للمشروعات المعاونة التى تمت فى العامين الماليين ٨١ / ٨٢ و ٨٢ / ٨٢ واذا لم يكن هناك دفعة قوية للقيام بهذه الصيانة فان هذه المشروعات سوف تتعرض لخطر الانهيار وبذلك تفقد الدفعة والروح التى ازكتها عملية اتمام المشروع وهذه المشروعات المعاونة يجب أن تقدم معملا لتوضيح اتجاهات الصيانة الوقائية .

تقييم عام لمشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء :

حقق المشروع أهدافه . وفى هذا المجال قدم نتائج ملموسة وقيمة ظاهرة لاعداد كبيرة من السكان الحضريين خاصة فى الاحياء الفقيرة والمكتظة .

بالإضافة الى ذلك فقد حرك المشروع أجهزة الحكم المحلى الحضرية فى اتجاه الاستجابة السريعة لحاجات الجماهير كما زاد من المشاركة الشعبية وزاد كذلك من القدرة على الادارة اللامركزية التى تطالب بها قوانين الحكم المحلى .

ويحظى المشروع بدعم قوى لدى قطاع كبير من المسؤولين المحليين والموظفين وأعضاء المجالس المحلية وممثلى الجمعيات الاهلية المتطوعة .

ان بعض جوانب البرنامج مثل التدريب والصيانة قد تأخرت أو قمرت فى أداء مهمتها بسبب فغوط متضاربة عديده، بالإضافة الى ذلك فان خطة المشروع قد فشلت فى التعامل مع قضية التمويل فى الامد الطويل لمبادرات أجهزة الحكم المحلى، وهذه المجالات الثلاثة قد تم معالجتها بصورة أقوى للمتابعة على هذه المشروعات فى المرحلة الثانية من برنامج التنمية المحلية .

زيادة	دعم	دعم فدرية أجهزة الحكم المحلى		رفع مستوى المعيشة		
		تعبئة الموارد المحلية	التدريب	المشروعات المعاونة	المياينة	
المشاركة الشعبى	الادارة اللامركزية					
المجالس الشعبى المحلية والجمعيه الاهلية المتطوعه مشاركون فى اختي المشروعات المعاونة . هناك توتر وتناقض ح بين اتجاهات المجال الشعبية وأعضاء فر الوزارات . تلقى ٤٤ مقط من قيادات المجل الشعبى التدريب .	دفع المشروع أجهزة الحكم المحلى الى اتخاذ قرارات على المستوى المحلى وذلك عن طريق تقديم شىء بشأن القـرارات والاختبارات المطلوبة المهارات الفرورية ليت متوفرة على مستوى الاحياء .	ان اعتماد أجهزة الحكم المحلى على التحويلات المركزية يزداد بسبب زيادة الاجور وخدمة الديون، كانت هناك بعض حالات نجاح فـس استعادة النفقات لبعض الخدمات من خـلال الجمعيات الاهلية المتطوعه .	عمل مدربو بيست الخبرة الفنية بجدية من أجل تطبيق برامج التدريب . تأخر التدريب وكان أثره المباشر فضيلا على المشروع . من المعب ايجاد المدربين المهرة المطلوبين .	يستكمل مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء ٢٨٠٠ مشروع معاون . وتلك المشروعات مناسبة وتلقى استحسان الممثلين كما أن الجماهير تستخدمها بكثافة . متوسط تكلفة المشروع المعاون ٤ الف جنيه مصرى تركيز العديد من المشروعات المعاونة فى نفس الموقع يزيد تأثيرها .	٠/٠٦٠ من المشروعات المعاونة التى تتم استكمالها تحتاج الى بعض المياينة . يوضح مسح بيت الخبرة الفنية أن ما بين ٠/٢٠ و ٠/٣٠ منها قاصر أو تالف أو غير مستخدم . اتخذ بيت الخبرة الفنية عدة خطوات لمعالجة مشكلات المياينة . المسؤولون بالاحياء غير معنيين كثيرا بالصيانة .	نتائج
ضعف المشر فرص اشراك كلا المجلس المحلى والجمعيه الاهلية المتطوعه فس عملية وضع القرار .	تحتاج الاحياء الى دعم يقدم اليها حاليا من بيت الخبرة الفنية وفى المستقبل من الحكومة المصرية .	فى الاعوام الخمسة الماضية أصبحت أجهزة الحكم المحلى اكثر اعتمادا على الحكومة المركزية للتمويل .	البرنامج التدريبى بهذا الحجم عملية معقدة ويعد المدربون عنصرا أساسيا .	نظام مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء الخاص بالاختيار المحلى لاقصى استحابة لاحتياجات قطاع كبير من المكان .	تبقى الصيانة قفية أساسية للحفاظ على المشروعات المعاونة محدد القدرة المحلية لتقديم الخدمات المطلوبة .	تلخيص
توسيع الدور للمجالس المحلية .	تركيز الاهتمام على المشاركة بين الحى والمستويات الاعلى فى المحافظة والامانة .	البدء فى مشروع تطبيقى لتحديث نظم الفراشب فى المحافظات ومجالس الاحياء حتى تتمكن من تحسين تحميل العائدات المتحققة .	برنامج تدريب المدربين يجب أن يكون عنصرا أساسيا فى مركز تدريب مقاره .	المشروعات المعاونة المغيرة للبنية الاساسية يجب استمرارها .	يجب أن تركز المرحلة الثانية من برنامج التنمية المحلية على استكمال صيانة المشروعات المعاونه التي نفذها المشروع بالفعل استخدام مشروعات المشروع المعاونة تعدل لوضع نظم الحياض الوشائية .	التوصيات

APPENDIX III

(English/Arabic)

**Survey of Local Government and
NUS Subprojects**

Laila Shukry El Hamamsy and Donald P. Cole

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Executive Summary

SURVEY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND NUS SUBPROJECTS

Laila Shukry El Hamamsy
and
Donald P. Cole

INTRODUCTION

The stated goals of NUS are 1) to contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of the population of Greater Cairo and Alexandria through the provision and improvement of basic services and infrastructures, and 2) to use procedures that promote the Government of Egypt's decentralization policy. In the process, the capacity of the districts to plan and execute improvement projects was to be enhanced through the provision of training for local government personnel in the form of short-term training and on-the-job experience as participants in decision-making or as administrators and executors of various phases of project activities.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

It is within the framework of the existing local government system, initiated in 1960 and increasingly strengthened over the years, that the NUS Project operated. To evaluate the role that NUS played in the system, it was deemed important that the views of various categories of participants in it be solicited concerning the manner in which the local government system itself is carrying out, in practice, its decentralization and popu-

lar participation policies. It was also thought necessary to obtain their opinions about how the NUS Project and its program of service improvements related to the local government system and the extent to which they felt it contributed to the reinforcement of local government policies. Although some of the outlooks are naturally biased, as each category would tend to view the system and the NUS contribution from its own vantage point and to be influenced by its own definition of its rights and responsibilities within it, it was felt that an examination of these views, with whatever points of differences or of strain they reveal, are important. After all, it is these people who make up the system and they are the ones who must sustain whatever new approaches have been introduced by NUS.

The survey covered 121 local government personnel in 13 districts (ten in Greater Cairo and three in Alexandria). The interviewees included 20 members of popular councils, 23 district chiefs or general secretaries, 18 heads of planning and finance, 25 project or housing engineers, and 35 representatives of service ministries. The responses obtained through personal interviews show that the participants in the local government system are very much aware of and are committed to its overall goals. Most of them are sophisticated in their analyses of its achievements so far, as well as of the difficulties that stand in the way of a full realization of its goals. They speak frankly of what they perceive as the shortcomings of the system and are conscious that local government still has some way to go to reach the desired decentralization and popular participation.

The opinion survey revealed that the local government system is generally seen as not decentralized enough because, according to respondents, the

main financial resources are still centralized as are the planning and execution of large-scale projects. The lack of well-trained technical staff at the district level and the fact that the appointment, promotion, and transfer of service ministries' personnel are still centralized are also viewed by some as impediments to decentralization.

The study also pointed to notable differences between the viewpoints of some of the executives, particularly service ministries' personnel, on one hand, and of popular representatives, on the other. Whereas the latter find that there is still need for greater participation of the Popular Council in decision-making; some of the former believe that the involvement of popular representatives in decision-making and in the follow-up of the work of the technical personnel acts, at times, as a constraint impeding the efficient implementation of their particular programs.

Operating within the above context, the NUS Project has acted as a much needed lubricant for the more effective functioning of the local government system at its grass roots. By providing funds for the execution of service improvement and infrastructure projects of a size that can be planned and executed by the districts, NUS injected the necessary fuel into the local government system to energize the processes of decentralization and of popular participation. As some members of the local government personnel expressed it, "Without projects at the district level like those of NUS, how can you talk of decentralization?" and "How can the districts become independent without local resources?"

At the same time that NUS helped accelerate the process of decentralization, it also provided the opportunity for areas of weakness and points of

strain in the local government system to reveal themselves. This should be seen as a positive result because the recognition of these shortcomings generated discussion and debate and prompted attempts to come to grips with such basic issues as: how much decentralization and how much central control are necessary to meet the real needs of the people while, at the same time, achieve a geographically balanced and equitable development; what is the role and authority of the executives and of the popular representatives; how much authority over the executives should the popular representatives wield and how much freedom is necessary for public servants, particularly technical service staff, to decide on and to execute programs relating to their own fields of responsibility and expertise.

While many found that the NUS Project was different from the usual service improvement programs, in that its funding and execution contributed in a basic way to decentralization, fewer mentioned the role of NUS in encouraging popular participation. It seems that the activities of NUS involved more directly, and the TA team worked more closely with, the government personnel than the popular representatives. A number of Popular Council members remarked that the NUS Project did not encourage enough their participation in decision-making or in training programs. Five of them, to make the point strongly, did not approve the condition set by the NUS Project that NUS subprojects be planned and executed at the district level, explaining that they refuse to approve such a condition so long as Popular Council members are not allowed to participate more fully in decisions relating to such district projects.

It is important that the participation of the elected members of the local government system be given special attention. As it is composed today, the

Popular Council is the youngest body in the local government system and the role of its members may not be as clear and well-defined as those of the personnel of local government, per se, and of the service ministries, both of whom constitute the Executive Council. This role needs to be defined in such a way as to encourage their more effective participation as representatives of and spokesmen for the general public and as potential mobilizers of community resources and talents in the service of the district. The participation of the general public by communicating its general opinion or by providing additional resources was not very apparent in the NUS program.

The voluntary agencies represent another important venue for public participation, but the PVO leadership is not always emanating from the district it serves. A number of community development voluntary associations, however, do exist whose leadership comes from within the district and whose main goals are to mobilize community resources for upgrading neighborhood services and the quality of the environment. Such associations need to be encouraged and their work facilitated through the provision of technical assistance and managerial training to expand their service and increase their impact.

CAPACITY-BUILDING

Sustaining the goals of the local government system of decentralization and popular participation needs funds, activities, but more important still, people at the district level with the skills and capabilities necessary to keep the system moving efficiently and effectively. NUS, in recognition of this, has included in its program an important training component. As mentioned earlier, the NUS training took two forms - formal, short-term

training sessions and on-the-job experience for the personnel of the district.

NUS provided the opportunity for the various categories of local government personnel to be involved, in varying degrees, in the whole gamut of activities related to project execution - the assessment of needs, the determination of priorities; and the planning, designing, follow-up and supervision of projects. This type of learning-by-doing was highly appreciated by most of the local government personnel involved, who indicated that they had benefited greatly from it. A large number also expressed their appreciation of the opportunity to work in conjunction with the TA teams and felt that they had learned much from the experience, both in terms of technical know-how and managerial skills.

The execution of NUS subprojects allowed the various bodies of the local government system - namely the Executive Council and the Popular Council - greater opportunity for interaction and cooperation and for the members to gain added experience in the exercise of their respective rights and responsibilities. There were wide differences, however, among the districts as to how smoothly and effectively cooperation was achieved between the Executive and Popular Councils. According to observers, much depended on the quality of leadership in these bodies.

Insofar as the more formal, short-term training is concerned, just over half of the local government personnel interviewed had participated in formal training organized by NUS. Most of these felt that this training was useful; but three-quarters of those who had attended felt that additional or improved training was needed. In particular, they felt that it should

be of longer duration than the few days or weeks during which some of the training was offered; and that it should be of a more practical nature and more directly relevant to their specific jobs. They expressed the need not only for more technical training, especially for engineers, but for practical training in management, in project planning and execution, and in dealing with local government procedures and processes. They would like to see changes in the methods of training, with a greater use of field visits to observe and study actual, on-the-ground projects. Furthermore, they would like to have more workshops using case studies for debate and discussion, and fewer theoretical, academic lectures.

The NUS experience also pointed to the great need of building the capacities of the districts themselves to undertake the type of construction, renovation, and maintenance activities that were involved in the execution of NUS funded projects. The most frequently mentioned difficulty that faced local government personnel in their work within the NUS Project was the poor performance of the contractors, specifically the latter's inability to meet deadlines or to undertake quality work. The lack of skilled workers for the small-sized projects that are likely to be undertaken at the district level can be a serious obstacle to any attempt at increasing the decentralization of project execution.

Although Egypt has been known for its abundance of skilled workers and master craftsmen, in recent years it has seen a decline in their number and quality. This is due to two factors - international labor out-migration and the expansion of free and compulsory education. The former has drained the country from some of its skilled talent; while the latter has drawn the

young away from the apprentice-type training (traditionally provided in what were family-type workshops) and into the general school system with its limited emphasis on the teaching of practical skills.

It is suggested that workshops be established in the districts that would retain some of the features of the traditional apprenticeship system in which the young learn under the supervision of a master craftsman or "osta", while at the same time providing trainees with the opportunity to receive at least the minimum schooling prescribed by law. Such workshops may be either totally private or semi-private; but there should be a formal relationship between them and the district, a formal system for the recruitment and graduation of the trainees, and provision for their eventual deployment within district projects. This proposal may be timely at this particular juncture because of the recent trend that has seen large numbers of Egyptian skilled workers returning from countries to which they had migrated.

DISTRICT SERVICE AND INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS

Through the planning and/or execution of 2793 subprojects over a five-year period, NUS achieved its goal of helping upgrade and expand existing basic services and essential infrastructures that are of direct benefit to the public, particularly of the less-advantaged areas. This evaluation is strongly endorsed by the personnel of local government and by popular representatives, most of whom stated that the main achievement of NUS was that it actually helped realize greatly needed projects. Furthermore, the project users (who included the persons in charge of services and members of the public at large) felt that, to a large degree, the successfully executed projects did indeed meet important needs.

There were, however, some reservations. Many do understand that the type of projects NUS executed were those that are not usually covered by the regular budgets; that there is a need to spread benefits, and that projects have to be of a size that can be planned and executed within the capacities available at the district level. However, they are left with a sense of frustration because of the large magnitude of needs in every service sector and the fact that NUS only addressed a small number of their many problems.

Many saw the upper funding limit of LE 83,000 as the most negative aspect of NUS, the second being the restriction that the projects be limited to improvements or extensions of existing services and facilities. They felt that, if NUS goals are to assess and meet the most urgent needs of the district, then the extent to which a project meets such needs should be an important criterion not to be subordinated to what is seen as an arbitrary funding limit. These conditions, it is felt, resulted in projects that are essential and much appreciated, but that are in no way the only nor necessarily the most essential ones.

The other reservation concerning the impact of NUS on district improvements has to do with the quality of some of the work executed on a large number of the projects. Most of the blame was placed on the contractors, some of whom were found to be incompetent. Occasionally, blame was also directed to NUS in cases where the executed project provided only fragmentary and partial improvements or did not include essential equipment for it to achieve a genuine improvement of a service or an infrastructure.

Behind some of the reservations seems to be the following uneasiness or concern: Is NUS a one-shot affair? Is there an after-NUS? If there is no sequel, then how will all the other needs be taken care of?

There would have been a better understanding of the limits within which NUS has been operating and some notion as to what to expect in the future if NUS has been presented, not as an independent project, but as part of a comprehensive plan to upgrade and expand district services and facilities. Such a plan would necessarily indicate short-term and long-term targets, funding sources, and division of responsibilities between various levels of local government.

Many of the NUS subprojects would have been taken care of if funds had been available, over the years, to take care of maintenance and of the gradual expansion of facilities and equipment within the services and infrastructures of the districts. By the same token, continuity of the NUS-type program would be assured if regular budgets for maintenance, small improvements and additions were to be made available in the future.

To be able to continue programs similar to the NUS, given the current funding limitations which are likely to extend into the future, the encouragement of the participation of the general public (whether through the PVOs, the Popular Councils or other direct means) can perhaps provide an important source of funds and of energy to ensure that what NUS started does not become the end of the road.

أن ٥٠ ٪ من أموال الصندوق لم توزع بعد على الأحياء .
وهذا التأخير يرجع جزء منه الى طبيعة الصيانة التي يجب ألا تتم خلال العام الأول من حياة المشروع حينما يكون العمل تحت ضمانات شركة المقاولات المنفذه . وعليه فانه في مشروعات العام المالى ١٩٨٣/٨٢ تم توزيع ٨٢ ٪ من الاموال وبالنسبة للعام المالى ١٩٨٤/٨٣ تم توزيع ٥٦ ٪ من حصيلة الاموال على الأحياء .
وقد وضع صندوق صيانة مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للأحياء دفعة واحدة توجهه للأحياء بوصفها جزءا من الباب (الثالث) فى الميزانية للاستثمارات الرأسمالية وليست كجزء من الباب الثانى السنوى الخاص بالتشغيل والصيانة . وبالنسبة لخطوة التنمية المحلية الثانية تم تلافى هذا الارتجال وبناءا عليه فان صندوق الصيانة للمشروعات المعاونة سيمصح عملا منتظما وبندا دائما من بنود الباب الثانى فى الميزانية ويعود نظريا للحكومة اذا لم يتم انفاقه وسوف يوفر هذا سيلا ماليا جيد وحافزا للأحياء كى تنظم أعمال الصيانة بها .

٣ - أنشطة المشروعات المعاونة :

تأتى أنشطة مشروعات الصيانة داخل اطار مسوخت بيت الخبرة الفنية لاحتياجات الصيانة الخاصة بالمشروعات المعاونة . وقد تم عمل مسح لمائتى مشروع نفذت فى العام المالى ١٩٨٢/٨١ فى عام ١٩٨٤ ويقوم بيت الخبرة الفنية بمسح مشابه لعدد ٤١٥ مشروع معاونة للعام المالى ١٩٨٣/٨٢ وهذه المسوحات تعد مسئولية رئيسية تقع على عاتق بيت الخبرة الفنية وتشير الى أن مساهمة يزيد على ٦٠ ٪ من المشروعات المعاونة التى تمت تحتاح الى اهتمام من ناحية الصيانة .

وتشير سجلات الاحصائية التى أجريت فى العام المالى ١٩٨٢/٨١ ان مساهمة يتراوح بين ٢٠ ٪ و ٣٠ ٪ من مشروعات البناء تعاني قصورا فادحا وتلفا كبيرا جنبا الى انها لم تستخدم ، وبين المسح أيضا ان ٢٩ ٪ من وحدات المشروعات لم تستخدم كذلك . (مسح مشروعات العام المالى ٨١ / ١٩٨٢ الصفحات ٥ - ١٠) .

وقد اتخذ بيت الخبرة الفنية عددا من الخطوات فى سبيل توجيئة الأحياء لمعالجة هذه المشكلة .

أولا : اتخذ بيت الخبرة خطوات وقائية للتقليل من تكرار حدوث مشاكل صيانة محددة فى المشروعات اللاحقة . كما تم دعم معايير اختيار الموقع بحيث تتضمن تحليل التربة وعوامل أخرى . كما تم معالجة مشاكل التصميم من خلال قيام بعض مقاولات الباطن للأحياء بتحويل مهام التصميم الأكثر

تعقيدا للشركات الخاصة . أما مشكلات نوعية الحرنبيين فقد تم معالجتها من خلال اتخاذ اجراءات أفضل لاختيار شركة المقاولات .

وقد تم ترشيد توزيع المهندسين على الاحياء وفى عملية التخطيط للمشروعات المعاونة تم تشجيع المزيد من التنسيق والتخطيط بين المديرين والاحياء والجهات المشرفة على المرافق .

ثانيا : صمم بيت الخبرة الفنية ونفذ برنامجا تدريبيا لمهندسى الاحياء بشأن موضوع صيانة المباني . وتم تقديم هذا البرنامج سبع مرات لأكثر من ١٥٠ من المهندسين والفنيين بالاحياء .

ويشتمل البرنامج التدريبى على محاضرات ومناقشات وزيارة لموقع المشروع بالاضافة الى دراسة مشروع معاون حقيقى .

ثالثا : من المسح الذى أجرى على مشروعات العام المالى ١٩٨٢ / ٨١ - الاحياء باستمارات مسح مفصلة من كل مشروع معاون كى تقدم دليل صيانة ونشير هنا الى أن الصيانة المطلوبة قد انجزت ٣٠ ٪ من هذه المشروعات المعاونة وبدأت فى العمل فى ١٩ ٪ منها .

وعلى أية حال هى الحقيقة أن الصيانة قد بدأت فى مائة مــــ من المشروعات المعاونة ، وان تلك الصيانة تقوم على مسح منظم ومنصوص عليها بصورة منتظمة فى بنود الاموال التى ترصدها الحكومة على مستــــوى الاحياء انما هو حدث له أهميته فى مصر .

ان أعمال الصيانة المتبقية فى المشروع مازالت كبيرة . واذا كانت المسوحات التى أجريت على المشروعات المعاونة التى نفذت فى العاميين الاولين مثالا وتدل على تحسن فى نوعية المشروعات المعاونة التى تمت فان ما بين ٣٠٠ و ٤٠٠ مشروع معاون فى الاحياء سوف تحتاج الى اهتمام ملح بالصيانة . كما أن مائة مشروع منها على الاقل ستكون فى مسيس الحاجة الى هذه المشروعات ولم تترسخ بعد الاجراءات التى تتخذها أجهزة الحكم المحلى بحيث تسمح لها بمباشرة مهامها المتعلقة باجراء مسوحــــات للمشروعات المعاونة والتعرف على أولويات الصيانة وتنفيذ الاعمال ويجدر الاشارة هنا الى ضرورة اعطاء دفعه من قبل ادارة مشروع الخدمات الحضريــــة للاحياء .

توصيات :

- ١ - يجب ان يبدأ كل حى فورا فى اعداد خطة وجدول للقيام باعمال الصيانة التى لم تتم والتى تم التعرف عليها فى المشروعات المعاونة للاحياء فى العاميين المالىين ٨١ / ١٩٨٢ و ٨٢ / ١٩٨٣ .
- ٢ - يجب على بيوت الخبرة الفنية ان يساعدوا الاحياء ويشجعوها على اتخــــاذ اجراءات وتدابير لتطوير خطط وجداول وميزانيات الصيانة للمشروعات المعاونة

الجديده المقترحة للاحياء .

- ٣ - يجب على بيوت الخبرة الفنية القائمة على تنفيذ المرحلة الثانية لبرنامج التنمية المحلية أن يساعدوا الاحياء والمحافظات على اتخاذ الاجراءات والتدابير التى تكفل تطوير برامج الصيانة السنوية لكل الخدمات والمعدات فى اطار اختصاصاتها .
- ٤ - يجب على بيوت الخبرة الفنية المنوط اليها ببرنامج التنمية المحلية أن تساعد المحافظات على وضع نظام معلومات لادارة أعمال الصيانة وذلك لاعداد التقارير وحفظ الوثائق وتقدير التكاليف الفعلية للصيانة فى كل المشروعات المعاونة .
- ٥ - يجب على بيوت الخبرة الفنية المنوط اليها ببرنامج التنمية المحلية ان تدعم الوعى الجماهيرى ببرامج الصيانة فى مجال المدارس والخدمات العامة . ويمكن لهذا المجهود أن ينطوى على تطوير وسائل الايضاح بشأن الاستخدام السليم لهذه المعدات . ويتم لصق هذه الوسائل على المرافق العامة . كما يمكن البدء فى مقابلة أساتذة المدارس وأعضاء جمعيات الاسكان الشعبى كى تقدم معلومات عن كيفية الاستخدام ورفع مستوى الوعى بمشاكل الصيانة .

x x x x

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Overall NUS Subproject Maintenance Activities

The NUS project has addressed the subproject maintenance problem on several levels and through several mechanisms.

First of all the inclusion of the 10% subproject maintenance set aside of GOE money in the project agreement signalled the importance of maintenance, put the responsibility with the GOE, and assured the availability of resources. AID project management and the TA contractor have worked to make sure that those funds be released.

The TA contractor has through its maintenance surveys, formal training courses, and on the job training acted to bring about maintenance actions by the districts.

Additionally, NUS has used the vehicle of the evaluation contract to study and review district level subproject management and maintenance procedures, and to prepare a study of the costs associated with a program of rehabilitation and preventive maintenance of urban services.

Finally, the design of the next phase of Local Development, LD II, builds upon the experiences of NUS, regularizing, expanding, and focusing on the maintenance issue.

2. Maintenance Fund

The maintenance fund called for in the project agreement has been established, funds have been distributed to the districts, and maintenance activities have begun on early NUS subprojects. Much work remains to make sure that the process continues and that the subprojects in need of maintenance receive attention.

To date less than 4% of the GOE money earmarked for subproject maintenance has been expended. Another 46% of the maintenance fund has been distributed to the districts, but not yet expended. Fifty percent of the maintenance fund has not yet been distributed to the districts.

This delay is partly the nature of maintenance which should not take place during the first year of subproject life when the work is supposedly under warranty from the construction contractor. Hence for the FY 82/83 subprojects, 82% of the funds have been distributed, and for FY 83/84, 56% of the funds have been distributed to the districts.

The maintenance fund of NUS was designed as a one shot affair and as such is somewhat anomalous in that it comes to the districts as part of the Bab III budget for capital investments and not as part of the annual Bab II budget for operation and maintenance. For LD II this anomaly has been corrected and the maintenance fund of subprojects will be a regular recurring item of Bab II and in theory returned to the central government if not spent. This will provide an improved financial mechanism and incentive for the districts to regularize their maintenance activities.

3. Subproject Maintenance Activities

Subproject maintenance activities take place within the context of the TA contractor's surveys of the maintenance needs of subprojects. The survey of 200 FY 81/82 subprojects was carried out in 1984. The TA contractor is now completing a similar survey of the 415 subprojects of FY 82/83. These surveys are a major undertaking of the TA contractor and they indicate that over 60% of the completed subprojects are in need of maintenance attention.

The records of the FY 81/82 survey show 20% - 30% of the construction subprojects seriously deficient, damaged, or unused; and 29% of the equipment subprojects in which equipment is unused. (FY 81/82 Maintenance Survey pp. 5 -10)

The TA contractor took a number of steps to guide the districts in addressing this problem.

First. The TA contractor took preventive steps to minimize the repetition of specific maintenance problems in later projects. Site selection criteria were strengthened to include soil analysis and other factors. Design problems were addressed through having some districts subcontract

the more complex design tasks to private firms. Problems of workmanship quality were addressed through better contractor selection procedures.

The distribution of engineering staff among districts was rationalized. More coordination and planning between directorates, districts, and utility authorities was encouraged in the subproject planning process.

Second. The TA contractor designed and implemented a training course for district engineers on the topic of building maintenance. This course has been given seven times to over 150 district engineers and technicians. The course combines lectures, discussions, a visit to an NUS site, and study of an actual NUS subproject.

Third. The FY 81/82 maintenance survey itself provided the districts with the detailed survey forms from each of the subprojects in order to provide a guide of the maintenance. To date, the required maintenance has been completed on 30% of these subprojects and initiated on 19%.

However, the fact that maintenance has begun on 100 district subprojects, maintenance based on a systematic survey and provided for in a regular manner by GOE funds allocated to the district level, is an event of some importance in Egypt.

The maintenance job remaining on NUS is a large one. If the surveys on the first two years' SPs are a guide and assuming an improvement in the quality of subprojects completed, 300 to 400 NUS district subprojects will need urgent maintenance attention; and at least 100 of them will need this attention very badly. Procedures are not yet well enough established in District Governments to allow them to carry out the tasks of systematically surveying subprojects, identifying maintenance priorities, and implementing the work. Major impetus and input from NUS project management and the TA contractor are necessary.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Each district should immediately prepare a plan and schedule for addressing the unmet maintenance needs identified for FY 81/82 and FY 82/83 district subprojects.
2. The TA Contractors for LD II should help and encourage the districts to establish procedures and processes for the development of maintenance plans, schedules, and budgets for new proposed district subprojects.
3. The TA Contractors for LD II should assist the districts and the governorates with the establishment of procedures and processes for the development of annual maintenance programs for all facilities and equipment within their respective responsibilities.
4. LD II TA Contractors should assist the governorates in developing an O and M Management Information System for reporting and documenting actual maintenance costs on all subprojects.
5. The LD II TA Contractors should develop a public awareness component to maintenance programs at schools and public housing areas. This effort could include development of graphics and signage regarding proper use to be posted at public facilities. Meeting with schoolmasters and public housing resident associations to provide useage information and increase awareness of maintenance problems could also be initiated.

APPENDIX V

(English/Arabic)

Maintenance of District Subprojects

Barry D. Frazier

NUS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

BACKGROUND

1. Scope and Purpose

NUS was basically designed to increase the capacity of the local government system to adequately provide neighborhood urban services. Completion of NUS is resulting in over 2600 sub-projects that were badly needed in the Greater Cairo area and Alexandria. Also, NUS made a significant impact on the technical capacity of GOE officials at the Governorate and District levels within the project area.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the role and implications of NUS funding on the financial capacity of the local government system to provide neighborhood urban services. In particular, the assessment is focussed on concerns with the sustainability and extension of the valuable achievements attained by this NUS project.

MAJOR FINDINGS

2. NUS Local Financial Role

- NUS financing played a very valuable and important role in relation to the local government finance system in the Greater Cairo area and Alexandria. For the first time in local government in Egypt, NUS created three new mechanisms specifically aimed at upgrading the adequacy of neighborhood urban services. It introduced additional capital investments at the district level. It established a special Maintenance Fund. And it increased the role of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in providing neighborhood urban services.
- More specifically; NUS increased financing for capital investments normally provided under the GOE budget by a total amount of about LE. 62 million over the last five years. This constituted an average annual increase of about 10-20% in capital investments. Also, the special Fund established for Maintenance calls for allocating about LE. 4.5 million to ensure the continuity of sub-projects completed under this project. Moreover, NUS increased existing financing by an average of about 30% to support PVOs in providing urban neighborhood services. In sum, NUS did not only increase financing for both Capital and Maintenance expenditures, but also provided great discretion to meet local priorities at the District level. As well, it started mobilizing local private resources, through PVOs, and this reduces the dependency on the government.
- All these achievements were not, however, without cost. NUS financing reinforced and indeed increased the dependency of the local government finance system on outside grants, rather than reorienting it towards self-financing. Also, in ensuring the creation of the Maintenance Fund, NUS increased budgetary pressures on the central GOE budget, rather than setting mechanisms for gradually building such financing payments by the beneficiaries. Finally, although it triggered local resource mobilization through PVOs again, NUS

increased their dependency on the grant system rather than capturing their great potential, for stimulating and encouraging the popular participation approach to financing capital/current expenditures for neighborhood urban services.

3. Local Government Financial System

* Governorate Level:

- The existing local government finance system is facing great financial gaps between local expenditure requirements and local revenues. These gaps usually result from lower rates of growth in local revenues compared to growth in expenditure requirements. Typically, these financial gaps are closed by transfers from the central to local government budgets. The dependency on these central transfers increased slightly between 1982/8 and 1985/86 in the governorates of Alexandria, Giza and Qalubiya. For the governorate of Cairo, dependency on central transfers continued but decreased noticeably from 42.8% in 1984/85 to 36.8% in 1985/86.
- Total budgetary expenditures at the governorate level are quite significant in the NUS project area. In 1985/86, total budget expenditures ranged between over LE 319 million for the Governorate of Cairo and about LE 109 million for the Governorate of Qalubiya. On the average, the largest majority is usually committed to (Bab I) Salaries and Wages (between 60% - 77%), followed by (Bab II) Operation and Current Finance (15%) and then (Bab III & IV) Capital Expenditures (between 25% to only 11%).
- The existing pattern of governorate expenditures changed significantly over the last five years (1982/83 and 1985/86). The most important result of this change is that growth in capital expenditures is declining. This is due to two unavoidable obligations to increase other current expenditures and capital payments. First is coping up with inflationary requirements, particularly for increases in Salaries and Wages. Second is debt management requirements, for short - medium and long term loans.
- On the revenue side, there are two important observations. First in terms of the size, the total amount of locally generated revenues is typically smaller than total expenditure requirements. Second, in terms of structure and growth, the largest source of local revenues is from "Revenue Sharing" (literally called "Sovereignty Revenues"), but this is due to the relatively large share from the Joint Revenues, rather than items like the Property Tax (on Buildings) which is the usual revenue source for local government finance in most developing and developed countries. Also, the Special Accounts, particularly for Services and Local Developments have a high elasticity of growth. But, this is not from income generating activities or increased popular participation. Rather it is due to budgetary book-keeping practices which credits to this Account half of the increase between estimated budget and actual collected revenues.

* City Level:

- At the urban/municipal or district level, a detailed analysis using the City of

84

Giza as a case study revealed more severe problems (than those at the governorate level). Growth in capital expenditures (Bab III & IV) is declining and an increasing portion is being committed to capital payments (Bab IV) rather than new capital investments (Bab III). Allocations for maintenance expenditures are very small; with only 5% of total expenditures budgeted for Operation and Current Finance (Bab II). Also, growth of maintenance allocations has been declining over the last few years.

- On the revenue side at the urban/municipal level, the Property Tax (on Buildings) is not utilized as a major source of local government financing for urban/municipal services. In 1985/86, revenues from this tax contributed only 3.4% of total expenditures in the City of Giza. More importantly, a detailed review of budget estimates and actual collection of this tax in Giza revealed an absolute necessity to upgrade the administrative efficiency of revenue collection, management and reform of local revenues in urban areas.
- The revenue generating potential of the Special Account for Services and Local Development is not fully utilized in the City of Giza. On the expenditure side, the bulk of spending under this account is being used largely to supplement insufficient financing for maintenance and capital allocations under the City Budget. On the revenue side, this Account is not used for income generating activities or to systematically stimulate popular participation for capital or current expenditures for the badly needed NUS-type of sub-projects.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4. Conclusions

- Three basic conditions are necessary to ensure continued sustainability of NUS achievements. First is sufficient future growth in capital investments and maintenance expenditures. Second is adequate discretionary power and predictability for local financing at the District/City level. And third is a systematic (rather than voluntary) increase in the role of PVOs in providing NUS-type sub-projects.
- However, the existing local government finance system if not altered, does not have the capacity to independently ensure the availability of these necessary conditions in the future. A number of constraints/limitations are faced. Growth is declining for capital investments and maintenance expenditures. Discretionary power and predictability are relatively low, particularly at the City/Municipal level. This is due to not only underutilization of potentially elastic local revenue sources, but also total absence of basic administrative efficiency in revenue collection, tax management and reform. In addition, there is no systematic mechanism in place to continue an increasing role for PVOs and stimulate popular participation in providing badly needed neighborhood urban services.
- To ensure NUS sustainability, future activities and funding under LD-II and LD-III have to pay special attention to address the above limitations faced by the existing local government finance system. Intensive efforts are required on at least two fronts. First is to maximize Local Resource Mobilization (LRM) to gradually increase growth, predictability and discretionary in local

revenues. Second is to review and reform fiscal relations between central and local governments to increase their capacity for LRM and hence reduce their dependency on central transfers.

5. Recommendations

- Upgrade Administrative Efficiency for local revenue collections and reforms within the evolving trends for various laws governing local government finance. A preliminary assessment of impacts for modernization and administrative efficiency of revenue collections indicates that Property Tax revenues can be increased by about 25% in the City of Giza.
- Establish an "NUS Revolving Fund" that would be aimed at encouraging, strengthening, and financing the establishment of Economic/General Organizations and/or Public Companies to provide neighborhood urban services on economic and self-financing basis. The target would be to gradually increase collections from beneficiaries for improved municipal services such as for solid waste management; street cleaning; lighting; pavement and sidewalk repairs; parking services; etc., as desirable and feasible.
- Establish an "NUS Participation Fund" that would systematically encourage and stimulate Popular Participation and PVOs in providing capital/maintenance expenditures required for municipal services. Such a "Participation Fund" would give highest priority incentive to NUS-type sub-projects (e.g. shifting from a dirt to a paved road) for which beneficiaries would voluntarily contribute (say 25%) to capital/maintenance expenditures required.
- Review and reform, as desirable, the central-local fiscal transfers. Efforts in this area should have a dual objective. First is to increase/strengthen the capacity of local governments to mobilize and gradually maximize their local resources. Second, is to increase the predictability of transfers from the central to local governments. Analysis of central current transfers (in FY 1984/85) reveals an implicit equalization formula built in the allocations of central transfers. In addition to this important equalization role, central transfers should also be aimed at stimulating/rewarding local government efforts for Local Resource Mobilization.

**مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء
وتمويل أجهزة الحكم المحلى
موجز للنتائج الرئيسية والخلاصة والتوصيات**

مقدمه :

١ - النطاق والغرض :

تم تصميم مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء من أجل زيادة قدرات أجهزة الحكم المحلى على تقديم مثل هذه الخدمات على مستوى عالٍ وسيتم اتمام هذا المشروع عن تنفيذ ٢٨٠٠ مشروع معاون كانت القاهرة الكبرى والاسكندرية فى مسيس الحاجة اليها . كما أن المشروع ترك أثرا كبيرا على المقدرة الفنية لمسئولى الحكومة على مستويات المحافظة والاحياء داخل نطاق المشروع .

والغرض من هذا التقرير هو تقييم دور وتأثير تمويل المشروع على القدرات المالية والتمويلية لنظام الحكم المحلى كى يقدم الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء ، وبصفة خاصة يركز التقييم على الاهتمام بضمان الاستمرارية والتوسع فى مجال الانجازات القيمة التى حققها هذا المشروع .

النتائج الرئيسية :

٢ - دور المشروع فى التمويل المحلى :

لعب التمويل الذى قدمه مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء دورا هاما بالنسبة لنظام تمويل الحكم المحلى فى منطقة القاهرة الكبرى والاسكندرية. ولاول مرة فى تاريخ الحكم المحلى فى مصر يخلق المشروع ثلاثة طرق جديدة تهدف الى رفع مستوى كفاءة الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء. فقد قدم المشروع استثمارات رأسمالية اضافية يتم القرار عليها فى مستوى الاحياء . كما انه انشأ صندوقا خاصا للصيانة. فضلا عن انه زاد من الدور الذى تقوم به الجمعيات الاهلية التطوعية فى تقديم الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء .

وبصفة أخى زاد المشروع تمويله لاستثمارات رأس المال التى يتم تحويلها عادة فى ظل ميزانية الحكومة بمقدار حوالى ٦٢ مليون جنيه مصرى فى السنوات الخمس الماضية . وقد شكل هذا متوسط زيادة سنوية تتراوح بين ١٠٪ و ٢٠٪ فى الاستثمارات الرأسمالية. كما أن الصندوق الخاص الذى أنشئ من أجل الصيانة يتطلب تخصيص حوالى ٥٤ مليون جنيه لضمان استمرار المشروعات المعاونة التى ينفذها هذا المشروع. بالاضافة الى ذلك ، فان المشروع زاد من التمويل الحالى بمتوسط مقداره حوالى ٣٠٪ كى يدعم الجمعيات الاهلية التطوعية فى تقديم الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء . وباختصار ، لم يزد المشروع من تمويله للانفاقات الرأسمالية والصيانة فحسب ، بل قدم مرونة متزايدة للاستجابة الى اللويحات المحلية على مستوى الاحياء فضلا عن انه بدأ فى تعبئة الموارد الخاصة من خلال الجمعيات الاهلية المتطوعة مما حد من الاعتماد على الحكومة .

كل هذه الانجازات لم تتم بالطبع دون تكلفة . فتمويل المشروع دعم من وزاد من اعتماد أجهزة الحكم المحلى فى التمويل على المنح (الخارجية) بدلا من اعادة توجيهها الى التمويل الذاتى . كذلك فى عملية ضمان انشاء صندوق صيانة ، زاد المشروع من الضغوط المالية على ميزانية الحكومة المركزية بدلا من وضع الاساليب الكفيلة بقيام المنتفعين بالمشروعات بدفع هذه التمويلات ، أخيرا ، على الرغم من ان المشروع أطلق الموارد المحلية من خلال الجمعيات الاهلية المتطوعة فانه زاد من اعتماد هذه الهيئات على نظام المنح بدلا من استغلال امكانياتها الهائلة من أجل تحفيز وتشجيع المشاركة الجماهيرية فى تمويل النفقات الحالية على الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء .

٣ - نظام تمويل الحكم المحلى :

مستوى المحافظات :

ان نظام التمويل الحالى للحكم المحلى يواجه فجوات مالية كبيرة بين متطلبات الانفاق المحلى والموارد المحلية. وعادة ما تنتج هذه الفجوات من معدلات الزيادة الاقل فى الموارد المحلية بالمقارنة بمتطلبات الانفاق . وتنقل هذه الفجوات المالية على التحويلات التى ترصدها ميزانية الحكومة والاعتماد على هذه التحويلات المركزية زاد زيادة طفيفة بين عامى ١٩٨٣ / ٨٢ ، فى محافظات الاسكندرية والجيزة والقلوبية . أما بالنسبة لمحافظة القاهرة فان الاعتماد على التحويلات المركزية استمر غير انه نقص بصورة ملحوظة من ٤٢٨ ٪ فى عام ١٩٨٥ / ٨٤ الى ٣٦٨ ٪ فى عام ١٩٨٦ .

تعد الانفاقات فى الميزانية على مستوى المحافظات كبيرة فى نطاق المشروع . ففى عام ١٩٨٦ / ٨٥ تراوحت انفاقات الميزانية بين ما يزيد على ٣١٩ مليون جنيه لمحافظة القاهرة وحوالى ١٠٩ ملايين جنيه لمحافظة القلوبية. وفى المتوسط يذهب الجزء الاكبر منها (الى الباب الاول) الخاص بلاجور والرواتب (بين ٦٠ ٪ و ٧٧ ٪) ثم (الباب الثانى) الخاص بالتشغيل والتحويلات الجارية (١٥ ٪) ثم البابين الثالث والرابع الخاص بالمنفقات الرأسمالية (بين ٢٥ ٪ الى ١١ ٪ فقط) .

ان النمط الحالى لانفاقات الحكومة تغير بصورة كبيرة فى السنوات الخمس الاخيرة (١٩٨٣ / ٨٢ و ١٩٨٦ / ٨٥) . وأهم نتيجة لهذا التغيير هو أن زيادات الانفاقات الرأسمالية فى تناقص . وهذا بسبب التزامين لا محيد عنهما ويختصان بزيادة الانفاقات الجارية ومدفوعات رأس المال . الاول هو ملاحقة متطلبات التضخم خاصة بالنسبة للزيادة المتطلبة للاجور والمرتبات ، والثانى خاص بمتطلبات ادارة الديون الخاصة بالقروض قصيرة ومتوسطة وطويلة الاجل .

وعلى جانب الموارد ، هناك ملحوظتان هامتان . أولا بالنسبة للحجم ، ان اجمالى الموارد المحملة محليا أقل من متطلبات الانفاق المحلى . ثانيا بالنسبة للهيكل النوى والزيادة ، يعد اكبر مصدر للموارد المحلية هو الموارد

السيادية . ولكن هذا يرجع الى النصيب الاكبر نسبيا من الموارد المشتركة بدلا من أن تأتي من ضرائب العقارات (على المباني) والتي تعد المورد العادى النمطى للموارد الخاصة بتمويل أجهزة الحكم المحلى فى معظم السدول النامية والمتقدمة . كما ان الحسابات الخاصة ، وعلى الاخص حساب الخدمات والتنمية المحلية ، تتسم بمرونة عالية فى النمو . ولكن هذا لا يأتى أساسا من الدخل الناشئ من الانشطة أو المشاركة الشعبية . ولكنه راجع الى طرق ممارسات امساك الدفاتر الخاصة بالميزانية والذي يضيف لهذا الحساب نصـف الزيادة بين موارد الميزانية المقدره والموارد المحصلة فعلا .

مستوى المدن :

على مستوى المدن الحضرية أو الاحياء كشف تحليل يذمل مركز على مدينة الجيزة كحالة دراسة عن مشكلات اكثر حده (من تلك الموجوده على مستوى المحافظات) . فالزيادة فى انفاقات رأس المال (بابا ٣ ، ٤) يتناقص كما أن نسبة متزايدته يتم تخصيصها لمدفوعات رأس المال (باب ٤) بدلا من تقديم استثمارات رأسمالية جديده (باب ٣) . كما أن مخصصات انفاق الصيانة صغيرة جدا . فهناك ٥ ٪ فقط من اجمالى الانفاقات قد تم تخصيصه للتشغيل والتحويلات الجارية (باب ٢) . بالاضافة الى ان زيادة مخصصات الصيانة أخذت تتناقص فى السنوات القليلة الماضية .

وبالنسبة للموارد على مستوى المدن الحضرية ، فان ضرائب العقارات (على المباني) يمثل أحد المصادر الرئيسية المخصصة لتمويل الحكم المحلى للانفاق على الخدمات البلدية الحضرية . ولكن فى عام ١٩٨٦/٨٥ أسهمت الموارد المحصلة من هذه الضريبة بحوالى ٣٤ ٪ فقط من اجمالى النفقات فى مجلس مدينة الجيزة . والاهم ان المراجعة المفصلة لتقديرات الميزانية والتحصيل الفعلى لهذه الضريبة فى مدينة الجيزة كشف عن ضرورة مطلقة لرفع مستوى الكفاءة الادارية لتحصيل الإيرادات والادارة واصلاح الإيرادات المحلية فى المناطق الحضرية . بالاضافة فان الامكانيات الناشئة عن تحصيل الإيرادات للحساب الخاص للخدمات والتنمية المحلية لم يستخدم بالكامل فى مدينة الجيزة . وعلى جانب الانفاقات فمن الاجمالى تحت الحساب يستخدم بصورة كبيرة فى اكمال التمويل غير الكافى للصيانة ومخصصات رأس المال تحت ميزانية المدينة . وعلى جانب الإيرادات فان هذا الحساب لم يستخدم فى الانشطة الموجبة للدخل أو فى تحفيز المشاركة الشعبية فى المساهمة فى الانفاقات أو رأس المال اللازمة للمشروعات المعاونة على نمط مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء .

الخلاصة والتوصيات :

٤ - الخلاصة :

هناك ثلاثة شروط رئيسية لازمة لضمان دعم انجازات مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء . أولا الزيادة المستقبلية الكافية فى الاستثمارات الرأسمالية وانفاقات الصيانة . ثانيا الكمية المناسبة والتنبؤ لتوفير التمويل

المحلى على مستوى الحى والمدينة . ثالثا الزيادة تحت منهج منظم (بسدلا من النظام التطوعى) فى دور الجمعيات الاهلية المتطوعة فى انشاء مشروعات معاونة على نمط مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء .

وعلى أية حال فانه ان لم يتم تطوير أو تعديل نظام التمويل الحالى للحكم المحلى فلن تكون له القدرة على ضمان توافر هذه الشروط الرئيسية فى المستقبل . ونواجه فى هذا الصدد مجموعة من القيود ، فالزيادة تتناقض فى مجال الاستثمارات الرأسمالية وانفاقات الصيانة . والكمية المناسبة والتنبوء للتمويل المحلى تعد ضئيلا نسبيا خاصة على مستوى المدينة والبلدية . وهذا مرجعه ليس فقط قلة استخدام مصادر الدخل المحلية المرنة ولكن بسبب الغياب التام للكفاءة الادارية الاساسية فى تحصيل الايرادات وادارة الضرائب والاصلاح . بالاضافة الى ذلك لا يوجد منهج منظم يكفل استمرار الدور المتزايد للجمعيات الاهلية المتطوعة وتحفيز المشاركة الشعبية فى تقديم الخدمات الحضرية التى تحتاجها الاحياء .

ومن أجل ضمان تعزيز مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء فان الانشطة المستقبلية ورمذ المبالغ تحت المرحلة الثانية والثالثة من برنامج التنمية المحلية يجب أن تعنى بمعالجة القيود المشار اليها عالية والتي يواجهها نظام تمويل الحكم المحلى . وهناك حاجة الى تكثيف الجهود على جبهتين على الاقل . أولا زيادة تعبئة الموارد المحلية الى أقصى حد حتى تزيد من معدل النمو والتنبوء والقوى المناسبة فى الايرادات . ثانيا مراجعة وتطوير العلاقات المالية بين الحكومة المركزية وأجهزة الحكم المحلى لزيادة قدراتها على تعبئة وتنمية الموارد المحلية وتقليل اعتمادها على التحويلات المركزية .

ه - التوصيات :

رفع مستوى الكفاءة الادارية لتحصيل الايرادات واجراء اصلاحات داخل اطار الاتجاهات الناشئة للقوانين التى تحكم تمويل الحكم المحلى . ويشير التقييم المبدئى للتأثيرات التى تنتج عن عملية تطوير ورفع الكفاءة الادارية فى تحصيل الايرادات المحلية ان ايرادات ضريبة العقارات يمكن زيادتها بنسبة حوالى ٢٥ ٪ فى مدينة الجيزة كمثال .

انشاء " حساب دائرى" لمشروعات الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء بهدف تشجيع وتعزيز وتمويل انشاء الهيئات الاقتصادية والعامه أو الشركات العامة لتقديم الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء على أساس اقتصادى بأسلوب التمويل الذاتى . والهدف هو الزيادة المتدرجة لاسترداد متطلبات التكلفة من المنتفعين فى مقابل تحسين الخدمات البلدية مثل تجميع والتخلص من القمامة وازاعة الشوارع ونظافتها ورصف الشوارع واصلاح الارصفة وتوفير المتنزهات . . . الخ بصورة مرضية وذات جدوى .

انشاء " صندوق مشاركة " لمشروعات الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء يشجع ويحفز

المشاركة الشعبية والجمعيات الاهلية المتطوعة على تقديم انفاقات رأس المال والصيانة للخدمات البلدية . ومثل هذا الصندوق سيعطى أقصى أولوية وحافـز للمشروعات المعاونة على نمط مشروع الخدمات الحضرية للاحياء (مثل التحول من الشوارع الترابية الى الشوارع المرصوفة) والتي سيساهم المنتفعون طوعا بنسبة حوالى ٢٥ ٪/٠ فى انفاقات رأس المال والصيانة .

تطوير ومراجعة نظام التحويلات المالية من الميزانية المركزية الى الميزانيات المحلية . ويجب ان تحقق الجهود المبذولة فى هذا المجال هدفا مزدوجا . أولا زيادة وتقوية قدرة الحكم المحلى على تعبئة وتنمية ايراداتها المحلية الى الحد الاقصى . ثانيا زيادة التنبؤ بالتحويلات من الحكومة المركزية الى الحكم المحلى . وقد كشف تحليل التحويلات المركزية الحالية (فى العام المالى ١٩٨٥/٨٤) عن صيغة متضمنة قائمة فى مخصصات التحويلات المركزية تهدف الى الاستواء بين موارد المحليات . بالاضافة الى دور الاستواء الهام هذا ، يجب أن تهدف التحويلات المركزية الى تحفيز ومكافأة مجهودات الحكم المحلى لتعبئة الموارد المحلية .

x x x x x x x

APPENDIX IV

(English/Arabic)

NUS and Local Government Financing

Monira Y. Fouad

خلاصة نتائج

دراسة وتقييم مشروع التنمية الحضرية
ليلي شكري الحمامي و دونالد كول

مقدمة :

تتلخص أهداف مشروع التنمية الحضرية للأحياء المجاورة فيما يلي :-

- ١ - المساهمة في تحسين مستوى معيشة سكان القاهرة الكبرى والاسكندرية من خلال توفير وتحسين الخدمات الأساسية والارتفاع بمستوى البنية الأساسية .
- ٢ - استعمال الأساليب التي تدعم سياسة اللا مركزية التي تنتهجها الحكومة المصرية ، وفي هذا الصدد يتم شحذ قدرات الأحياء للقيام بتخطيط وتنفيذ المشروعات الجديدة المتطورة، وذلك عن طريق توفير التدريب للعاملين بالحكم المحلي اما في شكل تدريب قصير المدى أو عن طريق اكتساب الخبرات العملية خلال ممارسة العمل كمشاركين في صنع القرار أو كاداريين في مختلف مراحل أنشطة المشروع .

لا مركزية الحكم المحلي والمشاركة الشعبية :

بدأ العمل في مشروع التنمية الحضرية في اطار نظام الحكم المحلي المعمول به منذ عام ١٩٦٠ والذي اتسع نطاقه على مدى السنوات التالية . ومن أجل تقييم دور مشروع التنمية الحضرية داخل هذا النظام، كان من الضروري أن يتم التعرف على وجهات نظر مختلف فئات العاملين بالحكم المحلي حول الأساليب التي يتبعها نظام الحكم المحلي نفسه في ممارسة وتنفيذ سياسات اللامركزية والمشاركة الشعبية ، وكان أيضا من الضروري التعرف على آرائهم في مشروع التنمية الحضرية وبرنامج تحسين الخدمات وعلاقته بنظام الحكم المحلي ، والتعرف على آرائهم في مدى اسهام هذا المشروع في تحقيق ودعم سياسات اللامركزية والحكم المحلي .

وعلى الرغم من أن بعض وجهات النظر كانت متحيزة بطبيعة الحال حيث أن كل فئة تقيم النظام ومدى مساهمة مشروع التنمية الحضرية فيه من موقعها الخاص متأثرة بتعريفها لمدى حقوقها ومسئولياتها داخل النظام . الا أنه رؤى أهمية التعرف على هذه الآراء مع ما تظهره من نقاط خلاف أو عدم موافقة وخصوصا أن هؤلاء الأفراد هم الذين يشكلون النظام ، وعليهم يقع عبء تنفيذ البرامج واستيعاب الأساليب الجديدة التي أدخلها مشروع التنمية الحضرية .

ولقد أجرى البحث على عدد ١٢١ من العاملين بالحكم المحلى موزعين على النحو التالى :

٢٠	اعضاء مجالس شعبية
٢٣	سكرتيرى عموم ورؤساء أحياء
١٨	مديرى التخطيط والمتابعة والشئون المالية
٢٥	مهندسى المشروعات ومديرى الادارات الهندسية
٣٥	ممثلى وزارات الخدمات

وهؤلاء يمثلون ١٣ حى فى القاهرة الكبرى والاسكندرية (١٠ أحياء بالقاهرة الكبرى و ٣ احياء بالاسكندرية) . وتشير نتائج البحث الى مدى بعد ادراك ووعى هؤلاء العاملين بنظام الحكم المحلى ، والتزامهم بأهدافه الشاملة . وقد قدم أغلبهم تحليلات دقيقة للانجازات التى حققها النظام حتى الآن ، كذلك العتبات التى تتف فى طريق تحقيق أهدافه على الوجه الأكمل . ولقد تحدثوا بصراحة حول جوانب القصور التى يرونها فى النظام مع ادراكهم بأن الحكم المحلى ما زال يحتاج الى بعض الجهود لتحقيق اللامركزية المنشودة والمشاركة الشعبية الفعالة .

ولقد أوضح المسح أن معظم المستجيبين ينظرون الى نظام الحكم المحلى على أنه لم يحقق اللامركزية بشكل كافٍ ، ويرجع ذلك - من وجهة نظرهم - الى ما يلى :

أ - أن الموارد المالية الرئيسية ما زالت مركزية شأنها فى ذلك شأن تخطيط وتنفيذ المشروعات الكبيرة .

ب - نقص العمالة الفنية المدربة على المستوى المحلى .

ج - أن عمليات التعيين والترقية والنقل لموظفى وزارات الخدمات ما زالت مركزية . الأمر الذى جعل بعض المستجيبين يرون أن ذلك أيضا قد يكون أحد معوقات تحقيق اللامركزية .

كما اشارت الدراسة الى اختلافات ملحوظة فى وجهات النظر بين بعض التنفيذيين - خاصة موظفى وزارات الخدمات - وبين ممثلى المجالس الشعبية المحلية ، فبينما يرى هؤلاء الممثلون الشعبيون ضرورة زيادة مشاركة المجلس الشعبى فى الحكم السحلى ، يعتقد بعض التنفيذيين ان مساهمة ممثلى المجالس الشعبية المحلية فى اتخاذ القرارات وفى متابعة عمل الموظفين بشكل أحياناً قيدا قد يعوق التنفيذ الكفء لبرامجهم .

وقد عمل مشروع التنمية الحضرية فى الاطار السابق كمنحرف لتحقيق المزيد من الفعالية فى كيفية الأداء لنظام الحكم المحلى على مستوى القاعدة بتوفيره التمويل اللازم لتحسين الخدمات ، وتنفيذ مشروعات البنية الأساسية بالحجم الذى يكون فى مقدرة الأحياء تخطيط وتنفيذ هذه المشروعات . وبذلك أعطى مشروع التنمية الحضرية الطاقة اللازمة لتنشيط نظام الحكم المحلى ، وتطبيق اللامركزية والمشاركة الشعبية . ولقد عبر عن ذلك بعض العاملين فى الحكم المحلى بقولهم " انه بدون عمل مشروعات على مستوى الحى مثلما هو متبع فى مشروعات التنمية الحضرية ، فكيف يمكن التحدث عن اللامركزية ؟ " و " كيف يمكن تحقيق الاستقلال للأحياء بدون توفير الموارد المحلية لها؟ " .

وفى الوقت الذى ساهم فيه مشروع التنمية الحضرية فى دفع عملية اللامركزية ، فقد أتاح فى نفس الوقت الفرصة لابرار جوانب الضعف والقصور فى نظام الحكم المحلى . ويجب اعتبار ذلك نتيجة ايجابية ، حيث أن الاعتراف بوجود بعض نقاط الضعف والقصور قد أدى الى فتح باب المناقشة والحسوار والمحاولات الجادة لمعالجة الموضوعات الأساسية التالية :

- الى أى مدى يجب التوسع فى الأخذ باللامركزية ، بمعنى الى أى مدى تكون اللامركزية ضرورية لمقابلة الاحتياجات الفعلية للناس ، وفى نفس الوقت تحقيق التوازن والعدالة الاجتماعية على المستوى المركزى ،
- ما هو دور وسلطة كلا من التنفيذيين وممثلى المجالس الشعبية ، بمعنى ما هو مدى سلطة المجلس الشعبى على السلطة التنفيذية - وخاصة الفنيين منهم - وما مدى الحرية لدى الفنيين فى اتخاذ القرارات وتنفيذ البرامج المتعلقة بمسئولياتهم وخبراتهم الوظيفية .

وبينما نجد أن كثيرا من المستجيبين يرون أن مشروع التنمية الحضرية يختلف عن برامج التنمية الأخرى فى أن تمويل مشروعاته وطريقة تنفيذها قد ساهمت بطريقة أساسية فى تحقيق اللامركزية ، نجد أن قليلا منهم قد أشاروا الى دور مشروع التنمية الحضرية فى تدعيم وتشجيع المشاركة الشعبية . ويبدو أن أنشطة مشروع التنمية الحضرية تتطلب تعامل فريق المعونة الفنية مع موظفى الحكومة بصورة مباشرة أكثر من التعامل مع ممثلى المجالس الشعبية . ولقد أشار بعض المستجيبين من أعضاء المجلس الشعبى المحلى الى أن المشروع لم يحاول اشراكهم فى اتخاذ القرارات أو فى برامج التدريب ، الأمر الذى جعل خمسة من هؤلاء الأعضاء يعبرون عن احتجاجهم بقولهم " انهم لا يقبلون الشرط الذى ينص على وجوب تخطيط وتنفيذ مشروعات التنمية الحضرية على مستوى الحى طالما لم يسمح لهم بالمشاركة الكاملة فى اتخاذ القرارات المتعلقة بهذه المشروعات " .

انه من الضروري اعطاء أهمية خاصة لمشاركة الأعضاء المنتخبين فى نظام الحكم المحلى . إن هؤلاء يمثلون المجلس الشعبى الذى يعتبر أصغر مؤسسة فى نظام الحكم المحلى ودور أعضائه قد لا يكون واضحا أو محددا بدرجة كافية بالقياس الى دور العاملين بالحكم المحلى وموظفى وزارات الخدمات الذين يشكلون المجلس التنفيذى فى هذا النظام . إن دور هؤلاء الأعضاء المنتخبين يحتاج الى أن يكون واضحا ومحددا بطريقة ما لتشجيعهم على المشاركة الفعالة باعتبارهم ممثلى الأهالى والرأى العام وأنه فى امكانهم تعبئة الموارد والمواهب الشعبية للنهوض بمستوى الخدمة بالحى . إن مشاركة الرأى العام والجهود الذاتية لم تظهر بصورة كافية فى مشروعات التنمية الحضرية .

وتمثل الجمعيات الأهلية طريقا آخر وهام للمشاركة الشعبية ، ولكن قيادات هذه الجمعيات ليست دائما نابعة من الحى الذى تخدم فيه . ويوجد عدد من الجمعيات الأهلية العاملة فى مجال تنمية المجتمع تستمد قياداتها من الأحياء ومن أهدافها الرئيسية تعبئة موارد المجتمع للارتفاع بمستوى الخدمات وتحسين البيئة ، وان هذه الجمعيات تحتاج الى التشجيع والعمل على تسير أمورها بمدّها بالمعونة الفنية وتدريب العاملين فيها لضمان انتشار الخدمات التى تؤدىها وزيادة تأثيرها وفعاليتها .

بناء القدرات :

كما أن الأخذ بنظام اللامركزية والمشاركة الشعبية - هدف الحكم المحلى- يحتاج الى وجود الموارد المالية والأنشطة الخاصة به ، فانه ايضا من المهم جدا - لتوكيده واستمراريته - وجود العاملين على المستوى المحلى الذين يتميزون بالمهارات والقدرات الضرورية للحفاظ على هذا النظام وأدائه بالكفاءة والفعالية المرجوة ، ولقد أخذ مشروع التنمية الحضرية ذلك فى اعتباره واحتل التدريب جانبا هاما فى برامجه . وكما سبق الإشارة ، فان برامج التدريب فى مشروع التنمية الحضرية اتخذت شكلين ، التدريب القصير المدى عن طريق المحاضرات ، والتدريب العملى لاكتساب الخبرات أثناء تنفيذ المشروعات .

ولقد اتاح مشروع التنمية الحضرية الفرصة لمختلف فئات العاملين فى قطاعات الحكم المحلى - على مختلف درجاتهم الوظيفية - للانخراط فى أنشطة المشروع المرتبطة بالتنفيذ ، تقدير الاحتياجات ، تحديد الأولويات والتخطيط والتصميم والمتابعة والاشراف على المشروعات . وأشار هؤلاء انهم استفادوا كثيرا من اتاحة هذه الفرصة لهم للارتفاع بمستوى أدائهم الوظيفى ، ولقد عبّر أيضا عددا كبيرا منهم عن تقديرهم للفرصة التى اتاحت لهم للعمل مع فريق المعونة الفنية لاكتسابهم الكثير من الخبرات الفنية والادارية .

لقد أتاح تنفيذ المشروعات الفرعية في مشروع التنمية الحضرية فرصة أكبر لمختلف العاملين في أجهزة الحكم المحلي - المجلس التنفيذي والمجلس الشعبي - للتفاعل والتعاون فيما بينهم واكتساب وتبادل الخبرات والتعرف على حدود مسؤولياتهم وحقوقهم . ان الاختلافات الشاسعة بين الأحياء فيما يتعلق بمدى فعالية التعاون بين أعضاء المجلسين التنفيذي والشعبي - والتي لاحظها القائمون بالدراسة - تتوقف الى حد كبير على نوعية القيادة في تلك المجالس .

لقد ذكر نصف عدد العاملين الذين تمت مقابلتهم بأنهم قد اشتركوا في التدريب قصير المدى الذي نظمه مشروع التنمية الحضرية ، وأشار معظمهم الى أنهم قد استفادوا منه . ولكن ثلاثة ارباع هؤلاء المتدربين ذكروا انهم في حاجة الى تدريب اضافي او متقدم ، وعلى وجه الخصوص يرون أنه كان يجب مد فترة التدريب بدلا من اختصارها في بضعة أيام أو في اسابيع قليلة ، وأنه يجب زيادة الجانب العملي وارتباط التدريب مباشرة بما سيؤدونه في وظائفهم . وعبر هؤلاء أن الحاجة ليست فقط لزيادة التدريب الفني للمهندسين بوجه خاص ، وإنما أيضا زيادة التدريب العملي في مجالات الإدارة ، تخطيط وتنفيذ المشروعات ، وتفهم واستيعاب كل ما يتعلق بنظام الحكم المحلي . انهم يودون ان يسروا تغييرا في أساليب التدريب مع اعطاء أهمية كبيرة للزيارات الميدانية لدراسة المشروعات على الطبيعة في موقع العمل نفسه ، كما يودون مزيدا من الحلقات الدراسية التي يدور بها الحوار والمناقشة حول دراسة مشروعات محددة مع الاقلال من المحاضرات النظرية والأكاديمية كلما أمكن ذلك .

ولقد أشارت تجربة مشروع التنمية الحضرية الى ضرورة الاهتمام بدعم امكانات الأحياء في بناء وتجديد وصيانة المشروعات الممولة بواسطة مشروع التنمية الحضرية ، وذكر العاملون في الحكم المحلي بأن معظم الصعوبات التي واجهتهم في هذا الصدد - انخفاض مستوى أداء المقاولين ، وبالتحديد عدم المقدرة على نهر الأعمال في المواعيد المحددة أو انحازها في المستوى الجيد . إن نقص العمالة الماهرة التي تتولى تنفيذ المشروعات ذات الحجم الصغير على مستوى الحي تمثل عقبة رئيسية أمام أية محاولة لزيادة اللامركزية في تنفيذ هذه المشروعات .

وعلى الرغم من أن مصر قد اشتهرت بوفرة العمال وفئة الأسطوانات من الحرفيين الا أن السنوات الأخيرة قد شهدت تدهورا في هذا المجال من حيث الكم والكيف ، ويرجع السبب الى عاملين هما : الهجرة الدولية للعمالة ،

وانتشار التعليم المجانى والاجبارى . وقد أدّى الأول الى استنزاف البـسـلاد من بعض الحرفيين المهرة ، بينما أدّى الثانى الى ابتعاد الشباب عن الانخراط فى ورش العمل العائلية التقليدية للتدريب على الحرف المختلفة ، وجذبهم نظام التعليم العام الذى يفتقر الى التدريب على تنمية المهارات العملية .

ونقترح انشاء ورش عمل Workshops فى الأحياء بحيث تحتفظ ببعض سمات النظام التقليدى لتعليم الصبة فى مجال الحرف على يد المعلم الحرفى أو "الاسطى" ، وفى الوقت نفسه توفير الفرصة لحصول هؤلاء الشباب على الحد الأدنى من التعليم الأساسى الذى ينص عليه القانون . وقد تكون هذه الورش قطاع خاص بصورة كاملة أو جزئية، الا أنه يجب وجود علاقة محددة بينها وبين الحسى مع وجود نظام لتوفير وتخرج الأفراد المتدربين واتخاذ الترتيبات اللازمة لتشغيلهم فيما بعد فى مشروعات الأحياء . وقد يكون هذا الاقتراح ملائماً بصفة خاصة فى الوقت الحاضر حيث توجد ظاهرة عودة العمالة المصرية المهاجرة من الخارج .

تحسين وتطوير الخدمات والتنمية الأساسية بالأحياء :

من خلال تخطيط أو تنفيذ ٢٧٩٢ مشروعاً ضمن مشروع التنمية الحضرية على مدى الخمس سنوات الماضية ، نجد أن مشروع التنمية الحضرية قد حقق هدفه فى العمل على تحسين وأرتفاع مستوى الخدمات والتنمية الأساسية التى تتصل مباشرة بالقاعدة العريضة من الشعب ، وعلى وجه الخصوص فى المناطق محدودة الدخل . ولقد قرر معظم المستجيبين على الاستبيان سواء من العاملين فى الحكم المحلى أو من بين جمهور المنتفعين بهذه الخدمات أن الانجسار الرئيسى لمشروع التنمية الحضرية هو اسهامه ونجاحه فى تحقيق وتنفيذ المشروعات التى واجهت اهم احتياجات أهالى هذه الأحياء .

ولكن توجد بعض التحفظات لدى الكثير من الذين شملتهم الدراسة بالرغم من انهم يفهمون جيداً أن المشروعات المنفذة ضمن مشروع التنمية الحضرية لا يتم تمويلها عادة من الموازنة العامة ، وأن هناك الحاجة الى توسيع نطاق الاستفادة من هذا المشروع ، وأن هذه المشروعات يجب أن تكون فى الحجم الذى يمكن العمل على تخطيطها وتنفيذها فى حدود الامكانيات المتاحة على مستوى الحى ، فانهم يشعرون أن مشروع التنمية الحضرية لم يحقق الا البعض من مجموع الاحتياجات الضخمة المطلوبة فى كل قطاع خدمى، وانه لم يحل الا عدد قليل من مشاكلهم العديدة .

ويرى عدد كبير من المستجيبين أن أهم سلبيات مشروع التنمية الحضرية تتلخص فيما يلي :-

- أ - تحديد مبلغ ٨٣ ألف جنيه كحد أقصى لتمويل أى مشروع .
- ب - قصر هذه المشروعات على تحسين أو التوسع فى الخدمات والامكانيات الموجودة فعلا دون العمل على خلق وانشاء مشروعات جديدة .

وانهم يرون أنه اذا كان هدف مشروع التنمية الحضرية هو مقابلة الاحتياجات الرئيسية للأهالى ، فإنه لايجب وضع حد أقصى لتمويل المشروعات التى تساعد على تحقيق هذه الاحتياجات ، أو قصر هذه المشروعات على مجرد تحسين أو الارتفاع بمستوى خدمة موجودة فعلا . وقد نتج عن وجود هذه الشروط تنفيذ مشروعات هامة ومطلوبة ولكنها لا تمثل بالضرورة جميع وأهم المشروعات المطلوبة للأحياء .

ويوجد تحفظ آخر فيما يتعلق بمدى تأثير مشروع التنمية الحضرية على تحسين الخدمات بالأحياء وهو نوعية العمل الذى تم تنفيذه فى عدد كبير من المشروعات ، حيث قد وُجّه اللوم للمقاولين لأن بعضهم لم يكن على درجة عالية من الكفاءة . كما وُجّه اللوم لمشروع التنمية الحضرية ذاته ففى بعض الحالات التى تناول فيها مجرد عمل تحسينات جزئية لبعض الخدمات، أو لعدم تضمينه تزويد المشروعات المنفذة بالمعدات والأجهزة الرئيسية التى لا يتم تحسين الخدمة أو الارتفاع بمستوى البنية الأساسية بدونها .

ويبدو أن هذه التحفظات يكمن وراءها بعض التساؤلات الآتية :

• هل مشروع التنمية الحضرية هو مشروع ذات مرحلة واحدة ، أو أنه سيتبعه مشروع آخر ؟ .

• فى حالة عدم وجود مشروعات متعاقبة ، فكيف يتم مقابلة الاحتياجات الأخرى؟

لقد كان من الممكن أن يكون هناك فهم أفضل للحدود التى يعمل فى نطاقها مشروع التنمية الحضرية وما هو مُتوقع فى المستقبل اذا كان المشروع قد قُدم على أنه ليس مشروعا مستقلا ، ولكنه جزء من خطة شاملة للنهوض والارتفاع بمستوى الخدمات والامكانيات بالأحياء تتضمن الأهداف القصيرة والطويلة الأجل، مصادر التمويل وطريقة توزيع المسؤوليات بين مختلف مستويات الحكم المحلى .

ولقد كان من الممكن القيام بالكثير من المشروعات التي يتم تنفيذها ضمن مشروع التنمية الحضرية اذا كان لدى الأحياء على مدى السنوات التمويل اللازم لمواجهة أعمال الصيانة والتوسع التدريجي فى الامكانيات والخدمات والارتفاع بمستوى البنية الأساسية للأحياء ، وبالتالي فإنه يمكن استمرارية برامج مماثلة لمشروع التنمية الحضرية فى حالة ما اذا تضمنت الموازنات السنوية مبالغ للصيانة ، وللتحسينات والاضافات المحدودة للخدمات والبنية الأساسية . وفى الظروف الحالية التى تتسم بقله الموارد المادية المتاحة والتى لا يتوقع التغلب عليها فى المستقبل القريب ، فإنه يمكن استمرارية هذه البرامج المماثلة لمشروع التنمية الحضرية والتوسع فيها مستقبلا اذا ما تم تشجيع المشاركة الشعبية (سواء من خلال الجمعيات الأهلية التطوعية ، المجالس الشعبية المحلية أو أى منظمات شعبية أخرى) لتكون مصدرا هاميا لزيادة الموارد وتعبئة الطاقات اللازمة لتنفيذ مثل هذه المشروعات ، حتى يمكن أن نضمن أن ما بدأه مشروع التنمية الحضرية لا يصح نهاية المطاف .