

PD - AAY-967  
ISN 60151

KISMAYO PORT PROJECT  
649-0114  
EVALUATION

AUGUST 1988.

MEMORANDUM

March 14, 1988

TO: Dale Pfeiffer, DD

THRU: Richard Rhoda, PROG *jk*

FROM: Emily McPhie, PROG *EM*

**BEST  
AVAILABLE**

SUBJECT: Kismayo Port Project (649-0114) Audit Findings

Tom Lofgren has just shared the attached notes with me regarding the subject audit finding on evaluation. For the record, I would like to note that I concur in the points made by Dan Vincent in his January 24 memo in that the project has been adequately and evaluatively monitored to the most practicable degree. By way of explanation, let me say that the project's logframe is not in the least "logical," i.e., that very practical, physical outputs of port reconstruction were linked immediately - presumably by leap of faith - to an "improvement of economic and social well-being" purpose, a connection that would be very difficult to verify by any means. (This purpose in turn is directly linked to an "improved balance of payments" goal, which again stretches logic, therefore verifiability, beyond usual AID expectations for evaluation.) The ProAg does not specify what "objectives" were to be documented as attained. I would argue that the stated purpose and goal are not reasonably connected to the basic project concept (construction) and cannot realistically be evaluated as a part of the project's achievements. For a project such this, verification of achievements at the output level - perhaps with some documentation and analysis of some of the more logical benefits achieved beyond construction (e.g., increased port traffic and trade) - seems the only meaningful course to pursue.

I cannot explain why such a covenant was included in the ProAg, but I would argue that it was not well thought out and should not be seen as a major point of concern at this stage. Since it was included in the ProAg, it is reasonable for the auditors to have questioned the matter; however, the USAID can reasonably argue that the monitoring system has covered the "evaluation program" to have been established. In addition, as Dan notes, a final evaluation (which is intended to be basically a REDSO engineer's final report on project achievements at the output level) is scheduled for third quarter FY 88; see the attached FY 88 Evaluation Plan, prepared in April 1987, for details.

CC:

ENG: DVincent

CONT: HRBradley

It is believed that neither USAID nor the GSDP were aware, at the time of the execution of the ProAg, that the Navy ships are not seaworthy and cannot be removed from pier. The fact is that the compliance with this CP is not possible and in reality this condition should have not been included in the ProAg. I believe it was an oversight and any further attempts to bring it up again with the GSDP would create negative political impact.

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b) Lack of evaluation during the project implementation

Requirements: The ProAg, Amendment No. 1, Article 5: "Special Covenants, Section 5.1, "Project Evaluation" states the following:

"The Parties agree to establish an evaluation program as part of the Project. Except as the Parties otherwise agree in writing, the program will include, during the implementation of the Project and at one or more points thereafter:

- (a) Evaluation of progress towards attainment of the objectives of the Project.
- (b) Identification and evaluation of problem areas or constraints which may inhibit such attainment.
- (c) Assessment of how such information may be used to help overcome such problems.
- (d) Evaluation, to the degree feasible, of the overall development impact of the Project."

Facts and Compliance

a) Evaluations of all "a", "b", "c", items above has been and it is done regularly and it is reflected in the Monthly Progress Report issued by NAVFAC (with input from FBI on quality control and general inspection) to USAID.

The Monthly Progress Report is a very thorough report which specifically assesses progress, problems, recommendations and gives a clear picture of the project.

b) In addition to "2a" above, the USAID PSC engineer on the site is continuously monitoring the construction, participates in the quality control meetings with NAVFAC, FBI and the Contractor and reports to USAID regularly.

c) In addition to "2a" and "2b" above, NAVFAC/LANTDIV personnel from Norfolk, Va. perform periodic inspections on site; assess progress, identify problems and recommend solutions.

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d) In addition to "2a", "2b" and "2c" above, the Mission Engineer travels to the site every 2-3 weeks to personally evaluate the progress, identify problems and recommend solutions as well as to assess contractual performance by NAVFAC, FBI, USAID PSC engineer and Contractor.

e) A formal evaluation of the entire project was performed by USAID, NAVFAC, FBI and the GSDR at the completion of Phase I of the project (berths 1 and 2). The facility was thoroughly inspected, accepted and turned over to the GSDR for operation in July 1987.

f) Before the FACD of the project, another formal evaluation is scheduled with personnel from REDSO.

Notes: The coverage and continuous monitoring and evaluation this project receives are very comprehensive and proved to be satisfactory in the development of the project. It also appears that the monitoring and evaluation mechanism as described above not only fulfill the requirements of the ProAg but exceed them.

The Kismayo Fort is a construction project and as such the most meaningful evaluation is the one performed upon o/a its final completion. The evaluation of a partially completed phase cannot reveal any additional significant data which would be more useful to the project than the present monitoring and assessment mechanism. For example, what would a "project evaluation" say when evaluating a partly completed building structure or piledriving, etc. A meaningful evaluation however would be necessary when the operation is completed, facility inspected and found to be in accordance with plans and specs. Therefore the selection of the timetable for the final project evaluation o/a the end of construction is more meaningful and cost effective.

Attachments: (2)

cc: Dale B. Pfeiffer, DD  
Lois Richards, DIR

## memorandum

DATE:

January 24, 1988

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION:

Dan Vincent, ENG

SUBJECT:

Kismayo Port Project (649-0114) Audit Findings

TO:

M.P. Bradley, CON

BEST  
AVAILABLE**FOR PROJECT EVALUATION: SEE PAGES 2 and 3.**

The following are my comments regarding the "Potential Audit Findings Report" issued by RICA/N on 1/21/88:

1. Project Excessively Funded: Since we received AID/W's approval to utilize uncommitted funds in the Kismayo Port Project for the rehabilitation of the Kismayo Water System (KWSS), the issue of deobligating excessive funds should be deferred until the PLA decides on whether the KWSS project can be done as a PP amendment or a DEOB/REOB into a new project.
2. No Accounting Control Over Change Order Costs: see my memo to ROICC requesting action (copy attached).

3. AID Paid Port Charges For Which Contractor Was Responsible: see my memo to ROICC requesting action (copy attached).

4. Issues of Noncompliance:

a) Removal of Small Navy vessels from pier during construction

Requirements: The ProAg, Amendment No. 2, Article 5: Conditions Precedent, Item (c), requests: "Evidence that naval or other vessels currently moored at the Kismayo Pier have been removed", as a CP to initial disbursement.

Prior to beginning of construction the Navy vessels were removed from pier to satisfy the CP. Upon receiving notice of compliance with the CP the Navy ships returned to pier.

Facts: Numerous attempts were made by USAID and NAVFAC requesting the GSDR to remove the Navy vessels again but no avail. On March 18, 1986 a meeting was held in the Minister of Public Works office with the Minister, USAID Director and USAID Engineer and the notes from the meeting are self-explanatory (attached).

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
(REV. 1-80)  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1988

# memorandum

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DATE:  
REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:  
SUBJECT:  
TO:

19 July 1988  
F.J. Guymont, Chief Engineer, REDSO/ESA

Somalia Trip Report July 10-17, 1988

File

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Purpose:-

Review design and construction activities at Kismayo Port.

Persons Contacted:

88/1099

- USAID/Mogadishu
  - Dale Pfeiffer A/Dir
  - Dan Vincent, Chief Engineer
  - William Flores, TCN Engineer
- US Navy
  - Bruce Carter, Resident Officer in Charge of Construction
  - Kevin Conley, AROICC, Assistant Resident Officer in Charge of Construction
  - Abdi Mohamed, Engineering Technician
  - Kurt Garris, Inspector
  - PBI Engineer (Warren Busar's temporary replacement).

Accomplishment:-

During this TDY I visited Kismayo port, reviewed the files including the Conceptual Design Report, PBI contract, design drawings, monthly progress reports and the chron file. The following report represents a brief history of the project and some observations. My comments on construction are gleaned from conversations with the various people involved and from the review of the files. I also made some general observations although most of the construction is now finished.

Preconstruction Phase:-

Action due: 8/9/88

The present Kismayo Port was originally constructed under the supervision of the Army Corps of Engineers in the late 1960s. A

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causeway was built from the mainland to 'Serpente Island' about a quarter of a mile offshore. A breakwater was constructed on the ocean side of the island and a prestressed concrete deck was constructed on top of precast prestressed concrete piles and precast and cast in place concrete caps. The L-shaped pier had four berths with a total berthing length of 620 meters. Facilities on the pier consisted of an administration building, two warehouses/transit sheds with refrigerated storage capability, a longshoremen's building, a scale house and utilities.

The columns and the concrete deck showed significant deterioration by the late 1970s. Reinforcing bars had corroded and the deck could not support the design load of 600 pounds per square foot and a concentrated live load equivalent to an H-20 truck. There were numerous cracks in the upper portions of piles and pile caps, several broken piles, exposed and corroded reinforcing steel, salt stains on the underside of the deck and the almost complete deterioration of the concrete curb. Much of the problem has been attributed to washing the concrete aggregate with salt water.

In the late 1970s a new fendering system was installed to protect the deck from berthing ships. The fendering system consisted of bearing piles driven approximately 24 feet into the seabed, two horizontal walls spanning the piles, fender mounting pieces which in turn supported rubber fenders.

At the same time plans for rehabilitating the pier were proposed. Bertelin and Partners, who designed the fendering system, proposed rehabilitating the existing piles by removing the upper part of the existing piles and installing precast concrete collars. The existing deck would be over laid with a new concrete deck. This scheme was not implemented at the time.

TAMS in a 1982 technical evaluation report funded by AID has a number of reservations about this concept including:

- (1) The unknown condition of the piles below the mud line. Many of the piles could have been broken during construction.
- (2) Inspection of these piles would be very expensive requiring work underwater and below deck.
- (3) The proposal scheme would be very difficult because of the confined work space between the piers and the old deck.
- (4) The problem of concrete deterioration might be alleviated somewhat but the fundamental causes of deterioration still remained.

TAMS instead proposed removing the concrete deck structure, cutting the existing piles and constructing a master pile sheet pile bulkhead with one tier of tie rods anchored to a new sheetpile deadman in the original hydraulic fill in the area behind the apron.

Parsons Brincherhoff International (PBI) in 1983 further studied TAMS proposal and a modification to the Bertelin and Partners proposal (one advantage of this scheme is that it promised to be less expensive) that called for removal of the deck, pile caps and the deteriorated "upper portions of the piles". PBI also studied other possible designs because of possible uncertainties related to the soil conditions below the mud line. Coral stone was a possibility and this would make driving piles difficult and expensive. The coral would have to be predrilled, broken up or removed.

Two possible concepts that were reviewed in detailed were the concrete block wall and the steel sheetpile cell. The concrete block wall concept is simply layers of unreinforced concrete blocks on a prepared gravel or stone base. Stone fill is placed behind the gravity wall to reduce both the lateral pressure and the amount of concrete blocks necessary. The concrete block wall had to be beyond the edge of the pier (reducing the harbor size). The new fendering system would have to be removed.

The steel sheetpile cell concept consisted of individual large 48 foot diameter circular cofferdams. The cellular cofferdams are filled with hydraulic fill dredged from the harbor basin. This concept uses a large amount of imported steel and requires precise sheetpile driving to get tight closure. As was the case with the concrete block wall the steel sheetpile cell concept required construction beyond the edge of the existing pier.

The costs estimated ranged from \$36.1 million for the master pile bulkhead to \$40.3 million for the steel sheetpile cells. The costs were broken down into foreign exchange, local currency and local labor content. Other factors evaluated in a qualitative fashion included general appearance, longest useful life, least routine maintenance, adaptability to future operational changes, local acceptability, least operational interference during construction, adaptability to early start and completion, adaptability to staged construction, smallest construction uncertainty risk, most favorable environmental effects. The concrete block wall concept scored the highest followed by the master pile bulkhead and steel sheetpile cells. The key factors favoring the concrete block wall concept were the use of locally available aggregates, the use of local labor, long life and minimal maintenance.

Availability of aggregates in the quantity and quality had to be confirmed and a materials source investigation was recommended. Because of delays of materials sources and the resulting inflationary impact coupled with questions of the quality of local labor, the master pile bulkhead alternative was chosen (page 9-5 PBI Conceptual Design Report, April 1983).

While the design and construction IFB package were being finalized by PBI, the form of the construction contract was being debated. There was general feeling within AID that a host country contract was not feasible. It was felt that too many contractual delays and claims would result because Somalia's institutional weaknesses and inexperience with construction contract administration. Since AID was not familiar with port construction, a direct AID contract was likewise not very attractive.

Since the U.S. Navy was active in Somalia it was decided that they should administer the construction contract on AID's behalf. A Participating Agency Services Agreement (PASA) was signed with the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) on April 4, 1985 for \$35.1 million after much negotiation in 1984 and early 1985 among AID/W, USAID and the Navy. The PASA included \$31.362 million for construction plus a contingency of \$1.837 million. The Navy's cost for administering the contract including supervision and inspection totalled about \$1.9 million.

Construction Phase:-

Construction bids were opened on June 27, 1985. The low bidder was George A. Fuller Company at approximately \$20 million. The bids ranged as high as roughly \$28 million with a cluster toward the upper end. This compared to the engineer's estimate of \$34.949 million. Part of the reason for Fuller's low bid was the proximity of work in Saudi Arabia that was just finishing. Mobilization costs were less. Also Fuller proposed to staff the senior positions with Greek nationals. The contract was payable in dollars with the exception of a 105 million Somali shillings local cost component. On September 9, 1985 the construction contract was signed with George A. Fuller (GAFCO). Three of the bidders protested GAFCO's eligibility but it was determined that they qualified as a U.S. firm.

On September 24, 1985 the PASA with the NAVFAC was reduced to \$22 million to reflect the lower than anticipated bids. NAVFAC's portions for managing the construction was about \$1.5 million. PBI's engineering services, at a cost of \$700,000, were not included in the PASA but were funded directly by AID. PBI's senior engineer during the design was retained for the construction phase under the administrative control of NAVFAC. AID also stationed a fulltime Third Country National (TCN) engineer in Kismayo for the duration of the project.

NAVFAC had authority and responsibility for:-

- construction and related services
- methods of accomplishment
- inspection
- acceptance
- payment to contractors

- modifications and design changes within the scope of work
- contract administration
- contract termination
- liaison with Somali officials on such items as customs clearance

NAVFAC stationed a resident engineer and inspectors in Kismayo. Overall management was by the Regional Officer in Charge of Construction (ROICC) in Mogadishu.

By February 1986, GAFCO had mobilized on site and erected its prefab housing, installed utilities including a generator and packaged water treatment plant, and assembled prefabricated office space for both itself and ROICC. The contractor's quality control laboratory, mainly for concrete and soils testing, was also completed. Removal of the fender system and walling at Berths 1 and 2, the removal of cleats and bollards, H piles, precast concrete deck and pile caps was well along. Construction of the batching plant was underway. Quarry sites for aggregate had been identified and approved.

Steel and tie rod shipments began arriving in mid 1986. Excavation for the deadman and the bulkhead commenced and sand fill and filter course material was deposited at berths 1 and 2 and preparations for pile driving utilizing a floating crane were begun. The project was on schedule for its completion date of June 11, 1988. However, the contractor's method of placing the filter course resulted in the work having to be repeated a number of times and over excavation of the deadman channel resulted in excess material requirements (at no extra cost to the project). Also the quality control program was not performing as well as desired and changes were made in quality control personnel.

Pile driving activities in August 1986 for Berth 1 including bollard foundations, deadman and bulkhead sheets presented problems. The contractor had problems positioning and operating his pile driving equipment, particularly the impact hammer. Additional pile driving engineers were hired. In September a number of deadman sheetpiles had to be removed because they were out of tolerance. In late 1986 driving of the bulkhead piles, deadman and placement of tie rods improved and by January, of 1987 all major steel work had been completed on Berths 1 and 2 and compaction of the fill had begun. Construction of the generator building was well along.

In early 1987 placement and compaction of fill in Berths 1 and 2 continued and construction continued on the generator building. Construction of the water pump and fire pumps buildings on Berth 1 began. Installation of the cathodic protection for the tie rods and bulkhead and construction of the septic tank also started. By June 1987 installation of electrical, water, and new petroleum pipelines had been completed. Compaction and grading of subbase material was completed and the concrete deck was poured. Berth 1 was handed over in June and Berth 2 in July of 1987. Training in the operation of the water pumping plant and the generator building was carried out in June. Training in the operation of the fire pump facilities took place in August.

Once construction was completed on Berths 1 and 2 demolition began on Berths 3 and 4. A potential serious problem occurred when the foundation of transit shed 2 settled and shifted causing a number of cracks in the building. This occurred during the excavation of the deadman for Berths 3 and 4. A structural engineer from FBI's home office was brought in and he determined that no major structural damage had taken place. The cracks were plastered.

The rest of the construction proceeded according to schedule. The difficulties encountered in driving the piles in Berths 1 and 2 were overcome and the work proceeded more smoothly.

Earlier in 1987 a change order of \$4.6 million was negotiated and the NAVFAC PASA increased by that amount in May and September 1987. The change order called for the demolition and replacement of the administration building, the extension to Berth 1 for the fishing pier, the electrical system interface with city power, repairs to the water system (new pumps at the Kismayo Water treatment plant) and repairs to the transit sheds, banana warehouse and scale house.

By the end of 1987 the bulkhead, deadman and tie rods for Berths 3 and 4 had been installed and select fill and compaction began. Compaction and filling continued through early 1988 and by June Berths 3 and 4 including mooring hardware, fendering and dolphins were completed. After a one month maintenance period, Berths 3 and 4 will be turned over to the Port (July 1988).

The work on the Auxiliary Facilities Change Order was well underway at the time of my visit July 11-13. The new administration building foundation was completed and columns were up to the first floor. Pile driving operations on the Berth 1 extension were in progress and pumps had been delivered to the Kismayo Water Treatment Plant. This work is scheduled for completion in September of 1988. There is also a possibility of change order of about \$50,000 for repairs to the causeway. In October a formal dedication ceremony, which will include the high GSDR officials, is scheduled.

The quality of the construction appears to be good. There was some minor cracking of the concrete pavement at Berths 1 and 2 but the settlement does not seem to be the problem and minor patching is all that is necessary. The ROICC checked compaction results and feels confident settling will not occur. There is also some damage to the concrete curbs along Pier 1 caused by improperly docked ships. These can and should be patched by Kismayo Port work crews. There is a one year warranty on the construction work and provisions have been made for the NAVFAC to visit Kismayo and inspect the facilities in late 1989. If there are any problems, GAFCO will be required to repair them.

The project is well administered. NAVFAC has an assistant resident officer in charge of construction, an inspector, a Kenyan engineer

and a Somali administrator on its Kismayo staff. This staff is backed up in Kismayo by the PBI field engineer who previously served as the design engineer. The PBI engineer represents the continuity in the project because the Navy engineers, both in Kismayo and Mogadishu, are rotated out every year. The principle duties of the PBI engineer are:-

- Reviewing submittals including shop drawings, material data and operating plans
- Reviewing contractors monthly estimates and participating in meetings with contractor quality control personnel.
- Inspected construction daily
- Reviewing GAFCO's schedules
- Consulting on any design changes required by GAFCO operations
- Preparing supplementary sketches of details to facilitate construction

Back up support is provided by PBI's home office. In retrospect the decision to retain PBI during construction contributed significantly to the success of the project. AID has also closely monitored the project with a resident TCN engineer and twice monthly visits by the Chief Engineer. As a result AID has been involved in the details of the project and has actively assisted in overcoming any problems that occurred.

A number of problems were encountered by GAFCO clearing goods through the port. About \$100,000 in demurrage and excessive port charges were incurred. It was discouraging that the port authority, who is the beneficiary of the project, had not been more active expediting GAFCO's shipments. Also the Port Authority's unwillingness or inability to make minor repairs calls into question their long run maintenance commitment.

GAFCO encountered a number of problems of its own making including:-

- Underestimating the difficulty technical precision and technical expertise necessary in driving piles accurately.
- Back-filling and compaction also presented problems at times
- Trying to cut corners - for instance a major structural failure in the second transit shed was narrowly avoided. This could have cost GAFCO a couple of \$ million to repair. The excavation trench should have been shared as a precaution.
- Scheduling problems including the arrival of cement and not applying protective coating to sheetpiles far enough in advance of pile driving.
- Relations with the Somali work crews were at times tense and there were a couple of work stoppages.

Communication between AID and Navy personnel in Mogadishu and Kismayo is good. However, the ROICC in Mogadishu can only approve a change order up to \$100,000. Change orders above this amount have to be approved in Norfolk. The change order for additional construction took over a year to approve and NAVFAC wanted, at one time, to compete the additional work. This would likely have slowed the completion of the project and resulted in a higher cost. The NAVFAC though has closely monitored the construction and required detailed reporting from GAFCO in the form of schedules, when it was found problems, (in the areas of the quality control laboratory and sheetpile driving) it has not hesitated to bring it to GAFCO's attention.

The port will be relatively maintenance free. However the Port Authority will need to do minor concrete work such as patching the deck from time to time, check the cathodic protection to see that it is working properly, inspect the bulkhead sheetpile, and maintain the navigational aids. Electricity should not be a problem with both a new generator and the completion of the Finnish power project in the town of Kismayo. The Finns will be operating the facility for the next five years. A potable supply of water will be available upon the completion of the Kismayo Water Project. The USAID engineering office should regularly visit the Port, even after the expiration of the warranty period in a year's time, to monitor the condition of the construction and the adequacy of the maintenance.

**Further Action:-**

No further REDSO/ENGR action other than if a REDSO Engineer is in the neighborhood three or four years from now he should stop in and see how the port is holding up.

**Distribution**

REDSO/Director's Office  
REDSO/Admin Unit (Files)  
REDSO/ENGR

## memorandum

DATE: August 7, 1988

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: Dan Vincent, PDS/ENG. *WV*

SUBJECT: Kismayo Port Project (649-0114) Project Evaluation *file*

TO: Files

A project evaluation was performed by REDSO/ENG between July 10 and 17, 1988. The evaluation covered the engineering and construction aspects of the project and has been issued as the "Somalia Trip Report July 10-17, 1988".

The Report covers the pre-construction and construction phases and recommends further monitoring of the port's operation, maintenance and overall impact, during the next few years. The Report will be retained in the project files for reference.

Enclosures: Evaluation Report (Somalia Trip Report), dated July 19, 1988  
Memo from D. Vincent to M.R. Bradley, dated Jan. 24, 1988  
Memo from E. McPhie to D. Pfeiffer, dated March 14, 1988  
Cable Mogadishu 06103 (1988), Nairobi 14500 (1988)

cc: R. Rhoda, PROG  
T. Lofgren, PDS  
L. Richards, DIR

Best Available Document

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AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A  
 SUBJECT: SOMALIA KISMAYO FORT PROJECT (649-0114)  
 PROJECT EVALUATION.

REF: MOGADISHU 6103 - *pas/eng*

1. REVISED TIMING OUTLINED IN REFTEL APPEARS ACCEPTABLE. THERE IS A POSSIBLE CONFLICT HOWEVER WITH THE REGIONAL RAIL SYSTEM SUPPORT PROJECT DESIGN, WHICH WILL REQUIRE ABOUT A WEEK OF GUYMONT'S TIME IN JULY. WE WILL KNOW THE TIMING ON THIS MID JUNE.

2. ASSUME THIS EVALUATION WOULD FOCUS ON THE ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF THE PROJECT, THAT IS THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION AND BASICALLY SERVE AS AN END OF PROJECT STATUS REPORT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY.

3. SINCE SCHEDULE IS TIGHT AND THERE IS LITTLE TIME TO REVIEW DOCUMENTS IN MOGADISHU PRIOR TO FIELD TRIP TO KISMAYO WOULD APPRECIATE POUCHED COPIES OF A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF MONTHLY OR OTHER REPORTS THAT DEALT WITH CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS, CLAIMS OR OTHER PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED. WE HAVE COPIES OF THE GAFCO CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT IN OUR FILES. CONSTABLE

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NAIROBI 014500

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*Action done: 6/6/88*

*PDS/ENG*

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CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED  
GHSR: AID 5/10/88  
APTRV: DIR:LRICHARDS  
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AIDAC

FOR REDSO/ESA/ENGINEERING, FRMD GUYMONT

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: KISMAYO PORT PROJECT (649-0114) PROJECT  
EVALUATION

1. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE KISMAYO PORT WILL BE COMPLETED IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WITH THE BASIC FACILITIES SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED BY JUNE 11, ANCILLARY FACILITIES BY AUGUST 30 AND REPAIR OF THE ACCESS ROAD AND CAUSEWAY BY SEPTEMBER 30, 1988.

2. MISSION IS REQUESTING THE SERVICES OF F. GUYMONT, REDSO/ENG FOR A SITE VISIT AND A PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT AND IS PROPOSING THE FOLLOWING DATES FOR HIS TRIP:

- ARRIVAL IN MOGADISHU ON SUNDAY, JULY 10.
- TRAVEL TO KISMAYO, SITE VISIT AND TRAVEL BACK TO MOGADISHU, JULY 11, 12, 13
- REPORT PREPARATION IN MOGADISHU, JULY 14, 17
- RETURN TO NAIROBI ON JULY 17.

THE ABOVE PROPOSED SCHEDULE APPEARS AT THE MOMENT TO BE MOST DESIRED ESPECIALLY SINCE AFTER JULY 17 MISSION ENGINEER D. VINCENT WILL BE OCCUPIED WITH THE EVALUATION OF PROPOSALS FOR THE CATTLE QUARANTINE STATIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPANY GUYMONT ON THE SITE VISIT.

3. PLEASE CABLE YOUR ACCEPTANCE AND/OR COMMENTS.

RAWSON  
BT  
#6103

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