

PD-AAA-901  
59872

PROJECT PAPER (PP)  
RURAL WORKS PROJECT  
306-51-995-131

KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
January 22, 1975

PROJECT PAPER (PP)  
RURAL WORKS PROJECT  
306-51-995-131

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	i
I. SUMMARY	1
A. Summary Information	1
B. Project Purpose	1
C. Financial Data	3
II. PROJECT DESIGN	5
A. Logical Framework	5
B. Statement of Program Goals	8
C. Project Description	9
D. Rationale for the Project	27
E. Significance of the Project	28
III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION PLANS	29
A. Implementation Schedule	29
B. Fixed-Cost Reimbursement (FCR)	34
C. Progress Reporting Systems	35
D. The Evaluation Plan	36
IV. PROJECT ANALYSIS	37
A. Background	37
B. Economic Analysis	42
C. Financial Analysis	48
D. Social Analysis; Some Political and Social Linkages	48
E. Policy and Administrative Analysis	51
F. Technical Analysis	52

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDICES

- I. Building a Nation; An Historical Perspective
  - II. The Story of a Bridge
  - III. The Story of a Petition
  - IV. Power, the Family, and Local Politics
  - V.
    - A. RDD Chart
    - B. RDD Charter: Procedures of the Rural Development Department
    - C. Unpaved Roads
    - D. List of Water Resource Projects Designed
    - E. List of Bridges Designed
    - F. Pictures of Rural Works Projects
    - G. Fixed-Cost Reimbursement Procedure
    - H. Project Reimbursement Agreement
  - VI. Engineering Monitoring and Inspection
  - VII. Director's Certification of 25 Percent Requirement
  - VIII. Environmental Impact Statement
- Epilogue

## INTRODUCTION

Readers of this paper may be struck by the relatively modest dimensions of the project it describes. Constructing slightly more than 100 rural works structures and improving a few miles of farm-to-market roads can hardly be expected to make much of an impact on the estimated 10 to 12 million poor people who live in the rural areas of Afghanistan. The project also includes an experimental approach to an integrated rural development program but, here again, the purpose is limited to developing a design for only three districts of over 300 in the country which will not be implemented for one and one-half years.

It is true that from the standpoint of what needs to be done, this project is modest. From the standpoint of what can be done, it is an ambitious proposal. For a number of reasons, the ability to reach the rural poor is limited. Though there is willingness to accept foreign assistance, the ability to effectively utilize external resources of any nature is constrained. In the specific context of rural development, the institutional, personnel and policy constraints on development which characterize the country generally are exacerbated by the ethnic, linguistic and geographic diversity of society and the traditional attitudes characterizing both the government and the rural population.

This project is only a small beginning and it would be unrealistic to view it in any other light. Nevertheless, in our opinion, it is a necessary step in the direction to which the Government of Afghanistan must move if it is committed to larger efforts, designed to raise the standard of living of the rural poor and integrating them into the national life of Afghanistan.

This project proposal has been developed by the Division Chief, Public Administration and Rural Development Division; the two rural development advisors to the Rural Development Department and the Social and Economic Consultant for Rural Development. There has been over 14 months of collaboration with the President of the Rural Development Department to develop this document.

There are no rural area sector studies of Afghanistan. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank teams have made qualitative surveys and their findings and judgments as well as GOA interest appear consistent with this project. Further, because this project will be executed through the Rural Development Department of the Prime Ministry and is so intimately connected with the social, economic and cultural life of the country, virtually all of Afghan history and every social and economic study and report which has been done over the past 20 years by the Americans, Germans, Russians, French, Italians, British, Japanese, Chinese, Indians, Czechs, Yugoslavs, Poles, Bulgarians, not to mention the United Nations agencies, IERD, Asian Development Bank, and numerous foreign contract teams, are relevant. However, a bibliography of these writings is not available for reference.

To sum up: "To walk a mile, one must take the first step." This project will establish the systems and provide the necessary experience to do a larger, more significant program over the coming years.

The Country Team is familiar with and supports this proposal.

PROJECT PAPER (PP)

RURAL WORKS

306-51-995-131

FY 75 to 77

PART I. SUMMARY

A. Summary Information

1. Project title: Rural Works
2. Project number: 306-51-995-131
3. Cooperating country: Afghanistan
- Executing agency: Rural Development Department,  
Prime Ministry
4. Obligation span: From FY 1975 to FY 1977
5. Implementation span: From FY 1975 to FY 1977

B. Project Purpose

There are two purposes of this project.

1. Construction, on a fixed-cost reimbursement basis, of rural works projects which directly benefit the rural poor.

Eighty permanent structures will be constructed which will improve irrigation water availability and control affecting 30,000 acres of land, providing direct benefits to over 35,000 rural people through improved production.

Twenty-five bridges will be constructed and 100 kilometers (62 miles) of farm-to-market roads will be improved directly benefiting 50,000 people. Five thousand unskilled laborers will be employed for \$.70 per day for 40 days on road improvements for an average total income of \$28 each (annual per capita income estimate = \$85).

Using the fixed-cost reimbursement method, USAID will finance about 75% of the total estimated costs of each of these rural works projects.

2. Develop and experiment with an integrated rural development program in three districts of three provinces.

Rural development is more than construction of rural works. Therefore, the second purpose of this project is to develop and experiment with a comprehensive rural development program for three districts of three provinces. In devising an experiment, consideration will be given to education, health delivery, cooperatives, small industries, credit as well as rural works. It will be developed jointly by RDD and USAID in districts chosen by the GOA and be ready for implementation by the end of FY 1976. The targets of the experiment will be:

1) to increase average family income in the district by 5 - 10% a year over a three-year period;

2) to strengthen linkages between the people of the district and the GOA.

C. Financial Data1. Total Project Cost Table (U.S. thousands)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <sup>a/</sup>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>Total</u>
GOA	450	2,250	1,350	4,050
USAID	583	986	217	1,786
UNDP <sup>b/</sup>	50	250	150	450
FRG (DED) <sup>b/</sup>	5	25	15	45
WFP	(unknown)			
	<u>1,088</u>	<u>3,511</u>	<u>1,732</u>	<u>6,331</u>

---

<sup>a/</sup> FY 76 is a 15-month fiscal year.

<sup>b/</sup> Other donor estimates made on an expenditure basis, rather than U.S. style obligation, according to U.S. fiscal years.

2. AID Project Cost Table <sup>a/</sup> (\$U.S. thousands)

<u>Component</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u> <sup>b/</sup>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Personnel Services</u>	<u>329</u>	<u>207</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>586</u>
Direct Hire	-	(59)	(50)	(109)
Contract:				
PSC's	(100)	-	-	(100)
Intermediary	(122)	(102)		(224)
Third Country				
Contract for Eng.				
Monitoring/ Inspection <sup>c/</sup>	(107)	(46)		(153)
<u>Participant Training</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>59</u>
<u>Other Costs</u>	<u>254</u>	<u>748</u>	<u>139</u>	<u>1,141</u>
Fixed-Cost				
Reimbursement of Rural Works	(254)	(715)	(116)	(1,085)
Local Goods and Services	-	(33)	(23)	(56)
<b>Total</b>	<b>583</b>	<b>986</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>1,786</b>

<sup>a/</sup> Refer to II. C. 7 for budgetary details and narrative explanation of AID-financed inputs.

<sup>b/</sup> FY 76 is a 15-month fiscal year: July 1, 1975 to September 30, 1976

<sup>c/</sup> Refer to Appendix on Engineering Monitoring/Inspection for cost-sharing formula.

3. Appropriation category: Category I, Food and Nutrition.

PART II. PROJECT DESIGN

A. Logical Framework

Program Goals

1. To create and demonstrate a systems capacity within the RDD by 1978 to construct with villager participation up to \$3,000,000 worth of small infrastructure projects per year which will directly benefit the rural poor.
2. To demonstrate the validity and utility of people's participation in local development processes.

Indicators

1. Timely completion of projects which benefit rural people according to standards at an annual rate of \$3,000,000.
2. One beneficiary for every \$20 of investment and by the end of the third year, an accumulated benefit/cost ratio of at least 2:1.
3. Processes of planning, design, construction/monitoring, and inspection of rural works projects.
4. Utilization of facility by local people.

Assumptions

1. The GOA desires villager participation in local development processes to an extent whereby \$3,000,000 worth of projects could be constructed annually.
2. The GOA will assign qualified personnel on a priority basis to RDD.

Project Purposes

1. Construct, on a fixed-cost reimbursement basis, rural works projects which directly benefit the rural poor.
2. Develop and experiment with an integrated rural development program in three districts of three provinces.

Indicators

1. Eighty constructions improving water availability or control to increase the production capability of 30,000 acres of land; 25 bridges constructed and 100 kilometers of roads improved which improve market accessibility; and 200,000 man-days of labor employed at \$0.70 per day for a total estimated cost of \$1,200,000, directly benefiting 85,000 rural people.
2. A comprehensive rural development program functioning in three districts of three provinces with widespread participation of local people, which integrates the mutually reinforcing development activities of rural works, adult education, health delivery, small agro-industries, cooperatives, and the availability of agricultural technology and credit.

---

Assumptions

1. Farmers will use improved water systems effectively.
  2. The local power elite will not frustrate widespread benefit incidence.
  3. Local people will through the petition process and with some guidance, identify beneficial projects.
  4. GOA political and developmental priorities will be supportive of this project's purposes.
- 11

Project Output

1. New and improved RDD capability in planning, construction, and evaluation.

Indicators

1. 8 planning teams (all new).
2. 12 construction teams (4 new teams).
3. 4 evaluation teams (all new).
4. 150 retrained personnel.
5. Economic and social analysis of 80 water resource projects, 25 bridges and 100 kilometers of road improvement and evaluation of 20% of these projects after they are completed.
6. RDD positive or negative response to 70% of petitions received.
7. Designed and GOA approved comprehensive rural development experiment.

Assumptions

1. Newly trained personnel will not be transferred to other departments.

Inputs: See Summary Financial Data Charts: C. 1 and 2 above.

B. Statement of Program Goals

No sector goals have been enunciated by the GOA. National goals of a general nature have been expressed in statements made from time to time by high GOA officials, notably President Daoud. The following quotation, taken from his speech of August 23, 1973, is typical:

"The prime condition for development is the participation of all people in the economic, social and political life of the country."

Such general statements do not infer a planned, cohesive program for national development. No such program exists. Although the GOA developed and adopted a 1974-75 (1353) Annual Plan, it set forth only broad objectives and provided no operational guidelines. Furthermore, the plan was completed after the annual budget had been approved. Although a 1975-76 (1354) plan is being developed, there currently exist only discrete projects and isolated actions which suggest that the present Republican Government, in power since July 1973, is moving slowly and uncertainly to improve the well-being of the rural poor of Afghanistan.

In the absence of a more definitive GOA sector goal and plan it would be presumptuous for the USAID to define a sector goal. This will be done by the GOA, we believe, in the future. For the interim, the program goal of this project is to lay the groundwork for further expansion. This will be done by providing construction funds and very limited technical assistance to the RDD. By providing the funds through fixed-cost reimbursement, the RDD will be provided with an incentive and opportunity to perform well and at a greatly increased rate.

The second goal is to develop the basis for planning a more integrated rural development activity as distinct from discrete small rural works.

Together these developments will provide a step toward a GOA capacity for significantly influencing the rural sector. When this occurs it should become meaningful to address sector level objectives.

C. Project Description

1. Fixed-Cost Reimbursement of Rural Works Projects

During the second quarter of FY 1975, USAID/Afghanistan and the Rural Development Department (RDD) have successfully implemented a \$50,000 Phase I fixed-cost reimbursement project (See Part IV, A. 2., History of the Development of the Project). The purpose of this pilot has been to test the reimbursement method of financing rural works constructions executed by RDD and to assist RDD to improve its methods and capabilities. Phase I has demonstrated the efficiency of the fixed-cost reimbursement method of assistance to RDD and has started RDD on the road to greater capabilities and efficiency. This project proposal is a second stage which builds upon the experience to date. A third stage, which will be larger in scale and more comprehensive in scope, is envisioned for the future probably with loan funding. This loan might or might not come from the U. S.

Under this project proposal (Phase II), USAID will reimburse an agreed 75% fixed cost of each of 80 constructions designed to improve water availability and control, 25 bridges and 100 kilometers of improved farm-to-market roads for a total reimbursement value of \$905,000.

a. Water Systems; Targets and Indicators

Afghanistan has a total area of approximately 260,000 square miles. Of this area an estimated 10 million acres are cultivated, of which six million are irrigated. Large irrigation improvements have been restricted to a few areas and have affected no more than ten percent of the rural population. Most irrigation systems and water control structures are locally constructed and are mainly ad hoc temporary constructions of mud, wood and stone which require annual repair or replacement. In addition to their temporary nature, the structures are inefficient.

The Charikar Intake on the Ghorband River in Parwan Province is a good example of this type of structure. For at least 50 years, small farmers annually have built and rebuilt this intake with brush and riverbed rock to carry water to about 5,000 acres of

grape vineyards. Every spring the melting snow pack of the Hindu Kush turns the Chorband River into a raging torrent and the structure is destroyed. Moreover, the structure is inefficient because approximately two cubic meters of water per second are required for efficient irrigation of this amount of land and even when rebuilt, the temporary structure typically carries considerably less than two cubic meters per second.

The RDD has replaced this temporary structure by a permanent intake (cost \$5,000) which will not wash out during the spring and which can sustain the amount of water required.

Other examples of water resource projects include small siphons and flumes to carry irrigation water over river or stream beds or washes and erosion control and flood protection structures at an average cost of \$5,000 - \$8,000. See Appendix V. F. for illustrative photographs.

By improving water availability and control for small farmers through such permanent structures, it is estimated that average production may increase from 5 - 10%. Further, there will be some construction activities which will bring water to land presently dry-farmed or to land not under cultivation. In these cases, production increases will be substantially greater.

The RDD presently has designs completed for over 100 of these small water resource constructions which have been requested by local people (See Appendix V. D.). Further requests for similar projects continue to come to RDD. RDD and USAID will jointly decide which constructions will be reimbursed under this project. A full description of criteria is found in Part III A. 2. below. An estimated average of 375 acres will be significantly affected by each construction. Small farm size varies from region to region, but an average size of eight acres per farm family can be estimated. An average family of 9.5 people live on every eight acres. Therefore, each project will benefit slightly fewer than 450 people and for 80 projects direct benefits will accrue to roughly 35,000 people.

b. Transportation Systems; Targets and Indicators

Transportation systems projects include bridges and roads. A target of 25 vehicle or pedestrian bridges and 100

kilometers (62 miles) of farm-to-market road improvement has been established. Bridges usually made of stone and concrete construction are modest in size with an average estimated cost of \$14,000 each. Road improvement specifications will be 15 cm gravel surfacing, five meters width with drainage ditches on either side. An average of two culverts per kilometer will also be required. The average cost per kilometer is estimated to be \$2,000.

In Afghanistan, thousands of villages huddle in linear box valleys that abound throughout the country. The spatial relationships of villages to market towns is strictly determined by the geography (see Appendix II: Story of a Bridge). Transportation infrastructure is a mandatory pre-condition to economic and social development, because most of these villages are only tenuously connected to market towns by roads or trails which are impassable from three to five months each year. Even when the roads are passable, their soft, rutted and frequently washed out surfaces make movement of farm products slow and expensive. Further, dismal road conditions inhibit the outreach of technology and services from market towns to isolated valley villages.

By constructing bridges and improving roads in strategically important locations, small farmers will have cheaper and faster access to markets thereby increasing both their absolute and relative share of farm income.

The RDD has 50 bridges designed for construction which have been requested by local people. There are thousands of kilometers of improved roads needed (See Appendix V. C., E: Kilometers of Roads by Province Requiring Improvement; List of Bridges Designed).

It is estimated that at least 50,000 people will receive significant benefits from the construction of 25 bridges and 100 kilometers of road improvement. The number of convenience users will be several magnitudes larger.

RDD and USAID will jointly determine which bridges and roads will be considered for reimbursement under this project.

16

As a side benefit of this project, an estimated 200,000 man-days of unskilled labor will be employed for road construction. This is based on an optimum condition where one man can level, gravel and dig drainage ditches for .5 running meters of roadway per day. This will mean approximately 5,000 laborers will work for 40 days earning \$0.70 per day or \$28 each (40 afghanis per day; 56 afghanis = \$1).

Another secondary but meaningful benefit is that construction of rural works projects which benefit the rural poor may contribute to strengthening linkages between the Government and local people. Afghanistan is a dual society with the rural people separated from participation in national growth. And, the Central Government, though attempting benevolence, is separated from the rural poor by tradition, attitudes and even language (See Appendix I: Building a Nation: An Historical Perspective; Appendix III: Story of a Petition; Part IV. D: Social Analysis; Political and Social Linkages; Appendix IV: Power, the Family and Local Politics). By and large, Government resources have been unresponsive to the felt needs of local people. Every construction under this project will have been requested by rural people and every project will provide immediate and direct benefits to rural people and every project completed will be tangible evidence of the Government's concern for the rural poor. Therefore, this project contributes to stronger linkages.

The achievement of these targets will be verified through the work of eight RDD Planning and four Evaluation Teams of two persons each. A Planning Team will gather economic and social data on each project by two to three-week site visitation and analyze the probable quality and quantity of benefits to accrue. The Team will identify the anticipated beneficiaries.

Not less than 20 percent of the projects completed will be evaluated six - 12 months after completion by one of the four Evaluation Teams. The Evaluation Teams will spend four to six weeks at the site and, using the Planning Team data, estimate the actual benefits and beneficiaries of the project.

The Planning and Evaluation Reports will further verify the extent of local participation in a project by comparing the original petition request to the actual desire for the project reflected during their visitations.

## 2. Integrated Rural Development Experiments

The second purpose of this project proposal is to develop and start experimentation with an integrated rural development pilot program for three districts of three provinces, the goal of which would be to raise family income five - ten percent over a three-year period and strengthen linkages between the local people and GOA. The Rural Development Department is responsible for more than rural works. The new charter for RDD enlarges its scope of activities to include cooperatives, small industries, education, health and rural works. (See Appendix V. B: RDD Charter) Further, the Prime Ministry has directed RDD to begin comprehensive rural development in Badakshan Province and the Katawaz district of Ghazni Province. This charter provides an opportunity for moving deliberately toward a greater integration of the several rural development efforts we are supporting.

It was President of State Mohammed Daoud Khan who, while Prime Minister 20 years ago, began the Rural Development Department. His concept then was for comprehensive rural development activities with a high degree of local participation. And, it was Daoud -- now as Chief of State and Prime Minister -- who in May 1974 reinstated these same concepts with Cabinet approval of the new charter.

However, it is our judgment that to do more than begin to experiment with comprehensive rural development is presently premature. As background for this judgment, the following experiences are cited. RDD has sent survey teams to both Badakshan and Katawaz. The Badakshan team was composed of an UN expert, the RDD Chief of Engineering and two other Afghan technicians. The Katawaz team was led by the UN team leader and two Afghan technicians. After seven days, the UN expert returned to Kabul from Badakshan with a superficial report listing various things the Governor wanted to do. Six weeks later, the Afghan members of the team returned with a 75-page report which has not yet been released by the Prime Ministry. The Katawaz team returned after four days with a windshield survey report which could have been written in Kabul and is wholly inadequate.

Further, though the new organizational chart (see Appendix V. A: RDD Organization) reflects comprehensive rural development, RDD has no qualified personnel to fill the various offices except for engineering. And, we do not anticipate in the near term that RDD

will be assigned personnel from other Ministries to fill its needs.

Therefore, we conclude that it is premature to initiate a comprehensive and integrated rural development program. (See Part IV. A. 1: History and Analysis of RDD.) At the same time, it is not premature to initiate the design of such a program and begin experimentation by 1976.

There would be three phases to the experiment: Phase I, Situation Survey and Site Selection; Phase II, Experiment Design; Phase III, Implementation. Phases I and II will take an estimated 12 - 15 months.

a. Phase I: Situation Survey and Site Selection

The GOA will identify six districts of six different provinces, probably in different areas of the country, in which they would like to experiment with integrated rural development. Three of the eight Planning Teams, with the assistance of the USAID Team Analyst (see Input) would spend three to four weeks in each of the districts (two each) identified and gather general baseline data on the physical, social, and economic situation prevailing. The specific type and quantities of information required would be carefully determined prior to their visit and each team would be trained in a methodology of data collection.

This data would then be analyzed by RDD and USAID and priorities established for the three districts in which the experiment might most effectively be implemented. Criteria for this judgment would include present agricultural production, potential for diversification, number of small farmers and landless laborers to benefit, market potentials, the extent of technology improvement possible, and the attitude of local people toward participation in the experiment.

The data, analysis and conclusions regarding the six districts would be presented to the Prime Ministry with recommendations and the Prime Ministry would be responsible for selecting three districts.

b. Phase II: Experiment Design

After the selection of the three districts, the three planning teams would be assigned to a district for an eight to 10-week follow-up visit to further refine and gather new data with emphasis upon local participation in the process. Targets for each district would be determined with local people, RDD, and USAID and approved by the Prime Ministry which would lead to a five - 10 percent increase in income for a substantial number of the people of the district. A course of action would be formulated, resources identified, and an experiment design drafted for approval by local people and the Prime Ministry.

c. Phase II: Implementation

Finally, the experiment would be implemented by the allocation of resources and initiation of work. Previously identified ~~targets would be~~ addressed which will include rural works, adult education, health delivery, small industrial development and cooperatives.

USAID inputs will include technical assistance by the Team Leader and Analyst and as much as \$60,000 for fixed-cost reimbursement and possible other assistance for each district.

3. Assumptions

There are four major assumptions to achieve the two purposes of this project.

a. "Farmers will use improved water systems effectively." The single, most common complaint of farmers throughout Afghanistan is that they do not have enough water. And, when in fact they do have enough, they normally use too much, or are wasteful in allocation. For instance, if a temporary river intake is replaced by a permanent concrete structure, the juie (canal) will receive greater amounts of water and the flow will usually be more constant. If farmers fail to apportion the regularized increased supply properly, or if they make no use of the water during times when previously it was not available, production will not be positively affected.

b. "The local power elite will not frustrate widespread benefit incidence." In Afghanistan where there are weak links

between Government and rural people and where traditional power structures at the local level prevail, there is ample precedent for vested interests to maintain the status quo by excluding local people from developmental activities.


c. "Local people will, through the petition process and with some guidance, identify beneficial projects." Normally in Afghanistan, development project planning is done at Central Government levels and local people are not involved. With the exception of RDD processes which respond to local petitions, there is scant tradition for local involvement. Further, it is understandable that illiterate, subsistence farmers may not perceive their actual needs in a form conducive to development.

d. "GOA political and developmental priorities will be supportive of this project's purposes."

#### 4. RDD Organization Analysis

The official organizational chart of RDD (as shown in Appendix V. A) is an adaptation of a former organizational make-up designed in September 1973 for a regional, as distinct from a provincial, approach to comprehensive rural development. It now is adapted to a provincial approach. The formal organizational chart makes provisions for the broad responsibilities given under the RDD charter. However, many of these functions exist only on paper.

The actual organization is shown in the following chart:



Provincial offices exist in 23 of the 26 provinces (excluding Helmand, where the Helmand Arghandab Valley Authority is established; Paktia, where the German-assisted Paktia Development Authority operates; and Nangrahar, where the Russians have a development project). In each province there is a RDD Director with a staff of 10.

#### 5. Present RDD Capabilities

The current President of RDD has been with the Department for seven years and was appointed as acting President 15 months ago. He is a graduate of the Engineering Faculty, Kabul University, and holds an M.A. degree from the University of Tennessee (Fulbright Scholarship). There are 17 engineers attached to the Department of whom five are abroad on study fellowships. There are approximately 150 technicians, mainly graduates of the Afghan Institute of Technology (A. I. T.) which is a 12th-class vocational school.

There are in addition approximately 400 other personnel in Kabul and in provincial offices who are nonprofessionals. There are five UN civil engineers and two mechanical engineers and two German Volunteer Service construction volunteers assigned to RDD.

The Department as yet has no agriculturists, economists, sociologists, cooperative or small industry experts, and no qualified staff in the health or education fields. The staff is oriented to rural works design and construction engineering. Before the Spring of 1973, the central staff was employed primarily in project survey and design, with construction responsibilities given to Rural Development Directors in the provinces. Few if any of the designed projects were executed since local directors were without technical qualifications. In the Spring of 1973 the system was changed by organizing construction teams, each headed by an engineer. In addition to the engineer, the team's staff includes an administrative officer, two technicians, two steel workers for splicing steel bar for concrete slab work, a technical supervisor, and drivers and helpers for one jeep and two or more trucks. Local force account labor was usually conscripted or was available on a voluntary basis.

This gave the Department greater potential capacity, but the construction teams still functioned in limited ways completing only five projects in a year. RDD leadership changed twice and there was general lack of activity for months after the coup in July 1973.

For roughly four years (1970-74), excluding the activity during the drought emergency program, many engineering design drawings were drafted, but few executed. Under the impetus of the USAID \$50,000 pilot effort, in August 1974, eight construction teams began to function and by December 1974, they had completed 15 projects. Though the increase in the level of activity has been partly due to the USAID/RDD \$50,000 pilot project, it is also the case that GOA leadership has been more effectively mobilizing its own resources.

Currently, each construction team can complete an average of one project in approximately three months. The teams have been executing projects previously requested and designed during the years of construction inactivity. For this reason, the Department's current design, selection and evaluation capability has not been tested.

Economic and social data on these designed projects, though inaccurate, has been obtained previously and technical survey work has been completed. (Appendix V. D, E is a list of 114 water resource and 47 bridge designs that await construction.)

To do projects at a rate described in this proposal, 12 construction teams and eight planning teams will be required.

In sum, RDD has the capability to do technical surveys and to design and construct rural works projects. It has little capability to plan by gathering economic and social data, no internal training capability, and is without provision for evaluation. Its capability to design and construct projects has limitations (see Part IV. F: Technical Analysis) and it has no present staff to execute farm-to-market road improvement programs.

Therefore, a proposed output of this project is to establish capabilities in planning (economic and social data gathering and analysis), evaluation, training, and road improvement construction; and, to improve the quality of engineering designs and project construction. Establishment of planning capability will be the precondition for designing and implementing the experimental comprehensive program.

## 6. Implementation

a. Planning. As a result of the Food-for-Work Program during and following the 1970-71 drought, RDD organized and used about seven small teams of two - four persons each who met with the Governor to determine his project priorities. In some cases these teams visited project sites and estimated the extent of benefits which might result from the particular project. This information was collated in Kabul giving lists of projects by name, location,

and number of people to be affected. This approach made possible a degree of systemization in selecting relatively good projects and permitted responses to locally perceived priorities. This project will build upon this precedent.

Specifically, the President of RDD will appoint 16 staff members to an Office of Planning which will be part of the Technical Directorate. They must be at least graduates of Kabul University, and, hopefully, from the Faculty of Economics. The 16 will be divided into eight teams reporting to the Technical Director. The U.S. contractor, the Team Analyst, will work directly with these six teams. He will assist them in designing forms for economic and social data collection and train them in techniques of collection and analysis. Each project to be considered for reimbursement will be visited and analyzed by one of the teams. Their analytical report will be submitted to the President of RDD and be part of the information he will use in deciding whether or not to execute the project and whether or not the project should be considered for reimbursement.

In addition to collecting and analyzing economic and social data, the Team Analyst and selected members of the eight teams will be responsible for designing the experimental comprehensive program for three districts of three provinces which will be ready for implementation by Fall 1976. Additionally, this experiment may initiate the functioning of the Directorate of Programming (Appendix V. A: Organizational Chart).

b. Evaluation. Four teams with two members on each will be established for project evaluation. These teams will be trained in the same basic skills as the Planning Teams and evaluate not less than 20 percent of projects from six to 12 months after completion. Using the data originally collected by the Planning Teams, and eight to 10-week site visit, they will analyze the actual benefits derived by particular projects. Their work will be the basis for improving project planning.

c. Training. The U.S. contractor, the Project Team Leader, will assist the President of RDD in designing and implementing in-service training courses and coordinating out-of-country training for RDD staff in administration. Administrative training for four accountants and four administration personnel will be done in Tehran. All other training will be done on an in-service basis.

25

In-service training will focus upon three components of RDD in addition to economic and social data collection and analysis: the construction teams, road improvement teams, and the design office. The goal of this training will be to upgrade the quality of work of the construction teams and design office and to establish quality road improvement capability within RDD.

Construction teams. Training will concentrate upon the Administrative Officer, two technicians and the technical supervisor. The Administrative Office will be trained in keeping project records (labor, materials, transportation requirements, actual costs) and how to manage project logistical requirements. The two technicians and technical supervisor will be trained first in appropriate construction standards and how to effect these standards in the field, and, second, in basic mathematics and measurement.

Road Improvement Teams. These teams do not exist at present. However, they will be organized from on-board A. I. T. personnel in five teams of 10 each. Each team will have two trucks and two jeeps with drivers. Each team will have a team leader, administrative officer and eight road improvement supervisors. All personnel will be trained in techniques and standards for road improvement and in keeping labor attendance records. The Administrative Officer will be trained in techniques and controls for labor payment.

Design Office. Personnel (technicians and engineers) will be trained in office engineering, with concentration upon drawing preparation, specifications writing, material take off, and cost estimation procedures.

A director of the Office of Training will be appointed by April 1975. His staff will include two mathematics teachers, two experienced construction supervisors, and an experienced administrator. Other personnel will be assigned on a part-time basis to meet particular course requirements.

With the Director of the Training Office, the U. S. contract Team Leader and UN Team Leader will design specific training courses to meet the above requirements. Training courses will be held on a continuing basis all year for approximately three weeks each, beginning in April 1975. No more than 20 participants

26

will be in a course at the same time. Training completion certificates will be awarded to those satisfactorily completing a course, and special commendation certificates will be awarded outstanding participants.

7. Project Inputs

a. Government of Afghanistan

(1) Budget. The 1353 (1974-75) budget of RDD is 60 million afghanis (approximately \$ 1 million). It will be increased during 1354 and 1355 to afs 100 million annually (approximately \$ 1.8 million) to cover increased personnel, construction materials and equipment required.

(2) Personnel. At present, there are no trained personnel available for planning, evaluation, and road improvement. There are 17 qualified engineers. The GOA will assign 16 personnel for planning, eight for evaluation, 50 for road improvement construction, and 10 new engineers will be appointed to the Department.

RDD requires additional equipment for the execution of this project, including 20 dump trucks for road improvement construction, six trailer-hauled mobile cement mixers, and six vibrators (one for each two construction teams), four compressors (dynamiting for road improvement) and 20 transits (one for each construction and road improvement team and three for design office personnel).

RDD will secure this additional equipment from its own resources, and depreciation will be included in cost estimations for particular projects.

b. USAID

(1) Personnel Services. In FY 1975 the Mission financed two personal services contracts for the Rural Development Advisor and Assistant from the USAID Operating Expense Budget. The inclusive cost of these services will be \$100,000 through November, 1975. The purpose for which these contractors were employed included providing advisory service to the RDD during the implementation of the FY 1974-financed \$50,000 pilot project and assisting with the planning of this

21

"Phase II" project. Since the cost of these services is directly attributable to the project proposed in this paper and since the advisory services will span the period when the direct-hire Project Manager and new contract team are mobilized for this project, the financing will be shifted from the Mission's Operating Expense Budget to the Project upon the AID/W approval of the project.

The direct-hire Project Manager-Rural Development will be responsible for the overall monitoring of the implementation of this project. The incumbent will be on-board not later than July 1, 1975 and will remain until the end of FY 1977. The officer will be responsible to the Multi-Sector Officer, Chief of the Public Administration and Rural Development Division. The Project Manager will supervise the work of the contract Team Leader and Analyst (discussed below) and coordinate the work of contractor for engineering monitoring and inspection with the Mission's Capital Development and Engineering Division (see also Appendix VI.). The Mission will finance the services of the direct-hire Project Manager for a total of 27 man-months.

The U. S. contract personnel for this project (Team Leader and Analyst) will be recruited either directly by the Mission on Personal Services Contracts or through a Mission contract with a U. S. "intermediary" (for example, the Trans Century Corporation) contractor. The Mission does not propose to employ an "institutional" contractor for the reasons that home office overhead and supervision is not required and the Mission and RDD need to be directly assured of the experience of the personnel and, in particular, their fluency in Dari. The two contract personnel will work primarily in the offices of RDD under the authority of the RDD President. Liaison with the direct-hire Project Manager will be the responsibility of the Team Leader. The Team Leader will work as the general advisor to the President of RDD on all operational matters, design and implement in-service and on-the-job training, and coordinate participant training. The bare minimum language requirement is an FSI 2+ rating in Dari; knowledge of Pashtu is also desirable. The Analyst will design and help RDD implement systems for sociological and economic planning and evaluation in RDD as they relate to the identification and implementation of rural works projects jointly agreed by USAID and RDD. He will train 24 RDD staff in techniques of socio-economic data collection, analyses and interpretation. He will also provide advisory assistance to the work of the eight planning and four evaluation teams

and be immediately responsible for the design of the experimental, comprehensive programs in three districts of three provinces. Again, the bare minimum language requirement is an FSI 2+ rating in Dari and knowledge of Pashtu is desirable.

The least cost method of securing the above services is by Personal Services Contracts. Several qualified candidates with substantial experience in Afghanistan and language fluency are available. However, for the purpose of this paper we have calculated the cost on the basis of using an "intermediary," though the total cost would be higher than for the aforementioned PSC's. In FY 1975 the first 15 months of contract services would be obligated. The Mission's expectation is that the two contract personnel would be on-board not later than July 1, 1975. The total length of service under the contract would be 27 man-months for each contractor, with 12 man-months for each financed in FY 1976.

The final element of personnel services is a third-country contract with an engineering firm for projects' monitoring and inspection. Since the Mission is proposing three rural area projects at one time (i. e., Basic Health Services and Rural Primary Schools in addition to Rural Works) which involve construction, it is proposed to share the cost of monitoring and inspection of fixed-cost reimbursed projects under one contract. The details of the man-year requirements and cost sharing formula are presented in Appendix VI. As shown in the table at the end of this section, FY 1975 will be the initial year of obligation for monitoring/inspection services to be provided in FY 1976.

(2) Participant Training. Eight RDD staff will be trained in Iran in accounting and administration in short courses designed to meet RDD's needs. The estimated cost of the eight programs is \$2,500 for each program of six man-months. Four staff will be sent in FY 1976 and four in FY 1977.

Fourteen local Rural Development Directors and 12 local government officials will visit third countries to observe rural development programs and local government operations. Their visits will normally be for a period of four weeks and will include two countries. The estimated cost for this observational study is \$21,000 in FY 1976 and \$18,000 in FY 1977.

(3) Other Costs. The fixed-cost reimbursement method of financing will be used to finance 75 percent of agreed estimated costs of each jointly agreed construction project. \$1,085,000 will be committed by USAID calculated on an average of \$6,000 reimbursement for agriculturally related projects, \$11,000 average for each bridge, and \$1,500 per kilometer of improved roads. In addition, it is estimated that \$60,000 will be required for agreed project activity for each of the three districts under the experimental program. FY 1975 obligations shown on the following table are primarily for the reimbursement of projects which will be initiated and completed in FY 1976. FY 1976 obligations include an estimated \$180,000 for the three experimental district programs. (See also the implementation schedule, Part III. A.)

Local personnel costs include the services of an Afghan sociologist employed by the Mission on a Personal Services Contract (\$6,818 in FY 1976 and \$5,740 in FY 1977) and an Administrative Assistant hired on contract for the aforementioned contract team (\$7,575 in FY 1976 and \$6,380 in FY 1977). Local Support costs for contract and direct-hire personnel, including per diem for in-country travel, will be \$18,000 in FY 1976 and \$11,000 in FY 1977.

4. USAID Input Schedule - By Fiscal Year Obligation (in \$US 000)

<u>Component</u>	<u>FY 75</u> (mm) \$	<u>FY 76</u> <sup>a/</sup> (mm) \$	<u>FY 77</u> (mm) \$	<u>Total</u> (mm) \$
<u>Personnel</u>				
Direct-Hire Project				
Manager	-	(15)	(12)	(27)
Personal Services				
Contracts: <sup>b/</sup>				
RD Advisor	(15)	-	-	(15)
Asst. RD Advisor	(12)	-	-	(12)
U. S. Intermediary				
Contract:				
Team Leader	(15)	(12)	-	(27)
Analyst	(15)	(12)	-	(27)

<u>Component</u>	<u>FY 75</u>		<u>FY 76<sup>a/</sup></u>		<u>FY 77</u>		<u>Total</u>	
3rd Country Engineering Monitoring/ Inspection	(40)	107	(17)	46	-	-	(57)	153
Sub-Total	(97)	329	(56)	207	(12)	50	(165)	536
<u>Participant Training</u>								
3rd Country Short-Term	-	-	(24)	10	(24)	10	(48)	20
3rd Country Observation	-	-	(14)	21	(12)	18	(26)	39
Sub-Total	-	-	(38)	31	(36)	28	(74)	59
<u>Other Costs</u>								
Fixed-Cost Reimbursement		254		715		116		1,085
Local Support Costs for Direct-Hire Contract				18		11		29
Local Personnel: Afghan Sociologist			(15)	7	(12)	6	(27)	13
Contract Administrative Assistant			(15)	8	(12)	6	(27)	14
Sub-Total		254		748		139		1,141
TOTAL		583		986		217		1,786

<sup>a/</sup> FY 1976 is a fifteen-month fiscal year.

D. Rationale for the Project

Until recently, relatively little attention has been given by the GOA to improving the basic infrastructure currently in use in the rural areas of Afghanistan. Consequently, most such infrastructure, as it exists, is a product of village self-help. Because of limited capital, poor engineering capacity and the difficulty of marshaling and organizing village capability for any but the most short-term stopgap measures, most village infrastructure is ad hoc, only seasonally adequate or perhaps with a lifetime of only one season. In any case it seldom allows full efficiency even in the best of circumstances. Bridges wash out each year. Irrigation diversion dams may have to be replaced one or more times each season. Roads are closed much of the year. While short-term investments for ad hoc repairs may be rather small, cumulative maintenance costs tend to be rather high and losses of production and marketing opportunities are often significant because of inefficiencies and breakdowns. The mass of the rural people have made little or no direct contribution to the Government's past development effort. And they have received few if any benefits. The Government is now attempting to change this situation and to this end it has established the Rural Development Department (RDD).

It is noted in the Annual Development Plan for 1353 (1974-75) that "The aim of the community development policy in its final phase is the creation of a sound and desirable economic structure in the villages of Afghanistan . . . . The motive behind such a policy is the establishment of social justice and the development of the real elements of the economy of Afghanistan."

The attempt of the GOA to bring the rural people into the mainstream of the development effort coincides with the new amended U.S. foreign assistance legislation which directs that AID allocate its resources to directly benefit the rural poor.

This project is the second step toward an expanded USAID effort to assist the GOA's rural development efforts. Rural development is not only rural works. For sustained economic growth of rural areas, a more comprehensive project will be necessary. However, in view of the Government's limitation on proceeding with a large-scale, comprehensive rural development program, this project builds on the FY 1974 pilot project and is designed as a springboard to enlarged

efforts in the future. It is consistent with the GOA's intent and available resources and with the mandate of the new legislation.

E. Significance of the Project

The RDD has been engaged in rural works projects exclusively since 1970. Excluding those projects done under the emergency Food-for-Work program without RDD control and supervision, between July 1970 and September 1974 approximately 32 beneficial construction projects were completed. This project intends a six-fold increase, to complete 105 construction projects plus 100 kilometers of improved roads during a two-year period.

Further, this project intends to improve RDD capabilities to such an extent that it will be able to sustain this momentum and enlarge its scope and quality of work to benefit the rural poor. It is a second phase of the pilot \$50,000 project and will act as a building block to a larger and more comprehensive program.

PART III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION PLANS

A. Implementation Schedule

(See following 4-page chart.)

Targets	Date of Project Approval (DOPA)
Rural Works Constructions: Water resource structures	NA
Bridges	NA
Road improvement (km)	NA
<u>Beneficiaries. Numbers apply to water projects. (Bridges/roads Cumulative total 50,000)</u>	
Fixed Cost Reimbursement (\$000) Exp.	NA
RDD Functions: Training	RDD Director/Staff appointed; courses designed for road improvement, construction teams, office design
Planning	8 personnel assigned
Evaluation	4 personnel assigned
Construction Teams	8 teams functioning
Road Improvement Teams	20 personnel assigned
USAID Personnel	Existing PSC/RDD advisors
Participant Training; observational Study	NA
Equipment	Purchasing process identified
Integrated rural experiment	Agreement in principle on basic course of action between GOA/USAID
Progress reports and evaluation	NA

DOPA + 3 mos.	DOPA + 6 mos.	DOPA + 9 mos.
4 Water projects	8	12
2 Bridges	2	4
0 Roads (km)	5	10
1800 Beneficiaries	3600	5400
\$ 46 Expended	77.5	131
Courses completed: 2 for road improvement, 1 for construction team, 1 for design.	Courses completed: 2 for road improvement, 1 for construction teams.	Courses completed: 2 for construction team, 1 for design. Courses redesigned.
8 personnel trained; 4 teams functioning. 6 projects analyzed. 8 new personnel assigned.	8 personnel trained, 8 teams functioning, 12 projects analyzed.	18 projects analyzed Retraining
4 personnel trained, 2 teams functioning, 2 projects evaluated, 4 new personnel assigned.	4 teams functioning 4 projects evaluated	6 projects evaluated Retraining
10 Teams functioning	12 Teams functioning	do
2 teams functioning, 30 new personnel assigned.	5 Teams functioning	do
Existing PSC/RDD advisors ETA: Project Mgr, Team Leader, Analyst, Admin Ass't.	Existing PSC/RDD advisors Project Mgr, Team Leader, Analyst, Admin Ass't functioning	ETD PSC advisors
NA	NA	4 part. trg. Tehran (admin)
Equipment Ordered GOA identification of 6 districts 3 planning teams assigned 2 districts each for data collection teams trained in data collection.	ETA 50% Equipment 3 Teams complete preliminary analysis of 6 districts	ETA 100% Equipment Analysis of 6 districts; 3 recommended to Prime Ministry for approval.
1st progress report.	2nd progress report	3rd progress report USAID evaluation.

DOPA + 12 mos.	DOPA + 15 mos.	DOPA + 18 mos.
12 Water projects	10	12
4 Bridges	3	3
15 km Roads	15	20
5,400 Beneficiaries	4,500	5,400
\$ 138.5 Expended	115.5	135
Courses completed: 2 for construction teams, 1 design.	Courses completed: 2 for construction teams. Courses redesigned.	Courses completed as required.
do	do	do
14 observation study	4 part. trg. Tehran (admin)	12 observation study
All Equipment in use	do	do
3 districts approved for experiment. Follow- up teams visits to districts	Analysis of follow-up data collection; experiment design completed. Approval by Prime Ministry.	Experiment begins
4th progress report	5th progress report	6th progress report USAID evaluation/future recommendations

DOPA + 21 mos.	DOPA + 24 mos.	TOTALS
12 Water projects	10	80
4 Bridges	3	25
20 km Road	15	100
5,200 Beneficiaries	4,500	36,000 for water projects 50,000 bridges/roads = 86,000
\$ 236 Expended	205.5	1,085
do	do	Training Office in full operation for inservice training on continuing basis
do	do	8 planning teams trained and in full operation.
do	do	4 evaluation teams trained and in full operation.
do	do	12 construction teams trained and in full operation.
do	do	5 road improvement teams trained and in full operation.
do	do	NA
NA	NA	8 part. trg. Admin; 26 obs. study
do	do	NA
50% of \$180,000 expended in experiment's operation.	50% of \$180,000 expended in experiment operation.	Experiment outputs achieved.
7th progress report	final report by USAID	NA

**B. Fixed-Cost Reimbursement (FCR)**

See Appendix in V.G for USAID/A guidelines for FCR procedures. Under this guidance plus the six-month experience with the pilot \$50,000, the following FCR procedures will be used in this project.

First, the RDD and USAID will jointly determine which rural works projects will be considered for reimbursement under this project. The criteria for consideration will be the following.

1. The project will contribute to production increase or crop diversification. The paucity of available and accurate statistical data makes quantification of this criterion difficult, but through the work of the 8 planning teams, enough information can be obtained to make this criterion applicable.

2. The project has been identified and requested by local participatory processes which have included the small farmer. No project will be considered unless the poor have been included in the decision processes, whether by formal and official participation or through informal and unofficial processes.

3. A major share of the benefits will accrue to the rural poor. This is not to exclude a wealthy farmer. In some cases, a Khan may benefit enormously, but so must his tenants and small farmers.

4. The project will create employment directly or indirectly. It must not diminish job opportunities.

5. The project must be technically feasible, meeting agreed design standards.

6. The project must be outside the municipal limits of a provincial capital.

Second, after a project has been jointly identified for consideration, RDD will prepare an estimate of the costs and submit this estimate to USAID for approval. The estimate will include costs for local materials, manufactured materials, construction equipment, transportation, labor, planning, construction supervision, inspection and miscellaneous. It will also include 15 percent administrative overhead on personnel costs and voluntary contributions or equivalent costs. The total agreed estimated cost will then be established. From this total, overhead and voluntarily contributed equivalent costs will be deducted. USAID will agree to pay

75 percent of this final total. The 75 percent figure will be the fixed amount for reimbursement upon successful completion of the project. Payment shall be made by U.S. dollar check based upon the free market exchange buying rate for U.S. dollar checks as recorded by the Da Afghanistan Bank on the date the Director of USAID signs the estimation agreement.

C. Progress Reporting Systems

There will be four progress reporting systems:

1. Team members will report daily and weekly on an unofficial, oral basis to the Team Leader. These reports will cover accomplishments, problems, future activities and other developments of which the Team Leader should be aware. In addition, team members will prepare written reports of their activities for the Team Leader on at least a bi-monthly basis.

2. Every eight weeks, the Team Leader and the President, RDD, will prepare joint progress status reports to the Deputy Prime Minister and other appropriate GOA and USAID officials. These reports will be prepared in English and Dari. They will include the number and identification of projects certified for reimbursement, the number for which estimates have been agreed to for reimbursement and the number of those projects under consideration. In each case, they will describe the project, including benefit incidence, and provide an estimated completion date. These reports will also identify problems and recommend solutions. Finally, these reports will provide data on the exact amounts of reimbursement expenditures and new obligations.

3. The Project Manager will prepare a monthly, written report to the Chief of PARD. This report will be in the following format: 1) Significant activities; 2) Pending issues or problems; 3) Decisions and activities needed and by whom; and 4) Any other items of interest.

4. The Chief, PARD will prepare a monthly, written report to the Director, USAID, summarizing the information reported to him by the Project Manager and adding any relevant information of a more general nature which he feels is of significance.

In addition, the USAID Engineer and monitoring officials will prepare reports of special problems or significant activities within their area of interest from time to time. These reports will be addressed to the Team Leader and President of RDD, as well as appropriate USAID officials.

#### D. The Evaluation Plan

A certificate of technical adequacy of completed rural works considered for reimbursement by the USAID must be issued by the USAID Engineer prior to approval of reimbursement.

An evaluation of the social and economic effects of not less than 20 percent of reimbursed projects will be made by the RDD Evaluation Teams six to 12 months after project reimbursement. This evaluation will include such elements as number and kind of people benefited, nature and amount of benefits, social effects and use made of any increased income resulting from the project. These evaluations will be made with the assistance of the USAID team and will be compared with the anticipated benefits recorded during the planning process. The results of this process will be used in the development of criteria governing reimbursement of future projects.

At nine and 18 months after project initiation, evaluations of the project will be conducted by the USAID.

This will provide two overall evaluations of the project during its existence. These evaluations will be conducted in accordance with standard AID evaluation methodology and their results will be fed back into project design and implementation to the extent necessary. The 18-month evaluation will provide an overall evaluation of the project and recommendations for any future assistance in this area. A final report will be written by the end of the 24th month.

Finally, project progress reports will be prepared quarterly by the Project Manager and the President of RDD to the Deputy Prime Minister and the Director of the USAID. These reports will be primarily concerned with the degree to which RDD capabilities have been improved and additional measures needed, if any, to reach project objectives.

PART IV. PROJECT ANALYSIS

A. Background

1. History and Analysis of RDD

For 20 years there has been a Rural Development Department (RDD), or its equivalent. Initially, under Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan (1953), the RDD was established in the Ministry of Interior to engage in comprehensive community development activities. Due to the absence of management, technical skills and an adequate budget, it floundered ineffectively until 1970 when its scope was limited to rural works.

In the fall of 1971, the Department was moved into the Prime Ministry and became the agency through which emergency food relief was given to victims of two successive years of drought through a Food-For-Work program. Thousands of projects were completed through Provincial Government leadership and planning, though many were technically unsound. Often the projects provided scant economic benefit to local people, though many hungry people received food.

The Food-For-Work program of the RDD stimulated a momentum of rural works activity throughout the country. When it was terminated in December 1972, a group of five persons were appointed by the Prime Ministry to design a new RDD program to exploit the momentum and to overcome the deficiencies. A new program was designed and submitted to the Prime Ministry. At the same time a new Prime Minister and Cabinet were appointed and shortly thereafter a new President of RDD was assigned. However, the newly designed program, with some modifications, was approved by the Cabinet on July 16, 1973. The coup d'etat occurred the following morning so the new program was never implemented.

President Mohammed Daoud Khan again took control of the Government in July 1973 and the RDD was again given a mandate to do comprehensive rural development. In May 1974, a new charter (Appendix V-B) for the RDD was approved by the Cabinet, with four basic elements:

- a. A High Council for Rural Development composed of the Ministers of Education, Health, Public Works, Mines and Industries, and Planning; the President of State as Chairman, and President of RDD as Secretary. This High Council is to establish RDD policy.

b. A Council of Presidents, comprised of the Presidents of relevant ministerial departments with the President of RDD as Chairman. This Council is to coordinate all operational matters.

c. A provincial Rural Development Council in each province with the Governor as Chairman, the local RDD Director as Secretary, and representatives of line ministries, sub-governors and representatives of local people as members. The Provincial Rural Development Council will solicit projects desired by local people.

d. The RDD will be responsible for rural development activities including health, sanitation, education, small industrial development, cooperatives and rural works.

The Charter has established the Government's apparent intent to engage in rural development activities, but exists only on paper. It has not been implemented and it is unlikely that it will be implemented for several years for the following reasons: 1) Due to management and planning deficiencies, coordination within the High Council and Council of Presidents is impossible on more than an ad hoc basis; 2) There is ample precedent for tribal and local loyalties being inconsistent with Government leadership. At this time the Government sees councils with power to determine local needs as a decentralization of power which may be premature; 3) RDD has neither the manpower nor the experience to be involved with any activity other than rural works, and 4) Local councils probably would generate more work than RDD could handle.

In terms of the new U. S. assistance legislation and AID's renewed interest in integrated rural development, we may find such apparent reasoning unfortunate or mistaken. However, for at least the next two years it will probably apply.

The Rural Development Department of the Prime Ministry is headed by a President (e.g. one rank below Deputy Minister). The President reports directly to the Deputy Prime Minister. Bureaucratically, over the past three years at least, the Department has enjoyed a senior position in the Central Government. Formerly under the Minister of Interior, it was transferred to the Prime Ministry in 1971. The Department was placed in the Prime Ministry during the Zahir Government, remained there under Prime Minister Musa Shafiq and has not been changed under the new Republic.

The location of RDD in the Government bureaucracy is significant. The RDD function, even excluding its new comprehensive Charter, overlaps with the functions of the Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI), Public Works (MPW), Health, and the Housing and Town Planning Authority (HTP). It has a mandate to respond to local requests for agricultural projects (MAI), road and bridge construction (MPW), and potable water supply schemes (Health and HTP). The Government has recognized that line ministries, if only because of their massive size, cannot respond to basically small projects requested by rural people. By having the RDD in the Prime Ministry, it retains enough bureaucratic clout not to be crushed by the influence of the powerful ministries and at the same time, because it is small, it can respond to at least some local requests with relative alacrity. It is anticipated that the Government will retain RDD as a relatively small yet flexible Department under the wing and with the prestige of the Prime Ministry.

If this surmise is accurate, it can be concluded that the RDD is seen by the President of State as a relatively effective Department to satisfy political as well as developmental requirements. It is seen as a limited but useful tool to contribute to nation-building efforts.

It is in this context that USAID must design its assistance to build RDD capabilities. At this time the Government does not want a large organization with the task of comprehensively developing rural areas throughout the country. It does not because it is aware of the limitations imposed by the geography, culture, and people in and out of Government. It does want RDD to improve its efforts to respond to local requests. It is the only agency of Government that is designed solely for this purpose. While the quality and quantity of its response has been inadequate developmentally, still its capability to help small numbers of people in particular areas of the country can be improved.

## 2. History of the Development of the Project

This project is a continuation and expansion of a one-time \$50,000 pilot rural works project which was obligated by Project Agreement in late FY 74. The purposes of the pilot project were to demonstrate U.S. interest in rural development and to develop and test systems to employ the fixed-cost reimbursement method of project financing. The pilot project was implemented within the existing structure and systems of the Rural Development Department (RDD) of the Prime Ministry of the GOA.

Accomplishments under the pilot include:

1. U.S. interest in rural development has been demonstrated by the development and implementation of the pilot project to date and a willingness to follow it up with an expanded project. This interest has been matched by the GOA which has designated rural development as one of its highest priorities and increased the budget of the RDD by 66 percent for the Afghan year starting March 21, 1975.
2. A fixed-cost reimbursement method of project financing has been developed and is being implemented. In this method, the RDD and the USAID jointly review construction projects requested by rural people and select those to be considered for reimbursement on the basis of mutually developed technical, economic and social criteria. A total cost estimate for the project is jointly prepared. After the project is completed and certified as satisfactory by the USAID engineer, the RDD is reimbursed for 75 percent of the total estimated cost in U.S. dollars.
3. RDD cost estimating procedures have been significantly improved. Prior to this project, only material costs were considered. Such elements as transportation, labor, planning, inspection, administrative overhead and contingencies were ignored. On all projects considered for reimbursement, total estimated costs are now much closer to actual costs. The RDD is realizing the advantages of such cost estimating in establishing construction priorities, preparing budgets and allocating personnel and material resources.
4. Uniform design and construction standards and specifications have been developed by USAID, UN and RDD engineering personnel and are being gradually incorporated into all RDD projects. Uniform standards are without precedent in Afghanistan and their complete adoption will take some time although they are now observed on all reimbursed projects.
5. RDD construction quality has improved significantly. RDD and USAID personnel and UN engineers working with RDD have jointly examined projects in detail and found ways to improve their construction. Better cost estimating procedures and uniform engineering standards and specifications have aided this process considerably. The high quality construction required for USAID reimbursement is having a salutary effect on all RDD construction.
6. Close collaboration between RDD and USAID personnel has been developed. RDD solicits the views of USAID advisors on matters not strictly related to the pilot project. The cooperative relationship which is an important plus for an expanded project.

Some problems still remain:

1. Techniques to determine the economic and social benefits to be derived from requested projects need to be considerably sharpened. Data on each project are available but they are not always adequate or reliable. As data collection and analytical techniques are improved, better criteria can be developed.

2. Actual cost figures are not available and comparison with estimated costs are therefore impossible. If estimated total costs and actual total costs differ widely, cost-benefit ratios, planning and priorities may be adversely affected. Cost estimation in RDD (and other Government departments) is a procedure which historically has encouraged non-accountability. It is necessary in the Afghan context to protect civil servants from going to jail. For instance, an estimate is made for a bridge construction and signed by the estimator with the specific qualification: "This estimation is to begin the work and is not subject to audit." Or, as recently stated by a GOA official, "nobody is responsible for cost overruns." After an estimate is made, based on Government fixed material costs and volume measurement, money for construction of the project is transferred to the Mustafi (finance officer and deputy governor) in the province. This amount is known and recorded. However, planning, inspection and supervision costs are paid out of appropriate RDD budget codes, and not attributed to the particular project. Also, if extra materials are necessary, they are approved by the President, expended out of appropriate budget codes, and also not charged to the project.

In the \$50,000 pilot project, RDD and USAID designed and used a project estimation form (Appendix V-H) which includes local and manufactured materials, equipment, transportation, planning, construction and miscellaneous costs. This form has been successfully utilized and has helped RDD to focus on actual costs. Further, by field observation it has been able to determine fairly accurate actual costs and compare these with the estimate.

However, the estimation form has been designed for the pilot project, is not in Dari, and has not yet become a part of normal RDD estimation procedures. At the end of this project, RDD may have the capability to give complete estimates and actual project costs.

3. RDD management has so far been able to cope with the administrative and logistic demands placed on it by the pilot project. With an

expanded project, however, additional demands may create problems in personnel, logistics and accounting.

4. There is no adequate GOA precedent for cash payment of unskilled labor in RDD projects. Unskilled labor has always been voluntary, conscripted or paid with food. USAID has urged the RDD to pay for unskilled labor used on rural works. In the future, RDD will request the Prime Ministry to approve unskilled labor payment on a project-by-project basis. Although this is not as satisfactory as the adoption of a GOA policy to pay unskilled labor, it will be a considerable improvement over the present situation.

On balance, it is clear that the capability of the RDD to plan, design and execute quality rural public works projects has been improved by the pilot project. It is also clear that, while some refinements are required, the fixed-cost reimbursement method of project financing has been developed and implemented in a generally satisfactory manner. The progress made to date is manifested by the willingness of both the GOA and USAID to undertake the continued and expanded project proposed in this paper.

#### B. Economic Analysis

In an attempt to begin to bring the rural mass into the mainstream of the country's development effort, the RDD was revitalized and given a broad charter. The GOA sought foreign assistance in personnel and commodities in this effort and the U.S. responded with a small test project in FY 1974. The project described in this paper is much expanded over that of FY 1974 pilot. Eighty permanent irrigation structures will be constructed. Twenty-five bridges will be built and 100 kilometers of farm to market roads will be improved. Over the life of the project it is expected to directly benefit 85,000 people and increase income by a cumulative \$1 million.

The major intended direct beneficiaries of the project are the rural people in the areas in which the project activities will be implemented. The impact of the project on the beneficiaries will be increased real income and social services through the provision of improved community infrastructure.

Improved irrigation structures result in increased production. They encourage increased use of fertilizer (because of reduced risk and more water), second cropping and the introduction of higher value crops which consume more water. These factors all increase opportunities for the productive, remunerative

use of the communities' labor, reducing underemployment and unemployment. The construction of bridges and improvement of farm-to-market roads reduce transportation cost, save time, open up new markets and improve market accessibility, and affect the community generally even though the accurate quantification of benefits is difficult. Aside from the cost/saving/income generating aspects of bridges, they are a convenience to many, and add to the communities' stock of social amenities.

With the increased income and productivity, one could expect the community's saving and investment rate to increase, supplementing the infrastructure set in place by the project. There should be some demonstration or spread effect. The increased income would tend to cause imports to rise. But the increased output, some of which would be for export and some to reduce imports, should more than offset the increase in import expenditures. Construction would place added pressure on resources but this would appear to be negligible especially in face of the level of underemployment and unemployment. An important aspect of the project is the capability that it is expected to develop in RDD and the sense of accomplishment that it is expected to instill.

An example of an irrigation project is given below and may be fairly typical of the irrigation projects that will be financed. The project is located in Samangan province in the village of Ghaznigak. The people of the village requested the RDD to construct a concrete flume across the Samangan River to replace a smaller more crude flume which irrigates 155 hectares.\* Construction costs have been worked out in some detail. It is expected that all of the construction work will be done within a year's time and that interruption of irrigation water flow will be negligible. Most of the land served by the system is in wheat, but cotton is grown in surrounding areas. The cost of the project has been calculated at afs 165,218 (or about \$2,755.00). With the increased irrigation water supply it is likely that more double cropping will be done, more fertilizer will be used and higher value crops that consume more water will be planted. These expected benefits are not included in the benefit-cost ratio, however. A seven percent increase in wheat yield and wheat yield equivalent is projected. Wheat is valued at a projected world farmgate price of \$120.00 or afs 7,200, per MT. The opportunity cost of capital is assumed to be 15 percent and the useful life of the flume is 10 years. Market prices are used. Reduction in maintenance cost is estimated at afs 1,000 annually (\$17.00). Under these estimates the benefit cost ratio is 3.5:1. This is of course a very favorable ratio but not uncommon for this kind of project which begins yielding its benefits in the first year and production is not interrupted by the project.

---

\* Photographs of existing flume in Appendix V F

48

Costs of Project:

Material: Cement 200 bags @ 70 afs/bag = 14,000 afs  
 Steel 247 kg @ 32 afs/kg = 7,904 afs  
 Stone 65 m<sup>3</sup> (Conscripted Labor  
 Gravel 9m<sup>3</sup> (Conscripted Labor)  
 Wood 1m<sup>3</sup> (Conscripted Labor)  
 Sand 30 m<sup>3</sup> (Conscripted Labor)

21,904 afs

Labor: Skilled 80 mandays @ 150 afs/  
 day = 12,000 afs  
 Unskilled 200 mandays @ afs/  
 day =( 8,000) conscripted

TOTAL 12,000 afs

Transportation: Economic & Social Planning:  
 Jeep 1 vehicle, 6 trips @ 20 km/trip  
 @ 5 afs/km (Samangan-Chaznigak-  
 Samangan) = 600 afs  
 1 vehicle, 10 trips @ 680 km/trip  
 @ 5 afs/km (Kabul-Samangan- 34,000 afs  
 Ghaznigak-Kabul) =

Truck Steel 247 kg 1 vehicle, 1 trip  
 @ 680 km @ 10 afs/km (Kabul-  
 Samangan-Ghaznigak-Kabul)= 6,800  
 Cement 200 bags @ 50 kg/bag  
 2 trucks @ 2 trips @ 180 km  
 @ 10 afs/km (Samangan-  
 Pulekhunri-Samangan-  
 Ghaznigak) = 7,200

TOTAL 48,600

Construction Water pump 40 hrs @ 28  
Equipment: afs/hr = 1,120 afs  
 Welding of steel rods = 1,100 afs

TOTAL 2,220 afs

44

<u>Planning:</u>		1. Economic and Social Survey: (Salaries and Per Diems)	
		From Kabul - None	
		Provincial	3,080
		15% Admin. Overhead	462 (Total mandays 20)
		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,542 afs</b>
		2. Engineering and Feasibility Survey: Kabul (19 mandays)	2,050 afs
		(Salaries and Per Diems) Provincial (15 mandays)	2,700 afs
		Total Mandays 34	4,750 afs
		15% Overhead	712 afs
		<b>TOTAL =</b>	<b>5,462 afs</b>
		3. Design: (Salaries and Per Diems)	5,600 afs
		Total mandays 49	15% Overhead
			840
		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,440 afs</b>
		Economic and Social Survey:	3,542 afs
		Engineering and Feasibility survey	5,462 afs
		Design	6,440 afs
		<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>15,444 afs</b>

Construction, Supervision, Inspection:

Salaries and Per Diems for total mandays worked

Total Mandays 520	53,000 afs
15% Admin. Overhead	7,950 afs
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>60,950 afs</b>

Miscellaneous Costs:

Storage	600 afs/ms.	1,200 afs
Watchman	1,000 afs/ms.	2,000 afs
Design supply	lump sum	900 afs
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>4,100 afs</b>

Cost Summary:

Material	21,904
Labor	12,000
Transportation	48,600
Construction Equipment	2,220

Planning:

Economic and Social Survey	3,542
Engineering and Feasibility Survey	5,462
Design	6,440
Construction, Supervision and Inspection	60,950
Miscellaneous Costs	4,100

---

TOTAL ESTIMATED COST      165,218 afs (\$2,755.00)

51

Ghaznigak Flume

Cost Benefit Analysis

	<u>Present</u>	<u>With the New Flume</u>
Land Irrigated	155 hectares	155 hectares
Supply of Water	0.111m <sup>3</sup> /sec. (0.140m/sec/0.149m <sup>3</sup> /sec. to irrigate 155 hectare)	
Crops	Wheat, Barley	Same
Wheat Yield	1.36 M/Ha	1.45 M/Ha
Increase in production		14 tons
Increase in production in afs		100,800 afs (\$1,680)
Reduction in Maintenance Costs		1,000 afs (\$17)
Total Undiscounted Annual Benefits		101,800 (\$1,697)
 Assumption:		
Economic Life of Flume		10 years
Total Estimated Undiscounted Cost of the Project		165,213 afs (\$2,754)
Benefit Cost Ratio (15% Discount Factor)		3.5:1

92

### C. Financial Analysis

The RDD receives its budget from the Ministry of Planning and funds are allocated exclusively from the Development Budget. In the past several years the Department has not come close to expending its budget. In 1974-75, 60 million afghania (about \$1 million) have been budgeted, but by the end of the first six months, only 13 million (about \$215,000) had been expended.

Therefore, in terms of cash flow and total allocations, the Department has had and probably will continue to have no financial problem. Further, the Development Budget of the Ministry of Planning is fungible. If the Department were to require additional funds, the Ministry of Planning could provide a supplementary allocation.

The problem, of course, is that in the past the RDD has lacked the management expertise to efficiently utilize its resources.

### D. Social Analysis; Some Political and Social Linkages

Afghanistan is a conservative, religious, peasant and tribal society (see Appendix IV). Most of the population is not literate. The country is primarily engaged in basic food production. The culture remains rigid, static and non-mobile. Even the nomads follow traditionally defined routes. The millions of people who live in the vast arid deserts, mountain valleys, and northern plains are either unaware or suspicious of the activities of the Government. They are largely isolated from the nation-building developments of the past two centuries (See Appendix I). Many of them are still isolated from the progress of the past two decades. They are basically estranged from the Government which they see as tax collectors and conscriptors for the army. Government officials who are literate and who have a broader view of the world have difficulty focusing on village needs.

While Afghan leadership for the past two centuries has envisioned and fought for a union, the people have persistently walled themselves off from Government intrusions. This separation between the people and the Government has been a curse upon economic and social growth. The people are human resources for development at the local level. There are financial and technological resources within the Central Government. Today Afghanistan needs a bridge to link these resources together.

There must be links established between the Government and the people so that local initiatives will be stimulated and the people will be encouraged

to participate in the creation and growth of the nation. The extent to which these links can be established will determine Afghanistan's success in becoming a nation.

Of course, sustained rural development depends upon links at every level, both inside and outside of Government. Therefore, it is important to describe the general structure of the Government, and the way it really operates at the central and local level as well as other relevant local links that already exist.

### 1. Links Within the Government

Under the President of State, Mohammed Daoud Khan, there is a Deputy Prime Minister, and Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Planning, Interior, Finance, Agriculture and Irrigation, Health, Public Works, Commerce, Mines and Industries, Communications, Justice, Frontier Affairs, and Information and Culture. The President of State holds the portfolios of the Prime Minister, Defense and Foreign Affairs. President Daoud's brother, Mohammed Naim, performs a special advisory role to the President. Within the Prime Ministry there are numerous departments, of which the Rural Development Department is only one.

The various other ministries are also subdivided into functional departments, (e.g., Preventative and Curative Medicine in the Ministry of Public Health) under Presidents. Beneath the Presidents there are Directors who are in charge of further functional subdivisions.

The country is divided into 26 provinces. Each province is divided into districts called woloswalis and aler adaris. The governors of each province and officials of each woloswali and alegadari are appointed by the Minister of Interior with Presidential or Prime Ministry approval. Within the province there are representatives of most of the line ministries. These representatives report directly to their respective ministries, but concurrently they also function as the governor's staff. To some, the local government structure appears cumbersome and inefficient. In fact, it may be cumbersome, but the explicit checks and balances are ingeniously designed to meet the central government's requirements.

At the Central Government level, there are de jure links between the ministries, which are effective on major issues which come before the Cabinet,

but operational coordination exists only on an ad hoc basis. And, where there are strained relations between ministries, coordination is impossible. Similarly, coordination between Presidents and Directors of departments and offices - both within and between ministries - is severely limited.

At the provincial level, because representatives of line ministries function as the Governor's staff, there is usually better coordination and communication. Much depends upon the energy and skill of the Governor who commands extraordinary power and traditional respect in his province.

## 2. Links Between The Government and Village

The authority and power of the central government and its civil servants at the local level is recognized as legitimate, but it is also feared by the villagers. The governmental structure and the village structure represent two distinct sub-cultures within Afghan society. Each has its own set of values and rules which are often in conflict. The civil servants at the local level are foreign to the village. They dress and eat differently, have a different life style, and often speak a different language. There is very little social intercourse and they are not considered part of the community.

In theory the Government takes a strong and authoritarian hand in governing the rural areas. In fact, physical distance, geographic barriers, and social distance between the rulers and villagers combine to allow local indigenous power systems to prevail in most situations. Only when rural folk's deviations from the bureaucratic rules are made known to the civil servant is action necessary. Informally, this potential is recognized by both groups, and embarrassing encounters are avoided. The civil servant will deliberately remain in his office, for example, rather than learn the social, political, and economic realities of the village. At the same time the villagers will maintain community privacy by turning to the civil servant only as a last resort. When face-to-face contact does occur this mutual attempt to maintain distance will frequently result in a kind of formalized, even ritualized exchange. Each party plays a role carefully designed to limit the government's involvement in local affairs.

## 3. Links Within the Village

There are numerous indigenous institutions that are based on participatory action to meet the needs of the community. They include the building and maintenance of indigenous irrigation systems, water distribution systems, pasture use, changes in cropping patterns as they relate to systems of fallow land, mosque building and maintenance, and road building and maintenance.

A specific example of this comes from a village study in the Herat area where the property-owning heads of households meet annually to determine each property owner's tax for the upkeep of the water system of two karez systems. They annually contract with specialists to dig out the wells and underground tunnels, leaving to each farmer-landowner the choice of contributing either money for this work or his own labor to assist the specialists. The village also corporately recruits and employs various specialists - blacksmiths, barber, shepherd and carpenter - to cope with village needs.

This is not to suggest that cooperation does not break down in the face of inter-kin group disagreement or hostilities. But the element of community participation is strong.

#### 4. Social Analysis, Conclusion

The social and political linkages within Afghanistan are relatively consistent at all levels throughout the culture. To understand the role of the Governor at the rural level, for example, it is important to understand the nature of authority within the extended family. They are related. The patriarchal and patronal nature of rural society is reflected in the roles and expectations of government officials and leaders at the national level. The fact that there is considerable freedom of action for individuals at all levels makes the system workable.

#### E. Policy and Administrative Analysis

If rural development, in its broadest sense, may be considered integration of the rural poor into the national life, the Government of Afghanistan has been committed to rural development for over a century. In the 1880's, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan described his task as:

"...breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule."

Successive governments down to the present day have pursued, with varying degrees of energy and success, the goal of making Afghanistan a nation as well as a state. The new Republican Government stresses national unity and development, with emphasis on economic and social reforms. In his address to the nation on August 23, 1973, President Daoud stated:

"The prime condition for the successful performance of all the onerous national tasks is the participation of all the people in the economic, social and political life of the country."

just engineering standards--prevails. The common units for weight in Afghanistan, for example, are the pow and the seer. One pow is approximately equal to one English pound. In fact one pow is actually the weight of an old stone, or two bricks, or a coiled up scrap of metal or an old gear from a truck. As one travels around Afghanistan one seer will equal 1/4 pow in Herat, 10 pow in Kandahar, 16 pow in Kabul, 32 pow in Mazar, and 37 pow in Qalac-Nar. Further, if one goes next door to India or Pakistan, one seer will be equal to two pow.

In its own way and in its own context, the lack of standards can sometimes be rather efficient. By definition, firm standards limit flexibility, and in Afghanistan flexibility is highly desirable. Sometimes the absence of standards can stimulate field decision making. For instance, if a standard exists for the quality of wire to be used in a gabion and that particular quality is unavailable, the gabions for an erosion protection scheme will not be laid. Though it could be argued that it should not be laid without appropriate quality, it also is usually true that something is better than nothing. If quality precludes any erosion protection for a significant period, interim action is impossible and land will be lost. If there are no standards, the local construction supervisor can make a decision to afford some relief without ending in jail or being reprimanded by his superiors.

While there are advantages to not having standards in some situations, for quality control in engineering design and construction, uniform standards are important. There are two areas where RDD must establish standards for projects. First, they must have uniform design standards for selecting material strength and sizing structural elements for each project. Second, they must establish construction standards to dictate how and in what manner the materials are to be used to achieve the quality desired.

The RDD and USAID have prepared a basic set of uniform standards and specifications during the past five months. They will be expanded and refined. The major issue will be assimilation by RDD personnel. Standards are almost without precedent in Afghanistan, and their assimilation will be psychologically difficult.

USAID will also assist in quality control by providing in-service training to EDB design and construction supervisors in cooperation with the UN team and German volunteers.

## 2. Design Capability

The RDD has an adequately manned engineering department that has produced a considerable backlog of engineered project designs. A group of UN engineers from several different countries have been giving advice in design to the RDD. The result is a variegated series of designs, each wearing the mark of the home country of each particular advisor. This is unfortunate and efforts should be directed at establishing a set of design standards specifically for use in Afghanistan by the RDD.

A related problem which we are discussing with RDD is one often encountered in drafting rooms in LDC's: namely, putting enough information on a drawing to transmit the intent of the designer to the engineer in the field. The RDD is beginning to appreciate the need for this, however, and the drawings are getting better.

### 3. Construction Capability

The RDD site supervisors are usually technically trained and capable of reading and understanding drawings and specifications. Since they are given control of the project site, there is no dilution or fragmentation of responsibility. This also encourages pride in quality workmanship, and creates incentives to reduce costs, save time, and still achieve a good project.

Proj. No. 306-51-095-131      Original      1-22-75

---

APPENDICES

BUILDING A NATION; AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901), the rulers of Afghanistan have consciously sought to build a nation. For 150 years before Abdur Rahman, successive amirs - or rulers - had risen and fallen in attempts to unite and lead the diverse peoples of the region. There had been Ahmad Shah Durrani, Timur Shah, Zaman Shah, Shah Mahmud, Shah Shuja, the Barakzai Sardars, Dost Mohammed, Sher Ali, Mohammed Afzal, Mohammed Azam and Mohammed Yaqub. Their armies supported father against son, brother against brother, half brother against half brother, and uncle against nephew in battles for control of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and the Uzbek Khanates of the north. At the same time, the incessant disorders of the 18th and 19th centuries permitted and encouraged external invasions and intrigues by the British, French, Russians, Persians, and Turks, which further hampered the process of nation building. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan early described his task as,

"...breaking down the feudal and tribal system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule."

This same leader, shortly before his death advised those who would rule after him that,

"The first and most important advice that I can give my successors is to impress upon their minds the value of unity. Unity and unity alone can make Afghanistan into a great power...."

Abdur Rahman established provincial boundaries, which seldom coincided with tribal areas, and he appointed Provincial Governors from among his closest followers. The provinces, in part, became substitutes for tribal areas and the Government secured greater control in its preliminary efforts to build a nation.

External disputes and negotiations with the Russians, British, and Germans, plus palace intrigues plagued the reign of Habibullah (1901-1919), but after his murder, his third son, Amanullah Khan, took power and with the advice of his father-in-law, Mahmud Beg Tarzi, began a decade of nation-building reforms, which eventually ended in

chaos. He established the first Cabinet with a Minister of Foreign Affairs and a Prime Minister. He quickly gained support of the Tribal leadership and consolidated his power in urban centers.

In 1923 he proclaimed himself king - as distinct from amir - attempting to symbolize the establishment of a nation. When he returned from his western tour (1927 to 1928), he tried to change Afghanistan along the lines of Turkey and Ataturk. He removed the veil from women, opened coeducational schools, attempted to force all Afghans in Kabul to wear western dress, tried to educate the nomads by sending teachers to travel with them, began construction of a new capital at Darul Aman six miles southwest of Kabul and with German assistance built Afghanistan's first railroad which ran between Kabul and Darul Aman. His father-in-law and advisor, Mahmud Tarzi, had recommended separation of government administration from the royal family, a party system, and an elected Parliament. In 1928 Amanullah announced before a large assembly of Afghan notables the creation of a nominated upper house, an elected lower house, the formation of a western-style cabinet, the separation of church and state, the emancipation of women, enforced monogomy, and compulsory education for all Afghans. Amanullah had not listened to the advice of his grandfather, however, who had written in 1900:

"... My sons and successors should not try to introduce reforms of any kind in such a hurry as to set the people against their ruler, and they must bear in mind that in establishing a Constitutional Government, introducing more lenient laws, and modeling education upon the system of Western universities, they must adopt all these gradually as the people become accustomed to the idea of modern innovations."

By 1919, Amanullah was forced to flee Kabul with his father-in-law to Kandahar in a Rolls Royce, which he drove himself. Mahmud Tarzi traveled to Istanbul where he lies buried, and Amanullah fled to Rome where he died in exile in 1933.

After a brief interlude, Mohammed Nadir Shah, great-grandson of the brother of Amanullah's great-great-grandfather, took power and in 1931 promulgated a new constitution extracted from the Turkish, Iranian and French Constitutions. The constitution alluded to constitutional monarchy within a parliamentary system, but in fact the

monarchy retained full power without popular participation. Nadir Shah had scant time to rule. He was murdered by an 8th-grade student at an awards ceremony at Fejat High School on November 8, 1933, and on the same afternoon, his 19-year old son, Mohammed Zahir Shah, was invested as king. He wore a turban for the occasion.

Though Zahir had taken the throne, his uncles Mohammed Hashim and Shah Mahmud actually ruled the country until 1953. During the 1930's and 1940's the Government was primarily occupied with external relationships and seeking foreign assistance to bring modernization to Afghanistan. Germany, Japan and Italy became the early donors followed by the United States after the Second World War. Under Shah Mahmud an attempt was made to hold free elections and a Parliament was elected in 1949. Forty percent of the newly elected Parliamentarians were reformers. They took their role very seriously. The Parliament decreed a free press, and the conservative religious segment of society was severely attacked as were members of the Royal Family. By the 1952 elections, the Government took steps to smash the liberal leaders and were successful. Louis Dupree in his new book, Afghanistan, has described the scene well:

"The 'liberal parliament' failed because of several factors: opposition was directed against an established independent regime, not against a colonial oppressor; to many, in and out of government, a freer society would have meant less graft; the central government maintained tight control of the civil service, which did not participate widely in the 'liberal' movement for fear of retaliation; the massive illiteracy prevented the 'liberal' press from having an impact outside its own circle; personal attacks on the royal family and religious leaders antagonized many fence-sitters; the government refused to believe that the 'liberals' merely wanted to liberalize the existing government, and looked on all opposition as preparation for overthrow, a feeling common among most power elites in Afro-Asia."

Within the Royal Family there was dissent led by two brothers, sons of Sardar Mohammed Aziz, a third uncle of Zahir Shah. Like his brother, Nadir Shah, Mohammed Aziz also died from an assassin's bullet in 1933. He was shot while serving as Afghanistan's

Ambassador to Germany. The two brothers, Sardar Daoud Khan and Sardar Naim Khan, were first cousins and contemporaries of King Zahir Shah. One brother, Daoud, was married to the King's sister.

In 1953 agreement was reached within the Royal Family that Daoud Khan would become Prime Minister. This was tantamount to a bloodless coup d'etat. During the decade that followed, he gained large capital assistance from the United States and USSR for long-range national infrastructure development. Partly this was because of the cold war and Afghanistan's fortuitous position between the USSR and the U. S.

The 10 years of Daoud's leadership were primarily characterized by a vigorous but conservative nationalism. Ataturk's advice to Amanullah had been to build a strong army before instituting reforms. He even offered military assistance. Amanullah had ignored Ataturk's advice, but Daoud profited from the mistakes of his predecessor. He increased the size and effectiveness of the army many fold.

In March 1963, when Daoud resigned, further reform alternatives toward nation building were possible for King Zahir. The 19-year old who had come to the throne 30 years previously had diligently enlarged his support among the tribes and people of the country and he was able to institute a new constitution and begin the "experiment in democracy."

Six successive cabinets and 5 Prime Ministers (Mohammed Yousuf, Mohammed Hashim Maiwandval, Nur Ahmad Etemadi, Abdul Zahir and Mohammed Musa Shafiq) wrestled with the implications of the new constitution and 2 freely elected parliaments between 1963-1973. The struggle for nationhood was intense during the decade. The two Parliaments under the new constitution vehemently asserted their power and successfully blocked progress. Further, there was evidence to indicate that the King himself directly or indirectly influenced Parliamentary inaction. At the same time the new democracy was a severe challenge to the traditional systems. More than 20 newspapers came upon the scene, and countless student and workers'

strikes and demonstrations were carried out throughout the country. In July 1973, the King's reign and his experiment came to an end.

Some have concluded that this happened because the words of Amir Abdur Rahman 70 years earlier had not been heard. They feel that the movement for nationhood had been too fast. Others, however, have reached the opposite conclusion. They feel that the movement toward nationhood was not fast enough, or that the institutions for directing the movement - the Parliament and the monarchy - were poorly designed and badly lead.

In any case on the 17th of July, 1973, Mohammed Daoud Khan again took over the reins of power from his cousin, the King. Five weeks later Daoud delivered a radio address to the people of Afghanistan. In this address he characterized the previous ten years of Afghan history as follows:

"The domestic policy of the state... was based on hypocrisy, political fraud and public deceit. The policy of divide and rule, and intrigues among the various tribes in Afghanistan, together with threats, incitements, coercion, fear, discrimination, and favouritism, were the prime factors for the perpetuation of the monarchy. The internal policy of the fallen regime was to incite the reactionary forces and encourage them to attack the patriots under the guise of democracy. The people were smothered and suppressed and the voice of the down-trodden was not heard. The cruelty and injustice by the strong was defended. The people, especially the youth, were led astray. Anti-national plots leading to schism among the people were hatched every day, and political abuse was made of the false democracy. The parliament was changed into a voting machine which approved the anti-national deeds of the regime. The Parliament also became an organ for looting the national treasury and the pockets of the people. The rights and liberties of the people were violated every day. The law of the jungle, despotism, and anarchy ruled supreme in the country. The old regime was oblivious to the miseries of the nation. They neither saw the signals of danger all around them, nor heard

the cries of the suffering people. All hopes for reform were dead, and the only way left was to overthrow the regime." (unofficial translation)

We are too close to the times to know which interpretation of the "experiment in democracy" is more accurate. In any case, the new government, like most of its predecessors, once again seeks to build a nation of the Pashtun, Tajik, Qizilbash, Hazara, Aimaq, Uzbek, Turkamen, Kirghiz, Pamiri, Baluch, Nuristani, Gujar, Hindu, Sikh, and Jew. The Government seeks to build a nation as a vehicle to promote social and economic growth.

Afghanistan's history is a struggle to build a nation. Participants and descendants of participants in past struggles survive today and persevere in building the nation. It is a new country with aspirations tempered by fears; growth muted by inexperience; and, pride challenged by foreign arrogance.

THE STORY OF A BRIDGE

The following is the story of a fictional project which involves building a motorable bridge connecting a road from a small valley to a main graveled but unpaved provincial highway. It discusses economic and social interrelationships at the local level which include education, markets, credit, savings, health, small industries, and income that would be affected by the bridge.

The Shareen Valley on the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush extends for a 2-day walk from its lower edge (elevation: 500 meters) on the Oxus plains to its extremity in the Hazarjat (elevation: 3,000 meters). There are 19 villages in the valley and a woliswali (Shamsabad) is 6 hours up the valley. A small river meanders through the valley, running from the mountain peaks into the Bokhari River at the foot of the mountains and mouth of the valley. The Bokhari River ultimately joins other tributaries emptying into the Amu Daria bordering on the Soviet Union. A secondary, gravel surfaced road parallels the Bokhari on its north bank. A motorable track runs from the Bokhari through the valley to Shamsabad. Beyond Shamsabad there are only foot trails. The Bokhari River can be crossed by a temporary wooden-mud bridge which washes out every spring and is rebuilt every fall when the river's water is low. Produce goes from Shamsabad to the provincial capital 50 kilometers away.

Of the 19 villages in the valley, 7 have direct access to the motorable track. The other 12, higher in the mountains, can reach the track and Shamsabad, but it takes up to 1 1/2 days.

A petition to the Governor of the province, through the Sub-Governor of Shamsabad,\* has been signed by 150 farmers in the valley from 8 villages, all of which have access to the track. The petition requests the Government to build a permanent bridge across the Bokhari River. The petition states that the people of the valley want year-round access to the provincial capital. It states that the people have built a temporary wooden and mud bridge near the junction of the track with the Bokhari River but it washes out every spring. During the summer they have piled rocks in the river for trucks to ford, but neither crossing has been adequate to meet the needs of the people in the valley. They ask that the Government help them with their prosperity.

---

\* See map of Shamsabad

Zarak is a Tajik village 2 hours from Shamsabad. It has 29 families and a total population of 261. (See map: Shareen Valley)

The area north of the Bokhari River on the plains is mainly inhabited by Pashtuns. The Shareen Valley is occupied by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Though smaller in number, the Tajiks play a more important role economically and socially in relation to the other two ethnic groups. The Tajiks, who are historically urbanized artisans, live around the waliswali town of Shamsabad. They are more sophisticated and many members of their community are civil servants both in Shamsabad and the provincial capital. Of course, there are many Pashtuns of the northern plains too in these Government offices as well as people appointed by the Central Government who are either Pashtuns or Tajiks. The Uzbeks have only two people of their community as officials. The Hazaras have none. The Uzbeks, and Hazaras especially, treat the Tajiks with deference because they are dependent on them. Some Hazaras work as servants for the Tajiks in the town.

Almost all Uzbeks are very orthodox Sunni Moslems and look down upon Hazaras as Shias. This prejudice becomes especially poignant when a dispute over the division of water or an issue on land is raised. The Hazaras are the poorest of the three groups. The Uzbeks and Tajiks at least have one thing in common; they are both Sunni Moslems. However, there is one Tajik village mainly inhabited by Shia Tajiks. This, as well as their level of sophistication, greatly tempers Tajik prejudice against Hazaras. Some of the disputes between Uzbeks and Hazaras are mediated by Tajiks because the Tajiks along with Pashtuns are the officials in charge; and the Tajik can relate better to the Pashtuns. The Tajik, and even more the Hazara, fear the Uzbek. The Uzbek is more of a ruffian type. To the Tajik, Uzbeks are too provincial and not civilized. There is gossip about the Hazara women working with their families as servants in the cities for more wealthy Pashtuns and Tajiks. The Uzbeks sometimes joke about Hazara women, regardless of its truth. This, among other prejudices, makes it tough for the poor Hazaras.

A lack of social mobility has kept these groups quite isolated and distinct. Except <sup>for</sup> the Pashtun nomads passing through every spring and fall and some traffic of people in and out of the waliswali town, there has been almost no migration to the valley in the last 25-30 years. The increase in population keeps most people underemployed. Neither one's own group nor the people of the other groups allow one to move

61

to another group's area. The Hazaras, who are most hard pressed by scarcity of land, have to be physically more mobile. Now there are many Hazara shopkeepers in the town of Shamsabad. They are proud and hard working and are good businessmen. This is a source of astonishment and admiration for some and grudge for others. In order to assume a new occupation traditionally lower status people usually have to move away to distant cities like Kabul. The lack of social mobility is also seen in an absence of cross-marriages between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks and no marriages between Hazaras and the other two groups in the last 15 years. The three marriages between Tajiks and Uzbeks have been only between Sunni Tajiks and Uzbeks.

The following incident illustrates the lack of social mobility:

Once 2 years ago, Mahmud, a Tajik merchant's son, who was 21 years old, fell in love with a moderately wealthy Hazara family's daughter. The Hazara family was "Sayed" - that is descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. The Tajik boy, who was a 12th-grade graduate of the local high school and more broad minded, felt it would be possible with perseverance to get his family's consent to marry the girl because the girl's parents, though Shia, were Sayeds and therefore more acceptable to his group. Mahmud's older sister had been married to a very strict Uzbek family long ago.

While airing his wish, Mahmud was confronted with strong and harsh reprimands from his father and uncles. His Uzbek brother-in-law and his parents also brought great pressure that such a match would be a disgrace to the Uzbeks even if Mahmud's family did not care about their own name.

The Hazara girl's family, although never approached by Mahmud's family, were strictly against the match and locked up their daughter as a precaution.

After several months of fruitless struggle, Mahmud discussed the matter with Abdul, his young Uzbek friend. After having drawn a plan of elopement with the girl, with the assistance of his friend, Abdul, and the horses he provided, Mahmud set out for the girl's village by night. The girl, being ready to elope with Mahmud had managed to get out of the house and be ready. Mahmud's scheme did not prove sound. Both his family and the Uzbek in-laws of his sister were aware of the elopement plans. While riding out of the

Hazara village, Mahmud with the girl and his Uzbek friend were caught by their parents. Mahmud's uncles and the Uzbeks harshly condemned the Hazaras for having allowed their daughter to escape with Mahmud. Hazaras returned the condemnation, a fight broke out, and many people were injured. Mahmud was immediately locked up at home for two months and the girl was married off by her parents to a distant relative in another province within a week. The bitter feeling due to this incident still remains alive in the hearts of all parties.

#### A Typical Village in the Shabreen Valley

The people of Zarak engage primarily in dry land and some irrigated farming. The provincial capital is the major market for Zarak, and the whole valley. During the late spring, summer and early fall, however, Monday and Friday are bazaar days in the walled city of Shamsabad, which is 2 hours away.

All of the villages in the valley are at least one hundred years old; the newest settlements are the Hazara villages in the mountains. The people's knowledge of their history is hazy. Almost all their history is oral and it only goes back 3 or 4 generations.

The majority of the population of Zarak is under 15 (52%) and 17 young men have emigrated to work in the provincial capital or Kabul. Six are in military service.

Income for the people of Zarak is difficult to determine. At best, estimates are no more than wild guesses based on inadequate data. There is income derived from the women, who spin wool and cotton, breed silkworms and gather brush from the mountains, but there is no way to measure it.

Most of the land owned by the people of Zarak is dry-farmed and in wheat. Twenty-seven of the 29 families own land. Other crops include linseed, sesame for oil, melons, and barley. Nobody knows how much land is actually farmed because land measurement is calculated by the number of sairs of wheat seed sown. Further, for this area, one sair is the equivalent of 2 Kabul sairs, or 14 kilograms. The average land holding is approximately 10 sairs of which 3 is irrigated and 7 dry land. The normal production on dry land is 12:1 and on irrigated land 20:1. Therefore, the average family production would be approximately 2,016 kilos of wheat. If we calculate that each adult

eats 200 kilos per year (subsistence level) and an average family is 9 persons, including children, there is a surplus of about 500 kilograms each year. Out of this must be deducted approximately 140 kilograms for next year's sowing for a net surplus of 360 kilos. Some of this will be given to the poor and the mullah at the mosque. Some of it will be sold on the bazaar either in the waliswalli or in the provincial capital. The point is that other income sources are necessary. Added income comes from growing barley, melons and livestock. However, livestock (mainly lurakul sheep) is concentrated in the holdings of a few of the wealthier villagers and does not provide income distribution to most of the village families.

One other source of income is selling snow and wood brush from the mountains on the bazaar in the provincial capital. One donkey load of snow can be sold for 20 afs. One cubic meter of brush sells for 40 afs. Several times a week during winter one or more male members of each family will walk to the provincial capital with 2 to 3 donkeys carrying brush and snow.

Farmers have discussed a permanent bridge across the Bokhari River and how this would benefit them. They have had many meetings, usually in the village mosques. The Tajik villagers have taken the lead in discussing the benefits and several Uzbek villagers have followed suit. Two meetings have been held in the large mosque of Shamsabad. The people see the benefits of the bridge as increased truck transport to Shamsabad. Most of the villages in the valley have access to this. They believe that with better roads and permanent bridges they will be able to send excess wheat, larger quantities of brush, snow, melons and some of the spun goods woven by the women to the provincial capital. They also believe that if trucks come up the valley they can bring supplies to Shamsabad which will expand the bazaar and make it easier to travel to the provincial capital. Some of the village leaders have pointed out that if a permanent bridge is constructed and more trucks go to Shamsabad the people will have to work to improve and maintain the present track. At every meeting, there has been agreement that this would be no problem: people will work on the road. The people understand how much the road would benefit them. Further, many villages have agreed to provide workers to help build the bridge.

Government Action

The petition for the bridge is presented to the RDD Director in the provincial capital after clearing it with the Sub-Governor in Shamsabad. In this case, the Sub-Governor strongly supports the petition. He is Tajik, as were the majority of the petitioners. The RDD Director travels to Shamsabad to meet with the Sub-Governor and people and to see the proposed site. The RDD Director asks what local contributions will be made by the people. He is told that local materials and voluntary labor will be provided. He is also told that, if necessary, the wealthier people of the valley will present a cash contribution to the Government for their help. With some of the local people, the RDD Director goes to the Governor with the petition. The Governor is enthusiastic about the bridge and forwards the request to the RDD in Kabul. At the same time, the Governor calls the Deputy Prime Minister's office and requests an appointment for the next time he is in Kabul. He also calls the President of RDD and they discuss the importance of the bridge for the people of Shareen Valley. The President promises to send a survey team as soon as possible. Both the Governor and President are aware that nothing will transpire until the Deputy Prime Minister has given his support to the construction of the bridge. The RDD has more projects than it can handle already, and the President of RDD has no reason to place this bridge before the others already designed.

The local people raise 25,000 afs as a cash contribution to the Government. The Governor meets with the Deputy Prime Minister, stressing the importance of the bridge and assuring him that the benefits of the bridge will not accrue to only a few in the valley. In fact, the bridge will probably change the cropping patterns of the valley to include heavy emphasis upon potato production by large and small landowners alike. The Governor, who has listened to foreign agricultural experts from India, has learned that potatoes will yield 7,000 kilograms on the same amount of land that will produce 280 kilos of wheat. This should not substantially more profit per unit of land for the farmers. Further, the Governor who is a trifle didactic having been a teacher most of his life, explains the nutritional value of potatoes when compared with wheat:

	<u>Wheat</u>	<u>Potato</u>
Carbohydrates	519	1,335
Proteins	81	139
Fats	10	7
Ash	7	69
Calorics	2,422	5,664

The Governor, who is the brother of the Minister of Communications, has the full confidence of the Deputy Prime Minister. They have known each other for many years. The Deputy Prime Minister telephones the President of RDD telling him that the Governor is in his office and they have been discussing an important bridge, and asks if the bridge could be built in the near future. The President explains that he has talked to the Governor about the bridge, knows its importance, and will send a survey team within several days.

Immediately after hanging up the phone, the President of RDD calls the RDD Director in a southern province where an RDD construction team is working on an irrigation intake. He asks the RDD Director to travel to the intake (3 hours from the provincial capital) and tell the engineer in charge to return immediately to Kabul for an important assignment. Next, he calls one of the UN engineers in his engineering office and asks him to make arrangements to go within 2 days to the Shareen Valley in the northern province to survey a bridge site. The RDD President then arranges for a jeep, driver, petrol coupons and 2 technicians to travel to Shareen Valley.

After one week, the survey team is mobilized and leaves for the north. On arrival, they pay a courtesy call on the Governor, listen to his explanation of the bridge and the people's need for it, and the following day they arrive in Shamsabad, after fording the river with difficulty. The temporary bridge had not been rebuilt since it was washed out in the spring. A large group of farmers from Tajik and Uzbek villages meet them and a large Tajik landowner and his brothers host a festive luncheon of greeting and friendship.

Discussion during the luncheon is primarily between the Sub-Governor and survey team. The other participants remain respectfully silent.

After luncheon, the entire assembly including 20 to 30 farmers go to the bridge site. Here another 10 farmers meet them and add their comments. They speak of the temporary bridge having been washed out every year for the past 10 and how they have to rebuild it. They tell of the time the bridge collapsed under the weight of a heavily loaded lorry. They tell the survey team exactly where the bridge should be, so as not to infringe upon any land under cultivation, or ownership rights.

The survey team listens and by nightfall the site discussion is complete and the team is offered quarters in Shamsabad in the guest room of their host at lunch.

The following morning the team goes to the site with their transit for the actual survey. They find that the location identified by the people the previous afternoon is inappropriate because of the width of the river and sandy soil where the abutments would have to be placed. They chose a site 25 meters upstream and completed the survey. During the day 50 more farmers (including Hazaras) visit the team and see the changed location. The team suggests a meeting that night to discuss the change.

At the meeting the team discovers that the best site for the bridge takes away about 20% of one sair of irrigated land from a moderately wealthy farmer. The farmer complains that he will lose 14 sair of wheat every year. Heated discussion ensues and continues late into the night. A decision is agreed upon to meet again the next afternoon in Shamsabad.

The next afternoon more than 100 farmers are present. Many have walked all day to attend the meeting. The landowner who would lose 20% of a sair of land raises the point that another site 70 meters downstream from the original site would not affect anyone's land. Another visit to the river follows. After inspection the survey team concludes that while the downstream site itself would not interfere with cultivated land, the road siting would have to change, causing another farmer to lose approximately 1 sair of land. Nobody can agree on exactly how much land would be lost because there is no agreement on the size of roadway needed.

The survey team decides to return to the provincial capital for the night, report to the Governor and return to Kabul the following day. They tell the people that when the people have solved the right-of-way problem among themselves, they will return to construct the bridge.

The next morning, the Governor assures them the dispute will be solved shortly and thanks them for their visit.

Two weeks later, the Governor calls the President of RDD advising him that the problem is solved and to proceed with a bridge design per the team's recommendation on the upstream site. The President agrees. However, designing is delayed because the survey engineer is back in the south completing the intake and the President decides to await his return. Forty days later, the engineer returns. In the interim, the Governor had called the President weekly pushing for action. Forty days and 3 weeks later a bridge design is completed. However, because the winter had come, there was no way to begin construction of the bridge until after the spring waters have receded. The people of the valley and Governor understand.

In the spring, at Nawroz (the New Year), the Governor of the province is reassigned and a new Governor is appointed. The Sub-Governor of Shamsabad is also reassigned and a new Sub-Governor replaces him. The original petitioners, now joined by others, visit the new Sub-Governor, who calls upon the RDD Director in the provincial capital to seek his advice. The Director remembers the project well and they call upon the new Governor and explain the situation. The Governor calls the President of RDD and is told the design is ready and as soon as possible he will send a construction team to build the bridge. In terms of priority, however, the bridge has dropped slightly on RDD's list because the new Governor is not lobbying so vigorously, and it is not until mid-fall that the construction team arrives at the site for construction. The team is equipped with two 5-ton trucks, a jeep and adequate technical personnel, including an engineer and a UN advisor.

However, on arrival at the site the team realizes that the Bokhari River has changed its course and widened slightly and the original design has to be changed to include a longer span, bigger pier and extended wingwalls. The engineer in charge telephones the President in Kabul for instructions. Should he return to Kabul to

116

redesign the bridge, or make on-site changes? The President tells him to proceed with on-site changes and when next in Kabul, during construction, he should make appropriate changes on the master design drawing.

Construction begins on Mizan 10 (October 1) and is completed on Jaddi 3 (December 24). Fourteen hundred man days of unskilled labor are used. Initially, the laborers came regularly and voluntarily, but later labor was conscripted by the new Sub-Governor. Paid masons and carpenters came from the provincial capital, and day-to-day construction supervision was carried out daily for 83 days by a 25-year old 12th-class vocational school graduate of the Afghan Institute of Technology, who lived in a tent at the site. He, in turn, was supervised by the project engineer and UN advisor, who made regular but infrequent visits during construction. It was anticipated that construction would take 45 days. Delays were caused by truck breakdowns, unavailability of steel for a time, and late cement arrivals. The labor requirements to complete the backfill necessary to raise the level of the road up to the height of the new bridge were also underestimated.

But the bridge was completed. An official ribbon-cutting ceremony attended by the Governor, most of his staff, the Sub-Governor, President of RDD, a mullah and 200 local farmers was held on Jaddi 4 (December 25) as the first snow fell on the village of Zarak. The first beneficiaries of the bridge were the men loading brush onto lorries in Shamsabad for sale in the Provincial Capital.

Nobody could tell how many people would directly benefit from the bridge. Nobody knew how much anyone would benefit. Nobody knew how many more trucks would come up the valley during the next year. Nobody knew about potato production. But hundreds of people praised the bridge and believed it would serve them well. And, perhaps most importantly, hundreds of people had seen the Government respond to their request.

Economic and social relationships which are affected by the bridge: Markets, Education, Health, Small Industries, Credit and Savings, and Income.

Marketing: By providing access to the outside world, the bridge makes the Valley bloom. The previously isolated and inbred economy of the Valley expands substantially. The town of Shamsabad

becomes a small boom town. The population grows several-fold. The number of shops triples. Shamsabad experiences its first traffic jam in 1357, when four lorries come together from four different directions at the crossroads of the town, and the drivers and their respective cleaners spend several hours fighting among themselves to see who should back up first. Most of the town becomes involved in the dispute, and one cleaner is hit over the head with a shovel and has to be medivac'd to the Provincial Capital. This is one example of the kind of social interaction which the new bridge brings to the previously calm and tranquil Shareen Valley.

More to the point, however, it is now substantially cheaper to bring things from Kabul to the Valley. Formerly the price for transporting one sair of goods fluctuated radically over the year. It ranged from a low of 9 afs when the river could be forded, to a high of more than 20 afs for most of the rest of the year. It averaged 16 afs. Now one sair averages 9 afs throughout the year, and the price never fluctuates more than an af or two even in the middle of the winter.

Several mini-bazaars have opened up in the villages around Shamsabad. Virtually every village now boasts a shop or two which sells salt, needles and thread, ink, kerosene, lanterns, cloth, plastic shoes, and condoms which the local children use as balloons.

Education: Because they have year-round access to the outside world, several families send their sons away to the high school in the Provincial Capital. One very progressive family even permits their oldest daughter to go to oive with relatives in the capital. She becomes the first girl in the history of the Valley to graduate from high school.

Health: The Woliswal's son is rushed to the capital at three o'clock one morning when his appendix ruptures...and is saved by the miracle of modern medicine, good luck, and the prayers of the local mullah. The demand for medical services increases as the villagers realize what kind of hospital the people in the Provincial Capital have. Over time the Government is compelled to provide better medical services to the Woliswal and to the surrounding villages.

Small Industries: Several industries develop directly or indirectly as a result of the bridge. The local handloom cloth that

the women weave and its embroidery becomes popular in Kabul and the production increases several-fold.

The Shareen Valley has always been famous for its fruits, but traditionally these were consumed locally. Only the pomegranates which matured late in the fall were exported. Now peaches, pears, apricots, figs, grapes and raisins all become important cash crops. Many sairs of fresh fruit are exported to Kabul. The remainder of the fruit crop is dried and exported as far away as India and the Persian Gulf.

A small tourist industry also develops in the Shareen Valley. There was a beautiful spring-fed lake back at the far end of the valley which was rarely seen by anyone except shepherds. Once the valley is opened year round, the local people build a motorable road up to the lake and the Government establishes a small park on its shores. A shrine is built on the edge of the lake honouring the memory of a local holy man. The lake becomes a popular spot for picnics and pilgrimages.

Credit and Savings: As the supply of available capital increases in the valley, the cost of money goes down while the amount of savings in absolute terms goes up. People have more money...there is more capital available...and people who need money to expand their businesses have more institutions - both formal and informal - to which they can turn for credit. The local money lenders, who used to operate in collusion with one another establishing usurious rates of interest up to 100 percent per month, are forced by the new economic realities to lower their rates of interest to 10 to 12 percent per month. One of them is driven out of the valley completely by the changing economic situation. He retreats to another more remote valley in the Hazarjat where he can still make what he regards as a decent return on his capital. Eventually the Government opens a branch of the Da Afghanistan Bank in Shamsabad.

Income: A leading Indian economist who has never been to Afghanistan before comes to the country for ten days, spends 9 of them in Kabul in discussions with various members of the Government and makes a one-day field trip to the Shareen Valley. Afterwards he writes a report which receives wide circulation, saying that the per capita income of the people in the valley has increased 500 percent.

An Afghan economist who is a professor at Kabul University with a Master's degree from Harvard, who serves as an unofficial advisor to the President of RDD, disputes this report and argues strongly that the per capita income cannot possibly have increased more than three times over what it was before the bridge was built.

The Second Secretary of the British Embassy, a sardonic chap with a notoriously stiff upper lip, who has spent all his adult life in the Middle East and who has watched the valley very closely since long before the bridge was built states categorically that it is impossible to measure per capita income accurately in Asia. However, when pushed up against the wainscotted wall of the British Ambassador's library one evening over numerous pink gins, he finally concedes that the per capita income may have doubled.

Everyone agrees that income has increased, and by subjective indexes, everyone feels that the people of the valley are better off now.

THE STORY OF A PETITION

At present within RDD there are several ways projects can be identified. For example, people in a village may directly contact the RDD Director or the Public Works Director. These directors if they agree with the project, take the matter to the Governor and lobby for his approval. Alternatively, many projects are requested by people at the local level through written petitions signed with numerous fingerprints. The petition usually was drafted at the village level, and presented to the Sub-Governor of the district who indicated his support on the petition and transmitted it to the Governor for his support. Most commonly a group of the petitioners travel with their document to the Governor to state their case orally.

What follows is a story of a petition presented to a Provincial Governor. The Governor has recently been assigned and is not familiar with the people of his province or the three petitioners who have travelled four and a half days on foot from a distant waliswalli. The petition requests the Government to assist in the construction of a permanent structure to carry irrigation water across a wash of 25 meters. Every Sawr and Jawza (April-May) the melting mountain snow turns the wash into a fast-moving river which destroys the hand-built and maintained irrigation canal (jui) which crosses the wash. The rock in the wash makes the annual repair extremely difficult for the people. The petitioners have been waiting to see the Governor for two hours in a crowded hallway outside his office. Thirty-five other petitioners, representing six groups from various parts of the province are also waiting for the Governor. The doorway outside the Governor's office is piled high with shoes which other petitioners have removed before entering into The Presence.

The petition in question has been signed by five persons, one of whom was the Sub-Governor who had written:

"The people who have received the good intentions and services of the Government and who hope to accompany the Government in its work to develop the country and people. The people say this is a beneficial project for the people. The people want it very much. I agree on my own observation and talking to provincial directors and they agree that it should be built within the limits of the Government's policies and programs and if the manufactured

materials can come from the Government which the Government can afford. The people say they can give all sand, stone, gravel and labor that is necessary. They also will give donkeys. I told them I would approve this if the Governor saw fit and sanctioned in accordance with official laws and regulations and Government development programs. With prayers to the prosperity of our country and people."

The petition also contained 53 fingerprints, said to represent 75 families. Ghulam Mohammed Khan, a large landowner with perhaps 100 jeribes (50 acres), is the respected leader of the three petitioners. Ghulam Mohammed had met the Governor on one other occasion. The other two petitioners remain nameless to the Governor who has no reason to know them or call them by name. Ghulam Mohammed is the leader. The other two men are also landowners, however.

After removing their shoes the three are ushered into the Governor's office by a constable of the Commandant. Seated inside are the Commandant, Provincial Directors of Education, Rural Development, and Transportation, several unidentified persons from the provincial capital, a local merchant and two junior officials visiting from the Ministry of Education in Kabul. It is late in Qaus (December) and the office is heated by a small wood-fired bokhari or stove. The floor of the Governor's large and spacious office is covered with machine made Oriental carpets. The walls are painted a bilious green. A picture of the Head of State framed in black glowers down from the wall above the Governor's desk. The desk is covered with piles of paper and other petitions. There is a small electric heater under the desk next to the Governor's feet.

The three petitioners approach the Governor who stands, leans across his desk and they shake hands. The Governor offers them tea. It is a ritual offer, perfunctorily made, and the three men decline deferentially.

Ghulam Mohammed Khan: "Greetings! Peace be upon you, Mr. Governor. May the blessings of Allah shower upon your exalted head."

Governor: "Come in! Come in! Greetings, Ghulam Mohammed Khan."

Landowner #1: "Peace be upon you, Mr. Governor. How are you, sir?"

Governor: "Greetings! Please sit."

Landowner #1: "Mr. Governor, greetings. I hope Mr. Governor is in good health. We pray...."

Landowner #2: "We are your servants, sir. How are your children?"

Governor: "Thank you very much. Sit down. Please sit down."

Ghulam: "I hope your Excellency Mr. Governor is in good health. The people are happy under the shadow of your kindness and grace. We are praying that the Government be prosperous and in its elevated position. We are sure that everything will be in the right order."

Governor: "The Government is for the people. It's your government!"

Landowner #1: "The prosperity of the Government is our prosperity. May God Almighty give you more power. Your kind sir has done so much for this province."

Landowner #2: "Our children are praying for you. We poor people can only pray..."

Governor: "For the name of God and under the guidance and auspices of the State, development and prosperity will come to our country. We have to depend on and trust our people."

Ghulam: "We are in your service with our hearts and our souls."

(Pause)

Governor: "What news do you have? What work do you have?"

Ghulam Mohammed Khan rises and hands the Governor the petition. The Governor takes several minutes to read the document then looks to Ghulam.

Governor: "Your crops did better this year?"

Ghulam: "What can I say to your kindness, sir? Crops were not bad, for God is merciful. We increased the corn. However, some of our crops were burnt from lack of water."

Landowner #1: "We grew some cotton, sir. But cotton also needs water."

Ghulam: "Actually we grew very little cotton because we have a big problem with water. We don't have enough water. If we had more water, for instance, we could increase our yields of wheat from 10:1 to 100:1...."\*

Landowner #2: "During the drought we only got 0.5:1. It was a very bad time. But God is kind."

Ghulam: "It was very bad. But now it is bad too. With the price of wheat so low, 10 to 1 keeps us very poor men."

Governor: "How much fertilizer have you been using?"  
The Governor pauses then answers his own question. "We have not been able to get fertilizer transported to that part of the province. We have to work on roads."

---

\* 10:1 means ten sair of wheat would be reaped from every sair of wheat sown. One sair equals approximately 7 kilograms.

The Governor starts to turn to the Director of Transportation, stops himself and turns back to the petitioners.

Ghulam: "It is too difficult for us, Mr. Governor. We don't have enough water. If we had enough water we wouldn't need the new seeds and fertilizer. If we had enough water, we could increase wheat to 100 to 1. Just water. That's all we need."

The Governor knows little of agriculture. He was trained and has served most of his life as a teacher and headmaster, and he decides to change the subject.

Governor: "Tell me about this project. What will it do?"

Ghulam describes the project, generously using his hands, emphasizing that the jui which crosses the 25-meter wash carries all irrigation water available for the land on which 75 families live. He says it takes 50 men four weeks each year to repair and maintain the wash crossing and even then a great deal of water is lost in the wash through leakage. He says there is enough water in the jui for all the land, again speaking of 100:1 production, meaning the ratio of seed sown to the crop reaped. He also points out that the people practice a high degree of crop diversification. Rather than concentrate on one or two crops, the farmers grow a variety of foods -- sesame, lentils, corn and melons -- for local needs. Food production for local consumption as distinct from marketing is the primary interest. Better water supply will enable them to increase or at least maintain their diversification.

The Governor asks how much a permanent structure for the wash crossing would cost.

Ghulam: "Maybe 10,000 afs., sir. It does not cost very much...."

The Director of RDD laughs derisively and then everybody in the office begins to argue about the cost. The Director states authoritatively that it would cost more than one lakh (100,000 afghanis) but he must see the project. He has seen the area only once. He is also new in the province.

Ghulam: (turning to the Director of RDD) "When will you come?"

RDD Director: "After one day or two days. Whatever Mr. Governor orders."

Governor: "Yes, it is important for you to see the project. You should go soon. You should survey the project." (He is aware that the RDD Director is a graduate of the Faculty of Letters and knows little about surveying.)  
"When you return with a report, I will do something. God willing."

Ghulam, Landowner #1 and Landowner #2: "Thank you, sir. Thank you. May God give you a long life."

The Governor tells Ghulam and his friends that maybe they could go back to their village with the RDD Director in his jeep. Thereupon a long discussion among everyone present ensues about the road to the village. Conclusion: the present tract is not motorable, but when the RDD Director comes, Ghulam and others will meet him halfway with some good horses.

The meeting described occurred during December 1972. By December 1974, only the Governor had visited Ghulam's village. The wash and jul were seen by the Governor and he sent the petition to RDD in Kabul, but no survey has been made. Ghulam believes that someday, someone will come. And, he is probably right. Someday.

There are thousands of projects like Ghulam's throughout the country. They have been identified by local people. We do not know how much land Ghulam's project would benefit or how many people. We do know he overstated the seed to production ratio. We are unsure of the participatory process which led to the petition. However, the chances are probable that there was much participation and local debate and that the people thought that it was a good project which would benefit them by increasing production and maintaining diversification. Marketing, in this case, probably is irrelevant for the immediate future.

POWER, THE FAMILY, AND LOCAL POLITICS

Power in Afghanistan is generally associated with two things: wealth in land or animals and a large kin group willing to support the individual. Within rural Muslim society, the family unit is extended, patrilineal, patrilocal in residence, patriarchal, endogamous, and occasionally polygynous. The family unit is the basic unit within the social and power structures. Its characteristics tell much about the associated values of the total society.

Most action and organization at the village level is focused on the household unit of a patrilineage. Households within any given community are linked in the same manner. The household is the unit to which the most basic loyalties are attached. It is the most immediate unit to which responsibility is attached for any one member's action. It is the group to which a member is responsible in a blood feud. Typically the household unit is large and extended; it contains more than two generations; and it provides protection and power, politically and physically. Commonly, the wealthier and more politically powerful households will remain intact while poorer units will fragment or disappear. The extended family is based on a patrilineage which lives together and generally places the authority role with the oldest male, provided he is physically able and mentally fit. It is a system which equates age with knowledge and wisdom. To further solidify and strengthen kin ties, the unit tends to be endogamous. The commonly preferred marriage pattern is with father's-brother's-daughter, the first cousin of the patrilineage. This patrilineage may be geographically expanded through a region, by fact or fictitious patri-ties. It may take the form of clans or tribal groups who associate themselves with a common ancestor.

The fragmentation of the extended family unit may generally result in the breakdown of some traditional values relating to kin group loyalties, authority, or marriage choice. It may at the same time open up a broader range of contacts, change the dependency patterns within the culture, or make possible more meaningful social intercourse than was previously possible or necessary. The increased number of independent nuclear families, together with the fragmentation of the extended unit, is sometimes positively associated with social and economic development.

In Afghanistan, however, it must be viewed with mixed feelings. On the one hand the traditional extended family may be inwardly focused,

socially isolated, limited in world view, and dominated by conservative elders who have difficulty accepting change. On the other hand, there are few institutions at the rural level which would discipline and mobilize the fragmented units of land and other wealth associated with the nuclear family.

For settled communities of farmers, the power structure will vary by land tenure patterns. In areas of subsistence agriculture where many households have small and nearly equal amounts of land, the power will be fragmented among a number of households. In areas where most landholdings are concentrated in a few hands, power and control of resources - for example, water - will also be concentrated.

In the Helmand Valley, the Khan is a landowner around whom a village is organized. Usually the village will be referred to by the khan's name. The residents generally will be the khan's sharecroppers, farm laborers, servants, relatives, or individuals with some other political tie. In some cases, the khan will be the administratively recognized village headman or malik. In other cases the real power structure will be somewhat withdrawn and rather than assume the role of malik himself, a wealthy khan will have one of his political subordinates fill the role. In some cases, the khan will be the mirab or watermaster who controls the irrigation water distribution. Distribution of water usually will be for an area larger than one village. If a khan does not fill the role of mirab, he will have a major voice in the selection. Under such a structure the system of patronage for sharecroppers, farm labor and other small landowners in the area may be highly developed and complex, because it is the basis for local political affiliation. The patron has the responsibility to look after the interests of those who work for him and politically support him. The ideal qualities of a patron, as landowner or khan, are roughly the same as those for a Governor.

A khan has obligations to his supporters but he also has broader obligations to the community as a whole, because he is a man with worldly goods. Ideally, he will be pious and in the name of religion will perform religiously defined good acts (sawab) for the good of the community as a whole or for needy individuals. For example, he might build a mosque, a fountain, or some other community facility, aid the poor and destitute, support the mosque with firewood, or pay the lion's share for maintaining the mullah who leads the community in prayer.

In Afghanistan as virtually everywhere else, the personality of the individual determines his effectiveness in filling his role. It makes him

more or less legitimate in the eyes of those with whom he works. It is a sociological and psychological truth that people usually try to meet the expectations others have for them, but sometimes the individual personality characteristics get in the way. The eldest member of a family may be a fool and other members of the extended unit will attempt to reduce <sup>his influence</sup> or by-pass him. The same may be true of other authority figures.

On the rural level, personality is virtually everything. The villager is not open to impersonal appeals from strangers. He has the personal orientation of a small-scale society. It is a society based on kin ties, with limited social contact outside a limited group. It is a group where the individual knows everyone personally. Often everyone in a group will be related. They all face the same problems, have the same livelihood, and have similar views of the world. All of this makes project planning difficult on a national scale.

From this we conclude that social analysis must be a definite part of rural projects at the planning and implementation stage if the projects are to succeed. Anything less is a recipe for developmental tragedy.

RDD CHARTER

(United Nations Unofficial Translation)

PROCEDURES OF THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

PART I. GENERAL

- Article 1: These procedures are based on article 8 of the enclosure, published 15th Asad 1351, of the Organization Constitution.
- Article 2: The Rural Development Department operates in the Prime Minister's Office for administration of development programs.
- Article 3: Aims of the Department
- The basic aim of the department is development of all sectors of rural areas through the administration of economic and social programs for the public benefit and upgrading the standards of rural life at a stage where economic development of the villages depends on the people of the villages.
- Article 4: Persuasion of people for taking part in national life in general and for economic development in particular, to narrow the existing economic and social gaps between city and village, is the final goal of the rural development department.

PART II. ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES

- Article 5: The policy of the Rural Development Department will be determined by the High Council of the RDD. The following persons will be members of the Cabinet:
1. Deputy Prime Minister
  2. Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation
  3. Minister of Mines and Industries
  4. Minister of Education

5. Minister of Public Health
6. Minister of Planning

The President of the Rural Development Department will be Secretary to the Council.

**Article 6:** Guidance in the following matters is the duty of the High Council:

- i) Determination of areas, for administration of programs, all over the country.
- ii) Determination on the priority of Rural Development Program.
- iii) Annual assessment of the activities of Rural Development Department and a revision of its programs.

**Article 7:** Rural Development Department is an integral part of the general economic and social development program of the government.

**Article 8:** Upgrading the standards of living, through expansion of developmental activities in fields of agriculture and irrigation, energy and industries, communications and transport, drinking water supply, education, health, environmental health, establishment of cooperative in agriculture, husbandry, industry, consumers, goods building of houses and provision of other socio-economic public services comprises the rural development programs.

**Article 9:** The Rural Development Department comprises the Central Office, Agencies, Provincial Committees and subprovincial committees.

**Article 10:** Obligations of the Central Office are:-

- i) Socio-Economic study of areas where development programs are to be carried out.
- ii) Economic and Technical Study of projects included in the rural development programs.

- iii) Preparation of annual plans as well as five-year plans.
- iv) Preparation of budget-forms, according to accounting procedures, and submission of them to Ministry of Planning for actions on budgetary allocation.

**Article 11:** To avoid duplication of projects under Rural Development Program and under other programs and to coordinate the activities of the Rural Development Department, a Committee, with the President of the Department presiding will be assigned with the following members:-

- i) President, Agricultural Extension, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.
- ii) President, Primary Education, Ministry of Education.
- iii) President, Illiteracy Campaign Department.
- iv) President, Statistics.
- v) President, Public Health, Ministry of Public Health.
- vi) President, Industries, Ministry of Mines and Industries.
- vii) President, Agricultural Bank.
- viii) President, Planning, Ministry of Planning.

This Committee advises the Rural Development Department in Planning and establishment of coordination in activities of the Department.

PART III:            FINANCIAL SOURCES

**Article 12:** The Rural Development Program will be financed by the following sources:-

- i) Governmental Budget.
- ii) Foreign aid.
- iii) Agricultural Bank.
- iv) Assistance of people.

**Article 13:** Foreign aid will be sought, for financing the Rural Development Program in necessary cases, from international sources or from friendly countries under favorable conditions.

**Article 14:** Use will be made of the Agricultural Bank in financing the Rural Development Programs, particularly in fields of establishment of agricultural and animal husbandry cooperatives, provision of agricultural tools and equipments to farmers.

**Article 15:** Share of people will be determined according to the financial strength of the people of areas where Rural Development Programs are to be carried out.

PART IV: ORGANIZATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE

**Article 16:** To ensure a better coordination of activities and to ensure optimum use of the existing resources in executing the program and supervision of rural development activities in fields of labour, the Rural Development Committee will be organized in centers and provinces of the country.

**Article 17:** The Committee will be composed of the Governor, presiding, and the members will be:-

- i) Heads of concerned offices in Ministries, Heads of offices in provinces.
- ii) Woleswali.
- iii) Representative of people selected by the Governor.
- iv) Chief Rural Development who will also act as Secretary.

Article 18: Decisions of the Committee will be acted upon after study by the central office of Rural Development Department and in cases related to Government policies, and after provision of government's authorization.

Article 19: Obligations of the Committee will be:-

- i) Finding needs of people and collection of requests of people for selection of projects fitting in the framework of Rural Development Programs through contact with people.
- ii) Supervision of authorized programs.
- iii) Attraction of people's cooperation in collective labors.

Article 20: These procedures are effective after being published in the Official Gazzettee.

Unofficial Translation  
from the United Nations

<u>PROVINCES</u>	<u>UNPAVED ROADS IN KILOMETERS</u>
Badakshan	520
Badghis	500
Baghlan	260
Balkh	606
Bamiyan	480
Farah	1,140
Fariab	490
Gazni	1,286
Ghor	760
Helmand	833
Herat	683
Jozjan	470
Kabul	80
Kandahar	1,024
Kunduz	251
Laghman	112
Logar	195
Nangarhar	362
Nimroz	960
Paktia	920
Parwan	440

<u>PROVINCES</u>	<u>UNPAVED ROADS IN KILOMETERS</u>
Samangan	325
Takhar	450
Urozgan	570
Wardak	375
Zabul	428
	<hr/>
	14,520

Proj. No. 306-51-995-131

LIST OF WATER RESOURCE PROJECTS DESIGNED

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>PROJECTS</u>
Parwan	Diversion dam Wash crossing Diversion canal 2 Canal intakes Canal protection
Nangrahar	9 Canal intakes 6 Canal protections 3 River protection walls 3 Wash crossings
Laghman	4 Canal protections 3 Wash crossings 2 Canal intakes 3 River protection walls
Kabul	3 Canal intakes Canal protection Water treatment
Logar	2 Dam intakes River protection wall Wash crossing
Ghor	Diversion dam and canal Canal intake 2 Spring development
Badghis	City flood protection
Jozjan	Canal intake Irrigation dam repair work Erosion protection structure
Baghlan	Irrigation canal

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>PROJECTS</u>
Takhar	Flood protection walls Spillway Saltmine Irrigation dam Canal intake and protection walls against flood
Badakhshan	2 Canal intakes Irrigation canal 2 Potable water projects
Kandahar	Canal intake 3 Wash crossings Flood protection walls Flume and foot bridge Spring-fed irrigation canal
Nimroz	Canal intake
Zabul	Water pump site
Samangan	Wash crossing Flume structure Intake and diversion dam
Farah	Flood protection for the city Irrigation canal with protection walls Canal protection walls 2 Irrigation canals
Oruzgan	Diversion dam and canal intake Canal crossing over road 3 Wash crossings Canal extension Spring canal

PROVINCE

PROJECTS

Ghazni

2 Wash crossings  
Spillway  
Well  
Spring improvement

Bamiyan

Irrigation canal  
2 Dams  
Canal intake

LIST OF BRIDGES DESIGNED

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>NO. OF BRIDGES</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
Kabul	4	Saray Noorak Bridge (Saddle Bridge) Arghanday Khom-e-Zargar Qala-e-Wahed
Logar	2	Naser Gomran
Nangrahar	2	Shigal (Arch Bridge) Welgal (Beam Bridge)
Laghman	3	Alisheng Tarange Islamabad (Arch Bridge) Milam Alisheng Chakarman (Saddle Bridge)
Parwan	4	Sadeqi Sadullah Barikab (Saddle Bridge) Tagab
Badakhshan	3	Kazdeh Chakaran Katabala
Takhar	2	Badgozar Saqa
Kunduz	3	Shirmahi Zabor Gawkosh
Jozjan	2	Kotokjar Sar-e-Pol
Faryab	3	Shordarya (Arch Bridge) Som-e-sya (Arch Bridge) Safeld

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>NO. OF BRIDGES</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
Badghis	1	Kharestan (Beam Bridge)
Ghor	3	Dawlatyar Chagh-charan Dawlatyar
Bamiyan	5	Syadarah Soltan Kobata Kakrak Ahangaran Khwaja Nawazgah
Wardak	3	Terkhe Zyarat Aqchi (Saddle Bridge) Sadmardah
Paktia	1	Yaqubi
Ghazni	5	Khwaja Omeri Noborjah Godal Qandahari Char borjah Qarabagh
Oruzgan	1	Chora (Saddle Bridge)
Nimroz	1	Chakhansur

COPY

Memorandum To: All Division Chiefs  
From : Vincent W. Brown, Director  
Subject : Fixed Cost Reimbursement Procedure

The attached memorandum, dated December 10, 1974, provides guidance in the application of the Fixed Cost Reimbursement Procedure. The guidance should be followed in developing new projects which may be suitably financed through use of this technique. As we gain more experience with the FCR procedure, we will reexamine and perhaps modify the guidance set forth in the paper.

Please ask members of your staff to read the memorandum.

COPY

Memorandum To: Mr. Frederick Sligh, DD      Date: December 10, 1974

From                 : Terrence J. McMahon, CO

Subject              : Policy Proposal for the Fixed Cost  
Reimbursement Procedure

1. The DAC has met twice to discuss the Fixed Cost Reimbursement procedure. We have considered the basic elements of the procedure as described in AIDTO Circular 513 and have reviewed our experience with the Rural Works pilot project. Our concern now is that the procedure be efficiently and prudently applied to future construction projects involving schools, basic health centers, irrigation systems and additional rural works. This paper attempts to summarize the essential points discussed during our meetings.

2. Legitimate Cost Factors

When possible, it is advisable for AID's reimbursement to be determined on the basis of readily identifiable items such as those goods and services which the implementing agency must buy through contracts or other procurement procedures. Ideally, AID will cover additional costs incurred by grantees or borrowers in project implementation. This approach generally will preclude AID financing of regular salaries and overhead costs incurred by these agencies. It is important that the reimbursement amount be determined from cost estimates that are clearly definable as legitimate.

Additional cost financing may not be practical for all projects; when projects are constructed through use of Borrower/Grantee-owned equipment and directly employed engineering staff and labor force, the "additional" material cost may not represent a sufficient increment. The RDD project has also demonstrated the educational value of cost estimating assistance, and we are financing a percentage of virtually all cost components other than administrative overhead.

The clearly identifiable and "additional cost" approaches described above should be followed in applying the fixed cost reimbursement procedure to the majority of projects and should be accepted as the general rule. Exceptions can be considered after cost components are identified during the project planning process.

3. The 25 Percent Requirement

Section 110 (a) of the FAA requires that 25% of the costs of AID-financed projects and programs be borne by the recipient government. This provision will not necessarily limit AID financing to 75 percent of reimbursable estimated costs. The "additional cost" approach, which should explicitly identify reimbursable costs; will not include budgeted Borrower/Grantee (B/G) costs which are attributable to the project and which may be estimated to determine compliance with the legislation. AID might then finance a fixed percentage higher than 75% after having concluded that the GOA will still meet the legislative intent through attribution of B/G costs to the project. We should take a conservative position in establishing percentage reimbursements above 75% to be certain that compliance with Section 110 (a) is clearly determined.

4. Cost Estimating

AID's reimbursement amount is ideally fixed before project inception on the basis of detailed and justifiable cost estimates. Deficiencies in the estimating process may result in payments which are substantially less or more than actual project costs. Extreme variations between payments and actual costs will produce critical implementation problems and discredit the fixed cost reimbursement procedure. Provisions are going to have to be made to document the basis for the cost estimates and to justify the estimates as not above market value.

Cost estimating should improve with experience. Consequently, we should attempt to divide projects into logical segments which can be financed sequentially. Cost estimating deficiencies identified during the course of implementing any segment may then be remedied before estimating and "fixing" the amount to be reimbursed for the next segment. This technique may be accomplished through ProAg amendments to incrementally increase funding or by subordinate agreements such as those now being used for the RDD Project.

5. Negotiation of Reimbursement Amount

Reimbursement should normally be established in dollars based on the exchange rate at the time of negotiation. This procedure will prevent the problem of insufficient funds, to cover the agreed upon level of activity, arising from deteriorations in the value of the dollar. We have established a procedure for the Rural Works project which results in the Afghani estimate being converted to dollars at the exchange rate in effect on the date the USAID Director signs the individual project agreement. The RDD then assumes the risk of exchange rate gains or losses from date of signing to date of payment.

There are several advantages to establishing the dollar amount at the time we agree to the reimbursable cost. The most obvious problem of converting Afghani reimbursable costs to dollars on the reimbursement date is that the dollar amount of grant funds committed for an individual project segment cannot be accurately determined until payment is made. Practical application of this policy of converting at time of negotiation will require project planning which precludes a long elapse of time between agreement dates and payment dates.

6. Renegotiation Provisions

Unexpected events beyond the control of U. S. or Afghan Governments may occur during project implementation which will justify renegotiation of the reimbursement amount. Such events would include dollar devaluations and natural disasters but would not include ordinary cost overruns or other variations between estimated and actual costs. We should not open the door to a variety of renegotiation petitions, but it may be advisable to include a ProAg provision for renegotiation if an event occurs which materially affects the implementation of the project. In order to make it legitimate for the Mission to renegotiate when external factors make it desirable, it may be desirable to state an "Intent" when specifying reimbursement, such as "the intent is to reimburse for a listed bill of materials."

7. Implementing Agency Cash Flows

We must determine that the GOA will have available the cash necessary for operations before projects are undertaken. Additionally, we must review the adequacy of total project funding to determine if the implementing agency can complete the project before receiving

the reimbursement from AID. Advances can be made and subsequently recovered through deductions from reimbursements, but providing advances partially defeats the primary purpose of the fixed cost reimbursement procedure, i. e., that the implementing agency will assume the risks of poor project management. If advances must be made to assure project achievement, no more than 10 to 15% of U.S. funds should be "at risk."

We may wish to require the use of a "blocked" bank account to ensure that funds are available before projects are undertaken. This concept would require that the GOA deposit funds in a local bank account and that the funds be used by the implementing agency solely for project costs. AID reimbursements for completed segments of the overall project could also be deposited in the blocked account if the GOA wishes to avoid total advance funding.

We do not know how the GOA will budget funds for these projects or how reimbursements will be treated. The Ministry of Finance may provide total project financing and require that reimbursements be paid directly to the Ministry, or implementing agencies may be given only the GOA portion of project financing. It would be advisable for us to meet first with the Ministry of Planning to discuss the FCR procedure in detail and to then suggest that Planning meet with Finance. We should attend this latter meeting to provide explanations and offer suggestions, but the Ministry of Planning should initiate these discussions with the Ministry of Finance.

#### 8. Unacceptable Work

Prospective B/C's should be cautioned that reimbursements will not be made for completed projects which fail to meet predetermined requirements. Unacceptable work and denial of reimbursements will obviously produce severe problems for the implementing agency. Unacceptable construction can be minimized or prevented through application of adequate construction standards and properly-timed, adequately-performed engineering inspections.

One problem we must face is that of assuring that the implementing agency does not get an unabsorbably large investment in a sub-standard project before the issue of substandard work is raised. That is, the realities are that we will get into a difficult political situation if a GOA agency gets a large (by its standards) commitment which we refuse to reimburse because of our assertion of sub-standard work. At least in the beginning, our rate of inspection

must be adequate to prevent the occurrence of situations where the GOA's losses are so great that they would seriously fight nonreimbursement.

9. Construction Standards and Inspections

The social and economic requirements for AID-financed projects can be evaluated before construction is undertaken, and we can assume that these requirements will be met to our satisfaction as a prerequisite to project approval. Acceptance of the project for reimbursement will therefore be essentially an engineering determination. The USAID engineer will approve design plans and construction specifications, inspection plans, project sites and final construction. No reimbursements will be made until the Controller receives a certification from the USAID Engineer that the project has been completed in accordance with predetermined standards and specifications.

Project plans must clearly state how and when inspection will take place, the standards to be employed, the procedures for certification and rejection, the channels for communicating deviations, the GOA commitment to the procedures and the GOA's obligation to react.

10. Uniformity of Approach

There will be a wide variety of implementation procedures followed in completion of future FCR projects, and we should expect a similar variety of financing requirements. There will probably be variations in our approach to "additional cost" financing, percentage of reimbursement and perhaps advances. These variations should be determined on the basis of suitability for project implementation and should be explained to implementing agencies before project agreements are finalized. We must avoid giving the impression of multiple standards in applying the FCR procedure.

11. Audit

Borrowers and grantees should be advised that the Fixed Cost Reimbursement Procedure cannot preclude legal requirements for right of audit.

PROJECT REIMBURSEMENT AGREEMENT

CLEARANCE SHEET

Name.

RDD

	<u>Date</u>
Director Engineering .....	_____ / _____
Estimator.....	_____ / _____
Design Officer.....	_____ / _____

USAID

Project Manager.....	_____ / _____
Engineer .....	_____ / _____
Controller.....	_____ / _____
Program Officer .....	_____ / _____

Total Fixed cost to be Reimbursed by USAID \_\_\_\_\_ afs. to  
be paid in U.S. dollars.

PROJECT REIMBURSEMENT AGREEMENT

Project Name:

Project Location:

Project Number:

Estimated calendar days for construction:

In accordance with Project Agreement No. 306-51-995-131 and the Memorandum of Understanding dated July 9, 1974, USAID agrees upon satisfactory completion of this project, and receipt of the project certification as described in Paragraph 4 of the Memorandum of Understanding, to reimburse 75 percent of the agreed total estimated cost. Payment shall be made by U.S. dollar check. The USAID reimbursement will be based on the free market exchange "buying" rate for U.S. dollar checks as recorded by the La Afghanistan Bank on the date the Director of USAID signs this agreement below. Accordingly, the total fixed amount shall be 75 percent of Afs. \_\_\_\_\_ (equal to Afs \_\_\_\_\_), payable in U.S. dollars at the rate of Afs. \_\_\_\_\_ equals \$ 1.00. The total dollar amount payable shall then equal \$ \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 President, RDD (Date)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Director, USAID (date)

Estimated Cost Calculation for USAID/Afghanistan Reimbursement

Total Costs Categories I - VIII \_\_\_\_\_

Less Voluntary Contributions

Labor \_\_\_\_\_

Materials \_\_\_\_\_

Cash \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Subtotal \_\_\_\_\_

Less Administrative Overhead

Planning \_\_\_\_\_

Construction, \_\_\_\_\_  
Supervision,  
Inspection

\_\_\_\_\_  
Subtotal \_\_\_\_\_

Plus 10% Contingencies \_\_\_\_\_

Total Estimated Cost for USAID Reimbursement \_\_\_\_\_

75% of Estimated Cost for USAID Reimbursement \_\_\_\_\_

USAID Fixed Cost Reimbursement Total \_\_\_\_\_

100

Agreed Specifications, Standards















VI

Planning

A. Economic and Social Survey

Kabul Personnel	#	Rank/Grade	@ Travel Days	@ Site Days	Total Mandays	Salary Day	Per Diem	Cost

Total Mandays \_\_\_\_\_ Subtotal \_\_\_\_\_

Provincial Personnel

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Total Mandays \_\_\_\_\_ Subtotal \_\_\_\_\_

Economic and Social Survey Total \_\_\_\_\_

15% Administrative overhead \_\_\_\_\_

TOTAL \_\_\_\_\_

117

VI

Planning

B. Engineering Feasibility Survey

Kabul Personnel	#	Rank Grade	@ Travel Days	@ Site Days	Total Mandays	Salary Day	Per Diem	Cost

Total Mandays \_\_\_\_\_ Subtotal \_\_\_\_\_

Provincial Personnel

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Total Mandays \_\_\_\_\_ Subtotal \_\_\_\_\_

Engineering Feasibility Survey total \_\_\_\_\_

15% Administrative Overhead \_\_\_\_\_

TOTAL \_\_\_\_\_

113







MEMORANDUM TO: Controller, USAID/Afghanistan

In accordance with Section IV D of Annex A of Project Agreement Number 306-11-995-131 and Paragraph 4 of the Memorandum of Understanding between USAID and the Rural Development Department of July 8, 1974, this certifies that \_\_\_\_\_ has been completed according to specifications and recognized engineering standards under the direction of the Rural Development Department and is therefore eligible for reimbursement of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ per the fixed-cost reimbursement agreement signed by the President of the Rural Development Department and Mission Director of USAID/A on \_\_\_\_\_.

You are therefore requested to authorize payment of the agreed fixed-cost reimbursement in the amount of \$ \_\_\_\_\_ to the Rural Development Department, Prime Ministry, Government of Afghanistan.

_____	Date _____
Design Engineer, RDD	
_____	Date _____
Construction Engineer, RDD	
_____	Date _____
Chief Engineer, USAID/A	
_____	Date _____
Project Manager, USAID/A	
_____	Date _____
President, RDD	

17

ENGINEERING MONITORING AND INSPECTION

Appendix to proposed rural projects in development of health centers, schools and infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and irrigation works.

**I. INTRODUCTION**

The FY 75 and FY 76 Mission project papers involve 119 rural work projects, 91 basic health centers and 170 school sites, all of which will require a coordinated and uniform Mission approach to the engineering design, construction monitoring, and inspection inputs. Planning is ongoing for a small-scale irrigation project the size of which is as yet unknown. Concurrent with this Mission need it has also become apparent as a result of discussions, field inspections and meetings with GOA technical staffs that there is a common need for the establishment of design and construction standards and monitoring organizations which will assure that those construction activities receiving AID financial support will meet appropriate standards.

These projects will be financed under the fixed cost reimbursement procedure which stresses the GOA's responsibility for producing the planned outputs of a project. Of primary importance under this system is agreement as to identification and delineation of projects, and their costs, prior to the start of actual work. This requires that details of design and construction be established beforehand and then strictly followed to assure that projects completed will meet the requirements for reimbursement. The engineering monitoring/inspection role described below is necessary to attainment of long lasting quality work and to assure the financial integrity of AID's investment.

**II. ENGINEERING SCOPE OF WORK****1. Approval of Project Designs and Specifications**

This is the first step necessary to agreement between the GOA and USAID as to a project's or subproject's physical configuration and arrangement, the specific materials to be used, and specifications for the manner in which they are to be assembled. The location and site conditions for each project are unique and require close study and agreement to preclude construction of projects on unsuitable plots or at undesirable locations.

The establishment of adequate standards for design and construction is required in order that the designer's intent can be understood, and a determination made as to adequacy of the plans. It is not the intent that USAID or any USAID contractor would provide assistance to the GOA in improving their capability to design projects, write specifications, or establish standards, since the UN and other agencies are providing this expertise, but rather to emphasize that these inputs are needed to enable USAID to determine whether plans submitted are adequate.

2. Selection of Cost Estimating Procedures

Detailed forms for the identification of project labor and material components will be prepared and used for identifiable, direct project costs. The forms used in the Rural Works pilot project have been developed from field experience and revised as dictated by project implementation needs. These forms are recommended for use on other projects. The objective here is to develop the simplest system for estimating costs that will meet USAID's need to justify costs and assure reasonableness of price when compared to market prices. This is not expected to create great problems in project implementation.

3. Construction Monitoring and Inspection

This aspect of project implementation will be very time consuming because of the wide dispersal of projects throughout Afghanistan and their rural location where access is most difficult. Normally, sites would be visited at least once prior to the start of construction, during construction, and after completion of construction. Ad hoc visits would also be made as needed to cover troublesome projects. Little difference in monitoring requirements is expected to be encountered between projects being built by force account as distinguished from projects being built by local construction contractors.

This creates an extremely heavy monitoring and inspection workload during FY 76 and FY 77 which the Mission field can best be handled by a contract with a construction management firm.

III. OPTIONS FOR OBTAINING A USAID MONITORING/INSPECTION CAPABILITY

There are several options for securing the engineering capability discussed above in the areas of drawing and specifications review and construction monitoring

124

and inspection:

1. A U.S. firm;
2. A "Selected Free World" Code 941 Source Country firm;
3. An Afghan firm or agency.

The use of a U.S. firm for this work would result in contract costs exceeding 20 percent of the value of all construction and is therefore prohibitively high. The use of an Afghan firm or semi-private agency such as Afghan Construction Unit (ACU) or the Helmand Arghandab Construction Unit (HACU), although desirable, cannot be recommended at this time because of the limited number of trained personnel available and reservations concerning the availability of personnel that could perform objectively in an environment where social and family pressures could be brought to bear on the inspection work.

The USAID's recommended approach is the use of a "Selected Free World" Code 941 Source firm (e.g., Indian, Philippine, Korean, Egyptian) to supply the needed services. This arrangement would be less costly than securing the services of a U.S. firm. The costs developed below are based on this option.

The proposed contract would involve a maximum of seven persons and would cover an initial period of 12 months with provision for extension if required. Manning of the contract team would be geared to the actual progress of the projects with the first members arriving in country early in FY 76.

#### IV. CONTRACT SUPERVISION

This contract would be supervised by the Capital Development and Engineering Division. The three direct-hire engineers will assure coordination among the Mission's technical divisions overseeing the rural projects and the contractor for monitoring and inspection. The direct-hire staff would also actively spot-check the work of the contractor. As experience is gained in these projects it may be possible to reduce the number of site inspection visits and reduce project monitoring costs. This could only be accomplished, however, after the capacity of the GOA agencies has been developed and tested and the credibility of the firmness of USAID monitoring is clearly established.

125

V. REQUIREMENTS AND COSTS

A. Work to be Accomplished in Two Years

<u>RURAL SCHOOLS</u>	<u>No. of Visits</u>	<u>Ave. # Days Per Visit</u>	<u>Total Field Days</u>	<u>Corrective follow-up Days (20%)</u>	<u>Total Field Days</u>
(sites to be inspected)					
1st year - 169	3	1.0	527	65	392
2nd year - 61	3	1.0	183	37	<u>220</u>
Total - Rural Schools					612
<u>RURAL WORKS</u>					
Projects					
1st year - 70	3	2.0	420	84	504
Roads					
2nd year - 13	2	2.0	52	10	<u>62</u>
Sub-total - 1st year					(566)
Projects					
2nd year - 29	3	2.0	174	35	209
Roads					
2nd year - 7	2	2.0	28	6	<u>34</u>
Sub-total - 2nd year					<u>(243)</u>
Total - Rural Works					809
<u>HEALTH CENTERS</u>					
Complete partial construction					
1st year - 54	2	2.0	216	43	259
Completed Partial construction					
2nd year - 11	2	2.0	44	9	53
New Construction Health Centers - 26					
	3	2.0	156	31	<u>187</u>
Sub-total - 2nd year					<u>(240)</u>
Total - BHCS					499

126

B. Total Field Days Required

1st year = 1217  
 2nd year = 703  
 1920 field days

C. Man-Year Requirements

If there are 226 days available in a working year, and if 75 percent of the available days are spent in the field (169 field days per man-year), then the total man-year requirements (1,920 field days divided by 169) equals 11.36 man-years.

D. Draft Budget for Monitoring/Inspection Contract with Third-Country Firm

Position	(1) #	(2) Base Salary	(3) 10% Overtime	(4) Housing Allowance	(5) Overhead (50% of 2.)	(6) Sub-Total
Contract Chief	1	\$20,000	\$2,000	\$2,400	\$10,000	\$34,400
Civil Engr	5	\$10,000	\$1,000	\$2,400	\$ 5,000	\$18,400
Admin Asst.	1	\$ 5,000	\$ 500	--	--	\$ 5,500
	(7) 1 yr. cost (1 x 6)	(8) 2 yr. cost (2 x 7)	(9) Per Diem field days x \$ 14	(10) Round Trip Travel & Transp.	TOTAL (8 + 9 + 10) Two Years	
	\$34,400	\$68,000	\$ 4,732	\$ 5,000	\$ 78,532	
	\$92,000	\$184,000	\$23,660	\$25,000	\$232,660	
	\$ 5,500	\$11,000	--	--	11,000	
					<u>\$322,192</u>	

E. Transportation

1. 1920 field days x 100 miles per day x 20.3¢ per mile  
 equals \$39,000 \$ 39,000

F. GRAND TOTAL MONITORING AND INSPECTION  
 (D. and E.) \$361,192

1971

G. Allocation of Monitoring/Inspection Costs Among USAID Projects  
\$361,192 divided by 1,920 field days = \$189 per field day

Year	Project			Total
	Rural Schools	Rural Works	Health Centers	
1. FY 76 inspection (FY 75 obligation)	(393 f. d.) \$74,033	(566 f. d.) \$106,974	(259 f. d.) \$48,951	(1,217 f. d.) \$230,013
2. FY 77 inspection (FY 76 obligation)	(220 f. d.) \$41,560	(243 f. d.) \$45,927	(240 f. d.) \$45,360	(703 f. d.) \$132,867
Totals	(612 f. d.) \$115,668	(809 f. d.) \$152,901	(499 f. d.) \$94,311	(1920 f. d.) \$362,880

Estimate of Requirement for third year of contract:

3. FY 78 inspection (FY 77 obligation)	(187 f. d.) \$ 35,343
Total - BMCs only	(686 f. d.) \$129,654

Notes:

1. Rural Works projects finished in the last quarter of FY 75 will be inspected directly by USAID/A.
2. There are 170 village and primary schools and 40 teachers' hostels but approximately 170 sites only.
3. FY 76 is a 15-month fiscal year; July 1, 1975, through September 30, 1976.
4. f. d. = field days.

106

DIRECTOR'S CERTIFICATION OF 25 PERCENT REQUIREMENT

Verbal assurance has been received from the Government of Afghanistan that its contribution to Afghanistan's Rural Development program administered by the Rural Development Department of the Prime Ministry will be the following:


(\$ U.S. thousands)			
FY 75 <u>(Fourth Quarter)</u>	FY 76 <u>                    </u>	FY 77 <u>                    </u>	Total <u>                    </u>
450	2,250	1,350	4,050

Other Donor contributions to rural development, over the same period, will total \$495,000, while AID's contributions to the more discrete rural works targets will be as follows:

588	986	217	1,786
-----	-----	-----	-------

The grand total of all planned commitments will be \$6,331,000 of which the GOA's share will be 64 percent, AID's contribution will be 28 percent and other donors eight percent.

The aforementioned verbal assurance will be put into writing, that the Government of Afghanistan will assume a share of program costs greater than 25 percent, prior to or as a part of, the FY 1975 Project Agreement for the Rural Works project.




---

Vincent W. Brown, Director  
USAID Afghanistan  
January 20, 1975

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

No adverse effects to the environment or Afghanistan's ecology are anticipated as a consequence of construction and utilization of 125 Rural Development Department projects. The 80 irrigation projects will generally be improvements of existing water control structures. Where appropriate, erosion control factors will be incorporated into the design of all irrigation projects.

The 25 bridges will be incorporated into transportation systems with an average daily traffic (ADT) of no more than 15 vehicles per day. All bridges are designed to be minimally disruptive to the normal flow of the river. To secure reimbursement under fixed cost reimbursement, all bridge designs must provide adequate upstream and downstream riverbed protection.

The 100 kilometers of road will all be "Class C" roads, surfaced with gravel, and properly designed to insure adequate drainage and minimal erosion.

All projects are designed in a conservative manner to blend in well with the existing surroundings. Most construction materials will be indigenous, such as stone, sand, gravel, timber, and locally manufactured concrete.

Therefore, these projects will not contribute to the further degradation of the Afghan environment.

An Epilogue

Empires rose, flourished, decayed and disappeared; as each new conquest succeeded the last, the center of interest and activity shifted, fresh irrigation schemes were devised and barren lands were made fertile; and then war, conquest, or the ravages of some great nomad horde, obliterated the traces of past culture and civilization, till nothing was left save silence and desolation, and the great mountains brooding over the futilities of man.

Afghanistan

-- W. K. Fraser-Tytler