

A. I. D. EVALUATION SUMMARY PART I

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| <p>A. USAID/SANAA YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC ES # 87-03</p> | <p>B. WAS EVALUATION SCHEDULED IN CURRENT FY ANNUAL EVALUATION PLAN? <u>Yes</u></p> | <p>C. EVALUATION TIMING <u>Interim</u></p> |
|---|---|---|

D. ACTIVITY OR ACTIVITIES EVALUATED

| Project # | Project/Program Title | First PROAG (FY) | PACD (mo/yr) | Planned LOP (\$000) | Amount Obligated to Date(\$000) |
|------------|--|---------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 279-0052.4 | Agriculture Development Support: Horticulture Improvement and Training Subproject | 83 | 12/89 | 14,385 | 11,752 |

E. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

| Action(s) Required | Name of Officer | Date Action To Be Completed |
|---|---|--------------------------------|
| 1. Incorporate evaluation recommendations into HITS workplan FY88 to the extent feasible. | USAID/AGR JRifenbark ADSP, CP/P, AAskari | 10/13/87 |
| 2. Initiate dialogue with MAF and ARA on research agenda and station transfer. | USAID/AGR JSwanson JRifenbark | 9/30/87 |
| 3. Audit ADSP, including HITS. | USAID/CONF, HJanshed USAID/AGR, JSwanson | 2/28/88 |
| 4. Obtain YARG agreement in principle to move toward privatization of MAF nursery operations through use of P.L. 480 generations. | USAID/DIR, KSherper | 7/15/87 |
| 5. Assess MAF nursery operations and develop proposal for upgrading selective facilities prior to privatization. | ADSP, CP/P GBaltzer | 12/15/87 |
| 6. Work with MAF and/or other donor organizations to develop specific proposal to CPO for release of P.L. 480 funds. | USAID/AGR, JRifenbark | 3/31/88 |

F. DATE OF MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE REVIEW OF EVALUATION 10/15/87

G. APPROVALS OF EVALUATION SUMMARY AND ACTION DECISION:

Date

Agriculture Development Officer, John Swanson

John B. Swanson

2/9/88

Project Manager, John Rifembark

John T. Rifembark

2/10/88

Evaluation Officer, Mansour Shamiri

M. Shamiri

2/13/88

Mission Director, Kenneth Sherper

Kenneth H. Sherper

2/13/88

Representative of Borrower/Grantee: USAID considers the signatures of Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries senior staff on the HITS FY 88 Workplan to reflect MAF acceptance of this evaluation.

H. EVALUATION ABSTRACT

Project Objective: Institutionalize within MAF an expanded and improved capacity to support increased fruit production through extension, plant protection, and delivery of disease - free plant stock for improved fruit varieties. HITS has a promising extension effort which should be augmented and could benefit from improved coordination with other extension efforts. HITS has provided useful assistance in integrated pest management, publications, extension and coordination with other plant protection efforts. These efforts should be strengthened. Plant protection efforts suffered from either a lack of sound technical advice, or failure to heed available advice. The delivery of plant stock has been the MAF's highest priority. HITS' and USAID's bowing to MAF pressures for increased production has hampered HITS' ability to conduct a fully effective applied research effort. Deciduous horticulture research is underway, but behind schedule. Tropical horticulture research was doubly hampered by the advent of citrus canker, which required a major re-orientation of the al-Jarouba effort. HITS should terminate its own research program and support the YARG Agricultural Research Authority agenda for deciduous and tropical horticulture at the HITS stations. Managerial problems which hampered project implementation were the result of deficiencies in the Title XII mechanism in general, and specifically the Mission's inability to control project management through the CID and Cal Poly/Pomona contractual arrangement. The Mission needs to review these arrangements, take corrective action and work more closely with the MAF itself. Current market conditions favor private sector production, however some MAF policies, e.g., MAF production role and tree prices, preclude private sector entry into the tree production market. USAID should undertake policy dialogue with the MAF on private sector involvement in nursery development.

I. EVALUATION COSTS

1. Evaluation Team

| Name | Affiliation | Contract Number OR TDY person days | Contract Cost OR TDY cost (US\$) | Source of Funds |
|------------------------------|----------------|--|--|--------------------|
| Chris Hermann | AID/PPC/CDIE | 30 | 104,350 | Project |
| Richmond Allen | LABAT-ANDERSON | | | |
| Bruce Kratka | " | | | |
| Andrew Duncan | " | | | |
| Fouad Basiouny | " | | | |
| Mon. Abdel-Rahman | " | | | |
| Writing & Editorial Staff | " | | | |
| Total Contract | | 178 | | |

2. Mission/Office Professional
Staff Person Days (estimate) 20

3. Borrower/Grantee Professional
Staff Person Days (estimate) 60

J. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. MISSION: USAID/SANAA, ALJ.
2. PURPOSE OF ACTIVITY EVALUATED: To institutionalize within the MAF an expanded and improved capacity to support increased fruit production through extension, plant protection and delivery of disease-free plant stock for improved varieties to the fruit-growing subsector.
3. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION/METHODOLOGY USED: To provide interim assessment of progress and performance toward project goals and purpose. Initial field work and data gathering by means of document reviews and interviews with 97 individuals were followed by preparation of a report in the U.S. which compared actual to intended project accomplishments and provided recommendations for future actions.
4. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: A. Extension: HITS successful extension activities have largely been the work of one individual encompassing production of TV tapes, establishment of plot and "lead farmer" programs, training courses at the stations and visits to farmers. TV tapes are relevant and effective, but inadequate, as are the other activities mentioned. The Extension Specialist is over extended. HITS does not keep records on farmers receiving advice and there is no follow up for assessing impact. Because the MAF's National Extension Service is largely ineffective, it is unlikely that HITS cooperation with the NES would have improved HITS extension performance. HITS needs to augment its extension capability by increasing HITS' extension

staff, expanding outreach activities and media efforts. Despite NES inadequacies, HITS efforts could benefit from closer coordination with other donor extension activities, e.g., IBRD regional authorities, particularly on development of extension packages for farmers.

B. Plant Protection: Transfer of plant protection technology to the MAF is progressing, but many of the counterparts working in plant protection do not have the required training or experience to take advantage of the technical expertise of HITS advisors. Nevertheless, the MAF Plant Protection Directorate is very supportive of these efforts. HITS' plant protection activities have contributed to fruit tree survival and improved fruit production through the identification of diseases and insects and recommendations for their proper control. An Integrated Pest Management (IPM) program is being introduced which should benefit the farmers through reduced costs and less indiscriminate use of pesticides. Identification of harmful insects and diseases and development of control measures would be more pertinent if there were pesticides and fungicides available. HITS has not always followed sound plant protection practices itself, with unfortunate results at al-Irra. The advice of HITS' plant protection staff should be heeded despite possible conflict with MAF production objectives.

C. Research: The MAF placed heavy pressure on USAID to use HITS stations as a major source of plant stock, an understandable pressure given MAF desire to promote a major and rapid expansion of horticultural production, and the YARG's shortage of foreign exchange for plant stock imports. USAID's acceptance of MAF production objectives diverted project resources away from varietal testing, for which both deciduous and tropical horticulture research is behind schedule and unlikely to fully achieve project objectives. Moreover, lack of fertilizer and pesticides has made it impossible for HITS to conduct trials on their usage or to recommend applications to farmers. Current MAF staffing and budget constraints imply limited sustainability for HITS stations by the MAF after subproject completion. An alternative to turning HITS stations over to the MAF is needed.

D. Management: Cal Poly/Pomona (CP/P) has been unable to recruit and field well-qualified staff with necessary technical skills and development experience in a timely manner due, in part, to inexperience in Yemen and limited horticulture faculty. Beginning in 1985, management improvements were made in the direction of project staff and resources, commodity procurement procedures, communication between the field and CP/P, and the working relationship between HITS and USAID. Nevertheless, much remains to be done to restore HITS credibility with the MAF. AID's reliance on the Title XII collaborative assistance mode hampered project implementation by reducing AID's ability to control a number of important factors. Specifically, the Mission's contractual arrangement with CID interfered with the Mission's direct input into project management and made it difficult to pressure CP/P for improvements in performance.

E. Economics: Fruit growing remains highly profitable, but small and medium scale farmers are constrained by shortages of credit, water and ag inputs. Given these constraints, small-medium scale farm production will increase slowly, at best, but yield per hectare could decline. Production increases have lagged behind PP projections, but the payoff from additional plantings should be seen starting in 1987. The MAF is unlikely to be able to sustain the project at the present scale, thus alternative arrangements are needed. MAF policies on tree prices and MAF involvement in nursery production preclude private sector entry into the tree production market. At a minimum tree prices need to be increased to put MAF

nurseries on a self-sustaining basis. F. Institutionalization/Training: Short-term training has been effective, but too little. Long-term training is behind schedule due largely to language problems. Most training has been technical, with little focus on necessary management skills. The lack of MAF counterparts and frequent staff turnover have impeded institutionalization of an expanded capacity within the MAF to support increased fruit production.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: Extension: HITS expand its extension activities and coordinate its extension efforts with those of other donors. Plant Protection: HITS augment existing plant protection efforts through coordination with other donors and additional attention to improving the quarantine and inspection system. Research: HITS return to supporting applied research through coordination with and support of the Agricultural Research Authority's agenda at HITS stations. HITS develop an integrated agricultural program that addresses basic production constraints. Management: Mission move to a direct contract with CP/P or another contractor. Audit the project. Mission take more active role in HITS and ADSP management. Economics: USAID undertake policy dialogue with the MAF in private sector involvement in nursery development. Stations should be turned over at end of project to an alternative organization. Institutionalization: Focus remaining training on short-term Arabic language training, including ARA staff. General: AID should continue to assist Yemen in horticulture, but should consider alternative strategies to the HITS TA approach. If AID's overall agricultural program addressed major constraints, such as water, credit and inputs, fruit production would be favorably affected, e.g., horticulture activities could be included in a future on farm water management project.

6. LESSONS LEARNED: A common understanding of major project objectives at the outset among AID, the host country, and the contractor is essential to project success. Modification of project objectives should consider the economic, financial and institutional effects. Unrealistic assumptions of HC capabilities result in training programs and TA poorly attuned to local conditions. Institution building projects should include management training and provide on-the-job training in small increments. The Mission must retain control over basic design, implementation and evaluation functions to ensure that it can meet its management responsibilities. Collaborative agreements should be based on a thorough assessment of the capabilities of the implementing institution.

Date this summary prepared: 10/14/87

K. ATTACHMENTS:

Horticulture Improvement & Training Subproject Evaluation.

L. COMMENTS BY MISSION, AID/W OFFICE AND BORROWER/GRANTEE

Mission Comments: Extension: The Mission has accepted the evaluation recommendations. The FY 88 HITS workplan includes 10 more demonstration field plots (total 25 nationwide) and specific coordination program with the Northern Highlands Rural Development Project. Plant Protection: Mission has accepted recommendations. FY 88 HITS workplan includes transfer of HITS plant protection facilities to the Yemeni Plant Protection Center, development of a long-range plan for an entomology/plant pathology diagnostic lab, and

additional academic training for plant protection. Research: Recommendations accepted. An expanded varietal testing effort, to be coordinated with the MAF and ARA, will be conducted on HITS stations and demonstration plots. USAID is addressing basic production constraints more broadly as part of new strategic emphases in agriculture and through design of new Irrigated Farm Practices Subproject. Management: USAID concurs with thrust of recommendations, however with short time remaining before project PACD Mission does not believe major change in contracting mode would be cost effective. Better communications among the Mission, CID, and CP/P, as well as more active USAID role in ADSP management, appear to be improving management situation. Audit is underway. Economic: USAID concurs in thrust of recommendations with MAF on transfer of responsibility for HITS stations. Although original discussions focused on transfer of both stations to ARA, it now appears likely that the al-Jarouba station will be transferred operationally to the Tihama Development Authority with close collaboration with ARA on the research program. The future of al-Irra is still unclear. USAID is engaged in extensive negotiations with the MAF on the need to bring the private sector into nursery operations. The Mission notes that the MAF has subsequently raised seedling prices by 85% which is providing an incentive for private sector entry. Approximately 10 private sector firms have expressed interest in nursery operations. HITS conducted a review of all 22 MAF nurseries and identified 5-10 to be upgraded using P.L. 480 generations. The objective is that once upgraded, these nurseries can be privatized, while the MAF phases out operations at the remaining sites. Institutionalization: USAID concurs in recommendations regarding increased emphasis on short-term training, but believes that completion of the planned academic-training levels is also necessary to provide a Yemeni base over the longer-term for the fruit industry. General: USAID concurs. Re-oriented Mission emphases on production and productivity in agriculture, coupled with an effort to address major constraints including institutional and manpower inadequacies as well as inputs, imply different types of agricultural programs over the longer term.