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SUBJECT - Noncapital Project Paper, Public Safety (PROP)

REFERENCE -

Country: Pakistan

Project No. 391-12-710-113

Submission Date: August 1, 1969 Original X

Project Title: PUBLIC SAFETY

U.S. Obligation Span: FY 1960 through FY 1972

Physical Implementation Span: FY 1960 through FY 1972

Gross life-of-project financial requirements (in thousands) (of dollars)

U.S. Dollars 3,427

U.S. owned local currency 126  
(Rs. 600,000)

Cooperating country cash contribution 9,500  
(=Rs. 46.2 million at \$1 = Rs. 4.76)

Other donors

TOTAL 13,053

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OTHER AGENCY

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(See Project Funding Table - Attachment A)

Group 4 - Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified 12 years after date of origin

PAGE 1 OF 17 PAGES

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CLASSIFICATION

Noncapital Project Paper (PROP)  
Public Safety 391-12-710-113

B. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION

Project activity started modestly in FY 1960 but was expanded greatly during FY 1963 to meet anticipated internal security problems. It became apparent, however, that the expanded project was attempting to satisfy the general requirements of the internal security forces and that this had resulted in a proliferation of effort. In October 1964, a Mission review of the project adopted an emergency force concept as the essential basis for the operational planning of public safety assistance to the internal security forces of Pakistan. This concept is based on the requirements of the reserve and emergency forces in selected areas whose mission is to combat civil disturbances. It provides priority to East Pakistan and also focuses attention on the needs of the more heavily populated and larger metropolitan areas and districts in both provinces. Emphasis was placed on improving the transport and communications capabilities of the internal security forces as well as improving their training, administrative and operational practices. Achievement of project targets was scheduled through a combination of technical assistance, participant training and commodity support.

Goals of 50% mobility for the internal security forces in selected areas of West Pakistan and 75% mobility for similar forces in East Pakistan were established. At the same time the provision of adequate transport maintenance and repair facilities was undertaken with the development of nine major and secondary workshops in West Pakistan and five in East Pakistan, each with adequate equipment and trained personnel. Communications capabilities were improved by the establishment of an extensive provincial network in East Pakistan and VHF networks in five major cities in West Pakistan. Appropriate communications and repair facilities were also developed. The target to improve training, administrative and operational practices was approached largely through technical assistance and participant training.

In anticipation of the satisfaction of most project objectives in FY 1970, an evaluation of the project was completed in September 1968. The evaluation team proposed that the present project be extended through FY 1974 and offered recommendations and guidelines for the period FY 1971 - FY 1974. However, events subsequent to the publication of the evaluation report have necessitated a reappraisal of this proposal. It now appears more practical

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to continue current project activities through FY 1972 without modification of present objectives and course of action, a stretchout which has been necessitated by limited availabilities of commodity funds in the past. With final commodity and participant funding in FY 1970, this project envisions only technical advisors to supervise installation of terminal commodities and reinforcement of the last training, until project completion in FY 1972. At that time it may be feasible to develop a new public safety program which would focus on developing the capabilities of the internal security forces in selected areas of priority where public safety assistance has not been provided heretofore.

### C. ENVIRONMENT

The expansion of the Public Safety program in FY 1963 was based on an apprehension that the scheduled meeting of the National Assembly in Dacca during March 1963, following the lifting of martial law, would be accompanied by widespread demonstrations and disorders which the police would be unable to handle with available resources. Through the Public Safety project a large quantity of riot control supplies, consisting largely of tear gas munitions, masks and related equipment was airlifted to Pakistan in February 1963 for distribution to the provincial police forces of East and West Pakistan. Concurrent with this operation, the Office of Public Safety, AID/Washington, dispatched a team of instructors to Pakistan to conduct training in riot control tactics and techniques for the forces concerned. At the same time, five police officers were sent to the United States as participants to receive similar training. Although the expected disturbances did not materialize, the situation created an awareness of the deficiencies of the internal security forces and a survey was conducted to identify specific needs. The survey resulted in the expansion of the program and ultimate development of the emergency force concept.

In the ensuing years, until recently, overt opposition to the Government in the form of demonstrations and disturbances has been rather rare and, if they did surface, they were suppressed firmly with little subtlety. Such major demonstrations as did occur during this period invariably had an anti-American posture and were usually sparked by a highly emotional issue such as the Pak-Indo War, the Arab-Israeli War, the publication of the Prophet Mohammed's picture in an American scientific journal, and events of a similar nature. In such instances the emergency forces, employing resources

provided under the Public Safety project, proved competent to handle the situation. However, in recent months there occurred some much more widespread protest movements against the Government and these produced a law and order situation approaching anarchy which deposed the regime and resulted in martial law.

The great majority of these disturbances erupted in the principal and secondary cities of both East and West Pakistan. During this same period, the rural areas of both provinces were largely quiescent although some rather nasty incidents occurred in a few East Pakistan villages. The range and intensity of the disorders generated serious situations in some locations which necessitated the deployment of almost the entire police strength as well as paramilitary contingents in support of the basic emergency force.

In East Pakistan most of the trouble was centered in and around Dacca. Disturbances occurred in a number of other cities, including Chittagong, Rajshahi and Khulna, but these, although serious and in some instances decidedly dangerous, did not approach the prolonged spate of activity that Dacca encountered. In each of these cities the police through Public Safety project assistance, had developed mobility and communications capabilities which permitted them to deploy to meet changing situations, to exercise command and control over the forces engaged and to cope adequately with the disorders in their initial stages. However, in Dacca particularly, the Government began to yield to a number of demands and adopted a policy of permissiveness that tied the hands of the police and permitted the crowds free rein. The Government's inability or refusal to take a firm stand led ultimately to a decision to withdraw the police from the scene and to order them into civilian clothes in order to lessen confrontations and to reduce incitement.

In the major cities of West Pakistan the disorders were numerous and recurring. The internal security forces were severely overtaxed but managed to maintain control. Again, project supplied transportation and communications equipment were important factors in this respect. In Karachi on one single day 32 separate groups of various sizes were moving in the city at the same time. Only by being able to move and communicate were the police able to deploy effectively to contain them. Lahore also saw numerous groups in motion at the same time and here again the police resources permitted appropriate counteraction. Unfortunately the Government vacillated in developing a policy concerning the demonstrations with the result that the police in Lahore were handcuffed by indecisiveness and, as in Dacca, were withdrawn from the streets, although for a much shorter period.

In those cities in both provinces where no Public Safety project assistance had been provided because of established priorities, police response was paralyzed when the disturbances broke out. The inability to move and communicate delayed any counteractivities and allowed the situation to escalate so that it passed beyond control early. The importance of the A. I. D. -supplied equipment to police operations in the cities where it had been distributed provides not only a graphic illustration of the poverty of police resources in the other areas, but also demonstrates the effectiveness of past project assistance.

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The deficiencies of the internal security forces are chronic and have been spotlighted by the recent turmoil. The police training function is assigned as an additional duty to officers who are already overburdened with other responsibilities and who are unable to devote the time required for this most basic but important function. As a result, training does not receive the command attention it should and there is a tendency to rely on the old tried and true methods rather than to experiment with new ideas and techniques. When circumstances dictate the need for special attention to specific problems, as in the present instance, there is a spate of activity which remains as long as the interest abides and this is followed by a reversion to the status quo ante. However, some significant progress in effecting organizational changes has been made. Both provincial forces have recently established Planning and Research cells in their organizational structure. A natural consequence to this move should be the development of a central training division. This is a continuing objective of the project.

One hundred seventy-two (172) police officers of various ranks have actually received or are scheduled for participant training through FY 1970 in the United States in a number of essential general and specialized courses.

While martial law has restored law and order throughout the country, the root causes of unrest remain. The future in terms of demonstrations, processions, protests, strikes, mob actions and violence is an unknown quantity. Properly trained and adequately equipped internal security forces are essential in coping with these situations as they arise.

Prompt, efficient and fair handling of dissident crowds reduces rioting potential and the need for military intervention. Even under martial law the internal security forces remain the Government's first line of defense against civil disturbances and insurgencies.

#### D. STRATEGY

United States policy emphasizes the need to give priority attention to the maintenance of internal security basic to orderly and democratic economic, political and social development. For this reason, the Public Safety project was expanded greatly during FY 1963 to assist the Pakistan Government to cope with anticipated internal security problems.

Since that time, until the imposition of martial law, the threat to internal security has stemmed consistently from economic, political, social and geographical imbalances which have been varying in degree and intensity. The general backwardness of Pakistan, the slowness of economic development to reach the average individual and the increasing pressure of population growth on resources are causes for continuing concern. An inadequate diet and meager subsistence for the majority of the population together with general under-employment and low pay scales remain breeding grounds for discontent and unrest. A social structure, which nurtures resistance to change, inhibits literacy and education, and which has a general debilitating effect on the country at large, also contributes to dissatisfaction. The pressures and frustrations generated by these conditions present a threat to internal security and stability generally.

The political system in effect prior to martial law provided an electoral system with a restricted base and imposed restraints upon civil liberties.

Although there were many discontented, and perhaps disaffected, intellectuals, workers, students, peasants and politicians, opposition to the Government was generally dispersed and uncoordinated. Opposition of political parties has been parochial and lacking in cohesion. They were subject to government pressures and harassments and existed always in the shadow of restriction or outright ban. The frustrations generated by the apparent futility of their efforts induced a hostility, occasionally manifested in open defiance and violence, which added to the threat. East Pakistan has been the more vulnerable of the two provinces with respect to the threat materializing into action.

Other factors which have affected Pakistan's internal stability have been strong regionalism, relationships with India and Afghanistan, closer ties with communist China and a gradual Pak-Soviet rapprochement.

It <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ perhaps <sup>understandable</sup> ~~reasonable~~ that all these diverse elements of dissension, discontent, frustration, parochialism, regionalism, deprivation and external ideology ~~should have~~ <sup>evolved</sup> into individual and collective disturbances which ultimately toppled the government and brought about martial law. Ironically the imposition of martial law was accompanied by bans on assemblies, parades, demonstrations, processions and political activities. Thus, although law and order have been reestablished, the hopes and demands of the various dissident groups remain unfulfilled.

The maintenance of law and order, the prevention and repression of crime, and the preservation of internal security are essential to orderly economic, political and social development. Effective execution of these primary law enforcement functions by the internal security forces helps to create and maintain an atmosphere conducive to stimulating the development process. The performance of these forces is influenced by the state and quality of their training, by the adequacy and dependability of their equipment and by their administrative and operational practices. Deficiencies, some major, exist in each of these areas and it is to correct these that the Public Safety project is designed.

Management and administration of the project are well coordinated through the Central Government mechanism established at the inception of the project. The Director, Pakistan Intelligence Bureau, serves as Project Director for the Government of Pakistan and is the direct counterpart of the Chief Public Safety Advisor. Contact is open for the Public Safety staff with

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the agencies being assisted in both East and West Pakistan and implementation of actions to achieve project objectives are undertaken jointly. However, all matters pertaining to funding, priorities, policy and direction are decided by the Project Director and Chief Public Safety Advisor. Contacts with officials of the Provincial Governments are handled by the Project Director in order to control or eliminate unreasonable claims for priority attention and assistance. This arrangement has worked well throughout the life of the present program and is expected to continue.

A significant feature of the present program is the participant training program. Participant quality has been, in almost all cases, exceptional and utilization by the forces of those trained in the United States is outstanding. This is evidenced by the fact that the Inspector General, East Pakistan, Police and Special Police Establishment are former participants as is the Senior Deputy Director of the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau. In addition nine senior officers of the West Pakistan Police and seven in East Pakistan have received participant training. In both East and West Pakistan many of the District Superintendents of Police are United States trained. All of these officers constitute a cadre of senior and middle level executives trained in modern police administrative and operational practices who occupy positions to influence changes in existing traditional, conservative and colonial-oriented practices. They also provide admirable points of contact for the Public Safety staff to discuss various project activities and the means to achieve project objectives.

Pakistan leadership in the project has been extensive, effective and productive. Rapport is excellent. Attitude toward the project has been one of appreciation and full recognition of the value of the assistance furnished. The improvements which have resulted in their capabilities to meet their responsibilities have been fully credited by them to United States assistance.

#### E. PLANNED TARGETS, RESULTS AND OUTPUTS

When the present project was reoriented in 1964 to focus primarily on the mobility and communications requirements of the emergency forces, funding projections over the period 1965-69 were established with the view toward completion of objectives with funding provided in FY 1969. However, in FY 1967 and FY 1968 the project experienced severe reductions of programmed funding for commodities amounting to over \$900,000. Accommodating these

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imposed reductions required significant adjustments in project activities with the result that some operations, particularly telecommunications, were assigned a lower priority pending availability of funds in subsequent years. A stretchout of commodity procurement through FY 1970 also resulted. This stretchout generated other fiscal complications such as increased commodity procurement and transportation costs and other related expenses which increased project budget submissions for FY 1969-1970. The stretchout has postponed completion of the telecommunications program in East Pakistan until FY 1972 although procurement can be completed in FY 1970 if funds are provided in sufficient amount and according to project plan. Arrival of the equipment in country, its installation and a shakedown of the completed system will take the extra time.

Funding reductions have also affected achievement of mobility objectives. It is now planned that the commodity procurement will be completed under FY 1970 funding and that the commodities will arrive in country by the end of FY 1971.

#### F. COURSE OF ACTION

The course of action for the present programs through FY 1972 entails the completion of phased procurement and installation of essential transport and commodities to satisfy objectives in those fields. There is parallel activity to expand and improve transport and communications maintenance and repair facilities to include establishing new workshops and training the personnel to staff them. Attention is directed toward improving the operations and the quality of police training institutions and of police training by encouraging changes in curricula, raising the level of instruction

providing audio-visual equipment, emphasizing the use of training aids in the instructional process, seeking the establishment of a separate Training Division within the police organizational structure and striving generally to produce a better all-around police product. Modernization of administration and operational practices of the internal security forces is approached through a combination of advisory services and participant training.

1. Improvement of Motor Transport Capability (Provincial Police)

a. West Pakistan

Fourteen vehicles were programmed for procurement under FY 1969 funding. However, budgetary restrictions permitted the procurement of only 12 of the total required. The remaining two vehicles will be scheduled under FY 1970 funding subject to availability of funds and are expected to arrive in country in FY 1971. This will satisfy transport objectives of this organization under the present program.

b. East Pakistan

Twenty-four vehicles were programmed for procurement in FY 1969 and twenty-five in FY 1970 to satisfy mobility targets for this unit. However, FY 1969 funding was sufficient to permit the procurement of only eleven vehicles which is thirteen shy of the requirements. This shortfall will have to be partly absorbed as limited funds will compel reduction in vehicle procurement, without impairment of project objectives for the mobility of this unit.

Nine major and secondary motor transport workshops have been established in West Pakistan and five in East Pakistan. These have been provided with essential tools and equipment under the project and all are fully operational. They are considered adequate for the present needs of the organizations they serve.

In East Pakistan the police have a need for water transport in order to patrol the many waterways of the province. Attempts to assist in this area by providing boats have met with limited success. The present approach is a joint endeavor in which the East Pakistan Police undertake to

provide the hulls from their own resources and the engines to power them are supplied through the project. Five boats have been contracted under this plan. Two have already been turned over to the police and are undergoing tests. The three remaining are in various stages of construction and are expected to be completed in FY 1970.

## 2. Improvement of Telecommunications Capability (Provincial Police)

### a. West Pakistan

The VHF networks established in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Hyderabad are fully operational. Experience factors obtained through operational use and a continuing shakedown of the various systems have permitted a broader dispersion of the sets which has resulted in a more complete coverage of the districts mentioned. The equipment for the third phase of the Karachi network has arrived in country and is being installed. Actions through FY 1970 include installation of final phase of Karachi network and shakedown of system; improve and complete VHF networks in Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Hyderabad; continue to develop experience data on all systems; provide participant training as required, and continue advisory services.

Funding cutbacks in FY 1967-68 caused abandonment of plans to augment the above mentioned VHF networks by providing handi-talkie sets for foot patrols which operate in areas to which vehicles have no access, and for patrolmen who are assigned observation and reporting missions. It is now planned to provide at least some of this equipment under FY 1970 funding for delivery in country in FY 1971. Shakedown of equipment and system will continue through FY 1972.

### b. East Pakistan

The first phase of the East Pakistan Police communications network has arrived in country and is being installed. The second phase equipment has been ordered under FY 1969 funding and it is anticipated that the bulk of commodity procurement for this system will be accomplished with FY 1970 funds for delivery in FY 1971. Other actions outstanding will be the installation of equipment and completion of the system.

Participant training will be provided under FY 70 funding as required and advisory services will be continued. Maintenance and operational capabilities will be developed.

During the period FY 1971-72 there will be a continuing shake-down of the East Pakistan Police system and equipment and development of experience factors.

### 3. Modernization of Police Training and Training Institutions

#### a. West Pakistan

Progress in the improvement of the quality of instruction presented at police training institutions has improved considerably. Instructor training courses are offered regularly at the Police Training College, Sihala. In addition, a mobile team of instructors visits other police training institutions regularly to present short courses in instructor techniques. The development of an audio-visual depot and library at the college has advanced considerably. Over 2000 flip charts and graphs, transparencies and 35 mm slides are on hand for use of the instructional staff. The college also prepares training aids on request for the other training institutions.

Curricula and ~~xxxx~~ training at the recruit training schools are still weighted toward discipline and drill. Project efforts have been directed toward de-emphasizing ceremonial drill and reducing the course duration. Some interest has been shown but little action taken until the emergency prior to the establishment of martial law. A three-month course instead of the usual nine-month session is under consideration.

The Detective Training School is a thriving institution. Classes are conducted regularly and there is an admirable use of modern instructional aids, methods and techniques. USAID/Pakistan has authorized a grant of Rs. 300,000 (approximately \$62,000) for the construction of a permanent Detective Training School to replace its present leased quarters. Construction is expected to be completed in FY 1970.

Project activity in the field of training in West Pakistan during FY 1969-70 will continue technical assistance, participant training and some modest commodity support including books, films, training materials and audio-visual aids. Attention will be directed also toward the extension of inservice training to lower ~~subordinates~~.

\*Project No. 391-32-710-113, Sect. 402 funds.

Training activities through FY 1972 will follow the same general pattern with efforts directed toward continuing improvement in the training process and the finished product.

b. East Pakistan

Training operations at the Police Academy, Sardah, have shown little improvement. There has been an awakening interest in the use of audio-visual aids for instructional purposes but the quality of instruction is below standard. The isolated location of the academy, the long ingrained method of instruction by rote and a traditional curriculum combine to make progress ~~xxxx~~ agonizingly slow. Tact, patience and understanding should eventually produce the desired results.

The Detective Training School, which was established under the Public Safety project, continues to function although housed inadequately and in need of improvement with respect to course content and school administration. USAID/Pakistan has authorized a grant of Rs. 300,000\* (approximately \$60,000) for the construction of a permanent Detective Training School in Dacca to replace its present inadequate quarters. Construction is expected to be completed in FY 1970.

Through FY 1970, project training activities in East Pakistan will comprise a continuation of technical assistance, participant training and some modest commodity support to include books, films, training materials, and audio-visual aids. Attention will continue to be focused on developing improvements at the Police Academy and the Detective Training School as well as to the establishment and extension of roll call and in-service training.

The same general training activities with efforts directed towards improving the total training process will continue through FY 1972.

4. Modernization of Administrative and Operational Practices.

This target is approached by a combination of participant training and technical assistance. Training in modern police administration and operations is provided to Deputy Inspectors General of Police and Superintendents of Police at the International Police Academy, Washington. Other personnel are offered training in such specializations as traffic,

\*Project No. 391-32-710-1.3, Section 402 funds.

communications, management, training methodology, questioned document examination, ballistics, police records, automotive repair, radio operation/maintenance, riot control and special operations. Through FY 1969 there were 129 participants who had already received training or were scheduled for training under the project. Twenty-three participants are programmed for FY 1969 and twenty for FY 1970.

All participants, upon return to Pakistan, have been placed in assignments in which they have been able to employ their training gainfully, many in key positions within the internal security establishment. This reflects a high degree of acceptance and appreciation of the value of the training received. Continuation of this training for the duration of the present project is expected to provide similar results and thus create a cadre of middle and senior level executives trained in modern police administrative and operational practices, who will be in a position to influence changes in present traditional, conservative and colonial oriented procedure. Three Deputy Inspectors General and fourteen Superintendents of Police are programmed for participant training in various courses in both FY 1969 and FY 1970.

Technical assistance is employed in discussions, conferences, informal meetings and joint committees which examine a wide range of police matters. Among the issues explored are administration, planning, personnel practices, budgeting, training, public relations, records, crime prevention, patrol, research, statistics and management practices. A direct result has been the designation of a senior officer of each of the Provincial Police Forces as a Planning and Research Officer. Each of these officers has recently received training in the United States on these subjects and is now charged with the responsibility of organizing and directing a planning and research unit within the respective provincial forces. This unit is expected to introduce modern planning techniques into the police services and to revise existing plans along modern lines. It will also review police activities, both operational and administrative, to ensure the most effective and economical use of police resources. Present and anticipated police problems will be examined in order that appropriate solutions can be developed. Another objective is increased attention to public relations by the dissemination of directives and instructions to the field and by its inclusion in the curricula of the various police training institutions. The eradication of the poor police image, which is an inheritance of the colonial period plus some latter day embellishments, is a continuing and long range target.

Technical assistance through FY 1972 will provide advice and encouragement to counterparts, senior police officials and returned participants to institute, when possible, and to recommend, when necessary, administrative and operational improvements.

## 5. Improvement of Civil Armed Forces

### a. West Pakistan Rangers

#### 1. Transport

One hundred and three vehicles had been procured or were on order through FY 1969 against an original total requirement of one hundred ten vehicles to achieve the level of mobility determined under the emergency force concept. Outstanding procurement may be reduced to accommodate limited availability of funds.

Sufficient equipment has been supplied under the project to permit the Rangers to establish three small motor transport workshops. These are in full operation and have given the Rangers an independent motor maintenance capability consistent with their present transport authorization.

#### 2. Telecommunications

The equipment for the first and second phases of the plan to assist in improving the communications system of the Rangers in selected areas has been installed and is in operation. Some of the equipment for the third phase was ordered under FY 1963 funding and delivery is awaited. An operational problem was encountered with some of the AID supplied radio sets which created an inordinate requirement for certain spare and replacement parts. Field tests of a modification to the sets have proved successful in overcoming the difficulty and sufficient modification kits have been ordered under FY 1969 funding to make each set operationally reliant. In addition, the balance of the third phase procurement will also be accomplished in FY 1969. Immediate telecommunications requirements under the present project will be satisfied under FY 1970 funding and delivery in FY 1971. Shakedown of equipment will continue through FY 1972.

Some testing equipment and tools have been supplied through the project to provide the Rangers with a telecommunications maintenance and repair capability. These facilities are adequate for present requirements.

b. Frontier Constabulary

1. Transport

Nine vehicles remain to be procured to satisfy the immediate transport requirements as established under the emergency force concept. Five of these were programmed for procurement in FY 1969 and the balance in FY 1970. However, funding limitations permitted only three to be ordered under FY 1969 financing. The remaining six vehicles are scheduled for procurement in FY 1970 and delivery in FY 1971, to the extent funds are available.

The vehicles of the Frontier Constabulary are maintained under contract. There has been no need to date to establish an independent maintenance capability for this organization.

2. Telecommunications

Although the immediate objectives of the telecommunications requirements of this organization, as modified by reduced funding in FY 1967 and FY 1968, have been realized substantially, there remains a need for some additional radio sets in order to execute wide spread responsibilities for internal security in both the tribal belt and certain metropolitan areas. In addition, there is a requirement for modification kits to correct operational deficiencies in equipment previously supplied under the project. These modification kits will be procured under FY 1969 funding as will a few of the needed radio sets. All communications requirements of this organization, as programmed under the present project, will be satisfied with FY 1970 funding with delivery in FY 1971. Shakedown of equipment and system will continue through FY 1972.

A telecommunications maintenance and repair capability has been established within this unit by the provision of test and repair equipment along with essential tools. It is sufficient to meet present requirements.

c. East Pakistan Rifles

1. Transport

A total of six vehicles remains to be procured to satisfy the mobility requirements of the East Pakistan Rifles as established under the

emergency force concept. Five of these vehicles will be procured in FY 1969 and the one remaining vehicle may be procured under FY 1970 funding for delivery in FY 1971. This organization has a requirement also for water craft in which to move on the many waterways of East Pakistan. The East Pakistan Rifles have presently two hulls under construction through their own resources. Engines to power these craft have been provided through the project and will be installed when construction is completed.

The input of project supplied vehicles has generated a need for motor maintenance and repair facilities. Tools and equipment will be procured in FY 1969 for FY 1970 delivery to permit the establishment of small maintenance workshops to develop this capability.

## 2. Telecommunications

Although the immediate objectives of the telecommunications requirements of this organization, as modified by reduced funding in FY 1967 and FY 1968, have been satisfied substantially, there remains a need for some limited additional supplies and equipment to complete the present program. In addition, there is a requirement for modification kits to correct operational deficiencies in equipment previously supplied under the project. These modification kits will be procured with FY 1969 funds. All communications requirements of this organization, as programmed under the present project, will be satisfied with FY 1970 funds and delivery in FY 1971. Shake-down of equipment and system will continue through FY 1972.

An excellent telecommunications maintenance and repair facility exists. This was established through the project with the provision of test and repair equipment and essential tools. It is consistent with present capabilities and requirements.

## 6. Improvement of Central Government Investigative Agencies

### a. Pakistan Intelligence Bureau

This organization has responsibilities akin to those of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation in the fields of intelligence, counter-

[REDACTED]

intelligence and internal security. Its Director is also the Public Safety Project Director for the Government of Pakistan and is the principal counterpart of the Chief Public Safety Advisor.

A total of twenty-six vehicles has been provided to this organization to date. No specific transport objectives have been set for this unit because its requirements are modest and are not expected to exceed one vehicle per year unless the totally unanticipated occurs.

Interwing telecommunications capabilities have been provided to this organization along with a modest mobile system and maintenance facilities. Plans through FY 1972 call for a refinement and shakedown of the system.

USAID assistance has made significant contributions to improving the capability of this organization. The vehicles provided have increased its surveillance activities and have given it the means to carry out the functions which require mobility. Communications equipment has refined the interwing networks and the Frontier-Jammu-Kashmir systems to enable rapid communications with improved security and dependable transmission and reception.

The overall level of FY 1970 procurement of transport and communications equipment is being reduced from the original planned total due to limited availability of funds. However, it is anticipated that achievement of the general mobility and telecommunications objectives for the various forces will not be critically impaired.

SPAIN

[REDACTED]

19

**NON-CAPITAL PROJECT FUNDING**  
(Obligations in \$000)

PROP DATE 3/1/69  
Original X  
Rev. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Project No. 391-12-710-113

COUNTRY: Pakistan

Project Title: Public Safety

Rawalpindi TOAID A- 710 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Fiscal Years	AP	L/G	Total	Personnel		Participants		Commodities		Other Costs
				AID	PASA CONT	DIRECT	CONT	DIRECT	CONT	
				\$/No.		\$/No.				
<u>Cumulative Obligations Thru 1969</u>	TC	G	7324	1057		352		5915		
<u>Oper. FY 1970</u>	TC	G	727	132		45		500		
<u>Budget FY 1971</u>	TC	G	133	133		-		-		
<u>B#1 FY 1972</u>	TC	G	193	193		-		-		
<u>B#2 FY 1973</u>	TC	G	-	-		-		-		
<u>Total Life of Project</u>			1427	1615		397		6415		