

PD-AA 2-102
60599

FINAL EVALUATION: RURAL PLANNING II

June 5, 1987

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Prepared for the Mission to Kenya of the United States Agency for International Development, and for the Rural Planning Department in the Ministry of Planning and National Development of the Government of Kenya.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Rural Planning II, or "RPII," was the third stage of a twenty year effort by the Government of Kenya (GOK) to establish a decentralized administrative system for planning rural development policy at the district level. RPII lasted from June 1981 through February 1986, and was the successor project to RPI. Both projects were supported by USAID, and both were implemented by the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) which was selected as the contractor to provide technical assistance to the Rural Planning Division (RPD) of the Ministry of Planning and National Development (MPND).

This evaluation is primarily concerned with the outcomes of RPII, but because of the long-term effort within which the project functioned, and because RPII was a continuation of RPI, the evaluation examines the activities and impact of RPII in the context of the broader effort. The effort to establish a decentralized administrative system for planning rural development policy at the district level involved the design and establishment of new administrative procedures and institutions. It was an effort of extended experimentation which began slowly and without visible accomplishments in its early years, but which by the end of RPII achieved, virtually all of its principal objectives.

During RPII, substantial progress was made at refining and institutionalizing the new administrative system for district planning and budgeting. HIID fulfilled the original terms of reference of its contract, and went beyond these terms to provide critical support for two major policy initiatives by the Kenya government: (1) The District Focus for Rural Development which was announced by President Daniel Arap Moi in late 1982, and which has been the governmental umbrella for all rural development policy since 1983; and (2) Budget Rationalization which the GOK began in 1984 to control government expenditures and raise administrative efficiency. The intermingling of the specific objectives of RPII with those of District Focus and Budget Rationalization created a situation in which HIID was expected to expand and adjust the scope of

work contained in the original contract. The contractor responded to these expectations, and by so doing greatly increased the overall impact of the project.

The contractor has thus succeeded in carrying out the scope of work in the original project agreement by accomplishing the following:

1. It has established a viable administrative system for decentralized planning and budgeting at the district level that will continue to operate after the departure of the contractor. Primary indicators of the establishment of this system are (a) the timely production of 40 district plans for the Fifth Development Plan Period of 1984-88; (b) the regular production since 1984/85 of the Annual Annex to the district plan which contains the Annual Work Plan and Forward Budget; (c) better understanding and performance in respect to the planning and budgetary process by the District Development Committees and the District Executive Committees; (d) the progressive development and operation of a hierarchy of development committees below the district level down to the grassroots.
2. Improvement in project implementation at the district level including projects specified in the 1979-83 and 1984-88 district plans. Indicators of improved project implementation are (a) better project selection and prioritization by the District Development Committees; (b) better project planning and project supervision as a result of increased coordination between implementing departments and between the departments and the District Development Committee via the District Executive Committee; (c) a sharp rise in the completion rate for RDF projects from under 40 to 75 percent, in conjunction with other donor agencies (i.e., DANIDA, NORAD, SIDA, and the Netherlands) and GOK.
3. Provision of training to district level administrative personnel to support the decentralized system of planning and budgeting, and provision of post-graduate training to young officers in the Rural Planning Department of the Ministry of National Planning and Development. Indicators are (a) the development of teaching materials for the Kenya Institute of Administration and other government institutions charged with training district level officers in the mechanics of district planning and budgeting, and in the overall objectives of the District Focus initiative; (b) the periodic holding of workshops for District Development Officers, and other district based personnel; the support and arrangement for 22 person years of post-graduate training at Cornell University, Vanderbilt and MIT.

In respect to the implementation of District Focus and Budget Rationalization, the contractor developed important working relationships between the Rural Planning Division (RPD) and the Office of the President, and between the RPD and several central government ministries. The contractor also introduced micro-computer technology

into the planning and budgeting process. The contractor conducted important research and development work on problems of related interest including urban-rural planning, and the institution of administrative procedures for supporting private sector initiatives at rural development. And the contractor successfully planned for the successor project to RPII, RMRD--Resource Management for Rural Development which began in February 1986. Taken together, there can be little doubt that the accomplishments of RPII have improved the "enabling environment" provided by the Kenyan government to promote economic development at the local level. Details of these accomplishments, their limitations, and recommendations for their refinement, constitute the corpus of this report.

In conducting this evaluation the evaluators have been particularly sensitive to three factors: First, the basic fact that RPII was part of a long-term effort and cannot be evaluated apart from that effort, and what it entailed both before and after the project period. Second, that RPII, its immediate predecessor, and its successor are technical assistance projects whose primary purpose is institution building, and that as such, they are qualitatively different and provide different lessons than more conventional forms of foreign development assistance. Third, that because the primary objective of RPII was to strengthen development planning, budgeting, and project implementation at the district level and below, the most significant impact of the project (or lack of it) would be in rural areas and not in Nairobi.

These three considerations have guided both the method of our evaluation and the structure of this report. We therefore begin with an historical review of the twenty year effort to establish a decentralized administrative system for planning and budgeting at the district level, and then proceed to a structural analysis of the institutions involved in these processes. This is followed by discussions of training, and the introduction of micro-computers. A discussion of the unique requirements and significance of technical assistance projects concerned with institution building follows. The report concludes with a detailed summary of the accomplishments of RPII, and a discussion of recommendations and suggestions for further refinements.

The field work for this evaluation was conducted by Professor Joel D. Barkan of the University of Iowa, and Dr. Michael Chege of the University of Nairobi between February 15th and 27th. A complete list of people interviewed for this evaluation is found in Annex A. A list of documents consulted by the evaluators is found in Annex B. Annex C presents the text of the scope of work and terms of reference for this evaluation.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. An Historical Overview of District Planning in Kenya, 1967-1987

Rural Planning II, or "RPII" as it is more commonly known, is the third in a series of four technical assistance projects funded by USAID to support a twenty year effort by the Government of Kenya to create and institutionalize an administrative system for decentralized development planning and policy implementation. The time period of RPII (1981-86) also corresponds to the the third stage of the Kenyan experience with decentralized planning. This experience, which is summarized chronologically in Table 1, is one in which technical assistance provided by USAID has played an important and critical role. Other donors, most notably the EEC, DANIDA, NORAD, SIDA and the Netherlands have also been involved in the process of decentralized development, albeit mainly at the project level.

Given the long-term nature of Kenya's effort to decentralize the process of development planning, an overview of the history of this effort is both appropriate and necessary before assessing the impact of RPII. To appreciate the impact of RPII, one must first appreciate the status quo ante of the administrative system it was intended to improve. It is also important to appreciate the changing institutional and historical context within which RPII and its predecessors have functioned as this context has greatly shaped the activities of these programs.

Stage 1: 1967-1974

Kenya's experience with decentralized planning began in 1967 following the Government of Kenya's acceptance of a report of a conference held at Kericho the previous year which called for the establishment of a decentralized yet integrated process of rural development planning and policy implementation. Known as SRDP

Table 1: Summary of Kenya's History of Decentralized Planning

<u>Stage</u>	<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Major Developments</u>	<u>USAID Programs</u>
1	1967-1975	SRDP in six divisions; establishment of DDCs; posting of DDOs; establishment of RDF; preparation of first district development plans (1974-78)	SRDP in Vihiga
2	1976-1981	Preparation of 1979-83 district development plans; analysis of planning system; expansion of Rural Planning Division; training of DDOs; AIEs transferred to districts; establishment of Development Coordinating Committee in Office of the President	RPI
3	1981-1986	Proclamation of District Focus and Rural Development Strategy (1982); Budget Rationalization (1983-4); preparation of 1984-88 plans; preparation of annual budget annexes to plans; expanded training of DDOs and other district staff; increasing importance of DDCs and DvDCs; increase in completion rate of RDF projects; introduction of microcomputers to GOK	RPII
4	1986 on	Institutionalization and further improvements in district planning process with preparations for 1989-93 plans; posting of ADDOs to districts; establishment of District Planning Units; expanded training; administrative and financial systems development, expanded utilization of microcomputers by GOK, rural-urban policy analysis.	RMRD

(for Special Rural Development Program), this first attempt at decentralization was pursued on a highly experimental basis between 1967 and 1974¹ through a series of pilot projects in six administrative divisions which were financed by six different foreign donors including USAID. SRDP is generally regarded as a failure for at least four related reasons: (1) A lack of common objectives and coordination among the donors. (2) A lack of commitment to decentralization by senior administrators in key ministries of the Kenyan government. (3) A lack of appropriate administrative procedures and structures to effectively involve and incorporate district level administrators into the planning process of the central government. (4) A lack of coordination between the district administration and the rural people.² SRDP also became something of a political football. Because it was termed "special" and limited to only six divisions, prominent members of the Kenya National Assembly whose constituencies were not included in SRDP, opposed the program from its inception.

Despite these problems, SRDP led in 1971 to a series of statements in the report of the Ndegwa Commission³ on the structure of the public service, that planning for rural development should be carried out at the district level. This recommendation was followed in 1972 by the reestablishment of District Development Committees (DDCs) in all 40 of Kenya's districts for the purpose of planning and coordinating development activities within this important unit of the country's rural administration.⁴ SRDP also led to the establishment in 1974 of the Rural Development Fund (RDF)--the first significant attempt to provide block grants to district authorities for the purpose of funding small

¹SRDP was not renewed for a second phase, but some activities of the program were not terminated until 1977.

²Uma Lele, Design of Rural Development; Lessons from Africa (World Bank, 1975), pp. 140-43

³Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1970-71, chaired by D.N. Ndegwa, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971), paragraphs 294-99, pp. 11-13

⁴The establishment of the DDCs was first proposed in the 1966-70 Development Plan, but the original committees were moribund entities which rarely met.

scale development projects identified by the local people and their representatives. Still another legacy of SRDP, was the creation and partial staffing by 1974 of the position of the District Development Officer (DDO), a position established to oversee the planning process by coordinating the activities of the DDC with the activities of the field agents from central government ministries who comprise the district administrative team. All three of these advances, however, were undermined by most of the same problems that had constrained SRDP, and most significantly, by the absence of any precise definition of the authority and resources available to the DDOs vis a vis their fellow officers at the district level including the District Commissioner (DC).

Prior to 1979, rural administration in Kenya was highly centralized with the locus of decision-making authority on matters of rural planning resting with the Provincial Commissioners and their staffs (particularly the Provincial Planning Officer), and not at the district level. At the same time, officers of central government ministries posted to the districts, defined their roles in terms of being effective field agents for their respective ministries. Only rarely did such officers also view their roles in terms of providing "feedback" from the districts into the policy making process of their ministries, or, in terms of mediating between ministerial policy and local interests. Nor, given their perspective, did many district based officers view their duties in terms of being a member of an interdepartmental district administrative team.

In this institutional context, the extent to which DDOs could play a significant coordinative role over the district planning process was extremely limited. In this context, the DDCs were also moribund bodies. Lacking strong guidance by the DDO or sustained technical support from the district agents of the central government ministries, and having little authority (apart from the RDF) over the district budget, the DDCs met infrequently. As a consequence, the main products of the DDCs through the early-1980s were an unending series of "wish lists" for development projects which only the ministries could implement (but which rarely attracted the interest of senior ministerial officials), and the overcommitment of the Rural Development Fund to more projects than the fund could sustain. Meaningful decentralized district

planning, which we define as the systematic prioritization of the development needs of the district and the authority to budget for these needs by officials based at the district level, did not exist.

Stage 2: 1975-1981

The second stage of Kenya's effort to establish effective institutions for decentralized rural planning occurred between 1976 and 1981, and was known as RPI. Conceived in late 1975 by senior civil servants and technical assistance advisors in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and supported by USAID, the purpose of RPI was to overcome the institutional obstacles to that had plagued decentralized district level planning since SRDP. One measure of the seriousness of these problems was the poor quality of the plans produced by the first countrywide attempt at district planning which took place in 1975 and 1976. Although the district had been established as the basic unit of rural planning for the Third National Development Plan of 1974-78, the production of district plans for this period did not take place until more than a year after the national plan was published. These "district plans," moreover, were not written in the districts by members of the district administrative teams working with the DDCs, but at the provincial level by Provincial Planning Officers, and at the Ministry of Finance and Planning in Nairobi.⁵ Input from the districts into the national planning process was thus limited and post hoc with the result that the district plans themselves were but appendages to the national plan written in Nairobi.

Given this situation, the broad objective of RPI was clear--to design and implement a district planning system that would overcome the problems to date. To this end, the Government of Kenya negotiated a grant agreement with USAID in August 1976 specifying the terms of RPI. The Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) was subsequently contracted by GOK to carry out the terms of RPI over a five year period concluding in June 1981 at a cost of \$1.26 million. The terms of this contract are contained in an agreement between GOK and

⁵This description is taken from John M. Cohen and Richard M. Hook, "District Development Planning in Kenya," Kenya Rural Planning Project, Ministry of Planning and National Development, April, 1986

HIID which was signed in April, 1977.⁶ Both the grant agreement between AID and GOK, and the contract agreement between HIID and GOK stated that HIID should perform the following five tasks: (1) Implement a system for decentralized planning including an increased degree of local participation in the planning process. (2) Assess the informational needs for an effective local planning system and institute organizational systems and procedures for the timely collection and effective use of the required information. (3) Administer and implement those rural development programs which are the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and Planning including the Rural Works Program and District Development Grants (the Rural Development Fund). (4) Develop and implement the use of guidelines for identification and analysis of prospective projects and the evaluation of ongoing and completed projects, in order to strengthen the process of decentralized rural planning. (5) Analyze and make recommendations on training needs and appropriate programs for officers engaged in decentralized planning and development.

RPI was directed by Richard M. Hook, the senior advisor assigned by HIID to the project, and to the Rural Planning Division⁷ in the Ministry of Finance and Planning⁸ from late 1975 through 1982. Hook was

⁶See Rural Planning Project Agreement Between The Republic of Kenya and the President and Fellows of Harvard College, April 1, 1977

⁷Kenya's efforts to establish a system of decentralized district planning are directed by the Rural Planning Department (RPD) of the Ministry of Planning and National Development (MPND). Over the years the Rural Planning Department has grown and evolved from the Rural Planning Unit in the early 1970s to the Rural Planning Section in 1978, the Rural Planning Division in 1979, and to its present status as a department in 1985. For purposes of consistency, the RPD will be referred to in this evaluation as the Rural Planning Division, because this was the status of this administrative unit beginning midway through RPI and throughout most of RPII.

⁸The Ministry of Planning and National Development is the latest in a series of ministerial configurations responsible for economic planning in Kenya. Since the beginning of RPI in 1976, the ministerial "home" for the rural planning project has been the Ministry of Finance and Planning from 1976 to 1978; the Ministry of Economic Planning and Community Affairs from 1978 to 1980; the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development from 1980 to 1983; the Ministry of Finance and Planning from 1983 to 1985; and the Ministry of Planning and National Development since 1985.

subsequently joined by two additional advisors provided by HIID. Together they formed the HIID team for RPI. During the early years of RPI, the team devoted most of its efforts to three tasks: (1) Identifying the organizational bottlenecks present in the existing planning system, (2) designing potential solutions to these bottlenecks, and (3) to laying the groundwork within and outside the Ministry of Finance and Planning for their eventual implementation. The most tangible product of RPI was the production of 40 district development plans that complemented Kenya's Fourth Development Plan (1979-83). The quality of these plans was superior to the quality of the district plans for the Third Plan (1974-78), but more than three years were required to complete the exercise which again meant that the district plans were but addenda (rather than input) to the national plan. Repeated delays by central government ministries to provide district officials with disaggregated data about planned and actual expenditures by the ministries at the district level, also limited the extent to which the district planning exercise affected the shape of ministerial programs in the districts. As a result, the district plans were mainly collations of projects identified and funded by the central ministries together with locally identified RDF and "harambee" self-help initiatives. The planning exercise carried out under RPI thus fell well short of its original goals in that it failed to create and institutionalize an administrative process by which local initiative would be incorporated into development policy at the district level. The planning exercise was regarded with skepticism at both the district and national levels as merely a "pen and paper" exercise which would have no serious impact on district development budgets.

In retrospect, the intangible gains of RPI were probably more significant than the tangible products, because they formed the basis for significant improvements in the district planning process which were achieved in the 1980s. These included, (1) the growth (i.e. expanded staffing, enhanced responsibilities and authority) of the Rural Planning Division from its embryonic form in 1976 to a well-established unit within the Ministry of Finance and Planning; (2) the expansion, training and improved performance of the cadre of DDOs, the officers responsible for leading the planning process at the district level; (3) increased

understanding and monitoring of the Rural Development Fund; and (4) the formulation and design of a series of administrative procedures which would ultimately enhance the rural planning process. Included among these was the transfer in April 1979 of the Authority to Incur Expenditures (known as AIEs) for RDF projects from the Provincial Planning Officer to the DC or DDO. The transfer was the first significant step towards providing district level authorities with a mechanism to affect the budgetary process. (5) RPI also yielded a series of written analyses and position papers which described in detail the structural and procedural bottlenecks in the rural planning system, and proposed an array of solutions and ideas for overcoming them. These position papers were written principally for the internal use of the Rural Planning Division and the Ministry of Finance and Planning. They constitute an important institutional record of the efforts, successes and errors of the RPD during this period, and set forth the parameters within which future efforts were pursued by the HIID team and the RPD during RPII. Finally, (6) it is important to note that the Development Coordinating Committee (DCC) in the Office of the President (OP) was established in 1979 under the chairmanship of the newly appointed Permanent Secretary for development in OP, S.M. Nyachae. The establishment of the DCC within OP was the first in a series of major initiatives by President Daniel arap Moi which steadily increased government support for decentralized planning and budgeting at the district level.

As senior advisor to the Rural Planning Division during RPI, Dick Hook worked closely with Harris Mule, the then Deputy Permanent Secretary of Planning in the Ministry of Finance and Planning,⁹ to

⁹Mule was to take a keen interest in the development of the RPD for more than a decade during which time he held a series of senior posts in the home ministry of the RPD. Mule was Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and Planning from 1976 to 1978; the Permanent Secretary in Economic Planning and Community Affairs from 1978 to 1980; the Permanent Secretary for Finance from 1980 to 1983; the Permanent Secretary for Finance and Planning from 1983 to 1985; and the Permanent Secretary for Planning and National Development from 1985 until his retirement in December, 1986. During this period the RPD also benefited from a continuity of its senior administrative staff, and a continuity of the HIID team. The Director of the RPD from 1976 until the present has been John. H.O. Kidenda. His immediate superior, the

establish the Rural Planning Division as the coordinating agency for future reforms. RPI, in short, was largely an effort of learning and critical preliminary work, the fruits of which, were not to be reaped until the mid-1980s after the end of the project period. Initial progress in terms of improving the district planning process was slow, and underscores the nature of both the difficulties and opportunities inherent in technical assistance projects intended to bring about significant institutional changes in an extant bureaucratic system.¹⁰ Keeping these considerations in mind, the progress made by RPI was limited but essential for subsequent advances achieved during RPII.

Stage 3: 1981-1986

Conceived as the continuation of RPI, RPII was the third stage of Kenya's twenty year effort to create and implement an administrative system for decentralized planning and budgeting. The project paper was written largely by the members of the HIID advisory team and their Kenyan counterparts in the Rural Planning Division during the latter stages of RPI, and HIID was again selected as the contractor for the new project which cost \$4.2 million. The initial contract period for RPII was for two years from June 1981 to June 1983. The contract period was subsequently extended through June 1985, and again through February 1986.¹¹ As the continuation of RPI, RPII was addressed to the same basic goals of its predecessor. Nine specific objectives were pursued by the contractor to achieve these goals:¹² (1) Implement a system for

Director of Planning, is Professor T.C.I. Ryan who has held his position since 1983. Three HIID staff members have served as senior advisors to the ministry since the beginning of the rural planning project: Richard M. Hook (1976-82), David B. Lewis (1982-85), and John M. Cohen (1985 to present). All of the above listed individuals were interviewed for this evaluation.

¹⁰The significance of this point is discussed extensively in Section VI of this report.

¹¹The contract for RPII was in fact a series of amendments to the original contract for RPI. See The Rural Planning Project Agreement Between The Republic of Kenya and the President and Fellows of Harvard College, April 1, 1977; Amendment One, 29 June 1981; Amendment Two, 12 August 1983; and Amendment Three, 6 June 1985.

¹²This statement of objectives is taken verbatim from the from Harvard Institute for International Development, Final Report: Rural

decentralized planning with the district as the operational unit, including an increased degree of local participation in the planning process; (2) assess the informational needs for effective District level planning, monitoring and evaluation as well as to institute systems for the timely collection and effective use of the required information; (3) institute required changes in budgetary and financial information flows; (4) assist in the design and implementation of district level monitoring procedures; (5) develop and implement systems for the long term increase in resource allocation authority at the district level; (6) review, evaluate and coordinate decentralized plans, including plans for arid and semi-arid regions, to assure their consistency with national planning goals and locally defined objectives; (7) administer and implement those rural development programs which are the responsibility of the Rural Development Fund; (8) develop and implement guidelines for the quantification and analysis of proposed projects and the evaluation of ongoing and completed projects, in order to strengthen the process of decentralized rural planning; and (9) develop training programs for officers engaged in decentralized planning and development. A detailed analysis of the extent to which the contractor met these objectives is presented below, and constitutes the core of this evaluation. Before proceeding to this discussion, we shall conclude our historical review of the evolution of district planning in Kenya by highlighting the major features of RPII as well as the changing systemic context within which the project was carried out.

Planning Project II (Nairobi: September, 1986), pp. 8-9. The same nine objectives plus a statement that the contractor should "[f]ormulate District Planning strategies for the 1983/87 (sic.) planning period, and participate in the relevant aspects of the national planning exercise" are listed in the Scope of Work of the contract agreement between the Kenya government and HIID. See Ammendment One to the Rural Planning Project Agreement Between the Republic of Kenya and the President and Fellows of Harvard College, 29 June 1981, Appendix A. The nine objectives are an elaboration of three which were specified in the original project paper and in the contract between USAID and GOK: (a) The implementation and monitoring of the activities identified in the district plans prepared during RPI; (b) expanded training for officers of the Rural Planning Division and district field officers responsible for district planning; and (c) decentralization of decision-making by bridging the gap between district level planning on the one hand and district level fiscal responsibility on the other.

Three major accomplishments mark RPII: (1) The progressive institutionalization of the process of district planning for rural development including the linking of the planning process to the budgetary process. (2) The establishment and growth of an administrative infrastructure in the districts to sustain the planning process. (3) A marked increase in the implementation rate of projects supported by the Rural Development Fund, and an overall improvement in the quality of projects and the quality of project supervision at the district level.

As with RPI, the most tangible "product" of RPII was the preparation of 40 district development plans for Kenya's Fifth Development Plan for 1984-88. Preparation of these plans was the third such exercise and exhibited significant improvements over the first two efforts. In marked contrast to the earlier efforts, the plans were completed on time and presented to President Moi in December, 1983. Preparation time was shortened by more than a year over the previous exercise as a result of three factors which are elaborated in the sections below: First, the exercise of district planning was no longer new, and was becoming an increasingly familiar and iterative process. Second, and perhaps most important, the exercise received increased and vital support from the Office of the President as it became apparent that district planning could serve as a mechanism to implement President Moi's new initiative on District Focus for Rural Development. The District Focus strategy was first proclaimed by the President in September 1982 as the basis of all rural development initiatives effective July 1, 1983. Although preparation of the 1984-88 district plans had started before the President announced the District Focus initiative, completion of the plans in 1983 coincided with repeated statements by the President on the importance of the new policy. Third, the use of microcomputers to prepare the final camera ready drafts of the plans greatly expedited their production, and in the process introduced the use of this new technology to the Ministry of Planning and National Development and other ministries of the Kenyan government. While the initial use of microcomputers was limited to word processing for the purpose of expediting the publication of the plans, the introduction of these machines has now led to their use for an

increasing array of tasks, including the preparation of the annual draft estimates for the annual budget, personnel records, inventory control, etc.

The institutionalization of the district planning exercise was also significantly enhanced by the linking of the planning process to the budgetary process. As noted above, the preparation of the district plans prior to linkage was viewed by many officials as a "pen and paper" exercise because the plans had limited impact on the budgetary process. After linkage, these attitudes began to change. Once again the impetus for change came from outside the Rural Planning Division in the form of a new policy initiative by the Kenyan government, and once again the HIID advisory team and RPD capitalized on this situation to obtain increased support for their ongoing efforts. The initiative this time was the policy of Budget Rationalization launched by the Ministry of Finance in late 1983 and early 1984 as part of an agreement for structural adjustment worked out between the Kenya government, the IMF and Kenya's principle creditors. The basic objective of Budget Rationalization was to reduce government expenditures, particularly recurrent expenditures, by forcing government ministries and agencies to prioritize all activities according to a common set of criteria which emphasized efficiency of operation and completion of ongoing projects before starting new ones. Prioritization was also to be consistent with priorities set forth in the five year development plan.¹³ This in turn meant that an annual review and updating of the plan was necessary to provide an appropriate set of guidelines for the budgetary process. In the case of the district plans, this review took the form of an annual annex which set forth district priorities for the following three years. "The Annex" as it is now called, consists of an Annual Work Plan for the following year and a Forward Budget. The Annex was the mechanism to implement the Budget Rationalization policy in respect to district expenditures. The administrative procedures for the preparation of the annexes were designed by the HIID team as part of RPII, and the annexes were prepared for the first time in 1984 for the 1984/85 financial

¹³These criteria are defined in their most precise and comprehensive form in Treasury Circular No. 3 for 1986 issued by the Ministry of Finance on February 18, 1986.

year.¹⁴ In the process, linkage between the planning process and the budgetary process was achieved. With the advent of the Annual Annex and Forward Budget, district planning became a matter of "serious business." District level control over the budgetary process was also increased by a change in the procedure for issuing the AIEs. Whereas before 1983, all AIEs except those for the RDF were issued by central government ministries to provincial heads of department, after 1983 the AIEs were issued directly to the district department heads. The significance as well as the problems associated with these changes in the budgetary process are discussed in Section III.

The second major development during the course of RPII was the establishment of an administrative infrastructure to support the district planning and budgetary process and District Focus. The advent of district planning and budgeting required an expansion of the district administration which in turn required the recruitment, training, and posting of additional personnel to forty district headquarters across Kenya. Although the existence of the DDC and DDO date back to 1974, the activities and importance of each has expanded greatly during RPII to the point that both require assistance to carry out their mandates. To support the deliberations of the DDC, the District Executive Committee (DEC) consisting of all department heads of ministries operating in a district, was established in 1983. During RPII, plans were finalized to provide further technical support and information to the DDC through the establishment of a District Planning Unit (DPU). RPII also saw the progressive downward expansion of a hierarchy of local development committees below the DDC which were established at the division, location, and in some cases, sub-location levels to facilitate public input into the planning process. A discussion of the operation and need for these new administrative structures appears in Section II below.

The third achievement of RPII was a marked improvement in the implementation rate of projects supported by the RDF, and an overall

¹⁴Although separate annexes to the district plans were not prepared until 1984, an initial attempt to link the planning process to the budgeting process was included in the 1984-88 plans in the form of a listing of the costs of the 1983/84 development program and the presentation of a two year "rolling" program. For details, see Annexes 1 and 2 to the 1984/88 district plans.

improvement in the quality of projects and the quality of project supervision at the district level. Prior to RPII, the completion rate for RDF funded projects was below 40 percent. At the end of the project, it had risen to 70 percent overall, and in some districts as high as 85 percent.¹⁵ The need to prioritize projects to be consistent with the Budget Rationalization guidelines also meant that projects selected for funding were more thoroughly scrutinized for their viability by the DDC and district officials than before prioritization. For the same reason, the quality of project planning and the amount of technical assistance provided to projects by district agents of central government ministries, also rose.

As a result of these improvements which occurred during RPII, the process of rural planning in Kenya began to reach maturity in the sense that the process had become a more meaningful part of the district administrative system and could stand on its own feet. Slowly, but surely, the planning and budgetary process at the district level came to be viewed by both district officials and members of the public as a meaningful exercise whereas before it had not. By becoming so valued, the process became routinized.

Has the process also become institutionalized? Can the RPD and the district personnel concerned with the planning process carry out the next planning exercise if the contractor left tomorrow? We asked these questions repeatedly during the course of our investigations. The answer was invariably "yes:" "The planning process might not work as smoothly. The quality of the plans might slip a bit, but we are now at the point that we can carry on the process by ourselves." By this measure alone, RPII has fulfilled its mission. Many improvements still need to be made to the planning system, but the system is in place, and it works.

¹⁵The completion rate has risen steadily since the early 1980s. A joint evaluation by the Scandinavian donors reported a 65 percent overall completion rate as of the end of 1984 with the rates by province ranging from a low of 49 percent to a high of 79 percent. Data from Rift Valley Province reported a 77 percent completion rate at the end of 1986, up 10 points from the end of 1984. Hence, our estimate of a national completion rate of 75 percent.

Stage 4: 1986 to present:

Following the completion of RPII in February 1986, the HIID advisory team and RPD commenced work on a follow-up project to RPII known as Resource Management for Rural Development or RMRD which is scheduled to run through 1989. Although a primary objective of RMRD is intended to consolidate, refine and extend the achievements of RPII, RMRD is more than a continuation of the initiatives begun under RPII. As such is regarded as a "new" project by both the Kenyan government and USAID. In addition to continuing the development of the district planning systems begun under RPII, RMRD seeks to (1) enhance the capacity for regional policy analysis within the RPD; (2) extend the utilization of microcomputers for the purpose of data analysis throughout the Kenya government; (3) develop a national training strategy to support District Focus, internal training within the Ministry of Planning and National Development and specialized training in-country and abroad. Two new and related concerns not dealt with by RPII will receive special treatment by RMRD: (1) The nature and policy significance of urban-rural linkages, and (2) the mobilization of local resources for the employment generation, and the stimulation of private sector initiatives. RMRD is thus intended to build on the gains of RPII by extending the focus of the RPD beyond the operations of the district administrative team and its programs to a broader set of problems that involve the private sector and the structure of linkages that tie Kenya's rural communities to the country's regional and national urban centers.

2. Terms of reference for this evaluation

As described above, RPII was carried out within a historical and institutional context that both precedes and continues beyond its official starting and ending dates of January 1981 to February 1986. Any meaningful evaluation of RPII must therefore assess its significance for the ongoing effort to establish decentralized rural administration, and cannot be strictly limited to the activities carried out between the official starting and ending dates, or to the specific list of activities contained in the original project agreement. Both the

contractor, and senior Kenyan officials in the RPD view RPII in this broader context, and so do we.

The terms of reference provided to us for this evaluation by USAID in the "Statement of Work"¹⁶ likewise reflect this broad perspective of the RPII project:

In carrying out this analysis it will be necessary to evaluate the project with regard to:

- a) the broad terms of reference as stated in the Project Agreement and the HIID contract;
- b) the specific activities identified within the broad terms of reference and actions taken to accomplish them; and
- c) new initiatives permitted under the terms of reference but not specified in detail.

In particular, the evaluation will be concerned with the impact of inputs and outputs of the Rural Planning II project on the development of those administrative systems and planning processes which provide the "enabling (policy and administrative) environment" for increased economic productivity. A special interest is to examine the role and effectiveness of the technical assistance provided by HIID - an assessment made possible by, among other factors, the extended period which technical assistance was provided - and to glean from this examination lessons for the provision of future TA to Kenya. The project impact will be measured by analyzing indicators of administrative and planning systems capacity in terms of the extent to which it has (i) taken place (ii) resulted in more effective use of development resources, and (iii) resulted in utilization of resources for purposes desired by and appropriate to specific districts and local areas.

The analysis and recommendations which follow have been written with these broad guidelines in mind. While we have made a special effort not to forget the original terms of the agreement the contractor was engaged to fulfill, we have focused on the overall impact of RPII in the context of Kenya's evolving policies for the administration of rural development. The District Focus and Budget Rationalization initiatives were not articulated at the beginning of RPII, yet these policies proudly altered the context within which RPII was carried out, and led

¹⁶See Annex C to this report for the text of the "Statement of Work" as provided to the evaluators.

the project into new activities not envisioned when the project was planned. We have also been concerned with the universal lessons RPII provide for future technical assistance projects intended to bring about major institutional changes in the recipient country. While the specifics of the RPII project may or may not be replicable in Kenya or in other countries, the experience of the relationships between the members of the HIID team and the Kenyan members of the RPD provide an array of insights into the dynamics of technical assistance efforts whose purpose is institutional change. We hope that by following these broader terms of reference, this evaluation will attract a wider audience than merely the members of the HIID team, and their immediate employers in the MPND and USAID.

3. Evaluator's Plan of Work

The evaluator's work has been carried out in three phases: (1) A very short period of approximately three days prior to the start of the evaluation during which time the evaluators reviewed the most relevant documents pertaining to RPII. These documents included the project paper, the project proposal made by the contractor, the series of project agreements signed between HIID and the Kenyan government and between HIID and USAID, previous evaluations of RPI, and the final report for RPII. In addition, the evaluators read or reread the major policy statements of the Kenyan government in respect to District Focus for Rural Development and Budget Rationalization, and reviewed the principal treasury circulars concerned with district planning and the budgetary process. A complete list of the documents provided to the evaluators in the course of their work is provided in Annex B.

(2) The second phase of the evaluators work consisted of period of 11 days of interviewing more than 70 individuals, including the four present members of the HIID advisory team, a former permanent secretary, 16 Kenyan staff members in the RPD, and some 40 members of the district and provincial administration posted in Embu, Kajiado, Kakamega, Kisii, Kisumu, Muranga, Nakuru, Nyahururu and Nyeri. A special effort was made by the evaluators to interview district based officers in order to obtain a perspective on RPII from the unit of administration RPII was most intended to transform, and we believe that we succeeded in this objective. The interviews conducted for this evaluation began on

February 15, 1986, the day after Professor Joel D. Barkan arrived in Nairobi, and continuing through Friday, February 27th, the day of his departure. Professor Barkan and Dr. Chege began the interview process with an extensive series of briefings at the RPD and the Office of the President. On February 18th, the evaluators proceeded on a tour of five district headquarters and two provincial headquarters where they interviewed all relevant personnel including the DC, the DDO, a sample of district heads of departments, and the PPO. The evaluators returned to Nairobi on the morning of February 25th and commenced a second round of discussions with RPD staff including a final and very intensive meeting with members of the HIID team. The evaluators also presented a summary of their preliminary findings at a seminar held at the USAID Mission to Kenya on February 26th. A complete list of all individuals interviewed for this evaluation and the dates of these meetings is presented in Annex A. We found the officers interviewed to be extremely courteous, candid and helpful, and we wish to gratefully acknowledge their assistance.

(3) The third phase of the evaluation has occurred since Professor Barkan's departure from Kenya, and has consisted of an extensive review of the interview notes and documents obtained during the period of interviews in Nairobi, and the writing of this report. During this period it was also necessary for Dr. Chege to return to the RPD for additional documentation. The writing of this report was shared by both evaluators. Professor Barkan was primarily responsible for the Executive Summary, and Sections I, and V through VII while Dr. Chege drafted Sections II through IV. Both evaluators contributed to Section VIII. Barkan assumed responsibility for editing the entire report for consistency of style, avoidance of duplication, and the physical production of the document. Both evaluators regret the time it has taken to produce this report, but have been slowed by the fact that they are situated 8,000 apart, and by their ongoing responsibilities at their respective academic institutions.

II. THE PLANNING PROCESS

1. District Plans

As noted above, a major product of RPII was the production of the 40 district plans for the Fifth Development Plan of 1984-88. There is little doubt that the district plans for 1984-88 were the best ever in terms of quality and timeliness. The guidelines required for effective plan formulation were perfected by the RPD after discussions with field staff and issued in January 1983. The HIID advisors working closely with Kenyan officers in the RPD held seminars and workshops for all DDOs, and managed, despite many difficulties, to have the plans completed by the end of 1983. Though the quality of the plans varied, all plans contained the following information: (1) An overview of the physical, socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the district; (2) a discussion of the institutions dealing with project implementation; (3) estimates of the resource potential of the district; (4) a record of all major development projects in the district, the institution responsible for their implementation and their stage of implementation; and (5) a review of district development goals including annual work plans and the budget requirements of these plans. The plans also included a two year "rolling budget," a precursor of the three year forward budget which was established in 1985 as an annual annex and update to the district plan.

The information presented in the 1984-88 plans was far more comprehensive than that included in previous efforts. The data was culled from district files, provincial headquarters, central government ministries and the Central Bureau of Statistics. The collation of this information has also constituted a useful beginning in the creation of the District Information and Documentation Centers (DIDCs), an important part of the district infrastructure now being established to support District Focus and district planning.

Notwithstanding these significant improvements, the 1984-88 plans were not without some serious problems. First, there was very little congruence between the general district development strategies and sectoral priorities contained in the district plans, and the priorities generated by the DDCs. The membership of the DDCs does not appear to be guided by the district plans when they conduct their deliberations. In none of the districts we visited did the DDO's respond positively to the question: "Does the District Plan as a document have a great impact on DDC decisions?" Thus, while the planning process is being taken more seriously as a result of the annual exercise of producing the annex and forward budget to the plan, the members of the DDCs forget (or simply ignore) the guidelines contained in the original plans when they deliberate the merits of specific projects.

The lack of congruence between the wishes of the DDC and the sectoral priorities contained in the district plans is also revealed by the plans themselves. Upon comparing the sectoral lists of the priority projects found in Chapter Two of the plans, with the lists of projects budgeted for implementation and included in the annual work plans (Annex I), one finds a consistent pattern of funding: Whereas roughly three quarters to 90 percent of the projects listed in Chapter Two as originating from the central ministries were included in the work plans for 1983-84, only a third of the projects identified as originating from the DDC were included.

One must be careful on how one interprets these discrepancies between the sectorial priorities contained in the plans and the projects championed by the DDC. On the one hand, one could conclude that the DDOs must draw the attention of the DDCs to the priorities contained in district plans and those in the national plans as well, so that the decisions by the DDCs conform to plan guidelines. On the other, one could conclude that the decisions by the DDCs are an accurate reflection of locally established priorities, and that the sectoral priorities which are largely determined by the central ministries, should conform to the DDC if district planning is to fulfill its objectives. Put differently, the tension between the objective for more central control and the objective for local initiative is manifest in both the plans and the deliberations of the DDCs. We would contend that such tension is

healthy and consistent with the purpose of district planning, because it involves a balancing of these two goals.

2. District Planning Machinery

A major accomplishment of RPII was the strengthening of the district planning machinery--the administrative infrastructure which supports the district planning process. Improvements were made to existing structures and administrative positions within the district administration, such as the DDC and DDO, and improvements were made by creating new structures such as the District Executive Committees (DEC), the Divisional Development Committee (DvDC), and development committees at the location (LDC) and sublocation (SLDC) levels. The RPD also wrote several position papers which presented designs for additional structures and administrative positions, some of which are currently being established under RMRD. These include the positions of Assistant District Development Officer (ADDO) and District Statistical Officer (DStO), and the establishment of the District Planning Unit (DPU) and District Information and Documentation Center (DIDC) within the DPU. In overseeing the improvement or establishment of these entities, the RPD has also played a significant role in developing training materials and procedures for the existing and new personnel assigned to these agencies. The nature of the RPD's involvement in training during RPII is discussed at length in Section IV.

The District Development Committee (DDC)

The District Development Committee (DDC) is the oldest entity created for the purpose of district planning. Provision for the DDC dates back to the late 1960s, but the committees were moribund until 1974, and largely ineffective until the latter stages of RPI when they became more fully involved with the RDF and with the preparations of the district plans for the Fourth Development Plan of 1979-83. The DDC is chaired by the District Commissioner (DC), and composed of the DC, the District Development Officer (DDO) who serves as secretary to the committee, all department heads of all ministries represented in the district, all Members of Parliament (MPs) whose constituencies fall within the district, the district KANU chairman, all chairmen of local

authorities such as Town Councils, the clerks of local authorities, the chairmen of the DvDCs, and representatives of development-related parastatals. In addition, the DDC is composed of "invited (ad hoc) representatives of non-governmental development-related organisations and self-help groups"¹⁷ who are coopted as members to the body. Given the presence of these representatives, it is not unusual for the size of the DDC to swell to 50 to 80 members.

The DDC is now a clearly established institution in nearly all districts. The progressive institutionalization of the planning process, the advent of District Focus, and the linking of the district planning process to the district budget process as a result of Budget Rationalization, have all combined to raise the importance of the DDC. The DDC has grown in stature to the point that it is increasingly regarded as "mini-parliament" by its membership--a forum for the deliberation and making of public policy at the district level.

The DDCs are expected to meet quarterly, and in the six districts we visited, this was indeed the case. The fact that DDCs now meet on a regular basis is indicated by the data presented in Table 2 (on page 27) which shows the frequency of DDC meetings in 1986 by quarter in ten randomly selected districts (excluding the six we visited). Data for the table is from DDC minutes as reported to the RPD. As indicated by the table, there was an average of four DDC meetings in the sample districts in 1986. This is certainly a very great improvement from the period before RPII when one DDC meeting per year would not have been considered unusual.

Although most DDCs meet regularly, and the deliberations of the committees are accorded more importance than in the past, some weaknesses remain: (1) The meetings are attended by too many people to facilitate meaningful deliberation of the agenda. Closer adherence to the "Blue Book"¹⁸ guidelines on DDC membership might reduce the

¹⁷Office of the President, District Focus for Rural Development (final draft), February, 1987, p. 16

¹⁸"The Blue Book" is the colloquial name given to a series of guidelines entitled District Focus for Rural Development which have been issued by the Office of the President since June 1983. The "Blue Book" was updated in 1984, 1985 and again in 1987.

Table 2: Frequency of DDC Meetings in Selected Districts Per Quarter for 1986

<u>District</u>	<u>First Quarter</u>	<u>Second Quarter</u>	<u>Third Quarter</u>	<u>Fourth Quarter</u>	<u>Total</u>
Kitui	1	1	0	1	3
Machakos	2	3	2	1	8
Nyeri	1	1	1	0	3
Nandi	1	1	0	1	3
Uasin Gishu	1	1	1	1	4
Kakamega	1	1	0	2	4
Siaya	0	2	2	0	4
Marsabit	1	1	2	0	4
Tana River	1	1	1	1	4
Wajir	1	0	0	1	2

membership to more manageable size. The phrase in the Blue Book which states that the DDCs can include "invited (ad hoc) representatives of non-governmental development-related organisations and self-help groups" has been used far too liberally. (2) It is evident from a review of selected DDC minutes that much time is taken up discussing the progress of ongoing projects. Although this practice may reflect an increased desire by the membership of many DDCs to monitor projects closely to assure their completion, this tendency also means that the DDCs do not spend sufficient time on project prioritization. The problem is compounded where DDC meetings are attended by leading district political leaders for the purpose of introducing proposals for new projects. There is a need, therefore, for the DC's and DDOs in their respective capacities as DDC chairs and secretaries to guide discussion more closely to questions of prioritization.

The District Executive Committee (DEC)

The deliberations and performance of the DDC is greatly shaped by the District Executive Committees (DEC), the grouping of all department heads of ministries represented in the district and the DC and DDO. Our investigation revealed that the DEC has become the single most important unit involved in development planning and project implementation at the district level, and that as such, the DEC is also responsible for the marked improvement in the process of district planning. The DEC's deserve credit for the following: (1) Greater coordination between

ministries in respect to the planning and implementation of district specific projects than there has been in the past. Joint planning between the ministries of Agriculture, Cooperatives, Education, Health, Livestock, Water Development and Works is much greater, and is invariably initiated in the course of DEC meetings where department heads regularly report on projects with which their ministries are concerned. Such coordination, which rarely took place prior to the establishment of the DEC, has improved the quality of individual projects, reduced the time required for their implementation, and in so doing raised the efficiency of government development efforts in the districts. (2) By virtue of their technical expertise, the DEC's have been very useful in weeding out non-viable projects originating from the DDCs and/or DvDCs by applying more stringent technical criteria in project selection and prioritization. It is our belief that this contribution is beginning to be appreciated by district political leaders even though their pet projects have been subjected to increased review. (3) Improved guidance and assistance by district administrative team to the DDC. As the administrative arm of the DDC, the DEC is responsible for implementing DDC decisions regarding district development. The DEC is also in a position to improve the deliberations of the DDC by providing the latter with relevant information, especially interpretations of the District Focus strategy and district planning and budgeting procedures. We found that the DEC's met regularly in all six districts we visited, and that the DEC's also made a special point of preparing for the meetings of the DDC by holding a DEC meeting prior to each DDC session. (4) There is now a genuine "esprit de corps" among officers posted to the districts as a result of increased lateral (i.e. interdepartmental) communication which now operates in tandem with the more conventional vertical (i.e. field to ministerial headquarters) linkages. Officers who rarely shared information in the past, now do so, and greatly appreciate this new flow of communication. The long term significance of this development for the strengthening of district level administration cannot be overstated.

Divisional Development Committees (DvDCs), Location Development Committee (LDCs) and Sub-Location Development Committees (SLDCs)

Since the beginning of RPI in the mid-1970s, a major objective of the rural planning process has been to raise the level of public participation in the district planning process. The emphasis placed on public participation was reduced in RPII, but since the District Focus initiative in 1982, the objective of increasing grassroots involvement in the planning process has received renewed attention.¹⁹ The mechanism for achieving this has been the hierarchy of development committees which exist below the DDC at the division, location and sub-location levels. Plans for this hierarchy of development committees first emerged in the late 1970s. In theory, the committees at the lowest levels would be the initial sounding boards for development projects proposed by members of the local community via grassroots leaders. Proposals thus made to and endorsed by the SLDC would then be forwarded to the LDC where they would be in turn discussed, and if endorsed, forwarded on to the DvDC, and then to the DDC. In fact, this hierarchy of development committees did not begin to exist until the early 1980s when preparations commenced for the 1984-88 plans. Prior to this time, the DDCs themselves did not meet on a regular basis. During the course of the planning exercise the DDCs began to meet regularly, and for the first time the DvDCs met in approximately half the districts. The LDCs and SLDCs, however, remained paper institutions. Since 1984, there has been continuous downward expansion of the committee hierarchy. The DvDCs now hold quarterly meetings in most districts. This is in large part due to increased enforcement by DCs and DDOs of the principle that no proposals for new development projects will be considered by the DDC until the proposal has been previously discussed and endorsed by the DvDC. Our visits to six districts further confirm that this requirement is beginning to be replicated at the divisional level, and ultimately at

¹⁹In contrast to the contract agreement for RPI, the first contract agreement for RPII (Amendment One to the original 1977 agreement between GOK and HIID) did not include participation as a primary objective of the project. The renewed interest in public participation, however, was reflected in the subsequent extensions to the contract agreement (See Amendments Two and Three to the original 1977 agreement which were signed in 1983 and 1985).

the locational level--that DvDCs will only consider project proposals previously endorsed by an LDC, and that LDCs will only consider proposals previously endorsed by an SLDC.

The frequency and quality of LDC and SLDC meetings, however, varies greatly. In some districts, such as Embu, LDCs meet two to four times a year in all locations, and SLDCs meet in approximately half of the sub-locations.²⁰ In other districts, LDCs function in less than half of the locations while the SLDCs do not exist. Generally speaking, LDCs and SLDCs are most active in the most developed and densely populated districts. It is also clear from our discussions with more than a quarter of Kenya's DDOs, that the quality of the decisions made by development committees below the district level needs to be improved. Few of these committees, particularly the SLDCs and LDCs, fully appreciate the objectives of the planning and budgetary process, especially the need to prioritize projects.

Given the increased stature of the DDC and administrative encouragement to the formation of the DvDCs, LDCs and SLDCs, the downward expansion of the hierarchy of development committees will continue. This downward expansion offers many opportunities for increased public input into the planning and budgetary process. Further expansion, however, will require the posting of additional administrative staff to the district and divisional headquarters if these opportunities are to be reaped and the newly established committees are to become an institutionalized part of the planning system. Few of the DDOs with whom we spoke said that they had the time to regularly attend all meetings of the DvDCs in their district, and most rarely attended meetings of LDCs or SLDCs. With an average of six divisions, two dozen locations, and one hundred sub-locations in each

²⁰These figures, which were estimates provided by the DDOs we interviewed, seemed unrealistically high and led us to request documentation supporting the estimates. A review of copies of LDC and SLDC minutes sent to the DDO in Embu confirmed that the estimates given to us were accurate. Little in the way of comprehensive data, however, exists on the frequency of LDC and SLDC meetings, and clearly this should be an item for future research. The extent to which the rural planning process has percolated to the grassroots is not yet clear.

district,²¹ a typical DDO is lucky to attend all meetings of the DvDCs held in a given year and a smattering of those at the locational level. Meetings in the pastoral districts are particularly difficult to monitor on account of distance. Supervision of the LDCs and SLDCs is thus left to the chiefs whose training and familiarity with processes of district planning are limited at best. The committees at the grassroots consequently receive little supervision regarding the mechanics and requirements of the planning and budgetary process, yet until they do, the committees will not function properly. For the same reasons, the continued expansion of the development committee system will also require a matching increase in the training programs which familiarize committee members with the procedures of the planning process. A discussion of these requirements appears below. Our principle conclusion, however, is that the expansion of the hierarchy of development committees down to the location, and in some instances, sub-location level represents a significant advance in the establishment of the administrative infrastructure required to implement decentralized district planning.

District Planning Unit (DPU) and District Information and Documentation Centers (DIDC)

Two additional administrative structures were designed by the RPD during RPII to enhance district level planning capacity, but neither were implemented before the end of the project: The District Planning Unit (DPU) which is intended to serve as a secretariate to the DDC, and the District Information and Documentation Center (DIDC) whose purpose is to provide basic data on the state of the district to the DDC and which will be part of the DPU. The DPU will be directed by the DDO, and will be staffed by an Assistant DDO (ADDO), and a District Statistical Officer (DStO). As the DDC and subordinate development committees increase in importance, the need for the DPU becomes ever greater as the DDO alone cannot support this growing committee system and still attend to his present duties as secretary to the DDC and the DEC. We were

²¹Our averages are estimates for all of Kenya based on data for Embu, Kakamega Kajiado, Kiambu, Kisii, Laikipia, South Nyanza and Wajir Districts.

therefore pleased to learn that the first substantive steps towards the establishment of the DPUs will occur in 1987 under RMRD. The process will begin with the recruitment and training of 20 ADDOs. With the beginning of the planning process for the 1989-93 development plan scheduled to start next year, the first steps towards establishing the DPU and DIDC are a welcome development.

The District Development Officer (DDO)

Since its creation in 1974, the position of DDO has become increasingly important as the coordinator for development activities at the district level. As secretary to both the DDC and DEC, the DDO is expected to facilitate coordination between the district department heads representing central government ministries, and between the DEC and the DDC, especially its elected members. He is also supposed to serve as the secretary to the DVDCs, and to oversee the operation of the subordinate committees. As noted above, the task is impossible.

Given this multiplicity of assignments, and the increasing activities and importance of the committees within which the DDO is supposed to play a coordinating role, it is not surprising that the position of DDO is overloaded and that the DDO has unfortunately become the weakest link in the chain. Even with the greatest dedication to public service, it is difficult for a single officer like the DDO, without assistants and having inadequate resources, to evaluate and rank for the DEC all project proposals emanating from the DVDCs and DDC. As a result, the quality of project selection, prioritization, and analysis, though much improved, can be improved still further. Setbacks and delays are also likely to occur when the only DDO in the district goes on leave. Given this situation, the DDO needs help. We therefore consider the plan to appoint ADDOs as a critical first step and priority area for strengthening the district planning process. The importance we attach to the appointment of the ADDOs is also a result of another and more general problem--the high turnover rate among District Officers (DO). In the absence of the DDO, the DO has frequently become the linchpin of the DVDC, and also, the divisional representative to the DDC. Rapid transfers of DOs thus result in project discontinuity. The

problem manifests itself in improper project monitoring and delays in implementation.

3. Project Selection and Appraisal and the Rural Development Fund

A major problem throughout Kenya's twenty year effort at decentralized planning has been how to stimulate local initiatives for rural development while insuring that these initiatives result in projects that are both sustainable over the long-term and consistent with national development objectives. To solve this problem, the RPD and HIID have sought to improve the process by which projects are selected for government assistance, and the process by which projects are monitored by the government as they receive support. This became an important task during RPII and was consistent with the terms of reference which expected HIID to "develop and implement guidelines for the quantification and analysis of proposed projects and the evaluation of on-going and completed projects."²²

Kenya's rich experience of Harambee self-help initiatives has demonstrated the enormous capacity on the part of rural Kenyans to organize themselves for the purposes of establishing local community development projects. The proliferation of literally thousands of these projects, however, particularly schools, has created a problem of how and who will pay for their recurrent costs.²³ The self-help movement has produced an endless stream of demands by local project organizers for government assistance to cover recurrent expenditures, but it is beyond the resources of the Kenyan government to satisfy these requests. As a result, the RPD hopes to reverse the present pattern whereby local project committees provide the capital costs for projects and then seek government assistance for their recurrent budgets. Instead, the state will now fund the development costs of a small number of carefully selected projects on the condition that these projects assume responsibility for their day to day operations. Yet another challenge

²²See tasks 7 and 8 of original terms of reference as quoted on page 10.

²³Judith Geist, "Harambee Resource Mobilisation and Basic Needs," (Nairobi: Rural Planning Division, Ministry of Finance and Planning, May, 1984)

which underscores the need for better project selection is how to encourage a shift in local development initiatives from projects designed to provide social welfare services (i.e. schools, health clinics) to projects which increase the productive output and income of the local community (i.e. cattle dips, poultry schemes, cottage industries). When successful, production oriented projects cover their own recurrent costs, raise rural incomes and provide employment. Such projects, however, must be carefully selected and planned.

All of these pressures for better project selection are present in the projects supported by the Rural Development Fund (RDF). The RDF was established in 1974 through the merger of two existing programs, the District Development Grants (DDG) and the Rural Works Program (RWP). The RDF was intended to be a response to local demands for government assistance to community development projects, and allocation of the fund was therefore put in the hands of the DDC. The RDF is thus a series of block grants which the government provides to the DDCs for the purpose of funding a portfolio of small scale projects in each district. Monies for the RDF, which amounted to 76 million Kenyan shillings (\$ 4.72 million) for the 1986/87 fiscal year, are provided by the Government of Kenya, the Scandinavian development assistance agencies (DANIDA, SIDA and NORAD) and the Netherlands.²⁴ Projects funded by the RDF are required to have a self-help component to insure that they enjoy a large measure of local support. As a result, the RDF has become a natural target for Harambee groups which have deluged the fund with requests for aid. This high level of demand has in turn led to the funding of too many projects, poor project selection, and poor project implementation. Project selection was poor, because there were few guidelines on how to identify projects of high quality. One consequence was that from the beginning of the RDF to the early 1980s the completion rate for RDF projects was under 40 percent.

²⁴From its inception in 1974 through the 1984/85 financial year, 362.3 million Kenyan shillings were distributed by the RDF. Of this amount, 37 percent was provided by GOK, 35 percent by DANIDA, 10 percent NORAD, 11 percent by SIDA, and 6 percent by the Netherlands. See Kenya Rural Development Fund, A Report from a Joint Evaluation Mission Appointed by the Government of Kenya, DANIDA, NORAD and SIDA (Nairobi, April, 1985), Annex 5

The RDF accounts for only 2 percent of Kenya's development budget. In 1986-87, the average district budget for the RDF was 1.9 million Kenyan shillings (\$118,000) which meant that the fund could provide adequate support for only 7-8 projects per district. Better selection of fewer projects was also viewed as the means to improve the completion rate of the RDF.

The RPP and HIID sought to achieve better project selection by first insisting that the DDCs had to rank order projects proposed to the RDF and sectoral ministries. Pressure on the DDCs to prioritize project proposals became particularly intense after the Kenya government's commitment to the policy of Budget Rationalization in 1984, and after the establishment of the annual annex and forward budget at the district level in 1985. The guidelines for implementing Budget Rationalization were also clear. Projects to be funded first were those which (1) had a potential for growth and were consistent with the Development Plan; (2) would improve the utilization and efficiency of operation of existing facilities; (3) would finish incomplete projects before constructing new ones. Project selection would therefore need to be more rigorous than in the past, a requirement which in turn raised the need for officers skilled at project appraisal. To improve the skills for project appraisal among civil servants charged with this task, training programs were launched for DDOs and other relevant cadres at the district level (see Section IV below). Manuals for this purpose were produced by members of the HIID team, in particular a handbook written by Klaus Bethke in 1983 entitled Small Projects for Rural Development: Selection and Formulation Guidelines.

In respect to projects funded by the RDF, there is no doubt that these efforts combined with the application of Budget Rationalization were responsible for raising the implementation rate to an estimated 75 percent by the end of 1985. However, it is very difficult to determine whether these efforts by the RPD and HIID in particular contributed to an increased economic return from rural projects (both RDF and non-RDF), because there are many critical intervening variables which affect project performance. The first, and most significant, is the Kenya government's firm policy of giving preference to projects which are the

most productive.²⁵ In following the Budget Rationalization guidelines, the HIID team was following a significant policy directive, but one which other agencies were following as well. Second, there is an increasing number of donors and NGO's involved in project selection at the district level. The contributions by the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands to the Rural Development Fund (RDF) are the most significant in this respect, but so are those of the EEC Microprojects Program, and an increasing array of GOK projects. In short, credit or criticism of project selection at the district level must be shared by the increasing number of agencies participating in that field.

With these considerations in mind, an examination of RDF projects reveals a bias in favour of economic infrastructure and in particular cattle dips, afforestation, soil conservation, water and rural access roads. Table 3 provides a sectoral breakdown of RDF projects for the 1982-84 period. As indicated by the table, although the projects

Table 3: RDF Projects by Sector, January 1982 - December 1984

<u>Sector</u>	<u>No. of Projects</u>	<u>Amount (KShs.)</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Agriculture/livestock	407	30,332,250	26.0
Education	70	15,611,730	13.4
Transport (roads/bridges)	77	14,858,435	12.7
Natural Resources (Afforestation, soil conservation, etc.)	129	14,838,602	12.7
Water development	90	14,672,349	12.6
Health	74	14,453,780	12.4
Social services & other	51	11,074,360	9.6
Tourism	12	785,560	.6
TOTAL	910	116,627,070	100.0

Source: Kenya Rural Development Fund: Report From a Joint Evaluation Mission Appointed by the Government of Kenya, DANIDA, NORAD and SIDA (Nairobi: April 1985)

are concentrated in a few sectors, the funds are fairly evenly distributed. While livestock and agricultural projects accounted for 24 percent of RDF funds between 1982 and 1984, sectors as diverse as

²⁵Sessional Paper No. 1 for 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1986), p. 31.

education, health, natural resources, transport and water took almost identical shares of the balance.

These aggregate figures, however, obscure wide variations between districts. An RDF social-impact study conducted in eight districts in 1985 found that whereas economic infrastructural projects tended to be dominant in all eight districts, four of the districts which were located in high potential areas had already taken the lead in directly-productive, employment generating projects.²⁶

As indicated above the implementation rate for RDF projects has risen significantly from less than 40 percent in 1980 to 75 percent by the end of 1986. An even higher implementation rate has been achieved by the EEC micro-projects. Some of the credit for this must go to the input of RDF "engineer advisors" based in the offices of the Provincial Planning Officers, and to the EEC's engineer advisor based at the MPND in Nairobi who have worked with DDOs in project selection, design, and implementation.

With increased completion rates and better project selection, however, come new problems associated with success. As the RDF has evolved from a sick program to a viable one, it has attracted more interest on the part of donors. The attraction of the RDF has also increased as a result of a growing appreciation in some quarters of the donor community for the effectiveness of small scale community based projects for furthering rural development at the grassroots. The District Focus strategy and the linking of the planning process to the budgeting process has likewise made the RDF more attractive to the donor community. It is important, therefore, that there be better coordination between donors in respect to RDF projects and other donor funded projects such as the EEC microprojects which are channeled through the DDC. In this regard, the contributions made by the HIID advisory team to the training of district personnel in the procedures for monitoring RDF projects, makes an excellent complement to the tasks of project design and review carried out by the donors. Further coordination between the donors, however, is necessary to insure that

²⁶Kenya Rural Development Fund, p. 31.

donors do not work at cross purposes. Most important, individual donors to the RDF and similar projects must be kept sensitive to the burden of increased recurrent expenditures that is emerging as a result of increased donor support for the construction of small community based projects. Recurrent expenditures must be kept in check and consistent with the policy guidelines of Budget Rationalization, and increased attention must be given to how adequate funds for covering recurrent expenditures are to be raised. Our discussions with members of the HIID team indicate that they have been well aware of this problem for several years, but that actual monitoring of the problem began rather late in the course of RPII. For this reason, it is appropriate that the efforts by the HIID team on this matter which began at of RPII be continued under RMRD.

III. THE BUDGETARY PROCESS AND THE IMPACT OF RPII ON BUDGET REFORM

1. The Situation Before RPII

For the most part, Kenya has maintained the system of estimate preparation, approval, review and audit inherited from Britain at the time of independence in 1963. Until 1964, departments within ministries coordinated their annual estimates with the Principal Finance and Establishments Officer (PF&EO) in the ministry, and forwarded them to the Treasury in March. Each ministry prepared a "development" budget and a "recurrent" budget, and defended their estimates to the Treasury which was invariably inclined to revise them downwards in view of revenue constraints. Budget day followed in mid-June and provided Parliament with an opportunity to debate the estimates whose disbursement is, by law, subject to Parliamentary approval. Midway through the financial year, the Treasury in conjunction with the ministries issued "supplementary estimates" to account for new funds and the reallocation of old (unspent) ones.

The final process after the annual expenditure was an audit and the presentation of the Controller and Auditor General's report to Parliament after the end of the financial year. The report is the basis of parliamentary overview. At this stage, the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament takes over the process and scrutinizes those ministries which incurred expenditures not authorized by Parliament and included in the annual budget, and those ministries which did not incur expenditures which were authorized.

Between 1964 and 1974, the government's fiscal policy favored a higher rate of growth of development expenditure compared to recurrent expenditure. Generating a "recurrent surplus" (of taxes over expenditure) became a valued goal of budgetary policy. Its success is demonstrated by the fact that the development budget rose from 19 percent of the budget in 1966/67 fiscal year to 36 percent in 1977/78. This success, however, led to some serious problems, and to new policies by the Kenya government to solve them:

The Constraint of Recurrent Expenditures

By the middle of the 1970s, following severe balance of payments difficulties in 1972/73 and dramatic increases in the price of oil in 1974, the Kenya government became acutely aware that recurrent expenditures can itself become a development constraint following an expanded public investment program. As Brough and Curtin remark, "by the middle of the nineteen seventies . . . [the government] realised that it had used foreign aid to build health centers while providing no funds to staff them. Accordingly, the 1979-83 plan aimed at a more realistic balance between development and recurrent spending."²⁷

Forward and Program Budgeting as a Solution

Several different budgetary procedures have been devised by the Treasury to contain recurrent costs. One, known as a "performance budget" sought to include capital costs and recurrent costs in a single integrated budget to facilitate a better ranking of projects in terms of their economic return. The procedures required to implement the "performance budget," however, were judged as too complex. In their place, a simpler method was adopted which required the sectoral ministries to formulate their respective budgets under "programs" and to prepare triennial forward budgets. Through this process, it was expected that both the ministries and the Treasury would "look ahead" into the recurrent implications of new and on-going projects. Despite these changes, however, the problem of controlling excessive recurrent costs remained unsolved.

Budgetary System Overload

The growth of government expenditure (45 percent in real terms between 1976 and 1984) and the programs it represents meant that an exceedingly large amount of budgetary statistics and paperwork were being processed by the same (or slightly increased) number of officers as before. Most of this work was done manually, which apart from

²⁷A.T. Brough and T.R.C. Curtin, "Growth and Stability: An Account of Fiscal and Monetary Policy" in Tony Killick, ed., Papers on the Kenya Economy, p. 38

increasing the number of errors, often meant that the printed budget estimates were done in haste and completed a few days (or hours!) before Budget Day.

Lack of Input from Field Staff

Until the introduction of the District Focus program, field officers had very little input in the preparation of budget estimates. This work remained largely the province of PF&EOs and respective department heads. Although estimates were sometimes solicited by central ministries from the districts and provinces, they were seldom used and often not in a format that PE&EOs could use. Hence, once the budget was approved, PF&EOs issued the AIEs for local expenditures to the provincial heads of department rather than to the districts. Having been determined at the center, the amounts and purpose of the AIEs were often set on the basis of past expenditure rather than on a comprehensive analysis of actual investment and recurrent needs in the rural areas. There were also frequent delays in issuing the AIEs in time for spending the authorized funds at the district level before the end of the financial year.

2. District Focus and Budget Rationalization

With these difficulties in mind, as well as the constraints of the world economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the return of recurrent deficits in 1981/82, the Kenya government introduced the following policy measures:

Budget Rationalization

Kenya's policy of Budget Rationalization was adopted in 1984. The basic premises of the policy are outlined in Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986.²⁸ Details are to be found in Treasury Circular No. 3 of the same year.²⁹ In order to reduce the share of GDP attributable to government

²⁸Republic of Kenya, Economic Management for Renewed Growth, Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1986), pp. 30-32

²⁹Treasury Circular No. 3 of 1986

deficits from 5.1 percent in 1984/85 to 2.5 percent by the year 2000, two steps are envisaged on the supply and demand side of the budget. On the supply side, the tax regime is to be reviewed to raise revenue with increased taxes on consumption combined with incentives for production. Participant support (in the form of user fees) and "Harambee" will be sought for financing recurrent costs. On the demand side, budgetary allocations would favor immediately productive sectors, small towns with strong linkages to the rural economy, increased productivity and efficiency of existing projects. Overall, a greater role for the private sector is envisaged in Kenya's development.

District Focus for Rural Development

The District Focus strategy was announced by President Moi in September 1982, and is probably the most significant policy initiative by the Kenyan government in respect to rural development since Kenya's independence. The basic purpose of the District Focus initiative has been to deconcentrate the administration of rural development efforts down to the district level in order to achieve a more equitable distribution development activities across Kenya's 40 districts, and to bring government closer to the people so that it can better respond to their needs. To realize these objectives, project identification, prioritization, and ultimately selection, must originate at the grassroots. The hierarchy of development committees culminating with the DDC is the mechanism by which these tasks are to be carried out in the districts. Projects selected by the DDCs in a given year, constitute the Annex to the district plan. The Annex is broken down by sector and then forwarded to the relevant central government ministries for inclusion in their regular annual estimates.

3. The Impact of RPII on Budgeting and Expenditure: Some Major Unresolved Issues

As discussed in section I.1, RPII input into Budget Rationalization fell within its mandate to further "the implementation of district plans" and to sustain the momentum of "decentralized decision-making" which is now a central part of the District Focus

policy. The impact of the main activities under budgeting have been the following:

Computerization of National and Ministerial Budget

The full impact of this innovation is discussed in Section V below. It is only necessary to observe at this juncture that the introduction of micro-computers to the budgetary process is an unequalled advance which has facilitated a more efficient and timely preparation of government estimates including the breakdown of ministerial budgets by district and project. The computerization of the budgetary process has overcome some of the problems of budgetary overload noted above, and removed some of the logistical barriers to the disaggregation of ministerial budgets down to the district level.

Preparation of Annual District Annexes (including the Forward Budget)

The Annex is the most critical link between district planning on the one hand and government budgeting at the national level on the other. Put differently, the preparation of the Annex is the activity via which the planning process is linked to the budgetary process. As members of the DDCs have come to appreciate that their priorities will receive financial support from the center, as with the programs of the RDF and EEC Micro Projects Program, they have taken their responsibilities more seriously.

In principle, the preparation of the Annex and its insertion into the budgetary process should follow the following schedule:³⁰

- i. Mid-July: Forward Budget Ceilings for district expenditures are received by district heads of departments from their ministries. Ceilings are for next FY beginning the following June.
- ii. 15th July -15th August DDO and DEC agree on projects to be included in the Forward Budget, and obtain DDC approval on project prioritization. The result is the "District Annex and Annual Work Plan" which is forward to the MPND and all ministries for inclusion in their Forward Budget Estimates.

³⁰See the 1987 final draft of the "Blue Book," p. 25

- iii. 15th December Treasury approves/ammends Forward Budget Estimates
- iv. 15th January- Districts receive Forward Budget Allocations from ministries and react to them. DDCs evaluate allocations and sends revised allocations back to ministries
1st February
- v. March to May Preparation of Draft Estimates by ministries based on DDC evaluations and vetting of draft estimates by Estimate Working Groups at the Treasury
- vi. Late May- Final Budget Estimates reached by
early June Treasury
- vii. Mid-June Budget presented to Parliament. Printed Estimates issued.
- viii. 1st July Beginning of new financial year. AIEs arrive in districts allowing project implementation to begin.
- ix. Mid-July Budget cycle begins anew with the issuing of the new Forward Budget Ceilings for the following financial year.

The preparation of the Annexes in in such a manner that they match the nomenclature of the national budgetary votes (accounts, and sub-accounts) heads and items; and further preparation of realistic and defensible project costs and priorities, is a difficult and complex task. Under RPII, the RPD and HIID in cooperation with the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) organized numerous workshops and seminars to explain the process to district level officials. The RPD was also "on call" to answer questions by those charged preparing the Annexes. This effort resulted in Annexes being produced in all districts for the 1984/85, 1985/86, and 1986/87 financial years.

Although the production of the annual Annexes and Work Plans is becoming an institutionalized process at the district level, some outstanding problems remain: (1) The national budget cycle, and the DDC input into this cycle is not yet well understood by district heads of departments who must collaborate in the preparation of the Annexes. More specifically, there is much confusion over what constitutes a

"Forward Budget Ceiling." Whereas the "Forward Budget Ceiling" which is to be set to the districts in July is the maximum expenditure a ministry expects to make in a district during the next financial year, we found that the concept of "budget ceiling" in the minds of many district officials was very unclear. Some officials confused the "Forward Budget Ceiling" with the "Forward Budget Allocations" which are issued to the districts in January. Still others confused the meaning of "budget ceiling" with the actual budget allocations and associated AIEs for the current financial year, because these were the "real ceilings" within which these officials had to implement their programs. The confusion regarding the meaning of the "Forward Budget Ceiling" is compounded, because some ministries do not transmit Forward Budget Ceilings to the districts in the form of a single budget figure to be allocated by the DEC and DDC, but rather in the form of a list of specific projects for the district for which the ministry intends to allocate funds. Such lists, moreover, are rarely issued in mid-July when the Forward Budget Ceilings are due, but six months later in January as part of the ministry's Forward Budget Allocation to the district. The transmission of the Forward Budget Ceilings to the districts on time (in July) and in their proper form (disaggregated by district, but not by project) is essential to the long-term institutionalization of the district planning and budgetary process. During RPII, the RPD was only partially successful in persuading central ministries of the importance of the Forward Budget Ceilings for district planning. Some ministries, such as agriculture and water development made great improvements in this area, while others such as health made none. The ability of the RPD to bring about changes in the long established practices of central ministries, however, is very limited--a fact which has been noted in all prior evaluations of RPII and its predecessor, RPI. President Moi's District Focus initiative and the concomitant support for district planning by the Office of the President will no doubt hasten the adoption and proper preparation of the Forward Budget Ceiling by central ministries.

(2) A second problem within the central ministries is that the PF&EOs are not yet attuned to the harmonization of district and national estimates. The Annexes for the 1984/85 financial year arrived too late for inclusion in the Forward Budget. The Annexes for 1985/86 and

1986/87 were sent to the ministries on time, but their utilization by the PF&EOs in the preparation of the ministerial estimates remained sub-optimal. For the 1986/87 budget, only the Ministries of Agriculture and Health considered the district priorities as presented in the Annexes. Some PF&EOs, however, complain that the Annexes are not yet of high enough quality to be readily integrated into the budgets of their ministries.

(3) The quality and timeliness of the Annexes as prepared in the districts can certainly do with some improvement in respect to their structure and project prioritization if they are to be of use to the PF&EOs. An appraisal of the 1985/86 Annexes by the HIID staff which evaluated the sectoral annexes of twelve ministries in 39 districts using eight criteria such as precision in project identification, correctness of vote number, project ranking, cost estimates, etc., produced a mean percentage score for each district of only 51.3.³¹ Several district heads of department with whom we talked, expressed some lack of motivation to putting more effort into the preparation of the annexes when it was clear to them that their ministries were not providing them with the Forward Budget Ceilings in time for them to do the job, or where the "ceilings" consisted merely of lists of projects determined by the ministry. Some heads and two DCs also told us that the annexes were difficult to prepare, because the instructions provided by the RPD were too complex and too long, and that these instructions always seemed to change from one year to the next.³²

(4) Finally, it must be noted that so far, the district annexes are confined to the estimates for the Development Budget. Yet to achieve the overall purpose of district planning and Budget Rationalization, estimates for the Recurrent Budget must be also included in the annexes. District field officers for some sectors, such as health, regard some recurrent expenditures (i.e. for drugs) as more

³¹Computed from totals of district sector scores for thirty-nine districts. See table of district sector scores in Rural Planning Department, 1985/86 District Plan Annex Evaluation, February 10, 1986.

³²Members of the HIID team subsequently confirmed these problems, but indicated that plans were already afoot to streamline the guidelines.

important than development expenditures for the construction of clinics, yet have no input to this aspect of the budget. District field officers, moreover, feel that the priorities established for the recurrent budget at ministerial headquarters (i.e. transport over drugs) are determined arbitrarily.

It is the opinion of senior staff within the RPD (including the HIID team) that improvements in the preparation of the Annual Annex at the district level, and better utilization of the annexes within the ministries will take time, because in the final analysis, such improvements will only be achieved through the interactive process of regularly preparing the annexes. With each new attempt the process becomes a little more familiar, and more central ministries join the the effort. Continued support from the highest levels of the Kenyan government for the District Focus initiative will accelerate this process. Institutional change, however, is fundamentally a cumulative and a learning process, and it will be several years before the procedures for the preparation of the Annual Annex are fully in place at all levels. Until then, the RPD must continue to monitor this critical aspect of the budgetary process, and continue to provide guidance to those officials responsible for preparing the annexes. Special attention must be given to district department heads and other district agents of central ministries for it is among this group that the understanding of the budgetary process is most unclear. The DCs and DDOs as well as some department heads are both knowledgeable and increasingly comfortable with the procedures for preparing the Annual Annex, but the RPD must take steps to extend this knowledge base.

3. Creating an Enabling Environment for Local Business

One of the major objectives of local level planning is to stimulate linkages between different economic sectors at the district level, as a means of generating rural employment and increasing productivity. This policy is aimed at introducing a rural-urban balance in development as discussed in Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986.³³ The

³³See Economic Management for Revnewed Growth, , pp. 41-60

growth of secondary towns, the rural informal sector, and small-scale industries are essential components of this approach in planning.

The RPD and RPII come into the picture in two respects: First, the strengthening of regional planning within RPD as summarized in HIID's Final Report on RPII;³⁴ and second, by facilitating greater local business participation in development projects through the district tendering process now entrusted to the DDCs. It is important to note, moreover, that these activities are given particular emphasis under RMRD.

With regard to the introduction of regional planning for stimulating growth at the local level, a sound beginning has been made through the creation within RPD of a Rural-Urban Planning Section. The creation of the section grew out of the Rural-Urban Planning and Analysis Unit headed by a regional planning advisor provided under RPII. It should also be noted that the present head of the section is a Kenyan woman whose graduate training was arranged and financed by HIID with RPII funds.

With the Rural-Urban Planning Section in place, work on plans for secondary towns and rural market centers, and on relevant data collection has begun. The Section has already had an input to framing GOK policy on Rural-Urban balance as reflected in the Sessional Paper. What remains to be done now is to effect better planning linkages with and between DDOs and District Physical Planning Officers (who work within the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning). District Land Registries are also affected by physical planning as are local authorities. To increase the effectiveness of this policy, there must be increased inter-ministerial coordination in planning; an issue addressed in our recommendations below.

The creation of an enabling environment for local business participation is explicitly spelled out in the guidelines for the District Tender Boards,³⁵ and under Treasu. Circular No. 3 of September

³⁴Final Report: Rural Planning Project II, pp. 54-65

³⁵Members of the District Tender Board are the DC who also serves as its chair, the District Executive Heads of Departments, the District Accountant and the District Suppliers Officer who serves as the secretary. See Annex 1 in the "Blue Book," District Focus for Rural Development.

1985, the jurisdiction of the boards was increased to include projects valued up to KSh. 500,000 (\$31,000). The circular reiterates the principle of open competitive bidding except for small procurements (KSh. 2,000 and under), but states that priority will be given to suppliers and contractors who utilize locally available material. For district specific projects, local advertising of tenders is recommended.

The extent to which the District Tender Boards in the districts we visited complied with the regulations on local tendering varied greatly. Some districts were prepared to consider all tenders, especially for large projects, on criteria of efficiency and past performance. This practice obviously favors large suppliers from outside the district, and undercuts the intent of the "Blue Book" and Treasury Circular No. 3 of 1985. In other districts a start has been made in awarding supply and building contracts to local businessmen. Here too, however, there is cautiousness on the part of senior district officials including the DC to switch quickly to local suppliers who are unproven in the tendering process. As a result, local suppliers tend to be given small and relatively minor contracts. One DC summed it up quite candidly by saying "we give them (the local suppliers) some small things to see how they do, and will give them more later if prove they can deliver the right goods on time." The record at district tendering is thus uneven and the full extent of the causes and content of this unevenness merits further study. We nevertheless observed the following factors which, we are informed, are already the subject of GOK review:

On the Government's Side

The understanding of the district tendering procedures and Treasury Circular No. 3 of 1985 at the district level is still imperfect. There is room for further guidance, training and workshops. In some districts the practice was that all tenders were subject to approval by the DDC, a practice which may produce delays.

Secondly, there is considerable residual power in the ministries even after the decentralization of the tendering system. Under the Government Contracts Act (Cap. 25) any government contract exceeding KSh. 250,000 (\$15,500) is not legally binding on the Government of Kenya

unless the contract is signed by the accounting officer (usually the permanent secretary) and countersigned by the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury or a person authorized by him. Similarly, no civil contractor is legally qualified to undertake public construction work unless he is registered as such with the Ministry of Works to insure he meets basic skills in the trade. All contracts over KSh. 750,000 need approval from Treasury. As a result, there have been cases where ministries have not honored tenders awarded by District Tender Boards, and have substituted other contractors. Ministries have also amalgamated district contracts and retendered them at the ministerial level.

In the procurement of supplies at the district level, the District Supplies Officers (DSOs) have sometimes recommended the purchase of stock in excess of normal useage while in some cases, the reverse has occurred. It is vital to know what stock are available in what quantities at specific times, yet few districts maintain adequate inventories of the stocks they have on hand. The development of appropriate records for the purpose of inventory control is an area which would benefit from the extention of micro computers.

On the side of the Private Sector

There is also insufficient understanding of what the District Tender Board procedures involve. Local residence is not enough, as many contractors apparently believe. Completing a dossier on a governmentg tender in accordance with GOK regulations requires some education and experience. As a result, the tender forms in the rural areas are often poorly filled out, bills of quantities poorly calculated, and relevant samples sometimes missing. This makes technical and economic evaluation very difficult, especially if there is only one fully completed dossier. Second, the Government has sometimes experienced delays in the delivery of supplies, and in construction when preference was given to local contractors. Inexperience may have something to do with this. Local businessmen and contractors complain that information on what development projects are available for local tendering is often inaccessible, or that it reaches them a few days before the closing date

which puts them at a disadvantage because they are forced to prepare their bids in haste.

There appears to be a case for faster and wider information dispersal at the district level on available projects and supplies to tender. More information leads to more competition and lower costs. To this end, officials of the District Tender Boards should establish contacts with the district branches of the Kenya Chamber of Commerce, and the African Building Contractors Association in order to get them more involved in local development projects. The RMRD project should certainly address itself to this problem.

IV. TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR DISTRICT FOCUS AND BUDGET RATIONALIZATION

Training is one of the basic components of RPII. The proposal presented by HIID to the Kenya Government,³⁶ envisaged the provision of training under three broad categories: (1) Degree programs (24 person years) at the graduate level to strengthen district planning cadres; (2) seminars for district executive officers in conjunction with the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) and Government Training Institutes; and (3) short-term seminars for non-official participants in district planning.

These terms have been interpreted liberally in the five year duration of RPII. This pragmatism and change to suit circumstances accounts for the large measure of success which we consider RPII to have accomplished in the field of training. As in the case of planning and budgeting, GOK and other donors collaborated in the effort, and it will be difficult to assign a definite "weight" to HIID's contribution, especially since "team work" is the watchword in the Kenyan civil service training system. By the same token, the training scheme envisaged by HIID has run into some problems, none of which were of HIID's or GOK's making, and many of which could probably not been foreseen by any of the project's architects in 1981.

We discuss the impact of training undertaken under the auspices of RPII in five main areas: (1) The National Training Strategy for District Focus and Budget Rationalization; (2) graduate training; (3) short-term mid-career training; (4) counterpart training; and (5) information brokerage.

³⁶Rural Planning Project Phase II (A proposal submitted to the Government of Kenya by the President and Fellows of Harvard College on behalf of HIID), pp. 20-24

1. National Training Strategy for District Focus and Budget Rationalization

The efforts undertaken by HIID in training personnel engaged in the District Focus for Rural Development and Budget Rationalization programs have generally followed the contours articulated by the Kenya Government in its various policy documents and public statements. This approach has been blended into the objectives specified in the original contract agreement between GOK and HIID (particularly on post-graduate courses) with those incorporated in Amendment One of 1981 which specified HIID's obligations for RPII.³⁷ This has resulted in some important off-shoots to the main project which the HIID team has vigorously pursued. (e.g. training in the use of micro-computers). All this has immediate relevance to the long-term viability of decentralized planning and budget rationalization, but it has made HIID's role in training very diverse and taxing:

Production of Background Papers and Provision of Technical Support

Since the beginning of District Focus, the HIID staff has devoted a considerable amount of effort to writing background papers and providing technical support to for a wide variety of training workshops and seminars at the national, provincial and district levels. These activities are described at length in the final report.³⁸ In this task, the HIID staff worked intimately with the Permanent Secretary for Development Coordination in the Office of the President (OP) where the overall supervision of the District Focus program is located.

From the perspective of OP, HIID staff and their activities are considered as part of the RPD and MNPD, and not as the contractor for RPII. As such, the technical assistance rendered by the team is regarded as an RPD input into the overall process of OP's implementation of District Focus. Thus, public documents on District Focus, the

³⁷ See Amendment One to the Rural Planning Project, 29 June 1981

³⁸ See Rural Planning Project II; Final Report, Op. Cit., pp. 17-23

production of which involved the collaboration of OP, RPD and HIID staff, are officially published as GOK papers originating in OP.³⁹

Some of the most fundamental documents in Kenya's District Focus Program currently being used in training at various levels have originated in this manner, and they have received substantial technical assistance from RPII personnel. The popular "Blue Book" in its original and revised versions is one example.⁴⁰ Others are the widely used manual, National Training Strategy for District Focus,⁴¹ and District Focus and Population Planning,⁴² an important document in view of official GOK emphasis on family planning.

Between September 1976 and February 1986, RPI and RPII together produced some 128 documents, reports, research paper and memoranda,⁴³ and although only 16 of these were produced specifically for "training," many of the others have been used as teaching materials in workshops and seminars. In this task, close liaison has been maintained between the RPD and the National Training Committee on District Focus which is based in the Directorate of Personnel Management in the Office of the President.

Despite the richness of this material, one major problem needs to be pointed out with regard to the profusion of circulars and reports which arrive in the districts--most of them are left unread. District level executives claim that many of the documents published by the RPD, including, as noted above, important circulars containing guidelines for procedures, are too lengthy and often difficult to comprehend. Part of the problem, which is a subject for further investigation, is that district officials say that they are too busy with their daily tasks to

³⁹It is customary within GOK, for the ministry in charge of a given policy area to issue public documents in its name.

⁴⁰See particularly the most recent revision of 1987.

⁴¹Office of the President, National Training Strategy for District Focus, (Nairobi: Government Printer, March 1985)

⁴²District Focus and Population Planning

⁴³Ministry of National Planning and Development, Kenya Rural Planning Projects: Expanded Documentation List, (Nairobi, February 28, 1986)

take time out to read the material they receive from the RPD. Clearly, the RPD must assess the extent of this situation, and adjust its printed output accordingly.

Direct Participation in Training for District Focus

As part of the RPD team dedicated to this task, HIID personnel were active as the secretariat for the National District Focus Seminar held in March 1983, and the Provincial Seminars which followed at KIA in April. During RPI and RPII, HIID has also been responsible for organizing the "Annual Seminar for DDOs," an exercise which we regard as one of the most important innovations of the Rural Planning Project. The PPOs, RDF Engineer-Advisor, some DEC members and the ASAL program officers have also been participants. These seminars have covered a different region of the country each year, and have generally lasted from three to five days. Topics on the status of District Focus, Budget Rationalization, the District Plans and Forward Budget Annex have been covered. The only problem here is that there is too much material to be covered in so short a time. From the discussion in Section III on the preparation of the annexes, it is clear that more training is called for if decentralization is to be more effective. It was also evident from our visits to the field, that an evaluation of the impact of the training provided to date is long overdue. Although it is possible to list the diverse array of courses, seminars and workshops which have been laid on by the RPD, and although one can determine the number and positions of the officials who have attended these programs, there has been no assessment to date on the actual impact of these training activities on the performance of these officials in the field.

HIID's Role in National Training Institutions

The Directorate of Personnel Management organizes regular training courses for civil servants at different levels at the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA), the Government Technical Institutes (GTIs) at Mombasa and Maseno, and the District Development Centers at Matuga and Embu. Where such training sessions feature material on district planning and budgeting, RPD expertise has been called in and HIID personnel have participated in a large number of courses set up in this

manner. Topics dealt with have included District Focus itself, budgetary reform, the role of micro-computers in budgeting and planning, project selection and appraisal, the RDF, project management, national planning goals and their underlying political philosophy.

Once again, assessing RPII's singular contribution in this field is made difficult by the multiplicity of participants in what is essentially a team effort. The District Commissioners, for example, received training in decentralized planning in the United Kingdom at the University of Birmingham's Center for Development Administration, and also at KIA. Most of the DCs with whom we talked felt that they had benefited from both the Birmingham and KIA courses for different reasons. The Birmingham course and the field trips in the UK exposed them to efficient administration, the rule of law, and the overall low profile of the civil service. The KIA training was also regarded as especially useful for the opportunities it provided the DCs to interact informally outside of class and to compare notes; in other words, as a forum for lateral communication. Some DCs felt that the KIA lectures, though informative, tended to be somewhat pedantic. Almost all called for more "practical" type exercises, and field trips which would focus discussion on typical district-specific projects.

Members of the HIID team have also been involved in KIA District Focus courses for District Officers and district heads of departments. Approximately 1,140 such officers have so far attended a four week course on District Focus, but there remain 2,860 officers who have not. HIID training expertise and training manuals have also been deployed in courses for middle and lower-middle cadres of the civil service at the GTIs and at the District Development Centers. Our interviews with government officers who had attended these courses elicited generally favorable responses. Officers with scientific or technical backgrounds--agriculture, veterinary science, engineering, etc.--found the course content on development management as particularly useful, and provided them with new and necessary skills.

At the Kenya Institute of Administration, the background instruction materials prepared under RPII and the HIID staff involved with training, were highly praised. The only major criticism appears to be, in the words of one institution head, that "relations between the

RDP trainers and ourselves are essentially ad-hoc and unstructured." RPII has thus played a significant, albeit indirect, role in training through the officially designated national institutions. All this suggests that under RMRD, there should be a greater institutionalization of RPD input into training for District Focus, and a more stable and systematic relationship between the RPD and the national training institutions. It must also be remembered, however, that while HIID has (and should continue) to be responsible for making selected inputs into the training process, the contractor is not responsible, except for the occasional lecture or seminar, for the actual implementation of the training programs themselves as this is the task of the national training institutions. Thus, while a more systematic and institutionalized relationship between the RPD and the national training institutions is desirable, the relationship must be such that the different roles each play in the training process remain distinct.

Post Graduate Training Overseas

Under the terms of its contract, HIID was required to provide 24 person years of advanced (post-B.A.) degree training. By the end of the contract period, 14 Kenyan officers had received 22 person years of training in economics at various American universities which is 92 percent of the original target. We interviewed four of the 14. Two had received M.A.s in development economics at Vanderbilt University; one had taken a similar program at Cornell, while the fourth had studied physical and regional planning at MIT.

All four felt that they were better officers for having pursued the graduate training provided by RPII. However, there were differences of opinion regarding the relevancy of their respective curriculums to their subsequent work. It was generally agreed that theoretical work was covered competently, but that there was a lack of LDC application in general, and African case-study material in particular. Except for the trainee who had studied regional planning, none of the other participants felt that most of the academic skills they had obtained were applicable in their day to day ministerial duties. On the other hand, all felt that their exposure to students, faculty and literature

of non-Kenyan origin were useful, because of the comparative perspective these provided.

In response to this criticism, the HIID team has designed a more specific degree of Master of Professional Studies to be undertaken at Cornell University by a select number of the most qualified graduate officers. This is a task-oriented, professional degree for rural planners that is supervised by Professor David Lewis who was the senior HIID advisor to the RPD from 1982 to 1985. The amount of Kenya specific content in the MPS curriculum has been increased since Lewis's return to Cornell, including the writing of a thesis on some aspect of Kenyan development. A total of twelve officers of the MPND have attended Cornell to pursue the MPS degree since September, 1984, though only two were directly funded by RPII. Of the twelve, six have returned to Kenya to take up positions in the MPND while another six, who have been funded under RMRD went to Cornell in September 1986, remain in the U.S. An additional seven officers will go to Cornell in September, 1987, and six more will go in 1988 under the terms of RMRD.

A serious problem with the overseas graduate training program, however, is the high rate of attrition in each cohort of returning trainees. Only 10 of the 14 graduates sponsored by the MPND were retained by the Ministry as of September, 1986, and more officers were poised to leave for better paying jobs in parastatals (mainly the Central Bank) or in the private sector. The root of the problem is well-known to GOK and beyond the contractor's control--the remuneration scales attached to the scheme for economists and statisticians in the Kenya government. Given present "market rates" for an M.A. in economics, these scales are simply not competitive; hence the desire to leave for better paying jobs. By one account,⁴⁴ 40 percent of group 'J' and 'K' entrants in the MPND in any one year are bound to leave. Our interviews, however, reveal that the non-competitive salary scale is only part of the explanation.

"Frustration at work," as one graduate who had left RPD put it, appears to be an equally strong motive. Lack of satisfaction arises from job assignments which do not call for any of the acquired skills,

⁴⁴Final Report, p. 99.

little prospect of upward mobility, and especially from a lack of access to policy and decision-making duties. Two of the graduates with whom we talked were particularly troubled by what they termed "a lack of challenging work assignments." All this suggests that a review of the Scheme of Service for Economists and Statisticians must be accompanied by the assignment of graduates to relevant and more responsible duties. A comparison of the recent MPS graduates with their predecessors would also be instructive to determine whether and to what extent the Cornell degree program better prepares MPNP officers for their assignments in the Ministry following their return from the United States..

Short-Term Training

Some of the unused funds set aside for university level training went into mid-career short term courses for officers handling different aspects of rural planning. The three beneficiaries of these courses have continued serving RPD and we propose that further thought be given to the potential of this sort of training alongside the formal degree training at Cornell. Short-term courses ought to be used in rewarding the most effective officers.

4. On-the-Job Training for Counterparts

Members of the HIID team consider that working alongside Kenyan officers within the RPD is another effective way of transferring skills to Kenyan administrative personnel. The basic assumption here is that a collegial atmosphere prevails, which is not always the case in all working relationships. Most Kenyans with whom we discussed the matter said that "a lot depends on the HIID officer you are assigned to." Some past HIID advisors were thought to be overly officious, impatient, and reluctant to delegate responsibility to their counterparts--a problem most keenly felt by two recent post-graduate trainees. The present senior advisor, however, was singled out for praise as someone who "tosses me the ball, and tells me I'm responsible for getting the job done." The relationships between members of the HIID team and their Kenyan associates have been many and varied, and on the whole they have been highly productive. The context within which these relationships form, however, has changed greatly since the HIID team joined the RPD in

1976. Irrespective of the particular individuals, the relationship between the technical assistance advisor and the host country officer is one that steadily evolves (indeed should evolve!) over the course of any project of this type. This basic fact and the role of technical assistance in institution building is explored in some detail in Section VI.

5. Information Brokerage

This aspect of HIID's activities is also discussed in Section VI. For the purpose of assessing HIID's impact on training, it suffices to note that HIID takes credit for having put Kenyans in touch with potential donors of training funds in the field of rural development. This has been the case with USAID, the British Council, and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. The results are remarkable. Of the current group of 40 DDOs, eleven have benefited from short-term courses organized in this manner.

V. THE INTRODUCTION OF MICROCOMPUTERS

1. History and Utilization

The introduction of microcomputers into the operations of the RPD and other units of the MPND, and the spread of microcomputer technology to other ministries of the GOK, can only be described as an unintended "bonus" of RPII. The introduction of microcomputers is never mentioned in the terms of reference of the grant agreement signed between USAID and GOK in 1981. Nor is the introduction of this technology mentioned in the contract agreement between HIID and GOK of the same year. By the end of 1983, however, microcomputers were very much on the agenda of the contractor, the RPD, and the parent ministry.

The introduction of microcomputers into the GOK began in late 1981, and provides an instructive example of the opportunities and constraints which exist for the utilization of this technology in the context of development administration and foreign assistance. Initial introduction occurred not in the MPND, but in the Finance Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development (MOALD) by members of a HIID advisory team then under contract to that Ministry. Microcomputer systems were developed in MOALD to improve the monitoring of expenditures, the preparation of the budget, and the allocation of AIEs--all tasks which were similar to those which concerned the RPD as it grappled with the production of the 1984-88 district plans, the monitoring of the RDF, and the preparation of the Annual Annex and Forward Budget. The idea that the introduction of microcomputers might be appropriate for RPII was thus one that emanated from the "HIID community" in Nairobi, and is but one example of how the informal exchange of information between expatriate members of foreign assistance organizations leads to new initiatives in donor assistance: In February 1983, the new Management Advisor of the HIID team in RPD, completed a detailed feasibility study examining the potential uses of

microcomputers in carrying out the District Focus policy.⁴⁵ As a result of his findings, the Ministry agreed to purchase four Osborne microcomputers and one Apple which were capable of running selected software packages for the purpose of word processing, simple statistics, and data base management.

The first use of the new technology for RPII occurred towards the end of 1983 during which time the RPD was overseeing the final drafting and production of the 40 district plans for the Fifth Development Plan of 1984-88. Whereas the drafting of the district plans for 1979-83 had taken almost two years to complete, and were not finished until after the beginning of the plan period, the drafting of the 1984-88 plans took six months, and the plans were presented to President Moi on the twentieth anniversary of Kenya's independence in December 1983. The actual drafting was done by six local word processing firms in Nairobi who were supervised in the effort by the Management Advisor. The rapid drafting and production of the district plans involved only word processing, but provided dramatic evidence of the utility of microcomputers. The use of micros for word processing by the RPD and other units in the MPND has expanded steadily since 1984 and the presence of this equipment is now a common sight in the Ministry.

It is not an overstatement to say that the rapid production of the 1984-88 district plans captured the attention of senior administrators in the parent ministry, and led to the subsequent spread of the technology. Whereas before the plans were produced, microcomputers were regarded with some skepticism, afterwards the level of confidence in the technology rose. This confidence, combined with the fact that the Ministry's Government Computer Services Centre (GCSC) did not have the capability to oversee the operation and application of micros, led in April 1984 to the creation of a new unit within the RPD, the Management and Information Systems (MIS).

⁴⁵The Management Advisor for RPII from 1983 to 1986 was Clay G. Wescott. He was succeeded in 1986 by Stephen Peterson. Several papers have been written documenting the introduction of microcomputer technology by HIID. The most relevant for the purpose of this evaluation is Clay G. Wescott, Microcomputers for Improved Budgeting by the Kenya Government, Development Discussion Paper No. 227 (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development, April, 1986).

The MIS and its management advisor were charged with four basic tasks: (1) To assist senior management in improving planning and budgeting processes on a sustained basis. (2) To assist department heads in designing improved monitoring systems for government revenue, expenditures and debt, development project status, and donor coordination. (3) Supervising other microcomputer consultants and contractors, and liaising with Government computer programmers in adapting standard packages to compile databases and produce reports in support of the above systems. (4) Advising on requisite manpower development and training.

Since the establishment of the MIS, microcomputers have been applied to an every increasing array of tasks within the MPND, the Office of the President, and other ministries of the Kenyan government. In 1984, the MIS in cooperation with the Office of the President, developed a database known as the Development Project Status Reporting System (DEPRES) to keep track of more than 1,100 development projects launched by various ministries. In the same year, the MIS compiled a Compendium on Development Cooperation in Kenya for the purpose of tracing and monitoring the expenditures of all donor funded projects. Yet another project reporting system developed by the MIS is the database for monitoring projects supported by the RDF, a highly useful system that has contributed to the dramatic rise in the completion rates for these projects. The MIS has also developed databases for the purpose of inventory control for the Ministry of Works and Hospital Stores.

Perhaps more significant, has been the application of microcomputer technology to the preparation of the national budget. Beginning with the preparation of the budget estimates for the 1985/86 financial year, the MIS has worked closely with the PF&EOs to expedite the budgetary process and improve the quality of the estimates produced. Camera ready copies of the budget are now produced directly by the ministries thereby eliminating the laborious typesetting phase. All calculations are now done automatically thus reducing error. Most important in respect to the integration of the planning and budgetary process at the district level with that at the national level, the application of micro computers has greatly facilitated the

disaggregation of budgetary data, and could eventually eliminate the delays in communication between the central ministries and district department heads. For all these reasons, the application of microcomputers to the budgetary process has been warmly welcomed by senior administrators including the permanent secretary in the MPND and the Ministry of Finance. The only problem at this point is how to accelerate the spread of this application throughout the GOK. Thus, at the time of our field evaluation, the MIS had succeeded in applying microcomputer technology to the budgetary process of five ministries (MPND, OP, Agriculture, Livestock Development, and Water) and had begun to apply the technology to five more (Education, Science and Technology; Health; Transportation and Commerce; Works, Housing and Planning; and Wildlife and Tourism). Given that the GOK is divided into more than two dozen ministries, the computerization of the budgetary process throughout the government is a long term exercise that will require several years to complete.

As the work of the MIS has grown, the day to day operation of the section has expanded beyond the supervisory capacity of the management advisor provided by HIID. At the beginning of 1985, USAID provided a grant to Thunder Associates, to assist the MIS in systems design including the procurement of additional microcomputers and related equipment and for the development and/or modification of appropriate software. Thunder Associates has also provided training to MIS personnel, and since September 1985 has had a separate contract to assist in the computerization of the budgetary process.

By the end of RPII, there were approximately two dozen IBM PCs or IBM compatible computers in the MIS and adjacent offices in the RPD. An additional 14 machines, including nine Compaq computers that are compatible with the IBM AT, have been added since that time. The MIS thus constitutes the center of microcomputer expertise and equipment in the GOK. A recent survey conducted in late 1986 indicated that there were now approximately 130 microcomputers of various manufacture and design installed in approximately fifteen ministries of the Kenyan government.

In addition to the repository of expertise at the MIS, the RPD established three experimental microcomputer installations outside

Nairobi at the provincial headquarters in Embu, Nakuru, and Kakamega. Each of these centers was equipped with two PCs and two consultants who were assigned to the Provincial Planning Officer (PPO). The history of these satellite centers has been mixed, in part because the role and responsibilities of the PPO has been severely reduced under the District Focus strategy, and in part because the terms of reference for the centers are undefined. Performance of the centers is thus largely a function of the capability and personality of individual staff. In Kakamega, where the head of the computer unit is a particularly imaginative and outgoing person, the provincial microcomputer center has become involved in a wide range of projects including the tracking of student performance on standardized tests on a school by school basis. In Embu, on the other hand, where the two staff members are relatively shy individuals, little has been accomplished except the training of provincial and district clerical staff in word processing skills. Such training, unfortunately, has been a wasted effort, because none of those trained have access to microcomputers on which to utilize their new skills. The situation in Nakuru falls somewhere in-between.

The contrasting performance at Embu and Kakamega suggests that where the head of the provincial computer unit actively seeks to apply the technology to the performance of tasks that are both valued by local officials (especially district heads of department) and/or prominent citizens, and feasible to do on a regular basis, a demand for microcomputer services can be created in the rural areas. Where, on the other hand, the staff is passive and cannot demonstrate a use for the technology, the provincial computer unit will be underutilized. Given this situation, a recommendation by the Director of the RPD and the HIID management advisor to the Permanent Secretary of the MPND in October, 1986 to concentrate the future spread of microcomputers on PF&EO operations in more ministries in Nairobi instead of establishing more micro centers at district and provincial headquarters, was a sensible one.⁴⁶

⁴⁶See memo to J. Githuku (Permanent Secretary, MPND) from J.H.O. Kidenda (Director of RPD), "Strategic Issues of Microcomputer Implementation and MPND's Microcomputer Implementation Schedule," File NO. EPD/SA 67/18/052, October 28, 1986. Another compelling reason for this recommendation as stated on page 6 of the memo, is a substantial

2. Problems and Limitations

Several constraints have emerged since the establishment of the MIS which must be dealt with if the application of microcomputer technology is to spread in an efficient manner. These constraints, which are well known to the HIID Management Advisor, and outlined in the memo of October 1986 are as follows:

The Need for a High Level Steering Committee to Set National Guidelines on Microcomputer Technology

The greatest virtue of microcomputers--their flexibility and ease of use, their appropriateness for decentralized work, and their relatively low cost--has created a situation with which the GOK is illequipped to deal. Although the Government Computer Services Centre (GCSC) has formal responsibility for all official computer activities, the GCSC is unable to exercise its authority due to severe understaffing, and the fact that the nature of the technology makes it extremely difficult to control. Whereas the GCSC can oversee computer operations provided by large mainframe computers situated at a single location and requiring the skills of highly specialized staff, it is unable to deal with the proliferation of more than a hundred machines that do not require the Centre's staff to run. While any attempt to establish centralized control over microcomputers would be counterproductive, a national policy, or at least a set of national guidelines, are highly desirable in respect to the standardization of equipment, procurement procedures, lists of acceptable (i.e. reliable) computer consultants in the private sector, training programs, scheme for personnel service, etc. Space does not permit an elaboration on the above mentioned items which need attention on a system wide basis. Given our own familiarity with the issues surrounding this technology, and our familiarity with the availability of the relevant equipment in Kenya,⁴⁷ all these concerns seem valid. We therefore endorse the

difference in recurrent costs. The annual cost of one work station (i.e. one microcomputer and one printer) at a provincial computer unit is approximately KShs. 11,700 whereas the recurrent cost for a work station at a Nairobi ministry is KShs. 5,100.

recommendation contained in the October 1986 memo to the permanent secretary that a high level steering committee be established to determine a broad set of guidelines for the use of microcomputers throughout the GOK.

Recruitment, Training and Retention of Staff

The day to day operators of computer equipment at the MIS (there are currently about five) are grouped together to form the Microcomputer Unit (MCU), and carry out their duties as private consultants to the MPND and not as salaried members of a permanent staff. The reason for this seemingly curious arrangement is very simple; trained computer operators are in high demand in Nairobi, and can command much higher levels of compensation in the private sector than in government. This situation, moreover, will continue indefinitely because there is presently no separate scheme of government service for this type of personnel. Computer operators are lumped with clerical personnel and are consequently paid below market rates if they accept government employment. Not surprisingly, this situation has created a perpetual shortage and high turnover of trained personnel. As a result, the MCU has been staffed by using USAID funds under RPII, and now under RMRD, to hire personnel on a consultant basis. This is obviously a stop-gap solution to the staffing of the MCU, but it underscores the fragility and vulnerability of the current operation. Stated simply, the operation of the MIS will never become institutionalized, until an appropriate scheme of service can be devised for staff members in the MCU and other civil servants who perform similar tasks. Worse still, the critical work of the MIS in respect to the computerization of the budgetary process, can be brought to an immediate halt or suffer severe delays through any sudden turnover of personnel over which the MPND has no control. The seriousness of this problem cannot be overstated. Thus, as the MIS grows and expands, and the MPND and other government ministries come to rely on its support, the GOK becomes increasingly

⁴⁷ It should be noted in this regard that one of the evaluators (Barkan) is himself a long-term (since 1980) user of microcomputer equipment, and has recently overseen the installation of a network of 35 micros at his home university as well as a smaller group of micros at the Rockefeller Foundation in Nairobi.

vulnerable to staffing constraints. This in turn begs the obvious question: What will happen to the MCU and MIS supported microcomputer operations in other ministries when the HIID team completes its contract under RMRD and there are no continuing external funds to staff the MCU on a consultant basis?

The training of operators of microcomputer equipment is subject to similar constraints in that there is no permanent arrangement for staff training, and current training is dependent on external funds. Most operators are FORM VI graduates who have received some basic training on micros at secondary school or from private computer service centers in Nairobi. Training operators on the specific applications of microcomputer technology to budgeting, data base management for particular government programs, etc. requires further inhouse training at the MIS. Such training is currently provided by Thunder Associates, but over the long run the MIS must develop its own capacity to develop a series of introductory courses in the use of the software it supports. The MIS recognizes this need. The MIS also believes that the widespread adoption of microcomputer technology by government will require that middle-level officers, and not just clerks and secretaries, become "computer literate." To this end, the MIS believes that it should develop training materials for use by KIA in the same manner that the RPD currently supports KIA training programs for District Focus.

Recurrent Costs and Procurement

As indicated above, the annual recurrent costs of each micro-computer work station are not insignificant. Nor are they particularly high, especially when it is remembered that all spare parts must be imported. Recurrent costs for maintaining micro equipment, however, are not currently built into the budget, and must be so included if the technology is to be adequately supported over the long term. In this regard, both the MIS and indeed the GOK also need to develop better working relationships with local vendors of computer supplies and services. The cost of obtaining supplies and service from the private sector is currently excessive for several reasons, and as a result the MIS, via Thunder, provide their own or import it directly from outside Kenya. Here again, the MIS has established an arrangement that works

well for the present, but will not provide for its needs after the end of the HIID and Thunder contracts.⁴⁸ Nor will this arrangement provide supplies and service to micro installations in other government ministries at an affordable cost. If GOK could establish a meaningful procurement policy for microcomputers, it could then negotiate volume purchase discounts with a selected group of local suppliers to provide equipment, spares, and supplies at reasonable cost. Still another issue in this regard is the question of tariffs on imported equipment and supplies, and whether tariffs can be waived when the items are imported for government use.

Overdependence on Foreign Assistance

The introduction of microcomputers into the operations of the RPD, and the spread of this technology to other ministries for the purpose of expediting and improving the budgetary process has been a significant though unanticipated achievement of RPII. It is, however, a particularly fragile achievement, because it has been highly dependent on foreign assistance, both financial and technical, from the start and remains so today. When one remembers that only three years have elapsed since the establishment of the MIS, this level of dependence on foreign assistance should not cause undue alarm provided the MPND and GOK act quickly to deal with the long term issues that have emerged. The HIID team and the RPD are clearly sensitive to these issues, but critical guidance for their solution can only be provided by senior officials at higher levels. It is imperative, therefore, that a high level steering committee be appointed to deal with these issues without delay, and to produce a definitive policy paper. Once in place, it is important that the HIID management advisor together with Thunder Associates assist the committee in the implementation of any decisions it makes. We further

⁴⁸For example, in an effort to reduce costs, the MIS has been importing microcomputers from discount suppliers in the United States. While the unit cost of these machines is usually one third of cost of similar equipment (excluding import duty) sold in Nairobi, the machines are built for the U.S. market. This in turn means that the machines run on 110 electric current which necessitates the purchase of transformers. Warranties on such equipment is also problematic. On the other hand, the cost of similar equipment in Nairobi is highly inflated compared to London and New York, primarily because the volume of sales per dealer is relatively low.

suggest that the HIID management advisor and Thunder Associates eventually prepare a plan for the committee's deliberation which outlines the process through which the efficient utilization of microcomputers in government can continue on a self-sufficient basis after the end of RMRD and the Thunder contract.

VI. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND NATION BUILDING

As noted at the outset of this evaluation, the effort to establish an administrative system for decentralized planning in Kenya has been a twenty year endeavor that has been supported by a series of technical assistance projects of which RPII is but one. From the beginning, the basic purpose of this effort has been institution building and institutional change. As such, the effort to establish a decentralized planning system has been, and continues to be, fundamentally different from other forms of development activity and foreign donor assistance. For this reason, the entire effort, and RPII in particular, provide some interesting lessons which might be applied to other such endeavors.

1. Unique Features of Institution Building Projects

Development efforts involving institutional change have at least four qualities that set them apart from other types of development projects: (1) They are inherently experimental exercises. (2) They require long time-frames to carry out. (3) They require a high level of commitment on the part of both donor agency and host government. (4) They are often subject to a number of external constraints which are beyond the capacity of the technical assistance agent to control. In sum, technical assistance projects concerned with institution building are "high risk" projects. The actual cost of such projects, however, is relatively low when compared to more conventional efforts of donor assistance, and the payoffs are high.

Institution Building Projects are Experimental and "Open-Ended"

TA projects concerned with institution building are inherently experimental exercises, or, to use Korten's well-known characterization, "a learning process."⁴⁹ Put differently, they are "open-ended" projects

⁴⁹David Korten, "Community Organization: A Learning Process Approach," Public Administration Review, October, 1980

in that the knowledge of what is required for their ultimate success, is never fully known at the outset of the project.

Projects of this type involve substantial trial and error, the design of unique solutions, and continuous refinement, because the focal point of the project--an organizational structure of working relationships between human beings--is itself subject to continuous change in respect to its assigned tasks, complement of personnel, budget, etc. Whereas the construction of a road or similar physical infrastructure requires the contractor to apply a known technology to a problem that is clearly defined (e.g. building a road or a bridge between points A and B), technical assistance projects concerned with institutional change, must first invent the organizational configuration or "technology" appropriate for the desired outcome, and then persuade those who preside over existing institutional arrangements that the proposed change (which often diminishes their authority) should take place.

The task, moreover, not only involves the creation of a new organization or the modification of an existing one, but also the establishment a new capacity in the organization that will accommodate change and survive its creators. This is a particularly difficult problem when "outsiders," be they expatriates or senior decision-makers outside the organization to be created or modified (in this case, the administrative team and the hierarchy of development committees in the district), initiate the development of the new institution. One cannot simply "order" or decree a new institution or procedure into being, and expect that the order will be self-executing. Rather, those initiating the creation of the new institution must invariably persuade and negotiate with the members of the new entity, and together shape its procedures and terms of reference to ensure its smooth operation. Such negotiation, especially in the context of a hierarchical organization such as the Kenyan public service, is rarely formal or overt. Nor, is it an adversarial process, but a continuous process of mutual accommodation involving small adjustments between those initiating institutional change and those working within the new structures over the long term.

Institution Building Takes Time

Because they are inherently experimental and open-ended efforts requiring extended persuasion, projects devoted to institution building require much longer time-frames than more conventional development efforts. Whereas the construction of physical infrastructure, or a typical training project are relatively discrete efforts which can be completed in a specific time period of a few months or years, it is not uncommon for institution building projects to take decades. The fact that the combined period of RPI and RPII was just over ten years and part of an even longer effort, should not be regarded as unusual. Another East African example is the University Development Program of the Rockefeller Foundation which sought to build an insitutional strength in the social sciences at the Universities of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi and Makerere University from 1967 through 1979. One of the greatest lessons of this program which, had varying degrees of success, was that the time-frame of the effort far exceeded that envisioned by the those who mounted the program. They underestimated the time-frame required for creating new institutions, as did the those who conceived of the Rural Planning Project, by assuming that institutional change could be brought about by simply providing an initial round of easily identifiable and quantifiable inputs for the new institutional order over a period of three to five years. In the case of both the Rural Planning Project, and the University Development Program, five years proved to be merely the "start-up" and learning phase of a much longer endeavor. The implications of this fact for donor agencies are several and are considered below.

Sustained Support from the Host Country Government

Given their experimental nature and the long time-frames required for their implementation, it should be obvious that institution building projects also required sustained support at the highest administrative and political levels of the host country government to succeed. The history of RPI and RPII, indeed the entire history of the twenty year effort to establish a decentralized system for planning and budgeting in Kenya, is illustrative. During the first stage of the process, from

1967-1975, the idea for a decentralized system for planning and budgeting was a new one supported mainly by academic observers and outside consultants. Although the need for decentralized planning was expressed in the Ndegwa Report of 1971⁵⁰ and some initial steps towards decentralization were taken as outlined in Section I, it is fair to say that the strengthening district level government was not a high priority of the GOK at that time. Government support for district level planning and budgeting increased markedly during stage 2 (1976-81) which is why, of course, the initial grant agreement for the Rural Planning Project was signed between GOK and USAID. Official interest in the effort, however, was confined mainly to senior level administrators in the then Ministry of Finance and Planning, the predecessor to MPND. As discussed previously, the achievements of RPI were relatively modest; in part because of the experimental stage of the effort with which RPI was concerned, but also because RPI was perceived as an initiative of the RPD and its parent ministry, and not as a Government initiative in the broadest sense. The many accomplishments of RPII must therefore be attributed not only to the efforts of the contractor, but also to the high level of support provided by GOK during the contract period, especially since the President Moi's announcement of the District Focus initiative in late 1982. Since District Focus, the need to establish a decentralized administrative system for planning and budgeting has become a top priority at the highest levels of the Kenya government. Since District Focus, the Office of the President has provided critical support to the RPD and encouraged the RPD to expand its efforts. It is not an overstatement to say that it is this high level support that has enabled RPII to accomplish so many of its objectives. Without such support, RPII would have achieved some success, but the gains would have been far more modest. The general lesson from this experience is clear and simple: The extent to which efforts at institution building and institutional change succeed or fail, is proportionate to the presence of sustained and broad based support from the highest levels of the host country government.

⁵⁰Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1970-71, chaired by D.N. Ndegwa, pp. 111-13

Institution Building is Complicated by External Constraints

Because the institutions to be established or modified exist within a broader system, there will always be a number of external constraints which are beyond the scope of the project and beyond the capacity of the technical assistance advisor to remove. Indeed, attempts to do so may be perceived by host country officials as "pushing too hard," and repeated attempts risk undermining the project.

One need not elaborate on this point except to provide an example from RPII which continues, though on a substantially reduced level, in RMRD. This is the problem of how the RPD can obtain the cooperation of the PF&EOs based in Nairobi to provide disaggregated budget ceilings to the districts. The problem which has been discussed at length in Section III, is one over which the RPD and the HIID advisor have no formal authority. Since the days of RPI, the RPD has sought through informal contacts to persuade PF&EOs in selected ministries to cooperate in solving the problem, but until District Focus and Budget Rationalization little progress was made. The RPD and HIID have also sought to make it easier for PF&EOs to solve the problem via the application of microcomputers to the budgeting process. Overcoming external constraints to institutional change, in short, takes time and is achieved through gentle persistence and, in the case of the budget process, repeated attempts to implement the change desired. The informal authority of the RPD to deal with this problem has been greatly increased by District Focus and Budget Rationalization, but as noted in Section III, it is the opinion of the HIID team that the long term solution to the problem of disaggregating budgetary data will come piecemeal through the annual iteration of the process itself. We would concur in this assessment and suggest that this conclusion is instructive for other efforts at institution building in other locales.

2. The Challenge of Institution Building Projects for the Technical Assistance Advisor

Technical assistance projects concerned with institution building require advisors with great patience and skill. Such projects should not be entrusted to contractors without proven track records or who cannot provide personnel with such records. It is imperative, moreover,

that the personnel assigned to such projects exhibit expertise in at least three areas: (1) They should be trained social scientists, including, but not exclusively political scientists and/or sociologists or anthropologists who have a broad comparative knowledge of organizational change and organization theory. (2) They should have a specialized knowledge about the country and society in which the project is to take place. (3) Some, if not all, should have a research orientation and academic perspective of the development process. Put differently, TA projects concerned with institution building require advisors who ask "why" and seek to explain the processes with which they are concerned, and not merely personnel with "can do" "hands on" skills. Thus, someone who is a "wizzard" on microcomputer technology and who once taught mathematics at a Harambee secondary school as a Peace Corps Volunteer, is probably not the person to serve as a TA advisor to the MIS unless he or she has additional skills.

With few exceptions, the staff provided by HIID during RPII were individuals with the highest of credentials and experience. Stated simply, on what we might term "the knowledge dimension," the quality of the HIID team was second to none. Members of the team have been knowledgeable, imaginative, and highly committed to the effort.

Successful TA projects concerned with institution building require more than knowledge on the part of the contractor. They also require the qualities of patience, tact and knowing when it is time to leave. Given the long time-frames required for such projects, the need for patience need not be elaborated upon. The qualities of tact and knowing when it is time to leave, however, deserve some comment.

As with every project, but particularly one that spans a long period, there is an evolution that occurs from project "infancy" to "adulthood." It is clear that at the beginning of a project, and through its middle stages, the provider of technical assistance, must aggressively pursue the goals of the project at hand. This means, in the context of an institution building project, that the contractor, particularly the senior advisor, must play the role of initiator and entrepreneur. He must be careful not to overstep the boundaries of propriety, but he must push the system to its limit. Indeed, as we were told directly by senior officials in the MPND, a senior technical

assistance advisor "is not worth the salary he is paid," unless he does behave in an entrepreneurial and "freewheeling" manner.

It must also be recognized, however, that such behavior, precisely because it does "push the system," occasionally irritates those responsible for the system. In this regard, the technical advisor must be extremely careful to work within the norms of system including the accustomed "channels of communication." The advisor should avoid jumping the chain of command unless requested to do so by those beyond his immediate supervisor. And when so requested, he should inform his immediate supervisor of the extenuating circumstances which led to the request. It is particularly important that such tact be observed as the project matures.

It is also essential that members of the advisory team, particularly the senior advisor, be sensitive to the arrival of the time to leave, and to not "overstay its welcome." Put differently, the advisor must know when it is time to "let go" even when it is clear that there is more work to be done. This is extremely difficult for a contractor that has been involved with a project over a long period, and one committed to its long-term success and survival. It is also difficult for any contractor whose *raison d'être* is that there is work to be done which it can carry out.

The members of the HIID team, and in particular the current senior advisor, are sensitive to these considerations. This is due in part because of the experience of his predecessors, and in part because he oversees a project that is now drawing to a close. As a result, the current senior advisor has been more systematic than his predecessor in delegating responsibility to his Kenyan counterparts. Although RPII has been succeeded by RMRD, both the current senior advisor and his predecessor view the project period as a time of consolidation during which the achievements of the preceding decade are fully institutionalized and full responsibility is assumed by the Kenyan staff. If, in fact, the activities pursued under RMRD are consistent with this perspective, the long term involvement of HIID in the work of the RPD will draw to a successful close.

3. Lessons Learned from RPII

Given the forgoing discussion the lessons learned from RPII for future technical assistance in Kenya, and indeed elsewhere in Africa and the developing world, need little elaboration. Our main argument is that technical assistance projects concerned with institution building constitute a unique category of projects and as such require special conditions and support to complete.

There can be no doubt that compared to conventional projects, projects concerned with the building or modification of institutions are "risky" ventures, because there are many variables which neither the contractor nor the host agency of the recipient government can always control. Nor can the specific outcomes or completion dates for such projects be fully determined before the projects begin. "Success" cannot be guaranteed. The payoffs from such projects, however, are manifold for they bring about fundamental changes in the way the members of a society or government go about their day to day business.

It is difficult to measure in Kenyan shillings or dollars the monetary yield from RPII, but improvements in the completion rate of RDF projects, the time saved in producing the annual budget, greater cohesiveness and coordination between members of the district administration, and the greater responsiveness by these officers to local problems all suggest that there has indeed been a positive economic yield from the project. It is beyond the time-frame of this evaluation to be more specific in assessing the monetary payoff accruing to the project, but if one computes the savings on the RDF alone, which we would surmise is equivalent to at least half the annual budget for the Fund, the annual yield will be in the magnitude of 55 million Kenyan shillings⁵¹ or \$3.4 million which is roughly two thirds of the total cost of RPII.

Because projects with an institutional focus contain many unknowns and entail more risk, donor assistance agencies including USAID generally shy away from such ventures. Institution building projects are not regarded as "efficient" vehicles for "moving money" in terms of

⁵¹The figure of 55 million Kenyan shillings is half the projected budget for the RDF for the 1987/88 financial year. The estimate was supplied by the Danish advisor to the RDF.

the administrative cost expended relative to the project cost. But just as any prudent investor will diversify his portfolio to contain a representation of higher risk and qualitatively different instruments in his total package of investments, so too must donor assistance agencies such as USAID not neglect this important area of development. Building infrastructure, establishing a plant, or providing training to some number of individuals, however, valuable, are not interventions which produce institutional change that both donor and host government regard as desirable and necessary for the overall process of national development. For such outcomes to occur, technical assistance projects similar to RPII are the only answer. Not all will succeed, but benefits from the percentage that do will more than justify the effort made. It is important that USAID ponder this reality.

VII. SUMMARY: THE OVERALL IMPACT OF RPII

Since the late 1960s, the Government of Kenya (GOK) has sought to establish a decentralized administrative system for the purpose of planning rural development policy at the district level. This effort has involved the design and establishment of new administrative procedures and institutions. It has been an process of extended experimentation which began slowly and without visible accomplishments in its early years, but which now gives many indications of having achieved its principal objectives. It is an effort which has passed through roughly four stages, each of which has been supported by USAID. It an effort which has also received substantial support from other donors. And, it is an effort which, during the last four years, has coincided with the most significant initiative the Government of Kenya has taken in respect to rural development since Independence--the policy of District Focus and Rural Development.

Rural Planning II (RPII), which lasted from June 1981 through February 1986, represents the third stage of this effort, and the second for which the Harvard Institute for International Development was contracted to provide technical assistance to the Rural Planning Division (RPD) of the Ministry of Planning and National Development (MPND). During RPII, the fruits of the preceding decade of experimentation began to be reaped as substantial progress was made at refining and institutionalizing the new administrative system for district planning and budgeting. The contractor fulfilled the original terms of reference of its contract, and went beyond these terms to provide critical support for the District Focus initiative, and for Budget Rationalization--the first major effort by GOK to control government expenditures and raise administrative efficiency. The contractor also conducted important R and D work on problems of related interest including urban-rural planning, and procedures for supporting

private sector initiatives at rural development. In specific terms, the accomplishments of RPII have been as follows.

1. The analysis, writing, and production of 40 district plans for the Fifth Development Plan period, 1984-88
2. The design and implementation of new administrative procedures for the production of the Annual Annex to the district plan containing the Annual Work Plan and Forward Budget. The introduction of the Annual Annex has provided the critical link between the district planning process and the district budgeting process, and has greatly increased the importance district officials and local citizens ascribe to the both efforts.
3. The analysis and strengthening of the district administrative machinery for rural planning and budgeting including, but not limited to, the District Executive Committee (DEC), the District Development Committee (DDC), and the hierarchy of development committees below the district level (DvDCs, LDCs, and SLDCs) for the purpose of raising the quotient of public input to the planning and budgetary process.
4. The design of the District Planning Unit (DPU) and District Information and Documentation Centers (DIDCs), and plans for the terms of service, initial recruitment and training of the Assistant District Development Officers (ADDOs) to staff these centers.
5. The design and implementation of procedures to monitor the operations of projects financed by the Rural Development Fund (RDF). The raising of the completion rate of RDF projects from under 40 to 75 percent, in conjunction with other donor agencies (i.e., DANIDA, NORAD, SIDA, and the Netherlands) and GOK.
6. The establishment of a critical set of working relationships between the RPD and the Rural Development Coordinating Committee at Office of the President to support the implementation of District Focus, including the production of background documents by the RPD.
7. Expanded training, both direct and via the Kenya Institute of Administration and related government institutes, of DCs, DDOs, and district department heads in the procedures of district planning and budgeting.
8. Twenty-two person years of post-graduate training at Cornell University, Vanderbilt and MIT for Kenyan officers in the Rural Planning Division.

9. The successful introduction of microcomputer technology into the planning operations of the Ministry of Planning and National Development for the rapid and timely production of district plans and annual annexes. The introduction of microcomputer technology to other ministries for the purpose of facilitating the budgetary process, and for other tasks including inventory and staff control. The establishment of the Management Information Section in the Ministry of Planning and National Development.
10. The beginning of increased tendering by local suppliers for GOK contracts let at the district level as part of district planning implementation.
11. Planning for the successor project to RPII, Resource Management for Rural Development (RMRD): The establishment of the Rural Urban Planning Section within the RPD for the purpose of conducting urban-rural policy analysis. The establishment of an agenda of work to be pursued under RMRD which when completed will result in the mobilization of local resources for the generation of off-farm employment, and the stimulation of private sector initiatives.

Given these accomplishments, RPII can be described as "highly successful" in respect to its overall objective of providing "an enabling (both policy and administrative) environment" for increased government efficiency and economic productivity at the district level. The experience of RPII, together with its predecessor project, RPI, has also provided several important lessons about the nature and duration of technical assistance projects whose purpose is institutional development and change. Because their primary purpose is to effect a permanent change in human behavior, projects of this type are qualitatively different from all other forms of technical assistance. As such, they require relatively long time-frames to implement, and contractors which can provide advisors of the highest quality. They also require long-term support by both donor and host government.

From the standpoint of the donor, projects of this type are more risky than more conventional foreign assistance projects, because "success" cannot be guaranteed. Projects whose purpose is institution building are also more administratively intensive in terms of the number of person years of assistance provided relative to total project cost. The total cost of such projects, however, is relatively inexpensive when compared to more typical forms of foreign assistance. Most important, the impact of institution building projects is likely to be more more lasting, because such projects are by definition concerned with systemic

change. While no donor agency or host government would be prudent to invest only in projects of this type, both would be equally imprudent to neglect the importance of such projects exclude them from their respective programatic agendas. Indeed, the experience of RPII suggests that given the right opportunities, the proportion of such projects in the portfolio should be increased. In this regard, RPII has provided a valuable case study which should be pondered by both the GOK and USAID (both at the Kenya mission and in Washington at the Africa Bureau and the Office of Science and Technology). There is much to be learned from this project which can be transferred to others. As the evaluators of RPII, we hope that this report contributes to that review.

VIII. Recommendations and Suggestions

1. Strengthening District Planning

- a. The DCs and DDOs must regularly remind the members of the DDCs of the content of the District Development Plan and its importance for project prioritization, if the plans are to guide the DDCs in respect to the allocation of the RDF and the preparation of the the Annual Annex (work plan and forward budget). The DCs and DDOs must also regularly apprise the DDCs of national guidelines including Budget Rationalization and Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986.
- b. DCs and DDOs must insure that the agenda, duration and size of DDCs are carefully controlled. The size of DDCs must approximate those specified in the "Blue Book." Extended discussion must be curtailed, especially when it arises from members anxious to introduce new projects that have not been previously recommended by a DvDC.
- c. There must be greater incorporation of project priorities from the sub-location, location and division levels in the project proposals of the DDCs to raise the level of public input into the planning process. The smooth operation of the full hierarchy of development committees below the DDC is essential if the District Focus strategy and district planning process are to realize their shared and often stated goal of increasing public participation in Kenya's development. SLDCs and LDCs must be established where none exist. A further study of the extent, nature and impact of planning activities by SLDCs, LDCs and DvDCs appears warranted as a prelude to strengthening these institutions.
- d. The district development plans currently under preparation must include all projects anticipated by the ministries concerned with project implementation in the district. To be fully integrated, the plans must include district-specific as well as regional and national programs which cover specific districts.
- e. The DDOs need help, and the strengthening of their resource base must be regarded as a high priority by the MPND. The appointment and training of ADDOs must be followed by the speedy establishment of the DPUs and the appointment and training of District Statistical Officers (DStO). The eventual posting of two or more ADDOs per district, especially populous ones, should be anticipated to insure that the hierarchy of

development committees from the SLDCs on up through the DvDCs function smoothly.

2. Strengthening Budgetary Reform at the District Level

- a. Despite great improvement, there remains a need for further, indeed probably continuous, training for district heads of departments on the basics of Kenya's budgetary system--its terminology, nomenclature and procedures. DDOs and District heads must understand how they fit into a wider and continuous process which ends up in one annual document--the national budget.
- b. PF&EOs in all ministries with extensive field staff must be apprised on the importance of the Annual Annexes, and be required to demonstrate that they have used them whenever Estimate Working Groups meet.
- c. Central control on the District Tender Boards' jurisdiction should be relaxed with time, and as these boards gain experience. One place to begin is to clarify to most DDCs what exactly these boards are expected to do.
- d. Greater contacts must be made with district branches of the Kenya Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the National Construction Corporation and the Association of African Builders and Contractors, to alert them on opportunities provided by decentralization. Information of available contracts in the districts should be passed on to the members of these organizations in sufficient time to enable them to bid.
- e. The procedures of auditing and feedback provided by the Office of Controller and Auditor General must be applied more effectively at the district level to avoid abuses in the contracting and tendering system. The District Focus Task Force must seek ways of receiving and dealing with such reports in the course of the financial year. Parliamentary oversight, though important, often comes into the picture too late.

3. Coordination Between the District Headquarters, the MPND, OP and the Implementing Ministries

- a. Although a large measure of interdepartmental coordination at the district level has been achieved by RPII (most notably via the DEC), there are dual or triple lines of authority at the national level of the Kenyan bureaucracy which inhibit efficient decision-making and which are in need of reform.
 - i. Although DCs must ensure the overall effectiveness of District Focus, the powers they have over non-cooperative ministerial department heads is still minimal. This problem is less serious than it was before District Focus, but many district department heads still insist on receiving

instructions from the headquarters of their ministry before acting. Communication upwards for the DC leads to OP; that of executive heads to their respective PS. A procedure must be established which bridges these separate lines of authority.

- ii. DDOs face similar problems. They are expected to coordinate district planning and to follow-up project implementation across several departments and parastatals, but they can only report their unresolved difficulties upwards to the PS/MPND via the PPO. At the latter stage the issue can be taken up with the Office of the President which has overall responsibility for District Focus.
- b. The problem of insufficient coordination between the MPND, OP and the implementing ministries, is particularly serious in respect to the preparation of the Annual Annex and Forward Budget. When implementing ministries do not send the Forward Budget Ceilings to district department heads on time, or when they overspecify the projects on which expenditures are to be made, there is no central agency with the authority to intercede. Similarly, implementing ministries must be made more sensitive to district priorities as reflected in the district plans, and of the vital linkage between the district plans and the national plans. The extent to which the MPND and/or OP should assume this role is a question that demands immediate attention.

4. Training

- a. HIID must continue to work with KIA and other national training institutes to expand training, including short-term refresher courses, for DCs, DDOs and especially the new ADDOs to achieve the objectives stated above in 1e and 2a. It is imperative that the mechanisms be established for such training to be on an institutionalized and self-sustaining basis by the end of the RMRD contract.
- b. Consistent with assisting the national training institutions to institutionalize training for District Focus, it is also imperative that HIID conduct a broad and systematic assessment of the impact of its training programs to date on the day to day performance of previous trainees. Such an assessment is overdue, and must be made before the implementation of any plans for expanded training over the long-term.
- c. HIID should consider expanding the scope of short-term, mid-career training for the most talented officers, alongside the present MPS degree program.

5. Micro-Computers

- a. The GOK must establish a scheme of service for computer operators lest its entire microcomputer operation become increasingly vulnerable to the sudden departure of current personnel.
- b. The GOK must establish a high level steering committee to draw up guidelines for government microcomputer operations on a decentralized basis. These guidelines would be addressed to equipment procurement, training and recruitment of appropriate personnel, budgeting for recurrent costs of the technology, etc.
- c. In respect to equipment procurement, steps should be taken to establish local sources for appropriate equipment at non-inflated cost.
- d. Following the establishment of a steering committee for microcomputer operations and setting of guidelines by that committee, HIID and Thunder Associates should draw up a plan for the utilization of microcomputers in government that ensures a continuous and self-sufficient operation by the end of RMRD and the current Thunder contract.

6. Within the RPD and MPND

- a. Technical assistance concerned with institution building demands a long-term commitment by both donor and host country government, but long-term assistance of this type also requires an evolving relationship between the members of the technical assistance team and the staff of the unit to which it is posted. Having participated in the work of the RPD for more than a decade, HIID's relationship with the RPD is now in what one might best term a "mature" stage. Members of the HIID team must therefore give increased attention to delegating responsibility to their Kenyan colleagues, and to turning over many of the tasks they have performed since the inception of RPI. The long-term impact of HIID's activities under RPII will probably be best served by HIID seeking to consolidate what has been accomplished over the past decade, rather than by pursuing all of the new initiatives anticipated under RMRD. This may pose a dilemma for HIID given its contractual obligations for the "new" project, but in so far as RMRD is also a continuation of RPII, this recommendation is not inconsistent with RMRD's stated goals.
- b. Use of consultants and experts from local institutions (i.e. the University of Nairobi; Kenyan owned consultancy firms) has already been done by HIID. This is a significant step towards building local capacity and skills which should be continued and strengthened.

- c. Given the significant improvement in the completion rates of RDF projects as well as the success of the EEC Micro-Projects, there is increased donor interest in an expanded RDF or the establishment of parallel programs. Overrapid expansion of the RDF, or the establishment of a multiplicity of district development programs by donors are likely to undermine the progress achieved under RPII. The RPD should therefore plan for a modest expansion by the RDF over the next five years, and establish the machinery for coordinating increased input to the RDF from what is likely to be an expanded number of donors including NGOs. The establishment of separate programs by individual donors, even if they replicate those of high quality such as that of the EEC, should be discouraged.
- d. As the administrative infrastructure for district planning and budgeting becomes more elaborate and routinized, increased attention should be given to monitoring the impact of the district administration on the development process. Which of the new administrative units and procedures have had the greatest impact on the lives of rural Kenyans? Which have not? Whereas before RPI and RPII, the challenge was to simply establish a system for decentralized planning and budgeting, the present task is to monitor the impact of the system and then "fine-tune" it.
- e. If the RPD is to retain the best of its recent graduate staff, the Scheme of Service for Economists and Statisticians must be improved.
- f. The expanded use of micro-computers by the MPND should be encouraged, but increased attention should be given to the use of this technology for the performance of analytical tasks rather than merely for word processing. It will also be necessary to improve the Scheme of Service for staff conversant with this technology if the MPND hopes to retain the services of those it currently employs.

7. Within USAID

In addition to being a successful project, RPII provides a valuable case study of the nature of technical assistance projects concerned with the building of institutions. As such, the history of RPII and the entire effort to establish decentralized planning and budgeting in Kenya should be studied by the Kenya mission, and appropriate officers in the Africa Bureau and Office of Science and Technology in Washington.

**ANNEX A: GOVERNMENT OF KENYA OFFICIALS AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS
INTERVIEWED BY EVALUATORS**

At Ministry for Planing and National Development

M. Gachago, Principal Economist, 16/2/87
J.H.O. Kidenda, Chief Planning Officer, 16/2/87
E.N. Njeru, Principal Economist, 16/2/87
J. Otieno, Deputy Chief Planning Officer, 18/2/87
Prof. T.C.I. Ryan, Director of Planning, 17/2/87

H. Bagha, 18/2/87
M. Charles, P.O., Rural Urban Planning Section, 17/2/87
S.M. Gachau, P.O., Rural Support Section, 17/2/87
E. Keli, P.O., Rural Services and Coordination Training Unit
J.M. O'Maroro, S.P.O., Rural Development Fund Section,
19/2/87
D. Nthusi, Management and Information Section, 16/2/87
E.S. Osundwa, Principal Economist, 18/2/87

S. Ramakrishnan, Budget Supply Officer, 18/2/87
M. Munusa, Budget Supply Department, 18/2/87
B.G.K. Oigara, Budget Supply Officer, 18/2/87
S.M. Kinuthia, Budget Supply Officer, 18/2/87

R. Karanja, Microcomputer Consultant, 17/2/87
J. Kimutai, Microcomputer Consultant, 17/2/87
W. Kioko, Microcomputer Consultant, 17/2/87
A. Mboya, Microcomputer Consultant, 17/2/87

John M. Cohen, HIID Senior Advisor, 16/2/87, 27/2/87
Judith Geist, HIID Advisor, 16/2/87, 27/2/87
Alan Johnston, HIID Advisor, 16/2/87, 27/2/87
Stephen Peterson, HIID Advisor, 16/2/87, 18/2/87

At Office of the President, 18/2/87

O.N. Ireri, Deputy Permanent Secretary

At Embu District HQ, 20/2/87

J.A.A. Mwinamo, PPO, Eastern Province

J. Gaknwo, Act. DC
B.O. Adewa, DO
M.K. Mwaniki, DDO

]E. Mucai, DAO
S.N. Njenga, Act. DSWO
P.K. Mugo, Rep. DEO
J.M. Mutua, DSO
J.K. Maiteri, DVO
Catherine Njue, computer unit
Jane Njagi, computer unit

At Kajiado District HQ, 19/2/87

P. Ndemo, DC
T. Nturibi, DDO
D.N.K. Ntihia, DAO
S.K. Mutuku, Dep DEO
E. Munga, DHO
O. Kennedy, DSDO
P.M. Musau, Dep DVO
R.N. Kingori, DWO
S.M. Kimingi, DWE

At Kisii District HQ, 23/2/87

D.B.M. Maina, DC
K. Macharia, DO II
H.J. Saggia, DDO

At Muranga District HQ, 19/2/87

J. ole Waupari, DC
M. Indiazi, DO I
F.M. Munguti, DDO
J.K. Kinoti, DAO
C.N. Wahothi, Rep. DSWO
A. Karuga, Act. DVO
V.M. Kanyana, DWO
M.R. Njuguna, Dep. DWO

At Nyandarua, District HQ, 24/2/87

K. Ng'ayo, DDO
F.O. Otieno, Asst. DSWO (CDO)
M.C. Kiama, DWO
S.W. Njogu, Rural Forrestry Program

At Nyanza Province HQ, 23/2/87

C. Wekullo, PPO

At Rift Vally Provincial HQ, 24/2/87

P.S. Muthui, PPO
A.N. Konyoru, PO
S. Gitanda, DWE for Nakuru District
J.M. Muchoma, DDO for Nakuru District

At Kenya Institute of Administration, 19/2/87

J.D. Kimura, Principal
P.M. Naiya, Head, Urban and Regional Unit
E.M. Kariuki, computer specialist

At Kenya Mission USAID, 25/2/87

Steven Sinding, Director
Laurence Hausman, Deputy Director
Joe Stepanek, Program Officer

James Goggin
Steve Klaus
Doug Kline
David Lundberg
Nick Mariani
Esther Mbayah
Maria Mullei
Curt Nissly
Al Smith
Curt Toh
Peter Weisel

Other

T. Caruso, Thunder Associates, 18/2/87
S. Charaggu, Daily Nation, 19/2/87
Richard M. Hook, former HIID Senior Advisor, 12/2/87, 20/5/87
David B. Lewis, former HIID Senior Advisor, 31/5/87
W.A. Luka, DDO, Kitui, 27/2/87
P.A. Malova, DDO, Bungoma, 27/2/87
P.B. Mjambili, PPO, Western Province, 27/2/87
H. Mule, former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning
and National Development, 27/2/87
J.A. Omungo, PPO, Central Province, 27/2/87

ANNEX B: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED FOR EVALUATION

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ANNEX C: STATEMENT OF WORK FOR EVALUATORS

Background

The concept in Kenya of decentralized planning has a lengthy history. In planning documents produced in the years immediately following independence emphasis was given to the need for development planning to extend to the provincial, district and municipal levels in order to identify investment proposals appropriate to local area and to allow local involvement in the development process. These concepts were elaborated upon and institutionalized through the 1960s and 1970s: district plans had their origins in a pilot area development program which commenced in 1967, the Special Rural Development Programme; planning officers at the Provincial level and Provincial and District Development Committees were established in the First National Development Plan (1964-70); a District Development Grant system was established in 1971; and the district was identified during the Third National Plan period (1974-78) as the operational unit for preparing local plans and implementing selected development activities.

To assist with this effort the Government of Kenya Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOF&P) requested, in 1976, A.I.D. to provide selected technical and commodity assistance. A project was designed, under the title "Rural Planning Project (RP)", and the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) was contracted to assist with project implementation. The activity was located in the MOF and P's Rural Planning Division (RPD). The latter was charged with assisting Government planners to: (1) implement a system for decentralized planning with an increased degree of local participation, and coordinate and review decentralized plans to assure their coherence with national goals; (2) assess information needs and set up systems to collect and use needed information; (3) implement local rural development programs such as the Rural Development Fund, and develop guidelines for identification, preparation, and evaluation of local projects; and (4) develop training programs for officers engaged in decentralized planning and development. HIID was to assist the RPD carry out these responsibilities.

The initial Rural Planning Project extended until mid-1980, at which time a new Project Agreement was entered into between A.I.D. and the MOF and P for a second phase of this effort - a project titled Rural Planning II (RPII). The HIID again was chosen as the contractor. This activity extended until early 1986. In general, it was designed to build upon the activities carried out under the original rural Planning Project. The work to be contracted under this PIO/T is an evaluation of the RPII Project.

Objectives

The principal objective of this evaluation is to assess the impact of the rural Planning II project on administrative systems and planning processes which are being developed to support Kenya's strategy of decentralizing rural development planning so as to promote more efficient and effective use of scarce domestic resources. In

particular, the evaluation will be concerned with the impact of selected inputs and outputs of the Rural Planning II project on the development of those administrative systems and planning processes which provide the "enabling (policy and administrative) environment" for increased economic productivity. A special interest is to examine the role and effectiveness of the technical assistance provided by HIID - an assessment made possible by, among other factors, the extended period which technical assistance was provided - and to glean from this examination lessons for the provision of future TA to Kenya. The project impact will be measured by analyzing indicators of administrative and planning systems capacity in terms of the extent to which it has (i) taken place (ii) resulted in more effective use of development resources, and (iii) resulted in utilization of resources for purposes desired by and appropriate to specific districts and local areas. In carrying out this analysis it will be necessary to evaluate the project with regard to:

- a) the original terms of reference as stated in the Project Agreement and the HIID contract;¹
- b) the flexibility of the project to identify and pursue initiatives not specified in the original terms of reference;
- c) the importance and relevance of these new initiatives; and
- d) the impact of these initiatives

Scope of Work

The specific issues to be addressed will include, but not be limited to the following:

1. An assessment of Project inputs, including
 - a) the availability, quality and timing of personnel (technical assistance and local), funding and materials/equipment;
 - b) the adequacy and appropriateness of support provided by the HIID home office to the project; and
 - c) the relevance of training (both local and overseas) relative to the needs;
2. An assessment of Project outputs and impact on the development of administrative systems and planning processes. The issues to be addressed and selected indicators include:
 - a) lessons learned related to the provision of technical assistance to the Government of Kenya, e.g., approaches to effective use of TA, appropriate role of TA, contractual issues in the provision of TA.

¹See the original terms of reference attached

- b) the extent to which the Project affected the expectations of Kenyans that:
- district plans will be produced on time, used by District Development Committee's (DDCs) and as the basis for budget requests from districts;
 - district annexes will be done each year and will be used by ministries in their forward budgets;
 - district allocation books will be produced and distributed on time, money will be released to districts or, if not, district heads will complain; and
 - AIEs will be released by 30 July
- c) the strategy and policy areas which the Project affected and how. The extent to which the Project's contribution aimed at facilitating more effective and efficient use of scarce domestic resources. The extent to which the Project contributed to changed planning and administrative/budget systems promoting such ends. And, the degree of influence which the improvement in the "enabling environment" had on the economy and rural development.
- d) the effect the Project had on building linkages between the planning and budgeting subsystems. The extent to which that effect improved the capacity of the "enabling environment" to promote Kenya's economic and development objectives.
- e) the difference between district level planning prior to the project and as of 1985. The extent to which the Project facilitated the fostering of economic rationality, emphasis on the completing of projects, selection of fewer but better projects, and district level understanding of resource constraints.
- f) the extent to which the Project contributed to improved project implementation and maintenance of district level investments aimed at increasing rural economic growth and improving the quality of rural life.
- Indicators: utilization of project systems to improve implementation of rural projects, monitoring rural project implementation, tracking of project maintenance and utilization (infrastructure inventories);
- g) the impact of the Project on the timely allocation and utilization of government funds.
- Indicators: timely projection of budget documents; issuance of AIEs on time; use of microcomputers in the Ministry of Planning;

- h) the extent to which the Project's initiatives in regional planning contributed to an improved policy framework which, if implemented, will be supportive of economic growth, efficient use of resources, and the expansion of the private sector.
- i) the effect of the Project's attention to drought relief problems on Kenya's capacity to respond to the pressing needs of the Government and the population
 - Indicators: effective estimation of food import requirements; improved food import scheduling; effective birthing assignments for incoming ships; effective inventory control for food distribution;
- j) the extent to which those officers trained overseas contributed to improved performance of the Rural Planning Department and other units of the Government.
 - Indicators: number of officers trained; period of time spent working on project related tasks after returning from training; work activities of those trained; estimation of the effectiveness of the training received and long term benefits to Government; Project's activities to advise the Government on ways to strengthen its capacity to retain those trained;
- k) the extent to which the local training programs and workshops developed by the project contributed to the building of a more efficient administrative and planning environment for the implementation of government strategies, policies, programs and projects.
 - Indicators: effect of training activities on Government training policies; number of seminars and workshops held; number of officers trained; content and utility of materials used in training; estimation of effectiveness of training efforts;
- l) the extent to which the consultancies undertaken by the Project contributed to any of the above areas of Project influence on the policy and enabling environment.
- m) the contribution of the Project's experience to the body of knowledge, both in Kenya (particularly in Government agencies) and in the international professional community, related to decentralization and budget reform, and other matters.

ANNEX D: GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

ADDO	Assistant District Development Officer
AIE	Authority to Incur Expenditure
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DC	District Commissioner
DCC	Development Coordinating Committee in the Office of the President
DDC	District Development Committee
DDG	District Development Grant program
DDO	District Development Officer
DEC	District Executive Committee
DIDC	District Information and Documentation Centre
DO	District Officer
DPU	District Planning Unit
DStO	District Statistical Officer
DvDC	Divisional Development Committee
EEC	European Economic Community
GCSC	Government Computer Service Center
GTI	Government Technical Institute
HIID	Harvard Institute for International Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KIA	Kenya Institute of Administration
LDC	Location Development Committee
MCU	Microcomputer Unit (in the MIS)
MOALD	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development
MPF	Ministry of Finance and Planning (the prede- cessor to MPND)
MPND	Ministry of Planning and National Development
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development
OP	Office of the President
PPO	Provincial Planning Officer
RDF	Rural Development Fund
RMRD	Resource Management for Rural Development
RPI	Rural Planning Project I (1976-81)
RPII	Rural Planning Project II (1981-86)
RPD	Rural Planning Division (now a Department)
RWP	Rural Works Program
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SLDC	Sub-Location Development Committee
SRDP	Special Rural Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

ANNEX E: BIOSKETCHES OF EVALUATORS

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