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EVALUATION REPORT ON THE REFUGEE SELF-RELIANCE

PROJECT

(USAID PROJECT NO. 649-0123)

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PREFACE

The evaluation of the Refugee Self-Reliance Project was conducted over four weeks, from 30 September to 10 November 1985. The team spent the first week in discussions with USAID Refugee Affairs personnel, Program Office personnel and representatives of the Planning Unit, National Refugee Commission (NRC). During this time, the team also reviewed documents and files relating to the project. Members of the team spent between four and eight days assessing Project activities in the Northwest and Awdal Regions, in which two of four sub-projects are based and a third active, while a site visit was made to another sub-project in the Lower Shebelle Region during the last week. Half way through the evaluation, the team met with and discussed their preliminary findings with representatives from the NRC. Throughout the evaluation exercise, findings were shared with the Planning Unit, NRC, while on site visits the team was accompanied by an NRC technical officer.

The two consultant team members were joined by the USAID Rural Development and Refugee Affairs Social Advisor, Farah Abokor Khayre, and USAID Program Office Social Analyst, Dr. Hazel McPerson. Half way through the evaluation, Bill Keefe from the USAID Project Development Office joined the team. During their visit to the Northwest Region, the team benefited from the participation of "Engineer" Omar Hussein from the Planning Unit.

The team received the joint support of the National Refugee Commission and the USAID-Mission to Somalia in conducting site visits and preparing final documents. Regular meetings were held with representatives of the NRC and USAID to discuss progress and share recommendations. It is worthy of mentioning that throughout this period, the NRC and USAID consulted frequently and collaborated in putting together what can creditably be called a joint evaluation.

It is particularly appropriate to acknowledge the assistance and support received from the Rural Development/Refugee Affairs Office, in particular from Frank Sagan, a staff

Lalitha Jayaraman as well as the overall direction provided by George T. McCloskey (RD/RA Officer) and by Loring Waggoner, Evaluation Officer in the USAID Program Office. In the Northwest, we received excellent cooperation from Norris Nordvold of USAID, Leon Muffet of New TransCentury Foundation and John Grierson of Partnership for Productivity. The team's visit to Qorioley was greatly facilitated by Hashi Abib and Hassan Ilhan of Save the Children Federation, while Stanley Andrews of Experiment for International Living cooperated with the team while in Mogadishu. Our thanks and appreciation also go to Linda Crawford, Alicia Querubin, Becky Lock, Rosamund Labor and Leticia Vallejos for typing the report.

It should be noted that one member of the Evaluation Team had previously been the Field Office Director for Save the Children Federation in Somalia. To avoid any possible challenges to the objectivity of this evaluation, the team agreed that he should scrupulously avoided participation in the assessment of the SCF sub-project activities, and this has been the case.

Dr. Carol Kerven, Consultant, Team Leader
Alvin Edgell, Consultant, Project Management
Farah Abokor Khayre, Social Science Advisor, RD/RA, USAID/Mogadishu
Dr. Hazel McPerson, Sociologist, USAID/Mogadishu
William Keefe, Project Development Office, USAID/Mogadishu

ABBREVIATIONS

AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
CDA	Cooperation for Development in Africa (Forestry)
CDU	Community Development Unit (of NRC)
EIL	Experiment in International Living
FLP	Family Life Program
GSDR	Gov't of the Somali Democratic Republic
HCC	Host Country Contract
IITT	Institute for In-Service Teacher Training
LOP	Life of Project
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	National Refugee Commission
NW	NorthWest (Region)
NTF	New TransCentury Foundation
OPG	Operational Program Grant
PACD	Project Activities Completion Date
PSC	Personal Services Contractor
PfP	Partnership for Productivity International
PU	Planning Unit (of NRC)
PVO	Private and Voluntary Organization
PP	Project Paper
RAU	Refugee Agriculture Unit
RHU	Refugee Health Unit
REFCOORD	Refugee Coordinator (US Embassy and USAID)
RRC	Regional Refugee Commissioner (of NRC)
RD/RA	Rural Development and Refugee Affairs Office (USAID)
RPA	Refugee Project Assistant
RWSU	Refugee Water Supply Unit
SCF	Save the Children Federation (USA)
SETS	Socio-Economic and Technical Studies
SURERD	Somali Unit for Research in Emergencies and Rural Development
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development Mission to Somalia
USG	United States Gov't

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As part of its ongoing Project evaluation plan, AID and the GSDR undertook this evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the RSR Project in assisting refugees in Somalia to prepare for a self-reliant non-camp life. The evaluation took place between October 1, and November 10, 1985.

The Refugee Self-Reliance Project was signed on 22 December 1982. The Project Activity Completion Date is September 1986. Sub-project activity began in April of 1983.

Funding levels are established at:

\$6,000,000 USAID Grant

\$2,390,000 GSDR equivalent local currency contribution

\$2,859,000 PVO and third party contributions

\$11,249,000 TOTAL

The larger purpose of the Project was to begin movement from refugee dependence on externally supported care and maintenance towards self-maintenance. Full self-maintenance was not anticipated during the Life of the Project, and it was understood that only a limited number of refugees would benefit, related to the experimental nature of the Project. It was hoped that lessons for more inclusive projects would result. Non-refugees in the areas of the camps were also to share in the benefits offered to refugees. Settlement was excluded as an outcome of the Project, in accord with the GSDR policy of that time which saw repatriation as the only possible durable solution. This policy shifted in March 1983 to recognize settlement as one possible solution for the refugees.

Project components included: financial and technical support to the National Refugee Commission, support for socio-economic and technical studies of refugee programs, direct assistance to refugees through PVO field projects, and Monitoring and Management Assistance to the Project.

Of these components, the major allocation of resources was to the sub-projects undertaken by private and voluntary organizations (PVOs). To date, four such sub-projects are in varying stages of implementation. Participating PVOs are Save the Children Federation, Partnership for Productivity, New TransCentury Foundation and the Experiment in International Living.

The Project has met with modest success in achieving the objectives established by the Project Paper. The number of sub-projects anticipated never materialized and, while the number of beneficiaries targeted has, in some cases, been approached, the economic benefit to refugees has been limited by, among other factors, sub-project implementation delays and drought.

There is reason to believe, however, that the Project has proven to be a successful "experiment" in so far as a groundwork for future planning for refugees has been established and a number of valuable lessons learned as a result of Project activities. Through the Project the Mission has established a working relationship with PVOs which extends the effectiveness of USG assistance to Somalia and the refugees. First time problems of grant review, commodity procurement and CIPL financing have gradually, if painfully, been resolved, smoothing the way for future projects with PVOs.

The Project has also acted as a vehicle for training a significant number of Somali professionals in diverse development activities. Engineers, extensionists, trainers and administrators have assumed responsible positions with PVO implementing agencies and gained first hand experience in the design, implementation and evaluation of small projects.

At another level, Project activities have raised issues and begun activities which have generated discussions between the GSDR and the Mission in the development of strategies for durable solutions, such as settlement. It is safe to say that had the Refugee Self-Reliance and CDA Forestry projects not been undertaken, USAID would have been far less prepared to assist in the settlement of refugees, and U.S. PVOs would have been less familiar with successful implementation formulas in and around the camps.

The characterization "experimental" does not excuse the Project results from comparison with planned outputs. The Project called for sub-project inputs to agriculture, skills development and infrastructure. A summary of impact in each of these sectors follows.

Agriculture

Agricultural activities on a smaller scale than envisioned in the Project Paper have to date developed and allocated 720 ha. of rainfed crop land and 320 ha. for irrigation. Seeds, tools and tractor services have been provided, but sub-projects have not initiated a system of refugee cost-sharing which similar projects have begun. One sub-project has trained five extensionists who, in turn, have worked with refugee farmers. Training has been largely on horticulture, but there is intensive work with refugees who have undertaken horticulture. There remains much to be done to improve current extension outreach and follow-up.

The one sub-project with an irrigated agriculture component is unlikely to meet sub-project targets prior to the sub-project PACD. Internal management difficulties, problems with sub-contractors, and long delays in procurement and delivery of needed equipment all contributed to this. Policy issues regarding land tenure and plot size threaten to hold up the Project even further.

Skills Training

Skills training, beyond agriculture, has, so far, emphasized commercial management, and the variety of administrative skills needed in the management of refugee related projects, but of possible broader career application. Training for planners and implementors provided by one sub-project has been carried out through a series of field workshops. Special topic seminars and curriculum development Project activities have been implemented, but it is unclear as to the effect that this has had on the targeted beneficiaries. The evaluation team observations strongly suggest that future training be given to

productive skills, on which businesses can be built. This idea implies the concomitant need to provide capital assistance for would-be entrepreneurs. A study on appropriate skills training leading to viable enterprises needs to be done.

Infrastructure Improvement

Infrastructure improvements using intensive wage labor began rather late with a sub-project to rehabilitate roads to camps in the Awdal Region beginning in September 1984. The improved movement of goods including farm produce has already been noted by local farmers. Future labor-intensive infrastructure work is planned for water crossings and sub-surface sand dams. More sophisticated water exploration activities are also underway. These efforts have been well received by residents in the Awdal and the Northwest Regions, and are providing participating refugees with up to 4,500 So. Sh. per months in wages and benefits. Continuation of these activities should, therefore, be encouraged, but more must be done to train beneficiaries in skills which will be of value to them in non-camp environment (e.g., operating machinery, reading plans, surveying).

Institutional Support to NRC

The Institutional Support to NRC component, while achieving some advances in Planning Unit capability to plan, monitor and evaluate refugee projects leaves considerable room for further improvement of these functions, especially in rationalizing a Planning Unit division of labor. Technical assistance to the Planning Unit has failed to leave a mechanism for initiating and managing the planned Socio-economic and Technical Studies. Studies completed so far have had disappointingly limited distribution and assimilation.

Monitoring and Management

Project Monitoring and Management has evolved quite far from the original objectives of intensive gathering of information on field activities and assisting refugee sub-projects funded by USAID. Refugee Project Assistants (RPAs) who were to implement this field monitoring were frequently (and for extended periods) absorbed in office-based management priorities. USAID shortage of Direct-Hire project management staff, and the failure to anticipate the level of monitoring and management required for multi-sectoral PVO projects such as this, to a great extent account for this evolution. While evolution is not in itself negative, it has drained considerable Project resources and future Project management arrangements should be closely monitored for effectiveness and cost.

Lessons Learned

1. The sub-grant mechanism is well suited to an environment where flexibility is needed in the targeting of resources. Planners must recognize that the level of effort required to manage such projects is great and should plan resources accordingly.
2. Self-reliance has proven to be an elusive concept, running a continuum from temporary income generation to full self-sufficiency. Sub-project activities need to be directed towards leaving substantial and sustainable benefits to participants whenever possible. Manual labor and piecework services, while providing a small buffer to ration relief supplies, do little to prepare a refugee for eventual non-camp life.
3. Joint sub-project funding should only be undertaken when inputs from separate donors fund discreet project entities which will not be held up should one donor withdraw. No project should accept joint funding without complete agreement on duration of activities and final outputs.

4. Long-term planning for refugees requires consultation of all parties - most importantly the refugees themselves. Sub-projects drawn up with little input from beneficiaries encounter unavoidable delays as they inevitably adapt to the agendas of project participants.

5. Many refugees are devising their own strategies to cope with the changing circumstances of their stay in Somalia. The Project can and should target future efforts to support initiatives by refugees who seek their own solutions.

Recommendations applying to the Project as a whole include:

1. Extend the RSR Project for one year from the present PACD of September 1986.

2. Support this extension with an additional \$1,500,000.

3. Assure adequate levels of management support, including monitoring of field activities.

4. Urge and support clarification of land tenure issues.

5. Allow necessary time for a thorough final evaluation of present Project (before extension) to digest the lessons of this variegated Project.

Salient recommendations on the four Project components from the larger number appearing in Section III. include:

1. Replace the departed Implementation Manager at the Planning Unit.

2. Arrange to better utilize the past and future Socio-Economic and Technical Studies funded by the Project.

3. Allocate \$1,200,000 for sub-project activities during the period of extension, and involve more non-refugee beneficiaries.
4. USAID and NRC to coordinate as appropriate on gathering of field information and to share the results of such reporting.

Recommendations specific to sub-projects are found in Section IV.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Setting

By mid-1981 the Somalia refugee relief activities which had begun with the arrival in Somalia of hundreds of thousands of predominantly ethnic Somali refugees in 1977 was ending, a period in which relief had been the focus of Somali Government and international assistance.

Thirty-five camps had been established in four Regions of Somalia in which food, water, health and rudimentary educational services were provided to an estimated 700,000 camp-based refugees. There remained much to be done to assure that refugees' basic survival needs were met, but the shift was being started by planner and implementing agencies to focus attention on providing refugees with opportunities to learn skills and find productive employment which would prepare them for the time when a durable solution would be become available.

The shift was manifested by a first time allocation of funds for income-generating activities by the UNHCR Branch Office in Somalia, by increased emphasis on camp agricultural activities, and by the departure from Somalia of a number of relief oriented PVOs. At the same time the National Refugee Commission (NRC), with the assistance of UNHCR, established a Planning Unit which was intended to bring an effective development planning, monitoring and evaluation capacity to the NRC.

Within this context, the Refugee Self-Reliance (RSR) Project (649-0123) was conceived as representing one of AID's first efforts to provide development assistance to refugees in Africa.

B. Project Description

The RSR Project was designed and implemented in conjunction with the Cooperation for Development in Africa (CDA) Forestry Phase I, Refugee Areas Project. Both of these Projects are now administered by the Rural Development and Refugee Affairs Office of USAID. These two related Projects have the overlapping objective of promoting economic

opportunities for refugees in Somalia. Both Projects are funded under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, following a State/AID Mission report on "U.S. Government Policy for Refugee Affairs in Somalia" (1982).

The RSR Project was authorized and funds were obligated to the amount of \$6,000,000 in December 1982. The Somali Government (GSDR) commitment was \$2,390,000, added to PVO/UNHCR contributions of \$2,859,000, giving a total Project funding of \$11,249,000.

The objective of the Project is to increase the capacity of refugees in Somalia to become more productive and more self-reliant, thereby improving their economic status while reducing their dependence on the Somali Government and on donor agencies. A longer term objective is to enhance the possibilities for a positive solution of the refugee situation. Further, the Project's intention is to encourage participation in Project activities by Somalis living in the vicinity of camps, in order to build cooperative relationships between refugees and their neighbors.

The Project design sets out three types of direct assistance to refugees:

- Increasing agricultural skills and allowing participants to supplement their diets and/or earn cash from crop sales.
- Offering vocational and skills training, thereby assisting them to become more productive; relatedly, providing management upgrading courses to personnel engaged in managing refugee assistance programs.
- Supplying tools, seeds and water pumps to the drought-affected areas, using labor-intensive methods that can provide wage income to participants.

In addition to the above forms of direct assistance, indirect support is provided by the Project in the form of:

- Institutional support to the Planning Unit of the National Refugee Commission (NRC)
- Funding of socio-economic and technical research related to refugee self-reliance
- providing Project monitoring and management assistance through USAID.

Table I Refugee Self-Reliance Illustrative Budget in PP (\$000)

	USAID	GSDR	OTHER
Institutional Support to the NRC	700	85	
Socio-Economic and Technical Studies	250		
PVO RSR sub-projects	4,720	2,285	2,859
Monitoring and Management	<u>330</u>	<u>2,285</u>	<u>2,859</u>
	6,000	2,285	2,859

C. The Components of the Project

1. Sub-Projects

FSR sub-projects inputs were to be primarily in support the activities of PVOs in implementing sub-projects in and around the refugee camps, with USAID funding concentrated on technical assistance and commodities.

It was expected that these sub-projects would bring additional land under cultivation through irrigated and dryland farming efforts reaching 7,300 refugee and a number of local Somali households living adjacent to the camps. Vocational and skills training and production centers were to be established which would focus on reaching refugee women. Finally, roads were to be improved while providing refugees with income-generating opportunities, and skills training.

2. Support to the NRC Planning Unit

Technical assistance and commodities were to be provided to the Planning unit to train staff and build the long-term capability to plan, manage and evaluate refugee programs.

3. Socio-Economic and Technical Studies

Four to seven studies were envisioned which would inform planners and programmers on methods to improve programming for refugees.

4. Monitoring and Management Assistance

Commodities and contract technical assistance provided to USAID to continue monitoring of the overall refugee activities and provide sub-project specific support.

D. The Concept of Self-Reliance

Since this idea seems to permit various interpretations, the evaluation team feels it important to make known its view at the outset. Here self-reliance means activity leading to the ability of refugees to eventually maintain themselves in a non-refugee situation, whatever the options open to them by way of durable solutions, or the choices they might make among these options. This is the primary criterion used in assessing the impact of sub-project activities. A project, for example, which hires refugees to mix sand for cement notably creates work and employment for refugees; yet it would not compare favorably with one which systematically trains these refugees to operate the mixer, build forms, pour and set the cement.

This view, we believe, represents the one most often reflected in the Project Paper which, though it acknowledges a broad spectrum of benefits, targets those with lasting impact as being most effective.

II. EXTERNAL FACTORS

It is to be expected that a project attempting to meet the development needs of a group whose future is as uncertain as that of refugees will be subject to a rapidly changing environment. A few of the critical factors which have affected refugee Self-Reliance Project implementation are discussed below.

- A. General and localized drought conditions common in Somalia have affected planning for agricultural sub-projects and the implementation of the one agricultural sub-project under implementation.

Extensive plans for agricultural expansion in and around the camps which were proposed in 1982 by the Refugee Agricultural Unit were drastically curtailed as rainfall did not meet expectations and farm productivity dropped. The PP called for 2-3 sub-projects in the interior regions of Gedo and Hiran, none of which were implemented. While a number of reasons account for this, expectation of inadequate rainfall was certainly a consideration.

At the Save the Children sub-project, refugee and local farmers experienced extremely poor harvests in the Hu and Dehr seasons of 1984, reducing economic benefits to participating farmers. Efforts to introduce agroforestry on these farms also failed for lack of rain.

- B. Scarcity of fuel and spare parts, and erratic delivery schedules to Mogadishu hampered sub-projects in both Refugee Self-Reliance and CEA forestry. To some extent the Project design anticipated these problems and made allowance for 100-115% source procurement. Nonetheless, field travel was held up, construction halted and critical targets not met, in part due to the unexpected difficulties in procuring fuel and commodities.

Sub-projects which have relied on UNHCR for international procurement have suffered inordinate delays as the UNHCR Branch Office in Somalia has been hampered by reductions in funding and difficulties negotiating a local currency rate of exchange. Further UNHCR has followed a system of central procurement of commodities, requiring that the General headquarters conduct all international procurement for projects. Delays of 9 months to a year have been common.

- C. Much has changed at the policy level since the Project was conceived in March 1981. Progress has been made in the search for durable solutions to the camp situation. Among them :

The announcement in March 1983 that settlement of refugees in Somalia would be an option, and;

Initiation of an active program of repatriation for a number of refugees in the Lower Shebelle region camps.

These policy changes have had some effect on present sub-projects, especially the Qoroley agricultural project, whose land distribution scheme is now being reconsidered by the GSDR in light of potential settlement plans.

More important, these changes challenge the National Refugee Commission, USAID and the PVOs to design activities which encourage the private initiatives of individuals seeking alternatives to camp life. The unique benefit of the Project sub-grant formula, which does not allocate all its resources at the outset, is the ability to prudently and reasonably alter its activities with the lessons learned from implementation.

III. EVALUATION OF PROJECT COMPONENTS

In assessing the extent to which the Project has so far been able to meet the objectives, several points must be noted. First, the Project was the first large-scale attempt in Somalia to go beyond the "care and maintenance" level of assistance to refugees, and to offer refugees opportunities to improve their economic status (some small-scale PVO-funded efforts had already begun at the time of the project's inception). Therefore, the Project was conceived of, and is still thought of by some, as experimental in nature. There was little previous experience in Somalia upon which the Project planners and implementors could draw for carrying out the type of activities planned. The one major previous experience of development projects for displaced persons was that of the government settlement schemes for drought-affected persons, in the mid 1970's. The RSR Project, however, was radically different in intent, in that economic opportunities were to be offered to refugees resident in existing camps, rather than on the basis of new planned settlement. no model existed for this type of assistance in Somalia. Shortfalls and difficulties in meeting the objectives can therefore be expected and understood, given the new directions being pursued by the Project.

A second point which must be considered in assessing whether objectives are being met is that the mid-to-long term residential status of the refugees was unclear at the time of Project design, and remains unclear in the absence of an operational settlement program. In 1983, the Government announced that those refugees who wish to settle in Somalia would be allowed to do so.

Much debate between concerned parties has since centered on whether, as some hold, self-reliance implies settlement and self-support by the refugees, or whether self-reliance can be achieved without settlement. It is felt that self-reliance is a necessary condition for settlement, but that settlement is not a necessary condition for self-reliance. The debate has implications for the future of the refugee population as a whole. Various combinations of these two positions are also stated by some. How the evaluation of the Project's

success in meeting the objectives depends greatly on which view of self-reliance one takes. It has been the position of this evaluation team that the project's objectives were intended to provide refugees the means by which they could become self-supporting in the future, which would progressively diminish their dependence on GSDR and external assistance and allow those who so chose to settle in Somalia.

A Institutional Support to the NRC

Support to the NRC Planning Unit has produced mixed results. Though the Planning Unit is far from reaching the objectives set out in the Project Paper, clerical staff have been trained and reporting, monitoring and planning systems designed by Project-funded technical assistance. The Planning Unit has assumed a pivotal role in planning projects with PVOs, and expanded its role in the coordination of refugee programs with UNHCR and implementing agencies.

What success the Unit has achieved is in large part attributable to the talents and energy of the Director. All those interviewed agreed that Planning Unit activity revolved around his office. Clearly, his skills were recognized within the NRC when, in 1984 he assumed the post of Deputy Commissioner.

However, herein appears to lie one problem in reaching projected targets. There seems not to be a commensurate spread of project responsibilities to other staff members of the Unit and to be an insufficient division of labor and responsibilities among other members of the Unit. Project records and interviews conducted indicate that staff believe they should play a larger part in the decision-making process and be consulted more often.

There is little evidence that the Unit has developed staff potential, or trained the eight Somalis targeted as a Project output. The NRC did not implement the scheduled part-time consultancies of experts from line ministries described in the PP. Difficulties in locating individuals and obtaining funding are cited as causes. It seems equally likely that it may simply have been too early in the development of the Unit to expect such close cooperation with other ministries. Such assistance would no doubt have been beneficial.

1. Technical Assistance

a. Implementation Manager

Despite early delays in contracting and establishing a SOW, the Implementation Manager appears to have made a significant contribution by establishing procedures for review and evaluation of proposals, site visit reporting and long-term planning. An important factor in this success was the perceived need for these services on the part of the Planning Unit staff. The need was intensified when UNHCR project funding was reduced and allocation of limited resources became important.

The major setback here was the failure to recruit and maintain a qualified national staff counterpart whom the Implementation Manager would help develop on the job. In a two-year period four people were assigned as counterparts, the longest for six months. While a number of documents were developed to better plan, manage and evaluate projects, there is now no trained national staff capable of seeing that these systems are implemented. This will also be seen in the discussion of the Research Advisor position.

There is a case to be made, however, that even if a qualified counterpart was recruited and stayed for two years, he or she would today be little more effective in bringing about change in the Unit, or in the NRC. There are a number of disincentives within the Somali public sector, to discourage even a trained, well-meaning individual. Low pay and little incentive for production are common in civil service, as pointed out in the USAID Mission - COMTAD Project Paper.

b. Research Manager

This individual managed to complete a number of valuable tasks, among them: Establishing research priorities, inventorying existing research on refugees in Somalia and proposing criteria for NRC/PU review and selection of research proposals.

It is generally agreed, however that he was underemployed. SETS activity was too little to justify a full-time coordinator, and he was not expected nor allowed to conduct primary research. He terminated his contract after one year and left Somalia.

Like the Implementation Manager, he was never assigned a counterpart who remained long enough for skills transfer. Unlike the former, his position was apparently not perceived to be needed by the NRC. A replacement has not been requested.

The loss of the advisor and the absence of a trained counterpart brought a halt to the development of future research proposals by the NRC for over one year, and effectively eliminated the possibility of developing a long-term substantive research coordinating function within the Unit. Recently two new unsolicited proposals have been submitted, but USAID has assumed a much greater role in negotiations and a shift in the contracting method from MCC to Direct-AID is under discussion.

c. Administrative Assistant

This position was held for two years by the same individual. By all measures this person was quite successful in completing the SOW and leaving a lasting impact on the Unit, (albeit not at the planning level). Two counterparts were trained in office procedures, typing, filing and interpersonal skills. These individuals are now considered as very good at their jobs in comparison with their peers. Further English language training is suggested to assist them in dealing with PVO staff and foreign advisors.

2. Commodities

Procurement of commodities for the Unit has had a less than satisfactory implementation record. Requests for vehicles, equipment and supplies have been held up by a combination of NRC unfamiliarity with AID procurement regulations, turnover in AID Project management staff and differences over project progress and direction between USAID and NRC.

4. Interagency Relationships

a. USAID/NRC Relationship

The NRC in working with refugees is involved with a highly visible, politically sensitive program receiving a large amount of USG assistance which crosscuts a number of USAID and Embassy Offices. Among these are the USAID Program, RD/RA, and at one time the Project, Offices - with an annual 27,000 MT of food aid to refugees (handled by NRC) drawing the most attention -- and the Embassy Refugee Affairs and Consular Offices.

This is mentioned because it is generally believed, and somewhat supported by Project documents, that the general NRC/USG relationship over the past three years has been problematic, and that this has had a negative impact on Project progress.

The Institutional Support component has clearly felt the effects of this strained relationship. Among these effects are:

- i. A prolonged period of isolation and limited responsibilities for Project-funded advisors: Advisors' reports indicate that, in their opinion, their early difficulties in finding full employment in the Planning Unit are in part explained by their association with the USG.
- ii. Procurement of commodities: Project files indicate that Mission dissatisfaction with NRC and Planning Unit progress slowed the procurement of at least some project commodities.

Despite this, the Planning Unit Director and USAID Project Office were able to work together to resolve some of the problems of the Project-funded Advisors, and some difficult counterpart problems with the EIL sub-project. Records show that they have met regularly through the L.O.P. to discuss Project issues.

b. NRC/PVO Relations:

USAID-funded PVOs staff who were interviewed stated that relations with the Planning Unit, though sometimes frustrating, have improved to some degree over time. Most comment that the Planning Unit has taken a more active role in project development, instituted income-generating meetings, and worked with them to resolve project problems. Complaints were that the NRC Planning Unit "is" Mr. Dubed, the Director, and that Mr. Dubed is often too busy to attend to needed actions.

c. NRC/UNHCR Relationship:

As described above those involved in the Project believe that the NRC has assumed a stringer position in this relationship over the past two years. It is unclear if this is due to increased abilities of the Planning Unit, though the Unit has no doubt improved its capacity to evaluate project proposals. It is clear that the assistance of Project-funded Advisors provided the Unit with tools to better assume this role. The question is still open as to whether those increased abilities spread beyond the Director of the Planning Unit. The team did not have time to fully investigate this question, but it is safe to say that the roles of other Unit members were not as well understood by outside agencies.

5. Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the overall recommendations of the Evaluation Team to extend the life of the Project into September 1987, and the assumption that the level of sub-project activity will remain somewhat constant through this period:

a. That a replacement for the Implementation Manager be recruited as soon as possible and funded at least through September 1987. This person should have at least 5 years organizational management experience, a familiarity with AID procurement and grant procedures and experience in the

developing world - preferably in a government ministry. There is certainly no guarantee of sustainability of these efforts beyond LOP, but indications are that, despite a possible reduction in UNHCR budget support, the Planning Unit will be called on to provide a greater voice in project planning and management in an operational settlement program. Further, it is important, if the Project continues, that USAID have a link with NRC who can assist the Unit in working through the USAID management system to expedite procurement of materials and services and proposal review. It is unwise to expect that these skills can be imparted to Planning Unit staff otherwise.

b. That the Research Manager's position be dropped. If the Dolco and N. Hasci proposals are finalized there will be some component activity but not enough to justify a full-time advisor. The former Advisor was never fully employed. The NRC puts little priority on research and there is no plan to use the NRC Country Contracting for research grants. This function, when needed, should be assumed by the USAID Project Officer and the above-mentioned Implementation Manager (\$225,000).

c. That the Director of the Planning Unit be someone who can dedicate full-time responsibilities to managing and developing the Unit. The NRC will maintain a key role in the Somali refugee program thru at least the medium-term future. The current Planning Unit Director is overtaxed, and as such has little time to develop the Unit.

d. Planning Unit and USAID staff to draw up a timetable for delivery of currently ordered commodities, and prepare a revised procurement schedule to go through the life of project. No additional AID contribution is recommended.

e. That a short-term (30 day) consultant be brought in to assess the progress of the NRC information management system begun with EIL assistance, the need for computer capabilities, staff training and future technical assistance. Estimated cost (\$12,000).

f. That NRC collaborate with USAID project management in the scoring of proposals, technical reports, contracts and project possibilities.

g. That the Planning Unit undertake the self-assessment, possibly with the assistance of EIL or another qualified PVO, called for in its terms of reference and share this with USAID to re-establish goals and outputs in light of perceived progress and constraints.

B Socio-Economic and Technical Studies

1. Description

The Project Paper called for from four to seven program relevant studies to "further inform program planning, policy and strategy development" leading to recommendations or changes, expansion for replication of existing projects or programs, and to identify issues or further investigation. The SETS component was budgeted at \$250,000.00 for three years.

2. Progress to Date

To date, four studies at a total cost of \$94,000.00 have been completed. \$90,000 was shifted from the SETS budget to the Management and Monitoring component. Two additional studies have been approved for implementation beginning in January 1986.

. a. Completed Studies

- i. William Tunstall for the Somali Academy of Sciences,
"Report of a Survey in Mogadishu and Hargeisa". The study was completed in September 1985 and is on file at USAID.
- ii. B.C.Spooner, "Refugee Settlement in the Lower Shebelle Region," Completed in 1984
- iii. Africare, "Jalalaqsi Socio-Economic Survey." Completed.
A copy is on file with the NRC and has not yet been presented to USAID.

iv.. Planning Unit/NRC, "Settlement Analysis, Sudan." The study tour took place March 1-15, 1984. The final report was presented to USAID in July 1984.

b. Studies recently approved in principle and awaiting implementation in 1986

i. Naima Ali Hasci, "Refugees and Settlement: The Evolution of the Somali Government's Policy Towards Refugees", the proposal was approved in principle in September 1985.

ii. Dolco, Inc., "Refugees Evaluative Baseline Attitudinal Survey Effort" (REBASE): The proposal was reviewed in July 1985, and approved in principle.

(See Annex II for details on studies.)

3. Recommendations

The SETS evaluation has revealed the need for greater coordination between the NRC/PU and USAID, to facilitate joint and continuous monitoring of studies in progress, and to identify priority areas for future study. The evaluation has also determined the need for a mechanism to disseminate studies to interested GSDR agencies and PVOs working in the area of refugee self-reliance, and to insure that studies recommendations are considered at the policy level.

If the Project is extended it is recommended that the SETS component be continued with additional funding of \$50,000.00. Future studies, in order of priority should include:

- a. The Spooner Report recommends that a detailed study be undertaken on future refugee land tenure and water rights, including identifying/or creating a system for resolving competitive claims and conflicts between refugees and their local neighbors. It is recommended that

- a study of land tenure in Qorioley on both the traditional and legal levels be undertaken. The study would include a survey of the attitudes of local people towards land-use options available to refugees in the area.
- b. The development of small-scale income-generating activities for women refugees and non-refugees in camp areas; including identifying potential markets for products, skills assessments, training needs and opportunities, and identifying constraints on small enterprises.
 - c. Remission the study on urban ("invisible") refugees.
 - d. A comparative study on alternative land use options, such as PVOs renting local land for refugee agricultural projects.
 - e. An assessment of the changing roles and economic contributions of refugee men, women and children.
 - f. An assessment of the generational differences and similarities between the refugee population and in neighboring communities.
 - g. An examination of the economic effects of RSR activities on the local economy in the vicinity of the camps.

C. Self Reliance Sub-Projects

1. Agricultural Objectives

Meeting the agricultural development objectives is problematic, given uncertainties surrounding refugee access to farm land in and around camps and the smaller number of sub-projects implemented than planned. Land has been developed in two areas by sub-projects and allocated to refugee farmers: At Qorioley (SCP) 320 ha. of land to be irrigated and 570 ha of rainfed land; and 150 ha. of unirrigated land at Tug Wajaale camp (NTF) in the Northwest region.

The Project design called for development of 1300 ha. of irrigated land and 700 ha. of rainfed land to benefit 7,400 households over the four year project life. Thus, development of rainfed land has exceeded the target (720 ha.) while irrigated land development falls short. (320 ha. cleared, only 80 ha. of which is presently under irrigation.

Between both sub-projects a total of 3,320 refugee families have been given access to plots to be cultivated. Given that this is less than half the original target, that there are no anticipated new agricultural activities, and that less than one year remains in the life of the Project, it is highly unlikely that the initial targets will be met.

The Project also called for several hundred local families to benefit from these agricultural development activities. To date, some 90 local farmers have been given access to irrigation canals built by the Qorloley sub-project. In Tug Wajaale no local farmers have yet been incorporated into activities, though such participation is called for in the proposal. Again, less than half the target has been achieved.

While land has been developed and refugee participants farming on this land for up to three years, as in the case of the Qorloley sub-project, many refugee participants are likely to be displaced in the near future, as the irrigated land area is to be redistributed by the NRC on a larger plot size basis. Only 320 families will remain, while the other approximately 2,300 families are expected to be relocated. The NRC has made assurances on several occasions that all possible steps will be taken to see that these people are included in such activities as the planned Furgano settlement.

The case of Qorloley underscores the uncertainties inherent in developing land for refugees to farm. Whether refugees will have security of tenure on land allocated for their use must be clarified before refugees are allocated land in the future. If Self-Reliance agricultural activities are to be extended beyond the present Project completion date, this issue will need resolution. While the Project may be able to increase refugee income (in cash and in kind) by assisting in agricultural development, over the longer term refugee participants will need to have clear understanding of the tenure status of this land to sustain motivation.

2. Skill-Training Objectives

Each of the sub-projects has skills training activities included as a part of overall sub-project activities. To a greater or lesser degree agricultural, vocational, enterprise development and vocational skills are promoted by Project activities. Skills training and income generation have, in fact, become the primary focus of sub-project activities as the project has developed.

In the one sub-project (PFP) designed to specifically meet skill and vocational training objectives, activity did not begin until late 1984 and has experienced numerous implementation delays. Of the 500 refugee beneficiaries to receive training, none have yet been trained. Impact assessment is as yet premature.

PFP's plans for training are concentrated in the field of small business management rather than skills training per se. The Project design, however, called for training programs in a wide range of potential income-generating skills. If this objective is to be reached, PFP will need to place a greater emphasis on this type of training. If PFP is to be successful in assisting refugees and locals to market their skills, support to refugee entrepreneurs will be required; e.g. small capital loans, loans for tools and equipment.

The objective of upgrading the management and administrative skills among refugee assistance program administrators was addressed through the Experiment in International Living (EIL) sub-project. Approximately 280 refugee affairs administrators in the field have received training through EIL, as have 71 refugees, 26 UNHCR personnel and 20 Mogadishu based managers from 13 agencies connected to refugee affairs. Six Somalis have been trained by EIL expatriate personnel as trainers for future management courses.

Continuation of EIL training programs is recommended provided that greater emphasis is given to assisting camp-based refugees and Somali implementing

The Save the Children agriculture sub-project in Qorioley includes training of extension workers and refugee farmers. Training of extension workers has progressed relatively well, with six project extensionists having received formal training at the Ministry of Agriculture extensionist training center as well as on the job training, and visits to other agriculture extension projects. Training of refugees has taken place but has been informal in nature. Delays in implementing the irrigated farm and drought on the rainfed farms have hampered start-up of a full-scale extension project. Project beneficiaries felt that they had learned a good deal about farming from participation in the sub-project, but could not identify the input of specific extension workers or groups.

This sub-project has only eight months to go before PACD. SCF field teams state that they are currently preparing more formal extension training plans to coincide with the start-up of irrigated farm activities. If this is so, a sub-project extension will be needed for such activities to provide further benefit to participating farmers.

The New TransCentury Foundation (NTP) sub-project in and around camps in the Northwest includes training components for road improvement and maintenance workers, and farmers participating in the agriculture component.

Participating refugees who were interviewed did say that they were learning some new skills, but did not perceive them as marketable after the completion of the sub-project. Achievement of specific impacts for refugees must rely in the future on more marketable skill training offered to the refugee participants, who will then be enabled to secure wage employment.

3. Infrastructure Improvement

Progress in infrastructural activities has been good, except where delays have prevented specific targets to be met. Infrastructural activities are being implemented by NTP in the Northwest, and consist of dirt road rehabilitation, construction of sub-surface dams and exploration for groundwater sites. Plans for infrastructural development in the sub-project design included improvement of 50 kms. of existing roads while 10 river

crossings were to be constructed. To date, the target for road improvement has been exceeded - some 90 kms. of road have been upgraded and the sub-project has a target of 200 kms. Construction of river (i.e. wadi or tug) crossings is planned, but not yet begun. However, other infrastructural improvements in the Northwest have been undertaken by NTF (sub-surface dams constructed and urban drainage systems improved) which were not called for in the project design. Test drilling for water is to proceed at 12 sites, with an outcome as yet unknown.

Infrastructure was included in the Project as a contribution to refugee self-reliance on two grounds. First, labor intensive construction methods would generate food or wage income for refugee workers. Second, improved access and major roads would generate refugee income by increasing access to markets for refugee agricultural produce. The NTF sub-project itself also planned to train refugee participants in marketable skills, by involving them in construction. Only the first of these three objectives can be said to have been met, however. Although refugees have gained cash income, there is little evidence that this has been enough to permit productive investment by refugees which would lead to their being self-reliant in the future. Regarding the second justification, that of increased access to markets, roads so far improved do not link refugee farms to markets. This is not, however, a serious shortcoming in the sub-project. As discussed above, the development of refugee agriculture has been hampered by climatic and policy problems. Nevertheless, road improvements have no doubt assisted the regional transportation network, including marketing of local agricultural produce.

Though all objectives may not have been met, the continuation of these types of infrastructural improvements is strongly recommended. Not only do these works lead to expanded economic opportunities for the whole region (including, therefore, refugees resident in that region), but improvement of basic services such as roads is a visible and highly appreciated form of development assistance to non-refugees. The model of labor-intensive road improvements used by NTF achieves several interrelated and important goals: Direct income is provided to refugees; local non-refugees receive a tangible benefit; and the region as a whole is developed.

D. Project Monitoring and Management Assistance

1. Description

Building directly on the earlier experience of the Food Monitors, this component's three expatriate PSC Refugee Project Assistants (RPAs) energetically and closely approximated the component's objectives of data collection and management assistance in the field of refugee activities. Their detailed reports, based on frequent field travel, appear to have been closely read and relied upon by USAID Project managers to identify problems and in formulating lines of action and policy. However, the reports were not shared with the NRC, as seemed intended in the Project Paper.

While noting the past absence of sharing field reporting between USAID and NRC, the responsible senior managers of both agencies now feel that the time has come for arranging the exchange of such information.

Over time ED/PA management resources became stretched thin and the Mogadishu-based RPAs were pulled increasingly into other Project management tasks, leaving little time for pursuit of their original objectives. (ED/PA was of course fortunate to have such versatile and upward-capable talent.) Time also brought some changes in the types and quantity of field reporting needed. But for the past year or more little attention could be given to the monitoring functions, in large part because ED/PA staffing was short handed. Recently ED/PA has taken steps to develop a RSR (and Forestry) management structure which it believes will remedy the past shortfalls on field information gathering and will meet the overall needs for Project management.

The present NW-RPC (one of the early RPAs) has been assigned to Hargeisa for two years and has managed to carry out the original monitoring functions more closely and continuously than those based in Mogadishu. But his occupations have also evolved, perhaps inevitably, to embrace more activities since he has become something of an unofficial representative of USAID, if not USA, in the Northwest of Somalia.

The underestimation of management burdens in the design of the RSR Project (along with Forestry) deserves special notice since it has important instruction for designing future projects of this sort.

Four positions have become directly involved in the mix of monitoring and management responsibilities for the RSR and Forestry Projects:

- 1) Project Management Coordinator (presently a PSC);
- 2) Project Operations Specialist (a PSC);
- 3) Northwest Regional Project Coordinator (a PSC); and
- 4) the RPA with REPCOORD (vacant).

It now appears that the last position will be funded by a non-project source, and so will be left out of account in what follows.

While RD/FA feels that it has the costs of these positions covered for the current LOP by the funds recently shifted from other components to this one, the Mission 'pipeline' report indicates that adequate funds may not be available to meet even the present costs of the first three positions. For the recommended one year RSR Project extension--September 1986 to September 1987--the following estimated costs should be considered:

- Project Management Coordinator (PMC)	\$120,000
- Project Operations Specialist (POS)	100,000
- Northwest Regional Project Coordinator (NW-RPC)	100,000

Taken together, these positions appear to be a vital minimum for the monitoring and management of RSR (and Forestry). At the same time, the NW position has evolved to also embrace more general duties for USAID, and the

Project Management Coordinator has responsibilities not contemplated in the original Project design. For these reasons, and the one following, the evaluation team feels that at least one of the PMC or NW-RPC positions should be funded by non-project sources, possibly Mission operating expenses. This would also keep this component's share of costs to the extended Project at a more justifiable proportion to other expenditures; 13% or 15%, as opposed to 21% were all three above positions to be Project funded.

The team essentially agrees with the CDA Forestry evaluation that, ideally, USAID should seek to place management of each of the Projects in the hands of a Direct-Hire Project Officer, each assisted by an RPA-like PSC. Failing this, USAID should, at minimum, extend the contracts (however funded) of the Project Management Coordinator and the Project Operations Specialist (RPA-like) through the end of the Project, to ensure management continuity in Mogadishu without the interruptions of the past. The NW Regional Project Coordinator is also essential, for non-Project as well as Project reasons.

The Project's intent to have the RSR and CDA Forestry Projects relate closely to one another has not been realized. The main reason has been simple separation of locations. In the one case where location should have had cooperation possible, personality problems seem to have limited its extent.

Recommendations:

1. NRC and USAID to coordinate as appropriate on field information gathering, and to share in resulting reporting.
2. Regular monitoring of field activities to be continued as an essential part of RD/RA project management, if on less frequent basis than was required at earlier stages.
3. Because of past inadequacies in RD/RA staff coverage of the Project's management needs, the newly replaced management structure in Mogadishu should be closely monitored for adequacy by the RD/RA Officer, at least during its early testing stages.

4. The NW/RPC position's unique situation should be explicitly recognized as such, and the job description adjusted accordingly to acknowledge the widened scope of the position's responsibilities, taking into account the incumbent's suggestions on such a revised scope of work, and incorporating, of course, the presently appropriate level of Project monitoring and management assistance.

5. Every effort should be made to fund either the Project Management Coordinator or the NW-Regional Project Coordinator through non-Project sources.

IV. EVALUATION OF SUB-PROJECTS

A. Experiment in International Living

1. Objective

The goal of the sub-project is to decrease GSDR dependence on expatriate agencies' planning, management and implementation capacities in administering refugee assistance projects.

2. Description

The sub-project provides management training and other support to the Planning Unit of the National Refugee Commission, to the staff of other GSDR Ministries, to refugee camp leadership and to PVOs.

On March 10, 1983, the EIL entered into a Cooperative Agreement with USAID and NRC to provide two years of sub-project activities in management training to the above entities. Sub-project activities included: Management training workshops, seminars, and courses to improve planning and management capacities in implementing and administering refugee assistance programs. The Grant provided \$510,000 USAID contribution and a GSDR contribution. The Cooperative Agreement has been amended twice: The first time to include an expanded management program, and an increase in beneficiaries; the second to include strengthening the planning, management and implementation capacity of four additional agencies working in refugee assistance -- the Refugee Health Unit (RHU); the Family Life Program (FLP); the Community Development Unit (CDU); and the Institute of In-Service Teacher Training (IITT). Together the amendments have lengthened the project life to January 1986 and increased the total sub-project U.S. dollar budget to \$962,522.

3. Progress to Date

By the end of 1984, EIL had conducted 17 field seminars and workshops in 7 districts for over 250 participants from 25 agencies. Two additional workshops were held in Mogadishu for NRC Planning Unit staff, but these were discontinued prior to completing the scheduled series of eight such workshops. Three special topic seminars were held for 150 agency heads and administrative staff. In 1985, activities for over 100 participants included a special topic seminar; a mid-level training workshop in Mogadishu and six workshops at field sites.

a. Specific activities consisted of the following

- a 3-5 day workshop for Planning Unit staff, NRC, August and September 1983;
- a mid-level management training workshop, Mogadishu, January 1985;
- two counterpart training seminars, October 1983 and January, 1985;
- 3-5 day workshops: Hargeisa I, and Boroma I, 1984;
- IITT Field Workshop, Qorioley, August, 1985;
- Interagency Field Workshop, Qorioley August 1985;
- Community Development Unit, Mogadishu, July 1985;
- Family Life Workshop, Mogadishu, July 1985.

Intermittantly during the LOP sub-project activities have included:

- skills training workshops for NRC and other GSDR agencies, and PVO staff in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating self-reliance activities;
- Mogadishu-based training courses for NRC, NRA and other GSDR and PVO agencies in project design, monitoring and evaluating techniques;
- field-based training for refugee camp commanders and other implementing agency personnel in management training and skills development.

b. Management Information System

Included in the second Grant Amendment (April, 1984) its purpose is to provide technical assistance to the NRC Planning Unit in designing a system for data collection from within NRC and from Ministries, other organizations and PVOs.

The position of Management Information Systems officer was filled in July 1984. Systems were designed and introduced. By March 1985 both internal and external systems were ready to be tested. The expatriate Information Systems Officer worked with a counterpart who took over responsibilities in March 1985, with the departure of the expatriate.

c. English Language Teaching Program

This program for IITT teachers and other camp personnel also resulted from the 1984 grant amendment. A Curriculum Development Specialist (CDS) arrived in Mogadishu in May, 1984, and began the first phase (needs assessment) of the program which will assist teachers in the camps to (a) learn English; (b) become certified and; (c) qualify for future English training at the national teacher training college. As of August 1985, Unit I of the writing course was completed and readied for a final review by the English team in September. It is too early to assess impact of this element. The IITT English language program is a five-phase, 3 year project.

d. Management Training - Vermont

In June and July of 1984, participants travelled to Vermont for management training courses. The participants were: the Training and Education Officer of the Planning Unit; an NRC Counselor from Social Services; IRC Community Development Officer; the Director of the Inservice Institute for Leaders Training; and two UN National and Northwest Regional Directors

e. Training Course for 6 Somali Trainers (Completed)

Training of the six staff trainers has been a notable success. One of the trainees will be assuming the position of Chief Trainer, recently vacated by an expatriate. Another trainer has since left Somalia to assume a position in the Gulf States.

f. On-going Assistance in Proposal Writing

For Somali Agencies and Project Development: This has not been fully achieved during the LOP. EIL has, however, provided informal ad hoc consultation to RHU, CDU and to SURERD.

g. Office Skills Training

For Planning Unit office manager and counterpart: A five month course was designed and implemented for all NRC secretaries from July-November, 1983. Supplemental training continued until June 1984 for three English-speaking secretaries--two from the Planning Unit and one from the Extraordinary Commissioner's office.

h. Special Topic Seminars

December 1983, Mogadishu, Seminar on "Socio-ecological Research among Refugees in Somalia";
December, 1984 "Refugee Participation in Somalia", "Making the Transition from Relief to Development" February 1984; "NRC Information System", February 1985

i. Beneficiaries

There were a number of direct beneficiaries including: Somali and expatriate staff of the GSDR; staffs of PVOs; six Somali trainers who received 9-16 months of on-the-job training; approximately 280 participants of field seminars, including refugee camp commanders, secretaries, inspectors and Somali staff of 26 refugee agencies and Volags; CDU officers from seven sites; participants of special topic seminars, including 36 participants of the

Research seminar; 41 participants of the Relief/Development seminars; 71 refugees who participated in various workshops; 15 NRC personnel who worked with the Information Systems Officer; 24 counterpart seminar participants; 11 office skills participants from the NRC staff; 20 Mogadishu mid-level management training participants from 13 agencies and; 15 EIL staff members who received "jobs, relatively high salaries, and overseas experience", (EIL Self-Evaluation, March 1985.) The number of direct female beneficiaries is negligible.

An assessment of the impact of this training including such issues as: Effect on refugee program planning, utilization of skills by trainees and increased information processing capability of the Planning Unit; was not undertaken by the evaluation team.

5. Recommendations

The EIL sub-project is scheduled to end in January 1986. In the event the LOP is extended, the following should be considered:

- a. EIL should be requested to do an in-house assessment of impact on targetted beneficiaries as part of future amendments or follow-on activities to the current sub-project.
- b. Due to the distance from Mogadishu where the sub-project is based, an EIL field representative should be placed in Hargeisa to facilitate continuity and day-to-day contact should EIL continue activities in the Northwest;
- c. The time frame of the workshops should be extended to provide more in-depth training or correspondence courses should be offered between workshops.
- d. Increased emphasis should be given to implementing the proposal writing project--for Somali Government agencies which have responsibility for refugee-related projects, the personnel of refugee camps, and Somali community groups.

- e. The possibility should be explored of establishing a Counter-part relationship with Haqabtir to provide training in income-generating activities for women. (Haqabtir is in need of additional funds, and training to increase their service delivery capacity, and has formally requested to be granted PVO status by USAID).

A.. Save the Children Federation (SCF)

1. Objectives

The purpose of the sub-project was to assist refugees and their neighbors to enhance their productivity, economic livelihood and skills in agriculture: to provide individual farmers access to improved land, tools, equipment, extension services and market outlets that are needed for increased agricultural and related augmenting productivity (Cooperative Agreement SCF/USAID/NRC).

2. Description

The Cooperative Agreement was signed on 31st July 1983, with a sub-project life of 3 years. Total USAID contribution was to be \$473,000 with a GSDR contribution equivalent of \$505,000. As part of its contribution the implementing agency (SCF) agreed to provide resources valued at \$79,000. A UNHCR contribution of \$795,000 was anticipated -- and was, in fact, exceeded.

The sub-project was to increase agricultural productivity and otherwise improve self-reliance conditions by producing the following outputs:

- a. Project-irrigation system designed, tested and operating
- b. Irrigation canal between Shebelle river and project site completed
- c. 320 hectares of land prepared for irrigation farming
- d. 1,600 refugee families each farming 0.2 hectares of improved irrigated land
- e. 900 hectares of dry land prepared for cultivation
- f. 900 refugee families each farming 1 hectare of rainfed land
- g. 400 non-refugee families benefitting from project-placed irrigation system

h. 75 heads of family employed in bee keeping

- Up to 3,500 refugee and non-refugee farmers, acquire improved farming methods and practices through demonstration and training.

This sub-project was one of only two described in the PP which was eventually implemented. It is also the only one with a major agricultural emphasis -- an emphasis whose risks we may now more fully appreciate. As such, it is one from which a number of lessons have been learned which argueably have influenced the design of later project activities. The evaluation presented here is not intended to replace the thorough sub-project assessments called for in the Cooperative Agreement. These three party joint evaluations have apparently not been held to date.

3. Progress to date

In numerical terms the sub-project has exceeded the target established in the Cooperative Agreement. Presently approximately 3,370 refugees and a small number (90) of non-refugees are directly benefitting from sub-project agricultural activities. Three hundred and twenty hectares of land beginning to be irrigated have been allocated to refugee farmers and 570 of an expected 900 hectares of dryland has been allocated for refugee use.

The increase in beneficiaries is due in large part to decisions by refugee participants to increase the number of people working irrigated land by allocating .1 ha. of land per family as opposed to the .2 ha. called for in the Agreement. Interviewees explained that, seeing that .2 has. would not be adequate for full support of a beneficiary family, participant representatives in three, of four, camps decided to distribute the plots on a .1 ha. basis in order to provide a hedge against ration fluctuations to a greater number of people.

While reducing the yield per beneficiary and ultimately the economic benefit to each family, the decision did provide significantly more refugees with potentially productive land, and avenues for training and development of agricultural skills. It is also the foremost example of beneficiary input into critical project decision-making among all the sub-projects. One for

which Save the Children has received well-deserved praise. This evaluation team considers it unfortunate that this process may soon be undermined by a redistribution of land which does not take into account participant input.

The economic benefit derived from this sub-project is not as apparent. Hampered by SCF delays in recruiting key staff, a long delay in completing the irrigation system, and extremely low rainfall over all but the first two seasons of sub-project implementation, participants have garnered little from the land they have been farming.

Participants are planting maize and sesame on both the irrigated and dryland sites. Neither participants nor sub-project staff could give a firm estimate of yields, but refugees interviewed stated that money they earned from the sale of crops is spent on clothes, medicine, sugar, onions, fresh milk and meat. Income, they claim, is not sufficient to use for further investment. Nonetheless, if those interviewed are representative of the majority of participants, the sub-project is making some progress in reducing the dependency of the refugees on food rations, an output called for in the Project design.

The sub-project's major setback has been the failure to bring the irrigated farm into use in the planned time of 18 months. While most agree that the 18 month period was far too ambitious for the task to be undertaken, the fact that with but 7 months remaining in the sub-project only 80 of the planned 320 has. is under irrigation is a major disappointment. Certainly delays in procurement and knotty policy issues regarding land distribution and tenure are factors, but SCF management problems, especially delays in fielding key technical personnel, were also contributing factors.

Further, they found themselves in concurrent agreements with two separate funding agencies, USAID and UNHCR, which had different objectives. These agreements funded different elements of the same project activities. When there was difficulty with one agreement, (e.g., delays in funding or procurement), progress on the entire activity was delayed. This mechanism of joint funding must be revised if future funding is anticipated. One possibility is channeling different donor inputs into mutually independent project activities. This would assure that sub-project activities continue, and donor and beneficiary expectations of progress can be met.

Training

The sub-project has trained five extension agents (2 male and 3 female) and a Ministry of Agriculture Extension Manager. All had previous farming experience. The women had received formal training in horticulture under another sub-project activity. The sub-project arranged for a four week formal training program at the Ministry of Agriculture school of extension training, as well as site visits and extensive on the job training.

These agents have been working with participant farmers since September 1984. According to sub-project staff, refugee farmers have benefited from this extension but do not recognize it as having come from the sub-project, or any individual extension agent. As activity on the irrigated site increases SCF expects to begin implementation of more formal extension services. At least a few of the farmers said that they already possessed adequate agricultural skills, and would benefit most from tools, seeds and pesticides. However, experience with refugee farmers has indicated that assistance with crop production techniques, plant protection, weeding and irrigation management does prove beneficial.

A certain amount of training seems to have occurred simply in the provision of land to the refugees. Farmers interviewed most often cite the project's major impact as having provided land on which they could practice farming. Over the past three years, local techniques have been adopted by those previously unfamiliar with sedentary farming.

This unexpected benefit, albeit indirect, seems to have been a contributing factor in the initiatives by some refugees to rent and farm local land in the region. The extent of this movement towards independent farming efforts could not be ascertained during the team's brief visits, but refugee authorities and sub-project staff agree that a large number, possibly greater than 20%, of all refugee households have made arrangements to rent or share private agricultural land in the region.

Bee Keeping

Seventy-five refugee families are currently participating in the beekeeping component. To date, a sub-project input has been limited to providing some hives and materials to these beekeepers, who had had previous experience with beekeeping. The success of an originally small group of beekeepers has led to expansion of the program. SCF has recently supplied participants with materials to build an apiary and is sending out a bee keeper to improve the apiary and provide additional training.

Land Tenure: the Irrigated Farm

A complex policy issue governs the future use of the 120 ha. irrigated site. The SCF, NRC, USAID Cooperative Agreement calls for distribution of land on a .2 ha. basis to refugees - some camps have distributed .2 ha. per family, supra. However, the NRC strongly believes that this agreement was intended to be modified by all parties to accommodate larger plot sizes, and, seeing that the irrigated land poses a potentially good settlement opportunity for refugees, has decided to redistribute land on a 1 ha. per family basis to 120 participating families. Displaced families would be moved to other sites, such as the pending Furgano settlement site, as soon as possible.

There has been much discussion of this issue by all parties for almost the entire period of implementation, and the outcome will affect even the most technical of sub-project implementation tasks such as water course management and maintenance. This evaluation cannot presume to be able to resolve this issue. A few considerations are offered based on our discussions with all parties:

In the remaining seven months of project implementation it is unlikely that SCF will be able to irrigate all 120 has., establish a water course management system and inastically affect crop production, i.e., introduce horticulture, to any great extent. If redistribution is to be considered, a project should be prepared (not necessarily by SCF) to ensure that those receiving the land are prepared to manage and sustain activities. Simply redistributing the land at this time will not do this.

Refugee input into decisions on who receives redistributed plots is essential, and can be modelled along the lines of the original distribution method. While by no means perfect, this method did come up with a system which reflected participant priorities. Conditions such as land tenure, options for non-participants, and possible disincentives should be made clear to the refugees prior to their making decisions on distribution.

It is the Somali Government's sovereign right to decide what the ultimate disposition of project land is to be. It is, however, in the interests of all parties, especially the refugees, that the decision and its implications be made clear to all parties involved. Presentation of objectives for use of this land, priorities concerning access to technology for land use, and a clear timeline will give donors and implementing agencies the information needed to decide to what extent they wish to participate.

Other Project Activities

In their three years of operation in the Lower Shebelle, Save the Children has developed an understanding of the camps and the region -- and has developed linkages with the populace -- which has enabled them to experiment with other types of inputs. Some of the more successful deserve mention if only to indicate possible areas of future activity.

SCF has begun to target for assistance small groups of refugees who have an idea and initiative. These refugees receive let a or a combination of grants and loans to start up enterprises on their own. Tea shops and small dry goods stores have received loans and grants, as has a group which set up a grain grinding operation in one of the camps. Women are the primary beneficiaries of these loans, which have all been 100% repaid, according to SCF staff.

One group of 40 refugees have been provided a loan to rent land in the nearby village of Farkayrow which they are now using to grow tomatoes, onions and other cash crops. SCF provides seeds tools and extension to these women. Another group of 15 women is farming the 2 ha. SCF demonstration plot where they will be trained in farrow irrigation and horticulture techniques. SCF plans to locate irrigated land for this group and provide loans and small capital inputs for them to begin independent farming.

One consideration here is that sub-project staff should monitor the effects of these loans. It was not evident that the staff was clear as to exactly what extent these activities were benefitting the participants, and, therefore, what types of inputs should follow. Knowledge of crop yields and profitability of small enterprises would help to measure the extent of impact and plan follow-on assistance.

4. Recommendations

a. Save the Children should decide, and make its decision known to USAID and NRC, on what level of involvement it foresees in the continuation of the irrigated agriculture component. It should clarify how redistribution will affect that decision. In any event, SCF should consider limiting involvement to a period needed to implement a watercourse management system, and offer one or two seasons of training to participants. After this, handover to refugee participants is advised. A plan for such a handover would be included in proposals for further activity.

b. NRC and USAID should encourage SCF to continue activities on the site. While the SCF implementation record has lacked consistency, the team does have experience with the refugees, a trained staff and a long term commitment to the region. Careful consideration should be given before abandoning these benefits for something as yet unknown. However, in the event that SCF is not to continue these activities, all parties should meet to begin the project close-out process no later than April 1986.

c. SCF should explore further opportunities to offer assistance to refugees who independently initiate self-reliance activities. These activities should be monitored as to the effectiveness of inputs, and the economic viability of these efforts for long-term self-reliance. It is important that SCF become aware of the level of impact of its loan/grant activities, not only to measure success, but to learn from these activities in the design of follow-on projects.

d. One way to begin this process of assessment and planning would be to undertake the three party assessments called for in the Cooperative Agreement. A mediated forum such as those conducted by EIL for the CDA Forestry sub-projects in 1983-4 is advised.

C. New Transcentury Foundation

("Resource Development for Refugee Self-Reliance in NW Somalia")

1. Objectives:

"To increase capacity of the refugees to become more self-reliant through labor-intensive employment opportunities, expanded agricultural production and skills training in infrastructure maintenance and construction." (Excerpt from NTF USAID NRC Cooperative agreement, Annex I). In addition, as amended in Amendment I, "to provide income-generating opportunities for refugees and indigenous persons" (emphasis added).

2. Description

The Cooperative Agreement between NTF, USAID and NRC was signed on 27 September, 1984, with a project life of 18 months, total USAID contribution of \$1,265,000 and a GSDR contribution equivalent to \$811,000. The Cooperative Agreement has since been amended to extend the sub-project to 24 months, ending 30 September, 1986. Amendment I increases the USAID contribution to \$1,985,000, GSDR contribution is now 98,606,300 shillings and certain objectives have been dropped from the original agreement while other objectives have been added. This evaluation will be largely confined to objectives set out in Amendment I, which was approved in October 1985. Some comment on why objectives were amended will be provided.

NTF activities now cover two phases: Phase I, September 1984 to January 15th 1986; Phase II, January 16 - September 30th, 1986. Phase I activities are listed as follows:

Mobilize team and procure project support equipment; analyze and design road maintenance, water supply and agricultural self-reliance activities; initiate data collection and regional delineation of sites for water search activities; complete data collection and analysis and identify up to 12 potential water sites; complete Social Soundness Analysis and Environmental Assessment except as pertaining to water exploration activities; implement labor-intensive road maintenance and water supply

activities providing a total of 110,000 person-days employment; bring 225 hectares of previously-uncultivated land under cultivation; complete emergency road rehabilitation with heavy machinery." (Amendment No. 1 to Cooperative Agreement between NTF, USAID and NRC).

3. Progress to date

The following tabular summary indicates progress made in achieving the objectives, as well as noting delays and obstacles met which have prevented targets being met.

Delays have been met in achieving the target number of labor-intensive work days to be provided to refugees and indigenous persons. This has meant, inevitably, that less road maintenance and rehabilitation has occurred than was planned. Delays in the approval of local currency funds generated through CIPL monies have meant that 4 of the 5 mobilized road crews had to be suspended in mid-August 1985. Labor-intensive construction of sub-surface dams has also been held up, in this case due to unavailability of gabion wire used in dam construction. The wire is to be provided through funds from UNHCR which assists the Refugee Water Supply Unit (RWSU), sub-contracted by NTF to supervise dam construction. The RWSU has also been unable to provide more staff time to this effort due to an increased work load resulting from refugee camp relocation in the region. Otherwise, no serious shortfalls in meeting the project targets are apparent at this time.

SUMMARY OF NTF OBJECTIVES, TARGETS AND OUTPUTS IN PHASE I

Phase I (as per Amendment I to Cooperative Agreement USAID/NTF/NRC) from 27 Sept. '84 to 15 Jan. '86

Objectives	Targets	Completed as of September 30, 1985	Obstacles Encountered
To provide income generating opportunities for refugees and indigenous persons	- provide 110,000 person days of employment in labor-intensive road and water supply activities	41,707 person days (38% of target)	- local currency funding delayed
	- provide 24,700,000 Shillings income	7,845,540 Shillings provided (32% of target)	- construction material delayed - local currency funds and materials delayed

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Objectives	Targets	Completed as of September 30, 1985	Obstacles Encountered
To strengthen infrastructure in the NW and Awdal Regions	- improve and maintain 200 km. of earth road between Boroma and Dharbi Hore camp	80.4 km. road completed by labor- intensive means; 11.4 km. road com- pleted by heavy machinery crew (45% of target)	- as above
	- design 6800 meters new storm drains and upgrade 810 meters existing drains in Hargeisa town	- design work 50% completed	- no obstacles; implementation in Phase II
	- generate agreement and commitment Ministry for continued maintenance of improved roads	One Public Works Department engineer seconded to NTF	- little incline- tion in PWD to use labor inten- work crews.

Objectives	Targets	Completed as of September 30, 1985	Obstacles Encountered
To enhance refugee water supply	- construct up to 7 sub-surface dams in seasonally dry rivers in and around camps	one dam partially completed	- construction material delayed (gabion wire) - heavy workload of sub-contracted agency on other jobs
Water exploration survey	- identify 12 explo- ratory sites for sustainable new water supply	- completed all data collection and identified 11 sites	none. Implementation Phase II

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Objectives

Targets

Completed as of
September 30, 1985

Obstacles
Encountered

Expand agricul-
tural opportunities
for refugees

- benefit up to
1,350 refugee family
members farming 225
ha. of previously
uncultivated land

- some 11 ha. land
allocated to refugee
and non-refugee
families

150 ha. new land
plowed and seeds
provided, benefitting
up to 900 refugee
family members

- further site
investigations
needed and participants
to be selected

Total of target met
72% of new land
cultivated

Current NTF Activities

One road crew of 60 is engaged in rehabilitation of a road section between Boroma and Dharbi Bore Refugee camp, under sub-contract to the Community Development Unit (CDU) of the NRC. NTF engineers are designing the Hargeisa drainage rehabilitation scheme. Under sub-contract between NTF and Refugee Agricultural Unit (RAU), an assistant farm manager is supervising the 150 ha. scheme at Tug Wajaale, while some progress is being made with agricultural activities planned for refugees at Dhare Ma'an camp, at which 11 ha. have been allocated.

While reasonable progress has been made in achieving quantified targets set, with the exceptions already noted, the question of whether NTF past and planned activities will meet the overall objectives of this sub-project is more problematic.

There is no evidence to suggest that these overall objectives are unfeasible or unjustifiable. There is some cause to doubt that the overarching objective will be met -- that is, of promoting refugee self-reliance. This becomes apparent when the present and likely impact on beneficiaries is considered.

Beneficiary impacts were planned in three areas; direct income (wages on labor-intensive schemes), increased agricultural production, and skills training. Each of these types of impacts is discussed below.

a. Direct Income

Wage opportunities on road and sand dam crews have provided cash income to refugee laborers and their families, ranging from a total maximum of 12,000 shillings to a worker employed for 5 months on a road crew to a minimum total of perhaps 5,500 shillings to a worker employed for 7 weeks on the

Saba'ad dam site. The RSR evaluation team interviewed a total of 18 workers or ex-workers on the NTF employment activities (4%). Only 3 out of 18 had used their wages for non-consumption purposes - all 3 purchasing a couple of goats. All workers interviewed said the bulk of their wages went to food and clothes purchases - tea and sugar being the main foods bought. Some of the employed workers were still saving up to buy goats or set up small teashops in the camps, with future savings. Therefore, while direct income earned has supplemented refugee incomes, to date there is little evidence of NTF employment opportunities leading to refugee self-reliance by expanding income-earning opportunities for refugees (whether in future wage or non-wage employment). NB: Complete creditability of beneficiary/interviewees on such subjects must be questioned given their likely vested interests.

b. Increased Agricultural Production

This will certainly result for the 150 refugee families whose plots were plowed with NTF assistance at Tug Wajaale Refugee camp. However, this is increased production for the 2 years of NTF assistance - 1985 and 1986. The RSR evaluation team interviewed 6 of 150 refugee participants on the Tug Wajaale NTF scheme (4%). Refugee farmers doubted that they could sell much surplus crops or fodder even in this year of good rainfall and anticipated harvest at Tug Wajaale, which suggests that longer-term income benefits from their participation are minimal. No farmer participants felt they would be able to afford tractor plowing themselves, although all felt they would benefit from access to oxen traction. This is despite the fact that oxen plowing is recognized by the refugee farmers as less effective, given the heavy clay soils at Tug Wajaale.

When participants were asked what they would do once NTF no longer provided tractor services, refugees simply said they would revert to hoeing the land, in the absence of availability of oxen traction. The resident MCC agricultural advisor at Tug Wajaale was of the same opinion, or that most plots would remain uncultivated once the NTF sub-project were concluded, unless people could get access to oxen teams. As noted, refugee farmers interviewed all clearly recognized the superior advantage of having their plots plowed. The issue is not therefore one of persuading refugees to adopt a superior technology; rather the issue is one of costs and returns

Again, in a case like this, refugee statements should not be taken uncritically, when their perceptions of their proximate interests are taken into account and especially in view of contradictory data. Such data appear in the report of the UNHCR/WFP Mission to Somalia of July 1985. Their assessment indicates that yields experienced, and those readily achievable, for this area could make the use of tractors cost-effective, even in seasons of poor grain production. (At such times the stalks sell at a good price as fodder.) A caveat is made, however, on the unreliability of tractor fuel availability. A more pessimistic study on yields (SOGRIAH, by Tuskegee Institute in 1984) however, suggests that past yields in the Tug Wajaale area have been so poor on rainfed land that they hardly justify any inputs for farming there.

In the team's brief look at Tug Wajaale, tractor costs seemed inordinate, especially when one factored in the pro-rated overhead of the NTF operation. The latter of course should not be included when calculating running costs for the post-project long term. NTF overhead should quite properly be considered in project-term calculations, but these costs can be accepted as near inevitable in a pilot/experimental (management-intensive but, one hopes, self-liquidating) stage.

On balance, this uncertainty on cost/yield factors suggests that a closer technical-economic analysis -- or trial and error -- is needed before any confident statements can be made on the use of tractors for sustained self-reliance agriculture in the Tug Wajaale area.

c. Skills training

All road and sand dam crew members interviewed felt that they had learned a skill as a result of NTF employment. Only about half of those interviewed felt this skill was marketable in the future, and about three quarters hoped to find wage work in the future though not necessarily on road or dam construction.

The level of experience gained by a manual laborer on the NTF road and dam crews will not guarantee him future employment, particularly since the main source of road work employment - the Public Works Department - does not favor labor-intensive methods. In order to ensure that at least some NTF workers

have the opportunity to earn wage income once the NTF project is completed, further skills training is needed. As already noted, the modest wage income earned by road and dam workers with NTF is insufficient to allow workers to become self-reliant in non-wage activities such as small business or agriculture. Therefore, if the sub-project is to assist refugee workers to become self-reliant in the future, more thought is needed on how refugee participants can capitalize on their experience as wage workers with NTF.

Refugee farmer participants at Tug Wajaale did not learn any new or useful skills. Although agricultural advice was provided by NTF funding to the Tug Wajaale assistant farm manager, refugee farmers interviewed did not feel they needed advice as much as tools, access to ox plowing and seeds.

i. Non-refugee Beneficiaries

In addition to the objective of promoting refugee self-reliance, the NTF sub-project in common with the other three RSR sub-projects, has the stated objective of providing income-generating opportunities to "indigenous persons." Based on the record of completed activities, the extent to which NTF has achieved this objective is questionable. A sample of road crew workers interviewed by the team asserted that all crew members were refugees. Likewise the one dam construction crew mobilized consisted entirely of refugees. While efforts were made by NTF to include local adjacent farmers in their plowing scheme at Tug Wajaale, this goal was not met, due to differences of opinion between local authorities and NTF/RAU as to the eligibility of locally-selected farmers. Customary processes and NTF criteria for inclusion in their activities appear to be at odds, resulting in little involvement from local Somalis. This may be a serious defect in the NTF implementation activities, and ultimately in NTF's ability to achieve one of the Project objectives. The conclusions of the NTF Social Soundness Analysis noted that:

It will be particularly important to include local non-refugee cultivators (or interested pastoralists) as participants (in the agricultural component of NTF) since it will be through their cooperation that refugee agriculture will have the best chance for expansion and therefore development. If the project can teach replicable, affordable ways to cultivate land more intensively, and if this is learned together with refugees in a spirit of cooperation, hosts may be willing to share land on which they have traditional claim with refugee cultivators. (Green, 1985)

However, NTF is taking steps to include local farmers who undertake to employ some labor on their farms. With regard to the apparent exclusion of locals as participants in the labor-intensive operations, it should be stressed that while locals may not have directly benefitted in terms of wage income there is no doubt that the NTF road rehabilitation is perceived by local truckers, business people and the regional governments as a great benefit to the two regions. Refugee workers on the road crews remarked on how their work is appreciated by locals who depend on the Margeisa-Boroma-Djibouti road. Such efforts promote better relations between local and refugee populations, as the refugees are seen as contributing to, rather than draining, the local economy. In the other hand, greater attention is needed as to how locals may be directly included in future NTF activities - particularly in farming - if NTF is to achieve its objective of generating income opportunities for indigenous people.

e. Beneficiary participation in planning

As has been discussed, while NTF activities may be on a target, progress in meeting the overall objectives of refugee self-reliance is less clear, at this stage. Several further points should be mentioned, regarding the extent to which refugee economic needs are being met, the process by which refugees are selected as participants, and the involvement of refugees in project planning and implementation.

The NTF project design was not based on close analysis of feasible economic means for refugees to become self-reliant, according to refugee perceptions. This was no doubt due to the absence of information, not only on what these means might be, but also on what different segments of the total refugee population in the NW Region aspired to achieve in terms of self-reliance.

The NTF in-house Social Soundness Analysis consisted of 2 weeks of field work (October, 1984). This analysis, while insightful and comprehensive, did not attempt to elicit refugee perceptions on the best means to achieve self-reliance. The analysis noted refugee experience and interest

in small enterprises, and recommend that small business development be included in NTF activities. This has not occurred, perhaps due to P&P activities in this area which were planned to coincide with the NTF project implementation. Our team conducted interviews with a very small sample of NTF refugee project participants. Respondents expressed an overwhelming preference for assistance in irrigated agriculture or horticulture, followed by a desire for assistance in rainfed agriculture and livestock keeping. This is not surprising, given the economic background of refugees in the NW and Awdal Regions - many refugees come from the fertile highlands of Ethiopia where farming and horticulture are practiced. At the same time, many refugees from a pastoral background have some experience in farming, while those interviewed who do not still expressed a strong interest in taking up farming in their host country.

If these interests and desires on the part of refugees are representative of the NW refugee population as a whole, the present activities of NTF in the agricultural sector may be questioned. As already noted, NTF funding of tractor plowing at Tug Wajaale may not lead to replicable and sustainable refugee self-reliance. One team member concluded that the use of tractors would be far better justified in clearing stone and trees off land which refugees could then farm, using low cost replicable technologies which are already known to them - hoes and oxen plowing. A desire for assistance in land clearing was expressed by some refugees interviewed by the team.

NTF activities at Tug Wajaale were based in part on recommendations made by the NTF agricultural consultants from Tuskegee Institute (1984). The Tuskegee report comments on the "limited agricultural potential in the NW" and concluded that NTF activities should address basic agronomic needs and training, as opposed to increasing "the sheer number of persons cultivating marginal land." This conclusion overlooks the fact that indigenous Somalis farm marginal land, both irrigated and rainfed, although often having to supplement their low yields by engaging in other income-generating activities. Given the very real constraints of climate and lack of critical inputs, there is little point in drawing adverse comparisons, as the Tuskegee report does, between yields of Somali agriculture and American farm yields. Likewise, the Tuskegee report discourages marginal agricultural activities in

Somalia on the grounds of a high farm or input required. One needs to ask, then what are the feasible alternative uses of family labor, particularly in the case of refugees?

One alternative which is repeatedly proposed by the refugee themselves is to develop small-scale irrigated horticulture in the NW. The Tuskegee report recommends tractor plowing at Tug Wajaale while at the same emphasizing that "fewer and fewer people are choosing farming as a way of life" leading to a labor shortage which cannot be replaced by capital inputs, since, as they rightly note, "extensive automation is unlikely and unwise at this time." This conclusion probably only applies to rainfed cultivation, leaving open the option of developing irrigated horticulture, which as the Tuskegee consultants and others have pointed out, was largely introduced to the region by refugees. However, the evaluation team was unable to ascertain the potential for irrigated farming by refugees in the NW. NTF water explorations may have considerable bearing on this.

f. Selection of Participant Beneficiaries

The process by which refugees were selected to participate in the different NTF activities was examined by our team. Several issues can be noted. First, it appears that the selection process for recruiting refugee camp members followed customary channels rather than being based on "objective" criteria such as need and ability. Non-refugees were supposed to be recruited to work alongside refugees in the road crews, in a ratio of 1 to 3. This does not seem to have occurred as road crews are apparently entirely composed of refugees. Given the widespread benefit resulting from the road improvement, whether local laborers were excluded from working on the crews is less of a concern. The NTF senior personnel take the position that external agencies such as PVO's should avoid a "policy" or "watchdog" role in matters such as participant selection. NTF has therefore delegated the responsibility for participant selection onto the NRC and GSDR technical units which NTFsub-contracts. This is probably wise, in view of tensions which could result if external agencies interfere in customary procedures.

However, NTF did not apparently take the same position with regards to selection of local farmers adjacent to Tug Wajaale, who were to receive assistance in plowing. In this case, no resolution could be reached between local authorities and NTF on the eligibility criteria for local participation. This is unfortunate, since an opportunity has been lost to

gain acceptability for refugee farmers among the local surrounding population, (be they wealthy or not). Both the Social Soundness Analysis for this whole Project and the Social Soundness Analysis for the NTF sub-project stressed the importance of including local farmers in sub-project activities, as a means of forging economic links between refugees and locals and reducing tensions.

One final point must be made with regards to refugee selection process and participation in sub-project activities. The RSR Project Paper repeatedly called for the inclusion of refugee women in sub-project activities. With the exception of some women farmers who had been allocated plots in the NTF Tug Wajale scheme, (an estimated 25% of the 150 allocatees were women), women are as yet, not included in other NTF activities. This may be justified on the grounds that road work and dam construction are not suitable jobs for women. However, women have been employed elsewhere in Africa on labor-intensive road works, and women may be observed working on Somali building sites (sifting sand, handling wheel barrows and laying bricks). Women refugees are currently working on forestry activities in the NW, under the auspices of the Overseas Education Fund (OEF) and at Qorioley under SCF, both funded by the CDA Forestry-Refugee Affairs Project (USAID). It may be true that refugee women are unable or unwilling to work on roads or building dams, but they should be given the choice. It is not clear they have been given this choice. Here NTF may face the dilemma: Let local custom dictate participant selection, or take an active role in setting criteria.

g. Progress and Objectives of the BCI Water Exploration Activities

The BCI sub-contract is to "complete a feasibility study to identify sustainable sources of quality water and perform test drilling for up to 12 exploratory wells". To date, BCI has successfully completed the work program set out for Phase I, locating at least 4 sites with potentially very high water yields, and plans are proceeding for BCI to begin test drilling in December, 1985.

Water availability is the crucial factor for agricultural development in the NW region. For this reason alone, water exploration activities are highly desirable. However, the extent to which these activities may ultimately promote refugee self-reliance is extremely problematic. The amended BCI sub-contract budget now comprises approximately one quarter of the USAID

funding to NTF. It is therefore appropriate to ask if water is found, whether refugees will have access to the land served by new water supplies.

A review of the NTF proposals to USAID, the Cooperative Agreement and written comments by USAID Refugee Affairs staff indicates that this issue has never been resolved. Commentators on the NTF proposals consistently remarked on the potentially explosive situation which may develop when and if water is found at new sites, at which point competing claims will be made on the adjacent land. There appears to be no agreement on who may claim and develop such land - refugees, locals or members of both groups? Nor is there any indication that discussions are taking place between the relevant authorities and agencies as to who may claim and use irrigable land once water is supplied. As it stands, the whole issue of whether refugees may be resettled at new sites next to water remains open. At the same time, local business people and farmers in the NW are rapidly expanding into the area of irrigated farming around river beds, and a large-scale process of land registration is already underway. It may well happen that once the presence of water is confirmed at a particular site, immediate land registration by locals will preclude refugee settlement at a site. The process of land registration and the difficulties encountered by refugees claiming land is examined in some detail by Hoben (1985), and his observations should be noted in this regard.

In the meantime, much closer attention is needed to the question of which groups may claim land around new water points. The original NTF proposal and Cooperative Agreement included a two-stage Soundness Analysis. The second stage of this analysis was to investigate issues surrounding water exploration activities, and was scheduled for Phase II of NTF's implementation. It now seems that a follow-up Social Soundness Analysis has been dropped, according to NTF "Semi-Annual Report" of April-September 1985. However, no justification for this deletion appears in the correspondence and agreements between NTF project management and USAID on file at the USAID RD/RA office. There is no trace of why or how this decision was reached. Yet only 2 weeks' field work time was allocated during the project inception period for a social soundness analysis. This is clearly an insufficient time to investigate all the many questions on how NTF activities will benefit refugees. In the absence of any further social soundness study, it is not clear how NTF will fulfill its proposed intention to submit to USAID a plan by which NTF

activities "can assess the nature and extent of the benefits and any long-range impact and success". (NTF proposal to USAID, June 1984). Identification and development of new water resources by BCI/NTF will probably have a greater long-term impact on the Region than any other single activity implemented by NTF.

4. Interagency Relationships

All local, refugee-related agencies and the RRC seem to have developed excellent working relationships and cooperation with NTF. The NTF model of sub-contracting implementation activities to NRC technical units appears by all accounts and according to the participating parties to be working well. It is a model that could well be followed by other PVO's involved in refugee self-reliance projects.

In one area, however, NTF activities may conflict with existing, successful development efforts. This is at Tug Wajaale, where a resident representative of the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) has been pursuing a gradual, self-help approach to agricultural development among refugee families. Although NTF management has been sensitive and responsive to the on-going efforts of the MCC, concern was expressed at to the effects of "dropping a big benefit" into a refugee camp, by giving something away for free. This may create unrealizable expectations among refugees. In future they may be less enthusiastic about returning to labor-intensive cultivation, even though the latter may be in the long run be the only economically feasible technique.

5. Recommendations

In any further funding or reallocation of funds to NTF, priority should be given to replicable, cost-effective agricultural development, in particular small-scale horticultural development. This area of development is viewed by refugees in the NW as their major hope of achieving self-reliance, and is the area in which they would most wish to have donor assistance. One method of increasing irrigable land area is by construction of sub-surface sand dams which allow stored water to be used on land adjacent rivers. This is a low-cost, labor-intensive method, which should be given greater priority in future NTF activities. Other activities could include giving loans for purchase of hoes and oxen.

Greater attention is needed on the part of NTF as to how refugee workers on road and dam crews can market their skills in the future. More formal training for the best and more skilled workers should be included in Phase II, as well as follow-up by NTF management in placing these men into local positions where they can take advantage of the skills they have learned.

Compromise is needed between NTF/RAU and customary criteria for including local farmers in agricultural schemes. The overall project objectives of increasing income-generating opportunities for both refugees and indigenous people should be kept in mind.

In the future (possibly in Phase II), all commodities essential to sub-project implementation should be procured directly by the principle implementing agency, in this case, NTF. This should lead to fewer delays in carrying out activities; e.g., the provision of gabion wire needed for sub-surface dam construction.

More effort should be spent on finding out if women refugees are able and willing to work on NTF activities. If they are, attempts should be made by NTF and the sub-contracted agencies to recruit women workers.

In order for the socio-economic impact of NTF activities to be assessed, further social analysis is necessary during Phase II. Amendment I to the Cooperative Agreement includes a line item in the budget for unspecified consultancy services. These funds should be used for an in-depth investigation of some of the issues raised in this evaluation and other issues which may emerge. Particular attention should be paid to two issues: first, the cost-effectiveness and impact of tractor plowing versus oxen plowing; second, the feasibility of providing some refugees access to land adjacent to water sites, on which irrigated agriculture can be carried out. A minimum of two months in the field with a further month for data analysis is required, if these issues are to be adequately investigated.

D. Partnership for Productivity

1. Objectives

To develop, test, document and implement methodologies to promote enterprise development among refugee populations and neighboring communities in the Northwest Region. Outputs expected include vocational and management training programs, business clinics and the growth of small enterprises.

2. Description

The Cooperative Agreement was signed on 23rd January 1985, with a project life of 19 months. Total USAID contribution was to be \$725,000 with a GSDR contribution equivalent to \$301,000. Four phases of sub-project activities are planned as follows:

Phase I

Expatriate team mobilized, office established and project support equipment procured, local personnel recruited; vocational and management training modules developed, benefitting 50 entrepreneurs in Dam and Saba'ad camps; internal monitoring systems established; staff training module designed and under implementation. (Duration 6 months)

Phase II

Satellite office in Ari Addeys camp opened; 200 refugee entrepreneurs benefitted from training and business advisory services; year 2 personnel recruited; staff training, program administration, monitoring and documentation of methodologies continued. (Duration 6 months)

Phase III

Satellite office in Daray Ma'an camp established; collaborative research effort implemented; total of 300 new and established entrepreneurs benefitted; 18 month evaluation conducted; staff training, monitoring system and program administration continued. (Duration 6 months)

Phase IV

Total of 500 refugee entrepreneurs benefitted from vocational and management training and/or business advisory services; local staff training capable of implementing and managing the activity without expatriate assistance; optional methodologies for enterprise development identified tested and documented (Duration 4 months)

3. Progress to Date

Twelve business advisors were hired in August 1985 and given an intensive eight week training program. Business advisors had about ten days on-the-job training in Daray Ma'an refugee camp in Hargeisa. All business advisors have good educational background (most of them university graduates), but very few had formal training in business. The business advisors who were interviewed concerning the content and emphasis of their training consistently mentioned business analysis, bookkeeping, accounting, analysis of assets and liabilities, and calculation of profit and losses.

During the training and afterwards, business advisors were sent out to meet with business individuals in Hargeisa. (It was not clear how many were refugees.) After identifying business problems, the trainees gave advice in bookkeeping, accounting and marketing. Business advisors found that what the business people considered their problems (i.e., lack of supply, lack of hard currency) and the services that business advisors provided were not complementary. According to the six business advisors we interviewed, business people contacted in Hargeisa were reluctant to accept their services at first, but some are now showing signs of accepting and implementing the advice in bookkeeping and accounting.

Business profiles undertaken by the business advisors, which analyzed 12 small businessmen in Hargeisa, focussed on financial analysis and typically recommended that the entrepreneurs keep better written records. However, the PFP business advisor's training program covered a much wider range of subject matter including the refugee situation, loan applications, market analysis, supply problems and licensing. Instead of merely identifying entrepreneurs' problems, the business advisors perhaps should act as facilitators in solving business problems; e.g., access to loans, equipment and vocational training.

The business advisors felt that the refugee skills in the camp are mostly in retail/trading, but very few in manufacturing. PFP training did not emphasize any particular type of business, but equally emphasized manufacturing, trading and services. According to PFP International staff, 40 percent of PFP's training program emphasizes manufacturing. The business advisors feel that they could assist the refugees in micro-businesses; shoe making, bakeries, carpentry, small groceries, tailoring, hand-crafting household goods (emphasis given to women refugees).

After the termination of the project, the business advisors are not sure how marketable their skills would be but expect to continue as business advisors for commercial men in town or another foreign agency, in the same capacity, working in the refugee camps. Placement of these advisors upon completion of this sub-project should be a primary concern of PFP project management.

The business advisors were until very recently still in Hargeisa waiting for the permission from the Regional Refugee Commissioner in Hargeisa to work in the camps, and for logistical arrangements to be finished. Permission has now been granted and PFP proceeded to field the advisors in the camps.

PFP sees recipients of its program in four categories of priorities:

- a. those with existing viable business but needing advanced skill training;

- b. those without existing business but with basic skills and resources and needing advanced skills training;
- c. those without businesses and basic skills but with resources and needing training and access to resources;
- d. those without businesses, skills or resources

According to the PFP Technical Manager, the Cooperative Agreement does not have a component giving resources to the recipients. PFP management insists on the philosophy of discouraging "give away" programs, but after gaining Somali field experience, PFP would like to have the capacity of providing capital inputs to recipients in cases of recognized need. A justification of PFP's basic approach is consistent with the Somali proverb:

"You can get some one to help you financially but it's difficult to get someone to advise you" WAX WAX KU SIIYA WAAD HESHA WA KU LA JALIYA MAHESHID.

Other activities include making preliminary arrangements for staff office/housing accommodations in the camps; initial pilot test of a small capital loan program market survey for potential entrepreneurs; feasibility study design of assistance (e.g., windmill manufacture, salt ponds); refugee craft making assistance in collaboration with OXFAM and Islamic African Relief. Activities still not completed include business assistance to MCC (Saba'ad skill training recipients) and marketing assistance with MCC/Saba'ad carpentry products. The Hargeisa main office, and a satellite business clinic are established, and meetings with some local business community members have been held.

4. Obstacles Met

Besides the earlier delay in signing the contract, the project is running behind in implementing the activities which were to have taken place. This is attributed by PfP to three factors:

- Cholera which prevented expatriate staff from travelling to project site for almost a month.
- Bureaucratic delays in permission to hire Somali staff.
- Lack of cooperation between RRC and PfP.

According to the RRC/NW, delays in PfP implementation are due to:

- PfP Manager not informing RRC of his staff hiring arrangements which led to delays in approving PfP Somali staff.
- PfP has not followed terms of the Cooperative Agreement

These differences in perception and the failure to resolve them have prevented PfP from getting to camps and hiring and training staff. Moreover, differences have heightened tension between local authorities and the team thereby inhibiting implementation.

Should these differences persist, resultant delays can be expected.

5. Interagency Relations

The working relationship with the Regional Refugee Commissioner's office has encountered a number of rough spots which may have been avoided if both parties had been better informed of the other's responsibilities and expectations. This relationship is now improving, but would benefit from stronger liaison between the RRC office and the Planning Unit in Mogadishu.

PfP has established good working relationships with other implementing agencies in the region, and in an effort to use local resources for their vocational training program, PfP developed links with NW Regional Education Officer in extending support to the vocational school in the region.

6. Recommendations

a. Due to the constraints the sub-project has encountered, which caused considerable delays to the implementation schedule, the schedule should either be adjusted to the time left for the sub-project or else sub-project life should be extended to accommodate the activities and objectives.

b. At the moment refugee participation is just beginning in the sub-project. Because of the supposedly limited number of manufacturing business enterprises in camps and the scarcity of their resources, the PfP business management program may not be the first need for these refugees in achieving self-reliance. The field experience just getting underway must assess the soundness of these, so far, speculations.

c. The vocational training skill component of the PfP program should be strengthened. After refugees, and others receive training in practical skills, then the input of the business advisors will be more helpful. The early focus of the program needs to be shifted from training in accountancy and record-keeping to the most critical input needed by potential refugee business people, that is, training in practical skills first. Once skills training is accomplished, refugee and entrepreneurs needs are for capital loans and/or loans of equipment, assistance in market research and assistance in establishing businesses. The example of AFSC in Daray Ma'an camp is a successful model for replication, and is highly regarded by local and refugee authorities in the region.

d. To avoid conflicts between parties, future projects should have more clearly stated agreements regarding selection and hiring of local and refugee staff. These agreements should be confirmed with relevant Regional Refugee Commission authorities prior to project implementation. Further, refugee projects must have a specified liaison with an official in the Regional Refugee Office. The terms of the liaison should be stated in the Cooperative Agreement

e. PFP, with the help of Camp Commanders and camp committees - where they exist - should identify skilled residents in the camps who would be willing and able to give on-the-job training to refugees. Other options are arranging for trainers to come into the camps or offering short courses in neighboring urban centers, e.g., Boroma/Hargeisa. PFP should be prepared to pay stipends and assist in the loan of equipment to trainers.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

- A. Self-reliance has proven to be complicated and often elusive concept, running a continuum from just above total dependence to full self-sufficiency. Temporary benefits from participation in project activities, while providing in situ advantages, may not help prepare refugees for eventual settlement or repatriation. Sub-projects need to be directed towards leaving substantial and sustainable benefits to Project participants, and not mere temporary income generation.
- B. The sub-grant mechanism is well-suited to an environment where the future is unpredictable and where comparatively little is known about the beneficiaries. While it runs the risk of slow disbursement of project funds, it permits maximum flexibility in the face of a shifting policy environment, or erratic environmental conditions.
- C. Management of PVO grants is a time-consuming and intensive administrative burden. Review of grants, site visits, responding to reports and simply maintaining an effective working relationship with 6-8 grantees requires considerable resources and careful planning. Care must be taken not to add to this burden by overmanaging these grants. Use of the Operational Program Grant (OPG) for future activities, rather than the Cooperative Agreement might be called for. While there is not necessarily a significant difference between the two, the former does not imply the extensive input of the Grantors that the latter does.
- D. Joint sub-project funding should only be undertaken under circumstances which allow for continuation of discrete project activities should any given donor withdraw. In any event, joint funding of projects without complete agreement on final outputs and duration of activities must be avoided.
- E. Some refugees are devising their own strategies to cope with the changing circumstances of their stay in Somalia. This Project and the sub-projects can, and should, begin to target their efforts to these initiatives.

F. Mission preparation for future evaluations of the refugee Projects must take into account the multiple levels of activities under implementation and limit the scope to the critical issues to be investigated. Clear definition of these issues is a key element in a timely and effective evaluation..

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the continuing presence of so many refugees in Somalia, the expected reduction in UNHCR funding levels in 1986, and the limited number of sub-project activities to date, it would be quite easy to recommend any number of new and diverse activities to be funded under this Project.

But some of the above findings temper any enthusiasm to propose major increases in Project activity.

First, the policy shift towards seeking durable solutions to the dilemma of camp-based refugees calls for future activity to be designed to better assist those refugees seeking long-term solutions for themselves. Second, the failure of the Project to reach projected targets, or even to approach some of these targets, suggests that more effective methods could be designed to involve a greater number of PVOs and reach a larger number of refugees, possibly through the 'shilling fund,' discussed below. Finally, the team's analysis of the management burden on the USAID RD/RA Office, and the limited number of USAID resources that can be appropriated to cover this load, indicates that the present management structure can be considered successful if it sees through only the current level of activities, with a few course redirections, and furnishes the groundwork for future Mission efforts by passing on the lessons learned from the two related Projects (RSR and CDA-Forestry).

The following recommendations are therefore limited to those which the evaluation team believes can be expeditiously implemented by USAID and the National Refugee Commission. General Project recommendations are presented first, followed by recommendations for the several components. Recommendations for specific sub-project activities are found in Section III, A through D.

A. General Recommendations

1. The Refugee Self-Reliance Project should be extended for one year from the present PACD of September 1986 to permit some of the sub-projects to see through a complete planning and implementation cycle and others to redirect their efforts to undertake activities which will better prepare refugees for future self-reliance and a return to non-refugee lifestyle.

2. To support this one year extension USAID/Somalia should request an additional \$1.5 million to cover extensions to at least two sub-projects, on-going institutional support to the National Refugee Commission Planning Unit, and USAID monitoring and management assistance to this and the CDA Forestry Phase I Project, and to the SETS component. Additional shilling resources will likely be required as well, but the absence of firm proposed project amendments from participating PVOs makes it difficult to estimate potential costs.

3. The design of future refugee assistance projects, if they are to involve multi-sector PVO activity, should take into account the lessons learned from this and other PVO projects worldwide. One particularly salient lesson is that monitoring and management of such projects is management-intensive, requiring significant staff time to insure the wise use of public funds and attainment of project objectives. In terms of resources, the equivalent of 10-15% of project funds can be expected to be required to manage a project covering grants to PVOs. In contrast, the 5% initially allocated to the two Mission refugee Projects falls far short. It is not surprising that funds had to be taken from other Project components to fulfill management objectives.

4. Land tenure issues must be resolved before further activity is undertaken requiring land to be allocated for either agricultural

or residential use.' this is especially true when one is considering allocating land to refugees whose claim is not supported by any traditional title to land. It is encouraging that the Mission is funding an in-depth assessment of land availability for settlement prior to undertaking such a Project.

5. A final Project Evaluation should be scheduled for a six week period prior to the extended PACD. This evaluation should include one, and possibly, two social scientists to fully look into the impact of the Project on beneficiaries. Our evaluation team found that its limited timeframe made adequate field assessments almost impossible to conduct, considering the great distance between sub-project sites, and the poor travel conditions to the more distant regions--and the variety of sub-projects. Consideration should be given to fielding at least one team member with an understanding of development efforts in a relief context. Mission preparations should enable the team to promptly begin the evaluation.

B. For Components'

1. Institutional Support

a. A replacement for the Project-funded Implementation Manager for the Planning Unit should be recruited as soon as possible, and funded through the extended life of the Project. This person must be assigned a qualified counterpart who has an incentive to carry on after the advisor has departed. Africare has submitted a proposal to the NRC and USAID to provide such assistance. Though the team has not had a chance to review the proposal, it does offer the advantage of bringing someone out without a lengthy candidate search by the Mission.

b. The Research Manager's position should be dropped and funds deobligated from the former advisor's contract. There is little planned activity at NRC for this component, the former advisor was never fully employed, and there is no plan to continue funding these studies under the Host Country Contracting Mechanism. This person's tasks, when necessary, could be assumed by the Implementation Manager at NRC and by the RD/RA. It would be advisable for the Planning Unit to assign an officer to monitor study activity, in order to alert NRC to the value of on-going and completed research.

c. The Director of the Planning Unit should be someone who can dedicate full-time to managing and developing the Planning Unit. The NRC will continue to have a key role in the course of the Somali refugee program through at least the medium-term future. Continued development of this Unit requires the full attention of the Director.

d. A short-term (30 day) consultancy should be funded to assess the progress of the NRC management information system, the need for computer facilities, staff training and future technical assistance. Estimated cost: \$15,000.

e. Planning Unit and USAID Project staff should jointly draw up a revised schedule for commodity procurement through the PACD. In the interim, USAID should begin procurement of office supplies and equipment presently requested by the Planning Unit.

f. The Planning Unit should undertake the self-assessment proposed in its Terms of Reference and the Project Paper. A critical look at objectives, and a frank internal discussion of progress and lessons learned would serve to clarify Planning Unit direction, and bring Unit staff into the decision-making process. Though this is uncommon in the Somali public sector, common things are being expected of the Planning Unit. This assessment could be conducted with the help of EIL, or another qualified management development team. Results should be shared with USAID Project staff.

2. Socio-Economic and Technical Studies

a. The Planning Unit and USAID must attempt to better coordinate monitoring of on-going studies and dissemination of information. It is possible that with joint monitoring, the SOMAC ("Invisible Refugees") study could have produced valuable recommendations. Seminars, as those planned in the SOMAC study, should be considered for all studies to insure the access to information which Project participants and planners have often lacked to date.

b. The proposal submitted by Dolco, to gather baseline data on camp-based refugees, should be approved. In order to meet the proposed cost of \$330,000, funds need to be shifted from other Project components (see Table I). It is recommended that \$100,000 be taken from the Monitoring and Management component, and another \$175,000 be shifted from the sub-projects component. These funds would also cover the proposed study of Ms. N. Hasci on the development of refugee policy in Somalia, which the team understands has already been approved in principle for funding.

c. An additional \$50,000 should be requested to cover study needs which may be identified during the extended life of the project. Possible topics for consideration are listed in Section III.B. and Annex II.

3. RSR Sub-Projects

a. The USAID Mission should request an additional \$1.2 million to extend the life of existing RSR sub-projects upon presentation and approval of amendment proposals. Activities need to focus greater attention on vocational training, teaching of marketable skills, or preparation of an entrepreneurial capital base upon which refugees can build for a future outside of the camps--and, most importantly, development of viable farming systems.

b. Sub-project efforts through the extended life of Project should be directed towards improving the currently funded sub-projects, and including those which show signs of significant impact on refugee and non-refugee beneficiaries and feasibility of implementation. Specific suggestions on how these sub-projects can accomplish this are found in Section IV. Following are some selected examples:

- More advanced skill training can be provided for some construction workers with the NTF crews. Placement of these workers with public or private construction companies may be assisted by NTF.
- A social soundness study of perhaps three month's duration should be carried out by NTF. The study should examine whether refugees will be able to settle at sites where water may be located by BCI. Further, the study should make recommendations on what will be needed to help refugees resettle at these sites, should resettlement become a possibility. Funds for consultancies are already included in the NTF Amendment No. 1.
- More vocational and skills training should be included in the PFP sub-project activities; these could be subcontracted through CDU. Individual artisans among refugees and locals should be hired, who can give short training courses to refugees. Reallocation of funds within the PFP sub-project budget may be required to achieve this end.
- NTF and ECF should increase efforts to include local farmers in its agricultural development activities. This will not require any additional funds, but rather a shift in planned activities.

c. No new major grant activity should be considered in the recommended extension period. Clearly, there are activities which could be proposed which would benefit from the experience of other sub-projects, but

the record of Mission and NRC review procedures for PVO sub-projects have averaged 13 months for those already approved (5 weeks was proposed in the PP).

d. There is adequate time to consider funding of smaller proposals which reach a limited number of beneficiaries or capitalize on successful PVO efforts already being implemented -- if AID and NRC can work out a streamlined approval process. A fund could be established to provide capital to refugee groups who wish to start or expand agricultural or entrepreneurial activities. There are a number of implementation options, including funding PVOs to sponsor this activity or providing support to the NRC's CDU to support refugees in these areas. Something along the lines of the "Community Action Grant" of the USAID PVO Development Partners Project is also suggested, or for limited scope shilling-funded projects, a parallel of the "Self-Help Fund". Such projects would build on the experience of PVOs already working with refugees--even some working with UNHCR funding--and not require the capital-intensive and time-consuming mobilization costs of larger projects. The condition of creating a streamlined review process is a considerable one, but one worthy of beginning an AID/NRC/PVO dialogue to bring about. It is clear that with the expected reduction in funding from other (UNHCR) sources in CY 1986, many enterprising refugees will otherwise face a serious setback to undertaking self-reliance efforts.

4. Monitoring and Management

a. Project monitoring and management needs can be expected to gradually decrease over the remainder of the life of the Project. Commodity procurement has slowed, no further sub-projects are recommended, and SETS activity and institutional support require only minimal supervision once contracts are signed and teams in place. However, the monitoring and management component also covers the Forestry Project under which there is considerable activity. Therefore maintaining relatively comprehensive management assistance is recommended.

b. The team essentially agrees with the findings of the CDA Forestry evaluation that the Mission should seek to put Project management in the hands of the Direct-Hire USAID Project Officer. Failing that, the Mission should extend the contract of the current PSC Refugee Project Management Coordinator (PMC) and the Project Operations Specialist (POS) through September 1987 to insure that Project management continues without interruption until Project completion. Though a costly alternative, it is

preferable to having the changes in personnel common so far. The PMC should be considered for non-Project funding.

c. The NW Regional Project Coordinator's position (ex-RPA) presents a unique case. Too far from Mogadishu to be of prompt assistance to PVOs in resolving major AID related implementation problems, the incumbent has, in addition to fully completing his monitoring and general assistance responsibilities, seen the position expand to the point where he is perceived as somewhat of a representative for USAID on all matters relating to the Northwest. As per his recommendation, this position's scope of work should be expanded to cover a wider range of USAID responsibilities. Because of the position's expanded activities it should also be considered for non-project funding.

d. Regardless of the ultimate management plan, monitoring of USG-funded refugee activities and the general refugee situation in the field should continue on a regular if less frequent basis than in the original RPA concept.

e. USAID and the NRC should make every effort to coordinate site visits and share information on Project activities. While difficulties are sure to be encountered in such things as scheduling and staff expectations, the benefits to Project implementation and planning should make the effort worthwhile.

ANNEX I

EVALUATION FOCUS AND METHODS

A. Evaluation Focus

Evaluation of the RSR project was carried out within a framework of questions proposed by the RD/RA Office, as subsequently modified by the evaluation team. This series of questions and issues became the scope of work used in evaluating each component of the Project. The scope of work was initially presented to the NRC Planning Unit and discussions were held between the team, USAID RD/RA staff and representatives of the NRC, as to the appropriateness of the proposed scope. During these discussions, NRC representatives expressed concern that the evaluation focus emphasized the Project's "secondary objectives" of refugee participation and benefits while "primary objectives" of building infrastructure and increasing crop production were overlooked. Agreement was then reached between RD/RA officials and the NRC Planning Unit representatives that this particular evaluation exercise should focus on Project management and beneficiary impact, rather than on the technical success or otherwise of the Project.

Following is the scope of work followed in the evaluation process:

1. Institutional Support to the NRC

- a. Were plans for strengthening the Planning Unit correct in their assumptions of NRC needs and desires?
- b. Has the Planning Unit been assisted in its role of coordinating donors and refugee agencies in the development and implementation of refugee projects?
- c. How do these activities link up with Project objectives?

- d. Has the Planning Unit expanded its capabilities for gathering data useful for planning and implementing refugee assistance?
- e. How has the technical support provided to the NRC been utilized?
- f. What additional support, if any, should be provided to the Planning Unit in order to carry out its responsibilities?
- g. What are formal and informal coordination mechanisms and opportunities with PVOs, donor governments and international organizations?
- h. . Are there specific mechanisms within the NRC for
 - i. coordinating first-stage evaluation of research proposals submitted for joint NRC-AID approval and funding?
 - ii. periodic reviews of on-going research projects approved by NRC and AID?
 - iii. Are there counterpart research coordinators at AID and the NRC? How frequent is contact and communication? Are there mechanisms for this?

2. Socio-Economic and Technical Studies

- a. Are the study objectives as set out in the Project Paper relevant and still useful?
 - b. What mechanisms exist for disseminating studies' results to interested GSDR agencies and to the RSR Project through, for example, regular seminars, policy papers, etc., as the basis for problem-solving, policy formation and enhancing the overall effectiveness of RSR projects?
 - c. To what extent have studies/findings/recommendations been incorporated into policy and project initiatives by both the GSDR and the RSR Project respectively?
- 76.

d. What mechanisms exist for identifying the strengths and correcting the weaknesses of the existing studies component? What mechanisms exist to regularly monitor the effectiveness of the studies component?

e. To what extent have studies to date assessed the potential for the development of small enterprise activities, especially for non-refugee women in camp areas; have studies identified income-generating opportunities for women, including potential markets, necessary skills, training and needs opportunities; credit; and opportunities and constraints to small enterprise development?

f. To what extent have studies assessed socio-cultural differences and similarities among refugees and between refugees and host country population in camp areas; assessed inter-generational differences among refugees and hosts; assessed refugee household structures and pre-flight economic activities; considered gender-related issues, particularly pertaining to the needs and problems of refugee women; assessed allocation of resources within refugee households and examined changing roles and economic contributions of men, women and children in refugee families; and incorporated these areas into policy recommendations and RSR sub-projects?

g. Review of RSR documents and files on SETS. Evaluation procedure will include discussions with RSR personnel on how useful these studies have been for the monitoring of RSR. Discussions will be held at NRC sub-project sites with camp representatives, and sub-project contractors regarding how the SETS results were used and if the results were useful for sub-project planning and implementation.

h. Evaluation of SETS results to make recommendations for any further socio-economic studies under RSR. Included will be recommendations for improving quality-control of SETS, improving coordination of SETS research (between USAID, NRC and PVO

sub-contractors). An assessment of the overall usefulness of the completed SETS to sub-project design, planning and implementation will be provided.

i. Are there joint assessment mechanisms for monitoring the progress of studies prior to completion by both NRC and AID?

j. . What mechanisms exist in order to insure that on-going research follows the original proposal and is in conformity with the planning, and implementation needs of the RSR and the policy needs of the GSDR?

k. Is there regular opportunity for research coordinators at AID and NRC to discuss future research priority areas? To identify potential problems and to receive feedbacks and generally have input into formulating studies of mutual interest?

3. Sub-Projects

a. Were sub-project activities based on adequate research to determine what refugees saw as their important needs?

b. The following questions will guide the social soundness analysis of sub-projects:

i. Is the social and cultural context of factors which will influence refugee and non-refugee participation considered at the design and implementation stages of sub-projects?

ii. Are social, economic and cultural factors which demonstrate a need for the Project considered, or is pre-design analysis limited to technical consideration?

iii. Do all sub-projects have specific mechanisms for insuring the participation of non-refugees in refugee-oriented projects?

iv. Is data collected on demographic factors which can be used to determine the likelihood of successful refugee and non-refugee involvement in sub-project activities, including: Pre-flight background of refugee population and primary modes of economic activity in home country; male-female and children ratios of population; levels of education by gender; traditional roles and responsibilities of refugee and host-country populations and an indication of how these are likely to be affected by a camp existence; traditional authority and decision-making patterns and how this is likely to change in a camp situation; generational issues likely to have an impact on traditional decision-making and authority structures of the camp population?

v. Where are the potentials for PVOs, to coordinate with CDA Forestry, WFP, etc., and how are these exploited?

vi. While existing sub-projects now cover the major areas of activities identified in the Project Paper, are there different needs now apparent which should be met by additional RSR sub-projects?

4. Project Monitoring and Management Assistance

a. Are the monitoring plans as stated in the Project Paper reasonable and still useful?

b. Has USAID been able to meet its monitoring objectives?

c. In what ways might refugee monitoring be improved?

d. Has USAID been providing adequate management guidance and technical support to assist the NRC and PVO's achieve their objectives under this project?

e. Has USAID been able to promote coordination between RSR and CDA Project activities?

B. Evaluation Methods

Team members responsible for particular component evaluations met with all available and relevant individuals involved in implementing each component. A list of the individuals interviewed can be found in Annex III. At each sub-project site visited, team members also interviewed individual beneficiaries and sub-project staff members. Following is the check list for questions posed to refugee participants in sub-project activities:

- Reasons for joining sub-project scheme:
- Difficulties encountered by refugee participants in carrying out the job.
- Amount of money earned per day and for whole period of labor.
- In the case of farming, estimates of total production and cash income from sales of produce were bought from refugee participants.
- What skills refugees felt were learned and how refugees will use these skills in the future.
- How income from job was/will be used, how job was obtained (i.e., how refugees participant was selected, how information on job was obtained by refugees).
- Future plans of refugee participants with reference to employment/income generating activities, including farming.
- Were refugees involved in the sub-project design and implementation?
- What was the participant's previous background--farming, pastoralism, employment?
- By what means would refugees achieve self-reliance?
- What proposals for self-reliance projects would refugees make?

At each site, respondents were chosen randomly on the basis of payroll lists kept by sub-project supervisors, with the exception of the Save the Children site, where lists were not available. In this latter case, team members went to the fields and interviewed those refugees working on their plots. Recipients of training by the Experiment for International Living sub-project were selected from several camps in the Northwest area. Individuals interviewed were asked for their assessment of the quality and usefulness of the training received. In the case of the Partnership for Productivity sub-project, team members interviewed trainees, since no refugees have yet benefited from this sub-project.

ANNEX II

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL STUDIES, ANNOTATION AND COMMENT

A. Completed Studies

1. B.C. Spooner, Refugee Settlement in the Lower Shabelle Region, Somalia; completed June 1984.

The Scope of Work called for the following:

- To conduct fieldwork in the Qorioley area and collect socio-economic data relevant to settlement planning;
- To identify options and suggest the implications thereof regarding modes for the achievement of self-sufficiency by refugee-settlers, including, but not limited to:
 - farm plot sizes and their possible range
 - promising farming systems
 - feasible alternative income sources for family units
 - marketing considerations
 - possible cooperative/collective arrangements
 - habitat dispersal/clustering
 - provision for essential community services ('basic human needs')
 - other considerations for viable communities
- To characterize operational stages involved and their timing.

- To note further specialized studies needed for prudent settlement planning.
- To identify required data which SCF staff should collect, by survey and other means.
- To identify staffing/consultancy requirements to carry out the most promising options, and to suggest the configuration of the implementing organization.
- To estimate, at least notionally, the scale of costs associated with various options.
- To supply a draft final report at the end of the field work and write-up period in England, and, upon approval, to submit fifty (50) copies of the final report to NRC via USAID/Somalia, to hold meetings to discuss the results of the consultancy study with officials of NRC, SCF, and other interested parties, and to make recommendations in the report concerning settlement planning.

Description of the study: The study which examined the potential for refugee settlement in the Lower Shabelle (Lodiioley), focussed on various modes of settlement and identified component projects which would facilitate coordinated rather than spontaneous settlement.

The comprehensive study assessed the implications of the GSDR's decision of March 1981 to settle refugees within four Regions of Somalia, and evaluated settlement proposals presented by the UNHCR, the NRC, and the Ministry of Agriculture. The organizational capacity of the Save the Children Federation (SCF), a NGO funded under the RSP Project, to shift from its traditional community development orientation to implementing refugee settlement was also considered. The study was ambitious and wide-ranging in coverage and examined human and environmental resources, inventoried development schemes and options for the main modes of settlement, the ways in which settlers should be selected, the issues of land tenure and security.

Spoooner study produced 68 findings/recommendations including:

- The need for evolving a flexible settlement program to accommodate and monitor future changes in the numbers of refugees and settlers;

- The need for improved coordination among donor agencies, if proposed projects are to avoid competing for resources or result in duplication and competition among agencies;
- Consideration of the capability of SCF to undergo significant reorientation (including shifting the focus of staff training and expanding organizational capacity) if the agency's traditional mission is changed to implementing resettlement at Qorioley. The report recommended against SCF becoming involved in land allocation, redistribution, tenure or inheritance issues.
- The need for detailed research on refugee land tenure and water rights, and the creation of incentives to prevent or resolve competitive claims and conflicts between refugees and their Somali neighbors.
- The establishment of a small research unit at Qorioley to design, monitor, and co-ordinate all the required aspects of the research phase and its technical requirements.
- Evolution of a mechanism for the selection of settlers for the SCF sub-project irrigation scheme. (Selection is being planned, as irrigated farming has recently begun in Qorioley.)

Most of the report's recommendations have not yet been implemented, though the GSDR and UNHCR have signed an agreement to undertake settlement.

The Qorioley RRC, Halane Diini, indicated that he knew of no follow up to the Spooner recommendations, though SCF is thought to have re-evaluated its once expected role in settlement as a result of the study. Others at the SCF office with which the evaluators talked during a visit to Qorioley said that the report was not entirely reflective of local realities. As a practical matter, the Spooner Report recommendations cannot, as, one person noted, be implemented until the land issue-- including family plot sizes--are resolved.

The quality of the Spooner report is very good. There is clear explication of the methodology utilized; assumptions and the terms of reference are clearly stated. Quantitative data is presented and analyzed, ar

the study contains an excellent bibliography which should be of assistance to researchers for years to come.

2. William Tunstall, Report of a Survey in Mogadishu and Hargeisa, ("invisible refugees") completed August 1985.

The Scope of Work described the lines of authority and responsibilities of SOMAC personnel, rather than the research content. The Summary of the Research Program called for an assessment of the problems facing non-camp refugees and the particular strains they impose on the social and economic fabric of the SDR: "The report will analyze and document the situation of this significant segment of the population. Concentrating on the two main urban centers of Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the research team will investigate and monitor over time, a sample of the total (non-camp) refugee population, so as to compile a comprehensive 'case study' analysis of the situation." A discussion of the methodology that was to be utilized was contained in the bi-monthly report for July 9 to September 3, 1984, and further described in the Contract. The second part of the final report was to include "Chapter 4; a comprehensive discussion of the methodology employed in the study". The chapter would, among other things, present the criteria for selecting the sample units, including "stratification of the study areas, sample sizes, the kinds of statistical analysis used in data handling" and would include a section on the framing and testing of survey questionnaires.

An item in Annex II of the project listed "training/seminars to cover cost of ten monthly seminars and honorariums for invited speakers: 10 @ 2,000 shillings or dollars not specified.

Description: The final report of the study, which was undertaken by the Somali Academy of Arts and Sciences (SOMAC), is an "assessment of particular problems faced by urban refugees located outside the camps, along with strategy recommendations, and, where appropriate, recommendations for further study." From a qualitative point of view, the study has a number of shortcomings, and does not meet the expected objective of undertaking a comprehensive survey which would yield the demographic and other social data needed to understand the problems of urban refugees and to suggest "strategy recommendations" which would guide policy and planning. Among the shortcomings, the following are the most crucial, and are reflected in the poor

quality of the report.

Weak Methodology: The methodological component is non-existent; it is not surprising that the report is basically devoid of quantitative data. For example, Chapter 7 ("Research" which is only two double-spaced pages long) states that "the research results are based on a set of 2,000 interviews, 80% of which were completed in Mogadishu"; this in spite of the fact that the Northwest region has a large number of camps. It is not clear why Hargeisa was not given more attention in the study and why the bulk of the interviews were conducted in Mogadishu. Was it because a number of non-camp refugees come to Mogadishu? This is not stated. The data is not specifically related to Hargeisa, and relevant comparisons between refugees settled in Hargeisa and Mogadishu is not discussed; indeed little mention is made of Hargeisa, as noted above.

No indication as to how the surveyed population was chosen; nor are there demographic and other social breakdowns (or even mention of) such as gender, ethnicity, age, and educational levels--all vital for planning and devising appropriate strategies and policies to assist urban refugees. The interview schedule is not included in the final report, nor is the survey questionnaire. Even though the study is based on 2,000 interviews, there is no attempt at quantifying responses or incorporating responses into the body of the Report; for example, only one interview is reproduced in the entire study, and this is only one paragraph long. Elsewhere the report states: "The survey was conducted on a 'household basis', but this sampling procedure was not as clear cut as it could be for instance, in a more structured urbanized society". What does this mean for the use of surveys as a technique in African vs. "more structured urbanized" societies? What are the constraints against survey research in Somalia? Who were the researchers conducting the surveys? What language(s) did they use? None of these questions are answered by the contents of the Report.

Recommendations are few, generalized and interspersed occasionally in the context of other topics of discussion. For example, the report states in the brief policy discussion that, "Attention needs to be paid to ways in which refugees could be spontaneously 'absorbed' across the board, in addition to the planned settlement schemes which do not necessarily have to be restricted to farming." But there is no discussion of possible schemes for absorbing urban refugees.

In sum, the "study" is descriptive, elementary, devoid of quantitative data and reads like the first draft of an undergraduate term paper.

3. Planning Unit/National Refugee Commission, Field Study Tour of Refugee Settlements in Sudan, May 1984.

The study tour took place March 1 - 15, 1984. The final report was presented to July in July 1984. The Study Team consisted of members of the Planning Unit staff, along with the Extraordinary Commissioner of the NRC. The purpose of the visit was to collect data on refugee settlement programs in Sudan. The outcome of the tour is a detailed report on the refugee settlements in Sudan, and recommendations for refugee settlement in Somalia

The Scope of Work called for:

- Collecting documents and relevant literature on refugee settlements;
- Collecting data on the refugee settlement program in Sudan;
- Analyzing patterns of agricultural settlements in the Sudan;
- Reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of non-agricultural settlements;
- Providing case studies on Qala-En-Nanal.

Qualitative Assessment of the Final Report:

The final report is a comprehensive and well-organized seminal document which should serve as the model for future studies on settlement in Somalia. The final report is summarized in order of topic presentation:

Historical Background of Refugees in Sudan: Included within this section is a discussion of the political conditions which compelled refugees to move from Ethiopia to the Sudan.

Sudanese Government guidelines for the treatment of refugees, including options for either voluntary repatriation or integration of refugees in the Sudan; guidelines for operating settlements in such a way that the interests of Sudanese are protected and that they are not dispossessed of

land, opportunities or services; the feasibility of locating settlements in areas where they do not interfere with the balance of ethnic groups; patterns of assistance for the two categories of refugees in Sudan -- refugees from rural backgrounds for whom farming and wage-earning settlements have been organized, and refugees from an urban background, who move directly or indirectly from border areas into Sudanese towns and who settle spontaneously among the local population. Land allocation was also considered with the emphasis on the need for surveys and studies of existing agricultural systems and agriculture related activities in the area. The study reported that in the Sudan, plots of land for family cultivation are provided, ranging from 5-10 feedans for each family.

Coordination of Refugee Assistance in Sudan, including a detailed discussion of the structure of the UNHCR in Sudan and the Commissioner for Refugees (COR).

Findings in Sudan:

This section presented sixteen findings, pertaining to plot size per family, utilization of mechanical equipment, production levels, housing, assessing income-generating activities, settlement and government policy, and availability of resources.

Case Studies of Settlements in Sudan:

This section focused on refugee settlement at Qala-En-Nahal in the local government area of Kassala Province, Gedar Region in the Eastern Region of Sudan. Areas of concern included the size of settlements, the presence of Volags in the area and their activities, land use, roads, ethnic origin and demographic characteristics of refugees in Sudan, analysis of the refugee situation in Sudan, UNHCR assistance activities including an assessment of counselling services and levels of protection accorded refugees. The section concluded that "some 15,000 refugees have proceeded to Kassala town and border areas, and are depending on assistance extended from relatives and friends. They are exerting a heavy burden on the already over-loaded services of Kassala town. Removing them from Kassala town would solve almost all their problems." The desirability of creating three rural settlements at Lider Sawi 1.2, and Goz Rajab was also discussed. Each family would be given one cow, three sheep, chickens and a 1/4 feedan for a vegetable garden. The garden would allow families to grow food and the produce from livestock and chickens would provide income.

ong list of recommendations covered areas such as family land allocation, methods of irrigation, food assistance, academic qualifications for Camp Commanders, government policy on urban refugees, training in cooperatives. Recommendations of particular relevance to Somalia include the need for a detailed study of past and present settlements and refugee camps in Somalia; the need for more attention being given to management issues in designing settlement schemes; a careful assessment of refugee attitudes concerning settlement, a study of land tenure patterns and policies in order to ensure efficient land management in the settlements; creation of self-help schemes for unemployed refugees in both rural and urban areas and the recommendation that further studies be made of refugee settlements in other parts of Africa.

To date, of the areas recommended for further study, the recently approved proposal of Dolco, Inc., which surveys refugee attitudes is scheduled to begin in 1986. The recommendation for a study of urban refugees in Somalia has been implemented. The recommendation that irrigated agriculture be practiced in areas with access to surface water is being carried out at Qorioley with the introduction of the irrigation scheme. The recommendation for dryland farming for example, in areas in the Northwest, is being tried. The scope of work did not call for seminars and other means of disseminating information.

4. AFRICARE - Jalalagsi Socio-Economic Survey - Completed. A copy of the Final Report was not available at the time the BETS were evaluated by USAID. A copy is reported to be on file with the NRC.

9. The following studies have been approved in principle and are scheduled to begin in early 1986.

- Dolco Inc., Refugee Evaluative Baseline Attitudinal Survey Effort (Rebase). Implementation period: January 1986 - September 1986

Description of the study: The study will consist of a survey of refugees in Somalia based on thorough examination of past and present socio-economic, attitudinal and behavior characteristics of refugees, for the purpose of planning and implementing refugee assistance programs, and developing options for repatriation and settlement.

The project will focus on (1) reconstructing past refugee life-styles; (2) describing and documenting new life styles and behaviors; (3) documenting perceived needs, options, resources and constraints regarding self-reliance; and (4) surveying refugee attitudes regarding future repatriation and settlement options

Background: A preliminary proposal, which received tentative NRC, USAID approval, was submitted in July 1985. A number of questions were raised by USAID staff at that stage. The major question concerned methodology, specifically the soundness of the sample design, the proportion of women refugees in the sample, consistent with their numbers among the camp population, and the need for a person trained in statistical

... investigator agreed to ... California, the ... add ... concern and submit ... proposal to ... AID/Somalia. The result is a comprehensive and ... -designed research project which should, with ... adjustments, yield important data and identify constraints ... inities related to refugee assistance, resettlement and ...

... research will be conducted through field surveys utilizing ... a ... questionnaires will be administered to the sample of ... refugees by a team of multi-cultural researchers ... in Oromo, Amharic, Somali and English. The statistical and sampling ... will be determined by the research team, and implemented with the assistance of Regional Commissioners, Camp Command Section Leads. The sample design will guarantee ... and life ... of the surveyed population. An ... sampling frame ... on ...

The survey will be based on a sample of camp refugees population, which is roughly estimated to be about 75% female and 25% male, consisting approximately of 2250 women and 750 men. Regional representation will be insured through sub-sampling by regions consistent with the geographic distribution of camp refugees throughout Somalia. Approximately 28% of the sample will be drawn from the Gedo Region; 36% from the Northwest; 30% from the Hiran Region; and 6% from the Lower Shebelle.

The data will be processed by computer at the University of California, under the supervision of the Statistician/Data Analyst. Data analysis will include standard distributions, and correlation, regression and analysis of variance, with a focus on possible attitudinal differences by age, gender or ethnic group.

Personnel: Dolco has assembled a strong research team -- of both Somalis and expatriates--with graduate training and knowledge of cross-cultural research. These include the Somali Project Senior Consultant, a Research Scientist and a Statistical Analyst.

2. Naima Hasci, Refugee Policy in Somalia, tentative implementation date: Early 1986.

Description of Study: The study analyzes the USDR's policy on refugees, focusing on policy options and their implications for both refugee assistance and for national development strategies.

The research is to be conducted by a Somali national in cooperation with the NRC. A significant amount of data has already been collected, including interviews with key decision-makers in Somalia, including at the NRC and in the camps, and with UNHCR personnel in Geneva.

The research focuses on a previously unresearched area and should, among other things, illuminate understanding of the complex relationship between refugee assistance and national development strategies, and the implications for policy-making and program implementation.

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ANNEX III

PERSONS INTERVIEWED

NATIONAL REFUGEE COMMISSION

Mohamed Omar Dubed, Deputy Commissioner and Director of the Planning Unit
Ahmed Haji Osman Hiis, Deputy Regional Refugee Commission for NW
Wendy Bell, Administrative Assistant
Abdillahi Ugaas Mohamed, Public Relations and Information Officer, NW
Mohamed Aidid, CDU - NW
Siraj Mohamed, Dam Camp Commander
Abdi Ismael, Saba'ad Camp Commander
2 members, CDR, Saba'ad Camp

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

George T. McCloskey, Chief, RD/RA
Frank V. Catania, Project Management Coordinator, RD/RA
Lalitha Jayaraman, Project Operations Specialist, RD/RA

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Qalif Ali Warsame, Acting Governor, NW Region

REFUGEE AGRICULTURAL UNIT

Abdirahman Ali Mohamed, NW Regional Coordinator
Yusuf Omar Hassan, NW Regional Treasurer/Accountant

SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION

Jeff Saussier, Acting Field Office Director, Somalia
Hashi Abib, Associate Director

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Hassan Ilhan, Agricultural Coordinator
June Plecar, Agricultural Extensionist
Abdirahman, Farm Manager

PARTNERSHIP FOR PRODUCTIVITY

John Grierson, Genral Manager
David Pease, Technical Manager
May Ferrara, Training Officer
6 Business Advisors

NEW TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION

Leon Muffet, Acting Director
Theara Gibson, Accounts Manager

MENNONITE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Dan Gilrein, Tug Wajaale Camp
Dennis Kehler, Saba'ad Camp

EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LIVING

Stanley Andrews, Resident Representative
Gail Von Hahmann, Acting Assistant Director

OXFAM

Dick Williams, Advisor to NW Refugee Water Supply Unit

WORLD FOOD PROGRAM

Joan Fleuren, NW Officer in Charge

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UNICEF

James Paton, NW Resident Programme Officer

CARE

David Hornberger, Forester (NW)

AFRICARE

Mohamed Jama Hamoud, Director

OVERSEAS EDUCATION FUND

Marilee Kane, Project Coordinator

REFUGEE HEALTH UNIT

Dr. Mohamed Ali Farah, NW Regional Director

- Central Committee Members, Sabalad Camp
- 6 workers at PWD road camp, Kalabeyd
- 10 NTF road crew workers, Borama - Dharbe Hoore road
- 4 NTF ex-road crew workers, Dharbe Ma'in Camp
- 2 refugee farmers at Dharbe Ma'in Camp
- 5 NTF/EWSU refugee workers, Sabalad Camp
- 6 refugee farmers, NTF/BAU scheme, Tug Wajaale Camp
- 2 refugee farmers, Sabalad Camp

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ANNEX IV

RPA REPORTING FORMATS

1. Twice per quarter reports:

- a. Summary
- b. Refugee Population (growth/decline, health, diet, self-help productivity and other).
- c. Commodity Management (food basket status, commodity management system/ELU monitoring and special problems).
- d. GSDR Administration and Management (NRC, RHU, and other).
- e. International Agencies (UNHCR, WFP and others).
- f. Voluntary Agencies (items of interest, problems, progress of self-help and forestry programs.
- g. USAID (activities in PL-480, activities sponsored for rehabilitation and others).

2. "Special Reports," to be generated "periodically," would cover the illustrative topics of:

- a) Refugee Population Status Report - growth or decline in population, movement of refugees, population distribution, demographic changes, refugee participation in self-help activities, equity of food distribution and assistance projects, morale and aspirations, etc.
 - b) Report on mobilization of self-reliance and forestry Projects - assessment of UNHCR, GSDR, PVO and other donor activities in these areas with a breakdown of projects and activities, budgets, progress in project start-up and implementation, problems encountered and lessons learned.
 - c) AID and Other Donor Review - assessment of the organizational framework, operations and accomplishments of donor and GSDR refugee assistance agencies, review of USAID's refugee assistance strategy and its relevance to the present and future.
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- d) Specific Region and Camp Report - information on particular refugee groups, PVOs, special projects and local environment description, the relationship of the refugees to their local Somali neighbors, refugee activities, and reporting of refugee concerns as expressed in everyday conversations.
- e) Authority Structure Report - assessment of the overall authority structure of the Somalia refugee program including the GSDR, donors and PVOs, as it pertains to planning, coordination, individual roles, performance and effectiveness, both in practice and as perceived by refugees and concerned agencies.