

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY -- PART I

1. BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM, READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS.
 2. USE LETTER QUALITY TYPE, NOT TYPEWRITER TYPE.

IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Reporting A.I.D. Unit: Mission or AID/W Office (USAID/Mogadishu)		B. Was Evaluation Scheduled in Current FY Annual Evaluation Plan? Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Skipped <input type="checkbox"/> Ad Hoc <input type="checkbox"/>		C. Evaluation Timing Interim <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Final <input type="checkbox"/>	
E.S.#		Evaluation Plan Submission Date: FY 89 Q 2		E.S. Post <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>	
D. Activity or Activities Evaluated (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated; if not applicable, list title and date of the evaluation report.)					
Project No.	Project /Program Title	First PROAG or Equivalent (FY)	Most Recent PACD (Mo:Yr)	Planned LOP Cost (000)	Amount Obligated to Date (000)
649-0132	Policy Initiatives and Privatization	FY 83	9/90	\$7,000,000	\$7,000,000

ACTIONS

Action(s) Approved By Mission or AID/W Office Director	Name of Officer Responsible for Action	Date Action to be Completed
1. Ensure coordination between studies and project elements. Ensure follow-up once studies are completed. Maintain complete files in USAID.	USAID/PPSD	Immediate
2. Coordinate with other donors.	USAID/PROG/ARD/PPSD	Immediate
3. Continue PSC position in Ministry of Industry as Enterprise Promotion Advisor. Recruit PSC to fill the position.	USAID/PPSD	May 1989
4. Redesign the project. Extend PACD to December 1992. Increase funding.	GSDR; REDSO; USAID/PDS/PPSD	June 1989
5. Recruit PSC to fill Financial Advisor position in the Domestic Development Department of the Ministry of Finance and Treasury.	USAID/PROG	June 1989

APPROVALS

F. Date Of Mission Or AID/W Office Review Of Evaluation: (Month) June (Day) (Year) 1989

G. Approvals of Evaluation Summary And Action Decisions:

Name (Typed)	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission or AID/W Office Director
	Marion Warren		Charles Gordon	Kenneth Rikard
Signature	<i>Marion Warren</i>			
Date	5/30/89		6/1/89	6/4/89

ABSTRACT

H. Evaluation Abstract (To be reviewed by project sponsor)

The goal of the project is to increase the economic growth of the Somali economy, improve efficiency of the public sector, primarily with regard to budgeting and revenue collection, and generate more economic growth within the private sector. The purpose of the project is to improve the Somali economic climate by: 1) supporting the development and implementation of improved economic policies; 2) identifying and testing ways and means of promoting private sector participation in the economy; and 3) improving the government's budgeting and revenue collection.

The evaluators found that "there has been little progress toward increasing economic growth of the Somali economy and, more specifically, generating more growth within the private sector. This has been due to poor environment, and project management's inability to follow through on completed studies and tours." The team found that, in general, there was private sector demand for the type of services the project provided.

However, the means for delivering, monitoring and following up on those services need to be improved. USAID had been unable, due to manpower constraints, to provide the intensive management needed to make the project more effective, particularly in light of the GSDR's slowly-evolving attitude toward the private sector. While the team understood the difficulty USAID faced in managing such a project with limited resources, it felt that the recommendations of the first mid-term evaluation (1986) for hiring at least one professional Somali monitor, should have been followed. The evaluators called upon USAID to reduce management burdens by hiring staff to manage the PI.

The team noted that the GSDR appeared to have retreated from its earlier promises both to liberalize the economy (e.g., permit private banking, liberalize foreign exchange access, etc.) as well as actively to encourage private sector growth and development. It noted that little progress had been made in assisting the Somali Chamber of Commerce become more private sector-oriented. The team suggested that the project focus on the private sector, and that public sector studies and assistance had been worthwhile, particularly the services provided by the project's advisor to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and general management training provided by TIPCO to the private sector.

The team concluded that the activity should be extended and several critical areas should be reinforced. These include: 1) improving USAID's ability to manage the project, 2) focusing more on the private sector and less on the public sector, 3) continuing to provide an advisor to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 4) coordinating more with other donors, 5) designing study tours and seminars and provide better follow-up, 6) coordinating studies with other elements of the program and provide better follow-up on completed studies.

COSTS

I. Evaluation Costs

1. Evaluation Team		Contract Number OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (U.S. \$)	Source of Funds
Name	Affiliation			
David McCloud	REDSO/PDO	n/a	n/a	
Mike McWherter	USAID/Kenya, Private Sector Advisor			
Omar Sheikh Abdul Rahman	Tech. Officer, MNPJVD			
2. Mission/Office Professional Staff		3. Borrower/Grantor Professional		
Person-Days (Estimate)	5	Staff Person-Days (Estimate)	12	

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A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART II

S U M M A R Y

J. Summary of Evaluation Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (Try not to exceed the three (3) pages provided). Address the following items:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purpose of evaluation and methodology used • Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated • Findings and conclusions (relate to questions) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principal recommendations • Lessons learned |
|--|--|

Mission or Office:	Date This Summary Prepared:	Title And Date Of Full Evaluation Report:
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Purpose of the evaluation and methodology used. (A) The evaluation was carried out to satisfy a requirement set forth by the revised project paper of 1986. (B) The evaluation was also carried out as part of a plan to revise and more narrowly focus the Mission's private sector portfolio. Parts of the plan included the assignment of the PIP project to a single office within the mission, the conduct of a private sector assessment recommending future directions, and an evaluation of PIP followed by a redesigned project. The evaluation was carried out in May 1988 by a two-person team from REDSO/ESA and USAID/Kenya with the assistance of a Somali counterpart from the Ministry of National Planning and Juba Valley Development. The team reviewed available documents within USAID, relevant GSDR ministries, and other donor organizations. The team also interviewed private sector businessmen, GSDR officials, other donor staff, contractors, and USAID staff.

Purpose of the activities evaluated. The goal of the project is to increase the economic growth of the Somali economy, improve efficiency of the public sector, primarily with regard to budgeting and revenue collection, and generate more economic growth within the private sector. The purpose of the project is to improve the Somali economic climate by: 1) supporting the development and implementation of improved economic policies; 2) identifying and testing ways and means of promoting private sector participation in the economy; and 3) improving the government's budgeting and revenue collection.

Findings and conclusions. The evaluation team found that necessary economic policy changes had not taken place, and there was not a significantly improved environment for increased investment and productive output as a result of the project. The team found that lack of progress was primarily attributable to:

- (1) USAID's inability to provide more direct project management and monitoring. The Mission has been unable, due to personnel limitations, to provide the type of intensive project management needed for a project of this type.
- (2) The GSDR's slowly-evolving and ambivalent attitude toward the private sector. This has been most notable in the lack of progress toward "privatizing" the Somali Chamber of Commerce, one of the objectives of the project.
- (3) A national policy environment, which had not been conducive to or consistent toward private sector growth and investment. One of the project's outputs was to include detailed examination of appropriate economic policies and a growing policy dialogue with the GSDR.
- (4) The GSDR's lack of fiscal restraint, thereby squeezing out the private sector.
- (5) Lack of contractor follow-up on studies and tours has limited their usefulness.

S U M M A R Y (Continued)

However, the project had led to:

- (1) Improved GSDR local currency budgeting through provision of a financial advisor to the Ministry of Finance and Treasury.
- (2) Improved efficiency of existing private sector firms through management training.
- (3) Increased initiatives in the private sector due to the Industrial Promotion Advisor's assistance to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

The team concludes, "There has been progress made toward improving the efficiency both of the public sector...and of the private sector...and toward encouraging policy reform." However, "there has been little progress toward increasing economic growth of the Somali economy and, more specifically, generating more growth within the private sector."

Principal recommendations

- (1) The project should focus on direct support to the private sector (e.g., services to the private sector) with limited support to the government to handle issues related to the private sector.
- (2) A core management team needs to be set up for the project which would comprise a USAID project manager, a contractor chief of party, and one or two Somalis, each familiar with private sector development.
- (3) The position of Industrial Promotion Advisor with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce should continue to be filled.
- (4) There should be more and better seminars and overseas tours, with better follow-up.
- (5) Studies should be coordinated with other project activities and should be monitored more closely.
- (6) There should be more coordination with other donor efforts in private sector development.
- (7) The accounting/management training and business consultancies should be continued, but should be focused with better follow-up.

Lessons Learned. Without sufficient commitment on the part of the Government, and without more intensive USAID management, meaningful dialogue and extensive changes in the economic environment can not occur.

ATTACHMENTS

K. Attachments (List attachments submitted with this Evaluation Summary; always attach copy of full evaluation report, even if it was submitted earlier; attach studies, surveys, etc. from "background" materials, if relevant to the evaluation report.)

COMMENTS

L. Comments By Mission, AID/W Office and Borrower/Grantee On Full Report

The evaluation was carried out in May 1988, while this PES was first prepared in March 1989. Several circumstances account for this delay.

1. PIP has been without a project manager since June 1988. The chief of the Public and Private Sector Development (PPSD) Office responsible for PIP held the position of Mission Disaster Relief Officer in addition to her regular duties. With the outbreak of civil conflict in northern Somalia (May 1988) and the declaration that relief and rehabilitation in support of political reconciliation was a priority U.S. Mission objective, the Office chief has had to spend the majority of time coordinating emergency assistance to the North. In June and July the two other USDH's in PPSD departed post, and AID/W is only now assigning replacements 9-10 months after the positions become vacant, despite repeated Mission representations on the urgency of filling these vacancies.
2. The Mission has been faced with gradually declining levels of foreign assistance funding. In December 1987 when the Mission first took up the idea of a major alteration in its private sector strategy, there was no reason to believe that future support levels would be substantially lower than in the past. The Mission went ahead with a major reallocation of internal responsibilities, including a transfer of PIP project management responsibilities from the Program and Projects Offices to PPSD. The intention was to establish PPSD as the responsible office for USAID private sector activities. In March 1988 a Private Sector Assessment was conducted with the intention of establishing a clearly-articulated, more focussed, private sector strategy. This was followed by the PIP evaluation in May and a revised Project Paper in October. It was during this time period that the Mission learned that assistance available for continuation of PIP activities and other projects was to be less than the minimum \$6 million budget for the proposed redesign. This forced an internal reassessment of USAID's private sector portfolio. A REDSO PDO has now returned to Mogadishu to write another PP supplement that will closely reflect this funding constraint and Mission decisions based on its internal reassessment.
3. GSDR progress on liberalizing the policy environment has been uneven, and has not provided clear-cut signals for purposes of deciding on activities to include in the redesigned project. This situation in fact influenced the Private Sector Assessment, the PIP evaluation, and the PIP redesign teams, to argue for a primary focus on direct assistance to the private sector with a secondary, reduced emphasis on assistance to the GSDR. Beginning in March 1988 and continuing through March 1989 the GSDR has reaffirmed its adherence to reform; adopted significant policy changes, including legislative changes to privatize banking; concluded a series of new agreements with the IMF and IBRD, and so far moved ahead to implement those agreements in a very impressive fashion.

The Mission's position in May 1988 was that continued assistance to the GSDR in support of an improved economic climate for private sector development was essential. This position has since been reconfirmed as a result of the Mission's internal reassessment. With the cutback in funds, the Mission was also faced with the choice of working with Government or working with the private sector, since anticipated funding levels are clearly inadequate to support both. Faced with this unfortunate choice, the Mission has decided to continue support to improving the policy environment for the reasons stated below.

It is encouraging to note that the GSDR has most recently reinstated its previously suspended policy reform program, reopened negotiations with the IMF on a medium-term program for reform, and taken several actions, including approving legislation to allow private competition with state monopolies in finance and trade, all indicative of a renewed commitment to liberalizing the policy environment.

The evaluation report itself does not make a particularly strong case for shifting project emphasis from public to private sectors. The report argues that the overall policy environment is not conducive to achieving the reform objectives set out by the PIP project paper. Based in part on this conclusion the report argues that the redesigned project should put the greatest emphasis on direct assistance to the private sector. It is the Mission's considered judgment that direct assistance to private enterprises will not be effective if the incentive environment is poor. Furthermore, the evaluation does not assess the effectiveness of the business advisory services which have been provided to date. This omission leaves little basis for justifying continuation or expansion of such advisory services.

Mission Comments on specific evaluation recommendations.

1. For reasons already discussed, the Mission rejects the recommendation that a redesigned project provide direct assistance to the private sector with only limited assistance to the Government.
2. The Mission rejects the recommendation that a core management team for the project be established. The redesign will be limited in both scope and funds. About \$5 million will be applied to: (a) two long-term advisors, one for the Ministry of Industry and one for the Ministry of Finance and Treasury; (b) attendance by high-level GSDR officials at conferences on privatization and economic policy issues; (c) short-term technical assistance on specific policy reform issues; and (d) studies on specific policy reform issues. Seminar attendance, technical assistance, and study requirements will probably be occasional, and arise from needs identified only as the GSDR proceeds to implement its reform program. Given this limited scope of PIP activities during the extension period, the Mission believes that one USDH can manage the Project. In fact, a USDH General Development Officer (GDO) has recently been assigned to USAID/Somalia to replace the present chief of PPSD office, and is scheduled to arrive in July 1989. It is Mission intention that he assume responsibility for managing the PIP Project.
3. Mission will continue the technical advisor position in the Ministry of Industry (formerly Industry and Commerce) as recommended. The title of the position is changed from Industrial Promotion Advisor to Enterprise Promotion Advisor; and the scope of work is changed to emphasize a more activist role in support of policy reforms that will benefit private sector development.

4. Mission agrees that there should be greater coordination with other donors involved in private sector development. The scope of work for the Enterprise Promotion Advisor within the Ministry of Industry specifically calls for continuous cooperation with donor organizations and other ministries involved in private sector development activities.
5. In view of the Mission's emphasis on improving the policy environment, the USAID does not accept recommendation for increased private sector involvement in seminars, field trips and study tours. Under a PP supplement the Mission will provide assistance for participation by both public and private sector individuals in seminars and study tours that are mostly directly related to the policy issues on which the redesigned project will focus. The USAID has since September 1988 used PIP's funding to finance attendance of senior and mid-level GSDR officials and private sector representatives at seminars and conferences on economic reform, financial management and intermediation, the informal sector, and at USAID's suggestion USIS is sending the Director General of the Ministry of Industry to a USIS seminar on U.S. economic policy.
6. The Mission agrees that the studies' element should be better coordinated with other elements and that studies once implemented should be followed up. We have already begun efforts to circulate more widely and to make available to key, senior GSDR decision-makers in the policy reform area copies of PIP's funded studies pertinent to issues they now face. Concerned USAID staff are also making every effort to maintain complete documentation on studies conducted since the evaluation.

The evaluators made several suggestions within the body of their report which are not specifically addressed or included in their final list of recommendations:

1. The report suggests that the financial advisor position within the Ministry of Finance and Treasury should no longer be funded out of PIP. The report argues that issues pertaining to the need for improved budgeting and accounting procedures divert resources from what should be the project's primary focus - the promotion of private sector development. In view of the Mission's conscious decision to focus the project specifically on public policies and procedures, this suggestion is rejected. The Mission plans to have a PSC fill the financial advisor position by June 1989.
2. The Mission agrees with the evaluation assessment that the training provided by The Information Processing Company (TIPCO) was a business outreach element that did benefit the private sector. Given funding constraints and the USAID emphasis on policy reform, however, TIPCO training activities will not be continued beyond May 1989. Some of the more generic training (accounting, financial management) which TIPCO provided can be provided through the Worksite Management Training Unit (WMTU) of the Somalia Management Training and Development (SOMTAD) Project. WMTU training is for both public and private organizations. USAID has requested the prime contractor responsible for SOMTAD to make a special effort to recruit as many private sector individuals as possible for its WMTU courses and to develop a strategy for ensuring private sector participation and benefit from SOMTAD. This is now being done by the Chief of Party.
3. The Mission rejects the evaluators' suggestion that PIP be transferred to the USAID Project and Development Services Office. If continuing personnel constraints do not permit management of PIP by PPSD, the question of the locus of project management will be revisited. Steps are being taken, however, to redefine the PPSD project manager's responsibilities and other USAID offices involved in PIP's activities.

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Given the time that has elapsed since the preparation of this evaluation and the evolution of the policy environment, the Mission will not formally review this evaluation report with the GSDR nor seek its signature on the PES form. These matters are now being taken up with the Government and agreements are being reached with them on future project directions. The substantive issues and recommendations of the evaluation will be addressed during the project redesign process.

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SOMALIA POLICY INITIATIVES AND PRIVATIZATION PROJECT

(Project No. 649-0132)

EVALUATION REPORT

June, 1988

SOMALIA POLICY INITIATIVES AND PRIVATIZATION PROJECT

(Project No. 649-0132)

DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT

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3. List of Project-funded Studies
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Full support for the evaluation team was forthcoming from the Ministry of National Planning, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, project technical assistance and personnel, and the USAID/Somalia Mission. The external evaluators would like to express their appreciation to all who gave assistance, and in particular to Omar Sheikh Abdul Rahman, who as the GSDR team member had the responsibility for making all appointments and arrangements with government personnel and who fulfilled that responsibility efficiently and effectively.

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ACRONYMS

CIP	Commodity Import Program
GSDR	Government of the Somalia Democratic Republic
IESC	International Executive Service Corps
IMF	International Monetary Fund
PIP	Policy Initiatives and Privatization Project
PACD	Project Activities Completion Date
REDSO/FEA	Regional Economic and Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa
SOMTAD	Somalia Management Training and Development Project
TIPCO	The Information Processing Company
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background to Project and Evaluation Purpose/Methodology

The Policy Initiatives and Privatization (PIP) Project was initially obligated on September 29, 1983, at a funding level of \$2.5 million. The original PACD was March 31, 1987. After an external evaluation conducted early 1986, a project paper supplement was prepared, the PACD extended to September 30, 1990, and project funding increased to \$7.0 million.

This evaluation focuses on project implementation since the previous evaluation in February, 1986. The purpose of the evaluation was both to assess progress to date toward achievement of project objectives, and to develop recommendations for a possible project redesign. The evaluation team consisted of three individuals: a REDSO/ESA Project Officer; a private sector specialist; and a Somali Government representative. The evaluation fieldwork took place in Mogadishu, Somalia, from May 11-25, and consisted of a documentation review, project site visits, and interviews with GSDR officials, USAID officials, project personnel and project participants.

Project Objectives: Goal and Purpose

The goal of the project is "to increase the economic growth of the Somali economy, improve the efficiency of the public sector (particularly with regard to budgeting and revenue collection), and generate more economic growth within the private sector." Its purpose is "to improve the Somali economic climate by: 1) supporting the development and implementation of improved economic policies; 2) identifying and testing ways and means of promoting private sector participation in the economy; and 3) improving the Government's budgeting and revenue collection."

The project design, as revised in 1986, identified both policy and growth constraints to development in Somalia. On the policy side, it was suggested that greater effort is required to allow private markets to operate more freely. On the growth side, a number of constraints were identified, including inadequacies of local inputs, lack of managerial and entrepreneurial skills, incomplete adoption of technology, shortages of investment finance and a rudimentary financial system. All of these constraints continue today, and with the abandonment of the foreign exchange auction system in September, 1987, and hiatus in agreement over policy change particularly with the IMF, both the policy environment and the economic environment became even more uncertain during late 1987 - early 1988.

Outputs and Inputs

Specific outputs envisaged in the PP supplement are as follows: 1) detailed examination of appropriate economic policies and reforms resulting from a more effective, concerted policy dialogue between the GSDR and USAID; 2) expanded dialogue between the GSDR and the Somali private sector on economic and regulatory policies; 3) establishment of private sector banking in Somalia; and 4) revised and improved GSDR budgetary and revenue collection systems.

To achieve these outputs, the following inputs are proposed for inclusion in the design: 1) long-term technical assistance, including financial and industrial advisors, a private sector banking specialist, an organization specialist in Somali Chamber of Commerce; 2) microeconomic and socioeconomic policy studies; 3) logistical support, including a Somali project management assistant; 4) study tours and conferences/seminars; and 5) limited commodity procurement.

Findings and conclusions

The project had had at the time of the evaluation limited impact in its objectives. Project activities had supported the promotion of improved economic policies geared in particular to increasing private sector participation in the economy, but there has been little progress toward actual implementation of those policies.^{1/} There were two reasons for the project's limited success. First and foremost, the overall environment in Somalia was not conducive to achievement of project objectives. Second, project management often has not coordinated project activities, nor has it always followed through with action based on completed studies and completed overseas tours.

One project design assumption was that the Somali Government would implement significant economic policy changes which would demonstrate increased fiscal responsibility, be more responsive to market forces, and reflect greater consideration and impact of Somali private sector interests. This assumption has proven not to be correct, and as a result the project has had to be implemented in a very difficult and less productive environment. Necessary economic policy changes have been uneven with some regression, and there was not at the time of the evaluation a significantly improved environment for increased investment and productive output.

^{1/} GSDR policies toward the private sector and liberalization changed significantly for the better subsequent to the evaluation with the Government signing two successive letters of intent with the IMF on July 24, 1988 and March 15, 1989, and agreeing with the IMF and IBRD on a Policy Framework Paper. Highly important legislative and constitutional changes were enacted by the Peoples Assembly in February 1989 regarding liberalization and privatization of key parastatals.

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Under the project, a finance advisor had been provided during 1985-1987, and improvements had been made to the GSDR's budgeting system in the area of local currency programming and accounting. (Another USAID project, SOMTAD, also has some impact on the areas of budgeting and revenue collection.) The management training activity has improved the efficiency of existing private sector firms. The industrial advisor has taken a number of initiatives in the area of private sector development. Due to lack of privatization of the Somali Chamber of Commerce and lack of movement by the Government toward the establishment of a private banking facility, dollar-funded project activities at the Chamber had been suspended and the private banking specialist was never recruited.

Thus, there had been progress made toward improving the efficiency both of the public sector through budgetary reform and of the private sector through management training, and toward encouraging policy reform primarily through the work of the industrial advisor, but there had been little progress toward increasing economic growth of the Somali economy and, more specifically, generating more growth within the private sector.

Implementation of Previous Evaluation Recommendations

The following three recommendations (of ten) from the 1986 evaluation of PIP have not been fully implemented: 1) USAID/Somalia should prepare a privatization/economy liberalization policy and action scenario; 2) one or two Somalis to monitor the day to day operations related to project implementation should be hired; and 3) the present workload of the Public and Private Sector Development Office and its staff needs to be reviewed and adjustments should be made to ensure that adequate time is available for the management of the PIP project.

The Mission has funded studies which deal with privatization and economies liberalization. What is necessary now is the preparation of a private sector development strategy which can guide the Mission in the implementation of its various activities involving the private sector. Project management has been an issue since the beginning of PIP. There continues to be a need for stronger project management within the USAID mission. The recommendation that a qualified Somali be hired to assist still stands. Alternatively, an existing staff member should be given more time for this activity. In addition to this, it is suggested that improved implementation could be achieved through the use of a contractor outside of the mission to direct and coordinate activities "in the field."

Recommendations

1. Project Focus: If redesigned the project focus should be (1) direct assistance to the private sector, for example in the form of services, and (2) limited assistance to the government to handle issues related to private sector development.
2. Project Organization and Management: A core management team for the project should be established consisting of a USAID project manager, a contract project director, and one or two Somalis, all of whom are knowledgeable about private sector development.

3. Continuation of Industrial Advisor and training/consultancy activities: The evaluation team believes that both these activities should be considered as part of a redesigned project.
4. Coordination with Other Donor Efforts: Other donors also are sponsoring efforts in the area of private sector development. Increased contact and familiarity by PIP project management with other donor work should avoid unnecessary duplication and promote more productive efforts overall.
5. Seminars and Overseas Field Trips/Study Tours: There should be increased participation by the Somali private sector, and involvement of other developing countries whose experiences could be of significant benefit to Somalia. In addition, there should be increased contact and follow-up action by project personnel of participants who return from study tours.
6. Studies: The studies element of the project should be organized in such a way as to ensure coordination between the studies and other project elements, and to ensure follow-up action once the studies have been completed, recommendations made, and reviews have taken place by USAID and GSDR. USAID Mission files on studies planned, in progress and completed should be reviewed regularly, and proper documentation, including at least one copy of each study and review comments by all concerned, should be included in those files.

Lessons Learned

The management of a project in an uncertain environment and with a diverse set of activities requires substantial attention to implementation issues. An individual or individuals with sufficient time and expertise should be assigned or if necessary contracted to perform the management function.

I. BACKGROUND TO PROJECT

A. Introduction

The Policy Initiatives and Privatization (PIP) Project was initially obligated on September 29, 1983, at a funding level of \$2.5 million. The original PACD was March 31, 1987. After an external evaluation conducted early 1986, a project paper supplement was prepared and a grant agreement amendment executed. The PACD was extended to September 30, 1990, the project goal and purpose were revised, new project activities were identified and defined in more detail than how they had been defined in the original project paper, and the funding level was increased to \$7.0 million.

This evaluation focuses on project implementation during the period since the previous evaluation in February 1986 up to this evaluation in May 1988. The purpose of the evaluation was both to assess progress to date toward achievement of project objectives, and to develop recommendations for a possible project redesign.

The original PIP project was designed as a flexible mechanism to respond to "targets of opportunity" in policy reforms and private sector development. Both areas were in a state of flux at the time of project authorization and there was a felt need for a funding source, easily accessible, that could be used to help the USAID/Somalia Mission and the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic (GSDR) sort out various options and opportunities. Given the predominance of socialist ideology on the part of the GSDR during the 1970's, private sector development and policy initiatives to initiate and support change were at low levels up to the early 1980's, when this project was designed. It was not clear what kinds of activities and initiatives might succeed, and the PIP project offered a variety of choices which could be tried and tested, and which perhaps would lead to further action if a particular activity was found to be effective.

The 1986 PIP project evaluation found that this approach had its drawbacks. "PIP project implementation activities have suffered from design and implementation problems resulting from: first, the lack of a clear project design and agenda, and second, the lack of a project manager with sufficient time available to properly implement such a diverse and demanding project."

The Project Paper Supplement, completed soon after the 1986 evaluation and obviously following some of the advice in the evaluation report, attempted to overcome the first problem noted above by specifying in greater detail the nature of activities which would be funded by the project. It attempted to overcome the second problem by recommending the hiring of one or two Somalis to handle the day to day operations of the project, but this recommendation has not been implemented. Thus, although planned project activities are explained in more detail, there remains a heavy management burden on the USAID Mission given the diversity of project activities and the need for coordination among those activities. In addition, although the GSDR has expressed an interest in promoting private sector development, obstacles exist to that development, and in such an environment project activities become even more difficult to implement effectively.

The project design, as revised in 1986, identified both policy and growth constraints to development in Somalia. On the policy side, it was suggested that greater effort was required to allow private markets to operate more freely. On the growth side, a number of constraints were identified, including small domestic markets, inadequacies of local inputs, lack of managerial and entrepreneurial skills, incomplete adoption of technology, shortages of investment finance and a rudimentary financial system. All of these constraints continue today, and with the abandonment of the foreign exchange auction system in September, 1987, both the policy environment and the economic environment became even more uncertain. It is in this setting that the current evaluation of the PIP project took place.

B. Evaluation Team Composition and Methodology

The evaluation team consisted of three individuals: David McCloud, REDSO/ESA Project Officer and Team Leader; Mike McWherter, USAID/Kenya Private Sector Specialist; and Omer Sheikh Abdul Rahman, Technical Officer, Ministry of National Planning, GSDR. The evaluation fieldwork took place in Mogadishu, Somalia, from 11 - 25 May, and consisted of documentation review, project site visits, and interviews with GSDR officials, USAID officials, project personnel and project participants. A list of persons contacted appears as an annex to this report.

II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

A. Project Objectives: Goal and Purpose

The goal of the project as amended is "to increase the economic growth of the Somali economy, improve the efficiency of the public sector (particularly with regard to budgeting and revenue collection), and generate more economic growth within the private sector." Its purpose is to "to improve the Somali economic climate by: 1) supporting the development and implementation of improved economic policies; 2) identifying and testing ways and means of promoting private sector participation in the economy; and 3) improving the government's budgeting and revenue collection."

B. Outputs and Inputs

Specific outputs envisaged in the PP supplement are as follows:

1. Detailed examination of appropriate economic policies and reforms resulting from a more effective, concerted policy dialogue between the GSDR and USAID;
2. Expanded dialogue between the GSDR and the Somali private sector on economic and regulatory policies;
3. Establishment of private sector banking in Somalia; and
4. Revised and improved GSDR budgetary and revenue collection systems.

To achieve these outputs, the following inputs are included in the design:

1. technical assistance, including
 - a. financial advisor in Ministry of Finance,
 - b. industrial advisor in Ministry of Industry and Commerce,
 - c. private sector banking management specialist,
 - d. organization specialist in Somali Chamber of Commerce, and
 - e. short-term assistance to entrepreneurial associations;
2. studies - approximately 80 person-months of studies on microeconomic and socioeconomic policies;
3. logistical support, including Somali project management assistant;
4. study tours and conference/seminars; and
5. commodity procurement.

In addition, GSDR inputs are to include local currency funded technical assistance, modest commodity procurement, fuel and logistical support services, appropriate office space, furniture, etc., and transportation. Local currency financing was expected to be provided by the CIP/PL 480 local currency receipts.

C. Project Design Assumptions

The following assumption was made in the project paper supplement:

Economic policy changes in Somalia will demonstrate increased fiscal responsibility, be more responsive to market forces, and reflect greater consideration and impact of Somali private sector interests. The logical result of this scenario will be the creation of a significantly improved environment promoting increased investment in the economy and increased productive output in the public and private sectors of the economy.

As discussed in this report this assumption has proven not to be correct, and as a result the project has had to be implemented in a very difficult and less productive environment.

III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Progress Toward Goal and Purpose Achievement

The project has had limited success toward the achievement of its objectives.

Project activities supported the identification and development both of improved economic policies and of ways and means to increase private sector participation in the economy, but there was little implementation past the identification and development stages. Initiatives made by project personnel and those introduced by project activities frequently was not pursued. There were two reasons for this. First, as mentioned above, the overall environment in Somalia has not been consistently conducive to achievement of project objectives. The necessary economic policy changes had not taken place, and there was not a significantly improved environment for increased investment and productive output. Second, project management often did not coordinate project activities, nor did it always follow through with action based on completed studies and completed overseas tours.

Individual project components made progress in their respective areas. Improvements were made to the GSDR's budgeting system in the area of local currency programming and accounting under the project. The management training activity has improved the efficiency of existing private sector firms. And the Industrial Promotion Advisor has had an impact on matters affecting the private sector within his Ministry. However, primarily due to factors external to the project, there was little progress toward increasing economic growth of the Somali economy and, more specifically, generating more growth within the private sector.

B. Nature of Planned USAID-funded Inputs

NOTE: Included at the end of the evaluation report text is Table 1, Project Dollar Expenditures: Planned vs. Actual to Date (03/31/88)

1. Financial advisor. The project has funded a financial advisor position in the Ministry of Finance Domestic Development Department. This position has been vacant for almost a year, but there appears to be continued interest on the part of the GSDR to recruit a replacement. The work of the advisor has focused on facilitating the development of an effective management information system for local currency accounting and programming. The Project Paper Supplement is ambiguous about the intended responsibilities of this position, but the work that has been done fits under one of the job descriptions included, and by all reports was performed to a high standard.

When this project element is presented early in the Project Paper, it appears to focus on budgetary and fiscal policies which relate to private sector development. If this were the focus of the element, its relevance to the project could not be questioned. However, the element is later interpreted to deal more with the management and administration of USAID's local currency program in Somalia. While this may be a necessary task and one of importance to the Mission, it has less relevance to achievement of project objectives.

2. Industrial Promotion Advisor. The current project-funded industrial promotion advisor has been in-country since February, 1986, and his contract has been extended to early 1989. The advisor's major tasks have included work on a tax commission, parastatal reporting requirements reform, the registration of firms, the revision of the foreign investment act, and development of a system of standardization of inputs and production. It is clear that this position is one which fits well into the project's goal and purpose, and that the advisor's work is relevant to and supports the achievement of project objectives. In an extension of the current project this is a position which could warrant inclusion.

3. Private Sector Banking Management Specialist. This position, and related short-term technical assistance, was intended to support the establishment of a chartered commercial bank in the domain of the Somali private sector. Up to the time of this evaluation there had been little progress in this area, and the position remained unfilled. A condition precedent included in Grant Agreement Amendment No. 2 required that, prior to disbursement for this position, the GSDR enact "rules, regulations, and legislation which will allow immediate establishment of privately-held, commercial banks in Somalia, and that a privately-held, commercial bank has been established in Somalia pursuant to such rules, regulations, and legislation." Neither of these conditions has been met, and thus there has been no disbursement for this project element.

4. Somalia Chamber of Commerce Organization Specialist. One of the project's contractors, TIPCO, implemented a number of activities with the Somali Chamber of Commerce. Two short-term advisors, one in late 1986 and the other in early 1987, were provided to the Chamber and produced reports on the Chamber's activities, with recommendations for further action. In addition, three financial reports were produced on the following topics: Pre-audit Review of Somali Chamber of Commerce (August, 1986), Report and Valuation of the Somali Chamber of Commerce (November, 1986), and Statement of Affairs as at 31 December 1986. Since early 1987 there have been no project-funded local currency contributions to the Chamber.

Project activities at the Chamber were ended because progress toward privatizing the Chamber, in part through planned elections for the board of directors, had been halted. In the absence of further moves toward increased direct private sector participation in the affairs of the Chamber, dollar-funded activities should not be resumed. It is desirable for the project to resume activities with the Chamber and to work through the Chamber, however such action can be taken only in conjunction with increased and effective private sector participation in the management and activities of the Chamber.

5. Entrepreneurial Associations Support. The evaluation team found no evidence of project activity in this area. When Somalia entrepreneurs were questioned about its relevance it was explained that such organizations could exist and would be useful, but would have no authority or real functions in the absence of association with the Chamber of Commerce. Thus, this activity would require resumption of project activities with the Chamber of Commerce.

6. Studies. The project was to finance microeconomic and socioeconomic policy studies in accordance with procedures established by the PIP Project Studies Committee. Procedures were agreed to in writing by April 1987. Reference to eleven studies either completed or in progress since 1986 was located in the project files. Also, a list of eleven studies was given to the evaluation team by the Director of Studies, Ministry of National Planning. However, the two lists do not include all the same titles. (The lists are included as an annex to this report.) It is likely that some reports identified in the USAID files were not supervised by the GSDR Director of Studies because they were associated with different project elements, and thus would not be included in the GSDR list. For example, some studies were conducted under the TIPCO contract and related directly to TIPCO's work.

The study-related project files in the USAID Mission were found to be incomplete. The evaluation team found little documentation in the project files explaining either USAID or GSDR reaction to the studies, and there was little apparent follow-up to the studies undertaken. In some cases Mission requests had been made six to nine months ago for revised drafts of studies, and no response had been received from the authors or editors. That the studies are a project element is appropriate, however the implementation of this element by project management has been lax, and the contribution of the element toward achievement of project objectives was minimal.

7. Study Tours and Conferences/Seminars. It was not possible to locate details of study tours in the project files. From project financial reports requested of the Controller's Office it was evident that such tours had taken place, but no additional information could be collected in the absence of requesting and reviewing the relevant financial documents. According to the project design, the project was to favor events which had been planned in such a manner which involved other developing countries whose experiences could be of significant benefit to Somalia. This directive was not followed in project implementation.

8. Logistical Support. This input is composed of two items, support provided by the USAID/Somalia Field Support Unit primarily to contractors under the project, and support to project implementation in the form of a local-hire project management assistant. The assistant was anticipated to be a Somali national with advanced university degree in business and/or economics. The Field Support Unit activities were not reviewed in detail by the evaluation team, but no negative comments were heard about it during the team's work. The project management assistant was never hired. One attempt to hire a candidate failed over the issue of salary. No other attempt was made.

Project management has been an issue since the beginning of PIP. The 1986 evaluation team commented on this issue, and the following two recommendations from that evaluation were accepted by the Mission: 1) one or two Somalis to monitor the day to day operations related to project implementation should be hired; and 2) the present workload of the Program Office and its staff needs to be reviewed and adjustments should be made to ensure that adequate time is

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available within the office for the management of the PIP project. Project management is now organized differently than at the time of the 1986 evaluation. The USAID project manager, however, still has insufficient time to properly manage the project. There continues to be a need for stronger project management within the USAID Mission, and the recommendation that a qualified Somali be hired for this purpose still stands. Alternatively, an existing staff member should be given more responsibility and time for this activity. In addition to this, it is suggested that improved project implementation could be achieved through the use of a contractor outside of the Mission to direct and coordinate activities "in the field."

9. Commodity Procurement. There has been, as expected in the PP supplement, a modest amount of imported commodities, including computers and accessories for the Directorate of Technical Services, Ministry of National Planning, which is the GSDR office responsible for project implementation.

C. Additional USAID Inputs

Much of the work of TIPCO since the project's redesign in 1986 was not included in the PP Supplement's project description. Instead, the Supplement includes the following statements: "In the original PIP Project Paper, direct assistance to the private sector was anticipated but confined primarily to management consultancies... Primary private sector focus for the PIP Project Supplement will be technical assistance to support the establishment/strengthening of private commercial banking in Somalia." (p.45) As explained above, the private commercial banking activity has not been implemented. Instead, private sector activities have focused on accountancy and management training, and management consultancies, all implemented by TIPCO. A listing of TIPCO reports and tasks completed, in progress, and on-going, is included as an annex to this report.

Although TIPCO's work is only indirectly related to the project's stated goal and purpose, it is certainly within the intent of the project, i.e. to initiate activities in support of private sector development. Discussions with Somali private sector individuals indicated that the training TIPCO is providing is important to the operations of their firms, and that such training is not readily available elsewhere in the country. A sample of firms which have benefited from TIPCO consultancies also reported favorably about the quality of the work performed. It is commendable that TIPCO has put together a work program and has reached the business community in the absence of clear direction from the PP Supplement. The aggregate number of participants in all TIPCO training workshops and seminars is approximately 250. Although exact statistics are not available, TIPCO reports that very few of these participants were women.

The evaluation team supports the TIPCO contract extension which was in process during their stay in Somalia, and supports the proposal that TIPCO have a resident technical assistant in Mogadishu to supervise operations. It is

recommended, however, that TIPCO make efforts to identify a suitable way to see that its training methodology, practices and expertise are continued past the project's completion. TIPCO should attempt to identify an existing organization, or recommend ways to develop an indigenous organization, through which it can conduct its training activities and thereby transfer its knowledge so that progress made can be sustained. In addition, an effort should be made to encourage greater participation by women in the training courses.

D. Nature of GSDR Inputs

Included at the end of the evaluation report text is Table 2, GSDR Planned Project Budget, 1985 - 1988. The evaluation team was unable to collect information on actual GSDR expenditures for these years. When a request was made to the Ministry of National Planning for details of actual expenditures, the team was given instead the planned budgets for the years requested. However, it is known that the GSDR has provided funding (through local currency generations) for studies, transportation, personnel, Chamber of Commerce activities, and one major capital item - an office building for the Directorate of Technical Services, Ministry of National Planning, which is the implementing agency for the project. It is evident that the project has received substantial GSDR support in terms of expenditures of local currency.

E. Outputs

1. Detailed examination of appropriate economic policies and reforms resulting from a more effective, concerted policy dialogue between the GSDR and USAID.

The environment in Somalia was not conducive for "effective, concerted policy dialogue between the GSDR and USAID". There has been dialogue on specific issues, and in some cases the PIP project has funded studies which support that dialogue, but little progress has been made toward achievement of the relevant project goal and purpose. It would be more productive in any redesign of this project to focus on activities which do not rely extensively on policy dialogue.

2. Judging by discussions with both the private sector and GSDR officials, there has been only limited dialogue between the GSDR and the Somali private sector on economic and regulatory policies. There was in 1987 a symposium on "Somalia's Industrial Performance Past, Present and Future", the organization of which was partially the responsibility of a PIP project-funded technical assistant, the Industrial Promotion Advisor. Logically the Somali Chamber of Commerce would be a forum for dialogue between the Government and private sector, but until the Chamber gains greater private sector participation it cannot perform this important function.

3. Establishment of private sector banking in Somalia.

This has been discussed above. There has been no effective development by the GSDR to promote the establishment of private sector banking. As a result, the PIP project has been unable to initiate activities in this area. Discussions with private sector individuals indicated that the establishment of private banking facilities would promote more efficient and productive business operations, but there is no indication that such facilities will soon be established.

4. Revised and improved GSDR budgetary and revenue collection systems.

The project has supported improvements to the GSDR budgetary system in the form of technical assistance (Finance Advisor) to the Domestic Development Department of the Ministry of Finance. No PIP project support has gone to improving revenue collection systems, however another USAID project, SOMTAD, is providing technical assistance in the areas of both budgeting and revenue collection.

The Finance Advisor position is basically that of a systems analyst responsible for the design and implementation of a financial system and management procedures which ensure the proper and effective use of counterpart funds in a manner consistent with GSDR regulations as well as USAID program/policy objectives. There is certainly scope for more work in the area of improved budgeting and revenue collection systems, but including this general activity under PIP would divert project resources from the primary aim of the project, to promote private sector development. Specific tasks relevant to budgeting, revenue collection and project objectives could be funded under the project, such as tax reform and studies of the impact on the budget of parastatal performance and privatization.

F. Issues Raised in Evaluation Scope of Work

The Mission requested that specific issues be addressed as part of the evaluation, and presented these issues in the evaluation scope of work which is included as an annex to this report. They are discussed in detail below.

1. Assessment of Project Design

The team was requested to "assess the project's design for its clear identification of the development problem(s)." The apparent development constraints at the time of project design are clearly identified in the project paper supplement. It appeared at that time that the GSDR intended to be more supportive of private sector development than it has been over the past two years. That conditions changed is not a fault of the supplement design team, but it does indicate that if private sector activities are to continue under the project then some redesign will be necessary.

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In the project design, the various pieces generally hang together, with the exception of the Government budgeting and revenue collection element which seems to be simply tacked onto an otherwise coherent design. It is not clearly explained how that particular element relates to policy initiatives and privatization. It would have been more evident had the element focused on specific policies such as tax reform or subsidies to parastatals. With regard to stated outputs and inputs, it has already been discussed above that while many of the inputs have been provided, there has been little progress toward achieving the stated outputs. Were those outputs being achieved, significant progress could be made toward purpose and goal achievement. As noted above, there have been two major problems which have led to project implementation difficulties. First, the environment for this kind of project in Somalia, in particular one which focuses on official government activities, is not conducive to successful implementation. Second, more intensive project management is required to coordinate project activities, and to create a situation in which the whole is greater than the sum of the individual parts.

Appropriate persons/organizations have been identified for appropriate project roles. However, the 1986 evaluation report's recommendation that a qualified Somali be hired to handle day-to-day project management continues to be valid. An alternative is that an existing mission staff member put more time into project management. In addition if a redesign is decided upon, consideration should be given to provision of a contractor based outside of the mission to monitor, coordinate and supervise project implementation.

2. Analysis of Project's General Implementation to Date

The reader is referred to the above sections on Inputs and Outputs for discussion of this topic. Here discussion focuses on matters not covered above.

One question raised relates to the allocation of unplanned resources to public versus private sector activities. Two major private sector activities which have not been implemented in part or in whole due to certain prerequisites not being met are the Somali Chamber of Commerce activity and the private sector banking activity. However, unplanned TIPCO work in the area of accountancy and management training has taken place. It is the opinion of the evaluation team that increased project resources should be allocated to more direct assistance to private sector development, while specific public sector activities, such as the technical assistance position in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, which appear to be making accomplishments albeit slowly should be continued. Such a shift in allocation of project resources would reflect the realities of the policy and private sector development environment in Somalia.

3. Analysis of Project's Implementation Achievements To Date

Again, the reader is referred to the above sections on Inputs and Outputs for discussion of this topic. Here is provided a summary of comments related specifically to this subject.

The project is not making great progress toward achievement of goal and purpose despite the fact that project inputs generally are being provided in accordance with the project design. The assumption of the project design that there would be an environment conducive to policy dialogue and private sector development has not been valid. As a result, project implementation has required a greater amount of initiative, coordination and adjustment than had been anticipated. This need for greater attention to project implementation was perceived in 1986 as well. Thus, while external factors (i.e. change or lack of change in environment) have played a major role in obstructing achievement of project objectives, inadequate attention to implementation issues by project management also has been a factor.

4. Recommended Changes to Current Project Design and/or Implementation

As noted above, the industrial promotion advisor position and the TIPCO accountancy/management training and business consultancies should be continued. There should be an effort by TIPCO to work with a Somali institution so that project achievements can be sustained past project completion. The study activities and study tours could continue, but only if great efforts are made to guarantee their relevance to project objectives and to guarantee that follow-up action will be taken. In addition, more complete project files should be maintained regarding the studies and the tours. Reaction to the studies and follow-up action, on the part of both USAID and GSDDR, should be tracked and documented. The Ministry of Finance position as it is currently defined has little relevance to the intent of the project, and should be given lower priority when a reallocation of project resources is considered.

In general greater emphasis should be placed on activities which directly involve the private sector. In addition, the various project activities should be implemented in a more coordinated manner. To achieve these two objectives, stronger and more intensive project management is required. Within USAID there should be a project manager who is able to spend up to half-time working on PIP, and who is knowledgeable about private sector development issues. Within the community outside of the Mission, there should be a contract project director who is a private sector development specialist capable of performing under difficult conditions, and whose primary function will be to work with the private sector and secondary function to work with the public sector on private sector development issues.

DB

G. Implementation of Previous Evaluation Recommendations

From the 1986 evaluation of PIP, the Mission accepted ten recommendations. Of these ten, seven have been implemented. The following three have not been implemented:

1. USAID/Somalia should prepare a privatization/economy liberalization policy and action scenario.
2. One or two Somalis to monitor the day to day operations related to project implementation should be hired.
3. The present workload of the Program Office and its staff needs to be reviewed and adjustments should be made to ensure that adequate time is available within the office for the management of the PIP project.

Numbers two and three above are discussed in this report in detail. With regard to number one above, the Mission through projects has funded studies which deal with privatization and economy liberalization, but has not developed "policy and action scenario". As one study pointed out, this perhaps has not been done because no one is quite sure what a "policy and action scenario" is. In any case, what is necessary is the preparation of Mission private sector development strategy which can guide the Mission in the implementation of its various activities involving the private sector, and in particular the implementation of PIP. There is a good amount of documentation already available which can be used in the preparation of this strategy. It is recommended that the private sector specialist member of the project redesign team prepare a draft strategy as part of his/her scope of work, and that this strategy then be used in preparing the project rationale.

IV. Lessons Learned

A lesson learned through the evaluation is that the management of a project in an uncertain environment and with a diverse set of activities requires substantial attention to implementation issues. In the absence of an individual or individuals with sufficient time and expertise to perform the management function, project activities are less likely to be well coordinated, and project objectives are less likely to be achieved.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Project Focus

If redesigned the project focus should be (1) direct assistance to the private sector, for example in the form of services, and (2) limited assistance to the Government to handle issues related to private sector development, for example the Industrial Promotion Advisor's position and funding of specific studies say on tax reform and parastatal reform. The Private Banking Advisor position could be retained in the design if there appears to be movement toward the establishment of a private banking institution in the near future.

B. Project Organization and Management

A core management team for the project should be established consisting of a USAID project manager, a contract project director, and one or two Somalis, all of whom are knowledgeable about private sector development. The project director should be a specialist in this area. Including Somalis in the management team should promote the sustainability of project achievements after project completion. One potential way to organize the project is to have a prime contractor, and include other activities under subcontracts. The prime contractor would be responsible at least for the expatriate project director position, and for the local hire positions. The contractor should be located away from the mission. However, support from the Mission Project Development and Services Office, in particular in terms of meeting AID documentation and procedural requirements, would allow the contractor the opportunity to conduct business in a more productive manner.

A logical location for the contractor would be the Chamber of Commerce. If the Chamber becomes more of a private sector institution, with viable private sector participation and management, the evaluation team would recommend this option. In this way, other activities could also be placed within the Chamber, such as management training and consultancy services.

It is understood that a newly assigned project officer to the Mission's PDS office has experience in private sector development. If this is the case, management of PIP within USAID should be transferred to the PDS Office.

C. Continuation of Industrial Promotion Advisor and TIPCO activities

The evaluation team believes that both the Industrial Promotion Advisor and the TIPCO activities should be considered as part of a redesigned project. However, a final decision on these matters would have to be made based on the overall proposed design and project objectives which the project redesign team formulates.

D. Coordination with Other Donors Efforts

Other donors also are sponsoring efforts in the area of private sector development. The Germans in particular are active in this area. There is German technical support being provided to the Ministry of National Planning and to the Chamber of Commerce, and there is a large German project providing vocational training. The PIP project has not taken full advantage of the opportunities afforded by these other related activities. One notable exception is the liaison which the Industrial Promotion Advisor, has established with the German-sponsored Economic Advisor in the Private Sector Promotion Unit of the Ministry of National Planning. Increased contact and familiarity with other work being done in the same area should avoid unnecessary duplication and promote more productive efforts overall.

E. Overseas Filed Trips/Study Tours

This project element could be used to much greater advantage if there is increased participation of representatives from selected Somali private sector entities, and if activities are planned in such a manner which involve other developing countries whose experiences could be of significant benefit to Somalia. Both private sector and other developing country involvement was planned for in the project paper supplement, but neither has been implemented effectively. In addition, contact by project personnel of participants who return from study tours should occur immediately upon their return, and follow-up action, such as collecting additional information for use by the participant or organizing appropriate short-term technical assistance relevant to the topic of the tour, should be initiated.

F. Use of IESC

The International Executive Service Corps (IESC) should be contacted and their services requested to provide training assistance to private enterprise in Somalia. Again this was planned for in the project paper supplement, but has not been implemented. When IESC participation is discussed with the relevant IESC representatives, the relatively difficult working conditions in Somalia should be thoroughly explained.

G. Studies

The studies element of the project should be organized in such a way as to ensure coordination between the studies and other project elements, and to ensure follow-up action once the studies have been completed, recommendations made, and reviews have taken place by USAID and GSDR. USAID mission files on studies planned, in progress and completed should be reviewed regularly, and proper documentation, including at least one copy of each study and review comments by all concerned, should be included in those files.

H. Suggested Team Members for Redesign

If it is decided to redesign the PIP project, the design team should include both a private sector specialist with significant developing country experience, and a training specialist who is familiar with both management and vocational training. Although the evaluation team did not have the opportunity to thoroughly assess the need for vocational training, the issue of such training was raised by some in the private sector. One possibility is that trainers are brought in to conduct training exercises on-site at factories, workshops, etc., so that individuals are trained in the environment where they work, and using the technology which is currently available.

TABLE 2

GSDR PLANNED PROJECT BUDGET, 1985 - 1986
('000 Somalia shillings)

<u>Category</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
Personnel	198	546	960	1,146
Transportation	1,202	12,764	10,130	5,418
Per diem	100	149	265	354
Office operation	500	540	648	8,478
Studies	1,857	6,600	25,537	17,500
Publication	--	2,000	1,200	2,378
Training/seminars	--	2,460	--	--
Consultancies	--	4,620	508	--
Office building	--	22,180	--	--
Office equipment	--	5,129	3,025	--
Chamber of Commerce	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>2,726</u>	<u>2,726</u>
Total	3,857	56,988	44,999	38,000

Source: Ministry of National Planning, Somalia

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ANNEX 1

EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

POLICY INITIATIVES AND PRIVATIZATION (649-0132) PROJECT

I. Background

The Policy Initiatives and Privatization (PIP) Project was originally designed and obligated in 1983 and amended in 1986. The original purpose of this project was "to provide consulting services and to undertake studies of major macroeconomic policies which should lead to policy reform aimed at increasing opportunities for economic growth and for an increased role for the private sector." This purpose was amended in 1986: "to improve the Somali economic climate by: (1) Supporting the development and implementation of improved economic policies, (2) Identifying and testing ways and means of promoting private sector participation in the economy, (3) Improving the Government's budgeting and revenue collection systems." Both the original and amended project involve a loosely connected series of activities, both short and long term, aimed at addressing these purposes.

At present, USAID/Mogadishu is in the process of redefining and redirecting its private sector efforts to more effectively address the needs of the Somali private sector. Toward this end, a Private Sector Assessment will be undertaken by AID in Somalia in February 1986. This will culminate in a new Mission private sector strategy. As part of this overall private sector effort, the Mission intends to evaluate the PIP project in order to assess the relative effects of its current private and public sector activities and to identify the potential role of PIP as a part of a new private sector strategy.

II. Statement of Work

In order to evaluate the PIP project, the Mission requires an objective evaluation team to gather and analyze relevant project information and recommend realistic near future courses of action for the project. The team's efforts will be directed at addressing, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

a. Assess the project's design, both as originally presented and as amended, for its clear identification of the development problem(s) to be addressed by the project and its logical presentation of the planned means to affect the problem(s). Specifically,

1. Is the development constraint clearly identified? In the team's opinion, was this a valid, priority constraint at the time of design/amendment? In the team's opinion, does this remain a valid, priority constraint?

2. Do all of the project pieces hang together in a clear, logical, and coherent manner? In other words, does the stated purpose lead logically to the stated goal? Are the stated outputs necessary and sufficient to achieve the purpose? Are the stated inputs necessary and sufficient to achieve the outputs?

3. Do appropriate persons/organizations appear to have been identified for appropriate project roles?

b. Analyse the project's general implementation to date based on the achievement of stated purpose-level objectives. This analysis should not discuss and evaluate specific project activities in isolation from one another but rather as they relate to the overall project's relative progress and impact. For example,

1. Has the project identified and implemented output activities as designed? Have the intended output- and purpose- level results been achieved?

2. How has the project managed public sector activities vis-a-vis private sector activities (i.e., has one received more unplanned attention than the other has one commanded more unplanned resources, etc.)? Has the public/private sector mix of activities been more or less according to project design? If not, why not? What have been the relative effects of public and private sector activities on the overall progress and success to date of the project?

3. Has the project involved appropriate actors/agencies in implementation in order to ensure achievement of objectives? Have all other planned resources (inputs) been forthcoming?

c. Analyse the project's implementation achievements to date based on a realistic assessment of the Somali context. That is,

1. Was the design realistic for Somalia's needs and circumstances? To the extent that implementation has not followed design, was this appropriate for Somalia's circumstances?

2. What is the team's overall assessment of the project's impact to date? Have investments been worthwhile for Somalia? Have they made a meaningful development contribution to Somalia?

3. To the extent that achievements are not those anticipated, have these been the result of design, implementation or external factors?

d. If/where appropriate, recommend possible changes in the current project design and/or implementation that would enhance the project's impact.

1. In the team's opinion, should the project continue to focus simultaneously on private and public sector matters? If so, what? If not, what recommendations for refocus does the team make?
2. In the team's opinion, are current project activities worthwhile in light of Somalia's priority development needs and USAID's resources? What should be retained and what not? Should anything be added? Does the project need to be rearticulated and/or reorganized in any way?

III. Team Qualifications and Responsibilities

USAID requires a two person team to undertake this evaluation. The team leader will be an AID Project Development Officer, preferably from REDSO/ESA in Nairobi, and the other team member will be a private sector specialist with experience in designing and implementation private sector activities in a developing country context where public policy often constrains development efforts. The team members will work cooperatively to gather and analyze the required information and present their findings to the Mission.

The team will be expected to review all relevant project and related documents, interview selected project participants (e.g., from USAID, contractors, the Ministry of National planning, the Somali Chamber of Commerce, the private sector, other participating ministries and government agencies), analyze the information collected and reach an internal team consensus on its findings and conclusions. The team will have four weeks to perform the evaluation, including the report write up and Mission debriefing. At least three days prior to scheduled departure from Somalia, the team will present a draft report of its findings to the Mission for review and will participate in a Mission debriefing in which the draft report will be discussed. Based on these discussions, the team will finalize its report, to be submitted to the PIP Project Manager prior to departure from Somalia.

The team will report to the PIP Project Manager who will assist in the identification of appropriate documents and project contacts and who will serve as a "resource person" to the team in fulfilling the statement of work. The team is solely responsible for the contents of its evaluation report.

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ANNEX 2

LIST OF PEOPLE CONTACTED

Government of Somali Democratic Republic

- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Hussein Elabe Fahie | - Director General, Ministry of National Planning and Juba Valley Development |
| Ali Hersi Osman | - Acting Director General, Ministry of Industry and Commerce |
| Abdullah Sheikh Mohamed | - Director of Technical Department, Ministry of National Planning |
| Hassan Sheikh Abdi | - Director, National Monitoring and Evaluation Facility Department, Ministry of National Planning |
| Abdullah Mohamed Yahya | - Director of Human Resources, Ministry of National Planning |
| Hawa M. Said | - Head of Studies, Technical Department, Ministry of National Planning |
| Omar Sheikh Abdul Rahman | - Technical Department, Ministry of National Planning |
| Abdi Ali | - Domestic Development Division, Ministry of Finance |
| Peter Magdlener | - Economic Advisor, Private Sector Promotion Unit, Ministry of National Planning |

Project-Related

- | | |
|----------------|---------------------------|
| Paul Williams | - President, TIPCO |
| Ahmed A. Dahir | - Country Director, TIPCO |

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- Ray Rumsey - Consultant, TIPCO
- Cleveland Thomas - ISTI Industrial Promotion
Advisor, Ministry of Industry and
Commerce

Private Sector

- Ali Sheikh Mohamed - Chairman, Somali Prefab Building
Materials
- Ali Mohamed Ibrahim - Consultant, I.C.S. Industries
- Hirei Gassem - Chief Executive, I.C.S. Industries
- Dahir Gassem - .C.S. Industries
- Ahmed Burale Farah - President, Buralhess Construction
and Trading Company
- Nur Abby Hussein - President, DOLCO International
Consultant
- Mohamed Ali Mohamoud - President, MAM & Bros. Co., Ltd.

Other

- Mohamed Ibrahim Egal - President, Somali Chamber of
Commerce
- Ali Farah Dahar - Permanent Secretary, Somali
Chamber of Commerce
- Berthold Johannes Lasch - Project Manager and Vocational
Advisor, Industrial Vocational
Training Center
- John Healy - SOMTAD Project Advisor, Ministry
of Finance and Treasury
- Garald E. Lovorn - SOMTAD Project Advisor,
Ministry of Finance and Treasury

U.S.A.I.D.

- Lois Richards - Director
- Dale Pfeiffer - Deputy Director
- Gladys Gilbert - Project Manager

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Gerry LaBombard	- Commodity Procurement Officer
Tom Lofgren	- Chief, Projects Office
Emily McPhie	- Program Officer
Winston McPhie	- Project Officer
Meredith Scovill	- Program Economist
Marion Warren	- Chief, Public and Private Sector Development Office

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ANNEX 3
USAID LIST OF
PIP PROJECT-FUNDED STUDIES

The following studies are those for which files can be located in USAID project files.

- | <u>File No.</u> | <u>Study Name and Comment</u> |
|-----------------|--|
| 368 | <u>Somali Leather Industry Study</u> , conducted by International Group for Finance and Consulting, December, 1988. |
| 371 | <u>The Policy/Regulatory Environment for Private Enterprise in Somalia</u> , conducted by SRI International, January, 1986.

No indication of GSDR approval of or comments on final draft. |
| 374 | <u>LIC Project on Resource Access and Tenure Research in the Shebelle and Juba Regions</u> , conducted by Land Tenure Center, January 1987-June 1988 (end date not clear - to be an 18 month study).

From quarterly reports, there appears to be strong GSDR interest in this study. |
| 378 | <u>Private Sector Firm Profiles</u> , conducted by Cook, Sutton, Gathinji and Co., September 1988.

No reference to GSDR review, comments or even receipt. 23 profiles. "Even though the subcontractors made every effort to obtain the required information, data was frequently not available or the owners were reluctant to disclose the true state of affairs. The subcontractor states that in no case did they feel that they had been given all the data required to calculate the true financial position of any business." Profiles used to provide TIPCO with information to select recipients of firm-specific technical assistance from 30 recommended firms. |
| 379 | <u>Women in the Economy</u> , conducted by Mrs. Sadia Musa Ahmed, Director of Somali Academy of Arts and Science (SOMAC), probably mid-1987 (no date given).

No indication that report was reviewed by AID, nor by GSDR. Attempt to document on quantitative and qualitative level the role of women in all facets of economy as result of liberalization and greater economic activity. |
| 379.A | <u>Attitudes and Behavior of Somali Businessmen and Businesswomen</u> , conducted by Thomas Labahn, May 1987. |

No file date - no USAID comments, no GSDR comments.

- 379.B Economic Relationship Between Pastoralists and Livestock Traders in Somalia, conducted by Reza Fazel, Department of Anthropology, University of Massachusetts, December 1986 - January 1987.

Draft only. No GSDR comments. 8/18/87 letter from USAID to Fazel giving comments resulting from USAID Mission Studies Committee review of report, and requesting some revisions to draft. At least as of January, 1988, no response.

- 379.C Regional Variation, Economic Specialization and Income Distribution in Somalia, conducted by Thomas Vietorisz, December 1986.

No GSDR comments. 9/21/87 letter from USAID on Mission Studies Committee review. "The Committee finds this study subjective and the presentation largely unrelated to the topic assigned." Requested significant revisions. As of January, 1988, no response.

- 379.D Fertility and Economic Development - Empty file.

- 378.E Polygamy, Savings and Economic Development - Empty file.

- 379.F Survey of Attitudes Towards Certain Occupations - No report, only cable traffic.

- 379.G The Socioeconomic Impact of Male Migration to Gulf States - Never finished. International African Institute could not get shillings fast enough, and canceled contract. Also, Ministry of National Planning asked for termination of contract so that their staff could do work. Then, no further communication in file.

- 379.I A Study of the Recurrent Costs of Development Projects in Somalia, conducted by Roger Poulin, March 1987.

No GSDR comment. Distributed within USAID March 1987 by Program Office, and no further file entry.

- 379.K Two reports are included in this file:

1) The Development of Small Scale Sugar Processing Plants, conducted by William Keenlside, March 1987. MONP was briefed. A follow up was scheduled for July, but no further entry.

2) Maritime Code Study, no report included, only correspondence organizing the study.

- 379.L Somalia Tax Study - just cable traffic, to take place January, 1988.

- 379.N National Tourism Master Plan, not done
- 379.U Study of the GSDR Regulation Affecting the Private Sector,
conducted by International Group for Finance and Consulting,
March 1986. Only report, no other file entries.

ANNEX 4

TIPCO REPORTS

The following reports were found in the "TIPCO Report" file for the PIP project. The list of activities which follows the report list is taken from a letter dated October 25, 1987, from TIPCO to USAID requesting a contract extension from 12/31/87 to 3/31/87.

REPORTS

1) TIPCO Accounting and Financial Management Seminar/Technical Assistance Engagement. (Conducted February-March, 1988.) Report date, March, 1988. Ray Rumsey.

Notes: 24 students began, 16 ended. Report lecture notes, etc., are all in Somali, so no way to evaluate them.

2) A Report on the Need for Private Sector Management Training and Technical Assistance in Mogadishu, Somali: Appraisal and Recommendations. (Conducted August 26 - September 24, 1986.) Report date, February, 1987. John Doggett and Jan-Hendrik Van Leeuwen.

Notes: Basis for TIPCO contract renewal proposal, approx. \$5 mil.

3) The Private Sector in Sector in Somalia: A Preliminary Analysis Using the Private Sector Development Framework. (Draft) Report date, December, 1987. Deborah Lindsay and John Doggett.

Notes: USAID criticized report for being too superficial and ignoring major aspects of Somali economy. Recommended major redrafting.

4) Microcomputer Training. Conducted for Ministry of National Planning, Technical Directorate. December 7, 1987. Robin Smith, consultant.

5) Interim Report: Somali Prefab-Marketing Plan. February 16, 1988.

FROM TIPCO LETTER DATED 10/25/87

TASK: T/A: Privatization and Program Development
CLIENT: Chamber of Commerce
START: 6/86
END: 8/86

TASK: Financial Profiles
CLIENT: TIPCO Clients, Mogadishu
START: 8/86
END: 9/86

TASK: Pre-Audit Assessment
CLIENT: Chamber of Commerce
START: 7/86
END: 8/86

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TASK: Training Needs Assessment
CLIENT: USAID/MONP
START: 9/86
END: 10/86

TASK: Study Tour
CLIENT: Chamber of Commerce
START: 9/86
END: 9/86

TASK: State of Affairs
CLIENT: Chamber of Commerce
START: 11/86
END: 1/87

TASK: Asset Valuation
CLIENT: Chamber of Commerce
START: 11/86
END: 12/86

TASK: Accounting Seminar
CLIENT: Client Group
START: 11/86 and 2/87
END: 12/86 and 3/87

TASK: Sugar Production Feasibility Study
CLIENT: MONP
START: 2/87 and 7/87
END: 3/87 and 9/87

TASK: Fruit/Vegetable Feasibility Study
CLIENT: MONP
START: 2/87 and 7/87
END: 3/87 and 9/87

TASK: Marketing Seminar
CLIENT: Client Group
START: 2/87
END: 2/87

TASK: Training in Accounting
CLIENT: Chamber of Commerce
START: 2/87
END: 2/87

TASK: T/A: Feasibility Study
CLIENT: INTRA: Plastic Manufacturer
START: 3/87
END: 4/87

TASK: Management Seminar
CLIENT: Client Group
START: 2/87
END: 2/87

TASK: Computer Training
CLIENT: Ministry of Finance
START: 2/87
END: 5/87

TASK: T/A: Accounting System
CLIENT: Guled Hotel
START: 5/87
END: 5/87

TASK: Study Tour
CLIENT: MONP Technical Director General (PIP counterpart)
START: 3/87
END: 4/87

TASK: T/A: Marketing Plan
CLIENT: LUNA African: Pepsi
START: 1/87
END: 2/87

TASK: T/A: Accounting System
CLIENT: Benadir: paint Manufacturing
START: 6/87
END: 6/87

TASK: T/A: Accounting System
CLIENT: MAM & Bros: Well Drilling Co.
START: 8/87
END: 9/87

TASK: T/A: Marketing and Expansion Plan
CLIENT: ICS: Soap Manufacturing
START: 4/87
END: 6/87

TASK: Feasibility Study
CLIENT: Edna Maternity Hospital
START: 4/87
END: 5/87

TASK: T/A: Administrative Business Plan
CLIENT: IFCA: Chemicals
START: 7/87
END: 8/87

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TASK: Business Conference
CLIENT: Kismayo
START: 6/87
END: 6/87

TASK: Financial Profiles
CLIENT: TIPCO clients
START: 8/87
END: 9/87

CURRENT ACTIVITIES TO BE COMPLETED BY DECEMBER 31, 1987

TASK: T/A: Marketing Plan
CLIENT: IGAR Ltd: Bottling Co.
START: 10/87
END: 11/87

TASK: T/A: Marketing Plan
CLIENT: MAM & Bros: well Drilling Co.
START: 10/87
END: 11/87

TASK: Fruits & Vegetable Facility Study
CLIENT: MONP
START: 7/87
END: 12/87

TASK: Seminar/fruits & vegetables
CLIENT: Client group
START: 10/87
END: 10/87

TASK: Seminar/training accounting
CLIENT: Client group
START: 11/87
END: 12/87

TASK: Seminar/training management
CLIENT: Client group
START: 11/87
END: 12/87

TASK Seminar/training business planning
CLIENT: Client group
START: 11/87
END: 12/87

TASK: Plant/equipment maintenance seminar/training
CLIENT: Client group
START: 11/87
END: 12/87

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CURRENT ACTIVITIES TO BE COMPLETED BY MARCH 1, 1988

TASK: T/A: Marketing Plan
CLIENT: Somali Prefab: building construction
START: 12/87
END: 1/86

TASK: T/A: Marketing Plan
CLIENT: LUNA Africa: Pepsi bottlers
START: 12/87
END: 1/88

TASK: T/A: Impediment to private sector report
CLIENT: USAID
START: 10/87
END: 1/86

TASK: Client: Profiles
CLIENT: New TIPCO clients, Mogadishu
START: 11/87
END: 1/88

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