A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART I

PD-AAY-555
58747

(BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM, READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS)

IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. REPORTING A.I.D. UNIT:
USAID/Mogadishu
(Mission or AID/W Office)
(ES#)

B. WAS EVALUATION SCHEDULED IN CURRENT FY ANNUAL EVALUATION PLAN?
yes ☒ slipped ☐ ad hoc ☐
Eval. Plan Submission Date FY 88 Q 3

C. EVALUATION TIMING
interim ☐ final ☒ ex post ☐ other ☐

D. ACTIVITY OR ACTIVITIES EVALUATED (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated; if not applicable, list title and date of the evaluation report)

Project #	Project/Program Title (or title & date of evaluation report)	First PROAG or equivalent (FY)	Most recent PACD (mo/yr)	Planned LOP Cost ('000)	Amount Obligated to Date ('000)
649-0119	Somalia Management Training and Development (SOMTAD)	1985	91	18,500	10,640

E. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

Action(s) Required	Name of officer responsible for Action	Date Action to be Completed
Per recommendations 1-6, amend the AED contract to include: (a) funds for qualified staff, instructional materials, and counterpart training; and (b) scopes of work for a DCOP, language training coordinator, and staff, that will strengthen the DCOP's administrative control over ELT and BMT.	USAID/Somalia, REDSO, AED	11/88
Per recommendation 18, assign a qualified USDH to the position of the project manager; and hire a (Somali) project assistant.	AID/W USAID/Somalia	ASAP 9/88
Per recommendation 20-22, in next interim evaluation: (a) focus on issues that could not be addressed in this evaluation, including appropriateness and quality of the Masters programs, and the effectiveness of the WMTU; (b) review (and possibly revise) objectives of the PP's scheduled second evaluation focussing on civil service reform; and (c) allow for 4-5 weeks evaluation time in Somalia	USAID/Somalia	6/89

(Attach extra sheet if necessary)

F. DATE OF MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE REVIEW OF EVALUATION: mo. 7 day ___ yr. 88

G. APPROVALS OF EVALUATION SUMMARY AND ACTION DECISIONS

	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission or AID/W Office Director
Signature	M Warren		Charles S. Gordon	Lois Richards
Typed Name	Marion Warren	Mohamud H. Egal	Charles Gordon	Lois Richards
Date	9/1/88	10/25/88	9/5/88	10/26/88

H. EVALUATION ABSTRACT (do not exceed the space provided)

The purposes of the project are (1) to improve the ability to plan and manage economic development in both the public and private sector and (2) to strengthen institutions that can supply training in management to both sectors. To address these purposes, the project has three major components: (1) provision of long-term advisors assigned to work closely with high-level staff in key ministries; (2) development of an MBA/MPA program taught at the Somali Institute of Development Administration and Management (SIDAM) to train 210 mid-level managers in both the public and private sectors; and (3) development of a Worksite Management Training Unit (WMTU) to provide short-term training to address immediate organizational problems in both the public and private sectors.

This evaluation was performed almost three years after project approval but only one year after the arrival of the first members of the contractor team; thus, the evaluation team had relatively little progress to assess. The evaluators concluded that the project "is, in many ways, an unwieldy effort launched in a difficult and uncertain environment," but that it has "much potential to provide crucial assistance to Somali managers and administrators in appropriate ways." The evaluators identified six problems affecting implementation: (1) coordination between the main contractor (a consulting firm) and a university, as required by project design, is awkward and can hinder effective implementation; (2) coordination between USIS (which has a PASA to provide English language training in the project) and other project components has been indirect; (3) USAID's procurement mechanisms have caused lengthy delays in obtaining vehicles, computers and library materials, (4) the budget for various activities was either not anticipated or was pared too drastically to permit adequate operations; (5) GSDR local currency contributions have not been forthcoming in the amounts requested or on the schedule required; and (6) political changes within the GSDR have interrupted the continuity of the project and meant that some individuals trained by the project are no longer available to assist with its implementation. In general, the evaluators found that: (1) the long-term advisors are generally well-placed and effective; (2) there is enthusiasm for the WMTU among GSDR ministry staff but this component of the project is underfunded; and (3) the academic program's component parts (MBA/MPA, basic management training and English language training) are not well-integrated either with each other or with the Somali context and management needs.

The evaluation team, composed of three individuals on an IQC work order, spent approximately three weeks in Somalia, reviewing project documents, interviewing relevant project participants and observing project operations. The team leader also spent several days in the U.S. visiting contractor and subcontractor headquarters.

I. EVALUATION COSTS

1. Evaluation Team Name	Affiliation	Contract Number OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (US$)	Source of Funds
Research Management Corp.		PDS-1109-1-00-7109-00, #1	45,926	Project

2. Mission/Office Professional Staff Person-Days (estimate) 5

3. Borrower/Grantee Professional Staff Person-Days (estimate) 12

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Try not to exceed the 3 pages provided)
Address the following items:

- Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated
- Purpose of evaluation and Methodology used
- Findings and conclusions (relate to questions)
- Principal recommendations
- Lessons learned

Mission or Office: USAID/Mogadishu

Date this summary prepared: June 1988

Title and Date of Full Evaluation Report: Somalia Management Training and Development First Interim Evaluation Report; May 31, 1988

Purpose of the activity evaluated: The project's purposes are: (1) to improve the ability to plan and manage economic development in both the public and private sectors and (2) to strengthen institutions that can supply training in management to both sectors. In order to achieve these purposes, the project is implementing three components: (1) the provision of long-term advisors to key ministries; (2) the development of an MBA/MPA program to train 210 public and private sector mid-level managers at the Somali Institute for Development Administration and Management (SIDAM); and (3) the creation of the Worksite Management Training Unit to provide short-term training for specific on-the-job needs.

Purpose of evaluation and methodology used: This evaluation was performed almost three years after initial approval but relatively early in actual implementation. (The first members of the contractor team had been in-country one year at the time of the evaluation.) The evaluation was carried out as originally scheduled in the PP in order to assess implementation progress to date, to document the reasons for problems and delays, and to propose realistic solutions to those problems.

A three person team was hired under an IQC work order. This team worked together in Somalia for approximately three weeks; the team leader spent some additional time in the U.S. visiting the headquarters offices of the contractor and subcontractors. The team reviewed project documents, interviewed project participants (i.e., representatives of USAID, the contractor, USIS, participating Ministries, SIDAM staff), and observed project operations.

Findings and conclusions: The evaluation team reported that it had "identified several problems in project design and other problems external to the project as the main factors that have caused delays in project implementation." These problems as identified by the team are:

(1) Coordination between the main contractor (a consulting firm) and a university, as required by the project design, is difficult and has caused problems for implementation;

(2) Coordination between USIS (which has a PASA to undertake the project's English language training activity) and other project activities has been indirect;

(3) USAID procurement procedures have caused delays in obtaining essential commodities such as vehicles, computers and library materials;

(4) The budget for various project activities (in particular, the Basic Management Training component and the Worksite Management Training Unit) was either not anticipated or was pared too much during design or contract negotiation to permit adequate operation of some aspects of the project;

(5) The Government of Somali has not provided its local currency contributions in adequate amounts or in a timely fashion;

(6) Political changes within the GSDR have meant that Somali counterparts working on the project have been changed over time, meaning lack of continuity and loss of trained personnel.

Regarding the performance to date of the three project components, the evaluation team found that:

(1) The long-term advisors are "generally well placed in their ministries and remarkably effective";

(2) The Worksite Management Training Unit "has great potential, and there is tremendous enthusiasm for it on the part of Somali Ministry staff, but it is underfunded and seriously under-staffed if it is to fulfill its purpose;" and

(3) The academic program's activities (i.e., MBA/MPA training, basic management training and English language training) are "not yet well-integrated either with each other ..... or with the Somali context and management needs".

The team concludes the "project has encountered initial delays and problems of access to resources typical of the start-up phase of a complex project" such as this one; some problems already are being addressed, while the evaluation report recommends additional actions required to improve project performance.

<u>Principal recommendations:</u> Recommendations are provided in six categories:

(1) Regarding the English language training activity, the evaluation team recommends replacing the USIS PASA with an English program offered by the primary contractor (or a subcontractor to this contractor) in order to improve academic coordination and project management. The team also recommends additional funding and staffing for English language training.

(2) The long-term advisors would be more effective with increased support and resources, according to the team. Specifically, the team recommends an administrative assistant for the contractor Chief of Party and more funding for travel and other project needs.

(3) The team recommends the project be made more appropriate to the Somali context by bringing curriculum developers to Somalia for longer periods to work with Somali faculty, by increasing the attention given to private sector management in courses, and by providing Somali language and culture training to contractors.

(4) The Worksite Management Training Unit should be made more effective, the team recommends, by increasing the staff and funding available to this project component.

(5) Project management needs to be strengthened both on the USAID and the contractor sides.

(6) The evaluation team recommends that the second interim evaluation allow the team more time and focus on continued progress in project implementation (particularly regarding development of the MBA/MPA program and the Worksite Management Training Unit) rather than on progress in civil service reform as recommended in the original project design.

Lessons Learned: The evaluation report does not specifically include lessons learned, therefore the following are derived from the evaluation team's findings and conclusions.

(1) Large and complex projects should not be made more complex by complicated contracting arrangements that may inhibit communication and clear lines of responsibility in implementation.

(2) Project papers must authorize adequate staff and budget to permit large, complex projects to achieve objectives without the time-consuming stop-gap measures compelled by unexpected need for additional resources.

(3) Special effort should be made during the design process to build into complex projects, mechanisms that will promote coherence between and among component parts.

(4) Given USDH staffing limitations, as much implementation responsibility as possible should be placed with the prime contractor.

(5) Projects should not be designed to be so complex as to make management impossible or to create an extraordinary management burden.

A number of recommendations are not selected for Action Decisions.

Number 7 recommends the Project provide long-term advisors (LTAs), transportation and per diem allowances for in-country travel.

This is an on-going requirement that has no single action decision completion date. Due to the fact that the AED contract does not authorized AED to incur these costs, USAID will have to use other means -- such as invitational travel -- to fund approved official in-country travel by LTA's, as the need arises.

Number 8 recommends the project authorize the COP to hire an (expatriate) administrative assistant.

The position of administrative assistant to the COP is not authorized by the PP, nor is it part of the AED contract. USAID is hiring an assistant project manager, however, whose duties will include the facilitation, coordination, and communication functions that would be expected of the administrative assistant. This will alleviate, at least in part, the COP's work load.

Number 9 recommends that the project maintain adequate funds for invitational (U.S.) travel for GSDR counterparts.

One orientation visit to participating U.S. institutions for each principal counterpart (director-general level) is a condition precedent. Funds for fulfilling this condition precedent are adequate; this recommendation therefore does not require an action decision.

Number 10 recommends a supplemental cash fund for AED local costs, "in case of further problems with the GSDR shilling account for SOMTAD."

The evaluation report provides no guidance for easily implementing this recommendation. Nor does the evaluation report provide guidance on how such a fund would be used, controlled, and administered. The only fully acceptable approach to establishing such a fund is through an amendment to the AED contract which will permit authorized LTA's to change certain earmarked contract dollars into shillings. According to relevant REDSO and USAID offices, this amendment cannot be effected without prior amendment of the PP and modification of the PP budget. At the present, USAID's SOMTAD project implementing office is not convinced that the need for such a fund is great enough to warrant the staff time and effort required to pursue its establishment.

Number 11 recommends encouraging SUNY/A curriculum planning teams to work collaboratively with SIDAM faculty on designing the MBA/MPA curriculum.

In the last four months since the evaluation, this recommendation has been closely observed. AED, USAID, SUNY, and SIDAM have worked collaboratively to ensure that the Somali context is as relevant a part of the training as possible. This is not a recommendation that requires a single action decision, but one that must be continuously observed as SUNY faculty come to Mogadishu to teach or assist in curriculum development.

Number 12 recommends that the Masters degree program and WMTU address private sector management needs.

About 70 of the 210 Masters degree candidates are from the private sector. The project paper, training needs assessments, and planning documents prepared for training components of the project, all require that the WMTU address private sector training needs. This recommendation does not now require a specific action decision, but must be an objective continually pursued during the implementation process.

Number 13 recommends the project provide training for contractors in Somali language and culture.

A few of the contractors are studying the language. This is not, however, a stipulated requirement of individual contractors' contracts with AED, nor should it be. The two-year period of their contracts is insufficient to warrant the time and effort required for even rudimentary command of the language.

Number 14 recommends a project training advisor and a Somali counterpart for the WMTU.

This has already been done. A temporary project training advisor arrives in September 1988 for a 4-5-month stay. His Somali counterpart has been selected.

Number 15 recommends that needs assessments from Ministries that have no advisors be sent to Creative Associates.

This action has been completed.

Number 16 recommends increasing the number of person/months available for the WMTU.

This is premature, and cannot be addressed until WMTU becomes fully operational, and specific requirements for additional technical assistance become clear.

Number 17 recommends at adequate budget for instructional materials for the WMTU.

What is an adequate budget? This is also premature, and for the same reasons.

Recent events have rendered some of recommendations less applicable now than at the time the evaluation was carried out. The PASA with USIS came to an end August 15, and REDSO is negotiating a contract amendment with AED that will place responsibility for English language training with AED. Coordination between the main contractor and the subcontracting university was difficult because State University of New York (SUNY) did not appear to be committed to fulfilling its obligations to SOMTAD. In the four months since the evaluation was completed, SUNY has demonstrated much more commitment to the project. A highly-regarded tenured professor will arrive October 1, to fill the position of deputy chief of party. SUNY staff from the Schools of Business Administration, Public Administration, and Education have spent a total of 10 months at SIDAM, administering the entire SOMTAD training program (including the English language classes), teaching basic management courses, and planning curricula for the MBA/MPA graduate programs.

September 25, 1988. Mission Director's Comment

Overall, I feel this evaluation has been helpful and constructive. There are some points in the evaluation which need clarification and/or a Mission response.

1. USAID had moved to cancel the USIS PASA prior to the evaluation's beginning due to concern over USIS management. For the SOMTAD English language PASA activities the line of authority was from the USDH Project Officer to the PASA staff, contrary to the organizational chart (page 23), and similar to that for any other contractor or PASA on this and other projects.

2. Two different USDH replacements were assigned in January and May, respectively, in the 1988/89 cyle to replace USAID's SOMTAD Project Officer. For varying reasons both assignments were later cancelled, and as of September 1988, no other USDH has been nominated by AID/W. The same situation exists for the Commodity Management Officer (CMO) position, which has been vacant since June. While these vacancies are detrimental to the project, I do not feel the evaluators' assertions and inferences re quality or experience of new staff are warranted or appropriate. Overall, new USDH staff who have been assigned here over the last year have been excellent, and both candidates to replace the Project Officer were of very high caliber.

3. The commodity procurement performance of the Mission on this project has been disappointing, in part due to the long-standing division of responsibility between USAID and the Field Support Unit (FSU), some personality factors, and, now, the vacancy in the CMO position, which has interrupted efforts begun at the time of the evaluation to sort out the problems and streamline the process. With a CMO at this post for six years until last June, however, I cannot fault REDSO/ESA for SOMTAD's procurement problems. The evaluation confuses contracting and commodity procurement by using the terms interchangeably when for A.I.D. they refer to different functions.

4. The evaluation points out that SOMTAD is a highly complex project. I would go farther and say that as designed it has too many major components. GSDR expectations are such that it would be politically very difficult to cut any of them out at this point. This does not mean, nor will U.S. and GSDR funding availabilities permit, development of the WMTU and SIDAM library to the magnitudes suggested in the evaluation report (page 24) and/or the original PP. There also will have to be ceilings set on the number of advisors in ministries and priorities established among the various SOMTAD project components. This will need to be an early task for the new Project Officer whenever he/she arrives.

5. I am mystified by the final sentence in the penultimate paragraph on page vii. USAID's removal from the PCC would still leave a project run by a sizable PCC, the Ministry of Labor and Sports, SIDAM, SNU, and AED. In these circumstances, I strongly doubt "centralization" is an achievable goal in Somalia. As one illustration, the long delay in obtaining GSDR approval of the 1987 local currency budget in the end was due to disagreement between the Ministry of Finance, members of the PCC, other GSDR parties and USAID over allowances which in USAID's view had been agreed in the original Project Agreement signed by the Ministry of Finance among others. I and my deputy devoted much time to resolving the problem in a way that would obtain for the project funds needed for essential start-up and operations. At one point assignment of new ministerial advisors was temporarily suspended until the budget problem was overcome.

6. The evaluation focuses on problems impeding implementation. I wish to stress a point the evaluators made while in Mogadishu on the quite remarkable progress SOMTAD had made during its first year of implementation - selecting 240 Presidential Fellows, launching the English language phase of their training; recruiting and placing the advisors; and getting a start on the myriad other activities cited in the report. Taken together those represent a quite remarkable feat which should not go unrecognized.

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Somalia Management Training and Development

First Interim Evaluation Report

May 31, 1988

(as revised July 1988)

Research Management Corporation

Team Members:

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Contract No. PDC-1109-1-00-7109-00, Order No. 1

PIO/T No. 649-0119-3-70016

Acknowledgements

Preparing this evaluation in the short time allotted would have been completely impossible, were it not for the excellent support and assistance our team received from USAID, USIS, Somali government personnel, and SOMTAD staff during our three weeks in Mogadishu. In a country where appointments are hard to make and sometimes honored in the breach, everyone we wished to contact made an effort to see us and was ready to receive us exactly when we planned to meet. As our list of contacts shows, this includes a long roster of people; we thank them all.

The staff of AID/Washington, USIA, the Academy for Educational Development, Creative Associates, SUNY/Albany, and Arthur D. Little, Inc. were generous with their time and cooperative in informing us, both before and after our travel period. Finally, the staff of Research Management Corporation were prompt and willing in backstopping this effort. We appreciate all their help.

Finally, the opinions put forth in this paper are those of the evaluation team, for which it alone is responsible. They do not represent USAID policy or views.

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Executive Summary

Description of the SOMTAD Project

The Somalia Management Training and Development project (SOMTAD) is a large, administratively complex project consisting of three major components:

1. Long-term advisors (LTAs) assigned to serve high-level staff in key ministries in the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic (GSDR);

2. An MBA/MPA program taught at the Somali Institute for Development Administration and Management (SIDAM); and

3. A Worksite Management Training Unit (WMTU), also situated at SIDAM.

The goal of the SOMTAD project is "to foster economic and social development in Somalia by creating avenues through which both the public and private sectors can improve their management skills..." (PP, p. 10) The more immediate purposes of the project are to improve the ability to plan and manage economic development in both the public and the private sector and to strengthen institutions that can supply training in management to both sectors. Beneficiaries are SIDAM, which should be strengthened in its capacity to provide diversified management training; the ministries in which advisors are placed, which should consequently operate more efficiently; MBA/MPA students, who will gain valuable management skills; and public and private sector administrators and managers at all levels, who will benefit from short term training.

The SOMTAD project was approved by USAID in June 1985. A contract for its implementation was awarded to the Academy for Educational Development (AED) in November 1986. By that time problems in obtaining the Somali shilling budget for project material and staff support were already evident. The first members of the field staff, including the Chief of Party and Deputy Chief of Party, arrived in country by the following March. The 1987 shilling budget was finally approved at the end of 1987. By that time, too, two of the original five key ministries had split. Five ministries had received advisors, SIDAM had received its long-term training coordinator and library/computer resources advisor, the English language training was under way, and the Basic Management Training (BMT) courses had just started. The SOMTAD project faced start-up problems common to such ambitious efforts with multiple objectives. Despite its goals of improving management and administration in Somalia, procedures within the project are cumbersome and certain areas of

responsibility vague.

Purpose of the Evaluation

This interim evaluation of the SOMTAD project, conducted in March 1988, focuses on the broad picture of:

- how SOMTAD's purpose and goals address Somali development needs;
- how the SOMTAD project has been operating to date;
- what it has accomplished;
- what problems it has encountered; and
- how it is affected by political and economic shifts that have occurred in Somalia since its inception.

Impact of external factors

Since the time the SOMTAD project was designed, significant changes have occurred both in the political and economic climate of Somalia and within the USAID mission staff. Structural problems are becoming manifest. There have been personnel changes among key Somali counterparts, and there will be changes in the next few months in USAID and sub-contractor staff that will affect the operation of the project.

The SOMTAD project has had to cope with economic and structural factors that have impeded the project. Four areas that have had direct and indirect effects include: problems in accessing the shilling budget, difficulties with USAID procurement procedures, shifts in personnel, and limitations of Somali infrastructure. The economic crisis in Somalia has meant that the GSDR has not been able to fulfill its commitments to the level originally agreed.

Operation of SOMTAD Components

The LTAs have been very active, contributing in positive ways to the operation of their host ministries and SIDAM. Several problems have plagued the LTAs, however. The project design anticipated that they would receive logistic support in their work -- office supplies and equipment, secretarial services, some travel -- from SOMTAD's shilling budget. The first LTAs to arrive found themselves without basic office amenities necessary for their job. The fielding of several others was delayed until these problems were resolved.

The English program has shown considerable success in meeting goals and implementing activities laid out in the PASA. Text-

books, instructional materials, office supplies and video equipment were available in a timely manner for the English classes. Class schedules, course syllabi, teacher and student manuals have been developed. Placement tests were administered and candidates assigned to classes. USIS is currently exceeding its objective of preparing 210 candidates in three cohorts with the TOEFL scores necessary to enter the graduate program. However, the English language training has not been well-integrated with the management training curriculum.

Up to now progress of the MBA/MPA program has been limited. Three major activities have occupied the subcontractor: student selection procedures and class assignment at SIDAM; starting up the English language and the Basic Management Training program (BMT) at a pre-graduate level at SIDAM; and curriculum planning in Albany. In all these areas the functional and professional interface between the subcontractor and host institution has been weak.

In evaluating the WMTU we are dealing with a plan, not an observable activity. We were able to confirm, however, that interest in this particular component of SOMTAD runs high in GSDR ministries and organizations. Ministry officials and staff were enthusiastic about the potential of short-term training to solve their immediate organizational problems. The WMTU has the potential for reaching large numbers of Somalis and could eventually become a self-sustaining unit within SIDAM. To achieve even part of this potential, however, the WMTU needs adequate funding and resources, which it does not presently have.

SOMTAD project designers made some inaccurate assumptions about the computer equipment and library resources available at SIDAM. More computers and more books and cataloguing materials are needed than originally anticipated. Still, preparation of orders for these commodities has progressed well up to the point of procurement. But procurement in accordance with USAID procedures has been cumbersome and slow.

Coordination Issues

The SOMTAD project was intended to have "highly interrelated and mutually supportive" components. However, in its design, coordinated activities are called for without the provision of a well-integrated structure to support them. Because USAID has remained involved in the Project Coordinating Committee and in procurement, management responsibility has not been centralized.

Coordination in designing the English teaching, Basic Management Training (BMT), and masters degree programs has encountered serious problems. In part this is because, up to now, the USIS PASA removed responsibility for English language teaching from AED's contract and because USIS has had trouble backstopping the

ELT program. Due to the difficulties encountered in the SOMTAD project USIS is now negotiating an amicable dissolution of the PASA with AID. Communication has also been difficult at times between SUNY/A and the field.

Lastly, insufficient attention was given in the project plan to assuring that the project would have enough time and resources to implement its activities. This has resulted in under-funding library and computer resources and the BMT educational component, and is likely to prove to be a major problem for the WMTU.

Conclusions

The SOMTAD project, despite structural and environmental hazards, has much potential to provide appropriate assistance to Somali managers and administrators. Yet a number of factors have caused delays in project implementation.

SOMTAD faces four types of problems due to project design: 1) coordination between the main contractor, a consulting firm, and a university, as required by the project design, is often a difficult relationship and has not been easy in the SOMTAD project; 2) coordination between USIS and the other project components has been particularly indirect; 3) USAID's procurement procedures and requirements have been a cause of delay in obtaining vehicles, computers, and library materials; and 4) the budget for various project activities either was never anticipated or was pared too drastically to permit adequate operation. Activities of the BMT and WMTU suffer the most from under-funding.

Problems external to the project that have hampered its operation include: 1) Somalia's present economic crisis, which makes it nearly impossible for the GSDR to meet all its project commitments at the level promised; and 2) political changes in the Somali government structure, which mean that there is, at present, no guarantee that the officials with whom LTAs must work will be the same people over the life of the project. It remains to be seen what the impact will be of some upcoming changes in USAID and project staff.

Regarding the operation of the three major components, we found:

- The LTAs were generally well placed in their ministries and remarkably effective.

- The WMTU design has great potential, and there is tremendous enthusiasm for it on the part of Somali ministry staff, but it is under-funded and under-staffed if it is to fulfill its purpose.

- The academic program's component parts -- MBA/MPA, BMT, and ELT -- were not yet well-integrated either with each

other or, as far as we could tell, with the Somali context and management needs. It is not too late to take steps to rectify these shortcomings.

In sum, the project has encountered initial delays and problems of resource access typical of the start-up phase of a complex project. Many of these are being resolved before they become detrimental. Others still need attention.

Recommendations

Our recommendations fall into six categories:

- Improving the English language teaching component of SOMTAD by replacing USIS with AED or a sub-contractor, providing additional funds for instructional materials and inservice training, improving coordination between the PTC and the LTC, and assigning responsibility for the BMT to the PTC;

- Providing adequate support for the LTAs by providing transportation allotments for those who need it, providing the COP with administrative assistance, continuing to fund invitational travel for counterparts and establishing a back-up to the shilling account;

- Adapting SOMTAD, especially the masters program component, to the Somali environment by encouraging collaborative planning between SUNY/A, SIDAM faculty, LTAs, and other experts in Mogadishu; addressing private as well as public sector needs; and training contractors in Somali language and culture;

- Preparing the way for an effective WMTU by providing a Project Training Advisor to manage it, making sure that training needs assessments are gathered from all participating ministries, increasing the amount of short-term advisor time for it, and making sure it has an adequate budget;

- Improving project management by making sure the USAID Project Manager's replacement has experience in managing such a complex project and that the D/COP's replacement has administrative as well as academic qualifications; and

- Rewriting the scope of work for the next interim evaluation to focus primarily on the effectiveness of the masters program and the WMTU, rather than on the progress of civil service reform, and to allow enough time in-country to evaluate such a complex project.

Introduction

The Somalia Management Training and Development project (SOMTAD) is a large, administratively complex project consisting of three major components:

1. Long-term advisors (LTAs) assigned to serve high-level staff in key ministries in the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic (GSDR);

2. An MBA/MPA program taught at the Somali Institute for Development Administration and Management (SIDAM); and

3. A Worksite Management Training Unit (WMTU), also situated at SIDAM.

The SOMTAD project was approved by USAID in June 1985. A contract for its implementation, awarded to the Academy for Educational Development (AED), was signed by USAID/REDSO in Nairobi in November 1986. By that time problems in obtaining the Somali shilling budget for project material and staff support were already evident. The first members of the field staff, including the Chief of Party and Deputy Chief of Party, arrived in country by the following March. The 1987 shilling budget was finally approved at the end of 1987; the part of the 1988 budget for secretarial and administrative support was not actually disbursed until mid-March 1988, about a week before the evaluation team's arrival.

By that time, two of the original five key ministries had split. Five ministries had received advisors, SIDAM had received its long-term training coordinator and library/computer resources advisor, the English language training was under way, and the Basic Management Training (BMT) courses had just started.

At the time of this evaluation, the SOMTAD project faces start-up problems common to such ambitious efforts with multiple objectives. Conceived on a large scale, it appears to have been trimmed back during USAID's bidding process to the point where funding is short for necessary support to its activities.[1] Because some of the explicit assumptions set out in its logical framework and other implicit assumptions no longer hold, some project strategies need to be modified. Despite its goals of improving management and administration in Somalia, procedures

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[1]We did not have access to the present budget, broken down by activity.

within the project are cumbersome and certain areas of responsibility vague. These built-in handicaps have led to initial awkwardness in implementation. This evaluation itself, fielded in March 1988, could not address all the questions set out for it in the Project Paper, since some anticipated activities had not started.

Despite these problems, thanks to the efforts of many talented, creative, and dedicated people, the project is launched and making considerable progress. With adequate resources, many project objectives appear to us achievable and worth pursuing. The aim of this evaluation is to help the SOMTAD project surmount these initial hurdles and achieve its goal of contributing to Somalia's economic and social development.

Purpose of the Evaluation

This interim evaluation focuses on the broad picture of:

- how SOMTAD's purpose and goals address Somali development needs;
- how the SOMTAD project has been operating to date;
- what it has accomplished;
- what problems it has encountered; and
- how it is affected by political and economic shifts that have occurred in Somalia since its inception.

SOMTAD contractors have been providing USAID with regular reports detailing project inputs and outputs. Instead of recapitulating this information, USAID mission staff and the evaluation team felt that it is an appropriate time to take a wider view of the project in order to identify systemic problems and recommend ways of dealing with them.

Due to delays in start-up, this evaluation comes at an unusually early point in the activation of the SOMTAD project. The evaluation team was charged with reviewing the project design in light of its stated goals, logical consistency, and fit with conditions prevailing in Somalia today. The team has further been asked to analyze the course of project implementation, noting, in particular, coordination between participants and the relative contributions of the roster of participating agencies, which include: USAID; the Academy for Educational Development (AED), the primary contractor; its three sub-contractors -- the State University of New York at Albany (SUNY/A), Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL), and Creative Associates(CA): and the United States Information Service/Somalia (USIS); as well as the original five

(now seven) key GSDR ministries[2] and SIDAM. Coordinating all these organizations, some with home offices in different parts of the United States, makes this unquestionably a complex project.

At the moment, the project is not fully in gear. Five long-term advisors have been placed in GSDR ministries to date, but one key advisor has been in country barely four weeks, another is currently being selected, and at least one more may be needed for a full complement. The academic courses of the MBA/MPA program will not actually begin for at least six months, and the WMTU short-term training is still being designed.

Yet significant changes have occurred in the project's environment since SOMTAD's design was approved. Key assumptions need to be questioned. Structural problems are becoming manifest. There have been personnel changes among key Somali counterparts, and there will be changes in the next few months in USAID and sub-contractor staff. The evaluation team has been asked to address these issues and to recommend changes in time to avert further delays and logjams as the project swings into full motion.

Methodology

The evaluation team for the first interim SOMTAD evaluation was composed of a specialist in educational evaluation with area expertise in Somalia, who served as team leader:

> Dr. Susan J. Hoben, African Studies Center, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts.

It also included a specialist in management training and instructional programs:

> Dr. William Darnell, Research Management Corporation, Herndon, Virginia;

and a TESOL and instructional program evaluation specialist:

> Cynthia J. Gimbert, Research Management Corporation, Dover, New Hampshire.

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[2]These were: Ministry of Labour, Sports, and Social Affairs; Ministry of National Planning; Ministry of the Interior; Ministry of Finance and Revenue; and Ministry of Industry and Commerce. In the period between plan and implementation the latter two Ministries were split, and each of the separate ministries was promised an advisor. Although they have now been officially recombined, each of the four still operates autonomously in a separate location.

For this evaluation the team employed a case study approach based on document review, interviews, and observation. Appendix 1 lists the project and project-related documents consulted.

The team made a concentrated effort to interview key persons involved with SOMTAD in a wide range of roles and with as many different perspectives as possible. It first met in Washington, DC, March 14 - 16, to be briefed by staff members of AED, CA, AID/Washington, and USIA home offices. The team leader, Dr. Hoben, also contacted ADL in Boston and traveled to Albany to meet with members of the SUNY/A team responsible for designing the MBA/MPA program for SIDAM.

In Mogadishu, March 21 - April 18, the team interviewed the Chief of Party (COP) and Deputy Chief of Party (D/COP), all the other LTAs, GSDR ministry officials and counterparts, SIDAM staff and students, and USIS and USAID staff concerned with the project. The list of persons contacted is given in Appendix 2. Team members also observed classes at SIDAM and attended project staff and Project Coordination Committee (PCC) meetings.

Goal and Purposes of the SOMTAD Project

The goal of the SOMTAD project is "to foster economic and social development in Somalia by creating avenues through which both the public and private sectors can improve their management skills..." (PP, p. 10) The more immediate purposes of the project are to improve the ability to plan and manage economic development in both the public and the private sector and to strengthen institutions that can supply training in management to both sectors. Beneficiaries are SIDAM, which should be strengthened in its capacity to provide diversified management training; the ministries in which advisors are placed, which should consequently operate more efficiently; MBA/MPA students, who will gain valuable management skills; and public and private sector administrators and managers at all levels, who will benefit from short term training.

Project components contribute to these aims in different ways:

- Long-term advisors in the ministries serve the purpose of improving government function directly through their staff assignments. They also contribute to institution building by training counterparts within the ministries and by teaching in the MBA/MPA program at SIDAM.

- The MBA/MPA academic program at SIDAM, supported by the two LTAs assigned to it, strengthens that institute's capacity to provide formal management training and also prepares a cohort of trained and qualified mid- and top-level managers for government and business administration.

- The WMTU adds to SIDAM's capacity to offer targeted short courses in management and responds to immediate training needs in government agencies and private enterprise.

- Preliminary English language training for managers, a component of the academic program, also constitutes a basic tool for managers and administrators and an important component of the teaching program at SIDAM.

- SIDAM's resource base is being also improved by enlarging its library, equipping an adequate computer laboratory, and providing in-service training for its teaching staff.

Since implementation began with the arrival of the COP and D/COP scarcely more than a year ago, some of the output indicators suggested by the PP logical framework cannot yet be checked. The project has successfully recruited its complement of 210 students for the academic program, along with thirty alternates. It is rather early for ministry officials to evaluate the contribution of their LTAs, but several ministries were particularly enthusiastic about their advisors. The WMTU is eagerly awaited by administrators in every ministry visited because they consider this type of training particularly suited to their immediate needs.

Underlying Assumptions

Since the time the SOMTAD project was designed, a number of changes have occurred both in the political and economic climate of Somalia and within the USAID mission staff. In the near future more changes are expected in USAID and project staff that will affect the operation of the project. One result of changes in the external environment over the past three or four years is that some of the explicit and implicit assumptions underlying the SOMTAD plan have proved questionable. They include:

- "Allocations of US and GSDR funds will be adequate and timely" (PP, p. 80). This statement implicitly assumed that: 1) the USAID budget was sufficient to support the U.S contractor's SOMTAD project activities, 2) DDD support would yield an adequate amount of Somali Shillings to underwrite the project's shilling budget, and 3) the GSDR's development budget would not be so overly extended that it could not afford timely release of the full amount of budgeted shillings to the project.

  It will become clear in the course of this report that some USAID-supported activities specified in the project are seriously underfunded. Also, because the GSDR restored a fixed and unrealistically high rate of

exchange for the Somali shilling, U.S. dollars yield fewer shillings than anticipated. Moreover, the GSDR finds itself in dire financial straits, unable to honor its commitments fully by releasing all the shillings promised for stipends for Somali support staff, teachers, and students or for material support for the ministry advisors.

- "Short-term training will be required of middle level management staff..." (PP, p. 80). This statement makes an implicit assumption that the project's aim is training mid-level management.

  LTAs and USAID staff point out that without trained people gathering, compiling, and feeding information upward from the lowest level of management chains and without top-level support, mid-level managers are hamstrung.

  So far, this issue has been addressed in only an ad hoc manner. Invitational training funded through the USAID training budget has been used for one U.S. study tour to orient high level ministry officials to SOMTAD's purposes and is being considered for a second similar tour. Two members of the PCC were sent to Nairobi for three months' English language training, as well. The WMTU and the in-service training provided by LTAs in their ministries both have the potential to address this problem by training personnel at all levels. How well they will do it remains to be seen.

- "SIDAM staff will be retained and other programs funded adequately." (PP, p. 80) We take this to mean that SOMTAD will not damage SIDAM's existing infrastructure.

  This assumption did not hold for SIDAM's English language teaching program. Due primarily to a 15 percent cut in budget, USIS pulled out of the other English language teaching it had been offering at SIDAM, leaving only the SOMTAD language classes, closed to outsiders, and a small internal English program. Now USIS will be withdrawing even from SOMTAD.

- "Civil Service Reform will be implemented." (PP, p. 80) The corollary to this assumption is that the civil service will accommodate MPA graduates by offering appropriate jobs and incentives to them to use their training.

  In fact, some important civil service reforms have been instituted in the mid-1980s, although not in the way that the USAID mission might have envisioned.

Guaranteed employment of secondary school graduates has been dropped, an essential initial step in reform. A first small attempt has been made to encourage employees to leave the civil service and become self-supporting (by relocating to a cooperative fishery or farm). It is not unreasonable to assume other plans of the sort will follow.

Raises in the government salary scale and merit pay incentives, however, cannot be instituted during the GSDR's current fiscal crisis, and it is these changes that directly impact the SOMTAD project. In sum, SOMTAD cannot assume that the MBA/MPA graduates will find immediate rewards for their training in the civil service. It is safer to assume that over the long run those incentives will be forthcoming when the GSDR can afford them, and that Somali civil servants have sufficient foresight to wish to prepare for them in advance.

- "GSDR policies toward (the) private sector will...promote continued growth." (PP, p.80) It would take a crystal ball to say whether this assumption will hold, although for the moment SOMTAD has no problem with it. SOMTAD training can adapt to either public or private sector management, a change in these policies would not invalidate the program.

- Finally, two related assumptions are unstated but implicit in project design: 1) that Somali officials directly involved in planning the project would remain in place during implementation; and 2) that USAID and USIS capabilities to carry out their parts would not change.

  GSDR restructuring has caused unforeseen changes on the Somali side, which have required re-establishing linkages. Personnel changes in USIS and REDSO have altered the capacities of these agencies.

The External Context of the SOMTAD Project

The SOMTAD project has had to cope with external factors that impeded the project from the start. Four areas that have had direct and indirect effects include: the shilling budget, the USAID dollar budget and procurement, shifts in personnel, and limitations of Somali infrastructure.

The Shilling Budget

Accessing the Somali Shilling account was a major problem in the first year of the SOMTAD project. The GSDR's economic crisis clearly aggravated the situation. A delay in USAID's submission of SOMTAD's detailed shilling budget for 1987 to the Ministry of Finance further compounded the problem. In case further problems with the shilling account should arise, alternative ways of temporarily providing Somali Shillings should be explored, possibly by establishing a small cash fund that the COP can draw upon in emergencies for operational needs.

Dollar Funds and Procurement

Procurement of equipment and vehicles has been a serious problem for the SOMTAD project, a problem centered not in contractor actions but in USAID itself. USAID enters the picture because in the project contract the Agency is responsible for direct purchase of computers and vehicles. Whatever the reasons for this decision, it has proved highly inconvenient for everyone.

At the time the project was designed, the REDSO office in Nairobi had strong procurement capacity, so the project was written using REDSO's capacity for procurement. This meant that REDSO, USAID/Somalia, and AED all had to collaborate on developing specifications for equipment purchases. Since then, REDSO's capability to support Mogadishu has weakened. As a result, it has been taking so long for REDSO to approve equipment specifications prepared by project staff that the specifications become outdated. There have been further problems in establishing equivalency among companies who would be prospective bidders. One way to handle this is to consult the Federal Supply Schedule. Since last September, vast amounts of time and effort have gone into writing and rewriting detailed specifications for proposed equipment purchases, without actually placing the order for the computers needed immediately. SOMTAD computers are currently being purchased using the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). This adjustment should significantly improve equipment purchasing procedures.

Even when AED is in charge of purchasing, as it has been with library orders, the process of approval can be lengthy and complex, as Appendix 3 illustrates.

Streamlining the procurement process is a vital consideration that goes beyond the scope of SOMTAD. It needs to be dealt with at both a project and mission level. The ability of the next USAID project manager to deal with USAID contracting procedures will have an important and direct effect on the success of this project.

It is difficult to pinpoint a specific problem in the procurement process. As noted above, REDSO has been less able to assist the mission. Turnover in personnel in the contracting and procurement office suggests a possible limitation in both expertise and experience. The cumbersome system of signoffs illustrated in appendix 3 is another significant consideration. Without a detailed examination of all aspects of the procurement process the evaluation team can only report the symptoms; not the cause. During the brief period of time on-site the project team had no opportunity to investigate the USAID or mission specific procurement process.

A beginning point in easing the problem would be the assignment of a contracting specialist, who is both knowledgeable and field experienced in USAID procurement, to the mission in Mogadishu. This individual would be in a position to review both past and current conditions and establish clear guidelines for those requiring the assistance of this office.

Shifts in Personnel

Changes in personnel external to the SOMTAD program itself have nevertheless had considerable impact on it. These changes are occurring in the GSDR and in the USAID mission itself.

Since the end of 1987 the GSDR has been restructuring several of the key ministries in which LTAs are placed and retiring a number of high-level government officials, including some of the LTAs' counterparts and the President of SIDAM. Several, the President of Somalia National University among them, were retired just after they had returned from a SOMTAD study tour in the United States; this will necessitate a second study tour to orient their successors. No one can predict how long the restructuring process will continue. But in the main, contractors and field staff have been able to cope with the changes well.

A few of the advisors have also seen considerable turnover in their junior counterparts. In general this has not created apparent problems for the advisors, although it makes the on-the-job training they can offer less effective.

Changes in USAID staffing may also affect SOMTAD. Between now and the summer of 1988 the project manager and assistant project manager will be leaving. Within the project itself the D/COP will be leaving momentarily and will need to be replaced. Important changes in USIS are discussed below.

When the mission searches for a new project manager, ideally he or she should be someone familiar with AID procedures who has experience in administering complex projects in developing countries, preferably projects with a strong educational component. If circumstances force selection of a project manager who lacks some of these qualifications, it may be necessary again to retain an assistant project manager with complementary skills.

Two significant changes within SOMTAD will have more direct impact on the project. Both are occurring at a significant point in the development of the MBA/MPA Project. There is also special impact on the language training program. During the time that the team was visiting Mogadishu we were informed that the primary field representative of SUNY/A, the then current Deputy Chief of Party (D/COP) was to be replaced. Similarly discussions were underway leading to the dissolution by mid-summer of the interagency agreement (PASA) between USIS/USIA and USAID and the termination of continued USIS participation in the English Language Training (ELT) program. Reference to these changes occur at several points in the report. A few related comments may prove useful here.

It is not clear what motivated the decision to replace the D/COP at this time. What was clear to the evaluation team was the sad state of affairs surrounding the Basic Management Training (BMT) program and the lack of evidence that SUNY/A had made any great advances in the development of the MBA/MPA program. More detailed discussion of these concerns are included in the sections entitled "English Language Training and Basic Management Training" (pg 13) and the "MBA/MPA Program" (pg 15). It is clear that some action on the part of SUNY/A was necessary. One can only assume that this change alone is not the complete solution to the overall problem.

There are obvious difficulties which arise in any change situation. The greatest requirement is that the new SUNY/A field representative have managerial skills as well as academic credentials. Equally important will be the personal skills required to implement necessary changes.

The dissolving of the PASA and USIS withdrawal from further participation in the ELT appears to have been motivated by a more general agency policy which redirects USIS efforts away from English language training. This change requires AID to establish a new contract relationship inorder to fulfill the need and maintain some continuity among instructors and full communication with the students who need better and more timely information. Especially important is the perception that some one is in control of the situation. For further discussion please refer to "English Language Training and Basic Management Training" (pg 13) and "Appendix 6: Lack of Responsiveness to Students".

Recruitment of LTAs

Recruitment for LTAs has been complicated not only by the multiplicity of their duties and consequent job requirements but also by the fact that candidates were flown to Mogadishu to be screened by the PCC and the receiving ministry, both of which had, and twice exercised, the right to turn down a candidate. Because of the time this entailed, three candidates withdrew before their appointments. On the whole, though, this protracted process has paid off handsomely; the advisors are an impressive

lot. Most have been well received by their host ministries.([3]) Their skills are generally being used productively.

Infrastructure

Certain limitations of infrastructure peculiar to Mogadishu have an obvious but sometimes overlooked impact on SOMTAD activities.

The telephone system is predictably unpredictable. This means that the normal mode of conducting business involves traveling from one office to another to communicate, a time-consuming business. Messengers were cut from the reduced Somali Shilling budget.

Electricity is equally unpredictable. This poses a particular hazard for computers. Besides the obvious risk of losing files during blackouts or brownouts, computers can be seriously damaged by power surges, which are common in Mogadishu's power supply. Under the circumstances it makes excellent sense to supply LTAs with battery-powered laptops. The SIDAM librarian has been planning power stabilization for the school's computers. Some thought should also be given to providing a stable power supply for the personal computers purchased for the ministries.

Short-term contract staff should be apprised of these conditions as part of their orientation.

Components of the SOMTAD Project

We turn now to an overview of SOMTAD project components: the long-term advisors, the preliminary ELT/BMT program, the academic MBA/MPA program, the WMTU, and library and computer resources and the PCC. After describing the operation and accomplishments of each component at the present time, we will point out issues or problems that adjustments in project strategy might help to resolve.

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[3]A recent change in ministry structure and leadership has meant that the Ministry of Finance advisor found himself much less well situated than did the others at the time of this evaluation -- without adequate office space, access to top-level officials, or well-focused work assignments. According to AED, his situation has since improved.

Long-term Advisors

The long-term advisors, fielded directly by AED, form the hub of an array of SOMTAD activities. They are the key element in improving administrative efficiency in the ministries, but they play roles in other activities as well. They are prime resources for both the academic program at SIDAM and for the WMTU.

Within the academic program their role includes teaching duties. Just what these are to be is left vague in advisors' job descriptions: "Professor of graduate classes at SOMTAD," for example. They are also supposed to consult with MBA/MPA and BMT curriculum planners in designing the academic courses, so that insights and material emerging from the LTAs' work experience is incorporated into the program.

For the WMTU, LTAs serve as a conduit between the training unit and the ministries, preparing training needs assessments for the training planners and helping to coordinate WMTU courses for ministry staff from within the ministries -- presumably identifying students, locating appropriate space for the course, and the like. At the time the first WMTU design team came to Mogadishu, the advisors then in place did supply training needs lists for four ministries, which proved useful in orienting WMTU planning. It is too early to comment on their coordination role, aside from observing that they appear ready to undertake it once the training is implemented.

The Deputy Chief of Party and Chief of Party arrived in February and March 1987. By June the next two LTAs were in place. Two more were fielded the following November, after the Somali Shilling budget issue was resolved. A sixth came in early March 1988; at the time of the team's visit the resume of a seventh was being circulated in anticipation of his screening visit.

The team found that the LTAs had been very active, contributing in positive ways to the operation of their host ministries and SIDAM. Examples of their activities illustrate their considerable accomplishments:

- The Ministry of Treasury advisor was engaged in studies of the personnel system and of the organizational structure of the Revenue Department. He had also been conducting feasibility studies concerning sales taxes, an airport tax, and the combining of excise and customs taxes.

- The Ministry of Industry advisor had provided critical analyses of the annual reports of six major government enterprises and had reviewed various donor documents and suggested action plans for the Ministry. He had

analyzed the operation of a seventh with recommendations that enabled it to move from operating at a loss to making a profit within one quarter. The ministry had called on him to draft laws governing three major public enterprises. He had also worked on establishing monitoring and inspection systems, and given training workshops.

- In addition to his SOMIAD duties, the Ministry of Labour, Sports, and Social Affairs advisor had been assisting with monitoring resettlement of ex-civil servants, had helped to create a division of Organizational Development with an able counterpart, and had been developing policy manuals for the ministry -- especially for SIDAM, which is attached to it. He was also training ministry staff in writing budgets.

- The Ministry of Finance advisor had compiled and analyzed data from Somalia's three banking institutions from 1983 to the present, an activity that demands considerable energy and creativity, given the paucity of records. He had also critiqued the SNAI Sugar enterprise's request for debt relief.

- The newly-arrived advisor for the Ministry of National Planning had already developed a fundable proposal for an Economic Planning Institute for the ministry and had conducted a workshop on manpower planning.

All except the last had also produced training needs assessments for the use of the WMTU.

- The librarian/computer advisor to SIDAM had inventoried the two present libraries, established a cataloguing system for SIDAM's library holdings, prepared a 5,000 volume book order, inventoried present computer facilities, prepared specifications for ordering SOMIAD computers, and designed a complete course of study for computer technicians and management information specialists for SIDAM.

- The Project Training Coordinator at SIDAM had established selection criteria, screened, and selected MBA/MPA students; set up ELT courses in collaboration with the USIS Language Development Specialist (LDS), and organized and taught in the Basic Management Training Program.

LTAs have had varying experiences with their ministry counterparts. In some cases an advisor has had a rapidly changing series of junior counterparts assigned him. Changes in high-level ministry personnel due to the spate of retirements and

restructuring that started in late 1987 have paired several with senior officials other than the ones who first selected them. In two cases the LTA has been placed not in the Director General's office but lower in the ministry hierarchy. In the Ministry of National Planning the advisor has been placed with the Director for Human Resources, where his training functions can be put to good use; the advisor has good support and ready access to officials higher up. In the Ministry of Finance, the situation was more difficult up to the time of this evaluation.

Many of the LTAs have found their counterparts invaluable guides to getting things done within and beyond their ministries. Several have taken their training duties within the ministry seriously from the start and have taught skills such as budget writing to ministry personnel.

Several problems have plagued the LTAs, however. The project design anticipated that they would receive logistic support in their work -- office supplies, equipment, and secretarial services -- from SOMTAD's shilling budget. The first LTAs to arrive found themselves without basic office amenities necessary for their job. The fielding of several others was delayed until these problems were resolved. The shilling account now available will ease the situation but, because of the GDSR's financial predicament is somewhat lower than originally planned.

Backstopping the LTAs has absorbed a tremendous amount of the COP's time; he has succeeded in supporting his team and directing them virtually without benefit of resources. He will need assistance in handling the logistic part of his job so that he can devote time to his advisory tasks and also continue to provide leadership to the team of LTAs.

Some of the LTAs must spend time outside of Mogadishu to serve their ministries effectively; others need not travel extensively. Several of them will be seriously hampered in their work if they do not acquire a working knowledge of Somali. In visiting the ministries that had received or were to receive LTAs, we tried to match specific work assignments to these needs. Appendix 4 gives ministry-by-ministry details. For the moment, resources needed to supply transportation and per diem for LTAs appear limited. SOMTAD needs to consider how to address these needs within the project.

English Language Training and Basic Management Training

A significant accomplishment of the SOMTAD project thus far has been the start-up of the English language training program in the Basic Management Training (BMT) component. The English

program, in particular, has shown considerable success in meeting goals and implementing activities laid out in the PASA. The program's successes are discussed in this section and difficulties are explored in more depth in the following sections on instructional coordination and USIS backstopping capability.

Textbooks, instructional materials, office supplies and video equipment were available in a timely manner for the English classes. Class schedules, course syllabi, teacher and student manuals have been developed to support the daily operation of the program. Placement tests were administered and candidates were assigned to classes on the basis of the results of those tests.

Twelve classes of 20 students each began in August 1987. Classes are taught five days a week, three hours per day as agreed in the PASA. Attendance has been high, and the drop-out rate has been low. Student progress, as measured by TOEFL scores, has been moderately high. Seventy-five percent of the students who took the TOEFL in February 1988 received the score necessary to pass into a higher level. Of the 25 percent who did not pass into the next level, 15 percent are scheduled to repeat the prior level and 10 percent, who were in the lowest cohort, were dropped from the program because the beginning level will not be offered again.

USIS is currently exceeding its objective of preparing 210 candidates in three cohorts with the TOEFL scores necessary to enter the graduate program. As of February 1988, 228 students remained in the three cohorts. Expectations prior to the program were that 70 students would enter the BMT after six months of English training; 75 actually entered, thus exceeding both goals and expectations.

During project planning it was estimated, based on past USIS administration of the TOEFL, that an insufficient number of Somalis with good English skills would be available to fill the higher level SOMTAD English classes at start-up. Open-enrollment "pre-implementation" English classes were offered to 800 Somalis over the course of a year (1986-1987) to form a pool of qualified candidates interested in entering the SOMTAD graduate program. However, the reservoir of Somali mid-career professionals with good English skills proved larger than anticipated, leading some staff and students to question the necessity of the large pre-implementation program.

Prior to the pre-implementation courses, fourteen Somali English teachers were sent to American University of Cairo to participate in further English language and teacher training. Most of these teachers taught in the pre-implementation English course, and a few are now working as teacher counterparts in the SOMTAD English courses. The Somali participants and American staff generally agreed that the Cairo training was useful in furthering the

teachers' skills. This type of invitational training was funded through the USAID training budget.

USIS instructional staff arrived in-country for the most part in February and March of 1987. The start-up of SOMTAD English classes was delayed until August 1987, due largely to the fact that SOMTAD's designers had not accurately assessed the amount of time needed for the student selection process. Classes for the BMT program began in early 1988. Approximately 18 months of English and BMT instruction remain to be completed before the third and last cohort will begin their MBA/MPA studies.

The BMT is supposed to be a substantive preparatory course which would flow naturally into the formal MBA/MPA program. The course content for the first cohort fell short of the standard set out in the project design. At the time of the evaluation team's visit there was little to suggest that a coordinated Basic Management Training program existed. There was no syllabus which described the content of the BMT or requirements for student performance. A syllabus is an essential document which guides both student and instructor.

No integration of the BMT components was in evidence. As discussed in more detail on pages 24 - 25 the BMT was envisioned as a three part program, designed to prepare students for entry into the MBA/MPA program. Several factors worked against successful implementation of the BMT.

There were those who suggested that responsibility for development and implementation of the program was unclear. Some suggested that the overall organizational structure was a significant factor. Our review of contract documents place responsibility for the BMT with the subcontractor SUNY/A. The formal chain of command (see Figure 1A - pg 23) implies a structural distance between the SUNY/A field representative (D/COP) and the USIS language development specialists and teachers. Within any successful system informed, functional lines of communication and cooperation exist without formal organization charts.

At the operational level teachers indicated that there was limited interaction among staff. Math and English teachers had little opportunity to discuss student concerns or exchange ideas. Several successful seminars were offered by the LTA's, yet again there appeared to be no attempt to integrate these experiences into the math and English components.

Within a preparatory program such as the BMT one would expect to see English for Special Purposes (ESP). Such a course would integrate technical subject matter which would facilitate the

students transfer to the formal MBA/MPA program. After several inquiries it remained unclear as to whether SUNY/A had failed to provide the promised assistance or USIS did not incorporate them for such reasons as late receipt of material. There also is little attention given to drawing upon the students prior experience. Such an approach would be to create useful writing exercises relative to their experience (see also further discussion on page 22 - English Language Training).

It may be unfair, but there was the perception that some viewed the BMT as a make work, holding action until the MBA/MPA program could be implemented in the Fall of 1988. This becomes more evident when one considers the lack of responsiveness to students (see also Appendix 6 for further discussion). Consider initially that student selection took place in mid 1987 and that the first cohort will enter the formal MBA/MPA program in late 1988. For others the wait will be much longer. With time comes frustration. It also provides an opportunity to learn more about the students.

The students were initially selected on the basis of limited but basic tests of English and mathematics skills. Using these test results students were assigned to cohorts which grouped them according to reading and math skills and determined their progression through the BMT and ultimately the MBA/MPA program. Beyond these initial tests there is no evidence of an attempt to further assess the students strengths and weaknesses. There has been no review of individual student work and educational experience.

The students come from varied professional backgrounds. Some may have skills and experience which are sufficient for immediate entry into a similar program elsewhere but are restricted due to economic or other reasons. Some students are able to progress at a more rapid rate yet there were no provisions which permit advancement beyond the next stage in the lock step system or be released from a program component in which they have demonstrated superior competence.

There has been ample opportunity to use the time in which students are in the BMT program to assess in more detail individual strengths and weaknesses. Note earlier comment on the lack of opportunity for teachers to discuss student strengths or special needs.

The most inexcusable failure to demonstrate a student focus has been the basic lack of information provided to students or an opportunity for students to discuss concerns or special needs. The SUNY/A contract does not assign a counselor to the students until they enter the MBA/MPA program. Yet for many students the need for contact and information is greatest during this long

period of uncertainty while awaiting entry into the formal program. In addition, misunderstandings and concerns arise on a regular basis. It has been reported by students and teachers that basic orientation to BMT was inadequate. This is not surprising since a syllabus was not in evidence as late as April 1988. SUNY/A has responsibility for the BMT and its representative is located at SIDAM. Yet it has been reported that the Chief of Party (COP) has been most instrumental in providing some interface with students.

Solutions? - Several solutions are suggested within the discussions of the problems with the BMT. More direct involvement by the new SUNY/A field representative and associated staff will certainly help. SUNY/A acknowledged their responsibility for the BMT and have promised to give it priority. Replacement of USIS and the PASA should simplify structural lines, especially if the prime contractor has direct administrative oversight. As noted earlier, redrawing lines is not sufficient. Success in development of a BMT which meets standards will require active stimulation of both formal and informal communication among program components. An ESP program is necessary. It is essential that students be introduced to material which is related to subject matter they will face when they enter the MBA/MPA program. The ESP should emphasize reading, writing, and oral skills.

The final recommendation is to open up communication with students. The need to know is not unique among Somalians. Students everywhere are interested in course requirements, their progress, as well as, what to expect in both the short and long term. Similarly special concerns such as require out of country travel for Ministry employees or special personal problems may develop. Both written and oral communications can be effectively used. However, there must be communication.

The MBA/MPA Program

The MBA/MPA program has not been planned as a permanent part of SIDAM's curriculum. Instead, it is meant to train one group of mid-level government officials and private sector managers to become competent trained administrators and managers in their various ministries and businesses. Some may return to SIDAM as instructors in its undergraduate training programs. For this program, institution building means creating a cadre of experts, each of whom will begin immediately to improve the agency in which he or she works. Sharing informal links and a common educational experience, these classmates will also help to support and reinforce their fellows in their efforts to streamline their organizations. LTA support should bolster the transition from classroom to office. Some of these effects are already apparent in the careers of the group of Fresno MBAs, trained under a World Bank program in the mid-1980s. As members of this group advance in their careers, the effects of the program should become even more significant. Over the very long run, the academic program should thus have ripple effects throughout Somalia's institutional structure.

Up to now progress of the MBA/MPA program has been limited. Three major activities have occupied the subcontractor: student selection procedures and class assignment at SIDAM; starting up the English language and the Basic Management Training program (BMT) at a pre-graduate level at SIDAM; and curriculum planning in Albany. In all these areas the functional and professional interface between the subcontractor and host institution has been weak. We are recommending that various changes in the process from here on be made to strengthen it.

In June 1987, students were selected, based on their scores on the TOEFL examination and on a qualifying math test. Cohorts were created based on the spread of test scores, and a plan was devised to stagger entrance into the BMT and, eventually, the MBA/MPA program. Since the entrance testing, little further attempt has been made to assess student skill levels, other than in the English courses, or offer individualized instruction. Moreover, for extended periods, prospective students received little or no information concerning their program status or expectations.

Most of the SOMTAD students are mid-career professionals with full-time jobs, as the project design specifies. Often they hold bachelor's degrees from European or American universities with international reputations.([4]) One noted that he had been admitted to a U.S. graduate program on the strength of his record and test scores but had not been able to finance study abroad. A number of them are top caliber.

Their most common complaint is that the current four- to five-year pre-professional and professional program is too long -- especially since the number of allowed absences is limited to five unexcused absences every six months. Some of the top group also claim that they do not need remedial work. Although attrition has been remarkably low so far, students intimate that under these conditions it may rise considerably in the future. Student counselling and advisory services have not been institutionalized by the sub-contractor. For further discussion of these issues see Appendix 6.

Our team was asked to evaluate progress in developing an MBA/MPA curriculum comparable to a U.S. degree program and adapted to the Somali context. The available course outlines and the detailed curriculum proposed are conceptually sound. The structure of the syllabus differs from that of the classic MBA syllabus but with no loss in quality or content in the realm of public administration. It appears weaker in subject matter more oriented to private sector management: marketing, production, advanced accounting, corporate finance, and international trade are examples. Since twenty to thirty percent of the students are from the private sector, instructional modules should meet the needs of this sub-group. The structure of the curriculum is not, however, the main cause for concern.

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[4]American educators should note that, in the European system, students enter university at a more advanced level than in the American system, having finished their general education courses in secondary school, ready to specialize in a single discipline. Thus their university transcripts do not reflect the breadth of their education.

SUNY/A is proposing to take an experiential approach to management training. This focuses on role playing and simulation as teaching techniques to demonstrate how theoretical concepts actually work. Developing an experiential curriculum cannot be done well without direct exposure to the end users. Two two-person curriculum development teams without significant overseas experience came to Somalia for three-week periods to contact SIDAM faculty and find resources for curricular materials. SUNY/A plans to make use of 35 Fresno Masters theses and to consult with a former Fresno professor. The SUNY/A team would also like to bring three Somali SIDAM faculty members to Albany for two months to help in curriculum development. These seem to be token measures.

Adapting a curriculum to the Somali context requires understanding how management needs are influenced by external structural factors -- cultural, organizational, environmental, and personal. The subcontractor needs to base its curriculum plan on Somali-based needs assessment and intensive collaborative planning with Somali faculty and others familiar with the Somali business and administrative context. To do this a curriculum planning team needs to spend several months in Somalia. It needs particularly to contact the end users of the training -- prospective students and public and private sector employers. Most of the curriculum planning to date has taken place in upstate New York.

Institutional linkages between SUNY/A faculty and SIDAM have been minimal, except for the presence of the long-term Program Training Coordinator (also serving as D/COP), whose office is at SIDAM - and who is now leaving. SUNY/A curriculum development teams have met with the President of SIDAM only briefly. The Albany sub-contract project manager has spent a total of eleven days on two trips to Mogadishu.

SUNY/A support for the D/COP needs strengthening, particularly in so isolated a place as Somalia. When his replacement is chosen, SUNY/A should make every effort to find an able manager with academic and administrative experience who can operate flexibly and effectively in a developing country and who will take an active role in making the home institution aware of specific conditions and educational needs in Somalia.

Preparations are underway for reception of the American faculty members coming in for one term to teach in the MBA/MPA program. USAID's Field Support Unit is in charge of logistical preparations and has readied adequate housing for them. Transportation will be needed to get them to work and back because the house is some distance from the school. It would also help to find a cook for the house.

The new president of SIDAM expressed concern that, although SIDAM's classroom space will accommodate the MBA/MPA classes, no one has planned office space for the faculty. This oversight will present problems for both SIDAM and the visiting faculty. The issue needs to be addressed soon.

As teachers, these short-term faculty members will need to "hit the ground running." The sub-contractor should be urged to prepare them through an intensive orientation, comprising an introduction to the people, culture and language of Somalia; overview of ministries and organizations served by the program; assessment of Somali students' skills; and preparation for the constraints of living in Mogadishu. Some of this could be done in Albany; much of it might well be done in Mogadishu a week or ten days before starting to teach, since the long-term advisors could contribute to it.

The Worksite Management Training Unit (WMTU)

In evaluating the WMTU we are forced to deal with a plan, not an observable activity. We were able to confirm, however, that interest in this particular component of SOMTAD runs high in the GSDR ministries and organizations we visited. Ministry officials and staff who expressed reservations about the length of the academic masters program were enthusiastic about the potential of short-term training to solve their immediate organizational problems. Ministry officials most often listed targeted and technical topics as their top management priorities: accounting, filing, computer use, and office management are examples. The TIPCO[5] report's research concerning private sector training cites parallel needs. The WMTU is the SOMTAD component best suited to respond to these needs.
*see references in appendix 1
According to the plan set out for the WMTU by Creative Associates, the unit will be run in a highly collaborative manner -- one or two American advisors at a time working in tandem with a larger number of Somali colleagues and trainers. Much of the needs assessment and guidance and most of the training will be done by Somalis in the Somali language. The designers are clearly concerned with understanding and responding to Somali needs for training, not with imposing an exogenous model on Somali managers and administrators.

The WMTU has the potential for reaching large numbers of Somalis. CA estimates that it will train 3200 people during the life of project, or 800 per year; even two-thirds that number would be a substantial achievement, amounting to ten to fifteen times the number of people the academic course of study can serve. Note,

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[5]See references in Appendix 1.

too, that the WMTU can provide courses for all management levels, from the base level workers to top level administrators.

Unlike the MBA/MPA program, the WMTU could potentially become a self-sustaining unit within SIDAM, integrated with its present short-course program after the end of project, possibly by charging fees for service.

To achieve even part of this potential, however, the WMTU needs adequate funding and resources. The proportion of the SOMTAD budget allocated to it is minute, considering the size of the Somali population it will reach. WMTU has been allocated only $429,000 plus $200,000 for equipment and is entitled to a maximum of 46 person/months of short-term consulting for four years (16 person/months for CA, and 30 shared with SUNY/A). This amounts to eleven or twelve person/months per year, far too little to supply enough short-term advisors for the thirty to forty workshops it will need to mount each year. Many of these courses will need to deal with technical subjects and to call in technical experts. It is worth investigating whether ADL's resources might be tapped to answer this need.

To be able to schedule workshops efficiently, the WMTU will also need to hire its own staff of full-time salaried Somali trainers, so that it can count on a core staff who have no conflicting work obligations. At this time, we were unable to ascertain whether funds for purchasing or producing instructional materials were sufficient.

The WMTU schedule of activities for the coming months include mounting a five-week management training workshop in June, conducting Office Management Training in July, and providing Training of Trainers from August onward. Before these events can occur, the WMTU urgently needs a full time Project Training Advisor in place at SIDAM. The PTA's duties would include: identifying and prioritizing training needs; locating resources for the training; selecting students and trainers; designing, publicizing, and scheduling workshops; overseeing the training of trainers; coordinating activities with CA's home office; and serving as a link between the WMTU and other SOMTAD activities and staff. In all, these duties are too extensive to be treated merely as an add-on to the responsibilities of the Project Training Coordinator at SIDAM. To carry out these activities the PTA will need the assistance of a full-time Somali counterpart.

Somali hopes and expectations for this component are high. The WMTU may well prove the most effective vehicle for immediate and sustainable impact on management systems in Somalia. It has been provided with vehicles, but it cannot live up to its promise without additional, adequate support.

Library Organization and Computer Acquisition

SOMTAD provides resources for SIDAM's library, audio-visual, and computer resources in support of the MBA/MPA and other training programs. We found, however, that the SOMTAD project designers made some inaccurate assumptions about the equipment and the library collection of the Institute. This has had consequences for the adequacy of SOMTAD resources available for upgrading these facilities. The Fresno program left fewer library resources than expected. The computers left behind were Commodore 64s, small and relatively limited machines that are not compatible with DOS-based systems. Of the eleven computers from Fresno, only four remained operative.

This has meant that more computers and more books and materials for cataloguing are needed than originally anticipated. To date, the strategy the SOMTAD library/computer advisor has adopted is to increase the number of computers on order but initially to stay within the original book budget. His reasons for both tactics seem cogent. But this means that the budget line for books may need to be increased so that the library can support an adequate MBA/MPA program. Appendix 5 gives further details.

Planning for library and computer resource materials at SIDAM has progressed very well up to the point of procurement. Comprehensive lists of materials needed and detailed procurement specifications have been drawn up. A plan for use of space to accommodate the enlarged library and the computer laboratory has been developed. But procurement, discussed earlier, has been a major roadblock. The librarian/computer advisor has prepared detailed purchase information in seemingly endless iterations. Appendix 3 traces the convoluted course of a single book order placed through AED.

The first purchase proposal and detailed specifications for computers were prepared in mid-September 1987 for equipment USAID has just now apparently succeeded in ordering. We had the impression that all parties to this exercise regretted that USAID had retained the task of procurement.

The president of SIDAM has asked the librarian/computer advisor to prepare a plan for instituting a full-fledged computer training and management of information systems curriculum for SIDAM, and the advisor has complied with enthusiasm and thoroughness. His work lays a good foundation for a proposal to set up those programs. In light of the many activities already vying for attention under SOMTAD, however, this proposal should either be used to obtain separate funding or should be held in reserve for a later phase of the SOMTAD project.

The Role of the Project Coordinating Committee

The Project Coordinating Committee (PCC) is composed of Directors General of the seven ministries participating in the SOMTAD project, the Somali Project Manager from the Ministry of Labour and Sports, the President of SIDAM, the USAID Project Officer and the head of the Chamber of Commerce. It is designated as a policy-making body, rather like a board of directors.

The model of setting up coordinating decision-making interministerial committees is familiar to Somali officials and is employed, usually on an ad-hoc basis, when policy decisions must be made that cross-cut the functions of several ministries or other agencies. What is unusual about the PCC is the regularity with which it meets.

In principle, any member of the PCC can call for a meeting. Each meeting follows a prearranged agenda. Member comments about the PCC's usefulness ranged from approbation to the observation that it was too time-consuming for the good it did. At least one member pointed out that the agenda circulated before the meeting is not always informative enough to prepare PCC members for the ensuing discussion: an item like "Somali Shillings," he noted, does not tell members what issue will be raised on the topic or give them opportunity to prepare a response. A further problem for some members at least, is that discussions are conducted in English. Initially several PCC members were sent to Nairobi for intensive English language training, but with the changes in the GSDR ministries a few members still find themselves at a linguistic disadvantage.

Coordination Issues

One of the strengths of the SOMTAD project, as outlined in the Project Paper, was to be its "highly interrelated and mutually supportive" nature. For example, the first-hand experience of the advisors in the ministries was to enrich instruction, while the coursework and training provided for ministry personnel would immediately benefit the participating agencies, thus facilitating the LTAs' work (PP, p. 10). In this way, the benefits of the whole project were to be greater than the sum of its parts.

The success of such an effort is predicated on a project's ability to create an organizational structure which fosters communication and teamwork among staff in each component. In the case of SOMTAD, coordinated activities are called for without the provision of a well-integrated structure to support them. Many of the coordination problems which have plagued the start-up phase of the project can be traced back to an unwieldy

organizational structure. This section describes the structure of the project and the difficulties it has engendered in integrating instructional programs.

Organizational Structure and Lines of Authority

The organizational structure of the project is illustrated in Figure 1. AED, as the prime contractor, supervises the activities of three sub-contractors. USIS provides English language training (ELT) and is responsible to USAID/S through a Participating Agency Service Agreement (PASA) but has no direct links to AED or the sub-contractors. Because USAID has remained involved in the PCC and in procurement and because, up to now, the PASA removed responsibility for ELT from AED's contract, USAID has been forced to remain at the head of SOMTAD administration. The PASA has not helped the project personnel to coordinate activities. It requires a PTC with strong administrative experience to work successfully within this structure.

The ELT program and the BMT, for instance, are supposed to build skills students will need to enter the masters program. Without a clear vision of what the graduate program will be like, this requirement cannot be met. Ideally, the PTC, in conjunction with SUNY/A faculty, should be formulating the aims and strategies of the graduate program and communicating them to the English language faculty, so that the Language Development Coordinator (LDC) can build that part of the program around the same principles. This coordination should be an on-going process. In fact, visiting SUNY/A faculty did provide the LDC with sample tests and curricular materials, but there seems to have been little follow-up to this one-time communication.

Instructional Coordination

The effects of this organizational structure have affected or have the potential to affect all instructional components of the program: ELT, BMT, MBA/MPA, and WMTU.

English Language Training

According to the PASA, the ELT program is an English for Specific Purposes (ESP) course. As such, its success depends on the ability of the curriculum developers to identify the academic language skills the Somali students would need in their MBA/MPA program and the professional language skills they will require as mid-career management professionals in their ministries or in the private sector. Then materials need to be developed which allow

FIGURE 1:
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOMTAD PROJECT

FIGURE 1A:

SOMTAD ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Lines of Authority



FIGURE 1B:

ASSUMED BMT LINKAGES



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for "increased practice ... within the appropriate management/administrative workplace contexts" (PP, 91). The PASA also calls for the development of supplemental materials appropriate to Somalia for the ESP program. Materials development of this nature has not yet been undertaken for reasons discussed in the next section.

Students and Somali counterpart teachers both commented on the incomplete nature of the materials used. They complained that they had expected materials with a management focus in the English for Management course. Some felt the beginning materials taught general language skills needed in the U.S., rather than skills appropriate to their occupations in Africa. A new contractor should assess the existing materials to see if 1) they teach the language skills required by the occupational and academic settings of the students, and 2) they are at a level appropriate to their users.

Basic Management Training

The BMT course was charged in the PP with using "authentic management materials as selected by OPEX (now LTA) and ESP Language Development Personnel." Phase 2 would include instruction by the LTAs with assistance from the ESP language development personnel. The BMT was clearly envisioned as a joint project where LTA experience would infuse language classes, and techniques to strengthen basic skills (including language skills) would infuse the LTA classes.

In reality, the BMT, through staff shortages and lack of adequate planning, has evolved into three largely separate components: language classes, math instruction, and guest lectures by LTAs. No coherent curricular thread is woven through the instruction, and instructors have little or no time to share information. If the math teacher finds that a particular student has difficulty with word problems, there are no formal linkages which would enable the language teacher to address them. The separation is even more severe for the first cohort in Phase I of the BMT because they either attend LTA lectures or English classes, not both.

Some of these problems can be partially attributed to a lack of substantive coordination between the PTC, the LDS, and SUNY/A to ensure that team planning was undertaken. The contract assigns this role to the PTC. In part the problems are due to the LDS's teaching and administrative overload, which left her no time for curriculum development. Another factor may be that the language professionals involved in conceptualizing the program design had left, and the remaining staff saw their job as implementing a program, not designing it.

A final source of confusion is that the BMT is sometimes termed a remedial course, sometimes a preparatory course. Students maintain that, if it is a remedial course, some of them should be allowed to place out of it, perhaps on the basis of testing, and move directly into the Masters program. If, on the other hand, it is a preparatory course, students who have already had academic courses in management might be exempted from it. These are both rational arguments for saving some time for some students, but the type of students each alternative favors differs. The next PTC will have to come to terms with this issue by deciding to what extent the course is remedial and to what extent preparatory. That decision depends, in turn on establishing a coherent curriculum.

It is essential that the new ELT contractor have experience in designing English for Managers and specialized English for academic purposes classes, if this aspect of the program is to be implemented as conceived in the PP. If this happens, the SOMTAD project may be able to leave behind the beginnings of ESP curricular materials adapted specifically to training Somali managers -- thus building SIDAM's institutional capacity to train managers in English, rather than undermining it as the withdrawal of the USIS ELT-P was perceived to do by SIDAM officials.

The Masters Degree Program

The MBA/MPA program is a key component of the SOMTAD project. It should integrate most of the other components into its curriculum -- LTAs as sources of background information, as well as teachers; SIDAM faculty; English programs. Cross-fertilization between the sub-contractor university and the field setting is essential. Moreover, the innovative attempt to create a core management program that branches into public administration or business management requires coordination between two separate faculties in the sub-contractor's home institution.

So far, curriculum development has been handled, instead, as an essentially "academic" exercise. SUNY/A has not yet adopted a truly collaborative approach either between its two management training faculties, though it appears to be moving slowly toward involving both in the project, or between Albany faculty and some of the prime resource people in Mogadishu. The gap between AED-fielded LTAs and SUNY/A professors has not been bridged as SOMTAD planners meant it to be. Field teams have spent more time gathering written materials than tapping the experience of people intimately involved with Somali administration. Since documented cases are a rarity, there is need to integrate experts' practical experience and advice into curriculum planning.

The link between Albany and their one long-term representative in Mogadishu, the D/COP and Program Training Coordinator, has also

been tenuous. Apparently few directives have passed either from Albany to Mogadishu to solicit advice in curriculum planning or from Mogadishu to Albany to inform curriculum planners or enlist assistance in setting up the programs for which the PTC was responsible. Since the current D/COP has now left, it is imperative to find a strong D/COP with both academic and administrative skills and to provide him or her with solid support from the home institution.

The Worksite Management Training Unit

The WMTU may face problems similar to the ELT/BMT component in coordinating short-term training if the current organizational structure is not modified. As it stands, the Project Training Coordinator is responsible for coordinating WMTU training which will involve the LTAs, Somali trainers hired by Creative Associates, and Creative Associate TDYs, all in addition to his responsibilities for the academic masters program. The PTC has no clear line of authority over personnel hired for the WMTU and not enough time to devote to its needs. The need for a full-time Project Training Advisor for the WMTU has been discussed above (p. 19).

Home Offices and Logistical Support

U.S. Contractors and Field Staff

Because communications between Somalia and the United States can be difficult, it is particularly important that U.S. contractors provide strong support for their staff in Mogadishu. AED, the prime contractor, stays in close touch with the COP and responds promptly to problems that arise. As a firm with extensive experience in project implementation in developing countries it is accustomed to dealing with teams like the one it has placed in Somalia.

For SUNY/A, on the other hand, this is an unusual venture. Some of the home/field coordination problems just described may be due to inattention to what SUNY/A considers a small project, located far from up-state New York.

The most far-reaching problems of home office support, however, have arisen between USIS and its SOMTAD project staff.

USIS Backstopping Capability

The English for Specific Purposes (ESP) Language Development Program outlined in the PP presents a powerful concept for

preparing the language student for professional interaction in managerial and administrative fields. The instructional goals of the project are commendable, but insufficient attention was paid to assuring that the administrative capacity would be maintained within USIS to backstop such an ambitious addition to its activities.

From 1982 USIS had been offering a potpourri of English language training in Somalia, including classes at government ministries, SIDAM, and the USIS center. These classes, which aimed at training the Somali elite, were partially funded through USAID. During planning of the SOMTAD project, dynamic and motivated TESOL professionals on the USIS staff saw the possibility of increasing USIS's in-country ELT capacity through a PASA to provide the SOMTAD English instruction, while at the same time creating an economy of scale which would decrease USAID costs.

The implementation of the SOMTAD English classes, however, put great pressure on the existing ELT Program. The unexpectedly large pre-implementation phase, which trained about 800 students in English, put pressure on the ELT-P Director to find and train Somali teachers, and qualified instructors were siphoned from the existing program into SOMTAD. The then director was overwhelmed by the administrative requirements of SOMTAD and had neither the time nor inclination to plumb the expatriate community for additional teachers. At the end of FY 87, USIS was facing a 15 percent budget cut and had to decide between closing the library, sending the Assistant Program Administration Officer (PAO) home, or closing the ELT-P. The latter, due to its internal problems, was closed.

The closing of the ELT-P eliminated the staff position of ELT-P Course Director, who was to be responsible, according to the PASA, for assuring that the program activities and objectives were carried out and for supervising the SOMTAD Language Development Specialist (LDS). By default, the LDS position was increased to include administrative responsibilities and placed directly under the PAO, formalizing a de facto transfer of responsibilities that had begun earlier. Not only did this increase the duties of the position, but it virtually eliminated day-to-day supervision, since the PAO, at the head of the USIS staff, would be unable to add SOMTAD monitoring in any comprehensive way to her already extensive duties.

Prior to the closing of the ELT-P, the LDS had to leave, due to medical problems, after only a month in country. Recruitment by USIA to fill the empty position would have delayed program start-up, and in-country USIS staff were understandably wary of the screening done stateside, which had allowed the first candidate's grave physical problems to go undetected.

It was decided that the best qualified teacher would be promoted to the LDS position. USIS had little in-country capacity, however, to orient the new LDS to the managerial requirements of the position. For example, there were no procedures established or sample forms available to tell her what was required for local hire contracting, an oversight which caused friction within the program later. (The LDS reported this problem was due to a lack of consistent formalized policies for the new hiring situations arising in SOMTAD.) Furthermore, the records received, especially financial ones, were scanty at best. Intermittent teacher shortages during start-up required the LDS to teach more hours than her contract specified. Given the increased administrative and teaching responsibilities of the job, major responsibilities actually assigned to the LDS in the PASA job description were not fulfilled.

Little time was left for the key responsibilities of the LDS position, namely the development of English for Specific Purposes (ESP) curricula which addressed the language needs of mid-career Somali managers preparing for a graduate course, the design of materials appropriate to the special problems and interests of Somali students, and teacher training and supervision. One of the unexpected outcomes resulting from overloading the LDS with administrative and teaching duties was the inefficient use of Somali counterparts in the program (see Appendix 7 for discussion of this issue).

In summary, the administrative backstopping capacity of USIS proved to be insufficient for the unexpectedly large demands placed on it by the SOMTAD program. Major difficulties arose from:

- Inability to recruit, screen and field qualified candidates in a timely manner;
- Elimination of a key supervisory and monitoring position; and
- Inability of the administrative structure to orient the new LDS to managerial procedures of the agency.

Due to the difficulties encountered in the SOMTAD project, USIS is now negotiating an amicable dissolution of the PASA with AID.

The Need for More Detailed Planning

In the final SOMTAD contract insufficient attention was given to assuring that the project would have the time and resources to implement its activities. It is unclear why this happened. Whatever the reason for it, it is recommended that the COP's current efforts to engage in more detailed advanced planning be

commended and that subcontractors be required to do the same. As outlined in the recommendations, some of the initial underfunding of certain components should be addressed. A few examples of the areas where such planning was initially overlooked are sketched below.

There was a lack of definition of resources needed to achieve the goals of the project. For example, the PP states that a library will be established which will provide "adequate resources" for the MBA/MPA program. In the U.S. a library of approximately 50,000 books would support a university MBA/MPA program. The existing facilities at SIDAM only have room for 25,000 books and the budget only provided for 5,000 books. Furthermore, the budget did not include funds for shipping or cataloguing books.

One of the goals of the BMT is to assist students to become computer-literate. Yet the PP originally limited the number of computers to be acquired to eleven, which would have provided each student in a cohort with approximately one and a half hours per week of computer time, hardly enough to attain computer literacy.

Scheduling for the WMTU has not been planned in sufficient detail. If it were to train 3200 persons, as proposed in the PP, over the space of four years, 800 persons per year or 200 persons per quarter need to be trained. This would take a level of person hours, resources, and logistical support not budgeted for in the contract. Furthermore, a four-year training schedule would call for 200 persons to have been trained by the end of the first quarter of 1988, and yet the WMTU is still in the planning stages. Given the importance of the WMTU, which was established earlier in this evaluation, it is necessary to ensure that it be funded sufficiently to attain its goals and that detailed planning begin as soon as possible to determine the feasibility of meeting the goals that have been set for it.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The SOMTAD project is, in many ways, an unwieldy effort launched in a difficult and uncertain environment. Yet it has much potential to provide crucial assistance to Somali managers and administrators in appropriate ways. It has succeeded in pulling together an impressive team who welcome challenges and have risen to meet them. In reviewing the project's progress to date, we feel that, with some modifications, it can contribute significantly to managing development in Somalia.

Conclusions

To summarize discussion of the context and components of the SOMTAD project, we have identified several problems in project design and other problems external to the project as the main factors that have caused delays in project implementation. After discussing these factors, we will comment on the operation of the three major components: the ministry advisors, the academic program, and the worksite training unit.

Four types of problems are due to project design: 1) coordination between the main contractor, a consulting firm, and a university, as required by the project design, is often a difficult relationship and has not been easy in the SOMTAD project; 2) coordination between USIS, awarded the English language teaching on a PASA directly with USAID, and the other project components has been particularly indirect; 3) USAID's procurement procedures and requirements have been a cause of delay in obtaining vehicles, computers, and library materials; and 4) during the course of project design or negotiations, the budget for various project activities either was never anticipated or was pared too drastically to permit adequate operation. Activities of the BMT and WMTU suffer the most from under-funding.

Problems external to the project that have hampered its operation include: 1) Somalia's present economic crisis, which makes it nearly impossible for the GSDR to meet all its project commitments at the level promised; and 2) political changes in the Somali government structure, which mean that there is, at present, no guarantee that the officials with whom LTAs must work will be the same people over the life of the project. It remains to be seen what the impact will be of some upcoming changes in USAID and project staff.

Regarding the operation of the three major components, we found:

- The LTAs were generally well placed in their ministries and remarkably effective.
- The WMTU design has great potential, and there is tremendous enthusiasm for it on the part of Somali ministry staff, but it is under-funded and seriously under-staffed if it is to fulfill its purpose.
- The academic program's component parts -- MBA/MPA, BMT, and ELT -- were not yet well-integrated either with each other or, as far as we could tell, with the Somali context and management needs. It is not too late to take steps to rectify these shortcomings.

In sum, the project has encountered initial delays and problems of resource access typical of the start-up phase of a complex project. Many of these are being resolved before they become detrimental. Others still need attention.

Recommendations

Our recommendations can only address the activities now in motion, but we offer them in a spirit of optimism, hoping they will help to smooth the way for the future course of the project.

Our recommendations fall into six categories:

- Improving the English language teaching component of SOMTAD;
- Providing adequate support for the LTAs;
- Adapting SOMTAD, especially the masters program component, to the Somali environment;
- Preparing the way for an effective WMTU;
- Improving project management; and
- Rewriting the scope of work for the next interim evaluation.

We focused attention on the English language teaching component of SOMTAD because it was the most visible teaching activity at the time of the evaluation. Our recommendations for improving ELT are:

1. Replace USIS with AED or an AED-designated sub-contractor who meets the requirements listed in Appendix 8, especially with a commitment to providing English language teaching for managers.

2. Provide additional funds for instructional materials appropriate to the ESP program, which are necessary to supplement existing general English materials procured by USIS.

3. Provide adequate staffing and funding for the new ESP provider to strengthen in-service training of Somali teacher counterparts and develop ESP materials appropriate to Somalia.

4. Recognize that enabling SIDAM to provide continuing English language training oriented to

management is a significant step in strengthening it as an institution that can train well-qualified administrators and managers.

5. Improve coordination between the D/COP and the language training coordinator.

6. Require the SUNY/A D/COP to coordinate strengthening of the BMT curriculum.

Appendix 8 gives recommendations for the English language training component in greater detail.

The LTAs' work in the ministries to which they are assigned can have profound and broad effects on the ability of those ministries to operate effectively and promote economic development. Their time is far better spent on substantive advisory tasks and training than on scrambling for the basic resources they need to do their work. Our recommendations are that they be provided adequate support in the following ways:

7. Provide a transportation allotment for surface and air travel and per diems for LTAs whose tasks are field-oriented (see Appendix 4 for details).

8. Add an administrative assistant for the COP, to free him from constant administrative pressures and to allow him more time for advisory duties.

9. Maintain adequate funding for invitational training for LTA ministry counterparts.

10. Set up a supplemental cash fund for AED to draw on to pay shilling costs as a short-term alternative in case of further problems with the GSDR shilling account for SOMTAD.

Many aspects of good management or administration depend on intimate knowledge of the social context, local management practices, and the skills of subordinates. Without understanding the environment it is hard to determine which managerial skills and techniques are transferable and which are context-specific. It is in this sense that SOMTAD, especially in its academic program, must adapt to the Somali environment. Specific recommendations are:

11. Encourage SUNY/A curriculum planning team to work collaboratively with Somali faculty and experts over the coming summer on designing the MBA/MPA curriculum, preferably while staying in Mogadishu.

12. Make sure that the masters degree program and the WMTU address private sector management needs as well as public sector administration.

13. Provide training for present and future contractors in Somali language, culture and society as specified in the project paper. (See Appendix 4 for detailed needs of LTAs.)

The WMTU, a minor component in the SOMTAD budget, has exciting potential for appropriate and much-desired training to solve immediate management problems promptly. Our recommendations are intended to help it off to a successful start:

14. Provide SOMTAD with a Project Training Advisor and a Somali counterpart to help plan and backstop WMTU and integrate it with SIDAM's current short-course program.

15. Make sure that needs assessments from the three ministries that had no advisors at the time of the WMTU team's initial visit last January are forwarded to Creative Associates as soon as they are available.

16. Increase the number of person/months available for WMTU to permit adequate operation over a four-year period.

17. Assure an adequate budget for instructional materials for the WMTU.

Several individuals with key roles in project management will be replaced over the summer. Finding appropriately qualified replacements for the USAID Project manager and the Deputy Chief of Party/Project Training Coordinator will have an important effect on how well the project is managed:

18. Search for a USAID project manager familiar with AID administration procedures who has had experience in managing complex projects, preferably with a strong educational component. If the candidate chosen lacks some of these qualifications, consider hiring an assistant project manager with complementary skills.

19. Replace the D/COP with someone who has had administrative experience and is familiar with problems of project management in developing countries in addition to possessing appropriate

academic qualifications -- this post calls for experience, energy, and creativity.

Finally, because the project has encountered delays in implementation this evaluation was unable to address certain issues. These should be included as tasks for the next interim evaluation. Among our recommendations for the next evaluation team are:

20. Focus on issues that could not be addressed in this evaluation due to delays in implementation, including:

    - Appropriateness and quality of Masters Program instruction;

    - Operation and effectiveness of the WMTU

21. Review the objectives of the second evaluation as set out in the Project Paper, Section viii, since they focus primarily on civil service reform. Recognize that civil service reform can no longer be expected to progress as SOMTAD planning had assumed.

22. Allow at least four to five weeks in Somalia, in addition to a week's briefing in Washington and Albany for the second evaluation, since the project will have grown in complexity and even more people will be involved in it.

APPENDICES

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Other

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Robert Gurevich, Technical Advisor, Management Unit for Support and Training (MUST), EIL
Dr. Adan Amin Awil, Chairman, Berbera Cement Agency
Shirley Burchfield, IEES Coordinator, and SOMTAD statistics instructor
Approximately 30 students in the SOMTAD classes
Observed 6 classes (ELT & BMT)

APPENDIX 3: THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS

The following chart shows the path and the chronology for the first book order for the SOMTAD library:

APPENDIX 3: THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS

DATE	ACTION	SOMTAD	USAID/SOM	AED	REDSO	G.I.-SOM BIDDERS
9/87	Book list sent to USAID for approval	BOOK LIST →	BOOK LIST			
9/87	Approves. Returns to sender	BOOK LIST ←				
10/87	Sends to AED to hold until specifications finalized			BOOK LIST		
12/87	Specifications sent to AED for review	SPECS →		SPECS		
1/88	Specifications finalized	SPECS →		SPECS		
1/88	Request for quotations sent to four bidders			RFQ →		RFQ
2/88	Bids received from three bidders			BIDS ←		BIDS
2/88	Bids evaluated and REDSO advised of best bid				BIDS	
2/88	REDSO requests copy of draft letter of agreement between AED and bidder			ADVISED ←	ADVISED	
3/88	Draft letter of agreement sent to REDSO			DLOA →	DLOA	
3/88	REDSO advises AED that approval of scope of work and delivery orders must be obtained from mission project officer. Telex sent to mission		TELEX ←	TELEX ←	TELEX	
4/88	USAID advises AED to proceed with procurement		TELEX →	TELEX		
4/88	Letter of agreement signed and procurement begins			LOA & BOOKLIST →		LOA & BOOKLIST
?	Books procured and shipped to Somalia	BOOKS ←				BOOKS

APPENDIX 4: LTA ASSIGNMENTS AND NEEDS FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

LTA assignments require adherence to a Somali work schedule. This means that these men are working, at a minimum, six-day weeks with no time off for holidays. Some have families remaining in the States. Allowing limited accumulation of leave days for all LTAs, to compensate for the extra work days, would boost morale and be an incentive to some to continue in their posts for a second two-year tour, when they will be experienced and increasingly valuable.

Several LTAs mentioned that they had paid certain business expenses out of pocket just to avoid the hassles of trying to bill the project. Sometimes this amounted to $14 here and $20 there, but at least one had incurred more considerable expenses. Providing a mechanism for reimbursement of "petty cash" business expenses is going to be necessary.

In addition to these blanket recommendations, each LTA assignment, particularly within the ministries, involves specific work obligations and access to particular resources or lack thereof. This means that each LTA working within a ministry has his own set of needs. These are outlined below, as best we could identify them for each assignment.

Ministry of Labour, Sports, and Social Affairs

- Needs an administrative assistant to relieve advisor of routine duties of project management so that he can attend to advisory duties at least 75 percent of the time.
- Needs funds for some surface and air transportation and per diem for work on civil service resettlement.
- Has no access to a computer.

Ministry of the Treasury

- Needs to make frequent field trips because he is responsible for improving regional, district, and municipal tax collection procedures. Therefore he needs funding for surface and air transportation and per diem allowances for himself and his counterparts from the ministry.
- Needs Somali language training to communicate with local-level Treasury officials.
- Needs project computers. Has no access to a computer,

which he and the Ministry need for his work and also for on-the-job training.

Ministry of Finance

- Works primarily in Mogadishu; does not need transportation.
- Ministry has 22 computers, eleven still packed. Needs assistance in setting up a computer for his own work, but does not need another computer.
- Needs better utilization and support (e.g., his own office) by the Ministry or a change of assignment.

Ministry of Industry

- Needs occasional surface or air transportation and per diem to visit about a dozen of the 21 state-operated industries under the ministry's jurisdiction. Most of his work is done in Mogadishu.
- Needs project computers. Has no access to a computer, which he and the Ministry need for his work and also for on-the-job training.

Ministry of Commerce

- Expects and wants the promised advisor. His functions will include training and institution building generally; specific needs are for creating as statistical base for commercial activity (import and export price information, foreign trade statistics, establishment of a ministry information system); trade promotion; and computerization of the ministry.
- Needs project computers. Has no access to a computer, which he and the Ministry need for his work and also for on-the-job training. There are no computers at present anywhere in the Ministry of Commerce.

Ministry of National Planning

- The ministry plans, coordinates, and monitors development projects in all parts of Somalia. The advisor needs funding for surface and air transportation and per diem for himself and ministry counterparts.
- Needs Somali language training to communicate with local-level project implementation teams and beneficiaries.

- The ministry has computers in a number of its divisions. The advisor has access to one for his work and is bringing his personal computer into Somalia, so he is not in immediate need of project computers.

Ministry of the Interior

- Expects and wants the promised advisor. His work will be primarily with improving management of regional, district and municipal government. Most of his time will be spent outside Mogadishu.

- Needs adequate funding for frequent surface and air transportation and per diem for himself and ministry counterparts.

- Needs intensive Somali language training to communicate with local-level government officials.

- Needs project computers. Has no access to a computer, which he and the Ministry need for his work and also for on-the-job training.

SIDAM Librarian/Computer Training Advisor

The complexities of setting up an adequate, functioning library and information system are far better understood by the expert on the scene than they were by project designers, or even by outside evaluators. At SIDAM he needs funding for systems development and library support activities, which include:

- text books for computer/library/management/information training;

- assistance of a two-year systems analyst/programmer/trainer.

- assistance of a two-year library cataloger/trainer;

- creation and operation of a management data base and possibly of an agricultural information management data base; and

- an independent budget line for transportation, insurance, packing, and processing fees for equipment, supplies, furniture, and the like.

SIDAM Project Training Coordinator

- Needs to concentrate on coordinating academic program planning within Somalia;

- Needs a full-time Project Training Advisor with a Somali counterpart to coordinate the WMTU activities.

SIDAM Project Training Advisor

- Will need funding for surface and air transportation and per diem for self and Somali trainers for setting up workshops outside Mogadishu;

- Needs an adequate budget for training materials, salaries and stipends for Somali trainers, and short-term outside consultants with technical skills;

- Needs Somali language training to be able to communicate with students and to understand and monitor training workshops.

APPENDIX 5: LIBRARY OPTIONS

The following report, prepared by the SIDAM long-term librarian advisor, explains in detail the budgetary constraints, options, and the strategy adopted for the MBA/MPA library procurement.

APPENDIX 5: LIBRARY OPTIONS

STAFF PAPER

SUBJECT: SIDAM Library

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED:

Funding currently cited in Contract No. 649-0119-C-00-7001-00, SOMTAD Project (Somalia Management Training and Development Project #2255), is insufficient to provide a research library of the scope and depth necessary to support a graduate-level program in Business Administration and Public Administration.

II. FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM:

1. Contract provisions -- The SOMTAD contract provides:

"As part of the MBA/MPA program support, the contractor (AED) will provide adequate resources through the purchase of books, journals and other resource material. The library will be augmented by the instructional materials developed by the WMTU and Masters theses completed by MBA/MPA students. To assist in the organization and operation of this facility, the contractor will provide a librarian at SIDAM for up to four years. This specialist will develop the library and train at least two counterparts."

2. Personnel -- A professional librarian, Mr. Burton Lankin, reported for duty in Somalia in early June, and has made an assessment of needs, and resources necessary to meet those needs.

3. Current resources -- In order to make a determination as to real needs, and how much of those needs can be supplied by existing resources within the current SIDAM library, an actual count and classification (by subject matter) was made of all existing books in the SIDAM library. In summary, the collection is far too small; the books are very much out of date; the balance within and between subject areas shows significant imbalance. Attached as exhibits are the following:

Exhibit I -- SIDAM Library, Collection Characteristics, Undergraduate Collection

Exhibit II -- SIDAM Library, Collection Characteristics, Graduate Collection

Exhibit III -- Analysis (by subject matter) of SIDAM Library Collections

Exhibit IV -- Comparison data for SIDAM Library Collection

4. Adequacy of resources -- Prior to coming to Mogadishu, the Librarian consulted with officials of several university libraries in the U.S., and with officials of the Research Library Association, located in Washington, D. C. The concensus was that a 50,000-book collection would be required to have an "adequate" library to support a graduate-level program for MBA/MPA. Physical space precludes a library of this size, and moderation in funding suggests an outside target of a 25,000-book collection, supplemented by appropriate reference materials.

5. Coverage of support -- The resources of SIDAM Library will embrace a broad spectrum of training activities, since they will be utilized by five (5) different instructional initiatives:

a) English language training;

b) Basic Management Training;

c) MBA/MPA Student Training;

d) Worksite Management Training; and

e) Professional Development.

6. Library objectives -- The primary objective is to create a viable SIDAM library Learning Resources Center. To accomplish this objective, it would be highly desireable to procure and/or to provide funds for:

a) Core library collection resources (25,000 books);

b) Textbooks and supplementary texts;

c) Professional journals and serials (periodicals);

d) Equipment and furniture; and

e) AED/SUNY support services.

7. Funding available -- The current budgeted items from which books and library resources might be purchased include:

a) Library and Support Materials . . . . . $ 301,500.

b) MBA/MPA Program Materials . . . . . 150,000.

c) WMTU Training Resources . . . . . 200,000.

It is doubtful that monies from either of the latter two categories should be diverted to library and support materials, since it is unlikely that the amount budgeted for MBA/MPA Program Materials is sufficient to cover the costs of texts which will be used by the students in the program, and an early appraisal of requirements in the WMTU Training Resources area indicates it to be a conservative estimate of needs over the span of SOMTAD. Accordingly, this analysis deals with a range of possibilities, from the basic funding of $302,500. for the life of the project, up to and including a 25,000-book collection.

8. A 25,000-book library -- Estimated costs for a 25,000-book library, with supporting materials and references, are:

Reference materials (*)	$ 44,000.
Computer reference services	25,500.
Monographs (books) for collection dvlpmt.	885,000.
Serials (periodicals)	39,000.
Multi-media resources	15,000.
Professional development resources	87,500.
Equipment	46,000.
Furniture	32,000.
AED/SUNY support services	100,000.
Freight	37,500.
TOTAL for 25,000-book collection	$1,312,500.

(*) NOTE: A more detailed description of library categories is shown in Exhibit V.

9. A 10,000-book library -- A scale-down to a 10,000-book library, with supporting materials, is shown below:

Reference materials	$ 20,000.
Computer reference services	10,000.
Monographs (books)	350,000.
Multi-media resources	10,000.
Serials (periodicals)	15,000.
Professional development resources	37,500.
Equipment	25,000.
Furniture	15,000.
AED/SUNY support services	10,000.
Freight	12,000.
TOTAL for 10,000-book collection	$ 505,500.

10. A library, as budgeted -- A further scale-down, to achieve optimum purchases within the $301,500. made available in the SOMTAD Project budget is shown below. Such a decision would provide for an addition of approximately 5,500 books to the existing

library at SIDAM, plus a scaled-down version of attendant research materials and references:

Reference materials	$ 10,000.
Computer reference services	10,000.
Monographs (5,500 books)	191,500.
Multi-media resources	5,000.
Serials (periodicals)	20,000.
Professional development resources	20,000.
Equipment	15,000.
Furniture	10,000.
AMD/SUNY support services	10,000.
Freight	10,000.

11. Timing of accessions -- No matter the size of the library, a substantial portion of the books should be available during the early stages of the MBA/MPA program. If possible, some of the materials should be available during the second stage of SOMTAD -- the Basic Management Training portion of the project. Thus, heavy emphasis will be required on immediacy of accession.

III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:

Based on a review of the foregoing, it is concluded that a 25,000-book collection would be the optimum choice in funding a SIDAM Library to support the MBA/MPA program at SOMTAD. However, there are a number of organizations involved in the determination of size of the SIDAM library. A major consideration is the level of funding desired by USAID/Somalia. The titles to be selected, the sequence in which books are ordered for delivery and shelving, and the training of library counterparts require major decisions. These decisions are almost totally dependent upon the level of funding finally to be determined. Once that decision is made, and the USAID Mission has provided the additional funds (assuming a library with at least modest support capability for a graduate degree program), the Long-Term Advisor (Librarian) can begin the selection process and the timing necessary to achieve the desired goals of the SOMTAD Project.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that USAID/Somalia give serious consideration to funding a 25,000-book library, and that the SOMTAD team be advised of the decision, in order to begin the book collection in an orderly process in sufficient time to meet the needs of the first graduate classes scheduled under the SOMTAD Project.

2. In the event that a 25,000-book library is considered too high a level of funding, it is recommended that the SOMTAD team be advised of the level of funding which can be sustained, and that action be initiated for book and supporting library materials acquisition.

APPENDIX 5: LIBRARY OPTIONS

EXHIBIT I

SIDAM Library, Collection Characteristics

Undergraduate Collection

-- The library started operation around 1965. It contains about 1456 English monographs.

-- Approximately 20% of the monographs are duplicates.

-- Encyclopedia materials are dated 1968 and earlier.

-- Over 85% of the collection was published prior to 1980.

-- The reference collection is limited. It contains few publications on business and public administration.

-- The latest edition of the Book of Knowledge is dated 1953.

-- Collection growth is based on faculty and donor agency "gifts".

-- A card catalog is needed to provide access to the collection by author, title and subject.

-- Accession records for library receipts is needed.

-- In the absence of accession records, an audit of the collection cannot be performed.

-- A modified Dewey Classification System is used to organize materials by subject.

-- Author and edition information is sparse and erratic.

-- An acquisitions program is needed.

-- The non-English materials (Arabic, Chinese, French, Italian and Russian) are not heavily used. The French material is used for classes.

APPENDIX 5: LIBRARY OPTIONS

EXHIBIT II

SIDAM Library, Collection Characteristics

Graduate Collection

-- The library started in 1984. It contains 1160 monographs.

-- Approximately 5% of the monographs are duplicates.

-- Accession records were not prepared when the library began. Therefore, it is impossible to determine how many items were acquired and lost during the life of the Fresno (California State University - Fresno) Project.

-- The reference collection consists of a dictionary. Two other business dictionaries were in the collection, but they were donated to the Accounting Program.

-- Referral materials, for the most part, consist of photocopies, pamphlets and reports on business.

-- About 78% of the collection contains materials dated prior to 1980.

-- A modified Dewey Classification System is used to shelve the materials by subject.

-- A list of publications in the collection was prepared on the Commodore computer. The list permits access to the collection by author, title, and subject.

APPENDIX 5: LIBRARY OPTIONS

EXHIBIT III

Analysis of SIDAM Library Collections

The data below summarizes the library collections of English monographs in the SIDAM undergraduate and graduate (CSUF) libraries. An accurate assessment of these holdings is vital to the planning of a library component for SIDAM/SOMTAD. The data represent actual counts unless otherwise indicated. Actual count was completed on 31 August 1987.

English Collection

Subject Disciplines	Undergraduate Collection	Graduate Collection
Accounting & Finance	112	78
Business Administration	--	154
Computer Science	0	38
Decision Science	--	50
Economics	345	68
English	--	32
Environment	--	10
General Management	244	101
General Science	0	15
Local Government	65	--
Management Information Systems	--	19
Marketing	27	49
Mathemtics	68	80
Money & Banking	0	19
Office Management	24	--
Organizational behavior	--	54
Political Science	216	--
Psychology	0	10
Production Operations	70	79
Public Administration	150	--
Statistics & Probability	0	45
Sociology	139	10
Miscellaneous	---	140
Management Journals (Random)	---	109
Subtotal	1,456	1,160
GRAND TOTAL	2,616	

APPENDIX 5: LIBRARY OPTIONS

EXHIBIT IV

Comparison Data for SIDAM Library Collection

Collection Distribution By Date

Dates	Undergraduate Collection	Graduate Collection
1985 +	0	2%
1980-84	15%	11
1970's	25	62
1960's	15	18
1950's	10	7
1940's & earlier	5	--
Totals	100%	100%

Subject Comparison For Libraraies

Subject Areas	Undergraduate Collection	Graduate Collection
Business Administration	49%	42%
Business & Industry	8	17
Computer Science	0	5
Library Science	0	0
Public Affairs	10	0
Public Policy	19	0
Misc	14	35

Existing & Proposed Subject Areas for Libraries

Subject Areas	Existing Collection	Proposed Collection
Business Administration	45%	30%
Business & Industry	11	19
Computer Science	2	5
Library Science	0	2
Public Affairs	2	15
Public Policy	11	29
Misc	29	0

APPENDIX 5: LIBRARY OP_ EXHIBIT V
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Description of Library Categories

Reference Materials -- A diverse group of publications used for researching facts and figures; i.e., encyclopaedias, dictionaries, directories, yearbooks, handbooks, tables, statistical publications, almanacs, atlases, maps, name indices, etc.

Computer Reference Sources -- Data bases on management and public administration topics; important in gaining computer literacy, analyzing market trends; planning public administration strategy and forecasting business development activity.

Monographs for Collection Development -- A broad spectrum of materials in the business, management public administration, computer science, library and information science fields. Also, supplemental textbook materials; hardbound and softbound materials including business and academic research reports.

Multi-Media Publications -- Training materials used for exercises and specialized self-instruction. Example: computer and software learning areas.

Serials -- Prominent professional serials (periodicals and journals) used for reference and research. Also, a selected list of titles ordered on a current subscription basis.

Professional Development Materials -- Materials acquired to satisfy needs of the short- and long-term advisors, teaching faculty and short-term consultants, such as trade publications, classification schedules, business reports, etc.

Equipment -- Items used for normal library operations, such as microfiche readers and printers, microfilm readers and printers, copiers, audio and video cassette recorders and players, etc.

Furniture -- Shelving, study desks, library carts, media study desks, work and study tables, circulation and reference desks, and the like.

AED/SUNY (Albany) Centers -- Use of both centers to provide on-demand procurement and technical processing of information from suppliers and the U.S. National Libraries. SUNY would also provide inter-library loan services from their vast collection.

APPENDIX 6: LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS TO STUDENTS

SOMTAD instruction and curriculum development to date has evidenced a tendency to take a pre-determined American template and impose it on the local situation. Insufficient attention has been paid to assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the student body and then adapting the courses to their needs. Furthermore, the impact of the local infrastructure and available resources on students' capacity to utilize the course content has been only superficially examined. Finally, student orientation has been lacking and student input discouraged. This is not to say individual instructors have not taken the initiative to do this within their classes, rather that the overall system has not encouraged such behavior.

Assessment and Adaptation

The SOMTAD graduate candidates represent a variety of academic backgrounds from biochemists to engineers and lawyers. Some have completed university studies abroad, some have served many years in high government positions, and others have more limited educational backgrounds. The language of their schooling and its content varies significantly among age groups and the regions in which they were schooled.

Yet the design of the instructional program divides this diverse group into three cohorts based only on math and language ability and then marches them through a lock-step course of from three and a half to five years. An approach is needed which would provide for the assessment of students' strengths and weaknesses, the development of an academic profile which could be passed from teacher to teacher, and an academic plan which would address individual needs. At this stage of the project, students who do not attain the required TOEFL score to pass to the next level are not given supplementary materials to prepare them for the next exam or provided with instruction in the particular areas in which they had difficulty. Rather, they are required to repeat their previous course using the same materials they had already studied. Conversely, no provision has been made for candidates who have the English skills required for entry into the graduate program to opt out of further English instruction or for students with weak English but an academic background in management to place out of the BMT.

Little concentrated effort has been given to bringing the adult student's previous experience into the classroom. The materials used in most of the English classes do not encourage bringing management content or professional experiential knowledge into the classroom. A striking exception to this general pattern was a BMT executive seminar given by an LTA where he organized a participatory exercise which allowed students to develop basic skills of charting, graphing, data analysis, and oral

presentations while inductively developing a framework for macroeconomic policy analysis through working with statistical data obtained from the students' ministries. The result was an intellectually stimulating class, according to the students, which built on their strengths.

There is a Somali saying that "Knowledge resides among the students." This program has yet to tap that extensive reservoir. Without doing that, the program runs the risk of not only appearing condescending to the students, but also not developing management skills which are appropriate to the Somali context.

Infrastructure and Resources

The current austere economic environment may have an impact on the students. Most students work all morning, have families, and are faced with increasing economic difficulties. Study space and reliable electricity is limited. There is a need for the program to be responsive to the impact these conditions may have on the students' motivation to continue through the program and their ability to make use of the instruction presented. For example, some students in the statistics class need access to a classroom where they can work together with peer study groups on statistics homework, because transportation, electricity and space problems make it difficult for them to find such space on their own. Incoming short-term faculty need to be aware of the socioeconomic situation their students face.

Student Orientation and Input

Language teachers and students alike complain there was inadequate orientation for the students to SOMTAD at the outset of the program. Misunderstandings still arise. For examples, some students claim they were expecting BMT to be taught by SUNY-A faculty when actually there were no such plans. On-going orientation to inform students about project changes and activities should continue throughout the life of the project.

The program needs a better mechanism for listening to the concerns of the students, judging their validity, and responding where necessary. The COP hs been active in providing this missing link by spending a few afternoons at SIDAM during difficult periods to allow students to get questions answered officially; however, it is now time to see that SUNY/A staff located at SIDAM take over this function in a more responsive and permanent way.

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APPENDIX 7: THE ROLE OF SOMALI ENGLISH TEACHER COUNTERPARTS

The Somali English teachers recruited as counterparts have not been given roles which allow them to work up to their potential. Although some have impressive qualifications (extensive experience teaching English and graduate degrees in TESL from British universities or training in TESL provided by donor organizations in Somalia), they for the most part are limited to teaching 15 minutes to a half hour of grammar at the end of a three-hour class taught by a native speaker. The in-service training and supervised teaching phase, outlined in the PASA, has been discontinued recently due to the LDS's heavy teaching and administrative schedule and the resulting lack of time.

Native speakers are used to teach all but the lower level classes because it is felt that Somali students do not like being taught English by Somali teachers. However, given the high quality language and teaching abilities of certain of the counterparts, it appears likely that with on-going in-service training they could make an important contribution to the students' learning of English. Given what the evaluation team has seen thus far, it would seem possible to incorporate a more even sharing of teaching responsibilities by expatriates and Somali teachers so that most students are exposed to both. A more efficient incorporation of the Somali teachers might allow more individualized or small group instruction to take place which would more accurately address students' needs.

A more extensive in-service training component for Somali teachers and better incorporation of their teaching skills in the program is needed if there is to be "the creation of a cadre of highly skilled (Somali) instructors" (PASA, p. 3). It is suggested that the new ELT contractor contact other donor English teacher-training operations in-country to observe their operations. For example, the British Council's project at the Curriculum Development Center, which provides training to English teachers in Somalia and also employs a few of the SOMTAD teacher counterparts in their operations, could be a valuable resource.

APPENDIX 8: DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ELT

Detailed Recommendations for English Language Training

The new ESP provider chosen to replace USIS should be contractually responsible to the prime contractor and meet the following requirements:

- Experience working in training projects in Somalia, preferably in the field of ELT;
- Ability to continue the ELT training after USIS withdraws without interrupting students' instruction;
- Ability to recruit and field qualified ESP instructors and curriculum developers in a timely fashion;
- Experience in designing and implementing English for Managers courses;
- Capacity for providing training for trainers, which would include:

  * providing on-going in-service training, including classroom observation, to Somali teachers in a manner that builds on their already extensive skills;

  * providing training to native English-speaking teachers in ESP materials development and teaching techniques;

  * establishing collegial relationships between expatriate and Somali teachers that will allow for critique and training to flow in two directions (expat to Somali and Somali to expat);

  * orienting BMT instructors to the language development aspect of the course and providing instruction in participatory adult education skills building techniques where necessary.
- Capacity to administer a multi-level language program and teacher training component;
- Evidence of a commitment to providing culturally sensitive instruction and a willingness to adapt to the political and cultural realities of Somalia;

- Ability to assess strengths and weaknesses of current instructors and a willingness to work with them to ensure program continuity;

- Commitment to work with other SOMTAD staff in a team approach.

The transition from USIS to a new contractor should be implemented as soon as possible. Given that this may not occur until mid-summer or later, it would be advisable for AED, USAID and USIS to examine the possibility of funding the new ELT provider in an advisory capacity for certain activities which should occur before the actual transition. The new provider's ELT experts should be briefed on the SOMTAD project as soon as possible. A site visit to Mogadishu should be arranged to assess the current state of the English component, the qualifications and desires of the current personnel to continue in their positions, and the availability and appropriateness of current training materials and other resources. Such a site visit would allow the contractor to more realistically plan for a smooth transition which would be as minimally disruptive to the program as possible.

Currently, USIA/W is in the middle of a recruitment effort to hire two long-term instructors and a Language Development Specialist to fill one currently vacant position and two that are due to open in May and July, respectively. Initial screening was conducted at the March 1988 TESOL Convention. It is essential that the new ESP provider participate in the hiring of these new staff for although they may be fielded prior to the transition by USIS, their contracts will then most likely be picked up by the new provider. Alternatively, if the candidates selected by USIS do not meet the new contractors' criteria, it is suggested that an arrangement be made whereby USIS could field staff chosen by the new provider. Whatever process is used, it is essential that the staff hired to fill current and expected vacancies be qualified to continue teaching in the program after the transition. It is also necessary that staff be well-oriented to the Somali situation and the SOMTAD project prior to fielding, preferably with the aid of the new contractor.