

PD-AA X-458 RS/PS
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NONCAPITAL PROJECT PLAN (PROP)

A.I.D.
Reference Center
Room 1656 NS

COUNTRY: Bolivia

Project No. 511-11-710-091

SUBMISSION DATE 1970 ORIGINAL X REVISION NO. _____

PROJECT TITLE: Public Safety

U.S. OBLIGATION SPAN: FY 1956 through FY 1973

PHYSICAL IMPLEMENTATION SPAN: FY 1956 through FY 1973

GROSS LIFE-OF-PROJECT FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS

U.S. Dollars	\$2,345,000
U.S.-Owned Local Currency	-
Cooperating Country Cash Contribution	202,000
Other Donor	<u>70,000</u>
TOTAL	\$2,657,000

Group 4
Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after date of origin

[Redacted]

I. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION

A modest Public Safety program has recently been reinstated in Bolivia which will strive to improve urban radio patrols, communications, police weaponry, police investigations and police training. Plans for FY 71 include the technical services of two Public Safety advisors, the training of 14 participants in the U.S., as well as the procurement of vehicles and radios for the radio patrol, police weapons and training aids. Commodities procured from FY 70 funds consisted of 15 vehicles, 40 radios, 600 revolvers, as well as ammunition and some riot control equipment.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
A sub-project in narcotics control and enforcement was established in April 1970, and equipment for this effort is on order. A study of communications needs was conducted in May 1970. Its recommendations are summarized in this PROP.

The project is presently programmed until FY 1973.

Table 1
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NONCAPITAL PROJECT FUNDING (OBLIGATIONS IN \$000)

PROP DATE
Original X
Rev. No.
Project No. 511-11-710-091

COUNTRY: Bolivia Project Title: Public Safety

Fiscal Years	AP	L/G	Total	Cont ^{1/}	Personnel Serv.			Participants		Commodities		Other Costs				
					AID	PASA	CONT	US	CONT	Dir	CONT	Dir &	CONT			
													US	AG		
Prior through Act. FY 70	AG	G	2,076	1	539		1	227			893		416			
Oper. FY 71	AG	G	113	-	60		-	10			33		10			
Budg. FY 72	AG	G	112	-	65		-	20			25		2			
B + 1 FY 73	AG	G	84	-	65		-	9			10		-			
B + 2 FY _____																
B + 3 FY _____																
All Subs.																
Total Life	AG	G	2,385	1	729		1	266			961		428			

^{1/} Memorandum (nonadd) column

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Table 1

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Exchg rate \$1

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Fiscal Years	AID-controlled Local Currency	Other Cash Contribution Cooperating Country (\$ Equiv.)	Other ^{1/} Donor Funds (\$ Equiv.)	Food for Freedom Commodities		
				Metric Tons (000)	CCC Value & Freight (\$000)	World Market Price (\$000)
Prior through Oct. FY 70		110,000	40,000			
Apr. FY 71		28,000	10,000			
Budg. FY 72		32,000	10,000			
1 + 1 FY 73		32,000	10,000			
1 + 2 FY _____						
1 + 3 FY _____						
All subs.		-----	-----			
Total life		202,000	70,000			

^{1/} During FY 67 and 68, Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru provided training assistance to Bolivia's National Police. It is possible that similar assistance will be offered in the future.

II. SETTING OR ENVIRONMENT

A. Historical Factors

Historically, the character of the threat to Bolivia's national security has been gross political instability, exacerbated by poverty, rigid class divisions, a lack of effective leadership, poor inter-regional communications due to rugged terrain, poor executive or managerial talent in most fields, the predominance of the ~~practices~~ of personalism over loyalty to state or private institutions and institutionally prescribed modes of behavior, laziness, fatalism, venality, divisiveness and opportunism.

Thus, Bolivia has had 10 governments in 20 years. In spite of the social reforms following the "class revolution" of 1952, there remain social and economic injustices of considerable proportions. Subversive insurgency has frequently menaced the government requiring heavy commitments of GOB resources for its control. In the past 2-1/2 years, there have been more than 400 civil disturbances requiring police control, 250 bombings, 20 persons killed and 45 injured, as well as growing problems of urban and rural terror expressed in political assassinations, bank robberies, kidnappings and other such crimes. In spite of the joint U.S.-GOB success in stopping the "Che" Guevara-led rural guerrilla movement in 1966-67, the threat of extremist groups applying modern insurgency tactics still remains and may be building to yet another crisis.

B. The Present Situation

The U.S. Embassy and officials of the GOB described the present threat as the possible opening of several rival and urban fronts by the National Liberation Army (ELN) which consists of about 30-50 men supported by advisors, money and training from Cuba, Central America, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. Their objective is reported to be the creation of chaos in the country and the eventual seizure of power. It is not known how well organized the ELN has become or if there are other separate groups, perhaps loosely tied together by common objectives and tactics. The history of the lack of cohesiveness of the insurgent movements has led the Embassy to believe that the creation of a single,

strong movement is not likely. However, even if loosely organized, the efforts of such movements enjoying possible sympathy and rapport from students, professors, intellectuals, workers, and some peasants could very well keep the country in a state of constant and destructive turmoil.

Due to the factors cited above, Bolivia will probably remain in turmoil and development efforts in all fields will suffer from Bolivia's chronic instability and consequent lack of effective attention to the tasks of growth. Economic deterioration and the inability of the government to cope with the problem is likely to result in continuing civil disturbances by students, teachers, labor, and others. Small, more or less organized groups of subversive insurgents will take advantage of the instability to further their ends with violence of gradually increasing brutality. Various power factions may vie for the throne and the temptation to apply harsh, repressive measures to repress disorder and enforce government policies may appear.

C. The Bolivian Police Forces

The Bolivian Police are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. They consist of three elements. The first is the National Guard with an actual strength of about 3,700 men. It is a uniformed force responsible for maintaining law and order throughout the nation. It has a professional officer corps, a good training facility, oriented particularly for officer training, and enjoys a fair public image. It lacks equipment, particularly arms, riot control equipment, vehicles and communications. Its capabilities are poor in patrolling, rapid reaction to major crimes, investigative capabilities, records and identification. It has a fairly good record of non-lethal control of civil disturbance and its leadership is good by Latin American standards.

The second element is the National Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DNIC), with a strength of about 1,300. It is responsible for the investigation of crimes nation-wide, and also conducts political investigations. It lacks training and equipment. It has the nucleus of a promising criminalistics facility and records and identification system, both of which need considerable improvement. It enjoys fairly good leadership.

The third element is the Traffic Police, comprising about 1,300 men. It has a fair capability for traffic control within the city of La Paz, although its jurisdiction is nation-wide. It lacks police arms, training for non-officer personnel, communications, mobility. It possesses only a limited preliminary and practically no follow-up investigative capability.

Some additional weaknesses in all of the forces are low pay and fringe benefits, lack of systematic inspection, a sharp social class division between officer and non-officer personnel and a high rate of resignations by non-officer personnel. There is some evidence of corruption, particularly among narcotic investigators who fall prey to the bribes offered to them by cocaine traffickers.

D. Present Status of the Public Safety Program

The Public Safety program was discontinued in the late fall of 1969 due to lack of interest shown by the then Minister of Government. His attitude was reflected throughout all levels of the Bolivian police forces, and finally caused the last remaining USAID Public Safety advisor to leave the country in November 1969.

In January 1970, the Minister of Government somewhat reversed his feelings toward the program and asked the U.S. Ambassador for equipment in face of the growing threat of urban terrorism. He said at the time that technical assistance was unacceptable, since any advisors would be ineffective because of their presumed CIA association in Bolivia's public opinion. This position was later reversed.

The GOB formal commodity request, submitted at that time, consisted of arms and ammunition, radios, vehicles, and spare parts, amounting to some \$800,000 including shipping costs. USAID decided at this point to request a TDY by a Public Safety technician from OPS in order to negotiate a more realistic program. The technician arrived in February 1970. Upon his recommendation and the Mission's concurrence, it was decided to re-initiate a modest Public Safety program. Two Public Safety advisors arrived in July 1970.

III. STRATEGY

A. General

It is the purpose of this project to assist the three Bolivian police agencies in performing their present duties in a more effective and professional manner. To this end, grant financing will be made available for technical assistance, ~~training~~ and some commodity support.

B. Operational

The operational strategy of this project is designed to meet the targets outlined in Section IV below. The strategy is to be implemented by the following means:

1. Technical Assistance. Two full-time advisors, already in Bolivia, supported by TDY specialists in telecommunications, auto maintenance, criminal investigations and narcotics investigations.
2. Training. Under the general supervision of a Public Safety advisor, courses will be offered at the Bolivian National Police Academy in patrol tactics, preliminary criminal investigation techniques, human and public relations, crime control techniques, and firearms instruction.

Mobile training teams will be dispatched to teach the above courses at police posts throughout the country.

Qualified police officers will be selected for more advanced training at the International Police Academy in Washington, D.C., primarily in instructional methods, criminal and narcotics investigations, traffic control, and anti-subversive techniques.

3. Commodities. It is planned to supply the Bolivian police forces with vehicles equipped with radio equipment for patrol purposes, some revolvers, laboratory equipment designed for crime detection and basic automotive and repair equipment. In addition, it is planned to provide some furniture, especially files, for a centralized records and identification division, servicing the entire country.

IV. PLANNED TARGETS

Upon the completion of this project, presently anticipated for the end of 1973, it is expected that the following results will have been achieved:

A. Radio Patrolling

1. Operation of thirty radio-equipped patrol vehicles in La Paz, as well as thirty more in the other major urban centers in Bolivia.
2. Operation of thirty bicycle and foot patrol teams in La Paz, equipped with walkie-talkies.
3. Capacity of the police to respond within 5 minutes to any emergency within the La Paz city limits.
4. Peak hour patrol coverage in La Paz by sixty police (National and Traffic), with the capability of responding to an average of 60 necessary services during each 24-hour period.
5. Maintenance facility for third echelon maintenance servicing about 15 vehicles per week.

B. Armaments - La Paz

1. Capacity to field up to 500 riot-control trained and equipped personnel within 2 hours.
2. Sufficient tear gas and other riot control expendables to sustain operations in six areas of Bolivia over a two-week period.
3. Qualification in "minimum competence" in revolver, shotgun and carbine firing for 90 percent of all police personnel.

C. Investigations

1. Establish an average clearance (crimes solved) rate of up to 30 percent with a clearance rate of up to 30 percent for homicide cases.

2. Establish laboratory facilities to conduct examinations and preservation of trace evidence; blood typing; discovery of latent fingerprints; analysis of questioned documents; preparation of casts and molds; ballistics and firearms identification; as well as chemical and drug analysis.

D. Training

1. Expansion of the present training facilities at the National Police Academy and other localities to provide all non-commissioned officers with at least 240 hours of instruction in patrol operations, criminal investigation (preliminary), human and public relations, riot control techniques, and use of firearms.
2. Train all detectives in preliminary investigations and selected personnel in advanced investigations.
3. Provide 2-month training courses for specially selected narcotics investigators.

E. Telecommunications

1. Establish about 30 radio base stations to cover urban areas in the interior, presently lacking those facilities.
2. Establishment of a maintenance facility for repairing and maintaining of all police radio equipment throughout the country by means of periodic inspection trips.

V. COURSE OF ACTION

A. Radio Patrolling

During the period covered by this PROP, commodities in the form of vehicles, radios, as well as spare parts will be brought to Bolivia. This phase of the project will be implemented under the general supervision of the Public Safety and Training Advisors, with the assistance of TDY specialists in vehicle maintenance and communications. Six police officers will receive specialized training in patrolling techniques and two will receive advance training in auto maintenance.

Bolivia's contribution will consist primarily of the provision of facilities for an operations and dispatch center as well as an auto maintenance facility.

B. Armaments

This portion of the project will be carried out under the general supervision of the Public Safety and Training Advisors. Police weapons and riot control equipment will be provided. Two participants will be selected for an advanced firearms specialization course at IPA.

Bolivia's contribution will consist of the necessary firing ranges, as well as cartridge reloading equipment.

C. Investigations

This phase of the project will be carried out under the general supervision of the Public Safety and Training Advisors, with TDY assistance by an investigations specialist. During the course of this project it is planned to give specialized criminal investigations training to four participants and training in narcotics detection and control to two additional participants.

The Bolivian contribution to this portion of the project will consist of the provision of a locale for the installation of the laboratory facilities.

D. Telecommunications

It is planned to supply commodities in the form of radio spare parts and test equipment. In addition to the general supervision by the Public Safety Advisor, the TDY specialist referred to in point A above will assist with the implementation of this phase of the project. Three participants will receive specialized training in communications.

The Bolivian contribution will be the provision of a radio repair and maintenance facility.

Drafted: PS:ARuiz/PR:P.Kolr

Clearance: D:ENCoy
POL:PShankle

PS/ru