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UNITED STATES PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM TO ANGOLA

FINAL REPORT

October 25, 1988

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Thanks also to the representatives of donor governments and international NGOs* working in Angola with whom we met for information regarding their programs, and their suggestions of possible program interventions that might be appropriate for American PVOs to consider.

This report has been prepared using individual presentations written by the various assessment team members. The team leader has used considerable liberty in editing and consolidating the submissions of his colleagues, several of whom did not have an opportunity to review the final draft due to time constraints.

It is inevitable that some errors have been made, for which the team leader apologizes in advance.

The report reflects the views of the team members, but not necessarily the PVOs they represent nor the U.S. Government. Likewise, the report's recommendations in no way commit the U.S. Government or the PVOs whose staff members were on the team to specific activities or funding.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The joint United States Private Voluntary Organization/United States Government Assessment Team's report on their visit to Angola contains the following findings and recommendations:

A. Present conditions within Angola are extremely difficult, with the many years of war and economic stagnation taking a toll on living and health standards and the overall way of life of the country's population.

B. The Government estimates that approximately 650,000 of the country's 9,500,000 population can be considered as displaced persons, i.e., directly uprooted by war and related security conditions.

C. Emergency program management structures are inadequate to meet present requirements and urgently need better definition of responsibilities, staff strengthening, and the increased resources needed to assist the affected population more effectively.

D. Assistance from UN, bilateral and other sources plays a vital role in helping those most in need.

The terms PVO (Private Voluntary Organization) and NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) are used interchangeably in this report. While "PVO" is usually used in the U.S., "NGO" is in more common use outside the United States.

- E. Security problems severely limit the emergency response.
- F. The Government of the People's Republic of Angola would welcome a U.S. PVO presence.
- G. Operational constraints are significant. U.S. PVOs should initially consider working within a consortium arrangement.
- H. U.S. PVOs should initially consider well targeted operations in the provinces of Benguela and Cuanza Sul, and should design programs in such a way that they are self-managed to the extent possible to avoid further overloading existing relief structures.
- I. Initial interventions should include food, water, health and nutrition, and basic agricultural supplies to assist the displaced in producing their own food. Assistance is also required in a number of specific technical sectors, including charter air service, management information and logistics coordination systems, and assistance to amputees.

SECTION A

The Assessment Team's Report

SECTION A - THE ASSESSMENT TEAM'S REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

This report is the result of a visit to Angola in October 1988 by a joint U.S. Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) - U.S. Government (USG) assessment team of six persons. The visit was proposed at the May 1988 donors' conference in Geneva and undertaken at the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola (GPRA). The team's visit was sponsored by the Agency for International Development (AID), through the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

The visit officially began on October 5 and ended October 18, 1988. Considering staggered arrival and departure dates and the week spent in Angola by one of the group making arrangements in advance for the visit, team members spent nearly 100 days in Angola in activities related to the objectives of the visit. The objectives were to review Angola's present situation, assess emergency programs and requirements, and develop recommendations concerning the feasibility of implementing U.S. Government-funded PVO programs for Angola's displaced population.

These are trying times in Angola. The country has lived with internal strife continually for twenty-five years. More than half of the country's population has known no other way of life.

The current state of internal strife that exists within Angola did not begin in 1975, but with the struggle for independence more than ten years earlier. The departure of the colonial government was accompanied by all but a handful of the country's trained personnel. (An estimated 350,000 persons within eight months.) A significant portion of the country's infrastructure was either removed from Angola or destroyed during this period.

Economic deterioration is widespread and the quality and level of social services very poor. The national currency, the kwanza, is virtually worthless when considering prevailing open market prices for goods and services and the salaries of most employees. Goods that are available at official prices are few and basic foodstuffs require ration cards which allow for limited quantities. Salaries are inadequate for the vast majority of the population to afford to purchase the imported goods that are readily (albeit illegally) available at extremely high prices. Commercial and industrial activities are at a near standstill.

The nation survives on income from the efficiently operated petroleum sector. Petroleum accounts for up to 90% of government income, which has been affected by recent drops in the world petroleum price. Internal strife and economic policies begun following independence contributed to the decline of all productive sectors of the economy with the exception of the petroleum industry.

Allocation of a significant portion of petroleum income to the struggle against rebel movements has left inadequate capital for investment in rebuilding the nation's productive sectors. Health and sanitation problems are acute, with a high incidence of morbidity and mortality caused by infectious diseases, malnutrition and poor sanitation. It is estimated that at least one in five children dies before reaching the age of five. The average life expectancy of 44 is one of the lowest in the world.

In 1987, the GPRA began an economic reform program. Some aspects of these reforms are now becoming visible, particularly in the production of fruits and vegetables, which can now be legally marketed by small-scale private producers. These reforms, known as the SEF (Saneamento

Económico e Financeiro) program, have slowly begun to move the economy away from the tightly controlled, centrally planned system begun following independence. Decentralization and encouraging increased private sector activity in areas such as transportation and food production are a part of this program. Additional reforms are expected. Monetary reform and increased incentives for the private sector appear to be urgently needed to reactivate economic activities.

Angola is a country blessed with significant natural resources. The potential for developing its agricultural production, marine resources and mineral wealth to complement its present petroleum income places Angola in an enviable position in the developing world. The nation's small population of 9.5 million and low population density (eight people per square kilometer) are also factors in favor of future self-sufficiency.

Angola's current needs are significant. The continuing war and widespread guerrilla actions severely constrain much of what American PVOs can do to assist the affected population. It is our hope that this modest effort on our part will result in a U.S. PVO presence in Angola which, in cooperation with the GPRA and other donors, will bring increased assistance to the thousands of innocent victims of the nation's years of strife.

The GPRA's invitation for the joint U.S. PVO-USG team to visit Angola is an indication of its willingness to receive increased cooperation and assistance from Western sources, including the United States, and a frank admission of its need for assistance in meeting the needs of the country's displaced population.

GPRA officials understand the need for U.S. PVOs to have a Basic Agreement with the GPRA to initiate activities within Angola. The assessment team was told that such an agreement should most probably be signed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Team members universally felt an openness towards themselves as individuals and towards the United States during their visit. It is our hope that this visit marks the beginning of closer and more frequent contacts and increased cooperation and understanding between the citizens of our two countries.

II. TERMS OF REFERENCE

A. OBJECTIVES OF VISIT

1. Determine whether a modest United States Government-assisted program through one or more U.S. PVOs, targeted at displaced persons, is warranted and, if so, what kind of program.
2. Assess the feasibility of a U.S. PVO working in Angola.
3. Determine the role of the Government of Angola in support of a U.S. PVO assistance program.

III. TARGET POPULATION

A. BACKGROUND

The GPRA State Secretariat for Social Affairs (SEAS), which has the primary responsibility for government services to people affected by the emergency, divides the total affected population into three groups. A detailed regional breakdown is provided in Annex B. For purposes of discussion they can be described as follows:

1. Displaced Persons

Numerically the most significant, with an estimated 647,953 people countrywide considered displaced, this group is the focus of current relief efforts. The level of support is inconsistent at best, however, and varies widely depending on resource availability, security constraints, logistical access and the capacity and competence of the agencies and individuals charged with specific regional programs. It is clear that further support is required, and that this population probably corresponds best with most relief agency definitions of an "emergency-affected" group.

2. Urban Destitutes

The next largest group, with an estimated 447,000 people in need of support, consists in principal of displaced persons who have become integrated into the larger urban population. The largest concentration of this group is, as might be expected, in and around Luanda. The basic unreliability of all population estimates in Angola is, unfortunately, even further exacerbated in the case of urban destitutes by two basic and potentially contradictory factors. First, experience in similar situations has shown that many displaced people who seek refuge in urban areas do so through family or other personal channels and avoid contact with government registration systems. This phenomenon can be caused by the non-existence or inefficiency of official registration and support systems, by a lack of information among the displaced population about the existence of such systems and, perhaps most important, by a perception that official registration can lead to taxation, conscription or forced resettlement. On the other hand, emergency assistance efforts can become overextended and diffused if no distinction is made between urban immigrants who moved for critical reasons of security and survival, and those who are seeking expanded economic and social opportunities in the urban centers. Agencies which, through policy and budgetary imperatives, must focus on the direct emergency-affected population will likely find these distinctions difficult to make in the larger urban settings. In the specific case of Luanda, the picture is even further confused by the apparent lack of classic shantytown settlements on the periphery of the urban center. In other situations, the existence, size and physical conditions of these settlements (e.g., types of shelter materials, visible infrastructure, etc.) have provided useful clues as to the probable timing of and reasons for the movement to the settlement. In Luanda, however, it appears that the bulk of the destitute population may be living in both "vertical shantytowns" and large, sprawling neighborhoods. In the first case, large apartment blocks in the center of the city, which seem superficially to be quite adequate for habitation, are in many cases "vertical shantytowns" with inadequate or no water source or sanitary facilities, populated by families with no access to either cash income or goods with which to barter for food and services. In the second case large, maze-like neighborhoods, which were traditionally developed to resist penetration by the colonial power, have now been taken over as a haven by both emergency displaced and other families of the most destitute. The largest of these (known as the "musseque"), reportedly houses 400,000 people.

In both instances, the needs are great but the prospects dim for specific interventions by agencies which have an "emergency" focus and which do not have a deep understanding of the existing social, economic and settlement structures.

3. Rural-Affected

Finally, the government has attempted to identify those elements of the general rural population which have had their economic and social base disrupted by military instability in their area. There are estimated to be 406,000 people in this category, or approximately 6.5% of the total rural population. Accurate identification of these people as to real numbers and locations is, however, currently beyond the capacities of the responsible agencies. Access to many areas is extremely limited if not impossible, and base-line information on levels of productive activity both before and during the periods of instability is largely unavailable. In the absence of better targeting information about these groups, and faced with perhaps insurmountable security and logistical constraints in the near term, we may be forced to assume that the rural-affected population will survive through reliance on traditional coping mechanisms and some limited and sporadic outside assistance. If and when conditions worsen, members of this group may well be forced into the "displaced" category, and become accessible to some relief efforts.

B. FOCUS OF U.S. PVO ACTIONS

In surveying the broad range of possible program areas, and the depth of need in all of those target populations, the assessment team felt that it would be essential for newly arriving U.S. PVO representatives to focus their efforts on fairly tightly defined beneficiary groups and intervention techniques. Most of these issues will be discussed in greater detail in the following section on Intervention Strategies. The choice of target population is, however, a primary element to any discussion of optional interventions. For purposes of clarity, we retain the government's categorization of the emergency-affected population into displaced, urban destitute and rural-affected groups. In a further refinement, we introduce the element of geographic focus to the discussion.

1. Focus on Displaced Persons

The team strongly recommends that initial U.S. PVO activities in Angola be focused on the displaced segments of the population. As noted above, these groups most closely fit the traditional definition of an emergency-affected population. Their needs for food, shelter and health and nutrition support are immediate and, in many cases, are literally a matter of life or death. Particularly in rural areas and provincial towns, they can be more readily identified either through settlement patterns or self-selection through registration for support in government organized camps. Almost by definition, many displaced can be found in areas which are accessible to agencies working with the government. On a practical level, the more obvious emergency nature of their situation may make it easier for agencies helping the displaced to gain access to donor funding and other resources which are intended for emergency operations.

In making this recommendation, the team is aware of the very serious needs among both the "rural-affected" and, more immediately, the "urban destitute" segments of the affected population. We believe, however, that effective interventions in these areas would likely require a degree of operational capacity and level of material resources which would be both impossible to achieve and unwise to attempt for U.S. PVOs at this time. Notwithstanding this general position, however,

the team will give some guidance on possible modest efforts in these areas in the section on Intervention Strategies.

2. Geographic Focus

As a result of security, logistical, budgetary and other operational factors which are described in other sections of this report, the team believes that U.S. PVO activities should initially be tightly focused on a few specific geographical areas. We recommend that the major efforts be concentrated in the Provinces of Benguela and Cuanza Sul which were identified for this purpose by the government and visited by the team. In addition, some modest activities may be foreseen among the displaced and urban destitute in Luanda. In all cases, and particularly with regard to Benguela and Cuanza Sul, critical needs exist which can be effectively addressed by U.S. PVO interventions. The potential interventions, and the underlying immediate and longer-term rationale for concentrating on Benguela and Cuanza Sul, are presented in the following section on Intervention Strategies.

IV. INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

A. FOCUS ON DISPLACED PERSONS

As discussed in the section on Target Population, the team recommends that the primary focus for initial U.S. PVO activities be emergency relief for displaced persons in rural areas. In some instances, this will also require assistance to the displaced who have sought refuge in and around provincial and municipal capitals. In this section, we will describe two basic programmatic approaches, involving a number of complementary relief activities in a specific geographic area, with a discussion of both immediate intervention options and possible "second phase" programmatic directions. In addition to these two priority program options, we will describe a number of more specific sectoral interventions which may be appropriate for U.S. PVOs that have an appropriate technical interest and capability.

B. DIRECT ACTION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

When reviewing possible interventions to address the emergency support requirements of the displaced population, the assessment team has considered the potentially different strategies inherent in direct emergency action programs versus longer term institutional development activities. Although most PVO programs will likely embody elements of both approaches, we believe that the emphasis in the early phases of most relief activities will need to be on direct provision of emergency services. The needs of the affected population are too immediate, and the capabilities of individual government agencies and provincial structures too fragile, to rely entirely on a "trickle down" strategy.

In making this recommendation, the team nonetheless acknowledges the valuable work being done by many government personnel involved in emergency programs. They are often the sole providers of emergency services in some of the most affected and dangerous operational zones. The team recognizes, however, that the human resource constraints in the emergency and social service sectors are too broad and too connected to basic governmental priorities to be effectively addressed by PVO programs. As long as the most capable people in the society are channeled to the defense and oil production establishments, and the talented people in line ministries rise quickly to

administrative rather than operational positions, the prospects for meaningful counterpart training and development are difficult at best.

Notwithstanding the need to focus initially on the direct provision of emergency services, the team encourages all PVOs working in Angola to integrate counterpart staff training into program strategies whenever possible. In addition, we have identified some specific sectoral interventions which are primarily oriented to institutional support and counterpart training. These opportunities are described later in this section.

C. GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS

The assessment team recommends U.S. PVO interventions in the Provinces of Benguela and Cuanza Sul. Our rationale for these recommendations is as follows:

1. Benguela Province

The Province of Benguela contains a displaced population of approximately 21,478 people, plus an estimated 40,000 "urban destitute" which likely includes a large number of displaced who have taken refuge with family members and others in the towns.* The officially registered displaced population (i.e., the 21,478) is housed in nine camps and one transit center. Provision of services, including water, shelter, food, health and nutrition care, and agricultural assistance is rudimentary at best. On the other hand, the province includes the Port of Lobito, described in the section on Logistics as highly efficient. There are also extensive commercial irrigation schemes in the coastal area between Benguela town and Lobito, cultivating sugar cane and bananas, which indicate the potential for some self-sustainability in the camps if riverine and ground water sources can be successfully exploited.

The large majority of displaced persons in Benguela appear to be Ovimbundo people from the highland areas (planalto) of eastern Benguela and Huambo Provinces. Having fled from the more fertile and wetter highlands to the less hospitable coastal zone, these people may be likely candidates for voluntary return to their homes and reintegration into their traditional social and economic systems if the security situation improves.

2. Cuanza Sul Province

The situation in Cuanza Sul varies considerably from that in Benguela. The province contains an estimated 116,598 displaced persons, including approximately 40,000 being assisted directly by German Agro Action (GAA), an NGO with strong links to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. Other NGOs, including War on Want and Development Workshop (Canada), have been active in different sections of the province.

The displaced persons in Cuanza Sul appear to be a mix of local residents, who have been forced to flee from the province's eastern rural areas because of a deteriorating security situation, and many former residents of the planalto (Benguela, Huambo and Bie Provinces) who have moved closer to the coast to escape from zones of intense guerrilla activity. Most displaced persons in Cuanza Sul are in need of basic support in clothing, shelter, food, water, sanitation, and health and

* Refer to Annex B for estimates of displaced and other affected populations.

nutrition services.

Provision of this support is, however, directly affected by sporadic cycles of intensified insurgent activity in the area, particularly in the highland interior, which is often linked to the deliberate disruption of coffee cultivation and harvesting. In addition, the province has traditionally relied on the Port of Lobito for import of essential goods and coffee exports. Guerrilla activities have contributed to significant drops in coffee production and exports have ground to a halt. The road transport link to Lobito has been affected by guerrilla activity.

Cuanza Sul is now forced to rely on coastal shipping from Lobito to the nearest port at Porto Amboim, and then by truck to the Provincial capital of Sumbe and on to distribution points in the province. This comparatively roundabout transport link has resulted in a tenuous supply of food and other essential relief goods.

Finally, the fairly impressive success of GAA in providing relief to a large proportion of the displaced population is somewhat tempered by its institutional focus. GAA's program of immediate shelter, emergency food, distribution of survival items (blankets, cooking utensils, etc.) and provision of seeds and agricultural implements are clearly among the highest priority interventions. At the same time, its institutional focus and local staffing constraints have not allowed GAA to address urgent needs for potable water, sanitary facilities, medical care and nutritional rehabilitation (i.e. targeted feeding using supplementary foods) among their beneficiary population. Local government authorities appear hard pressed to provide even basic services to areas where they are the primary action agents, and do not appear able to extend additional help to groups which are identified as being within GAA's operational areas.

In sum, there appear to be both an urgent need for additional emergency services in the population being served by GAA, and a correspondingly attractive opportunity for joint action with GAA by an American PVO.

D. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

The assessment team strongly believes that the difficult operational environment in Angola requires a level of collaboration and mutual support among PVO programs which surpasses the norm. The fact that all American PVO programs will be starting from square one presents an enormous opportunity to design integrated operational and support structures into the programs from the beginning. By way of illustration, the team recommends that interested PVOs consider the following options for collaboration:

1. Joint Administrative and Logistics Operations

The need for full-time administrative and logistics representation in Luanda, particularly in light of the severe shortage and cost of lodging and office space, would seem to make a joint administrative office a natural area for collaboration. The common need for such services as port and airport oversight, customs clearances, travel arrangements, communications and shipment of goods to project sites argues for a collaborative time and cost-sharing approach. Similarly, complementary project activities in the provinces may also lend themselves to joint administrative operations.

2. Integrated Program Design and Implementation

Several of the priority relief interventions described later in this section seem particularly adapted to a multi-sectoral integrated program strategy. The broad range of programmatic requirements in Benguela, for example, may indicate an opportunity for two or more PVOs with different institutional advantages (e.g. water systems and agriculture; health and nutrition; food distribution and logistic systems) to collaborate closely on the design and implementation of a joint relief operation. The pooling of talents and resources from a number of PVOs would likely lead to an operational "whole" which was more than equal to the sum of its parts.

The possibility for informal, day-to-day sharing of experiences and information across sectors and institutional lines should lead to a more dynamic and effective overall program. In addition, the combined weight of personnel and potential material resources represented by a joint American PVO operation would likely translate into enhanced bargaining power when approaching the Angolan government, donor representatives and U.N. agencies for general support or resolution of specific issues. Finally, a collaborative approach during the initial start-up phase of operations in Angola would serve to introduce both field and headquarters personnel from a larger number of American PVOs to the realities and opportunities of working in the country. Such a broader base of experience and country knowledge would likely prove invaluable as future program development options arise.

3. Collaboration With Existing NGO Programs

One option for a more rapid introduction of emergency services by an American PVO is direct and complementary collaboration with an established international relief agency. By relying on an existing operational and logistics support base, a newly arrived American PVO might avoid some of the more difficult practical obstacles to becoming operational. Conversely, the "host" NGO could gain from the introduction of American PVO human and material resources. Possible avenues for collaboration would be expansion of emergency operations to populations beyond current program capabilities, or intensification of services in different skill areas to an existing beneficiary population which are not being provided by the host NGO. In more specific technical interventions, a minimum level of collaboration could be standardization of techniques (e.g., use of a standard model for prosthetic devices or nutritional status indicators).

E. PRIORITY INTEGRATED PROGRAMS

As discussed in the preceding sections, the assessment team recommends that American PVOs interested in working in Angola consider joint/integrated/multi-sectoral relief programs among displaced persons in Benguela and Cuanza Sul Provinces as a first priority. In order to provide some guidance and insight as to what activities such programs may encompass, we provide hereunder an indicative listing of specific interventions and implementation strategies. We particularly draw attention to the great desirability, when feasible, of providing equally attractive "return and reintegration" support and resources to balance the improved relief services in the displaced person's areas.

1. Benguela Province

Given the perceived weakness of current support structures for displaced persons in Benguela

Province, the team recommends a multi-sectoral direct action plan for emergency services. We further recommend that a joint program design and implementation structure be developed through discussion and collaboration among two or three interested PVOs. Specific program elements could include the following:

- a. Port clearance and delivery to project sites of all program materials, regardless of lead or action agency for each activity.
- b. Identification and registration system for all program beneficiaries, with follow-up capabilities to track arrivals, departures, births and deaths.
- c. Design and implementation of an improved emergency food and supplementary feeding program. Targeting of beneficiaries, development of specific rations and distribution strategies should be based on technically valid, site-specific surveys (e.g., using Centers for Disease Control techniques and nutritional standards), including camps and identifiable urban concentrations of displaced.
- d. Construction of potable water systems for household consumption in displaced person's camps. Improvement of household sanitation practices and facilities. Development of water catchment and irrigation systems for food production in camps. Introduction of vegetable and fruit production to provide necessary nutrients to the camp diet. Exploration of cash-cropping to provide funds for procurement of necessary animal protein, vegetable and fruit inputs to the diet which cannot be produced locally.
- e. Construction of improved camp infrastructure, including water systems and community facilities; possible use of a food-for-work strategy.
- f. Provision of basic medical and nutrition services, including primary health care, vaccination programs, and nutrition education.
- g. Development of an "ag pack" return and reintegration program through provision of seed and agricultural implements. Monitor registration process to detect repeat entries into the displaced-relief-return process.

2. Cuanza Sul Province

In light of the more difficult operational and security environment in Cuanza Sul Province, the assessment team believes that a more focused initial American PVO intervention is prudent, compared with the more expansive recommendations made for Benguela Province. Further, we specifically propose that American PVOs directly approach German Agro Action (GAA) regarding possible programmatic collaboration. We believe that a valuable opportunity exists for immediate American entry into an essential emergency program area, using the GAA program and logistics base and the experience of the GAA field personnel, to hurdle many of the normal time-consuming program start-up processes. Although all such proposals must be negotiated with GAA in Bonn and Luanda directly, the assessment team believes that GAA may be receptive to collaboration with an American PVO in the following areas:

- a. Potable water supply for displaced persons in organized camps in Sumbe and Conde municipal districts, and for peri-urban and camp concentrations for the displaced in Seles municipal district.

- b. Sanitary facilities and practices in concentrations of displaced persons.
- c. Primary health care and vaccination programs in collaboration with local government health services.
- d. Nutritional rehabilitation, through targeted supplementary feeding and nutritional education, for vulnerable groups within the displaced population.
- e. Logistic management for material resources being delivered through programs administered by the American PVO; and assistance as possible to the overall GAA emergency food and agricultural input distribution programs.

F. PRIORITY SECTORAL INTERVENTIONS

In addition to the broad program strategies outlined above, the assessment team has identified a number of specific interventions which may be of interest to appropriate American PVOs. These interventions, which tend to have particular technical requirements, include the following:

- a. Charter air service for PVO/NGO and other relief agency personnel and support materials. Access to program areas is a severe constraint to all current and planned emergency operations.
- b. Construction of prosthetic devices for war-related amputees. Coordinated with current programs for use of devices constructed using locally available materials and skills.
- c. Orthopedic training for surgeons involved in front-line treatment of civilian and military victims of anti-personnel mines and other devices. Current orthopedic techniques appear to prolong recovery time and make fitting of prosthetic devices more difficult than necessary.
- d. Maternal and child health program for displaced persons and urban destitutes in Luanda. Despite the serious obstacles to developing an effective program in this area, a modest, well-targeted program could address some pressing human needs in the urban areas. Collaboration with an indigenous counterpart agency with long and deep experience in these areas (e.g., church or governmental social service organizations) is strongly recommended.
- e. Technical assistance for logistics and management information systems with government agencies involved in emergency relief activities. Possible collaboration with existing U.N. and other donor technical assistance programs.

V. EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURE

A. INTRODUCTION

Both the GPRA and the United Nations have established organizations to coordinate NGO, bilateral and multilateral emergency assistance. Within the government, the State Secretariat for Social Affairs (SEAS) is responsible for responding to the emergency and rehabilitation needs of the country's vulnerable sectors (women, orphans, elderly, handicapped and war-disabled), displaced

persons, refugees and returnees. The Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Coordination of Emergency Assistance (CIMCAE) has been established to coordinate the nation's overall emergency response within the government and with NGOs and other donors.

The United Nations and the international NGO community in Angola have also established or begun to establish assistance coordination mechanisms. The United Nations in Luanda has instituted an Emergency Operations Group (UNEOG) to facilitate its emergency response, to support SEAS and CIMCAE, and to assist NGOs and other donors in their emergency efforts. The international NGO community in Luanda has also taken the first steps in forming an association to help present their needs to the GPRA and to further their assistance efforts.

B. THE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS (SEAS)

SEAS is an independent agency within the GPRA. The Director holds the rank of minister and oversees more than 4,500 employees nationwide. Although its clients include the broad spectrum of needy and destitute in Angola, this report will focus primarily on its activities with displaced persons.

SEAS's mandate for the displaced is to provide emergency food and relief, to maintain data on their number and location and to work with ministries, secretariats and donors to design and implement rehabilitation activities to return the displaced to self-sufficiency.

At the national level SEAS is organized into five departments. There is a Department of Planning and another for Budget and Management. SEAS also has Departments for Logistics/Transport and for Technical Services, which handle the delivery of food and relief supplies to the displaced; and there is also a Department for Human Services.

SEAS has parallel structures at the provincial level and branch offices in many of the municipal districts around the country. In Benguela, Cuanza Sul and Luanda provinces, SEAS offices have been established in each provincial capital and in the municipalities. (There are 9 municipal districts in Benguela, 12 in Cuanza Sul and 9 in Luanda Province.) SEAS employs 510 individuals in Benguela Province, 350 in Cuanza Sul and 360 in Luanda. The effectiveness of these provincial and municipal offices depends on the size and strengths of the staff, the extent and complexity of the emergency, and the priority accorded displaced persons. Equally important are their relationships with provincial authorities and the local security situation.

SEAS officials at the municipal level are responsible for the operations of the individual displaced persons' camps. Their responsibilities include the supervision of the delivery of food and relief supplies and the collection of data on the displaced populations. They also work with the local village and production associations to help integrate the displaced into the local economy. Provincial and municipal SEAS officials are instructed to coordinate their activities with other ministries such as Agriculture and Health, which provide some services to the displaced persons' camps. There are 9 displaced persons' camps in Benguela Province and 48 in Cuanza Sul. There are no camps as such in Luanda Province, but there are areas in and around Luanda city which are identifiable as displaced person's enclaves.

The principal resources related to the displaced which SEAS controls are the US Title II supplementary food provided through UNICEF and approximately 15,000 metric tons of food, mostly maize, provided by bilateral donors through the World Food Program. This food is allocated

to each province and municipality by SEAS and distributed through its Food Distribution Centers (CDAs). There are 16 CDAs in Benguela Province, 48 in Cuanza Sul and 20 in Luanda Province. It remains unclear as to how the sites have been selected and appears that the location of the CDAs does not change with fluctuations in the size and location of the displaced population. These SEAS food commodities are distributed to the displaced in all but the three southern provinces of Namibe, Huila and Cunene. In these provinces the WFP has a separate emergency food program for approximately 100,000 displaced persons.

Not all displaced persons' camps have CDAs. Due to security problems and logistical weaknesses, CDAs are often without food for weeks or months at a time. When the CDAs run out of food they cease operation until the next delivery arrives. Even when food is available, it is frequently inadequate for the needs because the displaced population has grown. There is no reliable data base or commodity management system by which SEAS can reallocate the supplementary food between provinces and municipalities as the location and size of the displaced population changes.

The role of the CDAs varies in each province as to their use as a focal point for providing additional types of assistance. In Benguela Province, for example, the Ministry of Health does not provide any services through the CDAs. In 28 of 48 CDAs in Cuanza Sul, however, the Ministry of Health provides basic health assistance and, in Luanda Province, Maternal/Child Health (MCH) programs are attached to the CDAs.

Not all of SEAS's energies are directed toward the displaced population. As outlined above, SEAS is also responsible for assisting the nation's orphans, elderly, handicapped and the rehabilitation of the war-disabled. In Benguela for instance, only 36 of 510 employees work primarily with the displaced and just under one-third of Cuanza Sul's 350 staff members devote their attention to the displaced.

The security situation in the country has a serious impact on the ability of SEAS to distribute food and relief supplies to the displaced on a regular basis. During the time of the assessment, SEAS could travel regularly to only three of nine municipal districts in Benguela Province. Distributions to other municipalities, dependent on military convoy, were irregular. ICRC airlifts food and agricultural inputs to residents, including some displaced, in Benguela's four eastern municipal districts. The security situation in Cuanza Sul also restricts SEAS's activities. SEAS activities in Luanda Province have not been hampered by security problems.

The SEAS structure is well developed and its officials are present throughout the country. Though the principal agency in the government for responding to the needs of the displaced, it is not charged with coordinating the response. Consequently, coordination and information sharing between SEAS and the various ministries, primarily Agriculture and Health, appeared to be erratic. SEAS and ministry officials do not appear to be fully familiar with each other's activities. Data on the numbers of displaced, their health status and their agricultural situation are often not available.

C. THE INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMISSION FOR THE COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE (CIMCAE)

CIMCAE was created in August 1986 following the 1985 donors' conference in Lusaka to coordinate the emergency assistance response inside the government and with the donor community. At the national level, CIMCAE consists of approximately four individuals who form the secretariat of CIMCAE and a director who chairs its periodic meetings. CIMCAE is located

within the Ministry of External Relations. The director of CIMCAE reports to the Vice Minister of External Relations for Cooperation.

The ministries represented on the CIMCAE commission include Agriculture, Health, Planning, Transport, Construction, Commerce and Defense. The State Secretariat for Social Affairs (SEAS) and the State Secretariat for Cooperation are also members. CIMCAE's specific responsibilities include coordinating at the national and provincial levels the effective use of emergency supplies, monitoring available stocks of food, facilitating regular food deliveries, and following up and assessing emergency requirements and operations.

CIMCAE proposes to set up parallel structures in each province. SEAS and the relevant ministries will be represented on these local bodies which will be chaired by the commissar, the ranking political authority in each province. At the present time, there are no functioning CIMCAE provincial councils.

CIMCAE is a fragile institution. At the national level it is just beginning to assume the coordinating and facilitating roles envisaged for it. At the present time, however, it is understaffed and lacks the status, data management resources and infrastructure to fully execute its mandate.

D. THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY OPERATIONS GROUP (UNEOG)

To facilitate its own responses to the emergency, to bolster SEAS and CIMCAE, and to aid donors in responding to the Angolan emergency, the UN created the UNEOG in April 1985. It consists of the UN agencies resident in Luanda (UNDP, FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP and WHO) and is chaired by the UNDP Country Representative. The UNEOG's mandate is to hold regular meetings and to prepare monthly and quarterly situation reports on the emergency for the UN and the Angolan government. The UNEOG meets periodically and provides updated information to the UN family and government as it is developed.

UN/Luanda has augmented its staff to respond to the emergency. UNDP, WFP and UNICEF have added one or more staff members to work on emergency activities. Through a United Nations Volunteer (UNV) project, the UN has provided SEAS with ten logistics and transport experts to assist in the distribution of food and relief supplies. UNVs are also training SEAS staff in logistics planning, storage procedures and in the maintenance of its truck fleet. UNVs are located in Luanda, Benguela, Huambo and Lubango. Additional UNVs are expected later this year. One of the new UNVs will be located at Porto Amboim in Cuanza Sul Province to advise SEAS on coastal shipping matters. The UN has a broad-based development effort in the southern provinces of Namibe, Huila and Cunene. Most of its emergency activities are also in these southern provinces.

One of the emergency-related activities also undertaken by UN/Luanda is to facilitate NGO and donor visits to Angola. It expertly assisted the assessment team with accommodations and in-country travel arrangements. UN officials were always available on short notice for briefings and meetings and, when necessary, stood ready to arrange appointments with government and donor officials.

E. NGO COORDINATION IN ANGOLA

The international NGO community in Angola has begun the process of establishing an NGO association. The objectives of this alliance appear to be three-fold: to enhance their own assistance

efforts, to work to resolve common problems, and to coordinate more effectively with the government.

During the final week the assessment team was in Angola, this group of NGO's held two meetings. The international NGOs leading the organizational efforts are OXFAM (U.K.), Development Workshop and German Agro-Action. Approximately nine NGOs attended the week's meetings. Contact with this group should prove useful in coming to understand the emergency needs of the displaced and the operating environment a U.S. PVO might find in Angola.

F. NGO ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE DISPLACED IN THE TARGET PROVINCES

This discussion is restricted to those NGOs which have active programs and a physical presence in Benguela, Cuanza Sul and Luanda Provinces. Indigenous NGOs such as the Angolan Red Cross, Caritas and the Angolan Women's Organization are active in each of the three provinces. In general, their programs are directed toward the nation's most vulnerable populations, which include women, orphans, elderly, handicapped and the war-disabled. Their programs are not specifically oriented toward the displaced. For a more complete listing of donor agencies and their programs, see UNDRO's "Provisional List of Non-Governmental Organizations Active in the Field of Disaster Relief & Rehabilitation in Angola," and CIMCAE's September 1988 publication "Programa de Emergencia."

1. Benguela Province

There are almost no NGO activities in Benguela directly related to the displaced. UNICEF, SEAS and ICRC appear to be the only organizations working with the province's displaced population. UNICEF, through SEAS, provides supplementary food to the displaced in three coastal municipal districts. Assistance to the other municipalities is irregular because of the security situation. ICRC airlifts food and agricultural inputs to the residents and displaced located in Benguela's four eastern municipalities.

2. Cuanza Sul Province

German Agro-Action (GAA) is providing food, agricultural inputs, clothes and blankets to 40,000 displaced in Cuanza Sul. Approximately 24,000 are located in 8 settlements near Conda and Sumbe in the south central part of the province. In the Seles municipal district, GAA has initiated a new program to assist 16,000 displaced. This effort has been interrupted temporarily due to the security situation.

3. Luanda Province

As in Benguela and Cuanza Sul Provinces, SEAS distributes UNICEF food through feeding centers to the displaced in Luanda Province. The principal NGO carrying out programs in Luanda Province is the Canadian NGO Development Workshop. Its program is directed toward the urban poor and often includes assistance to the displaced. Development Workshop has conducted or is implementing programs in urban shelter construction, urban planning and in sanitation and education schemes. Development Workshop has also implemented vocational training programs for the war-disabled.

SECTION B

Annexes A - J

ANNEX A

BASIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA

Capital	Luanda
Former Colonial Power	Portugal
Date of Independence	November 11, 1975
Current Leader	Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President
Country Population	9,472,000
Capital's Population	Approximately 1 million
Land Area	1,246,700 sq. km. (481,353 sq. miles)
Population per sq. km	8
Annual Population Growth Rate	2.6%
Life expectancy	43
- Male	41
- Female	44
Median age	17.5
Main export	Oil, (approximately 90% of foreign exchange earnings)
Currency	Kwanza
Per Capita Income	Approximately \$495
Infant Mortality Rate	(Per one thousand births) 145
Education Indicators (1985/1986):	
- Primary Education	1,304,145
- Primary Adult Education	72330
- Secondary Education	8123
- University Education	3195
Number of education centers	5277
Languages	Portuguese (official) various Bantu languages including Kikoongo, Kimbundu, Cokwe, Umbundo, Mbunda, Oxikwanyama
Ethnic Groups	30% Ovimbundu, 23% Kimbundu, 15% Bakongo, 2% Mestico

Source: UNDP - 7/88

ANNEX B

AFFECTED POPULATION

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMISSION FOR THE COORDINATION
OF EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE (CIMCAE)

<u>Provinces</u>	<u>TOTAL POPULATION</u>			<u>AFFECTED POPULATION</u>		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Displaced</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
1. Cabinda	147,200	73,600	73,600	150	20,000	15,000
2. Zaire	156,500	92,800	63,700	9,134	10,000	—
3. Uige	761,100	211,000	550,100	35,000	10,000	44,000
4. Luanda	1,379,800	1,363,900	15,900	—	120,000	—
5. K. Norte	365,100	18,000	347,100	34,622	4,000	—
6. K. Sul	629,300	52,700	576,600	116,598 ^(a)	10,000	20,000
7. Malange	829,000	250,800	578,200	36,601	30,000	12,000
8. L. Norte	279,300	36,300	243,000	11,531	10,000	—
9. Benguela	606,500	297,700	308,800	21,478	40,000	50,000
10. Huambo	1,416,300	214,400	1,201,900	96,564 ^(b)	50,000	100,000
11. Bie	1,044,000	201,600	842,400	77,596 ^(b)	40,000	100,000
12. Moxico	295,300	39,600	255,700	82,195	35,000	—
13. K. Kubango	125,600	3,600	122,000	32,234	5,000	—
14. Namibe	102,700	75,200	27,500	1,000	—	—
15. Huila	818,300	174,900	643,400	38,383	40,000	50,000
16. Cunene	219,800	4,600	215,200	35,673	—	—
17. L. Sul	151,400	80,000	71,400	10,072	20,000	—
18. Bengo	<u>156,100</u>	<u>18,700</u>	<u>137,400</u>	<u>9,132</u>	<u>3,000</u>	<u>15,000</u>
TOTAL	<u>9,483,300</u>	<u>3,209,400</u>	<u>6,273,900</u>	<u>647,953</u>	<u>447,000</u>	<u>406,000</u>

(a) 30,000 displaced assisted by German Agro Action are included.

(b) 50,000 displaced persons assisted by the ICRC are included.

Sources of Information:

- National Statistics Institute of the Ministry of Planning
- Provincial Commissars
- Other organizations involved in the emergency program (SEAS, Health, Agriculture).

Note: The team was told that the GAA and ICRC beneficiaries were not included in these totals. The number of beneficiaries receiving assistance from ICRC is 100,000 rather than 50,000.

ANNEX C

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Accommodations

One of the most serious problems facing any organization interested in becoming operational in Angola is the acute shortage of housing and office accommodations, especially in Luanda. The capital's population is estimated to have increased by 300% since 1975 to approximately 1.5 million, and there has been little new construction or maintenance of existing buildings. The GPRA does not have a policy that facilitates the leasing or sale of property by private parties.

Luanda's Hotel Meridien President is a modern, well-run facility suitable for visits and temporary accommodations, but is expensive and in great demand. Payment must be made in "convertible kwanza," i.e. hard currency exchanged at the official rate.

GPRA representatives have expressed a willingness to seek to obtain land on which U.S. PVOs could construct offices and housing for staff. (Pre-fab units are suggested.) Other options include completing or renovating existing structures. (There are numerous high-rises in Luanda left incomplete at the time of independence, as well as deteriorated buildings needing renovation). Whichever option is chosen, staff assigned to Angola must be prepared for long waits in temporary accommodations. Organizations considering a presence in Angola must be prepared to invest a considerable sum to provide housing for international staff and to set up offices.

Transportation

Luanda has good international air connections with various African and European cities, as well as Brazil. Demand is heavy and travel should be planned and confirmed well in advance.

Internal air travel on the national airlines, TAAG (Transportes Aéreos Angolanos), serves numerous locations within the country. Unrealistically low prices result in heavy demand, and scheduling difficulties are severe. The process of actually getting onto a flight even when one has a confirmed reservation is chaotic and undependable. One must rely on patience and luck when traveling by air. Charter flights can be arranged, but are extremely expensive. At times one can board relief or military flights.

Surface travel within the country is limited due to security problems. Convoys are necessary in some areas, and others cannot be visited at all. The state of repair of roads and highways varies. Four-wheel drive vehicles are necessary.

Rail transport has been affected by the war and is essentially non-existent. Foreigners traveling outside of Luanda require government authorization. Although team members noticed a few cars with taxi signs on them during their visit, private transportation service is very limited in Luanda at this time. The public transportation system is inadequate to meet the needs of the city's population and its use would not be appropriate for international personnel.

Communications

International telephone, telex and mail services are dependable in varying degrees. Internal services are generally less reliable. Phone lines are insufficient and it is extremely difficult to obtain a telephone in Luanda. Communications with program sites or regional offices would be difficult for any PVO requiring regular communications. It is suggested that fixed-frequency radio systems be considered as a solution to this problem, although obtaining the necessary permits and importing the equipment is time consuming.

Electricity

Power supply to Luanda (220 volt, 50 cycle) suffers from fluctuations and does go off altogether from time to time, but is generally dependable.

Water

Water supplies are inadequate to meet the needs of Luanda's present population and cannot be depended on for purity.

Sanitation

Luanda's sewage system is inadequate for the city's needs and in a state of disrepair, particularly during the rainy season, which begins in October and lasts until April. Outbreaks of cholera in recent years have been attributed to this problem.

Staffing & Salaries

There is a shortage of trained local staff. The economic situation and limited availability of food and other basics result in much time being devoted to obtaining basic requirements, with a reportedly high rate of absenteeism among workers.

The common practice for diplomatic and international organizations is to provide a portion of salaries in imported goods for household consumption and barter.

Skilled personnel are in demand in the generally more lucrative petroleum industry. Some international organizations have had difficulties in keeping better qualified staff.

Currency & Banking

Angola's currency, the kwanza, is not convertible and cannot be taken out of the country. The kwanza-U.S. dollar exchange rate has remained basically unchanged since it was first established following independence, at about 29.5 per dollar.

This presently unrealistic rate and the limited purchasing power of the kwanza result in the widespread use of barter, with imported consumer goods being traded for locally produced goods and services. A common medium of exchange is imported beer.

The "convertible kwanza," equivalent to a dollar at the official rate, is the medium of exchange at hotels and for the purchase of imported goods at hard currency stores ("Lojas Francas").

A parallel exchange system with little relation to the official rate of exchange is reported to exist, and is highly illegal. We understand that the dollar is 70 - 75 times more valuable in this market.

Due to the widespread availability of imported goods through the Lojas Francas and special stores for government and military officials, bartering imported items for local goods is common. This is also illegal but apparently not as controlled as direct currency transactions.

Checking accounts can be opened in convertible kwanza by depositing hard currency.

Considering the present official exchange rate and need for PVOs to operate within the law while maintaining costs to a reasonable level, it is suggested that any PVO negotiating to establish operations in Angola include a counterpart funding component in kwanzas as a government program input.

Markets

Angola's economic crisis has resulted in the limited production and availability of food items and consumer goods throughout the country. While the SEF economic restructuring begun in 1988 is reported to have resulted in improvements in the availability of locally produced items in markets, prices are prohibitive when considering local salary levels. Availability of fruits and vegetables very much depends on the season, and supplies appear inadequate to meet demand, even at prevailing prices.

The Lojas Francas where imported goods can be purchased by foreigners and others with access to convertible kwanzas offer a wide variety of items. Luanda's "Jurabo" is a large supermarket, relatively well stocked with a variety of imported foodstuffs and drinks, as well as some fruits and meats. Items such as refrigerators, stoves, televisions and air conditioners are also available.

ANNEX D

AGRICULTURE & WATER

Introduction

Agriculture in Angola is characterized by diverse conditions, climates and cultural practices. As the focus of the mission was on the provinces of Benguela and Cuanza Sul, so is the content of this report, through references to other areas are made as appropriate.

In general, climatic conditions vary from semi-arid along the coast from Luanda south, to humid highlands in the interior. Vegetation in the more arid coastal region is open to moderate savanna. The interior contains denser forested areas at higher altitudes.

The principle crops in Benguela and Cuanza Sul provinces consist of sugar, cassava, corn (maize), sweet potato, peanuts, beans, rice (near rivers), vegetables, coffee and cotton.

Displaced persons, however, tend not to be involved in cash crops, producing primarily food crops for their own consumption.

Livestock consists mainly of small ruminants and fowl, with goats, sheep, chickens and some ducks. (We were informed that ducks were not well received by local people during a promotional program in earlier years, as they did not like the meat.) There are cattle in some areas, but the assessment team saw none at any of the displaced person's camps it visited.

The most productive land was previously owned by private interests and taken over by the government at the time of independence. Private land holdings are generally small. We understand that as a part of the economic restructuring program (SEF), private farming on small parcels of land is being encouraged. The coastal region of the country has the highest population density. Rebel activities have restricted access to more arable tracts of land in the interior planalto region. The average holding is in the 0.5 to 1.0 hectare range in the more humid areas. In some cases holdings are smaller than 0.5 hectare. Typical family size is 4-6 people.

Emergency Situation

Disruption of agricultural production is one of the principal effects of rebel activity in much of Angola. These activities are targeted at the most fertile and productive areas of the country. This has resulted in an exodus of people to the coastal zones, which are less fertile and much drier than the interior of the country. Substantial livestock resources have also been decimated. One source estimated that herds have been reduced to one-third of pre-independence levels.

In two of the provinces visited, Benguela and Cuanza Sul, the displaced populations have been settled for up to three years. Their general needs are not very different from the local populations'. Few are capable of providing for their entire subsistence needs. Land holdings in general are small, ranging from .03 to 1.0 hectares. Yields are very low, the average being 600 kilograms per hectare for maize, the dominant cereal crop in the area. Low yields is one of the main reasons that food aid is required for displaced and local populations.

Another factor that figures prominently in the agricultural production equation is the lack of transportation and logistical support. It has become increasingly clear that transportation of inputs to the beneficiaries is at least as important as the supply of those inputs. It was repeatedly indicated by provincial and national officials that transportation of donated materials from ports and central storage facilities is a chronic problem. The situation should improve somewhat with the availability of a UNICEF truck fleet at Lobito port in Benguela province. German Agro-Action's fleet and warehouses in Sumbe, Cuanza Sul province, have been key elements in the success of its programs.

The coastal areas visited by the assessment team suffer from characteristically low rainfall. Typical precipitation levels are in the 400-500 mm range in normal years. In poor years this level is reduced to 200-300 mm. The rainy season is also short, covering a three-month period from December to March. As such, water availability for irrigation is a major component in the agricultural production prospects. Under these conditions rain-fed production will be low even with normal rainfall.

There is potential for irrigation on a small scale in Benguela and Cuanza Sul provinces visited. In Benguela there are a number of existing wells (boreholes) without pumps and motors near displaced persons' settlements that could provide irrigation water for 3 to 5 hectares each. Water could also be available to the community for domestic purposes. More boreholes could also be drilled for irrigation and household consumption. Two state-run enterprises have the capability to drill wells. They also install pumps and motors and keep technical data (hydrologic and geographic) of various zones.

Boreholes can also be drilled in the southern part of Cuanza Sul province, near Benguela. Further north, however, wells appear to be less viable due to the extreme depth (over 100 meters) of the water table, and poor or at least questionable water quality. The most popular water supply technique in Cuanza Sul is the construction of earth dams to store surface run-off from the surrounding catchment areas. The hilly topography of the coastal area provides numerous sites for this type of structure. Cuanza Sul is also the province with the greatest concentration of displaced persons. Given the low rainfall and lack of existing bore holes, water supply is a number one priority.

Agriculture needs expressed by government representatives and observed during field visits are similar in both Benguela and Cuanza Sul provinces. Farmers require maize, bean (cow pea), sorghum, and vegetable seeds, fertilizer, hand tools, animal traction equipment (plows), draft animals and irrigation equipment (pumps, piping, bore holes).

It was not possible to get an accurate or even rough idea of the quantities required of the above items. The lack of data and information from the municipalities within the provinces, either due to inaccessibility or to lack of adequate human resources, precludes rigorous quantification of needs. It is quite evident, though, that the needs are real. As a starting point, the report "The Emergency Situation in Angola," produced by the Government of Angola and the United Nations, can serve as a general guide to a range of emergency needs in agriculture. Virtually all needed items would initially have to be imported. There are some local industries that are capable of manufacturing hand tools and hand pumps, but lack raw materials. The most frequently identified sources of imported inputs are Zimbabwe, Brazil and Europe. Benguela officials specifically noted the need for 400 tons of maize seed and 1,500 tons of fertilizer.

Agricultural officials in Benguela also expressed interest in cattle for animal traction and small animal raising. There are currently few programs being carried out in this area. Government

officials are keen to embark on new initiatives involving rabbits, chickens, sheep, goats and hogs. "The Emergency Situation in Angola" lists the estimated cost and composition of selected types of small livestock program interventions. Pork production is popular in Cuanza Sul province.

Cultural Practices and Methods

While there are farmers who employ animal traction, fertilizer (when available), and use crop rotation, the majority of producers use only human labor, simple hand tools and few if any inputs such as fertilizers and agricultural chemicals.

Maize and beans are inter-cropped (grown in association) on up to 0.5 hectare, or half of the holding. The other half of the holding or area slightly smaller is dedicated to fruit production, mainly banana and papaya, with a small plot reserved for vegetables. Farmers with access to land near rivers or in low-lying depressions cultivate rice, but it is not considered a major crop in Cuanza Sul.

Apart from large-scale irrigation schemes on state-managed holdings, there appeared to be few irrigation activities using modern inputs. There is considerable interest in motorized pumps and equipment, but the costs are prohibitive and the supply/employment of such items minuscule. Manual irrigation using watering cans and well water is done for vegetables.

In Benguela province irrigation is done from wells (bore-holes) and small ponds. The main cash crops irrigated are bananas and sugar cane on larger plantations. Some displaced persons produce food crops on a small scale using irrigation. With holdings averaging 0.3 hectares they will obviously not meet their requirements without intensive production using modern inputs. At the one camp visited in Benguela there were existing bore holes without pumps. Along the coast, low rainfall does not hold much promise for rain-fed production in normal years. Thus, the near-term approach would involve bringing the dormant bore holes into production.

Institutional Facilities & Framework

Agricultural extension services are administered by the Ministry of Agriculture through the Office of Agricultural Cooperatives. Agents known as "dinamizadores rurais" (rural promoters) handle agricultural extension functions, though the program was created to promote and assist farmers with organizing cooperatives. The agents receive training at an agriculture training center. A minimum of a sixth-grade education is required to enter the program. Once at their posts mobility becomes the biggest handicap to effective coverage of their assigned areas, in addition to maintaining contact with provincial authorities.

In general there is a lack of trained staff, and an acute lack of staff with university-level qualifications. Angolan officials were very frank regarding this deficiency. It was evident that they need and want more highly qualified staff.

Formal research activities are conducted at the Institute for Agricultural Development in Lubango in Huila Province. There have been a number of trials and pilot projects focused on new seed varieties (hybrids), animal traction, and new livestock species. The seed and animal traction components appear to have provided encouraging results. Maize and bean seeds from Brazil, as well as a maize variety (Kalahari) from Zimbabwe, have given good results.

Government-operated enterprises handle input supply to large and small producers. ANGOSEMENTES distributes and produces seed. It also tests and screens new seed varieties and plant materials. DINAMA distributes tools, fertilizer and equipment. ENAMA does contract land clearing and preparation. All of these entities suffer from transport and managerial difficulties.

Technical Assistance and Logistical Resource Requirements

Follow up and monitoring of agricultural activities can only be done with adequate personnel and the means of transportation to reach project sites. The provincial agricultural services are severely handicapped on both counts. As a result extension agents have irregular contact with farmers and with their superiors in the provincial capitals. The same is true of most other civil agencies at the provincial level.

Enhanced mobility would improve the Ministry of Agriculture's extension capacity. Where there are existing agents at the sub-provincial level, motorcycles would probably be the most efficient means of transport. This would greatly enhance feedback between the field level and provincial level structures.

Given the deterioration of the transportation sector, it would be prudent to furnish the means of transport for any inputs, supplies or other materials to be provided in any program. The NGO working in Cuanza Sul, German Agro-Action (GAA), repeatedly emphasized the indispensability of means of transportation. Granted, this is not the only ingredient of a successful program, but (GAA's) success would have been virtually impossible without the reliable transportation network it has developed.

Human resource development is another area that merits attention. In general one can say that the amount of work that exists exceeds the capacity of available staff. This capacity could be increased by formal and informal training activities. FAO is currently involved in a project to train extension agents and farmers in Malanje province. Considerable improvement could be achieved by placing an experienced person with technical capability at the provincial level to interact with local officials at various levels. Priority subject areas would include agricultural statistics and planning, project design/definition/elaboration, crop and livestock protection, pest management, soil/water management, reforestation/fruit tree propagation, and small earth dam construction. Initial approaches might emphasize the basics of any chosen subject area, so that a foundation could be created to receive more sophisticated inputs at the appropriate time, depending on improvement in the local situation. A minimum of a sixth grade education is now required to enter into extension agent training. These agents are likely to compose the bulk of the agricultural technicians working at the field level.

Water Supply

This section will cover both potable drinking water and irrigation/livestock watering prospects in Benguela and Cuanza Sul Provinces. There are significant similarities in the approaches to establishing either type of water system. In a general sense the water supply situation in both provinces can be described as one of chronic shortage. Cuanza Sul's needs are more critical, due to the larger number of displaced persons there and limited sub-surface water (ground water) that can be easily and inexpensively exploited.

No hand-dug, wide diameter type wells were observed in any displaced persons' settlements visited by the team. What water was available came from three basic sources: (1) streams or rivers; (2)

natural or artificial ponds; (3) bore holes.

While it is possible for displaced persons to get water in streams and rivers, most of these sources dry up for a significant part of the year. In some parts of Cuanza Sul supplies can be maintained for a while by digging into riverbeds to reach ground water. Water contamination, however, remains a serious problem. One more drawback is that often the rivers do not pass near access roads, and under current conditions security is a concern. When people settle near the access roads, a trip to the river can involve walks of several kilometers.

Natural and artificial ponds can in some cases provide water year-round or nearly year-round. Natural ponds were more evident in Benguela than in Cuanza Sul. Conversely, artificial ponds were more apparent in Cuanza Sul than in Benguela. The ponds are created by constructing an earth dam across a water course, and collecting rainfall run-off during the rainy season. Both areas visited in Benguela and Cuanza Sul are suitable for this type of structure, but especially Cuacra in Cuanza Sul. An earth dam constructed by GAA was completed using heavy construction equipment (bulldozer, road grader, motorized scraper, etc.). The equipment was available at ENAMA, the National Enterprise for Agricultural Machinery. Frequent repairs were needed to keep the equipment operating to complete the job.

The Government of Angola is preparing to create new dam construction teams with all new equipment. One team, or "brigade" as it is called locally, is expected to cost around US \$2 million in equipment and support. The FAO has financed a similar brigade, though its principal purpose is land clearing rather than dam construction. It was not apparent that any dam construction activities were being undertaken with lower-cost methods. A technical survey of the areas under consideration would be necessary to determine the appropriateness of alternative methods. If it is determined that suitable sites do exist, this activity would be a good candidate to consider for food-for-work programming.

Surface sources of water are of course susceptible to contamination by bacteria, parasites, etc. Cholera and diarrhea have been recurrent problems in areas visited. Due to the scarcity of water it is likely that any surface source will be used for drinking. With this in mind, strategies for water treatment should accompany pond construction projects.

There were a number of bore holes in Benguela at sites visited by the team. Most do not have pumps and seem to have been out of service for some time. The wells would need inspection and perhaps rehabilitation. More bore holes could be drilled in the area visited to increase water supplies. It was not possible to get data on the characteristics of the bore holes or the aquifer in the region. These data would be necessary to get an idea of water yield. Irrigation requires substantial quantities of water, and therefore the risk of lowering the water table increases if there is a proliferation of bore holes for irrigation purposes. If irrigation is done it should be on a small scale for vegetables and fruit crops, "small" being 2 hectares maximum per bore hole.

Bore holes do not appear to be a popular method of obtaining water in Cuanza Sul, except in the southern part of the province. Outside of the south the water table drops to more than 100 meters. (As in Benguela, it was not possible to review technical data to confirm this estimate.) It is certain, however, that no bore holes existed at the displaced persons' settlements visited in Cuanza Sul. There may be opportunities to drill holes, probably near rivers where possible, but a more thorough survey would first be necessary.

Bore holes have the advantage of generally providing safe water for drinking and are therefore advisable for this reason. In Benguela there should not be many problems with this approach.

In Cuanza Sul, however, saline water has been reported where sub-surface water tests were done.

There are two state companies that drill bore holes, GEOMINAS in the northern part of the country, and HIDROMINAS in the south. UNICEF has also provided well-drilling rigs in their water supply program. Hand pumps and cement are available locally, but most other materials would have to be imported. Other than outfitting existing bore holes that may be in good shape with hand pumps, it seems that supplying water to Benguela and Cuanza Sul is likely to be a costly proposition. Undeniably, these are areas that need water as much as any other assistance.

ANNEX E

HEALTH & NUTRITION

Introduction

Angola's health services suffered from the exodus of trained personnel at the time of independence, as did virtually all sectors within the country. Few trained medical personnel remained after 1976. This significant gap has to a great extent been taken up by the large number of physicians and health personnel from Eastern bloc countries, particularly Cubans.

This section will focus on the most urgent and basic health needs of the country, with emphasis on emergency assistance to displaced persons as they are the most affected segment of the population. For this reason the assessment team's Health Advisor concentrated on the provinces of Benguela, Cuanza Sul, and Luanda.

At the time of independence the Portuguese left behind a Faculty of Medicine, although most of the technical staff left the country. Since then it has been a struggle to rebuild the medical school, relying heavily on assistance from the Eastern bloc.

To date we understand that the Faculty has graduated 150 physicians. Most of them now hold positions in the Ministry of Health. There are some 600 expatriate physicians from other countries, on which the Ministry of Health is quite dependent.

As in all developing countries, trained personnel quickly seem to be given additional responsibilities in administration, leaving behind their years of technical training. We understand that at present most of the local physicians are in administrative positions, with most clinical work being done by expatriates.

There are about 9,500 paramedic personnel in Angola, the largest number of trained health workers within the health system.

At the lowest level in the health system hierarchy, village health workers are trained at the provincial level in preventative medicine for a total of about three months. They are chosen by the communities they serve, but function under the Ministry of Health. Although their training is in preventative medicine, in most cases due to the absence of paramedic personnel, they cover curative functions as well. In a war situation where there are constant movements of population, the system of community-chosen health promoters works very well because of the promoters' links to the populations they serve.

Due to its relative newness, the Faculty of Medicine will continue to need highly trained technical staff to assist in the training programs. This is also true at the middle and lower levels of health care training programs at the provincial level.

Health Statistics

Much of the country is inaccessible due to the war. This makes it difficult to collect basic information and to interpret what information is obtained. Gathering, compiling and interpreting

information on health is an area where technical assistance could be useful.

Nutrition

The Ministry of Health has nutrition rehabilitation centers linked with provincial hospitals to address the needs of malnourished children. The "Road-to-Health" card is the record system used to monitor the growth of children admitted for treatment, utilizing the weight-for-age method. Surveys conducted by NGOs in mid 1988 in selected displaced and normal population areas using the "quac stick" method showed severe malnutrition of about 8%, and moderate malnutrition of about 42%. There is no nutrition information taken on displaced persons right after their arrival in camps.

Visual inspection of the under-5 population in displaced population camps indicated the presence of moderate, but not severe malnutrition. One has to consider that those visited had been established at least five months earlier, some even up to two years ago, and supplementary food supplies, though irregular, have been reaching these people.

Growth monitoring and nutrition surveys are sporadic at best and methodologies unstandardized.

Immunization

In 1979 an expanded program of immunization was launched with assistance from donor governments. Since then the emphasis has been on campaigns covering mainly the single antigens, because of inherent problems such as poor health education, organizational structure, technical knowledge of staff in the health posts, cold chain maintenance and logistical support.

UNICEF provides immunization supplies, including cold chain equipment, but transport within the country is a serious problem.

Vaccination coverage in Luanda and other provinces is estimated to be as follows: Measles - 73% and 32% respectively; DPT 3 - 18% and 6%; Oral Polio Vaccine 3 - 38% and 3%; Tetanus Toxoid 2 - 36% and 3%.

Included in the campaign programs are vaccinations against yellow fever and cholera.

Clinic Activities

The health posts are the first-line health structure, staffed by a nurse and a health promoter, but often the nurse leaves responsibilities to the health promoter.

Reports show that malaria, malnutrition, cholera and measles are prevalent. Hospital admissions in Luanda are in descending order for malaria, intestinal infections, undefined symptoms, anemia, tetanus (mainly neo-natal), measles, perinatal problems, trauma, pneumonia and bronchitis.

It has been reported that in some cases of neo-natal tetanus the mothers had been vaccinated with two doses of tetanus toxoid. Traditionally, women deliver their babies at home under the care of any woman who has had at least two deliveries herself. The government has a program to identify, train and incorporate into the health structure traditional midwives. UNICEF provides them with

kits and manuals.

Essential Drugs/Hospital Equipment

The government has adapted the essential drug procurement program for all levels of health care and has been funded by donor governments and UNICEF. Assistance in essential drug procurement does not seem as urgent as other needs at this time.

Transport

The big problem in implementing any program in Angola is transport from ports to provincial capitals and from there to the municipalities. The Ministry of Health does not have allocated space in any transport system, be it military or civilian. This has resulted in the loss of drugs and vaccines, which have spoiled due to breaking the cold chain because of transport delays, flight cancellations, etc. Fuel for vaccine refrigerators is available, but distributing it to the end of the cold chain remains a major difficulty that has taken a toll on the lives of the most vulnerable segments of the population.

Rehabilitation

The number of war victims needing rehabilitation is on the rise, and will be for as long as the war continues. One third of amputees noted in one rehabilitation center were children under the age of 16, with the youngest 2 years old.

Angola is reputed to have the largest percentage of amputees in the world. Even if the war stops today, it will take years to clear the anti-personnel mines that have been placed throughout the country.

Complications arising from poor orthopedic management were evident in almost all amputees seen in the hospital in Huambo. This prolongs recovery and complicates the preparation of prothesis. An area requiring attention is training local surgeons in amputation techniques and post-operative management.

ANNEX F

EMERGENCY PROGRAM LOGISTICS

Emergency Food/Non-Food Distribution System

The Planning Section of SEAS in Luanda is responsible for preparing allocation plans and determining points of entry, in collaboration with donors. On receipt of cargo, customs clearance and physical removal of cargo from ports is undertaken by SEAS. Cargo is then transported to destinations based on an allocation plan. Normally cargo for the northern zone is received at Luanda port; cargo for the central zone at Lobito; cargo for the southern zone is received at Namibe port. Transport to interior provinces can take several weeks or months due to security conditions and transportation constraints.

After receipt of cargo in each province, a plan is prepared for distribution to areas or camps where displaced persons are located. Distribution is carried out through CDAs (Food Distribution Centers) based on a listing of heads of family. Distributions are scheduled monthly. However, availability of commodities determines the actual frequency of distributions. Similarly, ration quantities are determined by the quantities of food available. The CDAs are staffed by SEAS employees who are responsible for overseeing supplementary food distribution.

The logistical pipeline is linked up to a reporting and control system. The system was not reviewed in depth. Based on the availability of information at the central and provincial levels, it was apparent that there is a need for improved quantitative and qualitative data to manage the system more effectively.

Road Transport Capacity

a. National Situation

Private and state-managed road transport systems now coexist in Angola. A general impression of the availability of trucks is that demand is greater than supply. Rates charged by state-managed companies are very low, but trucks are not readily available.

Private transport operators exist in Luanda and in some provincial capitals. Their rates are extremely high. There are also larger private companies whose rates are said to be somewhere between official rates and those of the smaller private operators. As in the case of public transport, the availability of this capacity for emergency operations should not be depended on. Demand for transport far exceeds supply and additional demands created by the emergency program will contribute to a greater imbalance. Those considering program interventions should therefore also carefully plan the logistics aspects of the activities they will undertake.

b. Transport Capacity - SEAS

SEAS reportedly has an operational fleet of 117 vehicles with a combined capacity of 1,400 tons. Forty-five of these vehicles are based in the north of the country, 48 in the central zone and 24 in the south. The fleet is composed of nine different makes.

The SEAS fleet appears impressive in terms of capacity to deliver food and other needed items to provincial and municipal level. However, the existing security situation precludes realization of the full capacity. Turn-around time is very long because trucks must travel in convoys to many areas, and the convoys do not travel on a daily basis. Attacks are frequent and trucks, goods and lives have been lost. As a result, it is estimated that only about 2,000 to 2,500 tons per month are transported.

We were informed that SEAS expects to receive at least another 30 trucks in the near future, increasing its combined fleet tonnage capacity to 1,850 tons.

c. Fleet Maintenance & Repairs

An estimated 20 to 30% of the potential fleet days are lost due to vehicles being under repair. This percentage will increase as vehicles age. The existing system for repair and maintenance of vehicles as generally applied in the country is probably part of the problem. The Ministry of Transport created a centralized agency to deal with repairs, importation of spare parts and maintenance of government-owned vehicles. The magnitude and complexity of this task make it a formidable challenge, and results have not been fully satisfactory. The Government has now proposed a new system to address inadequacies. This scheme includes the decentralization of the importation of spare parts and providing for more private sector involvement in repair and maintenance.

In order to address more effectively the transport requirements for emergency program supplies, SEAS, with the support of the WFP and UNICEF, has established maintenance and repair facilities in several key locations. When fully operational these facilities will exist in Luanda, Lobito, Huambo, Kuito, Lubango and Sumbe.

d. Location of Service Facilities and Types of Vehicles Serviced

In addition to the SEAS workshops, service facilities exist in Luanda for Renaults, Volvos and Scania vehicles. There is a fairly efficient facility for Volvo repairs in the central zone in Benguela. In the southern zone there is a facility for Scania and Volvo trucks at Lubango. Obtaining parts is a chronic problem everywhere.

Accessibility

Accessibility to provincial capitals varies from day to day because of security. Emergency logistics is managed by keeping an ear to the ground. Certain provinces are best reached by air-lift because of the dangers of moving by road and the long turn-around time in more distant provinces. Other provinces can be reached by road in armed convoys. Only a few provinces are accessible without convoy, and it is preferable to travel during the day.

These relatively accessible provinces were identified by the Angolan Government and suggested as possible locations for American PVOs to operate in. They were visited by the team. In Benguela there are nine municipalities, of which three are now readily accessible. In Cuanza Sul there are twelve, of which eight were said to be readily accessible, but conditions change regularly. A significant portion of the affected population is located in the less accessible areas.

Port Operations

a. Luanda

Luanda port has berths for 11 ships and draft ranges of 11 to 12 meters. There are 41 cranes in the port, though few appeared operational. Capacity of the cranes range from 3.5 to 22 tons. Rail sidings had been in existence alongside the berths. Currently sidings alongside only two berths are operational. The port has facilities to receive containers. In general, the port is in a state of disrepair.

Each month at least 6 roll on-roll off vessels are received at the port. Major carriers such as Nedlloyds, NIT, and NDS call here, some directly from European ports. Most vessels have to wait several days before berthing facilities become available.

Average daily cargo handled is low. Port authorities admitted that off-take per vessel of sacked grain was around 300 tons per day. Dockside clearance is slow. One of the principle causes for low off-take is the state of disrepair of port equipment. Added to this is the fact that labor absenteeism is high, estimated at 40% to 50% each working day. These problems are reportedly compounded by an extremely high pilferage rate, possibly up to 40%.

Congestion and the other problems herein described indicate that use of Luanda port should be kept to a minimum by PVOs importing project materials.

b. Lobito

Lobito port is reputed to be the most efficient in Angola. A visit confirmed this. The port's management appeared well-organized and competent. Pilferage is reportedly a fraction of Luanda. Lobito is 35 kilometers from the provincial capital of Benguela. Most shippers prefer to land cargo in Lobito. Transportation from the port to the interior, however, is a problem. The assessment team noted some relief cargo that had been stored at the port for many months and was in poor condition. Storage facilities are good, but because of excessive storage times losses are occurring.

c. Porto Amboim

This small port has increased in importance recently because of security problems on the highway between Lobito and Sumbe, capital of Cuanza Sul. There are two ports in Amboim town. The older one has two cranes, of which only one was operational. The draft alongside is only 4 to 5 meters. Three barges of 50-ton capacity are available, but only one is operational. The wharf is in poor condition. Amboim is primarily used for coastal vessels. A new fishing complex, financed with Italian funds, is nearing completion 3 kilometers from the old port. As it is a fishing facility it does not have cranes. The draft alongside the dock is 6 to 7 meters, and there is adequate space for four small vessels.

Customs Clearance

The National Directorate of Customs is within the Ministry of Finance and is led by a National Director. Despite the fact that Angola has fairly cumbersome procedures, an effort has been made to simplify them for all emergency-related cargo.

Customs clearance is managed either directly by the consignee through a clearing agent ("despachante"), or through a shipping agent. It would probably be advisable to establish relations with a clearing agent and use the same person on a regular basis rather than working through a shipping agent.

Coastal Shipping Capacity

Information on coastal shipping capacity obtained from shippers, port officials and shipping agents did not coincide. It appears, however, that there are a number of landing craft with a capacity varying from 200 to 600 tons, and 6 coastal vessels with a capacity range of 350 to 4,000 tons.

In addition, smaller fishing vessels owned by para-state companies are available in all ports. Additional landing craft are owned by petroleum companies.

Coastal shipping costs are extremely high, ranging from \$50 to \$85 per ton.

Emergency Communications Network

SEAS and CIMCAE are the principle government entities involved with emergency operations in Angola. The following observations are related to the existing situation as it applies to these entities and their impact on emergency operations in general.

Angola's telephone system does not function very well in Luanda, so communications between SEAS, CIMCAE, U.N. agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs is not as effective as it should be. In addition, the operational sections within SEAS are physically separated, adding to communications constraints.

Phone communications between Luanda and the other provincial capitals function at varying degrees of efficiency. Service to some provincial capitals is better than others.

SEAS and CIMCAE do not have their own radio networks. Such a system would greatly facilitate communications between Luanda and provincial capitals to better coordinate emergency requirements, transportation, etc. The Ministry of Telecommunications does authorize the use of radios on fixed frequencies and is advisable for the coordination of emergency program activities.

The U.N. plans to install a radio network to cover Luanda, Uige, Malange, Huambo, Namibe, Lubango and Lobito. In addition, a local network is being considered to cover the key Luanda operational centers.

ANNEX G

COMPOSITION OF THE ASSESSMENT TEAM

The assessment team's six members included four U.S. PVO and two U.S. Government representatives. Four are U.S. citizens, one Filipino and one Indian. Collectively they have more than 80 years of professional experience in fields directly related to the context of the visit.

Team members were:

TEAM LEADER:

RONALD P. BURKARD (48), Director, CARE/India: Mr. Burkard joined CARE in 1963. He has also served in Mexico, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Bangladesh, and has extensive experience in developing and managing emergency and development programs. From 1979 until 1983 he was an Assistant Executive Director at CARE/New York, where his responsibilities included managing CARE's fund-raising and communications programs within the United States.

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE:

WILLIAM GARVELINK (39), Assistant Director for Africa & Europe, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.: Mr. Garvelink worked in Bolivia for AID and has had short-term assignments in Latin America (El Salvador & Honduras) and Africa (Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe).

FOOD AID:

RICHARD HOUGH (37), Deputy Chief, Africa Division, Office of Food For Peace, Agency for International Development: Mr. Hough lived for nine years in Africa (Senegal and Mauritania) as a Peace Corps Volunteer and with AID. He has been assigned to AID/Washington for two years, where he has been Desk Officer for Ethiopia and Sudan and Deputy Director of the African Emergencies Task Force.

AGRICULTURE & IRRIGATION:

DAVID B. JACKSON (35), Resident Representative for AFRICARE in Mozambique: Mr. Jackson has had more than ten years development experience. His training and experience are in agricultural engineering, irrigation management, equipment maintenance and repair, cooperative development and reforestation. He was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Thailand and has had extensive experience in Africa (Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal).

HEALTH & WATER:

DR. HECTOR JALIPA (37), A Philippine citizen and a physician with World Vision: Mr. Jalipa has been with World Vision for eight years working with refugee populations in Thailand and Ethiopia, in addition to Mozambique where he is currently Manager of Health & Nutrition. He was with the Ministry of Health in the Philippines for three years prior to joining World Vision.

EMERGENCY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT:

MICHAEL MISPELAAR (33), Mr. Mispelaar, an Indian citizen, has nearly thirteen years development and relief experience. He served with CARE/India for six years before joining the Emergency Logistics Unit managed by CARE in Somalia. Since 1984 he has served with CARE in Mozambique in various positions related to the management of logistics for the delivery of emergency supplies. He is currently the Chief of Operations for the Logistics Supply Unit managed by CARE/Mozambique.

ANNEX H

SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES

September 22 to 29	M. Mispelaar in Luanda arranging for team's visit.
October 1 (Saturday)	Arrival of R. Burkard, W. Garvelink and R. Hough.
October 2 (Sunday)	Planning discussions (Burkard, Garvelink & Hough).
October 3 (Monday)	General meetings with UNDP and GPRA representatives.
October 4 (Tuesday)	Burkard, Garvelink & Hough continue general meetings; arrival of D. Jackson and M. Mispelaar.
October 5 (Wednesday)	Briefing by GPRA representatives at CIMCAE; meeting with Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Armando Mateus Cadete; group discussions.
October 6 (Thursday)	Briefing by U.N. agency representatives; meetings with International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and Development Workshop.
October 7 (Friday)	Arrival of H. Jalipa; meetings with Ministry of Health, Planning & Statistics, U.N. agencies, Agriculture, SEAS, Luanda port & Ministry of Commerce.
October 8 (Saturday)	Meeting with Ambassador of Italy, U.N. agencies, SEAS, Ministry of Transport.
October 9 (Sunday)	Departure for Benguela by TAAG commercial flight. Visit to displaced persons camp at Viamalpasso with the Provincial

- Commissar and other provincial officials; briefing by provincial officials. Visit to Benguela city and surrounding green belt.
- October 10 (Monday) Visit to Lobito port storage facilities SEAS warehouse, vehicle maintenance facility and social service institutions in Lobito and Benguela. Sectorial meetings with provincial authorities.
- October 11 (Tuesday) Departure for Sumbe by chartered aircraft. Meetings with Provincial Commissar and other authorities. Visits to displaced persons camps with provincial authorities and German Agro-Action personnel. Visits to SEAS and gaa. warehouses. Sectorial meetings.
- October 12 (Wednesday) Visit to vocational training center for petroleum industry workers. Sectorial meetings. Departure for Luanda by road with German Agro-Action, WFP, UNDP and GPRA staff. Visit to Porto Amboim en route.
- October 13 (Thursday) Garvelink and Jalipa depart for Huambo with on ICRC flight. Others continue sectorial meetings in Luanda.
- October 14 (Friday) Individual sectorial meetings in Luanda with GPRA, bilateral and UN representatives. Team meetings with province of Luanda authorities, Planning Ministry and SEAS. Garvelink and Jalipa return from Huambo.
- October 15 (Saturday) Visit to Luanda urban slums with and Viana with provincial authorities. Wrap-up meeting with Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs for Cooperation A. Cadete. Departure of R. Hough.

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October 16 (Sunday)	Luncheon at Hotel Costa del Sol hosted by Vice-Minister Cadete attended by GPRA representatives, U.N., bilateral and NGO personnel working in emergency programs.
October 17 (Monday)	Preparation of draft reports. Final discussions.
October 18: (Tuesday)	Departure of Burkard, Jackson, Jalipa and Mispelaar.
October 19 (Wednesday)	Departure of Garvelink.

ANNEX I

GLOSSARY

CDA	"Centro de Distribuição de Alimentos" (Food Distribution Centers)
CIMCAE	Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Coordination of Emergency Assistance
Deslocados	Displaced persons
FAO	Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GAA	German Agro-Action
GPRA	Government of the Peoples Republic of Angola
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
Kwanza	Angolan national currency (10/88 official exchange rate 29.62 per U.S.\$)
MCH	Maternal/Child Health
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
Planalto	Central plateau
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SEAS	State Secretariat for Social Affairs
SEF	Saneamento Económico e Financeiro
TAAG	Transportes Aéreos Angolanos (Angolan National Airlines)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Office
UNEOG	United Nations Emergency Operations Group
UNFPA	United Nations Family Planning Agency
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

ANNEX J

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