ASSESSMENT OF PL 480 TITLE II FOOD DONATION PROGRAM IN HAITI

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Africa • Asia • Europe • Latin America • Middle East

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Submitted by:

Louis Berger International, Inc.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The P.L. 480 Title II program in Haiti began in the mid-1950's with disaster relief for a hurricane, working through CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Church World Service (CWS). From 1973 to 1987 the program grew by 300 percent in terms of gross tonnage, with an approximate 250 percent increase in recipients, and with a cumulative value of over $ 75 million. It remained, however, static in terms of programmatic focus and generally peripheral to other U.S. objectives in Haiti. USAID/Haiti contracted with Louis Berger International, Inc. to assess the program to determine, inter alia, what modifications would be necessary to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Title II program.

Three Sponsors currently execute the Title II development program, CARE and CRS continuing since 1958 and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) since 1979. Each of these Sponsors works through a number of different delivery mechanisms, chief among which are School Feeding (SF), Mother Child Health (MCH) and Food For Work (FFW). In FY 89, USAID/Haiti anticipated that 73 percent of the commodities would go towards School Feeding, 15 percent towards Mother Child Health, and 6 percent towards Food for Work.

None of the players involved--the A.I.D. Mission or the Cooperating Sponsors--is operating on the basis of a strategic plan. That is, where explicit strategies exist operations do not support them. USAID/Haiti and the three Sponsors are operating based on an implicit strategy of meeting "targeted objectives" consisting primarily of levels of beneficiaries to be fed. This quantitative focus is due to the externalities involving organizational mandates, Title II planning processes and selected aspects of the situation in Haiti, all of which mitigate against more attention to qualitative results. The development resource that Title II might be is not being maximized.

This supply-driven approach frustrates all three Sponsors, who express concern that so much time is devoted to simply moving food without any particular end in sight. Both CARE and CRS are now engaged in structured internal reviews which will lead within the next year to improved planning and targeting, hopefully meshing explicit and implicit strategies and objectives with operations. ADRA must get its program under control in terms of sheer quantity prior to undertaking a meaningful strategic planning exercise.

The expenditure and cost patterns of each Sponsor mirror the strategic disarray of P.L. 480 program. The budgets of each Sponsor are to a large extent logistical, and there are no real cost linkages between the delivery of food and the establishment of developmental projects. Cost levels by Sponsor by delivery mechanism are reasonable and are not significantly different.

Due to lack of cost centered accounting and to the lack of historical data, no trend analysis could be undertaken.

Because the Title II program is implemented without strategic or operational developmental objectives, the effectiveness of the program can thus only be judged in terms of what does, as opposed to what it seeks to do. What the program does is provide supplemental food to children throughout Haiti, through the mechanism of MCH for the under-5's and through SF for the 5-15 age range. In FY 88, it provided food to approximately 500,000 children, or roughly 20 percent of all Haitian children for at least 9 months of the year. Following a concept developed in an earlier Haiti Title II evaluation (the Cotten study), it is likely that this supplemental food serves as a "safety net" for the children and possibly their families, a small constant in a rapidly deteriorating environment. While this achievement in terms of child survival and welfare is significant, no broader development impact can objectively be claimed.

The analyses also demonstrate only moderate variation in terms of the relative efficiency of the three Sponsors. None have strategic objectives (although CRS is close), and all are in dynamic states which should lead to much tighter programming. The organizational structure of each reflects its implicit objectives, with CRS currently having the most and ADRA the least focus. In costs, CARE is the most cost efficient, although margins are very slim. All Sponsors need to improve monitoring systems not only for efficiency but in order to judge effectiveness as they move towards their new foci.

The Assessment recommends that USAID/Haiti and the Cooperating Sponsors work individually and collaboratively to develop strategic and operational objectives. Once these are established, each should focus much more on monitoring of costs and measurable benefits. The Assessment does not recommend any major deviations in terms of delivery mechanisms but rather suggests the existing mechanisms be refocussed towards development aims.

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January 1989

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ABS	:	Annual Budget Submission
ADRA	:	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AER	:	Annual Estimate of Requirements
a.i.	:	ad interim
A.I.D.	:	Agency for International Development
CCC	:	Commodity Credit Corporation
CDC	:	U.S. Centers for Disease Control
CDSS	:	Country Development Strategy Statement
CHI	:	Child Health Center
CINEC	:	Centre Integre de Nutrition et d'Education
CRS	:	Catholic Relief Services
CSR	:	Commodity Status Report
CWS	:	Church World Services
DA	:	Development Assistance (funding)
ESF	:	Economic Support Fund (funding)
FAO	:	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FFP	:	Food For Peace
FFW	:	Food For Work
FVA	:	A.I.D. Bureau for Food and Voluntary Assistance
GOH	:	Government of Haiti
Gds, Gourd	:	Haitian currency, 5 Gds = U.S.$ 1.00
HN	:	Health and Nutrition
HRO	:	Human Resources Office, USAID/Haiti
MBO	:	Management By Objectives
MCH	:	Mother or Maternal Child Health (program)
MSF	:	Management Sciences for Health
MT	:	Metric Ton
MYOP	:	Multi-Year Operations Plan
NGO	:	Non-governmental Organization
OCF	:	Other Child Feeding (program)
PPS	:	Program and Project Support
PSF	:	Pre-School Feeding (program)
P.L. 480	:	Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade and Development Act of 1954, as amended
PVO	:	Private and Voluntary Organization
RSR	:	Recipient Status Report
SAWS	:	Seventh Day Adventist World Service, previous name for ADRA
SOP	:	Standard Operating Procedures
SF	:	School Feeding (program)
UNICEF	:	United Nations' Childrens Program
USAID	:	United States A.I.D. mission in Haiti
USDA	:	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	:	United States Government
VACS	:	Voluntary Agencies for Child Survival
WFP	:	World Food Program of the United Nations

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

The P.L. 480 Title II program has been one of the few constants in United States-Haiti relations over the last 30 years. The food program began in the mid-1950's with disaster relief for a hurricane, working through CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Church World Service (CWS). Although the A.I.D. Mission to Haiti was withdrawn from 1963-1973 due to disenchantment with Francois Duvalier, the Title II program continued throughout. From 1973 to 1987 bilateral programs were reinstituted, although disenchantment with the Duvalier regime continued and assistance was skewed to the non-governmental sector. During this period the Title II program grew by 300 percent in terms of gross tonnage, with an approximate 250 percent increase in recipients, and with a cumulative value of over $ 75 million. It remained, however, static in terms of programmatic focus and generally peripheral to other U.S. objectives in Haiti.

As directed by Title II, the Haiti program has been carried out primarily by U.S.-based private and voluntary organizations (PVO's), known as Cooperating Sponsors. Three such agencies currently execute the Title II development program, CARE and CRS continuing since 1958 and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) since 1979. Each of these Sponsors works to achieve the general goals of Title II through a number of different programs, chief among which are School Feeding (SF), Mother Child Health (MCH) and Food For Work (FFW). All School Feeding programs are implemented through existing public, private or mixed schools in Haiti. The MCH and OCF programs are implemented directly by the Government of Haiti (GOH) and/or other PVO's or private institutions, with the PL 480 but one of many inputs to the institution. Food For Work programs are generally carried out directly by the Sponsor in collaboration with a community group. The Title II program thus involves and theoretically has an impact on several million Haitians in many different walks of life.

United States assistance to Haiti has been particularly volatile in the 1986-1988 period, following the departure of Jean Claude Duvalier and the effective end of the Duvalierist era. As of this writing (November, 1988), all U.S. development assistance is channeled through the private sector (both non-profit and for-profit) with specific Congressional prohibitions against direct governmental aid. While the dollar funding has vacillated, however, Title II has remained stable in commodity levels and program mix. It remains to be seen whether U.S. policy will change or not under the newest U.S. administration. Given past experience, it is unlikely that the Title II program will be greatly affected if it does.

1.2 Review of the Scope of Work

This assessment was contracted by USAID/Haiti to Louis Berger International, Inc. under its Indefinite Quantity Contract No. PDC-0085-I-00-6097-00. The purpose of the assessment was "...to examine the organizational, financial and managerial aspects of the PL 480 Title II Food Donation Program to determine how efficiently and effectively targeted objectives are being met." Additionally, the assessment was to "...also determine what modifications would be necessary to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Title II program."

Two products were required under the contract, an Assessment meeting the purposes above and a short Strategy Statement for Title II for the period December 1988 through September 1990. An annotated Statement of Work is reproduced as Annex A.

The fieldwork in Haiti was undertaken over one month in October-November 1988 by two Berger professionals, a Development Management Specialist and a Financial Analyst. The methodology consisted of review of the literature (ref. Annex C), interviews with USAID, Cooperating Sponsors, and other key informants (ref. Annex D), and selected non-random site visits to each of the types of programs (SF, MCH, OCF) underway.

Each of the two products, the Assessment and the Strategy, was prepared as a stand-alone document. Two DRAFTS were presented to USAID/Haiti, which shared them with the Cooperating Sponsors. Following a three-to-four week review period, detailed comments were provided to Berger. This final report incorporates those comments that were received prior to the completion date of the contract.

This report, the Assessment, begins at Chapter 2 with a summary of the background of the PL 480 Title II program, focussing on discernable trends over time. Chapter 3 describes the program in more depth, assessing USAID/Haiti's and each Cooperating Sponsor's objectives, structures and functions, costs and results, both in terms of internal consistency and external impact. Chapter 4 provides conclusions and recommendations regarding potential modifications.

2. BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

2.1 Summary History of P.L. 480 Title II Program in Haiti

Table 1 overleaf reflects what data are available in terms of levels of P.L. 480 food donations to Haiti since resumption of a USAID development program in 1973. Earlier data are not available; the USAID Mission had only reopened that year after its 10 year hiatus and the CARE and CRS archives were destroyed when their warehouses were sacked in 1986.

The figures demonstrate that the program has grown approximately 250-300 percent in terms of commodities and approximately 250 percent in terms of beneficiaries over the 15 years, for an average of 15-20 percent growth per year. The data are, however, inexact and need some explanation.

The Table 1 data for 1974-1980 are taken from Table II-B in the comprehensive report by Joel Cotten Evaluation Research on the PL 480 Title II School Feeding Program in Haiti (March 1985). While the Cotten report includes a vast magnitude of precise raw and analyzed data on numerous variables, that which is included in Table 1 is of dubious validity. Specifically, the notation of "pounds" as unit of measure for 1974-1976 and "metric tons" thereafter must be an error, and the variation in terms of "proposed", "actual" and "estimate"--with no explanation of whether they represent commodities distributed by the PVO or commodities sent by A.I.D. to the PVO--limit the comparative value of the figures.

Data for 1982 are from two Inspector General's Audits of the Title II program, one of CRS alone and one of CARE, CWS and SAWS, both dated April 1983. It must be noted that the Audits also include data for 1980 and 1981 which are significantly higher than those presented herein from the Cotten report. The Audits give total commodity volume in 1980, for example, as 24.8 MT versus the 12.6 MT listed as "actual" from the Cotten report. It is assumed that the figures represent approved AER levels and not actual distributions. It is clear that the program increased significantly at some point in the early eighties; whether it was in 1980 or in 1982 cannot be determined.

Data for 1984-1985 are from The Pragma Corporation's Haiti Food For Work Evaluation (October 1984) and represent Annual Estimates of Requirements (AERs) and not actual deliveries. Data for 1986-1988 were provided by USAID/Haiti in its comments on the draft of this report. The Evaluation Team has included data for 1988 representing commodities actually distributed, which are higher than commodities Called Forward due to warehouse surplus at the end of 1987. The commodities actually distributed form the basis for the financial analyses in Chapter 3. The 1989 figures were approved levels provided to the Team by USAID/Haiti in December, 1988.

Table 1: P.L. 480 Title II Program Levels in Haiti 1974-Present

Fiscal Year	Sponsor	Commodities	Beneficiaries	Dollar Amt
1974 (Actual)	TOTALS	9,996.0 lbs.	168,000	1,060,000
	CARE	5,991.0	99,000	635,000
	CRS	2,592.0	37,000	275,000
	CWS	1,413.0	32,000	150,000
1975 (Estimate)	TOTALS	10,000.0 lbs.	167,000	1,061,000
	CARE	6,000.0	98,000	636,000
	CRS	2,600.0	37,000	276,000
	CWS	1,400.0	32,000	149,000
1976 (Request)	TOTALS	9,697.0 lbs.	158,000	1,030,000
	CARE	5,526.0	94,000	619,000
	CRS	2,319.0	33,000	246,000
	CWS	1,550.0	31,000	165,000
1977 (Proposed)	TOTALS	10,114.5 MT	183,900	1,185,800
	CARE	5,526.0	98,700	628,500
	CRS	2,482.2	42,600	311,000
	CWS	2,106.3	42,600	246,300
1978 (Proposed)	TOTALS	6,041.0 MT	202,000	2,048,600
	CARE	3,362.0	110,000	1,229,800
	CRS	1,779.0	52,000	549,300
	CWS	900.0	40,000	269,500
1979 (Actual)	TOTALS	10,297.6 MT	253,000	3,215,400
	CARE	6,271.4	140,000	1,970,400
	CRS	1,938.8	52,000	613,400
	CWS	1,159.3	44,000	366,200
	SAWS	928.1	17,000	265,400
1980 (Actual)	TOTALS	12,630.9 MT	300,000	4,339,900
	CARE	6,593.0	170,000	2,284,900
	CRS	2,904.4	57,000	985,400
	CWS	1,661.1	48,000	590,700
	SAWS	1,472.4	25,000	478,900
1981 (Actual)	TOTALS	14,100.0 MT	359,100	5,095,600
	CARE	7,906.0	193,000	2,895,100
	CRS	3,462.0	91,100	1,236,100
	CWS	1,620.0	48,000	585,900
	SAWS	1,112.0	27,000	378,500

Table 1 Continued: P.L. 480 Title II Program Levels in Haiti 1974-Present

Fiscal Year	Sponsor	Commodities	Beneficiaries	Dollar Amt
1982 (Received)	TOTALS	24,800.0 MT	574,000	7,608,000
	CARE	12,200.0	292,000	3,880,000
	CRS	5,500.0	126,000	1,454,000
	CWS	2,900.0	83,000	935,000
	SAWS	4,200.0	73,500	1,339,000
1983	-----Reliable data not available to team--------			
1984 (Program Levels)	TOTALS	30,562.8 MT	618,900	8,264,200
	CARE	15,590.6	316,500	4,283,500
	CRS	5,982.9	126,900	1,579.900
	CWS	3,757.1	89,000	1,010,500
	ADRA	5,232.2	86,500	1,390,300
1985 (AER)	TOTALS	30,173.0 MT	613,500	8,610,300
	CARE	15,555.4	316,000	4,563,300
	CRS	5,806.0	122,000	1,547,600
	CWS	3,757.4	89,000	1,059,900
	SAWS	5,054.2	86,500	1,439,500
1986 (AER)	TOTALS	31,830.0 MT	702,200	7,695,900
	CARE	16,201.4	349,000	3,856,800
	CRS	6,702.0	155,000	1,647,600
	CWS	3,768.6	84,700	934,700
	SAWS	5,158.0	113,500	1,256,800
1987 (AER)	TOTALS	31,683.1 MT	695,000	6,942,200
	CARE	16,459.4	349,000	3,565,900
	CRS	6,702.0	155,000	1,506,700
	CWS	3,560.5	82,000	773,300
	ADRA	4,961.2	103,500	1,096,300
1988 (Actual Called Forward)	TOTALS	14,251.1 MT	652,200	3,373,184
	CARE	6,891.4	335,100	1,521,211
	CRS	3,009.2	143,000	728,094
	CWS	4,351.5	258,500	1,123,879
1988 (Actual Distributed)	TOTALS	24,113.0 MT	558,702	5,176,755
	CARE	13,030.0	297,238	2,669,937
	CRS	4,899.0	145,433	1,102,407
	ADRA	6,184.0	116,032	1,404,411
1989 (Approved)	TOTALS	29,858.6 MT	736,600	8,877,000
	CARE	12,735.3	335,100	3,712,000
	CRS	5,291.0	143,000	1,517,000
	ADRA	11,832.0	258,500	3,648,000

Notes
SAWS = Seventh Day Adventist World Service, the former name of ADRA.

Source: Refer to text discussion.

Given the difficulties of accurately determining gross Title II levels over time, the Team decided only to spot check trends in program mix. Table 2 provides the percentage shares of the major programs since 1977.

Table 2: Title II Food Distribution by Major Program as Percentage of Total Commodities and Beneficiaries

	FY 77		FY 82		FY 86		FY89	
	COMM	BEN	COMM	BEN	COMM	BEN	COMM	BEN
FFW	44.5	26.5	24.0	13.8	9.0	5.0	6.0	4.0
SF & PSF	43.0	62.0	62.9	75.4	71.0	81.0	73.0	80.0
MCH	11.5	10.9	9.8	9.1	17.0	13.0	15.0	13.0
Other	1.0	0.6	3.3	1.7	2.0	1.0	6.0	3.0

Sources: FY 77 - 1977 Audit Report, Exhibit A
FY 82 - Cotten, Tables II A and II C
FY 86 & 89 - USAID/Haiti, Comments, 12/9/88

Table 2 demonstrates that the decline in Food For Work programming is not attributable solely to the political upheaval of the past 3 years, as some have suggested, but in fact is part of a trend that began many years ago. As FFW is generally supervised directly by the Sponsoring Agency and the cooperating community, with no intermediary, it may be characterized as more management intensive for the Agency and more costly. This higher cost is theoretically justified by the greater benefit of infrastructure created or persons trained, depending on the type of project. FFW also has a much greater commodity-to-recipient ratio, in that the ration is based on 1 worker plus 3 family members. Because FFW project identification has been fraught with difficulties, it has often been these supplemental commodities (i.e. the food to eat) rather than the project results that have become the perceived "development benefit" of FFW. Because of the management intensity and paucity of development benefits of FFW, the Sponsors have decided to move to more efficient and effective programming.

Table 2 also documents the slow but steady increase in both School Feeding (including Pre-School Feeding, which is a small percentage of the category) and Maternal/Child Health. As also will be discussed in subsequent sections, the increases in the former are due more to the institutional ease of SF distributions than to any demonstrated impact of the program, whereas the increase in the latter is actually attributable to program targeting.

Few data were available to the team on geographic spread, rural-urban or public-private balance, or other program characteristics over time. Cotten has some data reflecting number and type of schools served by Sponsor for the 1981/82 school year, indicating that 52 percent of the schools were private and 48 percent public; the number of student beneficiaries does not, unfortunately, accompany the table (Cotten, Table II F). The Assessment Team initiated a d-Base program to establish a baseline of such data but unfortunately was not able to get a clean enough run to prove useful. Internal analyses by CARE and CRS indicate that a range of 30-45 percent of their target group may be considered urban.

Based on the 1977 Audit it is known that the Sponsors have practiced de facto regionalization for over 10 years, with CARE in the North and Northwest, CRS in the South, and CWS, then SAWS/ADRA, in the Central regions. Regionalization was formally given emphasis in a 1985 Title II conference. This Assessment Team noted the geographic spread of ADRA schools, suggesting that regionalization has not occurred to the extent desirable. Additionally, all three Sponsors are active in Port-au-Prince. The Team concluded that "regionalization" among all three Sponsors has not particularly occurred.

The Mission comment on this observation was "...CARE is no longer operating in the North and because of logistical constraints, CRS has not taken over all former ADRA schools that were transferred to its program. Regionalization is being reassessed by USAID and the PVOs."

Key benefits to regionalization would be cost and management efficiencies and effectiveness, and the sentence above suggests that CRS and CARE are mindful of these benefits. That is, CARE has moved out of the North because of logistic and other difficulties and is focussing much more attention to improving quality in its programs in the Northwest and La Gonaves. CRS, as noted in the Mission comments, preferred not to pick up additional schools even in its assigned region because of its desire to maintain efficient logistics. Both organizations maintain regional warehouses and personnel devoted to the food program in their specific geographic areas.

Additional benefits of regionalization would be program visibility and possible interaction among distribution sites, in this case schools. The political turmoil of the last few years has led to a prudent and modest approach to any visibility. Interaction has been fostered by CARE as part of its increased emphasis on community organizations, i.e., publicizing the experience of one school group to others in the area as an example of what can be done.

As noted elsewhere in this report, however, historical information is not available to measure program visibility, interaction, management or costs in both "with" and "without" regionalization settings. Stated plans of CARE and CRS to intensify program quality--as opposed to increasing geographic spread--suggest that these two Sponsors will continue to cluster their programs if not practice strict "regionalization" boundaries in all cases.

It is important to highlight that Title II donated food can be--and has been--used for emergency relief as well as development assistance in Haiti. Thus for FY 89, although the Cooperating Sponsors have projected needs for approximately $ 8.8 million worth of commodities for their on-going development programs, an additional $ 1.4 million (5,500 MT) is being sought to relieve suffering from the effects of Hurricane Gilbert in September 1988. The emergency food will be programmed through ADRA for use by CRS and the Haitian Red Cross. A small portion will also be allocated to ADRA for distribution through its churches in the hurricane's impact area of southern Haiti. It is not known what portion, if any, of the commodities listed in Table 1 were devoted to relief activities.

Prior to the cut off of its public sector aid to Haiti following the events of November 29, 1987, the U.S. maintained a large Title I/III concessional food sales program, primarily of wheat. This program was carefully analyzed in terms of desired commodity mix and pricing, and was viewed as strategic in terms of meeting critical constraints in Haiti. In its later years as Title III the concessional sales program was carefully constructed and tied to enactment of key policy reforms by the GOH. It also generated a significant level of local currency which was strategically applied to both A.I.D. and non-A.I.D. development efforts.

By contrast, the PL 480 Title II food donation program has been considered non-strategic and has generally operated independently of A.I.D. "standard" programming throughout its history. The levels have slowly increased in spite of constraints and program mix--SF, MCH, FFW--has not been particularly tied to A.I.D. objectives or strategies. When Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Funds (ESF) have been generous, Title II has composed only a small portion of the portfolio and this treatment may be considered appropriate. When DA and ESF have been limited, however, as is currently the case, Title II has assumed a more prominent position and possibly merits more attention.

In FY 88 Title II comprised roughly 20 percent of U.S. assistance to Haiti, with a proposed increase to 25% in FY 89 (excluding relief food). The Mission was interested enough in the resource that in late FY 87 it contracted for a strategic review. Several person months of effort were devoted to preparation of A Food Aid Strategy for Haiti: Maximizing Development Effectiveness (Deaton & Siaway, et al) which was issued in late April, 1988. The report, which synthesizes data in food production, consumption (including nutrition) and marketing, provides a number of interesting recommendations. Unfortunately, it was conducted and finished during a period of intense political turmoil in Haiti during which the Title I/III program as well as all other U.S. public sector assistance was terminated. The report has thus not gotten the circulation or debate its contents might merit.

This view of Title II as peripheral is certainly not unique to Haiti. In a period where development resources are scarce, however, P.L. 480 food donations can be managed more efficiently and effectively in terms of fit and impact within USAID's overall program. Chapters 3 and 4 include more discussion in this regard.

2.2 Review of Recent Title II Evaluations

In 1977 and again in 1983 the A.I.D. Inspector General's Office chided USAID/Haiti on the lack of any comprehensive technical evaluation of the Title II program (ref. Audits, December 1977 and April 1983). The Mission had in fact supported one of the most comprehensive longitudinal studies ever done of School Feeding (the Cotten report) in 1981 and 1982 but it was not written up in final until 1984-1985. It went on to contract for a major Food For Work evaluation which resulted in the Pragma report of October 1984. No overall MCH evaluation has been done to date, although in September 1983 A.I.D./Washington contracted an evaluation of the SAWS/ADRA Nutrition/MCH program covered by a centrally-funded Matching Grant. As required by Title II regulations, each Sponsor conducts an annual internal review as well, which are of decidedly mixed focus and quality. None of the evaluations or reviews to date have assessed program costs (beyond commodity value) in terms of comparative efficiency or effectiveness.

The Cotten study was based on two survey designs: (1) a cross-sectional survey to measure program performance using a sample of schools and students representative of the national School Feeding program; and (2) a second, longitudinal survey, with control sample, to measure the impact of the program on key variables of interest at the policy level. Both surveys were conducted from March through mid-June 1981 and the impact survey again in 1982.

The program performance survey, covering 73 schools and 1,422 children throughout the country, addressed the issues of targeting, ratio dilution, substitution, adequacy of facilities and related programs, local contributions, record keeping and operating efficiency. The issues of targeting proved the most complex and raised a number of questions in terms of whether the SF program requirements of facilities and local contributions preclude establishment of programs in areas of greatest need. It also demonstrated that the urban sub-sample was significantly worse off than its rural counterpart. Additionally, the survey found that record keeping in general was inadequate and that 17 percent of commodities were used for "extra-program" purposes (i.e. uses other than those for which the food was programmed, commonly referred to as leakage).

The program impact survey covered SF from a number of perspectives, including nutrition, school attendance, and cognitive performance. The initial baseline established that there were significant differences between program and non-program populations with regard to nutritional status and attendance, but that those variables were influenced by other factors, i.e. socio-economic status variables, which could also explain the differences. The longitudinal study did not fully clarify the attendance impact. In terms of nutritional impact, however, the study concluded that while there was a deterioration in the environment which had an impact on the well-being of all the children, those in the SF program were able to maintain and in some cases improve their nutritional status. The SF program benefit was thus defined as a "safety net" for enrolled children. The study concludes with a number of recommendations, including increased monitoring and improved targeting within an integrated intervention strategy by using the SF delivery infrastructure to meet objectives of both SF and MCH programs.

The Pragma Corporation study reviewed the Food For Work program of the four Cooperating Sponsors CARE, CRS, CWS and ADRA. A sample of 10 percent of each PVO's FFW projects, or seventeen in all, were assessed by the team. The overriding conclusion of the Pragma team was that the PVO's viewed FFW as a feeding--rather than development--program for the rural poor and focused most of their resources on managing commodity logistics. The program thus neglected the potential developmental impact of FFW in terms of developing technical skills for future employment, developing productive infrastructure or strengthening local organizations. The study strongly recommended refocussing the program towards infrastructure development and training, with emphasis on the measurable output of the projects. Since the Evaluation, first CRS and now CARE have decided to stop FFW altogether in that the measurable development outputs did not justify the management and other costs.

The third key evaluation on Title II is by Management Sciences for Health (MSH) descriptively entitled Evaluation Report Seventh-Day Adventist World Service Haiti AID Matching Grant Program Nutrition and Maternal/Child Health (December 1983). This study was an evaluation of the SAWS (now ADRA) nutrition program in 10 centers in Haiti under A.I.D. Matching Grant Funds from 1981 - December 1983. The team reviewed growth surveillance instruments and methodology and concluded "The nutritional impact of the project, as measured by a number of indicators developed by the evaluation team, appears to be substantial..." (p. 37) although it notes that planned greater community health benefits did not accrue. Management issues noted include concerns over changing/inadequate objectives, targeting (opportunistic site selection), and weak middle level and technical management. Attempts to measure program cost-per-beneficiary are notably more comprehensive in this than in the other documents cited but still quite superficial.

In addition to the three specific Title II evaluations, and three audits, the Assessment Team reviewed numerous USAID/Haiti program documents which are relevant to Title II. These included sectoral pieces such as the Education and Human Resources Sector Assessment (March, 1987), the National Nutrition Survey (1978) and the Agriculture Sector Assessment (November 1987) as well as more general documents, i.e. the Deaton & Siaway Strategy and the FY 89-90 Action Plan. It is not the intent of this assessment to discuss in detail all of those documents. There are, however, some areas of agreement which deserve highlighting:

- There is general agreement that a food deficit exists in Haiti, that agricultural production has been stagnant for decades, and that free and concessional food aid will be needed for some time to come. There is further agreement in the documents (although not necessarily in the general public) that the Title II food has not constituted a disincentive to production.

- There is general agreement that a significant proportion of the population is malnourished. The groups that are most at-risk are children under five years of age and pregnant and lactating mothers. The National Nutrition Survey, which serves as a baseline, did not find a significant difference in levels of nutrition among Haiti's provinces.

- There is general agreement that Haiti has numerous other developmental problems. Among those that are relevant to this discussion are poor quality education, a low level skills base and a paucity of indigenous institutions which could serve to mobilize what resources exist.

- Title II food aid is generally viewed as a tool for direct feeding to respond to nutritional (or at a minimum basic energy) needs rather than as a development resource to respond to other known problems. Even those papers which claim a broader developmental perspective conclude with recommendations supporting a nutrition focus (e.g., the Education & Human Resources Sector Assessment, the Deaton & Siaway Strategy).

- Because food is viewed primarily as a resource for nutrition, recommendations generally have included one or more of the following:

1) cap or decrease FFW (food doesn't reach those in need);
2) cap or decrease SF, in order to have adequate resources to increase MCH; in SF programs that continue, provide nutrition education and improve targeting of schools and/or students within schools.
3) increase and improve MCH coverage to reach to the group most at-risk.
4) undertake diverse pilot projects which are development rather than food driven, but use food as a resource; monitor them carefully to see what works.

This Assessment examines the Title II program neither on the micro-level of Cotten, Pragma or MSH nor the macro-level of the documents summarized above. It focusses squarely on the mid-level of the Sponsors' programs, mandates and capabilities. It concludes that each Sponsor is currently in a dynamic state and moving towards a more innovative and potentially effective use of food as a resource, so that all of the above may occur.

3. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

A key purpose of this Assessment is "...to determine how efficiently and effectively targeted objectives are being met." Chapter 3.1 examines the Sponsors' programs in terms of objectives and strategies, both explicit and implicit, in order to establish the "targeted objectives" and to set parameters of "effectiveness". Chapter 3.2 examines program management and Chapter 3.3 assesses costs and cost-effectiveness and efficiencies. Chapter 3.4 will summarize program results in terms of external efficiencies and development impact.

Table 3 below provides a summary of the actual achievement by type of program by sponsor in FY 88. The Table demonstrates that all three Sponsors undertook the same types of programs but at very different levels. The Table is offered for reference in subsequent discussions.

Table 3: Title II Actual Achievements by Type of Program by Cooperating Sponsor in FY 88

Sponsor/Program	Commodities (MT)	Commodities (%)	Beneficiaries (#)	Beneficiaries (%)	Dollar Value
CARE Totals	13,030.0	(100)	297,238	(100)	2,669,937
SF/PSF	7,487.0	57	233,985	79	1,507,950
MCH	1,898.0	15	24,457	8	379,355
FFW	1,145.0	9	10,793	4	253,564
OCF	0	0	0	0	0
Other	2,500.0	19	28,003	9	529,068
CRS Totals	4,899.0	(100)	145,433	(100)	1,102,407
SF/PSF	4,117.0	84	133,300	92	923,611
MCH	387.0	8	6,000	4	92,846
FFW	0	0	0	0	0
OCF	386.0	8	3,757	3	83,744
Other	9.0	-	2,376	1	2,206
ADRA Totals	6,184.0	(100)	116,032	(100)	1,404,411
SF/PSF	2,675.0	43	69,722	60	612,938
MCH	2,060.0	33	30,831	27	456,520
FFW	1,266.0	20	12,755	11	290,131
OCF	89.0	2	1,158	1	25,146
Other	94.0	2	1,565	1	19,676
Program Totals	24,113.0	(100)	558,702	(100)	5,176,755
SF/PSF	14,279.0	59	437,001	78	3,044,499
MCH	4,345.0	18	61,288	11	928,721
FFW	2,411.0	10	23,548	4	543,948
OCF	475.0	2	4,915	1	108,890
Other	2,603.0	11	31,944	6	550,950

Sources: Cooperating Sponsors' Commodity Status Reports and Recipient Status Reports, FY 88

3.1 Program Goals and Objectives

3.1.1 Program Externalities. The establishment of realistic objectives for the Haiti Title II program is affected by numerous factors, many of which are outside the control of either USAID/Haiti or the Cooperating Sponsors. Three in particular affect program planning and management: 1) the mandates of the organizations involved; 2) the Title II bureaucratic processes; and 3) the particular situation in Haiti. The impact of each on the program is summarized below.

Organizational Mandates

Title II food programming is governed by the Agricultural Trade and Development Act of 1954, as amended (Public Law 480), which is implemented primarily by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The existence and mandate of A.I.D. is governed by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. In Title II matters, the USDA works with A.I.D. through the latter's Bureau for Food and Voluntary Assistance (FVA).

The USDA and A.I.D. are political, non-profit public agencies which promote numerous objectives, with Title II playing a relatively minor role in their respective portfolios. The USDA's primary clients--the American farmers--have an indirect but strong link and thus influence with the USDA (often via lobbies) through the elected U.S. Congress, which provides 100 percent of the USDA's budget. A.I.D., however, is in the odd situation that its clients--citizens of developing countries--generally have very little influence on the U.S. Congress and thus on A.I.D.'s budget. Thus although A.I.D. may use rhetoric about "beneficiary participation in decision-making", and in spite of concerned Haitians' friends in the U.S. Congress, it is unlikely that this participation would ever extend above a marginal level. Both A.I.D. and the USDA must be primarily responsive and responsible to their principal, and only, revenue source: the U.S. Congress.

In addition to different clients, A.I.D. and the USDA also have different principal objectives for the Title II program. One of the key purposes of P.L. 480 food, from the USDA perspective, is the promotion of U.S. agriculture in the broadest sense, thus implying a supply side perspective. The key purpose of non-emergency P.L. 480 from the A.I.D. perspective is development, again in a broad sense, which by definition is demand driven. Thus although USAID/Haiti and/or the Cooperating Sponsors may recommend a certain mix of commodity types for developmental purposes based on demand, the USDA may not have all of those commodities in surplus in a given year and thus not be able to supply the desired mix. A recent example of the results of these different client-derived purposes on the program in Haiti is the lack of milk for MCH centers and other child survival activities. The USDA has recently completed a program of paying U.S. dairy farmers to stop producing milk due to a perceived glut on the market.

CARE, CRS and ADRA are non-political, non-profit private organizations, which promote a combination of humanitarian and developmental goals, with Title II occupying a varying but significant share of their portfolios in Haiti (ref. Chapter 3.3). Their direct clients--the rural and urban poor of Haiti, in this case--do not (and can not) provide significant revenues to the organizations. The PVOs must seek funding from other sources, which are also considered clients but which receive no direct services from the PVOs. The three must thus be responsive to the guidance and/or requirements of the USDA via A.I.D. as well as of various other institutions and individuals which may be providing ancillary funding. They must juggle supply of food with demand for it, and with organizational and administrative support to appropriately meet the demand. The end result is program objectives which try to be responsive to both types of clients (i.e. donors and the rural poor) and often end up being useful to no one.

In summary, the objectives of the Title II program in Haiti are primarily influenced by the U.S. Congress (through the USDA and A.I.D.), with some influence by CARE, CRS and ADRA other funding sources and virtually none by the Title II clients, the rural and urban poor. Given these influences, the program objectives may understandably be supply, rather than demand, driven.

Title II Programming Processes

The Title II programming process is formally directed by A.I.D. Handbook 9. This offers sample formats for a "standard" Multi Year Operational Plan (MYOP) format and the sacrosanct Annual Estimates of Requirements (AER) form. While the latter is rigorously adhered to, consisting as it does of simple blanks to be filled in with numbers and with no particular narrative, the former has been adapted to meet each PVO's practices and needs. Given the multiple influences on the PVOs' planning processes as described above, there is a tendency to liberally quote from the previous MYOP and avoid any explicit strategic rethinking.

Although A.I.D. has, over the years, experimented with a number of different management approaches on an agency-wide basis, it periodically returns to the Management By Objectives (MBO) of the early-1970's. The Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has reaffirmed its commitment to MBO in recent years. This is best reflected in terms of program planning through the hierarchy of objectives established in each Mission's annual Action Plan.

The MYOP might be considered Title II's answer to the Action Plan, although the externalities inherent in the process make it less than useful. That is, experience shows that annual commodity types and levels are changed frequently between the original plan and actual receipt by entities other than the originator of the MYOP (the PVO). These actions reflect constraints imposed by organizational mandates, bureaucratic processes and sheer logistics of the many players involved. USDA's supplies and other recipient countries' competing demands are an early but continuing hurdle in the process. The arrival of food aid in Haiti from another donor may stimulate a change of plans. Shipping schedules may necessitate borrowing and returning loans, occasionally of different commodities, thus affecting ration mix. And emergencies elsewhere may dictate that ships be diverted.

Given this context, the incentives for preparation of a Title II MYOP with carefully developed objectives reflecting realistic program components and levels are minimal. Also given the context, the incentive for USAID/Haiti to develop a truly strategic plan for use of Title II is equally minimal. There are, however, some aspects of the program which can be controlled, and objectives which can be met, through flexible programming with improved planning. These will be discussed in Chapter 4.

The Situation in Haiti

Title II program and USAID project reports for the last three years attribute numerous program delays to "the political situation". That is, food could not be distributed, warehouses were pillaged, and certain planned program components were not undertaken. This recent turmoil has certainly been disruptive and all concerned must recognize the major problems encountered and in many cases overcome. No data were available (or at least accessible), however, to contrast "commodities received" versus "commodities distributed" versus "actual recipients served" pre- and post 1986 to ascertain in quantifiable terms the level of disruption on the standard achievements of the program.

The lack of data on the Title II program is due to USAID's practice of archiving after 3 years and to the unfortunate looting of the CARE and CRS warehouses in 1986. Lack of data, however, is a generic problem in Haiti and affects the ability to assess demand and establish realistic objectives for Title II programs as well as other programs. For example, population dynamics are not well understood, and the validity of extrapolating from such data as school enrollment or urban under-fives from the 1981 census or, worse, the 1978 National Nutrition Survey is questionable. Agricultural production, particularly that for tubers, tree and root crops, is also poorly documented, so that national food security and food consumption must be guesstimated (without considering the impact of contraband!). The lack of valid data seems in some cases to have created an ethic of rarely trying to collect valid data, thus exacerbating problems in planning.

A second Haiti-specific problem is the lack of experience with local level institutions useful in mobilizing resources. Given the disparate origins of Haiti's citizenry, there are virtually no indigenous institutions beyond the household which can be tapped. In the rare cases where indigenous institutions do exist, Sponsors have found them uninterested in food programs. Although CARE claims some successes with Parent Teacher Committees running school canteens, CRS is not sanguine. That is, CRS cautions that one must beware of having groups whose primary functions concern the food distributed and of committees that are so only in name. Given problems with these relatively straightforward single-function entities, an assessment of realistic possibilities for local level management of more than a school canteen is not sanguine. Thus any planning based on thoughtful local participation is likely a long way off.

Finally, the problem of the low level of GOH involvement in planning or management of the program is noted, not because of short-term constraints but in a longer-term perspective. It is likely that this constraint is not unique to Haiti in the annals of Title II programs, but it is important when considering the possibilities for phase-out. It is simply stated as one more externality which is largely beyond the control of the Sponsors.

3.1.2 Explicit Objectives. In spite of the externalities summarized above, the Haiti Cooperating Sponsors have developed or are developing MYOP's which have a vague MBO framework and which provide stated objectives which can be reviewed by clients and constituents and judged by evaluators.

Figure 1 overleaf summarizes the stated or explicit overarching raisons d'etre of each Sponsor's Title II food program in Haiti. Each Sponsor's program nomenclature is slightly different. CARE discusses its "General Program Objective" which cross-cuts more specific objectives relating to each type of program, e.g. SF, MCH, FFW, etc. CRS refers to a "Current Operating Strategy" as guiding various components of the program. And ADRA, which currently only operates a food program, has no need to develop a separate rationale and simply relies on its worldwide "Statement of Mission".

It is interesting that all three "strategies" discuss community development or some variation thereof. In the CARE statement, the "formation of community institutions" is a higher order means leading to the end of "sustainability of the developmental process". In the CRS strategy, "community development" is used in straightforward English as an end in itself ("development of the community") and not as a process. In the ADRA mandate it is again a means, where "community based development includes a wide range of activities leading to ..."

Figure 1: Overall Title II Program Strategy of Cooperating Sponsors in Haiti

CARE General Program Objective:

To use the food resource as a developmental tool within the community by enhancing the distribution link between CARE Haiti and that community to permit better communication and more participation of the community in the project. This link should also facilitate transfer/training of management skills and the gradual empowerment of the community. Thus the formation of community institutions capable of interpreting the nutritional and developmental needs of its community into self help action is achieved, and sustainability of the developmental process beyond the life of the project is possible. (CARE Haiti PL 480 Title II Annual Progress Report FY 1988)

CRS Current Operating Strategy:

To improve the impact of CRS' Title II program through more efficient delivery of food resources to those who are most in need along with the integration of program components that contribute to community development. (CRS Haiti MYOP)

ADRA Summary Statement of Mission:

... Development is viewed as an integrated process which addresses the basic sources of poverty, seeking to build self reliance in the individual and equitable social relationships. ... Community based development includes a wide range of activities leading to improved health, economic and social well being, and increased self reliance. Through non formal education and training, ADRA focuses on developing competence and skills in areas appropriate to community needs. Community needs are also met by the development of institutions which deliver essential services in areas where they are inadequate or non-existent. (ADRA/International Statement of Mission)

Figure 2: Title II Program Objectives of Cooperating Sponsors

CARE

Purposes:

1) to supplement the nutritional requirements of pre and primary school children, women of childbearing age and their infants;

2) to act as an incentive to children to attend classes regularly and to remain for a longer period of time in school; and

3) to improve rural infrastructures and facilities through community initiated FFW projects and (school based) mini projects.

CRS

MYOP Goals:

1) Contribute to the improvement of formal education program for children between the ages of 5 and 15 (SF Program and School Projects); [From Narrative: to encourage children to attend school, supplement their diets and increase their attentiveness].

2) Improve the nutritional status of 9,000 children under the age of five by FY 91 (MCH Program); [From Narrative: to address the problem of endemic malnutrition among children under five by providing timely technical and material assistance within a framework that addresses three aspects of the problem simultaneously: economic poverty, poor access to information on health and nutrition, and insufficient access to food & medical resources]

3) Improve the nutritional welfare of orphaned and abandoned children being cared for under the auspices of public and private institutional programs (OCF Program);

4) Improve the capacity of public and private institutions to care for destitute adults who are no longer capable of taking care of themselves

ADRA

Outreach Operational Plan:
1) the significant improvement of the nutritional status of participating school children, children suffering from second & third degree malnutrition and their mothers, and participating food-for-work families;

2) the stimulation of community action through the support of developmentally-oriented work programs.

Specific Objectives:
SF: 1) increase in recipient levels; 2) program school exhibited higher attendance by December 1991; 3) improved learning capacity among selected groups of children documented by December 1991; 4) Title III support inputs fully integrated with ADRA SF program by December 1987.
MCH: 1) 70% of participating children show a positive weight-for-age growth trend within 3 mos of program participation; 2) 70% of participating children who receive no less than 50% of their nutritional requirements from breast milk show positive weight-for-age growth trend within 3 mos of program participation

These different emphases on community-based action of some sort in the overarching strategy statements becomes more interesting when viewed in the context of the more specific program component objectives. Figure 2 provides the stated or explicit program component objectives of each Sponsor as given in its MYOP (or CARE's Annual Progress Report). Here, although ADRA speaks of "the stimulation of community action" as an end in itself in FFW programs, all three sponsors focus much more on the "standard" Title II objectives relating to nutrition and school attendance. Although the Team did not believe it useful to append the entire MYOP of each Sponsor, the attention to precise beneficiary levels (e.g., 2000 children fed) as indicators of these more lofty objectives is informative.

The causal relationship between a child eating a school lunch and his/her improved school attendance, learning capacity and/or nutritional level has not been conclusively demonstrated in Haiti (ref. the Cotten, 1985) or many other places in the world (ref. Levinger, 1985). The relationship between that child's lunch and community action/development is even less well documented. Yet 80 percent of the recipients of the Haiti FY 89 Title II program will be school children consuming 73 percent of the commodities, in spite of the existence of unrelated higher order explicit objectives developed by the Sponsors. In spite of that numerous uncontrollable externalities affecting planning in Haiti, A.I.D. asks the Cooperating Sponsors to develop objectives and offer linear plans to achieve the objectives every few years, and the PVO's do so (often with heavy reference to the last such plan). These become the explicit objectives that they and most informed colleagues know are hyperbole.

3.1.3 Implicit Objectives. It became quite difficult for this Assessment Team to examine the PVO program "efficiency and effectiveness in achieving targeted objectives" when, for the most part, the PVO's admitted that what was stated in the formal plans as a "targeted" or explicit objective did not necessarily reflect program realities. Of the three organizations, CARE is in the process of massively reworking its MYOP addendum and of reorganizing its food program staff, and will not have everything formalized until at least January, 1989. ADRA has had a Director ad interim (a.i.) for over one year, with a new full time person due to arrive in December. The explicit objectives of these two organizations as provided in Figures 1 and 2 are either too ambiguous to be useful, in the case of CARE, or so precise as to be unevaluable, in the case of ADRA. Neither particularly reflects what is being implemented as compared to deployment of resources.

CRS has the closest match between explicit objectives and program realities. CRS planners and managers have been concerned for some time that national data indicate that the most nutritionally at-risk group in Haiti is the under-fives, who through the MCH program comprise less than 5 percent of CRS beneficiaries. It is now "...improving the impact of CRS' Title II program through more efficient delivery of food resources to those who are most in need..." through a thoughtful and professional process of internal review and program evaluation to assist in more precise targeting. As explicitly stated in its MYOP (not reproduced herein), it is reducing its general SF program by 8-10 percent each year, based on simply not replacing the schools that are normally dropped each year due to non-compliance. At the same time, it has obtained a state-of-the-art computer software package from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta in which it is entering all growth monitoring data from the MCH centers its supports. Through this exercise, which involves a visit to each center by senior staff and numerous discussions with CRS and GOH or intermediary MCH staff, CRS hopes, indeed, to improve its impact (effectiveness) through "more efficient delivery...to those who are most in need."

As the internal evaluation is implemented, CRS is operating with implicit objectives of (1) providing hot lunches to approximately 120,000 school children (SF/PSF); (2) providing food supplements to 6,000 children under 5 (MCH); and (3) providing minimum daily food allowances to orphans and indigent adults. This seemingly non-strategic approach is fully justified by the Cotten report, which documents that although composite socioeconomic indicators revealed an overall deteriorating environment, children in an SF program maintained or improved their health as compared to children not in a program. This "safety net" effect of an SF program does not respond to issues of longer term sustainability or cost effectiveness, but in the short term it is an efficient way to keep children alive, and an effective means of mitigating against potential long term human resource constraints. It is a rational interim strategy until CRS' internal evaluation is complete and more specific objectives are established. Caution is offered, however, that it be viewed as interim and not become institutionalized. (Note: the concept of SF as a "safety net" is introduced in the Cotten report and a more detailed discussion can be found therein).

CARE and ADRA implicit objectives are, as stated earlier, in flux. As evidenced in Table 1, until FY 89 CARE has had the largest of the three programs by far, has to the present included a management-intensive FFW component, and has explicitly and implicitly tried in recent years to use food as leverage for social change. In its FY 88 Annual Progress Report, its "General Objective" (ref. Figure 1) and "Purposes" (ref. Figure 2) are creatively phrased to imply this direction without establishing any specific benchmarks against which to be judged (except number of beneficiaries). That is, the nutritional objective is "to supplement..." without quantification; the attendance objective is "to act as an incentive" with no means of measurement of competing incentives; and the community development objective is "to improve..." with no baseline. Only in discussions and narrative text does one learn that CARE is staffing up for a major effort in developing Parent Teacher Committees, with which it has had some success, as community change agents.

The Assessment Team strongly supports the direction in which CARE is headed, i.e. to promote empowerment through the formation of community institutions. It cautions CARE to move slowly and to carefully monitor and evaluate variables contributing to both achievements and failures. It judges that until this effort is fully planned and staffed up, CARE may also be viewed as operating a "safety net", supply driven program.

ADRA's MYOP includes only numerical targets as objectives, which, while honest and direct, are certainly not strategic. The narrative justification is found in its Outreach Grant Proposal, which is reflected at Figure 2. The first "Specific Objective" for the SF program, "increase in recipient levels", is the operative or implicit objective. The others are for the most part not evaluable. For example, measurement of "program school exhibiting higher attendance" requires a current baseline, which ADRA has not prepared. "Improved learning capacity among selected groups of children..." is extremely difficult to measure, as evidenced by the Cotten report and others in the literature, and again, ADRA has established no baseline against which to measure.

The absence of even semi-strategic objectives has led to implementation problems and left ADRA vulnerable to major inefficiencies. With no practical focus other than increasing recipient levels, staff apparently believed "the more the better" and, during third quarter FY 88, added approximately 60,000 recipients and over 100 schools to the SF program and approximately 20,000 recipients and an unknown number of centers to MCH. They did not follow standard ADRA procedures for approval of a new center, did not inform the Director a.i. of these actions and have left ADRA in a difficult situation. That is, over 100 new centers (SF or MCH) with over 80,000 new recipients now believe they are part of the program, and expect food. The ADRA Director a.i., meanwhile, completed the FY 89 AER for the original levels. ADRA staff is reportedly currently scouring the country to reassess recipient levels to see what can be done.

ADRA's situation points up the key problem in operating without some sort of focus. Simply, ambiguities will compound until chaos is reached. Had more attention been paid to some sort of substantive objective, even if it was simply the "safety net" hot lunch, it is likely the emphasis on quantity with no concern for quality or sustainability would not have occurred.

3.1.4 A.I.D. Objectives. USAID/Haiti's explicit overarching program goal is stated in its FY 1989/1990 Action Plan (AP, prepared in April, 1988) as "a wider sharing of the benefits of growth." Within this goal, the Mission has selected the following LAC objectives as most relevant to Haiti's needs:

- LAC Obj. 1/6: Increase Agricultural Production/Preserve and Manage Natural Resources
- LAC Obj. 2 : Strengthen the Private Sector
- LAC Obj. 5 : Promote Exports
- LAC Obj. 8 : Increase Access to Voluntary Family Planning Services
- LAC Obj. 10 : Reduce Infant and Child Mortality
- LAC Obj. 12 : Improve Educational Opportunities
- LAC Obj. 13 : Increase Participant Training

True to the MBO approach, each of these objectives is further defined in the Action Plan in terms of Country Development Trends (CDT) Indicators; A.I.D. Program Performance (APP) Indicators; Actual Vs. Planned Accomplishments in FY 1987 and early 1988, as Compared to Last Year's Action Plan; Key Policy Dialogue Actions and Conditionalities Planned for balance of Current FY and Action Plan Period; and Key Project/Program Accomplishments Planned for balance of Current FY and Action Plan Period. Reporting on the latter is undertaken in the next Action Plan a year later.

Because the Title II Sponsors have been primarily concerned with feeding children, with no current operative higher order objectives, and because the LAC Objectives are established by A.I.D./W, USAID/Haiti has had little flexibility in establishing a rationale for its food program. In the Action Plan written in April, 1988, for FY 88, seventy-two (72%) of the Title II program was programmed for School Feeding, and 70% of its costs were thus allocated to LAC Objective 12, Improving Educational Opportunities. Four percent (4%) of the program was programmed for Food for Work, and the remaining 24% for MCH and "other" programs affecting at-risk children. Thirty percent (30%) of the costs were thus attributed to LAC Objective 10, Reducing Infant and Child Mortality.

Actual distributions led to much different ratios, as are presented in Chapter 3.3 and Annex B.

There are no CDT or APP or any other indicators remotely related to Title II under the educational objective, focusing as it does on teacher training and textbook distribution. The infant and child mortality objective actually includes a measurable APP indicator related to Title II, "percent of children in A.I.D.-financed feeding programs who have weights recorded on their Road to Health card twice for every six-month period." The PVO's do not now routinely report this information, all are in the process of improving MCH management and/or computerizing files, so it should be accessible in the future.

The Title II narrative in the AP is primarily input driven and preoccupied with local costs (an outstanding Mission issue at the time of the AP draft). The following "targets" established by A.I.D. for Title II may be inferred from the AP:

- Targeting decisions will be based on the cost-effectiveness of different delivery systems to ensure, to the extent possible, that those most in need are reached.
- Assistance to remote areas in the North and the Northeast will resume in FY 89 if accountability requirements can be satisfied
- Development activities initiated in FY 88 on a pilot basis will focus on increased participation by the program's beneficiaries and will be duplicated in other regions.
- End-use inspectors' roles as community animators will be further developed through training, which will also be provided to school directors and parent-teacher committees
- Development activities in conjunction with commodity distribution will be contingent upon adequate funding levels.
- Sponsors will use the program's resources as additional components to existing AID-funded projects. "For example, MCH programs are implemented in association with family planning and child survival project activities; School Feeding programs are a part of the Incentives to Improve Basic Education Project; FFW projects are designed to complement agricultural and community development projects; and Pre-School Feeding programs support the Community Integrated Nutrition and Education Centers. This approach will continue in the coming years." (AP p. 84)

These statements are not particularly strategic nor objective, and may be considered interesting implementation guidance. Only the last can be considered strategic, but because the PVOs' objectives do not coincide with this thrust it becomes almost antithetical. FFW is not undertaken by CRS, has been suspended by CARE and is on hold at ADRA (and this Assessment will recommend it remain on hold for the next few quarters). The Education Project is requesting that CRS and ADRA add schools to their SF programs; CRS is following an explicit objective of reducing the number of schools it serves and ADRA is, as noted previously, greatly over-extended. The relationship between the massive A.I.D. Child Survival program and MCH feeding can only be characterized as totally ad hoc. Thus USAID/Haiti's "strategy" provides no real framework or guidance for the Sponsors' programs.

As discussed in Chapter 2, USAID/Haiti recognizes that food is an important resource and has periodically attempted to develop a more strategic approach to its use. Chapter 4 will include more specific recommendations in this regard, summarizing the Strategy prepared as a separate part of this contract.

3.1.5 Synthesis. None of the players involved--the A.I.D. Mission or the Cooperating Sponsors--is operating on the basis of a strategic plan. That is, where explicit strategies exist operations do not support them. USAID/Haiti and the three Sponsors are operating based on an implicit strategy of meeting "targeted objectives" consisting primarily of levels of beneficiaries to be fed. This quantitative focus is due to the externalities involving organizational mandates, Title II planning processes and selected aspects of the situation in Haiti, all of which mitigate against more attention to qualitative results. The development resource that Title II might be is certainly not being maximized.

This supply-driven approach has been mirrored by all three Sponsors, who express frustration that so much time is devoted to simply moving food without any particular end in sight. Both CARE and CRS are now engaged in structured internal reviews which will lead within the next year to improved planning and targeting, hopefully meshing explicit and implicit strategies and objectives with operations. ADRA must get its program under control in terms of sheer quantity prior to undertaking a meaningful strategic planning exercise. This Assessment includes a recommendation to help it do so.

3.2 Program Structures and Functions

The organizational structures of the three Sponsors closely reflect their level of strategic awareness and management and are discussed in the following pages.

3.2.1 CARE Haiti. CARE Haiti is a large and classically structured organization with three basic divisions: Program & Plan, Program Support, and Field Offices in the north and south. Program & Plan comprises the line and/or technical offices, Program Support the staff offices, with the Field Offices a combination of the two. This structure is reflected in the CARE organizational chart at Figure 3 overleaf.

The Title II program is viewed as one of five major CARE Program & Plan "projects". With reference to Table 3, during FY 88 the project moved slightly over 13,000 MT of commodities to almost 300,000 beneficiaries. Fifty-seven percent of the commodities and 79 percent of the beneficiaries were in School Feeding (including a small portion of pre-schoolers), 15 percent of commodities and 8 percent of beneficiaries in MCH, and 9 percent of commodities and 4 percent of beneficiaries in Food For Work. A relatively large volume of commodities (19 percent) was used for Emergencies.

The plans and approved levels for FY 89 (ref. Table 1) are similar to the FY 88 activities, except that generic FFW will cease beginning in January 1989. FFW will thereafter only be used as a resource in other CARE projects, e.g. as an incentive for the construction of community water systems.

The Port-au-Prince based Food Project staff is headed by a Project Coordinator who is the lead person in food planning, monitoring and evaluation at CARE. Working closely with her staff and in discussion with the Deputy for Program & Plan, she develops the MYOP and AERs and Calls Forward and assures all implementation requirements are met. She prepares narrative reports and obtains required financial reporting from the Program Support - Finance Unit.

The Food Project Coordinator is currently reorganizing her staff to reflect the evolving emphasis on formation of local institutions. Her plan involves two functional units, one in Implementation and one in Administration. The Implementation Unit will include a Human Resources Officer and a Project Technical Advisor, presumably in community development. It will also include the one Supervisory Monitoring Officer who is based in Port-au-Prince. This person directly supervises the Field Representatives in Port-au-Prince (now 2, soon to be 3) and provides liaison with those in Gonaives (now 2, soon to be 4), Port de Paix (2) and La Gonaves (2).

Under the evolving Food Project structure, the Food Administration unit will comprise office management and logistics (warehouse management in particular) in collaboration with the Program Support division and the Field Offices.

The CARE Field Office in Gonaives devotes approximately 50 percent of its supervisory resources to food management, with its food Field Representatives and supervisory responsibility for the Port-de-Paix office. The latter's resources are 100 percent attributable to food. The Field Office on La Gonave is supervised directly by Port-au-Prince staff and is devoted 100 percent to the food project. All Field Offices have related warehouses and logistic responsibilities. No food is distributed in the south except on a carefully monitored basis in conjunction with CARE's water supply project, which is discussed below.

All Food Project staff are Haitian national hires except for the Project Coordinator and the Gonaives Field Office Representative (who is only 50 percent attributable to the Food Project), who are international hires.

Figure 3: CARE/Haiti Organizational Chart

(November 1988)



There are three points of particular interest in the CARE Food Project organization: 1) the absence of any specific units relating to the type of food project, i.e. School Feeding, MCH, etc; 2) the multiple function Field Representatives, instead of single function Inspectors or Monitors; and 3) the structural "isolation" of food as a technical project in itself rather than a resource to be used by technical projects.

The first point, the absence of units devoted to types of feeding centers, is unique to CARE among the three Sponsors. That is, CRS and ADRA both have MCH technical staff and ADRA maintains a FFW coordinator and separate SF inspectors. ADRA also had a person devoted to OCF, but has recently decided to integrate him with the SF inspectors. None of the Sponsors maintain staff for Emergencies, nor are they expected to.

CARE is planning to continue its MCH food donation program at the same levels in the near term, with the objective of assisting the GOH Ministry of Health with its MCH program (which presumably has the objective of improving health and nutrition...). CARE's response to the health and nutritional problem of children under five years of age and pregnant and lactating mothers is in the form of the RICHES project (ref. Figure 3) funded under USAID/Haiti's Voluntary Agencies for Child Survival (VACS) project. Food is not currently viewed as necessary or desirable project input by the RICHES project staff, and RICHES staff do not become involved in Food Project MCH matters. The 15 percent of commodities that are devoted to MCH thus constitute a food drop with no technical complementarities and thus no attributable impact on behavior and no prospects for sustainability.

CARE is clearly putting its management emphasis on the School Feeding activities but not as an end in themselves. As discussed earlier, CARE is focussing on the problem of a lack of community organization in Haiti, and plans to use the food resource and school canteen as an entry point for formation of such organizations. Thus the central level technical personal must be experienced in organizational development, human resources, community development, etc. rather than nutrition education.

The second point of interest with CARE's structure flows from this focus. That is, until the 1987-88 school year CARE employed Inspectors just like the other Sponsors. The Inspectors were to visit schools 3 times each year, with a primary function of undertaking classic food end use checks. With the move to use of the SF program as a means to an end (community organization) rather than an end in itself, CARE had a need for closer relationships and more organizational development work at the community level. Rather than hire new staff for this purpose, it decided to recycle the Inspectors and have them do both jobs.

This approach is certainly cost-efficient in terms of maximizing the use of personnel, vehicles and related expenditures but raises a number of disturbing questions. The first is the relative priority given to each the inspection function and the organizational development function. Given the new objective, the latter is clearly the key to program success. Given documented extra-program leakage in Haiti, however, the inspection function remains critical (ref. Chapter 3.3 on the cost of leakage to the program). Inspection is most effective if done on an <u>ad hoc</u> and unscheduled basis; work with a community organization would need to be scheduled well in advance. It is thus unclear whether the efficiencies obtained in organizational development would be lost by less rigorous inspection.

A second question related to monitoring is one of quality of effort. CARE provides food to approximately 1200 schools and will have 11 Field Representatives as of January 1989. One Field Rep visiting over 100 schools three times each year is limited coverage for inspection purposes. Adding time for organizational development efforts while maintaining the same numbers of schools and Field Reps will result in limited efforts at organizational development. The Team strongly recommends that CARE focus efforts on a select number of communities as "pilot" efforts with a selected number of well trained Field Reps and resist the effort to undertake "too much too soon."

A final question related to the multi-function workers is one of aptitude and skills. The recycling effort underway is an admirable example of CARE's commitment to employees, but aptitudes for organizational development and commodity inspection (outside of willingness to travel) are very different. CARE recognizes this problem and understands that after a certain period of time it will have to make some hard decisions on the success of the recycling.

The third point of interest with regard to CARE's organization is the structural "isolation" of the Food Project which encourages the idea of food as an end in itself. With reference to Figure 3, CARE's other current major projects are in agro-forestry ("ANR", with partial A.I.D. funding), education ("PEP", as a subcontractor on the A.I.D. Basic Education project), child survival ("RICHES", with VACS funding) and potable water ("CWSD", with A.I.D. funding). The focus of each project are implied from the titles. This unfortunately has carried over and heretofore made food an equal end in itself.

If CARE's planned new strategic emphasis is formalized and food indeed becomes a resource leading to formation of community organizations, the "Food Project" could be renamed to reflect the end rather than the means. In the longer term, "Food" as a resource would be managed out of the Program Support Division, at the same level as "Finance". It would thus be accessible and allocated--based on soundly conceived plans--to all of CARE's projects. Currently, only the potable water project uses this resource, as an incentive for water system construction by communities. Other possibilities exist. The point is to seek to maximize use of food while minimizing management demands through horizontally integrating it into CARE's existing and strong organizational structure. There would be no strategic objectives for food per se. Given the size and coverage of the CARE portfolio, this integration would be more efficient and effective by almost all criteria (cost, management, development impact, etc.).

3.2.2 CRS. CRS Haiti has a smaller overall portfolio with a larger relative share of P.L. 480 than CARE. With reference to Figure 4 overleaf, its structure combines line and staff functions on equal footing, with "staff" functions of Planning and Evaluation, Administration and Finance, and Food Administration and "line" offices of Projects and Nutrition/MCH. One Field Office (and warehouse) in Les Cayes is specifically under Food Administration.

The Title II program is the largest program of CRS' portfolio in Haiti, with approximately $ 1 million of non-food (and non-A.I.D.) resources devoted to other projects. With reference to Table 3, during FY 88 CRS moved almost 5,000 MT of commodities to 145,000 beneficiaries. Eighty-four percent of the commodities and 92 percent of the beneficiaries were in School and Pre-School Feeding (former CINEC centers, Foster Parents Plan). Eight percent of the commodities went to each of MCH and OCF, with each representing about 4 percent of the beneficiaries. A small proportion of commodities went to General Relief.

The plans and approved levels for FY 89 are slightly higher, with the previously mentioned 8-10 percent decrease in schools and compensating in MCH. CRS ceased FFW in FY 86. Although the CRS-supplied schools all theoretically have Parent Teacher Committees, these have been described as "phantom" and are not greatly emphasized by management. As discussed in Chapter 3.1, strategic interest is much more on nutritional benefits and the most at-risk population, that served by MCH.

The organizational structure reflects CRS' strategic interest by elevating Nutrition/MCH to full division status while ignoring SF structurally. Thus nutrition education programs in schools are possible but are motivated by the strategic interest in nutrition rather than by a supply of food.

Figure 4: Catholic Relief Services/Haiti Organization

(November 1988)



MYOP's, AER's and other planning tools are developed collaboratively, with the Food Administrator in the lead role, working closely with the Nutrition/MCH in-charge, the Program Planning and Evaluation Officer (who recently moved from head of the Projects division). Once plans are agreed upon, implementation responsibility is divided functionally. The Program Planning and Evaluation Officer is currently engaged in the massive data collection and analysis effort discussed earlier, and will likely maintain an active role in improved program monitoring after the first input is complete. The Projects Office assists where plans indicate in provision of mini-projects, such as chicken or rabbit raising projects.

The Nutrition/MCH staff of three develops curriculum and visits the 24 CRS-supported MCH centers frequently. These centers are a mix of GOH secular and mixed religious entities. The Nutrition/MCH staff thus basically provides technical assistance and organizational development assistance both to MCH staff and directly to mothers, with the food (and complementary inputs in the form of medicines, etc.) as an incentive for behavioral change. The Nutrition/MCH staff had plans during FY 88 to work more in the schools but political events precluded much travel.

The Food Administration staff devotes more of its time to the logistics of food movement and accountability. CRS has a total of six End-Use Checkers, two of whom are based in Les Cayes, and one Food Manager/Supervisor, who develops weekly schedules of inspections and reviews reports for problems. Although the Checkers are supposed to motivate schools to form Parent Teacher Committees, they do so only in a cursory manner and the clear priority is inspection. End Use Checkers focus on the schools; the MCH staff reports on the MCH centers.

The one area that does not seem to receive adequate attention is the identification and development of the ancillary or mini-projects. The Assessment Team only visited two such projects, one to produce rabbits and the other chickens, and both had only started within the last 3 months. Neither of the school directors associated with the projects had a clear idea of what they would do with the animals once produced. In these cases, the idea for the projects seem to have originated with the School Directors and been passed to the Program Planning Officer via the Food Manager or via direct request. Although materials and animals were provided, little work on the mini-project management, recurrent costs or end result seems to have been done with the participants. Monitoring such as exists appears to be done by school inspectors. While the cost of these mini-projects--$ 792 for the rabbits--may not justify much management/technical input on the part of CRS, if there are no clear objectives there is a question of why they are undertaken at all.

CRS is well aware of problems with the mini-projects and is taking steps to correct them. The last round of small projects were identified in collaboration with local school directors, community groups and students. CRS has assigned a trained agronomist and two paid technicians to monitor them. Mindful of the tendency to establish overly optimistic project objectives, CRS is now placing emphasis on training and objectives are being used as benchmarks for follow-up and assessment.

CRS is providing financial support to a number of local organizations, the diocese-level CARITAS Diocese Development Bureaus around the country. CARITAS in Haiti has traditionally avoided working with P.L. 480 Title II, but might be the perfect locus of technical assistance for improved food-related mini-project identification, development and technical assistance should CRS feel they are justified.

The Food Administration and Program Planning and Evaluation Officers are international hires, and the rest of the concerned staff is Haitian national hire.

The CRS structure is not particularly "standard" in classical management terms but appears appropriate to the size and mix of the overall program and well suited to the evolving strategy of food as a resource for nutrition. It is suspected that when the data entry and analysis of MCH is complete and conclusions inferred, a more focussed set of MCH interventions may be developed, including revised use of food and possibly revised and/or increased staffing. As part of this exercise the Team recommends CRS reassess the intent and management of the mini-projects and either develop improved systems for more effective use of such resources or drop them.

3.2.3 ADRA. ADRA Haiti is the newest entry to the Haiti P.L. 480 program, having begun food distribution in September 1979. That first year it distributed approximately 900 MT of commodities to 17,000 beneficiaries. The FY 88 program just completed thus represented a more than 600 percent increase in commodities and an almost 700 percent increase in beneficiaries from the base year levels. This growth averages out to 60 percent per year over 10 years.

The program forms the primary ADRA activity in Haiti, with a small A.I.D. centrally-funded Child Survival grant the only other activity in the portfolio. In previous years ADRA also had an A.I.D. Matching Grant to work intensively with 10 MCH/Nutrition centers, work which continues on a more modest scale without the core funding. ADRA has its main office and warehouse in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and currently has no regional offices.



Figure 5:

ADRA/Haiti Organization

November 1988

The ADRA Title II program is currently the most diverse of all the Sponsors, including a larger proportional share of MCH and a continuing interest in FFW. With reference to Table 3, in FY 88 ADRA moved slightly over 6000 MT of commodities to over 116,000 beneficiaries. Forty-three percent of the commodities and 60 percent of the beneficiaries were in SF, 33 percent of the commodities and 27 percent of the beneficiaries in MCH, and 20 percent of commodities and 11 percent of beneficiaries in FFW. A modest level of OCF and other activities were undertaken.

The plans and approved levels for FY 89 are significantly higher, representing the addition at the request of USAID of a group of nine local organizations that had been receiving food under the discontinued Section 416 surplus food program, increasing beneficiary levels by almost 100,000 and almost doubling the commodities. These nine local organizations also plan food in terms of SF, MCH, OCF and General Relief.

The organizational structure to manage this rapidly growing program is reflected in Figure 5. It must be pointed out that this organizational chart was developed in September 1988 as a result of an ADRA International internal review and not all positions are yet staffed. Prior to that time the current Business Administrator served more as a full Deputy, involved in program affairs as well.

What is particularly interesting in the new organizational chart is the explicit depiction of the Country Director as directly responsible to an Administrative Committee, an ADRA Board, and the Franco-Haitian Union Committee. The Administrative Committee and the ADRA Board are both locally formed. The Franco-Haitian Union is a division of the worldwide General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, i.e. the church structure, and includes church representatives from Haiti, Martinique, Guadeloupe, etc.. ADRA International, a separate organization that derives its Mission from the Church but maintains a secular profile, is not represented on the organizational chart.

A new ADRA International InterAmerican Division based in Miami is not represented on the chart; the Team was told that it too would become involved in supervision although this is believed to be only financial and logistic.

The Country Director, hence the country program, is thus supervised by two related but definitely separate entities, the Adventist Church and ADRA International. The ADRA Haiti Administrative Committee and the Board represent a combination of the two, with local ADRA staff and Adventists in Haiti comprising the membership, and the Committee simply being a sub-group of the Board. The Board, as is standard practice in Haiti, is closely involved in the program, and has functions as far reaching as personnel recruitment and hiring. This unique supervisory structure presents two distinct difficulties:

1) As most ADRA employees are Adventists, the dual structure should theoretically pose no conflicts of interest. Unfortunately, not all Adventists understand development and ADRA's capabilities to influence development, and this is where problems can crop up. The only specific problem mentioned to the Team was the occasional tendency of the Board to recommend employment of persons who are not professionally qualified for a specific position. While this is not an insurmountable problem and is certainly common to many board structures, it means that the Director must undertake development education of his board in addition to all his other responsibilities.

2) More importantly, the fact that employees serve on the Board is most unusual. While the Team is most impressed with the general ethic of ADRA to promote employee participation and leadership skills, it is unclear what the criteria are for nominating employees to the board. Currently, the Child Survival Project Director (who is actually only a part-time employee), the Business Administrator and the Country Director are on the Board, complemented by a GOH Bureau de Gestion employee and some Church officials. Whether ADRA International or the local Board has final authority in given matters was not entirely clear to the Team.

These "external" anomalies aside, the internal ADRA Haiti structure is evolving to meet its rapidly growing mandate. The structure provides four basic divisions reporting to the Director: Other Programs, Inspection, Food Programs, and Business Administration, thus two "line" offices and two "staff offices. Their functions are as follows:

- <u>Other Programs</u>: This structural unit was created in anticipation of the time when ADRA has a more diverse portfolio, and the Assistant Director position is currently vacant. As mentioned above, the only other program is the Child Survival grant, which is handled quite separately from other activities. The Child Survival personnel include paid Health Agents and a Clinic Supervisor, among others, who are not reflected on the ADRA organizational chart. The Project Director reports most directly to a technical backstop at ADRA International in Washington, D.C., and since the Project Director is on the local ADRA Board there are no questions of mixed supervision. The Child Survival project issues food as an incentive to mothers. The project's use of food is thus reported to one USAID/HRO employee (the P.L. 480 Manager) and its impact on children to another (the Child Survival Coordinator), one of the more classic examples of non-strategic planning and implementation found in this Assessment.

- <u>Food Programs</u>: The Assistant Director for Food Programs position is also currently vacant, with recruitment ongoing. The unit theoretically covers all food related activities except inspection but in the absence of the Assistant Director, the Chief Inspector (another division) appears to be the operational in-charge of the food program. School Feeding, FFW and OCF programming would theoretically be handled by the Assistant Director in the future. The MCH unit is similar in function to its counterpart at CRS, in terms of providing technical assistance and training to MCH personnel. Whereas 3 persons at CRS work with 24 MCH centers, however, at ADRA 7 (4 Supervisors, 1 Training Officer, 1 Nutritionist under recruitment and 1 Program Director) assist 137 centers. The (new) MCH Program Director (who was on extended leave during the Team's visit) is evaluating the MCH portfolio and eliminating those centers that are not responding to reporting requirements, in the hopes of bringing it down to a more manageable level. The Commodities Manager has primarily logistic responsibilities, with port clearing and forwarding being handled by a contractor, Emballage Adventiste.

- <u>Inspection</u>: The Inspectors form a separate division and the Team assumes this was so placed to constitute a sort of independent audit function. Given the as yet non-operational nature of the Food Programs division, the Chief Inspector is substantively involved in major programming decisions. For example, it was he who made the decision to add over 100 centers and about 80,000 beneficiaries to the distribution roles in the third quarter last year, bypassing all standard procedures in an effort to meet beneficiaries' needs. This more substantive role does not appear to have left him much time for the basic supervisory functions of reviewing inspection reports; in a random sample of 10 percent of the total ADRA SF files, for example, only one dossier had an inspection more recent than the spring of 1987. The 4 inspectors are theoretically supposed to visit each school 3 times per year.

The USAID/HRO comments to a draft of this report noted that "ADRA indicated that more recent inspections took place but that reports were not filed." The Team has no doubt that this is true. The lack of a systematic method of reviewing and maintaining files, however, implies less rigor in scheduling visits where needed, and to the Team underscores the excessive work burden placed on the Chief Inspector.

- <u>Business Administration</u>: The Business Administrator manages financial and administrative matters. The ADRA financial reports were extremely thorough and well prepared.

The internal structure as presented has a number of problems in addition to those noted. For example, the Team suggests that vehicle management is being made more difficult than it should be by having Truck Drivers report to the Assistant Commodity Manager in the Food Programs Division while Vehicle Assignment is made by a separate functional unit in the same division and Garage Vehicle Maintenance is totally separate in the Business Administration Division. More importantly, in the absence of a functioning Food Programs division, the whole question of strategic and operational planning is in question. The Director a.i. has maintained the organization to date, but with the doubling of the program this FY and the arrival of a new Director momentarily the future is very much uncertain.

Actual program effectiveness was difficult to measure in that ADRA's first quarter Call Forward was sent in late and, given the extraordinary distributions last year, it had no food at the time of the Team's visit and had distributed none on any scale since June 1988. At the time of the Team's visit in November, the Director expected both the first and second quarter Calls Forward in December, which would have exceeded ADRA's ability to store the food. The USAID/HRO December comments to the Team's draft stated that the Calls Forward were no longer due in December, and stated that ample space would be available to store food, particularly with the use of the Section 416 organizations' warehouses. As stated in Chapter 4, the Team recommends that USAID work closely with ADRA on scheduling the food movement.

3.2.4 USAID/Haiti. The USAID/Haiti P.L. 480 Title II program is managed by the Health and Nutrition functional unit (HN) of the Human Resources Office (HRO), one of USAID's three technical or line offices. USAID/HRO has a total of 16 professionals, 6 of whom are in HN and 2 of whom work full time on Title II. The two positions are the P.L. 480 Program Manager and the P.L. 480 Program Monitor. The Team believes that they constitute an adequate level and skills mix for the needs.

The P.L. 480 Program Monitor reports to the Program Manager, which is a logical and functional relationship. The Program Manager, however, reports to the HRO/HN Chief some of the time and to the overall HRO Deputy others. While this division theoretically is based on regular program and relief program food, it in fact overlaps and can create mixed messages. As the HRO organizational structure is relatively new, however, it is assumed these lines of authority will eventually straighten out.

The problem with USAID's management and monitoring of the Title II program is beyond the scope of the two Title II positions, and involves the establishment and acceptance of strategic and operational objectives. Until such an event occurs management can only involve more sophisticated juggling of commodity quantities and monitoring more careful counting of sacks. While the two employees, particularly the manager, should certainly be involved in revising and finalizing the strategy, it is important that other parts of the Mission--notably PPS and the Director's office--also become involved. The Strategy drafted as a companion to this Assessment will be no more useful than the Deaton and Siaway Strategy of April 1988 unless it is reviewed, accepted, shared and discussed with Sponsors and internalized as guidance by and for USAID.

Recommendations for USAID actions are found at Chapter 4.

3.3 Program Costs

3.3.1 Internal Cost Analysis. The purpose of cost analysis in this Assessment is to determine how well program objectives are supported by program cost structures, and to investigate comparative levels of internal efficiency. Chapter 3.1 documents a high degree of goal ambiguity and a split between stated and implicit objectives. By analyzing Cooperating Sponsor budgets and expenditures it is possible to determine the relationship between stated and implicit objectives and cost patterns.

As well, by analyzing cost data, an understanding of internal efficiencies can be gained. Internal efficiencies are cost measured outcomes related directly to implementation of an activity itself. In this case, the question becomes how well, or efficiently, is food delivered to program beneficiaries. For the Haiti Title II program, this question is all the more critical in light of implicit goals of food aid delivery as an end in itself.

What follows, then, is a description of total direct costs in the food program. While CARE, CRS and ADRA all have unique systems of accounts, it is possible to analyze their costs in common terms and arrive at an overall program cost estimate for each Sponsor, as well as a comparison of costs of each type of feeding program. To do this all program direct costs are broken into seven cost components as shown in Table 4 overleaf. Cost data has been aggregated directly from each organization's FY 88 expenditures or derived from USAID/Haiti and/or Sponsor information. The more detailed analyses are found at Annex B.

Table 4: Total Direct Costs

CARE

	FFW	MCH	SF	PSF	OCF	GR	TOTAL	PERC.	P/T
I. Commodity Cost	$253,564	$379,355	$1,485,487	$22,463	$0	$645,611	$2,786,480	32.7%	$214
II. Ocean Transport	$144,160	$239,020	$928,880	$14,360	$0	$628,716	$1,955,136	22.9%	$150
III. Administration	$68,127	$113,477	$440,813	$6,815	$0	$149,409	$778,641	9.1%	$60
IV. In country transport	$19,173	$31,810	$123,586	$1,911	$0	$41,882	$218,362	2.6%	$17
V. Empty container	$733	$1,215	$4,719	$73	$0	$1,592	$8,332	0.1%	$1
VI. Local contribution	$0	$72,000	$2,603,880	$0	$0	$0	$2,675,880	31.4%	$205
VII. Dev. projects/ Compl. inputs	$13,043	$0	$97,344	$0	$0	$0	$110,387	1.3%	$8
TOTAL	$498,800	$836,877	$5,684,709	$45,622	$0	$1,467,210	$8,533,218		
COST PER TON	$436	$441	$771	$400	$0	$587	$655		
COST PER BENEFICARY	$45	$34	$25	$20	$0	$52	$29		

CRS

	FFW	MCH	SF	PSF	OCF	GR	OTHER	TOTAL	PERC.	P/T
I. Commodity Cost	$0	$92,846	$923,611	$0	$83,744	$0	$10,368	$1,110,569	28.9%	$227
II. Ocean Transport	$0	$38,700	$411,700	$0	$38,600	$0	$4,700	$493,700	12.9%	$101
III. Administration	$0	$72,363	$340,552	$0	$31,930	$0	$745	$445,590	11.6%	$91
IV. In country transport	$0	$9,822	$104,491	$0	$9,797	$0	$228	$124,338	3.2%	$25
V. Empty container	$0	$248	$2,635	$0	$247	$0	$0	$3,130	0.1%	$1
VI. Local contribution	$0	$18,000	$1,496,250	$0	$0	$0	$0	$1,514,250	39.4%	$309
VII. Dev. projects/ Compl. inputs	$0	$14,381	$133,911	$0	$413	$0	$0	$148,705	3.9%	$30
TOTAL	$0	$246,360	$3,413,150	$0	$164,731	$0	$16,041	$3,840,282		
COST PER TON	$0	$637	$829	$0	$427	$0	$341	$778		
COST PER BENEFICIARY	$0	$41	$26	$0	$44	$0	$7	$26		

TABLE 4 CONTINUED

ADRA

	FFW	MCH	SF	PSF	OCF	GR	OTHER	TOTAL	PERC.	P/T
I. Commodity Cost	$290,131	$456,520	$612,938	$0	$25,146	$19,676	$0	$1,404,411	39.3%	$227
II. Ocean Transport	$126,600	$206,000	$267,500	$0	$8,900	$9,400	$0	$618,400	17.3%	$100
III. Administration	$78,264	$178,182	$148,790	$0	$5,503	$5,811	$0	$416,550	11.7%	$67
IV. In country transport	$24,260	$39,745	$51,260	$0	$1,705	$1,801	$0	$118,771	3.3%	$19
V. Empty container	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	0.0%	$0
VI. Local contribution	$0	$90,000	$784,935	$0	$0	$0	$0	$874,935	24.5%	$141
VII. Dev. projects/ Compl. inputs	$4,107	$50,802	$83,932	$0	$0	$0	$0	$138,841	3.9%	$22
TOTAL	$523,362	$1,021,249	$1,949,355	$0	$41,254	$36,688	$0	$3,571,908		
COST PER TON	$413	$496	$734		$464	$390	$0	$578		
COST PER BENEFICIARY	$41	$33	$28		$36	$32	$0	$31		

The data in Table 4 should be interpreted carefully. While the differences in cost between types of programs are absolute, the bottom line per ton costs for each Sponsor are relative. That is, these totals are extremely sensitive to the mix of program types and the dollar value of complementary inputs that each Sponsor employs. Particularly, if the percentage of school feeding is high in per ton terms relative to other program types, the Sponsor's per ton costs are apt to be high. It would be somewhat of a red herring to directly impute absolute levels of efficiency for each Sponsor from reading the bottom line of this table. More careful analysis is required.

In performing this analysis the common denominators are per ton and per beneficiary costs. A word is deserved on how each was derived. Commodities are quite clear. Each Sponsor submits a Commodity Status Report/Recipient Status Report (CSR/RSR) that details the number of kilograms that left the warehouse and arrived at the distribution site. Thus the number of tons being used is the amount distributed for FY 88, and not the number of tons Called Forward or projected in the AER. This gives a much more accurate picture of events.

Recipients, though, are more complex to estimate. Each RSR states how many recipients there were for the quarter, but does not imply how long the ration was meant to last. Thus, one cannot simply add the total of beneficiaries as one can commodities. Rather, an appropriate divisor must be used to annualize the number of recipients. Thus, the totals used in this report are the average number of beneficiaries reached throughout the year, which is the most accurate number to use.

The first cost component in each program is P.L. 480 Commodities. Some variation exists between each Sponsor and each program, ranging from $ 199 per ton for CARE's school feeding to $ 239 for CRS's MCH. In theory, rations are standardized for each program type and are generally adhered to by each Sponsor. The cost variation, therefore, can be attributed to two factors. First, there is some actual difference between the value of each ration per program type. Secondly, this difference tends to vary further when commodities are unavailable at the time needed for distribution, which seems to be a frequent occurrence. Each Sponsor may substitute or borrow commodities for those unavailable. Thus, the cash value of the rations actually distributed can vary from the prescribed norms. Table 5 shows the 1988 commodity cash value of rations by Sponsor for three types of programs on an annualized basis:

Table 5: Annualized Cash Value of Rations
Haiti P.L. 480 Title II Program, 1988
(U.S. Dollars)

	FFW	MCH	SF
CARE	23.60	15.45	6.40
ADRA	22.70	14.78	8.79
CRS	NA	15.47	6.92

The Table confirms that to a general degree the Sponsors are adhering to their agreement on standard rations.

The second cost component in P.L. 480 programs is Ocean Freight and Port Clearance Fees. Ocean freight rates are negotiated by the USDA-related Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and Sponsors have no impact on these prices. The standard cost is roughly $ 100 per MT from Gulf ports. However, CARE's cost per ton is significantly higher than the other Sponsors. This difference is due to the fact that roughly 65 percent of CARE's commodities are booked on a through bill of lading, to deliver them to areas other than Port-au-Prince. The cost of this service is an additional $ 40 per ton.

Although a rigorous transport analysis might show savings if CARE performed the onward transport itself, the savings to CARE in management time are considerable. Any losses are marine claims rather than inland losses. Thus CARE is not responsible for collection, and payment to the U.S. Treasury is much more likely from a major freight forwarder. Additionally, CARE saves itself management time and risk.

The only other difference between Sponsors is in port clearance. Both CRS and CARE have staff employees to handle customs clearance. ADRA has elected to hire a transport agent at $20,154 for FY 88. Naturally, there are no differences in cost for different program types under ocean freight.

The third cost component is Program Administration. It includes the administrative, program, and monitoring costs each Sponsor incurs in managing P.L. 480 programs. The administration component in Table 4 comprises commodity storage, salaries and benefits, office costs, supervisory travel, vehicle purchase, miscellaneous and home office overhead.

The dollar costs in this component are prorated per ton by program type, since no Sponsor keeps separate accounts for each food aid activity. At a strategic level the Sponsors' accounting practices thus give credence to the thought that food assistance projects in Haiti are seen not as development projects but rather as food delivery, with MCH, FFW etc. simply different targeting mechanisms. Without separate accounting, evaluation and monitoring procedures cannot readily be put into place. This assures that no real impact assessment can be done.

As an estimation of administrative cost per project, prorating per ton should give an accurate reading. The principle administration activities for each Sponsor are commodity management, reporting, logistics and monitoring. In general, these costs increase in a proportional manner with the number of tons of commodities utilized.

Per ton costs of administration are a good indicator of management depth. Here there is an extremely wide range. CARE, which has the largest overall program, is on the thin side, at $ 60 per ton. By contrast CRS, which has a program less than half the size of CARE, has administration costs of $ 90 per ton. ADRA has the highest percentage of total budget devoted to administration, at 11.7 percent, but a low $ 67 per ton. This would seem to indicate that ADRA is stretched thin at all line items. If administration is proportionately high and yet absolutely low, all other line items must have fewer funds to compensate for the extra percentage points in administration.

The fourth cost component is <u>In-Country Transport.</u> Here varying philosophies are in play. CRS uses commercial maintenance facilities and does not maintain a garage; CARE and ADRA both maintain their own vehicles. Cost structures between each organization are highly similar. As a percentage of total costs, each is paying between 2.6 and 3.2 percent. Again CRS is the cost leader, paying $ 25 per ton versus CARE and ADRA paying $ 15 and $ 19 respectively.

It should be noted, however, that several factors come into play in assessing transport. Because there are no accounting systems for types of projects, it is difficult to analyze real costs. Cost per ton is a close proxy, but does not take into consideration difficult logistics or relatively longer hauls, which would require analysis in terms of cost/ton/kilometer. This latter analysis is not possible due to the aggregate nature of the data.

CRS transported the fewest tons of the three organizations, using six ten-ton trucks. ADRA, using five ten-ton trucks hauled over 1000 MT more. Since both organizations rarely rely on truck rental, a possible explanation is that CRS has some over-capacity for which it is paying. CRS explains this as due to its concentration on SF programs and subsequent overuse during the school year and under use during vacations.

The fifth cost component, Empty Sack Fees, plays a small role in the overall project. CARE consistently recuperates its empty sacks and containers from delivery sites and CRS charges recipient centers 20 cents per container, both as a means of accountability and to resell them in the market. ADRA is now in the process of instituting its own similar system. CARE received in FY 88 $ 8,230 from this exercise, using the funds as a flexible expenditure account both for internal and food project needs. The CRS figure in Table 4 is not contained in its working budgets and was calculated for these purposes based on CARE's experience. CRS has been collecting these funds for many years, and placing them in an account. They are used primarily for bridge funding, and rarely irretrievably spent. To date approximately $ 100,000 exists in the CRS account.

The sixth cost component is Complementary Inputs and Development Projects. Until this point most costs have been somewhat generic--that is, they are the same per ton no matter the type of project. In noting the wide cost variance between Sponsors, it quickly becomes clear that Complementary Inputs and Development Projects funds are a principle cause of differences in per ton costs. This is true because these costs cannot be allocated on a per ton basis. Rather, they tend to accrue to specific types of projects.

Complementary inputs are generally spent for MCH materials, or more rarely FFW. Purchases can include scales, tools, and medicines. Development Project funds are oriented toward the repair or equipping of school canteens, or else are disbursed for small projects, such as rabbit raising or school gardens Generally, development projects take place with Parent-Teacher Committees and are related to school canteens.

ADRA marginally leads the way in this category, spending almost 3.9 percent of its total expenditures on these items, followed by CRS at 3.7 percent and CARE at 1.3 percent. ADRA actually had only one development project at a modest $ 450. All its other similar expenses are listed under Complementary Inputs, and involve either FFW tools, MCH materials or infrastructure support for school canteens.

CRS divides its resources almost equally between Complementary Inputs and Development Projects, with 90 percent going through schools. CARE, although in absolute terms spending as much as the others, maintains a very modest share of its overall budget for this aspect. It is primarily focused on Development Projects, with 90 percent going through schools. Again, CRS is the cost leader in absolute terms, spending $ 148,705 over the year.

The last cost component is <u>Local Contributions</u>, which are locally generated and accounted for, outside of direct Sponsor control. The primary source of these funds is the SF program, although MCH has some contributions as well. The funds play a substantial role in the functioning of school canteens. Every canteen needs to pay for fuel, cooking equipment, and, of course, cooks. Condiments, spices and enrichment--frequently beans--are also purchased. The funds are collected and managed in theory by the Parent Teacher Committee but, where none exists (which is most frequently the case) by the School Director. Typically, each school child is expected to contribute 10 cents per school day (150 per year). At a school of 200 students where 75 percent bring in their money, the year's sum is $ 2250. The MCH figure is estimated at $ .25 per month per beneficiary.

3.3.2 <u>Internal Efficiencies</u>. With this description finished, the next issue is to analyze internal efficiency. The question becomes, which program and type of program is the most cost efficient, and why?

In examining the bottom lines of Table 4, it is readily apparent that there is often an inverse relationship between cost per ton and cost per beneficiary. This is most pronounced in the School Feeding program. Upon reflection, this appears quite reasonable. In effect, the ration for SF is the smallest and therefore a given amount of commodities will serve proportionately more people than any other program. Thus the cost of delivering commodities to this population will be the lowest per person. Inversely, since the amount of commodities used will be low in relation to other programs the cost per ton will appear high.

In evaluating internal efficiencies the objective is to move commodities as cost effectively as possible. Types of projects become, in this view, channels of delivery and targeting mechanisms. Given the goal displacement of all three Sponsors discussed in Chapter 3.1, cost effective delivery becomes an implicit goal by default.

Table 6 overleaf demonstrates the per ton and per beneficiary costs of the program.

Table 6: Internal and External Operational Costs

CARE	FFW	MCH	SF	PSF	DCF	GR	TOTAL
Total internal costs	$485,024	$763,662	$2,978,766	$45,549	$0	$1,465,618	$5,738,619
Cost per ton	$424	$402	$404	$400	$0	$587	$440
Cost per beneficiary	$44	$31	$13	$20		$52	$19
Total external cost	$13,776	$73,215	$2,705,943	$73	$0	$1,592	$2,794,599
Cost per ton	$12	$39	$367	$1	$0	$1	$214
Cost per beneficiary	$1	$3	$12	$0	$0	$0	$9

CRS

	FFW	MCH	SF	PSF	DCF	GR	OTHER	TOTAL
Total internal costs	$0	$213,731	$1,780,354	$0	$164,071	$0	$16,041	$2,174,197
Cost per ton	$0	$552	$432	$0	$425	$0	$341	$440
Cost per beneficiary	$0	$36	$13	$0	$44	$0	$7	$15
Total external cost	$0	$32,629	$1,632,796	$0	$660	$0	$0	$1,666,085
Cost per ton	$0	$84	$397	$0	$2	$0	$0	$337
Cost per beneficiary	$0	$5	$12	$0	$0	$0	$0	$11

ADRA

	FFW	MCH	SF	PSF	DCF	GR	OTHER	TOTAL
Total operational costs	$519,255	$880,447	$1,080,488	$0	$41,254	$36,688	$0	$2,358,132
Cost per ton	$410	$427	$407	$0	$464	$390	$0	$414
Cost per beneficiary	$41	$29	$15	$0	$36	$32	$0	$22
Total external cost	$4,107	$140,802	$868,867	$0	$0	$0	$0	$1,013,776
Cost per ton	$3	$68	$327	$0	$0	$0	$0	$78
Cost per beneficiary	$0	$5	$12	$0	$0	$0	$0	$9

Table 6 categorizes the costs of line items I-IV in Table 4 as operational costs, and items V-VI as external costs. Cost structures change dramatically, and School Feeding is seen to be clearly the lowest cost both per beneficiary and per ton, compared to other projects. Sponsors costs appear similar although CARE demonstrates all around lower cost. Table 7 summarizes the internal School Feeding costs from Table 6.

Table 7: Internal School Feeding Costs of 1988 Haiti P.L. 480 Program (U.S. Dollars)

	CARE	ADRA	CRS
Per ton	404	432	407
Per beneficiary	13	13	15

In can be concluded from these data that the CARE SF program is operating the most efficiently, reaching the most people for the fewest dollars. A possible explanation for CARE's relative efficiency in SF might be its overall program size. The Food Project Manager has several peers substantially involved in various aspects of the program. The combined experience and support can allow for a synergistic management effect, where each manager brings about improvement in every other. By contrast, ADRA, with a high per ton cost, is staffed very thinly at the top. It could well be that marginal improvements in management do not accrue at ADRA due to an overwhelming work load, and the lack of peer sounding boards and other "soft" facets of organizational structure.

The narrow range of figures between each Sponsor is a positive management sign. In general, if different organizations have similar cost structures, it can be inferred that each is in the middle ground of managerial performance, and neither under nor over-performing in relation to its peers. That is to say--at least in terms of cost management--all three sponsors are in sync with the realities of food distribution in Haiti.

It should be noted that this data set cannot readily provide cost comparisons between types of projects. Without a clear-cut and common goal, there is no definition of efficiency. For example, relative efficiency cannot be dtermeined between SF and MCH. School Feeding provided a smaller ration at lower price than MCH. Conversely, MCH provided more food per beneficiary, although to do this the cost was greater. Until a decision is made on a preferred outcome, there are no standards with which to judge which is more efficient.

3.3.3 <u>External Costs and Efficiencies</u>. When developmental impact is being considered or is an explicit goal of a project, a different set of numbers needs to be considered. External costs are those that cannot be placed in a budget meaningfully, yet still impact upon the cost and implementation of a project. The principle external costs of the P.L 480 program are in lost commodities--in port, and in country leakages--and losses through ineffective targeting and weak monitoring.

The two kinds of leakage have similar programmatic effect. Both port losses and ex-Sponsor warehouse losses deprive beneficiaries of their rations, and incur costs upon the projects. In FY 88, port losses ran above $700,000. In dollar terms, this represents 13.5 percent of the commodities distributed in the year. If lost commodities are assumed to be divided equally among beneficiaries, this loss translates into the elimination of over 75,000 children from the program.

A secondary effect of port losses is to create slack resources in the program, increasing unit costs. Budgets, material and personnel are procured in advance of the landing of commodities. When there are shortages, the entire administrative function is working at less that capacity. Admittedly, the FY 88 port losses were abnormally high and are under investigation. This level is not expected to recur in FY 89.

A second type of loss are ex-sponsor warehouse losses, i.e. in transit to the recipient site warehouse or while at the recipient site. USAID/HRO believes that ex-sponsor warehouse losses are "practically insignificant" and mostly due to infestation and sporadic truck attacks (USAID/HRO Comments, 12/9/88). It concedes that diversions do occur but that does not mean that commodities are stolen. To quote from its comments to the draft of this report: "For example, in SF, food is sometimes given to cooks, teachers or sold to buy other commodities; in MCH, mothers might sell the milk they receive as an incentive for their baby's enrollment in the program; FFW rations are based on 1 worker and 3 family members and no one expects the recipient to consume the entire ration without bartering some for local products or other needed items."

Ex-sponsor warehouse losses are only rarely reported on CSR/RSR forms so the formal system suggests that indeed these losses are quite low. In that it was asked to undertake an assessment and not an audit, the Team did not trace the origins of the P.L. 480 food found in local markets to determine if it was a port loss or an ex-Sponsor warehouse loss. Because the

Team encountered such a widespread belief among local persons that food is stolen or sold, however, and because such losses are important to overall project effectiveness and cost efficiencies, it attempted to quantify these losses. Using the Delphi method, the Assessment Team arrived at the following estimates for ex-warehouse loss by program type: School Feeding 25 percent; MCH 18 percent; OCF 25 percent and FFW 60 percent. These are relatively consistent with what Cotten found in his statistically correct 1981-82 data gathering, i.e. 17 percent for extra-program usage.

As a complement to these types of losses are those due to targeting error. Two types of errors may occur. One is providing commodities to those who do not have need; the other, not providing commodities to those who do have nutritional deficiencies. During the Assessment Team's field trip, there was wide variation in the apparent resources available to the schools and thus in the visible well-being of the children. One school fed 150 "children" in secondary and vocational school, ranging up to age 20. The Team was unable to estimate the extent of targeting error. In essence, however, the cost effect is similar to diversion, since all costs are incurred, and no impact received.

The tie in to much of this loss is the monitoring function in each cooperating Sponsor. Active monitoring, and dossier verification is an integral part of the management process. Table 8 reflects the different levels of monitoring activities that take place in each organization. It demonstrates the considerable workload on a per ton, per beneficiary and per institution basis.

Table 8: Activity Levels per Monitor per Sponsor
Haiti P.L. 480 Title II Program

	Number of Monitors	Tons/ Monitor	Beneficiaries/ Monitor	Centers/ Monitor
CARE	11	1184	27,000	87.9
ADRA	7	883	16,571	106.0
CRS	9	548	16,159	70.3

Note: Levels of Monitors, Tons, Beneficiaries and Centers are for SF and MCH programs only.

It is clear that to cover this many tons, beneficiaries and distribution centers, cursory monitoring (of quantity but more particularly of quality) must be engaged in at all three Sponsors.

External costs come to bear on external efficiencies. These are issues and cost related outcomes that are outside the direct context of the program. In this case external efficiencies deal with the attempts to achieve developmental impacts and to use food as a developmental resource. Table 4 well demonstrates that the primary Title II program expenditure for resources for development is in the schools, both in terms of recipient contribution and direct expenditure. It is however somewhat incorrect to judge the external efficiency, the development impact, on a cost per ton or beneficiary basis. Less or more expenditure does not imply better in any way.

From a financial and managerial point of view, however questions arise as to the efficiency of the process used by each Sponsor. Given the monitoring data in Table 8, it is clear that little time can be spent at each locality, if Monitors are in charge of helping develop projects. At the same time, cost per project is usually low, implying more rather than fewer sites to visit. Thus it would appear that most projects will be on their own for both development and implementation. FFW, generally perceived as unsuccessful in Haiti, seems to be the model of development for smaller projects: rapid examination, resource delivery, and little evaluation. CARE, as well, in emphasizing Parent Teacher Committees seems to be using too few resources to garner a significant response, based on monitoring levels described above.

3.3.4 Synthesis. Expenditure and cost patterns echo clearly the strategic disarray of P.L. 480 food activities in Haiti. Without a clear goal, implicit goals become operational and the driving force behind program decisions. Efficiency becomes a goal in and of itself, and the question of "why food" gets lost in the transport bills. What this analysis presents is that even when efficiency is posited as an implicit--and with some an explicit--goal, external costs go a long way toward making efficiency some what of a dream.

The analysis presented here lends further support to the idea that the external goal, the attempt at development impacts, is grafted on to the internal goal. The budgets of each Sponsor are to a large extent logistical, and there are no real cost linkages between the delivery of food and the establishment of developmental projects. In fact, without the food, the external goal might well be more achievable. There would simply be less to manage.

3.4 Program Results

The preceding analyses demonstrate that the Title II program is implemented without strategic or operational developmental objectives. The effectiveness of the program can thus only be judged in terms of what does, as opposed to what it seeks to do. Table 3 demonstrates the quantifiable achievements in terms of number of beneficiaries per each delivery mechanism for 1988 and Table 1 provides rough indicative levels of overall programs for the last several years. These may be considered program accomplishments in the most basic terms.

The preceding analyses indicate that none of the three Sponsors' programs can claim results in terms of nutrition or school attendance, the "standard" Title II objectives, because they are either not structured to do so or they have no data to support such claims. Where both program structure and monitoring are geared towards a specific objective, as in the CRS MCH program, data were not available to the Team but may in fact soon yield interesting results. In the SF programs, however, resources are not particularly geared to specific nutritional needs and no data exist with which to measure impact.

What the program does is provide supplemental food to children throughout Haiti, through the mechanism of MCH for the under-5's and through SF for the 5-15 age range. In FY 88, it provided food to approximately 500,000 children, or roughly 20 percent of all Haitian children for at least 9 months of the year. Following the Cotten study, it is likely that this supplemental food serves as a "safety net" for the children and possibly their families, a small constant in a rapidly deteriorating environment. While this achievement in terms of child survival and welfare is significant, no broader development impact can objectively be claimed. (Readers who have more interest in discussion of the "safety net" impact are urged to review the Cotten report from whence it is drawn; it is an excellent compendium of extremely useful information and discussion on the impact of the Title II School Feeding program.)

What is interesting in terms of the effectiveness of this safety net is that the most at-risk group in Haiti, according to all literature, is the children under five, who in the FY 88 Title II program comprised only 11 percent of the beneficiaries (and consumed 18 percent of the commodities). The far greater share went to the older children attending school who are less at-risk as a group and who may, by the mere fact that they attend school, be assumed to be marginally better off than those who do not have access to or cannot afford to go to school. The question of why the Title II program has ended up with an FY 89 target of 80 percent of beneficiaries in the SF program was of considerable interest to the Team, particularly in light of the major funding being provided by A.I.D. for children under five through its child survival program.

The answer to this anomaly is offered in the closing paragraph of the cost analysis above: the external goal is perceived as more easily achievable without the management costs associated with food distribution. Thus the Sponsor which in its Title II program is the most cost efficient, CARE, provides food and no supporting inputs through its MCH program and supporting inputs but no food through its RICHES project (which is also possibly cost efficient). The three or four child survival grantees under A.I.D.'s VACS project that also receive food are not particularly monitored. Thus even though the explicit objective is the same, in child survival many view the food as a management headache that detracts from the program.

In assessing the Title II program's effectiveness in terms of providing a safety net, then, it cannot claim to be targeted towards the population with greatest need. Although comparative data with other country programs are not available, it can claim that in serving the needs of the population it has targeted it is relatively cost efficient. The key area which the Sponsors can affect in which efficiency could be improved is in the reduction of ex-Sponsor losses through improved inspection systems.

The analyses also demonstrate only moderate variation in terms of the relative efficiency and effectiveness of the three Sponsors. None have strategic objectives although CRS is close, and all are in dynamic states which should lead to much tighter programming. The organizational structure of each reflects its implicit objectives, with CRS currently having the most and ADRA the least focus. In costs, CARE is the most cost efficient, although margins are very slim. All Sponsors need to improve monitoring systems not only for efficiency but in order to judge effectiveness as they move towards their new foci.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Assessment Team wishes to underscore its general support for the conclusions and recommendations of numerous previous reports as summarized in Chapter 2.2 at pages 9-12. It also wishes to acknowledge that in several areas Sponsors and/or USAID/HRO are fully aware of problems and working toward resolution. In other words, the Team makes no claims to particularly new or startling findings. The items discussed below simply need to be carried out.

4.1 Internal Organizational Structures and Functions

4.1.1 USAID/Haiti. USAID should be prepared to provide resources to assist the Sponsors in improved strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation. Specifically:

- USAID should immediately work with ADRA to develop a Scope of Work for an accountability and management audit by a local auditing firm experienced in P.L. 480 work. Funding should be provided by PD&S or available local currency. If at all possible the audit should be undertaken as the First Quarter Call Forward is arriving and being distributed. The audit should at a minimum reverify the existence of the recipient schools and MCH centers and up-date their beneficiary levels. The purposes of the audit should be to (1) develop a new baseline of beneficiaries (number of centers and populations served) so that the new Director can start the program with a clean slate and (2) verify that all necessary administrative and accountability systems are in place and operational, so that the new Director has a clear idea of needed management focus. ADRA should be encouraged to maintain its moratorium on FFW until the audit is complete.

- USAID/Haiti should develop strategic and operational objectives for its Title II program and internalize them in its programming documents and its management structure. The companion Strategy (which draws on the April 1988 Deaton & Siaway Strategy) prepared under this contract is a suggested starting point. USAID/HRO should work with PPS and the office of the Director, at a minimum, to assure that the Strategy is accepted and approved and can be acted upon.

- USAID/HRO should be prepared to provide modest technical assistance to the Sponsors, under VACS project funding, to develop means of more effectively coordinating resources under the Title II and Child Survival efforts. For example, the CRS Program Planning and Evaluation Officer should be invited to give a presentation of the methodology and results of the computerized data on MCH when it is finished. If results appear interesting, USAID should assist the other PVO's, if they are interested, in procuring the same software and entering data from centers they support. This effort might involve a local contractor in that the ADRA and CARE programs are much larger than that of CRS.

- USAID/HRO should internally work to improve its Title II program monitoring and evaluation. Communication and coordination in particular should be strengthened: within HN, for child survival and urban health efforts; between HN and Education and Training, for the Increasing Incentives project; and between HRO and other USAID offices (particularly Agriculture and PPS) for strategic planning and monitoring. While Title II will by its nature remain supply-driven, it constitutes a large enough share of the Mission's budget that it must be better integrated into the program.

o USAID/HRO should also work towards computerizing basic Sponsor reporting format, in order to more rapidly and easily analyze CSR/RSR's (at a minimum) when they come in. USAID/HRO might enquire of FVA/FFP if any other Missions have developed software for the Wang or IBM system. (see below).

4.1.2 The Sponsors. All three Sponsors must work to develop clear goals and objectives for their food programs that are compatible with organizational mandates and capabilities.

o CARE and CRS are moving in positive directions and are encouraged to continue refining evolving goals. As objectives are defined, so monitoring indicators and systems should be established. The PVO's may wish to ask USAID/HRO for technical assistance in this regard.

o ADRA must get the sheer size of its program under control prior to focussing on improving quality. When its audit is finished and the new Director well settled, ADRA should consider a management retreat involving its Board and one or two ADRA International Washington-based officers to develop a more strategic focus for its program. ADRA should maintain a moratorium on FFW and any new initiatives until such time as management systems and staff to carry them out are in place.

o The Cooperating Sponsors should participate in reviews of the USAID/Haiti Title II Strategy to ensure that USAID's strategic objectives can be made operational. It must be emphasized that Sponsors be encouraged to develop their own objectives within the USAID framework which reflect the different mandates and experience of each Sponsor. A tighter operational focus on different strategic objectives will serve as an on-going sort of "operations research" in food aid programming in Haiti.

Once operational objectives are defined, all three Sponsors should work to establish realistic and evaluable indicators of achievement of the objectives. As suggested above, CARE and ADRA should consider adoption of the CDC program used by CRS for MCH monitoring.

All three Sponsors and USAID/Haiti should consider adopting a uniform computerized (Lotus 123 or d-Base) CSR/RSR form. Sponsors could provide diskettes to USAID (on loan) to transfer data which would be automatically tabulated and analyzed. This would enable Sponsors to individually rapidly assess quantitative achievements against plans on a quarterly basis, and enable USAID to do so on a Sponsor-specific and an aggregate basis. The Computer Specialist at USAID/Haiti could easily develop the format in consultation with the P.L. 480 Program Manager. CARE and CRS already have IBM-compatible capability and ADRA was in the process of procuring its computer during the Team's visit.

Given the volatile situation of funding sources for program management, all three Sponsors should consider implementing a greater cost analysis capability, starting with more cost-centered accounting. These data would be useful for internal management, and would additionally provide a solid base of analysis to support or define various programs and strategies. At a minimum thorough transport data should be collected and compared to aid in decisions regarding the efficiency of both various transport modes (cabotage or road, owned or rented) and cost implications of regionalization.

Although data collection is often viewed as onerous it is important that USAID and the Sponsors begin to generate more detailed data that can be analyzed over time. As reflected in Table 1 of this report, accurate and comparable data over time (even two years) do not currently exist simply for commodities (1) approved; (2) called forward; and (3) actually distributed, so that comparison of "planned" versus "actual" achievements are difficult to make on more than an ad hoc basis. This information should be maintained by quarter by Sponsor at USAID. Without this information for commodities and better historical data for costs future planning and budgeting will likely remain a slightly inflated version of last year's plan.

Better cost centered accounting and records that can be stored over a few years and relatively easily retrieved would provide data to answer such questions as whether geographic regionalization has provided any cost or management efficiencies; which type of program is more cost efficient; etc. With no data, decisions on such issues as regionalization and cost effective programming become extremely subjective. Cost projections for outlying years become virtually impossible.

4.2 Program Mix and Choices

As stated above, "USAID/Haiti should develop strategic and operational objectives for its Title II program and internalize them in its programming documents and its management structure."

The Cooperating Sponsors' operational objectives should build on each organizations' strengths but fall within the USAID/Haiti strategy. The accompanying draft Strategy summary prepared for USAID/Haiti in conjunction with this report recommends a shift towards a child survival emphasis (as opposed to the current child survival and education). The strategy and objectives established by USAID and the Sponsors should guide all subsequent choice of types of activities.

If USAID/Haiti adopts the Action Plan objective of decreasing infant and child mortality as the overarching goal of its Title II program, as is recommended by the Assessment Team, then choice of delivery mechanisms by each Sponsor and allocation of resources among those mechanisms would need to be more carefully justified than has been done in the past. Although it is recognized the categories such as "SF", "MCH" and "FFW" are standard Title II parlance and required in AERs, if the program is to have developmental impact it is important that these be viewed as the delivery mechanisms they are and not as ends in themselves.

That is, a CRS objective might be to improve nutritional levels of children under 5. One means of achieving this objective is the on-going combination of technical assistance and training from CRS' Nutrition/MCH Division and food rations provided through its Food Administration Division's MCH mechanism. A second means of achieving this, also on-going, is through pre-school programs such as those of Foster Parents Plan (2000-plus beneficiaries in Jacmel), which are serviced through the CRS SF mechanism with TA and training from Plan. Other means include well-planned school gardens in conjunction with MCH centers, etc. Achievement of the objective is thus predicated on several mechanisms, none of which is an end in themselves.

As stated earlier, CARE is focussing its food program on the problems of a lack of community organization in Haiti, and plans to use the food resource and school canteen as an entry point for formation of such organizations. CARE has started with single-function Parent Teacher Committees to improve management of the school canteen. With the Title II food for the school as leverage, in at least one case CARE has helped the single-function group expand its activities into improving the water system, vegetable gardening and other community actions centering on health and nutrition. Thus the SF delivery mechanism in fact has achieved far more than simply feeding of hungry children and in a possibly more sustainable manner. In this case "SF" and community organization are also leading towards child survival, and if CARE carefully targets the activities to schools of greater need and undertakes some weight and/or growth monitoring in those schools (as a school or community activity), SF may be shown to have a measurable impact on child survival in the community.

CARE is already operating based on "food as a means, not an end" under its Potable Water Project in the South, using food specifically as an incentive for community groups to undertake some of the more difficult aspects of water system construction. When the system is completed and working, the group has learned that the sum of individuals can be greater than its parts, and food has contributed to that learning. This is the sort of "FFW" that should be undertaken. Any generic FFW without a more substantive overall objective objective (community organization, health, sanitation) should be strongly discouraged by USAID/HRO.

The Assessment Team thus makes no particular recommendations regarding "cap the SF program" or "increase the MCH program" but rather recommends, as stated throughout the report, that attention be focussed on establishing operational objectives and working to achieve them, through whichever mechanism seems to work best for the specific sponsor.

In this vein, the Assessment Team makes no particular recommendations regarding ancillary activities. Activities such as providing roofing or other materials for school canteen construction and/or equipment for the canteens are seen as a necessary part of the feeding program and not particularly "ancillary". If money is available, such activities should continue in order to more closely meet the facility requirements of the Title II program as stated in Handbook 9.

The Team, in Chapter 3.2, has discussed the apparent lack of direction of some other "ancillary activities" (i.e. rabbit and chicken raising). Again, if operational objectives are established and such types of projects are more carefully structured to meet objectives, then within limits of funding they might be pursued. These, too, should not become ends in themselves reported as "X number of mini-projects undertaken." They must be viewed as means leading towards achievement of other objectives. For example, "X school gardens maintained over full school year produced X varieties of vegetables to supplement diets," might be one of many indicators of acitivities if a Sponsor were trying to really achieve a measurable nutritional impact through SF. For another example, "X Parent Teacher Committees move from single-function canteen management to at least one additional community health activity" might indicate organizational development.

USAID/Haiti and the Cooperating Sponsors should resist any tendencies to become too flexible and risk overextending their management capabilities. Cost and management efficiencies among Sponsors are relatively similar and middle range at this time, with exceptions understandable (ref. Chapter 3.3). Cost and management efficiencies among programs are also similar and differences explainable (ref. Chapter 3.3). As recommended above, more focused cost-centered accounting, particularly for transport, is recommended so that analysis of possible benefits of regionalization can be made in the future.

USAID/HRO should consider providing technical assistance to CARE and/or the Child Health Institute (CHI) in developing operations research efforts in using food and non-food approaches to child survival. CARE might consider some modest efforts in this regard under RICHES. CHI might take a sample of VACS project sub-grantees which are receiving food and which are not and try to isolate any causalities. The operations research should lead to some more innovative food programming.

USAID/HRO should also consider modest technical assistance funding for CARE to develop a substantive monitoring system for its new focus on "formation of local institutions." Of particular interest would be developing indicators to measure optimal size of committees, desired membership of committees, type and scope of responsibility and authority of committees (single-function, multi-function, etc), etc. Monitoring the new objective in quantitative terms alone (i.e., number of committees formed) must be strongly discouraged.

ANNEX A

ANNOTATED STATEMENT OF WORK

ARTICLE I - TITLE

PD&S (Health) Examination of PL 480 Title II Food Donation Program (Project Nº 521-000.3)

ARTICLE II - OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this assessment is to examine the organizational, financial, and managerial aspects of the PL 480 Title II Food Donation Programs to determine how efficiently and effectively targeted objectives are being met. This will be accomplished through (1) an examination of the Title II organizational structures, operational functions, and objectives of USAID and the Cooperating Sponsors (CAR, ADRA, and CRS), (2) an analysis of these existing structures, systems, and program activities to determine relative comparative efficiency and effectiveness, and (3) determination of internal and external constrains to program implementation and meeting the needs of the target population the assessment will also determine what modifications would be necessary to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Title II Program.

ARTICLE III - STATEMENT OF WORK

A. The Contractor will perform the following tasks:

Task 1: The Contractor will examine the organizational structures and operational functions established by USAID and the Cooperating Sponsors to implement the Title II Program. Specifically, this examination will cover the following:

1) The adequacy, effectiveness, and efficiency of structures, functions, and systems to implement the overall program and achieve objectives. What are the differences between approaches used by the Cooperating Sponsors and which are the most sufficient and effective? Are objectives mutually understood and agreed upon?

> Cooperating Sponsors' organizational structures and operational functions are discussed in Chapter 3.2. Cooperating Sponsors' objectives are discussed in Chapter 3.1. The degree of mutual understanding and agreement is covered in the sub-sections on explicit and implicit objectives.

2) Determine the cost per beneficiary for different types of programs, the degree to which costs have changes over the past

five years, the reasons for the cost increases/decreases, and the projected costs for the next two years if the beneficiary level remains unchanged.

The cost per beneficiary per program is covered in Chapter 3.3 and specifically provided in Tables 6 and 7. Due to the loss of records in looted warehouses and the lack of cost centered accounting for different programs noted in the text, it was not possible to review five years worth of data to analyze cost changes. In order to place each Sponsor on common terms without using cost centered accounting, many hours of interview are necessary to create a common cost structure, such as provided in Table 4. It is doubtful that this could be accomplished for any year other than the current fiscal year with reliability.

To extrapolate future costs from Table 4 is also not a fruitful venture for several reasons. First, Commodity cost (and availability) and Ocean Transport cannot be predicted from data sets available in Haiti. This ranges from 40-50 percent of total cost.

Secondly, data sets in Haiti provide no evidence of economies or diseconomies of scale. This would be the primary tool to analyze cost controlled by Sponsors. Without this evidence, it is not possible to determine whether a larger program is more or less costly than a smaller one per beneficiary. In fact, some support could be given to the idea that in most cost categories, scale is irrelevant, that is, costs are the same per ton no matter the quantity. Only for administration (cost category III in Table 4) might this assertion be questionable.

Also, it is difficult to determine whether marginal expenditures are in support of greater efficiency or greater effectiveness over a series of years. Effectiveness expenditures (more monitors or administration, for example) raise costs absolutely. Efficiency expenditures (investments in cost savings procedures or equipment, or negative expenditures in the form of cost savings) ultimately lower cost. Without an approved strategy in place for the n ext 2 years, it is not possible to estimate which direction each Sponsor will be heading.

As stated in Chapter 3.3 and in Chapter 4, it is strongly recommended that each Sponsor begin keeping data on costs so that these types of analyses may be made.

Inflation, however, may have a pronounced impact on costs in Haiti. Inflation would impact on local administration costs and in country transport. A 5 percent compound inflation rate would raise cost per ton as follows:

Sponsor	Cost Year 1	Cost Year 2
CARE	$ 659	$ 662
CRS	$ 783	$ 789
ADRA	$ 582	$ 587

[Note: The Contract Statement of Work contained no number 3) under Task 1, presumably due to a typo]

4) What would be the advantages and disadvantages of eliminating supplemental activities? Could these resources be put to better uses?

Supplemental activities are discussed in Chapter 3.2 and again in Chapter 3.3. Recommendations regarding program focus are found in Chapter 4.2.

What are the relative priorities of the Cooperating Sponsors and why?

The explicit and implicit objectives of the Sponsors are discussed in Chapter 3.1.

Do supplemental activities support the USAID activities?

The relationship of supplemental activities of the Sponsors to USAID activities is assumed to relate to the USAID food strategy, which is discussed in Chapter 3.1.

5) Are there AID or Cooperating Sponsor policies which are impediment to program implementation?

Program externalities, including the organizational mandates of the groups involved and the Title II bureaucratic processes, are discussed in Chapter 3.1.1.

How would the Cooperating Sponsors change their programs if they were totally free of AID policy and regulations?

Responses to this question ranged from "my organization would be a lot stricter" to "we'd sell the food in the U.S. and use U.S. dollars." The Assessment Team found such a possibility so remote that it did not pursue either option in depth.

Task 2: Examine the different Title II activities of each Cooperating Sponsor to determine the following:

1) What are the comparative per beneficiary cost for each PVO? This is to include beneficiary costs for each type of Title I assistance--Food for Work, Mother and Child Health, School Feeding, Pre-School Feeding, Other Child Feeding, and General Relief. What are the reasons for the differences between the Cooperating Sponsors?

> The per beneficiary cost for each PVO and each type of Title II Delivery Mechanism are found in Chapter 3.3. Reasons for differences are discussed therein.

2) In terms of relative cost, need, and impact, where should USAID and Cooperating Sponsors concentrate their resources, particularly if there are budgetary restrictions?

> Chapters 1-4 all highlight the need for improved strategic planning on the part of USAID/Haiti and the Cooperating Sponsors. Chapter 3.1 discusses evolving objectives. Chapter 4.2 provides the recommendation that concentration be towards child survival as opposed to education.

3) Describe the different programs being implemented by each Cooperating Sponsor and evaluate the relative performance of each in carrying out activities. What are the reasons for differences in efficiency and effectiveness and why do these differences exist?

> All of Chapter 3 is devoted to these questions.

4) How effective are food aid projects (income generating activities, parent teacher associations, and similar programs) and to what extent do they promote a better understanding/use of food aid?

> Food aid projects, including rabbit and chicken production and Parent Teacher Committees, are discussed in Chapter 3.2. The rabbit and chicken production projects were found to be of marginal value, although improved planning may result in improvements. One Sponsor, CARE, has found success with Parent Teacher Committees and one, CRS, is more cautious.
> Chapter 4.2 suggests that canteen roofing and equipment be viewed as part of food distribution and continued.

Are these activities promoting community development and solidarity and are they self-sustained?

As stated in Chapter 3.2.1, CARE believes its Parent Teacher Committees can be mobilized to promote community development and, given adequate technical and organizational inputs provided by CARE, the Team believes this possible and desirable.

CRS and ADRA have not focussed as much on community development per se. Other ancillary activities that are not designed to promote community development, such as chicken or rabbit raising, achieve other objectives (nutrition, income) and may indeed be sustained if properly managed. The projects visited by the Team were too new (3-4 months) to draw any conclusions.

Should USAID have a stronger role in food aid project approval, monitoring, and evaluation?

"Food aid projects" are called "mini-projects" and "ancillary projects" in the text and the Team does not believe USAID should have more involvement in them, particularly since they are generally not carried out with dollar funding.

Task 3: The Contractor will explore the following programmatic issues:

1) Does the Mission need a more flexible program or category of recipient to more quickly and effectively respond to needs?

Chapter 4.2 recommends that USAID/Haiti and the Sponsors resist the urge to become too flexible.

2) The Title II Program currently focuses on rural areas. Should more emphasis be placed on urban areas and, if so, how would this effect costs, the number of beneficiaries, and addressing the needs of the most disadvantaged?

Chapter 3.3 notes that cost centered accounting is not undertaken so that analysing costs in terms of urban [illegible]

Chapter 2.2 notes that the Cotten study found children in the urban areas worse off [illegible] parts. Chapter 2.1 notes that the Team was unable to do a detailed analysis of the current urban-rural split but believes the program to be from 30-45 percent urban. Given demographics in Haiti, with the stronger urban need (but smaller relative urban population) this is probably an appropriate [illegible]

3) The Title II Program currently emphasizes direct delivery of food commodit[illegible]

subsequent distribution. What are the possibilities for and ramifications of delivering food to cooperatives, indigenous or foreign PVO's, or other institutions which would then service as regional centers for further distribution?

> Chapter 3.2 notes that (1) CARE is increasing focus on working with the local institution of Parent Teacher Committees; (2) CRS has a relationship outside of food delivery with local CARITAS organizations, which may assist in ancillary activities, as well as selected other groups (i.e. Foster Parents Plan); and (3) ADRA is working with 9 former Section 416 organizations. The Team believes each Sponsor to be addressing this concern in a manner appropriate to its mandate and management style and does not recommend major structural realignments.

4) Due to the lack of better organizations, food is occasionally delivered, by necessity, to relatively less effective and efficient institutions for distribution. Should more emphasis be placed on providing food to those organizations which have a recognized institutional capacity to distribute food even if it means that the needy segments of the population in some areas may not be served?

> It the objective is feeding people then efficiency should not be a major issue and less efficient organizations, as long as they can effectively distribute food, may be appropriate. If the objective, as recommended by the Assessment Team, becomes more developmental, then working with efficient and effective organizations is more important for sustainability of development benefits.

5) If one of the three Cooperating Sponsors decided to withdraw from the Title II Program, what would be the likely effects on the program? Would the other two Cooperating Sponsors have the capacity or desire to absorb the additional responsibility?

> [illegible] Sponsors were contemplating withdrawing from the program. Should this occur, the results would depend on numerous factors, [illegible] what its objectives were in comparison with those of the other sponsors, what types of programs it was undertaking in comparison with other sponsors, where its programs were located in relation to other sponsors, etc. The Team did not believe development of a matrix of possibilities a good [illegible] the lack of evidence that any were contemplating withdrawal in the near future.

65

6) What different and innovative approaches have been used in other countries that could be used in Haiti to enhance Title II Program? For example, could food be sold to cover the costs of on-going development activities or to initiate income generating projects.

USAID/Haiti has a copy of a Monetization proposal prepared by CARE in collaboration with FVA/FFP staff for CARE and ADRA's. The Assessment Team was told that the GOH was considering the proposal but that it likely wouldn't be implemented in the near future. Food can be sold to cover costs, but such sales must be approved by the GOH.

Other "innovative" approaches will depend on the ultimate objectives set by USAID and the Sponsors. Both CARE and CRS are actively engaged in refining objectives and will likely come to some new delivery mechanisms, i.e. CARE through the Parent Teacher Committees and CRS possibly through modified form with MCH.

Chapter 4.2 recommends two types of operations research in innovative programming should the child survival objective be chosen.

7) When do the Cooperating Sponsors feel a phasing out of the Title II Program will be possible?

Given the limited nature of GOH participation in the program it is unlikely that phase out would take place in the next 5-10 years.

Task 4: The Contractor will formulate a series of recommendations, based upon the above tasks and other observations, on ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Title II Program.

Recommendations based on the tasks undertaken above are found in Chapter 4.2.

Task 5: The Contractor will prepare a 15-20 page strategy paper for the Title II Program for the period December 1988 through September 1990. This strategy statement, upon approval by USAID, will be summarized by the Contractor into a three-page document for submission to AID/W as part of its global strategy.

The strategy paper has been submitted separately.

Annex B: Cooperating Sponsor Actual Expenditures

CRS

ITEMS	TOTAL COST	FF	MCH	COF	OTHER	PERC.
COMMOD. STORAGE	$959	$799	$74	$74	$12	0.1%
TRANSPORT	$124,223	$103,331	$9,713	$9,528	$1,646	18.3%
ADMINISTRATION						
Sal/Benefits	$307,197	$255,295	$63,998	$23,936	$3,959	45.3%
Office	$29,907	$24,854	$2,336	$2,330	$386	4.4%
Travel	$37,400	$31,081	$2,922	$2,914	$483	5.5%
Vehicle	$13,500	$11,219	$1,055	$1,052	$174	2.0%
Misc.	$3,995	$3,320	$312	$311	$52	0.6%
COMPL. INPUTS	$73,269	$65,944	$6,849	$409	$68	10.8%
DEV. PROJECTS	$75,464	$67,918	$7,546	$0	$0	11.1%
OVERHEAD	$12,290	$10,214	$960	$958	$159	1.8%
TOTAL	$678,311	$573,965	$95,765	$41,672	$[illegible]	
COST PER TON	$137	$139	$247	$108	$1[illegible]8	

ACRA

ITEMS	TOTAL COST	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
COMMODITY STORAGE	$16,538	$7,319	$5,559	$3,416	$[illegible]	$254	3.4%
TRANSPORT	$118,502	$51,260	$39,475	$24,260	$1,705	$1,501	17.1%
ADMINSTRATION							
Sal/Benefits	$213,477	$86,577	$85,138	$39,398	$2,770	$2,925	30.9%
Office	$42,715	$18,477	$14,229	$8,745	$615	$649	5.2%
Misc.	$12,357	$5,045	$4,116	$2,530	$178	$188	1.3%
Travel	$75,044	$19,566	$44,880	$9,260	$651	$688	10.5%
Vehicle	$24,195	$10,423	$8,026	$4,933	$347	$366	3.5%
COMPL. INPUTS	$139,[illegible]	$53,932	$50,302	$4,107	$73	$83	20.1%
DEV. PROJECTS	$450	$450	$0	$0	$0	$0	0.1%
OVERHEAD	$28,219	$12,207	$9,400	$5,777	$406	$429	4.1%
PORT FEE	$20,542	$8,886	$6,343	$4,205	$296	$312	3.0%
TOTAL	$691,090	$294,442	$268,470	$1[illegible]	$7,336	$7,575	
COST PER TON	$112	$106	$130	$64	$[illegible]	$82	

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CARE

ITEMS	TOTAL COST						
COMMODITY STORAGE	$69,351	$39,248	$10,[illegible]	$6,090	$13,303	$607	[illegible]
TRANSPORT	$213,344	$123,558	$31,310	$19,173	$41,522	$1,911	19.7%
ADMINISTRATION							
Sal/Benefits	$552,756	$312,324	$80,529	$48,538	$106,028	$4,837	49.9%
Office	$81,503	$46,125	$11,374	$7,157	$15,634	$713	7.4%
Travel	$22,419	$12,688	$3,266	$1,969	$4,300	$196	2.0%
Vehicle	$28,737	$16,263	$4,137	$2,523	$5,512	$251	2.6%
Misc	$9,278	$5,251	$1,352	$815	$1,780	$81	0.8%
COMPL. INPUTS	$20,020	$16,016	$0	$4,004	$0	$0	1.8%
DEV. PROJECTS	$90,364	$81,328	$0	$9,036	$0	$0	8.2%
OVERHEAD	$14,267	$8,414	$2,166	$1,305	$2,252	$130	1.3%
TOTAL	$1,107,539	$661,725	$145,256	$100,510	$191,291	$8,726	
COST PER TON	$85	$90	$77	[illegible]	$77	$77	

COMMODITIES, SPONSOR x PROGRAM FY90
Tonnage and Dollars (000)

CORE

	FFW	$	MCH	$	SF	$	PSF	$	ULF	$	GR	$	EMER	$	TOTAL COMM	TOTAL DOLS.
VEGOIL	63	$41,654	141	$92,637	454	$298,147	8	$4,993	0	$0	97	$63,663	70	$51,100	841	552,2[illegible]
NFDM	0	$0	721	$79,321	1,174	$129,184	31	$3,377	0	$0	154	$16,9[illegible]	80	$8,[illegible]	2,160	[illegible]
CSM	0	$0	241	$62,445	44	$11,267	0	$0	0	$0	40	$10,412	0	$0	325	84,12[illegible]
SFB	1,081	$211,778	573	$112,347	4,262	$835,313	60	$11,740	0	$0	1,401	$274,596	163	$31,968	7,540	1,477,742
CM	1	$132	222	$32,605	1,499	$211,577	16	$2,352	0	$0	420	$47,011	167	$24,520	2,165	318,196
TOTAL	1,146	$253,564	1,898	$379,355	7,379	$1,405,487	114	$22,463	0	$0	2,012	$412,611	480	$116,[illegible]	13,030	$2,669,9[illegible]

VEGOIL $657
NFDM $110
CSM $259
SFB $196
CORN $147

[illegible]

	FFW	$	MCH	$	SF	$	PSF	$	ULF	$	GR	$	OTHER		TOTAL TONS	TOTAL DOLLARS
VEGOIL	30	$54,130	163	$107,041	105	$121,545	0	$0	18	$11,026	6	$3,[illegible]	0	$0	462	$[illegible]
NFDM	45	$4,950	576	$63,360	343	$37,730	0	$0	16	$1,900	22	$2,4[illegible]	0	$0	1,001	$110,[illegible]
CSM	92	$23,828	557	$144,263	642	$166,278	0	$0	19	$4,921	6	$1,554	0	$0	1,[illegible]	$340,[illegible]
SFB	1,010	$197,960	602	$117,992	1,350	$264,600	0	$0	29	$5,684	60	$11,760	0	$0	[illegible]	$[illegible]
CORN	29	$4,263	162	$23,814	155	$22,785	0	$0	5	$745	0	$0	0	$0	[illegible]	[illegible]
TOTAL	1,206	$290,131	2,060	$456,530	2,675	$612,938	0	$0	89	$25,146	94	$19,676	0	$0	[illegible]	$1,[illegible]

VEGOIL $657
NFDM $110
CSM $259
SFB $196
CORN $147

CRS

	FFW	$	MCH	$	SF	$	PSF	$	ULF	$	GR	$	OTHER		COMM	
VEGOIL	0	$0	40	$26,209	408	$268,151	0	$0	27	$17,745	0	$0	5	$3,[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
NFDM	0	$0	127	$13,970	553	$60,830	0	$0	89	$9,790	0	$0	14	$1,540	[illegible]	[illegible]
SFC	0	$0	26	$3,835	645	$95,135	0	$0	35	$5,162	0	$0	8	$1,180	[illegible]	[illegible]
SFB	0	$0	24	$4,704	2,395	$469,439	0	$0	156	$30,577	0	$0	13	$2,548	[illegible]	[illegible]
CSM	0	$0	170	$44,040	116	$30,056	0	$0	79	$20,469	0	$0	7	$1,814	[illegible]	[illegible]
TOTAL	0	$0	387	$92,846	4,117	$923,611	0	$0	386	$83,744	0	$0	47	$10,[illegible]	[illegible]	1,1[illegible]

VEGOIL $657
NFDM $110
SFC $147
SFB $196
CSM $259

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ANNEX C

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ANNEX D

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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